



Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria November 4 - 11, 2024

Overview¹

- ▶ The IDF forces continued their maneuver in south Lebanon. Preparations to expand it included evacuation notices issued to additional communities. The forces neutralized Hezbollah operatives, located and destroyed terrorist facilities hidden in civilian sites, and discovered large quantities of weapons. The IDF continued airstrikes on Hezbollah targets in Beirut and other locations in Lebanon. An IDF soldier who was injured in south Lebanon on October 26, 2024, died of his wounds.
- ▶ This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 155 attacks on civilian, military and security targets in Israel, as well as against IDF forces in south Lebanon, using rockets, missiles (including, for the first time, an Iranian surface-to-surface Fateh-11 missile), and UAVs were launched at targets in northern and central Israel, causing significant damage to property.
- ▶ Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah secretary general, said the organization was determined to continue a war of attrition which would compel Israel to cease fighting, leading to indirect negotiations for an agreement in south Lebanon. Hezbollah accused the Lebanese army of concealing details about an IDF operation in which a Hezbollah operative was taken during a raid in northern Lebanon.
- ▶ Senior Lebanese officials continued to claim a desire to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701 as part of a ceasefire and announced they were preparing to deploy 5,000 additional soldiers to the south Lebanon area.
- ▶ The IDF confirmed carrying out strikes on facilities belonging to Hezbollah intelligence headquarters in Damascus and Hezbollah weapons storage facilities in western Syria. According to claims, Israel attempted to target the head of Hezbollah's Golan File in an attack on Damascus.

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The Fighting in Lebanon

► The IDF forces continued their maneuver in south Lebanon. They neutralized terrorists from the air and on the ground, located and destroyed terrorist infrastructure hidden in civilian sites, and uncovered numerous weapons, including rocket launchers, mortars and anti-tank missiles aimed at northern Israeli communities. During operations in a dense forest in south Lebanon, a mobile missile system attached to a civilian structure was found, containing 24 rockets aimed at communities in the Galilee Panhandle. Meanwhile, the IDF continued airstrikes on Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, including headquarters, launchers and weapons production sites. Among the targets was the command and control compound of Hezbollah's Aerial Unit 127 in the Tyre area (IDF spokesperson, November 4-11, 2024).



**A mobile missile system ready for launch with 24 rockets aimed at Israel
(IDF spokesperson, November 9, 2024)**

► During the operation, IDF forces located a Hezbollah facility for combat training located about 200 meters from a UNIFIL base. The site was used for training, teaching the organization's combat doctrine and storing weapons. Documents and instructional materials on Hezbollah's operational methods, maps of Israel and explanations about IDF equipment were found. The complex contained tunnel shafts and rocket launchers prepared for firing at Israeli communities (IDF spokesperson, November 8, 2024).



Location of the Hezbollah facility near the UNIFIL base (IDF spokesperson, November 8, 2024)

► On November 11, 2024, the IDF spokesperson issued an evacuation notice in Arabic for second-line communities in south Lebanon, warning residents that Hezbollah's terrorist activities were forcing the IDF to act against it in those areas and the IDF did not want to harm them. He further warned that anyone near Hezbollah targets was putting their life at risk. The list included Bint Jbeil, al-Naqoura, Aynata, Aitaroun, al-Taybeh and Markaba (IDF spokesperson's X account, November 11, 2024).

Eliminating Hezbollah terrorist operatives

► The IDF continued targeting Hezbollah field commanders (IDF spokesperson, November 4-11, 2024). Social media sources claimed that the number of Hezbollah fatalities since the conflict began on October 8, 2023, had reached approximately 1,400 "fighters" and senior figures (Qalaat Al Mudiq Telegram channel, November 10, 2024). This past week Hezbollah released names of high-ranking operatives killed in IDF strikes:²

- ◆ "Sources" reported that Salim Ayyash, a senior Hezbollah terrorist convicted by a special international tribunal for involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, was killed in an Israeli strike (al-Arabiya, November 10, 2024).
- ◆ Reports also noted the death of Ali Adel al-Ashmar, formerly one of the most senior Hezbollah advisors to the Houthis, who participated in key battles that enabled the Houthis to gain control over vast areas in Yemen (Adnan al-Jabri's X account, November 10, 2024).

