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# Security Council

Eighty-first year

*Provisional*

## 10218th meeting

Thursday, 10 September 2026, 10 a.m.
New York

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| *President:* | Mr. Bonnafont | (France) |
| *Members:* | Bahrain | Mr. Alrowaiei |
| | China | Mr. Sun Lei |
| | Colombia | Mr. Gaona |
| | Democratic Republic of the Congo | Mr. Mukongo |
| | Denmark | Ms. Lassen |
| | Greece | Mrs. Balta |
| | Latvia | Ms. Pavļuta-Deslandes |
| | Liberia | Mr. Brown II |
| | Pakistan | Mr. Ahmad |
| | Panama | Mr. Alfaro de Alba |
| | Russian Federation | Mr. Nebenzia/Ms. Evstigneeva |
| | Somalia | Mr. Ibrahim |
| | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | Dame Sarah MacIntosh |
| | United States of America | Ms. Locetta |

## Agenda

Non-proliferation

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.*

**Adoption of the agenda**

**The President** (*spoke in French*): The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor on a point of order.

**Ms. Evstigneeva** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Given that some Security Council members will not desist in their attempts to misuse Security Council procedure so as to legitimize their unilateral assertions about the snapback mechanism, which has supposedly been triggered, we are compelled to take the floor on a point of order and to yet again reiterate the principled position of the Russian Federation on this matter.

Resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October 2025. On that same day, as stipulated in the resolution itself, the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation" was struck from the list of issues of which the Security Council is seized. The mechanism for reinstating previously adopted Security Council resolutions on Iran, which was set forth in resolution 2231 (2015), was not triggered for a number of legal and procedural reasons. Together with other delegations, we have repeatedly clarified those reasons for all Security Council members and other United Nations Member States.

Accordingly, there are no grounds for the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), which ceased to exist back in 2015, to resume its functioning, nor are there any grounds to discuss the Committee's "work" in the Council. Assertions to the contrary, including by invoking the Secretariat's biased and erroneous conclusions, as well as the provisions of note by the President S/2024/507, hold no water and are inappropriate.

In light of the above, the Russian Federation objects to the holding of this briefing and requests that the issue of the adoption of its agenda be put to a procedural vote.

**Mr. Sun Lei** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China supports the intervention made by the Russian Federation. I wish to emphasize that resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October 2025. The Council has ended its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. The President of the Council does not have a mandate to draft a so-called 90-day report and brief the Council on it.

China notes with regret that significant disagreements persist among Council members regarding the aforementioned issues. A few members, in disregard of those differences, insist on forcibly reimposing the Council's sanctions against Iran and convening Council meetings under an agenda item that has been removed. Not only will such actions deepen divisions within the Council; they will also seriously impede the political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. China expresses its grave concern at, and strong opposition to, these moves.

China calls on all members of the Council to effectively implement the measures relating to the termination date, as laid out in resolution 2231 (2015), maintain the authority of the Council and the credibility of multilateral diplomacy and foster conditions conducive to the political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue.

**Dame Sarah MacIntosh** (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom rejects the points made by Russia and China. Today's meeting is fully in line with the decisions and procedure of the Council. The United Kingdom, with France and Germany, initiated the snapback mechanism in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). We took this decision in response to Iran's significant non-performance of her commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As Russia and China are aware, the snapback process concluded on 28 September 2025, when the Council voted against the continuation of sanctions lifting for Iran. Six Security Council resolutions, including

1737 (2006), have been in force for nearly a year. Resolution 1737 (2006) is clear in its mandate: the Committee is required to report to the Security Council on its work at least every 90 days. The Council should act in accordance with its own legally binding Chapter VII resolutions and should not be denied the opportunity to consider these important issues. We therefore urge members to proceed with today's meeting. The United Kingdom will vote in favour of the adoption of the agenda.

**Ms. Locetta** (United States of America): The United States strongly rejects the assertions made by the representatives of the Russian Federation and China. We fully support the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom in support of moving forward with this meeting.

One year ago, the Council chose, in a decisive vote, to permit the reimposition of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010). Pursuant to this decision, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) was re-established. This Committee is operational. It has decided exemption requests. And the Secretariat selected a slate of members for the Panel of Experts. Resolution 1737 (2006) and the subsequent resolutions mandate quarterly reports from the 1737 Committee to the Council.

Today, the President of the Council, as Acting Chair of the 1737 Committee, should present the Committee's 90-day report. We are disappointed that the obstruction from two Council members yet again blocked the delivery of this mandated report to the Council. This report is an entirely factual description of the Committee's activities during the reporting period. China and the Russian Federation want to undermine the implementation of the Council's resolutions and in doing so, the will of the Council, so that they can protect Iran, a country that continues to openly defy many of its most basic United Nations obligations.

Regardless of such politically driven matters, the facts are the facts. The 1737 Committee exists. It was tasked by this body to constrain and monitor a nuclear programme that Iran sought to operate out of the view of the international community. Iran remains in non-compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), mandated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as reaffirmed this week by the IAEA Board of Governors. The United States will continue to work with partners, on and off the Council, to ensure the broadest possible international compliance with respect to the six resolutions reinstated in September (2025). We call on Council members to join us in that common effort. Despite the obstruction by two members blocking the Committee's report, this meeting provides an important opportunity to discuss implementation of the sanctions measures reinstated by the Council. I urge everyone to join us in voting "yes" to adopt the agenda, hold this meeting and allow the Council to proceed with its work.

**The President** (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of France.

In short, I align myself fully with the remarks just made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. The Council's resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme were reinstated on 27 September 2025. The Secretary-General took formal note of that in his note in respect of the correspondence of 28 September 2025 (S/2025/604). Resolution 1737 (2006), which is among the resolutions reimposed, provides for the establishment of a sanctions committee and requires that the Committee report to the Council at least every 90 days. Accordingly, we are of the view that this meeting must be held pursuant to the mandate conferred by the Council's resolutions, and we will vote "yes" to the agenda.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

In the light of the request made and the remarks made by the members of the Security Council, I shall now put the provisional agenda to the vote.

