

Iran Update Special Report, March 29, 2026



Parker Hempel, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Ria Reddy, and Annika Ganzeveld, Parker Hempel, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. The Washington Post reported on March 29 that the combined force has struck four key Iranian ballistic missile production facilities and 29 missile launch bases since the start of the war. ISW-CTP has similarly recorded strikes on over 20 missile bases during the war.
2. Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials continue to dismiss Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's concerns about Iran's economic conditions amid Iran's war with the United States and Israel. Anti-regime media reported on March 28 that there is a deepening rift between Pezeshkian and IRGC Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi over the regime's actions during the war and the war's mounting economic and social costs, citing unspecified informed sources.
3. The Iranian regime appears to be appealing to nationalist sentiments to recruit members of the Iranian population to help the regime maintain internal security. The Wall Street Journal reported on March 29 that Iran has launched a recruitment campaign called "Janfada," or "Sacrificing Life," to recruit volunteers to fight US forces in the event of a US ground operation in Iran, citing a text message sent to Iranian mobile users.
4. Russia continues to help Iran conduct attacks across the Middle East. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery of US military assets in the region. Zelensky said that Russia took satellite imagery of the US-UK base in Diego Garcia on March 24 as well as the Incirlik Airbase in Turkey, Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar, and the Shaybah oil and gas field in Saudi Arabia on March 26. Russian efforts to take images of these sites indicate that Russia is helping Iran attack not only US assets but also Turkish and British assets. Iran has attacked all of these sites since the war began.

Toplines

The *Washington Post* reported on March 29 that the combined force has struck four key Iranian ballistic missile production facilities and 29 missile launch bases since the start of the war.[1] ISW-CTP has similarly recorded strikes on over 20 missile bases during the war.[2]

The *Washington Post* assessed that combined force airstrikes have caused “severe damage” to the Khojir, Shahroud, Parchin, and Hakimiyeh missile production facilities.[3] Four experts told the *Washington Post* that the damage to these facilities has “most likely halted Iran’s ability to produce short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles until [the] facilities can be rebuilt.”[4] The combined force has inflicted the following specific damage to the Khojir, Shahroud, Parchin, and Hakimiyeh sites:

- **Khojir Military Complex (Tehran Province):** The *Washington Post*, citing satellite imagery from March 24, reported that the combined force has destroyed at least 88 structures at the Khojir Military Complex.[5] ISW-CTP observed reports of strikes on the Khojir Military Complex on March 3.[6] The Khojir complex is a research, development, and manufacturing facility for solid- and liquid-fuel missiles. An analyst at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies assessed on March 6 that the combined force had struck mixing and casting buildings at the Khojir complex.[7] The IDF also confirmed on March 29 that it struck a facility at Khojir that produced unspecified “critical components” for the “assembly and operationalization” of missiles.[8] The IDF noted that the facility was only one of two facilities in Iran that produced such components.[9]
- **Shahroud Military Complex (Semnan Province):** The *Washington Post*, citing satellite imagery, reported that the combined force has damaged or destroyed at least 28 structures at the Shahroud Military Complex.[10] The combined force has struck the Shahroud Military Complex multiple times during the war.[11] An analyst at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies identified on March 7 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had damaged a mixing building, casting building, and “warhead production line” at the facility.[12] The IDF struck buildings at the Shahroud Military Facility during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War that had previously housed planetary mixers.[13] Planetary mixers are essential for producing ballistic missile solid fuel. The IDF previously destroyed 12 Iranian planetary mixers, likely including mixers at Shahroud, during its October 2024 strikes on Iran.[14] Satellite imagery published by the Associated Press in September 2025 showed that Iran had started repairing damaged mixer buildings at Shahroud.[15] An Israeli analyst separately published satellite imagery on March 19 that shows that the combined force struck a launch pad at the Shahroud Military Complex between March 11 and 19.[16]
- **Parchin Military Complex (Tehran Province):** The *Washington Post*, citing satellite imagery from March 12, reported that the combined force has struck 12 structures at the Parchin Military Complex.[17] ISW-CTP has observed numerous reports of strikes on the Parchin Military Complex, including on March 3, March 7, March 12, March 26, and March 28.[18] The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on March 6 that combined force airstrikes caused “significant damage” to solid rocket propellant motor production facilities at Parchin.[19] The combined force also struck the Taleghan 2 site at Parchin on March 12.[20] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[21]
- **Hakimiyeh Military Complex (Tehran Province):** The *Washington Post*, citing satellite imagery from March 14, reported that the combined force has struck 19 structures at the Hakimiyeh Military Complex.[22] The *Washington Post* noted that the Hakimiyeh Military Complex contains facilities that produce liquid propellant and missile launchers.[23] The IDF issued an evacuation warning for the Hakimiyeh Industrial Zone in northwestern Tehran on March 3.[24]

The *Washington Post* also reported that the combined force has struck at least 29 missile launch bases

thus far.[25] The *Washington Post* highlighted damage to the following two bases:

- **Khorgu Missile Base (Hormozgan Province):** The *Washington Post*, citing satellite imagery from March 9, reported that the combined force has destroyed 15 facilities and struck two tunnel entrances at the Khorgu Missile Base.[26] The *Washington Post* assessed that the combined force has struck this base at least twice during the war. Two OSINT accounts previously published satellite imagery from March 18 that showed damage to multiple munition bunkers and multiple support buildings at the Khorgu Missile Base.[27]
- **Imam Ali Missile Base (Lorestan Province):** An imagery analyst at the security intelligence firm Janes told the *Washington Post* that the combined force has struck nine aboveground structures and at least two tunnel entrances at the Imam Ali Missile Base.[28] The combined force has struck the Imam Ali Missile Base several times during the war, including with bunker buster munitions.[29] The Imam Ali Missile Base is home to the IRGC Aerospace Force al Hadid 7th Missile Brigade and al Tawhid 23rd Missile Brigade.[30] The base reportedly stores Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, which have a range of between 800 and 1,300 kilometers.[31] OSINT accounts circulated footage on March 27 of a funeral for an IRGC Aerospace Force commander who reportedly died in combined force airstrikes targeting the Imam Ali Missile Base.[32]

Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials continue to dismiss Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's concerns about Iran's economic conditions amid Iran's war with the United States and Israel. Anti-regime media reported on March 28 that there is a deepening rift between Pezeshkian and IRGC Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi over the regime's actions during the war and the war's mounting economic and social costs, citing unspecified informed sources.[33] Pezeshkian reportedly warned that the IRGC's attacks on regional countries are exacerbating economic damage, cautioning that Iran's economy could collapse within three to four weeks if Iran does not reach a ceasefire with the United States and Israel.[34] This report is consistent with a March 16 report that Pezeshkian voiced concerns over the war's impact on the Iranian economy but that an IRGC official dismissed Pezeshkian's concerns.[35] Pezeshkian has also reportedly demanded "the restoration of executive and managerial authorities" to the government, but Vahidi has rejected this demand, according to the March 28 anti-regime media report.[36] The regime's poor management of the economy, which includes rampant corruption and IRGC control over broad swaths of the economy, has long hurt the Iranian economy and recently triggered the December 2025-January 2026 anti-regime protests.[37] The current conflict will likely further deteriorate Iran's economic conditions.[38] The combined force conducted airstrikes on several Iranian steel factories on March 27 and 28, which an Israeli military correspondent assessed are "expected to cause major damage" to the Iranian economy.[39] The conflict and regime-imposed internet shutdown have also had negative consequences for the private sector.[40] A restaurant owner in Tehran told a BBC Persian reporter on March 28 that "many businesses are completely shut down now." [41] The restaurant owner added that they think they can only keep their business open "for one month maximum." [42] The regime continues to promote the concept of a "resistance economy" without implementing tangible reforms in an attempt to reassure the Iranian population.[43] The regime's emphasis on the "resistance economy" is disconnected from the reality that the Iranian population faces, however.

The Iranian regime appears to be appealing to nationalist sentiments to recruit members of the Iranian population to help the regime maintain internal security.[44] The *Wall Street Journal* reported on March 29 that Iran has launched a recruitment campaign called "Janfada," or "Sacrificing Life," to recruit volunteers to fight US forces in the event of a US ground operation in Iran, citing a text message sent to Iranian mobile users.[45] The name of this campaign suggests that the regime seeks to appeal to nationalist sentiments by calling on Iranians to sacrifice their lives for Iran. The name of the campaign notably echoes a popular Iranian protest slogan, although it is unclear whether the regime

intentionally mirrored the language of this slogan.[46] The *Wall Street Journal* report separately noted that security forces set up checkpoints in Esfahan City and surrounding towns on March 28.[47]

Russia continues to help Iran conduct attacks across the Middle East. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery of US military assets in the region.[48] Zelensky told NBC News that Russian satellites captured images of Prince Sultan Airbase near Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on March 20, 23, and 25.[49] Iran struck the base on March 27, injuring several US service members and damaging aircraft.[50] Zelensky's statement follows reports that Russia has supplied Iran with satellite imagery and Shahed drones since the war began.[51] Zelensky also said that Russia took satellite imagery of the US-UK base in Diego Garcia on March 24 as well as the Incirlik Airbase in Turkey, Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar, and the Shaybah oil and gas field in Saudi Arabia on March 26.[52] Russian efforts to take images of these sites indicate that Russia is helping Iran attack not only US assets but also Turkish and British assets. Iran has attacked all of these sites since the war began.[53]**Iran continues to coerce vessels to comply with its new rules for transiting the Strait of Hormuz.** Pakistani Foreign Affairs Minister Ishaq Dar stated on March 28 that Iran agreed to allow 20 additional Pakistani ships to pass through the strait.[54] He stated that two ships will transit the strait each day. Iran has allowed some Pakistani oil tankers and other vessels to pass safely through an Iranian-approved route around Larak Island.[55] Iran has required some vessels to pay a transit fee.[56] An OSINT analyst assessed on March 28 that IRGC Navy fast attack craft are patrolling the area between Larak Island and Qeshm Island in the Persian Gulf and are likely serving as "toll collectors." [57]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to strike Iranian defense industrial sites. The IDF stated on March 29 that it struck several missile and drone production sites in Tehran.[58] The IDF struck an Iranian Defense Ministry missile engine production site, a drone engine production site, and an air defense system storage and production site.[59] An IDF spokesperson stated on March 29 that the IDF is "days away" from striking all of the IDF's "top priority" defense industrial targets in Iran.[60]

The combined force struck a bulldozer attempting to clear debris at a missile base in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, on March 28.[61] The combined force previously struck the Dezful Missile Base on March 2.[62] Iran is using heavy equipment to try to clear rubble from tunnel entrances that have collapsed due to combined force airstrikes.[63] The combined force has targeted tunnel entrances at underground missile facilities to prevent Iranian forces from being able to access missile launchers in these facilities. CNN analyzed 107 Iranian tunnel entrances on March 21 and found that the combined force had struck 77 percent of the tunnel entrances.[64]

The combined force continued to strike Iranian internal security sites. OSINT accounts reported on March 29 that the combined force struck the IRGC Ground Forces 18th Al Ghadir Independent Brigade base in Yazd City, Yazd Province.[65] The Al Ghadir Brigade operates under the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Yazd, Esfahan, and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari provinces.[66] The combined force struck the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base on March 8.[67]


Anti-regime media reported on March 29 that the combined force struck the "Amir ol Momenin headquarters" in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[68] This report may be referring to the Amir ol Momenin University of Military Sciences and Technologies, which the IRGC founded in 2006.[69]

The combined force struck a building that housed Qatari media outlet Al Araby's office in

Tehran on March 29.[70] It is unclear what the intended target of the strike was. Al Araby stated that the building houses administrative offices.[71]

Several neighborhoods in Karaj, Alborz Province, and Tehran City experienced power outages on March 29.[72] Anti-regime media, citing Iranian media, reported that strikes targeted a power transmission network at the Parchin Military Complex east of Tehran, causing power outages in districts 4, 7, 11, 13, and 14 in eastern Tehran City.[73] OSINT accounts posted footage of airstrikes near Parchin.[74] The combined force has repeatedly struck the Parchin Military Complex since the war began (see topline section).

