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IN ARGENTINA**

Y 4. IN 8/16:L 34

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ARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS**

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

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TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA/AMIA BOMBING IN ARGENTINA

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m. in room 2170, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The committee will come to order. I am pleased to call to order today's full committee hearing on international terrorism in Latin America, in particular Argentina and the bombing of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires last year to be our focus for today.

In 1993, we in our Nation had the World Trade Center bombing in New York, as we all know, along with the terrorist plots to kill government officials, destroy commuter tunnels, attack United States Government and U.N. facilities in the city of New York. Terrorism has come to our shores and, as we will hear today, to that of our neighbors to the south as well.

It is an unsafe world out there, particularly in the Americas where we have become the newest targets of these cowardly terrorists. We have a vested and common interest in this vital subject because it does threaten all of us, threatens our way of life and our fundamental freedoms. We must all battle this scourge together here in the Americas.

The Summit of the Americas in Miami last year had this to say on terrorism in the region and I quote, "We condemn terrorism in all its forms and we will, using all legal means, combat terrorist acts anywhere in the Americas with unity and vigor."

Surely, the deadly 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina, which we will be examining today, requires that same unity and vigor in the struggle against international terrorism. The Jewish Community Center bombing in Buenos Aires has been linked to Hizballah, the terrorist organization based in Lebanon, which has close links to Iran. An earlier deadly bombing at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 also has been linked to Hizballah.

The AMIA blast killed some 86 innocent civilians, wounded 300 more, and has again greatly shaken the feeling of security of the largest Jewish community in Argentina and in the Americas. We look forward to hearing from the coordinator for counterterrorism in the Office of the Secretary of State, and from the head of FBI's National Security Division.

Representatives of both organizations recently attended a regional conference in Argentina on international terrorism. We will also be hearing today from concerned members of the Jewish community, both in Buenos Aires, and here in our own Nation. We will also have a written submission from the ATF which was at the bomb site, and has been very helpful to us in preparing for this hearing.

During the August recess, committee staff traveled to Buenos Aires and met with many of the interested parties, including family members, the prosecuting judge and senior government officials on the AMIA attack. I am pleased to report that the committee received the full cooperation, and support of the Argentine government in learning details about the bombing, and the status of the inquiry to date.

We must continue to keep our regional effort strong and steady in this struggle against terrorism, especially when the subject isn't on the nightly news or in the morning headlines. Vigilance and perseverance is especially needed when the clues and leads die down, and the public and media attention shifts away from the horror of the smoke-filled ruins of the latest terrorist atrocity.

Hopefully, today's hearings will help to strengthen the resolve of all of those who are dedicated to seeing that justice is done in the AMIA bombing, the earlier Israeli Embassy attack and other such terrorist attacks, wherever and whenever they occur. Not to do so serves merely to reward these cowardly terrorists and encourages more of the same, whether abroad or here at home.

Before beginning testimony, I would like to ask if any of our colleagues have any opening statements. I must hold all our witnesses, incidentally, to 5 minutes and we will include all of their written testimony in the record if they wish to submit full testimony since we must be out of the room by 1 p.m. for a European parliamentary session, which has to be set up here for an afternoon session.

Mr. Lantos.

MR. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, before I make some substantive comments about this issue, I want to pay personal tribute to you for your leadership over the years in the fight against terrorism. You have been the strong voice of the United States in our semiannual meetings with the European Parliament advocating a coordinated effort to fight international terrorism and I want publicly to express my admiration for that effort.

It is ironic, Mr. Chairman, that you have called this meeting for today and, of course, I salute you for holding this hearing, because in a few minutes, some of us will be going down to the White House for the signing ceremony in this next stage of the Middle East peace process. We were there a year ago and while some progress has been made, there have been enormous setbacks, and almost every single one of them is related to acts of terrorism. So if we needed any reminder, we have the reminder of the event at the White House today that major international developments like the attempt to craft a more stable Middle East are at the mercy of ruthless, reckless international terrorists, and that is our subject at this hearing.

I think it is important to begin by suggesting that the problem is universal, whether it is Oklahoma City, the World Trade Center in New York, institutions in Paris or Lyons, or Argentina, we are dealing with an international conspiracy. We are dealing with an international conspiracy at the heart of which, of course, are some rogue countries, reckless dictatorial police states, like Iran and Libya, and much of the action, of course, is carried out by fundamental Islamic terrorists. I think it is important to differentiate between the highly respected religion of Islam and virtually all of its adherents who are peace-loving citizens everywhere and the terrorist element in that community.

Mr. Chairman, when last year I served as Chairman of the International Security Subcommittee and I convened a hearing on this subject in the wake of this outrage, I had high hopes that the government of Argentina would leave no stone unturned to deal effectively with this situation.

I particularly hoped so because an earlier bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina was pursued by a very lackadaisical, incompetent and confused attempt to uncover the source, the culprits and the criminals. But I must admit I am filled with disappointment and amazement that for the second time we have been treated to an incompetent, uncoordinated, confused attempt by Argentine authorities to get to the bottom of this.

The failure to pursue more effectively this matter creates a serious blot on the international reputation of these great Latin American nations. I earnestly hope that our own law enforcement agencies will provide far greater assistance to Argentine authorities than what has happened thus far. It is an outrage that after 90 people were killed, innocent civilians killed in a bombing, there is really no effective result that this investigation can point to, despite hearings in the Congress of the United States, despite the global publicity.

I understand it is not an easy issue. The tri-border area covering Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay provides an extremely attractive hiding place for fundamental Islamic terrorists. The extreme Islamic segments of the populations in these countries provide haven and cover. But it is simply inexcusable that so little progress has been made by the authorities in Argentina in dealing with this international outrage.

I hope that this hearing will provide yet an additional stimulus for the government of Argentina at the highest level to put this issue high on its agenda where it clearly has not been. The Congress of the United States will not walk away from this issue. I hope to God we won't have to have a hearing a year from now reporting equally dismal, pathetic, impotent results, and I am calling on the government of Argentina not to redouble its efforts because that would not be sufficient, but to at long last deal with this issue with the seriousness the problem merits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank Mr. Lantos for his very poignant statement. I am going to ask Mrs. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her opening statement and I am going to ask her to take over the chair. I have just been called to another hearing. I will try to return as quickly as possible. Mrs. Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your decision to hold a full committee hearing on terrorism in Latin America with a special focus on the bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association is greatly appreciated. The bombing of the Jewish Center in Buenos Aires was carried out by a truck bomb using fertilizer and diesel fuel. The similarity between the bombing in Buenos Aires and the bombing in Oklahoma City serves as a useful, if tragic, reminder of the international threat posed by terrorist activities. Our own experience with our fellow Americans in Oklahoma City creates a human bond between us and the people of Argentina, especially with the families of the 86 people who were killed and the 300 who were injured in the Buenos Aires bombing.

That the bombing took place at this location and that the Argentinean people of the Jewish faith were specifically targeted is especially troubling. The spread of violence targeted at the Jewish community in Argentina also demonstrates the international dimension of this issue and demonstrates the need to take effective action to end the terrorism.

The Jewish people in every country have become a target of terrorists from radical groups in the Middle East and we need to join forces to protect them from these terrorists. Every citizen of every society has a right to live in peace and freedom free from the threat of these terrorists.

As our esteemed chairman, Mr. Gilman, cited in his opening statement at the most recent Summit of the Americas, there were national leaders gathered there committing themselves to using all legal means to combat terrorism anywhere in the Americas and to pursue the struggle against terrorism with unity and vigor. This summit was held in my own city of Miami and we were especially interested in this aspect of the summit.

We cannot allow this terrorism to spread into our communities and we must count on international cooperation to safeguard all of our citizens. We must reach out across national borders thousands of miles from our shores to join hands with others around the world to ensure the survival of democracy and the safety of all of our citizens. The last 15 years has seen a dramatic period of political renewal in Latin America with the growth of democratically elected governments.

In 1979, only two out of the 10 South American and one out of the six Central American countries had democratically elected governments. But by 1990, democratic rule had been established nearly everywhere in Latin America outside of the cruel Castro dictatorship. And while the long-term prognosis for democracy in Latin America is bright, terrorism remains a threatening cloud on our horizon.

The cruel and senseless attack which took place in Argentina on July 18th of last year, as well as the World Trade Center bombing that the Chairman referred to, shows us how the entire hemisphere is at risk from state-sponsored terrorism.

To protect the people of this country and to preserve the hard-won democracy of our neighbors, we must learn to cooperate in our mutual defense. We must learn to share information on potential terrorist threats so as to prevent the bombers from reaching their targets. When these madmen succeed in shedding innocent blood,

we must be united in our determination to punish them and those who provide the means for murderers to indulge their blood lust. The United States must not only cooperate, but we must lead in the pursuit of justice.

Last May I co-signed a letter to the President of Argentina expressing deep concern about the lack of progress in investigating, not only this bombing, but the bomb attack of the Israeli Embassy in 1992, which resulted in 29 deaths. As that letter stated, "Failure to pursue these terrorists and their international sponsor energetically will only encourage future acts of terrorism."

As our esteemed colleague, Mr. Lantos, pointed out, the progress of those investigations has been lackluster. These hearings will shed light on the international nature of the terrorist threat that plagues all nations, as well as the cost in human lives. This diminishes all of us. It is our hope that it will serve to spur all the governments involved to redouble their efforts to bring these killers to justice and put an end to terrorism in the Americas.

I would like to recognize Mr. Wynn for any opening statement that he might have.

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, but in the interest of time, I will waive my opening statement at this point.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

We are pleased to introduce the first panel, the Honorable Phillip Wilcox, coordinator of counterterrorism with the Department of State and Mr. Robert Bryant, director of National Security Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thank you gentlemen.

Mr. WILCOX. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP WILCOX, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. WILCOX. Madam Chairman, thank you and thanks to the members of the committee for holding this hearing to educate the Americans on a vital subject and for your continuing interest in the resolution of the savage crime of the bombing of AMIA headquarters in Argentina and of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 in Buenos Aires. These two heinous acts have underscored to us that we in this hemisphere are also vulnerable to acts of international terrorism.

I would like to outline this threat in Latin America and how the United States and the other nations of the hemisphere are responding. The Lebanese-based Iran-backed Hizballah, which has waged a campaign of terror in the Middle East and is still implacably opposed to Israel, the peace process and the West, is now the major international terrorist threat in Latin America. The suicide car bombing of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 was Hizballah's first terrorist act in South America. Hizballah denied responsibility, but Islamic Jihad, a clandestine terrorist wing of Hizballah, claimed to have carried out the bombing and authenticated its claim with a videotape of the embassy before the bombing, a Hizballah trademark.

The Argentine Government has not brought charges for the 1994 bombing, but the evidence points to Hizballah. The attack was a virtual duplicate of the 1992 bombing against the Israeli Embassy.

The terrorist bombing of a commuter aircraft in Panama in July 1994, just 1 day after the AMIA disaster, is still unsolved, but circumstantial evidence there also points to culpability of the Hizballah.

Hizballah operations in Latin America, which include narcotics smuggling as well as terrorism, are supported in the triborder area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Hizballah is known to have cells in Colombia and Venezuela as well. Hizballah's chief patron is Iran, and it is likely that Iran was aware of and provided support to the two Buenos Aires bombings.

We believe that Hizballah has not committed terrorist acts abroad without Iranian consent, and that Hizballah cells in Latin America are aided and supported and guided by intelligence officers in Iranian embassies in the region. Other terrorist threats in Latin America also threaten our interest. Through August 1995, there were 53 acts of international terrorism in that region of which 35 were directed against United States interests.

A great many of these were kidnappings. There has been an epidemic of kidnappings in Colombia. One thousand four hundred such acts were reported in 1994, a 35 percent increase over 1993. At least four United States citizens are currently being held for ransom in Colombia, and two American hostages were killed on July 19th during a shoot-out between terrorists and government forces.

In Peru, the notorious Shining Path Group, which has killed thousands over the years, has been in decline since the arrest of its leader, Guzman, in 1992. But Sendero still remains a deadly force.

Let me turn now to the AMIA investigation. Argentine leaders have emphasized to us their strong determination to solve this crime and the attack on the Israeli Embassy, and to prevent any recurrence. The Argentine leadership has also promoted greater counterterrorism cooperation in the aftermath of these two crimes in the Western Hemisphere and this has been a precedent.

Large suicide bombings of this kind are very difficult to investigate and solve. Regrettably, there has been no breakthrough in the AMIA case and I believe there are various reasons for this. Argentina's laws and investigative and judicial systems do not provide all the tools and resources that are needed to deal aggressively with such major crimes. Improved machinery is needed.

In the past, Argentina's borders have been porous and the government has lacked an adequate mechanism for monitoring immigration. Recently, President Menem's government has adopted a new program to tighten border controls. In the past, Argentina's investigative security and intelligence arms have suffered from inadequate interagency coordination.

Recently, steps have been taken to provide greater cohesion and we believe this holds promise. Argentina also needs to improve the effectiveness of officials working in the lower levels of all of their law enforcement and security agencies.

Let me say a word about United States assistance to the AMIA inquiry. We have assisted the government's investigation in various ways because of our profound sympathy for the victims of the AMIA bombing and because of the close relations between the

United States and Argentina. Within 48 hours of the AMIA bombing, an international response team managed by the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, with three explosive experts from Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, flew to Buenos Aires. Three FBI agents also participated and provided technical assistance.

The members of the IRT team and the FBI were instrumental in this—in assisting in the early phase of the investigation. They helped in recovering parts of the engine of the van which was believed to be carrying the suicide bomber and the explosives. They helped monitor the cleanup efforts and they provided technical advice to the Argentine authorities on evidence collection and preservation.

The United States has also provided extensive antiterrorism training assistance to the Argentine government through the Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program, which this committee has given generous support. The ATA program has trained over 280 Argentine officials in 17 different courses.

We are proposing to provide 10 more such courses in the next 2 years that will train 222 additional officials. We have invested so far about \$4.8 million in this training and we think it is very important. The Buenos Aires bombings have created a new sense of urgency in the Southern Hemisphere and they have galvanized the states of that region into greater counterterrorism cooperation.

As in other parts of the world, you cannot fight terrorism successfully without cooperation among the law enforcement, intelligence and diplomatic elements of friendly governments. Spreading this approach of cooperation to our own hemisphere has been one of this administration's most important goals and I am pleased to report that this is working.

The United States, Argentina and other like-minded States led an initiative at the December summit in Miami for an OAS-backed hemispheric conference on terrorism. This will be held in Lima in the spring, and we will be playing an active role in that process.

In another move to strengthen cooperation, Argentina held a conference of the five states of the southern cone in Buenos Aires in August and they produced agreement to cooperate in very practical ways against terrorism. The United States and Canada also took part.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador, if you could summarize.

Mr. WILCOX. This was a heinous act of terrorism, as was the 1992 bombing. It was aimed at the very heart of the Jewish community in Argentina and it destroyed a priceless historical archive. Out of this tragedy has come greater awareness of the international threat to Argentina in the Southern Hemisphere, and we are doing everything we can to work with the government of Argentina and the other nations of the region to stop this threat. We pledge to continue this, so that there will be no recurrence of such acts in our hemisphere. Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilcox appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador, I apologize. We are trying to stick to the 5-minute rule because of all the witnesses that we have following this esteemed panel.

Thank you, Mr. Bryant.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT BRYANT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID R. WILLIAMS, FBI SPECIAL AGENT, FBI LABORATORY, EXPLOSIVES UNIT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you. On behalf of the FBI, it is a pleasure to appear before you this morning to discuss international terrorism in Latin America. Since the tragic bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, the FBI, the intelligence community and the law enforcement community have learned that we are confronted with a new and growing form of international terrorism. This brand of terrorism is loosely structured and comprised of many groups and persons who use violence to promote their personal, political, social or economic beliefs.

Currently, there are terrorist infrastructures in Latin America, the United States and Canada which actively support terrorist operations worldwide. In July of last year, two suspected transnational terrorist assaults occurred, namely the bombing of the Israeli Argentine Mutual Association, AMIA building in Buenos Aires, and the downing of a Panamanian commuter airline. As the attack on the commuter airline took the lives of three U.S. citizens, our citizens and our country became victims of potentially a broader terrorist campaign.

Today I would like to update you on the assistance the FBI provided during these investigations in one other major attack perpetrated by suspected transnational terrorists in Latin America. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 coupled with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 authorized the FBI investigative jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is taken hostage, murdered or assaulted by terrorists.

Naturally, FBI investigators abroad require coordination with the Department of State and permission of the host country. Since these acts have become law, we have responded to 207 incidents, 105 which are in South America. In Colombia, the National Liberation Army, ELN and the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia, FARC, regularly target U.S. interests.

Many Latin American Marxist terrorist groups, including Peru's Shining Path, have greatly diminished. However, new terrorist challenges are emerging in the region in the form of international radical terrorism. On March 17th, 1992, a car bomb destroyed the three-story Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and although 29 people were killed, more than 240 others sustained injuries.

The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this cowardly attack. The Islamic Jihad is a cover name used by Hizballah for the Party of God. The Hizballah is a radical extremist group based in Lebanon and backed by Iran that is dedicated to installing a theocracy in Lebanon modeled on the government of Iran. Moreover, the Hizballah is pursuing the removal of all nonIslamic influences from the Middle East.

In April 1983, 16 deaths occurred in the Hizballah bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Likewise, 241 fatalities were caused by a Hizballah suicide truck bomb attack on the U.S. Marine bar-

racks in Beirut in October 1983. Support for the 1992 terrorist bombing in Buenos Aires may have emanated from the triborder area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which has a large Middle Eastern population and a Hizballah presence.

The borders in this area are porous and are ideal for conducting some illegal fundraising enterprise, including narcotics smuggling and gun running. In Buenos Aires, the terrorist car bombing on July 18, 1994 destroyed the AMIA building in which over 90 people perished and more than 200 were injured.

A previously unknown group called the Islamic Command claimed responsibility for this brutal attack. The U.S. Government responded to this bombing less than 48 hours after the blast by offering and thereafter deploying 13 experts in explosive investigations from the international response team, the Department of State.

The international response team represented various government agencies including security experts from the FBI, the State Department diplomatic security and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. I have with me today FBI Special Agent, David Williams, from our Explosives Unit, who was in Argentina and conducted part of the investigation.

For the record, no arrests have been reported regarding the 1992 terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy, and with respect to the 1994 AMIA bombing, there have been two arrests of people involved in the sale of the vehicle. Outside of Colon City, Panama, an ALAS commuter plane destined for Panama City exploded in flight and crashed on July 19, 1994.

Among the 21 victims were three United States citizens and 12 Jewish persons. In Lebanon, a group using the name Ansar Allah, or Partisans of God, expressed support for the AMIA bombing and suggested participation in the bombing of the ALAS commuter plane.

The FBI is conducting a parallel investigation with the Panamanian Government due to the homicides of three United States citizens. No arrests have been made in this ongoing investigation. Due to the high visibility of the trials of Sheik Rahman and Ramzi Ahmad Yousef, both allegedly involved in terrorist acts in New York City, the counterterrorism community must remain on guard against potential sympathetic acts of reprisal by elements of the international radical terrorists.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Bryant, if you could summarize and we will be putting your full statement in the record.

Mr. BRYANT. I think the main point I want to make is that international terrorism requires an international response and it takes training, it takes skilled law enforcement and it takes a lot of co-operation to attack these elements that would destroy our society. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bryant appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. I thank the gentlemen for their excellent testimony.

Ambassador, in your statement, you had said, "the government of Argentina has not yet charged any suspect for the 1994 AMIA bombing, but the evidence points to Hizballah as the bomber." The operation was a virtual duplicate of the 1992 suicide bombing in

which a vehicle carrying massive explosive charges detonated in front of the Israeli Embassy. Ansar Allah, a clandestine subgroup of Hizballah, issued a statement expressing support for the bombing of the AMIA center after it happened. You later state Hizballah's chief patron is Iran and it is likely that Iran was aware of and provided support to the two Buenos Aires bombings. We believe that Hizballah has not committed terrorist acts abroad without Iranian consent.

So you would say that in your expert opinion that that very same terrorist group was responsible for both bombings in Argentina just a few years apart?

Mr. WILCOX. That is correct, Madam Chairman.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And the chief patron of this group, as we pointed out, is Iran.

In your expert testimony, you believe that that would not happen without the expressed consent of Iran, and certainly the State Department's annual Patterns Report on international terrorism in part describes Hizballah as, "closely allied with and often directed by Iran."

Therefore, if Hizballah is behind both of these terrorist attacks in Argentina, certainly Iran seems to be behind as to who is ultimately responsible for the AMIA bombings and Secretary Christopher at one point blamed Iran for this bombing. You would say that that is true.

Mr. WILCOX. Yes. Iran is the chief state sponsor of international terrorism and, as you know, the President has tightened U.S. sanctions against Iran recently with a full embargo against any U.S. trade with Iran. We hope other nations will respond similarly to tighten sanctions and bring home to Iran that this kind of behavior is beyond the pale of civilized conduct.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Would you say that Iran has been using its embassies and its diplomats to promote and support international terrorism around the globe, including possibly this attack, the latest attack in Argentina? What is the use of their embassies, their operation with the diplomats? How is that tied into the bombings?

Mr. WILCOX. There is significant evidence, Madam Chairman, of a classified nature, that the Iranian government does use its embassies around the world in support of terrorist activities.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Bryant, could I ask the FBI's opinion about Iran using the diplomatic channels or embassies around the globe to support their terrorist attacks?

Mr. BRYANT. I would concur with Ambassador Wilcox that the Nation of Iran has on occasion used their diplomatic services for these purposes, but we are getting into a classified area.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. When you say on occasion, sir, what occasions have those been?

Mr. BRYANT. I think I would rather answer that in a closed session.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ambassador, did you want to add something?

Mr. WILCOX. May I add, Madam Chairman, that one of the elements of the declaration issued in Buenos Aires 3 weeks ago at the subregional conference on counterterrorism was for nations in the hemisphere to take action against nations which abuse diplomatic

privilege by using accredited diplomats for terrorism and other illegal activities.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Following up on that, what are we urging our allies and our friends around the globe to do about this gross abuse of the diplomatic immunity by Iran? Are we urging them to use the persona non grata tool and expel these diplomats in order to attempt to break the links these diplomats have in the local community, as well as in order to expose Iran's outrageous role in promoting international terrorism around the world? What are we doing to help our allies help us in this?

Mr. WILCOX. We are sharing information in our possession with other States about Iranian diplomats, Iranian terrorist leaders who are posing as diplomats, so that nations will refuse to give them accreditation, or if they are already accredited, to expel them. We have had some success in that respect, but we have not always succeeded.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I would like to ask the gentleman a question submitted by Congresswoman Meyers to you, if you could respond and we would include that in the record. She asks two questions: What, if any, progress has been made in the investigation of the March 17th, 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires? And what connections, if any, are there between that attack on this most recent atrocity? Realizing that you might have covered that already, but if you could summarize it for the Congresswoman.

Mr. WILCOX. I regret that little progress has been made toward solving the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy. We do believe that the Hizballah was responsible for both acts because of the carbon copy similarity of the two acts: the same modus operandi, the same suicide technique, the same kind of vehicular attack, which are Hizballah signatures. Yet unfortunately, there has not been progress in identifying the individuals who are responsible and bringing charges against them.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. I would just add that the bombing had the earmarks of a Hizballah-type bombing. It has not been solved. But from what we see in similarities to other bombings, we would classify it as a Hizballah bombing.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Before I recognize Mr. Lantos for questions, I would like to recognize Mrs. McKinney and Mr. Menendez for any opening statements that they might like to put in the record.

Mrs. McKinney.

Mrs. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. I don't have an opening statement.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam Chair, I reserve my comments for my question period.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. Lantos, you are recognized for questions.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I want to commend you for your steadfast leadership on this very important issue. I also want to extend in advance my apologies to other witnesses because I am due at the White House in a few minutes. I will study your testimony carefully. I also would like to submit a

formal request through you to the Chairman that we have a closed session on this issue because Mr. Bryant properly indicated that on issues that we cannot discuss in open session and I think a closed session would be useful.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I will be passing that on to the Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. I just have a couple of questions at this point. President Clinton, in February, issued an Executive Order under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act freezing the assets of various individuals and organizations involved in terrorist activities, Ambassador Wilcox.

The Executive Order also prohibited "charitable contributions to those organizations and individuals." I want to ask you about the implementation of that Executive Order. One, how much money or other assets have been frozen, Ambassador Wilcox?

Mr. WILCOX. Congressman Lantos, the Department of Treasury is the agency which is implementing that.

Mr. LANTOS. I am fully aware of that.

Mr. WILCOX. I am informed by the Department of Treasury that approximately \$350,000 has been seized in illegal transfers or frozen in bank accounts, which were destined for the designated terrorist organizations. Perhaps my colleague, Mr. Bryant, might have some further information on that.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. The IEEPA provisions which were promoted in February are being looked at and are being reviewed. The actual seizures have been low, but some of those issues would be a matter of ongoing discussions.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, I find the answer very disappointing. There was an excellent public relations release about freezing the assets of terrorist organizations or individuals who promote terrorism, and yet in reality only a pittance has been seized. I will call, Madam Chairman, for a hearing on this whole issue.

We cannot deal with international terrorism merely via press releases. Action is called for. And \$350,000, in the domain of an activity involving billions and huge amounts within the United States, is very disappointing. Has anyone been caught violating the charitable contribution ban, Ambassador Wilcox?

Mr. WILCOX. Yes. The money that was seized, Congressman Lantos, was seized after the Executive Order was issued and those transfers, I believe, were made in violation of the executive order.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, that doesn't answer my question. Has anyone been caught violating the charitable contribution ban and what has happened to the individuals who have been so charged?

Mr. WILCOX. There have been no criminal prosecutions, sir, but there are a series of extensive investigations going on.

Mr. LANTOS. Since February.

Mr. BRYANT. Yes.

Mr. LANTOS. And not a single individual has been charged.

Mr. BRYANT. No.

Mr. LANTOS. I have difficulty visualizing this is a very effective pursuit of an order. But under these circumstances, my judgment would be that the practical impact of the executive order has been minimal, to be generous, and I am wondering if either of you would

care to comment on how you evaluate the practical impact of a Presidential Executive Order dealing with assets of terrorists and dealing with the issue of camouflaging contributions to terrorist organizations as charitable contributions.

Mr. WILCOX. Mr. Congressman, while I cannot quantify it and the number would never be known, I believe that a good many potential contributions to these 12 designated organizations have been deterred by the Executive Order and that it has had a substantial effect. I have no way of confirming that, but I believe it is the case, given the major publicity we have given to this and the penalties that attach to violating the Executive Order.

Mr. LANTOS. But you would agree, would you not, that since in every other criminal instance, in every other criminal activity, we are looking at the records to see whether, in fact, deterrence is operative, I would find it surprising that that would not be the case here.

Had we caught 10 people or 210 people and had we charged them with violating this Executive Order, I could see that acting as a deterrent. But what you are reporting is zero arrests, zero prosecutions, \$350,000 frozen, which to me could indicate that this is not a very serious issue or it is so viewed because, obviously—I have difficulty visualizing that in the entire United States not a single individual would have been charged with violating this Executive Order, that everybody suddenly decided to behave impeccably, which is what you are saying.

Mr. WILCOX. Sir, some weeks ago U.S. authorities detained Mr. Musa Abu Marzook, who is believed to be a senior official in HAMAS, one of the proscribed terrorist organizations. Subsequently the government of Israel has informed us that it proposes to request extradition of Mr. Marzook. There is reason to believe that Mr. Marzook has been extensively involved in HAMAS activities in this country and perhaps in fundraising activities also, so that a positive act, I believe, in fulfillment of the intention of the Executive Order, although it happened in a different context.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. And we will pass on your concerns and your requests to the Chairman.

Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Actually this question is for—well, I will ask both witnesses. I reviewed some of the testimony, one by the father of one of the victims and another by the national president of B'nai B'rith and there seems to be a strong, very strong suggestion that there is a problem in the security forces and in the courts that are impeding the investigation.

Reference was made to perhaps past links to the military dictatorship. But at any rate, I would like to get your evaluation of whether there is an internal problem that is impeding the investigation.

Mr. WILCOX. Congressman Wynn, I mentioned in my oral testimony and I have recorded in my statement that there are structural deficiencies in the Argentine law enforcement and judicial apparatus which have impeded this investigation. I have no information of any kind that there are senior government officials in Ar-

gentina who are impeding this investigation for any reason whatsoever.

Mr. WYNN. If I could just interject. Then you are saying by structural deficiencies, a lack of resources, training, problems such as this, rather than any deliberate obstacles being placed. Is that a fair assessment of your position?

Mr. WILCOX. To the extent of my knowledge, sir, that is the position of the U.S. Government. We have no reason to believe that there is any official hindrance and effort to stall or not to aggressively pursue this investigation.

The leadership of the government of Argentina is determined to do this. There are problems of efficiency, training and competence at some of the lower levels in the judicial and law enforcement apparatus, and I believe that this has probably been an impediment to the investigation.

Mr. WYNN. OK, and I appreciate you saying that. In that context, do you believe the current level of U.S. assistance to Argentina is adequate to assist them in dealing with these structural deficiencies should there be a significant increase in U.S. assistance or should there be an increase in multilateral assistance?

Mr. WILCOX. We view Argentina as an important country. The terrorist threat there continues. We have committed a disproportionate share of antiterrorism assistance program funds to training Argentine officials, and will continue to look for other ways to do that, as the opportunities arise and as the Argentine authorities request such assistance. We also have done considerable training in the area of aviation security to prevent Argentina's airports from being used by terrorists.

Mr. WYNN. Could you put a dollar figure on the additional funds that might be needed?

Mr. WILCOX. Sir, I can't do that, but I would pledge to you that if a need is identified, if the government of Argentina requests assistance and to the extent that our budget allows us, we will give this high priority.

Mr. WYNN. One final question and it may be more appropriate for a closed session. My thinking along these lines is that increased intelligence would be appropriate. Do you feel that the intelligence-gathering apparatus we have in place is appropriate or what changes ought to be made to give us a better ability to respond to this great threat in the region?

Mr. WILCOX. I can only say in this open session that the collection analysis of intelligence on the terrorist threats around the world and in Latin America is a very high priority for this administration and the U.S. intelligence community, and we are devoting far more resources to that area than we were some years ago. It is a critical area. It deserves that priority, and it is getting it.

Mr. WYNN. Thank you. Madam Chairman, I don't have any further questions, but I hear an underlying suggestion that perhaps we should have some sort of closed session. We can go into this in more detail.

I am particularly concerned in light of discovery of a billion dollars in apparently unused funds in one of the intelligence agencies that might be appropriately used for purposes of antiterrorism.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I share your concern and we will be glad to pass that along to the Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. For the record, I would like to ask Mr. Bryant about the triggering device that set off the van in front of the AMIA building. Could you give us a little information as to what was the triggering device that set the bomb off?

Mr. BRYANT. Madam Chairman, I have David Williams from our laboratory who was in Argentina and I would like to have him respond to your questions.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. If you could state your name and your title.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. It is David R. Williams and I am a supervisory special agent in the Explosives Unit Laboratory.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Would you say that this is an accurate artistic rendition of the path of the van and where it might have gone off?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. That is consistent with what I saw.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could tell us about the triggering device.

Mr. WILLIAMS. In this particular case, there was very little recovered. Due to the size of the device that had exploded, basically all that was recovered and identified was the vehicle itself. As far as the explosives residues, minimal was found in that particular case. By the damage and damage consistent with the surrounding area, it was consistent with a fertilizer-based explosive device. No triggering mechanism was found.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You say no triggering mechanism was found?

Mr. WILLIAMS. No triggering mechanism was found. There were some unusual characteristics found with the device. One suggests that on the site of the truck bomb opposite the explosive there was a tamping effect perhaps with sand or dirt which may directionalize the explosive force toward its target. Additionally, in doing a crime scene analysis, I had found portions of an individual which highly suggests that he was or she was the bomber.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What was the type of explosive and triggering device at the bombing of the Israeli Embassy? There was some testimony about the similarities.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Again, as far as I am aware, the FBI had no participation in the Israeli Embassy crime scene, and as far as I can recall, there was no explosive residue found in that case.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. Let me first say to the families of the victims of this both despicable and cowardly act, who will be testifying here and others, to Dr. Czyzewski and Mr. Goldman, I would like to express my condolences, as I am sure all of the members of the committee do. As someone who sits on the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of this committee, I have dedicated a lot of my time to the Western Hemisphere.

As my focus within the purview of this committee, I am particularly concerned about what I hear today and what I have been viewing for some time in the context of terrorism in this hemisphere. We have as a hemisphere, short of civil strife in various

countries in Central and Latin America, been relatively untouched per se by terrorism as known to other parts of the world, but obviously that has changed both for the United States, as it has for the hemisphere. I want to respectfully echo the comments of Mr. Lantos and with all due respect to the Ambassador, who is doing a fine job with what he has, that I am concerned that we are not dedicating sufficient resources and bringing this issue to the level of attention that we should.

