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New York

President:	Mr. Stamatekos	(Greece)
Members:	Bahrain	Mr. Alrowaiei
	China	Mr. Fu Cong
	Colombia	Mr. Gaona
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mr. Mukongo
	Denmark	Ms. Lassen
	France	Mr. Bonnafont
	Latvia	Mr. Ilgis
	Liberia	Mr. Brown II
	Pakistan	Mr. Jadoon
	Panama	Mr. Alfaro de Alba
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Somalia	Mr. Ibrahim
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Dame Sarah MacIntosh/Ms. MacNaughtan
	United States of America	Ms. Locetta/Mr. Waltz

Agenda

Non-proliferation

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

The President: The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor on a point of order.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are compelled to take the floor on a point of order in connection with yet another attempt to flagrantly violate the Security Council's rules of procedure and convene a meeting under a non-existent agenda item.

No matter how hard certain Council members may try to convince everyone otherwise, facts, especially legal ones, are stubborn things. In accordance with operative paragraph 8 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Council concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear programme on 18 October 2025, and the item "Non-proliferation" was removed from the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized.

As for claims about the alleged reinstatement of the Security Council resolutions on Iran that had been in force prior to 2015, Russia and like-minded countries have repeatedly emphasized that such claims have no legal basis whatsoever. This fact cannot be altered by any attempts to hide behind the erroneous and biased assessments of the United Nations Secretariat.

We cannot but note that, ahead of today's meeting, Russia and China proposed to the presidency a way out of this situation that would have allowed the briefing requested by certain Western delegations to take place without violating the Council's rules of procedure. Our countries proposed changing the agenda item to "Threats to international peace and security", since it is precisely such kinds of threats that are emerging owing to repeated strikes against Iran's peaceful nuclear infrastructure under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We also requested that the Agency's representative include in their report an assessment of these unlawful and reckless actions. Nevertheless, the presidency did not make use of this opportunity and instead chose to follow the lead of unscrupulous Council members by scheduling the meeting specifically under the item "Non-proliferation". We reject such actions by our Greek colleagues, which cast a shadow over their stewardship of the Council this month.

Given the aforementioned, the Russian Federation categorically objects to holding a meeting under a non-existent agenda item and requests that the question of adopting the draft agenda for today's briefing be put to a procedural vote. We call on all constructively minded colleagues to vote against the adoption of the draft agenda.

Mr. Fu Cong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China supports the position expressed by the Russian delegation. Resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October 2025. The Security Council and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency should cease deliberations on the Iranian nuclear file. Certain Security Council members, disregarding these facts, are pushing for the Security Council to hold meetings on an agenda item that has already been concluded. Such actions undermine the authority of Security Council resolutions. China expresses grave concern at efforts to stoke conflict and confrontation, which exacerbate divisions within the Security Council and hinder the process of finding a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. China calls on Security Council members to implement the relevant measures pertaining to the expiry date of resolution 2231 (2015), to uphold the authority of the Security Council and the credibility of multilateral diplomacy and to create favourable conditions for a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. China also urges certain members to play a genuinely constructive role in diplomatic efforts and to cease creating new obstacles.

Dame Sarah MacIntosh (United Kingdom): I will make two brief points.

First, today's meeting is fully in line with the decisions and procedures of the Security Council. Resolution 2231 (2015) remains in force, and the item "Non-proliferation" remains on the Council's agenda, as it has done since 2006.

Secondly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors has a mandatory obligation under the IAEA Statute to report findings of non-compliance with safeguards obligations to all IAEA member States and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. On 9 September, the Board was clear in its decision to report Iran to the Security Council for continued non-compliance with her nuclear safeguards obligations. As the Board has highlighted that this is a matter of proliferation concern that warrants this Council's attention, we should now hear from the IAEA about Iran's continued non-compliance.

The United Kingdom will vote in favour of the adoption of the draft agenda under the agenda item "Non-proliferation".

Mr. Bonnafont (France) (*spoke in French*): Once again on this subject, as this is not the first time we are having this discussion, France endorses the remarks just made by the representative of the United Kingdom and would like to respond briefly to the comments made by the representatives of Russia and China.

In August 2025, in response to Iran's continued failure to fulfil its nuclear commitments, France and its E3 partners triggered the procedure to reinstate Security Council sanctions against Iran. This procedure was carried out in full accordance with the law and in full compliance with paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution 2231 (2015). The outcome of this procedure was the reinstatement of the resolutions adopted by the Council between 2006 and 2010 to restrict Iran's nuclear programme. The Secretary-General himself noted this in his note dated 28 September 2025. This is now an objective reality that all Member States of the United Nations must accept, and it also follows that the item on non-proliferation has been retained on the Council's agenda, since the conditions were unfortunately not met to consider the Iranian nuclear issue to be definitively resolved. This item is absolutely pertinent to today's meeting, which concerns Iran's failure to comply with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement concluded under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Consequently, France will vote in favour of adopting the agenda and calls on all members of the Council to support it.

Ms. Locetta (United States of America): We strongly reject the assertions made by the representatives of the Russian Federation and China and fully support the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France in support of moving forward with this meeting. The Russian and Chinese efforts to deny the Council's decision of September 2025 are baseless, self-serving and counterfactual. On numerous occasions since snapback, the Council has decided to hold meetings under the non-proliferation agenda item. On 9 September, 23 member States at the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors voted to report Iran to the Security Council for non-compliance with its nuclear Safeguards Agreement. We urge all members to vote yes to adopt the agenda and allow the Council to proceed with its work.

The President: In the light of the request and the comments made by members of the Security Council, I shall now put the provisional agenda to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Bahrain, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against:

China, Russian Federation

Abstaining:

Pakistan, Somalia

The President: The provisional agenda received 11 votes in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. The provisional agenda has been adopted.

Non-proliferation

The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I now give the floor to Mr. Grossi.

Mr. Grossi: The global non-proliferation regime forms an indispensable part of international security, and it depends on the impartial technical verification provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Last year, the IAEA's inspectors spent more than 14,000 calendar days in the field, conducting verification activities in more than 1,400 facilities and locations outside them. Around 250,000 significant quantities of nuclear material are under IAEA safeguards. As a result of our inspections, we were able to draw safeguards conclusions for 179 States for which safeguards were applied.

Where there have been unanswered questions, we have been firm, fair and steadfast in our efforts of engagement, and this has been the case with the Islamic Republic of Iran. As set out in resolution GOV/2026/61, adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 9 September 2026, I have already reported to the Council and to the General Assembly, in accordance with the IAEA's statute, this latest resolution, and the previously adopted IAEA Board of Governors resolutions contained in GOV/2025/38 and 40, as well as the Director General's report contained in GOV/2026/50.

The Agency continues diligently to engage with Iran, seeking avenues to encourage it to clarify all remaining safeguards issues. These issues have now been outstanding for more than five years. In June 2025, at the commencement of military attacks, the Agency could not continue conducting verification activities in Iran and by the end of that month, we had to withdraw all of our inspectors from the country for safety reasons. Inspectors have been available to return for many months now.

As I reported in my remarks last week to the General Assembly, we have not been idle. In the context of different mediation efforts, the necessary preparatory technical work has advanced and the foundations on which a diplomatic agreement could be achieved so that inspectors can return to Iran are clear. Any path forward with regard to Iran's nuclear programme must include the IAEA's indispensable verification role, without which no solution is verifiable and, as a consequence, sustainable. Our work with the United States negotiating and technical team has been thorough.

