The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute
At the Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center



Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon

November 16 – 23, 2026

Trending

►President Aoun has hardened his position against Hezbollah in the struggle over state sovereignty.

►Security forces in Lebanon and Syria obstruct Hezbollah's efforts to smuggle weapons.

►Contradictory messages have been issued regarding Hezbollah's possible involvement in the event of a renewed conflict with Iran.

►American-French contacts to shape the international presence in south Lebanon after the expiration of UNIFIL's mandate have yet to agree on an alternative framework.

Overview[1]

►On Independence Day, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated his firm position against the continued existence of non-state weapons and against Iranian interference in Lebanon, while refusing Hezbollah's demand to revoke the government's decisions against the organization.

►Indictments were filed against five Hezbollah operatives who were apprehended in north Lebanon with maps and documents. Suspicions that they had planned to attack Christian towns are under investigation.

► The IDF continued its operations against Hezbollah infrastructure in the security zone and attacked a site in the Beqa'a Valley previously used by Hezbollah to manufacture missiles and store weapons, following concerns the organization was restoring it.

►According to unverified reports, Hezbollah's leadership asked Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps not to require it to participate in another regional war, citing the erosion of its capabilities and concerns about the consequences for its Shi'ite support base.

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.

► The Lebanese army seized a shipment of more than 260 kg of explosives smuggled from Syria and Syrian security forces intercepted shipments of weapons en route to Lebanon, while Hezbollah continued its efforts to restore its military capabilities and command and control systems.

► The United States imposed sanctions on a Hezbollah-affiliated association which operates in the pilot zones in south Lebanon and on a Lebanese businessman who transferred funds to Hezbollah from the Quds Force and smuggled cash and gold.

► Hezbollah reportedly tried to recruit Thai Shi'ite clerics for an Iranian terrorist attack on the Israeli embassy in Bangkok.

► In preparation for the expiration of UNIFIL's mandate, the United States and France continue to examine alternatives for a new multinational force.

► The World Bank criticized Lebanon after only $4.2 million of a $250 million reconstruction loan had been utilized.

The Lebanese Government-Hezbollah Struggle for State Control

Investigation of Suspected Illegal Military Activity by Hezbollah

► Legal proceedings continue against Hezbollah operatives suspected of unlawful activities. According to judicial sources, the proceedings are based on government decisions prohibiting military and "security" activity outside its authority, but they currently focus on suspects involved in specific cases rather than prosecuting the organization's leadership (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 18–19, 2026; *al-Akhbar*, November 20, 2026):

- **Investigation into Hezbollah's explosives truck**:[2] Legal proceedings have been delayed following appeals filed by the suspects' defense attorneys. Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar called for broadening the investigation and referring the case to the Supreme Judicial Council, arguing that national security had been compromised. However, political sources claimed Hezbollah's leadership opposed handing over additional operatives lest they expose the chain of command behind transporting the

[2] In early October 2026, Lebanon's internal security forces stopped a commercial vehicle driving from the Beqa'a to Beirut at the Dahr al-Baydar checkpoint on the Beirut–Damascus highway and arrested its two occupants, Hezbollah operatives. Hundreds of kilograms of explosives used to manufacture explosive devices, including C-4 and TNT, were found in the vehicle.

explosives (*al-Nahar,* November 17, 2026; Erem News and the Kataeb website, November 18, 2026).

- **The armed network case in north Lebanon**: The Lebanese government's representative to the military court, Judge Claude Ghanem, filed indictments against five Hezbollah operatives arrested in the north of the country on charges of establishing an armed network; recruiting, equipping and arming its operatives; and attacking Lebanese national security. A source said the prosecution was based on papers and documents seized from the five men after their arrest, including names of towns and geographical locations, as well as the fact that they carried weapons. According to the source, they denied planning to attack Christian communities and claimed they were engaged in "defending Shi'ite villages" (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 18–19, 2026). After indictments were filed, the case was transferred to military investigating judge Ghada Abu Alwan. Reportedly, other Hezbollah figures were summoned for questioning, including Sheikh Rada Ahmed, responsible for the organization's activities in the north, and the possibility of summoning Wa'el Tamer, responsible for the armored forces in the north, was being examined. Hezbollah rejected the allegations against its operatives and accused the authorities of being influenced by external pressure (*al-Liwaa* and *Nidaa al-Watan*, November 21, 2026).

