

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon

October 5-12, 2026

Trending

- Hezbollah used the third anniversary of the October 7, 2023 invasion and massacre to reiterate its commitment to the path of "resistance" and its rejection of any concession in return for an Israeli withdrawal.
- Hezbollah is being "positive" toward the Lebanese government amid increasing security, economic and political pressures on the organization.
- The seizure of a shipment of Hezbollah explosives en route to Beirut increased concerns that the organization was preparing to carry out assassinations.

Overview¹

- In a statement marking three years since the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion and massacre, Hezbollah declared it had been a "legitimate act of resistance" and boasted that Israel had failed to eliminate Hamas and the "resistance organizations."²
- Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem said the organization had no concessions to offer in return for an Israeli withdrawal, but was willing to discuss internal issues, including the state monopoly on weapons, within constitutional frameworks and without external dictates. Reportedly, parliament speaker Nabih Berri persuaded Hezbollah not to escalate its anti-government campaign.
- Hezbollah allegedly tightened security around secretary general Qassem following reports that Israel planned to eliminate him in the near future.
- Hezbollah is reportedly preparing for renewed fighting against Israel by increasing its presence on both sides of the Litani River in south Lebanon and upgrading its explosive UAV

¹ Click <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en> to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.

² Terrorist organizations.

capabilities. According to the report, Israel threatened to impose a complete blockade on Lebanon if war broke out again.

► Lebanese internal security forces seized a commercial vehicle carrying hundreds of kilograms of explosives, which were suspected of having been transported from Baalbek to the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, and arrested two Hezbollah operatives. The circumstances of the shipment are under investigation, with suspicions that it was part of preparations for a series of assassinations.

► Hezbollah reportedly received \$200 million from Iran to assist displaced persons and was preparing to announce a program for housing payments. It was also claimed that the organization raked in approximately \$40 million a month from smuggling, counterfeiting and the Lebanese state budget.

► In preparation for the next round of talks with Israel, set to take place in Florida on October 20-22, 2026, Lebanon planned to request an Israeli withdrawal from the towns surrounding Beaufort Castle, the release of detainees and the establishment of an international force to replace UNIFIL.

► The EU completed plans for a mission to train the Lebanese army and internal security forces. The European commissioner for foreign affairs visited Lebanon and called for progress in disarming Hezbollah.

The Anniversary of the October 7, 2023 Invasion and Massacre, and the Opening of the Support Front

► In a statement marking three years since the beginning of the Gaza Strip War, Hezbollah described the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion, massacre and subsequent atrocities as "brave, justified and legitimate." It claimed Israel had failed to eliminate Hamas and the "resistance organizations"³ and had not achieved stability. The organization held the American administration and Western countries responsible, expressed support for the Palestinian "resistance organizations" and told regional rulers that silence and submission to Israel would destabilize their regimes (al-Manar, October 7, 2026).

► Muhammad Ra'ad, chairman of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed the objective of the Gaza Strip War was to change international and regional

³ Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.

attitudes toward the Palestinian issue and disrupt the trend of Arab regimes' normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel. He said Israel had become a "pariah" and its deterrence had proved to be "borrowed" from the United States and the West. Ra'ad claimed the American-Israeli war against Iran had "proved" Tehran's interests and role in shaping regional security could not be ignored (al-Manar, October 7, 2026).

► Hezbollah continued ceremonies marking two years since the elimination of the organization's two secretaries general, Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din. At a ceremony in Qana, former minister Mustafa Bayram called the current Lebanese administration "temporary" and "doing what Israel could not," and warned that if the administration acted like Israel, it would be treated like Israel, with everything that implied (al-Manar, October 6, 2026). In Baalbek, Ihab Hamadeh, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said no one would be able to stop the "resistance" (Hezbollah faction website, October 5, 2026). His fellow faction member Hassan Izz al-Din declared that the "weapons of the resistance and our souls are twins," and claimed that Iran had linked memorandums of understanding to end the war and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to the end of the war in Lebanon (Hezbollah faction website, October 6, 2026).

► Circles close to Hezbollah referred to the increased frequency of appearances by senior organization figures in its affiliated media outlets, during which they revealed details and gave glimpses behind the scenes of the Nasrallah era and the decisions surrounding the Gaza Strip War. They claimed it was part of a deliberate policy of gradual media disclosure to present the organization's narrative to its supporters and to public opinion (Lebanon 24, October 9, 2026).

