The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute
At the Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center



Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon

November 2 – 9, 2026

Trending

►The Lebanese authorities are trying to preserve the state monopoly on weapons without escalating tensions with Hezbollah.

►Concerns are growing that Hezbollah will join another war alongside Iran, with uncertainty regarding the independence of the organization's leadership in making military decisions.

►Lebanon awaits the implications and consequences of the elections in Israel and the United States for the continuation of the political process.

Overview[1]

►International pressure is mounting on the Lebanese authorities to accelerate the investigation into the affair of the Hezbollah explosives truck to enforce state authority over the organization.

►Qatar is promoting an initiative for Hezbollah to disarm in two phases, with a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and the reconstruction of the destroyed areas.

►Hezbollah renewed its calls for the Lebanese government to end direct negotiations with Israel, while the Lebanese leadership is monitoring the possible consequences of the elections in Israel and the United States on the framework agreement. The Lebanese army reportedly rejected proposals for direct military coordination with IDF forces.

►IDF forces continued operations to destroy terrorist infrastructure and remove threats in the security zone in south Lebanon. An Amal terrorist operative was eliminated in an attack and weapons stockpiles were discovered near UNIFIL positions.

►Hezbollah's commitment not to participate if the Iran-United States war escalates is in doubt, despite the organization's reassurance.

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.

► A survey of the Shi'ites in Lebanon conducted by a Hezbollah-affiliated research institute showed clear support for keeping the weapons of the "resistance," despite pessimism caused by deteriorating living conditions.

► The Syrian authorities exposed a Hezbollah-affiliated cell which had planned a terrorist attack on the oil refineries in Homs.

► UNIFIL confirmed its mission in south Lebanon would end at the end of 2026, while discussions continue regarding a future international force which will assist the Lebanese army.

The Lebanese Government-Hezbollah Struggle for State Sovereignty

Affair of the Hezbollah Truck of Explosives[2]

► The first military investigating judge, Ghada Abu Alwan, questioned the two Hezbollah operatives arrested with the explosives truck, Ali al-Kurdi and Haitham Amhaz, and issued arrest warrants for them. The questioning of six other defendants was postponed until November 17, 2026, following the submission of preliminary objections by their defense attorney. The technical investigations were completed, including the examination of security camera footage and content from the mobile phones of those involved. Parties opposed to Hezbollah, including the Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Forces, continued to demand that the case be referred to the Judicial Council rather than remain under the jurisdiction of the military justice system (Lebanese News Agency, November 5, 2026; al-Manar, November 3, 2026; *al-Akhbar*, November 4, 2026).

[2] In early October 2026, Lebanese internal security forces intercepted a commercial vehicle traveling on the road from the Beqa'a Valleyto Beirut at the Dahr al-Baidar checkpoint on the Beirut-Damascus highway and arrested its two occupants, Hezbollah operatives. Hundreds of kilograms of explosives used to manufacture explosive devices, including C-4 and TNT, were found in the vehicle.



The affair of the explosives truck and the dispute over who would deal with Hezbollah's military activity (Saer Sabil's X account, November 7, 2026)

► In Beirut, the embassies of the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada and Japan issued a joint statement calling for swift, independent judicial proceedings in the explosives truck affair, without political interference, and said they supported the Lebanese government's efforts to ensure a state monopoly on weapons and its authority to declare war and peace. White House sources noted that the American administration was monitoring the investigation and was dissatisfied with the delay in completing it and the authorities' reluctance to refer the case to the Judicial Council. According to another report, Washington was also considering imposing sanctions on Lebanese security and military personnel over their handling of the affair (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 5–7, 2026). Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, called it "blatant interference" in Lebanon's internal affairs and judicial system. He called on the government and the foreign ministry to reject external pressure and said the United States had turned the affair into a political issue extending beyond the judicial proceedings themselves (*al-Joumhouria*, November 8, 2026).

