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Security Council

Eighty-first year

Provisional

10224th meeting

Thursday, 17 September 2026, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Bonnafont	(France)
Members:	Bahrain	Mr. Alrowaiei
	China	Mr. Fu Cong
	Colombia	Mr. Gaona
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mr. Banza
	Denmark	Ms. Lassen
	Greece	Mr. Stamatekos
	Latvia	Ms. Pavļuta-Deslandes
	Liberia	Mr. Brown II
	Pakistan	Mr. Ahmad
	Panama	Mr. Alfaro de Alba
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Somalia	Mr. Ibrahim
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Dame Sarah MacIntosh
	United States of America	Ms. Locetta

Agenda

Non-proliferation

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The President (*spoke in French*): The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor on a point of order.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Once again, in a matter of days, we have been forced to witness attempts by certain members of the Security Council and its President to grossly abuse procedure and hold a meeting on the selfsame non-existent agenda item.

We again recall the stubborn facts. Resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October 2025. That same day, the Security Council concluded its discussions on the issue of Iran's nuclear programme. The item "Non-proliferation" was removed from the list of matters for consideration by the Council. Such wording was clearly contained in paragraph 8 of the operative part of the aforementioned resolution. The mechanism for reinstating the Security Council resolutions on Iran that were in force prior to 2015, as provided for in resolution 2231 (2015), was not triggered for a number of reasons, about which we and some other delegations have repeatedly spoken. This being so, there is no legal or procedural basis for holding another Council meeting on the defunct agenda item, "Non-proliferation". We categorically reject attempts by some Council members to thus again give their assertions about a purported snapback a semblance of legitimacy.

We request that the issue of the adoption of the agenda for the meeting be put to a procedural vote.

Mr. Fu Cong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China supports the remarks made by the Russian Federation.

China has repeatedly reiterated that resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October and that the Security Council has concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. In disregard of this fact, the United States proposed and promoted the relevant draft resolutions, to which China expressed its opposition on numerous occasions.

The current situation in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear issue are deadlocked. The Security Council should play a constructive role in promoting dialogue and defusing the situation, rather than serving as a platform for individual members to engage in political confrontation and exert pressure. China calls on the relevant countries to earnestly implement resolution 2231 (2015) and the relevant measures related to the date of expiry of that resolution, uphold the authority of the Security Council and the credibility of multilateral diplomacy and create the necessary conditions for a political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. The President should also accommodate the concerns of all parties and play a constructive role to enhance unity and cooperation within the Council, while avoiding intensifying division.

Ms. Locetta (United States of America): We strongly reject the assertions made by some members of the Council, and we fully support moving forward with this meeting.

Several members of this body want to prevent this discussion to protect Iran — a country that continues to openly defy many of its most basic United Nations obligations. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) was tasked by this body to constrain and monitor a nuclear programme that Iran sought to operate out of the view of the international community. We will discuss the essential extension of the Panel's mandate today. Just one year ago, this Council voted

decisively to permit the snapback of sanctions and the re-establishment of the 1737 (2006) Committee. This Committee is legitimate. It has a sanctions list, a proposed slate of members for the Panel, and it has decided a number of sanctions exemptions. I urge everyone to join us to adopt the provisional agenda and allow the Council to proceed with the vote.

Dame Sarah MacIntosh (United Kingdom): As we heard in last week's Council meeting (see S/PV.10218), Iran's nuclear programme presents a threat to international security and to the global non-proliferation regime. With experts appointed, the Panel of Experts would play a critical role in supporting the implementation of United Nations sanctions by identifying, exposing and countering the progress of Iran's nuclear and missile programmes and other forms of non-compliance. Resolution 1929 (2010) sets out a clear mandate for this Panel of Experts.

We thank the United States for its work as penholder, and we urge Council members to proceed with today's meeting to adopt this important mandate and to defend a key pillar of United Nations sanctions architecture. The United Kingdom will vote in favour of the adoption of the provisional agenda.

Mr. Gaona (Colombia) (*spoke in French*): Colombia would like to explain the legal issues here.

