

Iran Update, June 9, 2025

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Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Iran continues to signal that it will reject the recent US nuclear proposal. The United States recently sent a proposal to Iran that would require Iran to halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil after the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium.[1] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei criticized the US proposal on June 9 and stated that Iran will soon present a counter-proposal via Oman.[2] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 8 that "no rational mind would accept" the US proposal.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran's continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran negotiations to collapse.[4] US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call on June 9 amid growing

indications from Iranian officials that Iran is planning to reject the US proposal.[5] Trump stated after the phone call that Iran and the United States will meet on June 12, which corresponds with the reported US deadline for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[6] Netanyahu reportedly convened a security cabinet meeting to discuss Iran following the phone call.[7]

The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement following Trump and Netanyahu's phone call on June 9 in which it threatened to attack Israel's "covert nuclear facilities" in response to a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[8] The SNSC claimed that Iran would attack Israeli nuclear facilities using a "treasure trove" of sensitive information about Israeli nuclear facilities that Iran reportedly recently obtained and exfiltrated to Iran.[9] Iranian officials announced Iran's alleged acquisition of this sensitive information on June 7.[10] Iran's claim that it obtained intelligence about Israeli nuclear facilities is likely an information operation that seeks to advance several objectives. A US journalist reported on June 4 that Iran may include a demand for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East in its counter-proposal to the United States, citing two experts in contact with Iranian negotiators.[11] Iran may calculate that it can use its alleged acquisition of "sensitive information" about Israeli nuclear facilities to bolster its argument for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Iran may also use this information operation to reinforce its threat to attack Israeli nuclear facilities in retaliation for a potential Israeli strike on Iran in order to try to deter such a strike.[12]

Iran threatened to expand its nuclear program if the International Atomic Energy Agency passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors is meeting between June 9 and 13, during which the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) intend to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran.[13] The United States and E3 drafted a non-compliance resolution in response to the May 31 IAEA comprehensive report that unscored Iran's "less than satisfactory" cooperation with the IAEA. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on June 8 that Iran has prepared "a list of countermeasures," including "technical" countermeasures, if the IAEA passes the non-compliance resolution.[14] Iran announced that it would install over 6,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities in retaliation for the IAEA Board of Governors' November 2024 censure resolution that condemned Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA.[15] It is unclear if Iran would decide to take a similar course of action in response to a non-compliance resolution. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[16]

Iran is conducting an information operation to undermine the recent IAEA comprehensive report, likely to deter diplomatic and military action against Iran. The IAEA's recent comprehensive report confirmed that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities at four locations—Turqezabad, Marivan, Varamin, and Lavizan-Shian—until the early 2000s.[17] The Institute for Science and International Security published an analysis of the IAEA's comprehensive report on June 6 and highlighted that Iran conducted several implosion tests essential to building a nuclear weapon at Marivan in 2003.[18] The IAEA stated that Iran conducted these tests as part of its broader plan to conduct a cold test, which is typically the final test of a nuclear weapon implosion development program. The release of the IAEA's comprehensive report follows reports that a "secret team" of Iranian weapons engineers and

scientists is "exploring" a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a "matter of months." [19] Iran responded to the comprehensive report by claiming on June 7 that Israel sabotaged and contaminated its nuclear facilities at these four sites. [20] Iran likely accused Israel of sabotage to obfuscate Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA and to try to deter a non-compliance resolution, potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran, and snapback sanctions.

Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework parties are committing electoral fraud ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to leaked audio recordings. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Kurdish media reported on June 8 that an unspecified leader of Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) threatened to fire AAH members who don't update their voter registration and vote for candidates of AAH's Sadiqoun political bloc. [21] The AAH leader also pressured the families of AAH members to vote for Sadiqoun candidates. [22] A professor at the Baghdad-based al Farahidi University, which is owned by Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, was recorded telling students and their families to vote for Mandalawi in exchange for academic degrees and financial benefits. [23] Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties have bought votes and threatened voters in previous elections. [24]

National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim condemned corruption and electoral fraud on June 7. [25] Hakim's condemnation came after various Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition, including AAH head Qais al Khazali, accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption. [26] Hakim's National Wisdom Movement will compete against Sudani and AAH in the upcoming November 2025 elections. It is unclear if Hakim is coordinating with Shia Coordination Framework parties to damage Sudani's electoral prospects, although Hakim could benefit from a decline in support for Sudani's coalition. [27]

Key Takeaways:

- **US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations:** US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call on June 9 amid growing indications from Iranian officials that Iran is planning to reject the recent US nuclear proposal. Trump stated after the phone call that Iran and the United States will meet on June 12, which corresponds with the reported US deadline for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal. Netanyahu reportedly convened a security cabinet meeting to discuss Iran following the phone call. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement following Trump and Netanyahu's phone call on June 9 in which it threatened to attack Israel's "covert nuclear facilities" in response to a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. The SNSC claimed that Iran would attack Israeli nuclear facilities using a "treasure trove" of sensitive information about Israeli nuclear facilities that Iran reportedly recently obtained and exfiltrated to Iran. Iran's claim that it obtained intelligence about Israeli nuclear facilities is likely an information operation that seeks to advance several objectives. Iran likely accused Israel of sabotage to obfuscate Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA and to try to deter a non-compliance resolution, potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran, and snapback sanctions.

- **Iraqi Parliamentary Elections:** Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework parties are committing electoral fraud ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to leaked audio recordings. Kurdish media reported on June 8 that an unspecified leader of Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) threatened to fire AAH members who don't update their voter registration and vote for candidates of AAH's Sadiqoun political bloc. A professor at the Baghdad-based al Farahidi University, which is owned by Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, was separately recorded telling students and their families to vote for Mandalawi in exchange for academic degrees and financial benefits. National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim condemned corruption and electoral fraud on June 7.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian officials may be trying to prevent public unrest following the killing of 24-year-old Elaheh Hossein Nejad by condemning the killing and vowing to bring Hossein Nejad's killer to justice. Hossein Nejad went missing on May 25 and was found dead several days later.[28] Hossein Nejad was killed by a male driver, who described Elaheh as "really shameless" and claimed that he was "paying for her sins." [29] Several female parliamentarians and Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani visited Hossein Nejad's family on June 7 and 9, respectively, to offer condolences.[30] The group of female parliamentarians demanded "swift and complete justice and the strictest legal punishment for the perpetrator." President Masoud Pezeshkian's daughter, Zahra Pezeshkian, also visited the family to convey the president's condolences.[31] The Iranian public has responded to the killing of Hossein Nejad with anger and distrust. Many Iranians expressed outrage on social media over the regime's failure to prevent the crime, despite its heavy surveillance and policing of women who "improperly" wear the hijab.[32] Iranian officials may seek to preempt unrest by sending high-profile figures to visit Hossein Nejad's family so that Hossein Nejad's killing does not spark widespread protests, like the killing of Mahsa Amini in September 2022 sparked the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.

The grandson of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, Ali Khomeini, visited Beirut on June 6 and toured the site of Israel's June 5 airstrike on a drone facility in Beirut.[33] Khomeini called the Israeli strike "madness" and emphasized that it will not effect on the spirit of the Lebanese people or the Axis of Resistance.[34] Khomeini separately met with former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's family during his visit to Beirut.[35] Khomeini visited Baghdad following his visit to Lebanon.[36] Khomeini discussed "issues related to the Axis of Resistance" with Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad Kazem Al Sadegh and Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani at the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad. Sadegh is reportedly a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[37]


The Iranian rial appreciated from 835,500 rials to one US dollar on June 6 to 825,000 rials to one US dollar on June 9.[38]

Syria

Unspecified Syrian government officials told Western media on June 8 that the Syrian transitional government has started integrating foreign fighters into the new Syrian army.[39] The United States and the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently agreed to integrate foreign fighters into the Syrian MoD to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.[40] The United States previously demanded in March 2025 that the Syrian government bar foreign fighters from senior political and military positions.[41] Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has historically integrated numerous foreign militias into its military structure and many of these groups are extremely loyal to HTS.[42] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara stated in late April 2025 that the Syrian transitional government would consider giving Syrian citizenship to foreign fighters who have lived in Syria “for many years” and “stuck beside the revolution.”[43] An unspecified Syrian military official told Emirati media on June 3 that the Syrian government will give most foreign fighters citizenship by the end of the year.[44] More than six foreign fighters told Western media on June 8 that they do not plan to leave Syria.[45] Several of the fighters stated that they seek Syrian citizenship.[46]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria

June 9, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



US President Donald Trump is reportedly planning to sign an executive order that will remove several US sanctions on Syria.[47] An unspecified US official told al Monitor on June 9 that Trump is expected to sign an executive order in the coming days.[48] The official stated that the executive order will be a “full revocation of Syria’s sanctions architecture.”[49] The executive order will reportedly revoke a series of decades-old executive orders that prohibited Americans from exporting various services, goods, and technology to Syria.[50] This executive order comes amid a series of measures by the Trump administration to lift all sanctions on Syria.[51]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Southwestern Syria June 9, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a drone strike targeting a Hamas member in the village of Beit Jinn, Rif Dimashq Province, on June 8.[52] The drone strike wounded two people, according to local sources.[53] Local Syrian journalists disputed the IDF's report that the strike targeted a Hamas member.[54] Hamas did not comment on the strike. The drone strike follows a likely Iranian-aligned rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3.[55] The IDF responded to the rocket attack with air and artillery strikes on June 3.[56]

The governor of Syria's Central Bank stated that Syria will fully reconnect to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) international payment system "in a matter of weeks."[57] Syrian Central Bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh stated

in an interview with the Financial Times on June 9 that Syria plans to attract foreign investment, remove trade barriers, stabilize the Syrian currency, and reform banking practices.[58] Husrieh's comments follow a series of international sanctions relief efforts that began after the United States announced that it would lift all sanctions on Syria on May 23.[59]

Iraq

Sadrist Basra Governor Assad al Eidani accused an unspecified member of the Fatah Alliance of attempting to sway Basrawi voters ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[60] A member of the Fatah Alliance, which is led by Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, stated in a leaked audio recording that unidentified actors have wasted billions of Iraqi dinars on unimplemented projects in Basra Province. Shia political parties have fought closely in Shia-dominated Basra Province in previous elections.[61] A Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Iraqi parliamentarian recently called for the dismissal and trial of Eidani on May 21 after Eidani reportedly attempted to demolish homes in an area where Iranian-backed parties may have substantial economic interests.[62] It is unclear whether the recent calls to dismiss Eidani were an attempt to diminish Eidani's electoral prospects in the upcoming elections.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali denied on June 7 that he pressured the Iraqi federal government to stop transferring funds to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).[63] The Iraqi Finance Ministry announced on May 29 that the Iraqi federal government would stop transferring funds to the KRG due to the KRG's failure to transfer oil and non-oil revenue to the Iraqi federal government.[64] The Iraqi federal government's transfer of funds to the KRG is a frequent point of contention between the federal government and KRG. An Iraqi parliamentarian aligned with Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani told al Araby al Jadeed on June 5 that unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leaders have pressured Sudani to maintain the government's decision to stop transferring funds to the KRG.[65] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on May 6 that Shia Coordination Framework leaders may be pressuring Sudani to abide by the federal government's decision in an attempt to create fissures between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which governs the KRG, and political parties that the KDP could ally with in the upcoming elections, such as Sudani's coalition.[66] Asaib Ahl al Haq is competing against Sudani's coalition in the upcoming elections.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories.

Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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Tags

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Iran Update



Avery Borens, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Nidal Morrison, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter


June 10, 2025, Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government's rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support for insurgent groups, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity in coastal areas. The transitional government deployed several General Security Services (GSS) and Defense Ministry units to Daliyah, Latakia Province, on June 4 following false reports about an Assadist insurgent attack in the town.[1] The “attack” was reportedly a personal verbal dispute between two people that local officials overstated.[2] Alawite militia “Coastal Shield Brigade” denied that any insurgent attack targeted Daliyah on June 4.[3] The local transitional government officials likely responded to the rumored attack with force and urgency, given that neighboring areas participated in the March attacks against the GSS.[4] Government forces imposed a curfew on Daliyah and arrested alleged “outlaws.”[5] Some of the defense ministry units that deployed to Daliyah committed atrocities targeting Alawite communities on June 4 and 5.[6] 50th Division soldiers reportedly killed three men and burned cars and homes in the neighboring villages of Daliyah.[7] The transitional government arrested the soldiers on June 9, however.[8] This incident underscores the threat posed by the government's continued discipline issues within certain MoD units. Poorly disciplined units that are deployed to areas in times of crisis could increase the risk of minor incidents devolving into widespread sectarian violence, like that seen in coastal Syria in March 2025.

The transitional government does not appear to be similarly concerned about small-scale insurgent activity in other areas of Syria.[9] Likely ISIS fighters detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting GSS positions in Deir ez Zor province, and unspecified militants detonated IEDs targeting other GSS positions in Daraa from June 4 to June 10, but Damascus had a minimal response.[10] Part of the transitional government's reaction to incidents in coastal Syria may be linked to continued threats from organized groups and former militia leaders in coastal Syria.[11] Syrian businessman and the maternal cousin of Bashar al Assad, Rami Makhlouf, claimed in late May 2025 that June 2025 will mark the “beginning” of anti-government activity and that this activity will accelerate in July 2025.[12]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria

June 10, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi told Iranian state media on June 10 that Iran is still preparing its response to the recent US nuclear proposal but described the counter-proposal as offering a "framework for an agreement." [13] Ravanchi stated that Iran is not currently interested in presenting a "very long...comprehensive" proposal. Ravanchi added that Iran and the United States can engage in "more detailed negotiations" after they agree on a framework agreement. A senior US official told Axios on June 10 that the United States has received indications that Iran will reject the recent US proposal while signaling interest in continuing the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. [14] Iran likely wants to continue negotiations in order to delay snapback sanctions or

strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, which may give Iran an incentive to prolong negotiations. Iran's push for a framework agreement and continued negotiations also comes ahead of US President Donald Trump's 60-day deadline, which expires on June 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[15] The United States and Iran will reportedly hold a sixth round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations this week. Axios reported on June 10 that the United States and Iran will hold the sixth round of nuclear talks in Oslo on June 13 or in Muscat on June 15.[16]

Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing domestic drone production in order to reduce its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons.[17] Israeli media reported on June 9 that Hezbollah has shifted its rehabilitation budget to focus on domestic production of explosive-laden and attack drones over missiles and rocket procurement.[18] These drones are reportedly simpler, faster, and cheaper to produce because they use readily available civilian parts.[19] The Houthis similarly produce some drones domestically and rely upon readily available civilian parts.[20] These Houthi drones were used to sustain a year-long campaign against Saudi Arabia that targeted southern Saudi provinces just over the Yemeni border.[21] Israeli media reported that these drones are harder for Israeli air defense systems to immediately detect and classify.[22] Some of Hezbollah's most lethal attacks against Israel have used these drones, including the October 2024 drone attack targeting an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) training camp in Binyamina that injured at least 67 Israelis.[23]

Hezbollah likely seeks to prioritize domestic drone production after recent setbacks that have complicated its ability to procure and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon.[24] The Israeli Air Force officer responsible for overseeing efforts against Hezbollah's covert aerial unit stated that Hezbollah wants to achieve "greater self-sufficiency and less reliance on Iran." [25] Hezbollah has historically relied on land, air, and maritime smuggling routes to procure weapons from Iran into Lebanon.[26] The new Syrian government has affirmed that it will not allow Iran to re-establish its activities and influence in Syria, which it previously used to provide financial support and military equipment to Hezbollah.[27] The Syrian transitional government has also continued to dismantle smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria that previously served as a key node in the ground line of communication between Iran and Hezbollah during the Assad regime.[28] Lebanese authorities also tightened security and control at Beirut's International Airport in May 2025 to curb Hezbollah-linked smuggling.[29] Iran has used civilian flights traveling to Beirut airport to traffic weapons to Hezbollah since at least 2018.[30] The IDF has also continued to target Hezbollah weapons production and storage facilities in recent months.[31] The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah drone production and storage facilities in Beirut's southern suburbs on June 5.[32]

Hezbollah may be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms through Syria into Lebanon, but Hezbollah will find it far more challenging to smuggle in missile or missile production components. Hezbollah previously used Syria as a rear area where it could produce very sophisticated solid-fuel ballistic missile systems, for example.[33] It will not be possible for Hezbollah to rebuild similar production capabilities. Many missile components, such as engines, are also much larger and difficult to transport compared to small arms or dual-use drone components.

Key Takeaways:

- **Syrian Insurgencies:** The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government's rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. The transitional government does not appear to be similarly concerned about small-scale insurgent activity in other areas of Syria.
- **Iran Nuclear Negotiations:** Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.
- **Hezbollah Reconstitution:** Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing domestic drone production in order to reduce its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons. Hezbollah likely seeks to prioritize domestic drone production after recent setbacks that have complicated its ability to procure and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon. Hezbollah may be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms through Syria into Lebanon, but Hezbollah will find it far more challenging to smuggle in missile or missile production components.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran continued to reiterate its commitment to the Axis of Resistance and its strategic objective to destroy the Israeli state. Senior Iranian officials met with Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mazhar in Tehran to discuss regional developments.[34] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Mazhar on June 9 and reaffirmed Iran's support for Palestinian militia groups in their efforts to "resist" Israel.[35] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately met with Mazhar on June 9.[36]


Iran continues to emphasize air defense modernization amid potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Northwest Air Defense Region Deputy Commander Brigadier General Jafar Saleh inspected the Shahid Tohidi radar station in Bileh Savar, Ardabil Province, on June 10, to evaluate defense capabilities at the site.[37] Advisor to the Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Abazar Jokar separately highlighted the domestic development of the Iranian-made Bavar-373 system. Jokar confirmed that Iran developed Bavar-373 after Russia failed to deliver S-300s.[38] Israeli airstrikes on Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran's four S-300 air defense systems inoperable. CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Russia can supply Iran with new S-300 components, given Russia's need for S-300s for its war with Ukraine.[39]

The Iranian rial appreciated from 825,000 rials to one US dollar on June 9 to 820,500 rials to one US dollar on June 10.[40]

Syria


There were several engagements between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian army's 66th Division that clashed in several areas east of Raqqa on June 9.[41] Syrian media reported that the SDF and 66th Division engaged each other near Madan, Abu Hamad, and al Maghla Bridge in the eastern Raqqa countryside on June 9.[42] The new Syrian army sent

military reinforcements to its positions in Madan, Raqqa province, following the fighting.[43] The SDF and Syrian transitional government previously agreed on March 10 that the SDF would integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[44] The SDF and Syrian transitional government have not yet reached an agreement on outstanding issues that the March 10 agreement did not resolve, however.[45]



The United States conducted two separate drone strikes that killed three people in Idlib Province on June 10.[46] The first drone strike killed two unidentified men on a motorcycle in the town of Dana, Idlib Province.[47] The second strike killed the driver of a car and wounded four nearby civilians in the town of Atmeh, Idlib Province.[48] This is the first US strike in territory controlled by the Syrian transitional government since the February 23, 2025, strike, which targeted a former leader of Hurras al Din, a Salafi-jihadi militant group allied to al Qaeda.[49] The US has previously shared

secret intelligence with the Syrian transitional government, and it is possible these strikes involved similar intelligence cooperation.[50]



The large number of Assad regime members in government custody is creating challenges for the Syrian transitional government as it attempts to balance the pursuit of transitional justice with the reintegration of low-level regime members. The Syrian Ministry of Interior's (MoI) spokesperson, Nouredine Baba, held a joint press conference with Supreme Committee for Civil Peace spokesperson Hassan Soufan on June 10 that focused on transitional justice and maintaining order in Syria.[51] The conference was held following the transitional government's release of prominent Assad regime members, including the head of the National Defense Forces (NDF), Fadi al Saqr, who is implicated in human rights violations perpetrated by the pro-Assad militia throughout the Syrian conflict.[52] Baba said that approximately 123,000 MoI

personnel during the Assad regime are implicated in war crimes and that the MoI is coordinating with Interpol to pursue violators outside of Syria.[53]