► Despite international pressure, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam do not want political escalation with Hezbollah. A source linked the decision not to refer the affair to the Judicial Council to issuing indictments for individuals involved in the affair rather than against the organization itself. The objective was to make it possible to dialogue with Hezbollah while keeping the principle of the state monopoly on weapons (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 7, 2026).

► Bechara al-Rai, the Maronite Patriarch, said the investigation of the explosives truck should be conducted without political exploitation, adding that preventing another war required establishing a single national security authority and leaving declarations of war to the state (al-Markazia, November 8, 2026).

The Lebanese Leadership

►Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam rejected claims that the government was "confused" by developments in the United States and Israel and said it was establishing a political safety net for Lebanon while adhering to the principle of the state monopoly on weapons and its authority to declare war. He warned against ties to external factors which could drag Lebanon into another war. Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji said the government was determined to restrict the possession of weapons and military activity to authorized bodies, although he acknowledged restrictions had not yet been imposed. He said Lebanon would not allow other parties to negotiate on its behalf or drag it into a war in the service of "foreign interests" (Lebanese presidency X account, November 4–5, 2026; *al-Nahar*, November 8, 2026).

Hezbollah

►The Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament called to end the exchange of accusations in the political arena, condemned those opposed to "resistance activities"[3] and claimed the Lebanese people had the right to "resist" Israel and defend their country (Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc website, November 5, 2026).

► Sources claimed Hezbollah's demand to revoke the government's March 2, 2026 decisions banning the organization's "military" activity was unacceptable to Lebanese President Aoun, although the presidential office did not rule out renewing the dialogue with the organization (*al-Akhbar*, November 6, 2026).

►A Western diplomatic source told the daily *Nidaa al-Watan,* affiliated with the anti-Hezbollah camp, that Qatar was promoting a two-phased plan: the handover of Hezbollah's "offensive" weapons in exchange for a timetable for a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, followed by arrangements for dealing with and handing over "defensive" weapons under agreed terms, alongside progress in reconstruction. According to the source, contacts between the United States and Iran indicated a degree of flexibility on Tehran's part, but no agreement had yet been reached on the plan's details or timetable (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 3, 2026).

Hezbollah's Opponents

►Two journalists, George Sadaka and Tony Issa, published articles in *al-Joumhouria* warning that Hezbollah's continued "independent military activity" would exacerbate

[3] Violence and terrorism against Israel.

internal divisions and expose Lebanon to further Israeli escalation (*al-Joumhouria*, November 3, 2026).

► Lebanese Parliament member Alain Aoun said he supported the state monopoly on weapons but claimed it required a "gradual process," with Hezbollah's cooperation and an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. He said an attempt to impose disarmament without a political arrangement would lead to internal confrontation, and therefore there had to be mechanism which would allow an Israeli withdrawal alongside the gradual handover of weapons (Lebanese News Agency, November 7, 2026).

Israel-Lebanon Negotiations for the Framework Agreement

The Lebanese Leadership

► During a visit to Canada, Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji said Lebanon remained committed to the framework agreement as the basis for negotiations with Israel to end Israeli military activity and effect a withdrawal from Lebanese territory. He said the agreement was not a final settlement and Lebanon did not want to be drawn into regional conflicts (Youssef Rajji's X account, November 6, 2026).

► A Lebanese official downplayed remarks by Israeli President Isaac Herzog, who called for progress in negotiations with Lebanon. He said what mattered was not what the Israeli president said but what Gadi Eisenkot would say, or Benjamin Netanyahu if Eisenkot failed to form a government. According to the source, they did not expect progress or a change in Israel's approach toward Lebanon, the differences would be only in how they acted (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 9, 2026).

