UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors

Dr. Igal Shiri

November 20, 2025

Overview[1]

- On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the 20-point American plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for "the day after."
- The resolution endorses the establishment of a Board of Peace which will temporarily administer the Gaza Strip until control is transferred to the Palestinian Authority. It also approves the establishment of an international stabilization force, which will operate alongside a vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination with Israel and Egypt, to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip and the disarmament of "armed groups."[2]
- The resolution does not include an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, but expresses hope for the creation of a "credible pathway" to Palestinian self-determination if the Palestinian Authority implements the required reforms.
- Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip rejected the resolution and warned that any international force that arrived in the Gaza Strip would be considered an "occupying force" if it attempted to disarm them. Iran and the Houthis subscribed to Hamas' position and claimed that the resolution was intended to serve Israeli objectives. The Palestinian Authority, however welcomed the resolution and expressed readiness to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip.
- **In ITIC assessment, despite the importance of the Security Council resolution as an outline for a course for "the day after" in Gaza which includes full demilitarization and a stable, non-Hamas rule, it is a declarative step and it is unclear whether it can be implemented. In all probability, the refusal of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to disarm, and the threat that they will regard the international force as an "occupying force," will increase friction between them and the foreign forces arriving in the Strip and lead to violent clashes which might also affect IDF forces. In addition, the uncertainty**

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] The Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.

regarding the Palestinian Authority's ability to fully and credibly implement the required reforms and the absence of agreements between Hamas and Fatah regarding the identity of the technocratic management committee, alongside the inherent difficulty in establishing effective control and supervision over the Palestinian population, will create a vacuum in governance which will allow Hamas to continue securing its security and civilian governance in the Strip.

The Main Points of UN Security Council Resolution 2803

On November 17, 2025, the Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the American 20-point plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for regulating "the day after" and calls for its full implementation. The resolution was passed with the support of 13 members of the Council, including Algeria, Pakistan and Somalia, while China and Russia abstained. The main points of the resolution are the following (UN website, November 18, 2025):[3]

- **A Board of Peace (BoP)** will be established as a temporary governing body to coordinate the reconstruction of the Strip and will remain in place until the Palestinian Authority (PA) completes all the required reforms in **a satisfactory manner**, according to the American president's 2020 peace plan (the so-called Deal of the Century) and the joint declaration of France and Saudi Arabia (the July 2025 New York Declaration for the Two-State Solution), after which it will be able to reassume control of the Strip.
- **A temporary international stabilization force (ISF)** will be established, composed of soldiers from various countries, which will operate alongside a trained and vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination and cooperation with Israel and Egypt. The objective of the force is to assist in securing the borders, stabilizing the security environment to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip, including the destruction of military, terrorist and offensive infrastructure and the prevention of their rehabilitation, and the permanent disarmament of "non-state armed groups,"[4] protecting civilians and humanitarian operations, training and providing support to Palestinian police forces, and coordinating the security of humanitarian corridors.
- All bodies and forces which will operate in the Gaza Strip will be subject to the authority and supervision of the BoP. They will be funded by contributions from donor

[3] For the full English version, see the Appendix.
[4] Terrorist organizations.

states and the BoP's financing mechanisms. The World Bank and other financial bodies will operate a designated fund for the reconstruction and development of Gaza.

- The resolution notes the importance of full renewal of humanitarian aid to the Strip in coordination with the BoP. The aid will be transferred through recognized organizations, led by the UN, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, while ensuring that the aid is not seized by "armed groups."
- After the international force achieves control and stability on the ground, the IDF will withdraw from the Strip in accordance with standards, milestones and timetables which will be linked to demilitarization, subject to agreement between the IDF, the ISF force, the states guaranteeing the agreement and the United States. The IDF will be allowed to maintain a limited security presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.
- The BoP and the international civilian and security presence will continue to operate in the Strip until December 31, 2027. Any further extension of the mandate of the ISF will be carried out in full coordination with Egypt, Israel and additional states participating in its activity. In addition, the Board must submit a progress report to the Security Council every six months.
- **The resolution does not include an unequivocal statement regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state**. However, it states that the Security Council hopes that after completion of the reforms in the PA in a credible manner and progress in the reconstruction of the Strip, conditions will be created for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and the establishment of a state. Within this framework, the United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians for agreement on a political horizon for prosperous coexistence by peaceful means.