The Syrian transitional government must balance the prosecution of former Assad regime members who committed crimes with disarming and reintegrating low-level former Assad regime members. Soufan stated that Saqr and other former Assad regime members were released as part of a political decision to preserve civil peace.[54] The lack of an effective transitional justice system has driven revenge-based attacks targeting individuals with ties or suspected ties to the former Assad regime. These attacks, in turn, discourage cooperation between Alawite communities who could effectively reintegrate into society and the transitional government. The Syrian transitional government must prosecute, charge, and imprison perpetrators of crimes committed under the former Assad regime through fair trials to effectively gain the trust of the Syrian population. The Supreme Committee for Civil Peace's decision to release Saqr could further undermine confidence in these transitional justice institutions.[55]

Iraq

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) General Directorate of Security and Discipline announced on June 9 that it had arrested an unspecified number of PMF members for using their authority under the PMF for electoral fraud.[56] The PMF Directorate announced that the arrests are part of an ongoing investigation into PMF members illegally obtaining voter cards or intimidating voters, following directives from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Popular Mobilization Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[57] The 2016 PMF Commission Law, which formalized the PMF as an independent security force, prohibits PMF members from being affiliated with or participating in political activities.[58] The PMF General Directorate of Security and Discipline aims to prevent PMF members from engaging in criminal activities.[59] These arrests follow reports of the PMF being exploited for electoral purposes ahead of the November 2025 elections.[60] Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political actors have used the PMF for illegal voter intimidation and election interference in past election cycles.[61] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias who nominally report to the prime minister but actually report to their respective commanders, many of whom have political wings.[62] The head of the PMF General Directorate of Security and Discipline, Abu Zainab al Lami, is a member of Iranian-backed militia Kata'ib Hezbollah.[63] Lami could either conduct a phony investigation or abuse his investigative powers to support the electoral interests of the Hoquq Movement, which is KH's political wing, or its allies.

Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politicians continue to try to discredit Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ahead of the upcoming elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs.[64] Sudani's Special Envoy to Syria, Izzat Shabandar, met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on June 9.[65] Shabandar posted on X (Twitter) that the visit was in Iraq's interest.[66] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated parliamentarian claimed on June 9 that unspecified Syrian officials gave Shabandar Assad regime Iraq-related documents. The parliamentarian claimed that Sudani will use these documents in his election campaign.[67] The parliamentarian did not indicate the content of the alleged documents. Iranian-backed Iraqi figures may seek to cast Sudani's meeting with

Shara in a negative light as part of a broader effort to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. They previously criticized Sudani's invitation to Shara to attend the May 2025 Arab Summit in Baghdad.[68] Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Sudani also recently accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage his electoral prospects in the upcoming elections.[69]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis have launched two separate ballistic missile attacks on Israel since June 9.[70] The Houthis launched one ballistic missile on June 9 that landed outside Israeli territory.[71] The Houthis conducted a second ballistic missile attack on June 10, targeting Ben Gurion Airport.[72] The IDF intercepted the missile.[73]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on the Hudaydah port on June 10 in retaliation for Houthi drone and missile attacks.[74] The IDF stated that the airstrike was intended to impede military use of the port.[75] UKMTO stated on June 9 that commercial ships should reconsider docking at Hudaydah port.[76]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the "Axis of Resistance" as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.



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Iran Update



Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

June 11, 2025 Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The United States authorized the voluntary departure of US military dependents and began preparations for a partial US Embassy Baghdad evacuation amid new pessimism about US-Iran nuclear talks. US President Donald Trump reportedly acknowledged that Iran has delayed US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 9, though he reiterated that the United States still opposes military action against Iran and believes a nuclear deal with Iran is possible.[1] Trump expressed similar qualified pessimism in a *New York Post* interview on June 10, when he said that he is “less confident” now than before about Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment.[2] Multiple US officials have said publicly that Iran will not be able to enrich uranium under a nuclear agreement.[3] Trump also added that Iran will not possess a nuclear weapon “regardless of whether a deal is reached.”[4] The United States began instituting a series of force protection measures on June 11 following the increase in pessimism. Axios reported on June 11 that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth authorized the voluntary departure of military dependents from locations across the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, citing an unspecified US defense official.[5] An unspecified US official separately told Reuters on June 11 that the US military plans to authorize the temporary departure of service members’ families from Bahrain due to “heightened tensions in the region”. [6] Unspecified US and Iraqi sources separately told Reuters on June 11 that the United States is also preparing a partial evacuation of the US Embassy in Baghdad due to unspecified “tensions in the Middle East.” [7] An unspecified Iraqi official added that the decision was due to “potential security concerns related to possible regional tensions.” [8]

Some reports suggest that Iran is opposed to several provisions of a recent US nuclear negotiations proposal. The time and date of the sixth round of nuclear talks have not yet been announced. The United States hopes the sixth round of negotiations will occur on June 12, while Iran insists on June 14.^[9] An Iranian expert close to the Iranian regime claimed on June 11 that several provisions of the US nuclear proposal were so "maximalist, excessive, and even humiliating" that they compelled Iran to issue a firm and proportional response. The "proportional response" may refer to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's categorical rejection of the recent US nuclear proposal, which would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on its own soil.^[10] This Iranian response may have influenced Trump's remarks about the decreasing likelihood of a deal.^[11] Trump separately told Fox News on June 11 that Iran has become "much more aggressive" in the negotiations.^[12] Unspecified senior US officials told Fox News that Iran appears to be delaying the process while it advances its nuclear program.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), which monitors maritime security issues, also reacted on June 11 to increased tensions in the region. UKMTO published an advisory on June 11 that warned mariners about a rise in military activity in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman due "to heightened tensions in the region."^[13] UKMTO advised vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Strait of Hormuz to exercise caution and report any incidents or suspicious activity.^[14] The advisory comes amid previous alert reports and Iranian threats to international commercial shipping since May 2025. UKMTO previously reported on May 18 that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz for several hours.^[15] Iran has historically conducted GPS jamming to create conditions to seize ships that inadvertently enter its territorial waters.^[16] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would respond to any attack by disrupting international commercial shipping.^[17] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami also inspected IRGC naval units in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf islands on June 11 to evaluate units' readiness.^[18] Salami stated that the IRGC Navy is "fully equipped and operationally ready" to respond to any threat and that it has prepared specific responses for all scenarios. Any Iranian response to any military action taken against Iran would likely include operations in the Persian Gulf.

Iran continues to threaten to target US and Israeli assets in the region, likely to deter potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh stated on June 11 that "Iran has access" to all US bases in the region and would target them "without hesitation if provoked."^[19] Nasir Zadeh added that the United States will "certainly suffer more casualties" than Iran in the event of an "enemy mistake and any aggression" against Iran.^[20] Nasir Zadeh is not responsible for the planning or conduct of operations, but his statements echo threats from other senior Iranian officials and military entities. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened in recent months to attack US bases and forces in the Gulf countries in response to any attack on Iran.^[21] IRGC-affiliated media claimed on June 10 that Israeli secret nuclear facilities are "within range" of the Iranian armed forces and that Iran could destroy them with "hundreds of ballistic missiles" with a single order.^[22] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) similarly threatened on June 9 to target Israeli secret nuclear facilities and claimed that Iran

has obtained sensitive intelligence that it could use to strike those sites if Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities.[23]

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a non-compliance resolution that declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 11.[24] The IAEA Board of Governors has not yet voted on the resolution and will resume its meeting on June 12.[25] The non-compliance resolution will reportedly give Iran an unspecified period to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared Iranian nuclear sites.[26] The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar non-compliance resolution against Iran in September 2005.[27] The Board of Governors later referred Iran’s non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in February 2006, which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran.[28] The Board of Governors could similarly refer the new non-compliance resolution to the UNSC, assuming the Board of Governors passes the resolution. Such an action could lead to the imposition of further UN sanctions on Iran. The E3 could separately use the non-compliance resolution in future efforts to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[29]

Iran has threatened to expand its nuclear program if the IAEA passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran. A UK-based outlet reported on June 11 that it has “learned” that Iran will “likely” open a new uranium enrichment facility in response to a non-compliance resolution.[30] This report is consistent with statements from Iranian officials threatening to take “technical” counter-measures in response to an IAEA non-compliance resolution.[31] Iran has previously announced it would take steps to expand its nuclear program in retaliation for IAEA resolutions.[32] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program at this time would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[33]

Russia offered to accept Iran’s “excess” enriched uranium stockpile as part of a potential US-Iran nuclear agreement.[34] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on June 11 that Russia is “ready to provide assistance” to the United States and Iran regarding the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[35] Ryabkov added that Russia could remove Iran’s “excess nuclear material” and downblend it.[36] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium. Iran previously sent 25,000 pounds of its 20 percent enriched uranium to Russia in December 2015 as part of the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal.[37] Russia’s offer comes amid recent Russian efforts to acquire a more influential role within US-Iran negotiations, including repeated offers to mediate the talks.[38] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia’s involvement in the US-Iran nuclear talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests due to Russia’s alignment with Iran.[39]

Russia has opposed the stated US demands in the negotiations by supporting Iran's right to enrich uranium and has tried to interfere with US-E3 attempts to declare Iran non-compliant with IAEA standards.[40] A *Wall Street Journal* journalist reported on June 11 that Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov delivered an "extremely long statement" at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 11, likely to delay a vote on the non-compliance resolution against Iran.[41] It is notable that Russia is simultaneously offering to support the US-Iran nuclear negotiations while trying to help Iran delay the vote on a non-compliance resolution and avoid further sanctions.

US Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told al Monitor on June 10 that the US holds several "expectations" for Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to act upon following the US decision to lift sanctions on Syria.[42] The shift to "expectations" from "conditions" to lift sanctions reflects the US decision to lift sanctions before all the previous conditions to lift sanctions were met. "Expectations" imply the US anticipates these previous conditions will be met in the future. Barrack stated that the United States expects transparency from Shara as he acts on the priorities that US President Donald Trump outlined to Shara during their meeting in Riyadh on May 14.[43] Barrack noted that the United States expects Shara to curb Palestinian militant activity in Syria, prevent an ISIS resurgence, and take steps towards an eventual entry into the Abraham Accords.[44] The US previously gave the Syrian government a list of "confidence-building" conditions in mid-March 2025 that Damascus needed to address before the United States would consider removing sanctions.[45] The similarities between the former confidence-building measures and the expectations described by Barrack suggest that US priorities in Syria not changed significantly, however. The March conditions reportedly included US-Syria counterterrorism cooperation, barring foreign fighters from senior political or military positions, the destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, and ending Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria.[46] The Syrian government has taken steps to address these conditions in recent months. The Syrian transitional government has taken steps to eject Palestinian militant organizations from Syria, engaged Israel in deconfliction talks, and has continued to dismantle Iranian-linked networks in Syrian territory, but it has not removed foreign fighters from senior military positions.[47] The United States and the Syrian transitional government recently agreed to integrate foreign fighters into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.[48]

Key Takeaways:

- **Tensions in the Middle East:** The United States authorized the voluntary departure of US military dependents and began preparations for a partial US Embassy Baghdad evacuation amid new pessimism about US-Iran nuclear talks. Some reports suggest that Iran is opposed to several provisions of a recent US nuclear negotiations proposal.
- **Iranian Threats Towards the United States:** Iran continues to threaten to target US and Israeli assets in the region, likely to deter potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.
- **IAEA Board of Governors Meeting:** The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a non-compliance resolution that declares Iran in non-

compliance with its safeguards obligations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 11. Iran has threatened to expand its nuclear program if the IAEA passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran.

- **Iran-Russia Cooperation:** Russia offered to accept Iran's "excess" enriched uranium stockpile as part of a potential US-Iran nuclear agreement.
- **Syria Sanctions:** US Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told al Monitor on June 10 that the US holds several “expectations” for Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to act upon following the US decision to lift sanctions on Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy


Two separate fires broke out near critical maritime infrastructure in southern Iranian provinces.^[49] A fire broke out at a waste storage facility near Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on June 11.^[50] The incident follows an April 26 explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas that destroyed a shipment of sodium perchlorate—a precursor for solid missile fuel—and disrupted port operations.^[51] The Hormozgan Province crisis management director claimed that the June 11 incident posed no threat to nearby residential areas or critical infrastructure and urged residents to disregard rumors. Another fire broke out at a methanol cargo vessel at Kaveh Methanol Company’s pier in Dayyer Port, Bushehr Province, on June 11.^[52] The Iranian Red Crescent spokesperson reported that the fire killed at least three crew members and injured two others.

The Iranian rial depreciated from 820,500 rials to one US dollar on June 10 to 824,500 rials to one US dollar on June 11.^[53]

Syria

Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria

June 11, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST




Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra has hosted several high-level Western officials since May 2025, possibly in an attempt to try to obtain foreign military assistance for Syria.^[54] Qasra separately met with Czech and French defense officials on June 3 and 10 in Damascus to enhance military cooperation between the two countries.^[55] Qasra also hosted with US and UK military officials in May 2025.^[56] Qasra's frequent meetings with Western defense and military officials come amid recent Western efforts to provide support to the Syrian MoD. The United Kingdom decided on April 24 to lift asset freezes on the Syrian Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, and General Intelligence Directorate.^[57] The European Union (EU) also reportedly discussed a sanctions relief proposal in mid-May that would allow member states to provide funding to Syria's defense and interior ministries.^[58] This proposal would allow for cooperation between Syria's security apparatus and the EU on reconstruction, capacity-building, counterterrorism, and

migration.[59]

A northern Syria-based source reported that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) engaged the Syrian army near Tishreen Dam, Aleppo Province, on June 10.[60] The source said that the SDF conducted a drone strike targeting a Syrian army position in al Saideen, west of the Tishreen Dam.[61] At least three Syrian army soldiers were injured, according to the source.[62] The Syrian army reportedly shelled unspecified targets near the dam in response to the drone strike.[63] CTP-ISW cannot verify local reporting about kinetic engagements near the dam. Such an engagement would be significant in that the SDF and Syrian government have agreed and have begun to implement a demilitarized zone around the dam.[64] The Syrian army's 72nd Division, which comprises five Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, was recently deployed to positions near the dam as of May 19.[65] These factions are under very limited government control and may not respond as the MoD directs them.

Assessed Control of Terrain around Manbij

June 11, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST




The Salafi-jihadi group **Saraya Ansar al Sunnah** has conducted several new assassinations, probably to capitalize on the public anger over the transitional government's release of prominent Assadists and emphasize the group's ability to punish former Assad regime members. The transitional government announced on June 10 that it had released National Defense Forces (NDF) commander Fadi Saqr from custody and allowed him to join the "Civil Peace Committee," which generated significant anger among Syrian citizens.[66] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah called on its followers on June 10 to share the identities and locations of other recently released Assad regime figures to conduct extra-judicial revenge killings in response to the government's announcement to release many Assad regime members from custody on June 10.[67] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah's recent posts to coordinate attacks targeting recently released Assadists received the highest

levels of audience engagement since the group relaunched its social media on May 17, though the engagement remains relatively low.^[68] CTP-ISW also observed Sarayah Ansar al Sunnah's subscriber count increase from under 1,000 users on June 4 to 1,581 at the time of writing. This is still an extremely limited follower base and demonstrates the group's lack of popularity. The group has claimed several attacks since its June 10 post, however. It assassinated a former Assad regime member and injured another in the town of Dijabijja, Homs Province, on June 10, and killed an Alawite man in Tartous City on the same day.^[69] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah also announced that it will continue to target Alawites in Homs Province on June 11.^[70] The group's efforts to kill former regime members and Alawites, who are viewed by some sectarians as complicit in the Assad regime's crimes, could enable it to gain support from other segments of the population. The group's hardline Salafi-jihadi beliefs will make it harder for the group to recruit outside of the Salafi-jihadi milieu in Syria, however.

The Syrian transitional government must balance the prosecution of former Assad regime members who committed crimes, such as Fadi Saqr, with the reintegration of low-level former Assad regime members. The transitional government's arrests of Assadists have been erratic and poorly explained, with some high-ranking officials being imprisoned while others, such as Saqr, are released without sufficient explanation, which has increased tensions across Syria.^[71] This behavior risks destabilizing Syria as many Syrians question the release of known criminals like Saqr while lower-level Assadists are targeted, and regime victims turn to revenge killings as a path to justice.^[72]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Syria

June 11, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



Iraq

The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) requested on June 11 that the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) clarify whether Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar is under investigation for suspected Baath Party links.[73] This request for clarification follows State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki's call on June 6 for the AJC and IHEC to investigate candidates and parties for suspected Baath Party links.[74] Iraqi law bans Baath Party members from working in the government and running in local or national elections.[75] The AJC replaced the De-Baathification Committee in 2008 to prevent "the return of the Baath's ideology, power, or practices," but has been weaponized by Iranian-backed actors, including Maliki, to sideline

Sunnis.[76]

Khanjar resigned from his position as leader of the Sovereignty Alliance in October 2024 after the AJC summoned him for alleged Baath Party links, but the AJC’s decision to summon him may be an attempt by sectarian Shia parties to sideline Khanjar.[77] Khanjar helped form the United Sunni Leadership Coalition in January 2025 to advance long-held Sunni political demands, which were perceived as a threat to Iranian-backed Iraqi Shias.[78] Iraqi media reported on April 20 that Khanjar’s Sovereignty Party will participate in Anbar Province in the upcoming elections.[79] Sectarian Shia actors like Maliki and other Iranian-backed parties could manipulate the AJC’s authority to investigate candidate backgrounds to sideline political opposition ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.

Arabian

Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

The

Palestinian

Territories

and

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually

expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

June 12, 2025, Information Cutoff: 9:45 ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates over the next 24 hours from June 12-13, 2025, to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.

This update is the first of at least three CTP-ISW Iran Updates over the next 24 hours that will cover the Iran-Israel war. The recent Israeli strikes are a rapidly evolving situation, and no single individual or organization will have complete information at this time, including the states involved. Some of the information that is available in the open-source will be contradictory or inaccurate. CTP-ISW will continually refine our assessments over the coming days and weeks, as we work to understand the situation. CTP-ISW will issue corrections and clearly articulate when we refine an earlier understanding of events.

Many sources will misinterpret information in the coming hours. Social media users posted footage that showed dozens of bright streaks in the sky during the October 2024 Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel and claimed that all of the streaks were ballistic missiles, for example. It later emerged that some of the streaks were ballistic missile interceptors, not missiles.

CTP-ISW will only publish high-confidence information. Our maps and the update below include information including "anti-aircraft fire," reported and confirmed explosions, and reported and confirmed airstrikes. Some users online may misinterpret anti-aircraft fire as evidence of an airstrike. Some air defense systems have long ranges that make it difficult to assess if the air defense fire's point of origin is the actual target or if the air defense systems are protecting a more distant site. Likewise, the sounds of explosions may not denote an airstrike because some sources may misinterpret the sounds of missile launches or other kinetic activity.

Israeli Strikes Against Iran June 12, 2025 at 11:00 PM ET



Key Takeaways:

- Israel conducted the first strikes of its air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12.
- These strikes killed a number of senior Iranian leaders.
- Iran has not yet responded to Israel's strikes despite claims on June 11 that it had finalized plans for an "immediate counterstrike" against Israel. It is unclear at this time why Iran has yet to respond.
- Iran may opt for "strategic patience" in the aftermath of a strike on its nuclear facilities or other key assets.


- **It is also possible that Israel somehow disrupted Iran’s response by targeting Iran’s ballistic missile launch sites and stockpiles.**

Israel conducted the first strikes of its air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on June 12 that Israel has launched a military operation against Iran that will continue “for as many days as it takes to remove the [Iranian] threat.”^[1] He stated that Israel has targeted Iran’s nuclear enrichment, nuclear weaponization, and ballistic missile programs as well as Iranian nuclear scientists.