*A vote was taken by a show of hands.*

*In favour:*

Bahrain, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Against:*

China, Russian Federation

*Abstaining:*

Pakistan, Somalia

**The President** (*spoke in French*): The provisional agenda received 11 votes in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. The provisional agenda has been adopted.

## Non-proliferation

### Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)

**The President** (*spoke in French*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

**Dame Sarah MacIntosh** (United Kingdom): For over 20 years, Iran's nuclear and missile programmes have been a source of grave international concern. The United Kingdom has consistently advocated for a diplomatic solution, through negotiation and dialogue. In 2006, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1737 (2006), marking a decisive step to address the threat. That resolution imposed sanctions banning nuclear technology and materials and asset freezes on those linked to Iran's enrichment programme. In 2015, the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), enabling comprehensive economic and financial sanctions relief if Iran undertook commitments to limit her nuclear programme. We regret that, instead, Iran chose a path of nuclear escalation, expanding her nuclear programme in ways that lack any credible civilian justification. That includes accumulating over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. Iran is the only country without nuclear weapons to enrich uranium to this level.

In August 2025, the United Kingdom, France and Germany notified this Council of Iran's clear and deliberate non-compliance with the JCPOA. And in September 2025, this Council took the necessary steps to complete the snapback process, and United Nations sanctions came back into force. One year on, Iran has repeatedly appealed to other Member States to uphold the Charter of the United Nations but has failed to uphold her own obligations and to respect the authority of this Council.

I will make three points.

First, our United Nations Charter requires the full implementation of all sanctions resolutions, including the arms embargo. Each of the six Security Council resolutions passed over the last 20 years constrains Iran's dangerous proliferation, protects international security and plays a key role in safeguarding the global non-proliferation architecture. All Member States, including Iran, are obliged to implement these Chapter VII resolutions without exception. The 1737 (2006) Committee must deliver on its

mandate. We call for the prompt appointment of a Committee Chair and appointments to the Panel of Experts, and we urge support for the upcoming mandate renewal of the Panel.

Secondly, Iran is now failing to uphold the obligations into which she freely entered under her comprehensive safeguards agreement, agreed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in line with her obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA Director General's report is clear. Iran has not engaged the IAEA. Rather her non-cooperation has worsened. Iran has not given access to IAEA inspectors since June 2025, except for the Bushehr power plant. And in the period leading up to its latest report, the IAEA was granted no access to any of Iran's nuclear facilities in that period, none at all.

As a result, the IAEA has not been able to verify the status of Iran's nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material, including her uranium stockpile. Director General Grossi's report calls this a matter of proliferation concern and of compliance with Iran's NPT safeguards agreement that needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency, and so is Iran's failure to implement her IAEA additional protocol since 2021. The IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be non-compliant with her comprehensive safeguards agreement obligations in June 2025. For over a year, we and others have urged Iran to return to compliance, but she has not. Iran's refusal to comply with her obligations has left us no choice but to act. And yesterday, the IAEA Board of Governors decided that Iran's non-compliance with her safeguards obligations is a matter for this Council's consideration.

Thirdly and finally, Iran can and now should choose the path of diplomacy. Iran should address the international community's long-standing concerns over her nuclear programme by returning to negotiations, cooperating fully with the IAEA and restoring full transparency on her nuclear programme, including her safeguards obligations. The United Kingdom stands ready to respond positively to credible and verifiable progress.

A negotiated settlement is the only long-term solution to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme. We remain committed to a lasting and sustainable diplomatic solution that ensures that Iran never develops or acquires a nuclear weapon.

**Mr. Alrowaiei** (Bahrain) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like to begin by thanking the delegation of the French Republic for assuming the presidency of the Security Council this month. We also express our appreciation for the scheduling of this important meeting on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), at a time when there is a growing need to activate the Council's tools to ensure compliance and safeguard international peace and security.

The Kingdom of Bahrain particularly welcomes the efforts made to submit the periodic report to the Committee in implementation of paragraph 18 (h) of the resolution, which stipulates that the Committee shall report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work. We note, in this context, that the report before us covers the period since the Committee's reactivation on 27 September 2025, in light of the failure to submit periodic reports in December 2025 or March or June 2026.

The report before us reveals a clear and pressing institutional challenge that warrants the Council's attention. Since the Committee was reactivated, no Chair has yet been appointed, as consensus on the appointment of Chairs to Security Council Committees and subsidiary bodies remains elusive. This casts doubt on the ability of these mechanisms to carry out their tasks as intended. In the case of the 1737 (2006) Committee, this is directly reflected in its work, as the Committee did not hold any meetings during the period covered by the report, despite continuing to receive and process requests and notifications relating to exemptions to asset freezes as well as receiving a proposal to update the list of sanctions.

In this context, the Kingdom of Bahrain emphasizes the importance of finalizing the Committee's institutional structure as soon as possible, including the appointment of a Chair, so that it may carry out its duties in a regular and effective manner. We also attach particular importance to finalizing the composition of the Committee's Panel of Experts, tasked with supporting the Committee and ensuring that it carries out its mandate fully and effectively. The report noted that the Committee had considered a letter from the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs containing a proposal for eight experts to serve on the Panel of Experts created pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010). However, no consensus has been reached on their appointment.

The Kingdom of Bahrain considers that the continuation of this situation would directly limit the Committee's ability to fulfil its mandate, as the Panel of Experts is not a procedural or secondary element within the sanctions regime, but rather constitutes an independent and essential technical arm supporting the Committee's work through its tasks in monitoring the implementation of the relevant measures and assisting Member States to understand and fulfil their obligations under the relevant resolutions. Accordingly, the Kingdom of Bahrain calls on the members of the Council to work constructively and urgently to reach consensus on the appointment of the Panel of Experts, to complete its composition and to enable it to commence its duties.

