

Iran Update Special Report, April 5, 2026



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Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. US President Donald Trump appears to have extended the deadline for Iran to stop attacking shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to 8:00 PM ET on April 7 amid discussions with Iranian officials. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said on April 5 that Iran would continue attacking shipping through the Strait, however.
2. US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that US forces on April 4 completed the rescue of both F-15E crewmembers after Iran shot down their aircraft on April 2 during a combat mission.
3. US forces successfully established a makeshift airstrip very close to a major Iranian city, successfully extracted all of its personnel during the rescue operation, and the combined force has continued to strike targets in Iran.
4. The combined force has continued to strike operational components of the program even as it targets production facilities for engines, guidance systems, and other components and research and development facilities, including a missile launcher reportedly for a Haj Qassem missile, which has a maximum range of 1,400 km.
5. The IDF is continuing to target Iranian tunnel entrances to prevent Iranian forces from using tunnels to conceal missile sites.
6. Iran has slightly altered its strike packages targeting Gulf states to include more cruise missiles, but it is unclear whether this represents experimentation with new tactics, an effort to manage the remaining missile reserves, or something else.
7. Hezbollah published footage on April 4 and 5 that Hezbollah claimed shows first-person view (FPV) drone attacks conducted on March 25 against an Israeli vehicle and two Israeli Merkava tanks in southern Lebanon.
8. Hezbollah claimed to have launched anti-ship cruise missiles at an Israeli warship located 68

nautical miles off the coast of Lebanon on April 5 for the first time since the start of the war.

9. The IDF estimated that Hezbollah can maintain a fire rate of 200 rockets and drone launches per day at Israel for an additional five months. Hezbollah rocket and drone attacks do not appear to be achieving the desired effect of altering Israel's decision-making in conducting airstrikes against Iran, however.
10. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to blame Kuwait for attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure, likely to obfuscate responsibility for these attacks to a domestic Iraqi audience.

Toplines

US President Donald Trump appears to have extended the deadline for Iran to stop attacking shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to 8:00 PM ET on April 7 amid discussions with Iranian officials.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said on April 5 that Iran would continue attacking shipping through the Strait, however.[2] Trump had previously set the deadline for Monday, April 6, following a prior extension.[3] Trump threatened to attack energy infrastructure and bridges in the event Iran persists in attacking shipping after his deadline.[4] Mojtaba said on April 5 that Iranian forces would continue to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[5] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on April 5 to discuss Pakistan's mediation efforts between Iran and the United States.[6] Media readouts did not disclose if Iran agreed to any negotiations, however.[7]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that US forces on April 4 successfully completed the rescue of both F-15E crewmembers after Iran shot down their aircraft on April 2 during a combat mission.[8] CENTCOM had not previously acknowledged the earlier rescue of the F-15E pilot, which occurred on April 3.[9] US special operations forces successfully secured the F-15E weapons system officer (WSO) on April 4.[10] US officials told Western media that the WSO survived after evading capture for 36 hours, but he is seriously wounded and now receiving medical treatment in Kuwait.[11] The rescue operation resulted in an unspecified number of Iranian casualties.[12] US forces destroyed two transport aircraft and multiple MH-6 Little Birds that they could not extract from Iran after the rescue operation.[13] US President Donald Trump stated that the recoveries involved two US "raids" and noted that in the second operation, US forces spent seven hours over Iran.[14] Trump also announced he will hold a press conference in the Oval Office at 1:00 PM ET on April 6.[15]

The Iranian regime media is falsely characterizing the shutdown of the F-15E and subsequent downing of an A-10 attack aircraft during rescue operations as a US defeat.[16] US forces successfully established a makeshift airstrip very close to a major Iranian city, successfully extracted all of its personnel, and the combined force has continued to strike targets in Iran.[17] An Iranian military spokesperson said that Iranian forces "thwarted" the rescue attempt, even though US forces recovered all personnel in Iran, and all personnel are alive.[18] Iranian regime media argued that US forces would not have struggled to get the MC-130 aircraft off the ground if Iranian air defense systems had truly been neutralized.[19] The MC-130s were unable to get off the ground because their nose gear got stuck in the sand, not because of any Iranian action.[20]


The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is continuing to target Iranian tunnel entrances to prevent Iranian forces from using tunnels to conceal missile sites. The head of the Israeli Air Intelligence Group stated on April 5 that Israel must expend "large resources" to prevent Iranian forces from hiding in mountainous areas.[21] The official added that the IDF blocks the tunnel entrances to prevent Iranian forces from entering or exiting the tunnels.[22] Iran buries important missile sites underneath mountains

and in tunnels to conceal the sites and to make it difficult for airstrikes to damage them.[23]

Iran has slightly altered its strike packages to include more cruise missiles. Iran has previously not used cruise missiles at the rate it did on April 5, but it is unclear whether this represents experimentation with new tactics, an effort to manage the remaining missile reserves, or something else. Iran launched four cruise missiles at Kuwait, two at Qatar, and one each at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.[24]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia

Between February 28, 2026 and April 5, 2026



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
All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Bahrain

Between February 28, 2026 and April 5, 2026




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Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates

Between February 28, 2026 and April 5, 2026




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Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Kuwait

Between February 28, 2026 and April 5, 2026



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
US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to strike operational components of the program even as it targets production facilities for engines, guidance systems, and other components and research and development facilities. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account on X and Kurdish media reported on April 5 that the combined force struck a missile launcher in Kamyaran, Kurdistan Province.[25] A defense analyst stated that the launcher appeared to be for a Haj Qassem missile, which is a medium-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of 1,400 km.[26] An OSINT account on X and anti-regime media reported on April 5 that the combined force struck a missile launcher inside a warehouse in Farashband, Fars Province.[27]

The combined force continued to strike Iranian internal security forces. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the Ahvaz International Airport in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[28] It is unclear what the target of the strikes was. The 51st Hazrat-e Hojjat Independent Armored Brigade is based near the airport and operates under the Karbala Operational Base in Ahvaz.[29] OSINT accounts on X reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the IRGC Ground Forces 14th Imam Hossein Division and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Provincial headquarters in Esfahan, Esfahan Province.[30] The Imam Hossein Division operates under the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base in Esfahan, which the combined force struck on March 8.[31]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between April 4, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 5, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



The combined force has continued its decapitation campaign against Iranian military officials.

The combined force killed IRGC Brigadier General Mostafa Azizi on April 5.[32] IRGC-affiliated media reported on April 5 that Azizi served in the IRGC Navy's 3rd Imam Hossein Naval District in Khuzestan Province.[33] The 3rd Imam Hossein Naval District controls the northwestern Persian Gulf and Khuzestan's maritime borders and coastal waters, and includes key naval infrastructure such as the Arvand Naval Base and associated surface combat brigades.[34] The IDF separately killed Mohammad Reza Ashrafi Ghahi in Tehran Province.[35] The IDF reported that Ashrafi Ghahi served as the head of commerce in the IRGC Oil Headquarters and managed oil sales that generated billions of dollars annually.[36] Iranian media reported on April 5 that the combined force killed Artesh Air Defense Academy Commander Brigadier General Masoud Zare during recent strikes.[37] US President Donald Trump stated on Truth Social on April 4 that "many of Iran's military leaders" were killed in a large strike in Tehran Province.[38] An OSINT reported that the video Trump shared shows explosions from strikes in

northern Tehran conducted on April 3.[39]

Anti-regime media reported on April 5 that Iran’s Bank Sepah experienced another major computer network disruption that reportedly prevented the bank from paying IRGC personnel and regime military officials.[40] The combined force previously struck a Bank Sepah building on March 11, in which Bank Sepah said that the strike destroyed the building and disrupted in-person and online services.[41] Bank Sepah is responsible for paying IRGC and Artesh personnel.[42] Repeated disruptions are notable because they could interfere with the regime’s ability to pay military personnel, which could exacerbate the challenges the regime is facing with desertions.

Iranian Response

Iran has launched at least five missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on April 4.[43] An Israeli military correspondent reported on April 5 that an Iranian ballistic missile hit an open area in Neot Hovav Industrial Zone, southern Israel.[44] An Iranian missile also directly hit a residential building in Haifa on April 5, causing extensive damage to the building and seriously wounding one person.[45]

The IRGC claimed on April 5 that it targeted “US-linked oil and gas infrastructure” in the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait.[46] Falling debris from a missile interception ignited three fires at a Borouge company petrochemicals plant in al Ruwais, UAE, on April 5.[47] Debris from intercepted Iranian projectiles also hit an unspecified container vessel at the Khor Fakkan Port, Sharjah Emirate, igniting a fire and injuring four crew members.[48] Iranian drones hit several Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (GPIC) units in Sitra, Bahrain, according to Bahraini state media on April 5.[49] An Iranian drone separately struck a Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) storage tank in Sitra on April 5, igniting a fire.[50] Iran previously struck the refinery on March 5.[51] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry also said on April 5 that Iranian drones hit two power generation and water desalination facilities, a Kuwaiti Ministries Complex building, an Oil Ministry building, and several Kuwait Petroleum Corporation-affiliated “operational facilities.”[52]

Iranian Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East

Between April 4, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 5, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET




A top Iranian official suggested that the Axis of Resistance will threaten shipping in the Bab al Mandeb. This statement is probably designed to deter future US action. Former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on X on April 5 that the “unified command” of the Axis of Resistance views Bab el Mandeb the same way it views the Strait of Hormuz.[53] Velayati warned that the flow of global energy and global trade could be disrupted “with a single signal.”[54] IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim previously warned on March 25 of a “new front” in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, the southern entrance to the Red Sea off the Yemeni coast.[55] Velayati’s statement suggests that Iran is framing the Bab el Mandeb as part of its coercive regional deterrent posture and is coordinating with the Houthis, but it does not mean that Iran alone controls Houthi decision-making. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the Houthis likely aim to help deter further US escalation against Iran and the wider Axis of Resistance, but they are unlikely to expand attacks in ways that would jeopardize their domestic position.[56]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 40 attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 4 and 2:00 PM ET on April 5.[57] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel.[58] An Israeli journalist reported on April 5 that Hezbollah rockets struck Deir al Asad, northern Israel, injuring at least six individuals.[59] Hezbollah drones also struck a home in Shomrat, northern Israel, on April 5.[60]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and April 4, 2026




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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah Attacks in Israel and Lebanon

Between April 4, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 5, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Hezbollah used an anti-ship cruise missile targeting an Israeli warship for the first time in this conflict. Hezbollah claimed that it launched anti-ship cruise missiles targeting an Israeli warship located 68 nautical miles off the coast of Lebanon on April 5.[61] This attack marks the first time that Hezbollah has used an anti-ship cruise missile in an attack against Israel.[62] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel estimates that the ship was damaged.[63]

Hezbollah used first-person view (FPV) drones in multiple attacks in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah published footage on April 4 and 5 that Hezbollah claimed shows FPV drone attacks conducted on March 25 against an Israeli vehicle and two Israeli Merkava tanks in southern Lebanon.[64] The FPV drones used in the two attacks were likely not fiber-optic FPV drones. Hezbollah previously claimed six FPV drone attacks against IDF armored vehicles between March 31 and April 3.[65]

The IDF reported on April 5 that Hezbollah has conducted at least 165 rocket attacks that fell

inside or near United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) positions in southern Lebanon.[66] The IDF stated that Hezbollah exploits its close proximity to UNIFIL positions and outposts to "advance terrorist actions against [Israel]."[67] UNIFIL operates 29 positions across southern Lebanon.[68] UNIFIL has not commented on this Israeli report at the time of this writing.

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and affiliated sites across Lebanon. The IDF has struck over 3,500 Hezbollah targets, including hundreds of command centers, weapon depots, and rocket and missile launchers, in Lebanon since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[69] The IDF struck Hezbollah headquarters and two Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations in Beirut on April 5.[70] The Amana Fuel Company is owned by Hezbollah, operates a network of gas stations in Lebanon, and manages Hezbollah's fuel supplies.[71] The United States sanctioned the Amana Fuel Company in February 2020 for its role in supporting Hezbollah.[72] The IDF has struck over 15 Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations since the start of Israel's campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[73]

Multiple IDF divisions are continuing ground operations across southern Lebanon. The IDF 91st Territorial Division, including the 8th Armored Brigade (Res.), has continued to expand its focused ground operations in southern Lebanon. The division's soldiers engaged with and killed several Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon, as well as located several Hezbollah weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and ammunition.[74] The IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) has similarly continued to expand the IDF's security zone and located various military equipment and weapons, including surface-to-surface rockets and launchers, explosive charges, ATGMs, and military vests, in southern Lebanon.[75] The IDF 146th Reserve Division, including the 226th Paratrooper Brigade and 213th Artillery Brigade, has killed over 90 Hezbollah fighters since March 2.[76] IDF officials have reaffirmed that the IDF will continue to hold territory in southern Lebanon until the direct threat of Hezbollah is removed.[77] IDF officials also reiterated that disarming Hezbollah is an ongoing goal of Israel's current campaign in Lebanon.[78]

Israeli media reported on April 4 that the IDF acknowledged that it overestimated the level to which Israel degraded Hezbollah during the fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict and noted that the IDF is compiling an updated estimate of Hezbollah's capabilities.[79] The IDF's updated estimates indicated that Hezbollah is prepared for a prolonged campaign and is operating a strategic campaign to be able to sustain its daily attacks against Israel.[80] The IDF estimated that Hezbollah is capable of maintaining a fire rate of 200 launches, including rockets and drones, per day at Israel for an additional five months.[81] Hezbollah's rocket and drone attacks do not appear to be affecting Israeli strategic calculations at this time. The IDF noted that Hezbollah maintains hundreds of launchers, most of which are located north of the Litani River in civilian areas, which makes it difficult for the Israeli Air Force to locate and destroy them.[82] The IDF has identified "significant cracks" in Hezbollah's command and control structure, specifically between Hezbollah's central leadership in Beirut and Hezbollah forces operating on the ground in southern Lebanon.[83] Security sources told Israeli media on April 4 that the IDF has Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem "in [their] sights" and noted that the IDF "will not hesitate to act as soon as the operational opportunity arises." [84] Israeli media also reported on April 4 that there is a decline in morale among Hezbollah fighters, noting that Hezbollah reservists have failed to report to duty and some operatives have fled to the north to avoid direct confrontation with IDF forces.[85]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Houthis claimed that they launched a ballistic missile and several drones targeting Ben Gurion Airport, central Israel, and unspecified “vital [IDF] military targets” in southern Israel on April 4.[86] The Houthis noted that they conducted their operation in coordination with Iran and Hezbollah.[87] ISW-CTP has not observed any reports of impacts at Ben Gurion Airport at the time of this writing. This attack marks the seventh time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[88] ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis’ involvement in the war thus far appears calibrated to try to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.[89]

The US-Israeli combined force struck positions held by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib al Tayyar al Risali for the third time in this conflict.[90] The combined force repeatedly struck 31st Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade sites in Salah al Din Province on April 4 and 5.[91] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib al Tayyar al Risali controls the 31st PMF Brigade.[92] The combined force separately struck Badr Organization-controlled PMF Brigade sites in Salah al Din Province on April 5.[93]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on April 4 that it conducted 19 drone attacks against “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region.[94] Likely front group Kataib Sarkhat al Quds also claimed on April 4 that it attacked unspecified US interests in Kuwait.[95] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab also claimed on April 4 that it conducted two “air attacks” targeting unspecified US and Israeli interests in Bahrain and northern Iraq with “appropriate weapons.”[96]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to blame Kuwait for attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure, likely to obfuscate responsibility for these attacks to a domestic Iraqi audience. Unspecified actors also launched six drones targeting a China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)-operated oil field in Maysan Province on April 4, igniting a fire.[97] This is the second time an Iraqi militia has targeted a partially or fully Chinese-owned asset since the beginning of the war. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have repeatedly attacked other foreign-operated energy sites in Iraq since the start of the conflict, however.[98] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds attempted to obfuscate militia responsibility for the attacks on Iraqi energy infrastructure by blaming the Kuwaiti government and the Kurdistan Regional Government in an April 4 statement.[99] This statement will not fool Western governments, the Iraqi government, or others, but the Iraqi groups still need to answer to a popular domestic constituency.