► Hezbollah opponents criticized the organization's decision to open the "support front" on October 8, 2023. Kataeb Party MP Nadim Gemayel wrote that Lebanon could not take another war and should not be an arena for wars of support and solidarity (Nadim Gemayel's X account, October 7, 2026); Lebanese Forces MP Ghada Ayoub claimed that Lebanon and the Shi'ite community were paying the price of "supporting Gaza," adding that Na'im Qassem was following Iranian orders. She called on Hezbollah ministers to resign from the government and on parliament speaker Nabih Berri to demand that the organization end its "weapons project" (Lebanon 24, October 9, 2026).

The Military Situation in South Lebanon

The IDF

► According to Lebanese media, this past week the IDF continued airstrikes, artillery fire and the demolition of buildings within the security zone in the south, including in al-Mansouri, Wadi Zibqin, Wadi al-Salouqi, Haddatha, Baraachit, Beit Yahoun, Bani Hayyan, Deir Siryan, al-Khiyam, Kafr Tebnit, Wadi al-Hujeir and Haris. It was claimed that IDF forces set fire to the al-Mabarrat School in al-Khiyam (Lebanese News Agency, October 8, 2026; Janoubia, October 9, 2026; Beirut 24, October 7 and 10, 2026). The IDF reported that an IDF officer was killed and three soldiers injured when a military vehicle overturned in the security zone in south Lebanon. In another operational accident, an IDF soldier was wounded by shrapnel from friendly fire (IDF spokesperson, October 8 and 12, 2026).

► On October 9, 2026, it was reported that an Israeli UAV attacked a vehicle near the town of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali in the Hermel District, near the Syrian border. Six people were wounded, five Syrians and one Lebanese (Lebanese ministry of health, October 9, 2026). The IDF said Syrian terrorist Yusuf Ali al-Hassoun had been eliminated. He had planned attacks on IDF forces in southern Syria under Iranian direction (IDF spokesperson, October 9, 2026). It was the first targeted killing in a long time in an area far from the south (*al-Nahar*, October 10, 2026).

► On the evening of October 10, 2026, an unidentified aerial object was detected entering Israel in the Arab al-Aramshe area on the border with Lebanon. Israeli security forces began searching for it, and said it was not a paraglider and a terrorist had not infiltrated Israeli territory. Reportedly, the possibility that it was a type of UAV unfamiliar to the IDF was being investigated (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 10-11, 2026).

Hezbollah

► In a speech at a ceremony opening the institution for the legacy of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem said the liberation of south Lebanon was "on the horizon" and Israel would not be able to remain in south Lebanon, even "if it took time." He claimed the organization's steadfastness over the past two years had proved its ability to continue and if the Israeli-American aggression had been directed against any other country, the resistance would have ended and the country would have "ended" long ago. He rejected the demand to offer concessions in return for an Israeli withdrawal, saying, "We have nothing to offer...the solution begins with the enemy leaving in defeat." However, he said Hezbollah

was prepared to cooperate on internal issues, including restricting weapons, in accordance with constitutional frameworks and without dictates from American or non-American patrons (Hezbollah secretary general's website, October 6, 2026).



Qassem during his speech (Hezbollah secretary general's website, October 6, 2026)

► Unverified reports that Israel was planning to eliminate Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem within the next three weeks alarmed the organization's political and security circles. Western diplomatic sources said the reports, which were allegedly leaked through British platforms, reflected a tangible Israeli intelligence and operational effort and not mere psychological warfare. They claimed Israel had renewed intelligence surveillance of the Hezbollah leadership and Qassem's means of communication. Specifying three weeks was intended to pressure the secretary general's security detail into rapidly changing locations and means of communication, thereby increasing the likelihood of a security error which would expose him. According to the claim, Israel would not limit its operations to a particular geographic area if it obtained reliable information about his whereabouts. According to assessments from the field, Hezbollah's security apparatus shifted to complete decentralization and delegated full authority to commanders in the field. The use of wired and wireless communications networks in the vicinity of the secretary general was also prohibited, and the organization relied on primitive means to transmit messages (Erem News, October 6, 2026).

