The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute
At the Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center



Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon

November 9 – 16, 2026

Trending

► The confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese authorities has been intensified by the arrest of suspects involved in unauthorized "security" activity in north Lebanon and the discovery of a weapons depot in a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut.

► Hezbollah continues to oppose direct negotiations with Israel but claims to be willing to discuss disarmament after the IDF withdraws from south Lebanon.

► There have been diplomatic contacts for the international force which will replace UNIFIL in south Lebanon when its mandate ends at the end of December 2026.

► Turkey is trying to increase its influence in Lebanon, including along the border with Israel.

Overview[1]

► The investigation into the Hezbollah explosives truck continues as Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's refuses to refer the case to the Higher Judicial Council lest such a move exacerbate the internal confrontation in Lebanon. An investigation is being conducted over suspicions of a Hezbollah connection to a weapons depot discovered in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut and to five suspects arrested with maps and documents in north Lebanon.

► Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem said it was important to continue the "resistance,"[2] claiming it was the only thing which had halted Israel's advance into Lebanese territory. He said he opposed direct negotiations with Israel and the framework agreement, adding that Hezbollah would not discuss disarmament before a complete Israeli withdrawal.

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.

[2] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon and making plans to destroy the State of Israel.

► According to assessments in Lebanon, Lebanese-Israeli negotiations will probably not resume before a new government is formed in Israel. Hezbollah and Parliament Speaker Berri oppose an American initiative to anchor the framework agreement in a UN Security Council resolution.

► After reports that Hezbollah continues rebuilding its military capabilities, the IDF attacked a shipment of weapons intended for Hezbollah on the Lebanon-Syria border, the first attack in the Beqa'a Valley region in three months.

► The Lebanese army announced it had completed the first phase of dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure south of the Litani River, but the American administration was dissatisfied with the progress and pace of the operation.

► The American ambassador to the UN met with Lebanese leaders in Beirut to discuss the future of the multinational force after UNIFIL's mandate ends and noted that Resolution 1701 would remain in effect, with adjustments. He is expected to present a plan to deploy a force of approximately 100 peace observers in south Lebanon.

► The son of the Turkish president visited Lebanon and met with government officials. He said his country was prepared to participate in an international force in south Lebanon and to assist in rebuilding the destroyed villages.

The Struggle between the Lebanese Government and. Hezbollah for State Sovereignty

Investigations into Hezbollah's Prohibited Military Activity

► The Lebanese authorities are continuing investigations into suspicions of prohibited Hezbollah military- activity:

- **Investigation of the Hezbollah explosives truck**:[3] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam did not bring the matter before the government for discussion, despite demands by Justice Minister Adel Nassar and the Lebanese Forces party to refer the investigation to the Higher Judicial Council. Consequently, the investigation is expected to continue within the military justice system (Asas Media, November 14, 2026). Muhammad Ra'ad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament,

[3] In early October 2026, Lebanon's Internal Security Forces seized a commercial vehicle traveling from the Beqa'a Valley to Beirut at the Dahr al-Baydar checkpoint on the Beirut-Damascus highway and arrested its two occupants, Hezbollah operatives. Hundreds of kilograms of explosives used to manufacture explosive devices, including C-4 and TNT, were discovered in the vehicle.

and faction member Hussein Jashi admitted that the explosives discovered in the truck seized at Dahr al-Baydar belonged to the "resistance"[4] and were to be used against Israel. Both rejected calling the matter a threat to national security and claimed its handling reflected an attempt to attack Hezbollah politically (Loyalty to the Resistance faction website, November 11–12, 2026). Ali al-Moqdad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, alleged direct American intervention in the handling of the case, including pressure to refer the investigation to the Higher Judicial Council (*al-Joumhouria*, November 14, 2026). According to a government source, Hezbollah was satisfied the investigation would be left to the military justice system, reducing tensions with the government (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 13, 2026). The public prosecutor at the court of appeals, Judge Ahmed Rami al-Hajj, said the investigation into the explosives truck was also being conducted at intelligence and technological levels, including an examination of security camera footage and an analysis of the defendants' phones. He said judicial decisions would be made based on evidence, maintaining the confidentiality of the investigation and avoiding premature conclusions (*al-Liwaa*, November 16, 2026).

