Iran Update, November 1, 2026

Bailey Pasternak, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, Kelly Campa


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran likely struck a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz on November 1 as part of its efforts to disrupt civilian shipping. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) reported on November 1 that an unidentified projectile struck a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz.
2. The Houthis are continuing to attempt to advance southeastward from Taiz Governorate into Lahij Governorate, potentially to set conditions to besiege or capture Aden City. A Marib-based Yemeni journalist reported that Houthi fighters advanced onto elevated terrain in al Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate, on November 1.
3. Saudi air defenses intercepted one Houthi ballistic missile and one drone launched toward Saudi Arabia's southern region on November 1. The Houthis have not claimed the attack as of this writing.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Toplines

See "Iranian Strike Campaign" and "Arabian Peninsula" sections.

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Iran likely struck a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz on November 1 as part of its efforts to disrupt civilian shipping. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) reported on

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

November 1 that an unidentified projectile struck a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz.[1] The Iranian regime calculates that it can pressure the United States into a diplomatic settlement that favors Iran by disrupting shipping and keeping oil prices high. Iran continues to be the only threat to civilian shipping in the strait.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.


Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula


The Houthis are continuing to attempt to advance southeastward from Taiz Governorate into Lahij Governorate, potentially to set conditions to besiege or capture Aden City. A Marib-based Yemeni journalist reported that Houthi fighters advanced onto elevated terrain in al Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate, on November 1.[2] Pro-Yemeni government media reported that Yemeni government reinforcements deployed to the district later on November 1.[3] The source didnot specify whether Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured territory in al Maqatirah District, which suggests that the area remains contested at the time of this writing.[4] Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly repelled another Houthi attempt to advance southeastward from southern Taiz Governorate into al Maqatirah District on October 30. The Houthis likely seek to capture terrain that overlooks Tur al Balah District and leads to Aden City. Such territory would support a potential Houthi effort to besiege or capture Aden City.[5]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to engage Houthi fighters in central Jawf Governorate on November 1. A Marib-based Yemeni journalist reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled a Houthi attempt to advance to Jabal Huwayshiyan from the northeast. Jabal Huwayshiyan is a mountain range overlooking al Hazm, the governorate's capital.[6] Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured Jabal Huwayshiyan between October 30 and 31.[7] Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely attempting to recapture territory in central Jawf Governorate as part of an effort to set conditions to recapture al Hazm.[8]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Saudi Joint Forces Command spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki announced that Saudi Arabia targeted unspecified “vital resources” in Houthi-controlled Dhamar and Hudaydah governorates on November 1.[9] Pro-Yemeni government mediaandHouthi media reported that Saudi Arabia struck Houthi troop concentrations in Dhamar Governorate.[10] Houthi media separately reported that Saudi Arabia struck oil infrastructure in Bajil District, Hudaydah Governorate.[11] Saudi Arabia previously struck Houthi oil and fuel storage infrastructure in Yemen on October 13, likely to both maximize economic pressure on the Houthi political organization and constrain the Houthis’ ability to sustain their military forces.[12]

Saudi air defenses intercepted one Houthi ballistic missile and one drone launched toward Saudi Arabia’s southern region on November 1.[13] The Houthis have not claimed the attack as of this writing. The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of the Houthis’ ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to halt military operations against the Houthis and accept the Houthis’ demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[14]

POWERED BY: BABEL STREET

Endnotes

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[1] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2116959014911418369
[2] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2116627829161128186
[3] https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116675968500994245 ;
https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116653487157088406
[4] https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116675968500994245 ;
https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116653487157088406
[5] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116155011386536418?s=20 ;
https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2116183128003813784 ;
https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116199045173559532 ;
https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116197264217571479 ; https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2026/10/30/الحوثيون-يشي-عون-51-من-عناصرهم-وسط-معارك-تعز ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/
[6] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2116864826106421746 ;
https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/2116904378896445944?a=4IaORbK900NVfimwJAs&s=20
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/ ;
https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2116131563721163092 ;
https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116500212835365057?a=XKiuG24IKadq-lE-eys&s=20 ;
https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2026/10/31/مصادر-عسكرية-احكام-سيطرة-القوات-الحكومية-على-جبال-حويشيان-بالجوف
; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116506973227094380 ;
https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116484192376586285?a=btbcxyFOVLBqNf_u_W8&s=20
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/
[9] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2116887766655172984 ;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2116914298534732050
[10] https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116677944911564918
[11] https://x.com/Almasirah_YE/status/2116726510572728340
[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-13-2026
[13] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2116920558625452216 ;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2116920039551168665
[14] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-riyadh-airport-and-saudi-oil-pipeline/4100562 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3948 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3934 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/loud-booms-heard-near-saudi-aramco-headquarters-dhahran-sources-say-2026-10-13/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-25-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iran Update, November 2, 2026

Benjamin Schmida, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Bailey Pasternak, Adham Fattah, Nidal Morrison, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. Recent Houthi advances in Lahij Governorate are part of a Houthi campaign that is designed to confront the internationally recognized government of Yemen with simultaneous dilemmas intended to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts. Houthi forces may struggle to consolidate their gains in exposed terrain, particularly if government-aligned forces can sustain air support and reinforce threatened positions.
2. Houthi forces advancing into al Maqatirah District are threatening government reinforcement and resupply routes on multiple fronts. The Houthis' establishment of positions in al Maqatirah District and possible future advances south threaten Aden City and, as such, are likely designed to impose a dilemma on government forces as to whether to divert forces from other fronts and efforts. Government forces are currently fighting against the Houthis south of Taiz City in an effort to break the Houthi encirclement of Taiz City and along the Red Sea coastal front in order to recapture territory near the Bab al Mandeb.
3. The Houthis may struggle to sustain advances south toward the coastal plain if the Yemeni government receives sufficient air and military support.
4. Senior Iranian officials met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior People's Republic of China (PRC) officials on November 2, likely to ensure Iran's political and military alignment with its primary political and defense partners amid recent reports about imminent US plans to attack Iran. Both Russia and the PRC have previously supported Iran's regional attack campaign by providing Iran with targeting intelligence and satellite imagery of US military positions. Russia almost certainly cannot provide Iran with significant material or financial support due to its own ongoing constraints, however.


© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Toplines

Recent Houthi advances in Lahij Governorate are part of a Houthi campaign designed to confront the internationally recognized government of Yemen with simultaneous dilemmas in order to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts. The Houthis captured mountainous positions in al Maqatirah District on November 2 that provide Houthi forces with high ground that overlooks Tur al Bahah District, which sits between Taiz Governorate's rugged, mountainous terrain and the coastal plain leading to Aden City.[1] Geolocated footage indicates that Houthi forces likely advanced southeastward from Hayjat al Abd and captured Souq al Roubah on November 1, which is located at a key crossroads leading north into al Shamayatayn District.[2] Geolocated footage posted on November 2 also indicates that Houthi forces then advanced further south from Souq al Roubah and captured Jabal Irf.[3]Jabal Irf overlooks the last government-controlled sections of the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC). Houthi positions in this area could enable the Houthis to establish fire control over Yemeni government-aligned reinforcements transiting north along the GLOC.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Houthi advances in the direction of Aden are part of a broader Houthi campaign that is designed to confront the Yemeni government with competing demands for its forces and resources across multiple fronts. The Houthis' establishment of positions in al Maqatirah District and ability to advance south threatens Aden City and, as such, are likely designed to impose a dilemma on government forces as to whether to divert forces from other fronts and efforts. Government forces in southwestern Yemen are currently fighting against the Houthis around Taiz City in an effort to break the Houthi encirclement of Taiz City and along the Red Sea coastal front in order to recapture territory near the Bab al Mandeb.

Houthi advances into al Maqatirah District since October 30 are threatening government reinforcement and resupply routes on multiple fronts, for example. The Houthis likely aim to seize additional sections of the Taiz-Aden GLOC, which also sets conditions for the Houthis to besiege or capture Aden City in the future, if they choose to do so.[4] Additional Houthi control of the Taiz-Aden GLOC would also further isolate government-aligned forces encircled in Taiz City and constrain the government's ability to reinforce its positions across the region.

Houthi advances in al Maqatirah also threaten government positions along the Red Sea coastal plain. Houthi forces may also attempt to outflank and isolate government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coastal front by advancing towards the Mokha-Taiz GLOC, which supplies government-aligned forces operating on that front. Such an advance would compound the pressure on government-aligned forces by threatening both their positions on the Red Sea coast and the routes needed to sustain them. Houthi forces would likely face the same vulnerabilities to air attacks in lowland terrain that could constrain any theoretical advance toward Aden, however.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

The Yemeni government has already diverted forces from the coastal plain to meet the Houthi threat in al Maqatirah, which underscores the dilemmas imposed by the Houthis' campaign. The Yemeni government reportedly redeployed an unspecified number of Red Sea coast-based Southern Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield Forces units to al Maqatirah District on November 2, likely to contain the Houthi advance.[5] These forces have previously helped halt Houthi advances along the Red Sea coastal plain since the Houthi offensive began in September 2026.[6] Their redeployment could weaken the government's defense on the coastal plain, depending on the size and characteristics of the units deployed. The recent appointments of several new commanders to the al Maqatirah area, including a commander of the government-aligned Homeland Shield Forces, also indicate Yemeni government concern about Houthi advances in al Maqatirah.[7]

The Houthis' current efforts to capture Taiz City further compound the Yemeni government's competing operational demands as Houthi advances in al Maqatirah District threaten to draw government forces away from efforts to break the encirclement of Taiz City. Yemeni government-aligned forces and civilians in Taiz City are facing food, fuel, medicine, and other resource shortages after the Houthis severed the last Yemeni government ground lines of communication (GLOC) into central Taiz Governorate on October 6.[8] The Houthis' continued encirclement of the city and control over major roads in the area limit the government's ability to maneuver across southwestern Yemen while permitting the Houthis to carry a high volume of forces and supplies north toward Taiz City along more established roadways. Yemeni government forces encircled in Taiz City reportedly launched counterattacks into al Misrakh District, Taiz Governorate, on November 2, possibly in response to the Houthi advances in al Maqatirah.[9]

The Houthis may struggle to sustain advances south toward the coastal plain if the Yemeni government receives sufficient air and military support. The terrain south of Tur al Bahah would expose Houthi forces to greater risk from air attack given that lowland terrain south of Tur al Bahah offers less terrain protection than the mountainous positions Houthi forces currently occupy in al Maqatirah District. Government-aligned forces, supported by air assets, have previously halted Houthi attempts to capture remaining government-held areas of the Red Sea coastal plain and the Bab al Mandeb Strait since September 10.[10] These setbacks suggest that Houthi forces may struggle to consolidate their gains in exposed terrain, particularly if government-aligned forces can sustain air support and reinforce threatened positions. The Houthis' ability to exploit their current high ground will therefore depend in part on whether they can advance south before government-aligned forces establish effective defensive positions. The Houthis may nevertheless achieve a broader operational effect even if they fail to advance further south. Continued Houthi advances could force the government to divert additional forces from Taiz and the Red Sea coastal fronts, disrupt reinforcement and resupply routes, and weaken its ability to respond to Houthi offensives elsewhere.

Senior Iranian officials met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior People's Republic of China (PRC) officials on November 2, likely to ensure Iran's political and military alignment with its primary political and defense partners amid recent reports about imminent US plans to attack Iran. Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei discussed regional developments in a phone call with Putin on November 2.[11] Rezaei and Putin likely discussed US-Iran negotiations and the potential for renewed US strikes on Iran. SNSC Deputy Secretary Ali Bagheri Kani separately discussed ongoing US-Iran negotiations with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on November 2.[12] Iranian officials' discussions with Putin and Wang follow three days of Iranian talks with Qatari mediators.[13] Iran does not appear to have made any meaningful concessions during the negotiations and continues to reiterate its maximalist demands, which effectively represent a complete US surrender.[14] Iranian officials likely discussed continued political and military support from Russia and the PRC for Iran, particularly in the event that the United States resumes a major strike campaign in Iran. Iranian attacks on the region and recent US economic restrictions have

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

increasingly isolated Iran on the world stage, and both Russia and China have long provided Iran with military, diplomatic, and economic support, including throughout the recent conflict.[15]

Rezaei and Bagheri Kani also likely discussed ongoing Russian and PRC military support for Iran in preparation for potential renewed US strikes. Both Russia and the PRC have supported Iran's regional attack campaign by providing Iran with targeting intelligence and satellite imagery of US military positions.[16] Moscow and Beijing have also both provided Iran with weaponry that has likely enabled Iran to attack US and regional targets. Russia reportedly sent Iran modified Shahed drone variants with increased accuracy that are harder to intercept, according to Western and Ukrainian intelligence.[17] Russia has also provided Iran with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and the PRC is rumored to have struck a deal with Iran to deliver PRC-manufactured MANPADS as well.[18]The PRC has long supported Iran's ballistic missile manufacturing capabilities, and the PRC has provided Iran with dual-use technologies, including missile engine parts, and about 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate — a precursor for missile fuel — before and during the 2026 US-Iran War.[19] Reuters separately reported in July that Iran was close to purchasing PRC-manufactured anti-ship missiles, which Iran could use to threaten or target vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.[20] Iran may seek to secure additional shipments of military equipment and guarantees of continued intelligence support in the event of renewed US strikes on Iran. Russia almost certainly cannot provide Iran with significant material or financial support due to its own ongoing constraints, however.[21]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

See topline section.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups, has continued to establish checkpoints in southeastern Iran in order to more aggressively target regime security forces and undermine the regime's authority in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The MPF posted footage on November 2 that showed a group of armed fighters stopping vehicles and collecting drivers' information at an unspecified location along the Khash-Zahedan road, Sistan and

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Baluchistan Province.[22] The MPF stated that it established the checkpoint to identify senior regime officials “involved in suppressing the people.”[23] The MPF recently established a similar checkpoint on the Khash-Saravan road on October 25.[24] Iranian regime security forces separately reportedly dismantled an anti-regime militant cell trying to establish another such checkpoint on the Zarabad-Konarak road in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 2. It is unclear if this cell is affiliated with the MPF. The checkpoint on Zarabad-Konarak road lies nearly 300 kilometers south of the two successful MPF checkpoints and is likely subject to a distinct security environment. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the MPF’s ability to establish such checkpoints suggests that the group assessed that security forces would be unlikely to disrupt their activity in these areas, either due to a lack of capability or willingness. The reported disruption of an anti-regime cell much farther south may suggest that anti-regime groups face different levels of freedom of operation across the province, and that the regime retains the ability to disrupt their activities in at least some areas. It is unclear if the regime’s successful security operation will deter anti-regime groups from attempting to continue to establish checkpoints in southeastern Iran.[25]

The MPF likely continues to publish footage of their operations on their Telegram account in order to generate fear among regime officials and affiliates while discouraging civilians from cooperating with the regime in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Regime media claimed on November 2 that the MPF’s footage of its “checkpoint” on the Khash-Zahedan road was “propaganda” and emphasized that the incident lasted only a few minutes.[26] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify the extent or duration of the MPF’s control over the checkpoint. That regime media highlighted the incident nevertheless reflects the regime’s concerns that the MPF could use such claims and footage, regardless of their veracity, to erode civilian perceptions of regime control in the province.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Lebanon

Hezbollah announced on November 2 that it began distributing financial assistance pledges to families in southern Lebanon, likely as part of the group's ongoing efforts to compete with Lebanese government reconstruction efforts and regain popular support. Hezbollah announced that it began disbursing "promissory notes" to residents of southern Lebanon out of the group's office in Nabatieh City on November 2.[27] Hezbollah has not specified when it will begin distributing payments to Lebanese citizens at the time of this writing. Hezbollah's announcement marks the first implementation of the group's "Promise and Commitment" financial assistance program that Hezbollah Executive Council Head Ali Damoush announced on October 13.[28] Hezbollah-aligned media reported on November 2 that Hezbollah intends to provide displaced families in Beirut and the southern suburbs with up to $14,000 USD, including quarterly payments of up to $2,000 USD for furniture and 12 monthly payments of up to $500 USD for rent.[29] Families outside of Beirut and the suburbs can receive up to $12,000 USD in similar intervals.[30] ISW-CTP continues to assess that Hezbollah's ability to provide financial support to Lebanese citizens is essential to the group's ability to rehabilitate its image among the Lebanese population, particularly its Shia support base, following two costly wars against Israel in the past two years that have made the group increasingly unpopular.[31] Hezbollah's decision to distribute pledges of financial assistance to families in Nabatieh City follows the Lebanese government's announcement on October 2 that it created 23 reconstruction programs to rebuild Nabatieh City and other areas in southern Lebanon.[32] Hezbollah likely seeks to demonstrate that it can provide reconstruction assistance more effectively than the Lebanese government.[33]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiyah threatened on October 30 that it would respond to any US use of Iraqi territory or airspace to conduct attacks on Iran.[34] Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya is a member of a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which also includes Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[35] Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya did not provide any specific details other than warning that it would respond to US use of Iraqi territory or airspace. Other members of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, who are often considered closest to Iran and most kinetically active, have not yet publicly threatened US forces and assets to deter the United States from attacking Iran amid recent reports about imminent US plans to attack Iran. The Iraqi militias have historically relied on such threats in periods of regional escalation, including prior to the start of the US-Israel-Iran War in February 2026.[36] Iraqi militias used drones to surveil the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27, which ISW-CTP previously assessed as a more subtle threat amid the changing political situation in Iraq and Iranian preferences.[37] It is unclear if the other Iraqi militias supported Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya's public threat or if Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya is acting of its own accord.

Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya also reiterated on October 31 that the group continues to reject disarmament on October 31.[38] The militia claimed that the Iraqi federal government's disarmament plan involves regulating and limiting militia weapons between September 2026 and June 2027 rather than disarming the militias.[39] The federal government is still negotiating the details of the agreement with the militias. Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to actually disarming the militias in line with US demands.[40]

Further reports indicate that the Iraqi federal government has made or is currently considering a deal to offer the Iraqi militias positions within the Iraqi government in exchange for disarming.[41] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media on October 29 that unspecified militias have reached an "understanding" with Zaydi to disarm in exchange for "key" government positions.[42] Iraqi media reported on November 1 that four unspecified militias are demanding that they select the next Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) head after Zaydi fired the previous head on October 26.[43] Iraqi media added on November 1 that the Iraqi militias are planning to present other candidates as independent technocrats if their initial candidates are not selected to lead the organization.[44] The militias' demand to fill this position could reflect results of the ongoing Shia Coordination Framework-militia negotiations or possibly Zaydi's own negotiations with the militias. Shia sources close to the framework told Iraqi media that the framework has rejected any Sunni figures, including former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi, from filling the position.[45] ISW-CTP previously assessed that the framework is probably offering government positions to the militias in order to both incentivize the militias that have agreed to disarm to fully comply while motivating militias that have refused to disarm to agree to the government's still unreleased disarmament plan.[46] The United States has reportedly vetoed any militia-affiliated candidate from filling the INIS head position.[47] INIS was the most capable Iraqi intelligence body for decades until Zaydi's predecessor, former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, allowed Iranian-backed actors to infiltrate the organization.[48]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces attempted to advance into central Jawf Governorate, likely to set conditions to recapture the governorate's capital in al Hazm. Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly engaged Houthi forces and attempted to advance in the Dahida area in central

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Jawf Governorate on November 2, according to an anti-Houthi journalist.[49] Saudi Arabia reportedly provided close air support.[50] ISW-CTP cannot verify whether Yemeni government forces captured the "Dahida" area at the time of this writing. Yemeni government media separately published footage of government-aligned forces engaging Houthi forces in al Jawf Governorate on November 2.[51] A Saudi AH-64 Apache gunship provided close air support to Yemeni ground forces.[52] Saudi air support has likely contributed to the success of Yemeni government-aligned advances in Jawf Governorate in recent days, including the capture of Jabal Huwayshiyan, a mountain overlooking al Hazm, on October 31.[53] Yemeni government forces also deployed a likely Saudi-provided M163 VADS anti-aircraft vehicle to conduct direct-fire attacks on Houthi positions in al Jawf Governorate on November 1.[54] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Yemeni government advances in al Jawf Governorate likely aim to recapture al Jawf's capital, al Hazm City.[55]

The Houthis claimed on November 2 that they struck airports and military equipment in Saudi Arabia over the past 48 hours.[56] The Houthis claimed that they struck King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, a Saudi military transport plane at Jizan International Airport, and an early warning radar in Jizan Province with drones over the past 48 hours. ISW-CTP cannot verify the Houthis' claims at the time of this writing. Saudi Joint Forces Command separately reported on November 2 that Saudi forces intercepted a ballistic missile over southern Saudi Arabia and two drones over Riyadh Province.[57] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of the Houthis' ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to halt military operations against the Houthis and accept the Houthis' demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen's oil and gas resources.[58]

POWERED BY: BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] https://x.com/AB4_Ali3/status/2117206454373323254?s=20 ; https://x.com/ALQhoom2020/status/2117051386106097756?s=20
[2] https://x.com/ALQhoom2020/status/2117051386106097756?s=20
[3] https://x.com/AB4_Ali3/status/2117206454373323254?s=20
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-1-2026/
[5] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117009029838807418
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/ ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2098385535521767522 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=943450894895511
[7] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117293295462228149
[8] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2107908744546042338?s=20 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2108154675941814712?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-7-2026/
[9] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117262676510577029

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/ ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2098385535521767522 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=943450894895511
[11] https://t.me/mehrnews/428200 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6ae8a0667151b7da7a847a4e
[12] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/249102/Dep-sec-of-Iran-SNSC-meets-China-s-top-diplomat-in-Beijing; http://politics.people.com dot cn/n1/2026/1102/c1001-40826224.htm
[13] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/iran-us-diplomacy-stepped-up-amid-signs-of-impending-escalation ; https://t.me/farsna/472118
[14] https://t.me/farsna/472118 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/02/world/middleeast/iran-deal-strait-of-hormuz.html
[15] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/06/russia-iran-intelligence-us-targets/; https://www.stern dot de/politik/irankrieg–russland-soll-mullah-regime-vor-us-angriffszielen-warnen-37318052.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-supplies-iran-with-cyber-support-spy-imagery-hone-attacks-ukraine-says-2026-04-07/; https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/16/world/video/russia-spy-satellites-iran-intelligence-strikes-us-assets-digvid-invs; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/russia-sharing-valuable-electronic-intel-iran-officials-say-us-war-dra-rcna589656; https://www.ft.com/content/1fddd2cd-1294-4e9c-a17d-5ea06b399355; https://ktvz.com/politics/cnn-us-politics/2026/09/24/intelligence-from-chinese-groups-aiding-in-irans-increasingly-effective-targeting-of-us-sites-sources-say/; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0496; https://alhurra dot com/en/31983; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iran-get-chinese-shoulder-launched-missile-systems-weeks-sources-say-2026-07-29/; https://www.ft.com/content/d5d7291b-8a53-42cd-b10a-4e02fbcf9047?syn-25a6b1a6=1; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-supplying-iran-with-shahed-drones-zelenskiy-says-2026-03-15/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2026-10-09/iran-said-to-have-preserved-its-missile-factories-evening-briefing-americas; https://www.wsj.com/politics/china-iran-aid-xi-trump-summit-e6541ae8; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-top-chipmaker-has-supplied-chipmaking-tech-iran-military-us-officials-say-2026-03-27/; https://www.reuters.com/world/iran/irans-hidden-web-military-agencies-is-slipping-hardware-past-us-blockade-2026-10-29/; https://democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/krishnamoorthi-courtney-press-state-and-cia-chinas-continued-transfers-rocket
[16] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/06/russia-iran-intelligence-us-targets/; https://www.stern dot de/politik/irankrieg–russland-soll-mullah-regime-vor-us-angriffszielen-warnen-37318052.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-supplies-iran-with-cyber-support-spy-imagery-hone-attacks-ukraine-says-2026-04-07/; https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/16/world/video/russia-spy-satellites-iran-intelligence-strikes-us-assets-digvid-invs; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/russia-sharing-valuable-electronic-intel-iran-officials-say-us-war-dra-rcna589656
[17] https://www.ft.com/content/d5d7291b-8a53-42cd-b10a-4e02fbcf9047?syn-25a6b1a6=1; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-supplying-iran-with-shahed-drones-zelenskiy-says-2026-03-15/
[18] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/06/russia-iran-intelligence-us-targets/;

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

https://www.stern dot de/politik/irankrieg–russland-soll-mullah-regime-vor-us-angriffszielen-warnen-37318052.html;
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-supplies-iran-with-cyber-support-spy-imagery-hone-attacks-ukraine-says-2026-04-07/;
https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/16/world/video/russia-spy-satellites-iran-intelligence-strikes-us-assets-digvid-invs;
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/russia-sharing-valuable-electronic-intel-iran-officials-say-us-war-dra-rcna589656; https://www.ft.com/content/1fddd2cd-1294-4e9c-a17d-5ea06b399355;
https://ktvz.com/politics/cnn-us-politics/2026/09/24/intelligence-from-chinese-groups-aiding-in-irans-increasingly-effective-targeting-of-us-sites-sources-say/;
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0496; https://alhurra dot com/en/31983;
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iran-get-chinese-shoulder-launched-missile-systems-weeks-sources-say-2026-07-29/; https://www.wsj.com/politics/china-iran-aid-xi-trump-summit-e6541ae8
[19] https://www.wsj.com/politics/china-iran-aid-xi-trump-summit-e6541ae8;
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-top-chipmaker-has-supplied-chipmaking-tech-iran-military-us-officials-say-2026-03-27/;
https://www.reuters.com/world/iran/irans-hidden-web-military-agencies-is-slipping-hardware-past-us-blockade-2026-10-29/;
https://democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/krishnamoorthi-courtney-press-state-and-cia-chinas-continued-transfers-rocket
[20]
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iran-get-chinese-shoulder-launched-missile-systems-weeks-sources-say-2026-07-29/
[21]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2026/; https://t.me/filatovcorr/7628; https://t.me/bomber_fighter/27018;
https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/16309 ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/; https://t.me/tass_agency/403348; https://t.me/istories_media/13935;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-02/russia-looks-to-delay-defense-ministry-pay-amid-budget-gap; https://suspilne dot media/1419209-sili-oboroni-viveli-z-ladu-ponad-51-naftopererobnih-potuznostej-rf-minoboroni/
[22] https://t.me/jmmfront/204 ; https://t.me/jmmfront/205
[23] https://t.me/jmmfront/204
[24] https://t.me/jmmfront/201 ; https://t.me/jmmfront/127
[25] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/874414/
[26] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6997431
[27] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/1316712/
[28]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-outlines-financial-aid-plan-lebanese-with-destroyed-homes-2026-10-13/ ; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/1258612/
[29] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/news/lebanon/909088/حزب-الله-يسدد-بدلات-الإيواء-لأصحاب-البيوت-المدمرة
30]] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/news/lebanon/909088/حزب-الله-يسدد-بدلات-الإيواء-لأصحاب-البيوت-المدمرة
31]]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-13-2026#_ednf79eb7a94a91ea4af4f59df45977b78745
[32] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5325171-سلام-من-النبطية-قرار-الحرب-والسلم-للدولة-ولا-
العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5325076-سلام-حاجات-إعادة-الإعمار-تفوق-إمكانات-/https://aawsat dot com ; انتظار-لتسوية الدولة-اللبنانية

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

33]]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-13-2026#_ednf79eb7a94a91ea4af4f59df45977b78750
[34] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%AF
[35] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq
[36] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سياسة/اجتماع-مرتقب-تنسيقية-المقاومة-العراقية-تتجه-لمساندة-يران-في-حال-تعرضها-للحرب ; https://t.me/abualaskary/132
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-27-2026/
[38] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%AF
[39] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%AF
[40] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/world/middleeast/iraq-prime-minister-interview-disarm-militias.html
[41] https://almadapaper dot net/459195/
[42] https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2115515575896018976 ; https://almadapaper dot net/458712/
[43] https://almadapaper dot net/459195/ ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-PM-removes-intelligence-chief-Hamid-al-Shatri
[44] https://almadapaper dot net/459195/
[45] https://almadapaper dot net/459195/
[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-19-2026/
[47] https://almadapaper dot net/459195/
[48] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-watergate-and-fallout-us-relations
[49] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117265808087003569
[50] https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2117192686906298506
[51] https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2117192686906298506
[52] https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2117192686906298506
[53] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/ ; https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2116131563721163092 ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116500212835365057?a=XKiuG24IKadq-lE-eys&s=20 ; https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2026/10/31/مصادر-عسكرية-احكام-سيطرة-القوات-الحكومية-على-جبال-حويشيان-بالجوف ; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116506973227094380 ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116484192376586285?a=btbcxyFOVLBqNf_u_W8&s=20

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[54] https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2117245465083449454 ;
https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2117241704323453016
[55] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/ ;
https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2116131563721163092 ;
https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116500212835365057?a=XKiuG24IKadq-lE-eys&s=20 ;
https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2026/10/31/مصادر-عسكرية-احكام-سيطرة-القوات-الحكومية-على-جبال-حويشيان-بالجوف
; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116506973227094380 ;
https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2116484192376586285?a=btbcxyFOVLBqNf_u_W8&s=20 ;
https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2026/11/2/al-jawf-becomes-new-hotspot-in-yemen-war-between-government-forces-houthis
[56] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2117291672103260638 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-launched-drones-towards-saudi-arabias-dammam-airport-2026-11-02/
[57] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2117143750749360258 ;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2117274782546702765
[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-1-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-riyadh-airport-and-saudi-oil-pipeline/4100562 ;
https://t.me/army21ye/3948 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3934 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/loud-booms-heard-near-saudi-aramco-headquarters-dhahran-sources-say-2026-10-13/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-25-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iran Update, November 3, 2026

Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Bailey Pasternak, William Doran, Kelly Campa


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. Iranian forces attempted to shoot down a US aircraft near Qeshm Island, in the Strait of Hormuz, on November 2. Iranian attempts to shoot down US military aircraft, if sustained, could seek to generate broader operational effects intended to hinder the United States' ability to protect international shipping from Iranian attacks.
2. Unidentified Iraqi security and political sources told US-funded regional media that the Iraqi federal government deployed four Iraqi Army brigades to Basra Province on October 31 to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Kuwait if the United States attacks Iran. This report of planned Iraqi militia attacks on Kuwait is consistent with militia activity during the US-Israel-Iran War. The militias will likely respond to US attacks on Iran.
3. The Houthis are continuing to attempt to advance south, southeast, and southwest through al Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate. These efforts are part of a Houthi campaign designed to confront the Yemeni government with simultaneous dilemmas in order to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts in southwestern Yemen.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Toplines

Iranian forces attempted to shoot down a US aircraft near Qeshm Island, in the Strait of Hormuz, on November 2.[1] US officials told the *Wall Street Journal* on November 2 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fired a surface-to-air missile (SAM) at a US fighter jet and that the US aircraft returned fire in self-defense.[2] The officials did not identify the fighter jet model or describe its mission.[3] The US aircraft could have been conducting a reconnaissance mission, a combat air patrol to protect commercial vessels in the strait, or preparing to attack an Iranian military target, all of which aim to inhibit Iran's military activities in the strait. The Iranian SAM crew likely sought to destroy the aircraft in accordance with standard orders, although a SAM could still force the aircraft to deploy countermeasures, take evasive action, abandon a target, or otherwise interrupt its mission without striking the aircraft. Iran previously fired a SAM toward a US F-35 fighter jet in August 2026 that was providing cover to vessels in the strait, although a US official said that the missile did not come close enough to threaten the aircraft.[4]

Iranian attempts to shoot down US military aircraft, if sustained, could seek to generate broader operational effects intended to hinder the United States' ability to protect international shipping from Iranian attacks. Repeated Iranian SAM launches could require the United States to assign additional aircraft and support capabilities, including electronic warfare, air-defense suppression, stealth aircraft, or longer-range munitions, to military operations over Iran's southern coast and the Strait. These requirements would increase the resources that the United States must commit to each mission and

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

could accordingly reduce US aircraft availability and coverage for other combat, support, or reconnaissance sorties. Successful Iranian attacks could also cause US casualties and generate domestic political pressure to end US military activity in the Persian Gulf. Iran could attempt to increase the operational cost of US efforts to strike Iranian systems that threaten commercial shipping by sustaining SAM launches targeting US aircraft near the strait.