² Since the end of September 2024, Hezbollah has not issued formal death notices for terrorist commanders and operatives.

◆ The death of Dr. Omran Ahmad al-Mughassil,³ aka Omran Karim, a dentist and Shi'ite Hezbollah operative from Qatif, Saudi Arabia, was reported. He was the first Saudi Arabian killed in Lebanon (Quds, November 9, 2024; Thawrat al-Nimr Network X account, November 10, 2024).

Casualties from other terrorist organization:

► The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced the death of Alaa Khalil Abdallah, 33 years old, a member of the Shaheed Ali al-Aswad Brigade, the PIJ branch in Syria (PIJ military wing Telegram channel, November 7, 2024).

Hezbollah

Attacks

► This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for **155 attacks** on military, security and civilian targets in Israel, including IDF forces in south Lebanon, using anti-tank missiles, artillery shells, rockets, UAVs and missiles, including anti-aircraft missiles to attack Israeli Air Force aircraft in Lebanese airspace. Some of the attacks were designated as part of Operation Khaybar. Hezbollah also claimed strikes on civilian settlements which "had become military targets" [sic]. Hezbollah reported that on November 9, 2024, it shot down an Israeli Air Force Hermes-450 UAV flying in Lebanese airspace, which crashed in the town of Deir Siryan (about six kilometers west of Metula). It was noted that fighter jets struck the UAV after it crashed (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 4-11, 2024):

◆ **First use of Iranian surface-to-surface missiles:** On November 6, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the first launch of an Iranian Fateh-110 surface-to-surface missile. According to Hezbollah, it is a surface-to-surface missile weighing 3,450 kg, 8.8 meters long, 61.6 cm in diameter, with a range of 300 km and a warhead weighing 500 kg (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 6, 2024).

³ Omran al-name is the son of Ahmad al- Mughassil (Abu Omran), the commander of the Hezbollah al-Hejaz organization, which served as a terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Saudi Arabia (meQdisii X account, November 9, 2024; Malatawi55 X account , November 10, 2024).



Right: Fateh-110 missile moments before launch. Left: Launch of the Fateh-110 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 6, 2024)

◆ **Combined launch of heavy rockets and precision missiles:** On November 8, 2024, Hezbollah issued a video claiming responsibility for a combined launch of Fadi rockets and Nasr-1 precision missiles carried out on the previous day. According to Hezbollah, four Fadi rockets were launched at Haifa's suburbs to engage Israel's air defense systems. Various slogans were written on the rockets, including "Ruin to Israel," "These are our messages and we are coming," "This is the destruction of the Temple [referring to the Jewish Temple]," and "This is what your government has done to you." Two Nasr-1 missiles were then launched (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 8, 2024). On November 10, 2024, Hezbollah released a similar video of an attack on a naval base on November 8, 2024 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 10, 2024).



Right: Nasr-1 missiles ready for launch. Left: Fadi-2 rockets with anti-slogans prior to launch (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 8, 2024)

◆ **Display of a short-range Hezbollah-manufactured rocket:** On November 9, 2024, Hezbollah revealed the use of a short-range rocket manufactured by the organization, launched the previous day. A video was released showing a Hezbollah operative carrying

the rocket on his shoulder and then launching it from a single launcher (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 9, 2024).



Right: Hezbollah's short-range homemade rocket. Left: Launch of the rocket (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 9, 2024)

◆ **Update on organizational activity:** On November 6, 2024, Hezbollah's war room announced that since October 1, 2024, the organization had attacked Israel 56 times as part of Operation Khaybar, with 18 of the attacks carried out in the past week. Hezbollah claimed the attack had forced more than two million "settlers" located more than 145 km inland to halt their activities and enter shelters and had caused a hiatus in air traffic. Hezbollah claimed its operations were intensifying according to plan, and the recent weeks had shown that the "resistance" had successfully organized its structure, reflected in the increased frequency of launches, whether UAVs or missiles, at various targets "within the entity" as far as Tel Aviv (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 6, 2024).

