



The Hezbollah Leadership, Two Years after the Elimination of Hassan Nasrallah

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Overview¹

- The military offensives Hezbollah waged against Israel, which began on October 8, 2023, resulted in the decimation of the organization's senior leadership, eliminating dozens of senior leaders and military commanders, particularly secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and his designated successor, Hashem Safi al-Din. Hezbollah had to fill key positions in its most important institutions, combining organization veterans with new commanders, while most senior appointments were not made public.
- Since Na'im Qassem became Hezbollah secretary general in October 2024, he has worked to consolidate his position and rebuild the leadership, centralize authority, regulate the division of responsibilities between the organization's mechanisms and strengthen his circle of associates. However, unlike his predecessor Nasrallah, to a large extent Qassem's position relies on the institutional framework and cooperation with veteran senior figures, and the extent of his personal influence on military and strategic decisions remains unclear.
- Given the severe blow to the military echelon and to make it more difficult for Israeli intelligence to penetrate the organization's core, Hezbollah had to promote a younger and less experienced generation of commanders while increasing compartmentalization and secrecy, appointing several deputy commanders who could maintain the chain of command in the event of eliminations and expanding the operational autonomy of small units for guerrilla warfare.
- Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps plays a key role in rebuilding Hezbollah's military, training commanders and restoring command and control mechanisms, with reports of Iranian involvement in decision-making and operational coordination and direction.

¹ Click <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en> to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.

► In Amit Institute assessment, Hezbollah has successfully maintained organizational and military continuity despite the unprecedented loss of its leadership, but it has apparently not successfully restored the quality of leadership and combat capabilities it had under Nasrallah. At that time, it relied on personal authority, accumulated experience and direct ties among veteran senior figures, but it is now moving towards a more decentralized and compartmentalized system in which authority is divided between several centers of power and Iranian involvement is greater. The change may increase the ability of the organization's military wing to survive and make it more difficult to strike the command structure, but at the same time may weaken cohesion, coordination and the ability to formulate a unified strategic policy. Therefore, the main challenges facing the new leadership are not only filling positions and continuing military activity, but to be able to turn the reconstructed system into an effective leadership capable of coordinating the political echelon, the military echelon and the Iranian patron.

The Loss of the Old Guard Generation of Leaders and Commanders²

► During the hostilities waged against Israel between October 8, 2023 and November 27, 2024, and especially during Operation Northern Arrows from September 2024 until the ceasefire in November 2024, Hezbollah lost thousands of operatives, including dozens of senior leadership and command figures, most of them organization veterans. Hezbollah published the names of 37 commanders who were killed during the hostilities, including secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and his designated successor, executive council chairman Hashem Safi al-Din, the organization's military commander Fuad Shukr, head of operations Ibrahim Aqil, southern front commander Ali Karaki, and senior figures in the organization's political leadership and mid-level commanders (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, February 25, 2025).

² For a list of the senior personnel eliminated since October 2023, see Appendix 2.



Hezbollah's 37 most senior fatalities
(Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, February 25, 2025)

► IDF attacks whose objective was to enforce the ceasefire agreement also eliminated hundreds of Hezbollah terrorist operatives and commanders. The most senior was the organization's acting chief of staff, Ali Haitham Tabataba'i, a former Radwan Force commander who also held command positions in the Syrian and Yemeni arenas, eliminated in November 2025.³

► On March 2, 2026, Hezbollah attacked Israel following the elimination of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei. In the ensuing hostilities approximately 3,000 operatives, field commanders and senior commanders were eliminated, many of whom had been appointed to their positions following previous eliminations. The senior figures eliminated included head of the intelligence staff Hussein Muqallad, Nasr Unit commander Hassan Salameh, and Radwan Force commander Abu Ali Rayan.⁴

Reorganizing Hezbollah's Leadership

Leadership and Command Structure before 2024

► Under the leadership of Hassan Nasrallah, who took office in 1992, Hezbollah had a hierarchical leadership structure headed by the Shura Council, the organization's highest decision-making body. It was responsible for setting policy and making strategic political, military, organizational and religious decisions. Five councils were subordinate to it: the Jihad, Executive, Political, Parliamentary and Judicial Councils, which were responsible for implementing the leadership's decisions in their respective areas. The Executive Council played a central role in managing the organization's systems and was described in later publications as a kind of internal government. The structure combined centralized strategic

³ See the ITIC (Amit Institute as of May 2026) report, [Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon \(November 17–24, 2025\)](#).

