

# IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



**Kelly Campa, Nidal Morrison, Ria Reddy and Annika Ganzeveld**

**June 15, 2025 - Morning Information Cutoff: 6:00 AM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates over the next 24 hours from June 12-13, 2025, to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.*

**We will produce two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. This first update covers events between 6:00 PM ET on June 14 and 6:00 AM ET on June 15. The second update will cover events between 6:00 AM ET and 6:00 PM ET on June 15.**

## **Key Takeaways**

- **The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted several nuclear sites in Tehran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14.**
- **A US weapons expert reported on June 15 that, if Israel does not render the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) inoperable, then Iran would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for nine nuclear weapons by the end of the first month using its pre-attack 60% enriched uranium stockpile.**
- **The IDF has also targeted several military and defense industrial sites outside Tehran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14.**
- **Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by attacking critical Iranian energy infrastructure.**
- **Iran has conducted two waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14.**
- **The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to strike Iranian missile launchers, which is likely limiting the scale of the Iranian response to Israel.**

**The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted several nuclear sites in Tehran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14.** The IDF struck the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.<sup>[1]</sup> The IDF killed former SPND Research and Technology Department head Mansour Asgari on

June 14.[2] The IDF also struck the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry (MODAFL), which controls SPND.[3] The IDF separately struck unspecified "nuclear weapons development laboratories" in Tehran, as well as an unspecified "chemical materials research and development site" and centrifuge production facility in western Tehran.[4] Two Israeli defense officials told the *New York Times* that the "nuclear weapons development laboratories" were experimental laboratories.[5] The IDF stated that Iran used the "chemical materials research and development site" to produce raw materials for the development of nuclear weapons.[6]

**An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 15 that Israeli officials received intelligence prior to the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12 that Iran had formed a "weapons group."**[7] The correspondent reported that Iran established the "weapons group" in the months following Hamas' October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. The correspondent reported that the "weapons group" was in the "experimental stage" and was conducting "successful experiments on the components" of a nuclear weapon. Israeli media reported on June 13 that Israel has killed military commanders and nuclear scientists who were part of the "weapons group." [8] Israeli media also reported that the "weapons group" was based in several universities in Tehran and at the Parchin military complex east of Tehran.

**A US weapons expert reported on June 15 that, if Israel does not render the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) inoperable, then Iran would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for nine nuclear weapons by the end of the first month using its pre-attack 60% enriched uranium stockpile.**[9] The Institute for Science and International Security reported on June 9 that Iran could convert its current stockpile of 60% enriched uranium at the FFEP into 233 kilograms of WGU in three weeks.[10] The Institute for Science and International Security reported that 233 kilograms of WGU would be enough to produce nine nuclear weapons, given that 25 kilograms of WGU is required to produce one nuclear weapon.[11]

## Israeli Strikes in Iran June 15, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET




**The IDF has also targeted several military and defense industrial sites outside Tehran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14.** The IDF reportedly struck Shiraz Electronics Industries in Shiraz, Fars Province, on June 15.<sup>[12]</sup> The United States sanctioned Shiraz Electronics Industries in September 2008 for producing electronics equipment for the Iranian armed forces, including “radars, microwave electron vacuum tubes, naval electronics, avionics and control systems, training simulators, missile guidance technology, and electronic test equipment.”<sup>[13]</sup> Shiraz Electronics Industries is a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (IEI), which is controlled by MODAFL.<sup>[14]</sup> The IDF also struck an Iranian munitions factory in Esfahan on June 15.<sup>[15]</sup> The IDF struck the same munitions factory in a kamikaze drone attack in January 2023.<sup>[16]</sup> MODAFL reportedly used the factory to produce ballistic missiles and drones.<sup>[17]</sup>

**Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by attacking critical Iranian energy infrastructure.** The IDF struck the Shahr oil depot on the northwestern outskirts of Tehran on June 14.<sup>[18]</sup> The Shahr oil depot holds three days' worth of fuel for Tehran in at least 11 storage tanks.<sup>[19]</sup> Iranian media reported that the IDF also struck the Shahr Rey oil refinery in southern Tehran on June 14.<sup>[20]</sup> The Shahr Rey refinery is one of Iran's largest oil refineries.<sup>[21]</sup> The IDF targeted two Iranian natural gas refineries in Bushehr Province on June 14.<sup>[22]</sup> Social media users reported long lines at gas stations in Tehran on June 15.<sup>[23]</sup>

Disruptions to Iran's energy sector will likely worsen the country's ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread and frequently electricity shortages and outages. Iranians have previously protested against the regime in response to energy shortages. Demonstrations over rising gas prices in 2017 and 2018 escalated into broader anti-regime protests.<sup>[24]</sup>



## Israeli Strikes in Tehran City June 15, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



**The IDF has continued to strike Iranian air defense systems to maintain air superiority over Iran.** The IDF struck Iranian radar systems overnight on June 14 and 15.<sup>[25]</sup> The IDF posted footage of an Israeli strike on a radar tower.<sup>[26]</sup> BBC analyzed satellite imagery from June 14 that showed "significant damage" to an IRGC radar site in Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province.<sup>[27]</sup> The IDF struck a military base in Piranshahr on June 13.<sup>[28]</sup>

**Iran has conducted two waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since June 14.**<sup>[29]</sup> The IDF reported that Iran launched 80 ballistic missiles in total.<sup>[30]</sup> The first wave targeted the Haifa area in northern Israel and the second wave targeted the Tel Aviv area in central Israel. An Israeli military correspondent reported that Iran also launched “dozens” of drones targeting Israel.<sup>[31]</sup> The Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted at least 10 drones.<sup>[32]</sup> An Iranian ballistic missile struck a building in Bat Yam, south of Tel Aviv, killing four Israeli civilians and injuring 100 others.<sup>[33]</sup> Iranian media circulated videos of fires at Haifa Port and an oil refinery in Haifa.<sup>[34]</sup> Israeli media reported that pipelines and transmission lines between facilities at the Bazan Oil Refinery Complex sustained limited damage from Iranian missile attacks.<sup>[35]</sup>

**The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to strike Iranian missile launchers, which is likely limiting the scale of the Iranian response to Israel.** The IDF continued to damage and destroy missile launchers overnight on June 14 and 15.<sup>[36]</sup> An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli drones are flying in western Iranian airspace to locate and attack launchers that Iran could use to attack Israel.<sup>[37]</sup> A missile analyst identified several damaged transporter erector launchers (TEL) that Israel struck on June 14 as Haj Qasem launchers.<sup>[38]</sup> Haj Qasems are medium-range solid-fuel ballistic missiles with a range of around 1,400 kilometers, which suggests that Iran may have intended to use Haj Qasem missiles to attack Israel. Two IRGC members speaking to the *New York Times* on June 14 stated that Iran originally planned to launch 1,000 ballistic missiles at Israel in response to the Israeli strikes on Iran.<sup>[39]</sup> The IDF estimates that Iran has thus far only fired between about 150 to 250 missiles in eight waves of attacks since Iran launched its first missile barrage at Israel on June 13.<sup>[40]</sup> Iran launched 200 missiles across two waves of attacks in a single day in its October 2024 attack on Israel in comparison.<sup>[41]</sup> CTP-ISW previously noted on June 12 that the initial Israeli strikes appear, in part, to be aimed at degrading Iran’s retaliatory capabilities.

The frequency of Iran’s missile barrages targeting Israel has decreased since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12, which suggests that Israeli strikes are impacting the rate at which Iran can launch missiles at Israel. Iran conducted six waves of attacks using between 100 and 200 missiles on June 13 and 14.<sup>[42]</sup> Iran has only conducted two waves of attacks using 35 to 40 missiles each since June 14.<sup>[43]</sup>

Israel has also struck missile stockpiles that could have supported Iranian attacks against Israel. Israel has struck missile bases that reportedly stored solid- and liquid-fueled missiles, including Ghadr, Qiam-1, Fateh-110, and possibly Kheybar Shekan ballistic missiles.<sup>[44]</sup> Iranian media reported that Iran has used Emad, Ghadr, and Kheybar Shekan missiles to attack Israel since June 12.<sup>[45]</sup> Iran used Emad, Ghadr, and Kheybar Shekan missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.<sup>[46]</sup> The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base that contained Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, Sejil, Emad, and Haj Qassem missiles in March 2025.<sup>[47]</sup> Former Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri claimed in March that the new facility included enough missiles for Iran to conduct an attack “dozens of times” greater than its October 2024 attack on Israel.<sup>[48]</sup> A missile expert identified photos of fallen Iranian missile debris that fell in Israel as boosters of Emad-type liquid-fueled medium range ballistic missiles and potentially a recently

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**The Axis of Resistance--with the exception of the Houthis--has thus far failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel for the Israeli air campaign against Iran.** The IDF reported that Israeli air defenses detected two rockets launched from the Gaza Strip on June 14. The rockets fell in open areas near Nir Oz in southern Israel.[50] No group has claimed the attack at the time of this writing. An unspecified Hezbollah official told Western media that Hezbollah “will not unilaterally launch an attack on Israel in support of Tehran.”[51]

**Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have released statements condemning the Israeli air campaign but have not claimed any retaliatory attacks against Israel or the United States at the time of this writing.**<sup>[52]</sup> Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) leader Abu Alaa al Walai threatened on June 11 to conduct attacks targeting the United States and its regional allies if the United States supported that Israeli air campaign against Iran.<sup>[53]</sup> Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri released a statement condemning Israel's strikes on Iran and held the United States responsible for Israeli actions.<sup>[54]</sup> Ameri did not issue any explicit threat to retaliate against Israel or the United States. Kataib Hezbollah (KH) Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi warned that KH will attack US forces and other unspecified targets in the region if the United States intervenes in the conflict.<sup>[55]</sup> Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may target the United States even if it does not directly participate in or approve Israeli attacks on Iran because Iran and its proxies believe that the United States approves Israeli actions in the region.

**The Houthis have conducted at least three separate drone and missile attacks targeting Israel since June 12.**<sup>[56]</sup> The Houthis fired a ballistic missile at Ben Gurion Airport on June 13.<sup>[57]</sup> The IDF intercepted the missile.<sup>[58]</sup> The IDF also intercepted three drones launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on June 13.<sup>[59]</sup> Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea stated on June 15 that the group targeted "sensitive" Israeli sites in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area with several ballistic missiles in coordination with Iran.<sup>[60]</sup> The Houthis announced on June 12 that they would participate in a potential conflict if Israel or the United States struck Iran.<sup>[61]</sup>

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[1] <https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1934031792018973137>  
; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025>

[2] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-14-2025-morning-edition> ;

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[4] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934203918847795284>

[5] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-energy-facility-strikes-tehran.html>

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[37] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/22949>

[38] [https://x.com/fab\\_hinz/status/1934193354490651032](https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1934193354490651032);  
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[39] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/13/world/middleeast/iran-israel-strikes-nuclear-talks.html>

[40] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/22903>; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1933588036950032792> ;  
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[42] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-it-strikes-iran-amid-nuclear-tensions-2025-06-13/>; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/22845>

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# IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



**Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Nidal Morrison, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Nicholas Carl,  
and Annika Ganzeveld**


**June 15, 2025 - Evening    Information Cutoff: 6:00 PM ET**

## **Key Takeaways**


- The IDF expanded its air campaign into Iran by beginning to strike regime institutions, including some related to internal security and social control. This comes the day after the IDF began striking energy infrastructure. The degradation of the Iranian coercive apparatus coupled with energy shortages could destabilize the regime.
- The IDF conducted its furthest strike eastward as part of its efforts to establish air superiority over Iran. The IDF specifically struck an Artesh airbase around Mashhad in northeastern Khorasan Razavi Province. Most of the Israeli strikes targeting air defenses have been around western and central Iran thus far.
- Iran has continued its missile campaign targeting Israel, having launched 10 total barrages at the time of this writing. Two of these barrages occurred in recent hours. The IDF has intercepted around 92 percent of the missiles that Iran has fired at Israel thus far, according to an Israeli official speaking to Reuters.

**The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expanded its ongoing air campaign on June 15 to target Iranian governance institutions, some of which are related to internal security.** The expansion of targets to include regime institutions comes after the IDF expanded its air campaign on June 14 to include critical Iranian energy infrastructure.[1] CNN geolocated footage of smoke near the Justice Ministry in western Tehran on June 15.[2] Israeli strikes also targeted the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry in Tehran.[3] The IDF also reportedly struck institutions that are part of the Iranian internal security apparatus, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) headquarters.[4] The LEC has many subordinate units, including the Prevention and Operations Police, which commands law enforcement stations across Iran, and Special Units, a highly trained, anti-riot force that deploys when regular police cannot contain civil disorder.[5] Disruption to institutions like the LEC could degrade the regime's ability to maintain internal security and social control. These internal security functions are particularly important given that recent Israeli strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure will likely worsen Iran's ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread and frequent electricity shortages and outages. Frustration over energy shortages could trigger internal unrest.

# Israeli Strikes in Iran June 15, 2025 at 6:00 PM ET




# Israeli Strikes in Tehran City June 15, 2025 at 6:00 PM ET






## Israeli Strikes in Tehran City June 15, 2025 at 6:00 PM ET



**An outlet controlled by the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff published an article calling for the deployment of the Basij across Iran in order to promote internal security and regime stability.**<sup>[6]</sup> The Basij is a paramilitary organization that recruits and organizes regime loyalists and uses them to produce and disseminate propaganda, suppress internal dissent, and conduct civil defense operations. The article called for the Basij to “conduct widespread patrols and establish stop-and-search [posts].” The article argued that these activities are necessary to counter Mossad infiltration across Iran. The regime would almost certainly use such Basij activities to identify dissidents and suppress any nascent protest activity.

**The IDF expanded its air campaign geographically on June 15 as part of its efforts to establish air superiority over Iranian airspace.**<sup>[7]</sup> The IDF struck an aerial refueling aircraft at

Mashhad Airport in northeastern Iran. Mashhad Airport is approximately 2,300 kilometers from Israel, which makes the strike on the airport the deepest strike that Israeli aircraft have conducted in Iranian territory since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12.[8] The Artesh Air Force 14th Tactical Airbase is co-located at Mashhad Airport.[9] The IDF also struck Mehrabad International Airport in central Tehran on June 15.[10] The Artesh Air Force 1st Tactical Airbase is co-located at Mehrabad International Airport.[11] The IDF reported that it continued to strike surface-to-air missile systems in western Iran.[12] Israeli strikes on Iranian air defenses systems and military airports will degrade Iran's ability to restrict Israeli operations in its airspace.




