Iran Update, October 18, 2026

Bailey Pasternak, Nidal Morrison, Benjamin Schmida, Annika Ganzeveld


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

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Key Takeaways

1. The Houthis downed a Saudi light attack helicopter over Saudi Arabian airspace that was likely providing close air support (CAS) or conducting reconnaissance in nearby al Jawf Governorate, Yemen, amid ongoing fighting between Yemeni government-aligned forces and Houthi forces there.
2. Houthi forces continued to try to make advances on the western and southern outskirts of Taiz City on October 17 and 18.
3. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to resume salary payments for unspecified Yemeni government-aligned forces fighting the Houthis, according to Yemeni sources cited by UK media on October 17. The reported Saudi-UAE deal likely involves the UAE funding and Saudi Arabia providing air support to the Southern Giants Brigades, which is a Yemeni government-aligned military faction that the UAE helped establish in 2016 and is one of the main Yemeni government-aligned forces that are fighting in the current conflict against the Houthis.
4. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi announced on October 18 that Egypt will provide defensive military aid to Saudi Arabia if Saudi Arabia requests support.

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
Toplines

The Houthis downed a Saudi light attack helicopter over Saudi Arabian airspace that was likely providing close air support (CAS) or conducting reconnaissance in nearby al Jawf Governorate, Yemen, amid ongoing fighting between Yemeni government-aligned forces and Houthi forces there.[1] The Houthis published footage on October 18 of a Houthi surface-to-air missile (SAM) downing a Saudi AH-6I light attack helicopter over Najran Province, Saudi Arabia, which lies north of al Jawf Governorate in Yemen, on October 17.[2] The Saudi Joint Forces Command (JFC) confirmed on October 18 that the AH-6I crashed over Najran Province, killing both pilots, but said that a technical malfunction caused the crash.[3] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) weapons analyst assessed on October 18 that Houthi forces may have downed the Saudi AH-6I with a Saqr-1 358 SAM missile.[4] The Saqr-1 358 is an Iranian-derived Houthi-produced loitering SAM munition with a range of 150 kilometers.[5] The Houthis likely downed the Saudi AH-6I before or after it provided CAS or reconnaissance support to Yemeni government-aligned forces fighting Houthi forces in nearby al Jawf Governorate.[6] Houthi SAM fire previously downed a Saudi F-15 over Marib Governorate, Yemen, on September 15, and struck a Saudi-operated Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet over Saada Governorate, Yemen, on October 14.[7] The Houthis separately claimed that they downed a Saudi-operated Turkish-produced drone over al Hajjah Governorate on October 17.[8]

Houthi forces continued to try to make advances on the western and southern outskirts of Taiz City on October 17 and 18. Yemeni government-aligned forces, likely with Saudi air support,

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conducted airstrikes on Houthi positions in the “Old Airport” neighborhood on the western outskirts of Taiz City on October 17, according to Yemeni government media and geolocated footage.[9] A Yemeni journalist and Saudi media sources reported heavy fighting between Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces in the “Old Airport” neighborhood on October 18, which indicates that the neighborhood remains heavily contested.[10] Houthi forces have sought to seize high ground west of Taiz City since encircling the city on October 12.[11] Yemeni government forces also continued to repel Houthi attempts to advance south of Taiz City, according to Yemeni government sources. Several pro-Yemeni government sources reported that government-aligned forces advanced into villages near Jabal Dhahih, south of Taiz City, on October 18, amid Houthi attempts to advance in the area.[12] Several Yemeni sources separately reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces launched a counterattack, advancing into two villages and capturing a Houthi T-55 main battle tank southeast of Taiz City on October 18.[13]



The United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to resume salary payments for unspecified Yemeni government-aligned forces fighting the Houthis, according to Yemeni sources cited by UK media on October 17.[14] The Yemeni sources stated that Saudi Arabia will provide air support to these forces in exchange for the UAE’s resumption of salary payments.[15] The report of increased Saudi-UAE cooperation in Yemen preceded reports that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman met with UAE President Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed and other Emirati leaders in Abu Dhabi, the UAE, on October 18.[16] The reported Saudi-UAE deal likely involves the UAE funding and Saudi Arabia providing air support to the Southern Giants Brigades, which is a Yemeni government-aligned military faction that the UAE helped establish in 2016 and is one of the main Yemeni government-aligned forces that are fighting in the current conflict against the Houthis.[17]

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The reported Saudi-UAE agreement is notable given the historic rivalry between UAE- and Saudi-backed forces in Yemen. The UAE supported the Southern Giants Brigades and other UAE-backed Yemeni forces that sought southern and eastern Yemen's secession from the rest of the country and fought Saudi-backed forces on multiple occasions prior to the current conflict.[18] The UAE suspended salary payments to the Southern Giants Brigades following the January 2026 Saudi-backed counteroffensive that reversed UAE-backed forces' territorial gains in southern and eastern Yemen.[19]

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi announced on October 18 that Egypt will provide defensive military aid to Saudi Arabia if Saudi Arabia requests support.[20] Egyptian state-owned media reported on October 18 that Egypt's Parliament will likely approve the aid package, which includes sending Egyptian forces to Saudi Arabia, on October 20.[21] Egypt's pledge to provide military aid to Saudi Arabia follows similar commitments from Saudi partners, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and Pakistan, to provide military support to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis in recent weeks.[22] Egypt previously provided air and naval support to the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in 2015.[23]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Iran likely attacked a tugboat transiting the Strait of Hormuz near Khor Fakkan, the UAE, on October 18. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on October 18 that two unknown projectiles struck a tugboat traveling southbound in the Strait of Hormuz northeast of Khor Fakkan, the UAE.[24] The attack damaged the tugboat and injured one individual, but the vessel continued its route, according to UKMTO.[25] Smaller vessels, like tugboats, can facilitate ship-to-ship transfers by aligning and positioning larger vessels before and during ship-to-ship transfers, but it is unknown whether this specific tugboat was engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer when Iranian forces likely attacked it.[26] This attack comes after Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 11 that Iranian forces attack, on average, five small vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers with larger vessels each day.[27] Gulf countries have increasingly relied on ship-to-ship transfers in recent months to evade Iranian detection and bypass Iranian control of the strait.[28]

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

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Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis have continued to launch attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on October 17. The Saudi JFC reported on October 17 that Saudi air defenses intercepted three likely Houthi drones and two Houthi ballistic missiles in Saudi Arabia's Riyadh, Eastern, and Asir provinces.[29] The Houthis have repeatedly launched attacks on military and civilian infrastructure in these regions as part of a broader Houthi campaign to degrade Saudi willingness to sustain military operations against the Houthis and compel Saudi Arabia to meet Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen's oil and gas resources.[30]

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Endnotes

[1] https://t.me/army21ye/3908 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3904 ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2111533085938647346 ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2111736543631044726
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[9] https://x.com/war_cube/status/2111566699342528663/photo/1 ;
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[25] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2111675229307044030
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Iran Update, October 19, 2026

Adham Fattah, Bailey Pasternak, Nidal Morrison, William Doran, Benjamin Schmida, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld


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Key Takeaways

1. The Houthis are adopting new tactics to bypass Saudi air defenses, including launching various munitions at Saudi targets simultaneously and targeting locations without air defense coverage, according to an unspecified senior US official briefed on Saudi air defense efforts speaking to the *Wall Street Journal* on October 18.
2. The Houthis' strike tactics against Saudi Arabia demonstrate how Iran and the Axis of Resistance are learning and sharing tactics to more effectively bypass adversary air defenses. This does not necessarily mean that the Houthis learned these tactics from Iran, however.
3. The Houthis are deploying reinforcements to Taiz Governorate, likely to try to break Yemeni government defenses surrounding Taiz City. The Houthis have attempted to make multiple advances near the city in recent days, but Yemeni government-aligned forces have largely repelled these advances.
4. The Iranian regime's appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran's new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program. Akhlaghi stated that the regime will rebuild its defense industrial base in areas that are less vulnerable to airstrikes.
5. The Iraqi federal government probably agreed to grant three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control of some government ministries as part of a broader disarmament agreement between the Iraqi federal government and Iranian-backed Iraqi factions. These Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will likely continue to circumvent the Iraqi government's disarmament efforts even after receiving control of some Iraqi ministries, however.