There are also reports of power outages in Karaj, Alborz Province.[75] An OSINT account reported that airstrikes targeted an IRGC base in the Azimiyeh neighborhood in Karaj that is located near a power distribution post.[76]



The combined force has continued to kill senior Iranian officials. Anti-regime media, citing Iranian media, reported that airstrikes killed the head of research at the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), Ali Fuladvand, in Borujerd, Lorestan Province, on March 28.[77] The SPND played a leading role in Iran's nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[78] The US State Department sanctioned Fuladvand in October 2025 for directing SPND efforts to acquire dual-use technologies that could be used for nuclear weapons development.[79] The IDF reportedly targeted Fuladvand in an airstrike during the 12-Day War in June 2025, but Fuladvand survived the attack, according to anti-regime media.[80]

Iranian Response


Iran has launched seven missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff.[81] Many of these attacks were concentrated around Beersheba in southern Israel. Israeli media reported over 20 missile impacts around Beersheba.[82] Several Israeli military bases are located near Beersheba.[83] An Iranian ballistic missile struck an open area dozens of meters from homes in Beersheba, injuring 11 people.[84] Either another Iranian missile or debris from an intercepted missile struck Israeli-Chinese agrochemicals firm ADAMA's Makhteshim plant in Ne'ot Hovav Industrial town, which is about 13 kilometers from Beersheba, causing a fire that destroyed one building at the plant.[85] Israeli authorities warned people not to enter an 800-meter radius around the plant because the plant houses chemical and industrial facilities.[86] IRGC Aerospace Commander Majid Mousavi stated on March 29 that Iran attacked the chemical plant, among other industrial targets, in retaliation for combined force attacks targeting Iranian industrial sites.[87] An OSINT account separately posted footage of smoke rising near the Turner Stadium in Beersheba following an Iranian missile attack on March 29.[88] A BBC Persian journalist geolocated footage of an explosion in front of a bicycle shop on the Menakhem Begin Highway in Tel Aviv on March 29.[89] It remains unclear whether a missile or debris from a missile interception caused the explosion. Israeli Army Radio separately reported that a cluster munition damaged a home in Savyon in central Israel on March 28.[90]

Iran has responded to combined force airstrikes against Iranian steel factories by targeting aluminum facilities in the Gulf.[91] Iranian drone and missile strikes targeted Emirates Global Aluminum in the UAE and the Alba Aluminum Factory (ALBA) in Bahrain, which are both critical nodes for the regional and global aluminum supply.[92] The Emirates Global Aluminum CEO stated that this company's facility sustained significant damage.[93] ALBA confirmed that two people were lightly injured and that damage assessments are underway following the attack on its facility.[94] Iran's targeting of industrial facilities in the Gulf is part of Iran's ongoing effort to try to impose economic costs on the Gulf states to coerce them to pressure the United States and Israel to halt their campaign against Iran.**Iran continues to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states.** The United Arab Emirates (UAE) intercepted 16 ballistic missiles and 42 drones on March 29.[95] Kuwait's Ministry of Defense reported that it detected 14 missiles and 12 drones in the past 24 hours, bringing the total number of munitions launched at Kuwait during the war to 307 ballistic missiles, 2 cruise missiles, and 616 drones. Iranian strikes injured 10 Kuwaiti military personnel. The strikes also caused material damage to warehouses belonging to a private logistics company.[96] The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted and destroyed 10 drones on March 29.[97] Bahrain has not reported any Iranian drone or missile attacks since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on March 28.

Iranian Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East Between March 28, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and March 29, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 29, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 29, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Kuwaiti Army.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 29, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET



Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 29, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




The Qatari Defense Ministry announced on March 29 that it intercepted an unspecified number of Iranian drones.[98] This marks the second Iranian attack on Qatar since US President Donald Trump warned on Truth Social on March 18 that the United States would “massively blow up the entirety” of the South Pars Gas Field if Iran attacked Qatar again.[99] Trump’s warning came after Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City and damaged Qatari liquefied natural gas facilities on March 18.[100]**The IRGC warned on March 29 that it may target US- and Israeli-linked universities in the Middle East.[101]** This warning follows combined force airstrikes on Iranian universities and research facilities that have ties to Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.[102]


Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 57 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli communities, between 2:00 PM ET on March 28 and 2:00 PM ET on March 29.[103] The majority of Hezbollah’s claimed attacks targeted IDF soldiers, vehicles, and positions in southern Lebanon.[104] Hezbollah claimed that it ambushed IDF forces using two improvised explosive devices, drones, and “light and medium weapons” in the Ghadmatha area near Ainata, Bint Jbeil District.[105] Hezbollah claimed that it directly engaged and launched anti-tank guided missiles and drones at IDF forces advancing near the towns of al Biyyadah and Chama, both in the Tyre District.[106] Hezbollah also continued to launch rockets and drones targeting Israeli communities in northern Israel, including Hanita, Shtula, and Nahariya, which all received

Red Alert warnings around the time of the Hezbollah attacks.[107]




Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and March 28, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 28, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites throughout Lebanon. The IDF struck a Hezbollah weapons storage facility, a rocket launch site, and other unspecified military buildings in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and other areas of Lebanon overnight on March 28 and 29.[108] The IDF issued evacuation warnings for multiple neighborhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs, which are a Hezbollah stronghold.[109] The IDF has repeatedly struck Hezbollah targets in Beirut’s southern suburbs since the start of the conflict.[110]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 29. The IDF reported on March 29 that 146th Reserve Division forces are continuing to advance into southern Lebanon to expand the “security zone” along the Israel-Lebanon border.[111] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the 146th Division is advancing deeper into Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon.[112] The 146th Division has destroyed over 200 Hezbollah targets.[113] The 146th Division has also killed Hezbollah operatives and seized Hezbollah weapons stockpiles in southern Lebanon.[114] The IDF separately said that the 84th (Givati) Brigade (162nd Armored Division) killed a Hezbollah operative who tried to plant an improvised explosive device and fire mortar rounds at 84th Brigade soldiers. The 84th Brigade also seized a weapons cache that contained ATGMs, grenades, and explosives following the unit’s engagement with the Hezbollah operative.[115] The IDF Alpinist Unit, which operates under the 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division), conducted a reconnaissance and intelligence gathering mission to identify Hezbollah infrastructure along the Israel-Lebanon border between the Syrian-controlled section of Mount Hermon and Mount Dov in southern Lebanon.[116]

The IDF announced on March 29 that a Hezbollah rocket attack killed one IDF soldier and

“moderately” injured three other soldiers in southern Lebanon between March 28 and 29.[117] The IDF reported that the killed IDF soldier was a member of the 890th Battalion, 35th Paratroopers Brigade (98th Paratrooper Division (Res.)).[118] The 98th Division is the most recent division to deploy to southern Lebanon.[119] The IDF has deployed six divisions to southern Lebanon as part of its effort to create a “security zone.”[120]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tasked the IDF with expanding the Israeli “security zone” in southern Lebanon on March 29. Israeli operations in Lebanon could last for “at least several months and possibly years,” according to Israeli media.[121] Netanyahu met with Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, and IDF Northern Command commanders at the IDF Northern Command on March 29.[122] Netanyahu announced that he instructed the IDF to expand the “security zone” in Lebanon to eliminate the threat of Hezbollah cross-border incursions and prevent Hezbollah from targeting northern Israeli communities with anti-tank guided missiles.[123] Netanyahu said that he discussed plans with IDF commanders to remove Hezbollah’s “residual ability to launch rockets” at Israel, adding that the plans will “fundamentally change this situation in the north.”[124] An Israeli security official told Israeli media on March 29 that the IDF will continue to operate in Lebanon “for at least several months and possibly years.”[125] Israeli defense officials also told Israeli media that the IDF does not plan to withdraw from Lebanese territory even if Lebanon and Israel reach a ceasefire agreement.[126]

Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani has reportedly refused to leave Lebanon, despite the Lebanese government’s March 24 decision to withdraw Sheibani’s accreditation and demand that Sheibani leave Lebanon. An unspecified diplomatic source told AFP on March 29 that Sheibani has refused to leave Lebanon, reportedly due to Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Hezbollah’s insistence that Sheibani stay in Lebanon.[127] The Lebanese Foreign Ministry withdrew Sheibani’s accreditation and declared him persona non grata on March 24.[128] The Lebanese government had given Sheibani until March 29 to leave Lebanon.[129]**Syrian authorities seized and closed three Hezbollah smuggling tunnels near Hawsh al Sayyid Ali, Homs Province, on March 28 and 29, according to Syrian sources.[130]**A Syrian source reported that Syrian Army units discovered and closed a Hezbollah-linked smuggling tunnel between the Syria-Lebanon border near Hawsh al Sayyid Ali, Homs Province, on March 28.[131] Syrian media reported on March 29 that Syrian Army units discovered two additional Hezbollah smuggling tunnels in the same area.[132] Hezbollah has historically operated smuggling routes into Lebanon using Hawsh al Sayyid Ali as a central hub.[133]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Unspecified actors conducted a drone attack targeting the US Embassy in Baghdad on March 29. Two unspecified security officials told Saudi media that unspecified actors launched two drones targeting the US Embassy in Baghdad.[134] The sources said that US air defenses shot down both drones.[135] The US Embassy has not been attacked since March 17.[136] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah, which previously launched attacks against the US Embassy in Baghdad, announced on March 27 that the group would extend its temporary and conditional suspension of attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad for an additional five days.[137]

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted multiple one-way drone attacks targeting Baghdad International Airport on March 28 and 29.[138] Two Iraqi security sources told Iraqi media on March 28 that two drones attempted to approach the diplomatic support quarters at Baghdad International Airport on March 28 and that another drone targeted the airport on March 29.[139] Air defenses shot down all three drones.[140] The drones caused no damage or casualties.[141] Iranian-

backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly claimed attacks targeting the former US Victory Base located near the airport since the start of the war.[142]

Unspecified actors conducted a drone attack targeting the Baiji Oil Refinery in Salah al Din Province, Iraq, on March 28.[143] A security source told Iraqi media on March 28 that unspecified actors launched a drone that exploded near the Baiji Oil Refinery in Salah al Din Province.[144] The attack did not cause any casualties.[145] The Baiji Oil Refinery is one of Iraq's largest oil refineries.[146]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 28 that it conducted 41 drone and rocket attacks against "enemy" bases in Iraq and the region.[147] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab separately claimed on March 28 that it conducted an unspecified "air attack" targeting "enemy" sites in northern Iraq and Bahrain with "appropriate weapons." [148] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam published footage on March 29 claiming to show the group launching multiple drones targeting unspecified US targets in the region.[149]

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. A security source told Iraqi media that three likely combined force strikes targeted two 14th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) bases in Ninewa Province.[150] The strikes reportedly caused "limited material damage" and no casualties.[151] The 14th PMF Brigade is controlled by Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[152] Another security source reported that the combined force struck a PMF checkpoint in Tuz Khurmatu District, Salah al Din Province.[153]

Syrian Deputy Defense Minister Sipan Hamo announced on March 28 that drones launched from Iraqi territory targeted the Qasrak Military Base in Hasakah Province.[154] Hamo reported that an unspecified actor launched four drones targeting the base but that the base's air defense systems shot down the drones and that there were no casualties.[155] The United States had begun withdrawing forces from the Qasrak Base in late February 2026.[156] The US withdrawal process was expected to take about one month, according to a Syrian military source in late February 2026.[157] The United States later reinforced the position with at least one air defense system on March 11, according to a Syrian source.[158] Syrian and Iraqi sources reported on March 23 that Iraqi militias launched rockets from Rabia, Ninewa Province, targeting the former US Rumaylan Landing Zone Base in Hasakah Province, Syria.[159]

ISW-CTP has not observed any Houthi attacks since its last data cutoff. The lack of attacks is notable because the Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack and a drone and cruise missile attack targeting southern Israel on March 28.[160] These attacks marked the Houthis' first involvement in the war. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the Houthis may be pursuing a relatively cautious approach designed to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.[161]

Other Activity

Lorem

Endnotes

Iran Update Special Report, March 30, 2026



Benjamin Schmida, Ria Reddy, Adham Fattah, Parker Hempel, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: *ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.*

Key Takeaways

1. US President Donald Trump told the *Financial Times* on March 30 that the combined force has struck 13,000 targets since the start of the war on February 28. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated on March 30 that it struck 170 targets over the past day.
2. The IDF stated on March 30 that it has destroyed more than 80 percent of Iran's air defense systems. The IDF continued to expand its air dominance over Iran by striking an air defense site in Mazandaran Province in northern Iran.
3. The combined force continued to target defense industrial sites in Iran. Strikes on defense industrial sites have likely degraded Iran's ability to produce missiles and drones. An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF has struck around 40 defense industrial sites in the past two days.
4. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on March 30 that the United States has destroyed 150 Iranian vessels, including 92 percent of Iran's "largest vessels," since the war began.
5. The Turkish Defense Ministry announced on March 30 that NATO air defense systems intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile that had entered Turkish airspace for the fourth time since the start of the war.
6. Anti-regime media and a Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated journalist reported that Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters have deployed to western Iran.
7. Iran targeted a water desalination plant in Kuwait on March 29 and killed one worker as part of its ongoing drone and missile attack campaign against the Gulf countries.
8. Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 65 attacks targeting Israeli forces and communities in northern

Israel and southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on March 29 and 2:00 PM ET on March 30. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said that Hezbollah has launched 5,000 missiles, rockets, and drones from Lebanon targeting Israel since March 2.