Iranian forces' attempt to shoot down a US aircraft near Qeshm Island is part of a broader pattern of US and Iranian military activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf in recent weeks.[5] US forces have conducted limited, unannounced strikes against Iranian military targets in recent weeks as part of efforts to prevent Iran from attacking commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[6] US officials described these US strikes as defensive measures that sought to prevent Iranian attacks on commercial vessels.[7] This acknowledgment comes amid unconfirmed reports of US strikes near Jask, Hormozgan Province, on October 29, and Iranian media claims of US attacks on two fishing boats near Qeshm Island on October 31.[8] Several sources, including an Israeli media outlet and an open-source intelligence social media account, previously claimed on October 22 that US forces struck IRGC missile launchers near Sirik, Hormozgan Province.[9] These reports are consistent with US officials' statements about recent limited strikes, but available reporting neither confirms the individual incidents nor establishes that the November 2 Iranian SAM launch was a discrete response to these strikes.[10] US forces separately intercepted an IRGC missile that originated from Qeshm Island and targeted commercial shipping on November 2.[11] Iran has continued to target commercial shipping with various systems while simultaneously publicizing claims of vessels hitting mines in an effort to deter vessels from bypassing Iranian transit procedures. The IRGC Navy claimed on November 3 that three oil tankers struck naval mines and caught fire after disabling their automatic identification system and using an "unauthorized" route through the strait.[12] US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper announced on August 27 that US forces successfully removed the mines that Iran previously laid in the Strait of Hormuz's internationally recognized traffic separation scheme.[13]

Unidentified Iraqi security and political sources told US-funded regional media that the Iraqi federal government deployed four Iraqi Army brigades to Basra Province on October 31 to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Kuwait if the United States attacks Iran.[14] The Iraqi federal government deployed these forces after an unidentified Gulf state reportedly informed Baghdad about Iraqi militias' plans to launch drones at Kuwait from Basra Province and conduct cross-border ground attacks into the country if the United States attacks Iran.[15] ISW-CTP has not observed any other reports of Iraqi Army deployments of this size, which would consist of four to six thousand soldiers, to Basra Province. Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir al Yasrallah met with Basra Province's governor and other provincial security leaders on November 1 to discuss border security, however.[16] Local social media accounts posted footage of Iraqi Army deployments to Baghdad in early August 2026 to thwart the militias' planned response to US-Saudi strikes in Iraq, but Baghdad's more urban environment may have increased the likelihood that local observers could obtain and share such footage.[17]

This report of planned Iraqi militia attacks on Kuwait is consistent with militia activity during the US-Israel-Iran War. The militias will likely respond to US attacks on Iran. Iraqi militias, including those that belong to the militia coalition known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, consistently attacked neighboring countries like Kuwait in March and April 2026.[18] Iraqi militias most recently used drones to surveil the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27, which ISW-CTP previously assessed as a threat that sought to deter the United States from attacking Iran.[19] This threat is more discreet than the militias' traditional public threats and belligerent rhetoric, which is likely a response to the changing political situation in Iraq and Iranian preferences concerning the militias' behavior.[20] Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, which is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, nonetheless made such a public

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

threat on October 30 to respond to any US use of Iraqi territory or airspace to attack Iran.[21] The realities of Iraqi politics and Iran's reported interest in some of the Iraqi militias prioritizing politics over kinetic activity are less compelling reasons to obstruct groups like Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya and the other members of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, who are considered closest to Iran and the most kinetically active, from responding to US strikes on Iran.[22]

IRGC-directed militia cells that operate along the Iran-Iraq border are also likely to respond to US attacks on Iran. These cells report directly to the IRGC instead of traditional militia leadership networks and have repeatedly conducted attacks on neighboring countries since at least April.[23] Three or four of these cells launched at least seven drone attacks on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE between April 20 and May 17, for example.[24] Iran reportedly organized these cells to insulate established militias from potential US and Iraqi government retaliation, given that the United States has continuously pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias.[25]

Iran is likely coordinating with the Iraqi militias in light of reports that the United States may be planning imminent attacks on Iran. Iran has dispatched senior officials, primarily IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, to meet and coordinate activity with the Iraqi militias ahead of and during past periods of regional conflict with the United States and Israel.[26] Quds Force officers reportedly coordinated with Iraqi militia commanders to expand the US-Israel-Iran War by intensifying Iraqi militia attacks during the April ceasefire, for example.[27] ISW-CTP has not observed any reports of recent meetings between Iranian officials and the Iraqi militias, but Iran could also be relaying messages to the militias via IRGC officers operating in Iraq, including those directing the independent militia attack cells.[28] The Iraqi federal government has attempted to crack down on the unsanctioned activities and movements of Iranian officials in Iraq, such as Ghaani, but it is unclear how effective these efforts have been.[29]


The Iraqi Army's reported deployment to thwart militia attacks on Kuwait is consistent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi's efforts in recent months to prevent Iraqi militia attacks on neighboring countries, in response to US and Gulf pressure. A Shia Coordination Framework source told US-funded regional media on November 3 that Iraq's main intelligence agency is working with the Iraqi Army and Gulf states to prevent attacks on the Gulf states from Iraqi territory.[30] Houthi forces embedded with Iraqi militias and IRGC operatives have conducted multiple attacks from Iraq and otherwise contributed to Iraqi militia attacks on the Gulf in recent months, including the September 10 strike on Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline.[31] The Iraqi federal government took several actions to restrict Iranian collaboration with Iraqi militias in response to the attack on the pipeline, which included temporarily closing multiple Iran-Iraq border crossings.[32] ISW-CTP assessed that the closures were unlikely to cut Iran's weapons smuggling to the militias given that the arms smuggling networks operate outside of the official Iran-Iraq border crossings.[33] Baghdad also recently increased monitoring of the geographic area where Iranian-backed actors launched the September 10 attack on the pipeline and ordered government authorities to close Houthi offices in Iraq, which are both part of Zaydi's efforts to stop attacks originating from Iraq.[34]

The Houthis are continuing to attempt to advance south, southeast, and southwest through al Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate. Yemeni government media and Yemeni government-aligned media reported that Houthi fighters engaged Yemeni government-aligned forces at positions south and southeast of Souq al Roubah in al Maqatirah District on November 2 and 3.[35] The Houthis previously captured Souq al Roubah, which lies at a critical junction in the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), on November 1.[36] Geolocated footage of Houthi fighters on November 2 and Yemeni government-aligned media reports from November 3 indicate that the Houthis attempted to advance along the Taiz-Aden GLOC further south into Tur al Bahah District.[37] ISW-CTP assessed on

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

November 2 that the Houthis are likely attempting to advance southeast through al Maqatirah District in order to seize sections of the GLOC to help set conditions for the Houthis to besiege or capture Aden City in the future, if they choose to do so.[38] Such efforts are part of a Houthi campaign designed to confront the Yemeni government with simultaneous dilemmas in order to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts.

Forces affiliated with the Yemeni government, including the Southern Giants Brigades and National Resistance Forces, engaged Houthi forces in the area after deploying to the district on November 2.[39] An independent Yemeni journalist reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured Jabal Irf on November 3, which overlooks the last government-controlled sections of the GLOC that extend south toward Aden.[40]



Some Houthi forces also appear to have infiltrated through mountainous terrain in southwestern al Maqatirah District in the direction of the coastal plain.[41] UK-based, Saudi-owned media reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces engaged Houthi fighters in al Zariqa and al Majza on November 3.[42] Al Zariqa is a mountainous subdistrict approximately seven kilometers south of Houthi-controlled terrain in Lahij Governorate. Al Majza sits approximately 12 kilometers south of Houthi positions in Lahij Governorate. The terrain and locations of al Zariqa and al Majza suggest that Houthi light infantry forces likely infiltrated these areas. Houthi advances in al Majza indicate that the Houthis may seek to approach the Mokha-Taiz GLOC, which is approximately 40 kilometers to the southwest. The Houthis could, in theory, outflank and isolate government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coastal front by advancing towards the Mokha-Taiz GLOC, which supplies government forces operating on that front. Such an

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

advance would compound the pressure on government-aligned forces by threatening both their positions on the Red Sea coast and the routes needed to sustain them. The Houthis may also be attempting to impose an operational dilemma on Yemeni government-aligned forces by attempting to establish positions southwest of the GLOC and requiring Yemeni government-aligned military officers to divert forces from other efforts to respond to Houthi infiltrations further southwest. ISW-CTP continues to assess that recent Houthi advances in Lahij Governorate are part of a Houthi campaign that is designed to confront the Yemeni government with simultaneous dilemmas that are intended to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts.[43]

US and Partner Military Operations

See topline section.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups, may be expanding the geographic scope of its kinetic operations into coastal southeastern Iran. The MPF claimed on November 3 that it attacked alleged Fatemiyoun fighters at a government school in Konarak, which is a port city on southeastern Iran's Makran Coast, on November 2.[44] The Fatemiyoun Division is an IRGC Quds Force-controlled Afghan Shia militia that conducts internal security operations in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, where the MPF is active.[45] ISW-CTP has previously observed MPF activity around Khash, Saravan, and Zahedan in recent weeks, although the group has never officially operated in Konarak before.[46] The IRGC Ground Forces Quds Operational Base, which is a local IRGC command headquarters, claimed on November 2 that Iranian forces ambushed an unspecified cell before it could attack security forces' positions and establish a roadblock on the Zarabad-Konarak road, killing one fighter and arresting several others.[47] The shared location, timing, and incident details suggest that the MPF and IRGC may be describing the same engagement, which would indicate that the cell in question belonged to the MPF. The two incidents may also be distinct, which would indicate a more active MPF presence in the Konarak area.

Continued MPF activity along the Makran Coast could disrupt Iranian maritime operations and economic

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

projects and force Iran to deploy additional forces to the area amid its broader confrontation with the United States. Konarak and the nearby port city of Chabahar host Iranian naval and air force stations, including Chabahar Air Base, which support Iranian strikes on vessels and drone operations in the Gulf of Oman.[48] Iran views the Makran Coast and its port cities, particularly Chabahar, as a crucial economic outlet to the Indian Ocean, as well as way stations for trade routes extending to Afghanistan and Central Asia.[49]

Iran may be reinforcing its security forces in southeastern Iran in response to continued militant attacks there. Iranian media reported on November 3 that an unspecified hostile group killed one member of the Artesh Ground Forces 377th Mobile Offensive Brigade and wounded another soldier in southeastern Iran.[50] The presence of 377th Brigade forces, who are normally based in northeastern Iran's Khorasan Razavi Province, may indicate that Iran has deployed forces from outside the province to reinforce security operations.[51] Iranian media separately reported that unidentified gunmen killed a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Criminal Investigation Officer in Saravan on November 3.[52] The MPF also claimed on November 3 that it killed an LEC Special Units field commander in Saravan.[53] These two reports likely describe the same incident involving MPF fighters and LEC personnel. The MPF also claimed to kill an IRGC commander and three unspecified companions in Golshan on November 3.[54]

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.


Iraq

US Ambassador to Iraq Steven Fagin told Iraqi officials that the United States will sanction Iraq if the government fails to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias by June 30, 2027, according to informed sources speaking to Iraqi media on November 3.[55] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi had pushed for an extension to the original September 30 disarmament deadline after failing to make significant progress in disarming the militias.[56] The Iraqi federal government, including Zaydi himself and the Shia Coordination Framework, continues to negotiate with the Iraqi militias over the details of the government's disarmament plan, even though many of the most kinetically active militias continue to refuse to disarm.[57]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to advance into central Jawf Governorate on November 3. Geolocated footage showed Yemeni government-aligned forces from the First Emergency Brigade recapturing a previously Houthi-controlled position near Jabal Dahida, which is a mountain range southeast of Jawf Governorate's capital at al Hazm, on November 3.[58] Yemeni government-aligned forces likely advanced to Jabal Dahida from positions further south at Jabal Huwayshian.[59] Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely attempting to recapture territory in central Jawf Governorate as part of an effort to set conditions to recapture al Hazm.[60]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



The Houthis claimed that they struck Saudi civilian and military airports in Saudi Arabia on November 3.[61] The Houthis claimed that they struck Abha International Airport with one drone and King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait with one ballistic missile.[62] Saudi Joint Forces Command spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki separately announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted one Houthi drone over Mecca Province on November 3.[63] The Houthis have not claimed the attack in Mecca Province at the time of this writing. The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure, including civilian airports, as part of an ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which involve significant economic concessions.[64]

POWERED BY: BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-irans-qeshm-island-as-trump-talks-down-war-risks-79d73d3d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3
[2]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-irans-qeshm-island-as-trump-talks-down-war-risks-79d73d3d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3
[3]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-irans-qeshm-island-as-trump-talks-down-war-risks-79d73d3d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3
[4] https://www.axios.com/2026/08/31/trump-iran-war-hormuz-hegseth-centcom
[5]
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/10/30/resumed-iran-war-after-midterms-would-put-fragile-gains-hormuz-test/ ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-11-2026 ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-14-2026 ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-30-2026
[6]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-irans-qeshm-island-as-trump-talks-down-war-risks-79d73d3d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3
[7]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-irans-qeshm-island-as-trump-talks-down-war-risks-79d73d3d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3
[8] https://x.com/Osint613/status/2115921223003885599 ;
https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2115926584016134359 ;
https://t.me/farsna/471651
[9] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2113040275610452249 ; https://t.me/Iranian_Militarism/95294 ;
https://t.me/Iranian_Militarism/95217 ;
https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/middle-east/artc-one-killed-eight-injured-after-latest-houthi-attack-on-saudi-arabia-s-king-fahd-airport-live-blog
[10]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-irans-qeshm-island-as-trump-talks-down-war-risks-79d73d3d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3
[11]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-irans-qeshm-island-as-trump-talks-down-war-risks-79d73d3d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3
[12] https://t.me/farsna/472233
[13] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2093131928023023729?s=20
[14] https://alhurra dot com/en/51175
[15] https://alhurra dot com/en/51175
[16] https://alhurra dot com/en/51175
[17] https://x.com/Osint613/status/2085511215787254160
[18]
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-27-2026/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-27-2026/ ;
https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2115075386610442481 ;
https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2115045210677977326
[21] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7-