Many Member States, including Oman, Pakistan, Qatar and Egypt, have undertaken important efforts to find a way to re-engage Iran so that an acceptable arrangement can be reached. On 9 September 2025, under the auspices of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi and with the indispensable assistance of Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, I signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Abbas

Araghchi, on practical steps on safeguards implementation in Iran, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Safeguards Agreement, following the armed attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities. The Cairo agreement represented a practical approach to addressing Iran's security concerns and to facilitating the conduct of necessary verification activities in Iran, following the attacks.

Revisiting this agreement could help us address practical matters related to the implementation of safeguards pursuant to Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, in particular to nuclear facilities affected by military strikes and their associated nuclear material. Included are the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, the pilot fuel enrichment plant and the fuel enrichment plant in Natanz, a number of facilities at the Isfahan complex and the Khondab heavy water research reactor.

Legal obligations in this regard cannot be unilaterally suspended, under any circumstances. This is a basic principle of international law. Maintaining continuity of knowledge is crucial in any verification and monitoring process. Iran has not provided the requested information and access enabling the IAEA to verify previously declared nuclear material at Iran's facilities under safeguards, both those that have been affected by military attacks and those that have not.

The one exception is the Bushehr nuclear power plant, where our inspectors are currently undertaking verification activities. In the context of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has engaged constructively with the IAEA to arrange for the delivery of safeguards equipment required for the verification of spent fuel prior to its transfer to a new dry storage facility. The transfer is expected to take place early next year.

While communications between the IAEA and Iran continue at a technical level, normal inspection activities have not resumed. I have urged Iran to work with us, to give us all the required information and to facilitate all the necessary safeguards activities planned by the IAEA to verify Iran's previously declared nuclear material, as required under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. I also wish to reiterate that in the implementation of its inspection activities, the Agency remains open to considering any legitimate safety and security concerns that Iran may wish to express. The spirit of the Cairo agreement was aimed precisely at addressing such concerns, fully in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. As stated in my reports to the IAEA Board of Governors, as of yet, the IAEA has not been able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This can and must be rectified. And we know from our past work with Iran, that constructive engagement is possible.

One area of particular concern is Iran's previously declared nuclear material, which includes 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The Agency has been unwavering in its efforts to engage with Iran so that Iran provides the necessary information and grants IAEA inspectors access to facilities to verify the status of this material, as is required under the NPT safeguards agreement. Information on, and access to, the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, declared by Iran immediately before the military attacks of June 2025 is necessary so that our inspectors can verify the status of the facility for safeguards purposes and whether it contains nuclear material. Iran had agreed, back in 2025, to allow our inspectors to access this facility. The commencement of the attacks prevented our inspectors from going to the site and since then, Iran has not accepted the Agency's repeated requests for access.

As stated in my reports to the Board of Governors, the IAEA continues to monitor activities at Iran's declared nuclear facilities and locations associated with its past and declared nuclear programme. Also, since June 2025, we have not identified any activity to repair or reconstruct any of the facilities damaged in the military attacks of 2025 and

2026. However, nothing replaces access to the facilities so as to verify the actual situation. I invite Iran to work with the IAEA without any further delay to clarify outstanding safeguards questions and to give the IAEA the information and access the Agency requires so that it can verify all relevant facilities and material, as is Iran's legal obligation. I encourage Iran to consider technical and gradual measures by which conditions are achieved that allow for the return of our inspectors to Iran. Such gradual, technical, incremental steps could pave the way to normal safeguards implementation in Iran while contributing to a confidence-building atmosphere conducive to a wider agreement.

In closing, let me thank Council members for this opportunity to brief them and assure them of the IAEA's continued commitment to fulfilling its indispensable mandate impartially, steadfastly and effectively. Only diplomacy, underpinned by IAEA verification, can prevent nuclear proliferation in the long term, in Iran and in the world. The IAEA stands ready. Let us seize the opportunity.

The President: I thank Mr. Grossi for his briefing.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

Mr. Bonnafont (France) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, I thank Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his briefing. I also wish to pay tribute to the Agency and its staff, who are performing an absolutely essential role with professionalism and impartiality for the international non-proliferation regime.

France, with a number of partners, requested that the Council meet today because the IAEA Board of Governors has raised with the Council grave and persistent concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. That programme will therefore be the focus of my observations.

On 9 September, the Agency's Board of Governors adopted, by a large majority, a resolution referring Iran to the Council for its persistent violations of its international obligations, specifically the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that the country concluded under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The referral follows the adoption by the Board of Governors, in recent years, of various resolutions urging Iran to resume fulfilling its commitments. I will point to some of the main concerns documented by the Agency and about which the Director General has reminded us.

First, the Agency is not in a position to verify the status of the nuclear material in Iran or to satisfy itself that it is not being diverted into proliferation-related uses and activities. There is an urgent need to clarify the status of the 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium — enriched to 60 per cent — that Iran has amassed by without any credible civilian justification. Such a quantity of material would potentially suffice to produce ten or so nuclear explosive devices. As the Director General has consistently pointed out, Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State enriching uranium to such levels.

Secondly, nor is the IAEA in a position to verify that Iran has suspended its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, as required by the resolutions reinstated by the Security Council in September 2025 to curb Iran's nuclear programme. Those grave, documented violations by Iran of its NPT safeguards are undermining the international non-proliferation regime. They are also fuel instability in the Middle East, as do Iran's ballistic missile activities and its support for armed militias fighting on its behalf in the region, particularly in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.

The Council must now fulfil its role in order to tackle this proliferation crisis. In the first instance, it must demand that Iran comply with its international obligations forthwith. Above all, there is an urgent need for Iran to resume meaningful cooperation with the Agency so that it can perform its verification activities regarding the status of

Iran's entire nuclear programme at all relevant sites. As a second step, the Security Council must implement its own resolutions on Iran in full. Those resolutions were lawfully reinstated in September 2025, upon completion of a procedure conducted in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). France reaffirms its support for the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), which was reinstated to oversee the implementation of those resolutions. Given the gravity of the situation, France regrets the consequences of the veto cast by two members of the Council on 17 September in respect of the renewal of the mandate of the Committee's Panel of Experts (see S/PV.10224). Despite that veto, France and its partners intend to continue exploring ways to document violations of the Council's resolutions.

Lastly, France reaffirms its belief that only a long-term diplomatic solution is capable of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. To such end, it is crucial that Iran engage in good-faith negotiations and agree to genuine concessions, with a view to credible regulation of its nuclear programme. France, together with its European partners, has been consistently engaged in the quest for such a lasting diplomatic solution for more than 20 years. We stand ready to contribute to efforts for a return to a robust and verifiable agreement that guarantees the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We regret that certain members of the Security Council continue to indulge a group of unscrupulous States that are abusing the Council's procedures to exert political pressure on Iran. It is they who bear responsibility for all the negative consequences for the Council's work that we have been experiencing for more than a year now. We have listened very carefully to the briefing by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi.

As we have already pointed out today, there are no procedural grounds for discussing the Iranian nuclear programme in the Security Council, as the Council formally concluded its consideration of this issue in October 2025. Nevertheless, for almost a year and a half, we have been witnessing developments that compel us to keep this matter in focus. However, let me clarify that these are by no means the developments that our Western colleagues are referring to.

In June 2025, Israel and the United States launched the first series of strikes against Iran's peaceful nuclear infrastructure under IAEA safeguards. Russia and a number of other Council members condemned these gross violations of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the IAEA Statute and the resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA General Conference. In February, the situation took an even more dangerous turn. Washington and West Jerusalem chose the path of full-scale aggression against Iran, including by launching a series of new strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. And today, we are once again hearing threats to resume such illegal actions.