The IDF struck a reported IRGC warehouse in Anahita neighborhood, Kermanshah City, on June 15.[13] A London-based Iranian human rights organization posted a video on June 15 reportedly



showing the aftermath of the Israeli strikes on two of the buildings at the IRGC facility in Kermanshah.<sup>[14]</sup>

The IDF continued to target defense industrial sites, including facilities that produce missile navigation systems, missile fuel, surface-to-surface missiles, and components for IRGC air defense systems.<sup>[15]</sup>

**Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed on June 15 that an Israeli airstrike killed IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi and his deputy, Hassan Mohaghegh.<sup>[16]</sup>** The strike also killed IRGC intelligence officer Mohsen Bagheri.<sup>[17]</sup> Kazemi previously led the IRGC Counterintelligence Organization and was therefore responsible for internal monitoring of the Iranian armed forces.<sup>[18]</sup> Kazemi replaced former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb in 2022.<sup>[19]</sup> Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly dismissed Taeb due to incompetence after the IRGC Intelligence Organization failed to prevent several Israeli assassinations and covert operations in Iran.<sup>[20]</sup>



**Iran has conducted 10 waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since the start of the Israeli air campaign against Iran on July 12.** Iran has conducted two waves of ballistic missile attacks since CTP-ISW's 6:00 AM ET data cutoff on June 15.<sup>[21]</sup> The IDF reported that Iran launched "several missiles" at Israel in the first wave but that none of the missiles landed in Israeli territory.<sup>[22]</sup> Iran launched a second wave of missiles targeting Haifa in northern Israel.<sup>[23]</sup> Israeli media reported that Iran launched approximately 30 missiles in the second wave.<sup>[24]</sup> An Iranian ballistic missile struck a building in Haifa, injuring two Israeli civilians.<sup>[25]</sup> The IDF has thus far intercepted about 92 percent of the Iranian munitions that Iran has launched at Israel as part of its Operation True Promise III, according to Israeli officials speaking to

Reuters.[26]

**Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have released statements condemning the Israeli air campaign against Iran but have not claimed any retaliatory attacks against Israel or the United States at the time of this writing.** Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Spokesperson Jawad al Talibawi warned the United States against supporting the Israeli air campaign against Iran on June 15.[27] Talibawi's warning comes after Kataib Hezbollah (KH) threatened to attack US forces and other unspecified targets in the region if the United States intervenes in the conflict.[28] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may target the United States even if it does not directly participate in or approve Israeli attacks on Iran because Iran and its proxies believe that the United States approves Israeli actions in the region.

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[1] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-15-2025-morning-edition>

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[3] <https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1934267751633453458> ; <https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-strikes-news-06-15-25#cmbxv1byq000x3b6tx10okylr> ; <https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1934341555516776907>

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[6] [www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/754878](http://www.defapress.ir/fa/news/754878)

[7] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1934267896504385991>

- [8] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1934267896504385991> ;  
<https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1934272483349127180> ; <https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-strikes-news-06-15-25#cmbxqb64j00053b6nxx30eyd2>
- [9] DNGTS: [https://balad.ir/p/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%8A%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%DA%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-mashhad\\_military-center-4M5MscCBROLGgH#14.87/36.25385/59.63068](https://balad.ir/p/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%8A%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%DA%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-mashhad_military-center-4M5MscCBROLGgH#14.87/36.25385/59.63068)
- [10] <https://x.com/andynovy/status/1934215244848734384> ;  
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- [11] [https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military\\_powers\\_publications/iran\\_military\\_power\\_lr.pdf](https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf) ;
- [12] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934294306690310302>
- [13] <https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1934291418471653539> ;  
<https://x.com/iranhrs99/status/1934277501250855317>
- [14] <https://x.com/iranhrs99/status/1934277501250855317>
- [15] <https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1934342358574698531>
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<https://x.com/NoamIhmels/status/1934294717782544805>
- [17] <https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/15/iranian-state-media-confirms-death-of-irans-irgc-intelligence-chief-and-his-deputy>
- [18] <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x85095>
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- [21] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934248103047291223> ;  
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[28] <https://t.me/centerkaf/5059>

# Iran Update Special Report, June 16, 2025, Morning Edition

Jun 16, 2025 - [ISW Press](#)



## Iran Update Special Report, June 16, 2025, Morning Edition

Avery Borens, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

### Information Cutoff: 6:00AM ET

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates per day to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.*

**We will produce two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. This first update will focus on reports about the strike campaign and identify the areas struck between 6:00PM ET on June 15 and 6:00AM ET on June 16. The second update will cover all events over the previous 24 hours and refine our earlier reports about the strike campaign.**

### Key Takeaways:


- Israel struck military and military-industrial sites around Tehran as part of its ongoing campaign into Iran. There are also unverified reports of an Israeli strike around the Fordow nuclear site.
- Iran conducted another ballistic missile attack against Israel. Iran reportedly fired around 40 missiles, with at least two missiles appearing to strike an energy site in Haifa.



# Israeli Strikes in Iran June 16, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



## Reported and Confirmed Strikes in Qom Province June 16, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET




**The IDF has targeted several military sites across Iran since June 15.** The IDF confirmed on June 16 that the Israeli Air Force struck the IRGC Quds Force headquarters in Tehran.[1] IRGC Quds Force operatives used this facility to plan attacks against Israel.[2] The IDF reportedly struck an IRGC barracks in Zanjan, Zanjan Province, and a munitions bunker in Qom City, Qom Province.[3] The IDF also struck Parchin military complex east of Tehran, which Iran has used to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including ballistic missiles.[4] Israel targeted missile production sites at Parchin in its October 2024 attack. The Parchin complex also reportedly played a key role in the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

## Confirmed Strikes in Zanzjan Province June 16, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



**An airstrike reportedly targeted Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Safarabad, Qom Province.[5]** CTP-ISW will provide a bomb damage assessment and further reflections on the status of the Iranian nuclear program in the upcoming evening update.

## Strikes Targeting the IRGC in Tehran June 16, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET




**Iran has conducted a single ballistic missile attack targeting Israel since June 15.[6]** An Israeli military correspondent reported that Iran launched approximately 40 missiles.[7] Two Iranian missiles reportedly struck the Haifa Power Plant, according to open-source watchers on social media.[8] Impacts in the Haifa area killed three.[9] Geolocated footage shows damage to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv.[10] US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee stated that the embassy sustained minor damage but that there were no injuries.[11]

**The IDF intercepted several drones that crossed into Israeli territory on June 15 and 16.[12]** It is unclear what group launched these drones.



## Observed Impacts in Israel June 16, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



CTP-ISW is tracking reports that an unspecified actor detonated car bombs or vehicle borne explosive devices in Tehran. CTP-ISW is unable to verify these reports currently due to the contradictory and unclear information space.

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- [1] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934463884535988462>
- [2] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934463884535988462>
- [3] [https://x.com/Mitch\\_Ulrich/status/1934379234409304252](https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/1934379234409304252) ;  
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/1934415711029325971>
- [4] <https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1934368018047353220>
- [5] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/1934361315058786392> ;  
<https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/1934360845502341198> ;  
<https://x.com/JasonMBrotsky/status/1934384497207730307>
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<https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934417438155612604>
- [7] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1934525884884496660>
- [8] <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1934425088641966499> ;  
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- [9] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1934525884884496660>
- [10] <https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1934487441684971866>
- [11] <https://x.com/GovMikeHuckabee/status/1934519892746633465>
- [12] <https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1934413140822835694> ;  
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## Tags

### [Iran Project](#)

1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036

ph (202) 293-5550

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<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-morning-edition>



# Iran Update Special Report, June 16, 2025, Evening Edition

Jun 16, 2025 - [ISW Press](#)



**Brian Carter, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, and Andie Parry**

**Information Cutoff: 6:00PM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates per day to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.*

**Iran has maintained its negotiating position on its nuclear program during the Israeli campaign, meaning that Iran does not appear willing to negotiate an end to the Iran-Israel War yet.** Western media reported on June 16 that Iran is seeking to “de-escalate tensions” and quoted Arab officials who said that Iranian officials said that Tehran is open to returning to negotiations if the United States does not join the strike.[1] Arab “intermediaries” said that Iran is “not ready to make concessions in nuclear talks,” however.[2] Public statements from Iranian leaders support this claim by Arab intermediaries. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continued to threaten “severe” responses if the United States failed to restrain Israel and separately defended Iran’s “right” to peaceful nuclear energy and research.[3] The Iranian parliament also began to build a proposal to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[4] These responses are presumably non-starters for the United States and Israel. An unspecified Israeli official said prior to the strikes that Iran must end its uranium enrichment at a minimum, which is a position that the Trump administration has also maintained during the negotiations.[5]

**Other reports appear to dispute the assertions by these Arab officials.** An unspecified regional source and “an official briefed on” Iran-Gulf Arab communications claimed that Iran would return to nuclear talks if a ceasefire were reached and if Iran is allowed to “finish its response” to Israeli strikes.[6] An unspecified Iranian official also said Iran is “willing to be

flexible“ in negotiations.[7] These demands in practice ask Israel to stand down and defend against a final Iranian attack without Iran facing the threat of an Israeli response. It is not clear why or if Israel would agree to such an arrangement.

**An unspecified Iranian diplomat shared a personal, unofficial message with an Iranian diaspora publication that claimed Iranian leaders are willing to “give up uranium enrichment to preserve the regime.”[8] These statements do not reflect official Iranian government positions.** The diplomat claimed that the Artesh and IRGC will “lose control of the situation” and that the regime is “ready to negotiate” if it can achieve “face-saving solutions.” He said that he was not speaking as a representative of the Iranian government.

Iran likely calculates that it can impose costs on Israel for Israel’s campaign against Iran, but Iran’s attacks have been mostly ineffective and do not appear to be influencing Israeli decision making. Iranian officials have continued to threaten a “severe response” to Israeli strikes. Iranian officials appear to design these statements to deter Israel by suggesting Iran can impose costs on Israel, but the lack of Iranian success in actually doing so will presumably diminish the deterrent effect of the statements over time. Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel have not achieved strategic effects that would influence Israeli decision making. The lack of Iranian success in imposing costs on Israel will presumably further diminish the deterrent effect of the statements over time.

Iran’s calculations about continuing the war may change in the coming weeks as Israeli strikes expand and threaten the regime. An Israeli outlet reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin told the Iranian supreme leader that the survival of the Iranian regime is under threat.[9] Putin made the call after a conversation with US President Donald Trump about Russian mediation between Iran and Israel. Israeli strikes have recently expanded to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions, which could threaten regime stability. The current Israeli strikes are probably the most serious threat to regime survival that the Iranian regime has faced since 1979. The supreme leader and his allies could conclude that offering concessions and ending uranium enrichment is necessary if it saves the regime.

**The United States is deploying new forces to the Middle East as part of a buildup to be closer to the Middle East and “provide options to defend US assets and interests.”[10]** A US official told Western media on June 16 that the USS *Nimitz* carrier strike group is en route to the Middle East from the South China Sea, and it is ahead of schedule.[11] The US Air Force is also moving “a large number” of refueling tanker aircraft to Europe to be closer to the Middle East, according to a US official.[12] Flight tracking data from June 15 confirmed that at least 21 tankers have left the United States and started to move towards Europe.[13]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- Iran has reportedly maintained its uncompromising position regarding nuclear talks, meaning that it is not yet ready to negotiate an end to the war with Israel. Other reports have indicated that Iran may grant concessions if it is allowed to fully retaliate against Israel.

- The United States is deploying additional forces to the Middle East to “provide options to defend US assets and interests.” These forces include a carrier strike group and a high number of refueling tanker aircraft.
- The IAEA indicated that Israeli strikes have likely damaged or destroyed thousands of centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear site. The Fordow site remains largely unscathed, however, according to the IAEA.
- The Iranian capacity to conduct missile operations is likely degraded. The IDF has likely destroyed around a third of the Iranian missile launchers. Iran has also used between a third and a half of its missiles that can reach Israel.
- The IDF struck the IRIB headquarters in Iran likely to degrade the Iranian capacity to produce propaganda and shape the information environment. This came after the IDF began striking other regime institutions and energy infrastructure.



**International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) battle damage assessments indicate that Israeli strikes likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[14]** Satellite imagery confirmed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and damaged electrical substations and support buildings critical to power supply across the facility.[15] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told BBC that there is a “great probability” that approximately 14,000 operational centrifuges located at one of the underground halls have been “severely damaged if not destroyed altogether” due to the “sudden loss of external power.”[16] Grossi stated that there has been “very little or no damage” at Fordow. The Fordow site is especially hardened against strikes, as much of the facility extends deep underground.

CTP-ISW has refined our previous June 14 assessment that Israel likely struck a building in the northeastern corner of Natanz. Higher-resolution imagery published by Maxar on June 15 shows no damage in that area of the facility (see below).



**Israeli airstrikes have reportedly destroyed approximately one-third of Iran's ballistic missile stockpiles and launchers.** Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Spokesperson Effie Defrin stated that the IDF has destroyed one-third of Iran's ballistic missile launch capabilities.[17] The IDF Air Force said that it has destroyed more than 120 missile launchers since the beginning of Israel's operations.[18] Israeli officials also said that Iran has fired a total of 370 ballistic missiles at Israel as of June 16 at 10:12 am ET, with approximately 30 to 40 missiles in each barrage.[19] Iran reportedly had between 750 and 1,000 ballistic missiles capable of hitting Israel prior to the conflict, which suggests that Iran has expended nearly half or a third of this ballistic missile stockpile.[20] Iran's missile barrages are notably smaller than its previous attack on Israel in October 2024, when Iran launched approximately 100 missiles per barrage.[21] Israeli attacks on its missile launchers and bases are likely hampering Iran's ability to launch large barrages.



**The Israeli strikes on June 13 and 15 did not cause any noticeable damage to missile facilities in Shiraz, Fars Province.[22]** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 15 showed active fires and burned vegetation in and around the missile facility. The satellite imagery shows no signs of destroyed buildings or vehicles at the sites. Missile facilities in Shiraz reportedly manufactured, repaired, and stored Iranian ballistic missiles. [23]



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Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

Israel also struck the Shiraz electronics facility on June 14 and 15.[24] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 15 showed large plumes of black smoke coming from the facility. The facility reportedly produces radar and electronic equipment for the Iranian military, including the Qamar 3-D search and control radar system for air navigation systems and electronic warfare.[25]

## Shiraz Electronics Production Facility June 15, 2025



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**Israel struck Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) missile facilities in Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province, on June 13.[26]** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 15 shows damage to multiple missile storage buildings and vehicle tunnel entrances, which were likely used to store ballistic missiles and other related equipment. Kermanshah is one of Iran's oldest ballistic missile bases.[27]



# Kermanshah Missile Facility

## June 15, 2025



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Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

# Kermanshah Missile Facility

## June 15, 2025



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
# Kermanshah Missile Facility

June 15, 2025



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**Israel struck the Bid Ganeh missile facility in Tehran Province on June 13 and 14.[28]** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 15 shows that the Israeli strikes destroyed multiple buildings at the facility. The Bid Ganeh site likely stored medium-range ballistic missiles, according to a missile expert.[29] Some of the containers mounted on the trucks in the satellite imagery of Bid Ganeh are 17m long, which is long enough to transport many medium-range ballistic missiles.



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Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.