(*spoke in English*)

It seems that we have a problem as to whether the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and the Panel are legal from an international perspective. Colombia wants to remind the members of the Council of the International Court of Justice's decision on Kosovo of 2010 on the good faith principle. Though the principle is situated in article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 1969, which obviously applies to treaty law, the Court has said, in this and in the nuclear tests decision of 1974, that the good faith principle also applies to any legal instrument that is issued by international bodies in the sense and context that provides any legal provision with the legal force that it requires to have legal effects. This principle is *obligatio est iuris vinculum*.

We need to understand that once the Council voted for the previous resolution a year ago, it provided legitimacy to the instrument. The fact that the snapback mechanism did not reach its goal does not render, under the good faith principle, the instrument that consecrated and established it inexistent. We impress upon everyone and ask them to consider the fact that not allowing the vote on this Panel of Experts would mean that we do not follow the principle of good faith in our commitments and our interpretation of international rules, especially regarding the sanctions regime of the Security Council. Though it seems to be a matter only applicable to the issue of Iran, we are setting a precedent here for any other similar legal issue that could take power away from the Security Council regime. As such, the decision is not just about this issue.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of France.

The Security Council's resolutions on Iran's nuclear programme, including resolution 1929 (2010), were reinstated on 27 September 2025. In this regard, I would like to draw attention to the note issued on 28 September 2025 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, taking note of the reinstatement of these resolutions. Paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 (2010) provides for the establishment, for an initial term of one year, of a Panel of Experts tasked with assisting the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). The reinstatement of resolution 1929 (2010) led to the reactivation of this mandate until 26 September this year. It is

therefore legitimate and necessary for a draft resolution aimed at extending the mandate of this Panel to be submitted to the Council. France will therefore vote in favour of the provisional agenda.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

In the light of the request made and the remarks made by members of the Security Council, I shall now put the provisional agenda to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:
Bahrain, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against:
China, Russian Federation

Abstaining:
Pakistan, Somalia

The President (*spoke in French*): The provisional agenda received 11 votes in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. The provisional agenda has been adopted.

Non-proliferation

The President (*spoke in French*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2026/740, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United States of America.

The Council is ready to proceed to a vote on the draft resolution before it.

I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:
Bahrain, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against:
China, Russian Federation

Abstaining:
Pakistan, Somalia

The President (*spoke in French*): The draft resolution received 11 votes in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution has not been adopted, owing to the negative votes of two permanent members of the Security Council.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.

Ms. Locetta (United States of America): We are not surprised by the actions of several Council members in vetoing the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts. That is because this Panel would have shined the light on the Council-resolution-prohibited bilateral defensive cooperation between Iran and its partners.

Given this veto, it is clear that this is part of a broader effort by some to prevent appointments or renew mandates of expert panels to stifle reporting that implicates their own activities in support of rogue regimes in defiance of their Council resolution obligations. Panels have learned the hard way that calling out members of this body for sanctions violations or evasion can have serious and sometimes tragic consequences. This includes delays or refusals to approve individual experts for the Yemen and the Central African Republic panels. In more extreme cases, entire expert panels have been eliminated, including those from Mali and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Mali's sanctions regime itself was terminated.

Without an independent Panel of Experts, this Council loses its principal source of impartial, evidence-based reporting on sanctions violations, creating a monitoring gap that only benefits the Iranian regime and those who profit from evading those measures.

In view of this latest act of obstructionism, the United States will not cease efforts within this Committee to establish a Panel of Experts that befits the mandate of this Committee, as well as name a Committee Chair and produce and post an updated sanctions list. The United States looks forward to working with Member States on continuing the important work of this Committee.

Dame Sarah MacIntosh (United Kingdom): I thank the United States for its work on this important mandate.

For over 20 years, the international community has sought to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. The United Kingdom has consistently championed a diplomatic solution. Regrettably, Iran has too often chosen escalation over cooperation, creating the circumstances that continue to demand the Council's attention today, expanding her nuclear programme in ways that lack any credible civilian justification, failing to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and denying access to IAEA inspectors, meaning that the IAEA has been unable to verify the current size, composition or whereabouts of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.

