

IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Morning -- June 22, 2025, Information Cutoff: 5:00 AM ET

Key Takeaways

- The United States conducted strikes targeting three nuclear facilities with bunker-buster bombs and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said all three sites sustained “extreme damage.” Israeli officials echoed that statement, though they added the Fordow nuclear facility was “not destroyed.”
- Iran began taking steps to retaliate against the United States, including by threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely interfered with GPS signals in the Strait of Hormuz on June 22.
- Israel continued its air campaign against Iran.

US strikes

Confirmed US Strikes in Iran June 22, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET




TLAM Cruise Missiles

GBU-57/MOPS

The United States conducted strikes against three Iranian nuclear sites, including the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEFP) in Qom Province.[1] A US official told the *New York Times* that six American warplanes dropped 12 30,000-lb GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) bunker-busting bombs on Fordow.[2] The standard payload of a B-2 bomber is 40,000 lb, but the bomber refueled immediately after takeoff.[3] US President Donald Trump said on June 21 that US strikes were a "spectacular military success" and were a part of the US objective to destroy Iran's nuclear enrichment capacity.[4] Trump said the facilities were "completely and totally obliterated." The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said all three sites sustained "extreme damage and destruction." [5] The chairman added that he did not yet have a complete battle damage assessment at this time, however. A senior Israeli official told Axios that US strikes set back Iran's nuclear program

by years.[6] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that there has been “no increase in off-site radiation levels” following the attacks.[7]

Satellite imagery of Fordow from June 22 shows six probable entry-point craters on top of a ridge above the underground complex that houses two halls of at least 2000 centrifuges. Approximately half of the centrifuges at Fordow are advanced IR-6 centrifuges. The Wall Street Journal reported that Fordow was producing nearly enough highly enriched uranium to fuel one nuclear weapon per month. Two unspecified Israeli officials with knowledge of the matter said initial Israeli assessments indicate that US strikes did not destroy but inflicted serious damage to the site at Fordow.[8] The officials added that it appears Iran moved materials and equipment from the site ahead of the strike. A senior US official similarly said that the US strikes did not destroy but severely damaged the Fordow nuclear site and took it “off the table.”[9]



The US official also told the *New York Times* that a US B-2 bomber dropped two GBU-57 MOPs on the Natanz nuclear site.[10] Israel has previously struck Natanz multiple times since the start of Israel’s air campaign against Iran on June 12.[11] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi previously stated that Israeli strikes likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[12] Satellite imagery from June 22 shows a probable entry-point crater at the above-ground complex at the Natanz nuclear site.

The United States separately struck an unspecified nuclear site in Esfahan with cruise missiles.[13] It is unclear what site the US strikes targeted. Israel has previously targeted the Esfahan

Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) on June 13 and 21 and caused substantial damage to several facilities in the complex, including centrifuge production facilities and a uranium conversion plant.[14] Satellite imagery from June 22 shows that US strikes likely damaged additional buildings within the complex. The United States may have also struck a new Iranian nuclear facility south of Natanz in Esfahan Province. The Institute for Science and International Security reported in April 2025 that Iran is constructing a security perimeter around two underground nuclear tunnel complexes located within Mount Kolang Gaz La, south of the Natanz enrichment complex.[15] Iran announced in September 2020 that it was building a tunnel complex near Natanz to make advanced centrifuges after a former centrifuge production facility was destroyed in July 2020.[16]



Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center

June 16, 2025



Iran has taken steps to begin its retaliation for the US strikes. The Iranian Parliament approved a measure on June 22 to close the Strait of Hormuz, which would disrupt international shipping.^[17] Iranian media reported that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) still needs to provide final approval.^[18] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on June 22 that Iran “reserves all options to defend its sovereignty, interests, and people.”^[19] An open-source observer citing Windward confirmed that vessels are experiencing Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz.^[20] Iran has previously threatened to disrupt international shipping in response to US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.^[21] Around 20 percent of global oil exports flow through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran launched two missile barrages at Israel after the US strikes.^[22] This attack may or may not be in retaliation for the US strikes on Iran. Iran could expand its retaliation to include attacks on US forces in the region. It may be several days before Iran responds directly against the United States. Iran fired ballistic missiles at US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq five days after the US strike that killed IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.^[23] An Iranian source close to the regime posted on X that it “seems like” Iran’s response to US strikes will include attacking “one or more US positions in the region” and “continuing the war with Israel with continuous strikes.”^[24]

Iran has launched two ballistic missile attacks on Israel since CTP-ISW's June 21, 5:00 PM EST data cut off.^[25] Iran launched the two ballistic missile barrages after the United States conducted strikes against the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and nuclear sites in Esfahan and Natanz.^[26] Israeli sources reported missile or interceptor impacts in Haifa and Tel Aviv from the two barrages, which injured several people in both cities.^[27] The IDF Air Force also struck six Iranian missile launch platforms and operators arming the missiles to strike Israel on June 22.^[28] An IRGC spokesperson announced that these missile attacks employed a mix of long-range liquid- and solid-fuel ballistic missiles.^[29] Iran fired between 22 and 30 missiles targeting Israel in these two barrages.^[30] Israeli emergency services responded to at least 10 impacts throughout the country.^[31]

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

June 20, 2025



Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant

June 15, 2025




Observed Impacts in Israel June 22, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



Israeli air defenses have intercepted 30 one-way attack drones launched from Iran overnight.^[32] One drone flew over the southern Golan Heights.^[33] Two other drones entered near southern Israel.^[34]

The IDF continued its campaign to destroy Iranian military infrastructure on June 22. Social media users reported Israeli airstrikes on an IRGC division headquarters in Tabriz, northwest Iran, on June 22.^[35] The IRGC 31st Ashoura Mechanized Division operates at the site.^[36] CTP-ISW has observed fewer reports of Israeli airstrikes from social media accounts based in Iran, which likely reflects widespread internet disruptions in Iran rather than an actual decrease in Israeli airstrikes.^[37]

Confirmed Israeli Strikes in Iran June 22, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



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IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



Ben Schmida, Andie Parry, Nidal Morrison, Ria Reddy, Olivia Gibson, and Brian Carter

Evening -- June 22, 2025, Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET

Key Takeaways

- Iranian leaders uncharacteristically gave no explicit vow of retaliation against the United States. The closest was an IRGC statement warning of “regrettable responses.” This absence of coordinated threats may reflect the extent to which Iranian leaders are struggling to communicate with one another, as they isolate themselves to evade Israeli strikes.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will travel to Moscow and meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 23. The Kremlin condemned the US strikes and issued veiled threats that are likely meant to stoke panic among Western audiences, including key decision makers.
- Israel continued its strike campaign against Iran, targeting missile, drone, and air defense capabilities. One of the strikes targeted equipment that Iran uses to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles, which will likely disrupt further the Iranian ability to reconstitute its degraded missile forces.

Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22.[1] The Russian MFA claimed that the US strikes are a violation of the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council is obliged to respond.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the world will descend into chaos if countries are allowed to interpret the right to self-defense in the UN Charter as they wish.[3] Lavrov claimed that the US strikes marked a new, dangerous escalation during a phone call with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on June 22.[4] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, Kirill Dmitriev, claimed on June 22 that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is en route to Moscow and will meet with Putin on June 23.[5]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev issued a series of veiled threats against the United States, but these threats do not represent a significant rhetorical inflection because the Kremlin commonly uses Medvedev to stoke panic and fear among Western decision makers.[6] Medvedev responded to the US strike in social media posts, including on his English-language channels, on June 22 by claiming that US President Donald Trump has started a new war.[7] Medvedev also claimed that the United States failed to destroy Iran's

nuclear capabilities, that Iran will continue to work towards the production of nuclear weapons, and that several unspecified countries are ready to "directly supply" Iran with nuclear warheads. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify narratives intended to stoke panic and fear among Western decision makers, particularly through nuclear saber rattling.[8] Medvedev's veiled threats thus do not represent a significant rhetorical inflection. CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being, showcasing the immediate limitations in the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[9]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) implicitly threatened to attack US bases in the region in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.[10] The IRGC released a statement on June 22 warning the United States that it should "expect regrettable responses." [11] The IRGC said that the "number, dispersion, and size" of US bases in the region has "doubled [the US'] vulnerability." [12] Iran has previously attacked US forces in the region in response to US military action against Iran. [13] Iranian media have widely circulated the IRGC statement as well as other threats to attack US interests in the region. [14] A large majority of the sources are inaccessible because Iran has reportedly imposed a "near-total internet blackout" across the country. [15] An outlet affiliated with a cultural and ideological organization subordinate to the supreme leader posted a graphic on X outlining steps Iran could take in retaliation for US strikes. [16] The graphic included Iranian attacks on US bases, activation of the Axis of Resistance, cyber-attacks on US infrastructure, and efforts to disrupt global markets. CTP-ISW reported in its June 22 Morning Update that the Iranian parliament conditionally approved a measure to close the Strait of Hormuz, which would disrupt international shipping. [17] The Supreme National Security Council still needs to issue a final approval.