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%AF ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq
[22] https://amwaj.media/en/article/what-s-left-unsaid-about-iran-s-influence-in-iraq ; https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq
[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/ ; https://alhurra dot com/en/32307
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/
[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/
[26] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/01/world/middleeast/iran-proxies-war-oil.html
[27] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/01/world/middleeast/iran-proxies-war-oil.html
[28] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/الخليج/5301331-مصادر-غربية-تتحدث-عن-مقتل-ستة-مستشارين-إيرانيين ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/
[29] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[30] https://alhurra dot com/en/51175
[31] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-are-attacking-saudi-arabia-iraq-sources-say-2026-07-30/ ; https://alhurra dot com/en/32307 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/ ; https://thenewregion dot com/posts/6507 ; https://www.arabnews dot com/middle-east/iraq-finds-drone-launchers-near-iran-border-security-sources-3001417
[32] https://www.iraqinews dot com/iraq/iraq-resumes-trade-through-border-crossings-with-iran/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/452526/
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/
[34] https://alhurra dot com/en/47490 ; https://almadapaper dot net/457787/
[35] https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2117425196202164530 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2117353211745182146 ; DNGTS: https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/353241 ; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2117647649474216003 ; https://x.com/Alii4ptm/status/2117650489433301256?a=RyKHlYsrdIYcLOP8p_8&s=20 ; https://t.me/Alibk3/40681 ; https://x.com/hossam_basha70/status/2117670422250697134?a=3pejblJjJyzlPXN4nKv8&s=20
[36] https://x.com/AB4_Ali3/status/2117206454373323254?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/ ; https://x.com/ALQhoom2020/status/2117051386106097756?s=20
[37] https://t.me/Alibk3/40681 ; https://x.com/hossam_basha70/status/2117670422250697134?a=3pejblJjJyzlPXN4nKv8&s=20 ;

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

https://x.com/Alii4ptm/status/2117650489433301256?a=RyKHlYsrdIYcLOP8p_8&s=20 ;
https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2117425196202164530 ;
https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2117353211745182146 ; DNGTS: https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/353241
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/
[39] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117009029838807418
[40] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117696866838360452 ;
https://x.com/tzalivia/status/2117691633755955299
[41] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5336882-معارك-ضد-الحوثيين-في-جبهات-باب-المندب-ولحج
42]] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5336882-معارك-ضد-الحوثيين-في-جبهات-باب-المندب-ولحج
43]] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/
[44] https://t.me/jmmfront/208
[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-crisis-update-february-3-2023/ ;
https://farsi.alarabiya dot net/amp/iran/2026/10/01/استقرار-فاطميون-در-بلوچستان-گشت-های-مسلحانه-در-سراوان-و-زاهدان-
46]] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-28-2026/ ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-8-2026
[47] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/874414
[48]
https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library—content–migration/files/research-papers/2023/04/watching-iran-the-isr-gulf.pdf
[49]
https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-sign-10-year-pact-with-iran-chabahar-port-management-et-reports-2024-05-13/
[50] https://t.me/defapress_ir/71285
[51] https://t.me/defapress_ir/71285
[52] https://t.me/farsna/472198 ; https://t.me/mehrnews/428427
[53] https://t.me/jmmfront/210
[54] https://t.me/jmmfront/208
[55] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84
[56]
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/world/middleeast/iraq-prime-minister-interview-disarm-militias.html
[57] https://almadapaper dot net/459563/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/950137/%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9 ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iranian-backed-iraqi-militias-seek-to-undermine-baghdads-disarmament-efforts/
[58] https://x.com/Of3uu/status/2117564191762444552?a=j0TFgWrdv4gtTqQaNPo&s=20
[59] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2116864826106421746 ;
https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/2116904378896445944?a=4IaORbK900NVfimwJAs&s=20
[60] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/
[61] https://t.me/army21ye/4007
[62] https://t.me/army21ye/4007 ; https://t.me/army21ye/4007
[63] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2117544016397160721
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-1-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-riyadh-airport-and-saudi-oil-pipeline/4100562 ;
https://t.me/army21ye/3948 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3934 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/loud-booms-heard-near-saudi-aramco-headquarters-dhahran-sources-say-2026-10-13/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-25-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iran Update, November 4, 2026

William Doran, Adham Fattah, Ben Rezaei, Nidal Morrison, Shealtiel Kiser, Kinser Rafert, Parker Hempel, Brian Carter


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. Iranian leaders view the US midterm election results from November 3 as evidence that Iran's military strategy imposed political costs on the sitting US administration. These leaders do not believe that the elections will lead to any fundamental shift in the US approach to Iran.
2. Iran is using suboptimal systems to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. US military overmatch is currently preventing Iran from significantly decreasing the transit of civilian tankers through the Strait, however.
3. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hezbollah advisers are reportedly stationed within Yemen to advise the Houthis on various military efforts and capabilities that primarily serve Iran's strategic objectives.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Toplines

Iranian leaders view the US midterm election results from November 3 as evidence that Iran's military strategy imposed political costs on the sitting US administration. These leaders do not believe that the elections will lead to any fundamental shift in the US approach to Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said in a November 4 statement that Iran's actions in the Strait of Hormuz and against US military bases demonstrated US weakness and the success of Iran's resistance.[1] Mojtaba also warned that changes in US political leadership would not alter Washington's approach toward Iran and that even a "slight tendency" toward surrender would only encourage further US "audacity."[2] Mojtaba's remarks suggest that Iran will maintain its maximalist demands regardless of the US election results, which senior Iranian officials have portrayed as evidence of the success of Iran's strategy. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei separately said on November 4 that Iran had inflicted a "political defeat."[3] Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also said on November 4 that American voters had rejected the war due to concerns about morality or the cost of living.[4]The beliefs of these senior leaders suggest that Iran will maintain its maximalist demands because Iranian leaders do not expect changes in US political leadership to alter Washington's approach toward Iran. Iranian leaders therefore likely believe that Iran must secure its gains regardless of the result of the midterms.

Iran is using suboptimal systems to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. US military overmatch is currently preventing Iran from significantly decreasing the transit of civilian

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

tankers through the Strait, however. Iran has begun to use unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and limpet mines to attack ships in recent weeks, according to the *Wall Street Journal* (*WSJ*).All these systems are suboptimal relative to the comparatively advanced anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles and drones Iran used earlier in the conflict. Limpet mines must be attached to a ship by a person approaching the vessel, RPGs will do only limited damage to a large vessel's hull and lack range, and known Iranian UUV capabilities presently lack the scale and sophistication required to be an optimal way to disrupt shipping. Iran's ability to sense shipping is also suboptimal compared to coastal radars Iran used at the start of the conflict. Iranian military personnel on small craft are observing and relaying back the position of vessels, which is far less effective than coastal radar or other sensors if the target is moving.[5] Iran's reliance on these suboptimal systems will only persist as long as the US military is present, however. Iran could acquire new radars, for example, if US aircraft stopped destroying them.

Iran may develop its UUVs into a more effective system if given time. UUVs are technically complex due to the requirement to control the system underwater at long range.[6] Iran's current UUV platforms — at least as of 2022 — use a combination of rudimentary guidance systems and torpedo designs with slower, longer-range specifications meant primarily for anchored targets.[7] Iranian naval forces may have since adapted their UUVs to better hit moving targets. Iran presumably would have used UUVs earlier in the conflict if they were an optimal way to disrupt shipping.

ISW-CTP and Western media have observed an uptick in attacks on ships in the strait over the past month, which is consistent with ISW-CTP's assessment that Iran may have partially reconstituted certain capabilities or is experimenting with new methods to retain a credible threat in the strait.[8] US military efforts have nonetheless been successful in escorting ships carrying oil through the strait. US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated on October 30 that US forces have escorted over 3,000 commercial vessels through the strait and have facilitated the transit of approximately 1.5 billion barrels of oil since this summer, for example.[9] *WSJ* similarlyreported on October 29 that US efforts in recent weeks have enabled oil exports in the Gulf to surpass prewar levels.[10]

It is likely that Iran will invest in its unmanned capabilities in the long term, as it seeks to rebuild its naval capabilities to threaten shipping in the strait given the limitations of its conventional naval capabilities against the United States. The combined US-Israeli force repeatedly struck conventional Iranian naval vessels, effectively sinking the entirety of Iran's surface fleet by March 11.[11] Persistent US strikes have also largely suppressed missile and drone attacks, as suggested by Iran's reliance on these suboptimal systems. ISW-CTP assessed in March that all future attempts by the Iranian navy to blockade the Strait of Hormuz will likely employ unconventional forces such as small boats, unmanned surface vessels (USVs), and UUVs.[12] Iran may also seek to develop, expand, and diversify its use of space, air, surface, and sub-sea sensors to improve its ability to detect and fix vessels. Iran would also likely replace its current suboptimal manned spotting capabilities with more accurate autonomous sensors where possible long term. It could also use human spotters hidden among fishing vessels in the Strait of Hormuz to tip and cue more bespoke sensors in the future.

Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hezbollah advisers are reportedly stationed within Yemen to advise the Houthis on various military efforts and capabilities that primarily serve Iran's strategic objectives.[13] The Yemeni Interior Ministry announced on November 3 that 14 IRGC officers and seven Hezbollah officials are currently deployed as advisers across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen.[14] **These advisers notably include IRGC Quds Force Brigadier General Abdolreza Shahlai, who is a long-serving emissary to the Houthis and is responsible for the deaths of US servicemembers in Iraq.**[15] Shahlai is one of several senior

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

IRGC and Hezbollah officials stationed in Sanaa, the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital, and is responsible for Houthi coordination with Iran and other Axis of Resistance groups.[16] Iran is supporting the Houthi campaign in part because Houthi attacks in Saudi Arabia affect the global energy markets and increase the economic and political pressure on the United States to end the war against Iran.[17]

Most of the identified IRGC and Hezbollah advisers who are currently stationed in Yemen belong to one of three main advisory subject areas that correspond to Iranian objectives.[18] Shahlai and a diplomacy-focused adviser, Ali Mohammad Ramazani, likely advise the Houthis at the strategic level and liaise with the IRGC.[19] Many other officials are based in Hudaydah and focus on developing Houthi submersible and surface naval drones, maritime surveillance, and other naval capabilities.[20] These advisers are improving Houthi technical capabilities to attack shipping both now and in the future, and Iran surely hopes that the Houthis can support Iranian efforts to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea in future conflicts. The Iranian regime is currently using unmanned systems like UUVs and USVs to attack commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz (see above). Another set of advisers, primarily stationed in Amran and Saada governorates, focus on long-range drones and missiles, which are critical to Houthi strike campaigns against Saudi Arabia.[21] Current Houthi attacks in Saudi Arabia likely seek to force Saudi Arabia out of the war in Yemen or to accede to Houthi objectives, but future Iranian campaigns may seek to encourage the Houthis to disrupt the energy markets for other reasons by targeting Saudi Arabia.[22]

A final group of advisers supports both Iranian external and Houthi domestic objectives. Hezbollah officials such as Bilal Ahmad Chiblak and Abbas Ali Haidar specialize in military communications encryption, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic warfare (EW), for example.[23] These tools can be useful for targeting shipping but are also important to Houthi ground campaigns against the Yemeni government. Houthi fighters used EW, including imitative communications deception (ICD) designed to saturate Yemeni government communications channels with false orders during efforts to capture terrain surrounding Taiz City on October 15 and during the Houthi Red Sea coastal offensive in early September.[24] Hezbollah has deployed SIGINT capabilities for decades, including intercepting Israeli military communications for psychological operations during the 2006 Lebanon War, and is likely assisting the Houthis in developing tactical EW systems.[25]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Nothing significant to report.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The regime is continuing its efforts to expand the forces it can use to suppress domestic unrest, both from potential protests and anti-regime militancy. IRGC Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Unit Commander Brigadier General Hassan Hassanzadeh announced on November 2 that the IRGC has organized, trained, and armed the first Iranian "Janfada" ("Those Who Sacrifice Their Lives") brigade, which has begun practical weapons training and field exercises.[26] The Janfada campaign is a Basij recruitment and mobilization effort designed to bolster support for the regime during wartime and increase the number of the regime's security forces.[27] Hassanzadeh added that the Basij plans to deploy fighters in this brigade to southern and western Iran, where the regime faces threats to its stability from anti-regime militant groups, from November 19 to November 25.[28] IRGC Basij Organization Training Chief Ali Kowsari separately stated on November 2 that 1,500 Janfada training bases will begin operating in provinces and cities across Iran with the aim of training one million volunteers.[29] These latest efforts also reflect the regime's longstanding concern with the outbreak of protests. Mojtaba appointed Hossein Taeb as Basij commander on August 10 and tasked him with making "every Iranian a Basiji" to confront domestic security threats, including the mobilization of Iranian citizens.[30]

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi likely withdrew the draft Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law from parliament for further revision after his recent disagreements with multiple Shia Coordination Framework members over some of the law's amendments. An informed source told Iraqi media on November 3 that Zaydi withdrew the draft PMF bill from parliament to rewrite "contentious clauses" and reach an unspecified compromise that preserves the "core" of the proposed PMF restructuring.[31] The text of the draft PMF law that Zaydi withdrew is not public, but sources told Qatari-owned regional media on October 7 that the draft PMF law includes amendments that would reduce the PMF's powers and prevent it from competing with the Iraqi Army.[32] ISW-CTP previously assessed on August 26 that Zaydi is attempting to reform the PMF through an amended draft PMF Law that could fulfill US objectives regarding militia disarmament and simultaneously consolidate his individual power as prime minister.[33] Zaydi's withdrawal of the law comes after Iraqi media reported on October 6 that Zaydi and several unidentified Shia Coordination Framework members disagreed on several amendments to the PMF draft law, despite Zaydi's office claiming on September 29 that the Iraqi government sent the bill to parliament.[34] Zaydi may, therefore, attempt to revise the draft PMF law in a way that resolves his outstanding disagreements with the framework over some of the law's amendments before re-submitting it to parliament. Zaydi may also calculate that these revisions could improve the odds that parliament will approve the draft PMF law, given that framework parties constitute the largest parliamentary bloc.[35]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.


The Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission (FIC) launched an investigation on November 4 into Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah's manipulation of government contracts to serve the militia's financial interests.[36] Unspecified sources told Saudi media on November 4 that Kataib Hezbollah has used shell companies to secure Iraqi government contracts in the aviation, transportation, and contracting sectors to funnel public funds to militia interests.[37] Kataib Hezbollah has long siphoned money from Iraqi government contracts that it previously secured using shell companies, according to the US Department of the Treasury.[38] The FIC's investigation comes as Zaydi attempts to disrupt Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' financial networks.[39]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis have reportedly conducted limited cross-border raids on Saudi border security posts in southwestern Saudi Arabia in recent months. Two Western and regional officials told UK-based media on November 2 that the Houthis have conducted various attacks, including limited ground incursions and raids, targeting Saudi border security posts near the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border, most recently in late October 2026.[40] Saudi Arabia has sought international military assistance, namely from Pakistan, to defend its borders in recent weeks, likely in response to these purported Houthi cross-border raids.[41] The Houthis previously conducted ground incursions into Saudi Arabia during the earlier stages of the Yemeni Civil War and previous conflicts with Saudi Arabia as early as 2009.[42]


The Houthis are likely relying on first-person view (FPV) drone technology to provide Houthi fighters with reconnaissance and targeting data for the reported cross-border raids into Saudi territory. Houthi FPV drones have repeatedly attacked Saudi positions near the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border since August 2026, typically dropping mortar shells or other small explosive payloads on military targets.[43] FPV drones can serve as both strike platforms and reconnaissance assets to collect precise imagery and video data on potential targets and then strike those targets if needed. Hezbollah has used FPV drones for reconnaissance, strikes, and battle damage assessments on Israeli military assets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel, for example.[44] The Houthis are likely to be exploiting FPV drones' capabilities for similar intelligence and strike purposes along the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Yemeni government-aligned forces have continued to advance and capture Houthi positions with Saudi close air support (CAS) in Jawf Governorate. Geolocated video footage published on November 4 showed Yemeni government-aligned forces at several positions in the vicinity of Jabal Dahida, which is a small mountain range about 75 miles east of the Jawf Governorate capital at al Hazm.[45] Saudi forces also conducted airstrikes on Houthi positions in the vicinity of Jabal Dahida on November 3 and 4, which suggests that Saudi CAS may have assisted Yemeni government-aligned ground forces in capturing terrain.[46] The Yemeni government likely intends to capture Jabal Dahida and other mountainous areas in central Jawf Governorate as part of a shaping operation that, if successful, could facilitate a Yemeni government offensive to recapture al Hazm.[47] The Houthis could otherwise exploit positions in the mountains east of al Hazm to spot and coordinate missile and artillery fire on Yemeni government-aligned forces advancing westward through open desert toward the city.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



The Houthis are continuing to conduct ballistic missile strikes on Yemeni government-aligned forces' staging areas and bases to disrupt the government's efforts to train forces and reinforce active frontlines. Yemeni media and independent Yemeni journalists reported on November 4 that the Houthis fired a ballistic missile targeting a Yemeni government military camp in Qatabah District in southern Yemen's Dhalea Governorate.[48] The strike reportedly killed at least 11 Yemeni government-aligned soldiers and wounded at least 60 others.[49] The Houthis also claimed that the group fired a ballistic missile targeting Yemeni government-aligned forces at a staging area along the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in southern Lahij Governorate, about 30 kilometers northwest of Aden.[50] These strikes are consistent with the Houthis' ongoing efforts to disrupt Yemeni government efforts to organize and deploy forces for counteroffensives against the Houthis across Yemen.[51] The strikes also come amid Saudi and Yemeni government air campaign efforts to degrade Houthi frontline forces and weaken the group's ability to maintain the initiative by striking reinforcements and staging areas.[52]

The Houthis claimed they struck King Khalid International Airport and Saudi military installations on November 4.[53] The Houthis claimed that they struck King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Akfa military camp in Najran Province, and a Saudi Border Guard headquarters and a radar in Jizan Province with multiple ballistic missiles and one drone.[54] ISW-CTP cannot verify the Houthis' claims at the time of this writing. Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki separately announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted one Houthi drone over southern Saudi Arabia on November 3.[55] The targets of these attacks, including command centers and radars, suggest that the Houthis may be attempting to disrupt Saudi forces' ability to detect and respond to attacks in

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

southwestern Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have also repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure, including civilian airports, as part of an ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands.[56]

POWERED BY: BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] https://rahbar dot ir/speech?cid=2330

[2] https://rahbar dot ir/speech?cid=2330

[3]https://x.com/ir_rezaee/status/2118021156846678139

[4] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2117848485580128287

[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-turns-to-guerrilla-tactics-in-bid-to-reassert-grip-on-strait-of-hormuz-f10da428?st=GxTbZ5

[6] https://gdmissionsystems.com/underwater-vehicles

[7] https://www.hisutton.com/Iran-IRGC-Weaponized-UUV.html

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/attacks-tankers-hormuz-hit-highest-any-week-since-start-iran-war-sources-say-2026-10-07/; https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incidents ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-8-2026

[9] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2116128769190859099

[10] https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/inside-the-u-s-militarys-open-ended-mission-to-keep-gulf-oil-flowing-0f4cbbc4

[11] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031700131687379148?s=20

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-4-2026/

[13] https://moi-gov-ye dot org/view/9363 ; https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=D1OkduiQnOwNO1CCPYk&s=20

[14] https://moi-gov-ye dot org/view/9363 ; https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=D1OkduiQnOwNO1CCPYk&s=20 ; https://x.com/alekhbariyatv/status/2117644902959886703

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[15] https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/abdul-reza-shahlai/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/world/africa/02iht-iraq.4.6449863.html ; https://www.stimson.org/2024/houthis-red-sea-shipping-us-uk/ ; https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=E5z4O53y9dwwzkM_NBw&s=20

[16] https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=t7mjEZU9cfmT-yICqyc&s=20

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/

[18] https://moi-gov-ye dot org/view/9363 ; https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=D1OkduiQnOwNO1CCPYk&s=20 ; https://x.com/alekhbariyatv/status/2117644902959886703

[19] https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=kY7j1frOEEk5trD1Uic&s=20

[20] https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=kY7j1frOEEk5trD1Uic&s=20

[21] https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=6QJMCt4bs27tquVGJ0U&s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-13-2026/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/loud-booms-heard-near-saudi-aramco-headquarters-dhahran-sources-say-2026-10-13/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-15-2026/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-17-2026/

[23] https://x.com/AlmasdaronlineE/status/2117669714637828225?a=U28r9z_Jmn7vi_c8_pg&s=20

[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-16-2026/ ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2110889541363998883?s=20 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2097862335494795579

[25] https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/853a7fcc-1d1a-443c-b038-029ad66bc3f4/content , p. 49 ; Nicholas Blanford, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel*, pp. 342-44

[26] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/874363/

[27] https://iranwire.com/en/news/158047-exclusive-many-military-and-government-officials-oppose-expansion-of-jan-fada-campaign/

[28] https://iranwire.com/en/politics/136473-khameneis-basij-pipe-dreams-killing-netanyahu-enforcing-hijab-fighting-abortion-etc-etc/ ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/874363/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-2-2026

[29] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1405081107328/

[30] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-august-13-2026

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[31] https://964media dot com/732723

[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-7-2026/ ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/exclusive-iraq-revises-pmf-law-curb-powers-after-us-pressure

[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-26-2026/

[34] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/-خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة ; https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/iraq/1079513

[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-18-2025/ ; https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/e33475ade87c41a58795bd544c7c1179

[36] https://ina dot iq/ar/local/278295-.html ; https://www.alarabiya dot net/aswaq/iraq-economy/2026/11/04/العراق-رصد-تلاعب-بعقود-وزارة-النقل-والمطارات-لصالح-جهات-مسلحة-خارجة-عن-القانون

[37] https://www.alarabiya dot net/aswaq/iraq-economy/2026/11/04/-العراق-رصد-تلاعب-بعقود-وزارة-النقل-والمطارات-لصالح-جهات-مسلحة-خارجة-عن-القانون

[38] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0277

[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2026-2/ ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-PM-appoints-new-central-bank-governor-investment-chief

[40] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/houthis-launched-cross-border-raids-saudi-arabian-military-posts-sources-say

[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudis-plan-assault-houthis-break-red-sea-chokehold-2026-10-02/

[42] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/yemen-focus-houthis-escalate-attacks-infiltrate-saudi-kingdom ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/saudi-arabia/tracker-saudi-arabias-military-operations-along-yemeni-border

[43] https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2090790825730990287?s=20 ; https://x.com/BobMilOSINT/status/2112690188400943555?s=20 ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2112582381102408124?a=sgCtMS6mK9Zcq3JAg7E&s=20 ; https://x.com/BobMilOSINT/status/2117986473777475860?a=VIS0Iw90HtX7qGyzhtU&s=20

[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-25-2026/

[45] https://x.com/alkumaim_m/status/2117959938060189783 ; https://x.com/20Yusef20/status/2117903436704284915?a=lKI9AcL-mZxNR3kInlY&s=20 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2117918150675345545?a=-GdTtBL2QowGzsvzvRQ&s=20 ; https://x.com/Of3uu/status/2117959294943367642?a=lBep52ZGZO67oNIaKYE&s=20

[46] https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2117965717517574187 ; https://x.com/tom_bike/status/2117974695655907783?a=nQb02kdJTMsgeCLp8qE&s=20

[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[48] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117964836508463329?s=20 ; https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/353280 ; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2117906756177441190

[49] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117964836508463329?s=20

[50] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2117999569653076102?a=4yNHojvlUMG36_ybzwU&s=20

[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-20-2026/

[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-30-2026/ ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2117825013067772032 ; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2117870676753420294

[53] https://t.me/army21ye/4012 , https://t.me/army21ye/4013

[54] https://t.me/army21ye/4012 , https://t.me/army21ye/4013

[55] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2117702041615188004

[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-riyadh-airport-and-saudi-oil-pipeline/4100562 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3948 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3934 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/loud-booms-heard-near-saudi-aramco-headquarters-dhahran-sources-say-2026-10-13/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iran Update, November 5, 2026

Carolyn Moorman, Bailey Pasternak, Katherine Wells, Parker Hempel, Kinser Rafert, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. The Houthis are seeking to end Saudi Arabia's involvement in the war in Yemen by demanding Saudi recognition of Houthi sovereignty, which would create conditions for the Houthis to advance their grand strategic objective of controlling all of Yemen. The Houthis have structured a campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its military intervention in Yemen, which would undermine the Yemeni government's ability to resist future Houthi efforts to seize the rest of the country.
2. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly sidelined Shia Coordination Framework leaders from engaging in disarmament negotiations with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, which is part of Zaydi's continued efforts to balance between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.
3. Kataib Hezbollah appears to be attempting to counter Zaydi's efforts to balance between the United States and the militias by stoking tensions between Zaydi and the Shia Coordination Framework. The framework has multiple political tools to thwart Zaydi's endeavors.
4. Current indicators suggest that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-directed militia cells conducted drone reconnaissance of the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27.
5. Iran reportedly sought to acquire Russian military equipment in 2023 and 2024 that could support the regime's counterinsurgency efforts.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Toplines

The Houthis are seeking to end Saudi Arabia's involvement in the war in Yemen by demanding Saudi recognition of Houthi sovereignty, which would create conditions for the Houthis to advance their grand strategic objective of controlling all of Yemen. Sources briefed on negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis told the *Wall Street Journal* on November 4 that, shortly after the Houthis' assault on the Red Sea coast on September 9 and 10, the Houthis demanded that Saudi Arabia recognize the Houthis' sovereignty over all of Yemen as part of an agreement to end the current war.[1] The Houthis resumed their war with Saudi Arabia in July 2026 after exploiting the window of opportunity presented by Saudi attempts to prevent the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) from landing in Sanaa.[2] The Houthis have since demanded that Saudi Arabia grant them significant concessions that would alleviate the dire economic conditions in Houthi-controlled territory.[3] The Houthis' reported demand that Saudi Arabia recognize the Houthis' sovereignty over Yemen indicates that the Houthis also seek the end of Saudi Arabia's involvement in Yemen as one of their war aims. Saudi Arabia initially intervened in Yemen in March 2015 to restore the internationally recognized government of Yemen's control over the country following the Houthi capture of Sanaa and advance on Aden.[4] Saudi Arabia has since supported numerous armed factions aligned with the Yemeni government to combat the Houthis in Yemen.[5] Saudi military involvement in the current conflict, primarily through close air support for partner forces on the ground, has enabled Yemeni government-aligned counteroffensives against the Houthis, including the counteroffensive along the Red Sea coastal plain in early October 2026.[6] Saudi withdrawal from the conflict would seriously cripple the coalition of

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

forces fighting for the internationally recognized Yemeni government and enable future Houthi offensives to destroy such groups and attempt to seize all of Yemen.[7]

The Houthis have structured a campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its military intervention in Yemen, which would undermine the Yemeni government's ability to resist future Houthi efforts to seize the rest of the country. The Houthis initiated their campaign by imposing a blockade on Saudi shipping in July 2026.[8] The group switched tactics after the blockade failed to produce desired effects and intensified a strike campaign against Saudi critical infrastructure, including oil facilities and airports.[9] Houthi attacks have, at times, temporarily disrupted the kingdom's ability to export oil and have targeted major civilian centers.[10] The Houthis have simultaneously launched a ground offensive that seeks to capture Taiz City and terrain along the Red Sea coast that, if successful, sets the conditions for future Houthi campaigns.[11] Houthi presence near the Bab al Mandeb improves the Houthis' capabilities to target Saudi shipping in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have long sought to consolidate control over all of Yemen as a grand strategic objective, and the economic concessions that they have sought from Saudi Arabia advance this objective.[12]The Houthis institutionally subscribe to an ideology based on the Jaroudi school of Zaydi Shia Islam, which the group believes grants them a divine right to rule over not just Yemen, but also territories controlled by Saudi Arabia and beyond.[13] The Houthis' current demands from Saudi Arabia in this war, including the lifting of the Saudi "blockade" on shipping and securing control over Yemen's oil and gas resources, set conditions for total Houthi control over Yemen, because some degree of economic stability is necessary for the Houthis to maintain control over their territory.[14] The Houthi demands to lift Saudi restrictions on shipping and grant Houthi access to Yemen's oil and gas resources also reflect the Houthis' insistence that Saudi Arabia recognize their sovereignty over Yemeni territory, which includes its critical infrastructure.[15] The Houthis have also rejected multiple Saudi ceasefire offers in recent months, including offers that reportedly included the removal of Saudi restrictions on Houthi-controlled ports and airports for humanitarian purposes and $1 billion USD in reparations.[16] The Houthis' rejection of the offers likely reflects the group's assessment that such concessions do not satisfy their broader objective of securing recognition of their authority over all of Yemen.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly sidelined Shia Coordination Framework leaders from engaging in disarmament negotiations with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, which is part of Zaydi's continued efforts to balance between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.[17] Leaders within the framework have been negotiating with the militias for several months. Unidentified sources suggested to Iraqi media on November 5 that Zaydi has sidelined the framework committee from engaging in negotiations with the militias on an unspecified date after September 30 by rejecting a written agreement that framework leaders reached with the militias that outlined conditions for disarmament and established a timeline for the militias to disarm.[18] The militias' demands reportedly included a complete Turkish withdrawal from Iraq and the exile of anti-Iranian regime groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan.[19] The militias have consistently conditioned their disarmament on Baghdad's fulfillment of such conditions, which ISW-CTP has assessed indicates that the militias have no intention of disarming. Zaydi's concerns with the negotiating committee are related to the orientation of the committee.[20] The four framework members on the committee have long-standing ties with Iran and the Iraqi militias, including State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri.[21] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Zaydi's pursuit of his own negotiations with the militias reflects his desire to make decisions independent of the framework but could also support US aims for the development of a sovereign and independent Iraq.[22] Previous reporting did not suggest that Zaydi's pursuit of separate negotiations amounts to actions that completely sideline the framework, which rejecting the framework's agreement with the militias would effectively achieve.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Zaydi's apparent rejection of the framework's agreement with the militias while he pursues independent negotiations with them suggests that the agreement does not meet US demands for the militias' disarmament. Zaydi has proven his willingness in recent months to act on, or at least consider, courses of action that are contrary to the interests of Iranian-backed actors in order to counter the militias and meet US objectives.[23] Kataib Hezbollah Security Chief Abu Mujahid Aasaf's November 3 statement called on Zaydi to release the signed disarmament agreement between the Iraqi militias and the framework.[24] Kataib Hezbollah's demand for Zaydi to release the agreement, despite the group's repeated rejection of disarmament, suggests that the agreement does not meaningfully disarm the militias or leaves sufficient room for the militias to circumvent its terms. Kataib Hezbollah may calculate that Zaydi releasing the agreement could undermine Zaydi's standing with the United States by portraying him as inadequately addressing US demands, which could further complicate Zaydi's efforts to balance between US pressure for disarmament and the militia actors in Iraq.[25]