Nevertheless, these actions have not received any appropriate assessment from a whole host of Security Council members. Moreover, our European colleagues, who so zealously profess their commitment to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, effectively supported those actions at the time. Now, however, they absurdly prefer to ignore the elephant in the room altogether.

Today, we have already heard yet another bunch of fabrications about the lack of IAEA verification activities in Iran. Do I really need to remind everyone that the problems with the implementation of IAEA safeguards at Iranian facilities arose precisely in June 2025, following the first series of United States-Israeli strikes? Yet, Western countries are doing their best to pretend that the difficulties surrounding verification activities arose out of nowhere — as if Tehran had simply woken up one morning and decided to refuse to cooperate with the IAEA. These same countries prefer to turn a blind eye to the fact that, even after the start of United States-Israeli aggression,

Iran continued to engage with the Agency, including on the issue of inspections at facilities unaffected by the strikes, including the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Indeed, creating such an alternative reality has been a long-standing tactic employed by the United States and European countries with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue. They also sought to place all the blame for the crisis in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action squarely on Tehran, despite the fact that its root causes were, obviously, the unilateral United States withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 and the failure of the United Kingdom, France and Germany to fulfil their part of the obligations. These same countries twist, distort and take out of context the conclusions from IAEA reports in order to substantiate the non-proliferation risks that they themselves have contrived to create. This is despite the fact that, in the course of their regular verification activities, Agency inspectors have not recorded any signs of nuclear material being diverted to unauthorized purposes.

Nonetheless, in August 2025, the E3 — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — relying only on their own fabrications, made an unsuccessful attempt to trigger the mechanism for reinstating Security Council resolutions on Iran, the so-called “snapback” mechanism. And now we are confronted with yet another unconstructive move: having pushed through the adoption of yet another non-consensual resolution on Iran in the IAEA Board of Governors, Western countries are presenting its provisions as a sort of transfer of the safeguards issue to the Security Council. Moreover, this is legally and procedurally illiterate, since there is simply no such concept as the referral of a safeguards issue to the Security Council. Those individuals and countries presenting the matter in this way would do well to familiarize themselves with the background.

Whatever goals the United States and its allies may be pursuing through these actions, they have nothing to do with the Security Council. Persistently advancing unilateral, politicized initiatives in the Council will lead to nothing but an even greater escalation of the already fragile situation around Iran and the creation of new, fabricated pretexts for renewed aggression.

Once again, we strongly urge our Western colleagues to abandon their destructive course regarding Iran, to refrain from using the Security Council and the IAEA as platforms to settle political scores with Tehran and to engage in genuine efforts to find a negotiated solution. There is, and there can be, no alternative to a political and diplomatic settlement. The Security Council must create conditions conducive to this process, not provoke further escalation. We trust that common sense will ultimately prevail.

Mr. Fu Cong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): At present, the situation in the Middle East remains tense, with spillover effects spreading constantly and severely affecting peace and stability in the region and the world at large. The negotiations between the United States and Iran are in a deadlock, while relevant rhetoric suggesting consideration of a new round of military strikes against Iran has further escalated tensions and is deeply concerning.

The Iranian nuclear issue, as one of the points of contention between the United States and Iran, was put on the negotiating table several times. Yet, those opportunities were missed repeatedly. The parties should draw lessons from history, adhere unswervingly to true multilateralism and the overall direction of political settlement, work to stop the fighting and promote talks and revitalize diplomatic efforts.

I wish to stress the following points.

First, objectivity and impartiality should be followed to get a clear understanding of the merits of the matter. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), resumed and constantly intensified unilateral sanctions against Iran, resorted to maximum pressure and violated the agreement that it

itself had worked to reach. These are the root causes of the current predicament. The E3 — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — failed to fulfil their obligations under the JCPOA. Yet, they joined the United States in imposing unilateral sanctions against Iran. Their so-called snapback is legally and procedurally flawed and has severely undermined the unity and credibility of the Security Council. The United States and Israel carried out military strikes on Iran's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-safeguarded nuclear facilities twice. This is the direct cause of the Agency's inability to conduct safeguards for the relevant Iranian nuclear facilities. Some countries, in disregard of the aforementioned basic facts, pushed through the resolution on Iran's safeguards at the IAEA, purely out of political motivations, undermining the cooperative relations between the IAEA and Iran and further escalating the crisis. This practice of abusing the IAEA is extremely irresponsible.

Secondly, double standards must be abandoned in the search for a comprehensive solution. The experience of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) is proof that political and diplomatic means are the only solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The core objectives and purposes established in the relevant documents should not be discarded, and important principles, such as the step-by-step approach, reciprocity and the balance between rights and obligations, should continue to be upheld. It is important to balance the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Iran should fulfil its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, and all parties should also respect Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We must objectively view Iran's difficulties in such aspects as restoring safeguards and verification and support the IAEA secretariat and Iran in resolving relevant issues through strengthened dialogue and cooperation. The United States should commit not to use force against Iran again, so as to ensure that safeguards activities can be carried out effectively in an environment free from coercion through force.

Thirdly, we must firmly oppose the use of force and resolve the security predicament in the Middle East through dialogue and negotiations. At present, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is making little headway, and the foundations of the two-State solution have been severely eroded. The threat of renewed hostilities between the United States and Iran has not subsided, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted, and tensions in Yemen and the Red Sea continue to escalate, disrupting global energy security, the geopolitical landscape and the international order.

Renewed hostilities between the United States and Iran would only bring greater catastrophe to the Middle East; run counter to the shared desire of countries in the region for peace, dialogue and justice; and further aggravate global economic, energy and food challenges. In the face of this situation, the Security Council must demonstrate reason and resolve, put an end to threats of force and unilateral military actions, speak with one voice, and take concrete action to advance dialogue and negotiations and reinvigorate momentum towards a political settlement, making unremitting efforts to restore peace and tranquillity to the Middle East and the Gulf region at an early date.

As a permanent member of the Security Council, China will actively implement the series of initiatives and proposals put forward by President Xi Jinping for peace and stability in the Middle East and continue to make its contribution to lasting peace and stability, development and prosperity in the region. As a party to the JCPOA, China will continue to take concrete action to uphold the authority of the Security Council and fairness and justice and make unremitting efforts to promote a political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue and safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Mr. Alrowaiei (Bahrain) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, we thank the presidency of the Security Council and the delegation of the Hellenic Republic for convening this

important meeting. We also express our appreciation to Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his valuable briefing on the latest developments relating to the Iranian nuclear programme and the related safeguards and verification issues.

Our discussion today follows the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in September concerning Iran's non-compliance with its obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which was referred to the Security Council in document S/2026/765. This development warrants the attention of the Council, given the serious concerns it raises regarding the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the repercussions that may ensue for international peace and security.

For more than seven years, Iran has failed to fulfil its obligations to cooperate with the IAEA in resolving issues relating to its undeclared nuclear activities and material, despite repeated resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors. It is deeply concerning that, for more than a year, the Agency has been unable to verify the status and whereabouts of Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium, raising serious concerns about nuclear proliferation risks in our region. Iran's continued evasion of its international obligations is unacceptable, and we call upon it to comply with those obligations immediately and fully.

The Kingdom of Bahrain wishes to emphasize three key messages.

First, compliance with international obligations concerning nuclear non-proliferation is not optional. Rather, it is a fundamental pillar of confidence-building and the preservation of collective security. Accordingly, the Kingdom stresses the need for Iran to cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA and provide the information and assistance necessary to enable the Agency to discharge its safeguards and verification mandate and resolve all outstanding issues without delay.