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
**Israel struck the Khorramabad missile base in Khorramabad, Lorestan Province, on June 14.[30]** An Israeli analyst posted satellite imagery on June 16 that shows that the Israeli strike

damaged several storage, missile launch, and administrative buildings at the base.[31] The site reportedly contained multiple launchers and storage tunnels for ballistic and cruise missiles.[32]

**The IDF targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters in**

**Tehran Province on June 16.[33]** The strike occurred shortly after the IDF issued an evacuation warning for the Tehran Municipal 3rd District.[34] The IRIB headquarters is located in the 3rd Municipal District in northeastern Tehran.[35] Online footage showed the anchor fleeing mid-broadcast as the studio filled with debris and smoke.[36] An IRIB employee claimed that at least four bombs hit the main building.[37] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated before the strike on the IRIB building that the “Iranian propaganda” and “incitement mouthpiece is on its way to disappear.”[38] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei directly appoints the IRIB directors, which underscores the broadcaster’s role as a high-level state propaganda instrument.[39] The US Treasury sanctioned the IRIB and added it to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list in 2013.[40]





**Israel continued to target IRGC and Artesh Air Force positions in Tehran Province on June 16.** The IDF targeted an IRGC position in Chitgar, northwestern Tehran, on June 16.[41] The IDF separately targeted Iranian F-14 Tomcats that were on the ground at the Mehrabad Airport on June 16.[42] The IDF likely targeted the Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA) that operates under the Iranian Ministry of Defense as part of the Aerospace Industries Organization.[43] The United States sanctioned PANHA in 2018 for providing maintenance, overhaul, and manufacturing support for military helicopters used by Iranian Armed Forces.[44]

**IRGC-affiliated media reported on June 16 that the IDF targeted IRGC and Artesh positions in Markazi and Qom provinces.[45]** Iranian media reported that an Israeli strike on

the Hazrat-e Ruhollah Unit in Khomein, Markazi Province, killed six IRGC personnel and two Basij fighters.[46] The strike also killed five members of the Artesh Hazrat-e Masoumeh Air Defense Group and three IRGC Aerospace Force personnel.[47] The Hazrat-e Masoumeh air defense site is responsible for protecting Fordow nuclear facility and is located roughly 16 km east of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP).[48] Iranian media previously reported on June 13 that an IDF strike killed two Artesh personnel at the Hazrat-e Masoumeh air defense site.[49] Iranian media also reported that an Israeli airstrike killed two Artesh air defense officers at Khondab Air Defense Group in Khondab, Markazi Province, on June 15.[50] This unit is likely tasked with protecting the IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor nearby. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and former IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh previously inspected the Khondab Air Defense Group on April 24.[51] Iranian media separately reported that recent IDF strikes on June 16 killed 22 Iranian armed forces personnel in Lorestan Province.[52]

**The IDF has continued to target Iranian military and weapons infrastructure across Iran, likely to further degrade Iran's retaliatory capabilities.** The IAF reportedly conducted preemptive strikes targeting missile launchers that Iran was planning to use in imminent strikes against Israel.[53] The IAF struck a vehicle that was moving ballistic missiles and other unspecified weapons on the Tehran-Qom highway.[54] CTP-ISW previously reported on June 15 that the IDF struck a missile fuel production facility in Garmsar, Semnan Province, on June 15.[55] Iranian dissident organization Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) previously claimed that Iran conducted covert nuclear activities at this facility.[56]

**Iran has conducted two ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 6:00 AM ET data cutoff on June 16.**[57] Iran reportedly launched between ten to twelve ballistic missiles targeting northern Israel, including Haifa, in the first barrage.[58] This attack was smaller than previous Iranian barrages, which have typically involved 30 to 40 missiles.[59] The attack may have been smaller in scale as a result of the IDF's targeting of Iranian mobile launchers and static launch facilities, as noted above. Israeli air defense systems intercepted all the Iranian missiles, according to open-source watchers on social media.[60] Remnants of an Iranian missile fell over the town of Safed in northern Israel but it caused no casualties.[61]

**Iran struck the Bazan Oil Refinery in Haifa on June 15, killing three people and damaging pipelines at the facility.**[62] New satellite imagery shows damage to a section of an oil pipeline after two Iranian ballistic missile strikes on June 15.[63] The strikes subsequently caused all the oil refinery facilities to shut down, according to the Bazan Group.[64] Reports earlier in the day indicated that two Iranian missiles struck Haifa Power Plant.[65] This was likely referring to the strikes at the Bazan Oil Refinery.

**An IRGC spokesperson said that Iran has launched over 545 drones at Israel since June 13.**[66] CTP-ISW has recorded zero drone impacts in Israel. Iran initially launched about 100 drones at Israel on June 13, all of which failed to enter Israeli airspace.[67] The IDF intercepted several drones that crossed into Israeli territory on June 16.[68] The IDF announced that some of the drones were shot down over the Golan Heights, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[69] It is unclear what group launched the drones over the Golan Heights. The purpose of strike packages that combine ballistic missiles and slower-moving drones is to have

the slower drones distract Israeli air defenses to enable the much faster and harder to shoot down ballistic missiles to penetrate the air defense network. Russia has employed a similar tactic against Ukraine.

**The IDF intercepted a ballistic missile launched from Yemen on June 16 before it entered Israeli airspace.[70]** The Houthis have targeted Israel with several drones and ballistic missiles since Israel's initial attacks on Iran on June 12.[71] Several Houthi leaders have also called on Arab countries to support the Iranian response since June 13.[72] Houthi attacks are not an inflection or new constraint on air defense bandwidth for Israel because the Houthis have regularly targeted Israel with drones and missiles since November 2024.[73] These attacks do further constrain Israeli air defense bandwidth when combined with Iranian attacks, however. The Houthis have not claimed the June 16 attack at the time of this writing.

**Iraqi media and open-source analysts are reporting that the United States has intercepted two one-way attacks drones near the US consulate in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, since June 15.[74]** It is unclear at this time if the drones were targeting the consulate or intended for another target like Israel. Iran has consistently targeted Israel with one-way attack drones since the Israeli air campaign began on June 12.[75] No group has claimed responsibility for either drone attack at the time of this writing. US President Donald Trump stated on June 15 that the US military would react with "full strength" if the United States is attacked by Iran.[76] An official from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said on June 16 that the "resistance" will not stand "idly by" as Israel strikes Iran.[77] The official's statement comes after Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to attack US forces and other unspecified targets in the region if the United States intervenes in the conflict.[78]

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## Tags

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1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036

ph (202) 293-5550

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<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-evening-edition>

# IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



**Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy and Annika Ganzeveld**

**June 17, 2025 - Morning Information Cutoff: 6:00 AM ET**


*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates per day to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.*

**We will produce two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. This first update will focus on reports about the strike campaign and identify the areas struck between 6:00 PM ET on June 16 and 6:00 AM ET on June 17. The second update will cover all events over the previous 24 hours and refine our earlier reports about the strike campaign.**

## **Key Takeaways**

- Israel has continued striking Iranian military targets, especially sites tied to the Iranian missile program. Israel has also struck a target with ties to the Iranian chemical weapons program.
- Israel conducted a strike killing the newly appointed commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is responsible for joint and wartime operations.
- Iran has conducted five additional missile attacks targeting Israel. All five attacks had a relatively small volume of fire, possibly demonstrating how degraded Iranian missile forces are.


## Israeli Strikes in Iran June 17, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



**The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted military infrastructure across Iran since June 16.** The IDF destroyed dozens of ballistic missile and drone storage and launch sites in western Iran overnight between June 16 and 17.[1] An Israeli analyst posted satellite imagery on June 16 that showed damage from an Israeli strike at an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base in Ghazanchi, Kermanshah Province.[2] The base was reportedly a ballistic missile launch site.[3] Israeli airstrikes also reportedly targeted an unspecified IRGC base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and an IRGC ammunition depot in Dezful, Khuzestan Province.[4]




## Israeli Strikes in Kermanshah City June 17, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



**The IDF targeted infrastructure reportedly linked to the Iranian chemical weapons program.** Satellite imagery from June 16 shows damage to two buildings at the Shahid Meisami Group in Karaj, Alborz Province.<sup>[5]</sup> The Shahid Meisami Group is an Iranian chemical engineering and research group that is involved in Iran's chemical weapons program.<sup>[6]</sup> The group is subordinate to the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.<sup>[7]</sup> The IDF targeted the SPND headquarters in Tehran on June 14.<sup>[8]</sup>

## Israeli Strikes in Alborz Province June 17, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET




CTP-ISW is tracking several unverified reports of additional airstrikes at the Natanz Enrichment Complex in Esfahan Province.[9] CTP-ISW will provide battle damage assessments and further analysis on the status of the Iranian nuclear program in its June 17 evening update.

**The IDF announced on June 17 that it killed newly appointed Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Shadmani in an airstrike in central Tehran.[10]** Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Shadmani to command the headquarters after the IDF killed former Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid on June 13.[11]

**Iran has conducted five ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 16.** Iran reportedly launched two ballistic missiles targeting central Israel in the first barrage on June 16, according to an OSINT social media account.<sup>[12]</sup> CTP-ISW reported this attack in its June 16 evening update but did not have details about the number of missiles that Iran launched at Israel at the time. Iran reportedly launched three ballistic missiles in the second barrage two hours later.<sup>[13]</sup> It is unclear how many missiles Iran launched in the third barrage.<sup>[14]</sup> An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Iran fired less than 10 ballistic missiles in the first three barrages with no reported impacts or casualties.<sup>[15]</sup> Iran launched approximately 20 missiles in the fourth barrage. At least one missile struck a parking lot in central Israel, reportedly injuring five people.<sup>[16]</sup> Iran reportedly launched approximately 10 ballistic missiles in the fifth barrage.<sup>[17]</sup>

**Iran struck the Israeli Military Intelligence School in Camp Moshe Dayan in Tel Aviv on June 17.**<sup>[18]</sup> The strike damaged a warehouse in the compound.<sup>[19]</sup>

## Observed Impacts in Israel June 17, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



**The IDF has intercepted several drones that crossed into Israeli airspace since June 16.<sup>[20]</sup>** The Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted approximately 30 drones that were launched at Israel overnight on June 16 and 17.<sup>[21]</sup>

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# IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



**Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy and Annika Ganzeveld**

**June 17, 2025 - Evening Information Cutoff: 6:00 AM ET**


*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates per day to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.*

**We will produce two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. This first update will focus on reports about the strike campaign and identify the areas struck between 6:00 PM ET on June 16 and 6:00 AM ET on June 17. The second update will cover all events over the previous 24 hours and refine our earlier reports about the strike campaign.**

## **Key Takeaways**


- Israel has continued striking Iranian military targets, especially sites tied to the Iranian missile program. Israel has also struck a target with ties to the Iranian chemical weapons program.
- Israel conducted a strike killing the newly appointed commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is responsible for joint and wartime operations.
- Iran has conducted five additional missile attacks targeting Israel. All five attacks had a relatively small volume of fire, possibly demonstrating how degraded Iranian missile forces are.

## Israeli Strikes in Iran June 17, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



**The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted military infrastructure across Iran since June 16.** The IDF destroyed dozens of ballistic missile and drone storage and launch sites in western Iran overnight between June 16 and 17.<sup>[1]</sup> An Israeli analyst posted satellite imagery on June 16 that showed damage from an Israeli strike at an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base in Ghazanchi, Kermanshah Province.<sup>[2]</sup> The base was reportedly a ballistic missile launch site.<sup>[3]</sup> Israeli airstrikes also reportedly targeted an unspecified IRGC base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and an IRGC ammunition depot in Dezful, Khuzestan Province.<sup>[4]</sup>


## Israeli Strikes in Kermanshah City June 17, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



**The IDF targeted infrastructure reportedly linked to the Iranian chemical weapons program.** Satellite imagery from June 16 shows damage to two buildings at the Shahid Meisami Group in Karaj, Alborz Province.[5] The Shahid Meisami Group is an Iranian chemical engineering and research group that is involved in Iran's chemical weapons program.[6] The group is subordinate to the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[7] The IDF targeted the SPND headquarters in Tehran on June 14.[8]



## Israeli Strikes in Alborz Province June 17, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



CTP-ISW is tracking several unverified reports of additional airstrikes at the Natanz Enrichment Complex in Esfahan Province.[9] CTP-ISW will provide battle damage assessments and further analysis on the status of the Iranian nuclear program in its June 17 evening update.

**The IDF announced on June 17 that it killed newly appointed Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Shadmani in an airstrike in central Tehran.[10]** Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Shadmani to command the headquarters after the IDF killed former Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid

on

June


13.[11]



**Iran has conducted five ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 16.** Iran reportedly launched two ballistic missiles targeting central Israel in the first barrage on June 16, according to an OSINT social media account.<sup>[12]</sup> CTP-ISW reported this attack in its June 16 evening update but did not have details about the number of missiles that Iran launched at Israel at the time. Iran reportedly launched three ballistic missiles in the second barrage two hours later.<sup>[13]</sup> It is unclear how many missiles Iran launched in the third barrage.<sup>[14]</sup> An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Iran fired less than 10 ballistic missiles in the first three barrages with no reported impacts or casualties.<sup>[15]</sup> Iran launched approximately 20 missiles in the fourth barrage. At least one missile struck a parking lot in central Israel, reportedly injuring five people.<sup>[16]</sup> Iran reportedly launched approximately 10 ballistic missiles in the fifth barrage.<sup>[17]</sup>

**Iran struck the Israeli Military Intelligence School in Camp Moshe Dayan in Tel Aviv on June 17.**<sup>[18]</sup> The strike damaged a warehouse in the compound.<sup>[19]</sup>

## Observed Impacts in Israel June 17, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



**The IDF has intercepted several drones that crossed into Israeli airspace since June 16.<sup>[20]</sup>** The Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted approximately 30 drones that were launched at Israel overnight on June 16 and 17.<sup>[21]</sup>

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[2] <https://t.me/BenTzionM/5105>

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# Iran Update Special Report, June 18, 2025, Morning Edition

Jun 18, 2025 - [ISW Press](#)



**Avery Borens, Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, and Annika Ganzeveld**

**Information Cutoff: 6:00AM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.*

## **Key Takeaways:**

- Israeli strikes have focused on targeting the Iranian missile program in recent hours. Israel has struck several sites tied to missile production, including a site that Iran has expanded significantly in recent years to build weapons for Russia and the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
- Iran downed an Israeli drone around Esfahan. This marks the first confirmed Israeli aircraft that Iran has downed since the Israeli strikes began.
- Iran conducted two ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel. The attacks reportedly included around 20 and 30 missiles.
- Israeli strikes have targeted two centrifuge production sites around Tehran. Israel also struck the IRGC Imam Hossein University, which is controlled by the IRGC and Iranian nuclear weapons research.