The Lebanese Government

► Speaking on the occasion of Lebanon's 83rd Independence Day, President Joseph Aoun said the continued Israeli presence in Lebanon and Iranian interference in its affairs were two major challenges to state sovereignty. He said the era of weapons beyond state authority was over, claiming they had been transformed from a means of defending Lebanon into tools for serving regional interests, and called for Hezbollah to surrender its weapons while guaranteeing the rights of all citizens and sects. He warned against the organization's involvement in another regional war and said he preferred dialogue and an arrangement without internal confrontation (Lebanese presidency website, November 17–21, 2026). Marking the anniversary of the assassination of President René Moawad, Aoun reiterated his position (Lebanese presidency X account, November 22, 2026).



Aoun making his Independence Day speech
(Lebanese presidency X account, November 21, 2026)

► Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said that the government was committed to its decisions regarding the state's exclusive control over weapons and the state's exclusive authority to make decisions on war and peace, adding that it had no intention of reversing them despite the difficulties of implementation (Nawaf Salam's X account, November 20, 2026).

► Meeting with the ministers of defense and the interior, and senior security officials, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun instructed them to increase the forces' preparedness and deployment, increase preventive intelligence activity and strengthen coordination among the security agencies. He said it was necessary to enforce the law, combat the possession of illegal weapons and prepare for the consequences of regional developments on internal stability while maintaining civilian peace (Lebanese presidency website, November 19, 2026).

► According to diplomatic sources, Washington is growing increasingly critical of the gap between the Lebanese government's decisions and their implementation, and an increase in political and economic pressure on parties obstructing the process is being considered. Yazid bin Farhan, the Saudi envoy, was reportedly firmer during his meetings in Lebanon regarding the need to disarm the organization, compared with the approaches of Qatar and Turkey, which encourage dialogue and the easing of internal tensions (*al-Sharq al*-Awsat, November 16–18, 2026; *al-Akhbar*, November 17, 2026; *Nidaa al-Watan*, November 18–19, 2026).

► Sources quoted in the Hezbollah-affiliated daily *al-Akhbar* claimed American and Saudi pressure to restrict Hezbollah's political, economic and "security" freedom of action had increased. Reportedly, that would include expanding sanctions against Hezbollah-affiliated institutions and demanding increased enforcement against its security activities. It was also

claimed that the legal proceedings against Hezbollah operatives in north Lebanon were linked to American pressure (*al-Akhbar*, November 21, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

►Lebanese army commander Rodolph Haykal said the army was committed to implementing government decisions, extending state authority in the south and concentrating weapons in state hands. He claimed the continued Israeli presence and attacks made it difficult for the army to carry out its missions and necessitated increased international assistance, particularly before the end of UNIFIL's operations. He said the preservation of internal stability and civil peace were his top priorities (Lebanese army website, November 16 and 19, 2026; *Nidaa al-Watan*, November 20, 2026).

►Tension was reported between government figures and the security establishment regarding the pace of implementing Hezbollah's disarmament. Sources said Haykal sought to avoid internal confrontation, and implementing the decisions required political directives while preserving the army's authority to determine how and when they were carried out. According to sources close to Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, he is concerned that growing criticism of the army command will undermine the stability of the military institution and its ability to deal with the challenges in south Lebanon (Erem News, November 16, 2026; *Akhbar al-Yawm* and *al-Diyar*, November 18–20, 2026).

►Army commander Rodolph Haykal and chief of staff Hassan Aoudeh visited army units in south Lebanon, reviewed operational difficulties and noted the continued fulfillment of the army's missions despite the Israeli attacks (Lebanese army website, November 19, 2026).

Hezbollah's Position

►In a statement for Lebanon's Independence Day, Hezbollah called the continued Israeli presence in Lebanon and American pressure the main threats to the country's sovereignty and accused the government of undermining the "resistance"[3] instead of focusing on stopping Israeli attacks and securing the return of the territories and prisoners. The organization reiterated its adherence to its slogan, "the people, the army and the resistance" (Loyalty to the Resistance faction website, November 21, 2026).