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Toplines

The Houthis are adopting new tactics to bypass Saudi air defenses, according to an unspecified senior US official briefed on Saudi air defense efforts speaking to the *Wall Street Journal* on October 18.[1] The official stated that the Houthis are overwhelming Saudi air defenses by launching drones, low-flying cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles at defended targets in Saudi Arabia in one strike package.[2] Unspecified regional officials previously told Western media on October 12 that the Houthis employed this tactic to strike King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 10.[3] The officials stated that the Houthis launched slower-moving drones before launching cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in the attack.[4]

The Houthis are also targeting locations in Saudi Arabia without air defense coverage to maximize drone and missile impacts on Saudi territory. The US official speaking to the *Journal* stated that Saudi forces have intercepted approximately 90 percent of Houthi attacks in the current conflict but noted that over half of the Houthi attacks have targeted undefended locations.[5] Saudi Arabia's vast size hinders its ability to defend critical infrastructure from drone and missile attacks.[6] The Houthis are striking Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its support for Yemeni government-aligned forces in Yemen and concede to Houthi demands.[7]

The Houthis have previously employed similar tactics to try to bypass regional air defense systems. The Houthis struck Ben Gurion Airport in Israel in early May 2025 using either multiple ballistic missiles or a missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.[8] The Houthis separately launched


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multiple Iranian-produced drones at Emirati-operated Patriot missile battery radar systems in Yemen in 2017 to enable subsequent missile strikes.[9]

The Houthis' strike tactics against Saudi Arabia demonstrate how Iran and the Axis of Resistance are learning and sharing tactics to more effectively bypass adversary air defenses. TheHouthis' use of multiple munitions to try to overwhelm air defenses closely resembles tactics that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have employed against Israel. Iran launched drones and cruise missiles ahead of faster-moving ballistic missiles at Israel in April 2024 to try to overwhelm Israeli air defenses, for example.[10] This tactic was not effective for Iran, given that Israel was able to shoot down the slow-moving drones and cruise missiles before they reached Israeli territory, however.[11] Hezbollah similarly launched multiple munitions in its rocket and missile attack on Binyamina in northern Israel in October 2024.[12] Iran and Hezbollah's use of similar tactics does not mean that they taught these tactics to the Houthis, however. The Houthis have been engaged in conflict with Saudi Arabia for over a decade, and the group has likely shared tactics it has learned in this conflict with other members of the Axis of Resistance. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah advisers are currently in Yemen providing targeting intelligence and military support to the Houthis and are almost certainly collaborating on tactics to bypass regional air defense systems.[13]

The Houthis are deploying reinforcements to Taiz Governorate, likely to try to break Yemeni government defenses surrounding Taiz City. UK-based, Saudi-owned media reported on October 19 that the Houthis have begun deploying hundreds of fighters to Taiz Governorate from Houthi-controlled Sanaa, Dhamar, and Ibb governorates over the past 48 hours.[14] The Houthis encircled Taiz City on October 6 by severing the last Yemeni government ground line of communication connecting the city to other Yemeni government-controlled territory.[15] The Houthis' encirclement has almost certainly constrained Yemeni government-aligned forces' ability to resupply and reinforce front-line positions as these forces seek to defend against Houthi advances on Taiz City.[16] The Houthis have attempted to make multiple advances near the city in recent days, but Yemeni government-aligned forces have largely repelled these advances.[17] Yemeni government media reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled a Houthi attack in al Rahan, south of Taiz City, on October 19, for example.[18]

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The Iranian regime's appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran's new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program.[19] The UN Security Council listed Akhlaghi in 2007 as the head of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, which is a subsidiary of the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and is involved in the development and production of Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missiles.[20] The United States sanctioned Akhlaghi in 2008 for his involvement in developing Iran's ballistic missile program.[21] Akhlaghi subsequently served as the head ofthe AIO and the Defense Industries Organization, which are both subsidiaries of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[22] The DIO is heavily involved in the development of Iran's conventional ground weapons capabilities, including armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and ammunition.[23] The AIO oversees Iran's ballistic missile program.[24] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian noted on October 17 that Akhlaghi had a close relationship with Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, who is regarded as the "father of Iran's ballistic missile program," and former IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, whom the United States sanctioned in June 2019 for overseeing Iran's ballistic missile program.[25] Akhlaghi notably held his first "working meeting" on October 19 with IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi, further indicating that Akhlaghi will prioritize the development of Iran's aerospace capabilities during his tenure.[26]

Akhlaghi indicated that the regime will rebuild its defense industrial base in areas that are less vulnerable to airstrikes. Akhlaghi stated on October 19 that Iran will not rebuild defense industrial facilities at old locations but will instead construct them "in mountains and security structures."[27] The US-Israeli combined force struck virtually every element of the Iranian ballistic

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missile production and supply chain from raw material facilities to final assembly plants.[28] Many, but not all, of these facilities were located above ground, and their destruction gives the regime an opportunity to rebuild them in a way that protects them more effectively against future airstrikes.[29] Rebuilding the defense industrial base in underground areas at a time when it has sustained extensive damage eliminates the opportunity cost that would be associated with replacing existing infrastructure. Recent Western reporting that Iran has resumed ballistic missile production at underground facilities is consistent with Akhlaghi's emphasis on the need to protect Iranian defense industrial sites from potential threats.[30]

The Iraqi federal government probably agreed to grant three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control of some government ministries as part of a broader disarmament agreement between the Iraqi federal government and Iranian-backed Iraqi factions. The Iraqi Parliament voted on October 15 to approve four militia-affiliated individuals to fill a vacant deputy prime minister position and three ministerial roles.[31] Individuals affiliated with Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali, which previously agreed to disarm, received two of the ministerial positions and the deputy prime minister position.[32] An individual affiliated with Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada received the fourth ministerial position.[33] The leader of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) claimed in an October 13 interview that the group has agreed to comply with the Iraqi government's disarmament plan, despite previously rejecting disarmament.[34] The framework approved some details of a disarmament plan in late September that aims to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias by June 2027.[35] The details of this plan are not public at the time of this writing. Some Iraqi government officials have previously proposed offering government positions to militia members in exchange for their disarmament.[36] The government probably calculates that offering these militias these positions may incentivize them to fully comply with disarmament efforts. The government may also calculate that rewarding the militias that agreed to comply with the disarmament plan could motivate militias that have refused to disarm to also agree to the plan.

These Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will likely continue to circumvent the Iraqi government's disarmament efforts even after receiving control of some Iraqi ministries, however. KSS leader Abu Alaa al Walai stated in the same October 13 interview that KSS will intervene to support Iran "if Iran faces a genuine threat to its existence," which suggests that KSS seeks to retain control of its weapons and be able to use them at will.[37] Other militias that previously agreed to disarm, including Asaib Ahl al Haq, have also taken steps to circumvent disarmament efforts, including by handing over inoperable weapons to the Iraqi federal government.[38]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Nothing significant to report.