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Endnotes

[1] <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116353078945787501>

[2] https://t.me/rahbar_english_ir/172

[3] <https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/ahead-latest-strait-hormuz-deadline-trump-threatens-irans-energy-r>

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[8]

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[13] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/04/us/politics/military-iran-airman-rescue.html?smid=url-share> ;

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Iran Update Special Report, April 6, 2026



Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Avery Borens, Nidal Morrison, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran rejected a ceasefire agreement with the United States to pause the war and “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz on April 6. Iran’s rejection of the latest ceasefire proposal reduces the likelihood that the United States and Iran will reach an agreement by US President Donald Trump’s April 7 deadline. Trump has maintained his threat to strike Iranian energy infrastructure and bridges if Iran does not agree to a deal by April 7.
2. Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis appear to have coordinated an attack targeting Israel on April 6, possibly to try to maximize the psychological effects of Iran’s limited ability to conduct large-scale attacks against Israel. The timing of these attacks suggests that the attacks were coordinated to some degree, given the vastly different travel times of the munitions fired at Israel by Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis.
3. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed on April 6 that it has struck Iran’s two largest petrochemical facilities in the past week that account for 85 percent of Iranian petrochemical exports. The IDF reported that the South Pars Complex contained infrastructure to produce explosives and propellant for ballistic missiles.

Toplines

Iran rejected a ceasefire agreement with the United States to pause the war and “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz on April 6.[1] Iran’s rejection of the latest ceasefire proposal reduces the likelihood that the United States and Iran will reach an agreement by US President

Donald Trump's April 7 deadline. The Pakistani-brokered proposal called for an immediate ceasefire followed by several weeks of negotiations to broker a lasting ceasefire and agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[2] Iran seeks a permanent end to the war rather than a temporary ceasefire, however.[3] Iranian state media reported that Iran's counterproposal included 10 demands, including a lasting ceasefire in the "region," a "protocol for safe passage" through the Strait of Hormuz, support for Iran's reconstruction, and the lifting of sanctions.[4] Trump rejected Iran's counterproposal as "not good enough" on April 6.[5] A US official similarly described Iran's demands as "maximalist" to an Axios journalist on April 6.[6] Iran's demand for a ceasefire across the "region" presumably refers to a ceasefire that also ends Israel's campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is unclear what Iran is referring to when it calls for a "protocol for safe passage" through the Strait of Hormuz, but it may refer to a mechanism that would enable Iran to regulate traffic through the strait. This demand suggests that Iran is using the strait as a point of leverage to attempt to extract concessions and secure a favorable post-war agreement with the United States.

Trump stated that the Iranian regime seeks to reach a ceasefire with the United States despite the regime's rejection of the latest ceasefire proposal. Trump characterized Iranian negotiators as "active, willing participant[s]" and said that they "would like to be able to make a deal." [7] Trump has twice moved his deadline for Iran to reach a deal — including once at the request of Iranian officials—in order to continue talks.[8] Iranian officials have continued to engage with mediators and countries involved in the talks. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who is involved in the talks, spoke with his Turkish and Qatari counterparts on April 6.[9] Both Turkey and Qatar are potential mediators for future talks.[10]

President Trump has maintained his threat to strike Iranian energy infrastructure and bridges if Iran does not agree to a deal by April 7.[11] Trump said in an April 6 White House press conference that the United States has a plan to render every bridge in Iran "decimated" and put every Iranian power plant "out of business" by midnight on April 8 if Iran does not agree to a deal.[12] US officials said that US forces are preparing to strike Iranian energy infrastructure on April 7 if President Trump orders them to do so.[13] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that the United States would conduct its largest volume of strikes on April 6 since the war began and will conduct even more strikes on April 7.[14]

Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis appear to have coordinated an attack targeting Israel on April 6, possibly to try to maximize the psychological effects of Iran's limited ability to conduct large-scale attacks against Israel. The three attacks triggered Israeli sirens across northern, central, and southern Israel within a roughly ten-minute period and the munitions used in the attacks appeared to reach Israeli airspace around the same time:[15]

- Iran launched two ballistic missiles targeting central Israel.[16] Shrapnel fell in central Israel.[17] Initial military assessments indicated that at least one of the missiles contained a cluster munition warhead.[18]
- The Houthis launched "several" drones targeting Eilat, southern Israel, which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted.[19] The Houthis also claimed to fire cruise missiles, though these missiles do not appear to have reached Israel.[20]
- Hezbollah rocket fire triggered sirens in Margaliot and Manara along the Israel-Lebanon border.[21]

The timing of these attacks suggests that the attacks were coordinated to some degree, given the vastly different travel times of the munitions fired at Israel by Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis. Ballistic missiles launched from Iran take about 12 minutes to reach Israel, whereas Houthi drones take several hours to reach Israel once launched from Yemen.[22] Israelis living along the Lebanon-Israel border only receive a 15- to 30-second warning of an imminent Hezbollah rocket attack, in contrast.[23] The Houthis also

claimed to conduct an attack coordinated with the IRGC and Hezbollah on April 1.[24]

Coordinated attacks between Iran and its Axis partners may aim to impose psychological effects on Israeli civilians by threatening multiple areas across Israel near-simultaneously.

The volume and types of munitions used in the attack suggest that this attack was not necessarily intended to overwhelm Israeli air defenses. Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis may be unable to conduct a coordinated large-scale attack large enough to achieve this effect. Iran has struggled to conduct large-scale missile and drone attacks targeting Israel since the war began and is instead likely opting for a strategy designed to maximize the effects of its limited fire, including using cluster munitions and firing barrages throughout the day to increase the number of times per day that Israeli civilians must seek shelter. Near-simultaneous attacks from multiple fronts may seek to invoke the feeling among Israeli civilians of being “encircled” by Iran and the Axis of Resistance and thereby terrorize Israeli civilians.

Several social media users have falsely attributed data from the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) on Iranian missile impact rates to ISW-CTP. ISW-CTP has not published an independent figure for Iranian missile impact rates in Israel. A recent JP Morgan report cited data from JINSA that missile impact rates in Israel rose from three percent during the first two weeks of the war to 27 percent in later weeks.[25] The 27 percent impact rate likely includes cluster munition impacts, which Iran started using at a greater scale starting in the second week of the war. Cluster munitions disperse over a wide area to maximize damage. Cluster munitions from one warhead can lead to over 30 individual impact sites, as seen on April 6 in central Israel. Many of the Iranian missile attacks that have caused damage and casualties in Israel have involved missiles with cluster munition warheads.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to strike Iranian missile sites and airbases. An Israeli journalist reported on April 6 that the combined force struck a missile depot in Bushehr City, Bushehr Province.[26] An Israeli analyst, citing the IDF, separately reported that the IDF recently struck the Abyek Missile Base in Ziyaran, Ghazvin Province.[27] This base has at least five tunnel entrances to underground facilities that store missiles and missile launchers.[28] Iran stores missiles and missile launchers in underground bases underneath mountains and in tunnels to conceal them and make it difficult for airstrikes to damage them.[29]

The IDF stated on April 5 that it struck unspecified targets at three airports in Tehran Province: Mehrabad International Airport, Sepehr International Airport, and Shahid Aryafor Airport.[30] The 1st Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase is co-located with Mehrabad Airport.[31] It is unclear what the IDF struck at the Sepehr and Shahid Aryafor airports. Anti-regime media separately reported on April 5 that the combined force likely struck the 7th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase in Shiraz, Fars Province, which is co-located with Shiraz International Airport.[32] The combined force has likely struck this airbase at least six times since the beginning of the war.[33]

The combined force continued to strike Iranian defense industrial sites. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts on X reported on April 6 that the combined force struck Shiraz Electronics Industries in Shiraz, Fars Province.[34] The combined force has struck Shiraz Electronics Industries multiple times during the war.[35] Shiraz Electronics Industries is subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). The United States sanctioned Shiraz Electronics Industries in September 2008 for producing electronic equipment for the Iranian armed forces.[36] OSINT accounts on X reported on April 6 that the combined force also struck the electronics research center at Sharif University of Tehran.[37] This center has been involved in missile guidance system research.[38]

The United States sanctioned Sharif University in 2019 for supporting Iranian ballistic missile production and procurement.[39] An OSINT account on X reported on April 6 that the combined force struck two unspecified shipbuilding companies at the Shahid Mousavi site in Khorramshahr, Khuzestan Province.[40] The account was likely referring to the Shahid Mousavi Offshore Industries, which builds ships for the Iranian Defense Industries-affiliated Marine Industries Group.[41]

The combined force continued to strike Iranian internal security sites. OSINT accounts on X claimed on April 5 that US forces struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces 2nd Imam Sajjad Special Forces Brigade in Kazeroun, Fars Province.[42] The Imam Sajjad Brigade operates under the Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[43] Anti-regime media separately reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the “Sarallah Barracks” in Tehran.[44] It is unclear whether this report was referring to the Sarallah Operational Base, which is responsible for coordinating internal security and protest suppression efforts in Tehran.[45] An OSINT account on X reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the Artesh 92nd Armored Division in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[46] The combined force previously struck the 92nd Armored Division on March 12.[47] An OSINT account on X claimed on April 6 that the combined force also struck the Shahid Tondgouyan Basij headquarters in Ahvaz.[48]

The IDF confirmed on April 6 that it has struck Iran’s two largest petrochemical facilities in the past week that account for 85 percent of Iranian petrochemical exports.[49] The IDF announced on April 6 that it struck the South Pars Complex in Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province.[50] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that South Pars accounts for 50 percent of Iran’s petrochemical production.[51] Katz added that the IDF struck Iran’s “second main [petrochemical] facility” last week.[52] Katz was likely referring to the IDF’s strikes on the Bandar Imam Petrochemical Complex in Khuzestan Province on April 4.[53] The IDF reported that the South Pars Complex contained infrastructure to produce explosives and propellant for ballistic missiles.[54] Iranian media reported on April 6 that the IDF struck the Mobin and Damavand facilities at South Pars and stated that these facilities produced electricity, water, and oxygen.[55] All of these components can be used in the production of liquid and solid missile propellant.[56] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Mobin’s owner, the Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Company, in 2022 for selling tens of millions of US dollars’ worth of petroleum and petrochemical products on behalf of the IRGC Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters.[57] An OSINT account identified damage to at least three gas turbines in footage of a fire at the Damavand petrochemical facility.[58] The Damavand Petrochemical Company provides and sells petrochemical products to the Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Company and the Iranian Armed Forces Social Security Organization.[59] Anti-regime media separately reported airstrikes at the Zagros petrochemical facility, which is also located at the South Pars Complex.[60] The Zagros Petrochemical Company produces methanol, which can be used in missile propellant.[61]



The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) did not sustain damage after a projectile landed near the facility's premises for the fourth time since the start of the war.[62] The IAEA confirmed that a projectile landed 75 meters from the BNPP's perimeter, citing April 5 satellite imagery.[63] The IAEA did not detect an increase in radiation near the BNPP.[64] Iran claimed that a projectile fragment killed one member of the site's physical protection staff and that shockwaves and projectile fragments "affected" a building at the site.[65]

The combined force has continued to degrade Iran's internal and external security apparatuses by targeting high-ranking commanders and low-ranking security personnel. The IDF confirmed that it killed IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Major General Majid Khademi in an airstrike in Tehran.[66] Khademi had held this role since June 2025, when the IDF killed his predecessor, Mohammad Kazemi.[67] The IDF also killed IRGC Quds Force Special Operations Unit 840 Commander Ashar Bagheri.[68] Unit 840 is responsible for conducting clandestine and terrorist activities against Israelis inside and outside of Israel.[69] Bagheri and his deputy, Mohammad Reza Ansari, facilitated attacks against IDF forces operating in the Israeli buffer zone in Syria using Syrian operatives who previously served in the Syrian Arab Army.[70] Bagheri also directed efforts to smuggle weapons from Iran into Israeli territory.[71] Local Iranian officials separately reported on April 5 that a combined force airstrike in Qods County, Tehran Province, killed eight Basij members.[72]




Iran continues to selectively regulate commercial maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran reportedly forced two vessels, the Marshall Islands-flagged *Rasheed* and Bahamas-flagged

Al Dayeen, that were carrying Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) bound for the People’s Republic of China to turn back before transiting the strait on April 6.[73] This action is part of Iran’s effort to impose economic costs on the Gulf states to coerce them to pressure the United States and Israel to end their campaign against Iran. An Indian government official separately stated that Iran has prevented 16 Indian-flagged vessels, some of which were carrying oil and gas, from passing through the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the war.[74] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with his Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on April 6, likely in part to discuss the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.[75]


Iranian Response

Iran has fired at least seven missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 5.[76] At least three of the missiles contained cluster munitions.[77] Cluster munitions impacted in at least 10 locations in Haifa and around 30 other locations in central Israel.[78] A missile fragment separately impacted a building in Haifa and killed four people.[79]



Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states. Iran fired two cruise missiles at both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see below).[80] ISW-CTP previously noted on April 5 that Iran appears to have slightly altered its strike packages against the Gulf states to include more cruise missiles.[81] An Iranian drone also targeted an Emirati telecommunications company building in Fujairah, the UAE.[82]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia
Between February 28, 2026 and April 6, 2026




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Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Bahrain

Between February 28, 2026 and April 6, 2026




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Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates

Between February 28, 2026 and April 6, 2026




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Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Kuwait

Between February 28, 2026 and April 6, 2026



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


Iran launched three drones and one missile at Jordan on April 6.[83] The Jordanian Armed Forces reported that it intercepted two drones, but that the missile and the third drone impacted in Jordanian territory.[84] **Iran conducted an unspecified number of drone attacks targeting Iranian Kurdish anti-regime groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan.** An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel claimed on April 5 that Iran attacked the office of Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) leader Hossein Yazdan Panah.[85] PAK stated on X on April 6 that Iran launched four waves of drones and missiles at its bases near Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, but reported no casualties.[86] Anti-regime media additionally reported Iranian drone strikes against the Komala Party's headquarters in Bakhtiari neighborhood in Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan.[87] The Iranian regime has historically been concerned about these groups attempting to infiltrate Iran and launch operations against the regime.[88] Iranian Kurdish opposition factions announced the formation of a new coalition to advance Kurdish self-determination inside Iran in February 2026.[89]


Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 33 attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and northern and central Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 5 and 2:00 PM ET on April 6.[90] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel.[91] Hezbollah claimed that it attacked the IDF Northern Command's Givat Olga Base in central Israel on April 6.[92] An Israeli military correspondent reported on April 6 that Hezbollah fired over 100 rockets at Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and Israel in the past 24 hours.[93] Forty-five Hezbollah rockets targeted Israeli territory, 17 of which fell in open areas.[94]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 2 and April 5, 2026




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Hezbollah has used first-person view (FPV) drones in multiple attacks in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah published footage on April 5 that Hezbollah claimed shows an FPV drone attack against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon on March 28.[95] Hezbollah also published footage on April 6 that Hezbollah claimed shows an FPV drone attack against an Israeli Merkava tank and an armored vehicle in Rachaf, southern Lebanon, on March 30.[96] The FPV drones used in these two attacks do not appear to be fiber-optic FPV drones. Hezbollah claimed six FPV drone attacks against IDF armored vehicles between March 25 and April 3.[97]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 2, 2026 and April 5, 2026 By Type



The Israeli Air Force killed a senior Lebanese Forces Party official in an airstrike near Beirut on April 5. The Israeli Air Force intended to assassinate a Hezbollah operative in the strike.