► A security source said Hezbollah had decided not to be drawn into an alleged attempt by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to exploit a pretext for launching a broad war which would postpone the elections in Israel, and therefore the situation on the ground would not change. The source claimed Hezbollah had considered violating the rules of engagement to halt the attack on the Ali al-Taher ridge, while the United States had indirectly conveyed the message that preserving the current situation until an arrangement could be reached was the optimal

solution. It was also reported that Israel had agreed to halt the advance toward the ridges in return for Hezbollah's inaction (*al-Joumhouria*, October 10, 2026).

► Nevertheless, sources monitoring the situation noted that Hezbollah was preparing for renewed fighting and had used the ceasefire to reinforce its presence in south Lebanon, including south of the Litani River. They claimed Hezbollah had upgraded the capabilities of its explosive UAVs to carry six kilograms of explosives instead of 2.5 kilograms and had also extended the UAVs' fiber-optic cables from 20 kilometers to more than 30 kilometers. The report noted that Israel had messaged Lebanon that if war broke out again, it would launch a broad campaign against Hezbollah, including in new areas, and impose an air, land and sea blockade on Lebanon to punish the state for its inability to stop Hezbollah's involvement and for failing to disarm the organization (al-Modon, October 12, 2026).

Negotiations for Implementing the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement

International Political Contacts

► Lebanon is preparing for the round of military talks under American auspices set for October 20-22, 2026, in Tampa, Florida, although the date has not yet been confirmed by Washington. A senior political source said the date had been announced only by Israel, without Lebanon having been officially informed, and the head of the Lebanese delegation, Simon Karam, would not participate. During the talks Lebanon will reportedly raise the cessation of demolition and blasting operations, completion of the return of the prisoners and correction of the disputed points along the Blue Line. The verification mechanism is under the authority of the military committee headed by American General Joseph Clearfield, which has not yet selected which countries participate in the verification team. It was also reported that some on the American side prefer to postpone the round until after the elections in Israel (*al-Joumhouria*, October 9, 2026). Diplomatic sources said time was not working in Lebanon's favor and the absence of an internal track for implementing the government's decisions could once again expose Lebanon to the danger of broader Israeli escalation (al-Jadeed, October 10, 2026).

► According to a ministerial source, the Lebanese delegation will present a package of proposals not limited to consolidating the ceasefire. It will include the release of Lebanese prisoners, the establishment of an international force under Security Council auspices to replace UNIFIL and an Israeli withdrawal from the towns surrounding Qal'at al-Shaqif

(Beaufort Castle) to enable the Lebanese army to deploy. Lebanon will also raise the continued demolition work carried out by the IDF in towns within the security zone and request American guarantees that Israel will not act against the ridges between Iqlim al-Tuffah and Jabal al-Rayhan. The source said he was concerned that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu would delay implementing the agreement until after the elections in Israel and claimed Hezbollah could no longer delay the army's deployment in those towns after it had evacuated the Ali al-Taher Ridge (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, October 7, 2026).

► An American diplomatic source said the topics of the next round would be timetables for the phases of the Israeli withdrawal and linking them to verification mechanisms on the ground, while implementation of the plan to restrict weapons would remain the responsibility of the Lebanese government and army. He said the American Department of State was working to define the areas for which the Lebanese army would assume responsibility after each withdrawal, a mechanism for documenting the dismantling of Hezbollah infrastructure and arrangements for exchanging information. Military officials from several countries met in Paris to discuss the needs of the Lebanese army after the reduction of UNIFIL's role (Erem News, October 6, 2026).

► The head of the Lebanese delegation, Simon Karam, reportedly discussed with Vatican officials the possibility that the Pope would act with the United States to encourage Israel to take steps regarding the withdrawal, while claiming that the stalemate strengthened Hezbollah's narrative regarding the futility of negotiations (*al-Akhbar*, October 8, 2026).

► Meeting with Oklahoma Senator James Lankford and the European representative for foreign affairs and security policy Kaja Kallas, President Aoun claimed Israel violated the framework agreement by continuing its operations in villages from which it had not yet withdrawn, while the Lebanese army was fully carrying out its duty south of the Litani River. He said Lebanon was exerting pressure to halt the destruction of homes and complete the return of the prisoners, negotiations were the alternative to war and an agreement was the only means of ending the state of hostility between Lebanon and Israel (Lebanese presidency X account, October 8, 2026).