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US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Pakistan's closure of two prominent border crossings with Iran will likely disrupt one of Iran's last remaining trade channels — overland trade — as the US naval blockade on Iranian ports and restrictions on Iranian flights have severely curtailed Iranian trade by sea and air. A Pakistani official announced on October 17 that Pakistan "temporarily closed" the Gabd-Rimdan and Taftan-Mirjaveh border crossings in Iran's Sistan and Baluchistan Province to address "security concerns, prevent smuggling, and make the border system more effective."[39]Both of these crossings play a significant role for Iran and Pakistan's economies. The Gabd-Rimdan crossing is a key route for Pakistan's liquefied petroleum gas and fuel imports from Iran, while the Taftan-Mirjaveh crossing serves as an important route for Iranian exports to Iranian trading partners in Asia, such as the People's Republic of China.[40] Iran has increasingly relied on overland trade as the United States has constrained Iran's ability to trade by sea and air in recent months.[41] The closure of these two border crossings will therefore likely exacerbate the economic restrictions Iran faces. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei confirmed on October 17 that the closures will be temporary but claimed that the closures are due to "technical problems."[42]

The closure of these two border crossings in Sistan and Baluchistan Province comes amid an uptick in anti-regime militant activity in the province.[43] These closures are unlikely to prevent anti-regime groups from operating in the area, however, given that they can transfer weapons and personnel across multiple parts of the porous Iran-Pakistan border. Baloch militant groups in Iran and Pakistan are able to move fighters and arms across the porous border due to its enormous size and the large force commitment required to adequately secure it.[44] These groups may smuggle some personnel and materiel through border crossings, but they can exploit other parts of the border that are not sufficiently secured. Iranian security forces have tried to disrupt weapons smuggling efforts along the border. Iranian border guards seized ammunition for heavy and semi-heavy combat weapons in Mirjaveh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on September 20, for example.[45] These efforts have thus far not successfully degraded anti-regime militant groups' ability to operate in the province, however.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with multiple high-ranking Iranian officials in Tehran on October 19 as Russia continues to support Iran economically and militarily in the US-Iran War.[46] Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei to discuss accelerating the implementation of joint economic agreements and regional developments.[47] Russia has provided Iran with satellite imagery for drone and missile attacks on US assets in the region as well as Russian-modified Shahed drones during the conflict.[48]

Lebanon

Hezbollah is threatening the Lebanese government with civil unrest to deter the government's recent efforts to disrupt Hezbollah's reconstitution and challenge the group's control over its traditional strongholds in Lebanon. The Lebanese government has conducted

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internal security missions in central Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs in recent weeks to disrupt Hezbollah's efforts to smuggle weapons and raise funds.[49] The Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) seized a Hezbollah truck en route from the Bekaa Valley to Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs on October 5 that was carrying nearly 800 kilograms of high explosives.[50] The ISF later raided an illicit, likely Hezbollah-owned prescription drug warehouse in Beirut's southern suburbs on October 16, without notifying Hezbollah in advance.[51] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) provided support to the ISF by confronting Hezbollah gunmen who attempted to prevent the raid.[52] The ISF's lack of "coordination" with Hezbollah before entering the southern suburbs indicates that the government is willing to conduct limited action to assert the rule of law in areas that are under de facto Hezbollah control.[53] The Lebanese government is demonstrating a growing confidence in challenging Hezbollah and signaling a commitment to asserting sovereignty in Lebanon by conducting these missions. The graphic below displays a timeline of recent tensions between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah since October 5:



Hezbollah officials and media have levied demonstrations and threats of civil conflict to deter the government from further threatening the group's activities and to exploit the government's priority of ensuring domestic stability. Several Hezbollah parliamentarians warned on October 19 that the government's actions are placing Lebanon on the brink of civil conflict. Hezbollah has often leveraged threats of civil strife to render the government unwilling to disrupt Hezbollah's activities.[54] Hezbollah officials made similar threats in June and July 2026 in an attempt to prevent the government from implementing the Trilateral Framework Agreement, for example.[55] Hezbollah officials also mobilized supporters to protest in Beirut and block a main roadway in the city on October 16 and 17 in response to

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the ISF raid in the southern suburbs.[56] A Sunni Lebanese parliamentarian told independent Lebanese media on October 17 that Hezbollah's demonstrations and threats are a "dress rehearsal for May 7," referring to Hezbollah's violent takeover of West Beirut to stop government disarmament efforts in May 2008.[57]

Hezbollah's threats have failed to deter the government from exercising legitimate sovereignty in the Beirut area at the time of this writing, however. The government has responded to the group's threats by increasing military and security force deployments in the city and its suburbs.[58] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed a "larger-than-usual" military force in Beirut and the southern suburbs on October 17 to ensure order and security in the area following the ISF's successful raid on Hezbollah's warehouse in Beirut's southern suburbs on October 16.[59] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told senior Lebanese security officials on October 19 that the government must "strictly enforce the law" and not tolerate "any attempt to undermine security" in Lebanon.[60]

It is unclear whether Hezbollah is willing to accept the potential political and material costs of a major confrontation with the government. A September 2026 Lebanese public opinion poll concluded that around 66 percent of Shia civilians support disarming Hezbollah, which indicates widespread disapproval of the group's conduct even among its traditional support base.[61] Lebanese Health Minister and Hezbollah member Rakan Nasreddine notably supported the ISF's October 16 raid in the southern suburbs.[62] Hezbollah could calculate that mounting significant civil unrest against the government could further erode public support for the group.

The government's expanded force presence in the Beirut area also imposes a dilemma on Hezbollah by risking an armed confrontation with the government if the group's protestors or gunmen attack soldiers and provoke a military response.[63] The Lebanese government is currently demonstrating strong resolve to uphold the rule of law despite Hezbollah's threats, which, if sustained, challenges the group's calculation that it can deter the government from asserting sovereignty and disarming Hezbollah through threats of armed conflict.[64]

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis attacked a Yemeni government-aligned training camp in Shabwa Governorate on October 19, likely to disrupt Yemeni government reinforcement efforts in nearby Marib Governorate. Yemeni sources told Western media that three Houthi ballistic missiles struck the Yemeni government-aligned al Alam training camp in Shabwa Governorate on October 19, killing at least 53 recruits and injuring 200 others.[65] The attack on the camp comes several weeks after the Yemeni government issued a national mobilization order on September 29.[66] Al Alam camp is roughly 150 kilometers east of the Houthi-Yemeni government frontlines in Marib Governorate, where Yemeni government-aligned forces have launched multiple counteroffensives in recent weeks.[67]

The Houthis also launched multiple ballistic missiles targeting Yemeni government-aligned forces along the Red Sea coastal plain on October 19 in order to disrupt the Yemeni government counteroffensive there.[68] The Houthis said they fired six ballistic missiles at Yemeni government-aligned forces in Ras al Ara and Suqqayan, Lahij Governorate, on October 19.[69] The

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Houthis conducted the attack amid ongoing fighting between Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces in Jabal Kahbub, Lahij Governorate, approximately 20 kilometers north of Ras al Ara and Suqqayan.[70] The Houthis have repeatedly conducted ballistic missile attacks targeting government-aligned staging areas, including near Ras al Ara, in recent days to disrupt the government's counteroffensive on the Red Sea coastal plain.[71]



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Iran Update, October 20, 2026

William Doran, Parker Hempel, Katherine Wells, Bailey Pasternak, Benjamin Schmida, Brian Carter


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely continuing to contest control over Jabal Han, which overlooks western Taiz City.
2. The Houthis likely fired several ballistic missiles targeting Marib City on October 19 as part of a campaign to render Yemeni government-aligned forces unwilling or unable to sustain their counteroffensives in Marib Governorate.

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Toplines


Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely continuing to contest control over Jabal Han, which overlooks western Taiz City.[1] The Houthis claimed that Houthi forces controlled all of the Jabal Han area on October 20, but an independent Yemeni journalist reported that both Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces occupy positions on the mountain.[2] Neither Houthi nor Yemeni government-aligned forces control Jabal Han's summit as of October 20, according to the journalist.[3] The Houthis posted footage on October 20, showing Houthi fighters at several geolocated positions on Jabal Han, which is a mountain on the edge of western Taiz City; the date of the footage is unclear.[4] The Houthis have recently posted old footage while claiming control over heavily contested combat areas, such as Dhubab Airport on the Red Sea coastal plain.[5] Yemeni government-aligned forces also claimed on October 20 that they repelled a Houthi ground assault on Jabal Han.[6]

Jabal Han is of considerable military value to the Houthis in their campaign to capture Taiz City because it allows observation of most of the city.[7] The Houthis could position fighters on Jabal Han to observe Yemeni government-aligned forces' movements and positions in combat areas, along key roadways, and within urban neighborhoods in the vicinity. Houthi fighters on Jabal Han could also provide spotting for short-range mortars and even target government positions and convoys with direct-fire weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles. This would require the Houthis to capture and hold all of Jabal Han, however, which the group has repeatedly failed to accomplish despite numerous ground assaults and military deception in recent weeks.[8] The city's dense urban environment will also make observation of government fighting positions considerably harder, assuming accurate fires against military forces are a

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priority.