9. The IDF said on March 29 that it intercepted two Houthi drones near Eilat, southern Israel, marking the third time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.

Toplines

The Turkish Defense Ministry announced on March 30 that NATO air defense systems intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile over the eastern Mediterranean Sea that had entered Turkish airspace.[1] This marks the fourth confirmed instance of an Iranian projectile entering Turkish airspace since the war began.[2] Iran has not commented on the attack at the time of this writing, but Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei denied on March 20 that Iran had conducted previous attacks on Turkey, calling them an Israeli "false flag tactic." [3] Iranian Defense Minister Majid Ibn al Reza held a phone call with Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler on March 30 to discuss the ongoing regional conflict, according to Iranian regime media. [4] The officials likely discussed Iran's violation of Turkish airspace. This incident comes after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told NBC News on March 28 that Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery of US and allied military assets in the Middle East, including Incirlik Airbase in Turkey. [5] ISW-CTP previously noted that Russia's provision of satellite imagery to Iran is helping Iran conduct attacks not only on US assets but also against US partners, such as Turkey.

Anti-regime media and a Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated journalist reported that Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters have deployed to western Iran.[6] An Iraqi official speaking to anti-regime media claimed on March 30 that PMF fighters have deployed to Basij bases in Khorramshahr and Abadan in Khuzestan Province. [7] The Basij is a paramilitary force that is responsible for civil defense and social control. [8] The reported PMF deployment is notable given recent Iranian regime efforts to recruit new security force members. [9] The regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots. Large protests took place in both Khorramshahr and Abadan during the December 2025-January 2026 protests. [10] Anti-regime media reported on March 29 that the combined force struck a border crossing checkpoint in Shalamcheh, Khuzestan Province. [11] Anti-regime media previously reported that PMF fighters had entered Iran via the Shalamcheh crossing. [12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Jordanian King Abdullah II in Amman, Jordan, on March 29 to discuss a potential security partnership.[13] This meeting comes after Ukraine signed defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar on March 28.[14] Zelensky expressed Ukraine's willingness to help Jordan defend against missile and drone attacks. [15] Zelensky and King Abdullah II also discussed security issues related to the Strait of Hormuz, noting that Ukraine has experience unblocking maritime trade routes with unmanned surface vessels and is prepared to assist partners. [16] CNN reported on March 30 that Zelensky suggested that Ukrainian sea drones could be deployed in the Strait of Hormuz. [17]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

US President Donald Trump told the *Financial Times* on March 30 that the combined force has struck 13,000 targets since the start of the war on February 28.[18] Trump added that the combined force still has around 3,000 targets left to strike. [19] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) stated on March

30 that it struck 170 targets over the past day.[20] The combined force has struck multiple Iranian military bases, defense industrial sites, and internal security institutions since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff.

An OSINT account reported that the US-Israeli combined force struck the Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on March 29.[21] The account reported seven explosions at the base.[22] The combined force previously struck the 2nd Tactical Airbase around March 3.[23] The IDF also struck the 2nd Tactical Airbase during the 12-Day War in June 2025.[24] An OSINT account noted at the time that the 2nd Tactical Airbase is home to MiG-29 and F-5 aircraft belonging to the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd tactical fighter squadrons.[25]

An OSINT account reported that the combined force struck two missile bases near Shiraz, Fars Province, on March 30, including a base that Iran has used to launch missiles at Israel in previous rounds of conflict.[26] One of the bases that the combined force struck on March 30 is the Shiraz South Missile Base.[27] The combined force has previously struck this base during the war. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 7 showed that the combined force had used ground-penetrating munitions to target underground facilities at the Shiraz South Missile Base.[28] The Shiraz South Missile Base is one of Iran's 25 primary bases for launching medium-range ballistic missiles.[29]

The combined force continued to suppress Iranian air defenses. The IDF stated on March 30 that it has destroyed more than 80 percent of Iran's air defense systems.[30] The IDF struck an Iranian air defense site in Nowshahr, Mazandaran Province.[31] The air defense site is located near the Caspian Sea. The IDF previously targeted "dozens of vessels" at the 4th Artesh Naval District Headquarters at Bandar Anzali Port, Gilan Province, on the Caspian Sea coast on March 18.[32] Anti-regime media reported explosions in Amol, Chalus, Babol, Nur, and Babolsar in Mazandaran Province on March 30.[33]

The combined force continued to strike internal security sites in western Iran. The IDF stated on March 30 that it struck Basij bases in Dehgolan and Divandarreh, Kurdistan Province.[34] The IDF also stated that it struck Law Enforcement Command (LEC) buildings in Sanandaj and Saghez, Kurdistan Province.[35] Iranian security forces suppressed protests in Dehgolan and Sanandaj in January 2026.[36]

The combined force continued to target defense industrial sites in Iran. Strikes on these sites have likely degraded Iran's ability to produce missiles and drones. An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF has struck around 40 defense industrial sites in the past two days.[37] The combined force has targeted the following defense industrial sites since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff:


- **IRGC Ballistic Missile Research Complex (Tehran Province).**[38] The IDF struck a site that produces ballistic missiles and satellite launchers. The site is located near the Khojir Missile Complex, which the combined force has struck multiple times since the start of the war.[39]
- **Artesh Air Defense Force Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (Tehran Province).**[40] The IDF struck a site that produces "essential components" for ballistic missiles. The Artesh Air Defense Force established this organization to conduct military research and development as well as maintain aircraft and defense systems.
- **Parchin Military Complex (Tehran Province).**[41] The IDF struck a weapons research, development, and production site at Parchin.[42] Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries, which operates under the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), oversees the facility.[43] The United States sanctioned Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries in April 2009 for its involvement in Iran's nuclear program, including the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.[44] The *Washington Post*, citing satellite imagery from March 12, reported that the combined force had struck 12

structures at Parchin.[45]

- **Saba Battery Factory (Tehran Province).** Anti-regime media posted footage on March 30 of damage to the Saba Battery warehouse in Tehran.[46] Geolocated satellite imagery indicates that strikes between February 28 and March 17 targeted the factory, which is located in Pasargad Industrial Town.[47] The Saba Battery company is a subsidiary of the DIO. Several countries have sanctioned the company for producing power units, including missile systems, for the Iranian Armed Forces.[48]
- **Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO) (Tehran Province).[49]** The Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) oversees the IAIO.[50] The European Union sanctioned IAIO in July 2010 for its involvement in Iran’s nuclear program, including the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.[51] An OSINT account previously reported strikes on IAIO on March 7.[52] There are several other defense industrial sites located near IAIO, including the Design and Manufacturing of Aircraft Engines (DAMA).[53] Several countries have sanctioned DAMA for its ties to the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA).[54] The combined force previously struck HESA in Esfahan Province between March 1 and 2, according to commercially available satellite imagery. HESA manufactures Ababil- and Shahed-series drones for the IRGC.[55]
- **Long-range anti-aircraft missile assembly site (Ghazvin Province).[56]** The IDF struck the site as part of its ongoing effort to degrade Iran’s air defense capabilities.

The IDF also conducted a series of strikes on facilities at Imam Hossein University in Tehran.[57] Imam Hossein University serves as the IRGC’s primary military institution and has conducted extensive weapons research. The IDF struck the following sites at the university:

- **Wind tunnels.[58]** Wind tunnels are used to test the aerodynamic properties of missiles at an early stage in their development.
- **Imam Hossein Chemistry Center.[59]** This center conducts chemical weapons research and development.
- **Technology and Engineering Center of the Mechanics Group and Development.[60]** This center develops weapons, including ballistic missiles.
- **Physics Center.[61]** This center is involved in Iran’s nuclear program.




The combined force likely struck an oil refinery in northwestern Iran and may have struck another refinery in western Iran. The head of the East Azerbaijan Province Crisis Management Directorate stated that combined force airstrikes targeted a petrochemical facility in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on March 30.[62] OSINT accounts and anti-regime media circulated footage of a large explosion at the Tabriz Oil Refinery.[63] Anti-regime media also published footage of explosions in the vicinity of the Abadan Oil Refinery in Khuzestan Province on March 30.[64] Neither US Central Command (CENTCOM) nor the IDF has confirmed either strike at the time of this writing.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed on March 29 that IDF airstrikes on March 27 targeting the Arak Heavy Water Reactor Facility in Khondab, Markazi Province, caused significant damage and rendered the facility inoperable.[65]

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on March 30 that the United States has destroyed 150 Iranian vessels, including 92 percent of Iran's "largest vessels," since the war began.[66] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine previously stated on March 19 that CENTCOM had destroyed 44 Iranian mine-laying vessels.[67] Iranian media reported that four vessels were struck in Bandar Lengeh, Hormozgan Province, on March 30.[68] The IRGC Navy 5th District is headquartered near Bandar Lengeh.[69]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 29, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and March 30, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that two unspecified projectiles landed near a vessel in the Persian Gulf approximately 22 nautical miles northeast of Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, on March 30.[70] The vessel reported that the projectiles landed within one hour of each other. It is unclear what the projectiles were targeting. The projectiles may have been targeting Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Defense Ministry announced that it intercepted seven drones and eight ballistic missiles on March 30.[71] The incident did not injure any crew members aboard the vessel.[72]


Iranian Response

Iran targeted a water desalination plant in Kuwait on March 29 as part of its ongoing drone and missile attack campaign against the Gulf countries.[73] The Kuwaiti Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy Ministry confirmed that an Iranian strike damaged a service building at one of the

ministry’s power and water desalination facilities on March 29, killing one worker.[74] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces stated on March 30 that 13 drones entered Kuwaiti airspace in the past 24 hours.[75]

The Bahraini Defense Ministry announced that it intercepted seven drones and eight missiles launched from Iran on March 30.[76] The United Arab Emirates Defense Ministry reported that its air defenses intercepted 27 Iranian drones and 11 ballistic missiles.[77] Saudi Arabia’s defense ministry confirmed that it intercepted seven Iranian drones and eight missiles.[78] The Qatari Defense Ministry announced that it intercepted an unspecified number of Iranian drones on March 30.[79]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 30, 2026




Kuwait did not announce attacks on February 28, March 2-5, and March 11. Kuwait did announce 283 ballistic missile attacks and 93 drone attacks on March 1, but it is unclear how many of these attacks took place on March 1 and how many took place on February 28

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Kuwaiti Army.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 30, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 30, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 30, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.