► Prime Minister Nawaf Salam noted the need for a timetable and a verification mechanism for implementing mutual commitments (Lebanese prime minister's office X account, October 8, 2026). Meeting with Lankford, Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament,

claimed Israel had never been committed to any of the agreements, from UN Security Council Resolution 425 to the framework agreement (*al-Joumhouria*, October 8, 2026).

► At a joint press conference with Kallas, Lebanese foreign minister Youssef Rajji noted the importance of European assistance to Lebanon in implementing the sovereign decision to restrict weapons to the state (Youssef Rajji's X account, October 8, 2026). Kallas supported the framework agreement and noted the need for Lebanon to exercise full control over its territory, including moving forward with disarming Hezbollah (*al-Diyar*, October 8, 2026).



Aoun (right) and Salam in meetings with Kallas (Lebanese presidency and Lebanese prime minister's office X accounts, October 8, 2026)

► An American security official who visited Lebanon after a visit to Israel told Lebanese leaders that the suspension of the pilot zones plan was the result of the Lebanese army's failure to fulfill its role in disarming Hezbollah, and asked "What are you afraid of, a civil war? And who told you that Hezbollah is capable of confronting the army?" A Lebanese security official replied that Washington wanted what Israel wanted, a confrontation between the army and Hezbollah and a broad segment of the Shi'ite community, and recalled that army commander Rodolphe Haykal had made clear the army was not prepared to fight its own people. It was also claimed that Prime Minister Salam had expressed reservations to American officials about the army's failure to implement government decisions and supported American and Arab pressure on the army command (*al-Akhbar*, October 8, 2026). Prime Minister Salam's office denied reports that he had criticized the army command and said that in all his meetings Salam had noted the need to strengthen the army's capabilities and establish a mechanism for verifying implementation of the framework agreement (Lebanese prime minister's office X account, October 8, 2026).

► Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, still opposes the framework agreement and direct negotiations, but distinguishes between criticism of the government and an attempt to topple it. A rapprochement between Berri and Prime Minister Salam was

reported, reflected in the Amal Movement's participation in Salam's visit to al-Nabatieh and in an interview the prime minister gave to the Berri-owned NBN channel (*al-Nashra*, October 6, 2026).

Hezbollah's Stance

► Hassan Izz al-Din, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed the direct negotiations had produced nothing, there was no ceasefire, no cessation of operations and no cessation of killing. He added that the framework agreement gave Israel freedom of movement, freedom of action and legitimacy for its presence without any consideration on its part. He further claimed that Washington sought to make the framework agreement the sole authority governing relations between Lebanon and Israel, thereby nullifying the 1949 Armistice Agreement and Security Council Resolution 1701, and was also pushing for direct communication between the Lebanese army and the IDF under the supervision of American officers in a joint operations room in al-Naqoura, instead of the mechanism committee. He claimed the United States rejected a force to replace UNIFIL to prevent the presence of an "international witness" to Israel's actions (Hezbollah faction website, October 5, 2026). Former minister Mustafa Bayram claimed the agreement had been imposed on instructions from the United States and a "regional state" to separate Lebanon from Iran, contrary to the constitution and the Taif Agreement (*al-Manar*, October 6, 2026).

► Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah said the entire region was waiting for the results of the Iranian-American negotiations, and the new equation in Lebanon rested on the strength of the "resistance" and on Iranian efforts to force Israel to withdraw from Lebanon as part of the Iranian-American memorandum of understanding. He said that as long as the government made "excessive concessions" under the framework agreement, it would receive nothing in return (*al-Diyar*, October 10, 2026).

► Political sources said Hezbollah had been "positive" toward the government. For example, its labor minister, Muhammad Haidar, joined Prime Minister Salam's tour of south Lebanon, Hezbollah did not take to the streets in protests whose objective was to topple the government and it supported the government in parliamentary sessions. According to the sources, secretary general Qassem's "moderate speeches" sent a "positive message" to the state regarding the organization's willingness to engage in dialogue on weapons within the framework of a national security strategy, although it still rejected the framework agreement (*al-Diyar*, October 9, 2026).