Yemeni government-aligned forces also continued to engage Houthi fighters south of Taiz City on October 19 and 20, likely in an effort to break the Houthis' encirclement of government-aligned forces in central Taiz Governorate.[9] Yemeni government media and a Yemeni journalist reported on October 20 that government-aligned forces have engaged Houthi fighters in al Misrakh and Sabr al Madawim districts, near the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC).[10] Successful Yemeni government efforts to recapture and hold territory in central Taiz Governorate could relieve some pressure on government-aligned forces in Taiz City and the vicinity, which are currently facing materiel shortages and intense combat.[11] Any Yemeni government breach of the Houthis' encirclement in central Taiz Governorate will not meaningfully improve government-aligned forces' operational environment unless these forces recapture, hold, and secure significant segments of the Taiz-Aden GLOC, however.[12]



The Houthis likely fired several ballistic missiles targeting Marib City on October 19 as part of a campaign to render Yemeni government-aligned forces unwilling or unable to sustain their counteroffensives in Marib Governorate.[13] Yemeni government media reported on October 19 that the Houthis fired a barrage of ballistic missiles that struck unspecified targets in Marib City.[14] The Houthis seek to defeat the Yemeni government's counteroffensives in northwestern and southern Marib Governorate, which have proven marginally more successful than other counteroffensive efforts in Taiz Governorate and on the coastal plain.[15] The Houthis could have attacked either military or civilian areas in Marib City in an attempt to render the government's counteroffensives unsustainable; the exact target remains unclear. The Houthis may have struck military targets as part of a strike campaign to

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disrupt military staging areas and reinforcements necessary to support counteroffensives in Marib. The attacks in Marib come after recent attacks on training camps and assembly areas in Shabwa and Lahij governorates.[16] The Houthis alternatively may have fired on civilian areas in an attempt to weaken local civilian and tribal support for the Yemeni government's counteroffensives in Marib Governorate. Marib Governor and military commander Sultan al Aradah depends on a coalition of local tribal forces for military operations in Marib Governorate, and, by maximizing casualties, the Houthis may seek to weaken these tribes' resolve to support military action.[17]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

The UK Defense Ministry announced on October 20 that it would intercept Houthi projectiles

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over Saudi Arabia.[18] This could allow Saudi Arabia to remove aircraft from defensive sorties and task them for offensive operations. The UK Defense Ministry stated on October 20 that it would also provide a transport aircraft to move materiel around Saudi Arabia and deploy additional military advisors to support Saudi air defense missions.[19] The UK also announced that it would continue to provide air-to-air refueling support to Saudi aircraft, which the UK authorized on September 22.[20] The number of UK fighter aircraft that will be deployed remains unclear.[21] Saudi aircraft are reportedly conducting dozens to potentially hundreds of strike missions on Houthi targets in Yemen per day.[22] Other Saudi aircraft are presumably conducting combat air patrol over Saudi Arabia to support ground-based air defenses amid Houthi drone fire.

The deployment of UK aircraft to Saudi Arabia could also help Saudi Arabia expand its air defense coverage across Saudi territory. The Houthis are reportedly targeting locations in Saudi Arabia without air defense coverage to maximize drone and missile impacts on Saudi territory.[23] An unspecified senior US official told the *Wall Street Journal* that Saudi forces have intercepted approximately 90 percent of Houthi attacks in the current conflict but noted that over half of the Houthi attacks have targeted undefended locations.[24]

The UK announcement comes amid continued Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on October 19. The Saudi Joint Forces Command reported on October 20 that Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile and a drone that targeted Riyadh.[25] The Houthis have conducted near-daily attacks targeting sites in and around Riyadh since October 1, including King Khalid International Airport.[26]

Saudi coalition aircraft later destroyed the Houthi missile launch platform that was used in the intercepted Riyadh missile attack on October 20, according to Saudi Joint Forces Command.[27] Saudi Arabia has attempted to degrade the Houthis' ability to launch missiles at Saudi Arabia by targeting Houthi missile launch sites and missile depots in recent weeks.[28]

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Iran Update, October 21, 2026


OCTOBER 21, 2026

understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-21-2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. **Iran may have used more accurate systems to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over the past two weeks, which is consistent with ISW-CTP's October 5 assessment that Iran is likely improving its ability to target maritime traffic in the waterway after it faced targeting constraints in August and early September 2026.**
2. **Iran may be using drones or cruise missiles equipped with infrared terminal guidance systems to target some of these vessels. Repeated successful strikes on engine rooms require weapon systems with a sufficient degree of precision, which suggests that Iran is likely firing anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) or IR-equipped drones.**
3. **The *Washington Post*, citing oil price-tracking firm Kpler, reported that the number of barrels of oil exported per day is approaching prewar daily averages after increasing from mid-August to late September. Iran likely launched its recent waves of attacks on civilian**
4. **ships in an attempt to change these conditions in Iran's favor.**



Toplines

Iran may have used more accurate systems to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over the past two weeks, which is consistent with ISW-CTP's October 5 assessment that Iran is likely improving its ability to target maritime traffic in the waterway after it faced targeting constraints in August and early September 2026.[1] Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms.[2] Bloomberg added that no reported incidents in the strait in September involved engine-room strikes.[3]

Iran may be using drones or cruise missiles equipped with infrared terminal guidance systems to target some of these vessels. Repeatedly striking engine rooms requires weapon systems that can distinguish between an engine room and other possible targets on a vessel. These weapons would need to make their terminal approach without human guidance, because

human guidance would require connectivity (likely via radio frequency) that would be challenging due to distance and jamming in the Strait of Hormuz. This would likely require a terminal guidance system equipped with a sensor that could distinguish the engine room from the rest of the vessel.[4] An infrared seeker is the most likely tool for such a task, given the limitations inherent in the employment of electro-optical seekers. An electro-optical seeker would need contrast between the target and the background, which would be sufficient to target a cargo vessel but not the engine room on that vessel. Iran has anti-ship cruise missiles equipped with IR seekers, and Russia has previously modified the Shahed-136 to carry an IR seeker.[5] It is not clear if Iran has made similar modifications.[6]

It is unlikely that Iran is continuing to use drones that rely on radio frequencies for guidance, given the jamming prevalent in the strait. Drones that require an uninterrupted radio frequency (RF) data link are vulnerable to jamming, interception, or line-of-sight signal loss. RF jamming has been frequently observed in the strait, which would theoretically complicate the accuracy and precision of Iranian strikes.[7] This suggests that Iran is more likely to be relying on an IR homing-equipped weapons system that does not require human terminal guidance, given that these characteristics would ensure that the system is unaffected by jamming or spoofing.

Repeated successful strikes on engine rooms also require weapon systems with a sufficient degree of precision, which suggests that Iran is likely firing anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) or IR-equipped drones. Attacks on ships' engine rooms almost certainly require a projectile that can impact a ship from a horizontal flight path with a high degree of accuracy. Ballistic missiles descend on near-vertical trajectories with massive warhead yields.[8] A ballistic missile could not hit the engine room without attacking it from above, risking destruction of the vessel's bridge — a fact that would surely be reported. Low-altitude, sea-skimming ASCMs equipped with IR seekers hit vessels from the side, which allows them to hit engine rooms directly without destroying the whole ship or causing mass casualties (see below).