## Israeli Strikes in Iran June 18, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET




**Israel has shifted its air campaign to target Iranian ballistic missile production facilities since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 17.** The IDF reported that it struck missile production sites in Tehran Province overnight on June 17 and 18 that produced raw materials and components for missile assembly.[1] Israel struck the Khojir Missile Production Complex in Hajarabad, Tehran Province.[2] The Khojir Missile Production Complex produces solid- and liquid-fueled missiles.[3] Satellite imagery captured in April 2024 showed that Iran had established 30 new buildings at the Khojir facility between August 2023 and April 2024.[4] Reuters reported that the expansion of the Khojir complex would increase Iran's capacity to send weapons to Russia, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.[5] The IDF previously struck the Khojir Missile Production Complex in October 2024.[6]

**The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed on June 18 that Israeli airstrikes targeted two centrifuge production facilities in and around Tehran.**[7] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) workshop in Karaj,

west of Tehran, and the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in Tehran City overnight on June 17 and 18.[8] The IAEA said that both sites were previously under IAEA monitoring and verification under the 2015 nuclear deal.[9] Israeli airstrikes destroyed two buildings at the TESA workshop, which Iran used to manufacture centrifuge components.[10] Israeli airstrikes damaged a building at the TNRC that Iran used to manufacture and test advanced centrifuge rotors.[11] The TNRC houses several nuclear research facilities and Iran has reportedly conducted undeclared nuclear activities, including plutonium separations, uranium conversion, laser enrichment, and polonium production, at the site.[12] The IDF said that the TNRC enabled Iran to expand the scope and rate of its uranium enrichment.[13]

**The IDF targeted infrastructure linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian nuclear weapons program.** The IAF struck the Imam Hussein University (IHU) in Tehran City on June 17.[14] IHU is controlled by the IRGC and has reportedly been involved in experiments related to nuclear weapons technology.[15] Several IHU professors and researchers reportedly work on Iran's nuclear weapons program.[16] The United States sanctioned IHU in 2012.[17]

## Israeli Strikes in Tehran City June 18, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



### Iran downed an Israeli Hermes 900 drone near Esfahan overnight on June 17 and 18.[18]

The IDF confirmed that Iran downed the drone and noted that “there is no fear of information leaking.”[19] This marks the first confirmed Israeli aircraft that Iran has downed since the Israeli strikes began.

**Iran has conducted two ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 17.[20]** Iran reportedly launched between 20 and 30 ballistic missiles in the two barrages.[21] The attacks did not cause any impacts.[22]

**The IDF has intercepted several drones that crossed into Israeli airspace since June 17.** The IAF intercepted a total of 13 drones that were launched at Israel overnight on June 17 and 18.[23]

## Observed Impacts in Israel June 18, 2025 at 6:00 AM ET



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[3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-26-2024>

- [4] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/>
- [5] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/>
- [6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-26-2024>
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- [19] <https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-first-israeli-drone-shot-down-over-iran-idf-says-no-fear-of-information-leaking/>
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## Tags

[Iran Project](#)

1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036

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<https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-18-2025-morning-edition>

# Iran Update Special Report, June 18, 2025, Evening Edition

Jun 18, 2025 - [ISW Press](#)



**Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Kelly Campa, and Annika Ganzeveld**

**Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.*

## **Key Takeaways**

- Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the call from US President Donald Trump for Iran's "unconditional surrender." Khamenei also threatened US forces if the United States joins the war against Iran.
- The so-called "Axis of Resistance" has continued to threaten retaliation if the United States joins the war against Iran. These threats have come from Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
- Israeli strikes have driven Iranian forces to begin firing missiles from central Iran rather than western Iran. Iranian forces will need to use longer-range missiles to reach Israel from the launch sites in central Iran.
- Iran is struggling to coordinate large-scale missile strikes targeting Israel due to pressure from Israeli strikes. This is reflected in the volume of recent Iranian missile fire, which has decreased significantly throughout the war.
- Iranian leaders appear concerned about the potential for social unrest. They have taken precautions to protect their regime, while Israel has struck sites connected to the Iranian internal security apparatus.

**Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected US President Donald Trump's call for Iran's "unconditional surrender" and threatened to target the United States if the United States intervenes in the Israel-Iran conflict.[1] Khamenei's statements**


are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran has maintained its negotiating position on its nuclear program during the Israeli air campaign and does not yet appear willing to negotiate an end to the Israel-Iran War.[2] Khamenei delivered a televised speech on June 18 in which he stated that Iran “will not surrender to anyone in the face of imposition.”[3] Trump called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender” in a social media post on June 17.[4] Khamenei described Trump’s comments as “unacceptable” and “unwise.”[5] Khamenei also warned that US involvement in the conflict will “undoubtedly cause irreparable damage to [the United States].”[6] The United States is currently deploying additional assets to the Middle East to “provide options to defend US assets and interests.”[7]



### **Iranian Offensive Capabilities:**

**Israeli airstrikes in western Iran since June 12 have degraded Iran's ability to conduct attacks against Israel from that region and have reportedly forced Iran to relocate forces to central Iran.** The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that Israeli strikes in western Iran have forced Iranian forces to withdraw from western Iran to central Iran.[8] The IDF said that Iran has attempted to launch missiles targeting Israel from Esfahan, central Iran, after withdrawing forces from western Iran.[9] The majority of IDF strikes targeting Iranian missiles launchers since June 12 have taken place in western Iran.[10] The IDF estimated on June 17 that it has destroyed between 35 and 40 percent of Iran's ballistic missile stockpile and around half of Iran's ballistic missile launchers.[11]

**Launching ballistic missiles from Esfahan will prevent Iran from being able to use three medium-range ballistic missiles that it has previously used to attack Israel.** Esfahan is approximately 1,600 kilometers from Israeli territory. Haj Qassem (1,400-kilometer range), Fattah (1,400-kilometer range), and Kheibar Shekan (1,450-kilometer range) ballistic missiles cannot reach Israel from Esfahan due to their shorter ranges.[12] Iran has claimed to use all three of these missiles in its recent retaliatory attacks against Israel.[13] Iranian ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel from Esfahan include the Emad (1,700-kilometer range), Ghadr (1,950-kilometer range), and Sejil-1 (2,000-kilometer range).[14] Emad and Ghadr missiles use liquid fuel, which is extremely volatile and challenging to transport.[15] Iran used Emad and Ghadr missiles in its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel and has used these missiles in its retaliatory attacks against Israel in recent days. Iran reportedly used a Sejil-1 missile to attack Israel for the first time on June 18.[16] Iran's use of the Sejil-1 missile for the first time may reflect Iran's need to launch longer-range missiles from deeper inside Iranian territory.




The IDF assessed that Iran has recently used fewer missiles to attack Israel because it is having difficulty coordinating large attacks on Israel, not because Iran is conserving its remaining ballistic missile stockpile. This assessment highlights how Israeli airstrikes have significantly degraded Iran's ballistic missile capabilities.<sup>[17]</sup> Iranian missile barrages have decreased in size since the beginning of the Israel-Iran conflict on June 12 from approximately 40 missiles per barrage to only a handful of missiles per barrage, according to an Israeli military correspondent.<sup>[18]</sup> The IDF's assessment is consistent with the IDF's recent statement that it has destroyed around half of Iran's ballistic missile launchers.<sup>[19]</sup> Iranian leaders would likely only choose to expend their remaining missile stockpile if they viewed the current conflict with Israel as an existential threat. The IDF has also targeted Iranian ballistic missile production sites to prevent Iran from being able to replenish its dwindling stockpile. Iranian ballistic missile attacks since June 15 have not caused any injuries or deaths.<sup>[20]</sup> Iranian attacks before June 15 killed 24 Israeli citizens.<sup>[21]</sup> The Israeli Home Front Command changed its civil defense policy on June 18 to allow limited gatherings, which may reflect reduced Israeli concern about Iran's ability to conduct damaging and lethal attacks.<sup>[22]</sup>

CTP-ISW has recorded 39 reported or confirmed Iranian ballistic missile or interceptor impacts on Israel since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12.



## Volume and Frequency of Iranian Ballistic Missile Attacks Targeting Israel since June 13



**Iran has conducted one ballistic missile attack targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 6:00 AM ET data cutoff on June 18.**<sup>[23]</sup> Israeli air defense systems intercepted a single missile launched from Iran, according to an Israeli military correspondent.<sup>[24]</sup> The ballistic missile was reportedly a Sejjil a solid-fuel missile.<sup>[25]</sup> This attack marks the first time that Iran has used the Sejjil missile, according to Iranian media.<sup>[26]</sup>

**The IDF has intercepted two drones targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 6:00 AM ET data cutoff on June 18.**<sup>[27]</sup> The IDF intercepted an Iranian drone over the southern Syrian town of Qarqas that was heading toward the Golan Heights.<sup>[28]</sup> The IDF reported that it intercepted another drone that was also heading toward the Golan Heights.<sup>[29]</sup> The IDF stated that Iran has launched approximately 1,000 drones targeting Israel since the start of the Israel-Iran conflict on June 12. Israeli air defense systems intercepted 200 of the drones in Israeli airspace while the other 800 drones did not enter Israeli airspace..<sup>[30]</sup>


## Observed Impacts in Israel June 18, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



### Israeli Strikes on Iranian Military Facilities:

**The IDF has continued to target Iranian military infrastructure across Iran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 6:00 AM ET on June 18.** The Israeli Air Force (IAF) reportedly struck the Shahid Soltani Garrison near Eshtehard, Alborz Province.[31] The Shahid Soltani Garrison is an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) missile storage and production site that reportedly houses Shahab-3, Qiam, Fateh, and Fath ballistic missiles.[32] The IAF also reportedly struck the IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division in Kermanshah Province and the Parchin Military Complex in eastern Tehran.[33] The IDF previously struck the Parchin Military Complex on June 12, 15, and 16.[34] Iran has used the site to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including ballistic missiles.[35]


## Israeli Strikes in Tehran and Alborz Provinces June 18, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



The IAF also reportedly targeted the Persian Resources Research Center in Zanjan City, Zanjan Province, on June 18.[36] The Persian Resources Research Center produces metallic powders and nano powders, including aluminum, magnesium, zinc, and carbon black.[37] Aluminum can be used to produce centrifuge rotors, which are essential for uranium enrichment.[38] Several of these minerals, such as magnesium, can also be used to manufacture various types of military equipment, including aircraft engines, protective gear, and communication systems.[39] It is unclear whether this research center had any direct ties to the Iranian military or nuclear program, however.

**Israeli airstrikes have destroyed Iranian aircraft that could try to challenge Israeli air superiority.** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 17 shows that Israeli

airstrikes destroyed an Iranian KC-707 aerial refueling aircraft at the Artesh Air Force 14th Tactical Airbase in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province. The IAF also destroyed eight Iranian AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters at the Artesh Air Force 15th Tactical Airbase in Kermanshah on June 18.[40] The IDF said that Iran intended to use the helicopters to attack IAF aircraft operating in Iranian airspace.[41] Iran maintains other aerial assets despite these airstrikes. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 17 shows several undamaged Shahed-136 drones and F-5 fighter aircraft at an airbase in Dezful, Khuzestan Province.



### **Israeli Strikes on the Iranian Nuclear Program:**

**CTP-ISW has not observed any new Israeli airstrikes targeting Iran's nuclear program or new damage to nuclear sites that the IDF previously targeted since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 6:00 AM ET on June 18.**

### **Iranian Regime Stability:**

**The Iranian regime appears to be very concerned about internal unrest.** An internet monitoring group reported a "near-total internet blackout" across Iran on June 18. The internet disruption has caused many Iranian media outlets to go offline, which limits the amount of information coming from the Iranian domestic information space.[42] The regime has also arrested several individuals whom it claims are "Mossad spies" since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12, which further illustrates the regime's growing paranoia about infiltration and heightened concern about internal security threats.[43] The Iranian Parliament passed a bill on June 17 that imposes harsher penalties on individuals who cooperate with "hostile" foreign governments, almost certainly referring to Israel and the United States.[44] The bill defines "cooperation" broadly, including actions such as sending videos or images to foreign media networks that might "weaken public morale or create division." [45]

Iran has likely taken these steps to crack down on any potential internal unrest and threats to regime stability that Israel's ongoing air campaign against Iran could incite. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Israeli airstrikes on Iran's energy infrastructure will likely worsen Iran's ongoing energy crisis by causing more frequent electricity shortages.[46] Iranians have previously protested against the regime in response to energy shortages and blackouts.[47] Israeli airstrikes have also damaged water infrastructure in northern Tehran, which has led to disruptions in the local water supply. Israeli strikes will also likely impact Iran's already struggling economy, which could stoke internal unrest. The Iranian rial has depreciated by 116,000 rials to one US dollar since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12. Reuters reported on June 17 that Iranian oil exports have nearly come to a halt, with a projected 94 percent decline by the end of the week.[48] Residents in Tehran told Iranian opposition media on June 18 that the regime reportedly deployed riot police to Tehran, which underscores the regime's concern about the possibility of internal unrest amid the Israeli air campaign.[49]

**The IDF has continued to target the Iranian internal security apparatus.** The IAF struck the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters in Tehran City on June 18.[50] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that the IAF "destroyed" Iran's "central repressive arm." [51] The IAF previously struck the LEC Headquarters on June 15.[52] The LEC has many subordinate units, including the Prevention and Operations Police, which commands law enforcement stations across Iran, and Special Units, a highly trained, anti-riot force that deploys when regular police cannot contain civil disorder.[53] Disruption to institutions like the LEC could degrade the regime's ability to maintain internal security and social control. The IAF also reportedly conducted new airstrikes targeting the Shahid Meisami Group in Karaj, Alborz Province.[54] The IAF previously targeted the Shahid Meisami Group on June 16.[55] The United States sanctioned the Shahid Meisami Group in December 2020 for testing and producing chemical



agents for use as incapacitation agents.[56] Iran has previously used pharmaceutical-based agents to suppress internal dissent.[57]

**Two anti-regime hacker groups conducted cyber attacks on June 18 that targeted Iranian financial and media institutions.** Gonjeshke Darande (Predatory Sparrow) targeted Iranian cryptocurrency exchange company Nobitex, "burning" over \$90 million of Nobitex holdings.[58] Gonjeshke Darande is a pro-Israel hacker group that has conducted cyber attacks targeting Iranian infrastructure since at least 2021.[59] Gonjeshke Darande claimed that Nobitex enabled the Iranian regime to bypass sanctions and finance the Axis of Resistance.[60] Gonjeshke Darande recently targeted Iranian state-owned Bank Sepah on June 17.[61] The United States sanctioned Bank Sepah in November 2018 for supporting the Iranian Defense Ministry.[62] Bank Sepah users have been unable to access their accounts, process payments, or withdraw cash from ATMs since the cyber attack.[63] The IRGC Cyber Security Command claimed that it thwarted several Israeli cyber attacks on Iran's banking network on June 17.[64] The command stated that cyber attacks disrupted services at two banks.[65] The cyber attacks on Iranian financial institutions come amid already dire economic conditions in Iran. An unidentified group separately hacked Iranian state TV and broadcasted anti-government videos calling on Iranian citizens to "take to the streets." [66] Iran's Information and Communications Ministry announced a temporary restriction on internet access following the cyber attack.[67]

#### **Axis of Resistance Response to the Israel-Iran War:**

**The Iranian-led Axis of Resistance has threatened to retaliate if the United States joins the Israel-Iran War.** A US official speaking to Al Jazeera said that US participation in the conflict would drive Iran's proxies to attack US forces and assets in the region.[68] A senior Iranian official also told Al Jazeera that Iran would call on Lebanese Hezbollah to join the conflict if the United States becomes directly involved.[69] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia stated on June 18 that it is prepared to "attack American bases in the event of any American aggression against Iran." [70] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Ansar Allah al Awfia announced on June 17 that they had developed a "joint plan" to target US forces if the United States joins the Israeli air campaign against Iran.[71] Unspecified US officials told the *New York Times* that the Houthis would "almost certainly" resume attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea if the United States attacks Iran.[72] Two Iranian officials also told the *New York Times* that Iran would attack US bases in Iraq and then target US bases in other unspecified Arab countries if the United States joins the war.[73]