► Reportedly, Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement, helped persuade Hezbollah not to escalate its campaign against the government to the point of attempting to topple it via the streets or in parliament, assessing that such a step could lead to a vacuum and an internal sectarian crisis (*al-Joumhouria*, October 7, 2026). Discussing with Hezbollah a no-confidence vote against the government or withdrawal from it, Berri said he was committed to the Saudis and to Salam to preserve the government. According to the report, Hezbollah replied that it did not want to give the government a vote of confidence, but would not withdraw from it if doing so would lead to its downfall. A report in the Hezbollah-affiliated daily *al-Akhbar* also accused President Aoun of exceeding his authority at the expense of the prime minister, with the backing of Saudi Arabia, which wanted to prevent Salam from being replaced (*al-Akhbar*, October 9, 2026).

The Lebanese State Monopoly of Weapons

► Lebanese political sources said that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and members of his office were working together with the army command and the ministry of defense to establish a separate timetable for the issue of weapons, which would begin in areas where the army's deployment south of the Litani River had been expanded and would subsequently move to Hezbollah warehouses and sites in other areas. The upcoming phase includes completing the mapping of military sites south of the Litani, dismantling unused permanent facilities and expanding deployment in villages where a security vacuum has developed, while the phases concerning heavy weapons and warehouses north of the Litani depend on future government decisions and the monthly reports submitted by the army commander to the government (Erem News, October 6, 2026).

► In a discussion held by the Washington Institute, Lebanese Forces party chairman Samir Geagea called the disarmament of Hezbollah "essential, a necessity without which a genuine state cannot be established," and rejected the claim that it was compliance with external demands. He said he supported making American aid to the Lebanese army conditional on its performance under the framework agreement and criticized senior Lebanese figures who were counting on resolving the Hezbollah issue through an American-Iranian agreement or Israeli measures (*al-Nashra*, October 6, 2026).

► After meeting with President Aoun, Lebanese MP Michel Moawad said building the state began with restricting weapons to its control, adding that all Lebanese were paying the price for Hezbollah's refusal to surrender its weapons. He said negotiations were a path to

protecting the Lebanese and ending the war and the occupation, but their success required a unified Lebanese decision and restricting declarations of war and peace to the state (Lebanese presidency X account, October 6, 2026).

Seizure of a Shipment of Explosives for Hezbollah

► Lebanese internal security forces stopped a commercial vehicle at the Dahr al-Baidar checkpoint on the Beirut-Damascus highway while it was driving from the Beqa'a Valley to Beirut and arrested its two occupants, Hezbollah operatives. According to a security source, 500 kilograms of explosives were found in the vehicle, 250 kilograms of TNT and 250 kilograms of C4, along with iron pellets and nails, which are generally used to manufacture explosive devices (al-Arabiya, October 9, 2026; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, October 10, 2026). According to another report, the shipment weighed 780 kilograms and contained about 216 kilograms of C4 and 281 kilograms of the explosive tetryl⁴ (MTV Lebanon, October 10, 2026). Another report stated that the shipment contained 562 kilograms of TNT in 14 sacks, 206 kilograms of C4, 350 kilograms of metal pellets and five empty molds for directional explosive devices. It was also reported that the driver tried to show the police officer at the checkpoint a card issued by Hezbollah, but the officer refused to recognize it (*Nidaa al-Watan*, October 12, 2026).

► According to a legal source, the detainees admitted they were members of Hezbollah and said a senior organization figure in the Beqa'a Valley, known as Sajed, had given them the shipment and instructed them to transport it to the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia and deliver it to a person known as Dhu al-Fiqar, who was also believed to be a commander in the organization. The government representative at the military court, Judge Claude Ghanem, returned the investigation file to the military police and requested that the investigation of the detainees be expanded (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, October 10, 2026). Another legal source said that one of the detainees was the son of a senior Hezbollah figure (Lebanon Debate, October 10, 2026). According to one report, the role of the two detainees was [allegedly] purely logistical and they did not know who was supposed to receive the shipment or what it would be used for (Lebanon 24, October 10, 2026). Another report claimed that the two denied any knowledge of the vehicle's contents and claimed they had simply been hired to transport it (Lebanon Debate, October 10, 2026).