⁴ See the monthly Amit Institute reports Spotlight on Terrorism for March–June 2026

authority at the senior leadership level with a division of professional responsibilities and institutional and personal centers of power at the levels below it.⁵

► Although the Shura Council was a collective leadership body, under Nasrallah decision-making was mostly in his hands, and he concentrated information and assessments from the various councils and mechanisms. Council members could present different positions and even disagree, but Nasrallah made the decisions by virtue of his personal standing, experience and the authority he had accumulated over more than three decades. Once a decision had been made, all members of the leadership, including the secretary general himself, were subject to organizational discipline. The continued tenure of most senior figures over many years contributed to leadership stability, but also concentrated knowledge, experience and authority within a small circle (L'Orient Today, March 28, 2023).

► Hezbollah's military operated within the general leadership hierarchy through the Jihad Council, which was subordinate to the Shura Council and responsible for the military and security. Nasrallah also played a central role in directing the Jihad Council, thereby linking strategic policymaking and the use of military force. Alongside its subordination to the senior leadership, the military was extensively compartmentalized and had professional autonomy in its areas of responsibility, and details of operational activity were not necessarily disclosed even to senior figures in the political echelon. Thus, centralized strategic decision-making was combined with compartmentalization and a division of military and security responsibilities.⁶

Composition of the Shura Council

► After Nasrallah and Safi al-Din were eliminated, Hezbollah began to refill the positions in the organization's senior leadership. On October 29, 2024, the organization announced that Sheikh Na'im Qassem, Nasrallah's longtime deputy, had been elected the new secretary general.⁷

⁵ See the February 2026 ITIC report, [The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa](#).

⁶ See the February 2008 ITIC report, [Imad Fayez Moughnieh, No. 2 at Hezbollah and responsible for its military and terrorist operations in Lebanon and abroad, died when his car exploded in Damascus](#).

⁷ See the November 2024 ITIC report, [Sheikh Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah's Newly – Appointed Secretary General](#).



**Qassem in a speech marking 40 days since Nasrallah's elimination
(al-Manar, November 6, 2024)**

► It was then reported that Sheikh Ali Damoush had been appointed head of the Executive Council to replace Safi al-Din and that former minister Muhammad Fneish had joined the Shura Council (*Nidaa al-Watan*, April 23, 2025; Asas Media, February 11, 2026). According to various reports, Muhammad Raad, chairman of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament (Loyalty to the "Resistance"), was appointed deputy secretary general, with Hassan Fadlallah expected to replace him as head of the faction; it is generally assumed that the appointment will be made public only after the general parliamentary elections, which were set for May 2026 but reportedly postponed for two years (*al-Nahar*, *al-Liwaa*, al-Hadath, December 29, 2024; al-Modon, March 3, 2026; *al-Akhbar*, March 14 and April 24, 2026). Youssef al-Zein was appointed media spokesman, replacing Muhammad Afif, who was eliminated in November 2024 (al-'Ahed, December 24, 2024). The changes reflect a combination of retaining veteran figures in leadership positions and refilling key positions, but most of the appointments, especially the reported appointment of Raad as deputy secretary general, have not been officially confirmed, and Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets still refer to him as faction chairman.




Muhammad Raad (*al-Akhbar*, April 24, 2026)

► The Shura Council continues as Hezbollah's highest leadership branch, responsible for determining policy and strategic decisions. In April 2025, the council reportedly had eight members, including the secretary general, his deputy and senior officials in the political, organizational, religious and military leaderships. A source said that in the event of a disagreement which could not be resolved within the council, the decision would be referred to the Iranian leader, in accordance with the status of *wilayat al-faqih* (rule of the Islamic jurist) in the organization's ideological system (*Nidaa al-Watan*, April 23, 2025).

► According to open-source information, in addition to Na'im Qassem, the current Shura Council has veteran members of Hezbollah's founding generation, including head of the Sharia Council Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek; head of the Political Council, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed; head of the Executive Council Ali Damoush; political assistant to the secretary general Hussein al-Khalil; chairman of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, Muhammad Raad; and former minister Muhammad Fneish (al-Modon, March 3, 2026; *al-Akhbar*, March–April 2026; al-Manar, May 31, 2026). However, the full membership of the council, particularly the identity of the representative of the military leadership, has not been made public or officially announced.⁸




From right to left: Damoush (*al-Nashra*, December 26, 2025), Yazbek (*al-Nahar*, August 18, 2023), al-Sayyed (Janoubia, April 18, 2025), al-Khalil (al-Manar, August 27, 2025) and Fneish (Sawt Beirut International, October 21, 2025)



Structure of the Shura Council (*Nidaa al-Watan*, April 23, 2025)

⁸ For information about the probable current structure of the Hezbollah leadership, see Appendix 1.