The success of Zaydi's efforts to convince the United States to accept Iraqi militia participation in the Iraqi federal government reportedly bolstered Zaydi's decision to pursue independent negotiations with the militias and circumvent the framework.[26] The federal government recently granted individuals affiliated with three Iraqi militias control over some ministries, which ISW-CTP assessed was likely meant to incentivize militias that have already offered to disarm to fully comply with the process, as well as convince militias rejecting disarmament to comply with the government's efforts.[27] Iraqi media also reported on November 5 that Zaydi rejected the framework's proposed arrangement with Kataib Hezbollah that would offer the militia a myriad of positions in various Iraqi government sectors despite the militia's continued rejection of disarmament.[28] Iraqi militias have historically pursued courses of action intended to increase their infiltration of the Iraqi state, which is a goal shared with Iran.[29] Aasaf denied reports that the group is involved in the federal government or has requested positions within the government.[30] Kataib Hezbollah's political wing, Haquq, controls five seats in the Iraqi Parliament and is part of the framework, however.[31]

Kataib Hezbollah appears to be attempting to counter Zaydi's efforts to balance between the United States and the militias by stoking tensions between Zaydi and the framework. The Iraqi militias have historically attempted to undermine prime ministers that have acted against militia interests.[32] Kataib Hezbollah likely views exacerbating Zaydi-framework tensions as an effective countermeasure to Zaydi's efforts to disarm the militias, given that the framework has multiple political tools to thwart Zaydi's endeavors. Aasaf's November 3 statement accused Zaydi of "tampering" with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law.[33] Zaydi is attempting to reform the PMF through the draft PMF law to fulfill US objectives regarding militia disarmament and simultaneously consolidate his individual power as prime minister.[34] Zaydi reportedly withdrew the draft law from parliament to rewrite "contentious clauses" and reach an unspecified compromise that preserves the "core" of the proposed PMF restructuring, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on November 3.[35] Zaydi's aims reportedly face pushback from multiple framework members, which Kataib Hezbollah may seek to capitalize upon in order to discredit Zaydi.[36] Aasaf recently highlighted accusations against Zaydi for engaging in corruption with US Special Envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack, for example.[37]

Kataib Hezbollah also appears to be trying to discredit Zaydi in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the Iraqi militias and their ability to bear arms following the September 2026 US withdrawal from Iraq. Aasaf claimed in his November 3 statement that unidentified actors, almost certainly referring to the militias, intercepted two aircraft violating Iraqi airspace, one of which Aasaf said the PMF Security Directorate obtained.[38] Kataib Hezbollah urged all Iraqi militias on September 30 to halt all military operations except operations targeting "enemy" aircraft.[39] ISW-CTP has not identified any evidence that supports the veracity of Aasaf's claim at the time of this writing. Iraqi militias have historically used the protection of Iraqi sovereignty, including its airspace, as their raison d'etre.[40] The

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

US withdrawal removed one commonly cited threat to Iraqi sovereignty, but claims of enemy aircraft in Iraqi airspace, regardless of their veracity, allow the militias to continue to use their nationalist veneer to gain Iraqi public support. The militias can also use such claims to portray the Zaydi government as incapable of defending Iraqi sovereignty, thereby arguing that continued militia existence and armament remain necessary amid government efforts to disarm them.

Current indicators suggest that IRGC-directed militia cells conducted drone reconnaissance of the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27.[41] The US Embassy in Baghdad intercepted two surveillance drones, almost certainly launched by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, on October 27.[42] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias repeatedly conducted drone attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad in March and April 2026, including using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to fly through and reconnoiter the embassy.[43] Aasaf stated on November 3 that the Iraqi militias have ceased all military operations and claimed the overflight was a friendly-fire incident.[44] Aasaf added that the militias normally claim their operations, implying that the militias did not conduct the attack.[45] Iraqi media, citing "leaked reports," reported on November 5 that Iran asked Kataib Hezbollah to temporarily suspend its kinetic operations because Iran has formed militia cells that the IRGC directly oversees.[46] One of these cells conducted the overflight of the embassy, according to the "leaked reports."[47] These IRGC-directed cells do not report to the leaders of the established militias and have conducted numerous attacks on neighboring countries in recent months, including with Houthi support.[48] Iran has also reportedly encouraged some of its more established partners to focus on politics instead of kinetic activity in recent months and has prioritized arming and supporting the new cells, which is consistent with the information in "leaked reports."[49]

Iran reportedly sought to acquire Russian military equipment in 2023 and 2024 that could support the regime's counterinsurgency efforts. Iran purchased at least six Mi-28 helicopters and at least 90 helicopter-mounted, APU-9L guided missile launchers from Russia in 2023 and Spring 2024, respectively, according to documents the *Financial Times* received from a Ukrainian private intelligence organization.[50] Iranian Deputy Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mehdi Farahi announced in November 2023 that Iran had "finalized" agreements to purchase at least six Russian Mi-28 helicopters, which can mount APU-9L launchers.[51] An Iranian journalist later shared footage of an Mi-28 in a hangar at an unspecified location in Tehran in January 2026, though it remains unclear whether Iran received the launchers and the guided missiles designated for the launchers.[52] APU-9L launchers are designed for Kh-39 LMUR guided missiles, and it is unclear whether they can accommodate other munitions.[53] The APU-9L system is designed for strikes against stationary and moving targets at ranges of up to 14.5 km, meaning it can be deployed to strike force concentrations, armor, radar stations, or electronic warfare assets, among others.[54] Iran likely sought to acquire these systems to support its counterinsurgency and border security operations, given the systems' limitations. Iran has historically faced anti-regime and insurgent threats along its northwestern and southeastern borders with Kurdish groups and anti-regime Baloch groups, respectively. Iran has previously deployed helicopters for internal security operations, including to target Kurdish insurgent groups near the Iran-Iraq border in July 2026.[55]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Chief Igor Kostyukov in Moscow on November 5 to discuss US-Iran negotiations.[56] Rezaei previously spoke with Putin by phoneon November 2, which ISW-CTP assessed likely reflected an effort by the Iranian regime to ensure Iran's political and military alignment with Iranian partners amid recent reports about imminent US plans to attack Iran.[57] Rezaei's meeting with Putin in Russia may reflect ongoing Iranian efforts to secure Russian support as the United States and Iran remain at odds over any US-Iran agreement. Rezaei characterized the US response to Iran's maximalist demands — which amount to a US surrender — as "inadequate" during his meeting with Putin, for example.[58]

Russia is actively supporting Iran, Iran's regional attack campaign, and Iranian efforts to disrupt global energy markets. Iran reportedly used "Russian-enhanced versions" of Shahed drones and Russian targeting intelligence to attack US forces and assets during the war.[59] Russia is also providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia that aim to constrain the kingdom's ability to export oil and keep oil prices high.[60] Russia's current constraints in its war with Ukraine mean that Russia almost certainly cannot provide Iran with additional significant material or financial support.[61] Rezaei and Putin also discussed the construction of a gas pipeline that would allow Iran to import Russian gas to address domestic gas shortages and resell Russian gas to neighboring countries.[62] Iran and Russia have discussed establishing an Iran-Russia gas pipeline since 2022 and made limited progress on its construction.[63]

Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline section.

Lebanon

Hezbollah is likely attempting to pressure Lebanese judicial officials to halt their current criminal case against Hezbollah members involved in the group's recent illicit military and smuggling activities. A Hezbollah delegation reportedly met with Lebanese Public Prosecutor General Ahmed Rami al Hajj on November 5 to discuss the Lebanese government's ongoing case against 13 Hezbollah members charged with smuggling nearly 800 kilograms of explosives from Syria into Lebanon.[64] The delegation almost certainly aims to coerce Hajj to drop the case.[65] The delegation

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

reportedly told Hajj that any government condemnation of Hezbollah would be “crippling” to the group’s ability to “defend” Lebanon against Israeli activity in southern Lebanon.[66] Hajj and Lebanese Military Court Civilian Commissioner Judge Claude Ghanem are the two key prosecutors involved in the case.[67] Hezbollah has simultaneously threatened the government with unrest and attempted to discredit the government as part of this broader effort to compel Lebanese authorities to return the group’s explosives, drop criminal charges, and abandon disarmament efforts.[68]

The Lebanese judiciary is continuing to advance the Dahr al Baydar case despite Hezbollah pressure and threats, however. The Lebanese Military court interrogated two detained Hezbollah members associated with the case and subsequently issued arrest warrants for both individuals on November 5.[69] The government’s initiation of a case that would prosecute the Hezbollah members involved in weapons smuggling represents a serious government effort to hold Hezbollah accountable to the rule of law.[70]

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula


Saudi close air support (CAS) and the deployment of additional Yemeni government-aligned forces to al Maqatirah District likely enabled Yemeni government-aligned forces to reverse some of the recent Houthi advances in al Maqatirah District. Forces affiliated with the Southern Giants Brigades and National Resistance Forces deployed to al Maqatirah District on November 1.[71] Saudi airstrikes targeted Houthi fighters in the area on November 5.[72] Regional media and independent Yemeni journalists reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured multiple areas in al Maqatirah District, including Hudada and Mabaq on November 5.[73] An independent Yemeni journalist separately reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured Jabal Irf on November 5, which overlooks the last government-controlled sections of the GLOC that extend south toward Aden.[74] Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly recaptured Jabal Irf on November 3, but it is possible that Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to fight against Houthi forces near themountain.[75] Yemeni government-aligned forces separately recaptured territory southwest of al Maqatirah District in the direction of the coastal plain. Independent Yemeni journalists reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured al Zariqa and Rahab on November 5.[76] Houthi forces infiltrated these areas on November 3.[77]

Yemeni government-aligned forces continue to defend against Houthi advances on other fronts. The Houthis launched attacks targeting Yemeni government positions southwest of al Maqatirah District near Jabal Kahbub on November 5.[78] ISW-CTP continues to assess that recent Houthi advances in Lahij Governorate are part of a Houthi campaign that is designed to confront the Yemeni government with simultaneous dilemmas that are intended to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts.[79]


Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to advance into central Jawf Governorate on November 5. An independent Yemeni journalist reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces advancedfurther along the Jabal Dahida mountain range, southeast of Jawf Governorate’s capital at al Hazm, on November 5.[80] Geolocated footage from November 5 shows Yemeni government-aligned forces advancing at least as far as Duhaydat al Aqir, which is part of the mountain range and approximately 75 kilometers from al Hazm.[81] Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely attempting

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

to recapture territory in central Jawf Governorate as part of an effort to set conditions to recapture al Hazm.[82]



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



The Houthis launched a ballistic missile toward Medina and claimed to have struck King Fahd International Airport on November 5. Saudi Joint Forces Command spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile near Medina.[83] The Houthis have consistently denied targeting the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina since beginning their strike campaign against Saudi Arabia, including the November 5 missile interception.[84] Saudi air defenses have nevertheless repeatedly intercepted Houthi missiles and drones in the vicinity of these cities.[85] The Houthis separately claimed to have struck King Fahd International Airport in Dammam with a drone.[86] Saudi Civil Defense also issued early warning alerts in Yanbu and Sharurah provinces on November 5.[87] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure, including civilian airports, as part of an ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen's oil and gas resources (see topline section).[88]