The Lebanese Forces Party is a Lebanese political party that opposes Hezbollah and has continuously blamed Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into the current war.[98] The IDF stated that the strike failed to kill the intended Hezbollah target and noted that it “regrets the harm” to civilians.[99]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon. The IDF struck Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons depots across Lebanon, including in Beirut, on April 6 as part of its effort to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and “strengthen the front line of defense.”[100] The IDF killed several Imam Hussein Brigade officials, including Artillery Commander Kamal Melhem, and destroyed the brigade’s artillery headquarters on April 5.[101] The Imam Hussein Brigade is a military force that the Iranian IRGC Quds Force uses to bolster Iran’s Axis of Resistance and employ forces against Israel.[102] The brigade also serves as a significant military unit for Hezbollah, comprising thousands of fighters, and has launched operations against Israel from Lebanon.[103] IDF Spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin stated on April 6 that the IDF has killed approximately 1,100 Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon since Israel began its campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[104]

Multiple IDF divisions are continuing ground operations across southern Lebanon. The IDF 933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) killed Hezbollah fighters in close combat and destroyed Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure in southern Lebanon on April 6.[105] The IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) has destroyed over 300 Hezbollah sites, including weapons depots, killed dozens of Hezbollah fighters, and located over 10 underground tunnels and hundreds of Hezbollah weapons in southern Lebanon since it started its ground operations.[106] The IDF 769th Territorial Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division) located an underground Hezbollah shelter and several Hezbollah weapons depots in southern Lebanon on April 6.[107] The depots contained military vests, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), explosives, Kalashnikov rifles, sniper rifles, and other military equipment.[108] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz noted that the IDF is “demilitarizing” southern Lebanon up to the Litani River while retaining “full freedom of action” in Lebanon.[109] The IDF called on Lebanese residents in over 40 southern Lebanese villages to evacuate north of the Zahrani River on April 6.[110]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on April 6 that it conducted 21 drone attacks against US bases in Iraq and

the region.[111] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed on April 5 that it conducted three one-way drone attacks targeting the Ali al Salem Airbase in Kuwait, the Muwaffaq al Salti Airbase in Jordan, and a US base in Qasrak, Syria.[112] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab separately claimed a drone attack targeting Sheikh Isa Airbase in Bahrain on April 5.[113] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched at least four drones targeting the US Consulate in Erbil on April 6.[114]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to target Baghdad International Airport on April 6.

Iranian **Armed Forces General Staff**-run media claimed on April 6 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted Camp Victory, a former US military base located at Baghdad International Airport.[115] A security source told Iraqi media on April 6 that unknown actors fired an unspecified projectile at the logistics support headquarters at Baghdad International Airport.[116] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continuously targeted Baghdad International Airport and its co-located facilities, including Camp Victory, since the war began.[117]

Senior Houthi official Mohammad Ali al Houthi told Western media on April 6 that the group will refrain from attacking Saudi Arabia so long as the Saudi government “adheres to de-escalation.”[118] This statement is likely an attempt to deter Saudi Arabia from joining the US-Israeli campaign against Iran.

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- [114] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردستانيات/اعتراض-هجوم-بطا-رات-مسيرة-فوق-مطار-ربيل-الدولي>
- [115] https://t.me/defapress_ir/55044
- [116] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/استهداف-مقر-الدعم-اللوجستي-في-مطار-بغداد>
- [117] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-3-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-30-2026/> ;

<https://t.me/awliadm/281> ; <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2011/12/2/us-hands-over-main-base-in-iraq> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/879> ; <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2032963872693563531?s=20> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/>
[118]
<https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/06/world/live-news/iran-war-us-trump-oil?post-id=cmnn4ywsq00003b6owi4c3tvs>

Iran Update Special Report, April 7, 2026



Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Parker Hempel, Benjamin Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. The United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on April 7 and will begin negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council announced that the regime agreed to the ceasefire on April 7, several hours after US President Donald Trump announced that he had agreed to the ceasefire on the condition that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed Iran's acceptance of the ceasefire and stated that Iran will allow the "safe passage" of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the two-week period "via coordination with Iran's armed forces and with due consideration of technical limitations."
2. Israel has reportedly agreed to cease operations against Iran and Hezbollah if Iran halts its operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posted on X on April 7 that Iran and the United States' allies, presumably referring to Iran's Axis of Resistance and Israel, respectively, have agreed to an immediate ceasefire "everywhere, including [in] Lebanon and elsewhere."
3. Combined force strikes on Iranian railways and roads may have cut off several Iranian lines of transportation to move weapons, including missiles and missile launchers or components, across Iran. The IDF struck eight rail bridges and road segments that the Iranian regime uses to move weapons and other military equipment.
4. Russia may be helping Iran conduct attacks on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz by providing Iran with satellite imagery of the strait. Reuters reported on April 7 that Russian satellites are "actively surveying" the Strait of Hormuz, according to Ukrainian intelligence. Russia has provided Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East to

help Iran conduct attacks since the war began.

5. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving decisions related to Iran's kinetic response to the US and Israeli air campaign, according to two sources close to President Masoud Pezeshkian's office speaking to anti-regime media on April 7.

Toplines

The United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on April 7 and will begin negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11.^[1] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council announced that the regime agreed to the ceasefire on April 7, several hours after US President Donald Trump announced that he had agreed to the ceasefire on the condition that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz.^[2] Trump made his announcement around three hours after Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced on X that diplomatic efforts toward a US-Iran agreement were "progressing steadily, strongly, and powerfully."^[3] Sharif called on Iran to "open" the Strait of Hormuz as a goodwill gesture and urged all warring parties to observe a ceasefire during the two-week period to facilitate a "conclusive" end to the war.^[4] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed Iran's acceptance of the ceasefire and stated that Iran will allow the "safe passage" of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the two-week period "via coordination with Iran's armed forces and with due consideration of technical limitations."^[5]

President Trump described Iran's 10-point counterproposal that it sent to the United States on April 5 as "a workable basis on which to negotiate."^[6] Iran's demands included a permanent end to the war with guarantees that the United States or Israel will not attack Iran again.^[7] Iran also demanded the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions on Iran, the termination of all UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolutions against Iran, the payment of reparations to Iran, the withdrawal of US forces from the region, and the cessation of war on all fronts, including Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.^[8] Iran also reportedly stated that it will charge vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz a fee of up to \$2 million US dollars, the revenue from which it will split with Oman and use for post-war reconstruction.^[9] Iran's proposal to charge vessels that transit the Strait of Hormuz highlights Iran's attempt to use the strait as a point of leverage and for its financial gain.


Israel has reportedly agreed to cease operations against Iran and Hezbollah if Iran halts its operations in the Strait of Hormuz.^[10] Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posted on X on April 7 that Iran and the United States' allies, presumably referring to Iran's Axis of Resistance and Israel, respectively, have agreed to an immediate ceasefire "everywhere, including [in] Lebanon and elsewhere."^[11] Israel and members of Iran's Axis of Resistance have not commented on the ceasefire at the time of this writing.

Combined force strikes on Iranian railways and roads may have cut off several Iranian lines of transportation to move weapons, including missiles and missile launchers or components, across Iran. The IDF struck eight rail bridges and road segments that the Iranian regime uses to move weapons and other military equipment.^[12] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck routes that Iran has used to transport missile launchers across Iran in order to evade combined force targeting.^[13] These strikes primarily appear to impact transport routes in northwestern and central Iran, which mirrors the combined force's strikes on Iranian missile infrastructure primarily in western and central Iran. The destruction of key railway and road infrastructure may also have multiple secondary effects, such as further disrupting Iran's economy or limiting the regime's ability to move military and

security forces across the country.



Several of the strikes appear to have been designed to disrupt the movement of missiles or other weapons to Iran's northwest by severing key Iranian railways connecting Tehran, Zanjan, and Tabriz. It is unclear how heavily Iranian forces rely on railways to transfer this equipment, however. Geolocated images show a cratered railway bridge in Chaharbagh, west of Karaj.[14] This railway connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea through Gilan Province and to other rail lines that lead to Tabriz and Urmia, the capitals of Iran's East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces. Iran has two prominent missile bases located near Tabriz—the Southwest Tabriz and Amand missile bases—that the combined force has struck several times in this conflict.[15] Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran. OSINT accounts on X reported that the combined force struck a railway bridge in Aminabad, Zanjan Province.[16] Anti-regime media claimed that there is an ammunition and missile depot located near this bridge.[17]



Israeli strikes on roadways and overpasses along routes that connect Tehran to western Iran may have also aimed to disrupt Iranian transfers of missile launchers or other weapons to these areas. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account posted footage on X of a combined force strike that destroyed an overpass along a highway in eastern Karaj.[18] This strike reportedly took place along a highway that connects Karaj and Tehran to western Iran, and the strike took place around five kilometers south of Karaj's B1 (Bileghan) Bridge, which is located along the same route. US forces struck the B1 Bridge on

April 2 to disrupt Iran's ability to transfer missiles to western Iran.[19] The IDF also struck a bridge along the Hashtroud-Tabriz highway in East Azerbaijan Province.[20] The Hashtroud-Tabriz highway is the main highway that links Tehran to Tabriz through Zanjan. There are presumably alternative routes that Iranian forces could theoretically use, however.

The strikes may also disrupt to some degree Iranian movement of equipment by rail or road between Tehran and central Iran, including in Esfahan. An Israeli journalist posted footage of a reported strike on a railway bridge in Kashan, Esfahan Province, along the main rail line that connects Esfahan City to Qom to the north and ultimately, Tehran.[21] This strike appears to have severed a key rail line between Tehran and not only Esfahan, but also Shiraz and Kerman. Anti-regime media and OSINT accounts on X reported that the combined force struck an unspecified bridge in Qom City, Qom Province.[22] The combined force also struck a rail bridge near Qaleh No, Tehran Province, along the railway that connects Tehran to Mashhad in northeastern Iran.[23]

Russia may be helping Iran conduct attacks on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz by providing Iran with satellite imagery of the strait.[24] Reuters reported on April 7 that Russian satellites are "actively surveying" the Strait of Hormuz, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[25] Russia has provided Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East to help Iran conduct attacks since the war began.[26] Russia previously provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence in 2024 to support their attacks targeting international shipping.[27] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has received 28 reports of attacks or incidents affecting civilian vessels transiting the strait since the war began.[28] A source familiar with Ukrainian intelligence separately told Israeli media on April 7 that Russia provided Iran with a list of 55 critical energy infrastructure targets in Israel.[29]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving decisions related to Iran's kinetic response to the US and Israeli air campaign, according to two sources close to President Masoud Pezeshkian's office speaking to anti-regime media on April 7.[30] Pezeshkian accused both commanders on April 4 of acting unilaterally and fueling escalation through attacks on regional countries, according to the sources.[31] These internal tensions come amid a separate British media report on April 6 that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is incapacitated and receiving medical treatment in Qom, citing a diplomatic memo based on US and Israeli intelligence shared with Gulf allies.[32]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reporting on April 7 that it destroyed over 130 Iranian air defense systems.[33] The IDF published a video on April 7 of an airstrike on an S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) transporter erector launcher (TEL) in Kahrizak, Tehran Province.[34] An S-300 battery consists of engagement and detection radars, command-and-control centers, fire-control units, and launchers to operate as a functional SAM system.[35] The IDF struck the S-300 SAM site in Kahrizak on April 4.[36] The IDF video also showed strikes on at least six other unidentified air defense systems in unspecified areas across Iran.[37]

The IDF continued to target Iranian petrochemical facilities. The IDF reported that it struck a Shiraz Petrochemical Company facility in Shiraz, Fars Province, on April 6.[38] The IDF reported that the site produced nitric acid, which is used in ballistic missile production, including to produce

explosives.[39] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the Shiraz Petrochemical Company in 2024 for being involved in the sale of Iranian petrochemicals.[40] The IDF has struck multiple Iranian petrochemical facilities in recent days, including petrochemical facilities linked to Iran's ballistic missile program at the South Pars Complex in Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province, on April 6.[41]


The combined force also struck several other Iranian defense industrial sites to degrade Iran's ability to produce military equipment, including aircraft and naval vessels. Multiple OSINT accounts and anti-regime media published geolocated footage on April 6 of a combined force strike on the Soffeh Weapons Depot in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[42] The combined force previously struck this site with bunker buster munitions on March 31.[43] Anti-regime media separately reported on April 7 that the combined force struck a building associated with Iran's aviation industry in Ekbatan, Tehran, which is located next to Tehran's Mehrabad International Airport.[44] The combined force likely targeted an Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO) facility, or a subsidiary of IAIO, such as the Fajr Aerospace Industries and Composite Materials Company, which are both located in Ekbatan.[45] The combined force previously struck IAIO sites in Ekbatan on March 7 and 29.[46] The Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) oversees IAIO.[47] The European Union sanctioned IAIO in 2010 for its involvement in Iran's nuclear program, including the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.[48] Multiple OSINT accounts also published geolocated footage of large smoke plumes emanating from a building in Tehran associated with Iran's Aerospace Research Institute.[49] The Aerospace Research Institute is also associated with MODAFL and Iran's Space Agency and develops space launch systems, which are a dual-use technology that can support Iran's ballistic missile program.[50] The IDF also struck Iran's main sonar and underwater detection system production site in Shiraz, Fars Province, on April 6.[51] CTP-ISW's analysis of the IDF imagery indicates that the sonar production site is located within the Shiraz Electronics Industries complex. The combined force has repeatedly struck buildings at the Shiraz Electronics Industries complex since the start of the campaign.[52] Shiraz Electronics Industries is subordinate to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[53] The United States sanctioned Shiraz Electronics Industries in September 2008 for producing electronic equipment for the Iranian armed forces.[54] The IDF also reported that it struck multiple naval cruise missile and air defense system production sites in Karaj, Alborz Province.[55]

The IDF continued to target IRGC headquarters in Tehran. The IDF struck an IRGC headquarters in Shahrak-e Valfajr, Tehran City, on April 6. There are several military and internal security sites in this area, including the IRGC General Command Headquarters.[56] The IDF previously struck the IRGC General Command Headquarters on March 4 and damaged at least four buildings.[57] The IRGC is the primary body responsible for controlling the Iranian missile and drone arsenals and managing and supporting Iran's Axis of Resistance.[58] The IRGC also oversees the IRGC Ground Forces, which have historically played a role in maintaining internal security.

The IDF said that it also struck an IRGC site that "served the armed forces responsible for suppressing the civilian population in Iran." [59] CTP-ISW could not confirm the exact site that was struck, but there are several IRGC facilities located near the targeted area, including the IRGC Intelligence Protection Organization and IRGC Ground Forces Headquarters.


US forces "restruck" Iranian military targets on Kharg Island on April 7.[60] The United States reportedly conducted over 90 strikes on military infrastructure on Kharg Island on April 7.[61] A US official told the *New York Times* that the US strikes were "restrikes" targeting previously targeted military sites on the island.[62] The United States struck bunkers, ammunition storage facilities, a radar station, and other military targets.[63] The United States previously struck military targets on Kharg Island on March 13.[64] The United States did not target oil infrastructure or port facilities in either the March 13 or April 7 strikes.[65] The most recent strikes on Kharg Island come after unspecified sources familiar with

US intelligence reports told CNN on March 26 that Iran has reinforced Kharg Island with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and other military equipment in recent weeks.[66]



Iranian Response

IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi claimed on April 7 that Iran has begun a “new phase” of the war in which Iran will use a new “twin-launch” system for its medium-range ballistic missiles to increase Iran’s strike rate.[67] This statement was likely an attempt to deter the combined force from intensifying strikes against Iran. Mousavi claimed that the new “twin-launch” system will double the number of Iranian ballistic missile strikes against US assets, Israel, and other countries.[68]




Iran has fired at least seven missiles targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on April 6.[69] At least two of the missiles contained cluster munitions.[70] Israeli media reported multiple cluster munition impacts in central Israel, including in Bnei Brak.[71] An Israeli journalist reported that debris from an intercepted Iranian missile injured one person in southern Israel.[72]

Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states. Iran fired 22 drones and 11 ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia between 2:00 PM ET on April 6 and 2:00 PM ET on April 7.[73] The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that debris from seven intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles fell near Saudi energy facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.[74] Multiple media outlets and OSINT accounts published footage of an explosion at the Jubail Industrial City in eastern Saudi Arabia.[75] The

IRGC claimed that it launched missiles and drones targeting US energy companies located in Jubail.[76] Saudi Arabia closed the King Fahd Causeway, the only road that links Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, due to the threat of further Iranian attacks targeting the Eastern Province.[77] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) recorded the lowest number of Iranian drone launches at the UAE since March 26 and the lowest number of ballistic missile launches at the UAE since March 25 (see below).[78] An OSINT account reported that an Iranian ballistic missile injured two Pakistani nationals and damaged a Thuraya Telecommunications Company building in Shajarah Governorate, the UAE, on April 7.[79] The Kuwaiti Army reported that it intercepted 17 drones targeting Kuwait in the past 24 hours.[80] This is a notable decrease from the 14 ballistic missiles, two cruise missiles, and 46 drones that the Kuwaiti Army intercepted on April 6.[81]


Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia
Between February 28, 2026 and April 7, 2026



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All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Bahrain
Between February 28, 2026 and April 7, 2026



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All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates
Between February 28, 2026 and April 7, 2026




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Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Kuwait

Between February 28, 2026 and April 7, 2026



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


Iran conducted an attack on a vessel in the Persian Gulf for the first time since March 31. UKMTO reported on April 7 that an unspecified projectile hit an unspecified cargo vessel 25 nautical miles south of Kish Island, Iran.[82] The projectile struck the vessel above the water line and did not cause any casualties.[83] Iranian regime media claimed on April 7 that Iran struck a container ship linked to Israel that was transporting Israeli military equipment.[84] This cargo vessel is the first vessel that Iran has attacked since March 31.[85]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah has conducted 56 attacks against Israeli targets since 2:00 PM ET on April 6, which is the highest number of attacks targeting Israel that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the conflict began.[86] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF positions in northern Israel.[87] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah fired roughly 40 rockets targeting northern Israel on April 7.[88] Hezbollah claimed 27 attacks targeting northern Israeli communities between 2:00 PM ET on April 6 and 2:00 PM ET on April 7.[89] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah rockets impacted in the Galilee Panhandle, Kiryat Shmona, and Nahariya in northern Israel.[90] Hezbollah is likely continuing to attempt to displace northern Israeli residents from their homes by targeting northern Israeli towns in order to increase political pressure on the Israeli government to halt its war effort against Iran.