I understand the present focus we have on dwindling resources, but I don't know how often we have to wait sometimes before we get a wake-up call and we have had some pretty significant ones already. I am from New Jersey and right across the river from us we had some pretty significant wake-up calls. I don't think we need to wait much longer. Sometimes when we deal with these issues, we deal with them in abstractness. That is why I think it is so moving to see this album of remembrance that has been handed out to the members. Even if they don't read Spanish, I would urge them to look through the album that is named *Sus Nombres Y Sus Rostros* because it brings to life for us the people who were lost in this despicable act.

Mr. Bryant, I would like to ask you, based on your testimony, a couple of questions. On page 5 you say that Hizballah has a presence in what you describe as a triborder area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. What type of presence?

Mr. BRYANT. This area is an area which has a population of numerous Arab and Muslim people and part of that presence are cells of Hizballah members.

Mr. MENENDEZ. While understanding sensitivity to some of this discussion and I am sure you will veer away from that which cannot be publicly stated, do we have a sense, I mean, what I am concerned about as I read the testimony is that it is couched in terms on page 9. You say that transnational Middle Eastern extremists may, which is somewhat speculative to me, be using Latin America as a support base and platform for operations. Have we had the ability or opportunity to quantify this?

Are we ongoing in our efforts—maybe this is a combination question for both you and the Ambassador. Are we in the process of quantifying this threat? Are we in the process of dedicating resources, not just in Argentina, but in the greater context of the threat to the hemisphere?

Mr. WILCOX. I can say on behalf of the Department of State and the counterterrorism community that this is a very high priority. Our diplomatic reporting and our intelligence-gathering apparatus have this right at the top of their agendas in Latin America. We are amassing a body of information. It is difficult to quantify.

In any case this information by its nature is not always completely verifiable. It is usually not in the public domain. But we think there is a growing body of information that the threat exists, is widespread, and it needs to be addressed, and that is what we are doing.

It is not just a question of putting more resources into the activity. I think we probably have an adequate level of resources going into gathering information now, sir. If we find a gap, that we need more, we will certainly invest in those resources.

Mr. MENENDEZ. What efforts concretely? You say you are gathering information. What efforts are we taking in cooperation with the countries which find themselves as the base for these platform operations?

Mr. WILCOX. Well, I think your question is very perceptive because ultimately the main burden lies on those countries to gather information, to perfect their intelligence security, law enforcement activities, and share information among themselves. We share information with them. They are increasingly sharing information among themselves, and that is critical so the terrorists cannot come from other continents into Latin America and travel freely across borders.

I believe there is a heightened understanding of the need for this now, whereas there has not been in the past. I have realized that Latin American governments understand this need, based on my two visits to Argentina during the last year and in contacts with many other Latin American governments.

Mr. MENENDEZ. What, in reference to their action has been done, while I recognize they have a significant role to play, I would not want to simply wait. We have seen that our borders are extremely porous and I would not simply want to wait for just merely their efforts. What has been their response and what is our response, in cooperation with them in trying to make both for the United States and for the hemisphere a more secure place from terrorism?

Mr. WILCOX. A year ago I visited Brazil with an FBI, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense team to discuss this problem, and the opportunity for more cooperation between the United States and Brazil. A member of my staff and other members of the counterterrorism community made a similar visit a month ago. They found a greatly increased awareness in Brazil of the need for cooperation in this area.

Similarly, we found this in Argentina, in Uruguay, in Paraguay, and in Venezuela as well. The activities that they are undertaking are of the sensitive nature, but basically they include improved intelligence gathering, tightened border control, better training of personnel, sharing of information with their neighbors, the use of extradition treaties, and the drafting of better antiterrorism criminal laws in the domestic realm. All those things are going on.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Let me close, Madam Chairlady, by joining my colleagues. I would have much more pointed questions, but recognizing that the response to those questions would be that they are of a privileged nature, a confidential nature, I would urge the Chairman through you, Madam Chairlady, to hold a private session for this committee because I have many pointed questions and with all due respect, I won't pursue them today, but I do want answers to them.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Menendez. We will pass on those concerns to the Chairman. We have been joined by Congressman Chris Smith, the Chairman of the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee, who has been looking at this problem of international terrorism as well. Thank you, Mr. Smith. And also by Marty Martinez, our colleague from California. Mr. Martinez, do you have an opening statement? Mr. Smith did not, so I will yield to you.

Mr. MARTINEZ. No, I do not, Madam Chair.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Do you have any questions for the witness?

Mr. MARTINEZ. Not at this time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We thank Mr. Bryant. We thank the Ambassador for being here with us. I would like to call our second group of panelists starting with Dr. Louis Czyzewski, the father of one of the AMIA victims in Buenos Aires. If we could start from my right, your left.

Dr. Rubin Beraja, President of the Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associations; Rabbi Avi Weiss, National President of the Coalition for Jewish Concerns; Mr. Tommy P. Baer, President of B'nai B'rith; Mr. Jacob Kovadloff, consultant for Latin American affairs, the American Jewish Committee; Mr. Israel Singer, Secretary General, World Jewish Council; Mr. Barry I. Mehler, National Commissioner, Anti-Defamation League; Mr. Goldman, father of a victim of the 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will begin with the first panelist, Mr. Czyzewski, and we are going to confine the statements to 5 minutes. We will be timing you. The interpreter for Mr. Czyzewski will be Alfredo Neuburger. Mr. Czyzewski is the Argentinean accountant whose firm is the external auditor of AMIA. His daughter was killed when she had gone to AMIA to assist his staff at work. Both he and his wife were present at the attack but fortunately neither were injured. Our sympathies and our condolences to your entire family. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LUIS CZYZEWSKI, FATHER OF AMIA BOMBING VICTIM, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA THROUGH INTERPRETER, ALFREDO NEUBURGER

Mr. CZYZEWSKI. I am the father of a victim who died in the attack against the AMIA headquarters. On behalf of myself and my wife who is with me, I am representing the relatives and friends of this brutal massacre of victims. I would like to share with you our views about the issues included in this meeting's agenda.

As we all know, Argentina suffered two attacks against Jewish targets in less than 3 years. After the second terrorist attack, one should carefully analyze whether the things that were not done or done in the wrong manner after the attack to the embassy could have caused the murders' action to be repeated.

We firmly assert that the mistakes and omissions that followed the first terrorist attack, which was practically not investigated, acted as an immense and attractive invitation to persuade terrorists to repeat their action.

Based on the theory that it was an attack by international terrorism against a foreign target located in Argentina, as is the case of an embassy, the responsibility was moved beyond our borders without seriously investigating the local connection which is not doubted by anyone today.

On the other hand, we do not see that the first attack alerted the Argentine Government about the security and control measures that should have been implemented in borders and airports and we believe that they were not applied as seriously and strongly as required.

This and the analysis of the events following the AMIA building make us believe that Argentina in particular and Latin America in general is a region in which international terrorism can operate with extreme ease. It is a generally accepted principle that a thief decides to steal where it is easier and that is applicable in this case, with the aggravating circumstance that in the two attacks perpetrated in Argentina, terrorists necessarily had support from internal partners who have not been discovered to date.

In our opinion, the following is therefore imperative: A, the countries of the region should coordinate efforts and elaborate joint strategies to prevent terrorist acts not only in Latin America, but in the continent as a whole.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Doctor, if I could just impose myself for a second because of the translation taking longer, obviously then we will afford you a few extra minutes. Thank you. I apologize.

Mr. CZYZEWSKI. [Through the interpreter.] With regard to the present status of judicial investigations aimed at clarifying the attack, we perceive that in 14 months, a lot was investigated with notoriously poor results. From our standpoint, where rational and emotional aspects are necessarily intermingled, we firmly hold that we will only be appeased when we get to know who perpetrated the attack, who the local accomplices were and when their full names are known and jail is the place where the rest of their lives would be spent.

It does not suffice to hear that investigators are working hard and doing everything possible. That is not their merit. It is their duty. We do not perceive the coordination of objectives that should exist between the judicial power and the agencies in charge of analyzing each of the pieces of evidence that appear every day and then nothing becomes of it. This makes the feeling of impunity grow day after day. As to this very day, the facts do not show the opposite.

We are certain that the Argentine Government positively knows that clarifying the attack to the AMIA will notoriously strengthen its international standing and it is therefore necessary for investigators to do so without fear, doubt or conditioning. However, it is something we have not perceived to date.

Madam Chairlady, allow me to spend one more minute analyzing the topic that gathers us here from a different perspective, the human aspect. For people and countries, attacks mean the analysis of facts and actions originating in them.

For the relatives, the tragedy in itself is the most important fact and I would like to convey a testimony on this aspect. Since July 18, 1994, myself, my wife, my other children cannot enjoy the smile, a kiss, and the model of life that our daughter, Paola, set for us every day and which were beautiful.

Since then we cannot see her grow up, become an adult, a good person as every parent wishes of her children. For the other 85 families, some Jewish, some Catholic, Argentine, Bolivians and other nationalities, the situation is the same with respect to their dead relative.

I hope that you who are also sons and daughters, parents, brothers, and sisters understand that the pain of this uselessly shed blood should force all persons and countries to reflect and do what-

ever is possible so that soon we can say with all our might never again.

Finally, I would like to thank the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives of the United States for this invitation I received through Mr. Benjamin Gilman to offer my testimony, which I hope is useful. Thank you very much.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Doctor, for a very moving testimony and all of the committee members have received this very touching and poignant book of memories of all of the victims of that tragic bombing and, indeed, on page 17 is a lovely biography and photo of your beautiful daughter. She lives today still in our memory and in our hearts.

Mr. CZYZEWSKI. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Next is Dr. Ruben Beraja, the President of DAIA, the Delegation of Jewish Organizations of Argentina since 1991. An attorney by profession. Dr. Beraja is the head of Mio Bank and is also the founding president of Bar Lan University in Buenos Aires. Thank you, doctor.

STATEMENT OF RUBEN BERAJA, PRESIDENT, DELEGATION OF ARGENTINE JEWISH ASSOCIATIONS, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

Mr. BERAJA. Thank you, Miss Chairman. I will provide and will make the presentation on behalf of the DAIA, the Delegation of Jewish Organizations in Argentina. We have been working to obtain so that the wound opened by the international terrorism does not remain unpunished and that they also receive the adequate political sanction.

Regarding the first aspect, as plaintiffs together with AMIA, we have had an active participation in the activities covered by the Argentina justice, witnessing the difficulties that prevented more concrete results in the ongoing investigation.

We criticize the fact that these difficulties were increased in the past by the lack of coordination between the security and intelligence agencies in charge of the investigation and because of the delay in obtaining the active participation of the police of the Buenos Aires Province, which only took place a few months ago.

In spite of the above-mentioned, we believe that the court has gathered elements that have allowed us to come to the following conclusions:

A. To commit the terrorist actions, the perpetrators acquired qualified support from diplomatic personnel or individuals linked to the Embassy of Iran in Buenos Aires.

B. Under diplomatic immunity or in close relationship to those who have it, as indicated previously, cells of activists identified with Islamic fundamentalism have been established in Argentina, one of which can be reasonably presumed has played an important role in the logistical support previous to the attack.

C. Groups involved in the illegal dealing of cars, where some members of the police of the province of Buenos Aires are involved, have been included as accessories, providing support to the terrorists.

D. The elements obtained in the investigation allow us to conclude that Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, constitutes a center of support of fundamental terrorism in Latin America.

I wish to emphasize that as we assert responsibilities to Hizballah and Islamic fundamentalism we would continue for a citizen investigation of the local connection and the anti-Semitic extreme right in Argentina.

The logical analysis of the information already gathered allows us to indicate that those mentioned in points A, B, C and D constitute an interconnected web, interacting between them and reciprocally necessary to consummate a massacre as the one we have suffered.

This logical conclusion which has been conducted with great effort in the court file is enriched by the investigations carried out within the sphere of the Secretary of State Intelligence, which is under the authority of the President, and they have arrived to the following conclusions:

The attack of July 18, 1994, and also the attack against the Embassy of Israel in 1992 was the responsibility of individuals belonging to the Hizballah organization. This was admitted recently by the head of intelligence, by the Argentinean Foreign Minister, and also by the Ambassador of Argentina to the United States.

There are serious indications of suspicious activity of individuals linked to the Iranian embassy as well as growing activism within elements of Islamic fundamentalism in Buenos Aires and other parts of Argentina. The accumulation of conclusions reached by the court and those obtained by the law enforcement and intelligence agencies allow us to state that from a political point of view there exist enough elements and background so that the government of Argentina can adopt policy decisions that imply stronger sanctions against Hizballah and all those states that through complacency, direct or indirect involvement, allow that organization to plan and execute acts of aggression in other countries killing innocent civilians, instilling fear in the society, creating havoc and enormous material damage, all of which affects and endangers the basic pillars of democratic life.

We, therefore, wish to propose, first, that democratic nations and particularly the United States intensify specific actions to neutralize terrorists groups in their own bases.

Two, governments denounce without fear or ambiguous speculation those regimes that support, protect and promote terrorism and narcoterrorism.

Three, that the resolution against terrorism passed unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the last year be implemented with complete measures. Words are not enough.

Our organization, an NGO, recognized for 60 years of the struggle against Nazism, discrimination and for the preservation of human rights, will continue its efforts within the rule of law so that Argentina becomes one of the leading countries willing to face terrorism and its allies and neutralize sinister threats that endanger democracy. Between them we see also the allies with the narcoterrorism.

We trust that this presentation contributes to strengthen the decision of the U.S. Congress to maintain as a priority item of its

agenda the terrorist threat, and that the rule of law will assure protecting the basic right of a human being, the right to live without fear.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beraja appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much.

Rabbi Avi Weiss, the president of the Coalition for Jewish Concerns, ACJC, a grass roots Jewish activist group with more than 5,000 members nationwide. He is also a senior Rabbi of the Hebrew Institute of Riverdale, New York, a congregation serving 500 member families. He is assistant associate professor of Jewish studies at Stern College, Yeshiva University in New York where he has been a member of the Judaic faculty for 25 years. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF RABBI AVI WEISS, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, COALITION FOR JEWISH CONCERNS

Rabbi WEISS. Thank you very much. I am grateful to Congressman Ben Gilman for convening these hearings and to my own representative, Eliot Engel, for his great concern and to your presence. I dedicate this testimony to the victims and their families in the prayer that justice will be done. Their images will forever be etched in my memory.

It is my contention that the government of Argentina is stonewalling the investigation and that a cover-up is taking place. This conclusion is not speculation.

One, it is part of the public record that President Carlos Menem has reincorporated many people with ultra right-wing or neo-Nazi views or criminals with murderous pasts into the State intelligence service, people with notorious pasts like Guerrieri appointed by Menem as an advisor to SIDE. One cannot expect individuals with these kinds of views to carry out a serious investigation into either of the two bombings, yet these were the individuals tasked to carry out the investigation.

Two, the Argentine immigration services are compromised. For example, in January 1990, a Syrian terrorist Monzar Al Kassar, linked to the Pan Am 103 bombing and Achille Lauro hijacking, was permitted to enter into Argentina by Martinez, appointed by Menem as director of immigration. Kassar's name surfaced in connection with the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy.

Three, specific questions concerning the AMIA and the Israeli embassy bombing point to a government cover-up.

A. Carlos Telleldin, the only person detained, swore before three Federal judges that Vergez, rumored to be an ex-member of SIDE, offered him \$1 million and his freedom in exchange for falsely implicating one of the Lebanese citizens held in Paraguay as the person to whom Telleldin sold the van. In *La Nacion* a few days ago it was reported that Telleldin met secretly with one of the judges and told her that he had in fact sold the cars whose parts were found in the AMIA rubble to two Buenos Aires police officers.

B. The policemen on duty at AMIA and the Israeli Embassy when the attack occurred were not present. Despite this fact, Captain Fernandez, chief of the seventh precinct which controls special guard duty in front of AMIA, was promoted.

C. Several Buenos Aires residents told me that members of the Painted Faces, a notorious neo-Nazi group, were given life sen-

tences and were seen on the streets of Buenos Aires just a few weeks before AMIA was bombed. Who was responsible for their early release?

D. Subsequent to the Israeli Embassy attack, the United States warned Argentina of possible further terrorism. Despite this fact, security remained lax, the borders remained unguarded. Jewish buildings were not protected by cement barriers. Why has no one been held accountable?

E. Respected Argentina *La Nacion* reporter, Adrian Ventura, told me he saw two men wearing blue uniforms digging craters in front of the Israeli Embassy on the Saturday night after it was bombed to give the appearance that a car bomb exploded. It was clear from the very beginning of the AMIA investigation that the police had a preferred lead, specifically Iran, and they weren't going to give serious consideration to other leads which would embarrass the Menem government. This kind of attack could not have taken place without being abetted from the inside.

For the investigation to be thorough, nothing can be left unchecked. If neo-Nazis were involved, if they worked together with Arab extremists, as the Mufti allied himself with Hitler 50 years ago, it must be revealed. If it was Syria, which the United States and even Israel seeks to protect from these charges to bring it into the peace process, that, too, must be reported. Political expediency has no place in the terrorist investigation. The chips must fall where they may.

The argument that AMIA bombing was Hizballah because it looked like the Israeli Embassy bombing does not wash. That is what they said after Oklahoma City, it was Middle Eastern because it looked like the Twin Towers and in the end it proved to be right-wing.

Four, serious questions have been raised about Federal Judge Galeano's independence, who is charged with the investigation.

A. Until April 1995, this judge was handling hundreds of other cases. While he has received no new cases since April, those cases are still pending before him.

B. There are many in Argentina who believe that the judiciary does not act without approval from high government officials, including Menem.

There is one other matter that deserves the committee's attention. Buenos Aires is a city that awaits the next terrorist attack. This is because security in Argentina is abysmal. The Buenos Aires International Airport is among the least secure in the world. They don't check your passports by computer. It is common knowledge the borders are open.

To test security, I traveled together with my colleagues by boat from Buenos Aires to Uruguay and back this past July. My worst fears were borne out. Both in Buenos Aires and Uruguay, our baggage, which included a tape recorder, commonly used by terrorists to hide sophisticated bombs, was not checked. Upon our return to Argentina, I walked directly from the ship to the streets of Buenos Aires not even passing through passport control.

To prevent further terrorist attack in Argentina, it is critical that this committee recommend that the U.S. Government conduct a full onsite investigation into Argentine security. If Argentine air-

ports are found to be unsafe, the U.S. Government should prohibit American carriers from landing there. And if the Argentine borders are found to be porous, U.S. citizens should be warned not to travel to Argentina.

There is great fear in Buenos Aires, fear that terrorism will strike again, fear that Argentina may once again slip back into a dictatorship, fear on the part of many Argentine Jewish leaders to speak out.

There is a fire burning in Argentina. Buenos Aires is ripe for another terrorist attack unless America pressures the Argentine government to take serious measures and demands that security be dramatically tightened.

Just days after the horrific World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings terrorists were apprehended. It is almost 4 years since the Israeli Embassy was blown up and more than 1 year since the AMIA attack, but there are no serious suspects and there will be no serious suspects without the U.S. Government stepping in to demand a real and full investigation.

I am only sorry that there isn't an official Argentine person here from its government to respond to what is this great concern about a government cover-up.

[The prepared statement of Rabbi Weiss appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Rabbi. We will be looking forward to the question-and-answer period.

Next, we will hear from Mr. Tommy Baer. Mr. Baer is the highly talented President of B'nai B'rith, receiving this distinction from delegates hailing from six continents. He is currently a partner in the Richmond-based law firm of Canfield, Moore, Shapiro, Cease and Baer. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF TOMMY P. BAER, PRESIDENT, B'NAI B'RITH

Mr. BAER. Madam Chairman, members of the committee, on behalf of B'nai B'rith members in this country and Argentina and in 54 other countries around the world, I welcome this opportunity to testify on a subject that has troubled and preoccupied us for more than a year, particularly since our members in Argentina have become deeply frustrated in the failure to find the culprits in the dastardly 1994 AMIA bombing that was so costly in the lives of both Jews and nonJews.

I am of two minds on the subject of the bombings and the inability to bring those responsible to justice. At the one level, while we can commend the efforts of those judges and investigators who are making a sincere effort to search out the truth and ensure that justice prevails, at another level, I have a knowing sense that obstacles are being thrown up by an old guard in the security forces and in the courts, an old guard whose instincts were finely honed under a military dictatorship and which has often been associated with and protective of Nazis and neo-Nazis.

Because of the suicidal nature of the bombings, suspicion pointed to Iranian sponsorship of Islamic extremists whose aim worldwide is to defeat the Middle East peace process and to create hostility between Jews and their neighbors. However, no clear evidence sufficient for a trial has yet appeared.

Wheels of justice turn slowly in Latin America. Argentina, better developed than most countries in the region, is still impeded by a lack of skills to deal with the ferocity of terrorism that has struck it. From the standpoint of courts, laws and their security forces and their apparatus, the country is ill-prepared to solve its terrorism problem. As a result, Argentina has begun to receive technical aid from the United States and other countries. What is more, judges from Argentina have also come to the United States to learn how our courts deal with terrorism cases.

At the onset of the two bombings, enormous technical assistance came from the United States, Israel and other countries. Indeed, offers of cooperation from the U.S. Government agents to Argentina are to be commended. More pressing is the reality that Argentina is facing a threat from its open borders, particularly with Paraguay and Brazil. The triborder region is thriving and unchecked, legal and illegal elicit business, particularly in Ciudad del Este invites strong suspicion of heavy drug traffic and drug running, contraband, arms and terrorists.

Aside from the fact that customs officials can be bought off for a closed trunk passage from Paraguay to Argentina, the documents collected from travelers are discarded after 3 months. There is no computerization of who crosses borders. In other words, no record of wanted or suspicious individuals is possible.

The investigation of the AMIA bombing has been the focus of one judge. Upon learning that the judge was not free from his other court duties and worked on the AMIA case only part-time, B'nai B'rith questioned government officials and other judges on this point. To its credit, the government released Judge Galeano from all duties but the AMIA case.

However, at the outset, there were numerous runs down blind alleys. By August, 1995, the judge had four people under detention. The lead suspect is Carlos Telleldin, the son of a sadistic torturer close to the junta who had been a high-ranking security official from Cordoba. Telleldin espouses neo-Nazi views and is being held for involvement in the falsifying of documents of the vehicle used in the bombing.

We learned only yesterday that the two policemen to whom he sold the vehicle were dismissed. However, knowledgeable people see Telleldin as only a small cog in the wheel while other operatives, especially those who planned this terrorist act, are still at large.

Many terrorism analysts believe that Iranian Embassies are the spark for activating dormant Hizballah and other Muslim extremist cells. They point to the enormous presence of the Iranian Embassy officials in countries like Argentina where there is a small Iranian community and limited trade with Iran.

Insofar as diplomatic representation is concern, senior government officials in both Chile and Uruguay told me several months ago that they are aware of the potential problems posed by overrepresentation at the Iranian embassies in their countries. Although there is a general belief among many that the government will not prove a case against anyone who directed the attack, some experts expect substantial breaks in the case.

It was thought that one occurred most recently. In early August, seven suspects from Paraguay, six Lebanese and one Brazilian, were extradited to Buenos Aires for their connection with a German-born Nazi arms seller. They were released in less than 48 hours for a lack of evidence.

It seemed odd to us. After all, it was Argentina which pressed for the extradition of the seven from Paraguay in the first place. Why were the suspects released so quickly? Would not there have existed probable cause precedent to a request for extradition?

Indeed, some countries in the region are aiming to comply with higher standards. There is now a democratically elected government in Paraguay and clearly the old way of doing business is changing. It is significant that the extradition which involved appeals by two of the terrorist suspects went through a process of adjudication. Despite insider claims of money changing hands at one court level, the judges abided by judicial rules.

In memory of those who died and as tribute to those who worked in rescue and research, B'nai B'rith and other Jewish organizations have pressed for a concerted effort to find those responsible. B'nai B'rith Argentina sponsored a 2-day conference on July 3 and 4, 1995, to analyze the wide-reaching effects of terrorism.

With the participation of government officials, rabbis and priests, educators and psychologists, the conference attracted more than 1,000 attendees. This historic conference, the first of its kind ever held in Argentina, raised the profile of the terrorist threat and proposed concrete steps to confront it.

B'nai B'rith has also maintained contact with a broad range of United States and Argentine officials to, among other things, gather information in order to properly assess the terrorist threat, to commend the positive steps that are taken to improve the situation, including greater cooperation among appropriate agencies and countries of the hemisphere and to continue pressing the Argentine government.

From the viewpoint of worldwide jury, it is important not to forget the innocent victims who lost their lives in the two Argentine bombings and in the Panamanian air bombing as well where members of B'nai B'rith, including an officer of that district, lost their lives. B'nai B'rith pledges to continue its global role in working to expose the threat posed by international terrorism and not just to Jewish communities and to Israel, but to democracy everywhere, including our own.

Madam Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baer appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. We have been joined by Mr. Chabot. I don't know if you have any opening statement.

Mr. CHABOT. No. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

We will next hear from Mr. Jacob Kovadloff, who is the consultant for Latin American Affairs and Spanish mass media at the American Jewish Committee. He is the former Director of the American Jewish Committee's South American Office in Buenos Aires and is responsible for public relations with Spanish-speaking

communities and media throughout the United States. Thank you. Mr. Kovadloff.

STATEMENT OF JACOB KOVADLOFF, CONSULTANT FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Mr. KOVADLOFF. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. On behalf of the American Jewish Committee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify today on a matter of grave importance to our country and to the security and well-being of democratic societies to the Western Hemisphere and across the globe.

By way of introduction, I must tell you that my connection to the issue before the committee today is profoundly personal. I am Argentine and Jewish. For the last eight of its more than 30 years of existence, I was the Director of the American Jewish Committee South American Office headquartered in Buenos Aires. In June 1977, I left my country due to escalating threats to my family, my staff and, of course, myself.

Allow me to say that many of us have not forgotten and still harbor deep gratitude to the chairman of this committee, Congressman Gilman, for the help to the victims of the barbaric struggle in my home country. We have not forgotten either his formal condemnation of the anti-Semitic acts which were a common occurrence in Argentina during that terrible time.

Indeed the history of extremist political movements in and out of power in my native country and across South America for several days has been interwoven with anti-Semitism. In a sense, today's hearing revisits a chapter of that history that might well be called "From Domestic Terrorism to International Terrorism."

While in Argentina today there are not surviving structures of militant movements of the extreme left, it is easy to see that the individuals and small groups of the extreme right remnants of the repressive former regime and support network are still active, anonymously, in important areas of Argentina's political life, particularly in its armed forces and in the security and intelligence services.

The link between this group and individuals on the militant right and the terrorist attacks against the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, respectively, has never been firmly established, but there continues to be a speculation in Argentina that such groups may have played a supportive, logistical role in the bombings and through law enforcement connections, may have complicated the government's investigative efforts.

The 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires brought a sincere expression of public sympathy with the victims and their families and with the Jewish community generally. But those expressions were, of course, made nearly incidental by the horror of the attacks themselves, attacks that together killed more than 120 individuals and that as yet have led to no conclusive persecutorial action.

President Menem and his entire cabinet, Catholic church leaders, lawmakers and representatives from all walks of Argentine life, join the Argentine Jewish community in expressions of solidarity and in condemnation of the attacks.

While the public reaction and the public statements by the national leaders were sincere and appropriate, the action that has followed those expressions has been frustratingly inadequate—inadequate for a State, I know, to Foreign Minister Di Tella, with whom several of my colleagues in AJC met yesterday in New York, and frustrating to the Argentine Jewish community and to all who are committed to justice in the AMIA case.

Answers to the questions posed by both of the Buenos Aires bombings have eluded the Argentine criminal justice system, although a consensus was formed among Western intelligence officials that the attacks were carried out primarily by operatives of or connected to Hizballah, very likely at the direction of or with the knowledge of Iranian officials. After both bombings, there was a speculation in Argentina that the attacks were intended as signs to the government that its warming relations with Israel and perceptions of a cooling in political and commercial relations with some in the Arab world would carry a heavy price. While such speculation cannot be discounted, it must be said that other countries even in Latin America, have enjoyed a longer history of close relations with Israel without experiencing similar tragedies.

The choice of Buenos Aires as the site for these two terrorist assaults has been the subject of considerable anxiety and speculation. In fact, we may never know why the bomber selected Buenos Aires. With each passing month, the prospect of resolving these crime grows more uncertain. But there are facts we do know. That with its long and, in many areas, minimally patrolled international borders, and its sorely inefficient immigration control procedures, Argentina likely offered the relatively easy access to and from their targets that terrorists require.

That within the ranks of right-wing extremist elements and within radicalized segments of the immigrant Arab population in Argentina and its border regions, outside agents would be likely to find operational support for an attack on Jewish institutions.

MR. CHABOT [presiding]. Mr. Kovadloff, if you could summarize. We have several other witnesses. I want to make sure we get all the testimony in.

MR. KOVADLOFF. I will, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CHABOT. We can put that in the record.

MR. KOVADLOFF. There are two publications that the American Jewish community published in the recent 2 years about the bombing of the AMIA and the Israeli embassy. I will respectfully ask, Mr. Chairman, to include it in my testimony in the congressional record. And I would like to thank the committee and you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kovadloff appears in the appendix.]

MR. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We will include that in the record. We appreciate your testimony here this morning.

Our next witness would be, I believe, Mr. Israel Singer, the Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress.

STATEMENT OF ISRAEL SINGER, SECRETARY GENERAL, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

MR. SINGER. Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my thanks to you for holding the hearings on this critical and urgent subject. I would

like to take notice of a personal friend, Mr. Ralph Goldman. I went to Argentina right after the murder of his son along with the other victims in the Israel Embassy bombing and I would like to take notice of Dr. Louis Czyzewski, whose daughter was killed. We flew to Buenos Aires with the president of the World Jewish Congress after that ugly event and we met with victims, parents and families.

We met with victims themselves in hospitals. And without attempting to deal with the formal testimony which I am going to include in the record and because of the interest of 5 minutes that we have here, I am, as well, going to include the research that we have done into the worldwide Jihad movement, militant Islam targets in the West, as well as the United States, which our institution of the World Jewish Congress has put out, particularly in light of the fact that the initial speakers that spoke today on behalf of the U.S. Government pointed out that Islamic Jihad is a wing of Hizballah.

I think that we have here today heard that the United States sometimes speaks very, very clearly with regard to statements that it makes on behalf of our administration and yet continues to speak very diplomatically with regard to some of our enemies. And yet we are the best of the lot because we are holding hearings today.

We represent 75 communities throughout the world. Argentina is the one that has been hit hardest. We visited those communities. We saw those victims. We cannot stand for the fact that none of these efforts on the part of our government have had any effect upon the government of Argentina. Yes, we, too, met with Foreign Minister Gatella this morning and, yes, he told us that there have been no results with regard to the questions we put to him when we were there last year after the AMIA bombing and in 1992 after the Israel embassy bombing. But he is not alone.

We met last week with President Chirac, with Prime Minister Juppe, after the bombing which saved, because of some miracle, hundreds of kids in Lyon. And we were to visit the people in London to our affiliate of the World Jewish Congress. There where two bombings took place within 24 hours. The people were satisfied with the efforts that were taking place. Many of those governments, as opposed to ours, still have relations with the Iranians to this very day. And no one raises their voices about these things. They have full relations.

There is a lot that hasn't been said here today and I have included in my remarks, but I would like to summarize quickly by telling you that there is no need to repeat what we already said last year after the bombing and 2 years ago, Ralph. What I want to say is that we have made little progress.

I want to commend Gilman and Lantos and yourself, the chairman and the members of this committee for asking us again, but I want to tell you that we are not going to sit by and watch this. We are going to continue to tell you that this is a problem in Argentina, that this is a problem in Europe, that many European countries aren't even cooperating with each other as many Latin Americans didn't until this bombing took place and until we, as the free world leader, act as the impetus to change the lethargy which

exists on this subject, we shall have to, as an organization of Jewish communities throughout the world, attempt to guarantee for our people and for citizens of the world personal security, which is the basis of a democracy.

On these days before the high holy days conclude with Yom Kippur, I would like to ask that those who sit in judgment of us all try to do a more effective job than we ourselves down here have done. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Singer appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for your moving testimony, Mr. Singer. We will, of course, include all of your statements in the full record.

Next, we will hear from Mr. Barry Mehler, who has been a leader of the Anti-Defamation League, of which he has been a trustee for over 20 years. Mr. Mehler is a Washington-based CPA and partner in charge of the 10-man Mehler, Bloom & Gruen accounting firm. Thank you, Mr. Mehler.

STATEMENT OF BARRY I. MEHLER, NATIONAL COMMISSIONER, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

Mr. MEHLER. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. Thank you for allowing the Anti-Defamation League to testify at this very important hearing. As you know, on July 18, 1994, the world was shocked by the horrific bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires. The terrorists who committed this heinous crime did not just destroy a building. They struck at the very heart of the Argentine Jewish community.