POWERED BY: BABEL STREET

Endnotes

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-has-no-easy-choices-as-it-weighs-how-to-combat-houthi-threat-a4adc358
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/
[4] https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2015/05/the-saudi-arabia-yemen-war-of-2015/392687/ ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/officials-saudi-led-action-in-yemen-relied-heavily-on-us-intelligence/2015/03/26/6d15302c-d3da-11e4-8fce-3941fc548f1c_story.html
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/who-is-fighting-yemen-2026-10-06/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-5-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/
[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-flew-irgc-commanders-missile-gear-yemens-houthis-sources-say-2026-07-23/ ; https://saba dot ye/ar/news3746630.htm ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-20-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/ ; https://t.me/army21ye/3934
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/ ; https://t.me/army21ye/3934
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/why-havent-houthis-irans-allies-yemen-stepped-into-war-20... ; https://www.merip.org/2018/01/how-the-houthis-became-shia/
[13] https://mei.edu/publication/ideological-underpinnings-houthis-red-sea-attacks/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/
[16] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/NewspaperArticles/arab/904576/-ابن—وتركية-ومصرية-أميركية-نصائح-بعد ; https://www.al-akhbar dot com/NewspaperArticles/arab/904897/-الرياض-توسط-سلمان-يطلب-الحوار-مع ; غروندبرغ-لدى-صنعاء–لا-أذن-يمنية-مصغية ; https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-yemen-strikes-mideast-conflict-riyadh-c81a91347c00b17097c8fafde7e4eeec; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/10/26/saudi-arabia-reportedly-offers-houthis-1-billion-in-iran-brokered-deal-to-halt-attacks/
[17] https://almadapaper dot net/459871/
[18] https://almadapaper dot net/459871/
[19] https://almadapaper dot net/459871/
[20] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’
[21] https://almadapaper dot net/459871/ ; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/what-nouri-al-malikis-prime-minister-bid-tells-us-about-iraq ; https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/badr-organization ; https://x.com/MehrnewsCom/status/2038330281225028092 ; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/10/iranian-backed-iraqi-militias-in-spotlight-after-secretary-of-state-rubios-call-with-prime-minister-sudani.php
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-29-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[23] https://alhurra dot com/32845 ; https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/ ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/ليلة-عصيبة-في-العراق-إنذار-عسكري-واتصالات-لتخفيف-حدة-التوتر
24]] https://t.me/centerkaf/5891 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5892
[25] https://t.me/centerkaf/5388 ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%91%D9%83-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD
[26] https://almadapaper dot net/459871/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-15-2026/ ; https://ina dot iq/ar/political/276282-.html
[28] https://almadapaper dot net/459871/
[29] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/
[30] https://t.me/centerkaf/5891 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5892
[31] https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/e33475ade87c41a58795bd544c7c1179 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-hoquq-movement
[32] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/lraqi-government-formation-iranian-backed-iraqi-parties-are-poised-to-control-the-next-government ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iranian-backed-iraqi-militias-seek-to-undermine-baghdads-disarmament-efforts/
[33] https://t.me/centerkaf/5891 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5892
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-26-2026/
[35] https://964media dot com/732723
[36] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة ; https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/iraq/1079513
[37] https://t.me/centerkaf/5891 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5892
[38] https://t.me/centerkaf/5891 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5892
[39] https://t.me/centerkaf/5825
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iranian-backed-iraqi-militias-seek-to-undermine-baghdads-disarmament-efforts/ ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5893
[41] https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2115075386610442481 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2115045210677977326 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5891 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5892 ; https://almadapaper dot net/459871/
[42] https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2115075386610442481 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2115045210677977326
[43] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2033389176607879615 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2033700305041232038 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2033736540724121891
[44] https://t.me/centerkaf/5891 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5892
[45] https://t.me/centerkaf/5891 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5892
[46] https://almadapaper dot net/459871/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[47] https://almadapaper dot net/459871/
[48] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/ ; https://alhurra dot com/en/32307 ; https://thenewregion dot com/posts/6507 ; https://almadapaper dot net/457787/
[49] https://amwaj.media/en/article/what-s-left-unsaid-about-iran-s-influence-in-iraq ; https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ ; https://thenewregion dot com/posts/6507
[50] https://www.ft.com/content/19ec7782-9f22-4101-ba55-da88860310bc
[51] https://www.ft.com/content/19ec7782-9f22-4101-ba55-da88860310bc; https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/en/news/2023/11/28/2996773/deal-done-iran-to-get-mil-mi-28-chopper-sukhoi-su-35-jet
[52] https://www.ft.com/content/19ec7782-9f22-4101-ba55-da88860310bc
[53] https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2118327745469907035; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-lmur-launch-from-ground-based-system/
[54] https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2118327745469907035; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-lmur-launch-from-ground-based-system/
[55] https://tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1350497; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202607175395
[56] https://t.me/mehrnews/429241; https://tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/08/14/3741378/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81187
[57] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-2-2026
[58] https://t.me/mehrnews/429241
[59] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-august-18-2026#_ednbaed54dd3bbd45840b1a742e630f82c17
[60] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24
[61] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-2-2026
[62] https://t.me/Iranian_Militarism/96260
[63] https://farsnews dot ir/Economy/1660544305000336769; https://agsi.org/analysis/iran-eyes-russian-gas/
[64] https://www.mtv dot com.lb/news/1755540 ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1552745/dahr-al-baidar-case-prosecution-against-13-people-including-hezbollah-members.html ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/
[65] https://www.mtv dot com.lb/news/1755540
[66] https://www.mtv dot com.lb/news/1755540
[67] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1552745/dahr-al-baidar-case-prosecution-against-13-people-including-hezbollah-members.html
[68] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/how-hezbollah-is-preventing-its-disarmament-again/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-23-2026/
[69] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1553444/arrest-warrants-issued-for-2-hezbollah-members-11-others-to-be-summoned-dahr-al-baidar-explosives-case.html
[70] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/
[71] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117009029838807418
[72] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2118088666014691614 ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2118110130747191776 ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2118090211628626025
[73] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2118119306542158222 ; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2118123266355122238 ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/world/yemen-

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

reports-airstrikes-clashes-with-houthi-rebels-on-several-fronts/4112190 ;
https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118083607466287193
[74] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118083607466287193
[75] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2117696866838360452 ;
https://x.com/tzalivia/status/2117691633755955299
[76] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118083607466287193 ;
https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2118077956132323695
[77] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-3-2026/
[78] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2118263030312214890
[79] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/
[80]
https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118333195921883152 ;
https://x.com/tom_bike/status/2118354715721478380?a=E0yH4bY8HALk2705lZQ&s=20
[81] https://x.com/TVyemenshabab/status/2118294140366581881?a=VObUYSFTKK8Q2O8fAYY&s=20 ;
https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2118298941670506908?a=2VT1KqfE8ehFx7xdALA&s=20 ;
https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2118303892425625663?a=0-8aaezfCASZcoMHcj4&s=20
[82] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/
[83] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2118279033813119031
[84] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3789252.htm?cid=1;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-16-2026#_edn0f17a7f1693548c44c8a956b9e1eee1520; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-1-2026/;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2105707381816455216; https://www dot saba.ye/ar/news3827557.htm?cid=1; https://t.me/army21ye/4019
[85] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2118279033813119031;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2116246581401776269;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2113232260103315522;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2112753944879300786;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2100014957244961101
[86] https://t.me/army21ye/4022
[87] https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118246251858952450;
https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118251328657059920;
https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118251856736481783;
https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118273247061884940;
https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118275866144710801;
https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118248640745451829
[88] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-1-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-riyadh-airport-and-saudi-oil-pipeline/4100562 ;
https://t.me/army21ye/3948 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3934 ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-15-2026/ ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2089422249862590886?s=20 ; https://sarabic dot ae/20260723/-أنصار-الله-تحدد-شرطين-لإنهاء-التصعيد-مع-السعودية-1115450869.html ; https://t.me/army21ye/3691 ; https://saba dot ye/ar/news3793029.htm?cid=76

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iran Update, November 6, 2026

Parker Hempel, William Doran, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Kinser Rafert, Shealtiel Kiser, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. The Houthi-controlled Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) has reportedly issued voluntary “transit permits” in recent months that grant civilian vessels safe passage through the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Houthis’ establishment of a permit system sets conditions for the Houthis to exert greater control over maritime traffic through the strait in the future by normalizing the Houthis’ regulation of shipping through the waterway.
2. Allowing state and non-state actors to control transit through global chokepoints risks causing economic disruption for the United States and its partners over the long term. Iranian and Houthi control over the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al Mandeb Strait, respectively, causes economic disruption by increasing insurance rates, raising shipping costs, and imposing transit fees.
3. The Houthis may be concentrating forces and materiel in al Turbah, which lies astride the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), in preparation for a large-scale offensive operation into Lahij Governorate and toward Aden.
4. Iran may have deployed at least four commercial vessels to map subsea cable routes in the Gulf of Oman last month. Iran would need to conduct such reconnaissance before conducting any operation to disrupt and damage regional subsea cables, which Iranian officials have recently threatened to do if the United States and Israel conduct strikes on Iran.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Toplines

The Houthi-controlled Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) has reportedly issued voluntary "transit permits" in recent months that grant civilian vessels safe passage through the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Houthis' establishment of a permit system sets conditions for the Houthis to exert greater control over maritime traffic through the strait in the future by normalizing the Houthis' regulation of shipping through the waterway. The *Wall Street Journal* reported on November 6 that "some" civilian cargo vessels have coordinated with the HOCC to secure voluntary "transit permits" in order to minimize the risk of Houthi attacks.[1] The HOCC previously announced on August 1 that the Houthis would only allow "authorized" civilian vessels to transit through the strait and the Houthis have repeatedly attacked Saudi vessels to enforce their blockade on Saudi Arabia.[2] The HOCC, which the Houthis have used since 2024 to communicate with international shipping companies, closely resembles the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, which Iran established in May 2026 to regulate traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.[3]

The *Wall Street Journal* reported that "many" vessels have not contacted the HOCC as they transit the strait due to the United States' designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.[4] The Houthis could at any time choose to compel international civilian vessels to acquire mandatory transit permits and enforce their decision by striking vessels in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb that refuse to coordinate with the HOCC. The Houthis have established control over territory along Yemen's Red Sea coast since September 10, which puts Houthi forces at a closer range from which they can target

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

international shipping.[5] Iran has implemented a similar mandatory transit permit system and fees for maritime traffic transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, which the regime has attempted to enforce through repeated attacks on civilian shipping.[6]

Allowing state and non-state actors to control transit through global chokepoints risks causing economic disruption for the United States and its partners over the long term. Iranian and Houthi control over the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al Mandeb Strait, respectively, causes economic disruption by increasing insurance rates, raising shipping costs, and imposing transit fees:

- **Insurance Rates:** The threat of damage to civilian vessels and cargo and injury to crew compels insurance companies to raise insurance rates and increase risk premiums.[7] Insurance industry sources told Western media in late July that insurance costs to ship goods through the Red Sea rose following the Houthis' announcement of the group's blockade on Saudi Arabia, even before the Houthis struck vessels to enforce the blockade.[8] Threats to commercial vessels also make some insurance firms unwilling to offer coverage for certain voyages or vessels, which, in turn, raises rates among remaining insurers as coverage options decrease.[9] Insurance underwriters reportedly cancelled policies for some Saudi-linked tonnage in the Red Sea in late July due to the Houthi blockade, for example.[10]
- **General Shipping Costs:** Shipping companies often reroutecommercial vessels to longer routes to avoid the risk of damage or injury to the company's vessel and crew. International shipping companies previously rerouted vessels around Africa during the Houthis' 2023-2024 campaign against international shipping, which added significant time to these vessels' journeys.[11] The increased voyage time results in increased ship fuel, maintenance, and crew costs.
- **Fees:** Iran has further increased the cost of shipping via the Strait of Hormuz by charging illegal fees on vessels that transit through the strait. Iran has compelled some civilian vessels to pay between $150,000 and $2 million USD depending on the size of the vessel.[12] The Houthis have claimed that the group will not charge fees on vessels that transit the Bab al Mandeb.[13] Regional sources told Reuters on July 29 that the Houthis have considered imposing fees on international commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb Strait, however.[14] The Houthis could decide to impose fees at any time of their choosing.

International shipping costs do not typically return to pre-crisis levels once a crisis has ended, particularly if a state or non-state actor retains the ability to resume its restrictions under threat of force. The average global cost to ship a standard 40-foot container has increased from $1,899 USD near the start of the Iran War in late February 2026 to $4,389 USD as of November 5.[15] The average global container shipping cost peaked in early July 2026 and has remained above $4,200 USD through November 2026, which, at least in part, is likely due to the start of the Houthi blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20 and Iran's ongoing strikes on civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.[16] The Houthis had a similar effect on global shipping prices between 2023 and 2025, as prices remained elevated over the two-year period even after the Houthis largely halted strikes on civilian vessels in November 2024.[17]

The Houthis may be concentrating forces and materiel in al Turbah, which lies astride the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), in preparation for a large-scale offensive operation into Lahij Governorate and toward Aden. An independent Yemeni journalist reported on November 5 that the Houthis have moved military equipment from rural areas on the Taiz-Lahij governorate border to al Turbah in southeastern Taiz Governorate.[18] The journalist reported that the equipment transfers occurred during a period of relatively low kinetic activity on the frontlines along the GLOC in Maqatirah District, southeast of al Turbah.[19] Another Yemeni journalist reported on November 5 that Saudi forces conducted airstrikes on Houthi fighters and vehicles in al Turbah.[20] These reports suggest that the Houthis may be concentrating forces and supplies in al Turbah amid ongoing Houthi


© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

efforts to advance southeastward along the GLOC and threaten the Yemeni government's de facto capital in Aden.[21]

Al Turbah is an ideal staging area for a Houthi offensive southeastward into Maqatirah District along and around the Taiz-Aden GLOC. Al Turbah is the largest town in southeastern Taiz Governorate and lies in the Houthi rear several kilometers behind the current frontlines in Maqatirah District. The town's location on the Taiz-Aden GLOC enables the Houthis to receive and assemble reinforcements and supplies from Houthi-controlled territory further north, and its position at a key junction in the GLOC could enable simultaneous Houthi advances along the roadway's southern and eastern forks into Maqatirah District.[22] The Houthis could also attempt to exploit smaller, less developed roadways that extend south from al Turbah to infiltrate government-held territory in valleys southwest of the GLOC.[23] The Houthis have likely used these roadways to infiltrate areas surrounding al Majza, about 25 kilometers southwest of the GLOC, in recent days to divert Yemeni government-aligned forces defending positions along the GLOC.[24]

A concentrated Houthi offensive along the Taiz-Aden GLOC in northern Lahij Governorate would likely encounter vulnerabilities and challenges from local terrain and Yemeni government-aligned forces, however. The rugged mountain valley terrain in Taiz and Lahij governorates generally forces large, vehicle-dependent military columns to use the few available local roadways.[25] These roadways, even the Taiz-Aden GLOC, are relatively narrow and poorly maintained, which would require large Houthi vehicle columns to advance slowly and single-file.[26] Local Yemeni government-aligned forces' knowledge of the rugged terrain could help them ambush these columns and identify targets for close air support (CAS).[27] Yemeni government-aligned forces demonstrated their ability to coordinate effective CAS with Saudi aircraft on October 30, when Saudi airstrikes destroyed a Houthi vehicle column attempting to advance along the GLOC at Hayjat al Abd.[28]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Iran may have deployed at least four commercial vessels to map subsea cable routes in the Gulf of Oman last month. Iran would need to conduct such reconnaissance before conducting any operation to disrupt and damage regional subsea cables, which Iranian officials have recently threatened to do if the United States and Israel conduct strikes on Iran. A shipping analytics firm recorded suspicious movements by three US-sanctioned vessels in the Gulf of Oman and an Iranian fishing vessel over the Europe-India Gateway cable south of Oman between October 21 and 26.[29] Their movements reportedly matched patterns commonly associated with subsea cable mapping, according to the firm speaking to the *Financial Times* on November 6.[30] Iranian officials, including Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei, have threatened to attack subsea cables in the Persian Gulf in recent months if the United States resumes airstrikes against Iran.[31] Iran would need to map subsea cable routes before conducting any operation to disrupt them, given that publicly available maps of subsea cable systems only show approximate locations of the systems. Any disruption to subsea cables, which provide cross-border internet connectivity and data transmission, would have serious repercussions for regional states, as well as wider implications for global communications networks, trade, and economic security.[32]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Iran is conducting excavation operations at at least two major missile sites as part of its ongoing efforts to rebuild damaged military bases. BBC Verify, citing satellite imagery from October 2026, reported on November 6 that Iran has conducted significant excavation operations and constructed tunnel entrances at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force-controlled Garmdareh and Shahroud missile bases in Alborz and Semnan provinces, respectively.[33] The United States and Israel conducted several airstrikes on both of these sites and damaged numerous facilities affiliated with missile production and storage during the 2026 US-Israel-Iran War.[34] Iran could be conducting excavation operations to move some facilities underground to protect them from future airstrikes. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mehrdad Aklaghi recently noted that Iran will rebuild its defense industrial base in areas less vulnerable to airstrikes, including “mountains and security structures.”[35]

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Iraqi authorities reportedly arrested three members of the 15th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade on November 6 for attempting to transport 35 rockets from al Latifiyah, south of Baghdad, to Babil Province.[36] This incident suggests that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be preparing for potential conflict between the United States and Iran. The 15th PMF Brigade, which is affiliated with the armed wing of a Dawa Party splinter group, managed militia logistics hubs in Ninewa Province in March and April in support of militia attacks on US and foreign targets in Iraqi Kurdistan.[37] Iraqi militias also maintained logistics hubs south of Baghdad during the war that supported militia attacks launched from Kataib Hezbollah’s stronghold in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province.[38] The militia members’ attempt to transport rockets to Babil Province may reflect a similar effort to move weapons stockpiles to militia launch zones, such as those in Jurf al Sakhr, especially amid reports that the

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.