The Council established the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) in 2006 because of these grave concerns and established a Panel of Experts in 2010 to help the Committee monitor the relevant provisions and to provide expert and independent advice to ensure that sanctions were effective and appropriate. Russia and China voted for both these resolutions. Twenty years later, we are again seeing Iran refusing to comply with the basic legal requirements of legitimate civil nuclear activity. The United Kingdom regrets that Russia and China have chosen to exercise their veto today, choosing to shield Iran and to undermine the Council's work to ensure that she does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

Sadly, we see similar actions beyond Iran. In March 2024, Russia's veto of the 1718 Panel of Experts ended 14 years of monitoring expertise on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's sanctions evasion. Russia has facilitated Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's evasions of sanctions and received Iranian-designed Shahed drones and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ballistic missiles to fuel her brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. But while the Russia and China vetoes today reduced the Council's understanding of how these sanctions are being implemented, they do not change the fundamentals. Sanctions against Iranian proliferation remain fully in force, binding on each and every United Nations Member State.

The United Kingdom stands ready to work with all partners towards a negotiated settlement to uphold and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime and to ensure that Iran never acquires or develops a nuclear weapon.

Mr. Stamatekos (Greece): We thank the United States for their efforts in this mandate.

Greece voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2026/740) before us. Our vote reflects, first and foremost, the need to ensure that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) can effectively discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Council. For this, it must have the necessary institutional and technical tools at its disposal. Central among these is a functioning Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010). Without it, the Committee's capacity to perform its mandate and the Council's ability to oversee the implementation of its own decisions are diminished.

More broadly, the effectiveness and credibility of Security Council sanctions regimes depend on ensuring that the Council's subsidiary bodies have the tools necessary to fulfil their mandates. Security Council decisions must be implemented by all Member States. We therefore reiterate that the remaining operational arrangements of the Committee, including the appointment of the Chair, must be completed without further delay.

At the same time, implementation and oversight mechanisms are neither an alternative to diplomacy nor an end in themselves. They are only part of a broader effort aimed at achieving a diplomatic resolution of the Iran nuclear issue. Greece reiterates that a comprehensive, verifiable and durable diplomatic solution remains the only sustainable path to addressing proliferation concerns and restoring regional stability.

Mr. Gaona (Colombia): Let us begin by disaggregating the legal issues so we understand what we are saying here.

First of all, Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations gives the decisions of the Security Council a binding effect: either they exist or they do not.

Secondly, we are talking about a Panel of Experts under international law, international treaty law and international constitutional law, therefore United Nations law.

This body is a subsidiary organ. No subsidiary organ, in practice or in jurisprudence, is considered to be the basis for the implementation of the instrument that established it. That instrument is a resolution of the Security Council. Whatever happens with the subsidiary body in this mission, once it is activated, does not determine the validity or the legality of the instrument that created it. In other words, the resolution and the sanctions regime never cease to exist. They were always there. They can be suspended, and there are many other issues in history since the United Nations was created when sanctions regimes have been suspended, and it is the practice of the Security Council to periodically review whether or not to re-establish sanctions, but the legality of the instrument was never at issue and it should not be considered to be so by virtue of a political interpretation of international law which has, again, institutional implications for all of us and the body in which we sit today.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

Recognizing the validity of these decisions goes beyond mere formal acknowledgement; it also requires the preservation of the mechanisms that the Council itself established to monitor Iran's uranium enrichment activities, and it is precisely this point that is the source of the Republic of Colombia's greatest concern. After a hiatus of almost a decade, the Committee needs this independent technical information at a critical juncture at which a regional conflict is escalating to an international level, with practices of evasion, as well as, of course, recommendations in response to new trends, key players and relevant networks.

Colombia regrets that the use of the veto has prevented the renewal of that mandate. This outcome deprives the regime of one of the instruments established by the Council to support the implementation of these decisions and, once again, to obtain information that facilitates not only decision-making but also, specifically, a diplomatic channel for a conflict that has already escalated to unsustainable levels.

Our decision is not only a legal one, it is a political one, but it is also likely to have consequences that extend beyond our time on the Council.