The need for an effective Committee and a fully functioning follow-up mechanism is of the utmost importance considering the developments that our region has witnessed over the past few months. The Kingdom of Bahrain and numerous countries in the region have been directly exposed to Iran's launch of ballistic missiles and drones against our countries and to the targeting of civilians, civilian property, vital infrastructure and energy facilities, as well as threats to the security and safety of navigation and international maritime corridors. Furthermore, highly sensitive facilities have been put at risk, including the peaceful Barakah nuclear power station in the sisterly United Arab Emirates and the Gulf Petrochemicals Industries Company facility in the Kingdom of Bahrain, which were targeted in the hope that this might result in humanitarian, environmental and economic repercussions extending beyond the borders of our targeted countries.

These developments take on particular significance in the context of our discussion today. The attacks that the region has witnessed in recent months highlight in practical terms the wider repercussions of non-compliance and the importance of the Security Council fulfilling its responsibilities to ensure that its resolutions are respected and implemented. They also reaffirm the importance of having an effective committee and a comprehensive monitoring mechanism, including a panel of experts capable of monitoring the implementation of the relevant measures and verifying potential instances of non-compliance. Taken together, these developments confirm that the issue of compliance is not merely a technical or procedural matter but is directly linked to international peace and security.

The Kingdom of Bahrain believes that sanctions are not an end in themselves but rather one of the tools made available to the Security Council by the Charter of the United Nations to promote compliance. We therefore reaffirm our support for diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme, ensuring its peaceful nature, de-escalating tensions, building trust and enhancing regional security and stability. In this context, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted a resolution yesterday concerning Iran's nuclear programme, pursuant to which it referred the issue of Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations to the Security Council, emphasizing the need to address outstanding issues urgently. This development underscores the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach to addressing this issue, an approach that combines ensuring compliance with international

obligations, full cooperation with the Agency and the continuation of the diplomatic process.

The Kingdom of Bahrain considers that this approach represents the optimal path towards a sustainable resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, thereby strengthening the non-proliferation regime and contributing to the preservation of regional and international security and stability. The Kingdom of Bahrain calls on Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency, to fulfil its international obligations and to refrain from any actions that would increase tensions or undermine the security and stability of the countries of the region.

In conclusion, the Kingdom of Bahrain reaffirms its support for all serious diplomatic efforts that lead to a sustainable solution, ensures the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, promotes security and stability, and establishes regional relations based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs and good-neighbourly relations.

**Mr. Mukongo** (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (*spoke in French*): The Democratic Republic of the Congo thanks the French presidency for convening this meeting.

We approach this issue with one consistent priority: to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security while preserving the unity and effective functioning of the Council. We take note of the developments that have taken place since September 2025 concerning the provisions relating to the Iranian nuclear issue. We also note that some of these developments have given rise to differences of opinion among Council members, particularly regarding the interpretation and implications thereof. In this context, we believe it is essential that these differences be examined in a spirit of dialogue and responsibility in order to preserve, to the extent possible, the continuity and effectiveness of the Council's relevant mechanisms. It is with this in mind that the Democratic Republic of the Congo attaches particular importance to maintaining monitoring, reporting and verification capabilities, enabling the Council to have access to reliable and impartial information to inform its consideration of and decisions on this issue.

This requirement of transparency and trust is also reflected in the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a State party to the Pelindaba Treaty, which establishes Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo reaffirms the importance of the Agency's role and encourages it to continue its technical work in a spirit of impartiality, independence and rigour. Looking beyond the nuclear issue, we remain mindful of its broader implications for international peace and security.

My delegation remains concerned about the deterioration of the security situation in the Middle East and its potential repercussions beyond the region, particularly for maritime security, energy supplies and international economic stability. In the face of these risks, the Democratic Republic of the Congo calls on all concerned parties to exercise restraint and reaffirms its commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we encourage the continuation of dialogue with a view to reaching a lasting, verifiable and mutually acceptable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and to helping reduce regional tensions. Such a process should make it possible to strengthen the necessary safeguards for all parties and gradually restore trust, which is an essential prerequisite of a sustainable outcome.

Under the current circumstances, we remain convinced that dialogue, transparency and cooperation must continue to guide collective action. As we emphasized in our statements of 12 and 16 March (see S/PV.10120 and S/PV.10122), it is incumbent upon the Security Council to overcome these differences to the extent possible, in order to preserve the effectiveness of its work, including through its subsidiary bodies.

In conclusion, the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to reassure everyone that, for its part, it will continue to support efforts to preserve the unity of the Council, promote dialogue and contribute to a peaceful solution, in accordance with international law and in keeping with the responsibilities incumbent upon this body.

**Mr. Brown II** (Liberia): We convene at a testing crossroads for international peace and the authority of the Council, where divided interpretations of resolutions 2231 (2015) and 1737 (2006) continue to challenge our multilateral architecture.

For small and developing nations like Liberia, the rules-based international order is not an academic luxury. It is our primary shield. While Member States debate procedural timelines, legal contention must never serve as an alibi for oversight paralysis. As it continues to be the duty of the Council to maintain international peace and security, it is clear to Liberia that we are all in agreement that we cannot hope to make a nuclear file on the Council's agenda safer by turning off the lights, only to argue over who misplaced the switch. This is why Liberia appeals for practical vigilance anchored in the primacy of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Verification is the non-negotiable core of non-proliferation. Therefore, we urgently call for timely, unhindered access and complete transparency for the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify all material, facilities and enrichment activities. Diplomacy without rigorous verification is not reassurance. It is a promise written in disappearing ink.