The United States will reportedly not conduct additional strikes in Iran unless Iran or its proxies retaliate against US interests. The United States struck three key Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21. [18] These strikes aimed to destroy Iran's nuclear enrichment capacity, and US President Donald Trump said that the strikes were successful. [19] Additional US strikes targeting other strategic sites in Iran would suggest an expansion of US objectives in the conflict. US President Donald Trump warned on June 21 that "there are many targets left" and stated that "future attacks will be far greater" if Iran does not "make peace." [20] A US official similarly told Axios that Trump is ready to resume strikes on Iran if Iran retaliates against US forces. [21] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed these comments and said that the United States currently has no plans for additional attacks if Iran does not "mess around." [22] Rubio said that the Trump administration is prepared to "impose costs on Iran if they attack American personnel" either directly or through the Axis of Resistance. [23] An Israeli official told Axios the United States has communicated that it is "done" with its planned strikes but that US officials "do [not] mind" if Israel continues its air campaign in Iran. [24]

Several Iranian-backed militias have released statements condemning the US airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, but have not claimed any retaliatory attacks against the United States at the time of this writing. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis released separate statements denouncing US strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. [25] These statements followed threats by several Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces if the United States participated in the Iran-Israel war. The Houthis threatened on June 21 that any US involvement in the Iran-Israel war would trigger Houthi attacks on US-linked vessels and naval ships in the Red Sea. [26] Iranian-backed

Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah also threatened on June 19 that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, for example.^[27]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to target Iranian ballistic missile and drone capabilities on June 22. The IDF conducted a series of strikes targeting several Iranian military assets near Yazd City in central Iran.^[28] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting the Imam Hussein strategic missile base on June 22, which reportedly housed long-range Khorramshahr ballistic missiles in underground tunnels.^[29] IRGC-affiliated media reportedly posted footage of Iran launching Khorramshahr-4 missiles with a cluster munition warhead being launched toward Israel, and claimed it was the first Khorramshahr-4 that Iran has launched.^[30] The missile base had fired approximately 60 ballistic missiles at Israel, according to an Israeli military correspondent.^[31] The IDF Air Force's strikes on the Imam Hussein headquarters were the longest-range strike Israel has conducted since the conflict began, with Israeli jets traveling 2,200 kilometers.^[32] Iranian Khorramshahr ballistic missiles have an effective range between 2,000 and 3,000 kilometers.^[33] The IDF conducted additional airstrikes targeting the Shahid Sadoughi Barracks located south of Yazd City on June 22.^[34]

Israeli Strikes in Yazd Province June 22, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



The IDF separately struck “planetary mixers and critical machinery” at a facility southeast of Shahroud City, Semnan Province, which are used to produce solid fuel for long-range ballistic missiles such as the Khorramshahr series.[35] The IDF previously destroyed this type of machinery during a raid on a Hezbollah facility in Syria in September 2024 and struck similar machinery at the same Iranian ballistic missile facilities in October 2024.[36] The IDF announced it simultaneously struck missile launchers, air defense factories, the headquarters of an unspecified “3rd Division”, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) headquarters, and a UAV warehouse, in separate strikes across Esfahan, Bushehr, and Khuzestan provinces.[37] It is unclear what formation the IDF is referring to with “3rd Division,” because the IRGC 3rd Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Special Forces Division is based in West Azerbaijan.[38] The IDF may be referring to the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base, which is distinct from the 3rd Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Special Forces Division and is in Esfahan.[39] The IDF also

conducted airstrikes targeting the Artesh 92nd Armored Division, north of Dezful City, Khuzestan Province.[40] There were additional reports of Israeli airstrikes near Khorramabad City, Lorestan Province, which have not been confirmed at the time of this writing.[41]



Iran has not launched drones or ballistic missiles at Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 5:00 am June 22. The IRGC claimed to use the Khorramshahr-4 cluster warhead ballistic missile for the first time in an attack on Israel earlier on June 22.[42] The IDF said that it struck the Khorramshahr-4 missiles in Iran before launch on June 22, however.[43] Iran also launched a Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile that contained a cluster munition warhead on June 19, according to an Israeli journalist.[44]



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[38] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/irans-reserve-of-last-resort-uncovering-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-ground-forces-order-of-battle>

[39] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/irans-reserve-of-last-resort-uncovering-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-ground-forces-order-of-battle> ;
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[40] <https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936777839568969787> ;

[41] <https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1936792227453235272> ; <https://x.com/Philipp27960841/status/1936789122364170534>

[42] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1936784300067750322

[43] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1936801762159071417>

[44] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1935703221961392613

IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2025, Evening Edition

Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 5:00PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

CTP-ISW will not publish a morning update given the ceasefire between Israel and Iran. All analysis of the Israel-Iran war will be covered in the daily evening update unless events warrant a resumption of twice-daily updates.

Israel conducted a two-week air campaign with the objective of degrading, destroying and removing the threat of Iran's nuclear program.[1] Israel also pursued two supporting objectives to limit Iranian retaliation and provide itself with an offramp. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that "Operation Rising Lion" achieved all of Israel's war aims "and much more." [2] Israel described Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel and stated that it would not allow Iran to weaponize its program. [3] Israel achieved its objectives vis-a-vis the nuclear program by destroying nuclear facilities and enrichment capacity with US support and killing key nuclear scientists who were instrumental in the development and weaponization of the program. The Israeli campaign, supported by US strikes, "effectively destroyed" Iran's enrichment capacity, though stockpiles of various amounts of enriched uranium remain. [4] Iran's ability to enrich these to weapons grade uranium is complicated by the destruction of most of Iran's centrifuges and the loss of many nuclear scientists. [5] There is more information about the status of the nuclear program below.

Israel supported this main line of effort by conducting a campaign designed to prevent Iran from conducting effective retaliatory strikes on Israel by degrading its ballistic missile capabilities. [6] Iran originally planned to launch 1,000 ballistic missiles in response to Israeli strikes on Iran, but Israeli strikes forced it to fire much fewer (more on the status of the missile forces below). [7] Iranian ballistic missile strikes would have targeted Israeli military, intelligence, and political institutions that enabled Israeli operations. These strikes could have also caused major Israeli casualties, which would have been unacceptable for many Israelis. Israeli airstrikes on Iran's ballistic missile program destroyed Iranian capabilities and forced Iran to launch fewer and smaller attacks on Israel, most of which were intercepted by the IDF. [8]

Israel pursued a second supporting effort to compel Iran to accept a ceasefire on Israeli terms by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime. Netanyahu and Israeli


Defense Minister Katz directed the IDF on June 20 to “intensify” strikes on Iranian institutions that support regime stability.[9] The Iranian regime has maintained social control by violently cracking down on protests and other expressions of popular anti-regime sentiment through internal security organizations. Israeli officials suggested that these airstrikes could create conditions which the Iranian population could exploit to overthrow the regime.[10] A series of strikes designed to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responded and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel could have calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival could compel it to agree to a ceasefire.

The limited nature of strikes against internal security institutions suggests that the IDF sought to demonstrate a credible threat to regime stability rather than topple or meaningfully destabilize the regime. A focused, well-designed regime destabilization campaign would have systematically destroyed IRGC provincial and district-level headquarters while simultaneously destroying the Iranian Law Enforcement Command’s infrastructure and assets across the country. Israel struck these targets, but it only did so in Tehran and did not do so systematically even in Tehran.[11] Israel, given its air superiority over Iran, could have presumably destroyed these targets if needed, which indicates that the IDF made a deliberate choice *not* to systematically target Iranian internal security assets. The IDF did systematically target missile and nuclear facilities, in contrast.