Colombia considers it essential to preserve these instruments so that the Council itself may implement its decisions. This is not being called into question in the letter of the law and is clearly set out in all the provisions of the legal instrument in question.

Mr. Alrowaiei (Bahrain) (*spoke in Arabic*): The Kingdom of Bahrain expresses its regret that the draft resolution (S/2026/740), in favour of which it voted, was not adopted, particularly as it would have extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) and enabled it to commence its work in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006).

The fact that the draft resolution was not adopted does not alter the facts requiring the Council's attention nor the applicability of its resolutions and measures, foremost among which are the continuing concerns regarding Iran's nuclear programme and the need to ensure full compliance with relevant international obligations. There remains a need for an independent technical mechanism to support the Committee in monitoring the implementation of measures and assessing cases of non-compliance, including those relating to nuclear activities, procurement networks and the transfer of materials, equipment and relevant technology.

This need takes on added significance in light of the regional repercussions of Iranian activities. The Kingdom of Bahrain and other countries in the region have been subjected to direct attacks on their territories, infrastructure and civilian objects. The Council condemned those attacks in resolution 2817 (2026). The risks arising from the activities of groups and proxies linked to Iran persist. Disabling a technical instrument does not erase the facts; it merely obscures them from the Council.

Ms. Pavļuta-Deslandes (Latvia): Latvia voted in favour of draft resolution S/2026/740, submitted by the United States, and we regret that a positive outcome was not reached. The selective interpretation of international law and the Council's decisions by some members has caused the work of all the Council's subsidiary organs to come to a standstill. Such politicization of the Council's past decisions undermines the ability of the Council to fully implement its mandate to uphold international peace and security. In this case, opposition to the draft resolution serves to shield Iran, a State that has been appropriately sanctioned for its long-standing and systematic failure to uphold its international non-proliferation obligations.

Despite efforts by some members to rewrite history and ignore binding Council resolutions, the sanctions against Iran remain in force. All United Nations Member States are obliged to respect and implement them. Today's draft resolution is a technical resolution aimed at extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), in line with established practice and in full accordance with the procedures of the Council.

Panels of experts are vital instruments for the comprehensive implementation and oversight of Council-mandated sanctions. They are particularly important for addressing efforts to circumvent sanctions, as well as for identifying any necessary changes and updates. The 1737 Sanctions Committee is currently operating without a panel of experts due to politicization rather than sound legal arguments. Today's outcome is part of a deliberate pattern of weakening the United Nations sanctions

architecture for the benefit of one Member State, similar to Russia's veto of the mandate renewal of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, another partner in its illegal aggression against Ukraine.

In conclusion, allow me to reiterate that Latvia will continue to uphold the global non-proliferation regime and the binding decisions of the Council to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

Ms. Lassen (Denmark): Denmark voted in favour of draft resolution S/2026/740 to extend the Panel of Experts supporting the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). The role of the Panel has become all the more essential in light of Iran's refusal to live up to its safeguards obligations and to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

We deeply regret that the draft resolution has been rejected. What should have been a simple technical rollover was prevented by the unwillingness of a few Council members to acknowledge that the snapback mechanism was activated in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). It is worth recalling that that resolution was adopted unanimously by the very same countries that are now preventing its implementation.

The Panel is meant to assist the Committee in carrying out its crucial role in sanctions implementation by providing independent and impartial information, putting all differences arising from geopolitical tensions aside. Denmark has remained actively and constructively engaged in the work of the 1737 Committee and its Panel of Experts. We call on all Council members to fulfil their responsibilities and ensure the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Iran has developed a nuclear programme that lacks any credible civilian justification, including enriching uranium up to 60 per cent. Just last week, the IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran to the Council over its safeguards non-compliance (see S/PV.10218).

Our goal remains very clear: Iran must never develop or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon. The responsibility before the Council is clear: to act with resolve, speak with one voice and safeguard the foundational principles of global non-proliferation upon which our collective security rests.

Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan): I am taking the floor to explain Pakistan's abstention on draft resolution S/2026/740, just acted upon by the Council.

