



Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis

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Key Trends

- **Coordination between Iran and Hezbollah in preparation for the possible resumption of the regional war.**
- **Iran is working to mobilize the “Sunni axis” against “Zionist aggression” in the Palestinian arena and Lebanon.**
- **Tensions between Iran and Iraq over the closure of border crossings between the two countries.**

Highlights¹

- Iran used the quadrilateral meeting in Tehran with representatives of the Sunni “Mecca Alliance” countries to discuss the Palestinian and Lebanese issues and to condemn the “crimes of the Zionist regime.”
- Conflicting reports regarding the messages Iran conveyed to Hezbollah during the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister’s visit to Beirut, concerning the organization’s required involvement in the event of a resumption of the regional war.
- Threatening messages from Iran to the Iraqi government following the closure of border crossings between the two countries under American pressure.
- It was reported that the Iraqi government is investigating suspicions that Israel is behind strikes on weapons depots of the pro-Iranian militias, in which weapons transferred from Iran in preparation for the resumption of the regional campaign were stored.
- An examination by a private intelligence company found that information from Russian satellites helped the Houthis and the militias in Iraq attack Saudi targets.

Iranian Involvement in the Palestinian Arena

- Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei referred to Israel’s activity in the Palestinian arena and in Lebanon during a meeting with representatives of the Mecca Alliance countries (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey), held in Tehran on October 26, 2026. President Pezeshkian condemned the “crimes of the Zionist regime in Gaza,

¹ The weekly study includes the activities of Iran, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Lebanon, and other countries in the region” and called on Islamic countries to stand side by side and adopt a coordinated position to prevent Israel from carrying out “acts of assassination and aggression against any person or country whenever it wishes” and to put an end to “the acts of barbarism and the crimes of the Zionist regime against the oppressed peoples and the Muslims” (IRNA, October 26, 2026). At the end of the quadrilateral meeting, Mohsen Rezaei said that the countries’ representatives had stressed the need for the “Zionist regime” to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria, and to stop “its acts of aggression” (ILNA, October 26, 2026).



Meeting of “Mecca Alliance” representatives with the Iranian Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in Tehran (IRNA, October 26, 2026)

Iranian Involvement in Lebanon

- Against the backdrop of a possible resumption of the war between Iran and the United States and Israel, it was reported that Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh, during his visit to Beirut in mid-October 2026, conveyed a message to MPs from the “Shiite duo” (Hezbollah and Amal), according to which Iran is capable of defending itself if the war resumes and does not need Hezbollah’s intervention (Asharq Al-Awsat, October 21, 2026). In another report, “parliamentary sources” said that Khatibzadeh had made it clear that Iran would not ask for the organization’s intervention in view of the sensitivity of the situation in Lebanon and the gaps in power vis-à-vis Israel (Asharq Al-Awsat, October 26, 2026). On the other hand, according to a different report, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister asked Hezbollah to prepare to respond in the event of an attack on Iran, whatever the cost (Al Joumhouria, October 24, 2026).
- Against the backdrop of these reports, Hassan Fadlallah, an MP from Hezbollah’s parliamentary faction, stated that the organization’s decisions are Lebanese and that Iran has not asked it, in the past or at present, to fight alongside it against the United States and Israel. According to him, in meetings with Hezbollah representatives, senior Iranian officials seek to find out what the

organization's needs are and what Lebanon's interests are so that they can support Hezbollah (Al-Ahed, October 26, 2026).

► It was reported that Iran had transferred tens of millions of dollars to Hezbollah to rebuild its military capabilities and prepare for the resumption of fighting against Israel. According to "security sources in Lebanon," over the past three months, after receiving an infusion of funds from Iran, Hezbollah has been working to replenish its weapons stockpile, acquire explosives, and manufacture drones intended to strike Israeli positions (Reuters, October 26, 2026).

► Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said at his weekly press conference that the Islamic Republic reiterates its "principled and firm position of comprehensive support for the Lebanese people and the Lebanese government." He noted that Iran's diplomatic apparatus regards preserving Lebanon's independence and stability and strengthening its capabilities in various fields as a strategic mission and will work to that end using all the means at its disposal (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, October 26, 2026).