► Once the results of the United States midterm elections became known, Lebanese political figures became concerned about possible changes in the current administration's priorities and the extent of its involvement in advancing the framework agreement with Israel. According to the Hezbollah-affiliated daily *al-Akhbar*, their concerns increased with reports of the possible departure of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, regarded as one of the principal supporters of strengthening state institutions and reducing Hezbollah's influence. Political sources questioned whether the current administration would be able to exert effective pressure on Israel to advance its withdrawal from Lebanese territory in light of changes in the American and Israeli political systems (*al-Akhbar*, November 6, 2026).

Hezbollah

► Hezbollah's parliamentary faction called on the government to reconsider, claiming the negotiations had produced no results and Israel continued its military activity on Lebanese territory (Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc website, November 5, 2026).

► Sheikh Ali Damoush, chairman of Hezbollah's executive council, accused the United States of interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs and claimed the framework agreement legitimized Israel's continued military presence. He said the organization would not yield to pressure to disarm and the right of the "resistance"[4] could not be revoked by a government or judicial decision. He called for prioritizing Israel's withdrawal, an end to the attacks, the return of displaced persons and the reconstruction of south Lebanon (*al-Diyar*, November 6, 2026).

► Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said Iran played a central role in the "regional campaign" and claimed ending Israeli attacks in Lebanon and withdrawing from its territory, and protecting Lebanese sovereignty had become central issues in the negotiations between Tehran and Washington. He claimed resolving the crisis in Lebanon required taking into account regional contacts and Iran's influence (*al-Joumhouria, November 8, 2026).*

The Lebanese Army

► The Lebanese army opposes Israeli demands for direct security coordination between the two armies as part of implementing the framework agreement. Lebanese military sources said that during the latest round of talks between the Lebanese and Israeli military delegations in Florida, proposals were made to establish a joint operations room with the IDF, conduct joint patrols and operate a joint verification mechanism without American involvement at every stage of coordination. The Lebanese army rejected the proposals and insisted that all coordination activities be conducted through an American or international mediator, as is done under the existing mechanisms. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reportedly supported the army's position, concerned direct coordination with Israel would undermine public confidence in the army and make it more difficult to expand its deployment in the south (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 2, 2026; *al-Joumhouria*, November 3, 2026).

[4] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.

The Military Situation in South Lebanon and Preparations to Renew the Fighting

The IDF

► IDF forces continued air and ground operations to remove threats and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure in the security defense zone in south Lebanon. Two suspects who were observing the forces were attacked in the area of the village of Qabrikha, outside the security defense zone in south Lebanon. In the village of Meis al-Jabal, two stockpiles of equipment and weapons were discovered in a civilian home and a warehouse located less than 200 meters from a UNIFIL position, and in the village of al-Tiri, an apartment with observation devices and combat equipment was found approximately 250 meters from a UNIFIL position (IDF spokesperson, November 2–9, 2026).



Weapons found near a UNIFIL position (IDF spokesperson, November 8, 2026)

► Lebanese media reported that IDF activity included airstrikes, artillery fire, the detonation and demolition of buildings and the movement of ground forces. Activity was reported in Tallouseh, Aita al-Jabal, Hadatha, al-Khiyam, Beit Yahoun, Haris, Baraachit, al-Mansouri, Wadi Zibqin, al-Qantara, Mifdoun and Wadi al-Salouqi. An Amal terrorist operative was reportedly killed in an attack in Qabrikha (*al-Akhbar*, Naharnet and the Lebanese News Agency, November 2–9, 2026).

Hezbollah

► Sources told the daily *Nidaa al-Watan,* affiliated with the anti-Hezbollah camp, that the organization was redeploying armed operatives in civilian clothing in villages in south Lebanon, in some cases just a few meters from IDF positions. Sources said Hezbollah was seeking covert ways to transfer weapons to south Lebanon, including the use of weapons which would not arouse suspicion, to prevent a recurrence of the explosives truck seizure (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 6–7, 2026).

►Ali Ammar, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the organization was ready for war and prepared to deal with all scenarios (NBN, November 8, 2026).