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 3 and April 6, 2026




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
Hezbollah has conducted 41 attacks targeting IDF forces in southern Lebanon since 2:00 PM ET on April 6.[91] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF forces across southern Lebanon.[92] Hezbollah claimed that its fighters used light and medium weapons in a direct engagement with Israeli forces in Bint Jbeil, southern Lebanon, on April 7 while Hezbollah fighters

simultaneously fired rockets and mortars at the Israeli forces.[93] Hezbollah claimed that it fired four surface-to-air missiles (SAM) targeting two Israeli helicopters and two Israeli aircraft in southern Lebanon on April 7.[94] Hezbollah previously launched a SAM targeting an Israeli drone, which the IDF confirmed on April 1.[95] Hezbollah also published footage on April 7 that shows a first-person view (FPV) drone attack targeting an IDF personnel carrier in Ainata, southern Lebanon, on March 31.[96]



Hezbollah published a video of fighters launching a Scud-B ballistic missile, which marks the first time that Hezbollah has released footage that confirms that it possesses Scud-type missiles.[97] Hezbollah claimed that it used a Scud-B missile to attack IDF infrastructure in Krayot, northern Israel, on March 31.[98] A Scud-B missile is a Russian-made ballistic missile with a range of 300 kilometers and can carry various warheads.[99] Syria reportedly transferred an unknown number of Scud missiles to Hezbollah in the late 2000s, but there was previously no evidence that Hezbollah possessed these missiles.[100]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 3, 2026 and April 6, 2026 By Type



The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across southern Lebanon. The IDF 91st Territorial Division killed a Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile unit and destroyed the unit's compound in southern Lebanon on April 7.[101] The 769th (Hiram) Territorial Brigade (91st Territorial Division) directed an Israeli Air Force (IAF) strike on a Hezbollah fighter in southern Lebanon on April 7.[102] The 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division) killed members of a Hezbollah cell and discovered large quantities of Hezbollah weapons, including explosive devices, rifles, and ammunition, in southern Lebanon on April 7.[103] The IDF reported that the 146th Reserve Division has killed 130 Hezbollah fighters and destroyed 1,000 Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon thus far.[104] The IDF announced that Israeli forces have established an "anti-tank line" several kilometers into southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from being able to fire anti-tank guided missiles

(ATGM) into Israel.[105] Metula Local Council Chairman David Azoulai stated that Metula is still under threat from Hezbollah ATGM fire despite the IDF's announcement.[106] Metula is located along the Israel-Lebanon border and is surrounded by various ridges that Hezbollah can use to launch ATGMs from. Israeli media reported on April 7 that IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir approved the implementation of the "Panda" robotic explosion method, which the IDF has previously used in the Gaza Strip, to help Israeli forces destroy Hezbollah tunnels, buildings, and headquarters in southern Lebanon.[107]

The IDF announced on April 7 that the IDF 98th Paratrooper Division has deployed and begun operations in southern Lebanon.[108] There are now six IDF divisions involved in Israel's ground campaign against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The IDF noted that the 146th Reserve Division and 162nd Armored Division are operating in southwestern Lebanon, and the 91st Territorial Division and 36th Armored Division are operating in southeastern Lebanon.[109] The 210th Territorial Division is operating in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[110] The following brigades are currently operating in southern Lebanon:

- **300th Infantry Territorial Brigade (146th Reserve Division).** The IDF 300th Infantry Territorial Brigade typically operates under the IDF 91st Territorial Division but is currently operating under the IDF 146th Reserve Division.[111] The IDF reported that the brigade discovered Hezbollah rocket launch platforms in Ramyeh, southwestern Lebanon, on March 31.[112]
- **613th Hasmonean Infantry Brigade (146th Reserve Division).** The IDF reported on March 23 that the 613th Hasmonean Infantry Brigade is operating in southern Lebanon for the first time.[113] It is unclear where specifically this brigade is operating. A geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analyst reported on April 2 that the 146th Reserve Division has largely cleared Chamaa, southwestern Lebanon, however.[114]
- **226th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade (146th Reserve Division).[115]** A GEOINT analyst reported on March 29 that the 226th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade advanced further along the coastal road toward Tyre and secured control over al Bayada in southwestern Lebanon.[116] An OSINT account posted geolocated images of the brigade operating near the al Bayada-Chama road on April 3.[117]
- **35th Paratrooper Brigade (146th Reserve Division).** The IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade typically operates under the IDF 98th Paratrooper Division but elements of the brigade are currently operating under the 226th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade within the 146th Reserve Division.[118] The 35th Paratrooper Brigade was operating in Naqoura and al Bayada, southwestern Lebanon, in conjunction with the 226th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade, as of March 29.[119]
- **213th Reserve Artillery Brigade (146th Reserve Division).** A GEOINT analyst reported that the 213th Reserve Artillery Brigade destroyed a building in Mansouri, southwestern Lebanon, on March 30.[120] The brigade directed an IAF strike on a Hezbollah cell in Majdal Zoun, southeast of Mansouri, on April 3.[121]
- **810th Mountain Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division).** A GEOINT analyst reported on March 22 that the brigade was operating in Kfarchouba, southeastern Lebanon, and controls Jabal Sedana, which is located west of Mount Hermon.[122] The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade was conducting targeted raids in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[123] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 24 that the brigade started conducting combing operations in the eastern outskirts of Chebaa and expanded its presence in southwestern areas of Kfarchouba.[124] The analyst reported on March 29 that the brigade conducted raids in eastern Kfarchouba and Chebaa, and that the brigade's Alpinist Unit conducted cross-border raids near Mount Hermon.[125]
- **89th Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division).** The 89th Infantry Brigade typically

operates under the IDF 98th Paratrooper Division but elements of the brigade are currently operating under the 210th Territorial Division.[126] Forces from the 89th Infantry Brigade's Egoz Unit conducted an operation near Mount Betarim in southeastern Lebanon and arrested a Hezbollah-affiliated commander on March 24.[127]

- **188th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division).** A GEOINT analyst reported on March 24 that the 188th Armored Brigade largely controls Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon, and has started conducting large-scale demolitions in the area.[128] The analyst reported on March 25 that the brigade may be involved in the IDF 36th Armored Division's advance from northern Taybeh to Deir Seryan, southeastern Lebanon.[129]
- **1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division).** The IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade has been operating in Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon, since March 24.[130] An OSINT account reported on March 24 that the brigade destroyed buildings near the Taybeh Mosque.[131] The brigade discovered a large number of Hezbollah weapons and military equipment in Taybeh on April 5.[132] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 29 that the brigade was also conducting operations in Deir Seryan and east of Qoussair, which are both located west of Taybeh.[133] Deir Seryan is a tactically and operationally significant location for Israeli forces in southeastern Lebanon as it is located on a hill that overlooks the Litani River.[134]
- **7th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division).** The IDF noted on March 9 that the IDF 36th Armored Division, including the 7th Armored Brigade, conducted a targeted raid in Rab el Thalathine, southeastern Lebanon.[135] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 25 that the brigade launched an armored assault from al Muhaysibat Hill, south of Taybeh, and advanced toward the entrance of Qantara, southwestern Lebanon.[136]
- **84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** The IDF 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[137] The 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade has been operating in Khiam, southeastern Lebanon, since at least March 24 and has seized the majority of the town.[138] A GEOINT analyst reported that the brigade began an operation to advance into Aainata on March 28 in order to flank Bint Jbeil, southwestern Lebanon.[139] The brigade directed an IAF strike on Hezbollah fighters and located various Hezbollah weapons in Aainata on April 3.[140]
- **401st Armored Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** The IDF 401st Armored Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[141] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 25 that the 401st Armored Brigade has largely taken control over Qouzah, southwestern Lebanon.[142] The brigade began advancing from Qouzah toward the outskirts of Rachaf on March 27.[143] The brigade is also involved in the Israeli operation to advance toward Aainata and reached Friz Hill in northeastern Aainata on March 31.[144]
- **7338th Artillery Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** Israeli media reported on March 13 that the 7338th Artillery Brigade directed an Israeli airstrike against Hezbollah fighters in Tyre, southwestern Lebanon.[145]
- **769th (Hiram) Territorial Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** The 769th (Hiram) Territorial Brigade directed an IAF strike against Hezbollah fighters in Ibl el Saqi, southeastern Lebanon, on March 29.[146]
- **8th Reserve Armored Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** The 8th Reserve Armored Brigade destroyed a Hezbollah building in Aitaroun, southeastern Lebanon, on April 1.[147] The IDF reported on April 5 that the brigade engaged in direct combat with Hezbollah fighters and conducted targeted raids on Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[148]
- **5th Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** The IDF reported on March 26 that the 5th Infantry Brigade has killed over 30 Hezbollah fighters during its operations in southern Lebanon.[149] An OSINT account reported that the brigade destroyed a building in Mays al Jabal,

southeastern Lebanon, on March 26.[150]

- **933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade (162nd Armored Division).** A GEOINT analyst reported on March 31 that elements of the 933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade advanced from Ramyeh and Qouzah toward the south of Beit Lif, southwestern Lebanon.[151] The analyst reported on April 2 that the brigade infiltrated the southern neighborhoods of Beit Lif and advanced toward the center of the town, during which Israeli forces engaged in direct combat with Hezbollah fighters.[152] The IDF confirmed on April 2 that the brigade killed a Hezbollah fighter in direct combat and located Hezbollah military equipment after the engagement.[153]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon. The IDF struck a bridge in central Lebanon on April 6 that Hezbollah used to transport weapons and fighters from northern to southern Lebanon.[154] This strike marks the seventh bridge that the IDF has struck since the war started.[155] The IDF reportedly conducted an FPV drone attack targeting a Hezbollah fighter on a motorcycle in southwestern Lebanon on April 7.[156] The IDF has not previously used an FPV drone against Hezbollah in this war.

The IDF issued a warning to all naval vessels in the maritime area between Tyre and Ras al Naqoura on April 7. The IDF stated on April 7 that Hezbollah's activities expose naval vessels off the coast of Tyre and Ras al Naqoura to danger.[157] Hezbollah claimed that it launched anti-ship cruise missiles targeting an Israeli warship located 68 nautical miles off the coast of Lebanon on April 5.[158] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel assesses that the ship was damaged.[159]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah released US journalist Shelly Kittleson on April 7 in exchange for the Iraqi federal government's release of multiple imprisoned Kataib Hezbollah members.[160] Kataib Hezbollah said that it released Kittleson, whom the group kidnapped on March 31, following mediation efforts by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[161] Iraqi security sources told the *New York Times* on March 7 that Kataib Hezbollah offered to release Kittleson the day after kidnapping her in exchange for the release of imprisoned Kataib Hezbollah members.[162] Iraqi security sources also told Iraqi media on March 7 that Kataib Hezbollah held Kittleson in Jurf al Sakhr, which is a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold in Babil Province that the Iraqi federal government is unable to enter.[163] Three Iraqi officials told the Associated Press that Iraqi authorities experienced obstacles in rescuing Kittleson because Kataib Hezbollah leaders, with whom the Iraqi federal government would have negotiated, are in hiding.[164] US-Israeli combined force strikes have targeted Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders since the start of the war.[165] A combined force strike in Baghdad killed former Kataib Hezbollah Security Chief and Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari on March 16.[166]

The Iraqi Defense Ministry intercepted multiple likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drones on April 7. The Iraqi Defense Ministry said that it intercepted a drone targeting a radar at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province.[167] US-led international coalition forces completed their withdrawal from this base in January 2026 and transferred control of the base to the Iraqi federal government.[168] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly targeted Iraqi military sites during the war that formerly hosted US forces.[169] The Iraqi Defense Ministry also said that it intercepted two drones in Kirkuk Province.[170] The Erbil governor separately announced on April 6 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia strikes targeting unidentified sites in Erbil killed two civilians.[171] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also repeatedly attacked US and foreign sites in Iraqi Kurdistan during the war.[172] Saraya Awliya al Dam, which is considered a front group for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, posted footage of an attack on a US base in Qasrak, Syria.[173] A Syrian military source told AFP on April 7 that four drones originating from Iraq

targeted the base.[174] Air defenses intercepted three of the drones and a fourth fell in an open area near the base.[175] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have claimed multiple attacks targeting the base during the war.[176]

Combined force strikes have targeted Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions in Anbar, Salah al Din, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Basra provinces since 2:00 PM ET on April 6. Strikes targeted a 13th PMF Brigade communications and operations headquarters, as well as artillery units, near al Qaim on April 6, but did not cause casualties.[177] The 13th Brigade is controlled by Liwa al Tafuf, which is affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah.[178] A security source told Iraqi media on April 7 that strikes also targeted the headquarters of an unspecified PMF brigade in Amirli, Salah al Din Province.[179] Combined force strikes separately struck sites belonging to the 16th and 40th PMF brigades in Kirkuk Province on April 7.[180] The 16th PMF Brigade is affiliated with the Badr Organization, while the 40th PMF Brigade is affiliated with Kataib al Imam Ali.[181] A security source told Iraqi media on April 7 that strikes targeted an engineering site at the Badr Organization's Camp Ashraf near al Khalis, Diyala Province.[182] An OSINT account published footage of explosions at the camp.[183] Another strike reportedly launched from Kuwait killed five individuals at a house belonging to an unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia in Khor al Zubair, Basra Province, on April 7, according to an Iraqi security source.[184]

Other Activity

Bahrain's proposed UN Security Council resolution authorizing countries to use "all necessary means" to reopen the Strait of Hormuz failed to pass.[185] Russia and China vetoed the resolution, while Pakistan and Colombia abstained from voting, leaving the final vote at 11-2.[186]

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Iran Update Special Report, April 8, 2026



Parker Hempel, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Benjamin Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: *ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.*

Key Takeaways

1. US President Donald Trump announced on April 7 that the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire deal mediated by Pakistan. Trump stated that Iran sent a ten-point proposal to form the basis of upcoming negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 10.
2. Senior US and Israeli officials stated on April 7 and 8 that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is not a part of the US-Iran ceasefire deal. Hezbollah officials claimed that unspecified actors informed the group that it would be a party to the ceasefire deal. US President Donald Trump told PBS News on April 8 that Lebanon is not included in the US-Iran ceasefire deal.
3. The IDF conducted the largest number of airstrikes against Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure throughout Lebanon, including central Beirut, since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon. The IDF struck over 100 Hezbollah headquarters, command-and-control centers, missile launch sites, and Hezbollah drone unit and Radwan Force sites in Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley.
4. Iran has continued to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz despite the ceasefire, which is making vessels reticent to transit the strait. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly low amid Iran's lingering threats and uncertainty over a fragile ceasefire.
5. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi had to convince Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders to accept the US proposal for a ceasefire, according to a regional source familiar with the talks speaking to Axios. The ceasefire follows reports that a group of veteran hardline IRGC commanders has consolidated power within the Iranian regime in recent weeks and is playing an increasingly central role in decision-making, such as appointments to key positions.