Among the 87 killed and scores wounded in the blast were Jews visiting the building to pick up their pensions, to look for work, to seek assistance. The records of 100 years of Argentine Jewish history was lost.

In the bomb's wake, the community, which had suffered the bombing of the Israeli Embassy just 2 years earlier, was left fearful, helpless and demoralized. They wonder when and where the third bombing will occur. Yet, 14 months after the assault against the AMIA building and over 3 years after the destruction of the embassy, little if any progress has been made.

In April 1995, a delegation of 17 leaders of the Anti-Defamation League visited Argentina. Our objective was to demonstrate the solidarity of American Jews with the Argentine Jewish community and to assess the Argentine government's investigation into the bombings of the AMIA building and the Israeli Embassy. Prior to the trip to Argentina, several members of the delegation met with the terrorism divisions of the FBI and the State Department and were briefed on the current status of the Argentine Government's investigation into both bombings and also given observations at both divisions on various facts and assumptions.

In the 4 days that the delegation was in Argentina, we met with government officials, including among others President Carlos Menem, the Ministers of Justice and Interior, the Director of State Intelligence Service in addition to several members of the staff.

Additionally, we met with the members of the DAIA which is the umbrella organization of Jewish organizations in Argentina. These meetings clearly showed that the Argentine Government, led by

President Menem has shown a greater seriousness and responsiveness investigating the AMIA bombing than that was shown following the embassy bombing. We also came to the following conclusions.

One, the expertise of the various Argentine security and police departments is much less than what would be desirable. A general consensus of the people we spoke to felt that the experience and training of the investigators was not up to solving the problems presented. In this regard, we would suggest that the American Government and the FBI, in particular, expand the availability of counterterrorism schools to Argentine personnel. We understand some of this training has already taken place by the FBI and we feel that much more is necessary.

Two, from what we have, we were able to gather, there is very little coordination in Argentina between the various entities that are investigating these two bombings. We heard that they don't share information, but rather that each one wants to be the one to hit the home run and this has greatly hindered the investigation.

Three, in IGUACU area in the north of Argentina where the borders of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina meet, there is an Islamic extremist group that I understand resides on the Brazilian side of the river. The border between these countries is very porous and having spent some time in the area, I can agree that it is almost impossible, if not impossible, to police crossings.

We suggest that a trilateral commission be set up between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay to maintain control of the groups that live in this area. There certainly should be infiltrators as well as monitors at work. We urge the U.S. Government to work with the respective governments to have such a commission formed that would be active in the prevention of terrorism that emanates from this area. But just as the United States must encourage Argentina to take firm steps to combat terrorism, we must continue to be at the vanguards of this international effort. Enactment of tough, comprehensive antiterrorism legislation has been a top legislative priority for the Anti-Defamation League and the broader Jewish community.

We support the broad policy objectives of the bill and are disturbed by recent reports that the momentum behind this measure has been stalled. The Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act is an important complement to existing legislation and strengthens the rule of law against terrorists worldwide. Most important, the bill strives for an appropriate balance between constitutional safeguards and the need for a more aggressive response to this escalating threat.

Madam Chairlady, thank you for your time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mehler appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for your testimony.

We will now like to hear from Mr. Ralph Goldman, who lost his son, David Ben Rafael in the terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992. Today, he joins us from New York and we send our deepest condolences to the entire Goldman family.

**STATEMENT OF RALPH I. GOLDMAN, FATHER OF VICTIM OF
1992 BOMBING IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA**

Mr. GOLDMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, on March 17, 1992, I lost my son, David Ben Rafael, to the most deadly terrorist act of that year, the attack on the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires. American born and educated, raised under the values of freedom and justice, he was there as a minister of the Israel Delegation.

In the years that passed since that day, I lost my confidence in the will of the government of Argentina to pursue the investigation into this criminal incident and its perpetrators with any energy and determination. For more than 3 years, I have pressed the Argentine authorities with respect to two simple questions: What has the Argentine Government done about the investigation of the March 17, 1992, bombing of the Israel embassy?

And two, specifically, has the Argentine Government investigated why their two policemen, who were charged with guarding the Israel Embassy, were not on duty when the attack took place? I take the opportunity to draw to the attention of this distinguished body that to this date, no response, publicly or privately, even from Members of Congress, to either question has been offered by the Argentine Government and that the investigation of 1992 is apparently at a halt.

We know that the poisonous weed of terrorism grows mainly where ripe conditions exist. In retrospect, it is clear that Argentina continues to provide such fertile grounds. A second deadly attack took place as we heard, as we know, in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, this time striking at the heart of the Jewish community.

Following the investigations of the two terrorist attacks, one cannot avoid the frustrating conclusion that the authorities of Argentina failed twice in their duty as a sovereign state. Once they failed to create the right climate to deterrence that would have prevented terrorism from operating on its territory. It saddens me to suggest that perhaps the opposite climate existed there, one that attracts terror by astonishing leniency of its law enforcement apparatus.

And the second failure is the inability of the authorities to capture and bring to trial those citizens of Argentina who with their deeds or omission were axillary to the two attacks.

Ladies and gentlemen, the political tradition of Argentina in the last quarter century is characterized by short memory. The natural tendency there, as demonstrated through various regimes, is the tendency to forget. I am cognizant of the fact that America has used its utmost resolve and considered resources to fight this terrorist scourge.

However, not enough has been done as it was intimated here by some Members of Congress. Americans must not let these events in Argentina be forgotten until justice is served. I urge the Congress of the United States to use its prestige and economic power to assure meaningful investigations of 1992 and 1994 terrorist attacks and to keep the international communities and, I repeat, keep the international community and the families of the victims informed what the government has not done.

Moreover, I hope that these hearings will continue and contribute to a thorough resolution of the investigations at hand.

Ladies and gentlemen, I open my statement by sharing with you the fact that I personally have suffered from terrorism in Argentina. No action you will take will return my son and others to life. However, your voice can be heard and your statement can resonate in the free democratic world encouraging the government of Argentina to exhaust all measures to pursue justice in these cases. By doing that, you may be adding a significant weapon to the global war against terrorism. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldman appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Goldman, and certainly that is the very message that we are trying to send today in our hearings and our continued hearings because this will not rest here today, and we know that the memory of your son and your daughter and so many other victims will be ever present in our minds and in our hearts as we continue that task of the deliberation.

Thank you so much, all of you, for being here with us. We wanted to ask just a few questions, some specific and some generally to all the panelists. But, Dr. Beraja, I wanted to start with you.

I noticed on page two of the testimony that you had given us you said, "groups involved in the illegal dealing of stolen vehicles where some of the members of the police of the province of Buenos Aires are involved have been included as accessories providing support to the terrorists." If you could tell us what was the role of these officers.

Was it knowingly in support of a planned attack on the Jewish community or certainly ongoing criminal activity involving stolen or altered vehicles? If you could expand on that part of your testimony.

Mr. BERAJA. I answer in Spanish and he will translate.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, of course.

Mr. BERAJA. [Through the interpreter.] In our opinion, those members of security forces who were involved in illegal car dealings were not necessarily, we do not—cannot determine yet, but were not necessarily aware of what the use of that vehicle would be. One aspect that supports this belief is the fact that the numbers of the motor of that vehicle were not deliberately erased and they appeared when they were found in the ruins of the attack.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Rabbi Weiss, do you think that Hizballah was responsible for the AMIA attack?

Rabbi WEISS. I stand by my testimony that it is my position that the investigation has been unfocused on Iran and specifically on Hizballah. It is quite possible that Hizballah was involved, but there are many other leads that would take us in other directions and there are specific leads which would indicate that what happened at the Israeli Embassy and at AMIA could not have been done without help from the inside.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I think that—let me see if I can find the doctor's testimony. He had said also, more or less, in a similar vein he says based on the theory that it was an attack by international terrorism against a target located in Argentina, as is the case of an embassy, the responsibility was moved beyond our borders without seriously investigating the local connection, which is not doubt-

ed by anyone today. If you could elaborate, doctor, just a bit about this local connection.

Mr. CZYZEWSKI. [Through the Interpreter.] We are convinced that this kind of terrorist attack cannot be perpetrated without the local support people. What we cannot determine yet is this local support was directly linked to the attack itself or was another kind of support. But both of the embassies and in the AMIA, this must have been the case.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We have had some documents shared with us and we will be looking at some of those, some of those problems that have been raised. We thank you for your testimony.

If I could ask all of you a general question, most of you had mentioned Iran and its diplomats' role in the AMIA attack. Do you support the greater use of the persona non grata tool against these Iranian diplomats? There have been many reports that these embassies are stacked with individuals who may have other agendas on their minds and there have been some indications that perhaps in the specific countries those host countries are not being aggressive enough in getting rid of those so-called diplomats who are really tools of their countries.

Would you please tell us your opinions about the greater use of this tool that, if the countries would use perhaps some of these problems might be averted or diminished somewhat. And it is a general question to whoever would like to answer it.

We heard from three of the individuals. Perhaps the others could comment. Thank you. Mr. Baer.

Mr. BAER. Let me be bold enough, I guess, to go first. We would concur that this is something that should be used, the persona non grata. In March when I was in the countries of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina meeting with the highest government officials of those countries, this concern of the overrepresentation at Iranian Embassies and the questionable activities of individuals there was raised very specifically, but primarily I must say by Chile and by Uruguay.

Both indicated that the activities of those at the embassy were being monitored and that this was very clearly a concern. Overrepresentation, meaning an inordinate number of individuals assigned to the embassy based on the limited relationship, both trade and otherwise, with the country of Iran.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Rabbi, let me just see in case anyone else would like to comment on using this tool.

Mr. Singer.

Mr. SINGER. Yes. I think that we should consider the possibility of using that tool, particularly when some of those people act as a cover. We attempted to deal with that question as well in an economic manner through the support that we brought to the meeting that we encouraged in your home city in Miami at the summit there and we tried to encourage the President to take a position on that and, indeed, he did at our meeting in New York when he called for a break of relations with Iran with regard to economic relations.

I must say that some of the host countries for the events that we are discussing here today, still haven't even begun to deal with

these questions the way we deal with them. And I think that having a meeting this afternoon on this subject might be a time to jolt some of the representatives from Europe that are dealing with this subject who still host some of these "diplomats" representing extremist groups, I think, in a manner that is much more kindly even than we do.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Rabbi.

Rabbi WEISS. Yes. I think it is a tool used by Iran, but the problem that the international community has is that it does not recognize that it is also used, I believe, by other countries, specifically by Syria.

I was at an open cabinet meeting that President Menem invited me to attend.

I believe I am the only foreigner—I am sure Menem is not too happy about the invitation; but I am the only foreigner to have ever attended a full open cabinet meeting in Argentina and was told then right after the AMIA bombing that the Israeli Embassy was bombed by an obscure terrorist group in southern Lebanon called *Ansar Allah*.

Well, if that is the case, then the Menem government should certainly direct its attention to Syria which controls southern Lebanon because if Syria wished to enter into the fray that terrorist group (*Ansar Allah*) could not be operating in southern Lebanon and as a consequence could not have bombed the AMIA building.

If I can, just one more statement, draw a parallel. Many of the families of Pan Am 103, John Root, Susan Cohen—and I recognize that the families are split—but many of the families believe that it was Syria that was very much responsible that had a hand in Pan Am 103, but that the U.S. Government, for political reasons, for politically expedient reasons, decided to dump it all on Libya because now the trend is to bring Syria into the peace process. And that is what I meant when I said in my testimony that even the United States, and I say with a heavy heart, even Israel, there was a front-page report that Israel was blocking that there was stuff coming out of Syria which contributed to the AMIA bombing and in order to get to the root of terrorism, it must be understood that politics can have no place.

Political expediency cannot outweigh the value of Jewish lives and let me just say this. That if after 4 years of the Israeli Embassy, if you don't find the culprits, after over a year of AMIA, you don't find the culprits, that sends a message to terrorists around the world you can do this and get away with it and I say it emboldened and encourages terrorists to act right here in the United States.

When it comes to terrorism, this world is a global "shtetl", we are one small community. And if America doesn't step in and pressure the Argentine Government to put an end to it, believe me, it will hop from South America to the United States as has already occurred. It is our problem.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Dr. Beraja, you wanted to add something?

Your translator is good, but I don't know if he is that good. Let's find out.

Mr. BERAJA. [Through the interpreter.] We believe that international terrorism creates confusion among governments and one of the consequences is this policy of appeasement regarding governments who sponsor terrorism and this is what we do not agree. The ambiguity and the lack of determination to act against the so-called diplomacy which covers up for terrorism.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And the connection about——

Mr. BERAJA. And the connection with drug trafficking and terrorism linked to drug trafficking also.

One last word. The policy of appeasement reminds us of what happened in Europe in the 1930's with the appeasement regarding the Nazi threat and the consequences of those mistakes are a sufficient lesson of history.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Your statement about appeasement, are you insinuating that Argentina has been intimidated by Iran?

Mr. BERAJA. We know that the Argentinean position follows the advice of European governments who have suggested to the Argentinean government to be extremely careful regarding its attitude toward Iran because there was danger of worse reprisals.

It was publicly acknowledged by the deputy foreign minister of Argentina when he met with a delegation of the American Jewish committee last year in Buenos Aires.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Let me just ask one question. For the folks who are based in Buenos Aires, is it your opinion that the local prosecuting judge has been getting all of the help and assistance that he needs from the government of Argentina in order to carry out this very difficult task that could be of far-reaching international perspective?

Mr. BERAJA. [Through the Interpreter.] The executive did provide support to the Federal Judge Galeano, but the issue of those in charge of the investigation both as security and intelligence agencies, took too much time for an adequate coordination under the authority of the judge and this was not helpful in the course of the investigation.

I wish, for the record, to say that President Menem has established a reward of \$2 million for any information that can be provided in this investigation and, second, in the Argentine Congress a follow-up committee has been established by both Chambers, House and the Senate, to monitor the investigation process.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I would like to thank all of the panelists for being here today. As Chairman Gilman said, we are dedicated to seeing that justice is done in this bombing, in the Israeli Embassy attack and that, as he says, other such terrorist attacks, wherever and whenever they may occur. We will keep the records open for statements from other members of the committee and I apologize on their behalf.

There are so many committee hearings at this time, so many meeting at this time because of our continuing resolution and reconciliation process, and that is the reason why they are not here with us. It is certainly not indicative of their level of concern for this very serious problem.

Rabbi.

Rabbi WEISS. Yes. I just wanted to make two points, one on Galeano. There are questions that have been raised about how

independent he really is. On my last visit to Argentina, I publicly mentioned much of my testimony and that is that there is a cover-up, that there is no full investigation because it would reveal that people on the highest echelon were involved.

The President of Argentina, also high profile, then proceeded to call me "totally delirious." When I repeated that charge, Galeano actually subpoenaed me to court. I think I am perhaps the only American to have testified, but this is what happened.

I was there for 6 hours. I felt semi-arrested. I was literally held in a very, very small room, read the riot act and I got the sense right there that the real purpose that afternoon was to intimidate me and to force me to recant my allegations and my sense is that the judiciary there, unlike in the United States where we have precise checks and balances, they take their orders from higher up, quite possibly from the President himself.

In my last comment, if I may, as an old Soviet Jewry war horse, the most effective tool that sprung Soviet Jewry was the Jackson-Vanik amendment in which the U.S. Government told the Soviet Union you want free trade? You want Most Favored Nation status? Then you are going to have to be true to human rights. And I say for the record, that the issue in Argentina is not a matter that they don't have the means. They have the means.

As I told Menem, I said there is a Hebrew statement [speaking Hebrew], there is nothing that stands before the will. It is not Iran that troubles Menem. He has got internal problems and the only way Argentina is going to beef up security and get the culprits. The only way they are going to do this, is if like Jackson-Vanik, there is going to be real pressure.

If the U.S. Government says if you want American tourists, if you want American carriers to land, then the Azeiza airport, the security better be better. If you want Americans to tour there, then those borders where you can take across sea ship loads of explosives, those borders better be tight. That is the only language the Argentina Government understands and if we don't do that, I predict, God forbid, that Buenos Aires is a community that awaits the next terrorist attack.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much and I apologize for bringing—

Mr. BERAJA. Only 1 minute.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. OK, thank you, Mr. Beraja.

Mr. BERAJA. [Through the Interpreter.] I will not have a confrontation with Rabbi Weiss, but I cannot agree on such a dramatic vision of Argentina. We, the Jewish leadership, have the total freedom to say what we believe we have to say. If we don't say more, he can criticize us.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you to all the panelists. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. WILCOX, JR.
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I appreciate this opportunity to testify on the subject of terrorism in Latin America and the bombing of the AMIA Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994. These subjects are of great concern to the United States, and we have intensified our focus on terrorism in Latin America and the need to bring the bombers of the AMIA center to justice.

The tragic bombing of the AMIA building, the almost identical bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, the bombing of the World Trade Center, and the related plot to blow up various public areas and government facilities in New York which is now before a federal court, brought home to us the truth that our hemisphere is also vulnerable to international terrorism.

The perpetrators of these savage crimes are or are believed to be extremists who abuse the Islamic faith in whose name they claim to act. Dedicated to the destruction of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the State of Israel, these groups are also steeped in hatred of the West and its culture. Their pursuit of terrorism in our hemisphere and in many other parts of the world, demonstrates that terrorism arising from conflicts in the Middle East is now a global phenomenon.

The International Terrorist Threat in Latin America

The Lebanon-based, Iran-backed Hizballah, which has waged a campaign of terror in the Middle East for many years, including many suicide car bombings, is now the major international terrorist threat in Latin America. The suicide bombing of the Israeli Embassy in 1992, which killed 29, was Hizballah's first terrorist act in Latin America. Hizballah denied responsibility for the crime, but Islamic Jihad, a clandestine terrorist wing of Hizballah, claimed to have carried out the suicide bombing, and authenticated its claim with a videotape of the Embassy before the bombing - a Hizballah trademark.

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The Government of Argentina has not yet charged any suspect for the 1994 AMIA bombing, but the evidence points to Hizballah as the bomber. The operation was a virtual duplicate of the 1992 suicide bombing, in which a vehicle carrying a massive explosives charge detonated in front of the Israeli Embassy. Ansar Allah, a clandestine subgroup of Hizballah, issued a statement expressing support for the bombing of the AMIA Center after it happened.

Another act of terrorism, the bombing of a commuter aircraft in Panama in July 1994, one day after the AMIA disaster, is still unsolved. Evidence gathered so far suggests it may also have been a Hizballah suicide bombing. Of the 21 passengers who were killed, twelve were Jews, and three of the twelve were dual national Panamanian-Americans. Ansar Allah also issued a press release supporting the attack. The apparent suicide bomber used a Middle Eastern name, but has not been otherwise identified. He had travelled the commuter plane route several times before the bombing, and no one claimed his remains.

We believe that Hizballah activities, which include narcotics and smuggling as well as terrorism, are supported in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The organization is known to have cells in Colombia and Venezuela as well. Hizballah cells are concealed amidst the large Shia' Muslim population of Lebanese origin which has settled in the tri-border area. Like the great majority of Latin America's large Shia' and Sunni Muslim communities, who emigrated from the Middle East, most of the Muslims in the tri-border area are peaceful, patriotic citizens who want nothing to do with terrorism. Nevertheless, Hizballah has used this area for fund raising and recruitment and for clandestine support for terrorism, narcotics and other illegal activities. Central government control is weak in this area; borders are porous and often unpatrolled; and it is a favorable environment for such operations.

Hizballah's chief patron is Iran, and it is likely that Iran was aware of and provided support to the two Buenos Aires bombings. We believe that Hizballah has not committed terrorist acts abroad without Iranian consent. And Hizballah cells in Latin America and elsewhere in the world depend on guidance and logistical support from Iranian intelligence officers assigned to Iranian embassies in the region.

Mr. Chairman, Hizballah is only one of various international terrorist threats in Latin America affecting U.S. interests. Through August 1995, there were 53 acts of international terrorism in the region, of which 35 were directed against U.S. interests. Forty-two of these were

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in Colombia, where there have been repeated bombing attacks against multinational owned oil property, and an epidemic of kidnappings.

In 1994, there were nearly 1,400 reported kidnappings in Colombia, a 35 percent increase over 1993, but the actual number may be even higher, since families and employers prefer to settle cases quietly by paying ransom. As of today, at least four U.S. citizens are being held for ransom by Colombia guerrillas, and two American hostages were killed on June 19, during a shoot out between the terrorists and government forces. We have urged the Colombian government to redouble its efforts to free these hostages. But since they are being held in remote areas where the government's control is weak, and since the terrorists are intent on extorting large ransoms, the prospect for voluntary release of these hostages is limited. Two groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) were responsible for many of these terrorist acts. These and other guerilla groups also have ties to Colombian narcotraffickers.

In Peru, the notorious Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path group, which has killed thousands over the years in pursuit of its revolutionary aims, has been in decline since the arrest of its leader, Abimeal Guzman in 1992. Yet Sendero remains a deadly organization.

It committed 215 acts of political murder in 1994, a major decline from 650 in 1992, but still a significant number. Its ideology is fervently and anti-foreign and anti-American, it has directed six attacks against foreign nationals so far this year. In July 1993, Sendero detonated a large car bomb in front of our Embassy in Lima.

Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico have also suffered from political violence, but they have not experienced major incidents of international terrorism in recent years.

Cuba, the only Latin American nation on our list of state sponsors of terrorism, is no longer an active player in Latin American Terrorism. Its former Soviet and communist revolutionary allies are gone, and Havana is increasingly shunned in Latin America as more and more states of the region turn toward democracy and free market economies. Yet we believe Cuba still harbors terrorist elements, for example from the Basque ETA group and the Colombian FARC and ELN, and for this reason it remains on our list of state sponsors.

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State of Progress in the Investigation of the AMIA bombing

Mr. Chairman, turning to the investigation of the AMIA bombing, Argentine leaders have emphasized to us their strong commitment to solve the AMIA bombing and the bombing of the Israeli Embassy, and to prevent any recurrence of such acts in their country. Also, Argentina's leadership in hemispheric councils to promote greater counterterrorism cooperation has been impressive.

Large suicide bombings of this kind, which create massive destruction, are extraordinarily difficult challenges for investigators. We are concerned, nevertheless, that neither of these major crimes has been solved, and to our knowledge there has been no breakthrough in the AMIA investigation. I believe there are various reasons for this.

- Argentina's laws and its investigative and judicial systems do not provide all the tools and resources that are needed to deal aggressively and intensively with such major crimes. We understand the Argentine Congress is now examining way to strengthen its anti-terrorism laws, in ways that will enhance the government's capabilities without endangering human rights. We have encouraged this effort.
- In the past, Argentina's borders have been porous, and the government lacked an adequate system for monitoring immigration. Recently, President Menem's government has adopted a new program to prevent the use of fraudulent travel documents by terrorists or other criminal elements seeking to enter the country, and to tighten border controls against hostile elements.
- In the past Argentina's investigative, security and intelligence services have suffered from inadequate interagency coordination. Recently, steps have been taken to provide greater cohesion. We believe this holds promise.
- Argentina also needs to improve the effectiveness of officials working in lower levels of its law enforcement agencies. The Government of Argentina realizes that to deal with major acts of terrorism like the 1992 and 1994 bombings, improved law enforcement machinery is needed.

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Regional Cooperation and Coordination, and the U.S. Role

The Buenos Aires bombings have created a sense of urgency in the hemisphere, galvanizing the states of the region into new cooperation. After the AMIA disaster, Secretary Christopher announced that he would send me, as his Coordinator for Counterterrorism, to Latin America to consult with the most concerned governments on a concrete plan to combat terrorism. He also announced that "as host for the 1994 Summit of the Americas, the United States will move to make terrorism in our hemisphere a priority item on our agenda".

The United States has learned in other parts of the world that close consultation and cooperation among the law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic security services of friendly states is critical to fighting international terrorism. Spreading this approach of cooperation among the states of our own hemisphere has been one of this Administration's foremost counterterrorism goals during the past year. Following up on Secretary Christopher's announcement, in early September, 1994, I led an interagency team to Buenos Aires, Asuncion, Brasilia, and Caracas, to discuss operative measures.

In the next phase, the U.S., Argentina, and other like-minded nations, led an initiative at the December Summit for an OAS meeting on terrorism, which will be held in Lima in early 1996. Argentina, which has been the most active Latin American state in this area, convened the UN Security Council after the AMIA bombing and sought approval of a "Declaration on Terrorism." And a special session of the OAS Permanent Council was held for the same purpose. The OAS has also established a Working Group on Terrorism, charged with preparation for the 1996 conference.

In another move to strengthen subregional cooperation, Argentina hosted a conference in August this year in which the other states of the southern cone, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, as well as the United States and Canada, took part. That meeting, at which I led the U.S. delegation, has proposed a series of concrete anti-terrorism cooperative measures in such areas as border control, intelligence sharing, extradition, and abuse of diplomatic privileges. It also called for wider adherence to international treaties and conventions against terrorism. These measures constitute a significant step toward greater regional cooperation in countering the international terrorist threat.

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U.S. Assistance to the AMIA Inquiry

Because of the international dimensions of the AMIA bombing, the profound sympathy of the American people toward its victims, and the close U.S.-Argentina relationship, the United States has been active in various ways in assisting the Argentine government's investigation.

Shortly after the bombing, Argentina asked us to assist in their post blast investigation. An International Response Team (IRT), managed by the Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security with three explosives experts from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, flew to Buenos Aires. Additionally three FBI agents provided technical assistance. A similar IRT had helped Argentina in the early phases of the investigation of the 1992 Israeli Embassy, and the 1994 team included some who had participated in 1992 as well as experts who were involved in investigating the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

The IRT spent 12 days, working side-by-side with the Argentine Police and Israeli experts, who were also at the bomb site. Members of the IRT were instrumental in the recovery of parts of the engine of the Renault van, which the suicide bomber used to bomb the building, and which were important to the investigation.

They also helped monitor the clean up efforts, and they provided technical advice to Argentine authorities on evidence collection and preservation, as well as laboratory analysis.

The United States has also provided various forms of anti-terrorism training to the Argentine Government through the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, with policy guidance from the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Since Argentina became a participant in the ATA program in 1992, ATA has trained over 280 officials in 17 courses, at a cost of approximately \$2.2 million. In the next two fiscal years, ATA intends to hold an additional 10 courses for Argentine to train over 225 students. This highly specialized training in multiple skills will cost approximately \$2.6 million, and will cover over 38 weeks of training.

Conclusion

The AMIA bombing was an especially heinous act of terrorism. Aimed at the very heart of Argentina's large

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and vibrant Jewish community, it imposed a dreadful cost in human life, and destroyed priceless archives as well. But out of this tragedy has come a greater awareness of the international terrorist threat to Argentina and the hemisphere.

The Argentine Government and people have rallied to denounce this evil and to express solidarity with the victims. And Argentina and the other states of Latin America are now working more closely together in the kinds of cooperative activities that are indispensable to fighting international terrorism.

This Administration is doing all it can to strengthen this trend, and to continue to assist Argentina, especially, to resolve the two bombings it has suffered and to prevent any recurrence of these terrible acts.

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**OPENING STATEMENT OF
ROBERT M. BRYANT
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION
BEFORE THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
HEARING ON INTERNATIONAL RADICAL TERRORISM
IN LATIN AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 28, 1995**

On behalf of the FBI, it is a pleasure to appear before you this morning to discuss international terrorism in Latin America. Since the tragic bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, the FBI and the Intelligence Community have learned that we are confronted with a new and growing form of international terrorism. This brand of terrorism is loosely structured and comprised of many groups and persons who use violence to promote their personal, political, social or economic beliefs. Currently, there are terrorist infrastructures in Latin America, the United States and Canada which actively support terrorist operations world-wide.

In July of last year two suspected transnational terrorist assaults occurred, namely the bombing of the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, Argentina and the downing of a Panamanian commuter airline. As the attack on the commuter airline took the lives of three U.S. citizens, our citizens and our country became victims of a potentially broader terrorist campaign.

Today I would like to update you on the assistance the FBI provided during the investigations of these and one other major attack perpetrated by suspected transnational terrorists in Latin America. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 coupled with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 authorize FBI investigative jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is taken hostage, murdered or assaulted by terrorists. Naturally, FBI investigations abroad require coordination with the Department of State and the permission of the host country.

In Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) regularly target U.S. interests. Many Latin American Marxist terrorist groups, including Peru's Shining Path, have greatly diminished. However, a new terrorist challenge is emerging in the region, in the form of International Radical Terrorism. On March 17, 1992, a car bomb destroyed the three-story Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Although no U.S. citizens were harmed, 29 people were killed and more than 240 others sustained injuries.

The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this cowardly attack. The Islamic Jihad is a covername used by the Hizballah or Party of God. The Hizballah is a radical extremist terrorist group based in Lebanon, that is dedicated to installing a theocracy in Lebanon modeled on the Government of Iran. Moreover, the Hizballah is actively pursuing the removal of all non-Islamic influences from the Middle East. In April 1983, 16 deaths occurred in the Hizballah bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. Likewise, 241 fatalities were caused by a Hizballah suicide truck bomb attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983.

Support for the 1992 terrorist bombing in Buenos Aires may have emanated from the triborder area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which has a large Middle East population and a Hizballah presence. The borders in this area are porous and ideal for conducting illegal fundraising enterprises, including smuggling, gun running and the sale of stolen vehicles.

In Buenos Aires, a terrorist car bombing on July 18, 1994, destroyed the AMIA building in which over 90 people perished and more than 200 were injured. None were U.S. citizens. A previously unknown group called the "Islamic Command" claimed responsibility for this brutal attack. The United States Government responded to this bombing less than 48 hours after the blast by offering and thereafter deploying 13 experts in explosives investigations from the International Response Team (IRT). The IRT represented various government agencies, including security experts from the FBI, the State Department Diplomatic Security, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. FBI Supervisory Special Agent David Williams from the Explosives Unit is here today to respond to any bomb-related questions. For the record, no arrests have been reported regarding the 1992 terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy. With respect to the 1994 AMIA bombing, an Argentine used car dealer and two other men implicated in the matter have been arrested.

Outside of Colon City, Panama, an ALAS commuter plane exploded in flight and crashed on July 19, 1994. Among the 21

victims were three U.S. citizens and 12 Jewish persons. In Lebanon, a group using the name "Ansar Allah" or Partisans of God claimed responsibility for the AMIA bombing and suggested participation in the bombing of the ALAS commuter plane. The FBI is conducting a parallel investigation with the Panamanian Government due to the homicides of three U.S. citizens. No arrests have been made in this ongoing investigation.

Due to the high visibility of the trials of Sheik Omar Rahman and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, both implicated in the terrorist acts in New York City, the counterterrorism community must remain on guard against potential sympathetic acts of reprisal by elements of International Radical Terrorists. This transnational criminal problem requires a concerted response from the international law enforcement community. To prevent future international terrorists acts, the FBI is pledged to share counterterrorism intelligence, training and techniques with our counterparts in Latin America.

Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, I am prepared to furnish the committee additional information in a classified form. I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you today.

Presentation by Dr. Luis Czyzewski, father of a victim of the terrorist attack against the AMIA-DAIA headquarters in Buenos Aires.

House of Representatives

Committee on International Relations

Washington D.C.

September 28, 1995

I am the father of a victim who died in the attack against the AMIA headquarters. On behalf of myself and my wife who is with me, and representing the relatives and friends of this brutal massacre's victims, I would like to share with you our views about the issues included in this meeting's agenda.

As we all know Argentina suffered two attacks against Jewish targets in less than three years.

After the second terrorist attack one should carefully analyze whether the things that were not done or done in the wrong manner after the attack to the Embassy could have caused the murderers' action to be repeated.

We firmly assert that the mistakes and omissions that followed the first attack -which was practically not investigated- acted as an immense and attractive invitation to persuade terrorists to repeat their action. Based on the theory that it was an attack by international terrorism against a foreign target located in Argentina, as is the case of an embassy, the responsibility was moved beyond our borders without seriously investigating the local connection which is not doubted by anyone today.

On the other hand we do not see that the first attack alerted the Argentine government about the security and control measures that should have been implemented in borders and airports and we believe were not applied as seriously and strongly as required.

This and the analysis of the events which followed the attack to the AMIA building make us believe that Argentina in particular and Latin America in general is a region in which international terrorism can operate with extreme ease. It is a generally accepted principle that a thief decides to steal where it is easier, and that is applicable to this case, with the aggravating circumstance that in the two attacks perpetrated in Argentina, terrorists necessarily had support from internal partners who have not been discovered to date.

In our opinion the following is therefore imperative:

- a) The countries of the region should coordinate efforts and elaborate joint strategies to prevent terror acts not only in

Latin America but in the whole continent.

- b) To obtain U.S. support in all aspects required to contribute to the judicial investigation of the attack against AMIA.

With regard to the present status of judicial investigations aimed at clarifying said attack we perceive that in fourteen months a lot was investigated with notoriously poor results.