- **Arrest of suspects in north Lebanon**: Five people were arrested in the mountainous area between Bsharri and al-Batroun on suspicion of unauthorized military activity. Reportedly, torn maps and documents were found in their possession, containing markings and names of communities, some of which may refer to routes and methods of clandestine communication. The suspects claimed they had been "looking for houses to rent in the area" in case there was another wave of displacement, but they provided no explanation for the contents of the documents. They were allegedly connected to the Charitable Association for the Revival of the Five Villages, which operates in the al-Koura and al-Batroun areas, but there was no proof that the association was a cover for military activity. According to security sources, the allegations concerning an organized "security mission" or organizational ties to Hezbollah have not been substantiated (*al-Nahar*, November 12, 2026; al-Modon and MTV, November 13, 2026). Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the detainees belonged to the "resistance,"[5] later

[4] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon to destroy the State of Israel.
[5] Were Hezbollah terrorist operatives.

claiming they supported the organization but had not acted on its behalf. Ali al-Moqdad, also a member of the Hezbollah faction, dismissed the suspicions and claimed "the young men had gotten lost." Prime Minister Salam and officials from parties opposed to Hezbollah demanded the investigation be pursued to its conclusion and it be determined whether the activity was organized (Asas Media, November 12 and 14, 2026; MTV, November 13, 2026; *al-Joumhouria*, November 14, 2026).

- **Discovery of a weapons depot in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia**: Lebanese military intelligence raided a weapons depot in the al-Musharrafieh area of the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, following surveillance of arms dealing. During the raid, large quantities of weapons and military ammunition were seized and one suspect was arrested. An investigation was opened under the supervision of the judicial authorities. The army did not provide details about the identity of the depot's owners or their organizational affiliation (Lebanese army X account, November 13, 2026). According to another report, the weapons and ammunition were not limited to personal weapons, and the surprise raid was carried out in a Hezbollah-influenced area. Reportedly, the raid could indicate an expansion of the army's enforcement activity in politically sensitive areas (Lebanon 24, November 15, 2026). An op-ed piece claimed that the absence of a public response from Hezbollah could indicate a desire to avoid confrontation with state institutions and the depot might be affiliated with the organization (*al-Liwaa*, November 16, 2026).

► According to a report, there were questions in Hezbollah circles as to whether the recent series of arrests reflected security breaches or leaks from within the organization, and an internal investigation might be conducted "to clarify the circumstances "(Lebanon 24, November 15, 2026).

the Position of the Lebanese Government

► Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated his commitment to state sovereignty and the state's exclusive possession of weapons, alongside the need to rebuild the south and ensure the security of its residents. Meeting with UN Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed, he said addressing the weapons issue, in accordance with Article 10 of the framework agreement, required a combination of security measures and political, economic and social initiatives. He said rebuilding damaged areas and strengthening civilian services would help

restore their confidence in state institutions and the state's ability to exercise its authority (Lebanese presidency X account, November 11, 2026; Lebanese presidency website, November 14, 2026).

► Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji said restoring the authority to declare war to the state and concentrating weapons in its hands were conditions for rebuilding the economy, restoring investor confidence and preventing Lebanon from becoming an arena for regional conflicts (Lebanon Files, November 15, 2026).

► Senior Christian church leaders in Lebanon joined the calls to strengthen state sovereignty. Maronite Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi and Greek Orthodox Metropolitan (Bishop) Elias Audi said the exclusive possession of weapons and the authority to declare war had to rest with the state. Al-Rahi warned against turning political negotiations into a prolonged process without results and said he was concerned about a security vacuum in the south following UNIFIL's withdrawal (*al-Nashra*, November 15, 2026).