Pakistan remains concerned that the consideration of the Iran nuclear issue, including by the Security Council, has become further complicated over a period of time. We have clearly come a long way from the spirit of cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes that characterized the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015) more than a decade ago. Ongoing tensions and hostilities in the region and strikes on nuclear facilities, as well as continued differences among permanent members on key aspects of this file, have added to the challenge of addressing the issue through dialogue and diplomacy.

In September 2025, the Council had two opportunities before it: either to continue the termination of sanctions, as envisaged under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or to bring into effect a six-month technical extension of the mandate under resolution 2231 (2015) to provide more time and space for diplomatic efforts to proceed amicably. Regrettably, a non-consensual path was chosen, with far-reaching consequences that have since continued to reverberate in the Chamber and beyond. We stressed at that time that a non-confrontational and cooperative approach

would have better facilitated the quest for a lasting peaceful solution while preserving consensus within the Council.

Pakistan continues to believe that diplomacy and dialogue remain the guiding principle for the resolution of outstanding issues concerning Iran's nuclear programme. Pakistan has consistently advocated the primacy of diplomatic engagement and the imperative of avoiding confrontation and conflict. We reiterate our position that the Iran nuclear issue should be addressed through peaceful means and in accordance with the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties concerned. We also lend our support to the critical role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the technical body entrusted with implementing the respective safeguards agreements. The IAEA should carry out this important work as per its mandate, independently and without political interference.

There is an urgent need to renew and continue diplomatic engagement to seriously and faithfully address outstanding issues in a cooperative manner, in accordance with the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties concerned. We must prioritize this approach and never give up on a peaceful, negotiated settlement.

For its part, Pakistan continues its efforts to promote peace and stability in the region, building on the solid foundation provided by the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran. We call on all parties to implement the commitments agreed under the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, return to the negotiating table and allow diplomacy to deliver for the sake of regional and international peace and security.

Mr. Alfaro de Alba (Panama) *(spoke in Spanish)*: Our vote in favour of draft resolution S/2026/740 today reflects the Republic of Panama's firm commitment to multilateralism, respect for international law and the institutional and normative architecture that underpins the implementation of the measures imposed by the Security Council.

Sanctions committees are fundamental instruments for the effective implementation of decisions adopted by the Security Council. Within that framework, panels of experts play an indispensable role, in particular in the technical and independent collection, verification and analysis of information. Their work provides Member States with objective information that helps them make informed, consistent decisions in accordance with the mandates established by the Council.

For this reason, the Republic of Panama regrets that differences among certain members have prevented the necessary consensus on the renewal of this important Panel of Experts.

This situation goes beyond a merely procedural matter. The absence of this mechanism impairs the Committee's ability to fully discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it, sets a troubling precedent and weakens the tools available to support the monitoring of the implementation of measures established for the effective operation of the United Nations sanctions regime.

One year ago, the Council decided to reapply the relevant sanctions in accordance with the provisions of the snapback mechanism, as a result of which the relevant resolutions came back into effect. Consequently, we believe that the mandate of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) was restored, as the body tasked with supervising the measures adopted by the Council, and the Republic of Panama is obliged to recognize its mandate and the binding nature of those measures. Panama regrets that the Committee is compelled to continue exercising its mandate without the support of a fully operational Panel of

Experts. We therefore urge Member States to preserve the capacity of the mechanisms established by the Council to fulfil its mandates and to prevent political differences from compromising the effective functioning of this and other subsidiary organs.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Today, we heard how international law functions and how Security Council resolutions are implemented. Now listen to what we have to say.

The Russian Federation voted against the draft resolution submitted by the United States on extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the illegitimate Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (S/2026/740). Our country's position on the fabrications of Western countries concerning the alleged successful triggering of the so-called snapback mechanism in 2025 is well known to everyone. For those with particularly short memories, I would recall that the United Kingdom, France and Germany had neither the right nor the grounds to invoke that instrument. We and other colleagues have repeatedly explained the reasons in exhaustive detail. Anyone interested may refer to our previous statements, as well as to the joint letters from Russia, China and Iran on the matter.

Thus, the Security Council resolutions concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran that were in force prior to 2015, including resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1929 (2010), were not restored. Neither attempts to contest that fact nor erroneous and biased actions of the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat that were not authorized by the Security Council, can alter that objective reality.

