



Security Council

Eightieth year

Provisional

10001st meeting

Friday, 19 September 2025, 10 a.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Sangjin Kim	(Republic of Korea)
<i>Members:</i>	Algeria.	Mr. Koudri
	China.	Mr. Fu Cong
	Denmark	Ms. Lassen
	France	Mr. Bonnafont
	Greece	Mrs. Balta
	Guyana	Mrs. Rodrigues-Birkett
	Pakistan.	Mr. Ahmad
	Panama	Mr. Moscoso
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Sierra Leone	Mr. George
	Slovenia.	Mr. Žbogar
	Somalia	Mr. Osman
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . .	Dame Barbara Woodward
	United States of America.	Ms. Shea

Agenda

Non-proliferation

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation

The President: The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor on a point of order.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are compelled to take the floor on a point of order, because we do not see any legal, political or procedural grounds for taking any steps to advance European claims about launching the snapback mechanism, including proceeding to a vote on the draft resolution submitted by the South Korean presidency (S/2025/561).

We have repeatedly explained in various forums that the European participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have no right to invoke the mechanism provided for in operative paragraph 11 of resolution 2231 (2015). The United Kingdom, France and Germany themselves have persistently violated resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, most notably by imposing illegal unilateral sanctions against Iran to replace the very restrictions that were set to expire under the Plan. These countries have also blatantly violated the dispute settlement procedure of the JCPOA. In particular, they did not launch the dispute resolution mechanism as the established procedure for the Vienna platform dictates.

We wish to recall that resolution 2231 (2015) is an integral document, inseparable from the JCPOA, which has been and remains its integral component. The attempts by the European countries to present the matter as though they are entitled to invoke the resolution's punitive provisions, while simultaneously failing to honour their own commitments, are both hypocritical and legally and politically untenable. That is why we do not recognize the complaint submitted to the Security Council by Berlin, London and Paris in the context of resolution 2231 (2015). We therefore see no need for the current presidency to take any steps in this regard, including introducing a draft resolution. We are perplexed by the fact that the South Korean presidency acted so hastily in putting this draft resolution to the vote, even though there is still more than a week left before the 30-day period elapses. We regret that the Republic of Korea has chosen to play along with the West's destructive approaches to the detriment of its own duties as an impartial President.

Overall, what is happening today gives the impression that we are witnessing a clumsy performance aimed at creating a fake parallel reality, which has nothing to do with the political or legal foundations of the Security Council's work. After all, it is no secret that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany do not care at all about the fate of the JCPOA or the authority of the Council. Their only goal now is to use the Council as a tool in their unscrupulous game, as a lever to exert pressure on an out-of-favour State that is defending its sovereign interests.

Let me offer a clear illustration of how our European colleagues are, in essence, nipping diplomacy in the bud, preferring the language of blackmail and intimidation. Last week, in Vienna, we officially proposed holding a meeting of all the original participants in the JCPOA to allow us to have a family discussion, so to speak, on how to emerge from the current crisis. The United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States rejected our proposal.

Therefore, under other circumstances, we would not even have participated in such a shameful performance in the Security Council, which is now unfolding at their instigation. We are doing so today only because the content of the document presented provides for the preservation of the regime for lifting sanctions against

Iran, which is in line with our long-standing principled position. However, this does not offer an iota of legitimacy to either the European statements about launching the snapback or the actions of the presidency in the development of these statements.

The President: The representative of China has asked for the floor on a point of order.

Mr. Fu Cong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): At the moment, there are major differences concerning the invocation of the snapback mechanism among all members of the Council, including whether the E3 have the right to invoke the snapback mechanism. China maintains that, under such circumstances, hastily pushing for a vote on the draft resolution (S/2025/561) might exacerbate confrontation further, which would not be conducive to the resolution of the issue.

The President: The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has asked for the floor on a point of order.

Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I want to be clear that the United Kingdom considers the argument just made by the Russian Federation to be entirely without merit. As the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and my own country, the United Kingdom, have set out, our decision to snapback is entirely legal, justified and consistent with the requirements of resolution 2231 (2015). According to resolution 2231 (2015), all that is required to trigger snapback is a notification by a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA. It is a plain fact that the E3 made this notification on 28 August and that snapback has, therefore, been triggered. We therefore look forward to proceeding to the vote on the draft resolution (S/2025/561).

The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2025/561, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the President of the Security Council.

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it.

I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Bonnafont (France) (*spoke in French*): I welcome the presence of the representative of Iran at this table, and I would like to thank the presidency for organizing today's meeting on a central issue for international peace and security and for non-proliferation. The convening of this meeting allows for the proper implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement and resolution 2231 (2015).

For France, the conditions have not been met for a permanent lifting of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council with regard to Iran before 2015. Since 2019, Iran has chosen to stop implementing its commitments under the JCPOA and has undertaken an escalation of its nuclear programme. This escalation, documented by successive reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has led Iran to exceed, one by one, all the limits established in the 2015 agreement. Iran has thereby accumulated a stockpile of enriched uranium more than 48 times higher than the 300-kilogram limit set by the 2015 agreement. This includes more than 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent, while the 2015 agreement sets an enrichment limit of 3.67 per cent. Let me repeat: a 48-times larger stockpile, some enriched to 60 per cent, far beyond the agreed 3.67 per cent. Those 450 kilograms,

if enriched to military levels, would make it possible to produce 10 nuclear devices. The IAEA has underscored in its reports that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State to have enriched to such levels. Such activities have no credible justification in the context of a civilian programme. Once more, that is what the IAEA said, with complete independence and professionalism.