►Hezbollah sources called President Aoun's Independence Day speech "political escalation" against the organization and claimed he was worsening internal divisions and making it difficult to renew dialogue. However, they said that the organization did not intend

[3] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.

to be drawn into a confrontation in the streets but would continue its "political struggle." However, political sources rejected the allegations against Aoun and said Hezbollah was responsible for the deadlock because it refused to accept government decisions and the principle of the state's exclusive control over weapons. The sources said dialogue could not be made conditional on reversing state decisions or easing legal proceedings against Hezbollah operatives (*al-Joumhouria*, November 21, 2026).

► Hassan Fadlallah and Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, members of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, accused the United States of interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs, including its judicial system and security agencies, and claimed the proceedings against Hezbollah operatives were part of a policy hostile to the organization. Fadlallah noted Hezbollah's commitment to its alliance with Iran but reiterated his call to avoid internal confrontation and resolve disagreements through dialogue (*al-Joumhouria* and *al-Diyar*, November 22, 2026; al-Modon, November 23, 2026).

► Senior Shi'ite clerics also criticized President Aoun's Independence Day speech. Jafari Mufti Ahmed Qabalan and Sheikh Ali al-Khatib, deputy chairman of the Islamic Shi'ite Council, rejected the president's allegations of Iranian interference in Lebanon's affairs and claimed Iranian assistance to Hezbollah was a contribution to the country's defense. Both warned that portraying the "resistance" camp as acting against the national interest could worsen internal divisions (al-Manar, November 21, 2026).

► According to sources, Hezbollah and Amal currently want to deal with the legal proceedings being pursued by the authorities through political and institutional channels. However, the sources warned that additional measures against senior Hezbollah figures could lead to a harsher response from the organization (*al-Diyar*, November 21, 2026).

Positions of Hezbollah's Opponents

► Politicians opposed to Hezbollah reiterated their calls to accelerate Hezbollah's disarmament. Kataeb Party chairman Sami al-Gemayel demanded increased enforcement against the organization's weapons infrastructure; MP Fouad Makhzoumi called for establishing a binding timetable for disarmament, along with strengthening the Lebanese army and international monitoring mechanisms; MP Fadi Karam warned that Hezbollah might have more armed groups outside south Lebanon and called for broadening the security agencies' operations against them (Kataeb website, November 17, 2026; *Nidaa al-Watan*, November 20, 2026).

► Lebanese Forces Party chairman Samir Geagea called for broadening the investigations into the Dahr al-Baydar and armed group cases in north Lebanon to find who had directed the operatives and supplied them with weapons. Geagea claimed Hezbollah's continued independent "military" activity undermined state sovereignty and the prospects for its economic recovery. He also warned against attempts to incorporate the Lebanese issue into possible negotiations between the United States and Iran and demanded that deciding the country's future be carried out by its legitimate institutions (*al-Nahar*, November 21, 2026).

► Reportedly, coordination between the Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Forces was renewed and contacts were being held with the National Liberal Party to formulate common positions regarding the country's future after weapons were brought under state control. Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Bechara Boutros al-Rahi also said it was necessary to strengthen the army and state institutions, preserve independent Lebanese decision-making and keep the country out of regional conflicts (Kataeb website, November 17, 2026; *al-Diyar*, November 18, 2026; *Nidaa al-Watan*, November 21, 2026).

The Israel-Lebanon Negotiations and the Framework Agreement

The Position of the Lebanese Leadership

► According to the UN secretary general's periodic report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, implementation of the June 26, 2026 framework agreement had stalled because of disagreement over the sequence in which the parties would fulfill their commitments. According to the report, the Lebanese army had established six checkpoints and 13 observation posts in the three pilot zones in Froun, Srifa and Zawtar al-Gharbiya, but the transfer of security responsibility to the army parallel to the withdrawal of IDF forces had not yet been completed. Lebanon still demanded an end to the attacks and an Israeli withdrawal as a condition for progress, while Israel made its withdrawal and cessation of operations conditional on the extension of state authority and the disarmament of "armed groups" (*al-Akhbar*, November 20, 2026).

► Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said they preferred a political course and called for establishing a timetable which would ensure gradual mutual progress. Aoun rejected direct Israeli supervision of disarmament but said he was willing to accept an international verification mechanism. Speaking on Lebanon's 83rd independence day, he demanded a full Israeli withdrawal, an end to the attacks and the return of prisoners,

and said diplomacy should be the way to achieve those objectives. Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa said an Israeli withdrawal and an end to the attacks were essential for completing the Lebanese army's deployment in the south (Lebanese presidency website, November 17 and 21, 2026; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 16–17, 2026; Lebanese Ministry of Defense website, November 20, 2026).