Our concern is neither theoretical nor geographically distant. The African Union has consistently cautioned that instability in the Middle East carries severe global shockwaves. Strategic miscalculation thousands of miles away does not remain offshore: it arrives at the doorstep of a market woman in Monrovia as an unaffordable transport fare and a more expensive bag of rice. When non-proliferation falters, human security pays the toll everywhere.

We therefore urge members to overcome the procedural impasse paralysing subsidiary bodies and the reporting mechanism of the Panel of Experts. Disagreement over specific files must not hold collective security hostage.

In closing, the purpose of the Council is not merely to mirror global divisions but to bridge them. Liberia calls for a disciplined diplomatic track, one that protects regional infrastructure from military escalation, restores full safeguards compliance and secures a durable peace anchored in robust multilateral verification.

**Mrs. Balta** (Greece): Allow me also to thank the Secretariat for its work in support of the Council and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006).

We have consistently stressed that the re-establishment of the 1737 Committee was both valid and legitimate. Following the activation of the snapback mechanism, the relevant Security Council resolutions were restored, and the obligations arising from them must be implemented by all Member States. The clear majority of Member States have reaffirmed this fundamental principle, as today's voting results again demonstrate.

For these obligations to be fulfilled effectively, the Committee must be equipped with the necessary tools to discharge its mandate. A functioning Panel of Experts is particularly important in this regard. Greece therefore supports the draft resolution and the proposed extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts, and we consider the restoration of the Panel an important step towards enabling the 1737 Committee to discharge its mandate effectively and ensuring the full implementation of the Council's decisions. At the same time, the implementation of the resolutions and sanctions measures forms only part of a broader effort aimed at achieving a diplomatic resolution of the Iran nuclear issue.

Greece's position on Iran's nuclear programme is unchanged. Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. The nature and scale of Iran's nuclear activities,

together with outstanding questions regarding transparency, remain a matter of serious concern. The continued accumulation of highly enriched uranium underscores the urgency of restoring confidence in the exclusively peaceful character of the programme. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is therefore indispensable. Iran must cooperate fully and constructively with the Agency and provide all necessary access and information so that it can fulfil its verification responsibilities effectively and independently. Only sustained transparency and credible verification can provide the assurances required by the international community.

We remain deeply concerned about the ongoing escalation in the region. There is an urgent need for a return to dialogue and the resumption of negotiations. Diplomacy remains the only viable path towards lasting peace and stability. Equally, respect for international law, including international humanitarian law, must remain at the centre of our collective efforts. The protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure is of critical importance. They must be protected at all times and must never become targets.

At the same time, the stability of global and regional supply chains, particularly in essential commodities such as food products and fertilizers, depends on the preservation of freedom of navigation and the unhindered movement of international shipping. In this respect, we need to see an immediate return to the status quo ante. The right of transit passage through international straits such as the Strait of Hormuz, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, must be fully respected. International shipping must remain free from impediments, threats or measures inconsistent with international law. The same principle applies to other critical maritime routes, including the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait. The security of these maritime arteries is an essential element for international peace and security.

There is ultimately no sustainable alternative to diplomacy and a return to negotiations. A comprehensive agreement supported by effective verification and consistent with international law and the Charter of the United Nations remains the best path towards addressing proliferation concerns and restoring regional stability. We encourage Iran to engage seriously and constructively in negotiations capable of producing a lasting settlement, as well as providing clear, durable and verifiable assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

Greece will continue to work constructively with all members of the Council to advance these objectives.

**Mr. Alfaro de Alba** (Panama) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting.

Since the reinstatement of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), periodic reports have been prepared in fulfilment of the obligation to report to the Security Council every 90 days. However, these reports have not yet been formally adopted. In this context, it is appropriate to examine the most recent draft report, which describes the Committee's current situation and, in particular, allows us to assess its progress in fulfilling its mandate. The draft report indicates that the Committee has faced constraints on the proper exercise of some of its functions, raising questions about its ability to fully discharge its mandate.

It must be recognized that the functioning of the Committee should not be considered in isolation, since the 1737 Committee forms part of the institutional and normative framework of the United Nations sanctions regime. Consequently, weakening one component does not merely affect that component individually; it may also compromise the strength and effectiveness of the system as a whole. The effectiveness of this framework depends precisely on the ability of each of its constituent bodies to properly perform its functions of oversight, coordination and implementation of the measures adopted by the Security Council. The political provisions that have prevented

the appointment of the chairs of subsidiary bodies, and thereby limited the functioning of their committees, therefore affect more than just procedural matters, as they undermine the ability of these bodies to fulfil their mandates effectively.

In this context, the impact of measures adopted by the Security Council extends beyond the internal functioning of its bodies, since those measures must also be implemented at the national level. The Republic of Panama, exercising its powers and recognizing the binding nature of these measures, has adopted the relevant provisions to strengthen the capacities of the public and private sectors to implement international sanctions and prevent the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is because the regime's ability to translate Security Council decisions into measures that can be effectively implemented also depends on technical factors.

Among these, we consider the regular updating of sanctions lists to be essential, as their accuracy and validity are needed to facilitate their proper implementation by Member States. Outdated lists do not benefit any of the parties and can give rise to both practical and legal difficulties, by placing States in a position of having to apply measures that do not always adequately reflect the current realities.

The Republic of Panama has reiterated in numerous forums its firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and recognizes that its objectives can only be achieved through effective verification and monitoring mechanisms, notably the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and, where appropriate, the mechanisms established by the Security Council in the field of non-proliferation. Therefore, we urge all Member States to preserve and strengthen these mechanisms so that they may fulfil their functions fully, independently and effectively.

**Ms. Lassen** (Denmark): I thank France for convening today's meeting.

We regret that once again the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) has not been able to agree on its 90-day report. This continued inability to reach agreement undermines the Council's ability to carry out its responsibilities.