► Below the Shura Council, the councils responsible for translating the leadership's decisions to action in the various spheres continue to operate. The Political Council, headed by Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed, deals with formulating positions and the organization's relations with political elements in Lebanon and abroad, while the Executive Council, headed by Ali Damoush, is responsible for managing its organizational and administrative systems. The division of responsibilities preserves the institutional framework which existed under Nasrallah, with changes in the individuals holding the positions and the division of authority among them (*Nidaa al-Watan*, April 23, 2025; Asas Media, February 11, 2026).



Structure of the Executive Council (*Nidaa al-Watan*, April 23, 2025)

The Jihad Council and the Military Leadership

► In addition to changing the composition of the political and organizational leadership, Hezbollah had to rebuild the Jihad Council, the organization's highest military body, whose membership and command structure were severely damaged. Reportedly, five of the seven members of Hezbollah's previous Jihad Council were eliminated in Israeli attacks: Hashem Safi al-Din, Fuad Shukr, Ibrahim Aqil, Ali Karaki and Haitham Ali Tabataba'i. The only members of the previous council who remain are Muhammad Haidar (Abu Ali), who combines political activity with overseeing operations and the organization's security mechanism, and Talal Hamiyah (Abu Jaafar), a senior figure in the veteran security system and commander of Unit 910, which is responsible for Hezbollah's covert activity outside Lebanon (Asas Media, February 11, 2026).

► To refill the council, according to reports, Sheikh Ali Damoush, head of the Executive Council, and Khader Youssef Nader, commander of Unit 900, which is responsible for counterespionage, joined it, with additional commanders from the geographic units whose identities were not disclosed.

► Another veteran security figure is Khalil Youssef Harb, a close adviser of Nasrallah and now an associate of Na'im Qassem who has coordination and liaison roles with Iranian elements and Palestinian terrorist organizations, although there is no confirmation that he is also a member of the Jihad Council. Retaining veteran senior figures while adding new commanders indicates an attempt to preserve essential knowledge, experience and working relationships while rebuilding the damaged command structure (Euronews Arabic, March 18, 2026).

Na'im Qassem's Status and Performance as Hezbollah Secretary General

► Since his appointment in October 2024, Na'im Qassem has consolidated his position as head of the organization and worked to rebuild the leadership damaged by the elimination of Nasrallah and other senior figures. However, his status differs from Nasrallah's, who, during more than three decades constructed an exceptional personal standing for himself, including beyond the borders of Lebanon, based on his religious and political status, personal charisma and rhetorical ability, accumulated experience, ties with the Iranian leadership and deep involvement in strategic and military decision-making. Qassem took office without comparable personal standing and with a severely damaged veteran leadership structure. According to publications in Lebanon, his authority relies on his institutional position and cooperation with a small circle of veteran senior figures, including Muhammad Raad and Hussein al-Khalil (This Is Beirut, March 8, 2026). Two years after Nasrallah's elimination, there are differing assessments of Qassem's success. While elements close to Hezbollah stressed the rebuilding of the organization's mechanisms under his leadership, opponents claimed that he had not yet succeeded in recreating his predecessor's personal authority (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, September 26, 2026; L'Orient-Le Jour, September 28, 2026).

► During 2026, Na'im Qassem reportedly tried to strengthen the position of the secretary general and centralize organizational and administrative authority. He instituted structural changes to make the organization's institutions defer to the general secretariat and reduce the scope for independent action by organizational centers of power. There were also reports of the growing status of senior figures with longstanding working relationships with Qassem, including Muhammad Raad, and of the increased weight of political figures in the senior leadership (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, February 7, 2026).