Hezbollah's Position

► Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem devoted his Martyrs' Day[6] speech to the role of the "resistance,"[7] while reiterating the organization's refusal to discuss disarmament at present. According to Qassem, the "resistance" and its supporters had prevented Israel from reaching Sidon and had prevented it from "consolidating the occupation and establishing settlements [*sic*] in Lebanese territory." He praised the principle of the "unity of the arenas"[8] and called for expanding the "resistance arenas" to assist Lebanon and "Palestine." He said, "The resistance must continue, arm itself and fight whenever necessary, and defend the land," as long as the government did not enable the army to fulfill that role. He called on the Lebanese government to stop talking about concentrating weapons in the hands of the state while the "aggression" continued, claiming it was an Israeli-American demand and did not appear in the constitution. He added that they were prepared to reach understandings with the government regarding weapons, but only after the Israeli withdrawal and "the end of

[6] Martyrs' Day is one of the most important days in Hezbollah's calendar. It commemorates the attack carried out by suicide bomber Ahmed Qasir at the Israeli military government building in Tyre on November 11, 1982, in which 77 members of the Israeli security forces and 15 Lebanese detainees were killed. It was Hezbollah's first attack against Israelis.

[7] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon to destroy the State of Israel.

[8] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, whose collective objective is the destruction and elimination of the State of Israel, and who have joined forces to attack Israel since the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion and massacre.

foreign patronage." He used the speech to tell the Lebanese government and political forces about the need to cooperate for the benefit of the people, making confrontation with Israel their top priority so the country could be rebuilt (*al-Akhbar* and Hezbollah secretary general's website, November 11, 2026).



Qassem delivers his Martyrs' Day speech
(Hezbollah secretary general's website, November 11, 2026)

► Nevertheless, efforts to renew the dialogue between Hezbollah and President Joseph Aoun remained stalled because of its demand to revoke the government decisions of March 2, 2026, prohibiting its military-"security" activity, and the presidency's refusal to rescind them (*al-Sharq al-Awsat* and Erem News, November 10, 2026). An additional disagreement concerns Hezbollah's demand to link the arrangement in Lebanon to understandings between the United States and Iran (*al-Nahar*, November 12, 2026). Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri continues to mediate between the sides, but his efforts focus on restoring channels of communication rather than renewing formal negotiations on weapons. Justice Minister Adel Nassar said he would oppose revoking the government decisions (*al-Liwaa*, November 13, 2026). The Turkish president reportedly encouraged Aoun to open a channel of communication with Iran in an attempt to reduce tensions between the presidency and Hezbollah (al-Modon, November 13, 2026).

► Hezbollah sources said Lebanon was facing two months of uncertainty, during which the possibilities of escalation and an agreement would remain open. According to a source in the organization, Hezbollah will be "strategically patient," avoid an immediate decision and wait for regional developments, particularly contacts between the United States and Iran. The source "justified" Hezbollah's participation in the confrontations alongside Hamas and Iran, despite its heavy losses, and claimed the war had caused military, economic and political erosion in Israel and the United States, reflected by the election results in both countries. Thus the organization seeks to preserve its capabilities and avoid concessions,

while remaining willing to accept Berri's mediation and maintain internal stability (*al-Joumhouria*, November 9, 2026; *al-Diyar*, November 13, 2026).

Hezbollah's Opponents

► Hezbollah's opponents demand its disarmament and the implementation of government decisions. Kataeb chairman Sami al-Gemayel claimed Hezbollah's weapons undermined state sovereignty, civil liberties and the economy. The Lebanese Forces party rejected Nabih Berri's initiative for bilateral dialogue, claiming the question of the exclusive possession of weapons had already been decided by state institutions and reopening it would undermine the government's authority (Kataeb website and *Nidaa al-Watan,* November 13, 2026).

► With Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's refusal to discuss referring the investigation of the explosives truck to the Higher Judicial Council, Lebanese Forces ministers continue to boycott government meetings, with the exception of the energy minister's participation to present the electricity plan (MTV, November 12, 2026). Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea demanded the investigation be expanded beyond the operational level to reach the decision-makers and said his opposition was directed at Hezbollah's "military" activity rather than its "political" activity (*al-Nahar*, November 14, 2026).