Iran is almost certainly also using other anti-ship weapon systems — without human terminal guidance — to hit ships in the strait, in cases it is not intentionally targeting engine rooms. Eighteen out of Iran's 23 recorded attacks in the first two weeks of October did not necessarily target the ship's engine room, according to Bloomberg.[9] Iran could be using drones or ASCMs equipped with standard inertial navigation systems and active radar homing to

target commercial shipping in general. The combination of inertial navigation systems and active radar homing is highly resilient against jamming.[10] Active radar seekers lock onto a target vessel's overall radar cross-section, automatically steering the missile into the center of mass of the ship's hull rather than a specific heat-emitting compartment.[11]

Naval mines may also present a serious threat to commercial shipping, but mines cannot selectively target a ship's engine room and generally rely on hull contact, magnetic signatures, or acoustic pressure.[12] Iran has repeatedly claimed in recent weeks that targeted vessels struck naval mines, likely in order to reinforce the perception that routes outside Iranian control remain unsafe.[13] US CENTCOM stated on October 8 that "primary transit lanes" through the Strait of Hormuz remain cleared of mines, however.[14] International Maritime Organization Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez warned on October 20 that Iranian forces "still have mines" and that it is difficult to verify the level of threat they pose.[15]

The increase in Iranian attacks on vessels is part of the ongoing Iranian campaign to pressure the United States to meet Iranian demands, including control over the strait, by driving up global prices. *The Washington Post,* citing oil price-tracking firm Kpler, reported that the number of barrels of oil exported per day is approaching prewar daily averages after increasing from mid-August to late September.[16] The report attributed the rise in oil exports to US efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the strait. Recent US successes in facilitating the flow of oil out of the strait undermine Iranian claims of control over the waterway and reduce the Iranian regime's leverage to achieve Iranian war aims. Iran likely launched its recent waves of attacks on civilian ships in an attempt to change these conditions in Iran's favor. Two Iranian officials told *The Washington Post* on October 19 that the regime is "focused on" driving up global oil prices in order to exert leverage over US President Donald Trump before the midterm elections on November 3.[17]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Iranian media claimed that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[18] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on October 21 that Ghalibaf met with Mojtaba to discuss military, economic, and political developments.[19] Mojtaba has not made any public appearances since he was selected as supreme leader. Several news organizations have reported that Mojtaba was seriously wounded or incapacitated in the strike that also killed former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[20]

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

The Iraqi federal government likely closed al Sheeb border crossing between Iraq's Maysan Province and Iran's Khuzestan Province on October 21 in response to US pressure on the Iraqi government to restrict trade with Iran.[21] The Iranian Interior Ministry spokesperson confirmed the crossing's closure on October 21 and added that Iraq did not give Iran advance notice.[22] An Iraqi border official told Western media on October 21 that Iraqi authorities closed al Sheeb crossing to "review security." Two unspecified political sources told Agence France-Presse on October 21 that the United States is "pressuring" the Iraqi federal government to close the majority of its border crossings with Iran.[23] Iraq's closure of this border crossing comes after Pakistan closed two of its key border crossings with Iran on October 17, which will likely further disrupt Iran's use of overland trade channels.[24] The closure of these three border crossings will likely exacerbate the effects of the economic restrictions that


Iran currently faces. Iran has increasingly relied on overland trade routes in recent months as the United States has constrained Iran's ability to trade by sea and air.[25]

The Iraqi federal government has taken some steps to limit the Houthis' presence in Iraq, likely in response to US and Saudi pressure on the Iraqi government to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks on neighboring countries. Iraqi government sources told US-funded, regional media on October 21 that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi ordered the closure of unspecified Houthi-owned offices in Iraq and the expulsion of any Houthi members who are "active" with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[26] The Houthis maintain an active presence in Iraq, including at a headquarters in Baghdad's Jadriyah neighborhood, and have coordinated with Iraqi militias in recent months to conduct attacks on neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia.[27] Zaydi's order comes amid US and Saudi pressure on the Iraqi government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and prevent militia attacks on neighboring countries.[28] The Iraqi government will likely face significant obstacles to identifying and expelling all the Houthi members who worked with Iraqi militias since the Houthis have historically taken steps to obfuscate their involvement in Iraqi militia attacks.[29]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces, supported by Saudi air power, are engaging Houthi fighters in contested territory south of Taiz City, likely in order to try to break the Houthis' encirclement of government-aligned forces in central Taiz Governorate. Geolocated footage showed Yemeni government-aligned forces operating in previously Houthi-occupied territory in Misrakh District south of Taiz City on October 21.[30] The presence of Yemeni government-aligned forces in these areas suggests that this area may now be contested, particularly alongside Yemeni government reports of Saudi airstrikes in al Misrakh District on October 21 that presumably targeted Houthi fighters, which suggests that there is still a Houthi presence in the area.[31] Yemeni government-aligned forces have engaged Houthi fighters south of Taiz City in recent days in order to attempt to break the Houthis' encirclement of central Taiz Governorate.[32] Yemeni government-aligned forces' operational environment in Taiz Governorate will not meaningfully improve until the Yemeni government-aligned forces recapture Houthi-held main ground lines of communication between Taiz and Aden Governorates, however.[33]

Yemeni government-aligned forces separately continued to engage Houthi fighters near the contested town of Murad, south of Dhubab Airport on the coastal plain on October 21.[34] Geolocated footage originally published on October 19 separately shows Yemeni government-aligned forces firing an anti-tank guided missile at Houthi positions in Murad.[35] Yemeni government-aligned forces regained control of Dhubab Airport on the southern Red Sea coastal plain on October 15 but fighting south of the airport suggests that this area remains contested by Houthi fighters and Yemeni government-aligned forces.[36]



The Houthis have continued to target Yemeni government-controlled airports in likely effort to disrupt external supply routes and constrain the government's ability to receive military aid. The Houthis struck a Yemeni government military camp at Aden International Airport and al Rayyan International Airport in Mukalla, Hadramawt Governorate, with drones and ballistic missiles on October 21.[37] The Houthis claimed that the latter attack targeted Saudi weapons shipments to the Yemeni government at al Rayyan International Airport.[38] The Houthis have previously claimed to target Saudi weapons shipments to the Yemeni government at Aden International Airport in early October, shortly after Saudi Arabia and Pakistan delivered military equipment to Yemeni government-aligned forces in Aden in September.[39] Houthi strikes on Yemeni government-controlled airports in Aden and Hadramawt could constrain Saudi coalition efforts to resupply Yemeni government-aligned forces across different fronts.



The Houthis have continued to attack targets across Saudi Arabia to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia and compel Saudi Arabia to capitulate to Houthi demands. The Saudi Joint Forces Command reported on October 21 that Saudi air defenses intercepted at least seven drones near Medina City, Eastern Province, and in southern Saudi Arabia.[40] The Houthis denied the October 21 attack on Medina or attacking any other parts of Saudi Arabia, however.[41] The Houthis previously targeted a power station in Medina on September 29.[42] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi oil facilities, airports, and other civilian

infrastructure as part of their ongoing strike campaign.[43] The Houthis likely seek to pressure Saudi Arabia to halt military operations and accept Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen's oil and gas resources.[44]

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Iran Update, October 22, 2026

William Doran, Adham Fattah, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. The Houthis almost certainly captured a major roadway segment that links Houthi frontlines on the outskirts of Taiz City to other frontlines in central Taiz Governorate on October 22. The Houthis posted footage of fighters in vehicles at various geolocated positions along a segment of the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in the al Dhabab valley between al Misrakh District and Taiz City's southwestern limits.
2. The United States and Israel are reportedly making preparations for renewed strikes on Iran after the US midterm elections. The *New York Times* reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.