Na'im Qassem struggles to reassemble the Hezbollah puzzle (Elaph, February 12, 2026)

► That can be seen in the reorganization of the Liaison and Coordination Unit, which included the termination of Wafiq Safa's position and a redistribution of his authority.⁹ According to a report, the changes in the unit were approved by the Shura Council, and the organization's leadership initially sought to reduce Safa's authority rather than remove him. Safa's opposition led to the suspension of his activity, and some of the coordination portfolios were transferred to Dr. Hussein Abd al-Rida (al-Hajj Sajed) (al-Modon, January 7, 2026). The authority of the Liaison Unit was reportedly transferred to Hussein al-Abdallah, an associate of Qassem and formerly responsible for security in the south, while Ahmed Muhanna, who had served as Muhammad Raad's assistant, was authorized to manage relations with the state and foreign elements (Reuters, al-Hadath and al-Jadeed, February 6, 2026; *al-Quds al-Arabi*, February 8, 2026). There were also reports that oversight of the organization's media institutions had been centralized within a new organizational framework (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, February 7, 2026; Asas Media, February 11, 2026). Sources said the reorganization was carried out under Qassem's direct supervision (Anadolu, February 8, 2026).



Wafiq Safa (al-Mayadeen, February 18, 2025)

⁹ See the February 2026 ITIC report, [The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa](#).

► According to reports, the reorganization caused disagreements in Hezbollah's senior leadership between conservative elements and those who support changes in the leadership structure and the division of authority. Reportedly, there was opposition to the appointment of Muhammad Raad as deputy secretary general; he is a political figure, not a cleric. According to claims, disagreements were influenced by Iranian power plays for influence and made it difficult for Qassem to reach agreements within the leadership (Janoubia, December 16, 2025). However, the claims are based on unidentified sources, making it impossible to independently verify the extent of the disagreements, the identities of those involved or their actual effect on decision-making processes. Later reports said that Muhammad Raad had been appointed deputy secretary general, but that does not mean the disagreements had been resolved (*al-Akhbar*, April 24, 2026).

► Published information does not make it possible to determine the extent of Qassem's personal involvement in military planning and the management of operations, or to identify precisely the division of authority between him and the Jihad Council, senior military figures and representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Apparently areas which were previously concentrated in Nasrallah's hands are now divided among the secretary general and his circle of associates, the Shura Council, the military and the liaison mechanisms with Iran. However, it is unclear whether the division reflects a new, consolidated leadership model or is the result of the damage to the veteran leadership and the limitations of Qassem's personal authority.

► Another indication of Na'im Qassem's involvement in managing the organization's internal affairs is in a report of his intervention in addressing failures in the compensation system for those affected by the war. Following logistical errors in the distribution of compensation and complaints of inequality among those eligible, Qassem ordered an internal investigation and action to correct the deficiencies (*al-Modon*, January 7, 2026).

Changes in Hezbollah's Leadership and Command

► The extensive damage to Hezbollah's command structure accelerated reorganization in military command and control intended to reduce its vulnerability to intelligence penetration and further eliminations and preserve continuity of operations. According to reports, dozens of new commanders were promoted, many of them younger and less well known than their predecessors, while compartmentalization was increased and the information available to each commander was limited to the activity of his unit. There were

reports of increasing use of small units with relative operational autonomy, the appointment of several deputies to commanders and reduced dependence on officials who had a broad operational picture. The changes indicate an attempt to preserve the ability to operate even if commanders are eliminated or communications with higher echelons are disrupted, rather than merely filling the positions left vacant (Reuters, March 21, 2026; Eram News, September 9, 2026).¹⁰

► A prominent unit which suffered severe losses was Unit 4400, which is responsible for Hezbollah's weapons and supply transfer in coordination with Iranian elements. During October-November 2024, Muhammad Jaafar Qasir, who had headed the unit for 15 years, and other members of its command structure, were eliminated by Israel. Reportedly, the losses led to a reorganization of the unit's command, with increased compartmentalization and the distribution of responsibility among several officials to reduce dependence on a single commander (Lebanon Debate, March 11, 2026).

► However, operational decentralization and the compartmentalization of units were not entirely new in Hezbollah. Under Nasrallah as well, the organization combined centralized strategic authority at the top with professional compartmentalization and relative autonomy for field units. According to Hezbollah-affiliated sources, for years the military system operated as a network of units capable of continuing their activity even when senior command was hit. The continued rocket fire and launching of UAVs after the elimination of the organization's senior figures were represented as proving field units could maintain operational continuity (al-'Ahed, March 14, 2026; Reuters, March 21, 2026).