Iranian and Axis Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East Between March 29, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and March 30, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET




Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 65 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli communities, between 2:00 PM ET on March 29 and 2:00 PM ET on March 30.[80] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said that Hezbollah has launched 5,000 missiles, rockets, and drones from Lebanon targeting Israel since March 2.[81] Most of Hezbollah's attacks on March 29 and 30 targeted IDF forces in southern Lebanon.[82] Hezbollah claimed that it launched a rocket attack targeting the IDF's Gilot Base near Tel Aviv, which is the headquarters of the IDF's military intelligence Unit 8200.[83] Hezbollah recently claimed that it targeted the Gilot Base on March 7 and previously targeted the base in 2024.[84] Hezbollah claimed on March 30 that it used an improvised explosive device (IED) to ambush IDF personnel who were advancing on the road to Aitaroun toward the town of Ainata, Bint Jbeil District.[85] The "anti-personnel explosive

device” that Hezbollah claimed it employed was likely a type of improvised explosive device.[86] Hezbollah has previously claimed IED attacks against the IDF, but has not previously specified its use of “anti-personnel” IEDs.[87] Hezbollah separately claimed that it engaged IDF forces in Deir Seryan and Qantara, Marjaayoun District, with rockets and drones on March 29.[88] Hezbollah also claimed that it struck two IDF Merkava tanks with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) in Qouzah, Bint Jbeil District, on March 29.[89]


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and March 29, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 29, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



Unspecified actors struck the Bazan Oil Refinery in Haifa, northern Israel, on March 30.[90] It is unclear whether Hezbollah rocket fire or an Iranian ballistic missile struck the facility. The Times of Israel reported that the Bazan Oil Refinery caught on fire following Iranian ballistic missile attacks and Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel.[91] The Times of Israel added that it is unclear whether the refinery was directly hit by a projectile or by shrapnel from an interception.[92] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted IDF air defense positions in Haifa on March 29 and the Haifa naval base on March 30, which is adjacent to the Bazan Oil Refinery.[93] The Jerusalem Post reported that an Iranian ballistic missile strike caused the fire, however.[94] Iran previously targeted the Bazan Oil Refinery in Haifa on March 19, as well as during the 12-Day War.[95]

The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites and personnel throughout Lebanon. The IDF reported on March 30 that it killed Hamza Ibrahim Rakin, who was the deputy commander of Hezbollah's Unit 1800 in Beirut.[96] Unit 1800 is a Hezbollah unit responsible for coordinating between Hezbollah and Palestinian militias to carry out attacks against Israel.[97] The IDF said that the strike also killed the Unit 1800 operations officer and another Hezbollah member.[98] The IDF also said that it has destroyed over 100 Hezbollah-affiliated high-rise buildings in Beirut.[99] The IDF said that Hezbollah used these buildings as command-and-control centers and to plan attacks against Israel.[100] The IDF released new evacuation notices for Beirut's southern suburbs as well as towns in the Bekaa Valley, including Yohmor, Sohmor, Dlafi, and Libbaya, Zellaya, and Qellaya.[101] Only ten percent of IDF strikes have targeted Hezbollah sites in the Bekaa Valley since the conflict began, according to an Israeli think tank.[102]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 29. The IDF's

401st Brigade located a Hezbollah weapons cache and destroyed a number of ATGMs in southern Lebanon.[103] The IDF 401st Armored Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[104]

The IDF announced on March 30 that Hezbollah killed one IDF soldier and wounded five others in southern Lebanon on March 29 and 30.[105] The IDF said that Hezbollah ATGM fire struck an IDF 9th Division tank, which killed one IDF soldier and seriously wounded another in southern Lebanon.[106] The IDF separately said that a Hezbollah drone strike seriously injured one IDF soldier and moderately injured two others in southern Lebanon.[107] Hezbollah has killed six IDF soldiers since the start of the war, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[108]

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) said that unspecified actors killed three UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on March 29 and 30.[109] UNIFIL reported on March 29 that unspecified actors launched a projectile at a UNIFIL position, killing one peacekeeper and injuring another near Aadchit El Qoussair, Marjaayoun District.[110] UNIFIL reported on March 30 that an unspecified actor separately struck a UNIFIL vehicle, killing two UNIFIL peacekeepers and injuring two other peacekeepers, near Bani Hayyan, Marjaayoun District.[111] UNIFIL reported that six peacekeepers have been killed in Lebanon in 2026.[112]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting Israel on March 29. The IDF said on March 29 that it intercepted two Houthi drones near Eilat, southern Israel.[113] This attack marks the third time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[114] The Houthis have not claimed the drone attack at the time of this writing.

IRGC advisers reportedly recently arrived in Houthi-controlled Saana, Yemen, to coordinate Houthi activities with Iran.[115] An unspecified journalist in Yemen told Israeli media on March 29 that “additional IRGC experts” recently arrived in Sanaa to strengthen coordination between the Houthis and Iran.[116]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to target Baghdad International Airport on March 29 and 30. A likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone struck the logistics support headquarters at Baghdad International Airport on March 29.[117] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also fired rockets at Baghdad International Airport and the nearby diplomatic support headquarters on March 30.[118] A security source told Iraqi media that the rockets were launched from Rusafa, eastern Baghdad.[119] Iraqi security forces found three rocket launch platforms in Rusafa following the attack.[120] The attack didn’t cause any injuries. These attacks coincided with likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab’s March 29 claim that it launched rockets targeting unspecified “Zionist-American” interests in Iraq.[121]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also likely conducted a rocket attack that destroyed an Iraqi Air Force transport aircraft at the Mohammad Alaa Airbase, which is co-located with Baghdad International Airport.[122] Iraqi media reported on March 30 that a rocket attack damaged an Iraqi Air Force Antonov An-32B transport aircraft belonging to the 23rd Squadron at the Mohammad Alaa Airbase.[123] Geolocated footage from March 30 shows the aircraft burning following the strike.[124] A security source told Iraqi media on March 30 that the damage caused by the strike rendered the aircraft inoperable.[125] The Iraqi Defense Ministry condemned the attack and said that it will deliver a “firm response” to the perpetrators on March 30.[126] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack on the aircraft at the time of this writing. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-

backed Iraqi militias, condemned rocket attacks targeting sites "within the city of Baghdad" on March 30, however.[127] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq said that rocket attacks in Baghdad endanger the lives of innocent civilians.[128] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq reiterated that the presence of US forces in Baghdad constitutes a major threat to its residents and added that the Iraqi government must work to expel US forces from Baghdad, however.[129]

Unspecified actors conducted a drone attack targeting Iraq's Balad Airbase on March 29.[130] Iraqi media reported that Iraqi air defenses at the Balad Airbase in Salah al Din Province intercepted a drone on March 29.[131] This attack marks the third attempted drone attack targeting the Balad Airbase since the war began.[132] No group has claimed responsibility for these attacks at the time of this writing.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on March 29 that it conducted 21 drone attacks against "enemy" bases in Iraq and the region.[133] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed on March 29 that it conducted eight attacks targeting US bases in the region.[134]

An IRGC-affiliated militia called Kataib Jund al Karar claimed that it attacked US forces in Jordan and Syria on March 29.[135] Kataib Jund al Karar was formed in January 2026 to confront the new Syrian government and reportedly has ties to Kataib Hezbollah.[136] Kataib Jund al Karar said that it struck Muwaffaq al Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan, with a drone.[137] Jordanian media has not reported an attack on the Muwaffaq al Salti Airbase at the time of this writing, however. Kataib Jund al Karar separately claimed that it targeted US forces at the Palmyra Airbase in the central Syrian desert with rockets on March 29, even though there are no US forces stationed at the Palmyra Airbase and the base is controlled by the Syrian army.[138] A Syrian source said that residents in Palmyra did not report any explosions near the base.[139] The Syrian source added that none of Kataib Jund al Karar's claims have been verified and that several of the group's claims appear to be fake.[140]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/2038622257405129116?s=20>

[2]

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-nato-defences-downed-fourth-inbound-iranian-missile-2026-03-30/>

[3] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-20-2026/>;
<https://www.tasnimnews.ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/>

[4] https://t.me/defapress_ir/54140

[5]

https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/russia-us-base-american-troops-zelenskyy-rcna265612?cid=eml_nbn_20260328&user_email=66b6883228ff200252c6ddc5125f1f647e464a0b8574c7dda8af0dd3fcbc7086&utm_campaign=breakingnews&utm_medium=Email%20Sailthru&utm_source=H4sIAAAAAAAAAAzWP3WrDMAyFnya7S%2BvaiRMGZYyNvoaRbbkx8R9yQugu9uxzLgYC6RyHT9KybaW%2BX69Jm4RHvUApl%2BDTehXlo%2BODKHdUFXzYFtrfmpHJP3

2CoHYK9%2BUc7sRnxx8tjuO4%2FGNMjqeTKdiW95XAJ2wV7bV66Pfaa6jYQ0TyBIK%2FUc6I9j8YMNX19erJJO
ByIDfeiYfxthPfGINKOinOuGSCzx2Xe0VSGNt9rS%2BllvMsOj%2Bd44zxkRtprRlvfHQ3J4cJBzkA0%2FM4DWay
FmZwzFrhjdYtm%2BXJ26lyEAv4Z2pETQirT8%2FzpbdfQodETSpN%2BWib718L5Yh%2F3vVV2kMBAAA%3D
; <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-29-2026/>;
<https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2037955484100051196>

[6] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038637015466455218?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2038685830156353998>

[7] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038637015466455218?s=20>

[8] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces>

[9] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603265637>

[10] <https://x.com/bbcpersian/status/2008921332285665553> ;

<https://x.com/Savakzadeh/status/2007602215738118201?s=20>

[11] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038334232284549277?s=20>

[12] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038334232284549277?s=20>

[13] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2038318499550957766?s=20>;

[14]
<https://www.euronews.com/2026/03/30/what-are-ukraines-new-gulf-defence-deals-here-is-what-zelenskyy-signed>;

<https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20260330-zelensky-hails-historic-defence-agreements-with-gulf-states>

[15] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2038318499550957766?s=2>

[16] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18471

[17]
<https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/30/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump?post-id=cmdnd27d260000396w331yn34i>

[18] <https://www.ft.com/content/3bd9fb6c-2985-4d24-b86b-23b7884031f5?syn-25a6b1a6=1>

[19] <https://www.ft.com/content/3bd9fb6c-2985-4d24-b86b-23b7884031f5?syn-25a6b1a6=1>

[20] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/air-force-struck-iranian-arms-production-sites-security-hqs-over-past-day/

[21] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2038351547680117211

[22] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2038351547680117211

[23] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-3-2026>

[24]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-14-2025-evening-edition/>

[25] <https://theaviationist.com/2025/06/13/israel-attack-iran-details/> ;

<https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1933462217233739953?>

[26] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2038552296297058473?s=20> ;

https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2038549505373553106 ; <https://israel-alma.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps-Aerospace-Force-IRGC-ASF.pdf>

[27] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2030061048750108912 ;

<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026-69ae4679967f0>

[28]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/>

[29]
<https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/satellite-images-show-iran-repairing-fortifying-sites-amid-us-tensions-2026-02-18/>

[30] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038638476329886178?s=20>

- [31] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2038626815489593571> ;
https://www.google.com/maps/place/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87+%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C+%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1+%D8%AA%D9%BE%D9%87%E2%80%AD/@36.5897024,51.6024617,17.59z/data=!4m12!1m5!3m4!2zMzbCsDM1JzlyLjkiTiA1McKwMzYnMTUuMijF!8m2!3d36.5897!4d51.6042204!3m5!1s0x3f8e95ba35e3b939:0xba322e274b78e6e1!8m2!3d36.5895928!4d51.6042158!16s%2Fg%2F11fmy00295!5m1!1e1?entry=tту&g_ep=EgoyMDI2MDMyNC4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D
- [32] <https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2034633053776097504?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2034633086281949237?s=20>
- [33] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038481002322894993?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038580131438944721?s=20>
- [34] <https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2038662483552935995> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038660026726805616>
- [35] <https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2038662483552935995> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038660026726805616>
- [36] <https://x.com/HengawO/status/2009297482467901541?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2009318179592655100>
- [37] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038516147553742953>
- [38] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038342264804545014>
- [39] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-29-2026>
- [40] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038342264804545014>
- [41] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038342264804545014>
- [42] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038342264804545014>
- [43] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-sayyad-shirazi-industries>
- [44] <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20090407> ;
<https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-sayyad-shirazi-industries>
- [45] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/29/iran-ballistic-missile-sites/>
- [46] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038527887431627199?s=20>
- [47] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2033999504832135526> ;
<https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.547137&lon=51.107326&z=15&m=w&search=35.55081%2C%2051.11313>
- [48] <https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-nNiyvbbL2UDAKSUEX3mfR3/>
- [49] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038342264804545014> ;
<https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.705890&lon=51.296282&z=15&m=w&show=/34360266/Iran-Air-Industry-Organization-I-A-I-O-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86&search=35.7060612%0951.28726>
- [50] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-aviation-industries-organization-iaio>
- [51] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-aviation-industries-organization-iaio>
- [52] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030359675724574768>
- [53] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/aero-engines-design-manufacturing-company>
- [54] <https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-Ue3LEDP3YKz4hDcTm8Waok/>
- [55] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1745>
- [56] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038515068795502822?s=20>
- [57] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2038580514618036562?s=20>
- [58] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2038580514618036562?s=20>
- [59] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2038580514618036562?s=20>
- [60] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2038580514618036562?s=20>
- [61] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2038580514618036562?s=20>