► The arrest of the five suspects in north Lebanon also angered Hezbollah's political opponents, who demanded clarification of whether the suspects had acted within an organized framework and who was behind their activity. Kataeb chairman Sami al-Gemayel linked the incident to the explosives truck in Dahr al-Baydar and said extra-state security activity was a threat to national security and civil peace (Sami al-Gemayel's X account, November 11, 2026). Sethrida Geagea, from the Lebanese Forces party, and Melhem Touq, an independent, said they were concerned about intelligence-gathering activity in areas far from the line of confrontation with Israel and demanded the investigation be expanded to include those who had allegedly directed or financed the activity (Lebanon Debate, November 11, 2026). The Free Patriotic Movement said it was necessary to pursue the investigation to its conclusion and enforce state authority, but warned against exploiting the affair for sectarian incitement before the facts had been established (Free Patriotic Movement X account, November 11, 2026).

► Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis), said Iran and Lebanon stood on a common front in war and peace, igniting a confrontation between Kataeb chairman Sami al-Gemayel and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Al-Gemayel warned of Iranian influence over war and peace in Lebanon and questioned Hezbollah's ability to avoid participation in another regional confrontation. Berri replied that the Lebanese were free to make their own decisions, but did not directly address Hezbollah's commitment on the issue (Kataeb website, November 12, 2026).



The confrontation between Berri (right) and al-Gemayel. Berri's assertion that the Lebanese were free is made fun of, Lebanon's independent decision-making is questioned, given Iran's influence over the Shi'ite camp (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 13, 2026)

The Israel-Lebanese Negotiations for the Framework Agreement

The Position of the Lebanese Leadership

► An official said the latest round of talks between the Lebanese and Israeli delegations in Florida had produced no tangible results and had taken place only at the request of the United States, which wanted the negotiations to continue. The official added that there was no point in holding another round before a new government was formed in Israel (al-Jadeed, November 12, 2026).

► Meeting in Beirut, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told Mike Waltz, the American ambassador to the UN, that the mutual, gradual principles of the framework agreement needed to be translated into practical steps which would produce tangible results while establishing a timetable which would lead to a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the extension of the Lebanese state's authority over all its territory (Lebanese prime minister's office X account, November 16, 2026).



Salam meets with Waltz and the American delegation
(Lebanese prime minister's office X account, November 16, 2026)

► considering promoting a new UN Security Council resolution which would establish the framework agreement as the basis for the security arrangement after the end of UNIFIL's mission and make the Israeli withdrawal conditional on progress in dismantling infrastructure and verification. Reportedly, Hezbollah and Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and head of the Amal Party, oppose the move and seek to retain UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the November 2024 ceasefire agreement as the basis for the arrangement. Qatar, France and Turkey were reportedly willing to assist in mediation, although no substantive progress has been made thus far (Erem News, November 10, 2026; *al-Akhbar*, November 12, 2026; al-Modon, November 14, 2026).

► The dispute over the monitoring mechanism in south Lebanon continues to delay implementation of the framework agreement. Israel demands direct verification on the ground while the Lebanese army dismantles Hezbollah infrastructure and is not satisfied with subsequent inspections. Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested establishing a civilian monitoring body, but Lebanon had previously rejected a similar proposal during the talks in Florida because of the absence of a sufficient international mandate. Israel rejected a Lebanese proposal to expand the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observer mission (Erem News and *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 10, 2026). Lebanese sources said Beirut opposed direct security coordination with Israel and the transfer of monitoring tasks to private entities, an option which, according to a ministerial source, had not matured into an agreement (*al-Joumhouria*, *al-Sharq al-Awsat* and al-Modon, November 13, 2026).

► Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said the current situation in Lebanon was ambiguous, neither war nor peace, as the country waited to see which direction developments would take, toward agreement or escalation. He said events in Lebanon were

linked to regional developments and the country's internal considerations could not be separated from the broader regional arena *(al-Nashra*, November 15, 2026).

► Reportedly, Bilal Erdogan, son of the Turkish president, meeting in Beirut with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, said a complete Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon was necessary and called it "a basic condition for ensuring the Lebanese state was sovereign over all its territory." Meeting with Parliament Speaker Berri, the young Erdogan warned against the "Israeli project" and praised the residents of south Lebanon for their steadfastness. He said Turkey was prepared to provide assistance that would enable the residents of south Lebanon to remain on their land (*al-Akhbar*, November 13, 2026).