⁴ (N-methyl-N,2,4,6-tetranitroaniline), a synthetic, yellow, odorless, crystalline high explosive.

► Lebanese media speculated about the shipment's intended destination. Jihad Abboud, president of the Lebanese Chemists Syndicate, said C4 is used in assassinations and ambushes. It was noted that the material had been used in assassinations attributed to Hezbollah, including that of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri (MTV Lebanon, October 10, 2026).⁵ A connection was also noted between the seizure of the shipment and warnings by European intelligence services of a plot by the Revolutionary Guards to target senior government officials, including President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam.

► Hezbollah requested the return of the explosives, claiming it needed them for "resistance" to the IDF in the south. International officials monitoring the affair warned against complying with the request and threatened serious consequences for anyone who cooperated with the organization on the matter (*al-Joumhouria*, October 12, 2026).

► Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam praised the security forces for intercepting the truck and said they had no intention of ignoring the incident, adding that those responsible would be held accountable. He said he understood public concerns because such explosives had previously been used in political assassinations, but promised that the authorities would not stop until the truth came to light, and they would expand the investigation to identify all those involved and bring them to trial. Salam said the government would not tolerate any attempt to undermine Lebanon's security and stability and would deal firmly with any weapons held outside the state's legitimate framework (Nawaf Salam's X account, October 12, 2026). Justice Minister Adel Nassar said disarming illegal weapons and the fight against terrorism were "a path from which there is no turning back and the investigation will be pursued to the end" (Adel Nassar's X account, October 10, 2026).

► The seizure of the explosives was met with anger from Hezbollah's political opponents. Lebanese Forces chairman Samir Geagea demanded that the entire chain of command be dismantled, even if it reached Na'im Qassem; Kataeb chairman Sami Gemayel warned of a recurrence of the wave of assassinations of 2004-2008; and MP Ashraf Rifi called it a test of the state's authority (*Nidaa al-Watan*, October 12, 2026). MP Fouad Makhzoumi said he would submit a parliamentary question to the government on the matter and said there were to be no weapons, explosives or security decisions outside the authority of the state (Fouad Makhzoumi's X account, October 10, 2026).

⁵ See the May 2026 Amit Institute report, [Hezbollah's Unit 121](#).

Challenges for Hezbollah

Economic Pressure

► Two sources familiar with the details said Hezbollah had received approximately \$200 million from Iran in September 2026 to assist displaced persons, despite increased American economic pressure on Tehran. According to the report, the intermediaries who transferred the funds charged a commission of 20%, four times higher than usual, and the organization intended to pay an initial sum of \$3,000 to approximately 50,000 families, with priority given to families whose villages had been destroyed or remained isolated because of the Israeli presence. A senior Hezbollah figure confirmed that the organization had succeeded in raising money and the distribution program would be announced in the coming days, without referring to the source of the funds. It was also reported that Hezbollah was having difficulty transferring funds through financial companies which it had used in the past, but had not stopped paying the salaries of its [terrorist] operatives and allowances to the families of those killed (Reuters, October 7, 2026).

► American Department of State spokesperson Tommy Pigott denied the report and claimed Hezbollah had every incentive to promote such narratives through anonymous sources, but the funds did not exist. He said the organization was trying to save face after suffering blows and the United States would continue to choke its sources of funding through sanctions, while supporting the Lebanese government in the reconstruction of the south. He added that under the American administration, Hezbollah would never be able to restore its strength or rebuild its terrorist infrastructure (*Nidaa al-Watan*, October 7, 2026).

► Lebanese and Arab sources said the funds Hezbollah was raising to assist displaced persons did not come solely from Iran, and the organization currently relied primarily on a network of businessmen and entities operating in Lebanon and abroad and on assets it had accumulated in the past. According to the sources, close monitoring of money transfers, including checks by a prominent European country, required the organization to raise the funds in phases, which could explain the shift to periodic payments (Lebanon 24, October 8, 2026). It was also reported that financial institutions in Lebanon had begun to heighten their scrutiny of dollar transfers from abroad (Lebanon 24, October 10, 2026).

► American sources said Hezbollah raked in approximately \$40 million a month from smuggling, counterfeiting and the Lebanese state budget. However, they said the disruption of drug-smuggling networks interfered with Hezbollah's financing and the Lebanese

authorities had also increased oversight measures at seaports and Beirut International Airport (al-Hadath, October 11, 2026).