► Lebanese media reported on American-French efforts to incorporate elements of the framework agreement into a future Security Council resolution, including the possibility of amending Resolution 1701. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri opposed incorporating the agreement into a resolution and said he had received no official proposal. President Aoun said Resolution 1701 should remain the legal basis for future security arrangements in south Lebanon. Saudi envoy Yazid bin Farhan reportedly also addressed the issue during his contacts with the Lebanese leadership (*Nidaa al-Watan* and *al-Akhbar*, November 17–19, 2026; Lebanon Debate, November 18, 2026).

Hezbollah's Positions

► Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, called on the Lebanese leadership to withdraw from the framework agreement and opposed attempts to grant it international status. He claimed that the agreement undermined Lebanon's sovereignty, contradicted existing legal arrangements and did not include a clear Israeli commitment to withdraw, while making Israel's fulfillment of its commitments conditional on Lebanese measures which could not be carried out. Fayyad claimed the continued Israeli presence, despite the negotiations, showed the failure of the political course and called for a return to reliance on Resolution 1701 and the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement. He also criticized restrictions which "affected the reconstruction of Hezbollah-affiliated properties" (Loyalty to the Resistance faction website, November 17, 2026).

► The Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament accused the Lebanese government of responsibility for the continued Israeli attacks, claiming the framework agreement reflected submission to external pressure. The faction accused the United States of increasing interference in Lebanon's internal affairs and warned against attempts to reshape "security arrangements" in the south after UNIFIL's exit in a way which could undermine Resolution 1701 and previous arrangements with Israel (Loyalty to the Resistance faction website, November 19, 2026). Ammar al-Moussawi, responsible for international and Arab relations in

Hezbollah, also claimed the framework agreement had not led to an Israeli withdrawal or an end to the attacks (al-Manar, November 21, 2026).

The Military Situation in Lebanon and Preparing for Renewed Hostilities

The IDF

►On November 19, 2026, the IDF attacked a site in Janta in the Beqa'a Valley, on the Lebanon-Syria border, which Hezbollah had previously used to manufacture missiles and store weapons. The IDF attacked the site several times during the war and the new attack targeted the entrances to prevent its restoration after Hezbollah terrorists had recently been seen arriving. It was the second attack in the area within three days, after a shipment of weapons which had crossed the border from Syria was attacked earlier (IDF spokesperson, November 19, 2026). Lebanese sources reported six airstrikes in the area of the villages of Janta and al-Nabi Shayth, near the Syrian border (Naharnet, November 20, 2026).

►This past week IDF activity continued in south Lebanon, including the completion of the destruction of a tunnel containing several accommodation and command rooms (IDF spokesperson, November 18, 2026). According to Lebanese media reports, the activity included airstrikes, artillery and machine-gun fire, ground troop movements and the demolition of infrastructure and buildings, and focused on Zawtar al-Sharqiya, Kafr Tebnit, Mifdoun, al-Qantara, Beit Yahoun, Haddatha and Haris (Naharnet, *al-Nashra* and the Lebanese News Agency, November 16–23, 2026).

Hezbollah

►According to Lebanese political sources, Hezbollah's leadership asked Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps not to require it to participate in a future war, in view of the erosion of its military capabilities and concerns about the consequences of another war for its Shi'ite support base. While political figures in Iran were reassuring, the Revolutionary Guards made no commitment. Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and Amal movement leader, reportedly also said he would not provide political backing for further Hezbollah involvement in a regional war. On the other hand, an op-ed piece in the Hezbollah-affiliated *al-Akhbar* claimed the organization might not participate in a limited campaign against Iran but could intervene if there the existence of the Iranian regime was threatened (*al-Akhbar*, November 18; *al-Nahar*, November 19; Erem News and *Nidaa al-Watan*, November 20, 2026).