Aoun and Bilal Erdogan (Lebanese presidency X account, November 12, 2026)

The Lebanese Army

► Lebanese army commander General Rodolph Haykal said the army's policy was the national policy, provoking reactions from members of the Lebanese Parliament who claimed that determining policy was the responsibility of the political leadership and the public should not be denied the right to criticize the army. Hezbollah, Parliament Speaker Berri and the Amal Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement came to Haykal's defense, while Defense Minister Michel Menassa said that the army was subject to government policy, but the military command was responsible for its implementation. Rami Abu Hamdan, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the organization would not disarm and said he was confident the army would not confront it (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, Lebanese ministry of defense X account, *al-Joumhouria*, November 10, 2026; Loyalty to the Resistance website, November 12, 2026).

► According to Lebanese military sources, the army completed the first phase of the plan to dismantle terrorist infrastructure south of the Litani River and provided the monitoring mechanism with documentation. However, army commander Haykal complained of shortages of personnel and equipment, the continued Israeli presence and concerns about

sectarian confrontation as limitations on further implementation. Sources close to the presidency said President Joseph Aoun supported Haykal and avoiding a direct confrontation with Hezbollah was a political decision (*al-Joumhouria*, November 10, 2026; *al-Nahar*, November 13, 2026; Asas Media, November 14, 2026).

► After meeting with senior Lebanese leaders in Beirut, Mike Waltz, the American ambassador to the UN, said he appreciated the Lebanese army's performance and expected continued assistance to the Lebanese security institutions. He said he hoped Hezbollah would agree to disarm voluntarily and said "no country can have two armies" (*al-Nahar*, November 16, 2026).

► American diplomatic sources claimed criticism of the pace of disarmament was growing in Washington and assessments submitted by Joseph Clearfield, head of the ceasefire coordination and monitoring mechanism, showed results were unsatisfactory in the pilot zones in south Lebanon, and Hezbollah had renewed its presence in three villages from which Israel had withdrawn. According to the sources, American criticism also focused on the lack of political and military willingness to confront the organization (al-Modon, November 13, 2026).

Hezbollah's Position

► Speaking for Martyrs' Day, Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem said the organization opposed direct negotiations with Israel, but did not rule out indirect negotiations. He rejected the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which he claimed violated the Lebanese constitution and laws and the Taif Agreement, granted Israel concessions without anything in return and divided Lebanon. Qassem criticized the Lebanese government, saying it had given Israel everything it wanted and had made no progress in accordance with the agreement, and therefore the matter should be reconsidered. He said the American president and the Israel prime minister "had been defeated in the elections," so now they had a good opportunity to change the regional order (Hezbollah secretary general's website, November 11, 2026).

► Hezbollah called on the Lebanese government to reject the American initiative to anchor the framework agreement in a Security Council resolution and to work through countries supporting Resolution 1701 to thwart the proposal in the Security Council. Hezbollah said it opposed the "pilot zones," where progress in Israel's withdrawal was conditional on the

verification of dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure, and also opposed the transferring verification tasks to private companies (*al-Liwaa*, November 16, 2026).

► Senior Hezbollah officials continued to represent the June 2026 memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States as the only way to halt Israeli "aggression" and force the IDF to withdraw. Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said there the organization's position was based on three principles: preserving the capabilities of the "resistance" as a means of liberating territories under Israeli control; changing Lebanese government policy and formulating a national consensus based on the army and the "resistance;" and integrating Lebanon into the "Islamabad memorandum,"[9] within the framework of possible understandings between Washington and Tehran. He claimed Iran insisted on including the Lebanese issue in any future agreement between the sides. His fellow faction member Hussein al-Hajj Hassan claimed Lebanon was an integral part of the regional equation between Iran and the United States and the Strait of Hormuz was leverage in Tehran's hands. Both said Hezbollah adhered to the path of "resistance"[10] and had no intention of relinquishing its military capabilities (*al-Joumhouria*, November 9, 2026).

The Military Situation in Lebanon

The IDF

► On November 16, 2026, the IDF attacked a shipment of weapons intended for Hezbollah in the Janta area on the Lebanon-Syria border (IDF spokesperson, November 16, 2026). Israeli aircraft reportedly attacked the mountainous al-Sha'ara area on the Lebanese side of the border with Syria, the first attack in the Beqa'a Valley region in three months (al-Manar, November 16, 2026).