For several years now, Iran has also imposed unprecedented restrictions on the IAEA's monitoring and verification activities. Even before the strikes in June 2025, the Agency had indicated that it had "lost continuity of knowledge" on entire sections of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Since then, France and its E3 partners have applied the JCPOA openly and in good faith in all areas of the agreement, and our countries have made constant efforts to reach a diplomatic solution. In January 2020, the E3 activated the dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the agreement, in an attempt to address Iran's non-compliance with its commitments. In 2021 and 2022, we conducted intensive negotiations in order to bring Iran back into compliance with its commitments and the United States back into the agreement. Two viable proposals were put on the table by the JCPOA Coordinator in March and August 2022. We regret that Iran rejected both of them.

Since September 2024, France and its E3 partners have clearly signalled to Iran their determination to trigger the snapback mechanism before it expires on 18 October, if an agreement on Iran's nuclear programme that takes into account the non-proliferation regime and our security interests is not reached. Our position is clear, consistent and known to Iran. The continued escalation of the Iranian nuclear programme threatens regional stability and international peace and security, while also jeopardizing the integrity of the international non-proliferation regime. Under those conditions, the Security Council would not be fulfilling its responsibilities if it were to approve the permanent lifting of all sanctions and permanently remove the Iranian nuclear issue from its agenda.

Nevertheless, we have sought by all means to find an alternative to triggering the snapback and reimposing sanctions. In June, France did not participate in, nor support the strikes against the Iranian nuclear programme, emphasizing instead the urgent need for diplomatic engagement as the only option capable of ensuring a lasting response to the Iranian nuclear issue. In July, we acknowledged the impossibility of reaching a negotiated solution by the end of the summer and we, the E3, ourselves put forward an offer of a temporary extension of resolution 2231 (2015), in order to create space for diplomacy.

This offer is accompanied by demands which are reasonable, as they cover Iran's obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and achievable, as they are calibrated to be technically achievable within the set time frame. These requirements are: first, the resumption of effective, not merely formal, cooperation with the IAEA on the ground, with access for inspectors to Iran's most sensitive nuclear facilities, including Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan; secondly, the production of special reports provided for in Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement on high enriched uranium in Iran; and thirdly, the resumption of direct and unconditional talks with the United States.

Indeed, an extension of resolution 2231 (2015) can only be envisaged if it is accompanied by Iran's compliance with its obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and if it allows for the commencement of substantive negotiations towards a robust, verifiable and durable deal on its nuclear programme.

Since the snapback procedure was launched, we have continued our unwavering efforts to find a negotiated solution within the 30-day period provided for in the procedure before the effective reimposition of United Nations sanctions. The E3

Foreign Ministers have met twice with their Iranian counterpart, most recently the day before yesterday.

However, our offer of an extension has not yet received a satisfactory response. Iran has not taken any concrete action to resume cooperation with the Agency. The agreement announced on 9 September in Cairo between Iran and the IAEA, while defining the modalities of a potential resumption of cooperation, does not include any timetable for implementation. According to the Iranian Foreign Minister, the return of inspectors to the most sensitive sites of the Iranian programme, such as Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, should be the subject of further negotiations with the Agency.

Moreover, the IAEA cannot guarantee the location or condition of the stockpile of 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. The Agency's latest report, dated 4 September, nevertheless describes this stockpile as "extremely concerning" and stresses the urgency of verifying the situation.

Finally, negotiations with the United States have not — to our knowledge — resumed. We therefore have no option but to support the continuation of the snapback procedure which, unless the Council decides otherwise, will lead to the reinstatement on 28 September of the sanctions regimes adopted by it prior to 2015, with regard to Iran.

I ask Council members to forgive the length of my statement, but the objections raised warranted this lengthy response.

I will conclude by saying that our commitment to a diplomatic solution remains unchanged. The ministers of the E3 — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — who met the day before yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, told him this again in the clearest possible terms. Our offer of an extension remains on the table until the end of the 30-day period, and we remain open to seeking a negotiated solution.

The President: I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Algeria, China, Pakistan, Russian Federation

Against:

Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Guyana, Republic of Korea

The President: The draft resolution received 4 votes in favour, 9 against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution has not been adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.

Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I welcome the participation of the Iranian Permanent Representative in this meeting.

Today's draft resolution (S/2025/561) fulfils a key step of the snapback process set out in resolution 2231 (2015).

The United Kingdom is committed to pursuing a diplomatic solution to ensure that Iran shall never seek, acquire or develop a nuclear weapon. That is why, on 28 August, the United Kingdom, France and Germany notified the Council of Iran's clear and deliberate non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

(JCPOA). We have urged Iran to address international concerns regarding its nuclear programme, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been unable to confirm to be exclusively peaceful. Iran's nuclear escalation has been detailed in more than 60 reports by the IAEA over six years. It includes the accumulation of a highly enriched uranium stockpile, which lacks any credible civilian justification and is unprecedented for a State without a nuclear weapons programme.