►United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly warned Lebanese President Joseph Aoun that Israel might expand its attacks in south Lebanon and operate in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia and other areas of Beirut if Hezbollah resumed activities to assist Iran. Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, reportedly conveyed reassurance from Hezbollah claiming did not want to expand the confrontation and Iran did not need its military assistance (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 2, 2026). However, sources close to the organization said it did not intend to make commitments which would restrict its freedom of action as long as Israeli military activity in Lebanon continued (*al-Diyar*, November 5, 2026).

►According to a government source, Aoun is encouraging indirect contacts with Hezbollah, with the support of parliament speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri, to reduce tensions and prevent the organization from joining another war alongside Iran. However, the contacts are currently limited to Hezbollah's political echelon, and the source claimed concern that the organization's commitments would not necessarily commit the military leadership (al-Modon and *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 7, 2026).

►A dispute arose over the degree of independence of Hezbollah's leadership in making military decisions. A commentator named Qassem Qassir, who is close to the organization, claimed decisions were made through a leadership mechanism binding on all its institutions, including the Jihad Council. Ali al-Amin, also a commentator, said strategic military decisions were effectively dictated by Iran and the political echelon's room for maneuver had narrowed following the blows to the organization's leadership (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 7, 2026).

The Lebanese Government

►A Lebanese government source said statements by Iran's leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, about the continuation of the "unity of the arenas,"[5] had caused the Lebanese president and prime minister concerns lest Lebanon be dragged into another regional confrontation. Prime

[5] In case of hostilities with Israel, all members of the "resistance axis," that is Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, would join forces against Israel.

Minister Salam said declaring war rested solely with state institutions and Lebanon was not bound by Iranian policy. The source pointed to a possible discrepancy between the Iranian statements and the reassurance from Hezbollah, and said he doubted whether the commitments of the organization's political echelon would also commit its military echelon (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 5, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

► Meeting with senior general staff officers and commanders of operational units, Lebanese army commander General Rodolph Haykal said the army was working to implement the decisions of the political leadership and extend state authority over all its territory, despite security challenges and limited resources. He said the continued Israeli presence on Lebanese territory was the main danger facing the country and noted the importance of UNIFIL's continued activity in monitoring and documenting violations along the border. He also said the army was preparing for various security scenarios and working to maintain internal stability (Lebanese Army X account, November 6, 2026).

Hezbollah's Opponents

► Kataeb Party chairman MP Sami Gemayel warned that Hezbollah might drag Lebanon into another war alongside Iran and called on President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam to take practical steps, led by the Lebanese army, to prevent the country's involvement in a regional confrontation. Gemayel claimed Hezbollah's military decisions were influenced by Iran and the Revolutionary Guards, and the organization's promises not to join the campaign should not be relied upon. The party also called for the establishment of a crisis cell involving the Lebanese army, local authorities and UNIFIL, and the preparation of an emergency plan to ensure basic services for residents of border communities and deal with the possibility of widespread displacement. The party also appealed to the Amal Movement and Shi'ite political and religious figures, calling on them to help prevent Lebanon from being dragged into another war (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 3–4, 2026).

Challenges for Hezbollah

Rebuilding Capabilities

► Hussein al-Nimr, in charge of the Beqa'a Valley district on behalf of Hezbollah, said the organization was reorganizing and rebuilding its capabilities, formations and units, alongside efforts to assist the population affected by the war. He said the organization

worked to preserve its strength and ensure the continuity of the "resistance" (Lebanon Files, November 8, 2026).

Challenges within the Shi'ite Community


►There were reportedly differences of opinion between Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, who seeks to participate in decisions affecting the Shi'ite community, and Hezbollah's decision-making practices, particularly on military matters, and the disputes have spread to the local level. A dispute arose in the town of al-Hallousiyeh over the commemoration of former Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and Amal founder Musa al-Sadr, while in the town of Selaa, Amal representatives abstained from municipal activities, claiming Hezbollah was making unilateral decisions. Sources in both leaderships said the disagreements were not expected to lead to the dissolution of the political alliance (al-Modon, November 6, 2026). According to another report, the Amal movement is expanding its influence in south Lebanon and is taking over positions it previously divided with Hezbollah (L'Orient-Le Jour, November 8, 2026).