Israeli airstrikes were reported at the following locations:


- Natanz Enrichment Complex in Esfahan Province.^[2] Netanyahu confirmed that Israel hit Natanz.^[3]
- Nobonyad Street in Tehran Province.^[4]
- Lavizan district in Tehran Province.^[5]
- Jahan Koudak Tower in Tehran Province.^[6]
- Farahzad neighborhood in Tehran Province.^[7]
- Amir Abad neighborhood in Tehran Province.^[8]
- Andarzgou neighborhood in Tehran Province.^[9]
- Langari Street in Tehran Province.^[10]
- Patrice Lumumba Street in Tehran Province.^[11]
- Asatid-e Sarv Complex in Tehran Province.^[12] ^[13]

Israeli Strikes Against Tehran City June 12, 2025 at 11:00 PM ET



● Reported Airstrike
 ● Report of Explosion With Footage
 ● Report of Explosion Without Footage

Israeli Strikes against Esfahan Province June 12, 2025 at 11:00 PM ET




● Reported Airstrike
 ● Report of Explosion With Footage
 ● Report of Explosion Without Footage

Israeli Strikes against Northwestern Iran June 12, 2025 at 11:00 PM ET





Israel also targeted Iran's leadership and nuclear scientists. Iranian media has confirmed that Israeli airstrikes killed Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Hossein Salami, Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Gholam Ali Rasid, Iranian nuclear scientist and former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Fereydoon Abbasi, and Iranian physicist and President of the Islamic Azad University Mohammad Mehdi Tehrani.^[14] Unverified images circulating on social media show specific buildings impacted by the airstrikes, suggesting that Israel conducted targeted killings in Tehran.^[15] Israeli Army Radio also reported that Israel targeted Ali Shamkhani, a top adviser to the supreme leader.^[16] Iranian media reported that Shamkhani is in critical condition.^[17]

Unverified reports also indicate that explosions were heard in the following provinces: Qom, Markazi, Kermanshah, and Hamadan.[18] The maps below include key Iranian sites in these provinces. Please note that we are not confirming at this time that any, some, or all of these facilities have been targeted.



Iranian Nuclear, Military, and Energy Infrastructure in Kermanshah City





Iran has not yet responded to Israel's strikes despite claims on June 11 that it had finalized plans for an "immediate counterstrike" against Israel.^[19] It is unclear at this time why Iran has yet to respond. Iran may opt for "strategic patience" in the aftermath of a strike on its nuclear facilities or other key assets. Iran responded four days after the US airstrike that killed Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020. Iran similarly waited two weeks to respond to the Israeli airstrike that killed senior IRGC officer Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Iran could choose to delay a counterattack to better assess the damage that Israel inflicted and then calculate a suitable response to the initial attack or campaign. CTP-ISW will continue to monitor Iran's response whenever it comes.

It is also possible that Israel somehow disrupted Iran's response by targeting Iran's ballistic missile launch sites and stockpiles. Netanyahu said that the strike simultaneously targeted the nuclear program and the missile program, but CTP-ISW has not yet observed reports of Israeli strikes against multiple

missile sites.[20]CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.



[1] <https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1933331296895312025>

[2] https://x.com/isna_farsi/status/1933350871435510132

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[4] <https://x.com/ArteshAriamehr/status/1933330842128109598> ;
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[17] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/276971

[18] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1933341278915486030 ; ; <https://x.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/1933328354486145509> ; <https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1933329618414809206>
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[19] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/11/us/politics/iran-us-iraq-diplomats-middle-east.html>

[20] <https://www.axios.com/2025/06/13/israel-strike-iran-trump-nuclear-talks>

IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Johanna Moore, Nidal Morrison, Nicholas Carl, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

June 13, 2025 Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates over the next 24 hours from June 12-13, 2025, to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.

CTP-ISW will resume our coverage of the Israeli strikes on Iran tomorrow, June 14, 2025. We will produce two updates. The first will cover events between 2:00 PM ET on June 13 and 6:00 AM ET on June 14. The second update will cover events between 6:01 AM ET and 6:00 PM ET on June 14. We will continue to produce two updates per day while conditions warrant it.

Key Takeaways

- **Israel launched an air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12 to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of Iranian weaponization of its nuclear program. The June 12 to 13 strikes are the opening volley in a weekslong air campaign, according to multiple Israeli officials. It will be difficult to assess the success or failure of the Israeli air campaign based on these objectives in this early stage.**
- **Israel's strikes intended to impose discrete military effects on Iran that made it difficult for Iran to respond quickly. These effects included the suppression of Iranian air defenses, the degradation of Iran's ability to retaliate against Israel, and the disruption of Iranian command and control. Israel's ability to generate at least some of these effects has contributed to Israel's immediate success and set conditions for Israel to continue and expand the campaign as needed.**
- **Israel has targeted Iranian nuclear infrastructure on June 12 and 13 in an effort to cripple Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities. Israel struck enrichment capabilities at Natanz, nuclear facilities in Esfahan. There are unverified reports of strikes at or near Fordow, possibly targeting air defense systems.**
- **The IDF also targeted multiple Iranian military targets, including a major missile base in Kermanshah Province.**

- **The IDF targeted prominent members of the Iranian nuclear research network. Israel killed five senior Iranian nuclear scientists from Shahid Beheshti University on June 12 and 13.**
- **Unspecified Iranian sources told a *New York Times* journalist that Israeli strikes killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani.**
- **Iran has replaced its slain commanders with other high-ranking officers with long records of service to the regime.**
- **Iran conducted a two-wave ballistic missile attack targeting Israel from Iranian territory about 18 hours after the initial Israeli strikes. This retaliation seems to have had limited to no effect at this time.**
- **Iran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance—excluding the Houthis—released generic statements condemning the Israeli strikes and have not yet changed their behavior toward Israel. The parties gave no indication that they would intervene on behalf of Iran, reflecting how weakened they are after years of fighting Israel. The Houthis are the only Axis partner that has targeted Israel after the strikes.**
- **US President Donald Trump warned that "even more brutal" attacks on Iran will follow if Iran does not commit to a nuclear deal with the United States. Iran subsequently announced that it has withdrawn from the US-Iran nuclear talks.**
- **The US Navy deployed the USS *Thomas Hudner* to the eastern Mediterranean, presumably to assist Israeli ballistic missile defenses.**

Israel launched an air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12 to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of Iranian weaponization of its nuclear program.[1] The June 12 to 13 strikes are the opening volley in a weekslong air campaign, according to multiple Israeli officials.[2] It will be difficult to assess the success or failure of the Israeli air campaign based on these objectives in this early stage. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) declassified an Israeli intelligence report on June 12 that argued that Iran was approaching a “point of no return” in its ability to weaponize its nuclear program.[3] The intelligence report, which cited the May 31 International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive report, argued that Iran’s rapid enrichment of uranium would enable it to quickly weaponize and produce multiple nuclear weapons.[4] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on June 12 that the strikes are part of a campaign to “roll-back the Iranian threat to Israel’s survival.”[5] It is not immediately clear at what point Israel would determine that Iran’s nuclear program no longer poses a threat to its survival. An air campaign designed to cause significant damage to Iran’s nuclear program will nonetheless be a lengthy undertaking, as public statements by senior Israeli officials and comments by unspecified Israeli officials suggest.[6] An unspecified senior Israeli official cited by the Wall Street Journal on June 13 stated that Israel’s air campaign targeting Iranian nuclear and military targets is intended to force Iran into negotiations or incapacitate it.[7] An operation to force Iran to negotiate could be much less intensive than an operation to incapacitate Iran, for example.

Israel's strikes intended to impose discrete military effects on Iran that made it difficult for Iran to respond quickly. The strikes have targeted air defenses and missile sites as well as key leaders. These strikes appear to be imposing three effects on the Iranian military:

- *Suppressing Iranian air defenses.* Reports indicate that Israel has struck some key components of Iranian air defense systems, including an early-warning radar at the Khatam ol Anbia Western Air Defense Zone in Hamadan Province.[8] Other strikes may have hit the air defense base responsible for protecting the nuclear facility at Fordow.[9] Strikes that destroy components of Iran's air defense systems will cause a temporary disruption to Iranian defenses that would enable Israeli 4th-generation, non-stealthy aircraft to operate in Iranian airspace with greater ease.
- *Degrading Iranian retaliatory capabilities.* Israeli airstrikes and drones have struck numerous Iranian ballistic missile silos and launchers. These strikes may have destroyed some of Iran's missiles, launchers, and missile stockpiles, which would limit Iran's ability to immediately retaliate in a meaningful way.[10] Iran claimed on June 11 that it had finalized plans for an "immediate counterstrike" against Israel that would involve hundreds of ballistic missiles, but may have only been able to enact part of its plan due to degraded capabilities.[11] CTP-ISW is currently monitoring a large-scale Iranian missile attack targeting Israel, which may suggest that the degradation of Iran's retaliatory capability had only a limited temporal effect (see below under "Iranian Retaliation").
- *Disrupting Iranian command-and-control.* Israel has conducted a decapitation campaign targeting Iranian military leadership.[12] This disruption is temporary and limited, however. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has already appointed successors for a majority of the military leadership that killed.[13] Iran has presumably already drafted a plan for retaliation that these successors can adopt. The successors may have difficulty implementing the retaliation plan, however, given the losses incurred from Israeli strikes targeting Iran's retaliatory capabilities.


These constraints have contributed to Israel's immediate success and set conditions for Israel to continue and expand the campaign as needed. Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities serve Israel's long-term purpose of removing the Iranian nuclear threat and protecting Israel.

Israel has targeted Iranian nuclear infrastructure on June 12 and 13 in an effort to cripple Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities. Israel struck several facilities at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Satellite imagery confirmed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz.[14] The PFEP housed over 1,700 advanced centrifuges, including IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, to produce 60 percent enriched uranium. Satellite imagery also confirmed that the strike damaged electrical substations and support buildings critical to the power supply across the facility. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on June 13 that a strike hit the Natanz site but said IAEA monitoring and Iranian reports showed "no elevated radiation levels." [15] A senior Israeli official told Israeli media that Israel dealt a "severe blow" to Natanz but did not destroy it, and "there will be more strikes." [16] This is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that these strikes are only the initial volley in an air campaign.

Israeli Strikes in Iran June 13, 2025 at 2:30 PM ET



Claimed Israeli Strikes June 13, 2025 at 7:00 AM ET




Israel also struck nuclear facilities at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) in Esfahan Province, including a metallic uranium production facility and infrastructure for re-converting enriched uranium to produce nuclear fuel.[17] The ENTC houses several other nuclear facilities, including a Uranium Conversion Facility, Fuel Manufacturing Plant, and Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, as well as reactors.