Speech by Na'im Qassem

► On November 6, 2024, Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah secretary general, delivered a recorded speech marking 40 days since the death of Hassan Nasrallah, in which he praised the actions and work of the former secretary general. He related to the conflict with Israel and efforts to achieve a ceasefire, emphasizing the need to continue a war of attrition to compel Israel to halt its actions, and expressing [alleged] willingness to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Key points noted were (al-Manar, November 6, 2024):

◆ Qassem [falsely] claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to set an end date for the war because he planned to extend the conflict beyond Gaza and Lebanon to other parts of the Middle East. According to Qassem, Israel's "aggression" against Lebanon had three stages: ending Hezbollah's presence, occupying Lebanon and changing the map of the Middle East.

- ◆ He praised the capabilities of the "resistance fighters" [terrorist operatives] in fighting against IDF forces in south Lebanon, noting that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of trained fighters capable of engaging the "enemy" over a prolonged period. He claimed that actions on the ground rather than diplomatic moves would "lead the enemy to want to stop the aggression."
- ◆ He claimed that once Israel decided to halt its "aggression," indirect negotiations would take place sponsored by the State of Lebanon and Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, whom Qassem described as sharing the political vision of the "resistance." Qassem emphasized that the foundation for any negotiation included stopping the "aggression" and fully protecting Lebanese sovereignty. He also hinted Hezbollah was prepared to separate the issue of a ceasefire in Lebanon from the war in Gaza, claiming that the original cause of the war in Lebanon was now "irrelevant."
- ◆ Referring to the IDF operation in al-Batrun on the night of November 1, 2024, during which a Hezbollah operative was detained and transferred to Israel, he called the operation a "great insult to Lebanon and a violation of its sovereignty." He urged the Lebanese army to protect the country's maritime borders and to publish the findings of its investigation, as well as examining the circumstances of the incident with UNIFIL forces, especially Germany, which operates warships near Lebanon.



**Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah Secretary-General, in a speech commemorating Nasrallah
(al-Mayadeen, November 6, 2024)**

Letter from Hezbollah terrorist operatives to Na'im Qassem

► On November 9, 2024, Hezbollah published a letter written by its terrorist operatives to Na'im Qassem. They declared their complete commitment to the new leader, noting their "adherence to the path of Hassan Nasrallah," and stating that the Hamas flag would "continue to proudly wave among us and the on the battlefield. We are your right hand and will force the enemy to surrender" (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 9, 2024).



From a video of the reading of the letter Hezbollah terrorist operatives sent to Na'im Qassem (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 9, 2024)

Other statements

- ▶ Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, wrote an article marking 40 days since Hassan Nasrallah's death, promising that Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance remained committed to "resistance" [terrorism and violence] against the "enemy." He said that the organization's position was to continue "resisting" and escalate the confrontation until the "enemy" halted its "aggression" and did not impose conditions (al-Akhbar, November 8, 2024).
- ▶ Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed Israel's objective was to control the area south of the Litani River, but "those dreams will not be realized, thanks to the resistance." He said the "resistance" employed its capabilities according to pre-determined plans and each attack was carefully calculated. He claimed the "resistance" was present in villages just one to two kilometers from the border, and that the "occupation" was trying to harm people through widespread destruction, which Hezbollah promised to rebuild. As to the displaced people, Fadlallah claimed that the organization and Na'im Qassem were closely monitoring the issue and "were doing excellent work" (al-Mayadeen, November 8, 2024).
- ▶ During a tour in Sidon, Hassan Izz al-Din, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, stated that the front in south Lebanon "stood firm" and would continue fighting until Israel "surrendered out of despair." He claimed that the organization was not fooled by the "positive atmosphere" surrounding ceasefire initiatives, and while open to any initiative, it would not negotiate under fire (al-Manar, November 10, 2024).
- ▶ Muhammad Afif, Hezbollah's communications chief, in a speech given for Shaheed Day, claimed that developments on the ground were in the hands of the organization's "fighters," who would have the final say, as after 45 days of "bloody fighting, the enemy has not succeeded

in capturing a single village." He claimed that talks of diplomatic negotiations were the result of "our steadfastness on the ground." He also denied Israeli claims of damage to Hezbollah's missile stockpiles, adding that "Israel will not win its war through airstrikes" and claimed that "talk of a significant decrease in our missile stockpile is a lie, and our forces on the frontlines have enough equipment for a prolonged war." He added that Hezbollah's connection with the Lebanese army remained strong, and they believed in the unity of the "army, people, and resistance" (Radio al-Nur, November 11, 2024).