From our standpoint, where rational and emotional aspects are necessarily intermingled, we firmly hold that we will only be appeased when we get to know who perpetrated the attack and who the local accomplices were, when their full names are known and jail is the place where the rest of their lives will be spent.

It does not suffice to hear that investigators are working hard and doing everything possible, as that is not their merit but their duty.

We do not perceive the coordination of objectives that should exist between the judicial power and the agencies in charge of analyzing each of the pieces of evidence that appear every day and then become nothing.

This makes the feeling of impunity grow day after day as to this very day facts do not show the opposite.

We are certain that the Argentine government positively knows that clarifying the attack to AMIA will notoriously strengthen its international standing, and it is therefore necessary for investigators do so without any fear, doubt or conditioning. However, it is something we have not perceived to date.

Mr. Chairman:

Allow me to spend one more minute analyzing the topic that gathers us here from a different perspective: the humane aspect.

For people and countries attacks mean the analysis of facts and actions originating in them.

For relatives the tragedy in itself is the most important fact. I would like to convey a testimony on this statement.

Since July 18, 1994 my wife, my other children and myself cannot enjoy the smile, a kiss and the model of life that our daughter Paola set for us every day, and they were beautiful.

Since then we cannot see her grow up, become an adult and a good person as every parent wishes of his/her children.

For the other 85 families, some Jewish, some Catholic, Argentine, Bolivian and of other nationalities, the situation is the same with respect to the dead relative.

I hope that *you*, who are also sons and daughters, parents, brothers and sisters understand that the pain of this uselessly shed blood should force all persons and countries to reflect and do whatever is possible so that very soon we can say with all our might: NEVER AGAIN

Finally, I would like to thank the Committee of International Relations of the House of Representatives of the United States for the invitation I received through Mr. Benjamin A. Gilman to offer my testimony which I hope will be useful.

Thank you very much.

PRESENTATION BY DR. RUBEN E. BERAJA,
PRESIDENT OF DAIA
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON DC, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

Mr. Chairman,

I thank you for the invitation to address this distinguished Committee of International Relations of the House of Representatives.

This occasion is appropriate to complement what we have stated 14 months ago, shortly after the massacre perpetrated in Buenos Aires, when the AMIA-DAIA building was destroyed by a terrorist attack.

The time elapsed has allowed us since then to acquire a greater knowledge about international terrorism as a phenomenon of the times, to better calibrate the threat that it constitutes for civilian populations and democracies, and understand the strengths and weaknesses that the State apparatus shows vis a vis this dangerous challenge.

On behalf of DAIA, the representative organization of Jewish institutions in Argentina, we have worked relentlessly so that the wound opened by international terrorism does not remain unpunished, and that it also receives the adequate political sanction.

Regarding the first aspect, as plaintiffs together with AMIA, we have had an active participation in the activities carried out by Federal Judge, Dr. Juan José Galeano and

the Prosecutors, witnessing the difficulties that prevented more concrete results in the ongoing investigation.

We criticize the fact that these difficulties were increased by the lack of coordination between the security and intelligence agencies in charge of the investigation and because of the delay experienced in obtaining the cooperation of the Police of the Buenos Aires Province, which only took place a few months ago.

In spite of the above mentioned, we believe that the court has gathered elements that allow us to come to the following conclusions:

a) To commit the terrorist actions, the perpetrators required qualified support from diplomatic personnel or individuals linked to the Embassy of Iran in Buenos Aires.

b) Under diplomatic immunity or in close relationship to those who have it, as indicated previously, cells of activists identified with islamic fundamentalism have been established in Argentina, one of which, it can be reasonable presumed, has played an important role in the logistical support previous to the attack.

c) Groups involved in the illegal dealing of stolen vehicles, where some members of the Police of the Province of Buenos Aires are involved, have been included as accessories, providing support to the terrorists.

d) The elements obtained in the investigation allow us to conclude that Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, constitutes a center of support of fundamentalist terrorism.

From the point of view of criminal law, and the requirements of doctrine and jurisprudence, it can be accepted that additional evidences must be gathered so that the Court can reach a final verdict against those included in my previous remarks.

Nevertheless, the logical analysis of the information already gathered allow us to indicate that those mentioned in point- a), b) and c) constitute an interconnected web, interacting between them and reciprocally necessary to consummate a massacre such as the one we have suffered.

This logical conclusion which has been constructed with great effort in the Court file is enriched by the investigations carried out within the sphere of the Secretary of State Intelligence (SIDE), which is under the authority of the President, and they have arrived to the following conclusions:

a) The attack of July 18, 1994, was the responsibility of individuals belonging to the Hizbollah organization -this was admitted coincidentally by the head of intelligence, Dr. Hugo Anzorreguy, by the Argentinean Foreign Minister, Ing. Guido Di Tella and among others by the Ambassador of Argentina to the United States, Dr. Raúl Granillo Ocampo.

b) It should be indicated that the authorities of my country believe that the attack against the Embassy of Israel in

Buenos Aires, in March 1992 was also perpetrated by members of Hizbollah.

c) There are serious indications of suspicious activities of individuals linked to the Iranian Embassy, as well as a growing activism within elements of Shiite fundamentalism in Buenos Aires and other parts of Argentina.

Once again, these conclusions have the characteristic of investigations of intelligence agencies, based in clues, indirect evidence, confidential investigation in the country and abroad, as well as information provided by similar agencies of friendly governments.

The accumulation of conclusions reached by the Court and those obtained by the law enforcement and intelligence agencies allow us to state that from a political point of view there exists enough elements and background so that the government of Argentina can adopt policy decisions that imply stronger sanctions against Hizbollah and all those States that through complacency, support, direct or indirect involvement allow that organization to plan and execute acts of aggression in other countries, killing innocent civilians, instilling fear in the society, creating havoc and enormous material damage, all of which affects and endangers the basic pillars of democratic life.

We wish to indicate categorically that there are no raisons d'état, be them economic or political, that can justify a policy of compromising with terrorists, because we are convinced that it sends a dangerous message, inviting further attacks and also damaging the credibility of the people in the rule of law.

We are aware that there are many countries that faced with terrorists aggression have chosen a policy of appeasement, trying to unilaterally forgive crimes committed in their territory as a necessary price to theoretically prevent new terrorists attacks in the future. This policy of appeasement brings back to our minds what happened in the thirties in Europe, regarding the nazi threat: the historical conclusions of the cost of that ambiguous policy are so evident that no additional comment is necessary.

Our position was initially shared by President Menem, who publicly supported a strong political reaction of Argentina against those governments which protect or promote Hizbollah. Unfortunately, in August of last year, the Deputy Foreign Minister and the Foreign Minister of Argentina, indicated to delegations of American Jewish organizations that following the advice of friendly European governments, it was wise to be extremely prudent vis a vis Iran, so as not to be subject to worse reprisals.

This position has established a policy still current, policy which greatly worries us, not only for the past, but also for the future.

It is widely accepted by the experts that terrorists activities may increase, that its links with drug trafficking (i.e. the Bekaa Valley/Hizbollah) are greater and greater, and increasingly dangerous, and that the combination of those factors -as the war in Bosnia demonstrated- can have tragic consequences for humanity. In Argentina, marihuana fields have been detected in the northeastern

Province of Misiones, bordering the region where groups linked to Hizbollah have settled, as it was indicated last August by the head of the Paraguayan Police. According to military authorities in Argentina, the most serious hypothesis of conflict comes from narcoterrorism and recent statements of the head of Security of Uruguay indicates that because of the open border policies which will be a result of the Mercosur common market, the dangers of terrorists activity are increased.

We are conscious that we are not only struggling regarding the past, to solve the criminal attack against AMIA, but also to protect our future from the threat of narcoterrorism, whatever its ideological affiliation. The democratic world can not take lightly the information regarding attacks with poisonous gas, bombs in airplanes, or the miraculous delay of a clock, which prevented a massacre at a school with seven hundred children in Lyon, France.

We therefore wish to propose:

- 1) That democratic Nations and particularly the United States intensify specific actions to neutralize terrorists groups in their own bases.*
- 2) That Governments denounce without fear or ambiguous speculations those regimes that support, protect and promote terrorism and narcoterrorism.*
- 3) That the Resolution against terrorism passed unanimously by the General Assembly of the United*

Nations on December 9, 1994 be implemented with concrete measures. Words are not enough.

Our Organization, an N.G.O. recognized for 60 years of struggle against nazism, discrimination and for the preservation of human rights, we will continue our efforts within the rule of law so that Argentina becomes a leader among the countries willing to face terrorism and its allies and neutralize sinister threats that endanger democracies.

The State Departments counterterrorism policy follows three general rules, which we fully share:

. First, do not make deals with terrorists or submit to blackmail.

. Second, treat terrorists as criminals and apply the rule of law.

. Third, bring maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions and urging other states to do likewise.

We trust that this presentation contributes to strengthen the decision of the United States Congress to maintain as a priority item of its agenda the terrorist threat, and that the rule of law be reassured protecting the basic right of a human being, the right to live without fear.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH

TESTIMONY OF RABBI AVI WEISS, National president, Coalition for Jewish Concerns-Amcha, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. September 28, 1995:

I'm grateful to Congressman Ben Gilman for convening these hearings. After returning from Buenos Aires this past July I met with Congressman Gilman and my representative, Eliot Engel. Their concern for the victims of the AMIA and Israeli Embassy bombings, as well as Congressman Gilman's quick response to my request that hearings be called--is greatly appreciated. As I sit before you the image of countless numbers of families of victims, of Diana Malamud, Liora Ginsburg, the Czystewskis, of Damian Goldenberg and so many others are etched in my heart. I dedicate this testimony to them and to the memory of their loved ones in the prayer that justice be done.

Having spent almost a week in Argentina in July 1994 when the AMIA attack occurred during which time I met with Argentine President Carlos Menem and also attended a full cabinet session, and having spent several days in Buenos Aires on the first anniversary of the attack this past July, I have come to the conclusion that the government of Argentina is stonewalling the investigation and that a cover up is taking place. There has been no full investigation because such an investigation would reveal that people in the highest echelons of government, or people who worked for them or the government intelligence service were involved.

This conclusion is not speculation. Evidence points in this direction:

1) It is part of the public record that President Carlos Menem has reincorporated many people with ultra-right wing or neo-Nazi views, or criminals with murderous pasts into the state intelligence service. One cannot expect individuals with these kinds of views to carry out a serious investigation into either of the two bombings. Yet these were the individuals tasked to carry out the investigation.

For example, Menem appointed Col. Oscar Pascual Guerrieri as advisor to the state intelligence agency, SIDE. Guerrieri had headed two concentration camps during the previous military regime and was part of a bombing campaign to destabilize the government of Menem's democratically elected predecessor, Raoul Alfonsin. The destabilizing campaign included Guerrieri's telephoned death threats to elementary schools. A Jewish nursery was the first target of the campaign. Another example: Luis Abelardo Patti, a former police official involved in an alleged shoot-out in 1983 with two political dissidents, was named by Menem to head the Buenos Aires lucrative Central Market. Just a few days after the one year anniversary of the AMIA bombing, Menem lauded Patti's performance.

Articles attached to this testimony, written by Martin Edwin Andersen and published in the Washington Times document countless examples of similar appointments.

2) The Argentine intelligence and immigration services are compromised. For example, in January 1990 a Syrian terrorist, Monzer Al Kassir, linked to the Pan Am 103 bombing and implicated by German intelligence sources to the Achille Lauro hijacking which resulted in the murder of New Yorker Leon Klinghoffer, was permitted to enter Argentina by Carlos Aurelio "ZaZa" Martinez, appointed by Menem as Director of Immigration. A few days later, Kassir was granted an Argentine passport signed by Menem's brother. Kassir's name surfaced in connection with the 1992 bombing of

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the Israeli Embassy. Additionally, Menem's brother-in-law, Ibrahim Al Ibrahim, was appointed head of security at the Buenos Aires airport despite the fact that he didn't even speak Spanish.

3) Specific questions concerning the AMIA and for that matter the Israeli Embassy bombing point to a government cover-up.

(a) The only person detained though not indicted in the AMIA bombings is Carlos Alberto Telldin. Telldin was the last owner of an automobile whose parts were found in the ruins of the AMIA building. Telldin swore before three federal judges that Hector Vergez, rumored to be an ex-member of SIDE offered him \$1million and his freedom in exchange for falsely implicating one of the Lebanese citizens held in Paraguay as the person to whom Telldin sold the van. The charge precipitated a separate investigation by Judge Branca. It's now four months later and no results have been forthcoming.

In an article published in La Nacion September 26, 1995 it was reported that Telldin met secretly with Luisa Riva Aramayo, one of the three federal judges and told her that he had in fact sold the car to two Buenos Aires police officers. Aramayo's decision to meet with Telldin in secret without her colleagues was highly unusual and was roundly criticized.

(b) The policemen on duty at AMIA and the Israeli Embassy were not at their posts when the buildings were blown up. Despite this fact, Captain Gaston G. Fernandez, chief of the 7th precinct which controls special guard duty in front of AMIA was promoted.

(c) Several Buenos Aires residents told me that members of Painted Faces--a notorious Nazi type group--who had been given life sentences, were seen on the streets of Buenos Aires just a few weeks before AMIA was bombed. Who was responsible for their early release?

(d) Subsequent to the Israeli Embassy attack, the US warned Argentina about possible further terrorism. Despite this fact, security in Argentina remained appallingly lax, the borders remained unguarded. Jewish buildings were not protected by cement barriers. Whoever was responsible for these security lapses surely contributed to the AMIA attack--nonetheless no one has been held accountable.

(e) Respected Argentine reporter Dr. Adrian Ventura of La Nacion told me he saw two men wearing blue uniforms digging craters in front of the Israeli Embassy on the Saturday night after it was bombed to give the appearance that a car bomb had exploded.

In any police investigation one examines all possible leads and then discards them one by one based on improbability or lack of evidence. It was clear from the very beginning of the AMIA investigation that the police had a preferred lead--specifically Iran--and they weren't going to give serious consideration to other leads as such information would have been embarrassing to the Menem government. The reality is that this kind of attack could not have taken place without being abetted from the inside.

For the investigation to be thorough, no lead must be left unchecked. If neo-Nazis were involved--perhaps intent on destroying Nazi files in the AMIA building--they must be implicated. If they worked together with Arab extremists as the Mufti allied himself with Adolf Hitler 50 years ago, it must be revealed.

At the open cabinet meeting I attended I was told that Argentine intelligence had concluded that the Israeli Embassy was bombed by an obscure terrorist group called An Sar Allah operating out of Southern Lebanon. If the Menem government is serious about an investigation why has it not directed its attention to Syria which controls Southern Lebanon? Without Syrian cover this terrorist group could not operate. Indeed, if Syria--which the United States protected from terrorist charges in the Pan Am 103 bombing in order to bring her into the peace process--was responsible, that too must be reported. Political expediency has no place in a terrorist investigation; the chips must fall where they may.

The US government's claim that the AMIA bombing was the work of Hizbollah because it so closely resembled the Israeli Embassy attack which had the earmarks of Hizbollah, doesn't wash. It ought to be remembered that after the Oklahoma City bombing, the immediate reaction was that Middle Eastern extremist terrorists were responsible because of similarities with the World Trade Center attack. As it turned out, extremist right wing fanatics played a key part in the Oklahoma City tragedy.

4) Serious questions have also been raised concerning Federal Judge Juan Jose Galeano charged with the investigation into the AMIA bombing.

(a) Until April of 1995, Judge Galeano was handling hundreds of other cases. While he has received no new cases since April he still presides over the hundreds of cases still pending before him.

(b) Questions have been raised about Galeano's independence. After publicly accusing the government of a cover up this past July, I was subpoenaed by Galeano and spent six hours virtually locked in a small room answering questions about my allegations. The judge's assistant spent close to half an hour reading a series of laws warning me that perjury carried with it a serious penalty. There are many in Argentina who believe that the judiciary does not act without approval from high government officials including Menem. I sensed right there in Galeano's presence that the real purpose that afternoon was to intimidate me and to force me to recant my allegations.

There is one other matter which deserves the committee's serious attention.

Buenos Aires is a city that awaits the next terrorist attack. I say this not only because the continued failure to apprehend the terrorists who bombed the embassy and AMIA sends a message to terrorists everywhere that Buenos Aires is an open target, but also because security in Argentina is abysmal.

The Ezeiza Buenos Aires International airport is among the least secure in the world. When I entered Buenos Aires this past July my passport was not checked by computer. It's common knowledge that the borders into Argentina are sieves allowing terrorists to transport explosives unimpeded across the frontier, especially by sea.

To test security I travelled together with several colleagues by boat from Buenos Aires to Uruguay and back this past July. My worst fears were borne out. Among those traveling with me that day by boat was Gabi, an Israeli citizen, who, despite the fact that he entered Argentina using an Argentine passport, left that day using his Israeli passport. In other words, although there was no indication on his Israeli passport that he had arrived in Argentina, he was nonetheless, permitted to leave. Despite the fact that the US government had just issued a warning that a terrorist attack in South America could be imminent, both in Buenos Aires and Uruguay our baggage, which included a tape

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recorder--commonly used by terrorists to hide sophisticated bombs--was not checked. Upon our return to Argentina I walked directly from the ship to the streets of Buenos Aires not even passing through passport control.

To prevent further terrorist attacks in Argentina it is critical that the US government conduct a full on-site investigation into Argentine security. If Argentine airports are found to be unsafe the US government should prohibit American carriers from landing there. And if the Argentine borders are found to be porous, US citizens should be warned not to travel to Argentina.

There is great fear in Buenos Aires. Fear that terrorism will strike again. Fear that Argentina may once again slip back into a dictatorship. Fear on the part of many Argentine Jewish leaders to speak out.

After I publicly accused the Menem government of a cover up this past July, Menem himself called me "totally delirious" in stories carried on the front page of Buenos Aires newspapers. In a lead editorial in *La Nacion* (July 30, 1995), Adrian Ventura indicated that the head of DAIA rejected my accusations "out of fear." Ventura continued, "The truth is that from this moment on the volume has been raised and now the discussion is concentrated on the actions of the security forces." Ventura confirmed what I had heard from scores of Buenos Aires Jews who came up to me and said "Thank you for saying what we believe but were afraid to say."

There is a fire burning in Argentina. Buenos Aires is ripe for another terrorist attack unless America pressures the Argentine government to take serious measures and demands that security be dramatically tightened.

Just days after the horrific World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings terrorists were apprehended. It's almost four years since the Israeli Embassy was blown up and more than one year since the AMIA attack, but there are no serious suspects. And there will be no serious suspects without the US government stepping in to demand a real and full investigation.

**STATEMENT OF TOMMY P. BAER
INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT OF B'NAI B'RITH
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ON TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA
AMIA BOMBING IN ARGENTINA
SEPTEMBER 28, 1995**

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

On behalf of B'nai B'rith members in this country, in Argentina and in 54 other countries around the world, I welcome this opportunity to testify on a subject that has troubled and preoccupied us for more than a year, particularly since our members in Argentina have become deeply frustrated over the failure to find the culprits in the dastardly 1994 AMIA bombing that was so costly in the lives of both Jews and non Jews. The trauma connected with this event was damaging to the functioning of the Jewish community and to Argentina at large. The fact that the bombing was the second on a Jewish or Israeli institution in a two year period adds to the malaise of Jews in Argentina.

I am of two minds on the subject of the bombings and the inability to bring those responsible to justice. At one level, I commend the efforts of President Menem to buoy the spirits of a beleaguered people, and of those judges and investigators who are making a sincere and determined effort to search out the truth and to assure that justice prevails.

At another level, I have a gnawing sense that obstacles are being thrown up by an old guard in the security forces and in the courts, an old guard whose instincts were finely honed under a military dictatorship and which has often been associated with, and protective of, Nazis and neo Nazis.

The two devastating suicide bombings in Buenos Aires had staggering death tolls: Twenty-nine people were killed and 252 injured in the March 1992 attack which destroyed the Israeli Embassy; and 86 people died in the assault on the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA), an agency central to the life of the country's Jewry.

Because of the suicidal nature of the bombings, suspicion pointed to

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Iranian sponsorship of Islamic extremists whose aim worldwide is to defeat the Middle East peace process and to create hostility between Jews and their neighbors. However, no clear evidence sufficient for a trial has yet appeared.

With no clear path to a trial emerging after a year of intensive investigation, the Jewish community is understandably angry, frustrated and despondent. In addition, there is fear which grows out of the realization that Argentina remains a soft target. In fact, in a meeting last year with the country's foreign minister, Guido di Tella, a B'nai B'rith group heard him say that failing to bring the criminal killers to justice would invite a catastrophic, third terrorist attack in Argentina. He saw such an eventuality as enormously destructive to the Jewish community and to democracy.

The attacks are significant because they are directed at the largest Jewish community in Latin America, which is estimated to be in excess 250,000 people.

Wheels of justice turn slowly in Latin America. Argentina, better developed than most countries in the region, is still impeded by a lack of skills to deal with the ferocity of terrorism that has struck it. From the standpoint of courts, laws and the security forces and their apparatus, the country is ill prepared to solve its terrorism problem.

This background, if left in place, hardly invites an enthusiastic investigation of Jewish (or Israeli) institutions. However, in answer to questions from B'nai B'rith, high level Argentine officials claim they have replaced the old guard. Although there is some skepticism among critics, it is recognized that training security forces is a major undertaking. As a result, Argentina has begun to receive technical aid from the United States and other countries. What's more, judges from Argentina have also come to the U.S. to learn how our courts deal with terrorism cases. This is important for the future.

At the onset of the two bombings, enormous technical assistance came from the United States, Israel, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Argentina's acceptance of the offer to help was an admission that other

powers were better equipped to deal with the catastrophe. Indeed, offers of cooperation from U.S. government agencies to Argentina are to be commended. As never before, the importance of the existence of a State Department office of Counter-terrorism has been underscored.

More pressing is the reality that Argentina faces a threat from its open borders, particularly with Paraguay and Brazil. The tri-border region's thriving and unchecked illegal and illicit business in Ciudad del Este, Porto-Iguacu and Foz de Iguacu invites strong suspicions of heavy traffic in drug running, contraband, arms and terrorists. Aside from the fact that customs officials can be bought off for a "closed trunk" passage from Paraguay to Argentina, the documents collected from travelers are discarded after three months. There is no computerization of who crosses borders, in other words, no record of wanted or suspicious individuals is possible. This reality makes it absolutely essential that countries in this hemisphere closely cooperate in an effort to insure that borders cannot be traversed with impunity by terrorists or those who aid and assist them.

The prospects for rapid technological change are bleak because of the precarious economic situation in Argentina which now suffers from an official posting of 18.6 percent unemployment, but observers estimate an even higher figure. As a reaction, public protests have been growing.

On the positive side, Argentina is now playing a lead role in promoting interest in addressing the ravages of terrorism in the region. Additionally, the Argentine government has announced that it will issue new fraud-proof passports. This is even catching the eyes of previously disinterested countries like Brazil and Paraguay.

The investigation of the AMIA bombing has been the focus of one judge, Juan Jose Galeano. Following the Gallic system of law, judges are empowered to gather information and to prosecute. But if there is cynicism about the security forces which are supposed to aid the judges, the courts themselves are not highly respected institutions in Argentina.

By contrast, Judge Galeano has worked tirelessly with a small staff and volunteers in a difficult landscape for pursuing leads. Upon learning that

the judge was not free from his other court duties, and worked on the AMIA case only part-time, B'nai B'rith questioned government officials and other judges on this point. To its credit the government released Judge Galeano from all duties but the AMIA case.

The judge works closely with the Jewish community, particularly with the DAIA, whose president, Ruben Beraja, who is here today, is both an eloquent spokesman and frequent critic of the government's failings in the pursuit of the case.

However, at the outset there were numerous runs down blind alleys.

By early August 1995, the judge had four people under detention. The lead suspect is Carlos (Tel-el-deen') Telleldin, the son of a sadistic torturer close to the Junta, who had been a high ranking security official from Cordoba. Telleldin espouses neo-Nazi views and is being held for involvement in the falsifying of documents of the vehicle used in the bombing.

However, knowledgeable people see Telleldin "as only a small cog in the wheel". Other operatives, especially those who planned this terrorist act, are still at large.

Many terrorism analysts believe that Iranian embassies are the spark for activating dormant Hizbollah and other Muslim extremist cells. As evidence, they point to the enormous presence of Iranian embassy officials in countries like Argentina where there is a small Iranian community, and limited trade with Iran.

Insofar as diplomatic representation is concerned, senior government officials in both Chile and Uruguay told me several months ago that they are aware of the potential problems posed by "over representation" at the Iranian Embassies in their countries.

I should add that several years ago Argentina and Iran were cooperating on a joint nuclear project which had boosted the trade between both countries to a significant level. We are told that the joint nuclear project has ceased, but trade continues, albeit at lower levels.

Although there is the general belief among many that the government will not prove a case against anyone who directed the attack, some experts expect substantial breaks in the case. It was thought that one occurred most recently.

In early August, seven suspects from Paraguay – six Lebanese and one Brazilian – were extradited to Buenos Aires for their connections with a German born Nazi arms seller; they were released in less than 48 hours for lack of evidence.

This seemed odd to us: after all, it was Argentina which pressed for the extradition of the seven from Paraguay in the first place. Why were the suspects released so quickly? Would not there have existed probable cause precedent to a request for extradition?

What has been clear all along is that terrorism raises uncomfortable questions for societies on the following issues:

- 1.) the nature of security forces in Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil and their ability or interest in dealing with finding suspected terrorists;
- 2.) the need to secure borders by improving surveillance and checks on traffickers in drugs, contraband and the apparatus of terrorism; and
- 3.) the scant ability to share intelligence on the murky figures of Islamic extremism who have targeted Latin America.

With whatever flaws exist in the emerging systems, the affected countries have begun to realize that the damage from terrorism now far outweighs the unrestricted movement of people and goods across a thriving trade zone between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. One of the reasons is the increased pressure from the United States and from groups like B'nai B'rith, which continue to raise the twin issues of tightening security and seeking justice. At the very least, some of these countries now see that their international reputations for pursuing justice now count for something.

Thus, some countries in the region are aiming to comply with higher

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standards. Paraguay had no democratic rule in recent memory. The 34-year long dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner totally controlled all life forms. There is now a democratically elected government in Paraguay and clearly, the old way of "doing business" is changing. It is significant that the extradition, which involved appeals by two of the terrorist suspects, went through a process of adjudication. Despite insider claims of money changing hands at one court level, the judges abided by judicial rules.

In memory of those who died, and as tribute to those who worked in the rescue and the search, B'nai B'rith and other Jewish organizations have pressed for a concerted effort to find those responsible.

What can individual organizations like B'nai B'rith do to create an awareness of the threat posed by international terrorism?

B'nai B'rith Argentina sponsored a two day conference on July 3 and 4, 1995 to analyze the wide reaching effects of terrorism. With the participation of government officials, rabbis and priests, educators and psychologists, the conference attracted more than 1000 attendees. This historic conference, the first of its kind ever held in Argentina, raised the profile of the terrorist threat and proposed concrete steps to confront it.

B'nai B'rith has also maintained contact with a broad range of United States and Argentine officials in order to:

- 1.) gather information in order to properly assess the terrorist threat;
- 2.) to offer constructive insights into possible ways to improve security;
- 3.) to offer Argentine officials a platform to share their perspectives and interpret their policies and positions;
- 4.) to commend the positive steps that are taken to improve the situation, including greater cooperation among appropriate agencies and countries of the hemisphere; and
- 5.) to continue pressuring the Argentine government.

From the viewpoint of worldwide Jewry it is important not to forget the innocent victims who lost their lives in the two Argentine bombings.

B'nai B'rith pledges to continue its global role in working to expose the threat posed by International terrorism not just to Jewish communities and to Israel, but to democracies everywhere, including our own.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today.

**INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA,
AND THE AMIA BOMBING IN ARGENTINA**

**TESTIMONY OF
JACOB KOVADLOFF, CONSULTANT ON LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**

**BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify today on a matter of grave importance to our country and to the security and well-being of democratic societies throughout the Western Hemisphere and across the globe. Under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, the Committee has devoted considerable attention to this urgent issue -- probing the international connections that facilitate terrorist acts, and crafting legislation that will deter such acts, dry up their sources of support, and severely punish their perpetrators. The American Jewish Committee commends you in this critical effort and pledges to continue our work with the Committee and others in the Congress and in the Administration who seek to raise public awareness about the threat posed by international terrorism and to develop tough and practical countermeasures.

By way of introduction, Mr. Chairman, I must tell you that my connection to the issue before the Committee today is profoundly personal. I am Argentine and Jewish. For the last eight of its more than 30 years of existence, I was the director of the American Jewish Committee's South American Office, headquartered in Buenos Aires. In June of 1977, I left my country due to escalating threats to my family, my staff and, of course, myself. At that time, my country was in political turmoil, torn by a virtual civil war between subversive groups and the forces of repression -- and among civilian, military and paramilitary organizations. After the threat of political violence forced us to close our office in Buenos Aires, the American Jewish Committee continued to work alongside democratic institutions, both Jewish and non-Jewish, in Washington and New York, that sought an end to the repression and civil strife in my country. In the years since the end of that dark chapter in Argentine history, the American Jewish Committee, through frequent exchanges in both countries, has remained in close contact with the Jewish community there, with Argentine civic institutions, and with the Government of Argentina.

Allow me to say, Mr. Chairman, that many of us have not forgotten and still harbor deep gratitude to you for your help to the victims of the barbaric struggle in my home country. We have not forgotten, either, your firm condemnation of the anti-Semitic acts which were a common occurrence in Argentina during that terrible time.

Indeed, the history of extremist political movements -- in and out of power -- in my native country and across Latin America for several decades has been interwoven with anti-Semitism. In a sense, today's hearing revisits a chapter of that history that might well be called

"From Domestic Terrorism to International Terrorism." In a 1980 AJC analysis, "Latin America -- The Arab Connection," we described how the political pragmatism of many Latin American governments gradually allowed the penetration of a discriminatory and anti-Semitic ideology into their diplomacy. Its culmination was the infamous vote at the United Nations equating Zionism and racism. In an oddly parallel fashion, anti-government guerrillas and subversive movements from the 1960's onward, with support from anti-Western governments in the Muslim world, voiced similar strains of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. Operatives of some of these so-called liberation movements received weapons, money and asylum from confrontational nonaligned states, with training camps in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Sudan.

While in Argentina today there are no surviving structures of militant movements of the extreme left, it is easy to see that individuals and small groups of the extreme right, remnants of the repressive former regime and its support network, are still active, anonymously, in important areas of Argentina's political life, particularly in its armed forces, and in the security and intelligence services. The link between these groups and individuals on the militant right, and the terrorist attacks against the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community in Buenos Aires of 1992 and 1994, respectively, has never been firmly established, but there continues to be speculation in Argentina that such groups may have played a supportive, logistical role in the bombings -- and, through law enforcement connections, may have complicated the government's investigative efforts.

Before turning to those terrible incidents in 1992 and 1994, I must say emphatically, Mr. Chairman, that it would be inaccurate and unfair to broadly characterize Argentina as an anti-Semitic country and a Nazi haven -- stigmas which are frequently applied to my native country. Yes, there are racists in Argentina, and yes, the country harbored a number of infamous figures of German Nazism -- but Argentine society as a whole rejects anti-Semitism. Indeed, in 1992 the American Jewish Committee in cooperation with the DAIA, Argentina's umbrella group of Jewish organizations, published an opinion survey in which a decisive 81 percent of respondents expressed acceptance and tolerance of Jews -- a significant rise from previous studies conducted in the 1960's and 70's.

The 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires elicited broad and sincere expressions of public sympathy with the victims and their families, and with the Jewish community generally. But those expressions were, of course, made nearly incidental by the horror of the attacks themselves -- attacks that together killed more than 120 individuals, and that as yet have led to no conclusive prosecutorial action. Shortly after the March 17, 1992, bombing that destroyed the Israeli Embassy -- and again just three days after the July 18, 1994, bombing that reduced to rubble the AMIA Jewish community headquarters building -- large public demonstrations were conducted in Buenos Aires in support of Israel and the Argentine Jewish community, and in tribute to the victims. President Menem and his entire cabinet, Catholic Church leaders, lawmakers and representatives from all walks of Argentine life joined the Argentine Jewish community in expressions of solidarity and in condemnation of the attacks.

After the 1992 bombing, a newspaper in Buenos Aires headlined its report on the

TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

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demonstrations with these words: "We are all Jews." A member of Israel's Parliament, the Knesset, answered back: "We are all Argentines." Two years later, as I saw when I and my colleague Jason Isaacson, AJC's Director of Government and International Affairs, joined the public demonstration after the AMIA bombing, "We are all Jews" was a slogan prominently displayed on banners above the streets of Buenos Aires.