Israeli strikes against Iran’s energy infrastructure appeared to be related to an effort to influence regime decision-making. Previous energy shortages in Iran have led to protests against the regime. Demonstrations over the rising gas prices in 2017 and 2018 escalated into broader challenges for the regime’s stability, for example.[12] Israel’s attacks on gas production and oil infrastructure, which would exacerbate the root causes of previous demonstrations, suggested that part of Israel’s campaign aimed to influence Iranian regime decision-making by building the perception of a possible credible threat to regime stability. The IDF struck a natural gas processing facility and gas refinery in Bushehr Province on June 14.[13] The ensuing fire forced Iranian authorities to partially suspend gas production at South Pars Gas Field, which is one of the largest gas fields in the world and is central to Iran’s domestic energy supply.[14] The IDF also struck Iranian oil infrastructure in Tehran on June 14, including an oil depot and an oil refinery in Tehran.[15] Both the strikes on internal security institutions and energy infrastructure were relatively limited compared to IDF strikes targeting the nuclear program or retaliatory capabilities.

Israeli Strikes in Iran

June 12 to June 24, 2025



Israeli Strikes by Target Type June 12 to June 24, 2025



The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that US and Israeli strikes on Iran have “effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment program.[16] The Institute said it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels. This assessment is based on the destruction Iran suffered at Natanz nuclear facility, Fordow nuclear facility, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and the elimination of many nuclear scientists.[17] The six entry point craters for the US bunker-buster bombs at Fordow were above two weak points, and the bombs would have detonated within the facility.[18] The Institute for Science and International Security assesses that the bomb blast would have been channeled by the centrifuge cascade hall’s side walls, which would have destroyed all of the installed centrifuges there.[19] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) battle damage assessments indicate that Israeli strikes also likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Israel and the United States conducted airstrikes targeting the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant above ground and Fuel Enrichment Plant underground at Natanz, respectively.[21] The IAEA added that it was possible that uranium isotopes may have been dispersed within the facility (though not outside), which would make it difficult to access.[22] **This means it may be some time before even the Iranians can determine the true extent of the damage.**


The Institute for Science and International Security stated that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, however.[23] Weapons-grade uranium (WGU) is uranium enriched up to 90 percent. The destruction of so many centrifuges will make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. A US weapons expert stated that US and Israeli strikes have also made it significantly more difficult and time-consuming for Iran to turn WGU into a usable nuclear weapon.[24] He said the strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to “even build a non-missile deliverable weapon,” such as a nuclear bomb. There are significant challenges associated with miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to install it on a ballistic missile warhead.

US President Donald Trump reiterated the US demand for Iran to maintain zero uranium enrichment capabilities.[25] Trump stated on June 24 that Iran is “not going to have enrichment and [Iran is] not going to have a nuclear weapon.”[26] He emphasized that “Iran will never rebuild their nuclear facilities.”[27] A senior US official reportedly said the Israel-Iran ceasefire was based on discussions with Iranian officials that indicated Iran is willing to resume nuclear negotiations as long as Israel stop its air campaign.[28] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on June 24 that Iran is “ready for talks.”[29] Iran repeatedly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations from April to early June 2025.[30] It is unclear if Iran is currently willing to accept the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.

Israel has killed at least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists since June 12 as part of its campaign to delay Iran’s ability to weaponize its nuclear capabilities.[31] The IDF killed Sayyed Asghar Hashemi Tabar in Tehran Province on June 20.[32] Hashemi Tabar was a weapons expert at the Shahid Chamran Group, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), and specialized in pulse power research.[33] Pulsed power is a technology that stores and releases energy in intense bursts to simulate nuclear detonation effects for research, but pulsed power does not trigger actual nuclear explosions.[34] The United States sanctioned the Shahid Chamran Group and Hashemi Tabar in 2019 for research related to Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation.[35] The IDF also killed Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Sadati Ermaki in Tehran Province.[36]

Israeli Strikes Targeting the Iranian Nuclear Program

June 12 to June 24, 2025



The IDF announced it thwarted a possible Iranian ceasefire violation on June 24 at 4:20 PM ET. The IDF intercepted two drones that it said “apparently” originated from Iran before they entered Israeli airspace.[37] This attack marks the first time that Iran may have launched drones targeting Israel since the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET.[38] Senior Israeli military and political officials have not commented on the drone attack or threatened a response at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:


- Israel pursued a campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and with US support was largely successful in doing so. Israel also pursued two supporting lines of effort to limit Iran’s retaliation and create an off-ramp by creating conditions that would pressure Iran into terminating the conflict. Israel pressured Iran by creating a credible threat of regime destabilization.
- The limited nature of strikes against internal security institutions suggests that the IDF sought to demonstrate a credible threat to regime stability rather than topple or meaningfully destabilize the regime. A focused, well-designed regime destabilization campaign would have systematically destroyed regime institutions, which did not happen.
- Iran’s enrichment capabilities have been “effectively destroyed,” according to the Institute for Science and International Security. Iran still retains stockpiles of enriched uranium, but its ability to enrich these stockpiles further will be complicated by the loss of so many centrifuges and facilities.
- Iran’s inability to accurately strike military or energy infrastructure highlights the limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles. The high Israeli intercept rate made it even more difficult for Iran to accurately target key Israeli infrastructure. Israel nonetheless faced sustained missile attacks against key population centers that was unprecedented in the October 7 War.

The IDF has targeted Iran’s internal security institutions, including the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC provincial units since June 15.[39] Israeli strikes on regime security institutions continued on June 23 before the ceasefire. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on June 20 that he ordered “intensified” strikes on regime symbols and domestic repression centers in Tehran Province.[40] The IDF struck the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps headquarters in Alborz Province on June 23 and killed at least 23 IRGC members, including Provincial Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mojtaba Karami and Deputy for Social Affairs Brigadier General Akbar Enayati.[41]


The IDF also killed three senior security and intelligence commanders on June 23, including Deputy for social affairs of the Basij Organization Brigadier General Meysam Rezvanpour, LEC Intelligence Organization Deputy Brigadier General Alireza Lotfi and Basij Counterintelligence Commander Mohammad Taghi Yousefvand, likely to degrade the regime’s security and intelligence infrastructure.[42] The Iranian regime has maintained social control by violently cracking down on protests and other expressions of popular anti-regime sentiment through internal security organizations like the Basij, LEC, and the IRGC.[43] Basij units have been deployed to support LEC forces during major protest movements like the Mahsa Amini protests and the Iranian Green Movement.[44]

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani appeared at a rally in Tehran Province on June 24.[45] A *New York Times* reporter claimed on June 13 that Israeli strikes killed Ghaani along with other senior IRGC commanders.[46]

Israeli Strikes in Tehran City June 12 to June 24, 2025




Israeli Strikes in Tehran City June 12 to June 24, 2025



IDF Campaign Against Iran's Ballistic Missile Forces

The IDF sought to limit Iran's ability to respond to Israel at the start of its campaign and continued to destroy Iranian missile launchers and stockpiles throughout the air campaign. Iranian leaders originally planned to launch up to one thousand ballistic missiles at Israel in the immediate aftermath of an Israeli strike, presumably in multiple barrages.[47] The first Iranian missile barrage included about 30 missiles, and Iran never managed to launch over 40 ballistic missiles in a single barrage throughout the 12 days of attacks.[48] Israel reportedly built a secret one-way attack drone base in Iran, which it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers near Tehran on June 12.[49] Israel also targeted a meeting of senior IRGC Aerospace commanders who would have been responsible for giving the order to attack immediately after the strike.[50] The IDF Air Force proceeded to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers as they were readied to launch and in warehouses at a consistent and daily tempo throughout the campaign.[51] Israel has also targeted Iranian missile production sites and equipment, including planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for long-range ballistic missiles.[52] Israel's concerted effort to disrupt missile production, destroy launch infrastructure, and eliminate missile stockpile and Aerospace Force leadership muted Iran's ability to respond to Israel in both the short and medium term.