The United Kingdom voted against today's draft resolution because, if it were adopted, it would have permanently terminated six Council resolutions on Iran's nuclear programme, removing this important issue from the Council's agenda, despite Iran's non-compliance with the JCPOA and Iran's continuing failure to implement its legal obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In good faith, we offered Iran an opportunity to extend the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) if Iran resumed full cooperation with the IAEA, in line with its legal obligations, addressed concerns regarding its highly enriched uranium stockpile and re-engaged seriously in negotiations. These steps are achievable for Iran. They are also justified and proportionate. They would give reassurance to the Council that a full diplomatic deal would follow. But without these most basic conditions being met, there is no clear path to a swift diplomatic solution. We regret that Iran has thus far failed to take these steps, and we urge them to act now.

The United Kingdom remains committed to a diplomatic solution. We are ready for further engagements diplomatically in the next week and beyond to seek to resolve differences.

Mr. Žbogar (Slovenia): I also welcome the Permanent Representative of Iran to the Chamber.

I wish to begin by expressing my appreciation to you, Mr. President, for your leadership on this file and for your commitment to upholding the agreements reached among the members of the Council. We view today's motion precisely in that spirit, consistent with what the Security Council envisaged when adopting resolution 2231 (2015).

We stand at a critical juncture for multilateralism. Trust is eroding in the corridors of the United Nations. International law is being increasingly disregarded. Ten years ago, in 2015, global diplomacy was able to overcome differences and find consensus. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was rightly seen as a landmark multilateral achievement. It placed strict limits, mutually agreed among participants, on Iran's uranium enrichment and stockpile. It established the most rigorous inspection regime ever agreed through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since 2018, the deal has struggled to maintain credibility. For many years, we have been witnessing non-compliance with the provisions of the JCPOA. Prospects were further diminished with the 12-day war in June.

Slovenia voted against draft resolution S/2025/561 in today's vote in order to send a clear and deliberate message: a reset is urgently needed. We call on Iran to return to the negotiating table, to restore full cooperation with the IAEA and to recommit to pursuing its nuclear programme solely for peaceful purposes in a transparent and verifiable way. We call on Iran and on the E3 — France, the United Kingdom and Germany — to use the remaining days until 27 September for diplomacy. A diplomatic solution to Iranian nuclear issue is the only solution.

Mr. Osman (Somalia): I also want to welcome the participation of the representative of Iran in this meeting.

Somalia voted against draft resolution S/2025/561, pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 2231 (2015). This decision reflects the nuisance and multifaceted nature of the current situation, particularly regarding the commitment by the parties to

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. At the same time, we firmly believe in the importance of fostering diplomatic engagement and dialogue to address Iran's nuclear programme. Any decision regarding Iran's nuclear programme must be considered carefully, taking into account the broader implications for regional stability and international security. We urge all parties to work constructively in the coming days, prioritizing diplomatic solutions that address the concerns at hand, while avoiding actions that could lead to further escalation.

In conclusion, Somalia reaffirms its unwavering commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East and the peaceful use of nuclear energy in full alignment with article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We have already stated our principled position today, which entails rejecting both the attempts by European States to trigger a snapback and the actions of the presidency in support of those attempts, which include the introduction of this draft resolution (S/2025/561). Our position on this matter remains unchanged.

The fact that the Russian Federation voted in favour of the draft resolution should not be construed as a change in its position. We supported the draft for one reason only: its sole operative paragraph concerns the preservation of the regime for lifting United Nations sanctions against Iran. This is the only correct and politically and legally sound decision, the inevitability of which we have been discussing for years. The rationale for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was to gradually lift all restrictions on Iran, and we firmly believe that there is no reason why they should not expire on 18 October. The law, the letter and the spirit of the JCPOA, diplomatic norms and, ultimately, basic common sense dictate that to exert pressure on a sovereign State through political blackmail and brute military force — as we all witnessed, when Iran fell victim to aggression by Israel and the United States in June — and to then seek to “finish it off” with United Nations sanctions is immoral, unjust and illegal.

However, this is exactly what our Western colleagues are now attempting to do. We would like to point out that everything, including Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was proceeding according to plan until the United States embarked on a destructive path in 2018 and officially withdrew from the deal. That was the trigger for the JCPOA crisis, and the Council now must address the consequences of that — a fact that Western delegations are doing their best to sweep under the carpet.

Despite Washington's illegal and aggressive action, Tehran, at the time, showed restraint and continued to honour its commitments in good faith for more than a year — I emphasize, more than a year. Only after a further round of renewed pressure did Tehran take steps in response, consistently noting that these actions were reversible. Unfortunately, even then, our European colleagues showed no interest in reverting to diplomacy and did not pursue the path of normal dialogue when the opportunity arose in 2022 while the parameters for restoring the JCPOA were under discussion. The violations by the United Kingdom, France and Germany of their obligations under resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA have long since become chronic. They include their failure to fulfil their obligations to afford Iran the economic benefits from the lifting of European Union sanctions, which were in force until 2015, and their illegal decision to resume unilateral sanctions pressure after the JCPOA transition day, 18 October 2023.