► Another change was the accelerated generational turnover in the military and security command structure. According to Qassem Qasir, a Hezbollah-affiliated commentator, some of the vacant positions are being filled by commanders in their thirties and forties who were trained in advance for command positions and now bear responsibility for managing some of the military and security systems. Iranians noted the existence of a reserve of commanders which enabled the organization to continue operating after the loss of its senior figures. However, Hezbollah's critics said training replacements could not replicate the accumulated experience, personal connections and authority that the veteran commanders had built up over decades (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, August 31, 2026).

¹⁰ See the March 2026 ITIC report, [Hezbollah's Use of Force During the Current Fighting Against Israel](#)

► A report in the French daily *Le Figaro* dealt with reconstructing Hezbollah's military wing in the wake of the disruption after the eliminations, followed by the creation of a more secretive command structure. Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the organization had a "new, secret military structure, with younger and more dynamic leadership," while it was also reported that Hezbollah operated clandestinely as it had in the 1980s, separating the military wing from the "political" wing and shortening chains of command (*Le Figaro*, October 18, 2025).

► The structural changes were also accompanied by an internal review and lessons learned. Hezbollah reportedly reviewed security and organizational failures, the consequences of its involvement in Syria and the factors that enabled intelligence penetration of its systems. The review was followed by disciplinary measures and dismissals, changes in procedures, enhanced secrecy and compartmentalization and a reassessment of the organizational structure and system of alliances. That the reviews encompassed the military as well as the political and organizational echelons indicates an attempt to draw lessons rather than merely address specific failures (al-Modon, September 26, 2026).

Iranian Involvement in Hezbollah's Leadership

► Following the damage to Hezbollah's military command structure in the October 2023–November 2024 hostilities, there were reports of growing involvement by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in rebuilding and reorganizing the organization's military. Reportedly, after the ceasefire in November 2024, 100 Iranian officers were sent to Lebanon to train Hezbollah terrorist operatives, oversee rearmament and rebuild the commands which had been hit. They were integrated into the command systems and in some cases even filled positions left vacant by the previous elimination of senior commanders. Lebanese commentator Ali al-Amin claimed that the involvement of IRGC officers included command, coordination and supervision of operational activity, and relations between the sides reflected close organizational and military ties. However, sources differed over the extent of Iranian authority. While one claimed the IRGC had assumed direct supervision of the military wing, a Lebanese security source said its involvement focused on directing the management of the hostilities and not necessarily on determining targets at the tactical level (Reuters, March 21, 2026; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, June 24, 2026). According to a report, after the elimination of Nasrallah and senior military figures, direct ties between the Jihad Council and the IRGC

grew stronger at the expense of the influence of the political leadership (Eram News, October 23, 2026).

► Another report quoted sources claiming that 40 Iranian experts and technicians had arrived in Lebanon to train and rebuild Hezbollah's military and intelligence capabilities, while IRGC personnel already in the country were instructed to return to Iran, apparently because of concerns they would be targeted (Eram News, September 3, 2026).

► The reconstruction of Hezbollah's military command was apparently carried out with significant involvement by the IRGC, which assisted in filling gaps in the command structure, training operatives and reorganizing the military. The use of small, compartmentalized units with greater operational autonomy was expanded to reduce the command's vulnerability to intelligence penetration and further eliminations. However, compartmentalization had also existed in Hezbollah under Nasrallah, and the reported change relates primarily to greater decentralization and adaptation of the command structure to the new circumstances. The involvement of Iranian elements in reconstructing Hezbollah's military, with the continued activity of veteran senior figures with working relationships with the Qods Force, shows the importance of the coordination with Iran (Reuters, March 21, 2026; Euronews Arabic, March 18, 2026).

► According to an investigative report published in March 2026, IRGC officers were involved in planning coordinated missile attacks from Iran and Lebanon and not only in reconstructing Hezbollah's military. However, the sources quoted in the investigation differed in their assessments of the extent of Iranian involvement, ranging from coordinating the pace of the fighting to direct supervision of the military system (Reuters, March 21, 2026).

► There were also reports of direct liaison between the Iranian leadership and the Hezbollah command. Reportedly, Javad Mehrabi, who was appointed adviser to the Iranian president for Lebanese affairs and is associated with previous Iranian activity in Syria, operates in Lebanon to liaise between the leadership in Tehran and Hezbollah's war room. According to the report, he is responsible for conveying messages, plans and instructions, and his activity includes security and military matters. However, it is still impossible to determine who has final authority over the organization's military and strategic decisions (al-Arabiya, July 15, 2026).