Secondly, the Kingdom reiterates its full support for the independent and central technical role of the IAEA as the body responsible for verifying States' compliance with their nuclear obligations. Confidence is built not on pledges alone but on transparency, cooperation and effective verification of the implementation of obligations.

Thirdly, concerns relating to the Iranian nuclear programme cannot be separated from the wider security environment in our region, which has witnessed heinous Iranian attacks against sovereign States, civilian objects and vital installations. The Security Council condemned those attacks in its resolution 2817 (2026) and demanded their immediate cessation. Those developments have shown that a lack of confidence and continuing escalation threaten the security and stability of the region and heighten the need for compliance with, and a clear commitment to, international law and relevant Security Council resolutions.

The Kingdom of Bahrain believes that diplomacy and dialogue remain the best means of addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, on the basis of effective compliance, transparency, good-neighbourliness, respect for State sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. We stress the need to involve the States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf in any negotiations or arrangements affecting their security and interests and to ensure that such negotiations or arrangements cover all their security issues and concerns.

In conclusion, the Kingdom reiterates that accountability and diplomacy are complementary paths. Safeguarding the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime requires enabling the IAEA to carry out its functions and the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities for ensuring compliance and protecting international peace and security.

Dame Sarah MacIntosh (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting, and I thank Director General Grossi for his briefing. The United Kingdom is grateful to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its tireless efforts to fulfil the Agency's verification and monitoring mandate in Iran.

Last month, the IAEA Board of Governors took a decisive step in reporting Iran to the Security Council for continued non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations. It was the first time in two decades that the Board had made such a referral. That reflects the gravity of the concern faced by the international community. The referral followed the Board's determination in June 2025 that Iran was non-compliant with its obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement. Iran has had every opportunity to address that non-compliance.

Iran has amassed a stockpile of over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. Iran remains the only State without nuclear weapons to enrich to that level, for which there is no credible civilian justification. For more than a year, the stockpile of highly enriched uranium has remained unaccounted for. Iran has denied the IAEA the access needed to conduct inspections at Iran's most proliferation-sensitive nuclear sites. That should concern us all.

As a result of Iran's refusal to engage, the IAEA reported in June that it was unable to draw a safeguards conclusion on this nuclear material and made clear that this is a proliferation concern. Despite repeated opportunities to change course, Iran's refusal to remedy its non-compliance has left the international community with no choice. As a result, the Board was compelled to report Iran to the Security Council.

There remains a clear path forward. The IAEA has repeatedly made clear, as Director General Grossi did again this morning, that it is fully prepared to resume its safeguards activities in Iran at short notice. As a first step, Iran must allow the return of IAEA inspectors to all nuclear sites. Verification is essential to rebuilding international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

We urge all Member States to remain seized of the seriousness of Iran's continued non-compliance and to call on Iran to fulfil its safeguards obligations and to cooperate fully and in good faith with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United Kingdom remains committed to a lasting and sustainable diplomatic solution that ensures that Iran never develops or acquires a nuclear weapon.

Mr. Ilgis (Latvia): I would like to thank the Greek presidency for promptly convening this meeting and also thank Director General Grossi for the informative briefing today.

The recent decision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors in Vienna to refer Iran's long-standing non-compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations to the Council underscores the gravity of the situation that we face. The Iranian nuclear programme endangers regional and global peace and security and undermines international non-proliferation norms. Iran has repeatedly failed to meet its international obligations, most notably under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

These concerns are compounded by the Agency's repeated statements that it has lost the continuity of knowledge regarding Iran's stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. This is particularly troubling, given previous reports of uranium enrichment to levels of up to 60 per cent, which are wholly incompatible with any credible claim of exclusively peaceful nuclear purposes. Iran has denied IAEA inspectors the necessary access to sites related to the country's nuclear programme.

In response to Iran's continued non-compliance, the United Nations sanctions against Iran were reimposed, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) was re-established. The Council took this measured step after repeated diplomatic efforts and through the appropriate and legally binding snapback mechanism. Unfortunately, certain members of the Council have persisted in advancing legally unfounded claims against these sanctions, obstructing agreement on Committee reports and new listings under the sanctions regime and even vetoing the extension of the mandate of the Committee's Panel of Experts (see S/PV.10224). This selective interpretation of international law has affected the functioning of the Council's subsidiary bodies and their ability to carry out their mandated tasks effectively.

The IAEA is a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation architecture, carrying out its mandate impartially and effectively. If Iran is serious about finding a peaceful long-term solution and securing the eventual lifting of sanctions, it must fully cooperate with the Agency. To date, however, the Agency's outstanding verification concerns remain unresolved. Full cooperation with the IAEA is essential to creating conditions for a sustainable diplomatic solution.

Furthermore, Iran's neighbours continue to face unprovoked attacks. Its proxy forces are undermining regional security and conflict resolution efforts. Iran's efforts to hold the global economy hostage by using a vital international waterway as leverage, in flagrant disregard of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, have severely disrupted crucial supply chains and put millions of lives around the globe at risk of food insecurity. As previously noted, Iran's actions have implications beyond the region.

We strongly condemn Iran's support for Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, causing harm to Ukrainian civilians, including through the use of the same types of weapons that Iran has deployed against its neighbours in the Gulf. Iran must cease its reckless regional actions and escalatory nuclear programme. We call on Iran to fulfil its non-proliferation obligations and resume full cooperation with the IAEA, including by ensuring its inspectors unrestricted access. We remain steadfast supporters of a comprehensive diplomatic solution to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

Mr. Alfaro de Alba (Panama) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Rafael Grossi, for presenting his comprehensive and timely report at this emergency meeting. We welcome the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Germany, who are honouring us with their participation.

We have voted in favour of holding this meeting because we believe that the facts set out in the most recent report, as well as the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, warrant the Council's attention. The Iranian nuclear issue transcends the borders of a single State. Its implications are testing the robustness of the international nuclear non-proliferation architecture and the credibility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Over the years, the difficulties the IAEA has encountered in some cases in fully exercising its verification and monitoring functions have shown that cooperation with the Agency cannot be selective. The effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime depends largely on States translating their commitments into concrete actions. Hence, it is important for Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, facilitate the access necessary for the Agency to carry out its functions and address outstanding issues in a transparent and timely manner, as it has on occasion offered to do in the past.

We recognize that the efforts undertaken by the Council have not yet succeeded in translating the international community's concerns into sufficient progress, but rather those concerns have increased. This highlights that the effectiveness of international action depends not only on the measures adopted by the Council, but also and above all

on the willingness of States to fulfil the obligations that they have assumed. Given this situation, and in order to prevent an escalation of tensions, we believe that it is essential to keep diplomatic channels open and to promote a constructive dialogue with Iran, which, according to the view expressed by the briefer, could be possible. Such dialogue must be accompanied by effective cooperation with the IAEA, which enables progress in verification and monitoring and clarification of outstanding issues that remain a cause for concern for the international community. In this regard, we believe that the Iranian nuclear issue should remain on the Council's agenda, both because of its implications for international peace and security, and because of our responsibility to safeguard the integrity of the international non-proliferation regime.

Ms. Lassen (Denmark): I thank Director General Grossi for his briefing and for the report to the Council.