Against that background, the draft resolution just considered by the Council was deeply flawed and simply lacked any legal basis. It proposed extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1737 Committee, despite the fact that both the Panel and the Committee ceased to exist when the Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), and the expiration of that resolution in October 2025 made that fact irreversible.

From the outset, it was clear that the document prepared by the United States was a priori unacceptable to us. Together with our Chinese partners, we consistently conveyed that view to our American colleagues and other Council members, strongly urging the authors to refrain from pursuing such a draft resolution. It was obvious that the only result of persistently imposing such products would be a further rise in tensions within the Security Council over both political and procedural issues. Nevertheless, Washington decided to take a confrontational step and put the draft resolution to a vote.

However, such actions are hardly surprising, as they fit into the broader pattern of escalatory steps taken by Western countries with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme. They are by no means driven by concern for the global non-proliferation regime. Were that the case, the United States would not have unilaterally withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, nor would it have joined Israel in carrying out multiple strikes against Iran's peaceful nuclear infrastructure under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and countries loyal to Washington would not have supported those unlawful actions. The destructive course of our Western colleagues is driven purely by their opportunistic interest in exerting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran. To that end, they utilize all available international platforms, including the Security Council. That involves not only creating the illusion that anti-Iranian Security Council resolutions have been restored, but also directly attempting to impose non-existent restrictions on Member States.

A stark example of such absurdity is the so-called objections circulated in the Security Council a few days ago by certain members, including the United States, as our American colleagues openly admitted in Vienna, concerning the entry into Austria of the Vice-President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,

Mohammad Eslami, who was travelling to Vienna to attend the General Conference of the IAEA. The Austrian authorities seized upon that as a pretext to revoke the visa already issued to Mr. Eslami, thereby breaching Austria's obligations as the host country of the Agency.

In this context, it is worth recalling that, just a week ago in this Chamber, a number of Security Council members, including the United States, were actively demanding that Tehran step up its cooperation with the IAEA secretariat. The actions of the American side speak for themselves as to the sincerity of such calls. First, Washington, together with West Jerusalem, undermines the IAEA's verification activities in Iran through aggressive actions. Then, contradicting itself, the United States unlawfully attempts to pressure other States into obstructing cooperation between Tehran and the Agency's secretariat. On top of that, Washington persistently refuses to offer credible guarantees that military strikes against Iran's nuclear energy infrastructure will not resume. On the contrary, it continues to threaten further escalatory measures.

The Russian Federation categorically condemns such a dangerous course. Likewise, we reject the abuse of Security Council procedures in pursuit of political interests. Our country will continue to oppose any attempts to legitimize claims that the so-called snapback mechanism has been triggered. We demand that the Secretary-General and his staff rectify the mistakes made.

We strongly urge our Western colleagues to cease their extremely dangerous actions concerning Iran, which threaten to further complicate efforts to resolve the crisis in the Persian Gulf region. The only way to resolve differences and address any concerns, including those relating to the Iranian nuclear programme, is through diplomatic efforts grounded in respect for the interests of all parties and the legitimate rights of Tehran. The Security Council bears a special responsibility to create favourable conditions for such work. We trust that all our colleagues will demonstrate common sense and cease obstructing the achievement of that goal.

Mr. Fu Cong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): As conflicts in the Middle East drag on and the process of achieving a political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue remains deadlocked, the more turbulent the situation becomes, the more the Security Council must demonstrate leadership and act responsibly, eschewing double standards, political manipulation and pressure and confrontation. Proceeding from the need to defend fairness and justice, maintain peace and stability in the Middle East and take into account the broader goal of seeking a political and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, China voted against the draft resolution just put to the vote (S/2026/740). I would like to further elaborate on China's position.