Official Government reaction to the bombing of the AMIA building was immediate and heartfelt. Just hours after the first reports of the attack, Argentina's Consul General in New York, Arnaldo Listre, was able to arrange a meeting for American Jewish Committee officials with the then-Interior Minister and now Vice President Carlos Ruckauf, who was visiting New York; in that meeting and in further discussions with AJC later that week in Buenos Aires with Minister Ruckauf, Foreign Minister Guido DiTella, and other officials, and in the televised and frankly emotional public apology to the Jewish community issued by President Menem, the Government sought again and again to express its outrage and sorrow, and its determination to apprehend those responsible for this unspeakable crime.

While the public reaction and the public statements by the nation's leaders were sincere and appropriate, the action that has followed those expressions has been frustratingly inadequate - frustrating, I know, to Minister DiTella, with whom I and several of my colleagues in AJC met yesterday in New York, and frustrating to the Argentine Jewish community and to all who are committed to justice in the AMIA case.

Answers to the questions posed by both of the Buenos Aires bombings have eluded the Argentine criminal justice system, although a consensus has formed among Western intelligence officials that the attacks were carried out primarily by operatives of or connected to Hizbollah, very likely at the direction of or with the knowledge of Iranian officials. After both bombings, there was speculation in Argentina that the attacks were intended as signals to the government that its warming relations with Israel -- and perceptions of a cooling in political and commercial relations with some in the Arab world -- would carry a heavy price. While such speculation cannot be discounted, it must be said that other countries, even in Latin America, have enjoyed a longer history of close relations with Israel without experiencing similar tragedies.

The choice of Buenos Aires as the site for these two terrorist assaults has been the subject of considerable anxiety and speculation. In fact, we may never know why the bombers selected Buenos Aires; with each passing month, the prospect of resolving these crimes grows more uncertain. But there are facts we do know: That with its long and, in many areas, minimally patrolled international borders, and its sorely inefficient immigration control procedures, Argentina likely offered the relatively easy access to and from their targets that terrorists require. That within the ranks of right-wing extremist elements and within radicalized segments of the immigrant Arab population in Argentina and its border regions, outside agents would be likely to find operational support for an attack on Jewish institutions. That, at least from the perspective of 1994, it was unclear whether Argentina's investigative services had the will, or the experience, or the competence to resolve a difficult case of international terrorism.

The American Jewish Committee has explored these and other factors that may have contributed to the circumstances of the AMIA bombing in two publications. Shortly after the attack, we published a text by Professor Carlos Waisman of the University of California in San Diego -- "Why Argentina?" -- that portrayed the political and sociological context of the attack and described how local extremist groups could have given logistical support to the culprits in the AMIA bombing, likely members of an anti-Israel radical Islamic faction.

On the first anniversary of the attack, we published a report prepared for the American Jewish Committee by an Argentine journalist, Sergio Kiernan, titled "Atrocity in Buenos Aires - The AMIA Bombing, One Year Later." It provides the most thorough and balanced analysis I have yet reviewed of the investigation to date, and its forecast of progress toward a successful resolution of the case is nothing short of discouraging. As the Committee knows, the only suspect now being held in the case is Carlos Alberto Telleldin, a secondhand-car dealer who had connections with the police and especially with a Dr. Berges, who is well known in Argentina for having cooperated in the military repression of the 1970's. The investigation conducted by Judge Juan José Galeano has made little apparent progress in part, at least, because he and the prosecutors simultaneously are responsible for scores of other cases before the same court.

I respectfully request that both Professor Waisman's and Mr. Kiernan's studies be considered part of my testimony and be included in the hearing record.

The 1995 edition of the prestigious publication "Antisemitism World Report," which is published jointly by the London-based Institute of Jewish Affairs and the AJC, states in the final paragraphs of its entry on Argentina a conclusion similar to those I have made here. It says, in part:

"The bombing of the AMIA on 18 July was the most serious attack on a Jewish community outside Israel since the Second World War. In terms of Argentine antisemitism, it was a vivid demonstration of a certain contradictory trend. On the one hand, the incidence of antisemitic prejudice and manifestations in the country remains sporadic, even decreasing (despite an increase in the general crime rate).... On the other hand, the attack represented the second time in twenty-eight months that Buenos Aires was chosen as the site of international anti-Israeli or anti-Jewish terrorism.

"President Menem and key members of his cabinet are aware that such attacks bring back memories of Argentina as a place where terrorism is not yet something of the past, and undermine official efforts to attract foreign investment.... Responsibility for the AMIA bombing has been ascribed by the Argentine, Israeli and US governments, as well as by numerous analysts (both Jewish and non-Jewish) to Islamic militants. The latter, though, may have subcontracted parts of, if not the whole of, the operation to local anti-Jewish elements -- whether opposed or otherwise to the Menem administration's neo-liberal economic policies and international alignment with the USA -- or to other operatives."

It is worthy of note that Hizbollah, identified by intelligence agencies and singled out by

Secretary Christopher as the party most likely responsible for the AMIA attack, receives considerable funding from Iran -- some \$100 million annually, as U.S. experts have told us -- and operates with apparent ease in Syria and Lebanon. It is disturbing that, although Argentina appears to be seeking a lower profile in its relations with Iran, it continues to maintain such relations in the face of the consensus view of Hizbollah involvement in terrorist acts on Argentine soil. I know that some who are committed to justice in the AMIA case are concerned, as well, about Argentina's recent decision to sell one or more nuclear reactors to Syria, a nation that remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism -- although the Argentine Government has said that such a sale is dependent on the achievement of peace between Syria and Israel. As AJC has pledged to continue to monitor and report on the AMIA and Embassy investigations, we will continue to monitor these and other related issues in the pursuit of justice for the victims of those tragedies.

A prestigious Argentine writer has said that "the July 18th attack puts before us a tragedy and a drama. The tragedy, which is irreparable, is what happened. The drama, which is eventually reversible, is the state of powerlessness in which Argentina is today when trying to counter the impunity with which the attack's authors were able to act and the awful effects of the pain and sorrow they have sown."

It is to defeat that sense of powerlessness and to provide maximum assurance that the terrible events of March 1992 and July 1994 will not be repeated in Buenos Aires that we know key officials of the Argentine Government are committed -- a commitment we share. We hope this Committee will do all in its power, Mr. Chairman, to encourage a broadening of the international intelligence cooperation initiated among Argentina, the United States and Israel, in particular, in the wake of the Buenos Aires attacks, and to seek intensified participation by Argentina and other states throughout the Hemisphere in efforts to protect against international terrorist acts, block support for those acts -- whether such support derives from governments or individuals -- and punish those who engage in them.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to express to you my gratitude for having been called to testify before the Committee. I note that I am joined here today by my colleague Richard Foltin, AJC's Legislative Director and Counsel. On behalf of the American Jewish Committee, I must again thank you for your continued devotion to the eradication of the scourge of terrorism, and for the intense focus you have applied today to these tragic acts in my native country.

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ידישער וועלט-קאנגרעס

הקונגרס היהודי העולמי

WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

CONGRES JUIF MONDIAL • CONGRESO JUDIO MUNDIAL

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Statement by Israel Singer,
Secretary General, World Jewish Congress

on the subject of international terrorism

before the House International Relations Committee

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee,

I wish to express my thanks to you for holding hearings on this critical and urgent topic and allowing me to testify on the subject.

I come here in my capacity as Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress. As such my concern with this matter extends beyond that which we all share as Americans to include those of Jewish communities both here and especially abroad. I am particularly delighted that WJC vice-president Dr. Rubén Beraja, head of Argentina's Jewish community, has joined us here today.

The issue before us cannot of course be reduced to one-dimensional causes and formulas. So in the short time which is allotted, I want to focus specifically on the particular characteristic of the terrorist virus which clearly was at work and was behind the bombing of the AMIA center in Buenos Aires. That is the threat posed by fundamentalist Islamic terror.

At these hearings we are looking at the issue as it relates to Latin America, but it is abundantly clear that the threat in that region is not isolated from the more general one and that Jews have been made a specific though certainly not the exclusive target of these criminals. Witness the events in the past two years in Buenos Aires, Panama, London, and Lyon, France.

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Statement by Israel Singer
before the House International Relations Committee

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We have asked Steven Emerson, whose extraordinary 1994 documentary "Jihad in America" is viewed by many as the catalyst for the omnibus anti-terror legislation to produce a report in cooperation with our Research Institute (the Institute of the World Jewish Congress) on the world-wide Jihad movement. A copy of this report is being made available to the Committee members, and it is based on its findings that I wish to make the following observations:

Fundamentalist Islamic terror represents one of the most lethal threats to the stability of Western society. But at this point I wish to underline the very important fact that militant Islamic fundamentalism is not synonymous with the Islamic religion. The vast majority of the world's more than one billion Muslims condone neither terror nor violence. It is only a small minority which advocates militancy.

Fundamentalist Islamic terror represents one of the most lethal threats to the stability of Western society. The worldwide Jihad movement traces its roots to the Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan and the Muslim Brotherhood originally established in Egypt. Unfortunately, neither Western policy makers nor their constituents have fully grasped the implications of the fact that militant Muslim fundamentalists have organized extensive infrastructures particularly in the United States, taking advantage of American democracy and exploiting its freedoms. At the heart of this brand of Islam (to which a majority of Muslims do not subscribe) is Jihad — holy war to bring about the subjugation of non-believers and the creation of an Islamic empire. The movement is permeated by hostility toward the West — in particular the United States — and above all hatred of Jews and Israel. In the last several years, using the latest technology, the militants have managed to build up an impressive international infrastructure, which is geared toward fundraising, the recruitment of volunteers, and para-military training. Some of its members were responsible for the murderous bomb blast in the World Trade Center in New York. Documents captured in raids on the homes of suspects revealed elaborate plans for other such attacks in the US, Israel and elsewhere. Militant fundamentalism is on the rise throughout the Muslim world, as well as in Islamic communities in the West. Sudan is already firmly in its grip and Algeria and Egypt are directly threatened. Unless the West takes action to rein in this menace it could find itself the victim of extremist violence on a level hitherto unimagined.

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Statement by Israel Singer
before the House International Relations Committee

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The West, and in particular the US, must finally confront "political Islam" instead of sweeping the problem under the rug. The State Department seems to be guided by the philosophy that militant Islam need not be confronted; that only the "extremists" need to be challenged. Such a policy is doomed to failure because it posits the existence of artificial differentiations within militant Islamic movements. The essential element guiding these movements is the necessary aggrandizement of Islam at the expense of all other systems. As such, the much disparaged "conflict of civilizations" between Islam and to the West is, in fact, a conflict of irreconcilable values between political Islam and the West.

The State Department still believes in the notion that dialogue with the Islamic Movements is something that should be pushed forward. Unfortunately, the dialogue is in reality a means by which Islamists gloss over their differences with the West in an effort to lull it into a false sense of security. Unless the US recognizes first and foremost the differences with political Islam, the path of "dialogue" is an empty and dangerous gesture.

Most tragically, the reticence to face this threat has pulled the rug out from the great majority of Muslims who do not believe in a militant interpretation: secularists, modernists, and even traditionalists who do not demand the establishment of Islamic empires. Indeed, only through the emergence of a moderate Islam will a competing ideological center of gravity to political Islam be created. And in order for that to occur, the West, led by the US, must be willing to lend its great moral weight to the delegitimation of militant Islam and to the concomitant build-up of moderate Islam. In fact, the great power available to the US in this debate is largely of a moral nature; ultimately the militants would not be able to survive a worldwide effort of discreditation and marginalization.

Fortunately, the Clinton Administration has recognized the security threat emanating from militant Islam. Hence, the introduction of the counter-terrorist legislation in March 1995, which calls for the initiation of unprecedented judicial procedures allowing the use of secret evidence against resident aliens suspected of terrorist acts. In a sense, the Clinton Administration's security policy towards Islamic radicalism is ahead of its political policy. This emanates from hard-headed assessments by law enforcement officials who have perceived the international threat in much more substantive ways than have State Department officials.

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Statement by Israel Singer
before the House International Relations Committee

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In addition to the security elements, a comprehensive policy towards militant Islam will require the following components:

- * Intelligence and law enforcement coordination between Western and pro-Western states in the Middle East.
- * Support for moderate Muslim institutions and development of moderate Muslim leadership networks together with other countries.
- * Exposure and delegitimation of radical ideological movements.
- * A sustained coordinated anti-terrorist policy that confronts all the institutions, regimes, and support networks that aid radical cadres willing to carry out terrorism against the West.

STATEMENT

of

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

on

International Terrorism in Latin America

BEFORE THE

House International Relations Committee

September 28, 1995

House Committee Testimony - September 28, 1995

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for allowing the Anti-Defamation League the opportunity to testify at this most important hearing. My name is Barry Mehler.

The Anti-Defamation League, through its Gorowitz Institute and Klinghoffer Foundation has been deeply involved in the effort to combat domestic and international terrorism through educational and legislative means. ADL's Jarkow Institute has helped support our activities in Latin America.

As you know, on July 18, 1994, the world was shocked by the horrific bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires. The terrorists who committed this heinous crime did not just destroy a building; they struck at the very heart of the Argentine Jewish community. Among the eighty-seven killed and scores wounded in the blast were Jews visiting the building to pick up their pensions, to look for work, to seek assistance. The records of a hundred years of Argentine Jewish history were lost. In the bomb's wake, the community -- which had suffered the bombing of the Israeli embassy just two years earlier -- was left fearful, helpless and demoralized. They wonder when and where the third bombing will occur. Yet, fourteen months after the assault against the AMIA building, and over three years after the destruction of the embassy, little if any progress has been made.

In April, 1995, a delegation of seventeen leaders of the Anti-Defamation League visited Argentina. Our objective was to demonstrate the solidarity of American Jews with the Argentine

Jewish community and to assess the Argentine government's investigation into the bombings of the AMIA building and the Israeli embassy.

Prior to the trip to Argentina, several members of the delegation met with the terrorism divisions of the FBI and the State Department and were briefed on the current status of the Argentine government's investigation into both bombings and also given observations of both divisions on various facts and assumptions.

In the four days that the delegation was in Argentina, we met with government officials including, among others, President Carlos Menem, the Ministers of Justice and Interior, and the Director of State Intelligence Service in addition to several members of his staff. Additionally, we met with members of the DAIA which is the umbrella organization of Jewish organizations in Argentina. We also met with business leaders and both American and Israeli diplomats.

These meetings clearly showed that the Argentine government led by President Menen has shown a greater seriousness and responsiveness investigating the AMIA bombing than what was shown following the embassy bombing. We also came to the following conclusions:

- 1) the expertise of the various Argentine security and police departments is much less than what would be desirable. A general consensus of the people we spoke to felt that the experience and training of the investigators was not up to solving the problems presented. In this regard we would suggest

that the American government and the FBI in particular expand the availability of counterterrorism schools to Argentine personnel. We understand some of this training has already taken place by the FBI and we feel that much more is necessary.

2) From what we were able to gather, there is very little coordination in Argentina between the various entities that are investigating these two bombings. We heard that they don't share information but rather that each one wants to be the one to "hit a home run" and this has greatly hindered the investigation.

3) In the IGUACU area in the north of Argentina where the borders of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina meet, there is an Islamic extremist group that I understand resides on the Brazilian side of the river. The border between these countries is very porous and, having spent some time in the area, I can agree that it is almost impossible, if not impossible, to police crossings. It would be very easy for terrorists to slip over into Argentina from either Brazil or Paraguay, commit a terrorist act, and then return quickly.

We suggest that a tri-lateral commission be set up between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay to maintain control of the groups that live in this area. There certainly should be infiltrators as well as monitors at work. We urge the United States government to work with the respective governments to have such a commission formed that would be active in the prevention of terrorism that emanates from this area.

But just as the United States must encourage Argentina to take firm steps to combat terrorism, we must continue to be at

the vanguard of this international effort. Enactment of tough, comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation has been a top legislative priority for the Anti-Defamation League and the broader Jewish community. We support the broad policy objectives of the bill and are disturbed by recent reports that the momentum behind this measure has been stalled.

The Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Act is an important complement to existing legislation, and strengthens the rule of law against terrorists worldwide. Most important, the bill strives for an appropriate balance between Constitutional safeguards and the need for a more aggressive response to this escalating threat.

The recent bombings in Buenos Aires, as well as those in Paris, Jerusalem, and Oklahoma City demonstrate all too clearly that no country, no religious group, no individual, is immune from the threat of terrorism. The only effective antidote to this scourge is through aggressive local and multilateral counterterrorism measures.

Mr. Chairman, member of the committee, thank you for your time.

Ralph I. Goldman

Father of David Ben Rafael,

Victim of terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, March 17, 1992

House Committee on International Relations

September 28, 1995

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On March 17th, 1992 I lost my son David Ben Rafael in the most deadly terrorist act of that year, the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.

American born and educated, raised on the values of freedom and justice, he was there as the minister of the Israel legation.

In the years that passed since that day, I lost my confidence in the will of the government of Argentina to pursue the investigation into this criminal incident and its perpetrators, with energy and determination.

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For more than three years I have pressed the Argentine authorities with respect to two simple questions;

- 1) what has the Argentine government done about the investigation of the March 17, 1992 bombing of the Israel Embassy,
and
- 2) specifically, has the Argentine government investigated why their two policemen who were charged with guarding the Israel Embassy were not on duty when the attack took place.

I take the opportunity to draw to the attention of this distinguished body that to this date no response publicly or privately to either question has been offered by the Argentine government, and that the investigation is apparently at a halt.

We know that the poisonous weed of terrorism grows mainly where ripe conditions exist. In retrospect, it is clear that Argentina continues to provide such fertile ground.

A second deadly attack took place in Buenos Aires on July 18th, 1994, this time striking at the heart of the Jewish community.

Following the investigations of the two terrorist attacks, one can not avoid the frustrating conclusion that the authorities of Argentina failed twice in their duty as a sovereign government:

Once --

They failed to create the right climate of deterrence that would have prevented terrorism from operating on its territory. It saddens me to suggest that perhaps the opposite climate existed there: one that attracts terror by an astonishing leniency of its law enforcement apparatus.

And the second failure -

Is the inability of the authorities to capture and bring to trial those citizens of Argentina who, with their deeds or omission, were auxiliary to the two attacks.

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

The political tradition of Argentina in the last quarter of a century is characterized by short memory. The natural tendency there, as demonstrated through various regimes, is the tendency to forget.

I am cognizant of the fact that America has used its utmost resolve and concerted resources to fight this terrorist scourge. However, not enough has been done.

Americans must not let these events in Argentina be forgotten until justice is served. I urge that the Congress of the United States use its prestige and economic power to assure meaningful investigations of the 1992 and 1994 terrorist attacks and to keep the international community and the families of the victims informed.

Moreover, I hope that these hearings will continue and will contribute to a thorough resolution of the investigations at hand.

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

I opened my statement by sharing with you the fact that I, personally, have suffered from terrorism in Argentina. No action you take will return my son, and others, to life

However, your voice can be heard and your statement can resonate in the free democratic world, encouraging the government of Argentina to exhaust all measures to pursue justice in these cases.

By doing that, you may be adding a significant weapon to the global war against terrorism.

Thank you.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

Statement of James L. Brown
Deputy Associate Director (Criminal Enforcement)
Before the House International Relations Committee

September 28, 1995

THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT THIS TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS (ATF) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. ATF APPRECIATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS DISCUSSION CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON TERRORISM.

AS THE FORMER CHIEF OF ATF'S EXPLOSIVES DIVISION, THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE (IACP) AND AN APPOINTED ADVISOR TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOMB TECHNICIANS AND INVESTIGATORS (IABTI), I HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN EXPLOSIVES MATTERS, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, AS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FOR THE PAST 31 YEARS. IN MY CURRENT CAPACITY, I CONTINUE TO OVERSEE ATF'S EFFORTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL EXPLOSIVES LAWS, ALONG WITH ADDRESSING EXPLOSIVES-RELATED ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE IACP AND THE IABTI.

TODAY, I AM PLEASED TO DISCUSS SOME OF ATF'S INITIATIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE CONTINUING SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO OTHER FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. INCLUDED IN THIS TESTIMONY ARE THE CAPABILITIES ATF HAS IN ADDRESSING THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

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ATF HAS STATUTORY JURISDICTION OVER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE XI OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970, AS CODIFIED IN PUBLIC LAW 91-452. THE ACT ASSIGNED THE AUTHORITY FOR ADMINISTERING THIS LAW TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. ATF STRIVES TO BRING THE FULL FORCE OF THIS ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY TO BEAR AGAINST THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLENCE INVOLVING EXPLOSIVES. THIS IS BEING ACCOMPLISHED BOTH NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, THROUGH INVESTIGATIONS OF CRIMINAL BOMBINGS AND EXPLOSIVES THEFTS; INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING TO FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND FOREIGN AGENCIES; AND PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC FROM POTENTIAL INJURY, DEATH, OR PROPERTY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE IMPROPER STORAGE OR ILLICIT USE OF EXPLOSIVES.

SINCE BECOMING A BUREAU IN 1972, ATF HAS MADE CONSIDERABLE STRIDES IN EXPLOSIVES CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION. ATF'S GREATEST ASSET IN THIS REGARD IS ITS SPECIAL AGENTS, WHO THROUGH YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AND ADVANCED TRAINING, HAVE DEVELOPED AN UNMATCHED EXPERTISE IN POSTBLAST ANALYSIS. THIS EXPERTISE HAS, IN TURN, BEEN SHARED WITH ATF'S LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTERPARTS AT THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS THROUGH SUPPORT INITIATIVES DEVELOPED TO ASSIST THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE EXPLOSIVES CRIME

-3-

SCENES AND REDUCE THE INCIDENCE OF THIS VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY.

ONE SUCH INITIATIVE IS ATF'S NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (NRT). THE NRT CONSISTS OF FOUR TEAMS ORGANIZED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO COVER THE UNITED STATES. EACH TEAM, COMPRISED OF 20-25 EXPERTS INCLUDING POSTBLAST AND FIRE RECONSTRUCTION INVESTIGATORS, CHEMISTS, AND BOMB TECHNICIANS, CAN RESPOND WITHIN 24 HOURS TO ASSIST IN ONSITE POSTBLAST INVESTIGATIONS WHEN REQUESTED BY STATE OR LOCAL OFFICIALS. THIS SPECIALIZED RESPONSE CAPABILITY IS THE ONLY ONE OF ITS KIND OFFERED BY A FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY. TO DATE, THE NRT HAS RESPONDED 309 TIMES TO INCIDENTS THAT HAVE CAUSED 432 DEATHS, 2,324, INJURIES AND \$2.4 BILLION IN PROPERTY DAMAGE. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY AND THE TEAM MEMBERS WERE MOST PUBLICLY EVIDENT IN ATF'S RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND OKLAHOMA CITY FEDERAL BUILDING BOMBINGS.

IT WAS ATF'S RECOVERY OF THE PARTIAL VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF THE VAN IN WHICH THE BOMB WAS CARRIED THAT ULTIMATELY LED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE PERPETRATORS OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING.

-4-

AND IN OKLAHOMA CITY, 200 ATF AGENTS, BOMB TECHNICIANS, AND CHEMISTS, AS PART OF TWO NRT'S WORKING SIDE BY SIDE WITH FBI INVESTIGATORS, QUICKLY RECONSTRUCTED THE DEVASTATING BOMB AND THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THIS HORRIFIC CRIME.

EVEN BEFORE THE TRAGEDIES OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBINGS, ATF HAD TAKEN STEPS TO STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INVESTIGATING INCIDENTS OF THIS MAGNITUDE. AS A MEMBER OF THE TERRORISM SUB-WORKING GROUP, WHICH IS ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ATF HAS BEEN CONDUCTING RESEARCH INVOLVING LARGE-SCALE VEHICLE BOMBS.

THROUGH THIS RESEARCH PROJECT, LAW ENFORCEMENT WORLD-WIDE WILL DERIVE MUCH-NEEDED INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE EXPLOSIVES SIGNATURE, BLAST EFFECT, DEBRIS DISTANCE, AND RESIDUE RETRIEVAL.

SINCE JULY 1994, THERE HAVE BEEN 10 TESTS (RANGING FROM 50 TO 1,000 POUNDS) AT THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY (DNA) HIGH EXPLOSIVES TEST SITE IN WHITE SANDS, NEW MEXICO. TWO ADDITIONAL TESTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE

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DATA COLLECTION. THESE TWO TESTS WILL BE SCHEDULED SOMETIME IN 1996.

ATF EXPLOSIVES TECHNICIANS, NRT MEMBERS, EXPLOSIVES SPECIALISTS, AND LABORATORY PERSONNEL ARE UTILIZED TO OBSERVE AND COLLECT ALL TEST DATA. ASSISTING IN THIS EFFORT ARE THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE DNA. THE ADVANCED TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE RECEIVED BY THE ABOVE PERSONNEL IN MAJOR CAR BOMBINGS IS UNEQUALED. THERE IS NO OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY TRAINING INVESTIGATORS IN CAR BOMBINGS OF THIS MAGNITUDE.

ALSO SUPPORTING ATF'S EXPLOSIVES ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ARE ITS LABORATORIES IN MARYLAND, GEORGIA, AND CALIFORNIA. BESIDES PROVIDING THE FULL RANGE OF TRADITIONAL FORENSIC ANALYSIS, THESE LABORATORIES ROUTINELY EXAMINE THE COMPONENTS OF BOTH INTACT AND FUNCTIONED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND EXPLOSIVES DEBRIS IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY DEVICE COMPONENTS AND THE EXPLOSIVES USED. THE LABORATORIES ALSO PROVIDE TRACE EVIDENCE COMPARISONS. MOREOVER, THE LABORATORIES MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH EXPLOSIVES MANUFACTURERS WHO PROVIDE THEM WITH EXEMPLARS OF NEW EXPLOSIVES PRODUCTS ON THE MARKET.

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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS IS ANOTHER TOOL USED BY ATF TO SUPPORT ITS EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS. ATF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE ARSON AND BOMBING INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES SUBUNIT (ABIS) OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CRIME ARE TRAINED IN THE TECHNIQUES OF PREPARING ANALYSES ON SERIAL ARSONISTS AND BOMBERS TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT IN IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE SUSPECTS BASED ON CHARACTERISTICS PARTICULAR TO INCIDENTS. RELATED CONCEPTS OF THESE ANALYSES CAN ALSO BE APPLIED TO OTHER AREAS SUCH AS ONSITE CRIME SCENE ASSESSMENTS, SUSPECT INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES, AND INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES.

ATF ALSO HAS A CADRE OF EXPLOSIVES ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WHO HAVE UNEQUALED TECHNICAL EXPERTISE IN THE EXPLOSIVES AND BOMB DISPOSAL FIELDS. THEY CONSTRUCT FACSIMILES OF EXPLOSIVE AND INCENDIARY DEVICES, RENDER DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE DETERMINATIONS, PROVIDE EXPERT ANALYSES OF INTACT AND FUNCTIONED EXPLOSIVE/INCENDIARY DEVICES, AND PROVIDE ONSITE INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE AT BOMBINGS. THEY KEEP ATF ABREAST OF THE LATEST TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO EXPLOSIVES AND ISSUE CLASSIFICATIONS FOR NEW EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES AND MATERIALS.

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IN ADDITION, THEY PROVIDE TECHNICAL ADVICE ON FEDERAL EXPLOSIVES STORAGE REGULATIONS, AND PROVIDE TRAINING IN ALL ASPECTS OF EXPLOSIVES HANDLING, DESTRUCTION, AND INSTRUCTION FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. RECENTLY, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ATF EXPLOSIVES EXPERTS PROVIDED POST BLAST TRAINING TO POLICE OFFICIALS FROM RUSSIA.

IN AN AGREEMENT WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORIST ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ATF PROVIDES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WITH REGARD TO EXPLOSIVES EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES FOR EXAMINATION. THROUGH THIS SAME PROGRAM, ATF PROVIDES TRAINING IN BOMB SCENE MANAGEMENT TO FOREIGN SECURITY OFFICIALS AND ASSESSES THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN BOMB SQUADS AND LABORATORIES. RECIPIENTS OF THIS LATER ASSISTANCE INCLUDE ARGENTINA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, PANAMA, SWEDEN, ALGIERS, ETHIOPIA, BELGIUM, TURKEY, TUNIS, ESTONIA, LATVIA, EGYPT, AND RUSSIA.

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AN ADDED DIMENSION TO ATF'S EXPLOSIVES ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IS ITS CANINE EXPLOSIVES DETECTION PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM WAS IMPLEMENTED IN 1992 AT THE REQUEST OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHO NEEDED EXPLOSIVES DETECTION DOGS TO DEPLOY TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE KNEW OF ATF'S SUCCESS IN TRAINING ACCELERANT-DETECTING CANINES FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. USING THE PROVEN TRAINING METHODS AND PROTOCOLS FOR THE ACCELERANT-DETECTING CANINES, ATF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS NATIONAL LABORATORY, AND THE CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE, HAVE DEVELOPED THE EXPLOSIVES-DETECTING CANINE METHODOLOGY AND PROTOCOLS.

THIS UNIQUE METHODOLOGY HONES THE EXPLOSIVES IDENTIFICATION/DISCRIMINATION CAPABILITIES OF THE CANINES. THIS TRAINING EXPOSES THEM TO THE FIVE BASIC EXPLOSIVES GROUPS, WHICH INCLUDE CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS THAT ARE INCORPORATED IN OVER 19,000 EXPLOSIVES FORMULAS. THESE CANINES CAN DETECT MINUTE QUANTITIES AND A GREATER VARIETY OF EXPLOSIVES THAN CANINES TRAINED IN ANY OTHER PROGRAM AVAILABLE. BECAUSE OF THEIR CONDITIONING, THE EXPLOSIVES CANINES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETECT FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION HIDDEN IN LUGGAGE AND BURIED UNDERGROUND. SINCE 1992, OVER

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100 CANINES HAVE BEEN TRAINED FOR USE BY GOVERNMENTS IN THE COUNTRIES OF CHILE, GREECE, CYPRUS, ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

AS A MEANS TO COMBAT THE PROBLEM OF EXPLOSIVES THEFTS AND LOSSES, ATF INSTITUTED THE STOLEN EXPLOSIVES AND RECOVERIES (SEAR) INITIATIVE. SEAR WAS ESTABLISHED TO AID IN THE RECOVERY OF SUCH MATERIALS, TO DETERMINE TRENDS AND ESTABLISH PATTERNS OF THEFTS, TO ASSIST IN THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL BOMBINGS OR ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS, AND TO ASSIST STATE, LOCAL, FOREIGN, OR OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THEIR INVESTIGATION OF SUCH MATTERS.

ATF'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD IS FACILITATED BY ITS EXPLOSIVES TRACING CAPABILITY. THIS CAPABILITY ENABLES OTHER FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO INITIATE TRACES OF RECOVERED, STOLEN, OR ABANDONED EXPLOSIVES, EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS, AND CRIMINALLY OR ILLEGALLY USED EXPLOSIVES. THIS TRACING CAPABILITY IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN, COMMERCIAL, AND MILITARY EXPLOSIVES, ORDNANCE, AND MUNITIONS.

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ATF'S REPOSITORY FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THEFTS, LOSSES, RECOVERIES, AND SEIZURES OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS NATIONWIDE IS THE EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS SYSTEM (EXIS). INCIDENTS CAPTURED IN THIS DATA BASE ARE DIVIDED INTO SPECIFIC CATEGORIES SUCH AS DATE SHIFT CODE, MANUFACTURER, AND QUANTITY. EXIS CAN ALSO BE USED TO MATCH TARGETS AND MOTIVES OF BOMBINGS AS WELL AS SIMILAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AND CAN SHOW TRENDS OR PATTERNS IN A GIVEN AREA, STATE, OR THROUGHOUT THE NATION. INFORMATION THIS DETAILED IS UNAVAILABLE ELSEWHERE IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR. THIS COMPILATION OF DATA IS SUMMARIZED YEARLY IN A COMPREHENSIVE PUBLICATION KNOWN AS THE EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS REPORT. THIS PUBLICATION IS USED BY OTHER FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AS THE SINGLE MOST DEFINITIVE OVERVIEW OF EXPLOSIVES RELATED INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES EACH YEAR. THE PUBLICATION IS ALSO DISTRIBUTED INTERNATIONALLY. ATF IS IN THE PROCESS OF FORMULATING A SIMILAR DATA BASE ON INTERNATIONAL EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS. THE TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO BE CAPTURED WILL BE USED FOR COMPARISON TO DOMESTIC INCIDENTS.

ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1991, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE NRT CONCEPT, BUT ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE, ATF INITIATED

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THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (IRT). THE IRT IS THE RESULT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ATF AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE. THIS AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR ATF'S INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE IN AN EFFORT TO COMBAT WORLD-WIDE ARSON AND EXPLOSIVES VIOLENCE.