Denmark's position remains clear: Iran must never be allowed to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, it remains crucial that the international community can receive and engage with the findings and conclusions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Against this backdrop, Iran's continued non-compliance with its safeguards obligations is deeply concerning. For more than 16 months, the IAEA has been unable to fully discharge its verification responsibilities, including with regard to the status of Iran's nuclear facilities and nuclear material. The lack of information about Iran's previously declared stockpile of enriched uranium, combined with the lack of access, leaves the IAEA unable to provide assurances about the exclusively civilian nature of Iran's nuclear programme needed by the international community. This is a deeply troubling trajectory and must be addressed with the utmost urgency. We call on Iran to immediately resume full cooperation with the Agency, including by providing the necessary information and access.

We are once again witnessing the unwillingness of some Council members to face the facts. The fact is that the snapback mechanism was activated in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015) and that the relevant sanctions measures were consequently reinstated. We deeply regret that this unwillingness prevented the Council from extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Iran sanctions due to the use of the veto last month (S/PV.10224). Despite what we have heard on several occasions, the sanctions against Iran remain in force. They are in place due to Iran's persistent refusal to fully cooperate on its nuclear programme.

Denmark strongly supports a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We urge Iran to return to negotiations in good faith, without preconditions, and to engage seriously in efforts to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, including through effective international verification.

Mr. Mukongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (*spoke in French*): The Democratic Republic of the Congo thanks the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Rafael Grossi, for his briefing and for the information provided to the Council on developments in the Iranian nuclear issue.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo reaffirms its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and to the central role of the IAEA in verifying compliance by States parties with their safeguards obligations. We are, however, concerned about the continuing lack of verifiable information on Iran's declared nuclear material and facilities, as well as the difficulties facing the IAEA in maintaining continuity of knowledge and effectively carrying out its verification activities. In that regard, the Democratic Republic of the Congo encourages Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in accordance with its international obligations, including by providing the necessary information and granting access to the facilities concerned so that the Agency can verify the exclusively peaceful

nature of its nuclear programme. We also emphasize that verification activities must be conducted in an impartial, professional and independent manner, on the basis of the applicable agreements.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo believes that the current situation should be addressed in accordance with international law, the principles of multilateralism and the respective responsibilities of the competent institutions. We take note of the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to refer the matter to the Security Council. My delegation nevertheless believes that this development should serve as an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic efforts rather than further deepen divisions within the international community. In that context, we stress the importance of preserving the unity of the Council and avoiding any initiative that could undermine the prospects for dialogue. Differences of view concerning the status of the Council's previous resolutions and the mechanisms established under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action should not stand in the way of achieving a peaceful and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The Democratic Republic of the Congo recalls that non-proliferation and the right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with its provisions, must be considered in a coherent manner.

My delegation is also concerned about the deteriorating security environment in the Middle East and the risk that further military confrontations could deepen uncertainty surrounding Iran's nuclear programme. We recall that attacks on nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards raise serious concerns about nuclear safety and security. Such attacks can also undermine the conditions necessary for effective verification. The Democratic Republic of the Congo calls on all parties to exercise the utmost restraint, to refrain from any action that could lead to further escalation and to prioritize dialogue.

In conclusion, the Democratic Republic of the Congo believes that the Iranian nuclear issue cannot be resolved sustainably through political pressure alone or through the use of force. It requires a balanced approach combining respect for international obligations, cooperation with the IAEA, regional de-escalation and genuine diplomatic engagement. We encourage the Council to continue to discharge its responsibilities in a spirit of dialogue and collective responsibility and to seek consensus in order to preserve the credibility of the international non-proliferation regime and contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East.

Mr. Brown II (Liberia): Liberia thanks the Director General for his important briefing.

Although the Council is procedurally divided on this important matter of global concern, it borders on the incontrovertible that the longer verification is interrupted, the harder it becomes to rebuild much-needed confidence. Liberia believes that the Council must focus on restoring the facts on which a peaceful settlement can rest. Uncertainty is dangerous enough. We must not allow it to become a reason for further distrust and war.

We reaffirm our commitment to all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran's right to peaceful nuclear activities must be respected in conformity with the Treaty, and its safeguards obligations must be fulfilled. The credibility of this framework depends on consistent implementation by all States parties.

The resolution adopted on 9 September by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency reaffirms findings of Iran's non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. The Agency's inability to verify previously declared nuclear material is a serious proliferation concern. Liberia calls on Iran to provide the access, information and cooperation necessary to resolve outstanding safeguards issues and enable credible verification.

Verification gives diplomacy something essential, and that is a shared basis of fact. Supporting the Agency's independence and technical judgment should therefore be common ground, even in a divided Council, as we are. Its findings must guide our decisions, and its inspectors must be able to work safely and effectively. The immediate task, therefore, is to establish a practical sequence for restoring access, accounting for nuclear material and reporting verified progress. We encourage Iran and the Agency to resolve the arrangements required without further delay. Compliance with safeguards should not await agreement on every wider political dispute.

At the same time, military escalation places both people and verification at further risk. Liberia urges all parties to exercise restraint, respect international law and pursue a negotiated settlement. Attacks on nuclear facilities risk radioactive consequences beyond national borders and can make essential verification more difficult. Diplomacy needs both access for inspectors and conditions in which they can and must do their work. The consequences of escalation also reach the sea and affect global trade. As at 22 October, the International Maritime Organization had confirmed 24 seafarer fatalities. The damage to the Liberian-flagged tanker *Lipsi* on 4 October brings that danger close to home. Liberia calls for the protection of civilian seafarers and freedom of navigation in accordance with international law. Crews carrying the world's trade must not be made to carry the burden of its conflicts.

The Council should encourage immediate, verifiable steps that reduce uncertainty and open space for sustained negotiations. A durable settlement must address proliferation concerns, some of which the Director General briefed about earlier, while respecting lawful, peaceful nuclear activities and the security of the wider region.

In conclusion, our responsibility is to make the next verified step possible and the next escalation less likely. Liberia stands ready to support that work.

Mr. Gaona (Colombia): This is a legal case that should remain in history because it defines many others. Either we have international law, or we do not. So, for Colombia, the legal case here is abundantly clear, and the path comes from the Charter of the United Nations to the resolutions of the Security Council and the determinations and decisions of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Colombia cannot accept the premise that States' obligations on non-proliferation are subject to the military or political circumstances of the moment. This is not how international law works or should work. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is abundantly clear. Article III imposes on Iran specific obligations to cooperate and collaborate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it is not doing that. How we know it is not doing that is because the record of non-compliance is large, extensive and historic. It starts in 2019. If we read all the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency, they are clear: incorrect information, denial of access for inspectors, persistent inability to clarify discrepancies. The unwillingness of Iran to attend to the requests of the Agency, after this has been approved and requested several times, over and over again, is what triggers article 19 under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is the request for review by the Security Council, and here we are.

Colombia was part of the decision on the draft resolution of September as a member of the Agency's Board of Governors and, following the reports, decided to move the file, with the other members, to the Security Council. Now here, we understand that we are asking for an exemption based on the safeguards agreement that the State of Iran signed voluntarily. Unfortunately, that agreement does not provide an exception in international law. It does not because this is a Treaty, and there is treaty law with provisions for two agencies that are the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Security Council.

We also understand the underlying yet unacceptable premise of national ownership. Of course, within a territory, the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is established in the Treaty. However, the violation is not about national ownership. The violation is about the requests of the Agency and the reports that show over and over again incorrect information, denial of access for inspectors and the persistent inability to clarify all the discrepancies between the Agency and what Iran is reporting. That is international law. We must all be reminded that the very reason we are here is in Chapter 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which tells us about the purposes and principles of this institution, and the very first sentence of that chapter contains "international peace and security", so we care about this because we care about the security of all of us, not just Iran.