**The Israeli air campaign will likely have a secondary effect of weakening Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance groups.** The IDF struck a site in Iran on June 18 that produced anti-tank missiles for Lebanese Hezbollah and other Axis of Resistance members.[74] Many of Hezbollah's weapons stockpiles have been destroyed by Israeli airstrikes, seized by the Lebanese Armed Forces, or used in Hezbollah's 2023-2024 conflict with Israel.[75] A source close to Hezbollah told a Saudi outlet that Hezbollah "will join the Israel-Iran war only if the Iranian regime starts to collapse" and that the group would use "heavy weapons" to support Iran.[76] The Hezbollah-linked source also stated that Israel's destruction of the IRGC would mean "the end of Hezbollah." [77] Iran, and specifically the IRGC, have tried to help Hezbollah reconstitute

since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. Israel separately struck the Khojir Military Complex on June 17, as CTP-ISW reported in its June 18 morning update. Iran reportedly produced missiles at the Khojir complex for Russia, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.[78]

### **US Posture on Iran:**

**US President Donald Trump stated on June 18 that he seeks "complete victory" against Iran, which he defined as "no nuclear weapon."**[79] Trump said that he doesn't "want to get involved" but he believes that Iran would use a nuclear weapon if it was allowed to obtain one.[80] Trump also said that only the US military is capable of destroying Fordow but "that doesn't mean we are going to be doing it at all." [81] Trump also stated on June 18 that he's "had it" with Iran and that he was still deciding whether or not to join the Israeli air campaign.[82] The United States continues to move additional assets to the Middle East to "enhance [the United States'] defensive posture" in the region.[83] The United States will reportedly deploy the USS *Gerald R. Ford* carrier strike group to the eastern Mediterranean Sea in the next week.[84] The USS *Nimitz* carrier strike group is also en route to the Middle East from the South China Sea.[85] Flight tracking data from June 15 showed over 31 US Air Force refueling tankers, including KC-135s and KC-46s, leaving the United States toward Europe.[86] Commercially available satellite data captured on June 17 showed that unsheltered US aircraft at al Ubeid Airbase in Qatar have relocated to an unspecified location.[87]

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## Tags

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# Iran Update Special Report, June 19, 2025, Morning Edition

Jun 19, 2025 - [ISW Press](#)



**Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, and Annika Ganzeveld**

**Information Cutoff: 6:00 AM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.*

## **Key Takeaways**

- The IDF struck several nuclear facilities, including the Arak Heavy Water Reactor in Markazi Province. Iran could use this reactor to support the production of plutonium-based nuclear weapons. The IDF also struck a storage facility linked to the Iranian nuclear program in Natanz, Esfahan Province.
- The IDF has struck at least six Iranian Ghadir radars since June 12, according to commercially available satellite imagery. Ghadir radars reportedly have the ability to detect aircraft from 1,100 kilometers away.
- An Iranian ballistic missile struck the Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba. Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff have injured over 200 individuals. The Israeli defense minister warned that Israel will intensify its attacks on Iran following the strike on the Soroka Medical Center.

**CTP-ISW has observed fewer reports of Israeli airstrikes from social media accounts based in Iran, which likely reflects widespread internet disruptions in Iran rather than an actual decrease in Israeli airstrikes.** An internet monitoring group reported that Iran is currently facing a near-total internet shutdown.[1]

**The IDF (Israel Defense Forces) has struck several Iranian nuclear facilities since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 5:00 PM ET on June 18.** The IDF struck the Arak Heavy Water Reactor in Markazi Province on June 19.[2] Iran began construction of the heavy water reactor in 1997, but the reactor never became operational.[3] Heavy water reactors produce plutonium as a byproduct, which can be used to create nuclear weapons.[4] Iran agreed to redesign the facility to alleviate international concerns about possible plutonium production as part of the 2015 nuclear deal.[5] The IDF said that it struck the facility due to its capacity to support the production of plutonium-based nuclear weapons.[6] Iran has pursued a uranium-based, not plutonium-based, nuclear program. The IDF separately struck a storage facility in Natanz, Esfahan Province. The IDF said that the storage facility contained equipment that Iran could use to develop nuclear weapons.[7] Previous Israeli airstrikes on the Natanz Enrichment Complex directly impacted the complex's underground enrichment facilities.[8]

The IDF issued an evacuation order on June 18 for the area around the Arak Heavy Water Reactor.[9] Iran acknowledged that two projectiles hit the facility on June 19.[10] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that the IDF struck the heavy water reactor and that there was no nuclear material at the facility.[11] The IAEA said that it did not have information about whether the IDF had also struck the heavy water production plant, which is also located in the Arak facility.[12] The heavy water production plant provides heavy water for the reactor.[13]

# Israeli Strikes in Iran June 19, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



- Confirmed Airstrike
- Reported Airstrike
- Report of Explosion With Footage
- Report of Explosion Without Footage




## Israeli Strikes in Esfahan Province June 19, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



**Commercially available satellite imagery shows that the IDF has struck at least six Ghadir radars across Iran since June 12.** The IDF struck Ghadir radars in Bijar, Kurdistan Province; Marber, Ilam Province; Garmsar, Semnan Province; Behabad, Yazd Province; Dasht-e Arjan, Fars Province; and Mal Gonzeh, Bushehr Province between June 12 and 19. Israel likely targeted the Ghadir radars in order to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities and maintain air superiority over Iran. The Ghadir radar system is an important component of Iranian integrated air defense systems because of the Ghadir's ability to detect aircraft from 1,100 kilometers away.[14] Iran attempted to bolster its Ghadir system in the months leading up to the Israel-Iran War.[15] Iran likely built at least two new Ghadir radars in southern Iran near the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and one in West Azerbaijan Province in recent months.[16]

## Iranian Ghadir Over the Horizon Radars June 19, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET




**Iran has conducted two ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 5:00 PM ET data cutoff on June 18.** Iran launched four ballistic missiles targeting central Israel in its first barrage.<sup>[17]</sup> Israeli air defense systems intercepted all of the missiles.<sup>[18]</sup> Iran launched an estimated 30 ballistic missiles targeting central and southern Israel in its second barrage, causing four impacts: one in Beersheba, two in Tel Aviv, and one in Azor.<sup>[19]</sup> An Iranian ballistic missile struck the Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba.<sup>[20]</sup> The attack damaged the building but did not cause any injuries because the facility had been evacuated days prior.<sup>[21]</sup> Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that Iran targeted an Israeli intelligence headquarters next to the hospital.<sup>[22]</sup> Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that he and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “instructed the IDF to increase the intensity of attacks against

strategic targets in Iran and against government targets in Tehran” following the attack.[23] Another Iranian ballistic missile struck Ramat Gan, near Tel Aviv, damaging shops and apartment buildings.[24] A third ballistic missile struck Holon, near Tel Aviv, damaging several apartment buildings.[25] The Israeli Health Ministry reported that the three strikes critically injured four people and moderately injured 16 people.[26] 220 individuals sustained minor injuries from the attacks.[27] The IDF announced that at least one of the Iranian ballistic missiles contained a cluster munition which contained 2.5-kilogram explosive submunitions.[28] One of the submunitions struck a home in Azor, but did not cause any injuries.[29] These barrages mark the first Iranian strikes that have inflicted injuries since June 15.[30]

**The IDF has intercepted two drones targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 5:00 PM ET data cutoff on June 18.** The IDF intercepted an Iranian drone over northern Israel.[31] The IDF also intercepted an Iranian drone over the Jordan Valley area.[32]

## Observed Impacts in Israel June 19, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



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[1] <https://mastodon.social/@netblocks/114710081347671707> ;  
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- [2] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1935625592768225321> ;  
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- [3] <https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/arak-nuclear-complex>;  
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- [4] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1935625592768225321>;  
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935632190659776556>
- [5] <https://apnews.com/article/arak-heavy-water-reactor-iran-israel-airstrikes-628381fb9b0706bacac8a1b8820b1cf3>; <https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/arak-nuclear-complex/>
- [6] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935574764862492767>
- [7] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935574764862492767>
- [8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025-200-pm-et>
- [9] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1935508510118183064>
- [10] <https://apnews.com/article/arak-heavy-water-reactor-iran-israel-airstrikes-628381fb9b0706bacac8a1b8820b1cf3>
- [11] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1935625592768225321>
- [12] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1935625592768225321>; <https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/arak-nuclear-complex/>
- [13] <https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/arak-nuclear-complex/>
- [14] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-october-26-2024>;  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-october-29-2024>
- [15] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-april-3-2025>;
- [16] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-april-3-2025>;  
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- [25] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935563990928707963> ;  
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- [26] <https://x.com/IsraelMOH/status/1935649625060368823>
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- [28] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935668932947357719> ;  
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- [29] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935668932947357719>
- [30] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-15-2025-evening-edition>
- [31] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935474797409878037>

[32] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935480886423650568> ;  
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## Tags

[Iran Project](#)  
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<https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-morning-edition>

# Iran Update Special Report, June 19, 2025, Evening Edition

Jun 19, 2025 - [ISW Press](#)



**Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Kelly Campa, and Annika Ganzeveld**

**Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.*

## **Key Takeaways**

- Iranian officials have expressed interest in negotiating an end to the Israel-Iran conflict but have not moderated their negotiating positions from before the conflict. Iranian proposals that do not fulfill US demands, such as the US demand for zero Iranian uranium enrichment, will likely preclude Iran from reaching a new nuclear deal with the United States and a ceasefire in the Israel-Iran War.
- The IDF has continued to strike Iranian nuclear, military, and energy infrastructure. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on June 19 that "preventing [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's] existence" is one of the Israeli air campaign's objectives.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Mohammad Karami as the IRGC Ground Forces commander on June 19. Khamenei's appointment of Karami may reflect regime concerns about potential domestic unrest, given that Karami has previously been involved in suppressing internal dissent.
- Iran has continued its ballistic missile campaign despite the IDF's claims that it has destroyed between one-half and two-thirds of Iran's missile launchers. Iran has launched more advanced missiles targeting Israel since June 18.
- Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to threaten retaliation if the United States joins the Israel-Iran War. The Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson warned on June 19, for example, that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, the


closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and the closure of ports in the Red Sea.

**Iranian officials have expressed interest in negotiating an end to the Israel-Iran conflict but have not moderated their negotiating positions from before the conflict.** An unspecified US official cited by Axios on June 19 stated that US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has been in contact with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and has received some indications that Iran is interested in resuming negotiations.[1] Two Iranian government planes landed in Oman, which has been mediating between Iran and the United States, on June 18.[2] It is unclear who was on these planes or whether the flights to Oman were related to negotiations. Araghchi announced on June 19 that he will meet with representatives from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union in Geneva on June 20 to discuss “the nuclear issue and the latest developments in the region.”[3] French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean Noel Barrot stated on June 19 that France is prepared to support negotiations with the United States to “scale back” Iran’s nuclear enrichment and ballistic missile programs.[4] Negotiations to “scale back” Iran’s enrichment and ballistic missile programs would be consistent with Iran’s objective to maintain both programs. These objectives contradict stated US objectives to achieve zero uranium enrichment and degrade the Iranian ballistic missile program.

**Iranian proposals that do not fulfill US objectives will likely preclude Iran from reaching a new nuclear deal with the United States and a ceasefire in the Israel-Iran War.** Arab “intermediaries” speaking to Western media on June 16 said that Iranian officials are willing to “de-escalate hostilities” and return to negotiations but are not prepared to make concessions in the nuclear talks.[5] This suggests that Iran is not currently willing to concede to the US demand for zero uranium enrichment. So long as Iran insists on retaining a uranium enrichment program on Iranian soil, it is unlikely that Iran and the United States will conclude a nuclear agreement. US President Donald Trump called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender” in a social media post on June 17.[6] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected Trump’s call for Iran’s “unconditional surrender” during a televised speech on June 18.[7]


**The United States is reportedly preparing to support a potential strike on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant if Iran rejects US conditions to resume nuclear negotiations.** Unspecified US officials cited by Western media on June 19 reported that Trump has approved attack plans for Iran but is withholding a decision to attack to see if Iran would accept a deal.[8] Unspecified US officials cited by Axios reported that Trump seeks to ensure that a strike on Iran is absolutely necessary, would not entangle the United States in a protracted war, and would succeed in destroying the Iranian nuclear program.[9] The United States has begun moving assets to the Middle East in recent days to provide “more options” for defending US assets and interests.[10] US Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Trump will decide whether or not to strike Iran “within the next two weeks.”[11]

**It remains unclear whether Israel would attack Fordow without US assistance.** An unspecified US official told an Axios reporter on June 18 that Israeli officials told the Trump administration that Israel might “[attack Fordow] with humans” because Israeli munitions may not be able to destroy Fordow.”[12]



Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on June 19 that "preventing [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's] existence" is one of the Israeli air campaign's objectives.[13] Katz made this remark during a visit to the site of an Iranian missile impact in central Israel.[14] Israel launched its air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12 to "degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat" of the Iranian nuclear program.[15] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on June 12 that the strikes are part of a campaign to "roll back the Iranian threat to Israel's survival." [16] Katz's comment follows similar statements from Netanyahu since June 16, including Netanyahu's statement that Khamenei's death would "end the conflict." [17] Katz stated on June 19 that he and Netanyahu instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to increase the "intensity" of IDF attacks on government targets in Iran to eliminate threats to Israel and "undermine the ayatollah's regime." [18]

## Confirmed Israeli Strikes in Iran From June 12 to June 19 at 5:00 PM ET





**Battle Damage Assessments:**

## Western Part of Sanjarian Nuclear Site June 17, 2025



## Eastern Part of Sanjarian Nuclear Site June 18, 2025




**Commercially available satellite imagery shows that the IDF targeted the Sanjarian site in Tehran Province on June 18.** Former UN weapons inspector David Albright stated on June 19 that Israeli strikes “completely destroyed” four buildings at the Sanjarian site and may have caused “collateral damage” near the site.[19] The site served as a key facility in Iran’s Amad Project, which was Iran’s nuclear weapons program before 2003. Iran used the Sanjarian site to conduct high explosive tests in specialized chambers.[20] The Institute for Science and International Security previously reported that Iran increased activity at two nuclear sites in late 2024 that were previously used for high explosive testing, including the Sanjarian site.[21] Iran also “reactivated and accelerated” activities at the Golab Dareh nuclear site in Tehran Province in late 2024.[22]

# Israeli Strikes in Iran June 19, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET





## Arak Heavy Water Reactor Facility June 19, 2025



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Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

**The IDF struck the Arak Heavy Water Reactor in Markazi Province on June 19, as CTP-ISW previously reported. Commercially available satellite imagery from June 19 shows damage to the reactor.** Israeli strikes caused the dome of the reactor to collapse. Satellite imagery also shows damage to nearby distillation towers and other infrastructure.<sup>[23]</sup> Heavy water reactors produce plutonium as a byproduct, which can be used to create nuclear weapons.<sup>[24]</sup> Iran began construction of the heavy water reactor in 1997, but the reactor never became operational.<sup>[25]</sup> Iran agreed to redesign the facility to alleviate international concerns about possible plutonium production as part of the 2015 nuclear deal.<sup>[26]</sup>


## Ghadir OTH Radar in Fars Province May 27, 2025



**Israel struck a Ghadir over-the-horizon radar near Shiraz, Fars Province, between June 13 and June 19, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[27]** Ghadir radars can detect aircraft from about 1,100 kilometers away, which would have enabled this radar system to detect aircraft as far west as central and parts of western Iraq.[28] Israel has struck at least five other Ghadir radars across Iran in recent days, likely to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities and maintain air superiority over Iran.[29]

**The IDF has continued to target Iranian missile capabilities and leadership since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 5:00 AM ET on June 19.** The IDF conducted 20 strikes targeting surface-to-surface missile infrastructure, including missile launchers and vehicles containing surface-to-surface missiles.[30] Geolocated imagery published on June 19 shows that the IDF struck an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force facility located two kilometers from the IRGC Aerospace Force Headquarters in Tehran between June 12 and 15.[31] The IRGC Aerospace Force oversees Iran's drone and missile arsenals.[32] The IDF also reportedly struck an IRGC base in Karaj, Alborz Province, on June 19.[33]

The IDF continued to target Iranian energy infrastructure on June 19. The IDF reportedly struck a power plant in Karaj, Alborz Province.[34] CTP-ISW assessed on June 15 that Israeli strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure will likely worsen Iran's ongoing energy crisis by causing more widespread and frequent electricity shortages and outages.[35] Frustration over energy shortages could trigger internal unrest.