Israeli Strikes Targeting the Iranian Ballistic Missile Program June 12 to June 24, 2025



The IDF assessed that Iran launched between 500 and 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones targeting Israel during its “Operation True Promise III.”[53] The IDF’s assessment is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation of 543 Iranian ballistic missiles. CTP-ISW has recorded 43 waves of Iranian ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since the start of “Operation True Promise III” on June 13. Iran’s ballistic missile barrages during “Operation True Promise III” varied in size. Iran used around 40 missiles in its largest barrage and one missile in its smallest barrage.[54] Iran’s missile barrages in the recent conflict are much smaller compared to its barrages in its October 2024 attack on Israel when Iran launched around 100 ballistic missiles per barrage in two barrages.[55] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 24 that Israeli air defense systems successfully intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s ballistic missiles.[56] Israel also reportedly had a 99.99 percent interception rate of Iranian drones, with only one drone making impact.[57]

Iranian Ballistic Missile Interceptions vs Impacts in Israel

June 13 - June 24, 2025




Note: Some of these figures are estimates based on IDF and open-source reports.

Israeli air defenses maintained a high intercept rate against Iranian ballistic missile attacks during the war. Israeli air defense systems have successfully intercepted 89 percent of Iranian ballistic missiles launched at Israel since June 12. Israeli air defenses did not intercept Iranian ballistic missiles on trajectory to strike areas with no risk to Israeli civilians or no strategic value.[58] Air defense systems and their operators prioritize incoming projectiles that will hit targets of significance rather than attempting to stop every projectile. Missile strikes in open areas are not indicative of Israeli air defense failures or a shortage of interceptor missiles but rather Israel's defensive priorities. Israeli air defenses have previously prioritized defending highly populated areas as seen during Iran's October 2024 missile attack.[59] Iranian ballistic missiles did penetrate Israeli air defenses striking populated areas in some instances, however. Air defense systems are not perfect, and some projectiles will penetrate the system.[60]

Iranian ballistic missiles do not have pinpoint accuracy. Iran's inability to accurately strike military or energy infrastructure highlights the limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles. All ballistic missiles have a circular error probable (CEP). The CEP is "the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50% of the missiles would be expected to impact." [61] The stated and publicly known CEPs of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) used in this war are between 20 and 500 meters.[62] The relatively poor accuracy of these missiles compared to a precision-guided munition means that even in instances when Iranian missiles struck military targets, they were largely ineffective and caused no casualties and limited damage. Iran targeted an Israeli military intelligence facility during the war with four missiles, and three of the four completely missed the base while the fourth struck a warehouse on the outskirts of the compound.[63] This case demonstrates the futility of using these missiles against pinpoint military targets, which may explain the increased focus on civilian targets during this war. Iran likely began using cluster warheads--ballistic missile warheads with hundreds of submunitions--to maximize the potential impact of its ballistic missiles given their relatively low accuracy when fitted with standard warheads. [64]

Iranian Missile Circular Error Probable (CEP)




Iran used several solid- and liquid-fuel MRBMs, including Ghadr, Emad, Kheybar Shekan, and Haj Qassem missiles.[65] Iran previously used the Ghadr, Emad, and Kheybar Shekan missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.[66] Iran began using more technologically advanced missiles in its attacks on June 18.[67] Iran launched at least three missiles with cluster munition warheads, including two Khorramshahr-4 missiles.[68] Iran reportedly launched a Sejjil ballistic missile and several Fattah-1 missiles (which the Houthis have fired at Israel under the name Palestine-2) towards Israel on June 18.[69] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said on June 22 that it "employed new tactics using a mix of long-range liquid- and solid-fuel ballistic missiles with advanced warheads capable of penetrating air defenses." [70] Iran also launched a variety of drones, including the Shahed-136, Arash-2, and an enlarged version of the Shahed-101.[71]

CTP-ISW has recorded 60 Iranian ballistic missile or Israeli interceptor impacts in Israel from over 40 Iranian barrages since the Israeli air campaign began on June 12. This estimate is consistent with an Israeli Army Radio correspondent's assessment that between 50 and 60 Iranian ballistic missiles struck Israeli territory.[72] Iranian ballistic missile impacts killed 28 people in Israel, including one IDF soldier.[73] The majority of Iranian missiles struck civilian areas with only five out of the 60 impacts striking military or energy infrastructure facilities.[74] At least three Iranian missile impacts targeted Israeli military sites or facilities. One Iranian ballistic missile struck near HaKirya in Tel Aviv on June 13.[75] Another Iranian ballistic missile struck a warehouse near the Military Intelligence School in Camp Moshe Dayan on June 17.[76] An Iranian ballistic missile also struck the Gav Yem Negev Advanced Technologies Park which houses active military and cyber facilities.[77] At least two Iranian missile impacts targeted Israeli energy infrastructure. Iranian ballistic missiles struck the Bazan Oil refinery in Haifa on June 15, which caused the facility to temporarily shut down.[78] An Iranian ballistic missile struck an electrical substation in Ashdod on June 23.[79]

Observed Impacts in Israel

June 12 to June 24, 2025



Map by George Barros, Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Quinn Deutschendorf, Lea Corticchiato, Brian Carter, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida and Nidal Morrison
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No group has claimed responsibility for the drone attacks that targeted Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad International Airport overnight on June 23 and 24 since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 08:00 AM on June 24. The United States intercepted both drones.[80] A third drone crashed in al Radwaniyah, Anbar Province, about seven kilometers south of the airport.[81] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously attacked both Ain al Asad Airbase and the airport.[82] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened prior to the US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites that the militias would target the United States and its regional interests if the United States entered the war.[83]

Drone attacks targeting Camp Taji, Baghdad Province, and Imam Ali Air Base, Dhi Qar Province, on June 23 “severely damaged” Iraqi radars at those sites, according to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s spokesperson.[84] No group has claimed responsibility for these attacks at the time of this writing. Sudani ordered the formation of a high-level committee to investigate the attacks. These attacks follow Iranian-backed Iraqi figures repeatedly condemning Israel’s use of Iraqi airspace to strike Iran.[85]



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Iran Update



Iran Update, June 26, 2025

Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Key Takeaways:

- The United States and Iran will reportedly resume nuclear negotiations in the near future. Iran will likely reject any US nuclear proposal that requires Iran to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil given that Iran has maintained its position on uranium enrichment from before the Israel-Iran War.
- Moderate elements within the Iranian regime may be using Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's isolation during the Israel-Iran War to try to exert greater political influence in the regime. Four unspecified senior Iranian officials told the *New York Times* that senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, are part of a faction that supports a pragmatic and diplomatic approach to the conflict with the United States and Israel. The *New York Times* report about pragmatic and hardline factions vying for decision-making authority follows earlier indications of internal fissures in the regime.
- International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi stated on June 26 that centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) are "no longer working" due to the US and Israeli strikes on the site. Grossi stated that centrifuges are very "delicate" and that "even small vibrations can destroy them."
- Israeli airstrikes killed several IRGC Aerospace Force commanders, including commanders who would have coordinated Iran's retaliation against Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked a group of IRGC Aerospace Force commanders on June 12 who were meeting to discuss Iran's retaliation against Israel's initial airstrikes. The strike killed IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh and at least seven other commanders.