As such, from the perspective of international law, speaking only about national ownership, the right to self-determination or using the concept of State sovereignty to elude international obligations is a clear violation of international law. As I said from the outset, either we have international law, or we do not.

Mr. Jadoon (Pakistan): I thank Director General Grossi for his comprehensive briefing.

Pakistan remains concerned that the situation regarding the Iran nuclear file has sharply deteriorated, negatively impacting the consideration of the issue, including in the Security Council. On the one hand, the situation on the ground in the past few months has been marked by deep tensions and continued hostilities. On the other, profound mistrust and difference of opinion have led to a breakdown of consensus within the Council on this matter.

As recent developments have once again illustrated the fragility of the situation and the risk of escalation, a diplomatic settlement of the issue has become more critical than ever. There is a need to revive the spirit of cooperative multilateralism and mutual understanding to break the deadlock. We hope that the Council will act with unity of purpose and back efforts towards a pacific settlement. Pakistan urges all sides to exercise restraint; refrain from irresponsible and destabilizing rhetoric, actions and postures that could escalate tensions and increase the risk of conflict; and choose a path that delivers peace, security and stability for all.

We reaffirm our support for the resolution of all outstanding issues through peaceful means, diplomatic engagement and sustained dialogue. We must pursue a negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue in accordance with the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties concerned, in a manner that upholds the non-proliferation regime, while ensuring regional and international peace and security. We have consistently maintained that any issues of non-compliance must be addressed through competent technical bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), without politicization and consistent with the relevant parties' rights and obligations. The IAEA must be enabled to carry out its work without any hindrance and within its technical mandate.

On its part, Pakistan has been undertaking constructive diplomatic engagement to promote de-escalation, ceasefire and the broader pursuit of stability in the region. We have consistently sought to encourage dialogue, facilitate the exchange of messages and help create the requisite space and conditions conducive to the conduct of meaningful negotiations. The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding signed in June is a successful manifestation of this approach. It demonstrates that progress on the diplomatic track is possible. We thank the parties for their confidence and positive engagement and appreciate the support of our partners, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, China and others, for this endeavour. We believe that diplomacy can once again deliver results in paving the way for settling contentious issues peacefully.

To that end, earnest and painstaking work is required. As we speak, our leadership continues these efforts with sincerity, determination and conviction.

Mr. Ibrahim (Somalia): I thank Director General Grossi for his briefing.

Somalia reaffirms its commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the preservation of international peace and security. We take note of the letter dated 11 September 2026 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (S/2026/765, annex).

Somalia reiterates the indispensable and independent role of the IAEA in the verification and monitoring of nuclear safety and the preservation of international stability. We underscore the importance of ensuring that the Agency can carry out its mandate independently, impartially and effectively, in accordance with safeguards agreements and applicable international obligations.

Somalia reiterates that a negotiated settlement remains the only viable and sustainable path to resolving outstanding and non-proliferation concerns. We therefore urge all parties to engage seriously and constructively in sustained, meaningful and results-oriented diplomacy.

We reiterate our long-standing call for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We call on all States in the region, without exception, to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to fully comply with their international obligations.

To conclude, the challenge before us requires a collective measured response. Somalia stands ready to engage constructively with all Council members and relevant parties to chart a peaceful and diplomatic path forward that upholds the Charter of the United Nations, respects international law, strengthens the non-proliferation regime and supports the independent work of the IAEA and contributes to international peace and security.

Ms. Locetta (United States of America): The United States would like to thank the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for reporting Iran's non-compliance with its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)-required Safeguards Agreement to the Security Council. In particular, we thank Germany, France and the United Kingdom for being our indispensable partners in our years-long effort to hold Iran accountable to its safeguards obligations. We also thank the other 13 IAEA Board members who joined us in co-sponsoring the resolution in Vienna.

The Board found Iran to be in non-compliance in June 2025 because Iran failed to credibly address critical safeguard concerns that were outstanding for more than six years. The Board could have also reported this non-compliance to the Security Council at that time but delayed in doing so, preferring to give Iran time to rectify its non-compliance. Instead, Iran only doubled down on its stonewalling. For more than a year now, it has been delaying the IAEA access to its most sensitive nuclear facilities and refusing to provide required information about or access to its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. It also has failed to engage the IAEA on questions that form the original basis for the non-compliance finding. This is inexcusable.

Last month, the Board rightfully decided the time had come to report Iran's non-compliance to New York. In doing so, the Board is telling the regime in Iran and telling the world enough is enough: enough of the refusal to answer the IAEA's questions about the presence of undeclared nuclear material at undeclared locations; enough of the denial of access for IAEA inspectors to multiple nuclear facilities; enough of the lack of accountability for and full transparency on Iran's uranium stockpile, enriched far beyond the level needed for any credible peaceful use; and enough of the continued non-compliance with its obligations.

The Iranian regime's response to this resolution was to say that any future verification or cooperation would need to be tied to a broader diplomatic agreement. But we already have that agreement: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which Iran signed in 1970, under which Iran is obligated to place its nuclear material in facilities under IAEA safeguards. Regardless of progress towards any new broader diplomatic agreement, Iran has existing NPT obligations that it is currently refusing to uphold. All who value the NPT should be deeply concerned by this and commit to working together to hold Iran to account, including through the 1737 sanctions regime.

I must note that two members of the Council have turned a blind eye towards Iran's significant non-compliance with its obligations under its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council. Their actions are consistent with a broader campaign over the past several years to subvert United Nations panels and the sanctions regimes that they are mandated to bolster. These two members also voted against the appointment of individual experts for the Central African Republic and Yemen Panels. They eliminated the Panel for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Mali sanctions regimes, entirely. And last month, of course, these two members vetoed a resolution to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts that supports the 1737 Committee.

In view of the persistence of such threats to the 1737 sanctions regime, the United States will work together with other interested members to advance an independent multilateral mechanism to monitor and report on global implementation of the 1737 regime. We look forward to working with partners, on and off the Security Council, to realize this initiative. Fundamentally, these instruments — sanctions regimes, committees, panels — are all conceived to address threats to international peace and security without resort to further conflict. We urge the representatives here today from the Security Council and the General Assembly to help us support this architecture of accountability to improve the viability of an enduring peace.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Greece.

I would like to thank Director General Grossi for his briefing and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team for its work.

We have taken careful note of the documents transmitted to the Council by the Secretary-General (S/2026/765), following the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 9 September, which reaffirmed its earlier findings on Iran's non-compliance. The findings before us are serious and require the Council's continued engagement insofar as they affect regional and international peace and security. I wish to stress the following points.

First, Greece reiterates its unwavering commitment to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA as its indispensable cornerstones. Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. Its nuclear programme must be exclusively peaceful. Preserving the credibility of this regime is essential for regional and international peace and security.

Secondly, we are deeply concerned at the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear programme, the Director General's findings and the Board's reaffirmation of Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. The Agency has been unable to verify the current size, composition or whereabouts of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile. Its most recent estimate in June 2025 included more than 440 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent. More than a year later, the Agency could not establish the current status of this material or verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded. The Agency also cannot verify the suspension of enrichment-related activities, as required by the relevant Council resolutions. Outstanding questions regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities remain unresolved. This is a

proliferation-related matter of grave concern and must be addressed without further delay. Full, effective and constructive cooperation with the IAEA must be restored by Iran, with complete information and full access for the Agency to fulfil its verification mandate. Iran must also respect its NPT safeguards obligations and the Additional Protocol.