►A public opinion poll conducted by the Hezbollah-affiliated Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation of 1,065 Shi'ite respondents in Lebanon indicated continued widespread support for "the weapons of the resistance," accompanied by economic pessimism and a lack of confidence in government institutions. Approximately 80% of respondents expected their living conditions to deteriorate, but 84% believed the weapons of the "resistance" were necessary for defense and deterrence as long as the "Israeli threat" continued, and only 4% supported the state monopoly on weapons. The poll also showed that 77% declared they would vote for "resistance" slates or those supported by it in the parliamentary elections. Regarding the authority to declare war and peace, 53.5% supported leaving it exclusively in the hands of the "resistance," compared with 37.6% who supported decisions made by agreement between the state and the organization. The poll indicated widespread lack of confidence in the presidency and the government (*al-Akhbar*, November 3, 2026).

This question was aimed at those who picked "Armed Resistence" as the way to free the land

What is your position towards Armed Confrontation against the Occupation?

Position	Percentage (%)
Renew military activity even if it leads to war	54,0
Renew military activity unless it leads to war	24,5
Wait for a Political Decision	19,8
Doesn't know/Refuses to Answer	1,7
Overall	100



The public opinion poll taken of the Shi'ite community (*al-Akhbar*, November 3, 2026)

► Hezbollah continued giving housing allowances to families whose homes were destroyed or damaged in the last two hostilities with Israel and to displaced persons from border communities who could not return to their homes. The distribution was carried out through regional centers with the assistance of employees of the al-Qard al-Hassan Association. At the same time, the organization completed another survey of housing units in the south and updated the lists of eligible recipients, including cases which had not been covered by the previous compensation program, among them apartment owners who had lost rental income used to finance their alternative accommodation (*al-Akhbar*, November 3, 2026).



Criticism of Hezbollah and the tension between the demands for reconstruction and stability and the preservation of its military capabilities (Saer Sabil's X account, November 7, 2026)

Challenges to Hezbollah's "State within a State"

Challenges to Hezbollah's "State within a State"

► A United States State Department spokesperson confirmed that the Lebanese consul in Detroit, Ibrahim Charara, was persona non grata, following the discovery of posts he had allegedly published in the past praising the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. A source close to the consul claimed "his account had been hacked seven years earlier and he had not written the posts" (L'Orient-Le Jour, November 7, 2026). The daily *Nidaa al-Watan,* affiliated with the anti-Hezbollah camp, wrote that the affair would revive the issue of

diplomats representing the "mini-state," meaning Hezbollah, and that the Lebanese foreign ministry would investigate the affair, which was damaging the country's diplomatic reputation (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 9, 2026).

► Lebanon's central bank ordered an end to medical coverage for its employees and their families at two Hezbollah-affiliated medical institutions, al-Rasoul al-Aazam Hospital and the Lebanese Medical Center (LMC). Treatment expenses at these institutions would no longer be covered by the bank's medical plan. Ali al-Moqdad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, condemned the decision, claiming it reflected compliance with American pressure and infringed on employees' right to choose their medical treatment facilities (*al-Akhbar*, November 4, 2026).

Hezbollah Activity in Syria

► The Syrian ministry of the interior said the general intelligence directorate, in cooperation with the internal security forces, had foiled a plan to attack the oil refineries in Homs, which it claimed had been planned by a Hezbollah-affiliated cell. Two suspects were arrested and explosive devices ready for activation were seized. Sources quoted in the Lebanese media claimed the Syrian authorities had evidence of the involvement of Hezbollah-affiliated operatives, including Lebanese nationals, in security activities on Syrian territory, and raised the possibility of a demand for the extradition of organization operatives who had previously operated in the country. Hezbollah's media relations unit denied the allegations and reiterated its position that the organization had no presence or connection to activities undermining Syria's security and stability (Syrian internal security forces X account, November 3, 2026; *Nidaa al-Watan*, November 4, 2026; al-Manar, November 3, 2026).