Denmark's position remains clear: Iran must never be allowed to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We therefore strongly support continued diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the concerns surrounding Iran's nuclear programme and restoring genuine international verification. The effective work of the 1737 Committee is instrumental in this regard.

We deeply regret the continued disagreement over the status of the sanctions measures reinstated by the Security Council, and the approach taken by some Council members who refuse to recognize that all sanctions against Iran were in fact reimposed last year. We are also concerned about the continued inability to appoint a Chair for the 1737 Committee. This is particularly concerning, as the mandate of its Panel of Experts is due to expire later this month. Without a functioning Committee Chair and effective monitoring mechanisms, the implementation of the sanctions regime is further weakened.

Denmark has consistently engaged constructively in the work of the 1737 Committee. We call on all Council members to uphold their responsibilities, fully implement the relevant Security Council resolutions and ensure that the Committee can operate effectively in accordance with its mandate. We also regret how some Council members are using their opposition to the 1737 Committee to hold hostage the full and formal appointment of all subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs. A solution is long overdue.

We remain deeply concerned by Iran's lack of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and by the IAEA's inability to carry out the verification necessary to provide assurances regarding Iran's nuclear activities. There is no credible

civilian justification for the amount of highly enriched uranium that Iran has produced. Even more worrying, for over a year, the IAEA has been unable to verify further enrichment activities due to a lack of access. This serious non-compliance with safeguards obligations cannot be normalized. We support the resolution adopted yesterday by the IAEA Board of Governors and join others in strongly urging Iran to restore full cooperation with the IAEA.

We also remain deeply concerned about the wider regional security situation. Denmark calls on Iran to comply fully with resolution 2817 (2026), cease attacks against countries in the region and refrain from any actions or threats that undermine the freedom of navigation. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is not only a challenge for the region. The Strait is a critical international waterway, and its closure has global consequences, such as disruptions to global trade, rising energy costs and increasing food insecurity, which are felt around the world, with the most vulnerable bearing the greatest burden.

Upholding international law, including international humanitarian law, must remain a priority for all involved parties. Civilians must be protected, and free and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz must be restored.

**Ms. Pavļuta-Deslandes** (Latvia): I thank the French presidency for convening this legally mandated meeting.

I would like to start by stating the obvious and emphasize that the United Nations sanctions against Iran have been reimposed and remain in force. They reflect binding international law, and all Member States, including members of the Council, are obliged to respect and implement them.

The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) has also been re-established and is exercising its mandate, as reflected in its engagement on the relevant exemption procedures, despite the unprecedented delay in the appointment of chairs of the Security Council's subsidiary bodies in 2026, preventing the Council from discharging its mandate.

It is regrettable in this regard that we were again unable to reach an agreement on the 90-day report of the 1737 Committee. This follows the recent equally disappointing lack of agreement on new listings and the Panel of Experts.

Sanctions of the Security Council are a critical instrument under international law to curb the unlawful behaviour of States. Their reimposition has followed the continued and systematic failure by Iran to live up to its internationally binding obligations, most notably under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the comprehensive safeguards agreement. This week the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors in Vienna has decided to refer Iran's long-standing non-compliance to the Security Council. We sincerely hope that all members of the Council will take this referral seriously.

Iran has withheld required access for IAEA inspectors. The IAEA has repeatedly stated that it has lost the continuity of knowledge on highly enriched uranium stockpiles in Iran. Enrichment up to 60 per cent has been previously reported, and this cannot in any way be reconciled with any peaceful purpose. Only unhindered access for IAEA inspectors to all relevant sites and a return to meaningful negotiations would constitute a legitimate starting point for a diplomatic process to lift existing sanctions on Iran.

Instead of efforts to resolve these outstanding issues, Iran has been escalating further. Its neighbours have continued to suffer from unprovoked attacks; the regional security environment and conflict resolution efforts are undermined by its proxies; and we are all experiencing Iran's detrimental attempts to hold the global economy hostage. It has tried using an international waterway as leverage, in complete disregard of the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It has severely disrupted countless crucial supply chains, most notably of fertilizers, putting millions of lives around the globe at risk of food insecurity. Iran must cease these reckless actions. The humanitarian consequences have been far too grave.

Unfortunately, these are only the latest manifestations of Iran's destabilizing influence across the region and beyond. We strongly condemn Iran's support for Russia in its aggression terrorizing Ukrainian civilians, often with the very same weapons Iran has been using against its neighbours in the Gulf region.

Diplomacy remains the best instrument for achieving a comprehensive solution to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. Until then, the sanctions will remain in place. Efforts to dispute legal facts do not alter the obligations of all States under international law. Latvia will continue to constructively engage on this issue to uphold Council decisions, including the 1737 sanctions regime, until the actions of Iran substantively change.

**Mr. Ibrahim** (Somalia): Somalia reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the preservation of international peace and security.

My delegation takes note of the divergent views among Council members regarding the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). We believe that a measured, balanced and principled approach is essential to address the concerns of all parties while preserving space for diplomacy. We underscore the primacy of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Differences over legal and procedural matters should not prevent the Council from fulfilling its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. We therefore encourage all parties to engage constructively and in good faith to preserve the unity, credibility and effectiveness of the Council.

Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, we urge a return to the negotiating table and the resumption of sustained, meaningful and results-oriented diplomacy. A negotiated settlement anchored in the relevant Security Council resolutions consistent with international law remains the only viable path to resolving outstanding non-proliferation concerns. Somalia recognizes the indispensable role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the verification and monitoring of nuclear safety and the preservation of international stability. We underscore the importance of ensuring the Agency can carry out its mandate independently, impartially and effectively in accordance with its safeguards agreement and its applicable international obligations. We further recognize the critical role of the IAEA in monitoring nuclear material, including highly enriched uranium, and in clarifying outstanding questions concerning the location and status of such material.