There are unverified reports claiming Israel targeted Fordow Fuel Enrichment.[18] The Fordow site is especially hardened against strikes, as much of the facility extends deep underground.

Iranian media reported on June 13 that an Israeli strike killed one Artesh colonel and one soldier at the Hazrat-e Masoumeh air defense site in Qom Province, which protects the nuclear facility at Fordow.[19] It remains unclear whether the colonel commanded the air defense site. The air defense site, also known as the Fordow Air Defense Group, sits roughly 16 km east of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP).[20] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard previously inspected the site on April 16 to assess operational readiness.[21]

Israeli Strikes in Esfahan Province June 13, 2025 at 2:30 PM ET



Claimed Israeli Strikes in Esfahan Province June 13, 2025 at 7:00 AM ET




The IDF targeted multiple Iranian military targets, including a major missile base in Kermanshah Province. Satellite imagery shows that Israeli airstrikes destroyed a facility that Iran likely used to store ballistic missiles.[22] The base reportedly supports missile deployments in western Iran and stores ballistic missiles, including the Qiam-1.[23] Iranian media reported that the IDF also targeted the Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase in Tabriz and other unspecified military sites in East Azerbaijan Province.[24]


IRGC-affiliated media also confirmed on June 13 that the IDF targeted the following locations:[25]

- Israeli strikes targeted multiple areas in Tehran Province, with explosions heard in the neighborhoods of Robat Karim, Baharestan, Malard, and Shahr-e Rey in Tehran City.


- Iranian air defense systems activated over Andimeshk and Dezful (Khuzestan Province), Esfahan, Pakdasht (Tehran Province), and Qom.
- Iranian officials confirmed that strikes took place in Bostan Abad and Maragheh (East Azerbaijan Province) and in Zanjan Province. Iranian officials confirmed damage to Tabriz Airbase and Madani Airport.
- Explosions were reported in Buin Zahra (Ghazvin Province) and Mohammad Shahr (Alborz Province).




Claimed Israeli Strikes in Northwestern Iran June 13, 2025 at 7:00 AM ET



Claimed Israeli Strikes in Kermanshah and Kurdistan Provinces June 13, 2025 at 7:00 AM ET



Claimed Israeli Strikes in Khuzestan Province June 13, 2025 at 7:00 AM ET




The IDF targeted prominent members of the Iranian nuclear research network. Israel killed five senior Iranian nuclear scientists from Shahid Beheshti University on June 12 and 13.[26] Shahid Beheshti University, which is located in Tehran, plays a significant role in Iranian nuclear research. The United States and the European Union have sanctioned Shahid Beheshti University for its connections to the Iranian nuclear program.[27] Iranian media confirmed that the IDF killed the following individuals:[28]


- **Fereydoon Abbasi:** Iranian nuclear scientist and former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
- **Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi:** Professor of physics and former Amad Project supervisor. The Amad Project was Iran's nuclear weapons program prior to 2003.

- **Ahmad Reza Zolfaghari:** Nuclear engineering professor at the Shahid Beheshti University
- **Abdol Hamid Minouchehr:** Dean of the Shahid Beheshti University nuclear faculty.
- **Amir Hossein Fegghi:** Head of the Nuclear Science and Technology Research Center, which operates under the AEOL.[29]


Israeli Strikes in Tehran and Alborz Provinces June 13, 2025 at 2:30 PM ET



Claimed Israeli Strikes in Tehran and Alborz Provinces June 13, 2025 at 7:00 AM ET



Unspecified Iranian sources told a *New York Times* journalist that Israeli strikes killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani.[30] Ghaani took the position after the United States killed his predecessor, Qassem Soleimani, in Baghdad in January 2020. Ghaani was responsible for managing and supporting the Axis of Resistance. See the “Iranian Response to Israeli Strikes” section for biographies of the commanders who will replace the dead Iranian officers.



The Israeli air campaign will likely continue in the coming days. An unspecified senior Israeli official told the *Wall Street Journal* that Israel planned for the campaign to take place over 14 days.[31]

Iranian Retaliation

Iran conducted a two-wave ballistic missile attack targeting Israel from Iranian territory about 18 hours after the initial Israeli strikes.[32] The IRGC announced that it targeted dozens of Israeli military sites and airbases.[33] Iran launched less than 100 ballistic missiles at Israel during the attack, according to the IDF.[34] Israeli air defenses reportedly intercepted the majority of the Iranian missiles that crossed into Israeli territory.[35] A senior US official and an Israeli official said that US THAAD systems intercepted some of the missiles.[36] At least seven missiles or Israeli

interceptors impacted in Tel Aviv.[37] A fire also broke out in northern Israel due to fallen missile fragments.[38] Israeli emergency services reported that the attacks have injured at least 35 people as of this writing.[39] Sources may misinterpret information about this attack. Social media users posted footage that showed dozens of bright streaks in the sky during the October 2024 Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel and claimed that all the streaks were ballistic missiles, for example. It later emerged that some of the streaks were ballistic missile interceptors, not missiles. Iranian state media is incentivized to exaggerate the success of the attack and may spread misleading information.[40]

This is the third direct attack that Iran has ever conducted on Israel. The IRGC named the attack “Operation True Promise III” and declared that the attack was in retaliation for the recent Israeli strikes on Iranian territory.[41] Iran conducted Operation True Promise I and Operation True Promise II against Israel in April and October 2024, respectively.[42] Iran initially responded to the recent Israeli air campaign by launching over 100 drones at Israel from Iran about six hours after the initial Israeli strikes.[43] None of the drones entered Israeli airspace, however.[44] CTP-ISW will publish further analysis about Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel in future updates.

Iranian Response to the Israeli Strikes

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave an extremely rare, televised address during which he vowed to retaliate against Israel.[45] Khamenei said that Iran will respond with force and make Israel “helpless.” The Iranian Supreme National Security Council previously stated on June 9 that Iran would strike Israeli nuclear facilities in retaliation.[46]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which marks Pezeshkian’s first call with a foreign leader since Israel launched its air campaign.[47] The Iranian readout claimed that Pezeshkian and Putin condemned the Israeli strikes. It is notable that Pezeshkian’s first call was to Putin and illustrates the close and growing relationship between Iran and Russia.

As CTP-ISW already reported, Khamenei has appointed new leaders to replace some of the senior officers whom Israel has killed.[48] The following is a brief description of the promoted individuals.

Abdol Rahim Mousavi is a career Artesh officer and was the overall Artesh commander before Khamenei appointed him as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) chief. His appointment marks the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic that an Artesh officer has held this position; Khamenei has usually selected IRGC officers for the post. Nevertheless, Mousavi is a sensible choice for two reasons. He has some experience managing and coordinating between the armed forces at this level, as he was the AFGS deputy chief from 2016 to 2017. Furthermore, Mousavi is deeply ideological, despite being an Artesh member, having declared repeatedly in recent years that he would have served in the IRGC’s paramilitary Basij if he were not already in the Artesh.[49] Khamenei has thus empowered a competent and deeply loyal officer to manage the Iranian armed forces. Khamenei previously entrusted Mousavi with managing the Iranian integrated air defense network in 2019, further highlighting the trust that Khamenei has in him.[50]

Mohammad Pak Pour was the commander of the IRGC Ground Forces before Khamenei appointed him to be the overall IRGC commander. Khamenei seems to have significant confidence in Pak Pour,

given that Khamenei has kept him as the IRGC Ground Forces commander since 2009. During this time, Pak Pour oversaw the deployment of IRGC Ground Forces cadres to Syria to support the effort to keep Bashar al Assad in power.[51] These cadres reflected the growing Iranian focus on expeditionary operations and coalition warfare with the Axis of Resistance and Russia. Pak Pour also commanded the IRGC Ground Forces through intense periods of social unrest in Iran. The IRGC Ground Forces deployed in some cases to brutally suppress anti-regime demonstrations.[52] That Pak Pour kept his position through this unrest is even more remarkable when considering that Khamenei has replaced virtually every other major official responsible for internal security in recent years.

Ali Shadmani was the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters coordination deputy before Khamenei appointed him to command the headquarters. Coordination deputies in Iran are roughly equivalent to a chief of staff in the US military. Shadmani spent his career commanding different units in the IRGC Ground Forces before going to the headquarters. CTP-ISW previously identified Shadmani as a rising figure in the military establishment, as influential military figures appeared to favor and empower him.[53]

It remains unclear at the time of this writing who will replace IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh and IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani.

Axis of Resistance Response to Israeli Strikes

Iran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance—excluding the Houthis—released generic statements condemning the Israeli strikes and have not yet changed their behavior toward Israel. The parties gave no indication that they would intervene on behalf of Iran, reflecting how weakened they are after years of fighting Israel. Hamas condemned the Israeli strikes, stating that the strikes call for “a unified stance from the nation and its vital forces in the face of this dangerous aggression.”[54] Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias condemned the strikes and stated that “Iraq may not remain inactive” if the conflict escalates.[55]

An unspecified Hezbollah official told Western media that Hezbollah “will not unilaterally launch an attack on Israel in support of Tehran.”[56] Hezbollah issued a statement condemning the Israeli strikes and expressing its “full solidarity” with Iran.[57] Hezbollah’s decision not to support Iran and its relative impotence in the face of Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities demonstrate how Hezbollah was defeated and deterred by Israel after the November 2024 Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire agreement.[58] Hezbollah would have naturally led an Axis-wide response to a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran in the past. The defeats that Israel has imposed upon the Axis of Resistance since 2023 appear to have enabled the strikes against the Iranian military and nuclear sites.

The Houthis’ Political Bureau stated that it stands with Iran “in its legitimate right to respond to the aggression against it.”[59] The Houthis are the only Axis of Resistance member that has targeted Israel since Israel’s air campaign. The Political Bureau called on the Muslim world “to emerge from the state of silence and inaction” as Israel “threatens everyone and excludes no one.”[60] The IDF reported that Israeli air defense systems detected a missile launched from Yemen on June 13 at 12:32 ET that fell in the Hebron area of Israel.[61] The Houthis have regularly struck Israel with drones and missiles since November 2024.[62] Houthis have not confirmed or

commented on this launch at the time of writing. The Houthis recently threatened to resume attacks targeting US interests following a potential US or Israeli attack on Iran.[63] CTP-ISW has observed that the Houthis retain the ability to resume their attacks on international shipping or US targets at any time and for any reason.