US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Stances

The United States and Iran will reportedly resume nuclear negotiations in the near future.[1] Neither side has changed its position on key issues, including Iranian uranium enrichment and Iran's missile program, however.[2] US President Donald Trump announced on June 25 that the United States and Iran will meet next week to discuss a potential nuclear deal.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi dismissed Trump's announcement that Iran and the United States will meet in Oman next week, however.[4] Israeli media reported on June 26 that the

United States plans to present Iran with three baseline demands, including a total ban on uranium enrichment in Iran, the removal of all of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile, and limitations on future missile production.[5] Western media reported that these proposals are "preliminary and evolving," except for the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which is non-negotiable.[6] Trump said on June 26 that "the only thing we'd be asking for is what we were asking for before." [7] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff similarly told Western media on June 26 that uranium enrichment and Iranian weaponization are red lines for the United States.[8] The United States made these same demands during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations between April and June 2025.[9] Iran repeatedly rejected the US demands for zero uranium enrichment and limits to its ballistic missile program prior to the conflict, stating that its ballistic missile program and uranium enrichment on Iranian soil were non-negotiable red lines.[10] Three unspecified diplomats told Reuters on June 19 that Witkoff and Araghchi spoke several times during the Israel-Iran War to discuss the previous US nuclear proposal.[11] Two unspecified sources told Western media on June 26 that at least one preliminary US draft proposal includes several incentives for Iran.[12] The incentives reportedly include sanctions relief, the release of \$6 billion of frozen Iranian funds, monetary support from US-backed Gulf allies to replace the Fordow nuclear facility with a "non-enrichment program," and an estimated \$20 to \$30 billion investment to establish a civilian nuclear energy program.[13] Four unspecified sources stated that these incentives are "all part of an intensifying attempt to bring Tehran back to the negotiating table." [14]

Iran will likely reject any US nuclear proposal that requires Iran to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil given that Iran has maintained its position on uranium enrichment from before the Israel-Iran War. Senior Iranian officials have emphasized since the start of the Israel-Iran ceasefire that Iran will not change its position on uranium enrichment.[15] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, for example, stated on June 25 that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium on Iranian territory.[16] Iran's continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment after the conflict suggests that Iran is unlikely to make concessions during the reported upcoming talks. The United States and Israel have suggested that they would resume strikes on Iran if Iran decides to rebuild its nuclear program.[17]

Iran has made the recognition of its right to enrich uranium a precondition for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be able to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran's Guardian Council approved a bill on June 26 that suspends Iran's cooperation with the IAEA and bars inspectors from accessing Iran's nuclear facilities.[18] The bill requires Iran to suspend cooperation with the IAEA until the IAEA recognizes Iran's right to enrich uranium.[19] The bill also states that the international community must show "full respect...[for the] security of nuclear sites and scientists," likely to try to protect Iran's nuclear facilities from further US or Israeli strikes.[20] Iran has historically restricted IAEA oversight in Iran, including by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[21]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated on June 26 that Iran will not "surrender" to the United States during his third televised message to the Iranian public since June 12.[22] Khamenei claimed that the United States seeks nothing less than Iran's "surrender" and emphasized that Iran will not give in to this demand.[23] Khamenei claimed that Iran's confrontation

with the United States is no longer confined to uranium enrichment and the Iranian nuclear program.[24] Khamenei also claimed that Iran achieved a “victory” over Israel and the United States.[25] Khamenei said that the Iranian attack on al Udeid Airbase in Qatar was a “hard slap” that “can be repeated.”[26]

Internal Iranian Dynamics

Moderate elements within the Iranian regime may be using Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s isolation during the Israel-Iran War to try to exert greater political influence in the regime. Unspecified Iranian officials told the *New York Times* on June 26 that Khamenei is sheltering in a bunker under strict security and with limited communication.[27] Khamenei has not made any public appearances since the start of the Israeli air campaign in Iran on July 12 except for three pre-recorded televised speeches.[28] Khamenei’s isolation has reportedly spurred efforts by more moderate elements of the regime to play a more significant role in regime decision-making.[29] Four unspecified senior Iranian officials said that senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, are part of a faction that supports a pragmatic and diplomatic approach to the conflict with the United States and Israel.[30] Ultraconservative politician and Paydari (Stability) Front leader Saeed Jalili and other conservative officials have openly challenged this pragmatic faction and opposed the ceasefire with Israel.[31] Jalili has criticized Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi for agreeing to the ceasefire with Israel and signaling openness to renewed nuclear negotiations with the United States.[32] Members of Jalili’s faction include hardliners in the Iranian Parliament and unspecified senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders.


The *New York Times* report about pragmatic and hardline factions vying for decision-making authority follows earlier indications of internal fissures in the regime. Opposition media reported on June 21 that former President Hassan Rouhani met with senior clerics in Qom to encourage them to persuade Khamenei to drop Iran’s demand for uranium enrichment on Iranian soil and accept a ceasefire with Israel. Rouhani reportedly framed these efforts as a way to “save” the Islamic Republic.[33] Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani and Expediency Discernment Council head Sadegh Amoli Larijani reportedly attempted to contact Khamenei to advocate for a ceasefire but were unsuccessful.[34] The emergence of moderate elements during Khamenei’s isolation suggests that these elements may be using Khamenei’s absence to try to play a larger and more meaningful role in regime decision-making, particularly as these elements are typically sidelined by hardliners during normal times.

Battle Damage Assessments

International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi stated on June 26 that centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) are “no longer working” due to the US and Israeli strikes on the site.[35] Grossi stated that centrifuges are very “delicate” and that “even small vibrations can destroy them.”[36] The United States dropped 12 30,000-lb GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bombs on Fordow.[37] A GBU-57 MOP can carry 5,000 pounds of explosives.[38] The six entry points of the US bunker-buster bombs at Fordow were above two weak points, and the bombs would have detonated within the facility. The Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed that the bomb blast would have been channeled

by the centrifuge cascade hall's side walls, which would have destroyed all of the installed centrifuges in the hall.[39] The IAEA reported in May 2025 that FFEP houses six operating IR-1 and seven operating advanced IR-6 cascades.[40] Each cascade is comprised of approximately 160 to 170 centrifuges. Fordow was responsible for producing nearly 90 percent of Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile in the last IAEA reporting period from February to May 2025.[41]

Satellite imagery from June 24 showed damage to access roads leading to Fordow due to Israeli strikes.[42] Israel conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to FFEP in order to "disrupt" access to the site.[43] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Israeli strikes on access roads to Fordow may prevent Iran from being able to assess and repair damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to other locations.[44]




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Image Courtesy of Planet Labs PBC

Recent media reports have highlighted that the US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities failed to destroy Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile, which includes 20 and 60 percent enriched uranium. It is not possible to destroy enriched uranium, however, given that uranium is an element. Two unspecified officials told the *Financial Times* on June 26 that Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile "remains largely intact" following the

US and Israeli strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, citing "preliminary intelligence assessments provided to European governments."^[45] The US and Israeli strikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground to limit access to it but could not have destroyed the material. Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that some of Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium is buried under rubble at the Fordow and Esfahan nuclear sites.^[46]

Iran's remaining enriched uranium stockpile could potentially pose a weapons risk if Iran chooses to rebuild its nuclear program. Iran may have moved some enriched uranium from its nuclear facilities to other locations ahead of US and Israeli strikes.^[47] Iran would still need to further enrich its 60 percent enriched uranium to weapons-grade uranium (WGU), which is uranium enriched to 90 percent. The degradation of Iran's nuclear program, including the loss of thousands of centrifuges, may complicate Iran's ability to further enrich its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile to 90 percent. Uranium enrichment becomes progressively quicker at higher levels, however. Reaching 20 percent enriched uranium from natural uranium (approximately 2 percent) requires significantly more effort than enriching from 60 percent to WGU. Iran would still need to turn the WGU into a usable weapon, moreover. A US weapons expert stated that the US and Israeli strikes have made it significantly more difficult and time-consuming for Iran to weaponize its WGU to develop a bomb.^[48] Israel targeted various aspects of Iran's weaponization program, including at least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists.^[49]


US and Israeli Strikes Targeting the Iranian Nuclear Program June 12 to June 24, 2025



Confirmed Airstrike

Reported Airstrike

Likely Israeli strikes damaged an underground complex south of Esfahan that was reportedly involved in centrifuge production.[50] Commercially available satellite imagery from June 25 showed damage to a large underground complex near Haftom-e Tir Industries in Baghmalek, about 30 kilometers south of Esfahan City.[51] The complex's entrance is located on a mountain approximately two kilometers east of Haftom-e Tir Industries. The United States sanctioned Haftom-e Tir in 2008 for its involvement in Iran's centrifuge development program.[52] Haftom-e Tir is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which the United States sanctioned in 2007 for contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”[53] The DIO is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry. The Institute for Science and International Security reported in 2022 that Haftom-e Tir Industries may have had equipment to manufacture “high strength components” for advanced centrifuges.[54] A US weapons expert said that centrifuge components were previously manufactured in a small underground facility under the Haftom-e Tir facility, which may refer to the damaged underground complex identified in satellite imagery.[55]