The United Nations Security Council (Shehab News Agency, November 17, 2025)

Palestinian Responses

- Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip condemned the Security Council resolution and calling it a tool intended to help Israel achieve its objectives while ignoring Palestinian aspirations. They warned that they would view the international stabilization force to be deployed in the Strip as a threat if it attempted to disarm them:

  - Hamas rejected the Security Council resolution since, it did not pass the threshold of the political and humanitarian demands and rights of the Palestinian people, especially after two years of "a brutal war" in the Strip. Hamas called the resolution an international trusteeship mechanism to realize Israel's objectives after it failed to do so militarily, and to detach the Gaza Strip from the "overall Palestinian geographic entity." Hamas said "armed resistance[5] is a legitimate right," adding that the issue of weapons was an internal Palestinian matter linked only to a political course that would ensure the end of the "occupation." Hamas warned that any international force operating inside the Gaza Strip and engaging in disarmament would lose its neutrality and become a party on behalf of Israel (Hamas Telegram channel, November 18, 2025).

A UN soldier equals IDF soldier, cartoon by Ala' al Laqta, Hamas' house cartoonist, about the international force in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Communication Center, November 20, 2025)

  - Muhammad Nazzal, a member of Hamas' political bureau, said Hamas wanted the confrontation to remain focused on the "Israeli occupation" and not engage the rest of the world. He stated that even if a ceasefire was achieved in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian people would continue "resistance and to confront Israel" wherever possible. He said that as far as Hamas was concerned, the only solution to the conflict was full

[5] Anti-Israel terrorism and violence.

recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people and "victory over the occupation"[6] (Al Jazeera, November 18, 2025).

- Osama Hamdan, a Hamas figure in Lebanon, said the Security Council resolution strengthened United States support for Israel and provided it with cover for its [alleged] "crimes" while ignoring the rights of the Palestinian people. He called the resolution "dangerous," claimed it violated every existing international arrangemen, and reiterated that the battle had not ended and would continue until the "liberation of Jerusalem" (Telegram channel of the Palestinian Media Center, November 18, 2025).
- Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said the addition of the clause to the resolution regarding a Palestinian state was cosmetic rather than practical (Telegram channel of journalist Isma'il Abu Amar, November 19, 2025).
- The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also rejected the Security Council resolution. It reiterated Hamas' claim that the resolution imposed an international trusteeship over the Gaza Strip and attempted to achieve objectives that the "occupation" had not achieved in the war. The PIJ claimed that the resolution attempted to detach the Gaza Strip from the rest of the Palestinian territory, to impose a new situation violating the rights and red lines of the Palestinian people, and to rob them of their right to self-determination and "resistance," which it described as "a right recognized by international law" (PIJ Telegram channel, November 18, 2025).
- PIJ spokesperson Muhammad al-Hajj Musa condemned the resolution and harshly criticized the Arab and Islamic states which supported it, asking what gave them the right to hand over Gaza to the United States and Israel and to detach it from Judea and Samaria. He added that the PIJ did not wat confrontation with anyone, and certainly not with Arab and Islamic states, but as long as the resolution existed, the PIJ would regard any force operating in the Strip as an "occupying force," and threatened that if they entered the Gaza Strip, "they would have a problem" (al-Jazeera Mubasher, November 18, 2025).
- The Palestinian terrorist organizations said in a statement that the resolution was a tool of trusteeship and international cooperation in the "murder" of the Palestinian people. It that the resolution, which supposedly spoke of "peace," did not address the roots of the problem and the lack of true peace and did not call for an end to the

[6] The destruction of the State of Israel.

"occupation." The terrorist organizations also rejected the definition of "resistance" as "terrorism" and the desire to disarm the Palestinians of weapons used "to defend the people" (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 18, 2025).

- However, the Palestinian Authority (PA) welcomed the resolution and noted the urgent need to implement it to ensure the return to normal life, protection for the Gazans and a full withdrawal of Israeli forces. The PA claimed it was completely prepared to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip and to cooperate with all bodies, including the United States administration, Security Council members, the European Union and all members of the international coalition, to advance a process that would lead to peace, security and stability between Palestinians and Israelis (Wafa, November 18, 2025). The PA foreign ministry said the resolution strengthened the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, independence and life free of the "Israeli occupation," a right which was unconditional and not subject to negotiation, and which was consistent with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which determined the illegality of the "occupation" and the need to end it immediately (Wafa, November 19, 2025).