THE IRT PROVIDES INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE AT SELECT FIRE AND POSTBLAST SCENES ON U.S. PROPERTY IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHERE THE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE HAS INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY. ATF ALSO PROVIDES TECHNICAL/FORENSIC ASSISTANCE AND OVERSIGHT TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AT FIRE AND POSTBLAST SCENES ON FOREIGN TERRITORY. SUCH REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE ARE RELAYED THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AFTER RECEIVING A REQUEST FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN THE AFFECTED COUNTRY.

THE IRT IS COMPRISED OF FOUR SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENTS AND A CADRE OF FIRE CAUSE AND ORIGIN SPECIALISTS AND EXPLOSIVES SPECIALISTS HAVING POSTBLAST EXPERTISE. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY A NUMBER OF EXPLOSIVES TECHNOLOGY EXPERTS AND FORENSIC CHEMISTS.

THE IRT WORKS CLOSELY WITH STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL, CONDUCTING THE CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION/

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EVALUATION, AND EXAMINING AND PROCESSING THE EVIDENCE. TO DATE, THERE HAVE BEEN NINE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, FIVE OF WHICH WERE EXPLOSIVES-RELATED.

IN MARCH 1992, THE STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTED THE IRT TO AID THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IN A POSTBLAST INVESTIGATION OF A BOMBING ATTACK THAT HAD DESTROYED THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES. THE BOMBING CAUSED 32 DEATHS AND APPROXIMATELY 200 INJURIES. ATF'S INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS RESULTED IN THE RECOVERY OF A SECTION OF THE VEHICLE WHICH CONTAINED THE BOMB, THAT WHEN EXAMINED BY THE ATF LABORATORY, REVEALED THE TYPE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE USED. TESTIMONY ABOUT THIS FACT WAS MADE BY ATF BEFORE THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT.

IN JULY 1994, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AGAIN REQUESTED THE IRT TO AID THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IN A POSTBLAST INVESTIGATION OF A BOMBING ATTACK THAT HAD DESTROYED A JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER IN BUENOS AIRES WHICH CAUSED 95 DEATHS AND APPROXIMATELY 200 INJURIES.

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IN APRIL 1995, THE IRT WAS REQUESTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO AID THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR TO ASSIST IN THE IDENTIFICATION AND DISASSEMBLY OF AN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. THE DEVICE, WHICH CONSISTED OF A CLAYMORE MINE, SIX M-79 GRENADES, A BLASTING CAP AND 120 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, WAS BELIEVED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO BE USED IN AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THIS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE INITIATIVE HAS CREATED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR OTHER AGENCIES TO REQUEST ATF ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. SUCH WAS THE CASE ON APRIL 19, 1995, WHEN ATF RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM THE U.S. ARMY TO ASSIST IN THE INVESTIGATION OF A FIRE THAT OCCURRED AT CAMP HEADQUARTERS IN TAEGU, KOREA. AFTER 6 DAYS OF PROCESSING THE SCENE, ATF'S FIRE CAUSE AND ORIGIN EXPERT DETERMINED THE FIRE TO BE INCENDIARY IN ORIGIN. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE UNCOVERED DURING THE INVESTIGATION HAS LED TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF A SUSPECT.

CLEARLY, THE EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIVES AND EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL CAN BE VERY DEVASTATING, AS WAS WITNESSED IN ARGENTINA IN 1992 AND 1994.

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UNDER THE AUTHORITY VESTED THROUGH ITS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL EXPLOSIVES LAWS, ATF HAS TAKEN STEPS TO HELP PREVENT THE CRIMINAL MISUSE OF EXPLOSIVES, AND IT IS LOOKING AT SEVERAL FUTURE INITIATIVES THAT WILL ALLOW IT TO MORE EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM.

ATF RECENTLY SPONSORED A 5-DAY EXPLOSIVES SYMPOSIUM WHICH BROUGHT TOGETHER WORLD-CLASS EXPLOSIVES EXPERTS FROM THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND CANADA; REPRESENTATIVES FROM AGENCIES SUCH AS THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE BUREAU OF MINES, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY AND THE FERTILIZER INSTITUTE.

THIS CONFERENCE WAS HELD IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WAYS COMMON CHEMICALS USED TO MANUFACTURE EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS CAN BE RENDERED INERT, AND WHETHER SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD BE PRACTICAL. PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED METHODS TO ALLOW FOR THE DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES.

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THE CONFERENCE ALSO ADDRESSED WHETHER CONTROLS CAN BE IMPOSED ON CERTAIN PRECURSOR CHEMICALS (AMMONIUM NITRATE) USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS, SO THAT THE MANUFACTURE OF LARGE-SCALE BOMBS IS IMPRACTICAL.

DUE TO ITS PAST INTERACTION WITH MEMBERS OF THE EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY THROUGH ITS REGULATORY FUNCTION, ATF CAN CALL ON THOSE INDUSTRY MEMBERS, AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS, TO BRING FORTH AN EXTENSIVE ARRAY OF KNOWLEDGE TO SIFT THROUGH THE VARIOUS OPTIONS AND ARRIVE AT THE BEST POSSIBLE SOLUTION.

AS A COMPLEMENT TO THESE EFFORTS, ATF HAS BEEN PARTICIPATING IN A WORLDWIDE INITIATIVE IN COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, TO SEEK RATIFICATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE PLACEMENT OF A CHEMICAL COMPOUND IN PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES TO FACILITATE DETECTION.

THESE RESOURCES ARE HIGHLIGHTED TO SHOW WHAT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HAS IN PLACE TO AID IN THE PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST BOMBINGS.

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INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE OR ATTEMPTED VIOLENCE INVOLVING EXPLOSIVES AND IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS CONTINUE TO OCCUR. BUT THIS COMMITTEE CAN REST ASSURED THAT ATF WILL USE ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO PREVENT SUCH ACTS FROM OCCURRING AND WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE ARREST AND PROSECUTION OF INDIVIDUALS FOUND VIOLATING FEDERAL EXPLOSIVES LAWS.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995

Question

1. Were composite sketches prepared of the suicide bomber, or any of his accomplices associated with the vehicle used in the attack on the AMIA building in Buenos Aires in July 1994? If so, how many sketches were prepared, and who was depicted in each sketch?

Answer

Four identikit sketches were developed. One sketch was drawn of the suicide bomber in the AMIA bombing from testimony by a witness who saw the van approach the AMIA building before the explosion. A second sketch, also of the driver of the van used in the attack, was a composite of the first sketch and other information developed in the course of a door-to-door survey of residents of the neighborhood shortly after the bombing. A third sketch was of the person who parked the van at a garage on Azcuenage and Paraguay Streets three days before the attack. A fourth sketch was of the person who bought the van used in the attack.

Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Committee on International Relations
September 28, 1995

Question

2. Who prepared the composite sketches (i.e., police in Buenos Aires, Argentine intelligence, prosecuting judge)?

Answer

The sketches were prepared by Federal Police experts.

Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Committee on International Relations
September 28, 1995

Question

3. Were any of the sketches publicized in Argentina to help identify the suicide bomber or his accomplices? If so, please provide samples of any publicity the drawing may have received.

Answer

Three of the four sketches developed by police experts were publicized. The composite sketch of the suicide bomber in the AMIA attack was printed in Clarín, a major Buenos Aires newspaper, on August 1, 1994. Argentine TV broadcast the sketch on the same date. On August 6, Clarín published two other sketches, one of the person who parked the van used in the attack in a garage on Azcuenage and Paraguay Streets three days before the attack, and the other of the person who purchased the van. The Argentine media republished one of the sketches shortly before the September 28, 1995 HIRC hearing.

Attachment:

Samples

Página 4 • POLÍTICA

OPTIMISMO EN EL GOBIERNO POR LA DETENCIÓN DE LOS AUTORES

Galeano procesará esta involucrados en la venta de

OTRA VEZ

La Justicia procesará esta semana a los detenidos por la venta de la tráfico usada en el atentado contra la AMIA. El ministro del Interior, Carlos Ruckauf, mostrará ayer el optimismo del Gobierno en cuanto a la detención de los autores intelectuales de la explosión. La Policía procurará dar con el paradero de la persona que llevó la camioneta hacia el estacionamiento de Córdoba y Azcuénaga, el fin de semana anterior al atentado. El juez Juan José Galeano indaga a la persona que vendió la camioneta, un testimonio que es considerado clave.

El juez Juan José Galeano procesará esta semana a los detenidos por la voladura de la Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina, bajo la placa firme de que involucra la denominada "consulada argentina" de la organización. El juez Galeano procesará a los autores intelectuales de la explosión. Los plazos procesales que rigen en la causa muestran un funcionamiento una cuenta regresiva para Galeano, que en un plazo no mayor de 10 días deberá dictar la sentencia definitiva o la liberación por falta de mérito de los detenidos.

EL EJECUTIVO LE ENVIARÁ ESTA SEMANA

Ley antiterrorista, al Congreso

El Gobierno enviará esta semana al Congreso el proyecto de ley antiterrorista que incluye la creación de la figura de la "persona que sujeta la información" y la modificación de la ley de extradición para que permita la extradición de los autores intelectuales de los atentados terroristas.

El Ministerio de Justicia está corrigiendo el texto y la redacción de la ley antiterrorista. El proyecto de ley incluye la creación de la figura de la "persona que sujeta la información" y la modificación de la ley de extradición para que permita la extradición de los autores intelectuales de los atentados terroristas.

La ley antiterrorista se podrá aplicar a los autores intelectuales de los atentados terroristas que ocurrieron antes de la promulgación de la ley. La ley antiterrorista se podrá aplicar a los autores intelectuales de los atentados terroristas que ocurrieron antes de la promulgación de la ley.

ser aplicadas a quienes actualmente resultan culpables de la violencia. El proyecto de ley incluye la creación de la figura de la "persona que sujeta la información" y la modificación de la ley de extradición para que permita la extradición de los autores intelectuales de los atentados terroristas.


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Los fiscales y por eso se lo está enviando en todo se está enviando. El proyecto de ley incluye la creación de la figura de la "persona que sujeta la información" y la modificación de la ley de extradición para que permita la extradición de los autores intelectuales de los atentados terroristas.

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Identidad del hombre que condujo la Traffic hasta el estacionamiento donde permaneció el fin de semana anterior al atentado. La Policía intenta dar con su paradero.

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Identikit del hombre que condujo la Trafic hasta el estacionamiento donde permaneció el fin de semana anterior al atentado. La Policía intenta dar con su paradero.

ACION LA DA LA CAMARA FEDERAL

EFFECTUADO POR POLICIA FEDERAL

Promueve el terrorismo

TOTAL P. 04

CLARÍN

Buenos Aires, sábado 6 de agosto de 1993

Página 2 - POLÍTICA

LOS INVESTIGADORES ELABORARON DOS

siguen la pista

OTRA VEZ



LA EXTENSA INTERPELACION A RUCKAUF

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Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Committee on International Relations
September 28, 1995

Question

4. If sketches were prepared, but not publicized, please explain why.

Answer

One sketch of the suicide bomber was developed from the testimony of one witness. This was used as the basis for creating a composite sketch incorporating information provided by various other witnesses. Of these two sketches of the bomber, only the composite was publicized.

Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Committee on International Relations
September 28, 1995

Question

5. What is the routine practice of the ATF, FBI and other law enforcement agencies in using and publicizing composite sketches to attempt to identify bombers or their accomplices?

Answer

The law enforcement agencies use composite drawings as appropriate, although they do not necessarily always publicize them widely. They say the reasons may include uncertainty about the accuracy of the composite drawings or, concern that publication might drive the suspects deeper underground or otherwise prompt them to become more careful in their movements. Instead, the composite drawings might be used primarily with other potential witnesses or local law enforcement authorities.

Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Committee on International Relations
September 28, 1995

Question

6. Please provide details of the Argentine government's rewards program intended to help solve the AMIA case.

Answer

The Argentine government has offered a reward equivalent to two million U.S. dollars for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those involved in the AMIA bombing.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995

Question

7. You have identified the Middle East group, Hizballah, as responsible for the AMIA attack. Has the State Department offered the use of its world wide terrorist rewards and publicity program to help the Argentine government identify the suicide bomber or any of his accomplices?

Answer

We have not. The State Department's terrorist information rewards program is available for use only with respect to acts of international terrorism "against a United States person or United States property" (Section 36(a)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended). The AMIA attack did not involve U.S. persons or property. We have, however, given wide publicity to our concern about the AMIA bombing and the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and our belief that Hizballah was responsible for both attacks.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995

Question

8. Is there any prohibition on our terrorist rewards program that would prevent its use in this case, if the Argentine government's own rewards monies were used to pay for any reward that might eventually be granted?

Answer

The State Department's reward program is available for information concerning those acts of international terrorism that are against United States persons or property.

The statute that governs the State Department terrorist information rewards program, Section 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 as amended, provides, in part, that the Secretary of State may pay a reward to an individual who furnishes information leading to the arrest or conviction of an individual for the commission of an act of international terrorism, or leading to the prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of an act of international terrorism, "if the act of international terrorism is against a United States person or United States property." (Emphasis added. P.L. 98-533 § 36, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2708.)

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- 2 -

Similarly, publicity under the rewards program is limited to information concerning acts of international terrorism that affect U.S. persons or property. We have encouraged Argentina to give widespread publicity to its reward and they are aware of the means available for this, such as announcements by government spokesmen, the printing and distribution of posters and other printed matter, and advertisements in the media.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995

Question

9. What follow up steps are to be taken by the United States resulting from the recent regional meeting on terrorism in Argentina?

Answer

First of all, I would like to note that at the Buenos Aires "Consultative Meeting on Cooperation to Prevent and Eliminate International Terrorism," the United States and the other participating nations agreed to:

- Exchange information on terrorism;
- Strengthen and continue to develop domestic laws on terrorism;
- Encourage the accession to multilateral conventions adopted on terrorism and the conclusion of agreements, particularly to establish judicial, police, and intelligence cooperation to combat, prosecute, and suppress international terrorist activities;

Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995

Question

10. How will the Organization of American States address the regional terrorism problem?

Answer

The US Mission to the OAS and the Office of Counterterrorism represent the USG at the bi-weekly meeting of the OAS's Working Group on Terrorism, the entity responsible for planning the OAS Terrorism Conference, scheduled for April. This group has begun to discuss the agenda and goals of the conference. Although it is early in the planning stages, the agenda will be focussed on practical measures to counter terrorism, including anti-terrorism cooperative measures in such areas as border control, information sharing, extradition, and abuse of diplomatic privileges. It will also call for wider adherence to international treaties and conventions against terrorism.

ANTI-TERRORISM COOPERATION

The USG responded to the AMIA bombing by providing a team of 13 experts in explosive investigation, the International Response Team, which arrived Wednesday, July 20, 1992, less than 48 hours after the blast. The team represented government agencies including the State Department, the FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Members of this team had worked on the World Trade Center bombing and others had assisted the Argentine Federal Police (AFP) in investigating the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992. The team assisted the AFP for five days, working with AFP and Israeli experts at the bomb site. They were instrumental in recovering the engine parts of the bomb vehicle, the single most important piece of evidence recovered.

On August 4th three members of the FBI Disaster Squad, with particular expertise in fingerprint identification, were dispatched to help with the identification of remains. It was hoped that they would identify unknown victims and possibly the perpetrator of the bombing. They assisted the AFP in confirming testing results. On August 6th, the U.S. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology sent an eleven-member team of forensic pathologists to work with the Judicial Morgue in the identification of human remains through scientific examination. They assisted in the identification of at least two unknown bodies, permitting their burial.

- ♦ September 6, 1994, a team from the State Department Office of Counter-Terrorism, headed by Ambassador Phillip Wilcox, discussed combating terrorism with the Argentine government. As result, Argentina has received considerably increased assistance in anti-terrorism training (see below).
- ♦ October 26, 1994, a team of three FBI terrorism experts came to Argentina from the Miami office of the FBI to consult on the AMIA bomb investigation. They shared additional information coming from the Middle East and the U.S. with Argentine authorities.

Training:

December 1994 - An evaluation team was sent to determine if Argentina could participate in a bomb-detector dog program to be funded by the USG.

January 1995 - Terrorist Crime Scene Investigation: 20 officers from Police and Judiciary attended a two-week course at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

January 1995 - The U.S. offered and the GOA accepted the donation of a \$ 100,000 bomb robot to disarm devices.

March 1995 - Team went to the U.S. for initial phase of bomb detector dog training. When completed in August, it will represent a \$ 500,000 program.

Note: In FY-96, phase two of the dog program will start. Additional dogs will be trained, a supplementary \$ 600,000 program. At the end of phase two the GOA will have a fully operational bomb dog training program which will make Argentina self-supporting in its bomb dog capability.

March 1995 - A course on aviation security was given to airport authorities in Argentina. It taught security officials new ways to protect airports and airlines.

April 1995 - A team of physical security experts evaluated security at selected facilities in Argentina. NGO's, including AMIA, were invited to participate.


April 1995 - A group of 14 GOA officials from the Federal police, Federal Judiciary, Office of Security and Protection and various provincial police agencies were sent to the U.S. to receive training in coordination in the event of terrorist incidents.

July 1995 - A course on physical security will be offered to the GOA and Argentine NGO's. The aim of the course is training security, engineering, and architectural personnel in protection of buildings from terrorist attack.

September 1995 - A course on disaster management (man-made and natural) will be offered to senior members of the Argentine government.

ruta del coche bomba

ta forma se produjo el atentado según
lebas reunidas por el juez Galeano



cuando llega a
la AMIA se
coloca de frente
y activa la
carga explosiva
de 300 kilos
de amoníaco

Ya en
Pasteur
se abre
sobre
el carril
izquierdo

Para dirigir
la explosión
se usaron

bolsas
con tierra

**EL INTERIOR
DE LA TRAFIC**



9.52 del
18 de julio
de 1994:

La Trafic
venía por
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SENT BY:

9-27-95 ; 9:50AM ;

JCRC-

202 225 2035: # 2/ 4

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI
SENATOR

CONSTITUTION

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

HOUSE AND HUMAN RESOURCES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2003

April 7, 1995

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The Honorable Carlos Saul Menem
President of Argentina
BALCARCE 50 (1064)
Capital Federal, Argentina

Dear President Menem:

We are writing to express our concerns over the lack of progress in Argentina's investigation of the Jewish Community Center bombing in Buenos Aires over nine months ago. That bombing was an international tragedy both because of the tremendous loss of innocent lives and the dangers such attacks -- and the groups which perpetrate them -- pose for all civilized societies. There can be little doubt of the links between the instigators of this attack and those groups which have targeted Americans both here and abroad.

Therefore, we are greatly disappointed that more has not been done to apprehend these criminals and bring them to justice. Establishment of a reward fund was an important step, but unless these terrorists -- and their international sponsors -- are pursued with all available resources, they will be encouraged to commit future acts of terror in Argentina and throughout the world.

We appreciate your attention to our concerns and hope that you will bring to this effort the same vigor and determination you brought to reforming your economy. We, of course, stand ready to do what we can to help you in pursuing the perpetrators of this terrible crime against society.

Sincerely,

Barbara A. Mikulski

Connie Mack
United States Senator

Barbara A. Mikulski
United States Senator

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June 21, 1995

The Honorable Carlos Saul Menem
President of Argentina
BALCARCE 50 (1064)
Capital Federal, Argentina

Dear President Menem:

In April of this year, many of my colleagues and I wrote to you regarding the investigations of the 1993 bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires and the bombing of the Israeli Embassy bombing in 1992.

I am enclosing a copy of that letter. We would appreciate receiving a response to our letter and look forward to working with you to combat international terrorism.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

*Barbara A. Mikulski*Barbara A. Mikulski
United States Senator

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September 27, 1995

Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Gilman:

The Simon Wiesenthal Center wants to applaud your gesture in bringing before your committee, relatives of the innocent victims who lost their lives in the terrorist bombing, that destroyed the AMIA building on July 18, 1994.

Like many other concerned parties, the Simon Wiesenthal Center is deeply disappointed that Argentine authorities have not made more progress in identifying the perpetrators of this terrorist act.

It is clear that the government of President Menem can and should do more to bring this case to a successful conclusion. This would include, utilizing the media to promote the government's 2 million dollar reward and the appointing of a special prosecutor with a fully funded staff that would be able to deal swiftly and seriously with all leads.

Argentina's failure to act in a serious and effective manner in connection with this bombing, is a furtive leaves her territory and her citizens vulnerable to future terrorist outrages.

As an important sister democracy in the Americas, we urge the Congress of the US to express its deepest concerns to the government of Argentina on this matter.

With all good wishes in the new year.

Sincerely,

Rabbi Abraham Cooper
Associate Dean

International Headquarters

3760 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90035-6792 • 310.323.9036 fax 310.323.8007 e-mail: rcooper@wiesenthal.com
New York • Miami • Toronto • Jerusalem • Paris • Buenos Aires

La Nacion - by Adrian Ventura - - Sunday July 30, 1995

AMIA: A sign of adjustment

The investigation of the bombing of the AMIA building has entered such a delicate stage, that it is believed that the possibilities of solving the case - which will not take place anytime soon- depends upon which steps are taken next.

As a result of this, the Federal Parliament, upon ordering the District Attorney to indict Alberto Telleldin, the main suspect in the case, sent a clear sign of change. The new message is that the investigation must be thorough, no matter who is implicated: they cannot admit that the security forces -who should be the most interested party in solving the case- has obstructed its development.

Telleldin swore before representatives (camaristas) Luisa Riva Aramayo, Horacio Vigliani and Juan Pedro Cortelezzi, that a few days before the election the ex-captain Hector Vergez, who has been rumored to be associated with the intelligence service, offered him one million dollars and freedom, if Telleldin would implicate a Lebanese citizen who was recently investigated by the federal judge Roberto Marquevich.

Both men met on four occasions. One of these meetings took place in Judge Juan Jose Galeano's chambers. However, the Judge was not present at the meeting.

Judge Marquevich determined that the implicated Lebanese citizens who were sent to Argentina - possibly by the secret service?- had no relation with the amassing of an arsenal in the Delta, much less with the terrorist attacks committed against the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA building.

The leaders of the AMIA and the DAIA, would have no doubt that Vergez consorted with intelligence agents.

If Vergez had not had the backing of an intelligence agent, how would he have had the courage last Friday at a meeting to discredit Telleldin to call the president of DAIA, Ruben Beraja, a drug launderer. Furthermore, how could Vergez swear that the government had never obstructed the investigation, if as he affirms, he has no ties to any official agency and has no knowledge of their intentions.

This whole episode leaves behind a strange feeling that some scheming individuals who have infiltrated an official organization attempted to divert attention from the investigation.

RAISING THE VOLUME

What happened these days has to be analyzed in light of the occurrences of last week.

Rabbi Avi Weiss, a Rabbi from New York City, arrived in our country when we commemorated the first anniversary of the massacre.

The Rabbi on his second visit to our country was not pleased and upheld the theory, not based on fact, but on reliable information that in Argentina there has not been a serious investigation because to do so, would implicate a government official or his collaborators.

As you will recall, criticism was widespread. President, Carlos Menem, who had invited Rabbi Weiss to a cabinet meeting last year, has now described the Rabbi as delirious. Ruben Beraja, head of the DAIA, rejected Rabbi Weiss's accusations as reckless.

Never-the-less, what is certain is that the volume of the discussion has been raised and is now centered on the actions of the security forces.

Even yesterday, United States Democratic Congressman Elliot Engel, who met at the beginning of June with our president to convey his uneasiness over the lack of results from the investigation, stated to "La Nacion" that the Committee of International Relations of the United States Congress, had invited Rabbi Weiss to a meeting that took place last Thursday with the head of the committee, Ben Gilman, to try to understand why Menem insulted the Rabbi when to them he deserves the utmost confidence.

The Rabbi took this opportunity to reiterate that Menem has not taken this matter seriously and that our borders lack security. This is the way we are perceived.

In the meantime, Beraja warned that he would raise the level of his complaints if no progress is shown soon. As a result, Menem manifested his profound disgust. Corach is angry at Beraja as well.

Maybe because Rabbi Weiss' speech helped to redirect the fire toward antisemitic clusters, and surely because of the convictions of the Jewish leadership, Alberto Crupnikoff, head of the AMIA, Luis Dobniewsky, the AMIA's legal advisor and Beraja, had a long and honest meeting with the Federal Representatives (Camaristas). At this meeting, Beraja stated the problem clearly and the other two men backed him up.

It is suspected that the Buenos Aires police force has radical members in its ranks. Although less dramatic, due to the good will that these entities have toward Hugo Anzorregui, they also are distrusting of members of the second and third ranks of the SIDE. It is very probable that some of these members will be arrested in the near future.

SOMETHING IS MISSING

The pressure applied by the AMIA and the DAIA to clear up this matter is crucial. On the other hand, Judge Galeano and the District Attorneys Eamon Mullen and Jose Barbaquia, who had never been involved in a terrorist case, have in the last twelve months gained valuable experience and are conducting a solid and professional investigation.

The danger and the breakdown appear to be in the security forces who perhaps are protecting themselves or are covering up internal mafias. Additionally, Telleldin, a compactor of cars, related how in order to "keep his job", he must periodically hand over auto engines to an important urban police brigade ("conurbano"). They could be obstructing the investigation.

VANTAGE POINT

AVI WEISS
SPECIAL TO THE JEWISH WEEK

The Deadly Message: Terrorism Pays

The horrific bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City is not the first time that I have seen bombed out buildings, rescue crews searching for shreds of life in piles of rubble, bloodied victims weeping on the sidewalks, families hoping against hope that their loved ones will be found. I saw all of this only a few months ago when I spent a week in Buenos Aires after the terrorist bombing of the AMIA Jewish organizational building.

The public reaction to Oklahoma City was shock and disbelief. But considering the world's response toward recent terrorist activity, the public's surprise that such a blow can be struck at the American heartland is itself a surprise.


Political scientists describe the world today as a "global village." As it relates to terrorism, the world is a shire. Gaza, South Lebanon, Buenos Aires, New York City and Oklahoma City are all one. Terrorism knows no borders. Unchecked and accepted as an effective political tool in Gaza and Lebanon, it is bound in due time to leap oceans.

Rabbi Avi Weiss is national president of the Coalition for Jewish Concerns in Arab and senior rabbi of the Hebrew Institute of Riverdale.

It is no coincidence that the Oklahoma City bombing comes after 141 Jews have been murdered in Israel in the past 18 months without any of those responsible being brought to trial. Nor is it a coincidence that this attack occurred only a few months after the Buenos Aires bombing of the AMIA building left 100 dead without anyone being brought to trial. That attack came only two years after the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was blown up.

There, too, no one was apprehended. This is not to say that the failure to apprehend the perpetrators and their accomplices in Israel or in Argentina is the cause of the catastrophe in Oklahoma. But what that failure has done is to create a climate in which terrorists are emboldened and encouraged, and also in an atmosphere in which there is no place on this earth that is not vulnerable.

The message is clear: Terrorism pays. You can wreak havoc, you can murder and maim, you can instill fear and you can get away with it. It is naive for Western leaders to assume that they can cozy up to individuals who have achieved many of their ends through terrorist activity, individuals such as Syrian President Hafez Assad and PLO leader Yasir Arafat,



In Argentina, left, and Oklahoma, a common bond of terror.

Rabin has stated that American funding to the PLO should be forthcoming. The prime minister may be willing to live with the violations of the treaty, but to Americans, way of terrorism in our own backyards, Rabin's position is unacceptable.

We have the right and the obligation to tell the prime minister that these violations cannot be tolerated, that terrorism unchecked in any one area of the world will inevitably spread and contaminate every other corner of the globe.

In December, I stood in Oslo protesting the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Arafat. I wondered then if the granting of such a lofty award to one of the primary teachers of international terrorism would serve as an unmistakable message that terrorism is, indeed, worthwhile. The inescapable reality is this: If we really want to bring terrorism to an end everywhere in our global shire, we must be deadly serious and unrelenting in our pursuit and punishment of any group anywhere that engages in such crimes. [

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By Martin Edwin

ment of Argentine president Carlos Menem, whose pro-U.S. foreign policies and free-market reforms have made him the toast of two American administrations.

Argentine Jewish leaders and Mr. Menem himself say the Buenos Aires bombing, part of a fundamentalist offensive that has also rocked Panama and Great Britain, may have counted on logistic support from local and Semites. Attention is now rivetted on the prospect that help may have come from overseas.

Martin Edwin Andersen is the author of "Dossier Secreto Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the 'Dirty War'"

At Mr. Menem's invitation, investigators from Israel, the United States and Europe have poured into Argentina to help uncover the truth about the whereabouts of the truth.

Menem himself say the Buenos Aires bombing, part of a

regime support from local anti-Semites.

Argentina's chief law enforcement officer — bragged about being a friend of shadowy Italian neo-fascist financier Ugo Gelli, the head of Italy's notorious P-2 Masonic lodge (the discovery of which brought down the Italian government in 1981) and privately told associates that, for him, Adolf Hitler was "valiant."

Syrian national who barely spoke Spanish, to the lucrative spot of customs "overseer" at Ezeiza international airport in Buenos Aires. Al-Doukhi was forced to resign when he surfaced as a suspect in an international drug trafficking and money laundering ring.

[illegible]

In 1982, as the British were retreating from the Falkland/Malvinas Islands following an Argentine military invasion, Mr Meem visited Moamar Gadhafi's Libya in the company of the Arab armaments dealer, the late Sheikh Yusef bin Laden. Argentine businessman, Hiramio delgado, himself a rebel leader, and

* According to former Menem adviser Mario Rabinov, who presented bank receipts as proof of his accusations, the 1989 Peronist presidential standard bearer's campaign received \$4 million in contributions from Gadhafi. Other major contributors included

and the general public, and the government provided it with

TO THE HONORABLE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

We have spent the last 14 months waiting to learn who were the criminals who murdered our relatives in the bombing that destroyed the AMIA building on July 18, 1994. Experts from various countries assured us that the action of local groups was absolutely necessary in carrying out this bloody act, regardless of the intellectual and/or financial responsibility of international terrorism. Presently, the only person detained in the case (although still not indicted) is Carlos Alberto Telleldin, the last owner of an auto some of whose parts were found amidst the rubble of the AMIA building. After so many months of attempting unsuccessfully to find some explanation about those who were responsible for the massacre, we believe it is essential at this time to make known some details about persons involved in, and actions taken during the investigation. For example:

- * The total chaos in the zone from the moment of the explosion (which suggestively neither the judicial authorities, nor police officials ever attempted to curb) impeded the proper collection and processing of the basic evidence which would have given clues to the manner in which the blast was produced. Given that there was no control in, and no cordoning off of the area, one can surmise that since persons robbed belongings from the cadavers and looted items from the blown out shops and apartments in the neighbourhood, persons could just as easily have placed false evidence in the zone.

- * After 14 months the technical investigation is filled with conflicting hypotheses regarding the type and quantity of explosive charge, and the exact point of the epicenter of the explosion.

- * The judge in the case, Dr. Juan José Galeano, although he has received no new cases since April, 1995, still is presiding over 400 pending cases. In other parts of the world, in cases of much less importance, there would be an independent prosecutor or a judge placed exclusively in a position to investigate only the one crime.

- * The pressure exerted on the judge is obvious. He has suffered three attacks on his apartment, which supposedly has a 24-hour guard by the Argentine Federal Police.


- * There has been no publicity regarding the two million dollar reward offered by the government for those giving information on the AMIA bombing. That reward, part of the Decree # 2023 signed into law by President Menem on November 16, 1994, has had practically no publicity in the local media in the last ten months.


*The policemen Diego Barreda and Mario Bareiro, who admit their participation in a criminal gang specializing in - among other crimes - auto theft, have not been detained. Among the members of their gang was Carlos Telleldin. Even more suspicious is the fact that Officer Bareiro received a departmental promotion during the same time that he was under suspicion in the AMIA case.


*Another police officer who was promoted is Captain Gaston G. Fernandez, who even with a long history of anti-semitic behavior, was chief of the 7th Precinct (the same stationhouse that controlled the special guard duty in front of the AMIA). Fernandez is now a commissioner in charge of eight different precincts.


*Hector Vergez is an ex-member of SIDE, the Argentine intelligence service, who was chief of the La Ripera concentration camp and brags openly that he helped set-up La Perla, one of the bloodiest "detention centers" during the last military dictatorship. Vergez admitted offering Telleldin one million dollars and his freedom in exchange for fingering one of the Lebanese citizens (detained in another case in neighboring Patagonia) as the person to whom he (Telleldin) sold the van whose parts later appeared dispersed in the area of the AMIA bombing. The one million dollars was to be paid by "friends" of the SIDE, according to Vergez. The Vergez admission provoked the opening of a separate judicial investigation by Judge Branca. After four months nothing has been publicly communicated about the results of this secondary investigation.

We have only listed the tip of the iceberg - a few samples of some of the frightening facts surrounding this poorly managed, confusing and obstacle-filled investigation. We ask the Honorable Congress of the United States of America to exert the necessary pressure to clear up this heinous crime so that we, our children, and the entire Argentine society can live in peace and with justice. Then, and only then, can the dead finally rest in peace.