### Israel's Decapitation Campaign and Iranian Appointments:

**Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Mohammad Karami as the IRGC Ground Forces commander on June 19.[36]** Karami replaced Major General Mohammad Pak Pour, who held the position since 2009.[37] Khamenei appointed Pak Pour as the IRGC commander on June 13 after the IDF killed former IRGC Commander Major General



Hossein Salami on June 12.[38] Karami has decades of experience in internal security and counterinsurgency operations. Karami previously commanded the IRGC Ground Forces Quds Operational Base in southeastern Iran.[39] Karami also served as the governor of Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[40] The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada have sanctioned Karami for his role in violently suppressing protests, including the November 2019 and Mahsa Amini protests in September 2022.[41] Khamenei may have appointed Karami in part due to concerns about potential unrest in Iran, given Karami's background in suppressing internal dissent.[42]

**IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pak Pour appointed Brigadier General Majid Khademi as IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief on June 19.[43]** Israeli airstrikes killed former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi and his deputy, Hassan Mohaghegh, on June 15.[44]

### **Iranian Attacks on Israel**

**CTP-ISW has recorded 43 reported or confirmed Iranian ballistic missile or Israeli interceptor impacts on Israel since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12.**

**Iran has continued to conduct ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel despite the fact that the IDF has destroyed between one-half and two-thirds of Iran's missile launchers.[45]** Iran has conducted one ballistic missile attack targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 5:00 AM ET data cutoff on June 19.[46] Iran launched between six and ten ballistic missiles targeting northern Israel in its third barrage since June 18.[47] Israeli air defense systems intercepted all of the missiles.[48] An Israeli official told Reuters that the IDF estimates that it has struck two-thirds of Iran's ballistic missile launchers.[49] The size of Iranian ballistic missile barrages increased on June 19, with a barrage that included approximately 30 missiles. This barrage marked the largest Iranian salvo since June 16.[50] Iranian barrages on June 17 and 18 were more frequent but contained fewer missiles in comparison, often with no more than five missiles per barrage.[51]

**Iran has launched more technologically advanced missiles targeting Israel since June 18.** Iran launched a Sejil ballistic missile targeting Israel for the first time on June 18, according to Iranian media.[52] The Sejil is a two-stage, solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with a range of around 2,000 kilometers.[53] Israeli air defense systems successfully intercepted the Sejil.[54] Iran launched a Khorramshar-4 ballistic missile that contained a cluster munition warhead on June 19, according to an Israeli journalist.[55] The Khorramshar-4 is a liquid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with a range of around 2,000 kilometers.[56] The cluster munition warhead released 20 2.5-kilogram explosive submunitions at an altitude of seven kilometers, according to an Israeli journalist.[57] One of the submunitions struck a home in Azor but did not cause any injuries. The remaining 19 submunitions failed to detonate and were safely destroyed by the IDF.[58]

**The IDF has intercepted one drone targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 5:00 AM ET data cutoff on June 19.[59]** The IDF intercepted the drone over the Jordan Valley area.[60] The Israeli Air Force and Navy have intercepted over 95 percent of Iranian drones targeting Israel, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[61] IDF Spokesperson Brigadier General Effie

Defrin stated that over 480 of the roughly 1,000 drones that have been launched at Israel since June 12 have been shot down. Only around 200 of the 1,000 drones entered Israeli airspace.[62]

### **Axis of Resistance Response to the Israel-Iran War:**

**Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to threaten retaliation if the United States joins the Israel-Iran War.** Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari threatened on June 19 that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and the closure of ports in the Red Sea.[63] Askari claimed that Iran can launch missiles with “various ranges and technologies” at Israel at the same rate for a year and launch missiles at the “entire American presence in West Asia.”[64] The IDF estimates that its strikes have destroyed between one-half and two-thirds of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers.[65] Unspecified US officials told the *New York Times* on June 17 that US intelligence shows that Iran has prepared missiles and equipment to strike US bases in the region if the United States joins Israel’s air campaign.[66] US officials added that the Houthis would “almost certainly” resume attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea and Iran could lay mines in the Strait of Hormuz if the United States joins the conflict.

Askari and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi condemned US President Donald Trump’s recent “threat” to target Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[67] Trump called Khamenei an “easy target” in a social media post on June 17 but denied immediate plans to target him due to concerns about ramifications for US forces in the region.[68] Kaabi threatened on June 19 to target US citizens, soldiers, diplomats, and “direct or indirect interests” if Israel or the United States targets Khamenei.[69] Saraya al Dam separately threatened on June 19 to conduct unspecified actions if the Israel-Iran conflict persists.[70] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may target the United States even if it does not directly participate in or approve Israeli attacks on Iran because Iran and its proxies believe that the United States approves Israeli actions in the region.

**Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on June 19 that the Houthis will continue to attack Israel.**[71] The IDF has intercepted multiple drones and ballistic missiles launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since the Israel-Iran War began on June 12.[72] Abdulmalik called on Arab countries, including Iraq, to prevent Israel from using their airspace to strike Iran. The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau, Ali al Asadi, called on the Iraqi government on June 19 to declare Iraqi airspace a no-fly zone for the United States and Israel.[73] Asadi also called on the Iraqi army and the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces, which includes several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, to target any Israeli aircraft or missiles that enter Iraqi airspace. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the PMF have attempted to procure air defense equipment in recent years.[74]

**Geolocated imagery shows that Israel struck a site in Vandar, Ghazvin Province, on June 18 that Iran used to produce anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) for Lebanese Hezbollah and other Axis of Resistance groups.**[75] The IDF announced that it struck the site on June 18 but did not publish the site’s location.[76] CTP-ISW assessed on June 18 that the Israeli air campaign will likely have a secondary effect of weakening Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance groups, such as Hezbollah, that rely on Iran.[77] Iran, and specifically the IRGC, have tried to

help Hezbollah reconstitute since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem released a statement on June 19 confirming Hezbollah's support for Iran in the war.[78]



[1] <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/19/world/iran-israel-trump-news#iran-is-open-to-talks-with-the-us-a-senior-diplomat-says-even-as-the-supreme-leader-rejects-the-idea> ;  
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[2] <https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ep-ssm> ;  
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<https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ep-iga>

[3] <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/19/world/iran-israel-trump-news/european-and-iranian-officials-will-hold-talks-on-friday-in-geneva?smid=url-share>

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[7] <https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28269/>

[8] [https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-privately-approved-attack-plans-for-iran-but-has-withheld-final-order-4563c526?gaa\\_at=eafs&gaa\\_n=ASWzDAiiMEV3PLT\\_a\\_jx-vdfn9GlpMP1xQbIVq0rkxobXIKTMC3QTiVdd-Ok7rWtFwI%3D&gaa\\_ts=68532f1f&gaa\\_sig=JQs3YIivPE8tWwLO03NcJF94I9L\\_3qqmoiO1N\\_PkY9gw0yWKjryXJ2CjGSgwtGQYCx1SE8\\_RqLGYBSvPZRgWBw%3D%3D](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-privately-approved-attack-plans-for-iran-but-has-withheld-final-order-4563c526?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAiiMEV3PLT_a_jx-vdfn9GlpMP1xQbIVq0rkxobXIKTMC3QTiVdd-Ok7rWtFwI%3D&gaa_ts=68532f1f&gaa_sig=JQs3YIivPE8tWwLO03NcJF94I9L_3qqmoiO1N_PkY9gw0yWKjryXJ2CjGSgwtGQYCx1SE8_RqLGYBSvPZRgWBw%3D%3D) ;  
<https://abcnews.go.com/International/live-updates/israel-iran-live-updates/?id=122881565&entryId=122991922> ; <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-attack-plans-iran-no-final-decision/>

[9] <https://www.axios.com/2025/06/18/trump-bunker-buster-bomb-iran-nuclear-program>

[10] <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1934619037071532080> ;  
<https://x.com/JenGriffinFNC/status/1934634030994980959> ;  
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1934425218929336644> ;

<https://x.com/vcdgf555/status/1934427191544336737> ;  
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## Tags

### [Iran Project](#)

1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036

ph (202) 293-5550

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# IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



**Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter**

**June 20, 2025 - Morning    Information Cutoff: 5:00 AM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.*

**Six US Air Force air-to-air refuelers moved westward from bases in California and Oklahoma to Honolulu, Hawaii, and Travis Air Force Base, California, respectively, on June 19.** Open-source flight trackers showed six US Air Force KC-46A Pegasus aircraft redeploying westward to Travis Air Force Base, California, and Honolulu, Hawaii, on June 19.[1] The KC-46A Pegasus is an aerial refueling aircraft that supports combat operations by enabling aircraft to project power over an extended area.[2]

## **Key Takeaways**

- The US Air Force deployed six air-to-air refueling aircraft to California and Hawaii. The aircraft support combat operations by enhancing the ability of aircraft to project force.
- Israel has continued to strike Iranian air defense and missile forces. These strikes have helped Israel achieve air superiority over parts of Iran and preempt Iranian missile attacks.
- Israel has continued to strike the Iranian internal security apparatus, which could degrade the ability of the regime to repress its people.
- Iran has continued firing small waves of one-way attack drones at Israel, but with no real success. The attacks appear poorly coordinated if they are meant to overwhelm Israeli defenses.

**The Israel Defense Forces continues its campaign to destroy Iranian ballistic missile systems and air defenses.[3]** This line of effort is essential to preempt Iranian missile attacks and limit the threat Iranian ballistic missiles pose to Israeli civilians. Iran launched one ballistic missile attack since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff, but one missile penetrated Israeli defenses and struck near a residential area in Beer Sheva, injuring five Israelis.[4] The IDF is continuing to confront the challenge posed by ballistic missiles, however. The IDF struck over 35 missile storage and launch infrastructure sites in Tabriz and Kermanshah.[5] The IDF also struck missile and radar systems in Esfahan and Tehran.[6] The IDF struck three missile launchers prepared to fire elsewhere as well and

separately killed an unspecified IRGC commander who commanded 15 missile launchers.[7] The size of this officer's command suggests he is probably a battalion-level commander. A single battery of fifteen launchers would presumably be beyond a single battery commander's span of control, which makes it more likely that the slain officer is roughly equivalent to a battalion commander. An artillery or missile battalion consists of multiple batteries.

**The IDF issued an evacuation order on June 19 for the area around the Sefid Roud Industrial Complex in Taleshan, Gilan Province.[8] This complex is linked to Iran's missile program.** The IDF conducted four airstrikes targeting the area following the evacuation order.[9] The Sefid Roud Industrial Complex reportedly houses a Navid Composite Material Company carbon fiber production plant.[10] The United States sanctioned the Navid Composite Material Company in 2013 for its involvement in Iran's ballistic missile program.[11]

**Other IDF strikes have continued to degrade Iran's nuclear program.** The IDF struck the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) again after it had previously struck the facility on June 14.[12] The SPND played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003, though SPNG used a different name at the time. The IDF also struck the Sanjarian site in Tehran Province again on June 20 after targeting it on June 18.[13] This site was a key facility in Iran's Amad nuclear weapons program and missile component production.[14] The site hosted high-explosive testing in specialized chambers.[15]

The IDF separately targeted a residence in the Gisha neighborhood of Tehran on June 20 that reportedly killed an Iranian nuclear scientist.[16] Israeli media reported that an Israeli drone struck the scientist's residence.[17]


**The IDF has also continued to strike targets that are important to Iran's internal security and social control apparatus, which could destabilize the regime over time.** The IDF targeted two key sites in Tehran Province on June 20. The IDF targeted the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters in Central Tehran and the LEC Special Units in southeastern Tehran.[18] The IDF previously targeted the Iranian LEC on June 18.[19] The destruction of these facilities and the disruption of the LEC could destabilize the regime over time because the LEC plays a key role in suppressing civil unrest and maintaining regime control. The LEC also oversees the Special Units, a highly trained anti-riot force deployed when regular police are unable to manage civil unrest.[20] The LEC has also intervened abroad, such as in Syria, in order to help secure other members of the Axis of Resistance.[21]



# Israeli Strikes in Iran June 20, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET




## Israeli Strikes in Tehran City June 20, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



**Iran has continued to fire drones at Israel, but these attacks are relatively ineffective due to the amount of time Israel has to react to Iranian drone attacks.** The drones employed by Iran to target Israel take roughly nine hours to reach Israel, which enables Israel to scramble aircraft or direct aircraft on combat air patrol to intercept incoming projectiles. The IDF has intercepted four drones targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 5:00 PM ET data cutoff on June 19.[22] The IDF intercepted an Iranian drone over Haifa in northern Israel.[23] The IDF also intercepted three Iranian drones over the Dead Sea.[24] These drone interceptions occurred in three separate waves that were reported at 5:20 PM ET, 8:05 PM ET, and 8:38 PM ET.[25] **None of the three waves appears calibrated to enter Israeli airspace at the same time as the ballistic missile attack mentioned above, which was reported at 10:48 PM ET.[26]** This means that the

drones presumably failed to strain Israeli air defense bandwidth like they would if the drones entered Israeli airspace at the same time as the ballistic missiles.