Our country has repeatedly informed Council members of its position that the United Kingdom, France and Germany have no right to invoke the procedure for reinstating the Council sanctions regime against Iran under operative paragraph 11 of resolution 2231 (2015). A party that fails to fulfil its obligations under any treaty or agreement forfeits its right to invoke the instruments provided for therein,

as affirmed by the so-called “clean hands doctrine”, the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* and the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice.

Against this backdrop, the so-called “notification” by the E3 on the triggering of the snapback mechanism, circulated to the Council on 28 August (S/2025/538), has no legal or procedural validity. It cannot serve as a basis for any decisions or action by the Council. This position is set out in the joint letter from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia, China and Iran and circulated to the Council on 28 August (S/2025/546). We wish to underscore, once again, that, from our perspective, no snapback procedure has been triggered. The introduction of the draft resolution under consideration today is a direct violation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, which is an integral part of that resolution. For this reason, the Russian Federation does not recognize the purported actions, nor any subsequent steps taken in this context.

We would like to point out that there is a genuine alternative to the lawlessness now prevailing in the Chamber: the Russian-Chinese draft resolution, which is currently in blue and proposes a technical extension of resolution 2231 (2015) for six months, while requiring that all original participants in the JCPOA immediately resume negotiations so as to find a diplomatic solution. We call on all sensible members of the Council to support it when we present it for a vote.

Mr. Fu Cong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China supports the continued lifting of Security Council sanctions against Iran and voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2025/561). At the same time, I must emphasize that we firmly oppose certain countries’ attempts to force the Security Council to trigger the snapback mechanism, as such a move seriously undermines diplomatic efforts for a political resolution of the Iran nuclear issue.

The current impasse concerning the Iran nuclear issue stems from the United States unilateral withdrawal from, and undermining of, the proper implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), its reinstatement and continuous escalation of its sanctions against Iran and its exertion of maximum pressure. These actions have deprived Iran of its access to the economic dividends provided for under the deal and have left Iran with no choice but to scale back its compliance with the agreement.

The United States has jettisoned its own credibility by brazenly targeting Iran’s nuclear programme and launching military strikes against its nuclear facilities, thereby undermining the very negotiation process that it had initiated. Under these circumstances, the fact that the United Kingdom, France and Germany are invoking resolution 2231 (2015) and insisting on activating the snapback mechanism to unilaterally sanction Iran is both unfair and unreasonable. Such a move is fuelling tension and division among Council members, impeding efforts to rebuild mutual trust and bridge differences among the parties and undermining diplomatic efforts towards an early resumption of talks and may even entail unforeseeable catastrophic consequences, potentially undoing years of diplomatic efforts at a stroke. China has grave concerns about this state of affairs.

China has consistently maintained that a political and diplomatic solution is the only effective and viable option for resolving the Iran nuclear issue and the correct path to lasting peace. This is also the prevailing view within the international community. In the current situation, we call on the parties to stay calm and exercise restraint, resolve issues through diplomacy and dialogue, and avoid falling back into the vicious cycle of sanctions, pressure and escalating tensions.

I wish to emphasize the following points.

First, Iran’s efforts should be acknowledged, and sanctions and efforts to apply pressure halted. For some time now, Iran has repeatedly reaffirmed the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and emphasized that it has no intention to develop

nuclear weapons. It has overcome multiple challenges since it sustained military strikes by Israel and the United States to resume cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran has sent positive signals many times, expressing its willingness to resume talks with the United States. The E3 — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — should view this positive initiative objectively and immediately withdraw their notifications concerning snapback sanctions against Iran.

Secondly, we must maintain dialogue and negotiation and abandon threats of force. The use of force is not the right way to resolve international disputes, nor can it resolve the Iran nuclear issue. The United States ought to reflect on the disruptive impact of its withdrawal from the JCPOA and its military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, give a positive response to Iran's call for the resumption of dialogue, undertake not to resort to the use of force again, unconditionally resume dialogue and negotiation with Iran without delay and resolve differences and respective concerns during negotiations.

Thirdly, we should focus on a political solution and create favourable conditions to that end. The Security Council should play a constructive role in assisting the parties concerned to build trust, bridge differences and advance the political process to negotiate a new agreement. China, together with Russia, presented a draft resolution on the technical extension of resolution 2231 (2015) for the purpose of buying time for diplomacy and creating conditions for a political solution, so as to prevent an irrecoverable tailspin that pushes the situation over the edge. This draft resolution remains on the table, and we encourage the parties to give it serious consideration.

Fourthly, we should uphold objectivity and impartiality and properly resolve differences. In the next steps of the political settlement process, the relevant goals and measures of the JCPOA and of resolution 2231 (2015) remain valid. The objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy must be balanced. Iran should continue to honour its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, and other parties should fully respect Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On the basis of mutual respect and equal dialogue, we must identify the greatest common denominator that accommodates the legitimate concerns of all parties, reach a solution that meets the expectations of the international community and place Iran's nuclear activities entirely under the safeguards of the IAEA.

As a participant in the JCPOA and a permanent member of the Security Council, China remains committed to a political solution of the Iran nuclear issue and to security and stability in the Middle East. China will continue to maintain an objective position, work hard to promote peace talks and play a constructive role in advancing the political process to settle the Iran nuclear issue.