Hezbollah's Involvement in the Rehabilitation of Lebanon

► Sources close to the "reconstruction portfolio" said Hezbollah would soon announce when it would start distributing aid to displaced persons, adding that the sums required for housing payments were available and larger than those announced. Reportedly, Hezbollah would also pay for the rehabilitation of partially damaged homes, and the start of the distribution would provide an answer to those who doubted its ability to compensate its supporters (al-Modon, October 8, 2026). The program has an initial payment of housing expenses for six months, apparently \$500 a month, with priority given to 50,000 families whose villages were destroyed, and its details will be presented at a press conference by the chairman of Hezbollah's executive council, Ali Da'moush (*al-Diyar*, October 9, 2026).

► Sources close to Hezbollah said that the organization was completing the lists of those eligible ahead of the upcoming distribution, relying on the experience and database it had accumulated during the previous round of aid. The sources called the announcement of the program a message of "defiance" to the American administration, which they claimed had portrayed Hezbollah as "finished and bankrupt." According to the report, after the first ceasefire Hezbollah distributed aid to more than 50,000 families and, according to estimates not affiliated with any political side, its scope at the time had exceeded \$1 billion (*al-Nahar*, October 9, 2026).

► Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, accused the Lebanese government of deliberately neglecting reconstruction to exert pressure on the organization's support base, including the \$250 million World Bank loan, of which nothing had been paid (*al-Diyar*, October 10, 2026).

Challenges from within the Shi'ite Community

► The Asas Media website claimed Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem's announcement of housing payments to displaced persons came three days after Prime Minister Salam's visit to al-Nabatieh, during which many residents expressed a "longing for a state." According to the website, the organization's support base raised questions about

the benefit of a connection with the "Iranian axis"⁶ after the destruction of their homes (Asas Media, October 9, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

► Lebanese army commander Rodolphe Haykal visited Cyprus and met with the Cypriot minister of defense and the chief of the national guard general staff. He toured the CYCLOPS training center in Larnaca, where Lebanese army officers participate in training courses, and the joint rescue coordination center (Lebanese army X account, October 9, 2026).

► At the port of Beirut the Lebanese army received a shipment of ammunition donated by France, part of the continuing cooperation between the two armies (Lebanese army, October 9, 2026). At a ceremony held at the logistics brigade headquarters in Kafr Shima, attended by European representative for foreign affairs Kaja Kallas, the army received an EU donation of engineering vehicles, transport vehicles and generators (*al-Diyar*, October 8, 2026).

► The Lebanese army announced that the smuggling of rockets and 24 kilograms of TNT into Lebanon had been prevented in the al-Qusayr-al-Hermel area along the border with Syria (Lebanese army X account, October 9, 2026).



**Preventing smuggling from Syria in the al-Qusayr-al-Hermel area
(Lebanese army X account, October 9, 2026)**

UNIFIL and Preparations for Replacing It

► UNIFIL announced that small-arms fire had been directed at one of its positions near the village of Shebaa in the eastern sector of south Lebanon. Most of the bullets struck the outer wall, while some hit residential units and UN vehicles inside the base; there were no casualties. UNIFIL began an investigation and said an attack on the peacekeeping force was

⁶ Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, whose collective objective is the destruction and elimination of the State of Israel.

a serious violation of international law and Security Council Resolution 1701, and "bordered on a war crime" (*al-Nashra*, October 7, 2026).

► A delegation of members of parliament headed by Lebanese member of parliament Melhem Khalaf submitted a legal study to President Aoun concerning Security Council Resolution 2790, which extended UNIFIL's mandate until the end of 2026. According to the study, there were substantial difficulties in implementing some of the resolution's provisions, particularly the transfer to the Lebanese army of sites from which UNIFIL had withdrawn in the shadow of the Israeli occupation. The members of the delegation demanded that the resolution be reconsidered to ensure the continuation of the international security umbrella in the south and discussed alternatives to prevent a security vacuum (Lebanese presidency X account, October 6, 2026). Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji received a similar memorandum from the delegation, signed by 86 Lebanese MPs, regarding efforts to extend UNIFIL's mandate and contacts for finding an alternative (Youssef Rajji's X account, October 8, 2026).