US Response to Israeli Strikes

US President Donald Trump warned that "even more brutal" attacks on Iran will follow if Iran does not commit to a nuclear deal with the United States.[64] Iran subsequently announced that it has withdrawn from the US-Iran nuclear talks.[65] Trump noted on social media that the Israeli strikes took place one day after the expiration of his 60-day ultimatum to Iran to agree to a nuclear deal.[66] Trump said Iran now has a "second chance" to commit to a deal and that he hopes that Iran will return to the "negotiating table."[67] An unspecified US official said that US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff still wants to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on June 15 for the previously scheduled sixth round of talks.[68] Iranian state media announced on June 13 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are suspended indefinitely.[69]

Senior Iranian officials had continued to signal in the days leading up to the Israeli strike that Iran intended to reject the US demand for zero uranium enrichment. An Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated newspaper stated on June 11 that Iran is "ready to leave the negotiating table" if Iran's demands are not met. These demands are a reference to Iran's demand to maintain domestic uranium enrichment capabilities.[70] Iran had signaled interest in recent days in an interim deal with the United States, possibly because Iran calculated that reaching an interim or framework deal with the United States at the meeting would delay or prevent US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Such a calculation will have undoubtedly changed in light of Israel's strikes.

Unspecified US officials told the Associated Press that the US Navy ordered the USS *Thomas Hudner* destroyer to deploy to the eastern Mediterranean Sea.[71] The Navy also ordered a second unspecified destroyer to move toward the Middle East. Western media reported that Iran summoned the Swiss ambassador to Iran to deliver a warning to the United States that Iran will hold the United States accountable for its cooperation and coordination with Israel and for giving Israel a "green light" to attack Iran.[72] Trump confirmed on June 12 that the United States was aware of the planned Israeli attack before it occurred but emphasized that the United States had no military involvement.[73] Trump said that the United States would defend itself and Israel from an Iranian retaliatory attack.[74] The deployment of the USS *Thomas Hudner* to the region is part of the US effort to defend US assets and Israel.



[1] <https://x.com/IDF/status/1933369064124031170>

- [2] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933611199431913674> ;
<https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-strike-conflict/card/israeli-operation-likely-won-t-be-over-for-many-days-official-says-VLPlNDNuYrpxTyJxm7l2>
- [3] <https://x.com/IDF/status/1933369064124031170>
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- [5] <https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1933329728246534596>
- [6] <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-strike-conflict/card/israeli-operation-likely-won-t-be-over-for-many-days-official-says-VLPlNDNuYrpxTyJxm7l2> ;
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1933318523469931001>
- [7] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-attacks-hit-more-than-irans-nuclear-program-they-are-aimed-at-hobbling-tehran-307cabf9?mod=WSJ_home_mediumtopper_pos_2
- [8] <https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/1933378577434882195> ;
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IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Nicholas Carl, and Brian Carter

June 14, 2025 Information Cutoff: 6:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. Our updates will provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership.

We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.

We will produce two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. This evening update covers events between 6:00 AM ET and 6:00 PM ET on June 14. CTP-ISW published a morning update that covered events between 2:00 PM ET on June 13 and 6:00 AM ET on June 14.

The Israeli air campaign is driving generational turnover in Iranian military leadership.[1] Israeli strikes have killed numerous senior military officers so far. These individuals, such as Mohammad Bagheri and Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, had occupied some of the highest positions in the Iranian armed forces for years and, in some cases, decades.[2] Many of these officers had close personal bonds to one another, having forged brotherly ties in their youth during the Iran-Iraq War and maintained those relationships as they rose together through military ranks in the following decades. These relationships created an informal influence network at the highest echelons of the Iranian military establishment. These officers were extremely influential in shaping Iranian strategy due to their positions at the top of the military hierarchy and their immediate access to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. These officers intervened in Iranian domestic affairs on several occasions to assert their shared political preferences and see the regime through internal crises. CTP-ISW identified this network in a 2013 report, labeling it the IRGC Command Network.[3] That Israel has killed so many members within and in the orbit of the Command Network in recent days means that Israel has not only removed a key leadership cadre—it has also degraded one of the most stable and influential factions in the Islamic Republic. The Command Network has been an enduring presence in Iranian decision-making circles for decades—one of the few factions to remain so dominant other than Khamenei himself. It is too soon to assess what implications the dismantlement of the Command Network will have on Iranian behavior and strategy.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Major General Amir Hatami as the overall Artesh commander.[4] Hatami replaces Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, whom Khamenei earlier appointed as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) chief. The selection of Hatami is notable for several reasons. Khamenei overlooked Artesh Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad


Hossein Dadras, who has been the Artesh second-in-command since 2017, and instead favored Hatami for the top post. Hatami is a career Artesh officer but has little experience in senior Artesh command positions compared to Dadras. Hatami spent much of his career working in the AFGS before becoming the defense and armed forces logistics minister under the second Hassan Rouhani administration (2017-2021). Hatami was the first Artesh officer to become the Iranian defense minister in decades, highlighting the great trust that Khamenei had in him. Khamenei appointed Hatami to become his personal adviser for Artesh affairs at the end of Rouhani's term, further demonstrating support for Hatami, despite the deteriorating relationship between Khamenei and Rouhani.

Hatami is notably a vocal proponent of Iran's "active deterrence" doctrine, which has underpinned the offensive strategy that Iran has had since 2014-16.[5] Active deterrence is a preventive warfare doctrine that emphasizes interventions abroad to expand Iranian influence and strategic depth and strengthen the Axis of Resistance.[6] It does not follow, of course, that Hatami's promotion will presage additional Iranian interventions abroad. But it does at least reflect the influential role that Hatami appears to have played in shaping Iranian strategy and Khamenei's decision-making in recent years.

Israeli Strikes in Iran June 14, 2025 at 6:00 PM ET



Israeli Strikes in Tehran and Alborz Provinces June 14, 2025 at 6:00 PM ET



Key Takeaways

- **The Israeli air campaign is driving generational turnover in Iranian military leadership. Israeli strikes have killed numerous senior military officers so far. Many of these officers had close personal bonds to one another, having forged brotherly ties in their youth during the Iran-Iraq War and maintained those relationships as they rose together through military ranks in the proceeding decades.**
- **Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Major General Amir Hatami as the overall Artesh commander. Hatami is notably a vocal proponent of Iran's "active**

deterrence” doctrine, which has underpinned the offensive strategy that Iran has had since 2014-16.

- The IDF has continued to target Iranian military targets across Iran, likely to degrade Iran’s retaliatory capabilities.
- This update contains early bomb damage assessments (BDA) of several Iranian facilities, including Natanz, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, and several military bases.
- Two US officials said Israeli strikes at Natanz were “extremely effective,” but a senior Israeli official added that the damage is not yet “fatal.”
- Israel struck the Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase (TAB) in Tabriz on the night of June 12 to 13, as CTP-ISW previously reported. The strikes destroyed several buildings north of Artesh Air Force aircraft hangars and cratered the approaches from the hangars to the runway.
- Israel may have destroyed a likely aircraft hangar and a radar at Hamedan Air Force Base (43km north of Hamedan) on the night of June 12 to 13.
- Israel struck several buildings at the Amand Missile Base that likely stored ballistic missiles.
- Israel struck the Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) underground missile base in Kermanshah on June 13.
- Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by targeting critical energy infrastructure. This expansion marks new Israeli efforts to degrade Iran’s capacity to sustain its military and nuclear program.
- CTP-ISW is monitoring reports that the IDF struck the Shahrn oil depot on the northwestern outskirts of Tehran on June 14.
- Iran may respond to the Israeli escalation by threatening international maritime security.
- Iranian officials said that Iran will not return to US-Iran nuclear negotiations until Israel halts its attacks on Iran and Iran has finished its retaliatory attacks on Israel.
- Some of Iran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance have so far failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel for targeting Iran so far.
- Iran has launched seven waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since initial Israeli strikes on June 12.

Israel’s Air Campaign in Iran

The IDF has continued to target Iranian military targets across Iran, likely to degrade Iran’s retaliatory capabilities. The IDF confirmed on June 14 that it struck an unspecified

underground weapons facility in western Iran.[7] The IDF stated that the facility was used to store and launch dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles.[8] An Iran-focused analyst reported that the Israeli strikes collapsed the facilities' entry points and silo openings.[9] Satellite imagery shows that the IDF struck the Bid Ganesh ballistic missile site in Tehran Province and the Khomein missile site in Markazi Province.[10] The Bid Ganesh site likely stored medium-range ballistic missiles, according to open-source watchers on social media.[11] Satellite imagery shows that the Israeli strike on the Khomein missile site damaged the drive-through facility, which allows for the efficient movement of missiles and other related equipment.[12] The IAF reported that it was unable to destroy all of Iran's missiles and has set disrupting Iran's ability to launch large barrages as its top priority.[13]

Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center June 12, 2025



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Imagery Courtesy of Planet Labs PBC

Israel struck the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) (12km east of Esfahan City)

on the night of June 12-13.[14] Satellite imagery published on June 14 showed damage to several warehouses and other buildings in the complex. The ENTC houses a number of nuclear facilities, including a metallic uranium production facility, a Uranium Conversion Facility, a Fuel Manufacturing Plant, and a Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, as well as reactors. CTP-ISW previously reported on June 13 that the Israeli strikes hit the metallic uranium production facility and other infrastructure for re-converting enriched uranium to produce nuclear fuel.[15] The IAEA added that four critical buildings at Esfahan nuclear sites were damaged in the June 13 strike, including the Uranium Conversion Facility and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant.[16] These comments likely refer to ENTC, though they could apply to Natanz (see below), which is also in Esfahan Province.