- [62] <https://donya-e-eqtesad dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/4261289-%D9%BE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA>
- [63] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2038373517251535218?s=20;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038532656716042490?s=20>
- [64] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038508506794348827?s=20;>
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038511711368437771?s=20>
- [65] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2038339917424832954?s=20>
- [66] <https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c8jke9v9xv9t?post=asset%3Ad1cf8900-52a3-4ed8-a02a-46d3f67c3c1f#post>
- [67] <https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4438625/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da/>
- [68] <https://t.me/mehrnews/366071>
- [69] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
- [70] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2038629976870641682?s=20
- [71] [https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038489617389826112?s=20 ;](https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038489617389826112?s=20)
[https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038603484770062818?s=20 ;](https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038603484770062818?s=20)
[https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038756709749899337?s=20 ;](https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038756709749899337?s=20)
[https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038755260362080276?s=20 ;](https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038755260362080276?s=20)
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038750460492783809?s=20>
- [72] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2038647590061834281?s=20
- [73] https://x.com/kuna_en/status/2038409572453425317?s=20
- [74] https://x.com/kuna_en/status/2038409572453425317?s=20
- [75] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2038628736212291918?s=20>
- [76] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2038536898423971961?s=20;
https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2038261660922577160?s=20
- [77] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2038574314078044418?s=20>
- [78] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038489617389826112?s=20;>
[https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038603484770062818?s=20;](https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038603484770062818?s=20)
[https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038750460492783809s=20;](https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038750460492783809s=20)
[https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038755260362080276s=20;](https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038755260362080276s=20)
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038756709749899337?s=20>
- [79] https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2038630932631232593?s=20
- [80] Data Available Upon Request
- [81] <https://x.com/gidonsaar/status/2038505640646123712>
- [82] Data Available Upon Request
- [83] <https://t.me/mmirleb/136231> ; <https://greydynamics.com/unit-8200-israels-information-warfare-unit/>
- [84] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10477> ; <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hezbollah-thought-to-have-targeted-mossad-hq-near-tel-aviv-in-mostly-foiled-barrage/>
- [85] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13664>
- [86] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13664>

- [87] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-29-2026/> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/13480>
- [88] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13543> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13589> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13587> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/13649> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13639>
- [89] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13562>
- [90] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/footage-aired-on-tv-shows-flames-at-haifa-oil-refinery-after-iranian-hezbollah-missile-attack/
- [91] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/footage-aired-on-tv-shows-flames-at-haifa-oil-refinery-after-iranian-hezbollah-missile-attack/
- [92] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/footage-aired-on-tv-shows-flames-at-haifa-oil-refinery-after-iranian-hezbollah-missile-attack/
- [93] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13625> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13608>
- [94] <https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-891624>
- [95] <https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-890480;>
<https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c93ydeqyq71t?post=asset%3Ac7ea3d5f-aed8-49a4-8df5-f3ce98ecadd#post>
- [96] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038654722140229679> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038654817820696919?s=20>
- [97] <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/hezbollahs-virtual-entrepreneurs-hezbollah-using-internet-incite-violence-israel/>
- [98] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038654722140229679> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038654817820696919?s=20>
- [99] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038652727362728428?sort_replies=likes
- [100] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038652727362728428?sort_replies=likes
- [101] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038666728800952570> ;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038486161455202434?s=20>
- [102] <https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollah-strategic-depth-in-the-bekaa-valley-an-operational-and-logistical-center-of-gravity/>
- [103] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038558625342378030>
- [104] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-24-2026/>
- [105] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038551686340321730> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038501545877065884>
- [106] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038551686340321730>
- [107] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038501545877065884>
- [108] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038551686340321730>
- [109] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/2038376112661676250 ;
https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/2038655439785640228
- [110] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/2038376112661676250
- [111] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/2038655439785640228
- [112] <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>
- [113] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038468746398888338>
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038381168307867899>
- [114] <https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2038417361154228228> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-28-2026/>
- [115] <https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/03/29/saudi-payments-houthi-war-entry-irgc-yemen/>
- [116] <https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/03/29/saudi-payments-houthi-war-entry-irgc-yemen/>
- [117] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/0-أمن/سقوط-مسيرة-جديدة-في-محيط-مطار-بغداد-الدولي>

118]]

<https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A9->

<https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF>

[119] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/دوي-سلسلة-انفجارات-في-جانب-الكرخ-ببغداد

[120] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/ضبط-منصات-صواريخ-استهدفت-مطار-ببغداد-شرفي-العاصمة

[121] https://t.me/Jaysh_AlGhadab/178

[122] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/تضرر-طائرة-للقوة-الجوية-العراقية-وخروجها-عن-الخدمة-ثر-قصف-مطار-ببغداد

[123] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/تضرر-طائرة-للقوة-الجوية-العراقية-وخروجها-عن-الخدمة-ثر-قصف-مطار-ببغداد

; https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2038418303270408519

[124] https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2038420097031610569 ;

https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2038418303270408519 ;

https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2038416971432071248

[125] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/تضرر-طائرة-للقوة-الجوية-العراقية-وخروجها-عن-الخدمة-ثر-قصف-مطار-ببغداد

[126] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/الدفاع-العراقية-تتوعد-ب-رد-حازم-بعد-تضرر-حدي-مقاتلاتها-جرا-هجوم-صاروخي

[127] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1614>

[128] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1614>

[129] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1614>

[130] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/سقاط-مسيرة-حاولت-استهداف-قاعدة-بلد-الجوية-في-صلاح-الدين-4

[131] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/سقاط-مسيرة-حاولت-استهداف-قاعدة-بلد-الجوية-في-صلاح-الدين-4

[132] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> ; أمن/سقاط-مسيرة-حاولت-استهداف-قاعدة-بلد-الجوية-في-صلاح-الدين

<https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> ; أمن/سقاط-مسيرة-حاولت-استهداف-قاعدة-بلد-الجوية-في-صلاح-الدين-4

<https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF> أمن/سقاط-مسيرة-حاولت-استهداف-قاعدة-بلد-الجوية-في-صلاح-الدين-4

[133] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1612>

[134] <https://t.me/awlialdm/329>

[135] <https://x.com/PhillipSmyth/status/2038407867078676655?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2038656498297893083> ;

https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2038614861278597362?s=20

[136] <https://x.com/PhillipSmyth/status/2038407867078676655?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2034996431652602035>

[137] <https://x.com/PhillipSmyth/status/2038407867078676655?s=20>

[138] <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2038656498297893083> ;

https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2038614861278597362?s=20

[139] <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2038656498297893083>

[140] <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2038656498297893083>

Iran Update Special Report, March 31, 2026



Katherine Wells, Benjamin Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Nidal Morrison, Ria Reddy, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. The combined force campaign targeting Iranian commanders is likely impeding their ability to conduct sizable and coordinated attacks. Officials familiar with US and Western intelligence assessments speaking to *The New York Times* on March 30 said that the deaths of local Iranian commanders have degraded the ability of local Iranian commanders to communicate to launch large and coordinated attacks. The targeted killing of local commanders has immediate practical effects by removing key commanders who give orders. Decapitation also creates a pervasive fear that can cause targeted commanders to take precautions to survive that impede their ability to execute their assigned mission.
2. Iran launched only three missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff, marking its lowest barrage rate of the war to date. These salvos also contain only a small number of missiles, which may be a byproduct of Iranian command-and-control challenges highlighted previously. Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20.
3. The Iranian Parliament National Security Commission passed a bill on March 30 titled the "Strait of Hormuz Management Plan," which outlines a series of policies that assert that Iran has sovereignty over international waterways in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's parliament has little real power but its decision to pass this bill represents a desire in Tehran to continue to impede international shipping around the Strait after the war. Iran could use these threats to coerce concessions from the United States or its partners or deter them.
4. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah almost certainly executed the kidnapping of US freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson in Baghdad City, Iraq, on March 31.
5. Hezbollah conducted four first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against IDF armored vehicles in southern Lebanon on March 31. None of the IDF's armored vehicles that Hezbollah struck with FPV

drones appeared to be equipped with improvised top-mounted slat armor to protect the vehicles against FPV drone attacks or anti-tank munitions.

Toplines


The combined force campaign targeting Iranian commanders is likely impeding their ability to conduct sizable and coordinated attacks. Officials familiar with US and Western intelligence assessments speaking to *The New York Times* on March 30 said that the deaths of local Iranian commanders have degraded the ability of local Iranian commanders to communicate to launch large and coordinated attacks.[1] The targeted killing of local commanders has immediate practical effects by removing key commanders who give orders. Decapitation also creates a pervasive fear that can cause targeted commanders to take precautions to survive that impede their ability to execute their assigned mission.[2] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 31 that combined force airstrikes have degraded the Iranian military's morale and even led to "widespread desertions, key personnel shortages and causing frustrations amongst senior leaders." [3] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are evidently facing recruitment struggles as they lowered the recruitment age to 12 to support patrols, checkpoints, and logistics.[4]

Iran launched only three missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on March 30, marking its lowest barrage rate of the war to date.[5] These salvos also contain only a small number of missiles, which may be a byproduct of Iranian command-and-control challenges highlighted previously. Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20.[6] The three waves only consisted of one missile in two of the waves and a "small" number of missiles in the third wave.[7] Smaller salvos are relatively easier for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)'s air defense systems to intercept, as demonstrated by their performance against small Houthi salvos between 2023 and 2025.[8] Iran has only been launching one missile per salvo and three to seven salvos per day at Israel for the past four days.[9] This is considerably less compared to what Iran fired at the start of the war.[10] The IDF also assessed that Iran's missile fire targeting Israel has slowed to around 10-15 missiles a day over the past two weeks.[11] The low salvo and missile-per-salvo rate targeting Israel does not necessarily imply Iran is suffering the same challenges when it comes to its short-range ballistic missiles that target the Gulf states, though March 31 saw a lower number of missiles targeting the Gulf states than the average.[12] Hegseth separately confirmed on March 31 that Iran launched its lowest number of missiles and drones in general in the past 24 hours.[13]

The combined force's extensive airstrikes targeting Iranian missile bases and production sites have also degraded Iran's ability to launch missile strikes against Israel. CTP-ISW recorded that the combined force has struck over 20 missile bases since the start of the war.[14] The *Washington Post* on March 29 identified "severe damage" on satellite imagery to Iran's four major missile production sites, including Khojir, Shahrud, Parchin, and Hakimiyeh.[15] The IDF announced on March 31 that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has struck 70 percent of Iran's defense industrial sites, which are essential to reconstituting Iran's missile capabilities.[16]

Iranian and Axis Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East


Between March 30, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and March 31, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Iran is asserting sovereignty over international waterways by demanding payment from ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Parliament National Security Commission passed a bill on March 30 titled the "Strait of Hormuz Management Plan," which outlines a series of policies that assert that Iran has sovereignty over international waterways in the Strait of Hormuz.[17] The plan forces other countries to negotiate with Iran for safe passage through the strait and for some vessels to pay to transit through the strait, which is an international waterway. It also bans US and Israeli shipping or any ships from countries that sanction Iran.