**The IDF targeted an IRGC base in Bostan Abad, East Azerbaijan Province, on June 20.**[27] Iranian media confirmed the strike and reported several IRGC personnel casualties.[28]

**Iranian media circulated a statement reportedly from Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani claiming that he is alive, but Iran has offered no visual evidence of Shamkhani's survival at this time.** Iranian state media reported on June 20 that Ali Shamkhani sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stating that he is alive and “ready to sacrifice myself.”[29] The IDF previously announced that it had killed Shamkhani on June 13.[30]



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# IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



**Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei,  
Nidal Morrison, and Brian Carter**

**June 20, 2025 - Evening      Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.*

**Iran is attempting to impose a dilemma on the United States and the international community: either accept Iranian terms in nuclear negotiations or risk a long and challenging hunt for hidden Iranian nuclear material.** This dilemma is likely designed to harden Iran's nuclear program against destruction either by securing an agreement on Iranian terms (which would presumably allow Iran to continue enrichment) or protecting Iranian nuclear material by hiding the material, thus making a US or Israeli effort to destroy the material more difficult.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Mohsen Rezaei stated during an interview on June 20 that Iran has relocated its enriched material to a secure location to prevent it from being destroyed.[1] This statement is presumably intended to suggest to a Western audience that destroying all of Iran's nuclear material would require a long, challenging, and possibly futile hunt for hidden material and that, therefore, the West should negotiate with Iran. Iranian officials have expressed their interest in negotiating a nuclear deal with the United States, but have not moderated their negotiating position from before the conflict.[2]

Iran remains committed to preserving its stated "right" to enrich uranium.[3] These Iranian demands over enrichment have been a non-starter for the United States and Israel in the ongoing negotiations, suggesting Rezaei's statement is designed to increase the pressure on the United States and Israel to relax their positions. The United States and Israel have rejected Iranian demands and maintained that Iran will not be permitted to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.[4] Israel launched its air campaign on June 12 to "degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat" of Iranian weaponization of its nuclear program, and a senior Israeli official said that enrichment remains a red line.[5] US President Donald Trump has threatened to support an air campaign targeting Iranian nuclear infrastructure if Iran fails to meet US demands for zero enrichment.[6]

**European partners, alongside the United States, have demanded that Iran accept zero uranium enrichment levels, restrict its ballistic missile program, and end its support for its proxy forces.**[7] French, German, British, and European Union representatives met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Switzerland on June 20 to urge Iran to return to nuclear



negotiations with the United States.[8] Araghchi rejected European calls to resume negotiations and reiterated that Iran will not negotiate until Israel ends its air campaign.[9] US White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on June 19 that Trump will decide whether or not to strike Iran “within the next two weeks.”[10] An anonymous European diplomat speaking to the *Washington Post* stated that the delegation hoped to reconvene before the end of Trump’s two-week deadline.[11]

**An unspecified US official speaking to Fox News reported that the USS *Nimitz* carrier strike group is expected to arrive in the CENTCOM area of responsibility by June 22.[12]**

A US official told Western media on June 16 that the USS *Nimitz* carrier strike group is en route to the Middle East from the South China Sea and that it is ahead of schedule.[13] The USS *Nimitz* carrier strike group, which includes the *Nimitz* and its air wing, multiple destroyers, and other assets, can support both offensive and defensive contingencies.[14] The United States has also deployed additional assets to support potential operations in the Middle East. There are five guided missile destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean as of June 20, according to US defense officials.[15] The destroyers can provide much-needed ballistic missile defense support for Israel. A large number of US aircraft have similarly traveled into the Middle East.[16] Six US Air Force air-to-air refuelers also moved westward from bases in California and Oklahoma to Honolulu, Hawaii, and Travis Air Force Base, California, respectively, since June 19.[17]

**Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to deter US participation in the Israel-Iran War by threatening to expand the conflict.**

These militias are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western media about the risks of a protracted war in the Middle East and seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand the conflict.[18] The militias have repeatedly threatened to target the United States and its regional interests if the US enters the war, but have not conducted any such attacks at the time of this writing.[19] Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari threatened on June 19 that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and the closure of ports in the Red Sea.[20] Askari added that US participation would cause the United States to lose trillions of dollars from the region, which could imply that Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could attack US-aligned Gulf states. This implication likely aims to pressure the Gulf states to discourage US involvement.[21] Attacks on major US bases outside of Iraq and Syria would by default target US-aligned Arab states, including the Gulf states.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are also likely conditioning their entry into the war on US participation to avoid dragging Iraq into the war and the negative political repercussions of that decision ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr stated that Iraq does not “need new wars” in his condemnation of Israel’s attacks on Iran.[22] Iranian-backed political parties, which include those of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, and the Badr Organization, lost a significant number of seats in southern Iraq in the 2021 elections to the Sadrist Movement.[23] Sadr publicly announced in March 2025 that he is not running in the elections, but could change his mind.[24] Sadr’s warning against Iraqi involvement in the Israel-Iran War suggests he could position himself in opposition to the Iranian-backed Iraqi groups if he decided to run. Sadr could also use potential militia participation to deter Sadrist voters from Iranian-backed parties if he does not run. CTP-ISW assessed on June 3 that Iranian-backed parties may seek to

win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections, which underscores the potential risks associated with militia involvement in the conflict.[25]

**International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi warned of a dangerous degradation of nuclear security at Iranian nuclear sites due to Israeli strikes.[26]** Grossi addressed the United Nations Security Council on June 20 to present the IAEA's findings on nuclear security concerns amid the Israeli air campaign. He noted that further damage to Iranian nuclear facilities could result in radiological leaks that could endanger surrounding populations. Grossi noted that Israeli airstrikes targeting the Natanz enrichment site on June 13 destroyed electricity infrastructure and seriously damaged underground nuclear cascade facility. He noted that there was no observed radioactivity outside the facility following the strikes, but suggested that there could be contamination within the facility. Grossi stated that Israeli airstrikes on June 13 also damaged the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility at the Esfahan nuclear site. Grossi confirmed that the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak, Markazi Province, was not operational at the time of Israel's June 19 airstrike. Grossi issued a strong warning that any damage to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant could result in a "very high" release of radioactivity into the environment. Grossi stated that a strike that destabilized power to the facility could cause the reactor's core to melt and release radioactivity into the environment. He explained that damage to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant would require relocating the nearby population several hundred kilometers away from the facility and providing iodine tablets to prevent radiation poisoning.

### **Key Takeaways**

- Iran is using negotiations and its efforts to hide nuclear material to impose a dilemma on the United States and force Washington to decide between accepting Iranian terms in nuclear negotiations or risking a long and challenging hunt for hidden Iranian nuclear material. This dilemma is designed to protect the nuclear program by securing an agreement with allowances for enrichment or protecting enriched material by hiding it. Iranian officials have not relaxed their negotiating position, which US and Israeli officials are not willing to accept.
- The *Nimitz* Carrier Strike Group will arrive in the CENTCOM AOR by June 22.
- Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to deter US participation in the war by threatening to attack US forces if the US attacks Iran. These threats are probably informed by ongoing discussions in the West about a protracted war with Iran.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency director warned of a dangerous degradation of nuclear security at Iranian nuclear sites due to Israeli strikes.
- Israel continued to conduct strikes targeting the Iranian internal security and social control apparatus, which could destabilize the regime. CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that the regime is near collapse or that its control is significantly weakened at this time.

**The IDF intensified its strikes in southern and southwestern Iran to disrupt IRGC ballistic missile capabilities, air defenses, and command structures.** The IDF conducted several strikes on Ahvaz on June 20, including the IRGC Karbala Operational Base.[27] The IRGC

Karbala Operational Bases is one of the ten regional commands of the IRGC Ground Forces based in southwestern Iran.[28] The headquarters oversees three provincial corps, including Vali Asr in Khuzestan, Abolfazl in Lorestan, and Fath in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad, and commands several major combat units, including the 7th Vali-ye Asr Operational Division and the 15th Imam Hassan Mojtaba Special Forces Brigade.[29]

The IDF also conducted a wave of airstrikes in southern Iran on June 20 that hit several ballistic missile sites and the 6th Tactical Airbase in Bushehr Province, where Iran reportedly stored ballistic missiles.[30] The types of missiles Israel targeted are unclear, and they could be either short-range ballistic missiles, which could range US bases in the Gulf, or medium-range missiles, which could target Israel. Israeli security officials stated that the strikes did not target the Bushehr nuclear reactor.[31] The IDF separately targeted an air defense base in southwestern Iran on June 19.[32] The air defense base was in northern Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[33]


## Israeli Strikes in Iran June 20, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



# Israeli Strikes in Khuzestan Province June 20, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



## Israeli Strikes in Bushehr City June 20, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



**The IDF continued to degrade Iranian missile capabilities through sustained airstrikes on launch sites and storage facilities.[34]** The IDF announced on June 20 that it completed another wave of strikes in western Iran using 15 fighter jets and over 30 munitions to target missile launch sites.[35]

**Israel continued to target IRGC positions in Tehran Province on June 20.** The IDF targeted an IRGC position in Chitgar, northwestern Tehran, on June 20.[36] The IDF previously targeted the same location on June 16.[37]


**The IDF continues to strike the Iranian internal security apparatus as part of Israel's stated objective to destabilize the Iranian regime.** Israel has struck internal security institutions across Iran, including the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC provincial units, since June 15.[38] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on June 20 that he instructed the IDF to “intensify” strikes on Iranian regime symbols and sites connected to domestic repression in Tehran to “destabilize” the regime.[39] Katz previously stated on June 19 that he and Prime Minister Netanyahu



directed the IDF to increase the intensity of strikes on Iranian government targets to "undermine" the regime.[40]

A sustained campaign that targets Iran's internal security and social control institutions, combined with severe economic downturn and mass population displacement that triggers protests, could destabilize the regime over time because the Iranian regime has relied on the LEC and Basij as the first line of defense against mass anti-regime protests. The IDF struck the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters in central Tehran and the LEC Special Units headquarters in southeastern Tehran on June 20.[41] The IDF previously targeted the LEC headquarters on June 18.[42] The Iranian regime has maintained social control by violently cracking down on protests and other expressions of popular anti-regime sentiment through internal security organizations like the Basij, LEC, and the IRGC.[43] The LEC Special Units are highly trained anti-riot forces deployed when regular police are unable to manage civil unrest.[44] Basij units have been deployed to support LEC forces during major protest movements like the Mahsa Amini protests and the Iranian Green Movement.[45]

## Israeli Strikes in Tehran and Alborz Provinces June 20, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



**Iran has continued to use ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads, possibly to compensate for its inability to launch large missile salvos and reliably penetrate Israeli defenses.[46]** Iran has conducted one ballistic missile attack containing approximately 20 missiles targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's 5:00 AM ET data cutoff on June 20.[47] The IDF confirmed that Iran launched at least one ballistic missile that contained a cluster munition warhead in its barrage.[48] The cluster submunitions within these warheads can cause more damage over a wider area, though these warheads have significantly less explosive power at the point of impact. Iran may calculate that using cluster munitions is more likely to cause Israeli casualties and impose costs on Israel for its air campaign against Iran.

The Iranian missiles struck several buildings in Haifa, northern Israel, and Beer Sheva, southern Israel. The impacted sites include the Weizmann Institute of Science, Gav Yem Negev Advanced Technologies

Park, the Colel Chabad Daycare Center, al Jarina Mosque, and an unspecified residential apartment.[49] The daycare center said that it was hit by cluster munitions.[50] The Gav Yem Negev Advanced Technologies Park reportedly houses active military and cyber facilities.[51] Iranian missiles also reportedly struck near the Israeli Interior Ministry and the Beit ha Mifras Tower in Haifa.[52] The Beit ha Mifras Tower reportedly houses several Israeli government agencies.[53] The IDF Chief of Staff, Eyal Zamir, reported on June 20 that the IDF destroyed about half of Iran's missile launchers.[54] Zamir also stated that Iran had about 2,500 missiles on June 12 and has launched at least 500 so far, suggesting that Iran has a maximum of 2,000 missiles remaining.[55] The IRGC said that Iran's strikes in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Beer Sheva "indicate that the offensive capability of ballistic missiles is on the rise until the complete punishment" of Israel.[56]

Iran has also continued to fire drones at Israel, but these attacks are relatively ineffective due to the distances involved and the amount of time Israel has to react to Iranian drones. The drones employed by Iran to target Israel take roughly nine hours to reach Israel, which enables Israel to scramble aircraft or direct aircraft on combat air patrol to intercept incoming projectiles. The IDF intercepted at least 16 Iranian drones targeting Israel since this morning.[57] It is unclear if any of these drones were calibrated to enter Israeli airspace at the same time as the ballistic missile attacks mentioned above, which were reported at 8:34 AM ET.[58]

## Observed Impacts in Israel June 20, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



**The United States sanctioned eight entities and one individual on June 20 for procuring and transshipping dual-use components to Iran for its ballistic missile, drone, and asymmetric weapons programs.[59]** The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned eight entities based in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Turkey.[60] OFAC sanctioned one Chinese national who was aware of the Iranian shipments.[61] OFAC also identified the Panama-flagged bulk carrier Shun Kai Xing as blocked property because it has carried sensitive goods bound for Iran.[62] Blocked property means freezing assets of financial property, tangible or intangible assets, and any other interests.[63] These sanctions are part of the United States' effort to degrade Iran's ability to produce and proliferate ballistic missiles, drones, and other weapons.[64]



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# IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



**Johanna Moore and Brian Carter**

**June 21, 2025 - Morning    Information Cutoff: 5:00 AM ET**


*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.*

## **Key Takeaways**

- Israel continued its strike campaign targeting Iranian air defenses, missile forces, and nuclear sites. These sites include one in Esfahan that produced centrifuges.
- Israel struck and killed senior officers in the IRGC Aerospace Force and Quds Force, which may impose a temporary disruption upon Iranian command-and-control.
- An Iranian drone struck a populated area in Israel for the first time during this war. This is not indicative of a systematic breakdown in Israeli air defenses. Integrated air defense systems are not perfect, and some projectiles will impact their targets.
- Iran conducted another ballistic missile attack targeting Israel. It consisted of five missiles, all of which the IDF intercepted.


**The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a new wave of airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center on June 21 as part of Israel’s campaign to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of Iranian weaponization of its nuclear program.**[1] The IDF struck two centrifuge production facilities present at the compound and additional unspecified military targets in the surrounding area.[2] The IDF reported that its June 21 strikes on the facility caused “significant damage” to the Iranian centrifuge production capabilities.[3] Centrifuges are critical components used to enrich uranium.[4] Israeli strikes that damage or destroy centrifuges could severely inhibit Iran’s ability to further enrich uranium for weaponization, which makes the destruction of centrifuges a key line of effort for Israel as it tries to accomplish its objectives. Israel previously struck the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center on June 13 and damaged the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility on site.[5]

## Israeli Strikes in Esfahan City June 21, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



**The IDF has continued its air campaign on Iran's ballistic missile program to further degrade Iran's ability to retaliate.** The IDF Air Force launched a new wave of airstrikes on ballistic missile storage and launch infrastructure since CTP-ISW's June 20, 5:00PM EST data cut off.[6] Social media users and anti-regime media claimed that Israel struck an IRGC-owned area near the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Imam Ali Training Command in Shiraz, Fars Province.[7] Geolocated footage posted on June 20 showed the aftermath of an Israeli airstrike on a missile launcher in Azan Ozan, Kermanshah Province.[8]

## Confirmed Israeli Strikes in Iran June 21, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



**The IDF has killed two senior IRGC and Quds Force commanders since CTP-ISW's June 20, 5:00 PM EST data cut off.** The IDF killed IRGC Unit 190 commander Behnam Shahriari.[9] Unit 190 is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran to other members of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, particularly Hezbollah.[10] Shahriari used personal connections in Turkey and Lebanon to operate a network of front companies, currency exchanges, and money couriers to transfer money to members of the Axis for operations.[11] The IDF estimates that Shahriari transferred approximately "hundreds of millions of dollars" annually to members of the Axis of Resistance.[12] Shahriari's death is particularly notable because Iran has been reduced to sending Hezbollah cash rather than large shipments of weapons after the collapse of Assad.[13] The IDF also killed IRGC Quds Force Palestine Corps commander Saeed Izadi.[14] Izadi served as a liaison between Iran and Hamas and facilitated Iranian funding to Hamas.[15] The IDF reported that Izadi was one of

the "architects" of the October 7 attack on Israel.[16] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that while Iran was involved with the development of strategic plans and operational concepts, it was not aware of the timing or Hamas' planning on a tactical level.[17]

The IRGC and Quds Force are the main Iranian forces used to project force into the region and externalize threats to the regime. The IRGC has a traditional military hierarchy that will enable it to survive decapitation campaigns without major, long-term disruptions to operations. There will be temporary disruptions to Iranian operations and planning. Shahriari and Izadi's deaths are unlikely to affect Iran's ability to continue operations, but are indicative of the nodes Israel would seek to impact to reduce the Iranian threat posed to Israel.