Thirdly, Greece fully supports the IAEA's professional, independent and impartial work. We reiterate that the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1737 (2006), which were restored following the activation of the snapback mechanism, must be fully implemented. At the same time, we remain convinced that there is no sustainable alternative to dialogue and diplomacy. We urge Iran to engage seriously and constructively in meaningful negotiations. We encourage all the relevant parties to work towards a comprehensive, lasting and verifiable agreement capable of restoring confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. A further escalation of the conflict is in no one's interest. In this respect, we acknowledge the positive role of third countries willing to mediate and help to bring the parties back to the negotiating table.

In conclusion, the security situation in the region makes restraint and a peaceful settlement all the more urgent. All parties must respect the Charter of the United Nations and international law, protect civilians and avoid any further escalation. The stakes are simply too high for global security and the global economy. Verification, compliance and diplomacy must guide our collective efforts. Greece will continue to advocate for a peaceful solution and stands ready to contribute constructively to that end.

I resume my functions as President of the Council.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Darzi (Islamic Republic of Iran): At the outset, we thank Russia and China for their reaction to this illegal meeting. We also thank Pakistan and Somalia for their vote in abstention on the convening of this meeting.

We support the position expressed by Russia and China and categorically reject the convening of this meeting, which lacks any valid basis. Iran's position is clear and consistent and has been officially communicated to the Security Council. Resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October 2025, bringing the Security Council's consideration of the nuclear issue under the resolution to a definitive end. The legal effects are unambiguous. As of that date, resolution 2231 (2015) ceased to have any legal effect or operative mandate. The "Non-proliferation" agenda item was accordingly removed from the list of matters before the Council in this context. There is, therefore, no basis whatsoever for convening this meeting under the agenda item "Non-proliferation".

Eighteen months have passed since the aggression against Iran by two possessors of nuclear weapons, which was met with the appalling indifference and inexcusable inaction of the Security Council. The principal aggressor is itself a permanent member of the Council. Eighteen months have passed since the betrayal of diplomacy by the United States, which twice has resorted to military aggression against Iran in the middle of diplomatic negotiations. Eighteen months have passed since the United States and the Israeli regime launched a multifaceted campaign of terrorism and coercion against the Iranian people, from armed aggression and war crimes to internal sabotage and waging media and economic warfare. The collective punishment of a nation of 19 million, through deliberate infliction of economic hardship on the entire civilian population, constitutes the latest chapter in these sustained, relentless 18 months of aggression. More than 4,000 civilians, including 254 children and 251 women, lost their precious lives in these brutal wars; they are human lives destroyed. Each of them was alive. Children are robbed of their futures, and families are forever shattered. The massacre of 168 students and teachers in Minab, the attacks on Lamerd stadium, the bombing of homes in Qeshm and the deadly

strike on a wedding in Kuhestak, Sirik, are only a few examples of these heinous crimes. These are war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The Security Council's indifference in the face of the threats to annihilate a civilization, the threats to use weapons of mass destruction against Iran and the threats to destroy civilian infrastructure have been astonishing, particularly in the light of all the crimes that were actually committed by the aggressors during this period. There seems to be an attempt to excuse, normalize or render lawful the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects and the threats to use prohibited methods or means of warfare. The most fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, including the core principle of non-aggression, have been flagrantly violated throughout these 18 months by the United States and the Israeli regime.

Since the United States and the Israeli regime launched their wars of aggression against Iran on 13 June 2025 and 28 February 2026, Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities, under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, have been repeatedly attacked. In their war of aggression on Iran, the aggressors continued these attacks.

On 13 June 2025, the uranium conversion facility and the fuel plate fabrication plant were attacked.

On 19 June 2025, the Arak heavy water research reactor was attacked.

On 21 June 2025, the President of the United States declared that Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities had been completely and totally obliterated.

On 1 March, the Natanz nuclear facility was attacked twice.

On 17 March, a structure just 350 metres from the operational Bushehr nuclear power plant was attacked.

On 21 March, several locations within the Natanz nuclear facility were bombed.

On 24 March, a projectile struck within the wider perimeter of the Bushehr nuclear power plant site.

On 27 March, the Bushehr nuclear power plant site was attacked for the third time.

On 27 March, the heavy water production plant at Khondab-Arak was attacked.

On 27 March, the Ardakan-Yazd uranium processing site was bombed.

Repeated attacks near the operational Bushehr nuclear power plant are particularly alarming. Such strikes create a grave risk of radiation release, with potentially devastating consequences. These attacks flagrantly violate resolution 487 (1981), the relevant IAEA decisions and resolutions and the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

What, then, has been the Security Council's response to these grave violations? It has been silence — silence in the face of aggression, silence in the face of threats of mass destruction, silence in the face of threats against civilian infrastructure and silence in the face of attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities.

These atrocious crimes demand accountability, not silence. Why do the Western members of the Council remain silent? The answer is simple: the perpetrators and aggressors are their allies, and political loyalty takes precedence over accountability. To be fair, however, the Western members of the Council have not been entirely silent. Since Israel typically does their dirty work, they have chosen to direct their accusations at Iran rather than at the Israeli apartheid regime or the United States.

Today's meeting is yet another instance of the hypocrisy that has become an integral feature of these countries' foreign policy. Today's meeting is an illustration of

an established double standard, in which the aggressor is shielded with impunity, the victim is subjected to criticism, and the language of non-proliferation is cynically appropriated to advance geopolitical objectives. The central issue of today's meeting must be the United States' unlawful use of force and ongoing aggression against Iran, the attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities and the continuing United States and Israeli threats to destroy Iran's civilian and critical infrastructure. These attacks pose a grave threat to international peace and security.

The United States President's repeated threats must be taken seriously. They must be assessed and addressed in the context of the wars of aggression waged against Iran by the United States and Israel and their deliberate attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure. Threatening to terrorize a population and deliberately destroy infrastructure indispensable to civilian survival is not legitimate political rhetoric. Such threats constitute grave violations of international humanitarian law with severe, potentially long-lasting humanitarian and environmental consequences, incurring further responsibility on the part of the United States. The United States and the Israeli regime have repeatedly demonstrated disregard for their obligations under international law, including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law.

In view of the gravity and the urgency of these threats, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in its letters and communications, called upon the Security Council and the Secretary-General to condemn these threats to international peace and security and to take immediate and appropriate measures within their respective mandates. Regrettably, the Council continues to respond with inaction and deafening silence in the face of explicit threats against an entire nation and its civilian population.

Today's meeting is a politically orchestrated attempt to construct a pretext for pressure against Iran, distort the factual record and divert attention from the aggression committed against it. At the very least, the Western members of the Council are well aware that Iran's nuclear programme has never posed a threat to international peace and security. They know very well that the nature and essence of Iran's nuclear programme have always been peaceful. Therefore, these politically motivated allegations have no bearing on Iran's peaceful nuclear activities, which have been conducted entirely within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its applicable safeguards obligations. No one should be deceived any longer by these crying wolves.

Anyone with genuine non-proliferation concerns need only look slightly to the west in our region. The fact that the Israeli regime, which possesses approximately 200 nuclear warheads, remains outside IAEA safeguards and has a record of committing all major international crimes should be the real cause for concern. Israel possesses nuclear weapons, yet the Council's concern is the absence of inspectors in Iran. Israel maintains clandestine programmes for developing all kinds of weapons of mass destruction while it is a party to none of the disarmament conventions. Yet, the concern of Western members of the Council is the lack of inspections in Iran?