[9] A diplomatic and regional framework mediated by Pakistan in April 2026 to de-escalate and end the 2026 conflict between the United States, Iran,and associated regional fronts.

[10] The aspiration to destroy the State of Israel.



The attack near the Lebanon-Syria border (al-Manar, November 16, 2026)

►IDF forces continued operations to locate and destroy terrorist infrastructure in the security zone in south Lebanon, destroying a 35-meter-long tunnel with two rooms in the village of Majdal Zoun (IDF spokesperson, November 15, 2026). Lebanese media reported that IDF activity included airstrikes, artillery fire, tank fire and the demolition of buildings (Lebanese News Agency, Naharnet and Hezbollah on the Ground Telegram channel, November 9–16, 2026). Reports in Lebanon claimed two Lebanese brothers were abducted from their home in the town of Shebaa and taken to the "occupied territories," and their older brother was also being held by Israel (al-Manar, November 16, 2026).

Hezbollah

►According to reports, Hezbollah continued its clandestine efforts to rebuild its presence and military infrastructure in south Lebanon without an overt military deployment. The organization patrolled and conducted observations near IDF positions with small squads and operatives in civilian clothing, examining the deployment of forces and their response patterns. Reportedly, Hezbollah was trying to preserve communications networks and examine infrastructure and positions it had previously used, taking advantage of the residents' return to the villages and restrictions on searches of private property, including in areas where the Lebanese army was working to dismantle its infrastructure south of the Litani River (al-Modon, November 9, 2026; Erem News, November 12, 2026).

The Lebanese Government

►Lebanese Information Minister Paul Morcos announced that Lebanon would submit a report to the UN Human Rights Council in early December 2026 concerning Israeli attacks, part of its efforts to advance its demands through international channels (*al-Diyar*, November 14, 2026).

UNIFIL

► UNIFIL reported that 12 rounds had been fired at one of its patrols in the Wadi Jilo area of south Lebanon. The UNIFIL personnel returned fire after identifying the source of the shots; no casualties were reported. UNIFIL did not report who it believed was behind the incident, but called on the Lebanese authorities to investigate, noting that deliberate attacks on peacekeeping forces violated Resolution 1701 and international agreements (UNIFIL X account, November 10, 2026).

Hezbollah's Challenges

Rebuilding Military Capabilities

► In his Martyrs' Day speech, Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem responded to and rejected claims that the organization was weak. He said the objective of claims that Hezbollah's decisions were made in Tehran and there was no one in the organization to talk to because its entire leadership had been eliminated was to weaken Hezbollah's morale. He reminded his audience that Hezbollah had led the last two wars against Israel and had participated in the funerals of those killed, noted the activities of the scout movement and recalled Hezbollah's success in the local elections. While he did admit that Hezbollah was militarily weaker than Israel, he was quick to state that military weakness could be overcome, but the important things were "belief in the resistance," the will to confront and the will to stand firm (Hezbollah secretary general's website, November 11, 2026).

► Lebanese security sources told the Emirati news website Erem News, which is critical of Hezbollah, that the organization was dealing with damage to its security and intelligence capabilities following the loss of experienced commanders and operatives in 2024 and 2025. According to the sources, the damage was reflected in the erosion of operational discipline, coordination difficulties and deficiencies in securing clandestine activity. They pointed to the seizure of the explosives truck in Dahr al-Baydar and the arrest of the suspects in the Bsharri–al-Batroun area as manifestations of those failures, although the connection between the detainees and Hezbollah has not yet been proven. Security analyst Riad Kahwaji said rebuilding clandestine capabilities based on experience, networks of trust and professional discipline required time and was not a matter of appointing replacements for the personnel who had been lost (Erem News, November 11, 2026).

Challenges within the Shi'ite Community

► Initiated by Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and Amal leader, the movement began holding organizational workshops to examine the performance of its institutions and its standing within the Shi'ite community, given the consequences of the war, displacement and the economic crisis. Reportedly, the move reflected the strengthening of Berri's position as a central figure in representing the community and in contacts with state institutions, as Hezbollah weakened (*al-Akhbar*, November 9, 2026).