 JUAN ANTONIO DE ALENCASTRO
 DNI 127600


 MARCELO SOSA
 DNI 12760000


 MARTIN C. DE LA CRUZ
 DNI 12760000


 LAURA GUSSBERG
 DNI 12760000

Written by Gabriel Levinas

Submitted by Rabbi Ari Weiss

Pres. Coalition for Jewish Concerns

Report about the Investigation of the AMIA Attack

at 10/28/95 Hearing

Introduction

This work was undertaken with the purpose of discovering the reasons why the investigation into the attack against the AMIA-DAJA headquarters hasn't advanced. Capturing the guilty depends on the development of a consistent hypothesis, free from political ideas or preconceptions. Until now, such notions have served only to deviate from the case. Without a consistent hypothesis, it will be difficult to conclude the investigation. And if the time already gone by and the poor management of this case make it difficult to catch the guilty, we have to think about preventing future attacks which, with each passing moment, seem to draw pitifully closer.

Historical Background

This attack, along with the one committed two years earlier against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, can be viewed as the second most important case in Argentine judicial criminal history.

The first culminated at the end of 1985, when the leaders of Argentina's military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983, Generals Videla and Viola and others such as Admirals Massera and Lambruschini, were judged and condemned. Kidnappings, rapes, assassinations, tortures and other crimes were proved. More than 10,000 disappearances were accounted for, although that figure may actually approximate 30,000.

Analyzing the list of the victims of those crimes (and we refer to the 10,000 proven cases) one finds that 15% were of Jewish background. This is a remarkable figure, if we consider that the percentage of Jews in Argentina is only 1%. Also, according to the testimony of the survivors of the concentration camps and extermination camps that existed at that time, simply being a Jew or being considered a Jew meant death almost without exception.

In the case of the journalist Jacobo Timerman, the mobilization of the Jewish community of the United States, backed by its state organizations, finally helped save his life, although they could not stop his torture.

The indictment of the military junta was possible due to the political conditions and the correlation of forces during Argentina's return to democracy. At that time, after the Malvinas Islands defeat, the totality of the Armed Forces were at a point of disintegration and deterioration. Nevertheless, before leaving power, they decreed a law of self-amnesty.

In 1982, months before the elections which reestablished democracy, the Presidential candidate for the majority Justicialist party was asked about the possibility of repealing the

self-amnesty law should he be elected President. Dr. Italo Argentino Luder answered that to do so would be manifestly anti-Constitutional.

In the end, Raul Alfonsín of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) won the elections and pushed for the trial of the commanders, which ended in their condemnation at the end of 1985. This entire process, even if it cannot be considered satisfactory, would not have been possible had Luder won.

A short time later, due to pressure from a variety of sectors, the laws of Due Obedience and Final Point were decreed, and with them dissolved the possibility of pursuing further judicial actions and sentencing of the Armed Forces and Security Forces involved.

The current Argentine government is Justicialist. Without this implying any accusation against the President, many of the current high officials could have been in a government led by Luder, and in some cases, some of them served in military governments, especially in areas tied to security organizations, the police, intelligence, etc.

Nazism in Argentina

From the first coup orchestrated by General Jose Felix Uriburu, Argentina has been a country with a Nazi tradition, inside and out the apparatus of the State. That coup was carried out against the Radical government of Hipólito Yrigoyen on September 6, 1930.

The people of Argentina used to call Uriburu "Von Pepe" due to his admiration for Germany. The German influence during his reign was notable.

During the entire decade of the '30s, with strong resources supplied by the German ambassador Von Therman, the extreme right -- groups such as the Civic Legion and the Nationalist Freedom Alliance -- proliferated. The latter was led by a policeman named Juan Queraltó. These groups marched down a principal thoroughfare in Buenos Aires known as Avenida de Mayo dressed in Nazi uniforms and under police protection.

The coup of June 4, 1943 was eminently fascist. The majority of its protagonists, civil and military, did not hide their admiration for the "Hitler cross." Even Perón, the obvious brain of the coup, and later president, spent many years in Italy and Argentina, and also explicitly manifested his admiration for the totalitarian regimes of the right.

When the war exploded and practically until 1945, different Argentine governments maintained an uncomfortable "neutrality" which the Allied powers interpreted as a political cover in favor of the Third Reich.

As such, numerous war criminals found a refuge in Argentina and later collaborated with different State structures like the Police and the Armed Forces. A typical case is that of the AS of the Luftwaffe, Hans Rudel, who was practically the father of the Argentine

military Air Force. Rudel, like Eichmann and other Nazis, arrived in Argentina after 1945, fleeing Allied justice.

This influence of Nazi ideology continues today. The Interior Minister, Carlos Corach (of Jewish heritage) has currently among his advisors two known Nazis. One is Carlos Tórtora, who belonged to the Nationalist University Concentration (CNU). At the beginning of the '70s, the CNU assassinated a Jewish student named Silvia Ester Filler in Mar del Plata. Tórtora, before being designated as an aide to Corach, was one of the main officers of the SIDE (State Information Service).¹

During the Second World War, a priest names Julio Meinvielle, became very popular. He revindicated Nazism and did not hide his aversion to Jews. In the '60s, he was the mentor and ideologue of the Nationalist Restoration Guard (GRN) that committed crimes and attacks of all kinds. Among his disciples was a youth named Norberto Belladrich, who currently is the press aide to Interior Minister Corach.

In the '70s, Horacio Calderón edited a book entitled "Jewish Argentina," a book of Nazi ideology in which it was affirmed that Jews were the true owners of the country. On the cover was a map of Argentina, nailed with little Stars of David to a cross. "Jewish Argentina" is considered as an archetype model of the majority of the studies about Neo-Nazism. Today, Calderón is an advisor to President Menem. In his latest public comments he has reneged on his anti-Semitic past, but he has not been convincing.

The Arab Influence

Justicialism, the political movement founded by General Juan Perón in 1945, which President Menem belongs to, has ties to the Arab world. Perón looked upon the birth of Nasserism with great affection and the ideology of Nasser coincides with many Justicialist principles.

When Perón returned to power in 1973 -- after a 17 year exile in Franco's Spain -- he was sympathetic towards the Arab cause and he sent a commercial mission to Libya, Egypt and other Arab countries.

In 1960, the Arab League sent Hussein Trikki, the founder of the organization Crislam, to Argentina. Crislam's purpose was to try to achieve a union between the Moslems and Christians against a common enemy: the Jews. Many ultra-right figures were part of Crislam, among them Mohamed Ali Seineldin, a fanatic Christian fundamentalist, and the Neo Nazi leader of National Alert, Alejandro Biondine, who declared himself the "Fuhrer of Argentina."

¹ The SIDE, after the attack against the AMIA, circulated a presumed "secret report," that attributed the bombing to an "internal Jewish" matter. The report was written by Norberto Ceresole, who taught courses in military institutes in Brazil. The report was published in a magazine financed by the SIDE called "Critical Point."

In 1988, when he was a candidate for the Presidency, Menem visited Syria at the invitation of President Hafez el Assad. In that visit he met Monzer Al Kassar, a Syrian arms dealer, and Ibrahim Al Ibrahim, who would later marry Menem's sister-in-law, Amira Yoma.

When Menem was elected President, Ibrahim and Al Kassar traveled to Argentina and obtained passports in record time. Although he hardly spoke Spanish, Ibrahim was named Special Delegate to the President in the Customs Division of Ezeiza, where he obtained sufficient power to block inspection of entering merchandise.

In the middle of March 1992, some days before the attack against the Israeli Embassy in Argentina, the US State Department placed Argentina's airport Ezeiza in the "unsafe" category, and warned visitors that the airport was open to terrorist attack.

A short time after, Monzer Al Kassar was arrested in Spain for arms trafficking. Ibrahim Al Ibrahim divorced the President's sister-in-law and left the country. He is wanted by Interpol and by Argentine authorities for drug trafficking charges and forgery.

The election of President Menem worried various sectors of Argentina's population, especially the Jewish community, overall due to his Syrian environment and his contacts with the Peronist ultra-right. But Menem tried to show himself as friendly to the Jewish community. In his speeches, he spoke of tolerance and respect and he was the first Argentine president to visit Israel.

The Sivak Case

During both the Proceso (Argentina's military government from 1976 - 1983) and again when the country returned to democracy, the engineer Osvaldo Sivak (of Jewish origin) was kidnapped twice. His kidnappings demonstrate the relationship that exists among neofascist and delinquent groups that are maintained intact and in a situation of power until today.

When the case regarding Osvaldo Sivak's second kidnapping began in the court of Dr. Luis Enrique Velasco, in the Secretariat of Dr. Bruno and with the collaboration of Dr. Galeano,² in the complaint, Dr. Marta Oyhanarte de Sivak and her brother-in-law Dr. Jorge Sivak requested from the Federal Police a list of the kidnappings that had occurred in the last years. The request, made in 1985, was made to find similarities with the kidnapping of Osvaldo Sivak. The Federal Police denied the request. After some insistence, the list was given in April 1986.

Approximately 25% of the persons on the list were of Jewish origin. The list reached the president of the Delegation of the Argentine Israeli Associations (the DAIA), Dr.

² Dr. Galeano is currently in charge of the investigation of the AMIA bombing.

Goldberg, who was grateful for the information and said that he had suspected that something like this had been occurring, but that it hadn't been possible to prove. In any event, the matter was not denounced publicly, and it has never been known whether this information has been considered in the appropriate manner.

In April 1986 it was determined that Mario Agustín Aguilar,³ and Barrionuevo, Army Intelligence Agents, with the collaboration of others, extorted Marta Oyhanarte de Sivak and Jorge Sivak. Judge Velasco considered that they were not mere extortionists, and he attributed the Sivak's kidnapping to them. This was one of many errors of the investigation.

Also, it was known that in his private practice as a lawyer, Judge Velasco previously had defended Mario Agustín Aguilar, in an extortion case in a court in San Isidro (in the province of Buenos Aires)

When the kidnappings took place, the Chief of the Federal Police was commissary Di Vietri. The anomalies in the investigation generated an interpellation in the House of Representatives. Interior Minister Antonio Tróccoli defended the action of his subordinate Di Vietri. But this defense was a failure. Various days later the heads of the Federal Police resigned, including the Chief and the Assistant Chief of the Fraud Division.

Judge Velasco tried to defend his competence in the case, from Dr. Smolianski's complaint.⁴ After appeals and different judicial and parliamentary proceedings, the case was transferred to the Federal Criminal and Correctional District Court No. 5, headed by Dr. Martín Irurzun.

A very few months later, in the first days of November of 1987, Judge Irurzun brought the investigation to a close. He determined who the perpetrators were, found Sivak's remains and clarified that two other two extortionary kidnappings ended in death: those of Benjamin Neuman and Eduardo Oxenford.

Neuman had had an important role in the Argentine Jewish community and had ties to the Israelita Hospital and the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. A policeman named Villarreal

³ From prison, Aguilar sent a note to the Supreme Court of Justice on June 28, 1994, anticipating the attack against the DAIA. [This note, a copy of which can be found now in Judge Galeano's court records, has the June 28 entry date with the Court's stamp and signature. During the Sivak case, Aguilar demonstrated a mythomaniac personality and in innumerable opportunities tried to change dates and add notes to the record to his own benefit. Nevertheless, the stamp and signature of the Court's entry table are real and should be taken seriously.] The Court did not investigate the matter. In the same way, Judge Galeano failed to note that if the date were certain, various felonies were committed by public officials who did not act in accordance with their duties once they received the accusation. Or by declaring the date stamp false, Galeano failed to recognize the complicity of some Court official or that he should investigate the reason for it. Aguilar's accusation can be found in Section 14 of Galeano's court proceedings.

⁴ Dr. Smolianski was recently brought in (March 1995) to help the lawyers of the AMIA-DAIA in their task.

who was a custodian in the Embassy determined that Neuman was a good candidate for kidnapping. It was also discovered that all those involved in these cases were in the Argentine Federal Police, among them Officials Buletti, Galeano⁵ and the Assistant Commissary Lorenzatti, who to date is a fugitive.

Success in the investigation of the Sivak, Oxenford and Neuman cases was directly related to the drastic changes in the cupola of power of the Argentine Federal Police. Commissary General Pirker who took over as Chief from June 1985 to until his death in May 1987 was one of the key pieces of this success.

Pressure from U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy and various Jewish institutions in North America was also important. One of the coordinators of this effort was the deceased rabbi Marshall Meyer.

National Alert

When Commissary Pirker commanded the Federal Police, a Nazi-fascist group called National Alert was arrested. National Alert had placed bombs in a Sephardic temple on Lavalle street (four blocks from the AMIA building) and in a movie theatre in the Capital (where a Jewish movie was playing). This group was responsible for Anti-Semitic propaganda in downtown Buenos Aires.

In attempting to deactivate the bomb in the movie theatre, a policeman of the Explosives Brigade died and another was seriously injured. This led some sectors of the police to collaborate with Commissary Pirker to detain the perpetrators. Pirker had to use officials from the Railroad Security Superintendency of the Federal Police, a dependency with little organic ties to the rest. According to what Pirker confessed to the author of this report, "I didn't know who I could confide in in the force."

The incidents regarding National Alert and Osvaldo Sivak are the only two, the first of net anti-Semitic content and the kidnapping with anti-Jewish connotations, that the Federal Police has resolved from 1983 to the present. During this time at least thirty threats and anti-Semitic attacks have occurred.

The Embassy

In 1992, the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires occurred. The investigation of the attack, for Constitutional reasons, is in the hands of the Minister of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, Dr. Ricardo Levene, an elderly man, physically and mentally deteriorated.

⁵ No relation to Judge Galeano.

Dr. Bisordi, who was assigned to investigate the case and who worked with Levene, has been accused by the Lawyers Association of Buenos Aires of sympathizing with Nazism and with the military regime that governed Argentina until 1983. He was relieved some time later by Dra. Silvina Catucci, who has not been found to be very effective.

Levene's investigation was not successful because he committed many mistakes in the investigation, even though they were technical. Faults were manifested. Finally, the case entered death row. Today nobody bothers with the subject.

A few hours after the attack against the Embassy occurred, when survivors were still being rescued, a journalist with close ties to the Menem government, Silvia Fernandez Barrios, asked the wounded, without any basis, if it was true that the arsenal of the Embassy had exploded. This question was broadcast on official television, Argentine Color Television. These comments were also made by, among others, the governor of Buenos Aires Province, Eduardo Duhalde.

Security in the AMIA Building

The building was located in Once, a commercial neighborhood where there is a constant loading and unloading of merchandise.

The roof was easily accessible from two buildings in the rear. One was an apartment building, from which kids would go to look for their ball each time it would fall from a balcony to the patio. The other easy point of access was from an old house taken over by squatters, Uriburu 626 (linked to AMIA funds).

After the attack on the Embassy, parking on the block of the AMIA headquarters was prohibited, and a patrolman and two agents were assigned to guard the building around the clock. Still, it was easy to convince them to allow parking on the block, especially if a bribe were offered. Neighbors saw vehicles parked there with total freedom, drivers spoke with the police officers and then they would load or unload their merchandise.

Ten days before and up until the moment of the attack, the lights of the street Pasteur were not working.

The Explosion

At 9:53 AM on July 18, 1994, a powerful bomb exploded and destroyed the headquarters of the AMIA. According to local authorities, the bomb was carried by a Renault Trafic pickup truck which came down Pasteur Street and detonated right in front of the building. This is the official hypothesis, but there is conflicting evidence that points to a bomb in the inside of the building.

No terrorist group took responsibility for the attack. In spite of this, as soon as the explosion occurred, and before the investigation began, all community leaders, the media and government officials maintained that the attack was carried out by Arabs.

The front of the building crumbled instantaneously. The majority of the victims died as they were crushed by the collapse of the walls and floors. The largest number of survivors were found in the back of the building.

In the street, victims were wounded by the explosive charge, many others were hit by flying rubble.

As soon as a column of black smoke emerged from the ruins, and the survivors were overcome by a strong ammonia smell, chaos enveloped the area. Buenos Aires, a city of three million inhabitants (eight million in Greater Buenos Aires) lacks a centralized organism that handles public catastrophes. The immediate consequences of the explosion clearly showed the lack of an authority to take charge of the matter.

The site was invaded by hundreds of curious onlookers, journalists, firefighters, paramedics, volunteers and afflicted individuals searching for relatives or friends. It was only at 12:15, more than two hours after the explosion, that the area was cordoned off. Gas and light were cut off a half an hour later. Fortunately, one of the main hospitals of the city is located a few blocks away (the Hospital de Clinicas). Many wounded were able to walk there, with the aid of friends or workers. The seriously wounded were taken by ambulance.

A survivor, Natalio Slutsky, described the confusion after the crumbling of the building. At the time of the explosion, Mr. Slutsky was in his office in the rear of the AMIA building, and he was able to rescue other survivors through the roof of the building. Upon scaling an adjacent balcony, Slutsky looked back: "I saw hundreds of people standing in the ruins, giving orders. At that moment, I thought that if anyone were still alive, all this noise and lack of organization would kill them. I think that they should have remained silent, trying to listen for sounds to find someone alive. People died asphyxiated."

Friday, July 22, a group of forensic Israeli police arrived in Buenos Aires, led by Dr. Jay Levenson, head of the Disaster Victims Identification Group. According to all the witnesses, the group essentially took charge of the Argentine morgue, and added a little bit of order to the confused scene. The autopsies, delayed due to a lack of personnel, accelerated so that relatives could receive corpses in time to have a proper burial.

Witnesses present who helped in the search for victims told that each time a body was detected or found, the firefighters would make the others leave, giving no logical explanation for this measure.

There were many robbery cases. Diana Malum recovered her dead husband's watch, his wedding ring and his wallet, but the latter only had 6 pesos. "My husband always carried

alot of money," she says. "Someone took his money and left only his credit cards and personal papers." According to survivors, Andrés Malamud, Diana's husband, who was the architect responsible for the building's repair -- was carrying \$6,000 dollars in his shirt pocket, because that morning he had withdrawn that money from the bank.

The surrounding businesses were also ransacked. In the photography store of Mario Damp, cameras, film and an enlarger were stolen. His safe was forced open and \$3,800 dollars were stolen. A nearby shoestore was also ransacked the night of July 21. That same day the owner of a toy store asked the police for permission to enter the perimeter of the security area, and he spent the afternoon putting merchandise that had not been damaged in garbage bags. The next day when he returned to find them, the bags were gone.

The owner of a print shop was luckier. When he arrived at his store he found it destroyed by the explosion. Someone had taken a key from his desk, had opened the safe, and had taken all the checks and cash. The owner argued so violently with police and his case attracted such attention that finally a police official told him that his belongings had been transferred to the 5th Commissary "for security reasons." They returned everything to him.

Anti-Semites did not dare to speak openly, but nevertheless they were present. The Jewish institutions were inundated with anonymous telephone attacks, indicating that more bombs had been placed in other buildings.

One of these calls stood out for its cruelty. Because some survivors had been found wandering the area in a state of shock, many people requested help via radio and television, in the hope that a disappeared family member would be found. One man received a call on his cellular telephone, telling him that his mother was in a hospital thirty minutes from the AMIA. The man rushed to the hospital, but he was told that they hadn't admitted any victim of the explosion. At that moment, his cellular telephone rang again: it was the same person that had called before, this time laughing and asking "How did you like the joke, you disgusting Jew?"

Members of the bomb squad of the Federal Police only examined three buildings searching for rubble from the explosion, the two contiguous to the AMIA building and the one across from it. A group of journalist who were doing an investigation for a book, searched in more than a dozen buildings, in which they found remains of the explosion and found more human remains. The journalists took all this evidence to the Judge in charge of the case. The doormen of the buildings they visited told them that the Police had never come by. In one of the few buildings where the police did gather evidence, the technicians came with brooms and picked up all the material with used and dirty shovels. The material was not labeled nor were photos taken.

The remains of the explosion were abandoned in a deserted lot in the University City, by the side of the river. Among the remains were hundreds of books of the AMIA and IWO

Library, some damaged, others intact. There were also, according to witnesses, pieces of remains from the police laboratory, and remains of a dumpster which sat in front of the AMIA. Abraham Lichtenbaum, the AMIA's librarian, went to the lot to try to rescue some books, accompanied by some volunteers. They were arrested. The librarian called a lawyer and petitioned the authorities to be able to enter the land and save the books. Once the petition was accepted, they went back to the lot and they were arrested once again. Lichtenbaum appealed to Judge Galeano. Three weeks passed without an answer from the court. Then the librarian received a call from the owner of the restaurant across from the lot telling him that vagabonds were coming to the lot daily taking away things to sell. Professor Lichtenbaum called the police and went running over there. There he found a dozen persons complaining to the police agents and asking them "Why can't we go in today?"

A North American specialist that works for a federal agency saw the personnel of the Police and the Civil Defense gathering parts of cadavers in the explosion site, and placing them in garbage bags. Bothered -- the standard procedure is to put away each part separately and label it--, he tried to intervene, but they told him not to interfere. At the same time, remains of the building, which are critical for analyzing the type of explosives used and the exact position of the bomb, were removed from the site, except for small samples that the local agencies took.

The Judicial Morgue still has 16 bags of human remains that have not been identified. No analysis has been done to determine which cadavers these remains belong to.

The Federal Police

The attack of the Embassy occurred when Commissary General Pasero was the Chief of the Argentine Federal Police. He resigned a few days after the attack on the AMIA-DAIA headquarters. It was not clear if his resignation can be attributed to the lack of professional efficiency or if there were other reasons.

Another question is in what measure the current Chief of the Federal police, the Commissary General Adrián Pelacchi (previously in charge of the Superintendency of Dangerous Drug Investigations) will want to or be able to do what his predecessor Pasero could not.

It is important to mention some things about the Argentine Federal Police. It is a very powerful institution (it has more than 35,000 in its ranks) and it possesses an enormous degree of autarky -- even if it does depend hierarchically on the Ministry of the Interior and ultimately on the President of the Nation. Only in the period during the last military government did the Executive Branch exert real power over the Police. The Argentine Federal Police in its organic role has a formal similarity to the FBI of the US. Republican and federal institutions were incorporated into the Constitution of 1853, as were the reforms that followed.

In Argentina, mafias do not exist in the same way they do in the U.S. and the few organizations that would be able to organize themselves as mafiosos are more in the business of meat or in the distribution of newspapers and magazines. But prostitution, drugs, gambling, etc. are administered or regulated by some groups belonging to the Federal Police. These are independent groups, but at the same time they are tied to the institutional organization chart, and their respective spheres of influence are clearly divided.

These considerations help to understand, or at least not to discount that even if a minority of the Force, undertakes or has anti-Semitic activities,⁶ the rest are not in conditions to investigate these activities, given that they (by being involved in other types of illicit activity) prefer to avoid eventual conflict, in order not to be discovered themselves. Their intervention is only possible if the political pressure amasses at the national or international level.

The Argentine Federal Police has been acting superficially, but these matters demand more forcefulness.

The Seventh Commissary

The AMIA building is in the jurisdiction of the Seventh Commissary, which is the responsibility of Inspector Commissary Gastón Fernández.

As soon as he took charge as Commissary, Fernandez was visited by , as a welcome, five members of the Jewish community, merchants in the zone. The Commissary made them wait two hours and then finally told them that he would not receive them.

In the beginning of the military regime (1976) an organization was created called CAPE or the Special Police Correction Center, in which courses of net anti-Semitic content were given, in which it was said that the Jews were to blame of what used to be called the "international and apatriate subversion" or "international synarchy," Gastón Fernandez attended these courses.

Fernandez was also related to the famous task forces working with great freedom and absolute power over the lives of the detained. Fernandez' group applied specifically what they had learned in the courses at the CAPE. Commissary Fernandez was promoted to Inspector Commissary and currently is in charge of Zone Three of the Federal Capital. (Zone Three has seven commissaries under its charge in the capital).

Three months after the attack, the DAIA honored to Commissary Fernandez for his role in the investigation.

⁶ Until recently, the Constitutional Order of Police indicated in its official report that there was no attack against the AMIA, but that its was an accident produced by the explosion of a heater.

It's also appropriate to underline that no Police guard assigned to the custody of the AMIA (Fernandez' subordinates) was at his post at the time of the explosion. The Federal Police never clearly explained the reason for this, something that had already occurred in the attack against the Israeli Embassy.

This process (removing guards suddenly in order to perform a kidnapping or attack) was called "free zone" in the time of the military rule. In many cases, the free zones were determined according to where the jurisdiction of where case would be handled, assuring either the complicity of the judges or their ideological sympathy and the consequential impunity from justice.

Many of these judges continue working in the different areas of the Judicial branch.

The police guarding the AMIA were hardly equipped for security. They only had guns. Their only means of communication was through walkie-talkies and the police car didn't run. Since no one had seen the car move during an entire year, the neighbors had asked if it had an engine. When the police car was destroyed by the explosion, the mystery was revealed: it had an motor, but it didn't work.

The police reports and the firefighters' report that appear in court records tell of their actions after the explosion.

Even with the contradictions and the ambiguities of the accounts, one can deduce that one of the policemen assigned to guard Pasteur street was in the bathroom of the bar across the way when the bomb exploded. Three minutes later, he went to save his partner and help him out of the patrol car. Also it's said that his partner was fixing the vehicle, and the hood of the car was up, protecting him from the blast. In other paragraphs, the Officer that wrote the report (in third person) notes that the sergeant was struck by the arrival of a truck at the door of the AMIA with two dumpsters. The driver unloaded them both and left the scene. It's interesting that the assistant officer said that in that moment the sergeant got out of the patrol car and went to the bathroom. The sergeant maintains, each time that he refers to the subject, that "God's hand saved him." Seeing the dumpsters being delivered, failing to investigate their contents and arrival as one would expect from a guard, and then abandoning the scene may indicate that he was not just lucky but may have been an accomplice.

A young man who operated a quiosk in the area and was a witness arrived at the scene 40 seconds after the explosion (more than two minutes before the sergeant). He looked inside the destroyed vehicle and upon assuring that it was empty proceeded to save victims among the building's ruins. Only some minutes later did he see police at the site. The sergeant, in an interview with a weekly magazine, offered yet another account when he declared that he found his partner various meters from the place, standing and holding his head.

Hours after the explosion, the Volunteer Firemen Corps of Florencio Varela offered to collaborate in the rescue of victims. This body is the only one at that time that had equipment for rescuing victims similar to that brought by the Israelis some days later. The equipment was purchased in France and some of their members were trained in its usage.

Aside from these Firemen, members of the Federal Police did not possess the equipment nor the experience and did not authorize their colleagues to collaborate.

Judge Galeano

The AMIA-DAIA investigation is formally the responsibility of the Criminal and Correctional Federal Judge, Dr. Juan Galeano. In Argentina, the judges act as investigators and prosecutors. Ideally, the police and security organizations should help the judges. But the system rarely works.

A series of scandals has stained the image of the Judicial Branch in Argentina. In 1992, a judge named Sarmiento was accused of blackmail against a private hospital, Sanatorio Guemes. In that case the present Judge Galeano was a secretary for Judge Velasco, and with the help of the chief of the State Information Service (SIDE) Hugo Anzorregui, they were able to detain Judge Sarmiento. What was interesting was that the hospital was the subject of extortion in connection with a felony, which the hospital's medical director Dr. Sorin admitted in a televised report. The felony consisted of reusing disposable materials (syringes, filters, etc.). The lawyer that represented the hospital, Anzorregui's brother, was able to get them to detain Judge Sarmiento and to forget the felony committed by Sanatorio Guemes itself. A little time later, thanks to the efficiency he demonstrated in this case, Dr. Galeano was named a Federal Judge by recommendation of the SIDE Director, Hugo Anzorregui.

In 1994, some months before the attack on the AMIA, a prosecutor from Judge Galeano's court was forced to resign, because he had accidentally discovered that Galeano was not even a lawyer. When Galeano was named, it didn't occur to anyone to ask for his diploma.

Judge Galeano's work has been criticized a great deal. In his proceedings, many defects have been found. Many witnesses were not called to testify. Some went voluntarily to the police but were rejected. In one case, a witness was told there were no diskettes, so his declaration couldn't be taken. Another witness was told that his declaration "didn't interest them" because "they already had too many."

One of the wounded in the AMIA attack was transferred to the Hospital de Clínicas, and by the individual's name and description he was of Arab origin. The Jewish, Korean and Arab communities all live together in the Once neighborhood, so it's quite likely that a passerby hit by the blast could be of Arab origin.

The victim, the same day he arrived at the hospital, was visited by various people, who immediately took care of transferring him to the Syrian-Lebanese Hospital. Judge Galeano freed up an official and asked the Syrian Lebanese Hospital to give him information about this patient. It's important to note that the Hospital de Clinicas is also a Teaching Hospital and even though it may lack means, it is considered professionally one of the best in the country. The Syrian-Lebanese Hospital did not respond to Galeano's request and some months later Galeano tried again. It goes beyond saying that the proper procedure in a case like this - being careful of course not to fall into a racism -- would have been to send a official of the Court, accompanied by the police, to appear in the Hospital and register the patient themselves to avoid any alterations to the record. In these cases, to send one official only serves to alert the suspicious. The matter has still not been investigated. Research should be done - in a subtle but efficient manner - of the wounded, given that one can't discount that some terrorist could have been wounded in the explosion.

At one point Galeano received information about an Iranian in Venezuela that could provide important information about the attack. He traveled to Caracas in the President's plane⁷ with this secretary, Dra. Spina, and with two prosecutors, where they interrogated an Iranian who presented himself as remorseful, manifesting that the perpetrators of the attacks in Buenos Aires were members of the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires.

Judge Galeano did not clarify why, or by whose authority, he authorized Berges⁸ to visit Telleldin in prison.

Berges, with photos in hand and the promise of an important sum of money, tried to convince him to recognize the detained Lebanese in Paraguay as purchasers of the Traffic.

Dr. Galeano also authorized the "reconstruction" of the explosion, done by Armed Forces experts in military dependencies. The reconstruction was broadcast on national television and seen by millions of viewers. The similarities to the actual explosion were minimal. It was done in an open field where the lack of surrounding buildings made it so that the only impact produced which could be verified was the rating of the program itself.

In spite of this, the experiment was added to the court record.

Some obstacles to the investigation can be explained by the lack of organization in certain areas of the Government. For example, when Judge Galeano asked for information about the entry of Iranians into the country and other suspicious foreigners, Immigration

⁷ The National Constitution clearly and precisely establishes the independence of the three Powers of the State: Judicial, Legislative and Executive. Judge Galeano, confirming the politicization of the case, instead of requesting authorization for his trip from the Court, asked directly for it from the President of the Nation.

⁸ Berges is also an intelligence agent. During the Proceso he was in charge of the concentration camp La Perla and he is friends with Telleldin's father, a member of the Triple A and a known anti-Semite and oppressor.

Services answered him by sending him a note in which it said that computer registers weren't saved since 1989, "due to budgetary problems." In order for the Immigration Services to find the real registry of the entry and exit of suspicious persons from the country, the Judge had to submit the exact date of entry, the flight number and place of entry into the country. In reality, the computer system of Immigration Service only consist of inputting in alphabetical order the forms that the border officials send to the central office. There was no computer network nor a digital information system.

From the beginning, the Court or more specifically the court record, received all kinds of visitors. Confidential information became public, with amazing exactness.

Feeding the pages of the newspapers, from the Court, the Prosecutor, and from the DAIA itself, the task of the journalists was made easy. They have limited their extensive investigation to talks over coffee with the government officials while Xerox machines do the heavy work.

One could suppose that Judge Galeano and the complainants know where the information flows from and, of course, that this will not get into the hands of the guilty, so that they can avoid having to build their defense or alibis. In any event they don't have to do much more than read the newspapers to inform themselves, even before the officials leave the Judge's chambers.

The court record consists of more than 80 sections, of four hundred pages each, in addition to other sections which are not in the principal court proceeding, where one can find the declarations of eleven protected witnesses. These latter reports are reserved for the Intelligence Service, etc. Several hundred telephones were involved and 10,000 hours of recordings of those telephone conversations have been gathered.

All this information, which until now has not served to reach any positive result, is virtually unmanageable for one person, and one has to further consider that the Court's record is growing at the rate of one and one half sections each week.

The Iranian Connection

The declarations of an Iranian refugee, Moatmer Manucher, who is said to be a former diplomat, currently under protection of the United States, warned beforehand that Iran was planning an attack in London.

There is not a great deal of transparency here. Two high-ranking officials of the UN High Commission on Refugees personally responsible at the time for protecting the Iranian, were dismissed. In the declarations taken by member of the Court there is reference made to the fact that the Iranian anticipated the future attack.

Galeano visited the President at his residence in Olivos to show him this lead. The British, nevertheless, were not interested in the Iranian and thanks to that, they were able to uncover the attack committed in the center of London, organized by a Palestinian woman in an act of vengeance. According to her, the Israelis had killed her husband. There was no Iranian connection.

At that time, Galeano had already accused four Iranian diplomats as accomplices and had asked for their extradition to Iran. Iran harshly criticized Judge Galeano and demanded apologies.