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Toplines

The Houthis almost certainly captured a major roadway segment that links Houthi frontlines on the outskirts of Taiz City to other frontlines in central Taiz Governorate on October 22. The Houthis posted footage of fighters in vehicles at various geolocated positions along a segment of the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in the al Dhabab valley between al Misrakh District and Taiz City's southwestern limits.[1] These geolocated positions indicate that the Houthis have effectively secured the Taiz-Aden GLOC between al Turbah in southern Taiz Governorate and the outskirts of Taiz City.[2] The Houthis can exploit control over this roadway to quickly transport supplies and reinforcements between frontlines surrounding Taiz City and other combat areas further south in al Misrakh District.[3] The Houthis are simultaneously attempting to capture favorable terrain on Taiz City's western outskirts and prevent Yemeni government-aligned forces in al Misrakh District from breaking out of the Houthis' encirclement. The Houthis could use this newly obtained GLOC segment to reinforce positions on either front.[4]

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Houthi fighters also likely captured the Hangar Checkpoint, which lies along a key roadway through Taiz City's southwestern limits, according to geolocated footage released on October 22.[5] The Houthis have repeatedly attacked Yemeni government-aligned forces at this checkpoint in recent days, likely in order to secure a roadway into Taiz's city center from the southwest.[6] The Houthis also posted footage of fighters at a geolocated position on Jabal Han, which is a mountain that overlooks western Taiz City and provides favorable positions for observing and targeting nearby Yemeni government-aligned forces.[7] ISW-CTP cannot assess whether the Houthis have consolidated control over Jabal Han at the time of this writing because the Yemeni government has repeatedly recaptured parts of the mountain following brief Houthi advances in recent weeks.[8]

The United States and Israel are reportedly making preparations for renewed strikes on Iran after the US midterm elections. The *New York Times* reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.[9] US officials added that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent days to discuss renewed strikes.[10] Axios, citing US and Israeli officials, reported on October 19 that dozens of Israeli fighter jets and aerial refueling tankers executed a sortie through Syrian and Iraqi airspace and turned back just as they reached the Iranian border.[11] Some US and Israeli officials stated that the sortie sought to deter Iran from attacking Israel ahead of Israel's elections on October 27.[12]

Iranian officials and media have recently threatened to expand their target base if the United States and

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Israel strike Iran, including threatening strikes on Gulf undersea cable infrastructure.[13] Iran also reportedly conducted over 30 tests of medium-range solid-fuel Emad and Kheibar Shikan ballistic missiles on October 11, almost certainly in preparation for a possible renewed conflict with the United States and Israel.[14]

US and Partner Military Operations

Several sources, including an Israeli media outlet and an open-source intelligence (OSINT) account, claimed on October 22 that US forces struck Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) missile launchers near Sirik, Hormozgan Province.[15] US CENTCOM has not confirmed any US strikes in Iran as of this writing. The exact target of the IRGC's attempted missile launch is unclear, assuming the reports are accurate. Iranian forces have targeted commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz at an increased rate over the past month in order to reestablish control of the strait. ISW-CTP assessed on October 21 that Iran may be using more accurate systems, such as weapons systems with infrared terminal guidance, to attack some of these ships.[16] The regime previously faced targeting constraints in August and early September 2026 as a result of US strikes on Iranian coastal radar infrastructure.[17]It is also possible that Iran attempted to target US naval forces. Iran fired a number of ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles targeting US naval forces in early September 2026, but ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian attempts to target US naval forces since.[18]

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The US naval blockade on Iranian ports has degraded Iran's ability to earn revenue from oil exports, which may motivate the Iranian regime to intensify efforts designed to break the US blockade. The *Wall Street Journal* reported on October 21, citing oil analysis firm Kpler, that Iran has exhausted the oil reserves that it has stored on vessels anchored beyond the US blockade line and previously sold to the People's Republic of China to earn revenue.[19] US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on October 17 that the blockade has denied the regime at least $25 billion USD in oil revenue.[20] Oil revenue is vital to the regime's operations, which include reconstituting its ballistic missile and drone programs.[21] Increasing costs imposed by the US naval blockade may motivate the Iranian regime to intensify military efforts designed to break the US will or ability to maintain the blockade. The IRGC

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Aerospace Force claimed on September 5 that it targeted a US aircraft carrier and destroyer that were enforcing the US naval blockade, for example.[22]

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

The Iraqi federal government has continued its efforts to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks on neighboring countries from Iraqi territory, likely in response to US and Saudi pressure. Unspecified sources told Iraqi media on October 22 that Iraqi authorities have increased surveillance in the past two weeks over militia sites in Maysan Province that the authorities suspect militias are using to conduct attacks.[23] The Iraqi media report assessed that the Houthis may be involved in operations at these sites and also noted the involvement of "shadow militias," probably referring to militia cells that the IRGC directly manages.[24] IRGC-managed Iraqi militia cells based along the Iraq-Iran border, including in Maysan Province, have conducted multiple attacks on neighboring countries in recent months, including a September 10 attack on Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline.[25] The Houthis, who maintain an active presence in Iraq, reportedly coordinated some of these cross-border attacks with Iraqi militias.[26] Baghdad temporarily closed multiple border crossings on the Iraq-Iran border in response to the attacks and dismissed security officials who were allegedly connected to the attacks.[27] The Iraqi federal government has more recently taken some steps to limit the Houthis' presence in Iraq, including by ordering the closure of unspecified Houthi-owned offices in Iraq on October 21.[28]


Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces are continuing to steadily consolidate control over terrain on the southern end of the Red Sea coastal plain. Anti-Houthi Yemeni media and independent Yemeni journalists reported on October 22 that the Southern Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield Forces, which are government-aligned military factions, reestablished full control over the al Aradi military camp on the southern end of the Red Sea coastal plain.[29] These claims suggest that at least some Houthi fighters are continuing to contest control of terrain by fighting government-aligned forces in areas south of Dhubab Airport, which is the site of the Yemeni government's northernmost advance on the coastal plain.[30] Al Aradi is of high tactical significance because it lies astride the Bab al Mandeb Strait, where the Houthis could fire close-range weapons at civilian vessels in the Strait if they were to maintain control over the area.[31] The Houthis still pose a broader operational threat to international maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea, however, because the group maintains control over most of the coastal plain and possesses weapons with sufficient range to attack vessels throughout the waterway at any time.[32]

The Houthis are continuing to attack Saudi government, civilian, and oil infrastructure sites in order to compel Saudi leaders to withdraw support for the Yemeni government and capitulate to Houthi demands. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree announced on October 22 that the Houthis launched ballistic missiles and drones targeting a Saudi Aramco oil site in Yanbu, Abha International Airport, King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, and the Saudi Defense Ministry (MOD)

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headquarters in Riyadh.[33] The Houthis' claimed strike on the Saudi MOD headquarters is the first Houthi attempt to attack a Saudi ministry headquarters since the current conflict began in July 2026. Saudi authorities also reported on October 21 and 22 that Saudi air defenses intercepted Houthi drones over Riyadh, Medina, and a Saudi Aramco oil processing plant at the Shaybah Oil Field, Eastern Province.[34] The Houthis' high volume and broad geographic scope of the targeting is consistent with Houthi efforts in recent weeks to expand their strike campaign against Saudi airports, oil facilities, and other infrastructure.[35] The Houthis calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia to withdraw support for the Yemeni government and capitulate to other Houthi demands by maximizing the kingdom's domestic political and economic costs.[36]



The Yemeni government announced on October 21 that it will begin attacking Houthi public assemblies, recruitment events, and tribal gatherings, almost certainly to hinder Houthi efforts to sustain the group's military forces and public support.[37] The Yemeni government is almost certainly responding to the Houthis' strike campaign against staging areas and training camps of Yemeni government-aligned forces, which has sought to disrupt the government's counteroffensives in southern and eastern Yemen.[38] The Houthis routinely use tribal gatherings and other public assemblies to recruit and mobilize fighters, including child soldiers, to support the group's offensive efforts across frontlines throughout Yemen.[39] The Yemeni government's announcement is likely in part an informational effort to deter Yemeni tribes and civilians from cooperating with the Houthis or providing manpower for the Houthi war effort. The Yemeni government's intent to strike public assemblies and tribal gatherings also represents a discrete government effort to disrupt Houthi recruitment, training, and reinforcement.