Toplines

US President Donald Trump announced on April 7 that the United States and Iran had agreed to a two-week ceasefire deal mediated by Pakistan.

[1] Trump stated that Iran sent a ten-point proposal to form the basis of upcoming negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 10.[2] Trump stated that “almost all” of the previous points of contention between the sides have been agreed to.[3] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on April 8 that Iran will withdraw from the ceasefire agreement if Israel continues to attack Lebanon, citing an informed source, however.[4] Iran’s proposal includes multiple points that contradict the US 15-point proposal on March 24.[5] Iran’s proposed ten points are as follows:

- A guarantee of no further US attacks against Iran
- Iran maintains control of the Strait of Hormuz.
- Ending the regional war on all fronts, including against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
- Withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from all bases and positions in the region.
- Reparations to Iran for war damages.
- Acceptance of Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment.
- Lifting all primary sanctions on Iran.
- Lifting all secondary sanctions on Iran.
- Termination of all resolutions against Iran by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Termination of all United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran.[6]


The US proposal stipulated that Iran would not enrich uranium on Iranian soil and dismantle its nuclear program.[7] Trump has demanded multiple times that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[8]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on April 8 that the United States and/or Israel violated three of Iran’s points in the ten-point proposal.[9] Iran’s proposal is a framework for negotiation and not a binding agreement on the United States, however. Ghalibaf claimed that Israel violated Iran’s demand by continuing to strike Lebanon despite Lebanon not being part of the ceasefire agreement (see below).[10] Ghalibaf also claimed that the United States denied Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium.[11] Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium was one of the main points of negotiation before the war, and Iran never made a serious compromise on the point of uranium enrichment. Uranium enrichment will remain a major point of negotiation in the upcoming talks on April 10.[12]

Senior US and Israeli officials stated on April 7 and 8 that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is not a part of the US-Iran ceasefire deal. Hezbollah officials claimed that unspecified actors informed the group that it would be a party to the ceasefire deal.[13] US President Donald Trump told PBS News on April 8 that Lebanon is not included in the US-Iran ceasefire deal.[14] Trump claimed that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is “a separate skirmish.”[15] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office released a statement on April 7 saying that the two-week ceasefire does not apply to Lebanon.[16] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff General Eyal Zamir said that Israel will continue to launch strikes targeting Hezbollah “non-stop” in Lebanon.[17] Hezbollah parliamentarian Ibrahim Moussawi told Reuters on April 8 that Hezbollah halted attacks against Israel after unspecified actors “informed [Hezbollah] that it [was] part of the ceasefire – so we abided by it.”[18] A Hezbollah official told AP that Hezbollah would give mediators a chance to secure a ceasefire in Lebanon.[19] The official said that Hezbollah had not agreed to the ceasefire yet because Israel had yet to adhere to it.[20] Three Lebanese sources close to Hezbollah told Reuters that Hezbollah stopped attacking Israeli targets on April 8.[21] Hezbollah parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah told Reuters that Israeli strikes on Lebanon were a ceasefire violation that would have “repercussions for the entire agreement.”[22] All claimed Hezbollah


attacks occurred before the US and Iran implemented the ceasefire, with the last claimed attack occurring at 18:00 ET on April 7.[23] ISW-CTP has not observed any Israeli reports of Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel at the time of this writing.

The IDF conducted the largest number of airstrikes against Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure throughout Lebanon, including central Beirut, since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[24] The IDF struck over 100 Hezbollah headquarters, command-and-control centers, missile launch sites, and Hezbollah drone unit and Radwan Force sites in Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley.[25] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that the Israeli strikes were the “largest concentrated blow” dealt to Hezbollah since the September 2024 Israeli pager operation, which killed 39 people and wounded more than 3,400.[26] Open source (OSINT) accounts published and geolocated footage showing Israeli strikes in areas of central Beirut, including Ain al Mraiseh and Mazraa.[27] The IDF has repeatedly struck sites in Beirut’s southern suburbs since the start of the conflict.[28] The IDF has rarely targeted Hezbollah personnel or sites in central Beirut, however.[29] IDF Arabic spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Ella Waweya reported on April 8 that Hezbollah has begun to relocate forces from Beirut’s southern suburbs to densely populated civilian areas in central Beirut to complicate the IDF’s ability to target the group.[30] The IDF reportedly killed Hezbollah-aligned cleric Sadiq al Nabulsi in an airstrike on the al Zahraa complex in Sidon, Sidon District.[31] Lebanese media reported that Nabulsi was not an official Hezbollah member but preached in favor of Hezbollah.[32] IDF strikes killed 182 people and wounded 890 others, according to the Lebanese Health Ministry.[33] The Health Ministry’s numbers did not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.[34]



Iran has continued to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz despite the ceasefire, which is making vessels reticent to transit the strait. Unspecified Iranian maritime and military authorities have issued radio warnings that vessels transiting without permission could be destroyed.[35] Iran is levying these threats so that it can extract tolls on traffic through an international waterway. The Iranian Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Product Exporters’ Union spokesperson, close to the Iranian regime, told the *Financial Times* on April 8 that Iran intends to continue to monitor everything entering and exiting the strait to prevent unspecified weapons transfers to unspecified states.[36] The spokesperson added that Iran requires vessels to transit along Iran’s coastline and to submit cargo details by email to Iranian authorities.[37] The spokesperson added that Iran will impose a \$1-per-barrel tariff on oil shipments—reportedly payable in bitcoin to bypass sanctions—while empty tankers would transit for free.[38] The *Wall Street Journal* reported in April that fees could alternatively be paid in Chinese yuan and could rise as high as \$2 million for large tankers.[39] Iranian shipping officials on April 8 have publicly defended tolls and monitoring as lawful and enforceable under international maritime norms, citing environmental protection and enforcement obligations.[40] Omani Transport Minister Saeed bin

Hamoud bin Saeed al Maawali stated on April 8 that Oman will not impose fees as it has signed international maritime agreements; however, and pointed to a legal vacuum created by non-signatory states such as Iran and the United States.[41] A hardline Iranian Parliament member added on April 8 that political conditions, including mandating the use of the term “Persian Gulf” on shipping documents and pledging to devote 30 percent of Strait-related revenues to defense and 70 percent to war-loss compensation.[42] These measures follow parliament’s approval of a new management plan that introduces transit fees and Iranian approval for passage on March 30.[43]




Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly low amid Iran’s lingering threats and uncertainty over a fragile ceasefire. Commercial maritime tracking data showed only five Iranian-flagged cargo vessels entered the strait, while just three international oil tankers, six international cargo vessels, and one unknown Iranian-flagged vessel exited via Iran’s alternative route between April 7 at 2:00 PM ET and April 8 at 2:00 PM ET.[44] The S&P Global Market Intelligence recorded that Iran permitted only four vessels to transit on April 7, the lowest daily total so far in April.[45] Major shipping companies, including Maersk and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, continue to suspend or tightly limit transits, citing the absence of clear rules and security guarantees.[46] Shipping and maritime intelligence executives told the *Financial Times* that daily traffic has fallen to just 10 to 15 vessels, compared with roughly 135 per day before the crisis.[47] Around 800 tankers are now waiting to transit, with an estimated 300 to 400 vessels effectively stranded inside the Persian Gulf.[48]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi had to convince Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders to accept the US proposal for a ceasefire, according to a regional source familiar with the talks speaking to Axios.[49] The ceasefire follows reports that a group of veteran hardline IRGC commanders has consolidated power within the Iranian regime in recent weeks and is playing an increasingly central role in decision-making, such as appointments to key positions.[50] These commanders have been deeply involved in the highest levels of the regime since its foundation in 1979. That Araghchi reportedly had to convince members of the IRGC to accept the ceasefire suggests that the IRGC maintains significant influence over key regime decisions and continues to push for more hardline, anti-Western policies. Sources familiar with talks also described Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s approval for the ceasefire as a “breakthrough” and added that he approved all major decisions related to the ceasefire on April 6 and 7.[51] This suggests that Mojtaba may also retain at least some level of decision-making authority amid reports that Mojtaba is badly injured due to US-Israeli airstrikes and is absent from decision-making.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force struck multiple Iranian petrochemical facilities before the ceasefire went into effect. Anti-regime media reported airstrikes on the Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company, the Bandar Imam Petrochemical Company, and the Mahshahr Fajr Petrochemical Company in Khuzestan Province on April 7.[52] The IDF previously struck the Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company and the Mahshahr Fajr Petrochemical Company on April 4.[53] The IDF has struck several Iranian petrochemical facilities in the days before the ceasefire.[54]




The combined force also struck defense industrial sites in Iran before the ceasefire went into effect. An Iranian OSINT account also reported an airstrike on the Azarab Industries Company in Markazi Province on April 7.[55] The Azarab Industries Company is a general contractor that manufactures equipment for power plants and refineries.[56] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the company in 2025 for supporting Iran's nuclear program.[57]

The National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company claimed that unspecified "enemies" attacked the Lavan oil refinery in Hormozgan Province on April 8, according to Iranian state media.[58] An OSINT account footage of heavy smoke at the refinery on April 8.[59] An Israeli military correspondent reported on April 8 that the IDF denied involvement in the reported strikes on the Lavan refinery.[60]

Iranian Response

Iran launched multiple strikes targeting Gulf countries after the ceasefire went into effect. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)'s Defense Ministry announced on April 8 that Iran launched 17 ballistic missiles and 35 drones at the UAE after the ceasefire went into effect.[61] Kuwait's Defense Ministry said that Iran launched 28 drones at Kuwait since 1:00 AM ET on April 8, with Kuwait intercepting most of the drones.[62] Kuwait did not characterize these attacks as ceasefire violations, however. Iranian drones struck several sites, including oil facilities and three power and water desalination plants, at the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and Ministry of Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy in Kuwait City on April 8, causing significant material damage.[63] Iran did not claim attacks targeting the UAE and Kuwait, but Iranian media noted that the attacks occurred after the reported attacks targeting Iranian oil facilities on Lavan island.[64] The IDF denied its involvement in the attacks targeting the oil facilities.[65]


Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates
Between February 28, 2026 and April 8, 2026



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Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Kuwait
Between February 28, 2026 and April 8, 2026




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Qatar's Defense Ministry said on April 8 that Qatar had intercepted nine ballistic missiles and an unspecified number of drones but did not clarify if these attacks occurred post-ceasefire.[66] An unspecified "industry source" also told Reuters on April 8 that Iran attacked Saudi Arabia's East-West oil pipeline hours after the ceasefire was announced.[67] The pipeline is currently Saudi Arabia's main outlet for exporting oil, given Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz, and the source suggested that oil flow via the pipeline will likely be impacted.[68] The industry source added that Iran also attacked other unspecified Saudi Arabian facilities.[69] Reuters noted that the timing of the attack is not clear, and the Saudi government has not commented on the reported attack.[70] The Saudi Defense Ministry separately said it intercepted five Iranian ballistic missiles on April 7 and nine drones "over the past hours" on April 8, but did not provide further details.[71] Bahrain's Defense Ministry also said on April 8 that it intercepted 31 drones and 6 missiles since April 7.[72]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia
Between February 28, 2026 and April 8, 2026




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


Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Bahrain

Between February 28, 2026 and April 8, 2026




Iran launched four ballistic missile waves at Israel between 2:00 PM ET and 8:30 PM ET on April 7, including 3 waves after the United States announced the ceasefire.[73] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Iran stopped launching attacks at Israel at 8:30 PM ET.[74] Cluster munitions impacted several areas in central and southern Israel, including Haifa, Beersheba, and Tel Sheva.[75] The impact in Tel Sheva, southern Israel, injured three civilians.[76]




Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 13 attacks against Israeli targets in northern and central Israel before the US-Iran ceasefire went into effect.[77] This is a sizeable decrease in Hezbollah's claimed attacks on Israel, given that ISW-CTP previously recorded the highest number of Hezbollah claimed attacks on April 7.[78] The decrease in claimed attacks is likely due to Hezbollah's adherence to the ceasefire, despite the United States and Israel not including Hezbollah in the ceasefire.[79] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF positions in northern Israel, with multiple attacks targeting IDF positions in Kiryat Shmona and IDF barracks before the ceasefire went into effect.[80] Hezbollah also claimed several rocket attacks targeting towns in northern Israel.[81]




Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 20 attacks targeting IDF forces in southern Lebanon before the US-Iran ceasefire went into effect.[82] Hezbollah claimed several mortar and rocket attacks targeting IDF forces across southern Lebanon.[83] Hezbollah did not claim any drone attacks against IDF forces since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off at 2:00 PM ET on April 7. Hezbollah also did not claim any direct engagements with IDF forces in southern Lebanon before the US-Iran ceasefire went into effect. Hezbollah separately published footage on April 8 of a first-person view (FPV) drone attack on an IDF Merkava tank in Bayada, Tyre District, that occurred on April 1.[84] The video appears to show the FPV drone striking the Merkava’s turret, which is equipped with improvised top-mounted slat armor.[85] All previous Hezbollah videos of FPV drone attacks have targeted IDF Merkava tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) that did not have improvised top-mounted slat armor equipped.[86] The IDF previously deployed vehicles equipped with top-mounted slat armor in Gaza in 2023.[87]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 3 and April 7, 2026



The IDF announced on April 8 that Hezbollah killed one IDF officer and wounded five other soldiers in southern Lebanon on April 7.[88] The IDF said that Hezbollah fighters killed one IDF officer, seriously wounded another officer, and wounded four other IDF soldiers during a small arms engagement in southern Lebanon on April 7, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[89] Hezbollah has killed 12 IDF soldiers since it joined the war.[90]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 3, 2026 and April 7, 2026 By Type



Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, announced on April 7, after the US-Iran ceasefire went into effect, that it would halt attacks against US interests in Iraq and the region for two weeks.[91] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias claimed several attacks targeting US bases in Iraq and the region on April 7.[92]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeted Baghdad International Airport on April 7 and 8. Likely Iranian-backed militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam released fiber-optic FPV drone footage on April 7 showing an attack targeting two fuel tanks at Camp Victory, a former US military base located at the Baghdad International Airport.[93] This militia previously conducted an FPV drone attack targeting fuel tanks at Camp Victory on April 2.[94] The US Embassy in Baghdad also confirmed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted multiple drone attacks targeting the diplomatic support center and Baghdad International Airport on April 8.[95] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia have continuously targeted Baghdad International Airport and its co-located facilities, including Camp Victory and the diplomatic support center, since the war began.[96]

The combined force struck a Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah-owned property in Basra Province on April 7, killing three militia members.[97] A security source told Iraqi media on April 7 that unspecified actors launched an attack from Kuwait targeting an Iraqi militia-owned house in Khor al Zubair, Basra Province.[98]

Protesters carrying Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) flags attempted to storm the Kuwaiti Consulate in Basra City on April 7 in response to the attack.[99] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service, but many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[100] Iranian-backed Iraqi figures have blamed Kuwait for the strike on the Shalamchech border crossing and attacks targeting Iraqi oil infrastructure in recent days.[101]

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Iran Update Special Report, April 9, 2026



Nidal Morrison, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Parker Hempel, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.


Key Takeaways

1. Iran, the United States, and Israel have not exchanged fire since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on April 8. Gulf states continue to report drone attacks against them, however.
2. The US Government stated on April 8 that Iran submitted a "new" and "modified" proposal to the United States that will serve as the basis for the US-Iran talks. US President Donald Trump stated on April 7 that this proposal is a "workable basis on which to negotiate." Unspecified mediators told the *Wall Street Journal* on April 8 that Iran has softened several of its demands, including its demands related to nuclear enrichment, the withdrawal of US forces from the Middle East, and war reparations.
3. Iran is taking several steps to try to exert control over maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which have the net effect of keeping oil prices high. Iran likely aims to use high oil prices to exert economic pressure on the United States and extract concessions from the United States during negotiations.
4. Iranian officials continue to insist that Lebanon is part of the ceasefire framework. Israeli officials have stated that Israel will not observe a ceasefire in Lebanon and will continue to strike Hezbollah, however. Hezbollah has resumed attacks on Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed Israeli officials on April 8 to conduct direct negotiations with the Lebanese government "as soon as possible to discuss Hezbollah disarmament.