Israel also damaged several Iranian nuclear research facilities. A nuclear and missile analyst said on June 25 that satellite imagery shows damage from Israeli strikes to an underground facility connected to the Yazd Radiation Processing Center.[56] The Yazd Radiation Processing Center conducts applied radiation chemistry research.[57] Iran's Atomic Energy Organization oversees the center.[58] Satellite imagery from June 20 also showed significant damage to at least four buildings at Shahid Rajaei University in Lavisan, Tehran.[59] Shahid Rajaei University is affiliated with Iran's nuclear program and some US officials believe that the university has been involved in nuclear warhead design research.[60] Israel struck the facility between June 14 and 20.[61]


Israeli Decapitation Campaign

Israeli airstrikes killed several IRGC Aerospace Force commanders, including commanders who would have coordinated Iran's retaliation against Israel.[62] Israel conducted a decapitation campaign targeting senior Iranian military leadership during its 12-day air campaign. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked a group of IRGC Aerospace Force commanders on June 12 who were meeting to discuss Iran's retaliation against Israel's initial airstrikes.[63] The strike killed IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh and at least seven other commanders.[64] The IRGC Aerospace Force is responsible for Iran's missile and drone arsenals and has invested significant resources over many years to assemble the largest missile inventory in the Middle East.[65] The IDF intended to delay any immediate Iranian retaliatory attack by killing top IRGC Aerospace Force commanders.[66] An Israeli official told Axios on June 13 that "the fact that there was nobody to give the order neutralized an immediate Iranian response." [67] Iran did not respond until about six hours after the initial Israeli strikes.[68] The IRGC confirmed the deaths of the following IRGC Aerospace Force commanders:[69]

- **Brigadier General Davoud Sheikhian:** Sheikhian commanded the IRGC Aerospace Force's air defense program. Sheikhian previously served as the IRGC Aerospace Force operations deputy.[70] Iranian media interviewed Sheikhian in November 2024 at an underground Iranian missile site.[71] Sheikhian was killed in the June 12 Israeli attack on IRGC Aerospace Force commanders.[72]
- **Brigadier General Mansour Safarpour:** Safarpour was a commander in the IRGC Aerospace Force. Several Iranian outlets claimed that Safarpour oversaw the IRGC Aerospace Force in the greater Tehran region while other outlets identified Safarpour as a deputy intelligence officer.[73] Safarpour was killed in the June 12 attack.[74]
- **Brigadier General Masoud Tayyeb:** Tayyeb was an IRGC Aerospace Force spokesperson. Tayyeb was killed in the June 12 attack.[75]
- **Brigadier General Javad Jarsara:** Jarsara was an IRGC Aerospace Force spokesperson. Jarsara was killed in the June 12 attack.[76]
- **Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Madadollahi:** Madadollahi was an adviser to Hajji Zadeh.

The IRGC also confirmed that Israeli strikes killed the following senior commanders between June 13 and 24:[77]

- **Brigadier General Reza Mozaffarinia:** Mozaffarinia commanded the Special Weapons Center at the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND).[78] The SPND played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[79] The IDF struck the SPND headquarters in Tehran three times during its 12-day campaign, although it is unclear where Mozaffarinia was killed.[80] The United States sanctioned Mozaffarinia in 2013.[81] Mozaffarinia was killed on June 12.[82]
- **Brigadier General Mohammed Jafar Asadi:** Asadi served as the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Inspection Deputy. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations, performing a role similar to a US combatant command.[83] Asadi previously commanded the IRGC Ground Forces between 2008 and 2009.[84] He later commanded Iranian forces in the Syrian Civil War from 2013 to 2015.[85]
- **Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Nasir Baghban:** Baghban was former IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami's representative to the IRGC Intelligence Organization.[86] Baghban previously served as the Iranian Consul General in Basra Province, Iraq, in the 2000s.[87]
- **Brigadier General Masoud Shanei:** Shanei headed the IRGC General Command Office. Shanei was killed alongside Salami on June 12.[88] Shanei reportedly had a close relationship with Salami.[89]
- **Brigadier General Seyyed Mojtaba Moinpour:** Moinpour was the deputy commander of the IRGC headquarters in Alborz Province. Moinpour was killed in an Israeli strike on the Imam Hassan Mojtaba Provincial Unit in Karaj, Alborz Province, on June 23.[90]
- **Brigadier General Abbas Nouri:** Nouri was the Artesh Ground Forces Southwest Regional Headquarters Support Deputy.[91] This headquarters is located in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[92]



Iran-Belarus Cooperation

Iran has continued to develop defense ties with Belarus following the Israel-Iran War. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with a Belarusian military delegation in China on June 26, possibly to secure Belarusian military support and sell Iranian weapons systems to Belarus.[93] The Iranian and Belarusian delegations met on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Qingdao, China.[94] The Iranian Defense Ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements.[95] The Iranian-Belarusian meeting comes amid increased defense cooperation between the two countries in recent months.[96] The Iranian Defense Ministry showcased Iranian defense equipment at a military exhibition in Minsk, Belarus, on May 22.[97] Nasir Zadeh visited Belarus in March 2025 and signed a defense agreement with

Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Victor Khrenin.[98] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[99]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Israel-Iran War could be limiting Iran's ability to financially support Hezbollah. Hezbollah reportedly announced on June 25 that it has immediately and indefinitely suspended compensation payments to its fighters.[100] The payments are distributed by al Qard al Hassan, which is one of Hezbollah's main banking and financial arms.[101] Israel targeted several al Qard al Hassan branches during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[102] The *Wall Street Journal* reported in January 2025 that 28 al Qard al Hassan branches had resumed operations, however.[103] Hezbollah claimed that the recent suspension of payments is due to operational difficulties and a shortage of cash liquidation.[104] Iran has been reduced to sending Hezbollah cash rather than large weapons shipments due to the loss of key transportation routes after the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria.[105] The IDF killed two IRGC and Hezbollah figures responsible for transferring Iranian funds to Hezbollah, including IRGC Unit 190 Commander Behnam Shariari and al Sadiq Exchange Office head Haytham Abdullah Bakri, during the Israel-Iran War.[106] Hezbollah's suspension of payments could be an indication that the Iranian regime is prioritizing using its money to repair destruction and replace equipment that it lost during the recent conflict over financially supporting its proxies.

Hezbollah has struggled to maintain its financial commitments to its fighters following the Israel-Lebanon conflict.[107] Al Qard al Hassan previously froze compensation payments in February 2025.[108] Hezbollah has historically used financial incentives, including pensions and payments for the families of deceased fighters, to retain its support base.[109] Lebanese civilians' loyalty and support for Hezbollah could wane if Hezbollah does not resume distributing these financial benefits.

Potential Abraham Accords Expansion

An unspecified source told Israeli media on June 26 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump agreed to expand the Abraham Accords to include Syria and Saudi Arabia.[110] Trump and Netanyahu reportedly agreed to "swiftly expand" the Abraham Accords to include Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other unspecified Arab countries.[111] This report comes amid several statements from US and Israeli officials regarding the Abraham Accords. Netanyahu stated on June 26 that the outcome of the Israel-Iran War "presents an opportunity for a dramatic widening of peace agreements." [112] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff told Western media on June 25 that "we think we will have some pretty big announcements on countries that are coming into the Abraham Accords." [113] Trump and Netanyahu also reportedly agreed to end Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip within two weeks and have four Arab countries take over the administration of the Gaza strip.[114]



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Iran Update



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Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Annika Ganzeveld

June 28, 2025, Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET


Click [here](#) to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Key Takeaways

- US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran's nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization. The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization. This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb.
- Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows that Iran has filled in a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The imagery shows what appears to be two tents and a truck present at the impact site.
- Israeli strikes targeted senior Iranian military and security officials across multiple branches, likely in an effort to degrade Iran's command and control structure. Iranian media confirmed on June 28 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed 56 Artesh members, including at least three Artesh generals and 16 conscript soldiers. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on June 28 that Israeli strikes killed Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization Deputy Director Brigadier General Mehdi Nemati. Nemati reportedly fought alongside former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Iraq and Syria for several years.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani called on regime officials to resolve "disputes" with the Iranian population through "mutual understanding" in an interview on June 28. Shamkhani claimed that nuclear negotiations with the United States are a "deceptive plan" that seeks to "provoke unrest" and "prepare the atmosphere inside Iran" for protests. Shamkhani's statements come as the Iranian regime has taken steps to securitize the country since the Iran-Israel ceasefire went into effect on June 24.