Iranian Involvement in Iraq

► A "senior Iraqi official" said that political, military, and security officials in Iran had conveyed explicit threats through Iraqi intermediaries to senior government, military, and intelligence officials in Baghdad following plans to close border crossings between the two countries. The messages portrayed the move as a "declaration of war" by President Trump, and Tehran warned Iraq against becoming a tool in the hands of the United States in its war against Iran. The report also stated that Tehran was pressuring Shiite political figures in Iraq affiliated with the Shiite Coordination Framework to take a stand against the government of Ali al-Zaidi and issue a strong political condemnation of it if it insisted on proceeding with the closure of the border crossings. The "senior Iraqi official" said that an earlier Iranian threat to escalate tensions with the al-Zaidi government had already prompted the authorities in Baghdad to abandon their intention to close the airport in Najaf, southern Iraq, to the takeoff and landing of Iranian aircraft (Al-Modon, October 24, 2026).

The Houthis in Yemen

► During the past week, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree announced that the Houthi armed forces had carried out at least 21 "operations" against various targets in Saudi territory, including the Saudi Defense Ministry building in the capital Riyadh, airports, energy infrastructure, and military targets. According to Saree, the attacks were carried out with a large number of ballistic missiles and drones and caused damage and disruptions to civil aviation in Saudi Arabia and to the production and transport of oil and gas (Yahya Saree's Telegram channel, October 21–28, 2026). The spokesman

for the Saudi-led coalition, Turki al-Maliki, said that coalition forces succeeded in intercepting 26 ballistic missiles, 28 drones, and a cruise missile launched toward various targets in Saudi Arabia (X account of the Saudi-led coalition forces, October 21–28, 2026).

► Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei met with the Houthi ambassador in Tehran, Ibrahim Mohammed al-Dailami, and discussed with him the latest developments on the fighting fronts in Yemen. Rezaei expressed his appreciation for Yemen’s support for “Palestine” and for “its glorious struggle against Israel” in the Gaza war and in the recent war against Iran. Ambassador al-Dailami thanked Rezaei and the Islamic Republic of Iran for their positions (Asr-e Iran, October 27, 2026).



Mohsen Rezaei and Ibrahim Mohammed al-Dailami (Asr-e Iran, October 27, 2026)

The Pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq

► “Sources in the Iraqi government” said that the government in Baghdad suspects that two sites on Iraqi soil where Chinese-made shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles were stored went up in flames after an attack in mid-October 2026. This came after the pro-Iranian militias reported a fire that raged in an ammunition depot at one of the militias’ headquarters in the Baghdad area on October 17, 2026. According to the report, since the beginning of October 2026, militia-owned weapons depots containing attack and intelligence drones have been attacked. The sources further said that the weapons systems that were attacked had recently been transferred from Iran to the factions loyal to it in Iraq. Another “security source” said that the Iraqi authorities have “enough reason to believe” that Israel is behind the damage to the ammunition depots, but they have no information about how it occurred (Asharq Al-Awsat, October 24, 2026).

► “Saudi security sources” said that since the beginning of October 2026, Saudi Arabia has intercepted at least four drones launched toward its territory from Iraq. According to the sources, Saudi Arabia has updated the Iraqi government about these interceptions more than once, but the latter has not taken any step to prevent further launches of this kind (Alhurra, October 22, 2026).

- In this context, it was reported that the Houthis and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq had used intelligence from Russian satellites to carry out attacks in Saudi Arabia. According to the report, a “private intelligence company” that examined 40 attacks carried out by the Houthis and the militias against targets in Saudi Arabia between July and October 2026 found that in all of them, Russian satellite activity was recorded in the days before and after the attacks. According to “four different sources,” three of whom were described as “officials,” Iranian advisors analyzed the Russian information, as well as additional information from a Chinese source, and passed it on to the Houthis and the militias, which in turn used it to carry out attacks against Saudi Arabia and, in the Houthi case, also against the anti-Houthi forces in Yemen (AP, October 27, 2026).
- The “military assistant” of the Al-Nujaba Movement, Abd al-Qader al-Karbalai, stressed the militia’s “fixed position” of refusing to participate in the political process in Iraq. He also made it clear that, with regard to the “weapons of the resistance,” the concepts of restricting, surrendering [the weapons], or disarming [the resistance] do not exist in the militia’s lexicon (Al-Nujaba militia Telegram channel, October 21, 2026).

The Militias in Syria

- The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Possessors of Might (Uli al-Ba’s, UAB) praised the “self-sacrifice operation” carried out by two Palestinian terrorists near Hebron, in which two IDF soldiers were killed. The militia condemned the continued “settlement, demolition, and destruction projects in the West Bank and Jerusalem aimed at uprooting the Palestinian people from their land,” and declared that “the heroic operation is a natural and legitimate response to the ongoing Zionist crimes against the Palestinian people” (Islamic Resistance Front in Syria Telegram channel, October 23, 2026).