Iran's parliament has little real power but its decision to pass this bill represents a desire in Tehran to continue to impede international shipping around the Strait after the war. Senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have warned in recent weeks that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz "won't return to its pre-war status" following the war.[18] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Mokhber stated on March 19 that Iran can use its position

along the strait to “sanction [the West] and prevent their ships from passing through this waterway” even after the war ends.[19] Daily oil exports from the Middle East have fallen by at least 60 percent since the start of the war.[20] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has received 25 reports of attacks or incidents affecting civilian vessels transiting the strait since the war began.[21] Efforts to impede shipping around the strait could take a number of forms and would include efforts to threaten, disrupt, and selectively control traffic through the strait at any time or for any reason. Iran could use these threats to coerce concessions from the United States or its partners or deter them. Iran may be especially incentivized to leverage its control around the strait if it concludes that such actions are an effective means of coercing the United States and its partners. **Iran has continued attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf.** An Iranian drone struck the Kuwaiti oil tanker *al Salmi* northwest of Dubai on March 30.[22] The attack did not injure any crew members aboard the vessel. This oil tanker is the first vessel that Iran has struck since March 18.[23] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy inaccurately claimed that it targeted the Singaporean-flagged *Haiphong Express*, which it probably mistook for the *al Salmi*.[24]



Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah almost certainly executed the kidnapping of US freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson in Baghdad City, Iraq, on March 31.[25] The US government had reportedly warned Kittleson that Kataib Hezbollah planned to kidnap her, according to one source familiar with the warning speaking to CNN.[26] The Iraqi Interior Ministry stated on March 31 that they arrested one Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated suspect.[27]

Hezbollah conducted four first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against IDF armored vehicles in southern Lebanon on March 31.[28] Hezbollah claimed that it struck an IDF Merkava Tank at an IDF position in Ainata, southern Lebanon, on March 31.[29] Hezbollah later released a video on March 31 showing three FPV drone strikes on IDF armored vehicles in Biyyadah, Tyre District.[30] The first FPV drone strike targeted an IDF armored personnel carrier (APC).[31] The Hezbollah video appears to show an FPV drone targeting the APC's tracks, likely to immobilize the APC.[32] The second FPV drone strike targeted an IDF HMMWV (Humvee).[33] The Hezbollah video appears to show an FPV drone targeting the HMMWV's roof.[34] The third FPV drone strike targeted a separate IDF APC near the HMMWV. Hezbollah video shows an FPV drone targeting the APC's frontal armor, but at the beginning of the video, the HMMWV that was previously struck is visible burning nearby, which indicates Hezbollah launched at least the second and third FPV strikes consecutively.[35] Hezbollah used an FPV drone to strike an IDF Merkava Tank in southern Lebanon for the first time on March 26.[36] None of the IDF's armored vehicles that Hezbollah struck with FPV drones appeared to be equipped with improvised top-mounted slat armor to protect the vehicles against FPV drone attacks or anti-tank munitions. The IDF previously deployed some vehicles equipped with top-mounted slat armor in Gaza in 2023.[37]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to target missile sites and facilities in Iran. Strikes on these sites have likely degraded Iran's ability to produce missiles. The combined force has targeted the following missile sites and munition depots since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff:

- **Esfahan munitions depot in Esfahan Province.**[38] US President Donald Trump shared footage on Truth Social showing multiple explosions illuminating the night sky in Esfahan City.[39] An unspecified US official told *The Wall Street Journal* on March 31 that US forces used a high volume of bunker-buster munitions, indicating an effort to target hardened infrastructure.[40] The IDF said on March 20 that it has seen more Iranian ballistic missile launches from central Iran, including Esfahan, after combined force strikes degraded Iran's launch capabilities in western Iran.[41]
- **Parchin Military Complex in eastern Tehran Province.**[42] The IDF struck a warhead casting factory and a missile components research, development, and production site in Parchin.[43] The complex is controlled by the Defense Industries Organization and is used to produce advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.[44] Multiple reports indicate that Iranian activities at Parchin are also relevant to nuclear weapons development.[45]
- **Khojir missile production site in southeastern Tehran Province.**[46] The IDF struck a ballistic missile engine component production site and a ballistic missile engine testing site in Khojir.[47] An OSINT source reported that the two facilities likely support liquid-propellant production and liquid-propellant engine testing.[48] Khojir is one of Iran's most important ballistic missile complexes and serves as a central hub for missile production, storage, and research.[49]
- **Shahid Kharrazi barracks munitions depot.** Satellite imagery from March 27 shows that the combined force struck the Shahid Kharrazi barracks munitions depot in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province.[50] It is unclear what munitions Iran stores at this facility, but it is located next to a missile base.

The combined force continued to target defense industrial sites in Iran. Satellite imagery from March 30 shows extensive damage at the Iran Shipbuilding and Offshore Industries Complex (ISOICO) west of Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[51] ISOICO is a subsidiary of Iran's Industrial Development and Renovation Organization (IDRO), which the United States sanctioned in November 2018 for being an entity of the Government of Iran.[52] The combined force also struck the IRGC Navy Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization on March 31.[53] The United States sanctioned the IRGC Navy Research

and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization in 2017 for providing support to the IRGC.[54] The organization is responsible for ballistic missile research and development and has supported IRGC efforts to advance missile and drone capabilities, including by providing assistance to regional partners such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.[55]


The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance in Iran. The combined force struck an Artesh Air Defense radar system at Mount Magher in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province.[56] The IDF separately struck an Anti-tank guided missile (ATGMs) and small surface-to-air missile (SAM) components research and production site in Tehran Province.[57]

New satellite imagery has confirmed previous combined force strikes on internal security targets.

Combined force strikes destroyed several buildings at the Shohada Unit Complex in Urmia, according to commercially available satellite imagery from March 7. Anti-regime media reported that the combined force struck the “Shohada base” on March 3, but it was unclear at the time whether the source was referring to the to the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base or the IRGC Ground Forces Provincial Unit, which are both based in Urmia.[58] Combined force strikes also damaged several buildings at the IRGC 23rd Khatam ol Anbia Operational Division base in Tehran, according to commercially available satellite imagery from March 11. Anti-regime media reported strikes targeting the base’s Tohid Barracks on March 7.[59]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 30, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and March 31, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Iranian Response


Iran continues to launch strikes and publicly threaten future strikes against critical Gulf infrastructure in an effort to pressure Gulf states into pushing the United States and Israel to halt their ongoing campaign against Iran. The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 36 drones, eight ballistic missiles, and four cruise missiles on March 31.[60] An Iranian drone reportedly hit a telecommunications company's administrative building in central Sharjah, but did not cause any casualties.[61] The Dubai Media Office also reported on March 31 that air defense systems intercepted an Iranian projectile over southern Dubai, with falling shrapnel lightly injuring four residents.[62] IRGC-affiliated media reported on March 31 that "informed sources" claimed Iran is prepared to target Fujairah Port and the UAE's Habshan-Fujairah pipeline with a capacity of approximately 1.5 million barrels per day.[63] Emirati air defenses previously intercepted an Iranian missile targeting Habshan gas facility on

March 18.[64] Iran continues to target energy infrastructure to drive up global energy prices as part of their broader effort to coerce the Gulf states to pressure the United States and Israel to halt their campaign against Iran.

The Saudi Defense Ministry announced it intercepted 12 drones from Iran on March 31.[65] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces detected seven Iranian drones and five missiles in Kuwaiti airspace on March 31.[66] The Bahrain Defense Ministry announced it intercepted two Iranian drones on March 31.[67]

The IRGC threatened on March 31 to target US-linked information, communications, artificial intelligence, and advanced technology firms in retaliation for US and Israeli attacks.[68] The IRGC explicitly named a wide range of technology, defense, aerospace, finance, and industrial firms and accused these companies of supporting intelligence, surveillance, and targeting operations.


Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 31, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 31, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 31, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Kuwaiti Army.



Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 31, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 39 attacks targeting northern Israeli communities and Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on March 30 and 2:00 PM ET on March 31.[69] The majority of Hezbollah's claimed attacks targeted IDF soldiers, vehicles, and positions in southern Lebanon.[70] Hezbollah claimed it targeted four IDF military bases and one IDF barracks in northern Israel, however.[71] Hezbollah previously claimed it launched a rocket attack on the IDF's Gilot Base near Tel Aviv on March 30.[72]


Hezbollah conducted a complex ambush on March 31 targeting an IDF armored column in Beit Lif, Bint Jbeil District, in which Hezbollah detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) while engaging the column with small arms, rocket fire, and mortars.[73] Hezbollah said it also targeted IDF reinforcements attempting to relieve the armored column in Beit Lif with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).[74] Hezbollah killed a 934th (Nahal) Infantry Brigade battalion commander in the ambush and three other officers and wounded two other IDF soldiers.[75] Hezbollah also claimed that it struck three IDF Merkava Tanks with ATGMs in Qouza, Ainata, and Qantara on March 30.[76] This follows a Hezbollah ATGM attack on March 29, which killed an IDF soldier.[77]

Hezbollah Strikes in Israel and Lebanon

Between March 30, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and March 31, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET




Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and March 30, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 30, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites and personnel throughout Lebanon. IDF spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin said on March 31 that the Israeli Air Force has struck over 2,500 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, killing at least 900 Hezbollah members.[78] The IDF issued new evacuation notices for neighborhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs, including Haret Hreik, Ghubairi, Laylaki, Hadath, Bourj al Barajneh, Tahwitat al Ghadir, and Chiyah on March 31.[79] The IDF also issued an evacuation notice for a building in Ghubairi that the IDF identified as a “Hezbollah facility” on March 31 before striking it the same day.[80]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 31. IDF spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin said on March 31 that the ground offensive against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon is pushing Hezbollah north.[81] The IDF said on March 31 that IDF artillery had fired over 700 shells at Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon in recent days.[82] IDF artillery fire reportedly killed a cell of Hezbollah members who launched a drone that wounded three IDF soldiers during operations in southern Lebanon on March 30.[83] The 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Division) separately killed six Hezbollah fighters with artillery fire in southern Lebanon.[84] The IDF 146th Division destroyed dozens of Hezbollah rocket launchers in southern Lebanon on March 31.[85] The IDF said it has destroyed more than 180 launchers across Lebanon since March 2.[86]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to

prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck Kataib Hezbollah facilities associated with the 45th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade, which is controlled by Kataib Hezbollah, in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on March 30.[87] The combined force conducted three separate airstrikes in Anbar and Ninewa provinces on March 30 and March 31 targeting other PMF brigades.[88] The combined force struck an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Tayyar al Risali facility in Anbar on March 30, a Badr Organization PMF facility in Ninewa Province and a Saraya al Jihad-PMF facility in Anbar Province on March 31.[89] The combined force previously struck Kataib Tayyar al Risali on March 24 in Salah al Din Province.[90]

An unidentified senior official in Baghdad told a Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated journalist on March 30 that “more than a thousand” Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters are believed to have crossed into Iran.[91] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service but many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[92] This confirmation comes after anti-regime media previously reported on March 30 that PMF fighters have deployed to Basij bases in western Iran.[93] The Basij is a paramilitary force that is responsible for civil defense and social control.[94] CTP-ISW assessed on March 30 that the Iranian regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[95] Large protests took place in both Khorramshahr and Abadan during the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[96]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 30 it conducted 19 drone attacks against “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region.[97] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed it conducted five attacks against US bases in the region.[98]

Unspecified European officials told Bloomberg on March 30 that Iran is pushing the Houthis to launch a renewed campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea, contingent on any further US escalation.[99] The officials added that Houthi leadership is divided on how aggressive its actions should be. This report comes after an unspecified journalist in Yemen told Israeli media on March 29 that “additional IRGC experts” recently arrived in Sanaa to strengthen coordination between the Houthis and Iran.[100]

Iranian Internal Security

Iranian media reported that unspecified armed individuals killed a Law Enforcement Command officer in Mirjaveh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on March 31.[101] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. Sistan and Baluchistan Province is a hotbed for insurgent activity, including attacks by anti-regime groups that frequently target Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[102]