According to British terrorism experts, one can't discount this as just a maneuver to distract the bloodhounds. Until now, the elements that Judge Galeano sustains are meager and doubtful in order to insure an Iranian connection.

In spite of this, his investigation was directed to an area known in Argentina as the "Triangle," on the border of Paraguay and Brazil, where there is a large Arab community. Recent arrests made by the Argentine and Paraguayan police indicate the existence of a Nazi network that reaches Buenos Aires.

In accordance with Rubén Beraja, president of the DAIA, the hypothesis has a meaning due to the activist posture of the Iranian Embassy since the fundamentalist revolution of 1979 that toppled the Shah. The Iranian Embassy has financed visits to Iran, and together with a Lyndon Larrouche delegation in Buenos Aires, has sponsored many meetings and book presentations. According to Beraja, the Iranians spent the last decade organizing militant cells among the Muslim Arabs of Argentina, and trying to earn the sympathy of the majority of the local Christian Arab community. In the Triangle region, according to Beraja, there is a large group of Arab immigrants, sympathetic to Yasser Arafat. Because contraband flourishes in the area, the Triangle can provide the clandestine cells with asylum and connections with the entire world.

Three men currently under custody alleged that they were trained in an island of the Tigre River which belonged to the extremist neo-Nazi Alejandro Suckdorf.⁹ The other trails Galeano took didn't lead to anything either. There were also trails that indicated that a group of Pakistani immigrants that lived in a farm to the west of Buenos Aires were said to be "involved in something." But no evidence about them was ever uncovered.

Judge Galeano refused to consider the possibility of a Syrian connection. According to con Rubén Beraja, the DAIA president, Syrians in the Argentine government say there may be corruption in the government but no ties to an attack.

The court only has one witness that is said to have seen the white Traffic pickup truck, which according to the official explanation, contained the bomb. This witness, a woman, is said to have seen the driver: a man with Arab features, and she even describes the color

⁹ Currently detained in the Civil Court of San Isidro of Dr. Markevich.

of his eyes (which contradicts what was said in later declarations). The question is how could she have seen the driver so clearly.

No other witness saw the pickup with these characteristics before the explosion. Some time after, a street sweeper who miraculously survived given he was only a few meters from the explosion, went to the Court and was obliged under threats to confirm that he had seen a vehicle with the same characteristics as the Trafic heading for the AMIA, instants before the attack occurred. The street cleaner who lives in a poor neighborhood in the Port area and is the father of eleven children, refused to give false testimony. This fact is known to some of the families of the victims.

Based on the presence of few remains of a pickup truck of that description among the ruins of the building, the hypothesis of the car bomb has been attacked by various experts. The main argument is the degree of destruction on the right wing of the building, which much greater than that of the left. This indicates that the center of the explosion is different from where the truck supposedly detonated.

The government is said to have found evidence that the pickup had been kept in a parking lot in the area. According to the Intelligence reports, the terrorists left the white Trafic in the parking lot of the street Paraguay, three blocks from the AMIA. A man took the pickup there five days before the explosion, paid for a week of parking and left a generous tip. The person in charge of the parking lot testified that at the time he thought that the pickup was weighed down because it had difficulty going up the access ramp of the parking lot.

If this is so, how could it have gone over the curb of the AMIA at high velocity on Monday, July 18? Another curious detail is that the parking ticket included the complete name and the document ID # of the driver. Parking tickets never include such data - only the date and the hour of arrival and exit of the vehicles. If it is true that some remains of a vehicle were found inside and among the ruins of the AMIA, it is also certain that the quantity of people entered the site of the attack a few seconds after it occurred and with complete freedom, ruining the possibility of finding -- unless false proof was introduced from the beginning.

The fact that 15 months have passed since the attack without any resolution to the investigation, shows that terrorists planned their actions with great prudence and precision. This is contradictory with the manner in which the Trafic was kept in the parking lot, where each one of their acts calls attention or is suspicious. The generous tip, the risk of leaving a vehicle filled with explosives for 5 days, the traditional possibility of robbery in parking lots, or putting information never required on a parking ticket. Everything seems more like a mechanism prepared to derail the investigation than a part of a well thought-out plan prior to an attack of great magnitude.

The SIDE

In Argentina there are various intelligence services. In the time of the military government, their numbers were even greater, but today each Armed Force has its own. The Police has its own, and the National Gendarme and the Naval Prefecture has its own. Each provincial government has an autonomous intelligence service. Finally there is SIDE, the Information Service of the State, which answers directly to the President's Office. The existing and traditional rivalry between these intelligence services makes collaboration or the exchange of information impossible. This is also characteristic of the diverse foreign services solicited by the Government, which served to strengthen the investigation of the attack against the AMIA.

After the attack on the Embassy, the following episode occurred: In one of the islands of the Tigre (an area situated about 30 to 40 kilometers from the city of Buenos Aires, a group of islands where the Rivers Paraná and Uruguay join and the Río de la Plata begins) lived an agent of one of the intelligence services of the Argentine Army, by the last name of Suckdorf. He had had a strong argument with his wife and it ended with him striking her.

The wife denounced him with the Buenos Aires Provincial police and also told the police that he had a firing range, a large amount of explosives, arms of different calibres, and a landing area for helicopters. After the AMIA attack, her husband had returned home happy, saying that "at last the Jews were given what they deserved," and hinted to her that he had collaborated in the attack.

The Police broke into the house and proved the woman right. Suckdorf told the police that he kept all this material under the orders from the Chief of the Army, General Balza.¹⁰

A few months after this event, the attack against the headquarters of the AMIA-DAIA occurred..

The Traffic used supposedly in this attack had been sold by a auto merchant named Telleldin, son of the Commissary Telleldin¹¹ and member of the Intelligence Service. Together with various police officials in the province they sold "used cars."

¹⁰ General Balza has maintained in recent times his democratic ideas. On December 3, 1990, he defeated the military command of the painted faces, led by Col. Seineldin. Seineldin had a nationalistic ideology, but there were reasons to consider that in reality he was a neofascist and anti-Semitic. Seineldin manifested on one opportunity, jokingly, that "in the same way you can't talk about green horses, you can't speak of an honest Jew."

¹¹ Telleldin's first lawyer, the only one who has been detained until now for the AMIA attack, was paid by SIDE, according to vox populi in the Courts. His name: Pérez Ferrio. Telleldin's current lawyer is Victor Stinfale, the same lawyer as that of the Nazi Suckdorf, who was detained when explosives were found that would have been used in attacks.

Telleldin and his wife had had legal problems before. She has four cases pending, for prostitution, acting as a pimp, operating "massage parlors," check falsification and other criminal activities.

Telleldin is the only suspicious one still under custody, after another sixteen were freed. According to the Judge who listened to the declaration, Telleldin had bought a burned truck, and he had repaired it and painted it in a mechanic shop belonging to Ariel Nitzcaner and Fabián Jource and then he sold it. The buyer, according to Nitzcaner -- was a man with Central American features who used a hat and sunglasses.

The owner of the mechanic shop is Jewish and he complained that the police tortured him to oblige him to confess that he was Telleldin's accomplice.

The Hunter Report

After the attack, the Argentine government invited various countries to participate in the investigation and promised total support to the investigators. The results of this collaboration were not revealed. Nevertheless, it appears that foreign investigators found difficulty in their task.

The United States sent Charles Hunter, an expert in explosives of the U.S. State Department. He arrived in Argentina as part of a team comprised of U.S. State Department agents, the IRT and the FBI.

Charles Hunter arrived in Buenos Aires on July 22, 1994, four days after the explosion. In the report to his superiors he asked himself why nearby buildings were damaged so little. These doubts incremented when they could personally observe that in a building nearby the AMIA, at Pasteur 611, part of the merchandise had been blown out to the exterior of the store, as if the expansive wave had originated inside the AMIA building. If the blast occurred in the door or lobby, the merchandise would have been blown toward the back of the local.

Among other things, the team requested samples of the remains to analyze in U.S. laboratories. Immediately the Federal Police turned over the samples. According to a source tied to the Investigation Team, they were contaminated. In their analyses, the Americans found traces of Pet-N, RDX, silicone, ammonia, various nitrates, TNT and other signs of plastic explosives -- a combination that the source categorized as "ridiculous" because the bomb would be so unstable that it would be unmanageable.

The Americans had diverse opinions with respect to the reason for contamination. Some believed that it was the result of incompetence and poor management on the part of the Argentines. Others believed that it was a joke against foreigners to those that the Argentines didn't see as collaborators but as intruders. They also pointed out that the

traditional rivalry between the Security and Intelligence Forces in Argentina made the investigation more difficult.

Despite the report Hunter gave to his superiors, the final report maintains the existence of the Traffic pickup and the car bomb.

The Laborda report

In an expert report that Judge Galeano also collected and which was written by an ex-official of the Gendarmerie (Laborda), it indicates that the Security and Armed Forces are not taught in training courses about amonal, an explosive used in the attack. In the report, Laborda gives a list of ingredients that comprise an explosive and a list of companies that can provide them (industries, pharmaceutical companies, etc.) It assures that amonol does not produce an ammonia smell.

It also enumerates various groups and organization that know its use and are in conditions to use it. In this list the Brigada del Café is listed, a group of youths that travelled some years ago to Nicaragua to help with the coffee harvest.

It goes without saying that in that list the Triple A, the National Alert or other rightist organizations are not listed. Nor are specialists of the Armed Forces or Military Factories. In fact, the reconstruction of the attack was realized with the help of the military.

In confirming the quality of the report, we observed that many of the mathematic calculations were wrong.

Jewish Institutions

Some months before the attack, the President of the AMIA, Dr. Alberto Crupnicoff was alerted, through Dr. Bronstein of the DAIA, about the certain possibility of an attack. Despite this, invoking economic reasons, nothing was done to avoid it. Measures were not taken such as those to avoid the accumulation of people in the areas close to the Ground Floor of the building, to reduce possible consequences. That laziness in decision-making seems to still be the way both institutions operate. None of the lawyers that form part of the complaint have had previous experience in this type of matter and the criminologists who from the start have worked in the AMIA-DAIA lawyers group don't work full-time on the matter. None of them has even read the entire court record.

For political reasons, apart from the act in and of itself, different measures are needed which correspond to "querellantes"¹² The case before Judge Galeano is moving

¹² "La querrela" in the Argentine judicial system, is equivalent to a type of private prosecutor. They can demand measures and question all or part of a Court, in case the court is not acting in accordance with the law.

slowly., Nor has the Court known how to carry the investigation forward. Nor has it demanded minimally that the police or services assist it in undertaking measures of the most basic common sense: such as investigating contradictions in the police report, the fact that the guards were absent from their posts in the moment of the attack, the irresponsibility in the care and search for proof, the quantity of testimony that was rejected without being heard with the pretext that they had already had abundant information. This abundance that did not serve to resolve absolutely anything. As with so many other measures, or the lack of them, some of which form part of this report.

At no moment did the DAIA or the AMIA specifically denounce anyone, even though they know¹³ all and each of the officials of greater or lesser hierarchy, of net anti-Semitic past and present involved directly in the investigation of the case. Starting with Dr. Bisordi, secretary to the Minister of the Court where the case of the attack against the Embassy is investigated, to the current manifest Nazi advisors in the Interior Ministry. Neither was the numerous quantity of robberies produced after the attack by firefighters under the noses of the Federal Police which they belonged to, in nearby businesses and the cadavers they needed to rescue. Nor was the irresponsibility with which they managed the remains of the victims denounced, mixing everything together in a bag, without the certainty that they belonged to the same person.

The remains, objects and other elements that were taken from the destroyed building, possible necessary evidence for the investigation, were sent under police custody to the University City -- by order of the Court and to be evaluated later.

They were hardly deposited in the fenced terrain and with guards at the door and nearby, when vagabonds were extraofficially notified the take material for its sale. They walked on top of the remains and the evidence with total liberty.

Repeatedly and without any plan, despite the advice and orders from their lawyer's group, the officials of the DAIA passed on information, and they continue doing so, to the press. With this, the possibility increases that those measures requiring secrecy to be effective, could be leaked out by investigators.

A few days ago, Judge Galeano announced to the heads of DAIA that he would soon call for 30 searches. One cannot discount that these searches may serve to alleviate pressure on the Court, for fear that the case changes hands. This fear is shared by some of the attorneys of the DAIA, who prefer to maintain a friendly relationship with the Judge.

Even though searches require the most absolute reserve, Beraja announced on television that very important measures would occur, alerting once again the possible individuals that might be investigated.

¹³ much of the information in this report was checked and supplied by government officials and or lawyers of both institutions.

In the case against Berges for trying to bribe Telleldin to recognize the Lebanese extradited from Paraguay with respect to Suckdorf's case, the AMIA-DAIA lawyers' group agreed to present itself as private prosecutors. The possibility of doing this is based in that the private prosecutors could be damaged with this false testimony. As such they have the right to form part with the advantages that this implies for the basic cause.

The strategy in which this presentation is based has a double purpose: the first is to remind Galeano what occurred in the Sivak case when the investigation was practically stopped, and through a strategy similar was able to take the case from the court to Dr. Irurzin, who in four months resolved what Velasco and Galeano could not resolve in two years.

If the pressure wasn't sufficient, they could move the case into another Court and continue forward in a more efficient manner.

Despite the agreement between the lawyers, those charged with making it happen did not do so. After a month and a half they returned to the subject. They returned to talk about it but until today nothing has been done.

The majority of the most spectacular and publicized measures were taken in coincidence with different political circumstances such as Berges' detention, before the one year anniversary of the attack. Now, it seems that the July 28 hearing of the International Relations Committee in the House of Representatives in Washington, which will consider the attack, should push the measures announced by Beraja.

In a television report, part of a special program paid by the AMIA, and made by the son of the AMIA's President, Dr. Crupnicoff, ex President Raul Alfonsin said "I would have liked to have seen them arrive at some solution, but I have not seen any important complaint on the part of the Jewish community or on behalf of the Embassy of Israel in the sense that things have been handled poorly by the government. Then neither can the UCR go beyond what the community itself clamors for. We will always be aware to accompany the community in all that can be done on a road that culminates with the clarification of responsibilities."

When the leaders of the DAIA were alerted to the growing discontent among the families of the victims, they incorporated one of them into the lawyers' group for fear that their frustration would lead them to start separate complaints with a consequential loss of control.

Luis Czyzewski, parent of one of the victims, was included and recently was invited to participate in the September 28 hearing in Washington, but on the condition that the rest of the relatives were not informed. Until now, the families gathered in a group called Active Memory made its decisions as a group.

Also, about a month ago, about thirteen months after the attack, the first informative meeting for relatives of the victims was held.

Conclusion

To be able to carry an investigation of the attack forward, difficulties exist that are not related to the case in and of itself, but instead with political interference, inexperience and lack of interest in the organisms in charge of the investigation.

The court proceedings are the testimony of a tiring game of chess, with different sectors as protagonists, with two big absent groups: the relatives of the victims and the authors of the massacre.

It is full of all kinds of psychological actions, pressures, false leads and testimony. The abundant, insubstantial evidence ends up hiding the little data that could serve as a start for an effective investigation.

Three groups comprised of journalist investigators achieved greater success in their investigation than the Courts, the Federal Police, the Information Services and the National Government all together. This alone is a remarkable fact.

From an international point of view, the United States maintains, as does Israel, that the attack was done by Iranian terrorists.

Even if the attack coincides with other attacks that happened contemporaneously in different places of the world, its magnitude reveals a great collaboration of local forces. The inefficiency (in the best of cases) of the officials involved in the investigation of the attack, like those that should have foreseen it, plus the suspicious, evasive and irresponsible attitude of the Federal Police, protected by a strategy designed by local Information Services, in the manner that historically was done in the time of the Dictatorship, only reinforces the hypothesis of LOCAL PARTICIPATION, be it of partial or total responsibility. That is to say, if one cannot absolutely discard the connection with international terrorism, the leads that have been followed until now probably form part of a defense strategy and hide those truly responsible.

Repeatedly, different independent journalistic sources come denouncing the principal repressive organisms, like the Police the Armed Forces and different Intelligence services are infiltrated by anti-Semitic elements. The subject has generated also harsh internal discussion in the Jewish community.

In the official institutions of the community, even if there is ample understanding of these circumstances, their leaders have systematically refused to formulate the corresponding announcements. This nevertheless is not absolutely lineal, because some of them in giving declarations have unleashed the truth. The president of the DAIA, who ultimately adopted a very cautious attitude in order not to generate too many irritations with the

government, is used to denouncing certain anti-Semitic elements in repressive organisms. Their accusations, at first sight, in some cases can appear to be a great force, but by not being specific and naming names, efficiency is lacking.

The internal fights in the breast of the Jewish leadership prevail above the work that the lawyers of the "querella" must undertake. They have not demanded that the government or the Court investigate the local connection.

This report was done by a team directed by Gabriel Levinas. He is a journalist, he was the Director of El Porteno magazine between 1981 and 1986. He was also a member of the Jewish Movement for Human Rights.

Sources:

- Court Records.
- CELS (Center for Legal and Social Studies)
- Luis Domievsky - Lawyer of the AMIA's querellante.
- Omar Lavieri - journalist for the newspaper Clarin.
- Herman Shiller. journalist and writer. Founder of the Jewish Movement for Human Rights and ex-director of the magazine Nueva Presencia.
- Report supplied by the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Argentina, produced by Northamerican journalists.
- SG - Former official of the Israeli Army, dedicated to the search for Nazi war criminals.
- Archives of El Porteno and Nueva Presencia.
- Fernando Almirón, La Prensa newspaper.
- Colonel R. Horacio P. Ballester. Argentine Army (infantry).
- President of CEMIDA (Center of Military Officials for Democracy).

All the information in this report can be explained in greater detail upon request.

Guillermo Patricio Kelly
Posadas 1355, Capital Federal
Buenos Aires, Argentina

September 27, 1995

Committee on International Relations
2170 Rayburn Building
Washington D.C. 20515-6128


Mr. Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman

Dear Mr. Gilman:

I am respectfully submitting to your committee a document to be included in the congressional record for the hearing that will take place on September 28, 1995 on Terrorism in Latin America / AMIA Bombing in Argentina.

It consist of a document submitted by me and officially entered on the record to the Argentine Supreme Court on August 3, 1994 requesting from the Argentine authorities to investigate individuals that due to their background could very possible had participated on those terrorist acts and a planned attempt to the life of President Carlos Saul Menem. Since I have follow these terrorist events very closely, I make myself available to your committee for further consultations.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of a stylized 'W' or 'G' shape with a long diagonal stroke extending downwards and to the right.

Guillermo Patricio Kelly

Guillermo Patricio Kelly
Attachment to Argentine Supreme Court

1-Request from Mr. Kelly to the Argentine Supreme Court to depose Cesar Alejandro Enciso (AKA "Pino", "el Polaco") picture attached, whom due to his terrorist background might have knowledge on the execution of the actual bombing of the Embassy of Israel and the AMIA Building.

2.- Same request to depose Hector J. Villalon whom on his background show that he was detain 1976 in France for the kidnapping of the President of FIAT. His defense lawyers were also the lawyers of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He presently maintain extensive contact with Libya and Iran.

3.-Letter to Mr. Kelly from the Charge de Affair Embassy of Iran in Argentina June 9, 1987, protesting his articles against them and fundamentalist.

Corte Suprema de Justicia
de la Nación
Oficina

Cédula N° 6499/94
 Urgente

Señor/a KELLY GUILLERMO PATRICIO


Calle RODRIGUEZ PEÑA 2007 PISO 3° (ESL. DRA. CUCURULLO)

El Jefe de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación hace saber que en los autos SUMARIO INSTRUÍDO EN LA COMISARIA 15° POR AVERIGUACION DE LOS DELITOS DE EXPLOSION, HOMICIDIOS Y LESIONES CALIFICADAS Y DAÑOS (ARTS. 106, 80 INC 4° Y 5°, 92 Y 103 DEL CODIGO PENAL) CON MOTIVO DEL ATENTADO A LA EMBAJADA DE ISRAEL.

(Expte B- 143/92 OR1), el Tribunal con fecha 28 de julio de 1994, ha dictado Providencia.

Nota: ESTA DICE: ...
 DESIGNASE LA AUDIENCIA DEL DIA 3 DE AGOSTO A LAS ... 10.30 HORAS A LOS EFECTOS DE RECIBIR DECLARACION TESTIFICAL A GUILLERMO PATRICIO KELLY.
 FOLIO RICARDO LEVENE (II).-

Buenos Aires, 29 de julio de 1994



SUSANA ALICIA OROZCO
 Prosecretario Jefe

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 50Y

Notificado el 29 de Julio de 1994
 siendo las 13.58 hs. conste.

JOSÉ R. GONZÁLEZ DEL MARINI
 JEFES DE OFICINA SUPLENTE DE JUSTICIA

MANIFIESTA. ACOMPAÑA DOCUMENTACION.

Excelentísima Corte Suprema de Justicia
de la Nación:

GUILLERMO PATRICIO KELLY, periodista, argentino, por derecho propio, constituyendo domicilio en la calle Rodríguez Peña N° 2087, piso 3°, Dto."B" de esta Capital Federal, en la causa que tiene por objeto procesal el atentado terrorista contra la Embajada del Estado de Israel, a V.E. respetuosamente dice:

I. Que como resultado de la Intensiva Investigación periodística en el campo nacional e internacional, de una enorme asociación ilícita, considera pueda / ser pertinente, la comparencia ante V.E. de Cesar Alejandro ENCISO (alias "Pino", "el Polaco"), para que manifieste si tiene conocimiento respecto al brazo ejecutor que llevó a cabo la voladura de la Embajada del Estado de Israel y de la sede de la A.H.I.A.

II. Que esta Suprema Corte de Justicia esta - blezca si hay conexiones entre Cesar Alejandro ENCISO y Héctor J.VILLALON, cuya actividad terrorista consta en la documentación que se acompaña. Que los abogados defensores de Héctor J.VILLALON en París (Francia) cuando fué de tenido, luego del secuestro del Presidente de la Fiat, // eran los mismos abogados de Komein, quien en vida declaró la guerra terrorista a la civilización judeo cristiana.

III. Que no es necesario ir mas lejos de Resis

tencia (Provincia del Chaco), en conexión con Paraguay y Brasil para obtener armas y explosivos que hacen a la investigación de esta causa, para lo cual también se acompaña documentación entregada por el Jefe de Policía de la Provincia del Chaco.

IV. Que por lo tanto solicita la comparencia de los ex-Ministros del Interior Julio Mera Figueroa y José Luis Manzano, como así también la del Dr. Jorge Antonio Gait.

Proveer de conformidad,

SERA JUSTICIA.

GUILLERMO PATRICIO KELLY



Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación

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En Buenos Aires, a los tres días del mes de agosto de 1994, comparece ante el señor Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, doctor Ricardo Levene (h) y el Secretario de la Corte que autoriza, el Sr. Procurador General de la Nación, Dr. Oscar Luján Fappiano y el Sr. Procurador Fiscal Dr. Eduardo Casal, una persona previamente citada en esta causa S.143 a quien se le hizo saber que se le recibirá testimonial. Prestado que fue el juramento de ley en legal forma e impuesto de las penalidades en que incurren quienes se producen con falsedad, manifestó ser y llamarse: GUILLERMO PATRICIO KELLY, acreditando su identidad con C.I. 1.896.208 de nacionalidad argentino, de estado civil viudo, de profesión periodista, domiciliado en Rodríguez Peña 2087, 3er. piso Capital Federal. A preguntas relacionadas con los hechos que se investigan y sus partes y sin con respecto a ellos le comprenden las disposiciones generales de la ley que en este acto se le explican, respondió que entiende que no le comprenden las generales de la ley. En relación con los motivos de su presentación el compareciente desea hacer entrega de documentos relacionados con Héctor J. Villalón y Alejandro Enciso. Pide que el FBI certifique su autenticidad, sobre direcciones que da de Brasil y México. Allí está con la firma del jefe de policía del Chaco, que habló ayer por teléfono con él, una serie de documentos relacionados con un alentado al Presidente Menem y más documentación sobre Jorge Antonio Gait. Se ordena la incorporación de esta documenta-

ción consistente en un escrito que comienza "Manifiesta. Acompaña Documentación"; una carpeta anillada que reza "Carpeta con Datos e información relacionada al ciudadano Jorge Antonio Gait"; otras fotocopias que empiezan con la leyenda "A los señores Diputados de la Provincia del Chaco: Justo José Perini..."; y otra documentación sobre Mr. Héctor Villalón. Que tuvo una reunión, con el que era el embajador de Israel en la Argentina, Dr. Isaacc Sheki, donde comentaron el atentado a la embajada. Que se comentó cómo se había perdido tiempo sin encontrar a ningún culpable. Que él se había molestado mucho con las declaraciones del entonces ministro del interior Dr. Manzano, refiriéndose a que había habido una explosión por acumulación de explosivos en el sótano de la embajada. Que tal cosa no era cierta dado que incluso había botellas de coca cola y un aparato de emergencia para dar luz en caso de cortes que siguió funcionando pese a la explosión. Que el compareciente concurreó a los E.E.U.U., a San Diego, California, para ubicar al Dr. José Luis Manzano, en La Joya, donde está la Universidad, no encontrándolo y entonces mandó un camarógrafo a México (City) al hotel María Isabel Sheraton y este último lo pudo ubicar en el comedor y lo filmó con seis o siete personas acompañándolo y luego el dicente incorporó esa filmación al programa N° 3 de su producción, que pone a disposición del Tribunal. El Sr. presidente sugiere que sería interesante los aporte, a lo que se compromete el dicente. Que el dicen-



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te se trasladó a Miami y le fue dejando sucesivos mensajes al Dr. Manzano y solamente se lo contestó en el último viaje en que él pasaba por Miami viniendo de Quito, Guayaquil, y le dice que estaba recabando de su grabadora los mensajes. Que estaba en el hotel intercontinental de Miami. Que respondía a su llamado pero que no accedía a ningún tipo de entrevista periodística. Le hizo notar que había accedido con la revista Gente con amplitud. Que le contestó que tal cosa no era cierta, pero no quiso discutir con él. Le pidió que aunque no fuera una entrevista para TV, que por favor tuvieran una conversación personal "of de record", contestándole que "Ud. y yo podemos hablar por T.E. todo el tiempo que Ud. quiera, pero no me gustaría encontrarme personalmente". Le dijo: "no lo entiendo, en cualquier momento voy a viajar nuevamente a California y ya va a ver como vamos a conversar". En esta semana un diario, Crónica, comenta que Manzano se retiró de su domicilio alejándose de la zona, San Diego, y que a partir de ese momento estaría en Washington. Que el dicente recordó que había estado con el Sr. embajador Dr. Granillo Ocampo, testigo de por medio el Sr. Jorge Silvariño, camarógrafo e intérprete, y frente a un comentario sobre lo sucedido en la embajada de Israel, le respondió "como era posible que le preguntara lo sucedido en ese atentado si todo el mundo sabía quiénes eran". Que al dicente le llamó la atención y no siguió preguntando nada. Que si el tribunal lo requiere, acompañará artículo que realizó cor

motivo de esa conversación con Granillo Ocampo. El presidente solicita que también lo acompañe. Que hace notar en este momento del acto judicial que desde hace muchos años siguiendo la concepción del mundo fundamentalista donde si bien es cierto, todos los pueblos árabes tienen una religión, no todos son extremistas, pero el poder lo tienen ellos. Cuando habla de fundamentalismo, no lo hace sólo de Irán sino también de Irak, la línea de Chadafi y otros estados. Por lo tanto sigue sosteniendo que la concepción de los atentados en el mundo pertenece a la teoría religiosa del fundamentalismo, en este caso, islámico. Que independientemente así como cuando se atenta contra el Papa, aparece la "pista Búlgara" que lo hace una periodista norteamericana Ross, que sería la responsable y los diplomáticos de Bulgaria quedan detenidos. Que con el tiempo tienen que ponerlos en libertad y el único preso es Alek, que no tiene idea de lo que hizo. Que con esto quiere decir de acuerdo a todos los trabajos de estos años y entrevistas a lo largo del mundo, para visualizar bien este problema, dado que ellos sostienen desde Khomeini en adelante que la civilización Judeo-cristiana está liquidada y llegó el momento de ir al Corán. Por otro lado Chadafi, lanza el "libro verde" impreso en todos los idiomas. Allí sostiene que las fuerzas armadas pueden ser liquidadas y trasladadas sus armas en tres días y pasadas a asambleas del pueblo. Que un representante de Irán publica con su firma en "La Nación" que a su juicio la argen-



Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación

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tina está "libanizada". Dicen que van a llevar la guerra al territorio occidental. En aquél momento parecía algo altisonante, pero ahora las bombas están apareciendo. El dicente contempla ésto y lo ha hecho públicamente, que su conducción es la que podía tener a mano en todos los países. Que esto se puede dar en todos los países. Que el dicente sostiene que se está trabajando sobre los hechos y no sobre las causas. Que aquí no se ha investigado sobre uno sólo de los individuos que tienen antecedentes para atentados de esta naturaleza. Por eso nombra a César Alejandro Enciso, alias Pino, Pinito o el Polaco, y pide la intervención de este Tribunal si ha tenido contacto con Héctor J. Villalón. Que la dirección de Hector J. Villalón es Av. Pte. Wilson 40, 6° y 7° piso, Paseo Trocadero, París, Francia. Que Enciso cree que está prófugo y que agrega que no se lo encuentra porque "nazi no encuentra nazi, o tropa no encuentra tropa". Que como periodista ha recogido información y también en entrevistas mantenidas con diverso personal de inteligencia que los ejecutores como posibles copartícipes para esta asociación ilícita -no sólo está el que pone la bomba, sino también la acción psicológica posterior, echándole la culpa a las propias víctimas-, que el alcance del dicente es realmente limitado frente a la gravedad de los hechos ocurridos últimamente en los que se necesita frente a una razón de estado, el aparato necesario que surge del gobierno, servicios de informaciones y un periodismo que indague y siga la

investigación sin intereses políticos de núcleo o de monopolio. Preguntado cómo vincula a Enciso y Villalón con el atentado a la embajada y qué roles les adjudica, contesta que en el escrito que acompañara se hace referencia a ello, se ciñe a dicho escrito. Que el dicente no tiene el poder del Ministerio del Interior u otro organismo, y tiene que limitarse en primera instancia a ésto, que es lo que corresponde como ciudadano y periodista. Que este tribunal tiene actuaciones que provienen del juzgado de la Dra. Servini de Cubría en el caso de la bomba que le enviaron al dicente mediante un video-bomba. Que la empresa Oca sigue distribuyendo encomiendas so pretexto que no puede fiscalizar el contenido. Que en el juzgado federal de Ushuaia está probado que la droga se hace llegar por Oca. Los despachos con las bombas para gendarmería Nacional y el dicente, vienen por Oca. No hay que buscar las fronteras, sino adentro. Las bombas vienen del Chaco, con un remitente que se llama Jorge Antonio Gait, pero ambas investigaciones son separadas y los jueces no se han juntado para investigar. Que acá hay gente dispuesta a seguir colocando gente como mercenarios y que tanto el neonazismo y el neocomunismo lo hacen bajo la conducción del fundamentalismo iranista e islamista. Que no lo tiene probado pero hay una obligación para investigarlo a fondo. Sino nos va a pasar como en la pista Bulgara. Que el dicente no está para desarrollar la investigación. Que ayer el dicente habla con el jefe de policía del Chaco, quien le



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confiesa que no hay necesidad de dejar constancia de las salidas del país de la gente. Le pregunta por los explosivos y allí hay declaraciones que dicen que son personal del ejército y de servicios. Que hay que investigar las causas y sus ejecutores. Interrogado el compareciente para que manifestase si desea agregar algo más a la presente declaración, declara: Que no. Con lo que no siendo para más, V.E. dio por finalizado el acto, previa lectura y ratificación que hizo el compareciente por sí, firmando después de V.E. y por ante mí, de lo que doy fe.

En copia
[Signature]



*Embajada de la
República Islámica del Irán
Buenos Aires*



En su Venerado Nombre

Nota 292

Señores

Quorum

At. Sr. Editor Responsable

D. Guillermo Patricio Kelly


Buenos Aires, 9 de junio 1987

De nuestra consideración,

Nos dirigimos a Uds. por medio de la presente para hacer llegar nuestra protesta por lo que aparenta ser una campaña de desprestigio contra la República Islámica del Irán y su Lider el Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini a quienes insisten en presentar como mentores del Terrorismo Mundial, con múltiples conecciones en el ambiente de la subversión.-No solo rechazamos las términos de estas publicaciones (copia adjunta) por inexactos e injuriosos, sino porque ademas atentan contra las buenas relaciones existentes entre ambos paises.-

En caso de que estas infundadas agresiones persistieran nos veremos obligados a hacer uso de las instancias legales correspondientes.-

Sin otro particular, saludamos a Uds.respetuosamente.-


Seied Mohammad Farzamani
Enc. de Neg.a.



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