First, we must adhere to objectivity and impartiality and uphold the authority of the Security Council. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), subjected Iran to maximum pressure, twice resorted to force during negotiations with Iran and carried out military strikes against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Those actions are the root cause of the current crisis. The E3 — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — has failed to fulfil its obligations under the JCPOA and did not exhaust all options under the dispute settlement mechanism before invoking the so-called snapback mechanism, which is fraught with legal and procedural flaws. Resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October 2025, and the Council has ceased its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. To disregard these facts and force through a clearly contentious draft resolution in the Security Council to reimpose sanctions on Iran will only undermine the Council's unity and credibility and create obstacles to diplomatic efforts. China firmly opposes this.

Secondly, we must strive to end the fighting, promote peace and de-escalate the situation. The recurring conflicts in the Middle East and frequent mutual attacks between the United States and Iran have caused serious harm and losses to the peoples of various nations, including Iran. The spillover effects continue to widen, damaging the international community's common interests. The most urgent task for all parties in the international community, including the Security Council, is to urge the parties involved to exercise calm and restraint, cease the use or threat of use of force, ease tensions and actively create the necessary conditions for the parties concerned to resume and implement the ceasefire, return to negotiations and reach a peace agreement so as to safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East and the world.

Thirdly, we must take a long-term view and uphold the overall goal of a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Military measures and pressure through sanctions will do nothing to solve the problem; they will only exacerbate tensions and escalate the situation, which serves no party's interests. Dialogue and negotiations on an equal footing are the only viable path. All parties should fully respect Iran's legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Through diplomatic efforts, a long-term agreement should be reached that ensures the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, under the strict safeguards and monitoring of the IAEA. Any action taken by the Security Council should help the parties to negotiate on an equal footing, identify common ground that addresses each other's legitimate concerns and reach a solution that meets the expectations of the international community.

As a party to the JCPOA and a permanent member of the Security Council, China has consistently upheld justice and promoted peace talks. China seeks no geopolitical self-interest and engages in no political confrontation, but rather plays a constructive role in de-escalating tensions in the Middle East and promoting a political resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue. China will continue to work with all parties to make unremitting efforts to advance a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and promote peace and stability in the Middle East.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of France.

Draft resolution S/2026/740, submitted to the Council today, had a simple purpose — to renew the mandate of the independent Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) tasked with assisting said Committee and monitoring the implementation of resolutions concerning Iran's nuclear programme.

France voted in favour of this text because it supports the full implementation of those resolutions, which were reinstated a year ago in accordance with the procedures set out in resolution 2231 (2015), a move prompted by Iran's serious and repeated breaches of its commitments under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This decision was not taken unexpectedly, but following months of fruitless negotiations between Iran and the E3 —France, Germany and the United Kingdom — notably in Geneva, which demonstrated Iran's stubborn refusal to comply with its non-proliferation obligations.

We regret that the veto by two Council members has prevented the renewal of this Panel's mandate. We also regret that a few days ago those same two Council members prevented the recruitment of the experts proposed by the Secretariat to form this Panel. The veto deprives the 1737 Committee and the Council of an indispensable tool for ensuring the proper implementation of their decisions. It deprives the entire

international community of a reliable and impartial source of information on a critical issue of international peace and security. And, just like the veto cast two years ago against the renewal of the panel on North Korea, this veto undermines the international non-proliferation regime, which is a cornerstone of our collective security. The role of this Panel of Experts would have been all the more important at a time when Iran's violations of its international obligations, and specifically of the Council's resolutions, poses serious threats to international peace and security.

The state of Iran's nuclear programme remains a major cause for concern, as Iran continues to obstruct any resumption of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this regard, we take note of the recent decision by the IAEA Board of Governors to refer to the Security Council the issue of Iran's non-compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran's ballistic missile programme also continues to threaten regional stability, as demonstrated by the indiscriminate strikes carried out in recent months against the Gulf States. It should be recalled that resolution 1929 (2010) prohibits Iran from carrying out activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

France will continue to work towards the full implementation of the Council's resolutions on Iran, including by exploring ways to document violations of those resolutions. The implementation of international sanctions remains a crucial tool for encouraging Iran to return to compliance with its non-proliferation obligations and to engage in good-faith negotiations on a framework for its nuclear programme. France remains committed to seeking a diplomatic solution and it is prepared to contribute to efforts to reach a lasting and verifiable agreement to ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.