Ms. Shea (United States of America): The United States thanks the presidency for submitting this draft resolution (S/2025/561), consistent with the presidency's obligation under operative paragraph 11 of resolution 2231 (2015).

On 28 August, France, Germany and the United Kingdom — the E3 — each notified the Council of Iran's significant and continuing non-compliance with its nuclear commitments. Their case was clear: Iran has enriched uranium well above the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) limits in a manner for which there is no credible civilian purpose. As we speak, Iran continues to not implement the JCPOA monitoring measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to not provisionally apply the IAEA Additional Protocol.

The E3 could have initiated the snapback process as early as 2019. Instead, it chose to first pursue intensive diplomacy with Iran. Then, in July, the E3 offered to extend the snapback mechanism if Iran were to take steps to address concerns regarding its highly enriched uranium stockpile, comply with its IAEA obligations

and resume direct diplomacy with the United States. Despite suggestions to the contrary from Iran and others, Tehran has not yet realized those conditions. The United States therefore voted against this draft resolution, and we are pleased that this draft resolution was not adopted, owing to not having received the requisite number of votes in favour. The practical effect of this vote is that, absent any further action by the Council, the pre-2015 United Nations sanctions on Iran are reimposed following the end of the 30-day snapback period on 27 September 2025.

However, to be absolutely clear, our vote on this draft resolution does not impede the possibility of real diplomacy, despite any statements to the contrary. The United Nations provisions to be reimposed are not arbitrary, but instead narrowly scoped to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear, missile and conventional arms programmes and support for terrorism. Their return does not preclude later removal through diplomacy. More importantly, President Trump has continued to reiterate the United States ongoing readiness for a meaningful, direct and time-bound dialogue with Iran — be it prior to the conclusion of the snapback process on 27 September or after. Absent a deal, it is incumbent on the international community to not accept Iranian half-measures or efforts to delay accountability. We must, with one voice, press leadership in Iran to choose the path of peace and, by extension, prosperity for the Iranian people.

Mrs. Rodrigues-Birkett (Guyana): We welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Iran in this meeting.

Guyana has consistently maintained support for dialogue and diplomacy as the most viable option for addressing all concerns related to the Iranian nuclear issue. Indeed, it was through dialogue and diplomacy that China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Iran reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which the Council endorsed through resolution 2231 (2015).

Guyana recalls that resolution 2231 (2015) affirmed that the full implementation of the JCPOA would contribute to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It also emphasized that the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade relations and cooperation with Iran. Guyana therefore expresses its regret that, to date, the plan has not been successfully implemented and, consequently, the goals of the JCPOA have not been achieved.

Ahead of the expiration of resolution 2231 (2015), Guyana urges the participants of the JCPOA to honour their commitment to resuming negotiations in good faith and to do so without further delay. We reiterate our support for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA and commit to working with Council members for a swift resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We further express our disappointment that despite their stated commitment to dialogue, the parties have not been able to resolve their differences in a manner that addresses the fundamental issues and the security concerns of all involved. We believe that dialogue should always be the first recourse to resolve any dispute or challenge between or among States. In this particular context, we are resolute that dialogue should involve all JCPOA participants. Guyana's abstention must be seen in this light.

Ms. Lassen (Denmark): At the outset, let me thank the presidency for presenting this draft resolution (S/2025/561) in line with the procedures described in resolution 2231 (2015). I also wish to welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Iran in this meeting.

Ten years ago, a landmark diplomatic achievement was realized. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) demonstrated what is possible when political differences are set aside, when the international community unites around a common cause. Regrettably, it has become clear that Iran has been in significant non-compliance with its commitments under the agreement for most of the past

decade. This has been documented in more than 60 reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Against this backdrop, we are extremely worried about the fact that the Iranian nuclear programme, with its accumulation of highly enriched uranium stockpiles, lacks any credible civilian justification and is unprecedented for a State without a nuclear weapons programme. The suspension of the sanctions regime on Iran in 2015 was a key element of the JCPOA. As a European country, Denmark witnessed and supported the extraordinary efforts that the European Union and European countries put into its negotiation and its implementation. We did so guided by a firm belief in the power of diplomacy. Today, that belief remains.

The E3 have remained steadfast in their commitment to resolving the dispute with Iran without having to impose sanctions. Iran has been offered many opportunities to engage constructively to avoid the situation we are in today. Most recently, Iran has had nearly two months to address the E3's immediate concerns — concerns that we fully share. Regrettably, Iran has decided not to do so. Our overarching objective is clear: to ensure that Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon. Despite our differences, we are all united by this common goal. For this reason, Denmark decided to vote against the draft resolution. Denmark supports the activation of the snapback as a consequence of Iran's actions and non-compliance with the JCPOA.

In conclusion, Denmark remains fully committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear issue. We encourage Iran to accept the conditions set by the E3 and urge Iran to return to the negotiating table in good faith. Our belief in diplomacy remains. We remain committed to reaching a negotiated solution to the Iran nuclear issue. This vote does not close the door to diplomacy; it opens the door for diplomacy. There is still time for Iran to change its nuclear course. We strongly urge Iran to do so.