Natanz Enrichment Complex


June 12, 2025



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Two US officials said Israeli strikes at Natanz were “extremely effective,” but a senior Israeli official added that the damage is not yet “fatal.”[17] Israel struck the Natanz

Enrichment Complex, which is one of Iran's nuclear facilities, on June 12 and 13.[18] Satellite imagery on June 13 confirmed that the strikes destroyed the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz.[19] Satellite imagery posted on June 14 shows damage to buildings in the northwest and northeast corners of the facility, as well as other buildings elsewhere in the facility (see above). The senior Israeli official told Israeli Army Radio that the strikes inflicted significant damage to Natanz's air defense systems and Natanz itself.[20] The two US officials said in a comment to CNN that the strikes knocked out electricity in Natanz's lower levels, which is where centrifuges used to enrich uranium are stored.[21] The IAEA separately added that the electric infrastructure at Natanz was destroyed.[22]



Tabriz Air Force Base

June 11, 2025



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Israel struck the Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase (TAB) in Tabriz on the night of June 12 to 13, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[23] The strikes destroyed several buildings north of Artesh Air Force aircraft hangars and cratered the approaches from the hangars to the runway. This airbase houses three Iranian squadrons (the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Tactical Fighter Squadrons) that fly the MiG-29 and F-5, according to open-source watchers on social media and the Aviationist.[24] Iran will likely rapidly repair the runways, but cratering these surfaces would have prevented aircraft from interfering with Israeli operations on the night of June 12 to 13. The base also stored SA-6 Gainful surface-to-air systems.[25]

Hamedan Air Force Base

June 11, 2025

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Israel may have destroyed a likely aircraft hangar and a radar at Hamedan Air Force Base (43km north of Hamedan) on the night of June 12 to 13. Satellite imagery posted on June 14 shows damage to a probable aircraft hangar on the northeastern side of the runway. The hangar's parking spots are large enough to house F14 Tomcats (with wings swept), F4 Phantoms, MiG-29s, or F5s. Hamadan reportedly hosts the 31st Tactical Fighter Squadron, which flies F4s.[26]

Amand Missile Base

June 11, 2025

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
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Israel struck a number of buildings at the Amand Missile Base that likely stored ballistic missiles. CTP-ISW previously reported that Iran stores Ghadr medium-range ballistic missiles at Amand.[27] Many of the buildings to the west of the main Amand facility are surrounded by walls or high earthen berms, which suggests that Iran may have stored the missiles in these buildings. Earthen berms and walls can help contain explosions.

Israeli Strikes in Kermanshah and Lorestan Provinces June 14, 2025 at 6:00 PM ET



Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) Missile Base June 11, 2025

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Israel struck the Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) underground missile base in Kermanshah on June 13.[28] The Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) underground missile base reportedly stores Qiam-1 and Fateh-110 ballistic missiles.[29] The base also reportedly houses an underground facility, two munition storage areas, and missile launch pads.[30] It is not clear if Israel damaged the underground facility, however.

Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by targeting critical energy infrastructure. This expansion marks new Israeli efforts to degrade Iran's capacity to sustain its military and nuclear program. The IDF targeted Iranian gas refineries and industrial facilities early June 14, following waves of airstrikes on air defenses and nuclear-linked sites across western Iran and Tehran on June 13.[31] The IDF struck a natural gas processing facility linked to Iran's South Pars field in Bushehr Province on June 14, triggering an explosion and fire that forced Iranian authorities to shut

down Phase 14.[32] South Pars is one of the largest gas fields in the world and is central to Iran's domestic energy supply.[33] The IDF also reportedly targeted Fajr-e Jam Gas Refinery in Bushehr Province on June 14.[34] The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel may have been targeting nearby air defenses, while IRGC-affiliated media said "a collision with a hostile small aircraft" caused the explosion.[35] The refinery processes gas from the South Pars field and the Nar and Kangan fields and plays a key role in purifying Iran's domestic natural gas supply.[36] Over 90 percent of Iran's electricity is generated by gas-powered thermal plants.[37] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously pledged not to target oil infrastructure during calls with former US President Joe Biden in October 2024 due to the risk that targeting oil infrastructure would cause the price of oil to rise.[38]

CTP-ISW is monitoring reports that the IDF struck the Shahrn oil depot on the northwestern outskirts of Tehran on June 14.[39] CTP-ISW will cover these events in the June 15 morning edition.

Disruptions to Iran's natural gas production will likely worsen the country's ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread electricity blackouts, however. Iranians have previously protested against the regime in response to energy shortages. Demonstrations over the rising gas prices in 2017 and 2018 escalated into broader challenges for the regime's stability.[40]

The IDF separately targeted Farda motors automotive factory in Boroujerd, Lorestan Province, on June 14.[41] The strike reportedly caused extensive damage to production lines, vehicle parts, and completed cars, according to Iranian media. It remains unclear whether Farda Motors had any ties to Iranian military entities or was operating under the direction of Iran's military-industrial organizations.

Iran may respond to the Israeli escalation by threatening international maritime security. Former IRGC officer and current parliamentary security committee member Esmail Kowsari stated on June 14 that Iran is reviewing whether to close the Strait of Hormuz.[42] IRGC-affiliated media also reported on June 14 that the Iranian Navy intercepted a British warship in the Sea of Oman and forced it to change course.[43] Iranian media claimed that the warship had entered the northern Indian Ocean to assist Israeli missile guidance efforts against Iran. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.[44]

Israeli Strikes in Bushehr and Fars Provinces June 14, 2025 at 6:00 PM ET



Israel has conducted a decapitation campaign targeting Iranian military leadership in addition to the strikes targeting nuclear and military infrastructure.[45] Israeli strikes have killed the IRGC Intelligence Aerospace Force Chief Deputy Brigadier General Khosrow Hassani on June 13.[46] IRGC media reported that Hassani was with IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh during the Israeli strike that killed Hajizadeh.

Iran has launched seven waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since initial Israeli strikes on June 12.[47] An interceptor, shrapnel, or ballistic missile impacted in Tamra, northern Israel, and killed three people.[48] Fourteen people were wounded.[49] A projectile also struck a house east of Haifa.[50] Iran has also launched at least two waves of one-way attack drones targeting Israel.[51] The IDF has so far intercepted about 90 percent of the Iranian

munitions that Iran has launched as part of its Operation True Promise III.[52] At least 10 interceptors, shrapnel, or ballistic missiles struck the Tel Aviv area on June 13 and earlier on June 14.[53]

Iranian officials said that Iran will not return to US-Iran nuclear negotiations until Israel halts its attacks on Iran and Iran has finished its retaliatory attacks on Israel.[54] Iran withdrew from the negotiations on June 13.[55] Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi and a senior US official confirmed on June 14 that the sixth round of talks—originally scheduled for June 15—had been cancelled.[56] A senior US official said that the Trump administration remains committed to negotiations with Iran and hopes Iran will “come to the table soon.”[57] This is consistent with remarks from US President Donald Trump on June 13 that Iran now has a “second chance” and that “even more brutal” attacks on Iran will follow if Iran does not commit to a nuclear deal with the United States.[58] Two sources told Axios that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told several unspecified foreign ministers that Iran would be willing to resume talks with the US after Iran’s retaliation on Israel is over.[59] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian similarly stated that Iran will not participate in negotiations while Israel continues to attack.[60]

Russian President Vladimir Putin held phone calls with the heads of state of the United States, Israel, and Iran on June 13 and June 14.[61] Putin’s call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on June 13 marked Pezeshkian’s first call with a foreign leader since Israel launched its air campaign, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[62] It is notable that Pezeshkian’s first call was to Putin and illustrates the close and growing relationship between Iran and Russia. Heads of state often call trusted partners in times of crisis. Iran’s closest allies are its Axis of Resistance, but those relationships are often managed by the IRGC. Putin also told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a phone call that issues related to Iran’s nuclear program should be resolved through political diplomatic efforts, according to the Kremlin.[63] Russia has consistently supported Iranian objectives in the recent nuclear talks by supporting Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium, though Russia does support the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon.[64] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Trump told Putin during a June 14 phone call that US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff is ready to resume nuclear talks with Iran.[65] Trump did not confirm this in his own statement about the phone call. Putin has recently offered to facilitate the US-Iran nuclear negotiations in a likely attempt to portray Russia as a useful collaborator and partner that the United States needs to achieve certain global outcomes.[66]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with People’s Republic of China Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi.[67]

Some of Iran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance have so far failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel for targeting Iran so far. The IDF reported that the Israeli air defense system detected two rockets launched from the Gaza Strip on June 14 at 11:41 ET that fell near Nir Oz, southern Israel.[68] No group has claimed this launch at the time of writing. Lebanese Hezbollah has not participated in the conflict at the time of this writing. These groups all released generic statements condemning the Israeli strikes on June 13.[69]

Houthi Leader Abdul Malik Badr al Din al Houthi stated during a televised speech that the Houthis support “the Iranian response and are partners in the position with everything we can.”[70] Houthi stated that aggression against Iran is aggression against all Arab countries, calling for all countries in

the region to support the Iranian response.[71] This speech is similar to the Houthis' Political Bureau's previous statement in support of Iran on June 13.[72] The Houthis have targeted Israel since Israel's air campaign. The Houthis previously launched three drones and one ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen towards Israeli territory on June 13.[73] Houthi drone and ballistic missile attacks are not an inflection or new constraint on air defense bandwidth for Israel because the Houthis have regularly struck Israel with drones and missiles since November 2024.[74] These attacks do further constrain Israeli air defense bandwidth when combined with Iranian attacks, of course.

The IDF may have killed Houthi Chief of Staff Muhammad Abdulkarim al Ghamari in a targeted airstrike in Yemen on June 14.[75] IDF sources told Israeli media that the IDF conducted strikes in Yemen in an attempted targeted attack on Ghamari.[76] Yemeni media reported that an explosion on October 14 Street in Sanaa was a result of an airstrike.[77] Ghamari has served as the Houthi Chief of Staff since 2016.[78] Ghamari was responsible for overseeing Houthi military operations and directing the procurement and deployment of various weapons.[79] Ghamari reportedly has close ties to Hezbollah and the IRGC.[80] The Houthis have not confirmed or commented on the strike at the time of writing. An Israeli source told Israeli media that the IDF "will soon know if it succeeded." [81]

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