Media commentary

► A profile of Na'im Qassem published in the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, claimed that Hezbollah's new secretary general was "more extreme" in his positions against those who supported Israel, primarily Americans and Europeans, as well as the organization's rivals within Lebanon. According to the article, Qassem has extensive experience in administrative roles and was one of the "strictest" figures in Hezbollah in terms of organization and management, which would help him rebuild Hezbollah despite the setbacks it had suffered in recent weeks. However, the United States reportedly believed he might not be able to fill the void left by Nasrallah (al-Akhbar, November 6, 2024).

► Ibrahim al-Amin, al-Akhbar editor-in-chief and formerly a close associate of Hassan Nasrallah, emphasized that Hezbollah's stance was the only thing that could compel the "enemy" to change its behavior, which was "the heavy price it pays for its actions." According to al-Amin, the Israeli government sought to expand the scope of fighting against Lebanon and also engage Syria and Iraq, yet the "resistance" had successfully restored its leadership capabilities and operational strength, enabling it to strike northern regions or deep within the Greater Tel Aviv area. Al-Amin claimed that Israel's primary concern was that Hezbollah might impose a "prolonged, uncontrolled war of attrition" which would force it to stop fighting before a discussion about "the day after" could be held (al-Akhbar, November 10, 2024).

► "Official Lebanese sources" reported that Hezbollah had tacitly agreed not to link the Gaza Strip with the Lebanese front in terms of a ceasefire. The sources stated that the preparedness of Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, to implement Resolution 1701, meant Hezbollah had granted Berri the authority to negotiate a ceasefire under such terms. The sources also claimed that Hezbollah's position displeased Iran, which felt compelled to intervene to reestablish the connection between the two fronts (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 10, 2024).

Criticism of Hezbollah

► Bechara al-Ra'i, the Christian Maronite Patriarch, said Hezbollah had to learn from the "destructive" war, which displaced 1.5 million Lebanese and killed thousands of innocents. He stated that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu did not want to end the war before he could ensure that residents could return to their homes in northern Israel. Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued to engage in a "destructive battle," with Lebanon and the Lebanese being the biggest losers so far. Al-Ra'i also called for strengthening the Lebanese army, as it was the only entity responsible for defending the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity (Nida al-Watan, November 11, 2024). He declared that schools in Lebanon should be "liberated" from the displaced persons to allow the academic year to begin, adding that the Lebanese people were strongly opposed to the war between Hezbollah and Israel (Charity TV, November 4, 2024).

► Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces Party, stated that since opening the front in support of Gaza, Hezbollah's calculations had been "entirely erroneous," and that what was happening now was "exactly what the Israelis planned; otherwise, how would they have known the locations of Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din?" He condemned those who "slandered" the Lebanese army and accused Hezbollah of sidelining the army and starting a war. Geagea stressed that all parties had to immediately implement Resolution 1701, with a focus on rapid deployment of the Lebanese army in south Lebanon to monitor arms smuggling and ensure border security. Regarding the possibility of Hezbollah participating in Lebanon's next government, Geagea stated that it could happen "only if it becomes solely a political party" (LBCI Lebanon, November 7, 2024).

► Sami Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb Party, stated that Lebanese Shi'ites needed to realize that weapons endangered them and were exploited by Iran to meet its own needs. He added that only the Lebanese army and the country's legitimate institutions could protect the Lebanese people. Gemayel accused Iran of having robbed Lebanon of its sovereignty through Hezbollah for nearly 30 years and called for the situation to end as soon as possible (Lebanon 24, November 8, 2024).