Responses from Iran and the Shi'ite Axis

- The Iranian foreign ministry condemned the Security Council resolution and expressed "deep concern" that some of its clauses contradicted the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, while imposing a trusteeship regime on the Gaza Strip in a way that prevented Palestinians from self-determination and the establishment of a state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital. The ministry said that any international force operating in Gaza had to be under UN supervision and focus only on ensuring the ceasefire and the entry of humanitarian aid, while stressing "the legitimacy of resistance against the occupation" (Tasnim, November 19, 2025).
- Iran's ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, alleged that many members of the Security Council had expressed concern regarding the resolution because it was intended to neutralize the responsibility of the UN and the Security Council itself, but voted in favor of the resolution only to stop the "bloodshed" in the Gaza Strip. He said Iran's position was that the resolution and its mechanisms should not be implemented or interpreted in a way which harmed or undermined the legitimate rights of the Gazans. He said a temporary Palestinian committee should administer the Gaza Strip and called for the prevention of the possibility of "annexation, occupation, forced displacement" within the framework of the new resolution (Tasnim, November 19, 2025).

Iran's ambassador to the UN (Tasnim, November 19, 2025)

- The Houthis' political bureau condemned the Security Council resolution and claimed that it meant a trusteeship and regime of patronage under American supervision, serving the objectives of the "Israeli enemy" which it had failed to achieve through military force. The statement expressed regret that Arab and Muslim states supported the American position and emphasized "the right of the Palestinian people to resist the enemy" (Telegram channel of the Houthi movement, November 18, 2025).

Responses in the International Arena

- The American president welcomed the UN Security Council vote approving the establishment of the Board of Peace under his leadership. He claimed the board would include the "strongest and most respected leaders in the world" and would be recorded as one of the most important resolutions in the history of the UN, leading to a deepening of world peace (Truth Social, November 18, 2025). United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the resolution as a "historic milestone in building a calm and prosperous Gaza, governed by the Palestinian people and not by Hamas." He added that the resolution brought the achievement of a Gaza Strip that was "demilitarized, non-extremist and stable" closer (al-Sharq, November 18, 2025).
- Egypt supported the resolution but voiced reservations and concern regarding the process of demilitarizing the Strip without Hamas' cooperation in light of the movement's statement regarding disarmament. An "Egyptian source" stated that Cairo sought to obtain support and cooperation from the Palestinian terrorist organizations and from Cairo's perspective, the international force to be deployed in the Strip would not engage in disarming the "resistance," but would focus on "neutralizing" the weapons and preventing the digging of new tunnels and

the holding of military[-terrorist] exercises by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations (*al-Akhbar*, November 19, 2025).

- Despite the support of 12 members of the Security Council in addition to the United States, representatives of some of the states expressed reservations, especially in light of the uncertainty regarding the two-state solution: the representative of Sierra Leone, who serves as Security Council president, said the Council had no right to revoke or condition the Palestinian right to a state; Slovenia and Somalia were concerned the ambiguity regarding the role of the UN and the PA and regretted the absence of an explicit reference to the two-state solution; Guyana claimed that the "occupation" violated international law and said the PA had to have an integral role in the reconstruction of the Strip without vague preconditions; the French representative demanded that the resolution be implemented within a clear political and legal context that included a two-state solution, the return of a strengthened PA to the Gaza Strip, the removal of Hamas from any governing role, and the preservation of "the unity of the Strip and Judea and Samaria [*sic*]." However, the states emphasized that they had supported the resolution to prevent renewed escalation and enable progress in reconstruction and the political process. The representative of China said his country had abstained because the resolution was vague and unclear regarding the structure of the BoP, its composition and its authority, barely addressed the Palestinians and in practice sidelined the UN (UN website, November 17, 2025; *New York Times*, November 17, 2025).
- The Jordanian political commentator Muhammad Abu Arida claimed that the Security Council vote was a new *nakba* for the Gazans and should be rejected absolutely. He said Russia and China should have used their veto power, because the resolution was a "black day" for the Palestinian people. He added that the disarmament of the "Palestinian resistance"[7] was as "illegitimate," because weapons were a "legitimate right," noting that the "Palestinian resistance" was determined to keep its weapons, since it regarded them as the "only option" for restoring the rights of the Palestinian people (al-Aqsa TV, November 19, 2025).

[7] Palestinian terrorist organizations.