US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran's nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization.[1] The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called

metallization.[2] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb.[3] The Institute for Science and International Security reported on June 24 that the plant was not operational before it was struck.[4] Israel launched an air campaign on June 12 with the stated objective of degrading, disrupting, and removing the threat of the Iranian nuclear program.[5] The destruction of Iran's metallization process and the loss of several Iranian nuclear scientists would hinder Iran's ability to turn weapons-grade uranium, or 90 percent enriched uranium, into a usable nuclear weapon. The Israeli campaign has also "effectively destroyed" Iran's enrichment capacity. [6]



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Satellite image ©2025 Planet PBC

Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows that Iran has filled in a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The imagery shows what appears to be two tents and a truck present at the impact site. Israeli media and open-source watchers claimed that Iran may be trying to extract enriched uranium buried at Natanz.[7] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.

Possible Iranian Repair Operations at Natanz

June 22, 2025

Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Nuclear Facility



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Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC

Israeli airstrikes destroyed an Iranian radar in Khuzestan Province on June 21. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows a destroyed Iranian radar. The radar was constructed between 2023 and 2024, according to satellite imagery.[8] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) announced that it conducted operations against military infrastructure in southwestern Iran on June 21.[9]

Iranian Radar in Khuzestan Province

June 12, 2025



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Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

US and Israeli strikes may have targeted Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC).[10] Israel's June 13 strike on the ENTC damaged the Tehran Reactor Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FPFP) and the Central Chemical Laboratory. The FPFP produces natural uranium metal and stored approximately 85 percent of Iran's 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile and 83 percent of Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile as of August 2023. It is unclear how much, if any, of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile was at FPFP at the time of US and Israeli strikes. The ENTC includes several uranium conversion facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, natural and enriched uranium storage, and uranium metal production facilities. US and Israeli airstrikes on ENTC and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material, but could not have destroyed the material.

Israeli strikes targeted senior Iranian military and security officials across multiple branches, likely in an effort to degrade Iran's command and control structure. The IDF targeted Iranian Artesh personnel, including members of the Artesh Air Defense Force, during its air campaign.[11] Iranian media confirmed on June 28 that the IDF killed 56 Artesh members, including at least three Artesh generals and 16 conscript soldiers.[12] The generals include 71st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Commander General Ali Hossein Mohammadi and two senior Air Defense Force officers, General Ali Piri and General Gholam Ali Najafi.[13]

Iranian media confirmed that the IDF killed 41 IRGC members in its June 22 strike on the IRGC Ground Forces Imam Hassan Mojtaba Provincial Unit in Karaj, Alborz Province.[14] CTP-ISW previously reported some of these deaths on June 23.[15]

IRGC-affiliated media reported on June 28 that Israeli strikes killed Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization Deputy Director Brigadier General Mehdi

Nemati.[16] Nemati reportedly fought alongside former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Iraq and Syria for several years and received the “Defender of the Shrine” veteran medal.[17] Iran deployed IRGC Ground Forces, the IRGC Quds Force, intelligence services, and LEC forces to Syria to support Bashar al Assad during the Syrian Civil War.[18] Nemati previously served as the head of the Prisons Protection and Intelligence Department in Fars Province.[19] The European Union sanctioned Nemati in April 2025 for human rights violations.[20]

Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani called on regime officials to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through “mutual understanding” in an interview on June 28. Shamkhani’s interview follows earlier reports of his death during the Israel-Iran War.[21] Shamkhani claimed that nuclear negotiations with the United States are a “deceptive plan” that seeks to “provoke unrest” and “prepare the atmosphere inside Iran” for protests.[22] Shamkhani stated that foreign adversaries “wrongly assumed” that killing senior Iranian leaders would “spark a domestic riot.”[23] Shamkhani’s statements come as the Iranian regime has taken steps to securitize the country since the Iran-Israel ceasefire went into effect on June 24. CTP-ISW previously assessed that these securitization efforts demonstrate that the regime is prioritizing regime security following the war.

Anti-regime media circulated videos on June 28 of two Iranian citizens complaining about energy shortages following the Iran-Israel War.[24] The first citizen questioned the Iranian regime’s narrative that Iran had “triumphed” in the war when Iran continues to face frequent power outages.[25] The second citizen stated that Iran has returned to “normal conditions” of frequent water, power, and gas outages.[26] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Israeli airstrikes on Iranian energy infrastructure would likely worsen Iran’s ongoing energy crisis, which could incite internal unrest and protests.[27]

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Beer Sheva, southern Israel, on June 28.[28] The IDF intercepted a missile from Yemen before it crossed into Israeli territory on June 28.[29] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel in November 2023.[30]

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Iran Update



Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET, June 27, 2025

US and Israeli strikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat. The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow, directly targeted points above the centrifuge cascade hall, and likely destroyed all six IR-1 and seven IR-6 cascades that produced nearly 90 percent of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium as of the last IAEA reporting period.[1] IAEA Director Rafael Grossi confirmed on June 26 that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that small vibrations can destroy them.[2] The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that the twelve 30,000lb GBU-57s—over 180 tons of bombs—detonated inside the facility after traveling through the Fordow ventilation shafts.[3] These bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations.

Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles could pose a threat if Iran attempts to rebuild its nuclear program over the following years. Iranian officials have maintained Iran’s stated right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil despite the US and Israeli air campaign. Two unspecified officials told the *Financial Times* on June 26 that Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile “remains largely intact” following the US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, citing “preliminary intelligence assessments provided to European governments.”[4] The Institute for Science and International Security also noted that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, which Iran would need to enrich further to weapons-grade (90% enrichment).[5] Uranium enrichment is logarithmic, meaning that “the higher [the concentration of Uranium], the easier it gets” to enrich to higher levels.[6] The destruction of so many centrifuges between June 12 and June 24 will still make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material, but could not have destroyed the material. Conventional explosives cannot destroy enriched uranium. Iran may have moved some enriched uranium from its nuclear facilities to other locations ahead of Israeli strikes, according to some reports.[7] The White House has rejected reports that suggest Iran relocated enriched material ahead of US airstrikes on June 21.[8]

The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though Iran could enrich to weapons-grade if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility.[9] Iran could attempt to build a simple gun-type nuclear bomb, which is similar to the US atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. A gun-type weapon would need at least 25kg of 90 percent enriched uranium. Iran would only be able to deliver such a weapon using an aircraft or other, more rudimentary delivery weapon, however. Iran would also still require the

know-how and facilities to build such a weapon. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel's decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.[10] A US weapons expert noted that US and Israeli strikes have "significantly" increased the time required for Iran to even build a non-missile deliverable weapon, such as a nuclear bomb.[11]

IRGC-affiliated media confirmed on June 27 that the IDF killed another Iranian nuclear scientist, Soleiman Soleimani, in a recent targeted attack.[12] Soleimani was a chemical engineering graduate from the Iranian University of Science and Technology (IUST).[13] The IUST is a Tehran-based technical university closely linked to Iran's nuclear and missile programs.[14] IUST has conducted research relevant to unmanned aerial vehicles, missile propulsion, and satellite technology, and has collaborated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran's Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) on continuous mixer technologies with potential missile propellant applications.[15] Israel's targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear scientists degrade Iran's nuclear program by limiting the institutional knowledge available to rebuild the nuclear program following US and Israeli airstrikes.

Key Takeaways

- US and Israeli airstrikes severely set back Iran's enrichment capabilities, but Iran's enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat if Iran chooses to rebuild its nuclear program. The degradation of Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though it could do so if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility or retains surviving centrifuges at another facility. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel's decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.
- A top Israeli official said Israel is preparing to resume operations against Iran if necessary. Israel seeks to retain its air superiority over Iranian airspace, prevent reconstruction of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and inhibit Iranian support to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened to conduct retaliatory attacks against a potential Israeli strike.
- The Iranian regime continues to take counterintelligence steps that likely reflect the regime's paranoia about Israeli infiltration. First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli "spies" and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.