The Situation in Lebanon

Casualties

► According to the Lebanese ministry of health, between the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023, and November 9, 2024, 3,189 Lebanese had been killed and 14,078 wounded (Lebanese ministry of health X account, November 10, 2024)

The Lebanese Government

Contacts for a ceasefire

► Senior government officials and public figures in Lebanon continued to express a desire for a ceasefire in Lebanon:

◆ Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, called on countries "that champion humanity and human rights" to pressure Israel to halt its "aggression," emphasizing Lebanon's commitment to Resolution 1701 and its desire to strengthen the Lebanese army in south Lebanon. He said he appreciated calls for a ceasefire but claimed that "Israel has opposed all proposed solutions and continues to commit war crimes in Lebanon" (al-Nashra, November 4, 2024). During a government meeting he said that Lebanon's starting point for any acceptable solution was "ending the war against us, fully implementing Resolution 1701 and electing a president." He added that Lebanon was waiting for new initiatives to end the war (al-Nashra, November 6, 2024).

◆ Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said that American Envoy Amos Hochstein could return to Lebanon before the new American administration was sworn in on January 20, 2025, but only if he felt that Israel's position was positive, as Lebanon had already reached understandings with him (al-Mustaqbal, November 6, 2024). On another occasion, Berri said he would not abandon Lebanon's principles, regardless of "how and how much pressure is exerted on me." He accused Israel of wanting to render the border area in south Lebanon uninhabitable but said that if the fighting ended, residents would return to the destroyed towns and "live on the land and ruins until they were rebuilt" (al-Afdal News, November 10, 2024).

◆ At the Arab-Islamic foreign ministers meeting in Saudi Arabia Abdallah Bou Habib, the Lebanese foreign minister, said Lebanon was determined to strengthen the army's deployment in south Lebanon, and therefore the government would recruit 1,500 soldiers in preparation for sending 5,000 troops to the area. He added that Lebanon expected pressure from influential Arab-Islamic countries on Israel to stop the

destruction and noted that implementing Resolution 1701 meant that the Lebanese government had exclusive legitimate authority south of the Litani River, and there would be no weapons without government approval (al-Nashra, November 10, 2024).

◆ Walid Jumblatt, Lebanese Druze leader and former head of the Progressive Socialist Party, criticized the mediation attempts of American Envoy Amos Hochstein, arguing that neither Hochstein nor the Biden administration had influence over Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. Jumblatt said a distinction should be made between Hezbollah and the Shi'ite community, which he claimed did not necessarily favor Iran, citing the "independent actions" [sic] of Nabih Berri as evidence. He added that most Shi'ites supported the authority represented by Iraq's top religious authority, Ali al-Sistani, and that not all Shi'ites favored "uniting the fronts." Jumblatt stressed that the Lebanese had no wish to become a "battleground in the larger conflict between the United States and Iran" (al-Nahar, November 5, 2024).

The Lebanese Army

► The Hezbollah-affiliated daily newspaper al-Akhbar criticized the Lebanese Army's handling of the IDF operation in al-Batrun in northern Lebanon on the night of November 1, 2024, during which IDF forces detained a Hezbollah operative and transferred him to Israel. According to the paper, the Lebanese Army's investigation report submitted to Prime Minister Najib Mikati reported that the "Israeli enemy" landed around 25 fighters in the al-Ghalaghini area on the al-Batrun coast and abducted a Lebanese citizen named Imad Fadl Amhaz. However, the report did not provide details about the operation, address the role of the Lebanese Army in monitoring activity on the coast, explain how the commandos managed to enter and exit after the operation, or mention the radar issue or UNIFIL's role in the affair. The newspaper claimed "it becomes clearer every day that the Lebanese Army has something to hide or is trying to avoid responsibility" (al-Akhbar, November 7, 2024).

UNIFIL

► The Lebanese army reported that an Israeli airstrike targeted a vehicle passing through the al-Awali-Sidon checkpoint. As a result, three "civilians" in the vehicle were killed, three Lebanese army personnel stationed at the checkpoint were injured and four Malaysian battalion UNIFIL soldiers passing near the checkpoint were wounded (Lebanese Army X account, November 7, 2024). According to UNIFIL, five of its personnel were injured after a UNIFIL convoy passed through an area in Sidon where a UAV attack occurred. UNIFIL called on

all parties not to endanger its personnel or civilians and to resolve disputes through negotiations (UNIFIL X account, November 7, 2024). It was later reported that the number of injured Malaysian battalion soldiers had risen to six (al-Mayadeen, November 8, 2024).