Mr. George (Sierra Leone): I thank the presidency for submitting this draft resolution (S/2025/561) in line with paragraph 11 of resolution 2231 (2015). We welcome the participation of the representative of Iran in this meeting.

Sierra Leone notes the geopolitical context in which the Security Council has been called on to discharge its Charter responsibilities of maintaining international peace and security and addressing threats thereto. We are mindful of the provisions of the Charter and international law, which provide for lawful redress for internationally wrongful acts of States, including in this current broader context.

Regarding resolution 2231 (2015), our position is principled and consistent. We uphold the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. We favour the peaceful settlement of disputes through political and diplomatic dialogue. We call on all parties to act with restraint, uphold resolution 2231 (2015) and support a credible path back to compliance. All Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) stakeholders should therefore take concrete and verifiable steps. We also invite all stakeholders to take measured and reciprocal steps that preserve space for diplomacy and respond to verified compliance.

We share the concerns expressed during consultations that moving ahead without restoring verification and clarity will not strengthen compliance. The presidency's text would have decided that the terminations under resolution 2231 (2015) remain in effect at a time of increasing questions and allegations over transparency and reported verification gaps. It sets no immediate path to restore monitoring, lower enrichment or rebuild the continuity of knowledge. Neither does it address differing views among participant States on how procedures under resolution 2231 (2015), including paragraph 11, should operate.

Sierra Leone therefore voted against the draft resolution because it was clear that it would not attract the support of the vast majority of Council members and did not provide a basis for achieving consensus. It would therefore not have contributed to improving security and stability in the region. It could have also narrowed the

space for diplomacy by weakening incentives for verified steps towards compliance. Nevertheless, we stand ready to work with Council members and JCPOA participants to craft a balanced way forward that can command broad support. Early steps should include full International Atomic Energy Agency access, practical transparency measures and a clear plan to bring the programme within verifiable limits, while establishing the right of Iran to pursue a nuclear programme solely for peaceful purposes. Work should proceed through the Joint Commission, including use of the dispute resolution mechanism where appropriate, with timelines and deliverables reported to the Council.

Sierra Leone supports the view that diplomacy is the way forward in this context. However, it should be tied to verifiable action and lead to tangible outcomes and good-faith engagement. The priority now is to use the available period to restore compliance and reduce risk. Sierra Leone stands ready to engage with all members to facilitate this agreement, while maintaining the authority of the Council. We will assess any new text based on whether it strengthens verification, preserves space for diplomacy and improves regional security.

Our objective is clear: a lawful, proportionate and diplomatic path that sustains the global non-proliferation regime, restores effective verification and contributes to regional stability. We will continue to support balanced and constructive efforts that bring all parties back into compliance and strengthen international peace and security.

Mr. Koudri (Algeria) (*spoke in Arabic*): Algeria voted in favour of the draft resolution on lifting sanctions imposed on Iran (S/2025/561) submitted by the Republic of Korea as President of the Security Council for the month of September. The crucial principles on which we based our vote are steadfast and clear.

First, there is no doubt that the position expressed today is deeply rooted in international law and guided by our firm commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, as a cornerstone of the Charter of the United Nations and a landmark of our foreign policy. In fact, any alternative to the peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue poses major risks and could have devastating consequences for the Middle East region and for international peace and security. At this critical juncture, the Security Council should remain focused on the maintenance of international peace and security, which is our top priority.

Secondly, in the light of that, we firmly believe that implementing additional pressure currently would be counterproductive and would include risks of escalation that could undermine diplomatic efforts. We therefore welcome the recent agreement signed between Iran and the IAEA as a positive step towards resuming cooperation and honouring commitments and giving much-needed momentum to diplomatic efforts. We must stress that there is no military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The only feasible path is the path of diplomacy, negotiation and dialogue. Therefore, we must give diplomacy a genuine chance by providing enough time for peaceful and political efforts.

Thirdly and lastly, as members of the Security Council and responsible members of the international community, we must create an enabling environment for diplomacy to succeed. The current consensus already in place among the participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the members of the Council for the inexorable need for a diplomatic solution obliges us to work tirelessly to build on this common foundation with a view to overcoming procedural obstacles and to bringing positions closer in order to reach the desired solution. Our vote today is in line with our convictions, supported by United Nations reports and the report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/397), that the policy of imposing sanctions always deviates from the precautionary and pre-emptive goal and has consequences for civilians. Our vote is also in line with our position that everyone needs to seriously engage, in good faith, in negotiations for an agreement in the near future to reactivate the lifting of sanctions procedures.

For all the above reasons, we voted in favour of the draft resolution.

In conclusion, we call upon all parties to exercise utmost restraint, avoid any escalatory measures and engage in negotiations to reach the comprehensive, long-term and appropriate solution that this issue warrants.

Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan): Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2025/561). Our position on this matter has been guided by the following.

First, we firmly believe that all issues concerning Iran's nuclear programme must be resolved by peaceful means through dialogue and cooperation.

Secondly, more time must be provided for diplomacy to succeed.

Thirdly, a confrontation that could further complicate the situation must be avoided.

Fourthly, the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015) for reaching an amicable solution must be preserved, without resorting to coercive measures, until such time that a successor arrangement or a new deal is reached.