We reiterate our long-standing call for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We call upon all the States in the region, without exception, to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to fully comply with their international obligations. Such a zone would make an important contribution to regional confidence-building, non-proliferation and lasting peace and stability.

We express our deep concern that nine months into 2026, the Council remains unable to agree on the appointment of Chairs and Vice-Chairs. The prolonged deadlock follows the unprecedented delay in the appointment of Chairs last year and marks the second consecutive year in which the allocation of these positions has been significantly delayed. We therefore urge all Council members to demonstrate the flexibility, the pragmatism and the spirit of compromise necessary to resolve this matter without further delay.

To conclude, the challenges before us require a collective, measured response rooted in dialogue, mutual respect and renewed commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and multilateralism. The fragile security environment demands restraint, de-escalation and sustained diplomatic engagement. Somalia stands ready to engage constructively with all Council members to chart a peaceful, diplomatic path forward that upholds the Charter, respects international law, strengthens the non-proliferation regime and contributes to international peace and security.

**Mr. Ahmad** (Pakistan): Pakistan remains deeply concerned at the situation in the region, which is marked by ongoing tensions, hostilities and continued conflict. Recent developments have once again illustrated the fragility of the situation, the risk of escalation and the need for diplomatic settlement. The upsurge in violence in the Middle East in the past few days is quite unsettling for the prospects of peace in the region and beyond. Unfortunately, renewed violence and the breakdown of diplomacy have also affected the consideration of the Iran nuclear issue, including by the Security Council.

We affirm our support for the resolution of all outstanding issues, including the Iran nuclear issue, through peaceful means, diplomatic engagement and sustained dialogue. Pakistan is of the view that diplomacy and dialogue should remain the guiding principles for achieving a negotiated settlement of all contentious issues in accordance with the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties concerned. It is in that very spirit that from the outset, Pakistan has been undertaking constructive diplomatic engagement in supporting de-escalation, a ceasefire and the broader pursuit of stability in the region. Through sustained interaction at the leadership level and our active coordination with other partners in the region and beyond, we consistently sought to encourage dialogue, facilitate the exchange of messages and help to create space and conditions conducive to meaningful negotiations.

Our approach underscores Pakistan's enduring commitment to regional stability and international peace, reflecting our preference for principled, dialogue-oriented diplomacy in addressing geopolitical challenges. We continue our efforts for the wider objectives of peace and security. Given the necessary space, diplomacy can still deliver results in settling outstanding issues peacefully. To that end, sincere, earnest and painstaking work is required to find a peaceful, diplomatic solution to this conflict and all outstanding issues — something that has been emphasized by many around this table, even today. Pakistan urges all sides to exercise restraint and choose the path that delivers peace and security for all.

Lastly, we remain concerned at the continued divisions in the Security Council and the resulting impasse, which has also affected the work of the Council's subsidiary bodies. We hope that members will show unity and shoulder our responsibility in overcoming this challenge and find common purpose in upholding international peace and security.

**The President** (*spoke in French*): Before giving him the floor, I extend a very cordial welcome to Ambassador Mauricio Gaona, the new Permanent Representative of Colombia, to the Security Council. We look forward to working with him and his Mission in the coming years.

**Mr. Gaona** (Colombia) (*spoke in French*): I thank you, Mr. President, for your warm welcome

(*spoke in English*)

Colombia wants to call the attention of the Security Council to the ineluctability of the issue before us. The snapback mechanism is an operative mechanism. That being said, whether or not the snapback mechanism reaches its goal of resolving the conflict among the parties does not render the agreement that established it, much less a Security

Council sanction, inexistent. Such an interpretation will jeopardize the ability of the Security Council to accomplish its goals. More than that, it threatens the stability of the international legal system.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

The Republic of Colombia recognizes the reinstatement of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its Panel of Experts. All the resolutions subsequent to resolution 1737 (2006) — resolutions 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010) — the six resolutions, in fact, form part of public international law and must be observed as such. The purported ineffectiveness of an operational mechanism to resolve disputes does not diminish the prior legal effect of a provision of international law. International law is a body of law that is grounded not in the interpretation of recurrent acts but in the observance of the principles that precede and underpin it, including the Vienna Convention, which underscore to us the good-faith principle in the execution of contracts. This principle of good faith, specifically vis-à-vis an issue, a factor for analysis as crucial as international peace and the stability of not just the region but also the world and the possibility that all of us nations may control the enrichment of uranium up to certain limits, that enrichment being established in a treaty that Iran signed and to which it acceded in 1979, is a commitment.

(*spoke in English*)

It is a binding commitment.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

It must not in any way be interpreted, based on the legality of an operational mechanism, as a non-existent rule of international law, particularly when it is accompanied by sanctions and the authority vested in the Security Council by the Charter of the United Nations.

The Republic of Colombia is therefore in no doubt that the sanctions regime is applicable and exists, and that the Council must intervene as soon as possible to ensure the reinstatement of the 1737 (2006) Committee and the Panel of Experts. This is part of its international mandate. As a member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Colombia has also supported the decisions taken regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including the decision adopted this week by the Board of Governors to convey to the Security Council its findings on the country's non-compliance and, most recently, the report by the Agency's Director General.

Colombia supports the reinstatement of the 1737 (2006) Committee and its Panel of Experts. For us, this is not merely a political issue but an indisputable legal one. The principles of international law must be respected.

**Mr. Nebenzia** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are once again compelled to express our deep disappointment that most Security Council members failed to find the strength or the courage to stand up for the decisions they had previously adopted. We are grateful to those colleagues who did not support yet another attempt by a small group of countries to undermine the Council's authority to serve their short-term political interests.