Toplines

Iran, the United States, and Israel have not exchanged fire since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on April 8. Gulf states continue to report drone attacks against them, however. Bahrain's Defense Ministry stated on April 9 that it has intercepted seven Iranian drones since April 8.[1] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces announced on April 9 that an unspecified number of drones entered Kuwaiti airspace and that one of these drones targeted a Kuwaiti National Guard site.[2]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Bahrain
Between February 28, 2026 and April 9, 2026




The United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire deal mediated by Pakistan on April 7

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Iran is taking several steps to try to exert control over maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which have the net effect of keeping oil prices high. Iran likely aims to use high oil prices to exert economic pressure on the United States and extract concessions from the United States during negotiations. An unnamed senior Iranian source told Russian state media on April 9 that Iran will not allow more than 15 vessels per day to transit through the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire.[3] The Iranian Ports and Maritime Organization published a graphic on April 8 instructing ships to follow designated entry and exit routes in coordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy to transit the strait.[4] These routes move international maritime traffic into Iranian-controlled waters. The graphic warns that ships risk hitting mines outside of these routes.[5] Unspecified US officials previously told Western media on March 23 that there are at least a dozen Iranian mines in the strait.[6] Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei released a statement on April 9 in which he said that Iran will “take the management” of the Strait of Hormuz to a “new phase.”[7] This statement is consistent with other Iranian officials’ statements in recent weeks that Iran intends to use the strait as a point of leverage even after the war ends.[8] Commercial maritime tracking data showed that three cargo ships and one oil tanker entered the strait, while six cargo ships and four oil tankers exited the strait between 2:00 PM ET on April 8 and 2:00 PM ET on April 9.[9]



The US Government stated on April 8 that Iran submitted a “new” and “modified” proposal to the United States that will serve as the basis for the US-Iran talks.[10] US President Donald Trump stated on April 7 that this proposal is a “workable basis on which to negotiate.”[11] Iranian media previously published a version of its 10-point proposal, which included long-standing and maximalist Iranian demands.[12] The proposal called for guarantees against future strikes on Iran, Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, recognition of Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, and the lifting of all US primary and secondary sanctions.[13] It also demanded the termination of United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions against Iran, the withdrawal of US forces from the region, war reparations, and a ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon.[14] Unspecified mediators told the *Wall Street Journal* on April 8 that Iran has softened several of its demands, including its demands related to nuclear enrichment, the withdrawal of US forces from the Middle East, and war reparations.[15] The *Wall Street Journal* also highlighted disagreements over the scope of the ceasefire, noting that the United States does not consider Lebanon part of the agreement despite Iran including it in its proposal.[16] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on April 9 that Israeli strikes on Lebanon render negotiations “meaningless.”[17] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately insisted that Lebanon is part of the ceasefire framework.[18]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The US State Department reported on April 8 that the combined force’s campaign succeeded in degrading Iran’s military capabilities. The Department reported that the combined force destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s defense industrial base, including the majority of Iran’s ballistic missiles, missile launchers, and long-range attack aircraft.[19] The Department reported that the combined force destroyed 150 Iranian warships, all Iranian submarines, and 97 percent of Iran’s naval mine stockpile. The Department added that “Iran can no longer arm its terrorist proxies.” The Department reported that the combined force destroyed or degraded 70 percent of Iran’s launch facilities and ground control stations related to Iran’s space program. The Department added that the combined force struck more than 13,000 targets, including more than 2,000 command and control targets, more than 1,450 defense industrial targets, more than 1,500 air defense targets, around 800 drone targets, more than 600 naval targets, and more than 450 ballistic missile targets.



The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 8 that combined force strikes before the ceasefire damaged several buildings at a former nuclear weapons components production site at the Parchin Military Complex in Tehran Province, according to satellite imagery.[20] Iran developed the Shahid Boroujerdi site under the Amad Project, which was Iran’s nuclear weapons program prior to 2003.[21] Iran built the site to produce weapons-grade uranium cores for nuclear weapons.[22] The core forms the central part of a nuclear warhead and contains the fissile material that triggers the chain reaction in a nuclear explosion. Iran shut down the site after the Amad Project ended, but the Institute noted that there has been some construction outside the main tunnel entrance to the site since then.[23] The Institute stated that bunker buster bombs, among other munitions, targeted the site between March 24 and April 1. The strikes destroyed a ventilation structure and penetrated the ground directly above the main tunnel complex. The strikes also destroyed a utility building outside the tunnel entrance. The strikes on Shahid Boroujerdi were part of the broader combined force effort to degrade Iran’s nuclear industrial base. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine stated on April 8 that combined force strikes hit 80 percent of Iran’s nuclear industrial base.[24]


Iranian Response

See topline section.


Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah has resumed attacks on Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. These attacks come after a Hezbollah official stated on April 8 that the group would halt attacks against Israel under the ceasefire.[25] Hezbollah said that it resumed attacks against Israeli targets on April 8 after Israel violated the ceasefire agreement.[26] Hezbollah resumed attacks against Israeli forces and vehicles in northern Lebanon, claiming 8 attacks between 2:00 PM ET on April 8 and between 2:00 PM ET on April 9.[27] Hezbollah claimed that it launched mortar rounds and rockets and directly engaged Israel Defense Forces (IDF) forces in Bint Jbeil, Bint Jbeil District.[28] An Israeli journalist confirmed that Israeli units directly engaged Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbeil on April 9, after the IDF recently encircled the town.[29]


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 5 and April 8, 2026



Hezbollah similarly resumed attacks against IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern Israel, claiming 26 attacks between 2:00 PM ET on April 8 and 2:00 PM ET on April 9.[30] The IDF said that Hezbollah fired around 70 rockets from Lebanon at northern Israel in the past 24 hours.[31] An Israeli journalist reported that Israeli air defenses intercepted many of the Hezbollah rockets while allowing others to fall in open areas.[32] Hezbollah claimed that it fired at least eight rocket barrages targeting Kiryat Shmona.[33] An Israeli journalist reported that Israeli air defenses intercepted multiple Hezbollah rockets fired at Kiryat Shmona on April 9. Hezbollah also claimed that it launched rocket barrages and drones targeting the northern Israeli towns of Shlomi and Nahariya.[34] The Israeli journalist reported that Israeli air defenses intercepted Hezbollah rockets over Nahariya.[35]




Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 5, 2026 and April 8, 2026 By Type



The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that the IDF killed approximately 200

Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon on April 8.[36] The IDF reported that it killed Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem's personal secretary, Ali Youssef Harshi, in an airstrike in Beirut on April 8.[37] The IDF stated that Harshi was a close confidant and personal adviser to Qassem and played a key role in managing and securing his office.[38] The IDF killed Shebaa "Lebanese Brigades" Commander Maher Qassem Hamedan and seven other Hezbollah fighters in an airstrike in Sidon, southwestern Lebanon, on April 8.[39] The IDF stated that Hamedan was responsible for recruiting fighters, supplying weapons, and funding the "Lebanese Brigades" in Shebaa.[40] The "Lebanese Brigades" is funded by Hezbollah and directly linked to the group, according to the IDF.[41] The IDF struck two additional bridges along the Litani River overnight between April 8 and 9 that Hezbollah used to transport weapons and fighters from northern to southern Lebanon.[42] The IDF also struck approximately 10 Hezbollah weapons depots, launchers, and headquarters in southern Lebanon.[43] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on April 9 that Israel will continue to strike Hezbollah "with force, precision, and determination." [44]



The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across southern Lebanon. The IDF 401st Armored Brigade (91st Territorial Division) engaged in direct combat with Hezbollah fighters and destroyed several Hezbollah-affiliated sites in southern Lebanon on April 9.[45] The 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Armored Division) killed more than 70 Hezbollah fighters and directed an IAF strike in Yater, southwestern Lebanon, on April 9.[46] The 215th Artillery Brigade also destroyed Hezbollah anti-tank missile launch sites, observation posts, and command centers in southern Lebanon.[47] The IDF 933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade (162nd Armored Division) located large quantities of Hezbollah weapons and destroyed Hezbollah infrastructure, including anti-tank shell launchers.[48] The IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade (146th Reserve Division) located weapons depots and killed dozens of Hezbollah fighters on April 9.[49] The brigade also destroyed a Hezbollah building in Bint Jbeil, southeastern Lebanon, on April 9.[50] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir stated during a tour in Bint Jbeil on April 9 that the IDF's "main battlefield" is in Lebanon.[51] Zamir noted that the IDF will continue to deepen its ground maneuvers and strike Hezbollah.[52]

Israeli and Lebanese officials will reportedly begin direct negotiations under US auspices next week in Washington, DC.[53] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed Israeli officials on April 8 to conduct direct negotiations with the Lebanese government "as soon as possible." [54] Netanyahu stated that the negotiations will focus on disarming Hezbollah and establishing "peaceful relations" between Israel and Lebanon.[55] Netanyahu's statement reportedly followed calls between Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump, and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff.[56] Senior US officials told Axios that Witkoff asked Netanyahu to "calm down" Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon and open negotiations with the Lebanese government.[57] US Vice President JD Vance suggested on April

8 that Israel had expressed willingness to “check themselves a little bit in Lebanon.”[58] Israeli officials have stated that Israel will not observe a ceasefire in Lebanon and will continue to strike Hezbollah, however.[59]

The Lebanese government has continued to take steps to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam ordered the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to immediately enforce the Lebanese state’s monopoly over weapons in Beirut.[60] Salam’s order is a more targeted order than his cabinet’s March 2 decision to formally ban Hezbollah’s military activities across Lebanon.[61] Salam’s order comes amid consistent pressure from Israel on the LAF to disarm Hezbollah, and ahead of the Lebanon-Israel talks next week.[62]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Other Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis, did not claim any attacks against US assets, Israel, or other countries in the region on April 9. Multiple Axis of Resistance group leaders warned that they would resume attacks if the IDF continues its campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon, however. ISW-CTP has not observed any claimed or reported Iranian-backed Iraqi militia or Houthi attacks since April 8.[63]

Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders called for Iraqi militias to resume attacks against US and Israeli targets in response to recent IDF strikes in Lebanon.[64] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leader Abu Alaa al Walai called on April 8 for Axis of Resistance groups to attack Israel in response to its strikes in Lebanon, which the group framed as a ceasefire violation.[65] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi vowed on April 8 that the Axis of Resistance will “punish” Israel for its strikes in Lebanon.[66]

Houthi leaders also warned that the group may resume attacks against Israel if Israel continues its campaign in Lebanon. Houthi Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi said in a speech on April 9 that the IDF’s campaign in Lebanon “may lead to the return of the entire battle.”[67] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti separately told Hezbollah media on April 9 that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is a “clear violation” that threatens to collapse the ceasefire and resume the conflict.[68] Bukhaiti warned that the Houthis could escalate their involvement in a resumed conflict, including by increasing their operations on “the Red Sea front.”[69] The threat is likely intended to coerce the United States to pressure Israel to halt its campaign against Hezbollah.

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Endnotes

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Iran Update Special Report, April 10, 2026



Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Parker Hempel, Carolyn Moorman, William Doran, Avery Borens, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: *ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.*

Key Takeaways

1. The Iranian delegation arrived in Islamabad on April 10 ahead of planned negotiations on April 11. US Vice President JD Vance departed for Pakistan on April 10, operating under strict guidance from President Donald Trump.
2. It will remain difficult to determine whether the Middle East ceasefire conditions are being upheld, given the lack of mutually agreed-upon, written ceasefire documents available to the public.
3. US President Trump warned on Truth Social on April 10 that Iran is engaging in “short-term extortion” in the Strait of Hormuz and said that its leadership is negotiating only because it has “no cards.”
4. Neither the US nor Iran has signaled any public shift on their stances on key issues in previous negotiations, which include nuclear enrichment limits, the highly enriched uranium stockpile, the missile program, sanctions, and access to frozen assets. Now these sticking points include the Strait of Hormuz as well.
5. The US-Iran ceasefire talks are complicated by the fragmented nature of the Iranian negotiating team, composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions.
6. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated on April 10 that Kuwaiti armed forces detected and engaged seven Iranian drones in Kuwaiti airspace over the past 24 hours.
7. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias probably used first-person view (FPV) drones to ambush US Embassy personnel near the Baghdad International Airport on April 8. The Iraqi authorities' arrest of an IRGC officer connected to militia attacks on the airport and the claimed FPV drone attack against the same facility is further evidence that the IRGC is providing guidance to the militias and supporting

their attacks on US personnel in Iraq.

8. Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 49 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and 43 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern and southern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 9 and 2:00 PM ET on April 10
9. Iranian banks are in poor condition and are warned that current challenges risk pushing banks toward crisis or bankruptcy. Unspecified political insiders close to the Iranian establishment also told Reuters on April 8 that Iranian officials viewed the economy as Iran's "Achilles heel" and feared that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern.
10. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 9 that Iran likely aims to restrict access to the tunnel complex and delay or complicate any ground operation to reach or seize the highly enriched uranium stored at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) in Esfahan Province.

Toplines

The Iranian delegation arrived in Islamabad on April 10 ahead of planned negotiations on April 11.[1] US Vice President JD Vance departed for Pakistan on April 10, operating under strict guidance from President Donald Trump.[2] Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff are also part of the US negotiating team, which also reportedly includes officials from the Pentagon, National Security Council, and State Department.[3] CBS reported that the negotiating teams are expected to remain in Pakistan even if Vance departs.[4] A Pakistani source familiar with April 11 talks told Reuters that "everything is on track," citing de-escalation in Lebanon as a "good sign," and confirmed that advance teams from both Iran and the United States are already in place in Islamabad.[5]

It will remain difficult to determine whether the Middle East ceasefire conditions are being upheld, given the lack of mutually agreed-upon, written ceasefire documents available to the public. Iranian officials are using this ambiguity to frame the United States and its partners as aggressors who are attempting to collapse the ceasefire, which is far from clear. Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who are leading the Iranian negotiating delegation, insist that Lebanon must be included in the ceasefire and that Iran will be able to restrict shipping in the Strait of Hormuz as part of the ceasefire.[6] Ghalibaf wrote on X on April 10 that two "mutually agreed" measures — a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of Iran's blocked assets — must be implemented before negotiations begin.[7] There is zero public evidence that any of these measures were ever included in the ceasefire by either party. It is additionally unclear whether the ceasefire extends to Iraq, for example, where Iranian-backed groups ambushed US diplomats on April 8. President Masoud Pezeshkian told Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a phone call on April 9 that the ceasefire depends on US commitments, while Araghchi separately stressed Lebanon's centrality to the ceasefire in a call with Iran's ambassador in Beirut.[8]

Iranian media reported on April 10 that Iranian parliamentarians are preparing to vote on a strategic Strait of Hormuz plan that would prohibit "hostile" shipping (which would include US, Israel, and other vessels), require transit fees in rials, and mandate use of the term "Persian Gulf." [9] This plan would force crews or countries to negotiate for safe passage through the international waterway, which would have economic impacts because it implies that Iran's conditions in these negotiations could change at any time and for any reason. An Iranian analyst close to the regime argued that the US-Iran War has reshaped Iran's security doctrine and deterrence posture, referring to Iran's control of the Strait.[10] An agreement that allows Iran to restrict shipping in the Strait, tax it, or otherwise threaten international shipping and keep energy prices high for the consumer.[11] Some shipping firms are calling on tankers not to pay Iran's toll, as it is a violation of freedom of navigation.[12] Even without a formal toll system,

Iran is aware that it can coerce other powers in the future by threatening shipping through the strait.[13]

US President Trump warned on Truth Social on April 10 that Iran is engaging in “short-term extortion” in the Strait of Hormuz and said that its leadership is negotiating only because it has “no cards.”[14] Fox News reporter Trey Yingst reported on April 10 that US intelligence agencies assessed that the IRGC is exploiting the two-week ceasefire to solidify control over maritime traffic.[15] Vance stated that he and the negotiating team would not allow Iran to “play them” before boarding his flight on April 10.[16]

Neither the US nor Iran has signaled any public shift on their stances on key issues in previous negotiations, which include nuclear enrichment limits, the highly enriched uranium stockpile, the missile program, sanctions, and access to frozen assets. Now these sticking points include the Strait of Hormuz as well. Trump continues to hold a firm red line against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, while Iranian officials such as Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi have reportedly refused to discuss the missile program, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[17] Mediators cited by the *Wall Street Journal* on April 8 said Iran has privately softened on several demands, including its previous positions on enrichment, US troop withdrawals from the region, and war reparations — though it remains unclear whether this reflects an official regime stance, however.[18] These mixed messages underscore the fragility of both the ceasefire framework and the diplomatic process now unfolding through indirect channels in Pakistan.