The JCPOA was a sterling example of a pragmatic and cooperative approach which charted a negotiated road map to comprehensively address the concerns of all parties by clearly defining their relevant obligations and responsibilities. Regrettably, the agreement was disrupted, leaving many complications in its wake that had an impact on the full and faithful implementation of the JCPOA by various parties, leading to mutual recriminations.

The agreement on practical modalities for the implementation of safeguards in Iran, signed by Iran's Foreign Minister and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Cairo on 9 September, aimed at restarting the Agency's verification activities and inspections, was a positive development. The Director General of the IAEA termed it "an important step in the right direction". There is a need to build on this breakthrough to restore mutual trust and promote confidence among all the relevant parties, which was seriously eroded owing to the recent developments.

Invoking the snapback and reimposition of United Nations sanctions could further complicate the situation, harden positions and take us away from the objective of an amicable resolution of the issue. The current situation demands greater engagement and not a hasty reimposition of sanctions. That is why Pakistan favoured a technical extension of resolution 2231 (2015) for a period of six months in order to create space for political engagement and negotiations through a realistic and constructive approach by all the parties.

We regret being put in a situation that confronts us today with a vote on a clearly divisive matter when other avenues were available to avoid it and when other pathways could have been utilized to address the concerns harmoniously and cordially, allowing the Council to proceed with consensus as it did with the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), 10 years ago.

As an immediate neighbour and friend of Iran, we do not favour any action that risks destabilizing a region which is already mired in multiple crises. This region cannot afford further tensions. We believe that, even at this stage, diplomacy should be given a chance. There is an urgent need to renew and continue diplomatic engagement to seriously and faithfully address any outstanding issues, in a cooperative manner, in accordance with the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties concerned. We must prioritize this approach and never give up on a peaceful, negotiated settlement.

Let me emphasize that diplomacy and intimidation do not go together. Diplomacy has delivered previously, and, with the necessary sagacity and pragmatism, it can

certainly deliver again. We hope that the path towards a resolution of the underlying issues will not become more narrow. In our view, it still remains available, provided there is political will to take it.

Mr. Moscoso (Panama) (*spoke in Spanish*): We welcome the Permanent Representative of Iran, who distinguishes us today with his presence.

The Republic of Panama, committed to the international rules-based order, recognizes that multilateral cooperation is essential to address global challenges and promote peace and security. Our position is based on the key principles of Panamanian foreign policy, including the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime, the maintenance of that multilateral architecture and the promotion of diplomatic dialogue as the most effective means of mitigating tensions and reducing strategic risks. In that vein, we respectfully call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to commit fully and constructively to the IAEA and resume the obligations it previously undertook. We therefore reiterate that it is fundamental to ensure access, transparency and effective monitoring in order to re-establish trust in the exclusively peaceful nature of the programme. We call upon all the parties involved to prioritize diplomacy, because it is only through effective dialogue and cooperation that we can achieve lasting, sustainable and just security for all.

Mrs. Balta (Greece): I thank you, Mr. President, for scheduling today's vote and for fulfilling your duties as President on a critical matter for international peace and security. I welcome the participation of the representative of Iran.

I wish to make three points on this issue.

First, we reiterate our concern about the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme. I think it is something the majority of us agree upon. It is also the reason we voted against the draft resolution (S/2025/561). Iran has still not sufficiently responded to these concerns. Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as stipulated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, have not resumed, and information on the stockpile of the highly enriched uranium has not been provided. Let me add that recent steps taken by Iran are a welcome and positive statement of intentions but need to be followed by tangible commitments. Now is the time for meaningful engagement and a return to negotiations.

Secondly, let me therefore stress that this vote does not mark the end of the road. Instead, it should be a departure point to redouble our efforts towards diplomatically resolving the issue and upholding the global non-proliferation architecture.

Thirdly, with the high-level week coming up and with all the interested parties in the same room, now is the moment to talk and negotiate meaningfully. We believe that dialogue and diplomacy remain the most effective tools to arrive at a mutually agreed solution that addresses the concerns of all sides on a critical matter for international peace and security. And agreement is good for all, including Iran. This is not the end of diplomacy. Let us, instead, seize the moment.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Ten years ago, intense negotiations between the five permanent members of the Security Council, Germany, Iran and the European Union culminated in the unanimous adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), which laid out a path to a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The resolution envisioned a future where Iran would continue its civil nuclear programme for peaceful purposes under strict adherence to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards while the Security Council lifted sanctions and restrictive measures against Iran, in a phased manner, until 2025.

As the Council President for the month of September, the Republic of Korea has made every effort to ensure that the Council's work is conducted in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). Accordingly, we held today's vote as envisioned when resolution 2231 (2015) was adopted so as to secure full compliance with the text. Today's outcome is not the best future that resolution 2231 (2015) envisioned. However, this is not yet the end, and there is still hope.