► The approval of a $200 million World Bank loan to expand the Aman social assistance program[11] was criticized by sectors of Shi'ite society. They claimed operatives affiliated with Hezbollah and Amal influenced the eligibility lists on political grounds, excluding needy families and favoring associates, and called for the introduction of a transparent government distribution mechanism. No independent evidence was presented to support the allegations, but they reflect criticism of the involvement of the Shi'ite parties in aid mechanisms (*al-Nahar*, November 13, 2026).

► According to an unverified report, Hezbollah is also trying to expand its influence in Sunni populations through associations and local religious figures providing economic, medical and educational assistance, primarily in the Beqa'a Valley, Sidon and Tripoli. A source told Erem News that the objective of the activity was to establish social and political ties outside the Shi'ite support base and, in some places, was accompanied by attempts to recruit young people into Hezbollah-affiliated frameworks, including the Resistance Brigades[12] (Erem News, November 9, 2026).

The Economic Challenge

► Hezbollah reportedly uses international financial networks, including networks operating in Europe, to transfer funds, circumvent sanctions and finance its activity. According to a report, the networks combine ostensibly legitimate commercial activity with money laundering linked to trade in drugs, vehicles and luxury goods and the transfer of funds through third countries. Examples cited included the activities of businessman Nazem Ahmad (a United States specially designated global terrorist) and the use of digital currencies to transfer funds. It was further claimed that differences between sanction

[11] The Aman program (Emergency Social Safety Net) is Lebanon's national cash assistance initiative administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs to support extreme poor and vulnerable households.

[12] Hezbollah formed the group in November 1997 to recruit non-Shi'ite volunteers, including Sunnis, Christians and Druze, to fight against Israeli forces in south Lebanon.

regimes in European countries and difficulties in monitoring international trade chains enable networks affiliated with the organization to continue operating (Erem News, November 11, 2026).

► Hezbollah has reportedly resumed collecting donations from its supporters through operatives carrying donation boxes in the streets of the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. The daily *al-Nahar*, which is critical of Hezbollah, said the appeal for public donations reflected the organization's liquidity difficulties, but did not present data that would make it possible to determine the extent of the difficulties or whether the activity was unusual compared with previous fundraising patterns (*al-Nahar*, November 12, 2026).



Hezbollah operative waits for donations (*al-Nahar*, November 12, 2026)

Preparations for The Day After UNIFIL

► As end of UNIFIL's mission approaches, preparations for its withdrawal are being made and contacts continue to formulate an alternative security arrangement in south Lebanon. UNIFIL spokesperson Candice Ardell said Resolution 1701 would remain in effect even after the force's withdrawal (Erem News, November 9, 2026). France proposed extending UNIFIL's operations by at least six months or expanding the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observer mission to approximately 1,500 personnel, while adapting its powers to monitor implementation of Resolution 1701 and the framework agreement. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said the arrangement was intended to support an Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah's disarmament and the strengthening of state authority (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 10, 2026). According to Lebanese sources, France is coordinating with the United States to formulate the alternative, but its nature, powers and legal framework have not yet been agreed upon (al-Modon, November 13, 2026).

► Mike Waltz, the American ambassador to the UN, met with Lebanese leaders in Beirut to discuss the issue of ending UNIFIL's operations. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam noted the need

for a continued international presence in south Lebanon under a Security Council mandate and in accordance with Resolution 1701, to carry out monitoring, reporting and coordination tasks, and to support the Lebanese army's implementing state authority throughout its territory (Lebanese presidency and Lebanese prime minister's Office X accounts, November 16, 2026). After the meetings, Waltz said he would brief the administration in Washington and the Security Council on the positions of Lebanese officials. He said he expected Resolution 1701 to remain the basis for implementation, although with necessary adjustments, adding that UNIFIL had cost a great deal of money over 20years and that had to be "fixed" (*al-Nahar*, November 16, 2026).

► A diplomatic source said Waltz would present a proposal to the Lebanese leadership based on an international force which would not resemble UNIFIL in size or mandate, but would be more similar to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and would have an estimated 100 observers from various countries. According to the source, France, the Gulf States and European countries had changed the position of the American administration, which had opposed the presence of a new international force, after explaining that the Lebanese army could not be left in direct confrontation with IDF forces without an intermediary (al-Hadath, November 16, 2026).