► An unverified report in the Lebanese newspaper *Nidaa al-Watan*, which opposes Hezbollah, claimed that Hussein Taeb, commander of the IRGC Basij and an associate of the

Iranian leader, was involved in discussions on reconstructing the organization. It claimed Taeb was dissatisfied with Na'im Qassem's performance, leading to a reduction in the secretary general's authority over sensitive issues, and senior IRGC figure Ali Abbas was given a more central role in Hezbollah's decision-making processes (*Nidaa al-Watan*, September 18, 2026). Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, did not address the report directly, but said the Hezbollah secretary general was currently responsible for making strategic and fundamental decisions. He added that Qassem had been appointed secretary general to lead the organization with the assistance of "several leaders," and a rapid process of reconstruction and reorganization had been completed in accordance with internal procedures (*al-Modon*, September 23, 2026).

► Referring to IRGC involvement in Hezbollah's command system, journalist Iskandar Khashashu presented "command from behind," with Iranian officers and advisers directing, supervising and developing capabilities, while operational execution remained in the hands of Hezbollah forces. He said that after Hezbollah's senior leadership was hit in 2024, IRGC involvement in reconstructing command, command and communications systems and military capabilities increased. He claimed that during the escalation in March 2026, there was a separation between Hezbollah's political leadership and the military decision-making mechanisms, and certain operational decisions were made under direct Iranian direction without the organization's political and media echelons being fully informed. He pointed to the initial denial of Hezbollah's involvement in launching missiles at Israel (*al-Nahar*, March 5, 2026).



Right: Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem, the face of Hezbollah's leadership, with Iranian influence over the organization and its command system in the background (Saeer Sabil's X account, September 23, 2025). Left: The Iranian puppet master (Saeer Sabil's X account, August 28, 2026)

► An indication of the operational ties between Hezbollah and the IRGC appears in a report concerning Talal Hamiyah (Abu Jaafar), a senior figure in the veteran security system and commander of Unit 910, which is responsible for Hezbollah's covert activity outside Lebanon. According to a report on a website opposed to the Iranian regime, based on information it claimed was received from an international intelligence agency, Unit 910 continues to operate a mechanism in Iran for recruiting and training foreign operatives in coordination with the IRGC Qods Force. The activity is allegedly conducted through local elements and facilities in Qom and Tehran (Iran International, October 8, 2026).

► The close ties between Hezbollah's leadership and Iranian representatives were evident at the memorial ceremonies held in September 2026 to mark the second anniversary of Nasrallah's elimination. Seated in the front row were senior organization figures presumed to be members of the Shura Council: parliamentary bloc chairman Muhammad Raad; Executive Council head Sheikh Ali Damoush; and the secretary general's political assistant, Hussein al-Khalil. Alongside them sat Muhammad Reza Sheibani, who was supposed to be the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, but whom the Lebanese foreign ministry ordered expelled in March 2026 (al-'Ahed, September 27, 2026).



Raad, Damoush and al-Khalil alongside Sheibani (al-'Ahed, September 27, 2026)

► There are also indications of Iranian involvement in efforts to strengthen Hezbollah's organizational cohesion, morale and ideological infrastructure. In early October 2026, an Iranian delegation visited Lebanon. Its members included Hussein Yekta, associated with the IRGC and with recruitment and ideological information activity, and cleric Ali Reza Panahian, as well as figures involved in media, religious and social activity. Members of the delegation visited the families of Hezbollah terrorist operatives who had been killed and former senior figures, including Hassan Nasrallah's family, and Yekta was filmed on the banks of the Litani River delivering an ideological anti-Israel speech. According to Lebanese sources, the visit

took place under the auspices and direction of the Iranian leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and its objective was to support the organization's morale and ideological infrastructure. However, it was not stated how the senior Iranian figures reached Lebanon, given the restrictions imposed by the Lebanese government on the presence of IRGC operatives in the country(*al-Nahar*, October 4, 2026; Eram News, October 5, 2026).