► A government source said Prime Minister Salam, in coordination with President Aoun, insisted that an international force under the umbrella of the UN Security Council replace UNIFIL immediately upon the expiration of its mandate at the end of 2026 and serve as an international witness to the Israeli withdrawal and the army's deployment (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, October 7, 2026).

► During her visit to Beirut, European representative for foreign affairs Kaja Kallas said the EU had completed plans for a new mission to train and advise the Lebanese army and internal security forces, following a formal invitation from Lebanon, adding that EU foreign ministers were expected to approve it on October 12, 2026. She said that one of the objectives of the European mission was to train the army to confiscate Hezbollah's weapons, which surprised her hosts, and requested political and security guarantees for the mission personnel's activities in Lebanon (al-Modon, October 10, 2026). According to Kallas, the objective of mission is to strengthen the authority of the army and security forces, border security and internal security in accordance with Resolution 1701, and it would neither replace UNIFIL nor be restricted solely to the south. She warned of a security vacuum after UNIFIL's departure and noted that the EU had announced €505 million in aid through 2027 and its assistance to the army through the European Peace Facility had reached a total of €182 million since 2022 (*al-Diyar*, October 8, 2026).

► A European diplomat said that an advance contingent of the European mission, which would include at least 100 military personnel from France, Spain and Italy, should arrive in Beirut by December 25, 2026, and they would not deploy in the south (*al-Arabiya*, October 9, 2026). Reportedly, the Lebanese government approved the establishment of the mission in principle, with the addition of a clause inserted at the request of the Shi'ite ministers stipulating that any agreement resulting from it would be submitted to the government for approval. It was reported that the mission would not have an operational role and would support the internal security forces to free the army for border defense, strengthening the border regiments, intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and maritime security (*al-Akhbar*, October 10, 2026).

► Meeting with Kallas, Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, warned against ending UNIFIL's mandate without finding an alternative under the UN umbrella, which he claimed would undermine international legitimacy and Resolution 1701 (*al-Joumhouria*, October 8, 2026).

► Meeting with President Aoun, Patrick Durel, the French ambassador to Lebanon, reiterated France's commitment to working to prevent a vacuum in the south after UNIFIL's departure (Lebanese presidency X account, October 8, 2026).

The Civilian Situation in South Lebanon

► According to the Lebanese ministry of health, since the beginning of the current hostilities on March 2, 2026, 4,386 people have been killed and 12,424 wounded. Since October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah began the "support campaign" for the Gaza Strip, 8,953 people have been killed and 30,660 wounded (Lebanese ministry of health, October 10, 2026).

► Reportedly, families displaced from south Lebanon to the Beqa'a Valley face increasing economic hardship. Many lost their livelihood, their rent is \$200 a month and they struggle to pay for electricity, heating ahead of the winter and tuition. According to reports, assistance from organizations and associations has decreased and some families received their last food package approximately two months earlier, in part because aid is now being prioritized for the south (*al-Akhbar*, October 8, 2026). It was also reported that demand for apartments rose again among former displaced persons in villages and towns where they previously stayed because of fears of renewed war amid American and Israeli threats (*al-Nahar*, October 6, 2026).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

► Muhammad Qassem al-As'ad, the Palestinian ambassador to Lebanon, said the Palestinians were prepared to complete the transfer of the PLO organizations' weapons to the Lebanese state, through understanding and coordination and while avoiding steps that could lead to tension or confrontation. He said dealing with the weapons of the organizations outside the PLO was the responsibility of the Lebanese state through contacts with the relevant parties (MTV, October 10, 2026).

► The leadership of the PLO organizations in Lebanon met at the Palestinian embassy in Beirut with Yasser Abbas, the envoy to Lebanon and son of Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas, to discuss the Palestinian national dialogue and preparations for elections to the Palestinian National Council (before the decision to postpone them), including convening the electoral assembly in Lebanon (al-Modon, October 8, 2026).

► Hamas held a rally in the al-Badawi Palestinian refugee camp to mark three years since the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion and massacre. Bilal Sa'id Sha'ban, secretary general of the al-Tawhid al-Islami movement, praised the "support fronts" in Lebanon and Yemen in his speech and called for the unification of the Palestinian organizations (Lebanon 24, October 9, 2026).