A top Israeli official said Israel is preparing to resume operations against Iran if necessary. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on June 27 that he directed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare plans for additional operations against Iran to preserve Israeli air superiority, prevent reconstruction of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and disrupt Iranian support to members of the Axis of Resistance.[16] Iranian officials have repeatedly maintained that Iran has the right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil and have stated their intent to resume operations at nuclear facilities.[17]

Mossad's Farsi-language X account warned Iranian civilians to take precautions to ensure their safety during Israeli attacks.[18] Mossad warned Iranians to avoid Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) personnel and bases, and regime vehicles.

Mossad specifically warned civilians to avoid IRGC personnel who receive calls or messages on their personal devices, which could make IRGC officials less likely to use their communication devices. Israel detonated personal pagers and radios in a coordinated attack on Hezbollah communication systems in September 2025, which resulted in 1,000s of Hezbollah casualties and disruptions to its command and control.[19] Mossad's warning poses a dilemma for the IRGC by being forced to either disrupt their communications network or accept the risk of such an attack. Mossad's warning could cause IRGC personnel to disrupt their own communications network by abandoning regular systems to adopt safer but less efficient ways of communicating.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that Iran would retaliate against a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Araghchi stated that Iran would respond to any Israeli violation of the ceasefire and noted that "Iran is not Lebanon." [20] Israel has conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah across Lebanon since November 2025 as part of a stated effort to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting and threatening Israel under the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[21] Araghchi is suggesting that Israel will attempt to conduct similar strikes in Iran to prevent Iran from reconstructing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was reportedly not informed of the Israel-Iran ceasefire agreement prior to the Supreme National Security Council's (SNSC) decision to accept the agreement. The SNSC does contain one official whom the supreme leader appoints as a personal representative, however.[22] Unspecified officials cited by *IranWire* on June 22 claimed that Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani, and former head of the Iranian judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, were unable to contact Khamenei to advocate for renewed negotiations with the United States.[23] Unspecified Iranian officials cited by the *New York Times* on June 23 reported that Khamenei relocated to a secure bunker and only communicated with senior officials via courier.[24] Khamenei's seclusion very likely inhibited effective communication between senior Iranian officials and Khamenei. Unspecified sources cited by Iranian opposition media on June 27 claimed that the SNSC was unable to reach Khamenei to discuss the ceasefire. The sources added that the SNSC was forced to decide whether or not to accept the US-brokered ceasefire without Khamenei's input due to time constraints.[25]

The IDF struck internal security and social control centers in Tehran during its air campaign and targeted the Basij headquarters and Evin Prison. [26] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei issued a statement on June 27 confirming the death of Judge Ali Ghena'at Kar and several judiciary staff members during the Israeli strike on Evin Prison on June 23. [27] The statement also confirmed the deaths of multiple administrative and prison staff alongside Ghena'at Kar. Evin Prison is Iran's main detention facility for political prisoners and regime dissidents.[28]

IRGC Aerospace Force Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) Missile Base

June 07, 2025



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
The IDF destroyed or damaged Iranian missile and drone storage facilities during the Iran-Israel war. The IDF conducted airstrikes on June 13 targeting missile storage facilities at the IRGC Aerospace Force Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) Missile Base in Kermanshah Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 17 showed severe damage to an above-ground munition storage facility at the site as well as six bunker entrances.[29] The Bakhtaran Missile Base contained over 80 missile storage bunkers, an underground facility with two entrances, and two above-ground munition storage facilities, according to an Israeli think tank.[30] The missile base reportedly stored Qiam-1 and Fateh-110 ballistic missiles, and Iran used it as a ballistic missile launch site targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq in 2020.[31] Large earthen berms, which can be used to contain accidental explosions, surround the munition storage facility. The satellite imagery also shows that Israeli airstrikes collapsed six bunker entrances, which render the bunkers and their contents temporarily inaccessible to IRGC forces and prevent further ballistic missile launches from these sites until the collapse is fixed.

IRGC Navy 1st Saheb ol Zaman Region Base June 17, 2025



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Satellite image ©2025 Planet PBC

The IDF conducted an airstrike on a drone storage facility at the IRGC Navy's 1st Saheb ol Zaman Regional base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on June 21.[32] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 26 shows that the airstrike destroyed the drone warehouse. Commercially available maritime tracking data shows that an IRGC-linked landing craft, the *Baneh*, traveled from this base to Abu Musa and Kish islands in late April, which was a few weeks before CTP-ISW observed IRGC deployments to the Nazirat Islands, of which Abu Musa is a part.[33]



The Iranian regime continues to take counterintelligence steps that likely reflect the regime's paranoia about Israeli infiltration. First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli "spies" and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.[34] Iranian media reported on June 25 that Iranian security forces have arrested at least 700 Iranians on political or security charges since the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[35] The arrests include several individuals whom the regime characterized as "Mossad spies." [36] CTP-ISW assessed on June 25 that such arrests likely reflect Iranian recognition of the scale of Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran, which was revealed during Israel's opening attacks on Israel.[37] Iran has continued to arrest alleged Mossad spies across Iran. Iran's concern about Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran may be used as a justification for broader crackdowns on society.

The IDF estimated on June 27 that it killed between 200-300 IRGC and Basij members in strikes targeting IRGC headquarters in Tehran in the 24 hours before the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET on June 24.[38] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that recruits and organizes regime loyalists and uses them to produce and disseminate propaganda, suppress internal dissent, and conduct civil defense operations.[39] The IDF struck the Basij headquarters, the IRGC Ground Forces Sarallah Operational Base, and other IRGC headquarters in Tehran on June 23.[40] The IRGC Sarallah Operational Base is responsible for security in Tehran and oversees the 10th Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Division in Karaj, Alborz Province, and the 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division in Tehran City.[41] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 23 that the IDF estimated that it had killed many IRGC personnel in its strikes on IRGC facilities.[42]

China reportedly imported 1.8 barrels per day of Iranian crude oil between June 1 and June 20, according to ship tracking data from Vortexa.[43] Vortexa reported that Iranian oil exports accelerated in early June ahead of the Israeli airstrike campaign. US-Iran nuclear negotiations reached a stalemate in early June. Iran may have sought to rapidly export oil to protect itself from potential US or Israeli strikes. Israel concentrated strikes on Iranian energy facilities related to domestic Iranian consumption, rather than Iranian exports. CTP-ISW assessed on June 15 that Israeli airstrikes on Iran's energy infrastructure would likely worsen Iran's ongoing energy crisis by causing more frequent electricity shortages, which could spark popular protests. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which helps Iran circumvent US sanctions.[44] Reuters reported on June 17 that Iran has around 27.5 million barrels stored in tankers outside of the Persian Gulf, which almost certainly allowed Iran to continue exporting oil to China despite the Israel-Iran War.[45]

The IDF reported on June 27 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched approximately 40 drones into Israeli territory between June 12 and 24.[46] The IDF intercepted more than ten drones "from the east" between June 16 to 24.[47] The IDF has referred to drones launched by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias towards Israel during the October 7 War as originating "from the east." [48] Iraqi media reported that drones crashed in multiple areas of Iraq throughout the war, including Maysan, Dhi Qar, al Muthanna, and Anbar provinces.[49] It is unclear if these were Iranian drones en route to Israel or Iraqi militia drones en route to Israel that crashed due to technical malfunctions or electronic warfare.

Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias condemned Israel's strikes on Iran but did not claim any drone attacks against Israel between June 12 and 24.[50] CTP-ISW assessed on June 20 that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were attempting to deter US participation in the war by threatening to expand the conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were also likely seeking to avoid the negative political repercussions of Iraqi involvement in the war ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[51] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically organized and announced kinetic campaigns through operational rooms. The lack of public acknowledgement suggests that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have suffered from a lack of discipline among lower-ranking fighters who attempted to independently launch drone attacks on Israel. Militia leadership also could have passively allowed lower-ranking fighters to conduct the attacks.

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