Hussein Yekta on the banks of the Litani River (Eram News, October 5, 2026)

The appendices on the following pages

Appendix 1 – Probable Structure of the Hezbollah Leadership

Estimated Structure of Hezbollah Leadership (As of October 2026)



● Verified ● According to publications / reports ● Unknown identity

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Appendix 2 – Senior Hezbollah Figures Eliminated since 2023

Name	Position When Eliminated	Date of Elimination
Wissam Hassan Tawil	Commander in the Radwan Force	January 8, 2024
Taleb Sami Abdallah (al-Hajj Abu Taleb)	Commander of the Nasr Unit	June 12, 2024
Muhammad Naameh Nasser (Abu Naameh)	Commander of the Aziz Unit	July 3, 2024
Fuad Shukr (Hajj Mohsen)	Hezbollah military commander and member of the Shura and Jihad Councils	July 30, 2024
Ali Jamal al-Din Jawad	Commander in the Radwan Force	August 5, 2024
Hussein Ibrahim Qassab	Commander in the Radwan Force	August 17, 2024
Hussein Ali Hussein	Commander in the rocket and missile system	August 20, 2024
Muhammad Qassem al-Shaar	Commander in the Radwan Force	September 10, 2024
Ibrahim Aqil	Head of the Operations Staff and commander of the Radwan Force	September 20, 2024
Ahmad Wahbi	Commander of the organization's Training Unit 800; responsible for training the Radwan Force	September 20, 2024
Ibrahim Muhammad Qubaisi	Senior figure in the rocket and missile system	September 24, 2024
Muhammad Hussein Srour	Commander of the UAV system and the aerial unit	September 26, 2024
Hassan Nasrallah	Hezbollah secretary general and head of the Shura Council	September 27, 2024
Ali Karaki	Commander of Hezbollah's Southern Front	September 27, 2024

Nabil Qaouk	Senior leadership figure and head of Hezbollah counterintelligence	September 28, 2024
Muhammad Jaafar Qasir	Head of Unit 4400 for weapons transfers	October 1, 2024
Hashem Safi al-Din	Head of the Executive Council and Nasrallah's designated successor	October 3, 2024
Ali Hussein Hazimeh	Head of the intelligence staff	October 3, 2024
Mahmoud Youssef Anisi	Senior figure in the precision missile project	October 3, 2024
Muhammad Rashid Sqafi	Commander of the communications system	October 4, 2024
Suhail Hussein Hussein	Senior staff and logistics figure	October 8, 2024
Ahmad Mustafa al-Hajj Ali	Commander of the Houla sector	October 10, 2024
Muhammad Ali Hamdan	Commander of the anti-tank system in south Lebanon	October 10, 2024
Basel Shukr	Commander in the Radwan Force	October 20, 2024
Ahmad Jaafar Maatouk	Commander of the Bint Jbeil sector	October 27, 2024
Mustafa Ahmad Shahadi	Deputy commander of the Radwan Force in south Lebanon	October 30, 2024
Muhammad Afif	Responsible for Hezbollah's media relations	November 17, 2024
Ali Haitham Tabataba'i	Hezbollah chief of staff since the elimination of Fuad Shukr	November 23, 2025
Hussein Muqallad	Head of the intelligence staff	March 2, 2026
Zaid Ali Jomaa	Responsible for fire management in the south	March 4, 2026
Abu Ali Rayan	Commander of the Radwan Force in south Lebanon	March 7, 2026
Hassan Salameh	Commander of the Nasr Unit	March 8, 2026
Hussein Salami	Commander of the Jibchit sector	March 24, 2026
Muslim Harb	Commander of the Qana sector	April 1, 2026

Ali Abbas	Commander of the Bint Jbeil sector and commander in the Radwan Force	April 16, 2026
Ahmad Siblini	Replacement for the commander of the Shaqif sector	May 2026
Mahdi Bazzi	Commander of the Nasr Unit's Intelligence Department and deputy commander of the unit	May 2, 2026
Ali Hayek	Commander of the al-Khiyam sector	May 26, 2026
Ashraf Salloum	Commander in the Nasr Unit	May 27, 2026
Nasser Shuqair	Commander of the Shaqif sector	May 28, 2026
Fuad Ali Moussa	Commander of the Hujeir sector	May/June 2026
Kamel Younes	Commander of the Tyre sector	June 2, 2026
Ali Moussa Daqdouq	Senior commander in the Radwan Force and responsible for the "Golan File"	June 14, 2026
Ali Muhammad Fakhr al-Din (Abu Hassan Alaa)	City commander in the Badr Unit	August 15, 2026
Ali Samir al-Hajj Hassan	Battalion commander in the Radwan Force	August 15, 2026