As President Pezeshkian stated in his address to the General Assembly on 24 September: "The atomic bomb is in Israel, but the inspectors are in Iran. Israel kills, yet Iran is sanctioned. That is the tragedy."

What kind of non-proliferation policy is this? What kind of legal consistency allows a rogue regime in our region to possess nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework and to evade meaningful international scrutiny and accountability, while Iran — a responsible NPT State party — is subjected to relentless political pressure? This is precisely the question that Council members should first ask themselves and put to the IAEA and to its Director General as well. If one is unable to stand on the right side of history, one should at least not stand on the wrong side. If one dare not defend the United

Nations Charter and international law, one should at least refrain from supporting their violators. If one lacks the courage to support the victim of an aggression, one should at least refrain from defending the aggressor.

For more than five decades, Iran has been a responsible party to the NPT, has championed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and continues to advocate for this noble objective. Guess who has consistently opposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East? The Israeli regime and the United States have.

The misuse of the Security Council to advance geopolitical objectives under the pretext of non-proliferation concerns is regrettable. The politicization of the IAEA and its secretariat and the distortion of the non-proliferation regime to advance geopolitical objectives are equally deplorable. The credibility of the Security Council cannot survive such blatant double standards. The legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime cannot be preserved through politicization. The Security Council is not an instrument for legitimizing aggression, manufacturing allegations or applying political pressure against the victim of aggression.

The IAEA is not a vehicle for scoring geopolitical goals. We call upon the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities impartially, to confront the threats and acts of aggression directed against Iran, and to uphold the United Nations Charter.

The choice before the Council is straightforward: uphold international law universally or further undermine the credibility of the very international legal order it was established to protect.

The President: The representative of the United States of America has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

Mr. Waltz (United States of America): I take the floor today after just speaking out against one oppressive regime, the Cuban regime, and now I get to address another brutal dictatorship, which shamelessly massacred 40,000 of its own citizens just this year, with the Security Council and the entire world watching. Well, that was until the regime instituted an Internet blackout to hide its atrocities.

Council members have all heard a lot of discussion about attacks on civilian infrastructure. Of course, what they did not hear about was the Iranian regime hitting hotels, restaurants, tourist sites, civilian neighbourhoods, airports and civilian shipping across the Middle East. In fact, the representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain is right here. Does the Iranian representative want to apologize to him for attacking his country? I will take that as a “no”.

We have heard tired allegations against the United States. But what we have not heard today is an explanation for Iran’s continued failure to satisfy its safeguards obligations, as laid out before the Security Council. It is important to note that these obligations are not contingent on the conduct of any other country. One cannot blame others. Nor can they be suspended or paused or ignored until Tehran secures some type of agreement on its terms.

The Iranian representative can continue to direct accusations at other countries, but those accusations cannot substitute for the access, for the data, for the information and the cooperation that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Council, through resolutions, have repeatedly requested.

Today the IAEA — its Director General, Rafael Grossi, right here in this Chamber — asked Iran for answers, not speeches. We are here today because Iran was referred to the Security Council by the IAEA. Therefore, my suggestion to the Iranian representative is to maybe start by providing some answers.

The Iranian representative's lies are no good here. He can argue about agenda items, and he can argue about logistics or who gets to speak or not speak. But the hard truth is this, and the world needs to hear it: the United States and our partners will never let Iran obtain a nuclear weapon to terrorize the world. Period. End of story.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. Beutin (Germany): I would like to first of all thank Director General Grossi for his report and briefing today, and him and his team for their continued professional and impartial work. I would like to reiterate Germany's full support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Director General's latest report from 1 September is clear: the IAEA continues to lack the information and access necessary to verify important aspects of Iran's nuclear programme and the status of its nuclear material. And on 9 September, the Board of Governors underlined that this proliferation concern needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency. In accordance with its statutory obligations, the Board decided to report Iran's non-compliance to the Security Council and the General Assembly. This step was taken neither lightly nor hastily. It followed more than a year during which Iran was given repeated opportunities to return to compliance with its legally binding obligations.

While the Agency's access to affected facilities has been impacted due to safety concerns — and we have recognized that — these circumstances do not provide legal grounds for Iran to suspend the implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, nor do they explain Iran's failure to provide legally required information over the course of the years.

Our main message today is therefore this, and it is very clear: Iran must fully comply with its legally binding safeguards obligations.

There is a broader principle at stake here, and it is about the integrity and credibility of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of that regime, under which all non-nuclear-weapon States, such as Iran, are required to accept IAEA safeguards to verify compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

Iran itself has repeatedly emphasized this principle and reaffirmed both its rights and obligations under the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement and has stressed the importance of the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty. Germany recognizes the inalienable right of all States parties, including Iran, to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the NPT, but both rights and obligations are integral parts of the Treaty and must be upheld.

Germany, together with France and the United Kingdom, has invested considerable diplomatic efforts over many years in finding a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We have sought to preserve diplomatic channels, and we continue to believe that diplomacy offers the only sustainable path forward. Full cooperation with the IAEA would help rebuild the confidence necessary for a meaningful solution. Germany, together with its E3 partners, remains committed to working towards such a solution.

The President: The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.

Mr. Darzi (Islamic Republic of Iran): The representative of the United States failed to offer any credible arguments or justifications for his country's blatant act of aggression against Iran. Instead, he resorted to recycling lies and baseless allegations about Iran and its peaceful nuclear programme to conceal the truth and facts and evade responsibilities. Let us speak on the basis of facts, not fabricated allegations.

The facts are clear. The United States and the Israeli regime have committed acts of aggression, including repeated military attacks against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards. Iran is a victim of war, not an aggressor. The aggressors are the United States and Israel, which committed war crimes against the Iranian people.

Residential areas, schools, hospitals, bridges, airports, energy facilities, sport facilities, cultural heritage sites, railway transportation and other vital infrastructure have been deliberately targeted and struck. These attacks constitute flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international humanitarian law, and the United States and Israel are responsible for those severe violations.

No amount of propaganda can reverse the facts, erase the suffering of the Iranian people or absolve them of their responsibilities under international law. Those who ordered, carried out and enabled these heinous crimes must face accountability, not impunity.

The United States cannot commit aggression, inflict mass civilian casualties and then abuse the Council to portray itself as a victim. Together with Israel, the United States has carried out devastating attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure. They have committed war crimes and, sooner or later, will be held accountable for the commission of all their atrocities and crimes against the Iranian people. They cannot evade their responsibilities.

The United States representative asked about the alleged attacks on civilian sites in neighbouring countries. But he cannot answer why they killed these innocent children.

This is Mahya Salari, killed by United States and Israeli attacks. This is Niayesh Salehi, killed by the United States and the Israeli regime. All of them were in school, playing in the playground. They were attacked by the United States with bombs, and nobody here even questions this massacre.

Zahra Behroozi was killed by the United States and Israel.

Mohammad Shahdoosti Pour was killed by the United States and the Israeli regime.

Ahmadzadeh Halvaei was killed by the United States and the Israeli regime.

Benyamin Jangjoo was killed by the United States and the Israeli regime.

Mohanna Bahrami was killed by the United States and the Israeli regime.

Sonar Salari was killed by the United States and the Israeli regime.

Mohanna Zarei, still with her schoolbag, was killed by the United States and the Israeli regime.

Raha Zarei was killed by the United States and the Israeli regime.

These are only a few photographs of the children killed, out of 254 children who were killed by the United States and the Israeli regime. It is the responsibility of the Security Council to address this.

The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.

I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion of the subject.

The meeting rose at noon.