Challenges for Hezbollah

Restoring Military Capabilities

►According to unofficial reports based on Lebanese and foreign security sources, Hezbollah's efforts to restore its military capabilities include increasing reliance on local production and the procurement of dual-use components, especially restoring its UAV array and replenishing its rocket arsenal, alongside continued dependence on Iran for funding, technological knowledge and advanced systems. A reorganization of the command and control systems were also reported, including the appointment of younger commanders, a transition to smaller, decentralized units, reduced use of communications equipment vulnerable to infiltration and expanded authority for mid-level commanders. According to assessments, the objectives of the changes are to improve the organization's ability to wage a war of attrition and deal with a possible Israeli ground incursion (Erem News, November 16–17, 2026; al-Modon, November 20, 2026).[4]

► Meanwhile efforts to prevent Hezbollah from restoring its military capabilities continue with the seizure of weapons shipments suspected of belonging to the organization:

- The Lebanese army announced that following surveillance operations along the border with Syria in the north and east of the country, a military unit intercepted a shipment of 264 kg of explosives (203 kg of C-4 and 61 kg of TNT), smuggled into Lebanon from Syria in the al-Doura-Mashari' al-Qaa area. Three civilians were arrested on suspicion of involvement, and the explosives were referred to the judicial authorities for investigation (Lebanese army X account, November 22, 2026). Security sources said the shipment was linked to Hezbollah, partly because of the nature of the materials and their similarity to shipments seized in the past. Hezbollah, however, denied any connection to the shipment or the detainees, and reportedly the investigation has not yet uncovered evidence linking the truck to the organization (*al-Nahar*, al-Jadeed, al-Modon and Lebanon Debate, November 22, 2026).

[4] See the October 2026 Amit Institute report, **The Hezbollah Leadership, Two Years after the Elimination of Hassan Nasrallah**



The explosives seized near the Syrian border (Lebanese army X account, November 22, 2026)

- Syria's internal security forces and general intelligence directorate intercepted a shipment of weapons in the Damascus countryside area destined for Lebanon, and arrested one of those involved. An investigation was reportedly opened to determine the size of the cell responsible and identify the smuggling networks linked to it. On another occasion, the general intelligence directorate seized a truck carrying weapons en route to Lebanon (SANA, November 22, 2026).
- According to a report, the Lebanese authorities, in cooperation with judicial officials in Europe, broadened their investigations to uncover procurement and supply networks used by Hezbollah's UAV program. The investigations include examining possible links to a case involving the procurement of UAV components in Germany, in which one person involved was convicted in March 2026. There were suspicions that attempts were made to prevent individuals involved in the investigations from appearing before the judicial authorities in Lebanon (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, November 18, 2026).

Challenges from the Shi'ite Community

► According to Lebanese media reports, criticism is growing in sectors of Hezbollah's Shi'ite support base because of the high price of the war, continued displacement, reconstruction difficulties and the absence of a political horizon. In addition, an unverified report was published about a public opinion poll allegedly commissioned by a European embassy, according to which the organization continues to enjoy significant support within the Shi'ite public, partly because of the absence of a political alternative, cooperation with Amal and a sense of threat to the sect (Erem News, November 18, 2026; *al-Nahar*, November 19, 2026).

► Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, reportedly said he was dissatisfied with Hezbollah's "military" conduct and its consequences for the Shi'ite population, particularly in view of concerns about another regional war and the difficulties in reconstructing the

south. According to the report, American and Arab officials want to deepen the disagreements between the components of the "Shi'ite duo," while Iran is working to preserve its ties with Berri. Hezbollah, however, noted its commitment to the strategic alliance with Amal and maintaining the unity of the sect (al-Modon, November 20, 2026).

► With reports of disagreements, Ali Damoush, head of Hezbollah's executive council, met with his Amal counterpart, Mustafa al-Fawani, to strengthen sectarian unity. They noted their commitment to cooperation, an Israeli withdrawal and the reconstruction of the south, but did not explicitly address Hezbollah's disarmament (al-Manar, November 18, 2026).



Damoush and al-Fawani meet (al-Manar, November 18, 2026)

Iranian Involvement in Lebanon

► Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said he was willing to develop relations with Iran, provided they were based on noninterference in Lebanon's internal affairs and state-to-state relations (Lebanese presidency website, November 17, 2026).

► Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf spoke with Nabih Berri about regional developments. Ghalibaf reportedly noted Berri's key role in maintaining the cohesion of Lebanese society and said the Islamic Republic was paying attention to the Lebanese issue as part of advancing its demands and conditions in the negotiations. He said Iran felt regional calm would not return without an end to the war in Lebanon and the realization of Lebanon's sovereignty over its territory. Berri referred to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and noted the need for the withdrawal of the "occupation forces" from Lebanese territory (Tasnim and Lebanon Debate, November 16, 2026).

► According to assessments, Tehran, concerned about a rapprochement between Berri and Saudi Arabia and the organization's political isolation, wants to preserve its influence over decisions concerning Hezbollah and security arrangements in south Lebanon, (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 18, 2026).

Hezbollah's International Terrorist Activity

► Western intelligence sources and sources close to the Quds Force said the Revolutionary Guards had instructed Hezbollah to recruit six Thai Shi'ite clerics for a terrorist attack on the Israeli embassy in Bangkok, but the plot was foiled before it could be carried out. According to the report, which has not received official confirmation, the recruitment was carried out by Hezbollah's Unit 910, responsible for the organization's foreign operations, and focused on graduates of al-Mustafa International University in Qom, Iran. According to claims, Lebanese Hezbollah operative Majed Abdallah, also known as Abu Hassan and Fadi Kassab, was involved in directing the recruits and planning the attack, and a network of religious and family connections in Thailand was used for recruitment. Abdallah was also linked to Hezbollah activity against Israeli targets in other countries, including Cyprus and Bulgaria (Iran International, November 17, 2026).

International Activity against Hezbollah

► The United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the Hezbollah-linked Wa Ta'awanu Association and its founder and chairman, Afif Shuman, who was said to coordinate its activities according to Hezbollah's instructions. According to the Treasury Department, the association provides emergency assistance to residents of south Lebanon but also transfers donations from abroad to support Hezbollah's terrorist activities. The association also serves as a cover for Hezbollah's terrorist activity in the pilot zones (Treasury Department website, November 18, 2026).[5] Wa Ta'awanu chairman Afif Shuman claimed that the sanctions were meant to damage the civilian assistance system within the organization's support base but would not affect the association's activities, which he said relied on donations and non-financial material assistance. He also claimed that following the sanctions, approximately 2,500 new applications to volunteer had been received, compared with the 450–500 volunteers who had previously worked with the association (*al-Joumhouria* and al-Manar, November 18–19; *al-Akhbar*, November 19, 2026).

► Sanctions were also imposed on Lebanese businessman and money changer Hassan Muhammad Khashen, his brother Ibrahim Khashen and Hassan Khashen's Global Gold Company for transferring funds from the Quds Force through several countries to Hezbollah

[5] See the August 2026 Amit Institute report, **Hezbollah in the Pilot Zones Disguised as Civilian Organizations**

in Lebanon, including cash carried on flights from Turkey. Sanctions were imposed on Hassan Khashen's Sankari Gold company, which operates from Turkey and is affiliated with Hezbollah, and which helped Gold Global Company transfer gold bars and cash from Africa to Lebanon (Treasury Department website, November 18, 2026).[6]

► The authorities in the German state of Berlin outlawed the El-Irschad eV association and three of its subsidiary associations on suspicion of providing financial and organizational support to Hezbollah. Security forces also raided 28 locations linked to the associations (*Bild* and the Berlin state government website, November 17, 2026).

Preparations for the Day After UNIFIL

► Lebanese sources said Mike Waltz, the American ambassador to the UN, met with President Joseph Aoun, and they agreed in principle on the need to maintain an international presence, continue relying on Resolution 1701 and strengthen the Lebanese army. However, the United States still has reservations about extending UNIFIL's operations in their current format and prefers a limited monitoring and verification mechanism, along with transferring security responsibility to the Lebanese army. The possibility of a transitional period was also reported, during which approximately 3,000 members of the force would remain in the south for an additional six months, but no official confirmation of this arrangement was received (Erem News, November 19, 2026; *al-Diyar*, November 20, 2026).

► Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said a UN-sponsored arrangement was necessary, one which would ensure a continued international presence in the south after the expiration of UNIFIL's mandate. He was responding to a video issued by the IDF spokesperson in Arabic from a school in the Christian town of Debel in south Lebanon, which Salam condemned, claiming it violated the students' rights and exploited them for propaganda purposes. Salam said the government was committed to supporting the continued presence of residents in the border villages and extending state sovereignty over the area (Lebanese Prime Minister's Office X account, November 22, 2026).