**The IDF announced it had killed IRGC Aerospace Force 2nd Drone Regiment commander Amin Pour Joudaki.**[18] Joudaki replaced the former commander of the 2nd Drone Regiment, Mohammad Bagher Taherpour, on June 13 after Taherpour was killed in an Israeli airstrike.[19] Joudaki directed "hundreds" of drone attacks on Israel since assuming command.

**The IDF reported that Israel has intercepted 99% of the 470 drones launched by Iran at Israel since June 12.**[20] The IDF reported that an Iranian drone struck a home in Beit Shean, Northern Israel, on June 21.[21] This is the first confirmed instance of a successful Iranian drone strike since June 12, however.[22] The IDF has intercepted at least three drones launched from Iran since CTP-ISW's June 20, 5:00 PM EST data cut off.[23] A fourth drone launched from Iran landed in an unspecified area of the Golan Heights.[24]

The IDF's failure to intercept all munitions launched by Iran is not indicative of a breakdown in Israeli air defense systems or capabilities. Air defense systems are not perfect, and enemy projectiles and aircraft can usually penetrate even the best air defense systems. The fact that Israeli air defenses can intercept 99% of drones is noteworthy and abnormal; many Iranian-designed Houthi drones managed to penetrate Saudi air defenses during the Saudi involvement in the Yemeni Civil War. Israeli air defense systems similarly suffered occasional failures in intercepting drones during the October 7 War. These failures did not represent a systematic failure in Israeli air defenses. Iran has continued to fire drones at Israel, but these attacks are relatively ineffective due to the amount of time Israel has to react to Iranian drone attacks and effective Israeli combat air patrols. The drones employed by Iran to target Israel take roughly nine hours to reach Israel, which enables Israel to scramble aircraft or direct aircraft on combat air patrol to intercept incoming projectiles.



## Observed Impacts in Israel June 21, 2025 at 5:00 AM ET



**Iran has launched one ballistic missile attack on Israel since CTP-ISW's June 20, 5:00 PM EST data cut off.[25]** An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Iran launched five missiles in the attack.[26] The IDF intercepted the missile, and fragments damaged an apartment building in central Israel.[27]

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# Iran Update Special Report, June 21, 2025, Evening Edition

Jun 21, 2025 - [ISW Press](#)



**Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter**

**Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.*

*Please note that ISW-CTP will only be emailing the evening edition of our daily Iran Update Special Reports. You can find this morning's edition [here](#) on our website.*

*Click [here](#) to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.*

**Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has begun implementing emergency succession measures in response to escalating Israeli strikes and the potential for US military involvement.**[1] Unspecified Iranian sources told the *New York Times* on June 21 that Khamenei has relocated to a secure bunker, suspended digital communications, and now communicates with senior commanders only through a trusted aide.[2] Sources added that Khamenei named three senior clerics as candidates to replace him if he is killed.[3] Khamenei also reportedly named replacements for top military commanders and ordered senior officials to work from underground offices and avoid using cellphones.[4] These steps mark the first reported instance of Khamenei directly selecting potential successors outside the formal process of the Assembly of Experts. Khamenei likely took these steps amid heightened assassination fears, as some Israeli officials, including Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, have openly threatened Khamenei's life.[5] Two unspecified US officials told Reuters on June 15 that the US President Donald Trump vetoed an Israeli plan to kill Khamenei, however.[6] Trump separately stated on June 17 that the United States knows "exactly where the so-called 'Supreme Leader' is hiding" but would not "take him out, at least not for now." [7]

**Khamenei's previous actions indicate that the three possible replacements are almost certainly equally as ideological as he is.** Khamenei previously met with the Assembly of Experts members in November 2024 and emphasized that the next Supreme Leader must “embody the revolution” and implement Islam in Iranian society.[8] Khamenei did not name a successor at the meeting, however. Esfahan interim Friday Prayer Leader and Assembly of Experts member Abdolhasan Mahdavi confirmed a week after Khamenei's meeting in November 2024 that the assembly had confidentially identified and prioritized three candidates for succession and framed it as “a routine responsibility.”[9] The Assembly of Experts is an 88-member elected clerical body tasked with appointing, supervising, and—at least in theory—removing the Supreme Leader, though in practice it has never challenged the position and plays a limited role in day-to-day politics.[10] The only previous leadership transition in Iran occurred in 1989 under different political conditions. The current assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[11]

It remains unclear who Khamenei selected as his potential successor. Unspecified sources added that Mojtaba Khamenei, Khamenei's son and frequently rumored successor, is not among the designated candidates, however.[12] Former President Ebrahim Raisi, another widely speculated figure, died in a helicopter crash in May 2024 and is no longer in consideration.[13] Khamenei's decision reflects his concerns about external threats and potential instability after his death, as the regime expects opposition groups and anti-regime actors to exploit any leadership vacuum.[14] Opposition groups and anti-regime actors are more likely to try to exploit such a vacuum during a war.

**Israeli officials assess that airstrikes on Iranian ballistic missile capabilities since June 12 have degraded Iran's ability to launch ballistic missile attacks on Israel, which is consistent with the launch rates that CTP-ISW has observed.**[15] Israeli Hatzerim Airbase Commander Brigadier General “Ayin” said that the IAF has conducted over 1,000 sorties with fighter jets dropping “hundreds” of munitions on Iranian ballistic missiles and storage sites in the past eight days.[16] IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin said that Iran's ballistic missile capabilities “have been heavily degraded.”[17] Brigadier General “Ayin” stated that these airstrikes have also disrupted Iran's ability to launch retaliatory attacks from western Iran and have forced Iranian forces to relocate eastward and southward.[18] This southward movement of Iranian forces may account for the intensifying Israeli airstrikes in southern Iran that CTP-ISW observed on June 20. The IDF stated on June 17 that Iran had attempted to launch a missile targeting Israel from Esfahan, central Iran, after withdrawing forces from western Iran.[19] Iran would not be able to use three medium-range ballistic missiles that it has previously used to attack Israel if it fires them from Esfahan. Haj Qassem (1,400-kilometer range), Fattah (1,400-kilometer range), and Kheibar Shekan (1,450-kilometer range) ballistic missiles cannot reach Israel from Esfahan due to their shorter ranges.[20] Iran would almost certainly need to rely on Emad, Ghadr, and Sejil-1 ballistic missiles because these missiles are capable of reaching Israel from Esfahan.[21] Iran could hypothetically modify the shorter-range missiles to carry smaller payloads (thus extending the range), but doing so rapidly would be difficult. Emad and Ghadr liquid-fuel ballistic missiles are extremely volatile and challenging to transport, however.[22] Iran did not launch any ballistic missile attacks on Israel on June 21. The IDF intercepted approximately 40 Iranian drones targeting Israel overnight on June 20 and 21.[23] This is a slight increase in the number of drones that Iran has launched compared to 16 drones on June 20 and 4 drones on June 19.[24]

## **Key Takeaways**

- The Iranian supreme leader named three unspecified senior clerics as possible successors in an effort to secure the future of the Islamic Republic in the event of his death. The limited open-source reporting about possible successors and the supreme leader's view of his possible successors suggests that the three unspecified clerics are almost certainly equally as ideological as the current supreme leader.
- Israeli officials continue to assess that their air campaign has degraded Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observations.
- The Iranian foreign affairs minister again rejected US demands for zero uranium enrichment during a June 20 meeting with European diplomats.
- The United States continued to deploy military assets to the Middle East.
- Israel has continued to conduct strikes targeting Iranian internal security and social control institutions, which could destabilize the regime over time.

## **Political Developments**

**Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi again rejected zero uranium enrichment demands during his June 20 meeting with French, German, British, and European Union diplomats.**[25] European partners demanded during the meeting that Iran accept zero uranium enrichment levels, restrict its ballistic missile program, and end its support for its proxy forces.[26] Araghchi suggested that Iran would be willing to return to a 3.67 uranium enrichment level stipulated under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[27] Iranian officials have expressed their interest in negotiating a nuclear deal with the United States, but have not moderated their negotiating position from before the conflict.[28] An unspecified senior Iranian official cited by Reuters on June 21 argued that European demands were “unrealistic.”[29] Iran remains committed to preserving its stated “right” to enrich uranium.[30] The United States and Israel have rejected Iranian demands and maintained that Iran will not be permitted to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.[31] Araghchi noted that Iran would not engage in direct negotiations with the United States until Israel suspends its air campaign on Iran.[32]

## **Military Developments**

**The United States has continued to deploy military assets to the Middle East to support potential defensive or offensive operations in the region.** Satellite imagery posted by open-source social media accounts on June 21 appeared to show approximately 27 KC-135 air-to-air refuelers, 12 C-130 transport aircraft, and 52 fighter aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.[33] This does not include aircraft under shelters. A large number of US aircraft have similarly traveled into the Middle East in recent days.[34] Open-source flight trackers reported two B-2 long-range stealth bombers deployed from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, on June 21 and are en route to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.[35] Two air-to-air refuelers were also deployed to provide fuel to the B-2s.[36]

**Israel wants to act against the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant prior to US President Donald Trump's two-week deadline, according to unspecified sources familiar with the issue cited by Reuters on June 21.**[37] US White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated




on June 19 that Trump will decide whether or not to strike Iran “within the next two weeks.”[38] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, and Chief of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff Eyal Zamir argued that there is a limited window of opportunity to conduct an operation against the nuclear facility during a phone call with Trump on June 19.[39]

**The IDF continued its campaign to destroy Iranian ballistic missile and drone capabilities.**

This line of effort is essential to preempt Iranian attacks and limit the threat that Iranian ballistic missiles and drones pose to Israeli civilians. IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin said that the IDF has struck approximately 950 explosive drones during its airstrikes in Iran before they could be launched.[40] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck a twin-launch rail drone launcher in Esfahan, Esfahan Province, that was ready for immediate launch towards Israel.[41] The IDF also struck drone depots and another unspecified weapons depot in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[42] The IDF struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 64th al Hadid Missile and Artillery Group base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[43] The 64th al Hadid Missile and Artillery Group is responsible for directing and coordinating Iranian aerial assets and weaponry, including drones, missiles, and artillery fire.[44] The IDF also reportedly struck the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province.[45] The IRGC reportedly used the facility to develop, test, and launch solid-propellant missiles.[46] The IDF previously struck the facility during its October 2024 airstrikes on Iran.[47] Israeli Hatzertim Airbase Commander Brigadier General “Ayin” said on June 21 that the IDF is carrying out new strikes against launch sites in western Iran to prevent Iranian forces from returning there.[48]

## Confirmed Israeli Strikes in Iran June 21, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



### The IDF continued to strike other Iranian military sites and infrastructure on June 21.

Israel struck the IRGC Ground Forces Karbala base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[49] Iranian media reported that Israel struck an Artesh 4th tactical airbase in Dezful, Khuzestan Province.[50] Israel also struck three Iranian F-14 fighter jets on an Artesh Ground Forces base in Esfahan, Esfahan Province.[51] CTP-ISW is also monitoring reports that Israel struck Iranian forces at the port of Bandar Abbas. We will cover any developments related to Bandar Abbas in the June 22 Update morning edition, given the conflicting information available at this time.

## Israeli Strikes in Khuzestan Province June 21, 2025 at 5:00 PM ET



**Israel struck the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) headquarters in Tehran as part of Israel's stated objective to destabilize the Iranian regime.** Geolocated imagery posted on X (Twitter) on June 21 shows the heavily damaged headquarters.[52] The FATA is responsible for domestic surveillance and cyber operations.[53] The Iranian regime has previously used FATA to thwart dissent on online platforms, including during the crackdowns that followed the Masha Amini protests in 2022.[54] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on June 20 that he instructed the IDF to “intensify” strikes on Iranian regime symbols and sites connected to domestic repression in Tehran to “destabilize” the regime.[55] Katz previously stated on June 19 that he and Prime Minister Netanyahu directed the IDF to increase the intensity of strikes on Iranian government targets to “undermine” the regime.[56] A sustained campaign that targets Iran’s internal security institutions and social control institutions, combined with economic downturn and mass

population displacement that triggers protests, could destabilize the regime.[57] Israel reportedly struck Mahshahr Port in Khuzestan Province on June 21, which is a key hub for Iranian oil.[58] Popular frustration over the economic downturn could trigger internal unrest.

**International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi reported that renewed Israeli strikes targeting the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) on June 21 caused additional damage to the facility.[59]** The IDF previously struck the ENTC on June 13, which damaged the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion facility, a reactor fuel manufacturing plant, and an enriched uranium metal processing facility. Grossi stated that the renewed Israeli strikes on June 21 damaged six other buildings at the ENTC. Grossi stated that the Israeli airstrikes damaged a natural and depleted uranium metal production facility that was not operational at the time of Israel's June 21 airstrike. Grossi noted that the Israeli airstrikes on June 21 also damaged a fuel rod production facility, a building with low-enriched uranium pellet production, a laboratory and nuclear material storage, another laboratory building, a workshop handling contaminated equipment, and an office building with no nuclear material. Grossi noted that the targeted facilities either contained no nuclear material or small quantities of natural or low-enrichment uranium. Grossi assessed that there is no risk of off-site contamination.





**The Houthis threatened on June 21 that any US involvement in the Iran-Israel war would trigger Houthi attacks on US ships and naval ships in the Red Sea, almost certainly to deter US participation.[60]** The Houthis are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western media about the risks of a protracted war in the Middle East and seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand the conflict.[61] This threat follows similar statements by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatening the United States to avoid participating in the war.[62] The spokesperson of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on June 19 that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and the closure of ports in the Red Sea.[63]

**An Israeli airstrike along the Iran-Iraq border killed a senior member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and a personal aide to former Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.[64]** Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada released a statement on June 21, mourning the death of “security unit” head Haider al Musawi.[65] An informed source told Iraqi media on June 21 that Musawi managed Syrian affairs for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[66] The strike also killed Nasrallah’s former aide Abu Ali al Khalil and his son, Mahdi al Khalil.[67]

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1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036

ph (202) 293-5550

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