Explosive devices and equipment seized in Homs
(Syrian internal security forces X account, November 3, 2026)

► Sources claimed the Syrian judicial system had evidence of the involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah commanders in operating sleeper cells in Syria (*Nidaa al-Watan*, November 5, 2026).

► Hezbollah sources said in recent months Turkey had played a role in efforts to ease tensions between the Syrian regime and Hezbollah (al-Jadeed X account, November 8, 2026).

Hezbollah's Involvement with the Houthis

► Ibrahim Ali Haidan, minister of the interior of Yemen's internationally recognized government, claimed 14 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and seven Hezbollah operatives were active in six governorates in the country and were responsible for planning military operations, developing weapons and coordinating Houthi maritime attacks while managing the Houthis' military activity in a joint command structure. According to the minister, members of the network were engaged in command and control of operational activity, the development of ballistic missiles and UAVs, communications systems and electronic warfare. They also managed networks for supplying equipment and smuggling military components, participated in selecting merchant ships as targets for attack, coordinating maritime operations, developing explosive boats and autonomous underwater vehicles and training Houthi forces in mine-laying and urban warfare (al-Arabiya, November 3, 2026). Hezbollah claimed that the accusations were false and baseless. Its media relations department claimed the Yemeni people had the capabilities, means and experience to defend their country and sovereignty against any attack, threat or blockade and did not need support or intervention from anyone, as they had demonstrated in confronting the "American and Israeli aggression" against them and in their support for the Gaza Strip (Hezbollah on the Ground Telegram channel, November 4, 2026).

Hezbollah's Relations with Arab Countries

► Signs of cautious openness toward Hezbollah were recently seen in Arab countries, particularly the Gulf States. Reportedly, domestic Lebanese issues were discussed at a meeting between the prime minister of Qatar and Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, and the Qatari showed "understanding" for the positions of the organization. According to a report, Hassan Shuqair, the director general of Lebanese general security, returned from a visit to Saudi Arabia with encouragement for internal dialogue involving all political actors, and Hezbollah also received positive signals from the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Egypt. In addition, Turkey was encouraging the Arabs to be

open to the organization because of Iran's desire to include the Lebanese issue in a future agreement with the United States (*al-Diyar*, November 7, 2026).

Preparations for the Day After UNIFIL

► UNIFIL said that in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2790 (2025), the operational mandate of the UN force in south Lebanon would end on December 31, 2026, after which a process of reducing and withdrawing its forces would begin. Until that date, the forces would continue their routine missions, including monitoring developments in south Lebanon, maintaining contact with the parties and assisting the Lebanese army (UNIFIL X account, November 5, 2026).

► Lebanese army commander General Rodolph Haykal met with Jean Arnault, the UN coordinator for Lebanon, to discuss possible alternatives for the period following UNIFIL's withdrawal and the security challenges facing the country (Lebanese army X account, November 6, 2026). Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said UN Security Council Resolution 1701 remained the legal framework for regulating the situation in south Lebanon and UNIFIL played a vital role in its implementation (*al-Diyar*, November 6, 2026).

► According to the monthly Security Council Report,[6] during closed consultations in the Security Council on October 21, 2026, the possibility was raised of establishing a UN observer mission along the Blue Line alongside an international force operating outside the UN framework which would assist the Lebanese army. It was linked to a French-Italian initiative to establish an international coalition to support Lebanon after UNIFIL's withdrawal, but the composition and powers of the force have not yet been defined. Another alternative is an exceptional six-month postponement of the start of UNIFIL's withdrawal to allow time to formulate an alternative arrangement and prevent the emergence of a security vacuum in the south (Security Council Report and Lebanon Debate, November 6, 2026).