The US-Iran ceasefire talks are complicated by the fragmented nature of the Iranian negotiating team. The United States is dealing with a de facto committee composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions. These actors hold divergent views on the scope and purpose of the negotiations, and several are operating outside the formal responsibilities of their offices. The result is a fragmented team marked by internal rivalries, mixed signaling, and unclear lines of authority, especially between Iran’s diplomatic institutions, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

- **Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi** represents the diplomatic wing of the Iranian regime and has been supportive of using engagement as a tool to reduce pressure and stabilize the regional environment.[19] His position has been weakened by overt hostility from hardline elements. Social media users shared footage on April 9 of local IRGC affiliates and Basij supporters protesting outside the Foreign Affairs Ministry against Araghchi for negotiating with the United States.[20]
- **Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf** has emerged as the lead figure for the Iranian delegation for negotiations in Islamabad, a role more traditionally suited to the president or foreign minister.[21] President Masoud Pezeshkian has reportedly been sidelined in the regime’s decision-making process.[22] Ghalibaf is a powerful political operator with strong ties to conservative networks, but he appears not to exercise command authority over the IRGC.[23] His leadership of the delegation creates a mismatch between responsibility and control, which may leave him exposed to criticism from hardliners and the IRGC while lacking the leverage to enforce consensus.[24]
- **IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi** appears to wield outsized influence over Iran’s diplomatic posture despite being a senior military officer and not a formal negotiator. Vahidi is a long-time IRGC member, serving as IRGC Quds Force Commander from 1988 to 1997 and now as the senior-most IRGC commander.[25] Iranian media reported that Vahidi was one of the five influential figures involved in the establishment of Hezbollah, which may make him more supportive of demanding a Lebanon ceasefire and reticent to cast aside Hezbollah in

negotiations.[26] Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are driving military decisionmaking, according to anti-regime media on April 7.[27] Vahidi is reportedly at odds with both Ghalibaf and Araghchi because Vahidi has pushed for SNSC Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr to be on the negotiating team, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[28] The SNSC Secretary does not normally take up these sorts of diplomatic responsibilities.[29] Ghalibaf and Araghchi's negotiating team have pushed back on Vahidi's request because Zolghadr lacks the necessary experience to be involved in these negotiations.[30] Vahidi notably pushed for Pezeshkian to select Zolghadr, whom he has worked with for decades, as SNSC secretary.[31] Vahidi's influence highlights the continued dominance of security institutions over foreign policy when core defense capabilities are perceived to be at stake. His position effectively sets red lines that constrain negotiators who are ostensibly leading the delegation.


- **Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr** oversees coordination among Iran's military, intelligence, and security bodies and plays a central role in shaping national security policy, including war planning and crisis management. Zolghadr is a hardline IRGC veteran and long-time power broker with deep ties to Iran's security and judicial apparatuses, he commanded the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters during the Iran-Iraq War, rose through senior IRGC leadership roles in the 1990s and early 2000s, helped engineer Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 2005 election after opposing reformist President Mohammad Khatami, later oversaw internal security and Basij repression—including during the 2009 Green Movement—and was sanctioned by the UN in 2007 for involvement in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.[32] Zolghadr appears not to be in the negotiating delegation, however.[33] It also remains unclear what role the SNSC plays at the moment, whether it is directing strategy, arbitrating disputes, or simply lending institutional cover to factional maneuvering.

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is notably absent from the process. The Supreme Leader is often viewed as an informal but critical mediator among Iran's rival factions during periods of elite disagreement.[34] Mojtaba's lack of visible involvement has deprived the negotiations of a potential internal arbiter capable of harmonizing positions between the IRGC, the government, and the parliamentary leadership. This absence of clear mediation and coordination leaves the Iranian negotiating posture internally divided and externally unpredictable, which may complicate US efforts to assess credibility and reach enforceable agreements.

The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated on April 10 that Kuwaiti armed forces detected and engaged seven Iranian drones in Kuwaiti airspace over the past 24 hours.[35] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry added that Iranian drone attacks targeted Kuwaiti National Guard facilities, injuring several personnel.[36] The ministry reported that explosive ordnance disposal teams handled 14 separate incidents during the same period.[37] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Public Relations office denied reports that Iran conducted drone or missile attacks in Gulf states.[38]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Kuwait


Between February 28, 2026 and April 10, 2026



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Iranian threats and restrictions regarding the Strait of Hormuz continue to limit the flow of maritime traffic through the strait. Commercially available maritime tracking data shows that three cargo vessels, including one ship sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), have entered the strait since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on April 9.[39] The ship sanctioned by OFAC is the Iranian-flagged *Ganj*, which is subject to secondary sanctions.[40] Commercially available maritime tracking data also shows that five vessels, including four cargo ships and one tanker, exited the strait since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff.[41] Three of the five vessels were Iranian-flagged, and two of the Iranian vessels, the *Basht* and the *Negar*, are sanctioned by OFAC.[42] The *Basht* and the *Negar* are both subject to secondary sanctions.[43]



Iranian-backed Iraqi militias probably used first-person view (FPV) drones to ambush US Embassy personnel near the Baghdad International Airport on April 8. An unspecified US State Department official told a White House correspondent that Iraqi militias launched multiple drones at US embassy staff near the airport, causing no casualties.[44] The official did not specify the type of drone, but ordinary Iranian-made drones would lack the accuracy to "ambush" moving personnel, especially individual personnel on foot or in a vehicle. This suggests that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia responsible for this attack utilized a FPV drone. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to use FPV drones.[45] FPV drones can be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or outfitted with strike capabilities to conduct precise targeting, thus making this the most likely type of drone used in the attack.[46] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts have assessed that drone footage posted by multiple Iraqi militias during the war has appeared to be from fiber-optic FPV drones, making it likely that the militias already possess this technology.[47] US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau summoned Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Nizar Khirullah on April 9 to

condemn Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against US diplomatic personnel and facilities, including the attack on the Embassy personnel near the airport on April 8.[48]

The State Department noted on April 9 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted hundreds of attacks during the war against US citizens, diplomatic facilities, and commercial interests, as well as Iraqi institutions, civilians, and neighboring countries.[49] Landau emphasized the Iraqi government's failure to prevent these attacks.[50] Iraqi authorities conducted a few arrests during the war, but militia attacks continued. Iraqi authorities arrested four individuals on March 25 responsible for launching a drone attack at a former US military base in Hasakah Province, Syria.[51] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani's office said on March 8 that Sudani told French President Emmanuel Macron that the Iraqi authorities had arrested the perpetrators of a drone attack on a French base in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 12 that killed one French soldier.^[52]

An Iraqi security source told US-funded, Arabic-language media on April 9 that Iraqi authorities arrested an IRGC officer for suspected involvement in directing Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone attacks on Baghdad International Airport.[53] Iraqi authorities reportedly also arrested three Iraqis in connection with these attacks.[54] The Iraqi security source added that the IRGC officer and the three Iraqis remain in Iraqi government custody, despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to release them.[55] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed that it attacked the former US Victory Base at the airport on March 24 and posted drone footage of the attack.[56] There were also multiple other drone attacks on the airport.[57] A longtime observer of drone operations suggested on March 25 that the drone footage is consistent with a fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone.[58] ISW-CTP still cannot authenticate the Islamic Resistance in Iraq's video or confirm that a militia attack occurred at the airport on March 24, however.

The Iraqi authorities' arrest of an IRGC officer connected to militia attacks on the airport and the claimed FPV drone attack against the same facility is further evidence that the IRGC is providing guidance to the militias and supporting their attacks on US personnel in Iraq. This support may include FPV drones, given that the militias used FPV drones to attack US facilities and personnel at and near the airport. Iran potentially transferring this technology to its regional partners and proxies would pose a significant threat to US interests in the Middle East because FPV drones are difficult to shoot down using conventional systems and can be used to precisely target individuals or lone vehicles.[59] Some of the Iraqi FPV drones have been fitted with fiber-optic cables, as well, which makes them impossible to jam. Russia and Ukraine have extensively used FPV drones in their war.[60] Russia has given drone components to Iran, and Russia would be the most likely actor to have provided Iran with fiber-optic drone capabilities.[61]

Current economic challenges in Iran are causing Iranian officials to fear that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern. Iranian Parliament Budget Committee member Mehrdad Lahouti stated on April 10 that Iranian banks are in poor condition and warned that current challenges risk pushing banks toward crisis or bankruptcy.[62] Lahouti added that production has "practically" stalled and that exporters have halted activity.[63] Lahouti stated that producers cannot pay wages and that many hotels in Tehran have closed, noting that these businesses must pay workers.[64] Unspecified political insiders close to the Iranian establishment told Reuters on April 8 that Iranian officials viewed the economy as Iran's "Achilles heel" and feared that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern.[65] Unspecified insiders added that any comprehensive peace agreement would need to lift sanctions and release frozen funds because Iranian authorities would otherwise face severe difficulty meeting payroll obligations and repairing damaged infrastructure.[66] The internet blackout has also exacerbated economic strain. A recent NetBlocks report on April 10 indicates that Iran's nationwide internet blackout, exceeding 42 days, has severely disrupted financial

transactions, commercial activity, and business operations, compounding broader economic deterioration.[67] Netblocks previously estimated that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over \$37 million USD per day.[68]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

New satellite imagery shows damage to a number of Iranian facilities across the country. These strikes occurred prior to the ceasefire, with the exception of a strike on Lavan Island on April 9.


- Satellite imagery from April 8 shows that the combined force struck the Besat Research Complex in Shiraz, Fars Province, on April 6.[69]
- Satellite imagery from April 6 shows heavy damage to several warehouses and support structures at the IRGC Navy base in Ghesm Island, Hormozgan Province.[70]
- Satellite imagery from March 6 also shows the combined force struck six buildings at the 26th Salman Missile Group near Borazjan, Bushehr Province.[71]
- An Israeli journalist reported on April 10 that satellite imagery shows smoke from storage tanks at the oil terminal on Lavan Island, Hormozgan Province, following explosions that occurred on April 9 after the ceasefire took effect.[72] It is unclear who conducted the strike. Israel denied involvement, as did the United States.

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 9 that Iran likely aims to restrict access to the tunnel complex and delay or complicate any ground operation to reach or seize the highly enriched uranium stored at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) in Esfahan Province. The Institute reported that Iran has constructed new makeshift roadblocks at all three tunnel entrances at the ENTC.[73] All three tunnel portals remain backfilled with dirt, and Iran has not made any effort to clear them or regain access.[74] The Institute added that Iran added additional barriers, including earthen berms, rubble piles, and possible fencing and a chicane at the northern entrance to restrict movement toward the tunnel complex.[75] French outlet Le Monde previously reported on March 28 that satellite imagery from June 9, 2025, showed a large convoy transporting sealed blue barrels, possibly containing nuclear-related material or highly enriched uranium, into the ENTC ahead of the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[76]

Iranian media reported on April 9 that Strategic Council on Foreign Relations Chairman Kamal Kharrazi died from his injuries.[77] The combined force targeted Kharrazi at his home in Tehran Province on April 1, severely injuring Kharrazi, according to Iranian media.[78] Kharrazi was a senior and trusted member of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's inner circle.[79] Kharrazi stated in May 2024 that Iran has the capability to build a nuclear bomb but has not decided to do so, and warned it would change its nuclear doctrine if its existence is threatened.[80]

The IDF reported on April 10 that the Israeli Air Force conducted more than 8,500 operational sorties and over 1,000 air missions in Iran since the beginning of the war.[81] The IDF added that it employed more than 18,000 munitions and executed over 10,800 strikes across more than 4,000 targets and 6,700 target components.[82]

start of the campaign on March 2.[97] The IDF also announced on April 10 that it has destroyed over 200 Hezbollah rocket launchers and 1,300 rocket launch tubes since March 2.[98] The IDF struck 120 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon on April 10.[99] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah Nasr Unit rocket artillery commander in southern Lebanon in recent days.[100] The Nasr Unit is responsible for the eastern sector of southern Lebanon.[101] Each of Hezbollah’s geographical units possesses organic engineering, rocket, logistics, drone, and medical capabilities.[102] The Nasr Unit played a crucial role in Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel after October 7, 2023, and during the Fall 2024 conflict.[103]



The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across southern Lebanon.

The IDF reported that 162nd Armored Division and 36th Armored Division units have destroyed over 2,700 Hezbollah sites and seized over 250 weapons and explosives in southern Lebanon.[104] IDF reported on April 10 that the 401st Armored Brigade (162nd Armored Division) destroyed a loaded Hezbollah rocket launcher that Hezbollah fighters had prepared to fire on northern Israel at an unspecified site in Lebanon.[105] The IDF also said that the 401st Armored Brigade located two Hezbollah tunnels during raids in southern Lebanon and destroyed weapons and ammunition, including anti-tank guided missiles.[106] The IDF said that the 91st Territorial Division, 98th Paratrooper Division, and 146th Reserve Division units have destroyed over 1,500 Hezbollah sites and seized over 1,000 weapons and explosives.[107] IDF said that the 91st Territorial Division has killed hundreds of Hezbollah fighters since March 2.[108] The 91st Territorial Division has reportedly directed airstrikes that destroyed over 50 Hezbollah sites and killed over 40 fighters in the past week.[109] The 769th (Hiram) Territorial Brigade (91st Territorial Division) directed an Israeli Air Force (IAF) strike on Hezbollah fighters and a vehicle in southern Lebanon on April 8.[110]

The IDF announced on April 10 that a Hezbollah drone injured two Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon.[111] The IDF reported that shrapnel from a Hezbollah drone injured two Israeli soldiers from unspecified units in southern Lebanon.[112]

An Israeli official told Reuters on April 10 that Israel may “scale down” its operations in Lebanon ahead of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon under US auspices next week in Washington, DC.[113]

A senior Israeli official told Reuters on April 10 that Israel would scale down attacks in Lebanon ahead of direct negotiations between Israeli and Lebanese officials.[114] CBS News reported on April 9 that US President Donald Trump called on Israel to scale back its strikes on Lebanon.[115] Multiple Lebanese officials told multiple Western media that negotiations with Israel are contingent upon the two sides agreeing to a ceasefire. A senior official in the Lebanese president’s office told the BBC that Lebanon will participate in direct negotiations with Israel next week only if there is a ceasefire in place.[116] A senior Lebanese official told Reuters direct Israel-Lebanon negotiations would

focus on discussing and announcing a ceasefire, which the Lebanese official described as a precondition for further talks to reach a broader deal with Israel.[117] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on April 10 that Hezbollah refuses to return to the “previous situation” and will continue to fight against Israel “until the last breath.”[118] Qassem also called on Lebanese officials to “stop offering free concessions” in negotiations with Israel.[119]

The Lebanese government has continued to take steps to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Lebanese media reported that the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed units, including soldiers from its Commando Regiment, to secure the Government Palace and begin patrols in Beirut.[120] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam ordered the LAF on April 9 to immediately enforce the Lebanese state’s monopoly over weapons in Beirut.[121]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) announced on April 10 that combined force strikes during the war have killed about 80 PMF members and wounded 270 other members.[122]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control multiple brigades within the PMF.[123] Iraqi media reported on April 10 that combined force strikes in Anbar, Ninewa, and Babil provinces have resulted in most PMF casualties.[124] Combined force strikes on PMF positions during the war have attempted to degrade the ability of militias that operate under the PMF to conduct retaliatory attacks on the United States and Israel.