Today, the Security Council has once again convened for a routine briefing on a non-existent agenda item. The very fact that this meeting is taking place constitutes not only a gross procedural violation but also an irrational waste of the Council's valuable time and resources. Today's meeting simply has no subject matter. The Council has not adopted any decisions to reinstate the Security Council's anti-Iran resolutions, including the re-establishment of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), and the notorious snapback mechanism, provided for by resolution 2231 (2015) while it

was in force, has not been triggered. We will not delve into the reasons why the United Kingdom, France and Germany had no right to invoke it. We have already done so on numerous occasions. Anyone wishing to do so may refer to our numerous statements on this matter and to the detailed legal analysis jointly prepared by Russia, China and Iran and circulated to the Security Council and the General Assembly in 2025.

It should simply be noted that resolution 2231 (2015) expired, as stipulated therein, on 18 October 2025. On the same day, the agenda item "Non-proliferation" was removed from the list of issues dealt with by the Security Council. That is to say, the Council formally concluded its consideration of the matter concerning Iran's nuclear programme. No unlawful actions by the Secretariat in breach of Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, including the reinstatement of the website of the 1737 (2006) Committee and its sanctions list, will alter these facts.

In this context, we wish to emphasize once again that our country will not allow the Council to adopt any decisions that legitimize claims of an alleged snapback. Similarly, we will continue to oppose attempts to revive the 1737 (2006) Committee. Russia will continue to uphold the integrity of and the need for strict compliance with the Security Council's previously adopted decisions on the termination of resolutions concerning the Iranian file. We call on our Western colleagues to abandon their unlawful claims for their reinstatement and to cease obstructing the normal functioning of the Council, first and foremost regarding its legitimate subsidiary bodies.

It is worth noting that briefings such as today's offer no added procedural or political value whatsoever. Convening them has nothing to do with the objectives of maintaining international peace and security. The initiators of such meetings, who continue to live in an alternative reality of their own making, are merely regurgitating their familiar set of fabrications regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. This involves both the misrepresentation of facts — including the deliberate distortion of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's reports, particularly those for which he no longer has a mandate — and the blatant disregard for the situation on the ground.

If our Western colleagues were genuinely concerned about upholding the global non-proliferation regime, they would have explicitly identified the source of the direct threats to it. The United States not only provoked a crisis surrounding the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by unilaterally withdrawing from it in 2018, but it ultimately resorted to force. Together with Israel, it carried out a whole series of strikes against Iranian civilian nuclear infrastructure facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. These unlawful and reckless actions by Washington and West Jerusalem, which threatened to result in a large-scale catastrophe with unpredictable consequences for the entire Middle East, constituted an attempt to undermine the authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the safeguards system on which it is based. These actions were what prevented IAEA inspectors from carrying out their verification activities in Iran on a continuous basis. And despite this, Tehran has expressed its readiness to continue cooperating with the IAEA secretariat on this matter.

Nevertheless, European delegations are not merely failing to call a spade a spade. They are either pretending that nothing has happened or is happening, or worse still, they are supporting aggressive actions against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its nuclear facilities, placing all the blame for what is happening on Tehran. At the same time, Western countries are continuing to artificially stoke tensions in both New York and Vienna, the latest example being the politicized resolution adopted yesterday by the IAEA Board of Governors, which, incidentally, does not entail any procedural consequences for the work of the Security Council. But who among those who proposed and pushed for this resolution cares about that? And yet, the United Kingdom and France

have the audacity to speak of their commitment to finding a diplomatic solution to the issue of Iran's nuclear programme. Nevertheless, over the past year and a half, the failure of these countries in their efforts in this regard has become obvious to any impartial observer.

The Russian Federation categorically rejects attempts to manipulate the authority of the Security Council for the purpose of settling political scores with Tehran. Such irresponsible actions undermine the prospect of reaching negotiated solutions that would both achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict in the Persian Gulf and dispel any prejudices and suspicions regarding Iran's nuclear programme. We are convinced that agreements on this matter are possible only if they ensure a careful balance of interests and show due regard for Iran's legitimate rights. We urge Western countries to stop adding fuel to the fire of this escalation. We trust that all States with a constructive approach will continue their efforts to create favourable conditions for the situation to return as soon as possible to the path of a political and diplomatic settlement. Russia remains fully ready for this.

**Ms. Locetta** (United States of America): I thank France in its capacity as President of the Security Council for convening this meeting and for doing so despite those on the Council who seek to undermine the work of this Committee.

One year ago, the Council decided to re-establish the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). This vote represented a widely held concern among members about an Iranian nuclear programme progressing in the dark, without the international community's visibility. The Council therefore chose to establish this Committee with a specific, narrowly scoped mandate to oversee, in support of the six reinstated Security Council resolutions, the implementation of the sanctions measures, a sanctions list and reports every 90 days. Those efforts persist, even as obstructionist colleagues remain determined to obscure public visibility into sanctions violations and evasions. This interference aims to allow Iran to maintain its non-compliance with respect to its safeguards mandated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to protect its partners that violate sanctions under the resolution 1737 (2006) regime.

In his most recent report just this week, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Grossi said that the Agency has not received information from Iran regarding the status of its declared nuclear materials or facilities. The IAEA did not have access to any of the facilities to conduct in-field verification activities. The Director General said that this lack of accessibility left the Agency unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities under Iran's safeguards agreement. He once again called on Iran to engage the Agency constructively. In response to Iran's claims that it has not allowed IAEA inspections out of concerns for the safety of the Agency's inspectors, Director General Grossi noted that "Ukraine has been a worse and more constant war zone". Yet, those inspectors have still managed to carry out inspections at nuclear facilities throughout the war between Russia and Ukraine.

This week, at the meeting of the IAEA's Board of Governors, the Board voted to approve a resolution that urges Iran to urgently come into compliance with its safeguards agreement. We call on Iran to take all the necessary steps called for by the Agency and the Board, including the information on the previously declared nuclear material and access to facilities. Iran and its supporters on this Committee are well aware of what Iran needs to do to resolve this issue.