The Republic of Korea would like to emphasize that now is precisely the time for intense diplomacy to achieve a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Resolution 2231 (2015), which has been our anchor for the past decades, is still there, and there is a chance to preserve the core tenet of the resolution and arrive at a better outcome in future. Amid the eternal continuum of diplomatic efforts towards peace and security, the Republic of Korea, as President of the Council, abstained from the voting in hopes for, and encouragement of, further diplomacy.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Iravani (Islamic Republic of Iran): At the outset, I would like to express my appreciation to Algeria, China, Pakistan and Russia, which have rejected the politics of coercion and upheld the principles of diplomacy, justice and law. We also commend Guyana for its courage in resisting coercion. Their work today showed true commitment to diplomacy. Their position today sends a clear message: conflict must be resolved through dialogue, not through the blunt instrument of pressure and intimidation. They have chosen to stand on the right side of history.

Iran's position is clear and consistent. Resolution 2231 (2015) must be implemented exactly as agreed. Its timelines are not suggestions; they are binding commitments, painstakingly negotiated and unanimously endorsed by the Council. Any attempt by the E3 — France, the United Kingdom and Germany — to reimpose sanctions already terminated is not only baseless, but a direct assault on international law and the credibility of the Security Council itself.

Resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were hard-won achievements after more than a decade of negotiations. They settled all concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, confirming its exclusively peaceful character. Iran implemented the deal in full and in good faith. No other nation has ever subjected itself to such rigorous, intrusive verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We kept our word. The European Union, the E3 and the United States did not. It was the United States that unilaterally tore up the agreement in 2018, reimposing sanctions in open defiance of the Council. It was the E3 that failed to meet its obligation, hiding behind empty promises while quietly following Washington's lead and instructions. And now, in a striking display of hypocrisy, they claim that Iran must be punished for measures we took only after years of enduring their violations.

We categorically reject the E3 notification of 28 August. It is procedurally invalid, politically motivated and legally void. By bypassing the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism, the E3 has shredded the very framework it claims to defend. Worse still, parties long in material breach cannot suddenly present themselves as guardians of compliance. That is not legal or lawful. It is opportunism camouflaged as legality. Iran's remedial measures were neither reckless nor unilateral. They were calibrated, transparent and fully consistent with our rights under the JCPOA. To twist these lawful actions into a pretext for a snapback is to reward violators and punish compliance.

This travesty is unfolding against a backdrop of blatant aggression. Iran's safeguarded nuclear facilities were attacked — not in secret, but openly by Israel, a rogue regime, and by the United States, a depository of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Facilities under IAEA monitoring were bombed in violation

of every principle of international law and the very foundations of the non-proliferation regime. And yet, instead of condemnation, we are witnessing silence, and worse, justification, from the very States now lecturing Iran about obligations. What clearer evidence of double standards and hypocritical behaviour could there be?

Despite this, Iran did not abandon diplomacy. On 9 September, in Cairo, we reached an understanding with the IAEA to resume cooperation — a significant and forward-looking step. But rather than seizing this opportunity, the United States and the E3 dismissed it, exposing the gulf between their rhetoric and their true intentions. They speak of dialogue while strangling it; they proclaim support for diplomacy while burying it under threats. This reckless step undermines dialogue, rewards aggression and sets a dangerous precedent. The E3 and the United States, in coordination with Israel, are spreading false claims that the Iran nuclear programme threatens peace and security. This is a fabrication. Iran has not breached the JCPOA, the NPT or its safeguard obligations. Our nuclear programme remains entirely peaceful.

Even the impartiality of the Council has been compromised. The presidency, under pressure from certain permanent members, ignored the requirement to take into account the views of all participants, including Iran, Russia and China, before presenting today's draft resolution (S/2025/561). This requirement is explicitly stated in paragraph 11 of resolution 2231 (2015) and even in the President's draft. Yet, in practice, the President of the Council disregarded this language, violated the neutrality of the Council and effectively endorsed the E3's notification by both introducing the draft and calling for a vote without ensuring that the positions of China, Iran and Russia, as true participants in the JCPOA, were fully reflected. This was not consensus-building; it was coercion. The result is a decision imposed on the Council, not one owned by it.

In conclusion, I wish to state Iran's firm position.

First, today's action is hasty, unnecessary and unlawful. Iran recognizes no obligation to implement it.

Secondly, the responsibility for its grave consequences lies squarely with the United States and the E3, which fabricated allegations against Iran while enabling Israel's criminal attacks on safeguarded facilities.

Thirdly, this act, for which there was no consensus, weakens the Council, undermines diplomacy and jeopardizes the non-proliferation regime.

Fourthly, Iran's nuclear programme will not be destroyed by bombs, halted by sanctions or diverted from its peaceful path. The door to diplomacy is not closed, but it will be Iran, not its adversaries, which will decide with whom and on what basis to engage.

Today the Council has squandered an opportunity for dialogue and consensus. Russia and China, acting in good faith, presented a balanced initiative to extend resolution 2231 (2015) and preserve diplomacy. Instead of embracing this path of reason, the United States and the E3 chose escalation, pressure and division. This contradiction between their rhetoric and actions proves, once more, that their real intention is not diplomacy but escalation. They must now bear full responsibility for the crisis that they have manufactured. Let there be no doubt: Iran will remain steadfast in defending its sovereignty, its rights and the peaceful character of its nuclear programme. We will not yield to coercion. We will not be intimidated by unlawful threats, and we will not allow the Council to be misused as an instrument of injustice.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.