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Iran Update, October 23, 2026

OCTOBER 23, 2026


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Nadia Sleiman October 23, 2026

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Key Takeaways

1. **Hezbollah is leveraging several political and informational lines of effort to deter the Lebanese government from prosecuting the group for a recent smuggling operation, which Hezbollah likely fears could establish a precedent for legal action against its illicit activities.**
2. **Hezbollah's lines of effort are indicative of the challenges that face the government as it attempts to confront Hezbollah but do not guarantee that Hezbollah will succeed in breaking the government's will to disarm and prosecute the group in this instance.**
3. **Iraq-based Axis of Resistance actors have very likely launched at least four drones targeting Saudi Arabia within the past 20 days. Attacks on Saudi Arabia and other regional countries from Iraq by any Iranian partner or proxy support Iranian objectives to compel the United States to end the war in terms favorable to Iran by imposing increasing costs on US partners and allies in the region.**
4. **Saudi Arabia is expanding the scope of its air campaign in Yemen by interdicting Houthi smuggling cargo that could sustain Houthi military activities against the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia.**



Toplines

Hezbollah is leveraging several political and informational lines of effort to deter the Lebanese government from prosecuting the group for a recent smuggling operation, which Hezbollah likely fears could establish a precedent for legal action against its illicit activities. The Lebanese government is investigating the group after Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) personnel interdicted a Hezbollah truck carrying nearly 800 kilograms of high explosives from the Bekaa Valley to Beirut's southern suburbs on October 5.[1] The government currently seeks to refer the criminal case to the Judicial Council, which is Lebanon's highest criminal court, and prosecute the Hezbollah members involved in smuggling explosives.[2] Referring the case to the Judicial Council would break Hezbollah's de facto legal immunity and expose the organization to potential legal consequences.[3] Hezbollah accordingly likely views the possible legal actions that the government is exploring as steps that could progress or even hasten existing government efforts to disarm the group entirely under the June 2026 Agreement, particularly by establishing a precedent for legal action against Hezbollah's illicit activities.[4] Lebanese government success in holding Hezbollah accountable for smuggling weapons threatens Hezbollah's ability to resupply itself with impunity and maintain its arms.[5] The successful prosecution of the case could also

strengthen the government's confidence and preparedness to further challenge Hezbollah's military and criminal activities, potentially to the point of military disarmament.

Hezbollah is attempting to exploit the Lebanese government's sensitivity toward civil conflict by threatening the government with unrest and portraying the government as sectarian and beholden to Israeli interests. Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc warned on October 23 that Lebanon is liable to "fragmentation" and suggested that the government is pushing Lebanon toward civil conflict in pursuing legal action against Hezbollah.[6] Hezbollah officials further derided the government's efforts as "settling internal sectarian scores."[7] The Hezbollah officials also called any attempt to arrest Hezbollah officials an "act of Israeli aggression," which is likely also a veiled threat to confront government police or military action.[8] Hezbollah has historically used these kinds of threats and rhetoric to render the Lebanese government and public unwilling to threaten the group's military organization.[9] The government is particularly sensitive to such threats given Lebanon's history of civil war and sectarian violence.[10]

Hezbollah also leveraged its political alliance with Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri, who leads the Shia Amal Movement, to delay President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's efforts to prosecute Hezbollah on October 22.[11] Lebanese media reported on October 23 that Berri urged Aoun and Salam to postpone a necessary cabinet vote that would refer the Hezbollah explosives case to the Judicial Council, which answers to the pro-government Justice Minister and issues binding rulings without appeal.[12] Berri reportedly promised Aoun and Salam that, in return for postponing the cabinet vote, Hezbollah would neither foment civil conflict nor trigger a government crisis by withdrawing Hezbollah and Amal from the cabinet.[13] The Lebanese ISF and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will continue to investigate the incident during this postponement under the Lebanese Military Court's jurisdiction.[14] The Military Court is led by Brigadier General Wassim Fayad, who is reportedly close to Hezbollah and has previously obstructed prosecutions under pressure from the group.[15]

Hezbollah's lines of effort illustrate the challenges facing the Lebanese government as it attempts to confront the group, but these efforts do not guarantee that Hezbollah will succeed in breaking the government's will to disarm and prosecute the group in this instance. Hezbollah is relying on lines of effort that have succeeded during previous efforts to hold the group accountable over the last two decades.[16] Hezbollah is far weaker and less popular now than it was during some of these previous efforts, however, because it has exhausted much of its military strength and popular support since October 2023 by initiating destructive wars with Israel.[17] The Lebanese government is also demonstrating resolve to

counter Hezbollah's threats and thwart its illicit activities, including by authorizing ISF raids and LAF deployments in Beirut's southern suburbs, which are a historical Hezbollah stronghold.[18] ISW-CTP has outlined Hezbollah's lines of effort to avoid disarmament and vulnerabilities that the United States and Lebanon can exploit in an October 22 special report (read the full report here: How Hezbollah is Preventing its Disarmament, Again.)[19]

Saudi Arabia is expanding the scope of its air campaign in Yemen by interdicting Houthi smuggling cargo that could sustain Houthi military operations against the internationally recognized Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia.[20] Saudi coalition aircraft reportedly struck a likely Houthi smuggling vessel near Houthi-controlled Zuqar Island in the Red Sea on October 22.[21] Saudi coalition aircraft have increasingly targeted Houthi smuggling vessels in the Red Sea since October 16.[22] The Saudi Joint Forces Command also issued a statement warning Yemeni vessels against supporting Houthi smuggling efforts on October 19.[23] The Houthis have established an extensive international smuggling network, with support from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), to acquire small arms, drone and missile components, and other military equipment in recent years.[24] Saudi interdiction efforts likely aim to prevent arms and equipment that the Houthis could use to resupply frontline units from reaching the group by interdicting vessels carrying illicit cargo. The Houthis could also theoretically use drone and missile equipment acquired through smuggling to supply Houthi missile and drone units that are conducting daily attacks on Saudi critical infrastructure (see below).

The increase in Saudi airstrikes targeting Houthi smuggling assets comes amid challenges to the Yemeni government's ability to conduct maritime counter-smuggling operations. The Yemeni-government-aligned, Saudi-backed National Resistance Forces historically relied upon its positions on the Red Sea coast, and at Mokha port in particular, as a base for the Yemeni government's maritime counter-smuggling operations in the Red Sea. The Houthis seized this coastline, including Mokha, on September 10.[25] The loss of Yemeni-controlled territory and port infrastructure along the Red Sea coast has almost certainly limited the Yemeni government's ability to conduct anti-smuggling operations against the Houthis.[26] It is also unclear if government forces have had the bandwidth to conduct such counter-smuggling operations while forces are currently engaged in a full mobilization against the Houthis.

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

See topline section.


Iraq

Iraq-based Axis of Resistance actors have very likely launched at least four drones targeting Saudi Arabia within the past 20 days.[27] Saudi security sources told US-funded regional media on October 22 that the drones targeted unspecified “vital sites.”[28] Saudi Arabia has reportedly informed the Iraqi federal government of the attacks.[29] The report did not specify where in Iraq the launches originated, but Iraqi authorities have reportedly increased surveillance over militia sites in Maysan Province over the past two weeks that they suspect Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using to conduct attacks.[30] IRGC-managed Iraqi militia cells based along the Iraq-Iran border, including in Maysan Province, have conducted multiple attacks on neighboring countries in recent months, including a September 10 attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline.[31] The Houthis, who maintain an active presence in Iraq, reportedly coordinated some of these cross-border attacks with Iraqi militias.[32] It is possible that Iraqi fighters, Houthi fighters, or a combination of Iraqi and Houthi forces launched the drones at Saudi Arabia. Attacks on Saudi Arabia and other regional countries from Iraq by any Iranian partner or proxy support Iranian objectives to compel the United States to end the war in terms favorable to Iran by imposing increasing costs on US partners and allies in the region, including by imposing economic costs through attacks on energy infrastructure.