► Military and diplomatic sources said that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun was continuing contacts to ensure an international presence in the south after the end of UNIFIL's mandate, but no agreement had yet been reached on extending it or establishing an alternative. The sources said the United States had reservations about extending the existing mandate, alongside France, which noted the need to preserve monitoring and liaison mechanisms, protect civilians and establish state authority in the south. Meanwhile, American and France

[6] An independent organization that examines the activities of the UN Security Council.

were coordinating for a new Security Council resolution that would base future security mechanisms on the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel and define the powers of the international presence and its relationship with the Lebanese army (al-Modon, November 7–8, 2026).

The Effects of the Fighting on the Civilian Situation

► Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam chaired a meeting attended by representatives of state institutions responsible for reconstruction and assistance, to review tenders and projects advanced by the council of the south and the council for development and reconstruction. They discussed the supply of fuel and financial assistance to families in southern communities, the installation of prefabricated structures for temporary housing and ensuring water and electricity, the removal of rubble and the rehabilitation of civil defense services in al-Nabatieh (Lebanese prime minister's office X account, November 4–5, 2026).

► Reportedly, about 10,000 displaced persons from villages in south Lebanon were still living in 18 communities in the al-Zahrani coastal area, south of Sidon, unable to return to their villages because of the extensive destruction and the security situation in the south. Approximately 800 of the displaced persons were in three reception centers, while the remainder were living mainly in rented apartments and had housing arrangements in the local community. In view of the prolonged displacement and the decline in humanitarian assistance, local authorities were easing the situation of the displaced persons through rent supervision, fee exemptions and assistance in finding sources of livelihood (*al-Akhbar*, November 7, 2026).

► On November 9, 2026, farmers from Kafr Shoba were permitted to enter their lands in the eastern part of the village to begin harvesting olives, under an arrangement which had numerous restrictions. Mayor Qassem al-Qadri said only 120 people, landowners and farmers, would be allowed to enter for a limited period between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. He said it was a temporary arrangement and insufficient to cover all the village's farmland, adding that they demanded an expansion of the areas and an increase in the number of days allocated to agricultural activity and would reach the area by all necessary means (*al-Akhbar*, November 9, 2026).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

► Ramez Dimashkieh, chairman of the Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue committee, said the national plan for regulating governance in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, launched on October 30, 2026, combined strengthening security and the rule of law with improving social and economic conditions in the camps. He said the rights of Palestinian refugees were not conditional on handing over weapons, while the state monopoly on weapons was nonnegotiable. He said consultations would continue for six months with the participation of the relevant Lebanese and Palestinian parties. The Hezbollah-affiliated daily *al-Akhbar* was not optimistic about the plan's prospects, partly because of the connection between the weapons issue, political balances in Lebanon and regional interests, as well as the absence of representatives of the Palestinian factions, including Fatah, from the plan's launch event. The article recalled that previous initiatives to regulate the status and rights of refugees, including the "Lebanese Vision for Palestinian Refugees" of 2017, had not been fully implemented (*al-Akhbar*, November 4, 2026).

► The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) organized a march in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp, near Sidon, to protest cuts in UNRWA services and the alleged infringement of its employees' rights. DFLP representatives warned of the consequences of cuts in health, education, welfare and infrastructure services for the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and called on donor countries to ensure stable funding for the agency. They demanded that the Lebanese state expand the refugees' social and economic rights, particularly in employment and property ownership, and called for the promotion of a comprehensive Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue and increased coordination among the Palestinian "factions"[7] to maintain stability in the camps (Lebanese News Agency, November 6, 2026).

[7] Terrorist organizations.



The protest march in Ein al-Hilweh (Lebanese News Agency, November 6, 2026)