► UNIFIL claimed that IDF forces had destroyed part of a fence and a concrete structure at the UNIFIL post in Ras al-Naqoura. UNIFIL also expressed concern over the destruction of "two barrels marking the Blue Line" and stated that UNIFIL soldiers had observed the Israeli forces removing one of the barrels. The statement added that "the deliberate destruction of UNIFIL property by the Israeli army constitutes a blatant violation of Resolution 1701" and that "although the IDF asked us to evacuate, the incident was unrelated to gunfire, but was rather a direct, deliberate action on their part" (UNIFIL Telegram channel, November 8, 2024).



IDF activity near a UNIFIL post (UNIFIL Telegram channel, November 8, 2024)

► According to claims, UNIFIL has begun to operate freely and with no regard for the understandings of Resolution 1701 or the understandings between Lebanon and UNIFIL. According to the report, UNIFIL forces were conducting patrols without notifying the Lebanese leadership and "were operating completely independently" (Lebanon Debate, November 7, 2024).

Syria

► On November 4, 2024, an Israeli attack was reported in the al-Sayyidah Zaynab area to the south of Damascus. A "Syrian military source" claimed that the "Israeli enemy" had targeted several "civilian" sites in the Damascus area (al-Watan, Syrian News Agency, November 4, 2024). The IDF spokesperson confirmed that an intelligence facility of Hezbollah's headquarters in Damascus had been targeted. It had operated under the direct guidance of Hussein Ali Zeima, Hezbollah's head of intelligence, who was killed in Beirut in October 2024 (IDF spokesperson, November 4, 2024).

- ▶ On November 5, 2024, airstrikes targeted several "residential buildings" near the industrial area in al-Qusayr on the outskirts of Homs, in western Syria. According to reports, one person was killed and three others were injured (Syrian TV, al-Watan, November 5, 2024). The IDF spokesperson stated that Hezbollah's ammunition depots used by its weapons unit were targeted in the al-Qusayr area, close to the Syria-Lebanon border (IDF spokesperson, November 5, 2024).
- ▶ During the night of November 8, 2024, explosions were reported in the vicinity of the town of al-Safirah near Aleppo. A "Syrian military source" reported that the "Israeli enemy" had operated from the southeast of Aleppo, targeting several sites near Aleppo and Idlib. According to reports, several military personnel were injured and property was damaged (Syrian News Agency, November 9, 2024). A Syrian blogger tracking Israeli Air Force activity in the area claimed that Israel had targeted research labs and military industry facilities near al-Safirah. He said several Israeli planes had flown along the Syria-Jordan border towards the al-Tanf Base, then entered the Syrian desert, launched missiles at the Aleppo countryside, and returned along the same route over the Syria-Jordan border (SAM Syria Telegram channel, November 9, 2024).
- ▶ On November 10, 2024, an airstrike attributed to Israel reportedly targeted a "residential building" in the al-Sayyidah Zaynab area to the south of Damascus. According to official Syrian reports, at least six people were killed and 15 were injured (SANA and SHAM FM Radio, November 10, 2024). The target of the strike was allegedly Ali Musa Dakduk, responsible for Hezbollah's "Golan File" (al-Hadath, November 10, 2024).⁴



The site of the strike in al-Sayyidah Zaynab (Noura X account, November 10, 2024)

- ▶ On November 11, 2024, explosions were reported in the al-Majd region south of Homs. According to reports, "Israeli aggression" targeted [an alleged] gathering point for distributing

⁴ For further information, see the March 2019 ITIC report, "[Ali Mussa Daqduq \(Abu Hussein Sajed\): portrait of the commander of Hezbollah's military network in the Syrian Golan Heights \("the Golan Portfolio"\)](#)"

humanitarian aid to Lebanese refugees and the strike had temporarily closed the road between Homs and Damascus (al-Mayadeen, SANA, November 11, 2024). The strike reportedly targeted a Hezbollah ammunition warehouse in the area between al-Majd and Shamsin near Homs. Subsequent explosions were reported, with heavy smoke rising from the area; no casualties were reported (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, November 11, 2024).