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to advance into contested territory south of Taiz City, likely to try to break the Houthis' encirclement of government-aligned forces in central Taiz Governorate. Yemeni government-aligned forces advanced to Jabal Manara in al Misrakh District on October 22, which the Houthis previously occupied, according to Yemeni and DC-based Yemen analyst sources.[33] Yemeni government-aligned forces have advanced into al Misrakh District and engaged Houthi fighters in the area in recent days, likely in order to try to break the Houthis' encirclement of central Taiz Governorate. The Houthis fully encircled the city on October 12.[34]

Yemeni government-aligned forces' advances into al Misrakh District come amid the continued success of Yemeni government-aligned forces' efforts to repel Houthi advances into the "Old Airport" neighborhood on the western outskirts of Taiz City on October 22.[35] Yemeni government-aligned forces similarly repelled Houthi attempts to advance into the area on October 17 and 18.[36] The "Old Airport" neighborhood sits along a major road leading into Taiz City that the Houthis have sought to capture in recent weeks.[37]



The Houthis have continued to attack targets across Saudi Arabia to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia and compel Saudi Arabia to capitulate to Houthi demands. The Saudi Joint Forces Command reported that Saudi air defenses intercepted one ballistic missile over Najran, southern Saudi Arabia, on October 22.[38] Saudi air defenses also intercepted two ballistic missiles over Riyadh and Khamis Mushait and two drones over Saudi Arabia's southern region on October 23.[39] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi oil facilities, airports, and other civilian infrastructure as part of

their ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to halt military operations against the Houthis and accept the Houthis' demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen's oil and gas resources.[40]



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Iran Update, October 24, 2026

William Doran, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa


Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways

1. Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned on October 23 that US intelligence assessments indicate that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks against US targets in the region.
2. Houthi supporters and military officers have reportedly expressed dissatisfaction with the group's military progress near Taiz City and are urging Houthi leadership to conduct a large-scale ground assault to capture the city.
3. The Houthis claimed that they attacked three Saudi airports, pumping stations on the East-West Pipeline, and oil facilities at major Saudi Red Sea ports.

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Toplines

Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned on October 23 that US intelligence assessments indicate that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks against US targets in the region.[1] Clayton noted in a memo addressed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Iran has "substantially increased" its efforts to target US personnel.[2] US officials told Western media that US intelligence agencies assess that the Iranian threat to US citizens in the Middle East is at the highest level since the US-Israel-Iran War began in February 2026.[3] Iran has repeatedly targeted US military and diplomatic personnel based in the region since the beginning of the war. Iran also reportedly planned a drone attack against Royal Air Force (RAF) Fairford in the United Kingdom, prompting the United States to evacuate 12 B-1 Lancers from the base in early October.[4] US officials told the New York Times on October 23 that the United States has started to reduce its diplomatic personnel in the region due to the threat from Iran.[5]

Clayton's warning about Iranian plans to attack US targets comes amid recent Iranian threats to "expand" Iran's target bank in the event that the United States or Israel resume strikes on Iran.[6] Iranian officials warned Arab officials and mediators that Iran would "more aggressively" target US forces and naval vessels in the event of renewed conflict.[7] These warnings are likely intended to deter any renewed US or Israeli military operations while Iran is simultaneously preparing for possible conflict. Iran reportedly conducted over 30 tests of medium-range solid-fuel Emad and Kheibar Shekan ballistic missiles on October 11, for example.[8]

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US and Partner Military Operations

See topline section.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:

- *Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz*
- *Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war*
- *Restore deterrence vis-*à *-vis the United States and its regional partners*
- *Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states*

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

Houthi supporters and military officers have reportedly expressed dissatisfaction with the group's military progress near Taiz City and urged Houthi leadership to conduct a large-scale ground assault to capture the city. The Houthis have fully encircled Taiz City and surrounding areas to the south since October 12.[9] A Marib-based Yemeni journalist and a DC-based Yemen analyst posted social media messages from Houthi-aligned "activists" and military officers who argued that the Houthis' ongoing siege of Taiz City is providing Yemeni government-aligned forces with excess time to consider options to free the city and exhaust Houthi forces in combat.[10] The messages from the military officers and Houthi supporters claimed that a protracted siege of Taiz City would be a "serious mistake" and bring about "catastrophic consequences" for the Houthis.[11] These messages and reports suggest that some Houthi-aligned figures are not confident in the group's ability to compel government-aligned forces


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and civilians to surrender Taiz City, even though government-aligned forces defending the city are engaged in heavy combat and face significant supply shortages.[12]

Yemeni government-aligned forces' defense of their positions on Taiz City's western outskirts in recent weeks has also prevented the Houthis from quickly advancing and overwhelming government-aligned forces in the city.[13] Anti-Houthi Yemeni media reported on October 23 that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured the Hangar Checkpoint, which lies on a main roadway leading into Taiz City from the southwest, but ISW-CTP cannot verify this claim.[14] Saudi or Yemeni government-aligned forces also conducted at least four airstrikes targeting a major Houthi artillery battery at the abandoned Sofitel Hotel, which is located on a hilltop that overlooks Taiz City from the east.[15] The Houthis have used the hotel's advantageous terrain to fire heavy artillery barrages on government-aligned forces' positions in Taiz City since 2015.[16]

Yemeni government-aligned forces are continuing to engage Houthi fighters further south in Taiz and Lahij governorates in attempts to break the Houthis' encirclement of Taiz City and central Taiz Governorate.[17] Anti-Houthi media posted a video of Yemeni government-aligned forces at a security force headquarters in al Misrakh district, central Taiz Governorate, on October 23 and claimed that government-aligned forces have recaptured the entire district.[18] ISW-CTP cannot confirm this claim, however. An independent Yemeni journalist reported on October 23 that Yemeni government-aligned forces engaged Houthi fighters near the southern edge of the Houthis' encirclement in Taiz Governorate and along the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in al Maqatirah district, Lahij Governorate, on October 23.[19] A breakout from the Houthis' encirclement of central Taiz Governorate will provide little operational gain to Yemeni government-aligned forces unless these forces recapture, hold, and secure significant segments of the Taiz-Aden GLOC.[20]

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


The Houthis launched at least three ballistic missiles targeting the Yemeni Coast Guard's administrative buildings in government-controlled Aden on October 24. The Yemeni government's Interior Ministry confirmed that the Houthis struck a Coast Guard building at its headquarters, located near Aden International Airport, with two ballistic missiles.[21] Houthi military spokesperson Yayha Saree claimed that the Houthis struck the Yemeni government's al Nasr Military Camp site, where the Yemeni Interior Ministry is now located.[22] The Yemeni government's Interior Ministry also confirmed that a Houthi ballistic missile struck another Coast Guard building in Tawahi District.[23] Saree claimed that the Houthis also targeted the Naval Base in Aden, which is located in Tawahi District.[24] The Yemeni government's Coast Guard is responsible for monitoring and intercepting Houthi maritime smuggling efforts.[25] The timing of Houthi strikes targeting government maritime assets is notable given that Saudi Arabia has increasingly struck Houthi smuggling vessels in the Red Sea since October 16.[26]

The Houthis have continued their attack campaign to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia in order to compel Riyadh to capitulate to Houthi demands. The Saudi Joint Forces Command reported that Saudi air defenses intercepted a ballistic missile over Riyadh and a drone over eastern Saudi Arabia on October 23.[27] Saudi air defenses also intercepted ballistic missiles over Yanbu, Taif, Mecca, and Medina on October 24.[28] Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed that the Houthis fired ballistic missiles and drones on October 24 targeting King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, Najran International Airport, and King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, as well as a Saudi Aramco facility in Yanbu, a Petro Rabigh Refinery in Rabigh, and an unspecified number of pumping stations on the Saudi East-West pipeline.[29] The Houthis have

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repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of the Houthis' ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to halt military operations against the Houthis and accept the Houthis' demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen's oil and gas resources.[30]



Map by Daniel Mealie, David Schulert, Megan Ewert, Nathaniel Kramer, Carolyn Weinstein, Eliana Ornelas, Samuel McRee, Natalie Mesplay, James Thompson, Mikayla Green, Christopher Dayton, Brian Carter, Nick Carl, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Parker Hempel, William Doran, and Bailey Pasternak
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Endnotes

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