Iranian internal security forces have reportedly deployed Russian-made Spartak Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored vehicles to checkpoints in Tehran.[103] An OSINT account identified that Iranian Counter Terror Special Forces (NOPO) deployed a Spartak MRAP under a bridge between Evin Prison and Enghelab Sports Complex in northern Tehran from a photo circulated by anti-regime media on March 31.[104] NOPO reportedly operates under the LEC Special Units 1st Amir ol Momenin Brigade and has participated in violent protest suppression.[105] A BBC Journalist provided footage in February 2026 of NOPO using Spartak MRAPs in several prominent protests over the years.[106]

Endnotes

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/30/us/politics/iran-leaders-trump-war.html?unlocked_article_code=1.XFA.Q5G5.S1zgO9RY3XV1&smid=nytcore-ios-share

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/30/us/politics/iran-leaders-trump-war.html?unlocked_article_code=1.XFA.Q5G5.S1zgO9RY3XV1&smid=nytcore-ios-share

[3] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hegseth-says-he-visited-us-troops-middle-east-2026-03-31/>

[4] [https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-26-2026/;](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-26-2026/)
https://t.me/defapress_ir/53680

[5] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038684697572614537?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038687676816064930?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038865133124931879?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038869008259162191?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038872853722862051?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038888768204050643?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038888768204050643?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038872853722862051?s=20>

[6] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-27-2026/>

[7] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038684697572614537?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038687676816064930?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038865133124931879?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038869008259162191?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038872853722862051?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038888768204050643?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038888768204050643?s=20>
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038872853722862051?s=20>

[8] Data upon request

[9] [https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037622903416528964?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037622903416528964?s=20)
[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037628582705471965?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037628582705471965?s=20)
[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037656774677840226?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037656774677840226?s=20)
[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037851666913833426?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037851666913833426?s=20)[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037921076869517634?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037921076869517634?s=20)[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038026034717585685?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038026034717585685?s=20)
[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038078875574362470?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038078875574362470?s=20)
[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038148040234528843?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038148040234528843?s=20)<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038200072823878041?s=20>
[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038228926158278838?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038228926158278838?s=20)
[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038233383071818156?s=20;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038233383071818156?s=20)[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/203832684016013396;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/203832684016013396)[https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038346995652243637;](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038346995652243637)

<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038467623877321168>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038474199547662847>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038491407405474188>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038530661892444305>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038677588646732186?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038684697572614537?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038865133124931879?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038888768204050643?s=20>

[10] <https://t.me/manniefabian/55978>; <https://t.me/manniefabian/55978>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-27-2026/>

[11] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038904965956038878?s=20>

[12] Data upon request

[13]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hegseth-says-he-visited-us-troops-middle-east-2026-03-31/>

[14]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-29-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-27-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-25-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-2-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-24-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/map/us-and-israeli-strikes-targeting-iranian-missile-bases-as-of-march-22-2026-at-800-am-et/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-6-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-4-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-1-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-15-2026>

[15] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-29-2026/>;
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/29/iran-ballistic-missile-sites/>

[16] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038922812711141556?s=20>

[17] <https://t.me/farsna/425142>

[18] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2033972126948937872?s=20 ;

<https://www.iranintl.com>
<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603196781>

[19] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603196781>

[20]
<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/middle-east-oil-exports-drop-least-60-hormuz-stays-mostly-closed-data-shows-2026-03-16/>

[21] <https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incident>

[22] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2038889731782479992?s=20 ;

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/projectiles-splash-down-near-greek-vessel-off-saudi-gulf-coast-crew-unharmed-2026-03-30/>

[23] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2034415015327871091?s=20

[24] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/343803 ;

<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/giant-oil-tanker-off-dubai-hit-by-iranian-strike-trump-threatens-obliterate-iran-2026-03-31/>

- [25] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/foreign-journalist-kidnapped-baghdad-by-unknown-parties-internal-ministry-says-2026-03-31/> ; <https://x.com/ASDylanJohnson/status/2039068022451613858>
- [26] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/31/politics/shelly-kittleson-us-journalist-kidnapped-iraq>
- [27] <https://www.shafaqdot.com/ar/امن-الداخلية-العراقية-اعتقال-حد-خاطفي-الصحفية-الاميركية-بعد-محاصرة-عجلتهم-وانقلابها> ; <https://x.com/ASDylanJohnson/status/2039068022451613858>
- [28] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13710> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [29] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13710>
- [30] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [31] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [32] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [33] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [34] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [35] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [36] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13029>
- [37] <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/10/16/cope-cages-come-to-israel-as-idf-tanks-get-extra-drone-armor/>
- [38] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038813918450045437> ; <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2038761383022432351>
- [39] <https://x.com/TrumpDailyPosts/status/2038781791071588855>
- [40] <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-news-updates/card/u-s-attacks-large-ammunition-depot-in-isfahan-2JHG6jkDzTmvVU7DtKBI>
- [41] <https://t.me/BenTzionM/7171>
- [42] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038927108446028217> ; <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2038799956878803411>
- [43] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038927108446028217>
- [44] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/marine-industries-group>
- [45] <https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility> ; <https://www.axios.com/2024/06/18/iran-nuclear-model-us-israel-assessing-intelligence> ; <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/factbox-irans-parchin-military-site-idUSBRE84U0D1/>
- [46] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2039009910277525968> ; https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/2039024355716349958
- [47] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2039009910277525968>
- [48] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/2039024355716349958
- [49] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/> ; <https://israel-alma.org/air-defenses-of-irans-khojir-missile-production-complex-and-parchin-nuclear-site/> ; <https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-FZJApY8ibLTgv73vc3SQD/>
- [50] <https://x.com/SoarAtlas/status/2038443395962835220> ; <https://www.openstreetmap.org/way/924771218#map=14/32.97468/51.54768>
- [51] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2038724126576132364>

- [52] <https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=11643> ;
<https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/industrial-development-and-renovation-organization-iran-idro>
- [53] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2038832502941339948> ;
https://x.com/Iran_Tracker/status/2038997694971003286
- [54] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0689> ;
<https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-research-self-sufficiency-jihad-organization>
- [55]
<https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-research-self-sufficiency-jihad-organization>
- [56] <https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2039007225570525686> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038994928827609361>
- [57] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2039009910277525968> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038927108446028217>
- [58] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2028867612986294317?s=20> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>
- [59] <https://www.iranintl.com/202603071028>
- [60] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2038941095166677297?s=20>
- [61] <https://x.com/sharjahmedia/status/2038711297496543441?s=20>
- [62] <https://x.com/DXBMediaOffice/status/2038902103071170882?s=20>
- [63] <https://t.me/farsna/425398>
- [64] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-19-2026/>
- [65] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038850784595529934?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2038970685607834008?s=20> ;
- [66] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2038990976119701974?s=20>
- [67] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2038914333585936633?s=20 ;
https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2038536898423971961?s=20
- [68] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403099>
- [69] Data available upon request
- [70] Data available upon request
- [71] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13676> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13670> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13708> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/13744> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13750>
- [72] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-30-2026/> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/136231>
- [73] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13734>
- [74] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13734>
- [75] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13734> ; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038900723312742860>
- [76] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13678>
<https://t.me/mmirleb/13680> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13692>
- [77] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038900723312742860>
- [78] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039035572660895932>
- [79] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038930240991273138?s=20>
- [80] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038958912896962709?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/Osint613/status/2039001272490070197> ;
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2038989867317600758?s=20>
[81] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039035572660895932>
[82] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038852517941940678>
[83] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038852517941940678> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-30-2026/>
[84] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038935476040540422>
[85] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038989961572024817?s=20>
[86] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038989961572024817?s=20>
[87] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/4-أمن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-جرف-الصخر-في-بابل-> ; <https://al-hashed.gov dot iq/2026/03/31//مواقع-لل-ضربات-صهيو-أمريكية-غادرة-تطال-مواقع-لل->
[88] [https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقرات-الحشد-الشعبي-قضا-الكرمة-بال-نيار-](https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقرات-الحشد-الشعبي-قضا-الكرمة-بال-نيار/) ;
<https://al-hashed.gov dot iq/2026/03/31//مواقع-لل-ضربات-صهيو-أمريكية-غادرة-تطال-مواقع-لل->
[89] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/غار-جوية-تستهدف-نقطة-تفتيش-منية-مشتركة-جنوب-شرق-الموصل-> ;
[https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقر-حشد-الشبك-في-سهل-نينوى-](https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقر-حشد-الشبك-في-سهل-نينوى/) ;
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-hashd-al-shabak-30th-pmf-brigade>
[90] [https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقر-للحشد-الشعبي-في-صلاح-الدين-1-1-](https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقر-للحشد-الشعبي-في-صلاح-الدين-1-1/)
[91] <https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2038687132890398778>
[92]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/>
[93] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038637015466455218?s=20>
[94] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces>
[95] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-30-2026/>
[96] <https://x.com/bbcpersian/status/2008921332285665553> ;
<https://x.com/Savakzadeh/status/2007602215738118201?s=20>
[97] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1615>
[98] <https://t.me/awlialdm/332>
[99]
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-30/iran-presses-houthis-on-red-sea-shipping-european-officials-say>
[100] <https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/03/29/saudi-payments-houthi-war-entry-irgc-yemen>
[101] <https://t.me/isna94/374754>
[102]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/militants-kill-5-iranian-security-officers-southeast-state-media-says-2024-04-04/>
[103] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2038889881645023478?s=20>; <https://t.me/IranintlTV/329114>
[104] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2038889881645023478?s=20>; <https://t.me/IranintlTV/329114>
[105]
<https://iranfreedom.org/en/articles/2020/01/get-to-know-irans-police-special-units-who-killed-1500-people-14689/>; <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0517>
[106] <https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2024124796670292022?s=20>;
<https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2024124801653039138?s=20>;
<https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2024124806128398462?s=20>;
<https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2024124811237065131?s=20>

Iran Update Special Report, April 1, 2026



**Ria Reddy, Benjamin Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Ben Rezaei, Adham Fattah, Katherine Wells,
Brian Carter**

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. Senior officials in Tehran have signaled that they seek to use the Strait of Hormuz and energy flows around it as points of leverage that Iran can use after the war to extract concessions and secure strategic aims. They have also signaled that they will not accept a ceasefire or halt disruptions to international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz unless the United States and Israel cease all attacks on Iran.
2. Iran has continued attacks on shipping amid discussions in Tehran about Iran's leverage over the strait. Iran attacked the Panamanian-flagged *AQUA 1* oil tanker, leased by Qatari state-owned energy firm, 17 nautical miles northwest of Ras Laffan, Qatar.
3. These statements indicate that Iran could continue to use its proven ability to disrupt shipping in the strait after the war ends to deter the United States and its partners or compel them to avoid actions that would have negative impacts on Iran.
4. The IDF stated on April 1 that it struck "approximately 15 weapons production sites," including a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) complex for advanced missile production.
5. The IDF struck a pharmaceutical research and development company that supplied the Iranian regime with materials, such as fentanyl, that can be used for chemical weapons.
6. The IDF killed IRGC Quds Force Lebanon Corps Engineering Head responsible for advancing underground projects in Lebanon and Syria for Hezbollah and the Assad regime and he managed dozens of underground facilities in Lebanon used to store advanced weapons.
7. Iran launched five missile salvos, including a 10-missile salvo, which was among the largest missile salvos targeting Israel since the beginning of the war. It remains unclear if this was a one-

off large salvo or will become part of a trend.

8. Iran launched 19 drones and four ballistic missiles targeting Bahrain on April 1. One or more of these targeted a company in Bahrain. This follows the IRGC's threat on March 31 that it would target US-linked information, communications, artificial intelligence, and advanced technology firms in retaliation for US and Israeli attacks.
9. Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 71 attacks targeting northern Israeli communities and Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on March 31 and 2:00 PM ET on April 1.
10. The Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles targeting southern Israel on April 1. This attack marks the fourth time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28. The Houthis claimed that it coordinated the ballistic missile attack on Israel with Hezbollah and Iran.