The United States will continue to promote the broadest possible international compliance with the State obligations mandated by the Council's resolutions. We will look to partners in the coming days to weigh options to ensure that there is sufficient infrastructure in place to support that goal.

**Mr. Sun Lei** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China voted against the procedural motion on the adoption of the agenda. We regret the outcome of the vote. It has been more than two months since the United States and Iran signed the memorandum of understanding. However, the memorandum of understanding was undermined shortly after it took effect. With the military frictions between the parties concerned continuing, dialogue and negotiations have yet to be put on the agenda. Now that the 60-day window set by the memorandum of understanding has expired, the United States has intensified unilateral sanctions against Iran and launched a new round of military strikes against the country. With the two countries trading attacks, tensions in the region are once again heightened, seriously undermining efforts by parties to promote talks for peace. China is gravely concerned and deeply worried about the situation.

I wish to make the following points.

First, it is essential to pursue a political settlement through dialogue and consultations. Recurring hostilities in the Middle East have caused severe harm and losses to the peoples of all countries, including Iran. The spillover effects continue to expand, undermining the common interests of the international community. The parties concerned should refrain from resorting to the threat or the use of force, resume the implementation of the memorandum of understanding as soon as possible and bring the Iranian nuclear issue back to the track of political and diplomatic settlement. In an effort to achieve a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire, conclude a peace agreement and pursue a political and diplomatic settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue, parties should seek the greatest common ground that accommodates the reasonable demands of all.

Secondly, it is essential to aim at addressing both the symptoms and the root causes, while focusing on tackling the root causes. The unilateral withdrawal by the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), its use of force against Iran twice during the negotiation process and its pursuit of a policy of maximum pressure against Iran are the primary causes of the current complex and intractable situation in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear issue. The parties concerned should not confuse cause and effect. The United States should commit to refraining from further use of force, engage in sincere negotiations with Iran and ensure the effective implementation of any future new agreement. The parties concerned should manage their relations on the basis of equality and mutual respect, work to de-escalate the current situation and seek a comprehensive solution.

Thirdly, it is essential to uphold the principles of objectivity and impartiality and to take a balanced approach to nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, we must reject double standards and respect the legitimate rights and interests of the parties concerned. Iran, as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has the legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. China acknowledges Iran's repeated commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. China supports the United States and Iran in resolving their differences through rational and pragmatic negotiations, ensuring that Iran conducts its peaceful nuclear activities in an orderly manner under strict International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and eliminating the risk of nuclear proliferation.

Fourthly, it is essential to base judgment on the merits of the matter, oppose the abuse of sanctions and reject the instigation of confrontation. Distorting the historical context of the Iranian nuclear issue, ignoring the difficulties that Iran faces in resuming safeguards monitoring and verification, insisting on the Council reimposing sanctions against Iran and forcing the Council's intervention in the Iranian nuclear issue do not help parties to build trust or bridge differences. Under the current circumstances, the Security Council should play a constructive role and foster a positive atmosphere conducive to dialogue and negotiations. Certain members should immediately cease

using the Security Council to advance their own political agendas and avoid creating new obstacles to the political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue.

Recently, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a four-point proposal on improving the common security of the Middle East. It marks yet another contribution by China towards achieving lasting peace and stability in the region following President Xi's four propositions on safeguarding and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. China always stands firmly on the side of peace, on the side of dialogue and on the right side of history. As a participant in the JCPOA and a permanent member of the Security Council, China will continue to work with all parties to make unremitting efforts to advance a political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and promote peace and stability in the Middle East.

**The President** (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of France.

We regret that, once again, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) has not been able to submit its report, despite this being required by the Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme, which were reinstated almost one year ago. They were so reinstated in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015), owing to the serious, repeated violations by Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015.

Today the Iranian nuclear programme continues to constitute a cause for serious concern to international peace and security. More than one year ago now, Iran suspended all cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in flagrant violation of its safeguards obligations. Consequently, Agency inspectors have been denied access to Iran's sensitive nuclear facilities, and the Agency has lost all visibility over the status of Iran's enriched nuclear materials. It should be recalled that the accumulation of this stockpile of more than 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to 60 per cent has no credible civilian justification and represents a potentially sufficient quantity to produce approximately 10 explosive nuclear devices. In his most recent report, the Director General of the IAEA underscored that this situation "is a matter of serious proliferation concern" that "needs to be rectified with the utmost urgency". These concerns led the IAEA's Board of Governors on 9 September — that is, yesterday — to once again refer to the Council the matter concerning Iran's violations of its comprehensive safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We take note of this referral, and I would like to point out that paragraph 2 of resolution GOV/20/26/61, adopted on 9 September by the Board of Governors, requests the IAEA Director General to report to the Security Council.

In this context, it remains essential for the 1737 Committee to ensure the implementation of the resolutions reinstated by the Council. It is vital that the Council provide it with the resources to carry out its work, and in this regard we support the draft resolution prepared by the United States to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts. We also remain in favour of recruiting experts for the Panel, and regret that two members of the Council have so far obstructed this.

The implementation of the reinstated resolutions by all Member States remains a key tool for encouraging Iran to return to compliance with its international obligations and to engage in serious negotiations on the regulation of its nuclear programme.

We reaffirm our support for a diplomatic solution, which alone can provide a viable resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We will continue to support efforts to reach a robust, verifiable and lasting agreement that guarantees the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

With that in mind, we call on all parties to avoid further escalation, to work towards the full and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and to resume negotiations with a view to achieving lasting peace in the region.

France stands ready, when conditions permit, to help secure the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, through the independent, neutral and strictly defensive multinational military mission that it has initiated with the United Kingdom.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.

*The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.*