United States may be preparing for imminent attacks on Iran.[39] ISW-CTP assessed on November 3 that Iraqi militias would likely respond to US strikes on Iran.[40]

Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadegh is pressuring tribal leaders in Maysan Province to compel Iraqi officials and Shia Coordination Framework leaders to re-open the al Shayeb Iran-Iraq border crossing, according to Iraqi government sources who spoke to US-funded regional media on November 6.[41] Sadegh is reportedly a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[42] The Iraqi federal government closed the al Shayeb border crossing on October 21, reportedly to "review security" and install equipment to prevent the "smuggling of prohibited materials."[43] Iraqi political sources told Agence France-Presse on October 21 that the United States has pressured Baghdad to close most Iran-Iraq border crossings to restrict trade and financial exchanges that could help Iran mitigate the financial strain of US sanctions, however.[44] Baghdad has only closed one border crossing, which likely reflects Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi's attempts to balance between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. ISW-CTP assessed that the closure of the al Shayeb border crossing, combined with other closures along the Pakistan-Iran border, will likely exacerbate the effects of the economic restrictions Iran currently faces because Iran has increasingly relied on overland trade due to US restrictions on its maritime and air trade.[45]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to advance into central Jawf Governorate on November 6. Saudi media and an independent Yemeni journalist reported on November 6 that Yemeni government-aligned forces have seized additional positions in the Jabal Dahida mountain range.[46] Yemeni government-aligned forces have seized territory from the Houthis near Jabal Dahida since November 2.[47] Yemeni government efforts to seize Jabal Dahida are likely part of a shaping operation to facilitate an offensive to recapture al Hazm, the capital of Jawf Governorate.[48]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Syria has deployed a small number of military advisers to Saudi Arabia to train and prepare Saudi forces amid ongoing Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.[49] Two senior Syrian military sources and one senior US official told Reuters on November 6 that Syria is deploying military advisers to Saudi Arabia to provide Saudi forces with military advice and training.[50] The senior US official said that the Syrian units will help train Saudi and Yemeni units in Saudi Arabia to improve their combat effectiveness.[51] A senior Saudi diplomat told Reuters that the Syrian advisers could share their expertise fighting against militia groups during the Syrian civil war with the Saudi military.[52] Saudi Arabia and Syria signed a defense cooperation deal on November 4 that includes advisory support, training, and exchange of expertise between the countries.[53] This Syrian support comes amid broader military assistance from Saudi partners and continued Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia.[54]

The Houthis launched a drone toward Mecca and ballistic missiles toward Najran on November 6. Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi drone near Mecca and two Houthi ballistic missiles near Najran City.[55] The Houthis have consistently denied targeting the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the start of their strike campaign against Saudi Arabia, but the group has not denied the most recent attack as of this writing.[56] Saudi air defenses have nevertheless repeatedly intercepted Houthi missiles and drones in the vicinity of these cities, however.[57] Saudi Arabian Civil Defense also issued early warning alerts in Najran Province on November 6.[58] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of their ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[59]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

POWERED BY: BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/to-cross-the-red-sea-shippers-email-houthi-rebels-read-their-inbox-5ecace40?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2
[2] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2080043376351535532 ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2080045524745375831 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3603 ;
https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2084969698064535630 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3624 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cargo-ship-attacked-red-sea-sources-say-2026-08-11/ ;
https://en.hocc.gov dot ye/Articles/PressReleases/275 ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-1-2026/

[3]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/to-cross-the-red-sea-shippers-email-houthi-rebels-read-their-inbox-5ecace40?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2 ; https://www.saba dot ye/en/news3305712.htm ;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/countering-irans-latest-smart-control-gambit-strait-hormuz
[4]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/to-cross-the-red-sea-shippers-email-houthi-rebels-read-their-inbox-5ecace40?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2 ;
https://www.state.gov/designation-of-ansarallah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-11-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-9-2026/
[6] https://x.com/PGSA_IRAN/status/2056359509296099548 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/418946 ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-29-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-4-2026/
[7]
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/red-sea-insurance-soars-after-deadly-houthi-ship-attacks-2025-07-10/ ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/oil-vessel-transit-costs-through-hormuz-escalated-after-iran-war-enoc-exec-says-2026-09-09/
[8]
https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/red-sea-war-insurance-costs-rise-after-houthi-blockade-sources-say-2026-07-20/
[9]
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/red-sea-insurance-soars-after-deadly-houthi-ship-attacks-2025-07-10/
[10]
https://www.ft.com/content/52aa89e9-f014-498e-8415-2c435a1c858d?segmentId=2c1df321-36a4-1206-2c08-112c059dd69d&syn-25a6b1a6=1
[11] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67731853;
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/15/shipping-giants-hapag-lloyd-and-maersk-pause-red-sea-travel.html ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/maersk-diverts-vessels-away-red-sea-for-foreseeable-future-2

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

024-01-05/
[12]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tightens-its-grip-on-hormuz-despite-cease-fire-5027521f?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-21/iran-in-talks-with-oman-over-permanent-toll-system-for-hormuz
;https://www.reuters.com/investigations/iran-is-consolidating-control-hormuz-with-island-checkpoints-diplomatic-deals-2026-05-20/
[13] https://en.hocc.gov dot ye/Articles/PressReleases/275
[14]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-considering-fees-ships-sailing-through-red-sea-sources-say-2026-07-29/
[15]
https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry
[16] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3746630.htm ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-21-2026/;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-16-2026/ ;
https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry
[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-12-2025
[18] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118447147414659230?s=20
[19] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118447147414659230?s=20
[20] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2118475823044858045
[21] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2118475823044858045 ;
https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118447147414659230?s=20 ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-3-2026/
[24] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5336882-معارك-ضد-الحوثيين-في-جبهات-باب-المندب-ولحج ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-3-2026/
[25] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116248376761287092
[26] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116248376761287092
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/ ;
https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2116285666103292285?s=20 ;
https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2116248376761287092
[29] https://www.ft.com/content/492b2c62-8e15-47b3-bf24-842ae62e7217?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[30] https://www.ft.com/content/492b2c62-8e15-47b3-bf24-842ae62e7217?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[31]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=vcHsoB&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink; https://www.presstv.co dot uk/Detail/2026/10/11/778085/Exclusive–Rezaei-says-%E2%80%98Powers-greater-than-US-tried-to-conquer-Iran,-but-ended-up-in-dustbin-of-history%E2%80%99 ;https://x.com/PressTV/status/2109242170876346586?s=20;
https://t.me/mehrnews/424488;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trumps-iran-threat-renews-gulf-fears-war-it-didnt-choose-2026-11-02/ ; https://www.ft.com/content/492b2c62-8e15-47b3-bf24-842ae62e7217?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[32] https://concentric.io/your-world-in-focus/the-growing-threat-to-global-undersea-cables/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[33] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckjrwx1r2d5ro
[34] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027764221153292734?a=sGtJOIy7f8gqhQVdXiM&s=20; https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2028923588783542463?a=9xY4_hciHoKtIwFuIRU&s=20; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2032166804852720054?a=oAwnYkDb09-KUDNIwpY&s=20; https://x.com/HpwWJVafCv83954/status/2054822105481707971?a=zeOaqDbXBu4Mzfa8rvE&s=20; https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2030425360198984111?a=2gldEGAQTXDFIdrxU54&s=20
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-19-2026/; https://snn dot ir/fa/news/1473052/
[36] https://www.alhadath dot net/iraq/2026/11/06/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-3-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-35-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%A7- ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-35-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%A7
[37] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Iraq20-20ISF20PMF20Orders20of20Battle_0_0.pdf pg 53-54; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[38] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[39] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/24/us/politics/trump-netanyahu-iran-new-phase-of-war.html ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-warns-gulf-of-possible-short-intense-renewal-of-iran-war-after-midterms-cd1a55e1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-3-2026/
[41] https://alhurra dot com/en/52877
[42] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202204112356
[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-closes-sheeb-border-crossing-with-iran-urgent-security-reasons-sources-say-2026-10-21/
[44] https://almadapaper dot net/457770/
[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-21-2026/
[46] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118447147414659230?a=nZahuQjW39lSl1Dhf-g&s=20 ; https://x.com/AlArabiya/status/2118649998267019295
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/ ; https://x.com/alkumaim_m/status/2117959938060189783 ; https://x.com/20Yusef20/status/2117903436704284915?a=lKl9AcL-mZxNR3kInlY&s=20 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2117918150675345545?a=-GdTtBL2QowGzsvzvRQ&s=20 ; https://x.com/Of3uu/status/2117959294943367642?a=lBep52ZGZO67oNIaKYE&s=20

[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-4-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

[49]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-aids-saudi-arabia-with-military-advice-training-amid-houthi-attacks-2026-11-06/
[50]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-aids-saudi-arabia-with-military-advice-training-amid-houthi-attacks-2026-11-06/
[51]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-aids-saudi-arabia-with-military-advice-training-amid-houthi-attacks-2026-11-06/
[52]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-aids-saudi-arabia-with-military-advice-training-amid-houthi-attacks-2026-11-06/
[53]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-aids-saudi-arabia-with-military-advice-training-amid-houthi-attacks-2026-11-06/ ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-syrian-defence-ministries-sign-cooperation-agreement-spa-reports-2026-11-04/
[54]
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudis-plan-assault-houthis-break-red-sea-chokehold-2026-10-02/ ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2107024453960110146 ;
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/uks-burnham-agrees-saudi-request-refuelling-support-2026-09-21/
[55] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2118607991238807710 ;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2118650008677581057
[56] ttps://saba dot ye/ar/news3789252.htm?cid=1;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-16-2026#_edn0f17a7f1693548c44c8a956b9e1eee1520; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-1-2026/;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2105707381816455216; https://www dot
saba.ye/ar/news3827557.htm?cid=1; https://t.me/army21ye/4019.
[57] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2118279033813119031;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2116246581401776269;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2113232260103315522;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2112753944879300786;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2100014957244961101;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2118650008677581057
[58] https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118600818496590221 ;
https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118599742305321449 ;
https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118495097549369809 ;
https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2118496198411649032

[59] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-1-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-riyadh-airport-and-saudi-oil-pipeline/4100562 ;
https://t.me/army21ye/3948 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3934 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/loud-booms-heard-near-saudi-aramco-headquarters-dhahran-sources-say-2026-10-13/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-25-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iran Update, November 7, 2026

Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. The United States conducted limited strikes targeting Iranian air defense capabilities on Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz on November 6, amid reports that US officials are considering broader strikes on Iran and continued Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. US President Donald Trump stated on November 6 that US forces conducted “minor” strikes and destroyed a “little” Iranian anti-aircraft system.
2. Yemeni government-aligned forces have maintained recently captured positions in central Jawf Governorate. Geolocated imagery from November 7 showed Yemeni government-aligned forces on the Jabal Dahida mountain range following the forces’ seizure of additional positions in the area on November 6.
3. The Houthis continued to target Saudi critical infrastructure on November 6 and 7 to coerce Saudi Arabia to agree to Houthi demands. Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Saree separately claimed on November 7 that the Houthis launched ballistic missiles at multiple Saudi infrastructure targets.


© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



Toplines

The United States conducted limited strikes targeting Iranian air defense capabilities on Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz on November 6, amid reports that US officials are considering broader strikes on Iran and continued Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. US President Donald Trump stated on November 6 that US forces conducted “minor” strikes and destroyed a “little” Iranian anti-aircraft system.[1] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency confirmed that two missiles struck Qeshm Island.[2] The November 6 strikes follow a separate US attack on Qeshm Island on November 2, which US officials described to Western media as the latest attack in a series of limited, unannounced US strikes on Iran in recent weeks.[3] US officials reportedly continue to discuss conducting broader strikes on Iran.[4] The November 6 strikes also come amid continued Iranian drone, anti-ship cruise missile, and limpet mine attacks on commercial vessels in and around the Strait of Hormuz in recent days.[5] Iranian media claimed that vessels struck naval mines on November 6 and 7, but United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has not reported any attackssince November 5.[6] Iran’s claims of ships hitting mines likely seek to create an informational effect to increase shipping companies’ risk perceptions of transiting the strait without Iranian permission.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



US and Partner Military Operations

See topline section.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.


Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces have maintained recently captured positions in central Jawf Governorate. Geolocated imagery from November 7 showed Yemeni government-aligned forces on the Jabal Dahida mountain range following the forces' seizure of additional positions in the area on November 6.[7] Yemeni government-aligned forces announced on November 7 that they continued to advance along the mountain range while clearing Houthi mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[8] Yemeni government efforts to seize Jabal Dahida are likely part of a shaping operation to facilitate an offensive to recapture al Hazm, the capital of Jawf Governorate.[9]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.




Map by Daniel Mealie, David Schulert, Megan Ewert, Nathaniel Kramer, Carolyn Weinstein, Eliana Ornelas, Samuel McRee, Natalie Mesplay, James Thompson, Mikayla Green, Christopher Dayton, Brian Carter, Nick Carl, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Parker Hempel, William Doran, and Bailey Pasternak
© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
Underlying basemap assets from OpenStreetMap

Yemeni government-aligned forces also repelled Houthi efforts on November 7 to recapture positions in Wadi Halhalan, Marib Governorate, that Yemeni government-aligned forces seized on November 6.[10] Yemeni government-aligned forces reported that airstrikes destroyed Houthi fortifications and advancing fighters in the area.[11]

The Houthis continued to target Saudi critical infrastructure on November 6 and 7 to coerce Saudi Arabia to agree to Houthi demands. Saudi Arabia intercepted a Houthi drone and cruise missile launched toward Riyadh on November 6.[12] Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Saree separately claimed on November 7 that the Houthis launched ballistic missiles at multiple Saudi infrastructure targets, including Aramco storage tanks and a distillation tower at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, a gas pumping station in Riyadh, and a National Guard camp in Najran, Najran Province.[13] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of their ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen's oil and gas resources.[14]

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.



POWERED BY: BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1]https://x.com/CBSNews/status/2119098825952374920

[2] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/456854 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/456855

[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-irans-qeshm-island-as-trump-talks-down-war-risks-79d73d3d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/02/us/politics/us-military-strikes-iran-qeshm-island.html ;

https://www.cnn.com/2026/10/26/politics/us-iran-strike-plans-trump ;

https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/us-has-plans-strike-iran-early-tomorrow-report-says

[5] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/456733 ;

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.

https://t.me/Tasnimnews/456624 ;

https://t.me/Tasnimnews/456597 ;

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-4-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/

[6] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/456733 ;

https://t.me/Tasnimnews/456955

[7] https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/2118942814251700398?a=CniprmwY-DGX17ZIPhs&s=20 ;
https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118447147414659230?a=nZahuQjW39lSl1Dhf-g&s=20 ;
https://x.com/AlArabiya/status/2118649998267019295

[8] https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2119056413766934548

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-4-2026/

[10] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2118831053213216869 ;
https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2118783784342757613 ;
https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2118865846374174849

[11] https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2119051418422124916

[12] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2118798346106409455 ;
https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2118930942849143062

[13] https://t.me/army21ye/4033

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-1-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2026/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-riyadh-airport-and-saudi-oil-pipeline/4100562 ;
https://t.me/army21ye/3948; https://t.me/army21ye/3934;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/loud-booms-heard-near-saudi-aramco-headquarters-dhahran-sources-say-2026-10-13/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-25-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2026/

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War. All rights reserved.