► UNIFIL commander General Diodato Abagnara warned a security vacuum would be created after the force's mandate expires at the end of December 2026 and said the force had

[6] See the November 2026 Amit Institute report, "The Development of Hezbollah's Multilayered Financial System and the Current Challenges It Faces."

already begun transferring some of its positions to the Lebanese army. In a briefing to the Security Council, acting UN coordinator for Lebanon Jean Arnault said Resolution 1701 had to be preserved as the legal basis for the future arrangement and for maintaining the mechanisms for monitoring the Blue Line, coordination between the Lebanese army and the IDF and reporting violations. He said completing the extension of state authority in the south also required an end to military operations and strengthening the ability of state institutions to provide the population with services (*al-Nahar*, November 21, 2026).

► Reportedly, the main stumbling-blocks for the future of the multinational force in Lebanon concern the legal framework, the composition of the force, its area of operations and the division of authority between it and the Lebanese army and existing monitoring mechanisms. The missions under consideration include monitoring violations along the Blue Line, verifying an Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of the Lebanese army, liaison between the sides, humanitarian assistance and mine clearance. According to reports, responsibility for disarming Hezbollah will remain with Lebanese state institutions, but no agreement has yet been reached on who will be authorized to verify the absence of "non-state armed forces" in the areas of operation. In addition, reservations were reported among countries that might participate in the force, as well as Hezbollah's opposition to amending Resolution 1701 and incorporating the framework agreement into it (*Akhbar al-Yawm* and *Nidaa al-Watan*, November 17, 2026; *al-Joumhouria*, November 18, 2026; *al-Liwaa*, November 21, 2026).

The Consequences of the Fighting for the Civilian Population

► According to figures published in the Lebanese media, the total cost of reconstruction is estimated at $11 billion, and 137,000 housing units which were damaged or destroyed await reconstruction. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun estimated the war damage to the agricultural sector at $620 million, while Agriculture Minister Nizar Hani said that the fighting had affected approximately 22.5% of the country's farmland. Meeting with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, local authority heads from the border villages spoke up about the plight of residents and displaced persons and demanded measures to facilitate their return to their homes and clarification of the future security arrangements in the area (Lebanese presidency website, November 17 and 19, 2026; Prime Minister's Office X account, November 18, 2026; *al-Diyar* and *al-Nashra*, November 20, 2026).

►A representative of the World Bank said he was concerned about the slow pace of reconstruction, after only approximately $4.2 million of an approved $250 million loan had been utilized. The Lebanese government attributed the delays to the procedures for approving the loan in the Lebanese Parliament and the "security" situation, and said it intended to advance projects worth $70 million by the end of the year. Disagreements between government bodies regarding the management of reconstruction were also reported, along with concerns among international officials about the allocation of resources on political grounds, increasing demands for oversight of aid funds (*al-Diyar*, November 20, 2026).

►Lebanese President Aoun announced preparations to convene an international conference for the reconstruction of the affected areas, which could take place even before the completion of the Israeli withdrawal, but said the continued Israeli presence was delaying the damage assessment and actual reconstruction work. At a meeting with UAE Health Minister Ahmed bin Ali al-Sayegh, Aoun said hospitals and health centers damaged in the fighting had to be restored, adding that more than 116 healthcare workers had been killed. The UAE minister said he would examine possibilities for assisting the Lebanese healthcare system (Lebanese presidency website, November 17 and 20, 2026).



The tension between civilian reconstruction needs in Lebanon and Hezbollah's efforts to restore its military capabilities (Sa'er Sabil's X account, November 19, 2026)

The Palestinians in Lebanon

►Residents in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon continued protesting measures to reduce UNRWA's workforce and services because of its budgetary difficulties. Ali al-Huweidi, director of the Resolution 302 Body, warned that the agency might terminate the employment of more than 3,000 permanent employees in its five areas of operation and claimed it was part of a process to gradually reduce UNRWA's role. He said transferring the agency's services to other UN organizations or civilian organizations could undermine its

status and historical responsibility toward Palestinian refugees. He also warned that a significant reduction in UNRWA's activities in Lebanon would place an additional burden on the Lebanese government, given the large number of registered Palestinian refugees in the country (*al-Nahar*, November 19, 2026).