► Meeting with UN Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed, President Joseph Aoun said Lebanon wanted UNIFIL to continue its operations, and if that were not possible, the continuation of its missions during the transitional period should be ensured or an alternative mechanism established under UN auspices, while preserving Resolution 1701 as the legal basis for the arrangement (Lebanese presidency website, November 14, 2026). Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, also said his position was that UNIFIL should remain on the ground after its mandate expired, but the Americans and Israelis opposed that. He added that during his meeting with US ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz, he would hear the current American position so that progress could be made (*al-Nashra*, November 15, 2026).



The Lebanese leadership relies on Resolution 1701 as the basis for ensuring the state's sovereignty and security. The point is that international resolutions alone are insufficient to guarantee security and sovereignty without practical implementation on the ground (*al-Liwaa*, November 16, 2026)

► Sources said that meeting in Beirut, Bilal Erdogan, the son of the Turkish president, told Lebanese President Joseph Aoun that Ankara was prepared to establish a presence in south Lebanon after UNIFIL's mandate ended, if an agreement were reached on the presence of international forces along the border between Lebanon and Israel (*al-Akhbar*, November 13, 2026).

► During a visit to Tyre by UN Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed, representatives of the municipality and the union of municipalities of the Tyre District gave her a letter for the UN secretary general requesting an extension of UNIFIL's mandate or the establishment of an alternative mechanism which would prevent a security vacuum in the south. The representatives noted the force's role in humanitarian assistance and the difficulties faced by local authorities, which bear the burden of accommodating displaced persons despite a shortage of resources (*al-Diyar*, November 15, 2026).

The Consequences of the Hostilities for Civilians

► The damage caused by the hostilities continues to burden the economy and society in south Lebanon, particularly the agricultural sector, which is a major source of livelihood for the region's residents. According to figures from the Lebanese ministry of agriculture, agricultural losses from the fighting in 2026 are estimated at approximately $530 million, while extensive tracts of farmland remain inaccessible. Many farmers are struggling to resume their activities because of lost income, a shortage of financing and concerns about renewed fighting, and some claim that they have not yet received compensation even though their losses were documented (*al-Akhbar*, November 14, 2026). President Aoun reiterated the state's commitment to assisting farmers in the south and said the ministry of

agriculture had allocated $7.5 million in assistance with a plan for an additional $40 million, which includes the provision of 1,500 greenhouses and 50 water pumps. Aoun said he had approached American officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, requesting they exert pressure on Israel to allow farmers to return to their land (Lebanese presidency X account and *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 9, 2026).

► Sources said that Bilal Erdogan, the son of the Turkish president, met in Beirut with Lebanese President Aoun to discuss reconstruction and said his country wanted to help, either with financial aid or by selecting a village Turkey would rebuild (*al-Akhbar*, November 13, 2026)

► The Council of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops in Lebanon voted to establish a committee headed by Bishop Elias Nassar to monitor the situation in Christian villages near the border with Israel. That followed an appeal by local authority heads who warned of the deteriorating security and economic situation and said they were worried about possible harm to the continued Christian presence in the area. Initially the committee will focus on the villages of Alma al-Shaab, al-Qouzah, Debel, Rmeish, Ain Ebel and Yaroun, and its activities are expected to expand to other communities. The committee will work in coordination with state institutions, the Vatican and international and humanitarian organizations to raise assistance, improve living conditions and create the conditions for displaced residents to return to their communities (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 14, 2026).

► The Lebanese ministry of social affairs, in cooperation with the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, announced the launch of a rental assistance program for displaced families unable to return to their homes. In the first phase, the program will help 2,700 families, each of which will be eligible for assistance of $280 per month for six months. Haneen al-Sayed, minister of social affairs, said the program was intended to facilitate the transition from reception centers and temporary housing to adequate housing, part of efforts to address the consequences of displacement and promote the reconstruction of residential areas. She said an estimated 3,000 families were still living in reception centers, alongside many other displaced families who were unable to return to their homes, and the existing funding does not meet all their needs (Lebanese News Agency, November 13, 2026).