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Iran Update Special Report, April 11, 2026



Parker Hempel, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran and the United States have fundamentally different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations, which will generate friction. Iran seeks an all-encompassing agreement that will end the threat of war with the United States, while the United States seeks a much narrower agreement centered on the current war. The US delegation, led by US Vice President JD Vance and including US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to be pursuing a narrow, issue-specific negotiation focused on de-escalatory mechanisms around the Strait of Hormuz, and reportedly secondary matters like detainees.
2. Iran is using the existence of an unknown number of naval mines it laid in the Strait of Hormuz to force ships to use Iranian territorial waters to traverse the Strait, which enables Iran to shakedown these ships for fees while the ships are in Iranian territorial waters. This protection racket is illegal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Iran likely designed its threatening behavior and its shakedowns to disrupt the global economy, which Iran calculates will enable it to extract concessions from the United States. Iran warned merchant ships that mines could exist in a "hazardous area" that covers 1,394 sq km of the Strait, including the normal traffic separation scheme (shipping lanes) that ships use to transit the Strait.
3. The current ceasefire will provide Iran an opportunity to reorganize its missile force and recover from the temporary disruption wrought to the missile force during constant US and Israeli operations. Consistent US and Israeli operations over Iran had suppressed Iran's missile force by preventing Iran from digging out launchers, disrupting command-and-control, and creating pervasive fear in military units that made them unwilling or unable to conduct attacks, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed.
4. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei continues to recover from severe facial and leg injuries

that he sustained in the February 28 strike on the supreme leader's compound in Tehran Province. Three unspecified individuals close to Mojtaba's inner circle told Reuters on April 11 that the strike disfigured Mojtaba's face and injured one or both of his legs.

5. The People's Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran to reconstitute some of its degraded air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is preparing to deliver man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran within the coming weeks, according to three sources familiar with recent US intelligence assessments.

Toplines

Iran and the United States have fundamentally different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations, which will generate friction. Iran seeks an all-encompassing agreement that will end the threat of war with the United States, while the United States seeks a much narrower agreement centered on the current war. The US delegation, led by US Vice President JD Vance and including US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to be pursuing a narrow, issue-specific negotiation focused on de-escalatory mechanisms around the Strait of Hormuz, and reportedly secondary matters like detainees.[1] The Iranian delegation is explicitly framing the talks as leverage for a broader reset in the US-Iran relationship.[2] Iranian demands include sovereignty claims over the Strait of Hormuz, compensation for war damages, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and a region-wide ceasefire across the "Axis of Resistance," which creates an imbalance in expectations that sets the talks up for deadlock.[3] Two people briefed on negotiations told the *Financial Times* that the April 11 negotiations have reached a "stalemate" over the main sticking point — the status of the Strait of Hormuz.[4]

The composition of Iran's at least 70-person delegation, headed by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, underscores Iran's wide-ranging negotiating intentions.[5] The large and heavily securitized team blends diplomats, parliamentarians, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-adjacent figures, and high-level economic technocrats, indicating that Iran is pressing a long list of demands across a range of issue areas.[6] The inclusion of the Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati and economic specialists points to a focus on sanctions architecture, frozen assets, and alternative financial mechanisms, suggesting preparation for prolonged economic and strategic bargaining rather than confidence-building compromise.[7]


The unusually large size of the Iranian delegation likely also reflects internal divisions and deep mutual distrust among regime power centers, rather than a unified negotiating strategy. There was reportedly infighting between the regime factions before the negotiations.[8] Ghalibaf and Araghchi reportedly clashed with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi over Vahidi's effort to insert longtime IRGC affiliate and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr into the talks, despite Zolghadr's lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations.[9] An IRGC-affiliated media outlet reported on their English language X account that Zolghadr was in the delegation in Islamabad, along with Defense Council Secretary IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, but Iranian Persian-language media did not disclose if Zolghadr was present.[10] The presence of overlapping political, security, and economic actors suggests a need for constant internal monitoring.[11]


Iran is using the existence of an unknown number of naval mines it laid in the Strait of Hormuz to force ships to use Iranian territorial waters to traverse the Strait, which enables Iran to shakedown these ships for fees while the ships are in Iranian territorial waters. Iran likely designed its threatening behavior and its shakedowns to disrupt the global economy,

which Iran calculates will enable it to extract concessions from the United States. Iran warned merchant ships that mines could exist in a “hazardous area” that covers 1,394 sq km of the Strait, including the normal traffic separation scheme (shipping lanes) that ships use to transit the Strait. Ships seeking to avoid the Iranian-declared hazardous area must transit Iranian territorial waters.[12] Iran then shakes down these merchant ships by extracting “protection fees.”[13] These “protection” fees protect ships from Iranian attacks. This protection racket is illegal under maritime law. No state bordering a strait is permitted to restrict traffic or extract fees under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.[14] Unspecified US officials told the *New York Times* on April 11 that Iran laid its mines—of which there are reportedly fewer than a dozen, according to a previous March 23 report—“haphazardly,” which has prevented Iran from locating or removing them. These mines may or may not be in the 1,394 sq km “hazardous area.”

The threat of mines also enables Iran to keep the price of oil and shipping insurance as high as possible for as long as possible without conducting attacks that would cause the ceasefire to collapse. Iran may calculate that the high price of oil and shipping insurance would cause the United States to cave on some of Iran’s demands.

The United States is attempting to undermine Iran’s ability to use the threat of mines in the “hazardous area” by using US Navy destroyers to prove that the normal traffic separation scheme is safe and viable for traffic. Iran can only use the threat of mines to keep these costs high if the fear of mines persists. US President Donald Trump said on April 11 that the United States is “starting the process of clearing out” the strait.[15] Arleigh Burke-Class destroyers USS *Frank E. Peterson* and USS *Michael Murphy* transited the Strait to clear the Strait of naval mines.[16] US CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper said that the US Navy will share the route of safe passage with civilian shipping as soon as possible.[17] Such a move would undermine Iran’s threats and badly damage its leverage in negotiations. The Qatari Transport Ministry announced later on April 11 that it will resume operations “for all types of maritime vessels and ships” between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM local time on April 12.[18]





The current ceasefire will provide Iran an opportunity to reorganize its missile force and recover from the temporary disruption wrought to the missile force during constant US and Israeli operations. Consistent US and Israeli operations over Iran had suppressed Iran’s missile force by preventing Iran from digging out launchers, disrupting command-and-control, and creating pervasive fear in military units that made them unwilling or unable to conduct attacks, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed.[19] Such effects are temporary, however, and the ceasefire provides Iran with an opportunity to reorganize itself for more coordinated missile attacks. This is especially notable because Iran still retains roughly 1,000 of the 2,500 medium-range ballistic missiles it had before the war and well under 50% of its one-way attack drones.[20]

The US-Israeli air campaign has nonetheless severely degraded elements of Iran’s ballistic missile program, which is a system of systems that relies on many complicated and bespoke components to function. These components cannot be easily replaced. The air campaign targeted the critical capabilities of Iran’s ballistic missile program to prevent the missile forces from executing their campaign design.[21] The US-Israeli campaign, for example, targeted Iranian missile fuel production, missile guidance systems, steel production that could be used for ballistic missiles, ball bearing factories (which are key for inertial guidance systems on Iranian missiles), and other key components.[22] Such assets are not easily replaced, and when and if Iran expends its remaining missiles, it will struggle to replace them rapidly. This will play into Iranian strike package decisions if the war resumes.

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei continues to recover from severe facial and leg injuries that he sustained in the February 28 strike on the supreme leader’s compound in Tehran Province. Three unspecified individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle told Reuters on April 11 that the strike disfigured Mojtaba’s face and injured one or both of his legs.[23] The sources added that Mojtaba remains “mentally sharp” and continues to participate in major decisions, including war and negotiations with the United States, through audio conferences with senior Iranian officials.[24] It is notable that the sources noted that the strikes disfigured his face—which implies at least some degree of head injuries—and felt it necessary to note he remains “mentally sharp” in that context. Mojtaba has not appeared in public or in any new images or videos since his March 8 appointment as supreme leader.[25] The regime has circulated only older footage of him and has issued written statements.[26] Iranian state television described Mojtaba as a “janbaz,” which is a term for those wounded in war.[27] The reporting from individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle is consistent with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks on March 13 that Mojtaba is “wounded and likely disfigured.”[28]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran to reconstitute some of its degraded air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is preparing to deliver

man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran within the coming weeks, according to three sources familiar with recent US intelligence assessments.[29] Two of the sources told CNN that the PRC is attempting to route the shipments through third-party countries to obfuscate their route and origin.[30] The upcoming transfer may be the result of two-year-long negotiations between Iran and the PRC over Iran's acquisition of MANPADS and other weaponry, including anti-ship cruise missiles.[31] These negotiations "accelerated sharply" after the 12-Day War, and Iran and the PRC were still discussing the issue as of February 24, according to Reuters.[32] The PRC Embassy in Washington denied that the PRC has provided weapons to any party in the conflict.[33] Tehran has similarly sought to acquire MANPADS from Russia in the lead-up to the recent conflict.[34]

Iran may be eager to use the current cessation of hostilities in preparation for possible renewed US or Israeli strikes should negotiations fail. The combined force has degraded Iranian air defenses and established air superiority over Iran, but new systems could present a threat to the combined force aircraft, particularly those flying at low altitudes. US aircraft have flown at low altitudes over several areas of southern Iran during the conflict, which suggests that the combined force severely suppressed or destroyed local Iranian anti-air capabilities, including MANPADS, in those areas.[35] Iran could use these systems to attempt to bolster defenses around Iranian naval assets along the Persian Gulf coast amid combined force efforts to limit the Iranian threat to international shipping. Iran reportedly deployed MANPADS to reinforce its defenses on Kharg Island in late March, for example.[36] MANPADS alone cannot replace the damage inflicted upon Iranian integrated air defense systems by US and Israeli strikes during this conflict and previous rounds of strikes in 2024, however.[37]

The PRC's reported preparations to send Iran MANPADS underscore the nature of the PRC's military partnership with Iran. The PRC has historically limited its support with Iran due to its close economic ties to the Gulf and has shown a willingness to bolster Iran's capabilities without risking direct entanglement in Iran's conflicts in the region.[38] The PRC is one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears to be willing to sell military equipment to Iran; however, as also seen through the recent near-agreement to transfer PRC anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.[39] The PRC is also a key partner helping Iran to reconstitute its missile program and has likely continued this support by sending missile fuel precursor even during the conflict.[40] Iranian officials may also seek the PRC to fulfill previous agreements that it has made with Iran, particularly regarding dual-use technologies to help Iran rebuild after the war. US officials recently accused the PRC's largest chipmaker, SMIC, of sending chipmaking technology to the Iranian military for nearly a year, for example.[41]


US and Israeli Air Campaign

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 10 that Airbus satellite imagery from April 8 shows projectile impacts on an anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) position near the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in Bushehr Province.[42] The Institute added that AAA positions were located roughly 230 to 360 feet from the perimeter of the BNPP and about one mile from the operating reactor.[43] The Institute added that the strike destroyed two AAA systems and collapsed an unidentified structure, with debris visible around both impact sites.[44] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously reported on April 4 that Iran informed it that a projectile struck near the BNPP.[45] A projectile fragment reportedly killed one member of the site's physical protection staff, and shockwaves and fragments damaged a building on site. The Institute assessed that the strike likely targeted a military position adjacent to the nuclear facility rather than the reactor itself.[46]

Iranian Response

Iran fired a single drone targeting Bahrain on April 11.[47] The decline of Iranian fire on Gulf states over the past few days likely reflects Iranian adherence to the April 7 ceasefire. ISW-CTP has not observed any other Iranian fire targeting Gulf states since ISW-CTP's last data cut off on April 10. Iran also only attacked one Gulf state on April 10.[48]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Bahrain
Between February 28, 2026 and April 11, 2026




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Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 26 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on April 10 and 2:00 PM ET on April 11.[49] Hezbollah claimed 16 attacks against Israeli forces operating in the Bint Jbeil District, southeastern Lebanon.[50] Hezbollah claimed seven attacks specifically targeting Israeli forces with rocket, mortar, and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attacks operating near the al Israaq school, which is located between Ainata and Bint Jbeil.[51] An Israeli journalist confirmed that Israeli units directly engaged Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbeil on April 9, after the IDF recently isolated the town.[52] Bint Jbeil is operationally significant because it is located at the nexus of multiple main roads in southeastern Lebanon, including the Tebnine-Bint Jbeil Road, that the IDF could use to advance north. Bint Jbeil is also symbolically significant to Hezbollah. Former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah proclaimed "victory" in Bint Jbeil after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.[53] Hezbollah has also previously fought the IDF at Bint Jbeil in previous conflicts, including in 2006 and in the October 7 War.[54]


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 6, 2026 and April 10, 2026 By Type




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved. All data from the official Hezbollah media channel. Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 6, 2026 and April 10, 2026



Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 36 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern and southern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 10 and 2:00 PM ET on April 11.[55] Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Hezbollah launched around 40 rockets at northern Israeli communities on April 11.[56] Hezbollah claimed that it launched five rocket barrages targeting Kiryat Shmona.[57] An Israeli journalist reported that two Hezbollah rockets struck Kiryat Shmona without causing any casualties on April 10.[58] The journalist reported that Kiryat Shmona residents did not receive a warning before the Hezbollah rocket impacts.[59] The IDF reported on April 11 that an initial investigation indicated that the early warning system failed to detect the Hezbollah rocket launches and thus failed to issue an alert before the Hezbollah rocket impacts.[60] The Israeli journalist also reported multiple Hezbollah rocket and drone launches targeting Safed, Shlomi, and Karmiel, all in northern Israel.[61] The journalist reported that all the reported Hezbollah projectiles caused no casualties.[62] At least one Hezbollah drone did hit a residence in Shlomi, causing damage, however.[63]



Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on April 11 that the IDF had created a "security zone" in southern Lebanon.[64] Netanyahu stated that the IDF security zone extends between eight and ten kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[65] It is unclear if the IDF's "security zone" meets the doctrinal definition of control, which is "a tactical mission task in which a unit maintains physical influence over an assigned area. By controlling an area, units prevent its use by an enemy force or create conditions necessary for friendly operations." [66] An unspecified senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on March 22 that the IDF's objective for the "security zone" is to push Hezbollah forces back to limit their ability to fire ATGMs targeting northern Israeli towns and remove the threat of a coordinated Hezbollah cross-border infiltration into northern Israel.[67]

The IDF has continued to conduct air and ground operations targeting Hezbollah

unverified reports that Hezbollah may have been preparing to launch a "coup" against the Lebanese government and seize government buildings in recent days.[83] The reports claim that the IDF airstrikes in Beirut and its southern suburbs on April 8 disrupted the alleged coup.[84] The IDF said that the IDF strikes on April 8 killed at least 180 Hezbollah members.[85]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched three drones targeting a US security convoy, including diplomatic and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel, that was transporting previously kidnapped US journalist Shelly Kittelson to Baghdad International Airport from the Green Zone in Baghdad on April 8, according to unspecified sources speaking to regional media on April 11.[86] This follows the US State Department confirmation on April 9 and 10 that Iraqi militias ambushed a convoy of US diplomatic personnel on April 8.[87] No Iraqi militia has taken responsibility at the time of this writing. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah kidnapped Kittelson on March 31 and then released her on April 7 in exchange for the Iraqi government releasing an unspecified number of Kataib Hezbollah members.[88]

Intra-Regime Dynamics

Iranian media named Iran's negotiating team and identified Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the Defense Council secretary.[89] Iranian media have not reported Ahmadian's appointment to the position. Ahmadian replaced Ali Shamkhani, who was killed by the combined force on the first day of the war on February 28.[90] The Defense Council is Iran's highest national security decision-making body's sub-council on strategic defense, which the SNSC established in August 2025 to streamline decision-making during wartime.[91] Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Ahmadian to the Defense Council in August 2025 as one of his representatives.[92]

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