Appendix: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803

United Nations S/RES/2803 (2025)

Security Council

Distr.: General

17 November 2025

Resolution 2803 (2025)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 10046th meeting, on 17 November 2025

The Security Council,

Welcoming the *Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict* of 29 September 2025 ("Comprehensive Plan")(annex 1 to this resolution), and applauding the states that have signed, accepted, or endorsed it, and further *welcoming* the historic *Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity* of 13 October 2025 and the constructive role played by the United States of America, the State of Qatar, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Republic of Türkiye, in having facilitated the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip,

Determining that the situation in the Gaza Strip threatens the regional peace and the security of neighboring states and *noting* prior relevant Security Council resolutions relating to the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question,

1. *Endorses* the Comprehensive Plan, *acknowledges* the parties have accepted it, and *calls on* all parties to implement it in its entirety, including maintenance of the ceasefire, in good faith and without delay;

2. *Welcomes* the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) as a transitional administration with international legal personality that will set the framework, and coordinate funding for, the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan, and in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles, until such time as the Palestinian Authority (PA) has satisfactorily completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump's peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French Proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. After the PA reform program is faithfully carried out and Gaza redevelopment has advanced, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous coexistence;

3. *Underscores* the importance of the full resumption of humanitarian aid in cooperation with the BoP into the Gaza Strip in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles and through cooperating organizations, including the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent,

and ensuring such aid is used solely for peaceful uses and not diverted by armed groups;

4. *Authorizes* Member States participating in the BoP and the BoP to: (A) enter into such arrangements as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the Comprehensive Plan, including those addressing privileges and immunities of personnel of the force established in paragraph 7 below; and (B) establish operational entities with, as necessary, international legal personality and transactional authorities for the performance of its functions, including: (1) the implementation of a transitional governance administration, including the supervising and supporting of a Palestinian technocratic, apolitical committee of competent Palestinians from the Strip, as championed by the Arab League, which shall be responsible for day-to-day operations of Gaza's civil service and administration; (2) the reconstruction of Gaza and of economic recovery programs; (3) the coordination and supporting of and delivery of public services and humanitarian assistance in Gaza; (4) any measures to facilitate the movement of persons in and out of Gaza, in a manner consistent with the Comprehensive Plan; and (5) any such additional tasks as may be necessary to support and implement the Comprehensive Plan;

5. *Understands* that the operational entities referred to in paragraph 4 above will operate under the transitional authority and oversight of the BoP and are to be funded through voluntary contributions from donors and BoP funding vehicles and governments;

6. *Calls upon* the World Bank and other financial institutions to facilitate and provide financial resources to support the reconstruction and development of Gaza , including through the establishment of a dedicated trust fund for this purpose and governed by donors;

7. *Authorizes* Member States working with the BoP and the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza to deploy under unified command acceptable to the BoP, with forces contributed by participating States, in close consultation and cooperation with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, and to use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate consistent with international law, including international humanitarian law. The ISF shall work with Israel and Egypt, without prejudice to their existing agreements, along with the newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force, to help secure border areas; stabilize the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of the military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups; protect civilians, including humanitarian operations; train and provide support to the vetted Palestinian police forces; coordinate with relevant States to secure humanitarian corridors; and undertake such additional tasks as may be necessary in support of the Comprehensive Plan. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw from the Gaza Strip based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat. The ISF shall, (A) assist the BoP in monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza, and enter into such arrangements as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the Comprehensive Plan; and (B) operate under the strategic guidance of the BoP and will be funded through voluntary contributions from donors and BoP funding vehicles and governments;

8. *Decides* the BoP and international civil and security presences authorized by this resolution shall remain authorized until Dec. 31, 2027, subject to further action by the Council, and any further reauthorization of the ISF be in full cooperation and coordination with Egypt and Israel and other Member States continuing to work with the ISF;

9. *Calls upon* Member States and international organizations to work with the BoP to identify opportunities to contribute personnel, equipment, and financial resources to its operating entities and the ISF, to provide technical assistance to its operating entities and the ISF, and to give full recognition to its acts and documents;

10. *Requests* the BoP provide a written report on progress related to the above to the UN Security Council every six months;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

ANNEX 1 - President Donald J. Trump's Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict

1. Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors.

2. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.

3. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.

4. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.

5. Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1700 Gazans who were detained after October 7th 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.

6. Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.

7. Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.

8. Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025 agreement.

9. Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This

committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the "Board of Peace," which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of State to be announced, including Former Prime Minister Tony Blair. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump's peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment.

10. A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza.

11. A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.

12. No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.

13. Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration program all verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful coexistence with their neighbors.

14. A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbors or its people.

15. The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will consult with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this field. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.

16. Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF,

the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.

17. In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.

18. An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.

19. While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.

20. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.