Toplines


Senior officials in Tehran have signaled that they seek to use the Strait of Hormuz and energy flows around it as points of leverage that Iran can use after the war to extract concessions and secure strategic aims. Multiple Iranian officials and institutions, including Iranian parliament speaker and key regime leader Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, several IRGC-linked media platforms, and an analyst close to Iranian security institutions, all highlighted the strait's value as leverage and Iran's ability to use its leverage over shipping through the strait to "ensure" the regime's survival now and in the future.[1] Some of the officials discussing the value of the Hormuz are not decisionmakers, but their statements reflect a broader discussion in Tehran about how to achieve short- and long-term military and strategic aims. The analyst close to the regime stated on April 1 that Iran can remove the ability of the United States and Israel to threaten it if it maintains its "legal-security dominance" over the strait even after the war ends.[2]

These statements indicate that Iran could continue to use its proven ability to disrupt shipping in the strait after the war ends to deter the United States and its partners or compel them to avoid actions that would have negative impacts on Iran. Iran would not need to continue attacks indefinitely to retain the ability to deter and coerce the United States and its partners using the leverage Tehran has over the straits. Iran now has a proven ability to disrupt the global economy by shutting down the Strait, and it could threaten to disrupt shipping in the future for any reason and at any time. Iran may be especially incentivized to leverage its control around the strait if it concludes that such actions are an effective means of coercing the United States and its partners.

Iran has continued attacks on shipping amid discussions in Tehran about Iran's leverage over the strait. Iran attacked the Panamanian-flagged *AQUA 1* oil tanker, leased by Qatari state-owned energy firm, 17 nautical miles northwest of Ras Laffan, Qatar.[3] The tanker's hull sustained damage.[4] This is the second Iranian attack on a civilian vessel in two consecutive days.[5] Such attacks are one of the ways that Iran can impede shipping around the strait.

The UAE, among other Gulf countries, appears to support more aggressive action to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Emirati leaders almost certainly view Iran's efforts to control the strait, combined with sustained Iranian missile and drone strikes against the UAE, as a direct threat to the UAE's security. The United Nations Security Council is expected to vote on April 2 on a resolution that would authorize the use of "all necessary means" to protect shipping in and around the strait.[6] Unspecified Arab officials told the *Wall Street Journal* that the UAE has lobbied in favor of this resolution.[7] The resolution comes amid reports that the UAE may be willing to deploy assets to secure

international shipping in the strait.[8] The UAE almost certainly views Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the strait as a direct threat to its economic security. Iran has significantly disrupted shipping in the strait, which serves as a critical maritime chokepoint for the UAE and other Gulf states, since the war began. Senior UAE official Anwar Gargash stated on March 17 that the UAE’s “main concentration is...the Iranian threat on [the UAE’s] security.”[9] He emphasized that the strait is an international waterway and that states that rely on it share a responsibility to ensure the free flow of trade. The strait is critical to the UAE’s oil exports, liquefied natural gas trade, and food imports. Gargash also warned that Gulf states cannot accept a future defined by persistent Iranian missile and nuclear threats.[10] Iran has launched more missiles and drones at the UAE than at any other country since the war began, including Israel.[11] Iran retaining the ability to disrupt international shipping and resume missile and drone attacks on Gulf countries at any time poses a direct threat to the UAE and other Gulf countries.



Iranian officials have signaled that they will not accept a ceasefire or halt disruptions to international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz unless the United States and Israel cease all attacks on Iran. This position is inconsistent with the stated US position on a ceasefire. US President Donald Trump stated on April 1 that Iran’s “new regime president” has requested a ceasefire and emphasized that the United States will only consider one when the Strait of Hormuz is “open, free, and clear.”[12] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei rejected Trump’s claim as “false and baseless.”[13] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that they seek a permanent end to the war that guarantees the United States and Israel will cease all attacks on Iran.[14] Iran views the period

between the Israeli strikes in June 2025 and the current conflict as a "pause" in one war. The demands for a "permanent end" are akin to a guarantee that the United States and Israel will not attack Iran in the future as well. Iranian officials have stated that Iran will not grant the United States access to the Strait of Hormuz to secure a ceasefire, even after the war ends.[15]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to strike military bases and missile launch sites across Iran.

Anti-regime media reported on March 31 that the combined force struck the Artesh Ground Forces 55th Airborne Brigade headquarters in Shiraz, Fars Province.[16] Commercially available satellite imagery from March 17 confirms that the combined force struck an Artesh 840th Missile Group barracks in Aran and Bidgol, Esfahan Province.[17] Iran had plans to build five new missile bases for the 840th Missile Group before the 12-Day War.[18] OSINT accounts on X reported on April 1 that the combined force struck a missile base and munitions depot near the Baharestan Mountains in Esfahan Province.[19] The 15th Khordad Missile base is near the Baharestan Mountains.[20] The IDF also posted footage showing strikes targeting air defenses in Tehran on March 31. One strike targeted the old Iranian stock exchange building in Tehran.[21]


The combined force continued to strike Iran's defense industrial sites. The IDF stated on April 1 that it struck "approximately 15 weapons production sites," including a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) complex.[22] The complex contained infrastructure for the development of advanced ballistic missiles.[23] MODAFL is responsible for the research and development of Iran's missile and nuclear weapons programs and is sanctioned by the United States.[24] An OSINT account on X reported on March 31 that the combined force struck an IRGC Defense Industries building in Tehran.[25] The combined force also struck three major Iranian steel factories on March 31: Sefid Dasht industrial zone in Boroujen, Charmahal and Bakhtiari Province, the Khuzestan Steel Company in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and the Mobarakeh Steel Company in Mobarakeh, Esfahan Province.[26] The IDF previously struck the Mobarakeh Steel Company and Khuzestan Steel Company on March 27.[27] Strikes on Iran's steel factories hurt both its military and economy by degrading its ability to build ballistic missiles and reducing one of Iran's most important exports.[28]

The IDF struck a research and development facility, Tofigh Daru, in Tehran Province on March 31.

[29] The IDF stated that Tofigh Daru supplied chemical materials to the Iranian regime and functioned as a central supplier of fentanyl-based compounds to the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) organization.[30] The SPND is a research and development entity subordinate to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) that is responsible for advanced military-related research.[31] The United States sanctioned the SPND in August 2014 for engaging in or attempting to engage in activities that have materially contributed to, or posed a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.[32] Iran has conducted long-term research on pharmaceutical-based agents, particularly fentanyl and medetomidine, and has explored how to synthesize, aerosolize, and deliver these compounds through munitions such as grenades, anti-riot rounds, and potentially drones.[33] Iranian state media previously reported in November 2020 that Tofigh Daru produced the raw materials used in the domestic manufacture of remifentanyl, which has potential dual-use applications as a pharmaceutical-based incapacitating agent.[34] The Iranian regime previously used chemical or toxic gas to attack schoolgirls across multiple provinces following the Mahsa Amini Movement in 2020, which affected thousands of students and caused symptoms including respiratory distress and dizziness.[35]

The combined force has continued decapitation strikes targeting senior Iranian officials. The

IDF confirmed on April 1 that it killed IRGC Quds Force Lebanon Corps Engineering Head Mehdi Vafaei in Mahallat, Markazi Province.[36] Vafaei was responsible for advancing underground projects in Lebanon and Syria for Hezbollah and the Assad regime and he managed dozens of underground facilities in Lebanon used to store advanced weapons.[37] The IRGC separately confirmed on March 31 that an Israeli airstrike killed an adviser to the Armed Forces General Staff chief in Tehran Province.[38] The United States sanctioned Eshaghi in February 2025 for his role in an international network that facilitated illicit oil sales to China, which generated hundreds of millions of dollars for Iran’s armed forces and supported the Axis of Resistance.[39] The combined force also reportedly killed Mohammad Sadeghi, who was an engineering officer under the IRGC Aerospace Force al Ghadir Missile Command.[40] Sadeghi reportedly was responsible for constructing underground tunnels and missile infrastructure.[41]



Iranian Response

Iran has launched five missile salvos at Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on March 31.[42] The IDF stated on April 1 that 10 missiles were included in the fourth of the five salvos, most of which were intercepted or allowed to fall in open areas.[43] This salvo was among the largest missile salvos targeting Israel since the beginning of the war, according to an Israeli war correspondent.[44] It remains unclear if this was a one-off large salvo or will become part of a trend.[45] The fifth salvo reportedly involved only a "small number" of missiles, and three other salvos had only one missile.[46] The IDF reported that cluster munitions fell in three sites in central Israel, including Bnei Barak, injuring at least 10 civilians, on April 1.[47] Iranian media also claimed that at least one of its missile salvos targeting Israel on April 1 was coordinated with Hezbollah and Houthis.[48]

Iran continues to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states. The Bahrain Defense Forces reported on April 1 that it intercepted 19 drones and four ballistic missiles.[49] The Bahraini Interior Ministry reported that one of these Iranian attacks struck an unspecified company building but caused no casualties.[50] Unconfirmed reports circulating on social media suggested that the targeted building was the Bahrain Telecommunication Company (Batelco) headquarters in Hamala, Bahrain, but the Bahraini Interior Ministry only said that one attack struck an unspecified company building.[51] The incident follows an IRGC threat on March 31 that it would target US-linked information, communications, artificial intelligence, and advanced technology firms in retaliation for US and Israeli attacks.[52] Iran has previously targeted data centers in the Gulf states, including an Amazon Web Services data center in the UAE.[53]

The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 35 drones and five ballistic missiles on April 1.[54]

The United Kingdom's Royal Air Force (RAF) separately reported it intercepted 10 Iranian drones in unspecified locations in the Middle East.[55] UK aircraft have operated defensively over Cyprus, Jordan, Bahrain, and the UAE.[56]

The Kuwaiti Armed Forces also reported that it detected three Iranian cruise missiles and 15 drones in Kuwaiti airspace on April 1.[57] Kuwait media also reported that an Iranian drone struck fuel tanks at the Kuwait International Airport on March 31, causing significant damage but no casualties.[58]

The Saudi Defense Ministry separately reported that it intercepted and destroyed three drones on April 1.[59]


The Qatari Defense Ministry also confirmed that Iran launched three cruise missiles at Qatar and successfully intercepted two missiles, and one struck a tanker used by Qatari state-owned energy company, QatarEnergy (see topline section).[60]

Iranian Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East

Between March 31, 2026 at 2:00 PM and April 1, 2026 at 2:00 PM



Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and April 1, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and April 1, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and April 1, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and April 1, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Kuwaiti Army.




Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 71 attacks targeting northern Israeli communities and Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on March 31 and 2:00 PM ET on April 1.[61] The IDF confirmed on April 1 that Hezbollah shot down an IAF drone over southern Lebanon with a surface-to-air missile overnight between March 31 and April 1.[62]


Hezbollah may have conducted two first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against IDF positions in southern Lebanon on April 1.[63] Hezbollah has not posted footage of either attack. The term Hezbollah used to refer to the two April 1 strikes is the same one the group used to describe previous FPV drone attacks.[64] Hezbollah previously conducted four FPV drone strikes against IDF armored vehicles in southern Lebanon on March 31 and posted footage of the attacks.[65] Hezbollah has also used the same term in 2024 to describe a drone attack in 2024, however, two years before the group's first confirmed FPV drone attack in March 2026.[66]

Hezbollah Attacks in Israel and Lebanon

Between March 31, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 1, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET




Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and March 31, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 31, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites and personnel throughout Lebanon. The IDF said it killed Hezbollah Southern Front commander Yusuf Ismail Hashem in a strike on Beirut on April 1.[67] The IDF said that Hashem replaced Ali Karaki as Southern Front commander after IDF strikes killed Karaki in September 2024.[68] The IDF stated that Hashem was responsible for directing Hezbollah's ground combat against the IDF in southern Lebanon and rocket attacks on Israel.[69] The IDF also reportedly killed three Hezbollah-affiliated Amal Movement members in strikes on southern Lebanon on March 31.[70]

The IDF also continued to target Hezbollah organizations that provide financial services. The IDF struck Hezbollah-linked currency exchanges "Boa Chance" and "Trade Point International" in Beirut on April 1.[71] The IDF said the sites laundered money and transferred funds to Hezbollah.[72] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Trade Point International and its owner in 2016 for providing financial services to Hezbollah.[73] The IDF has struck several Hezbollah organizations that are part of the group's social and financial service network in Lebanon since the start of the conflict.[74] This network is essential to Hezbollah's efforts to maintain the support of its Shia base.[75]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on April 1. The IDF 8th Armored Brigade (Res.) (91st Division) began ground operations on April 1 to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, including observation posts and weapons depots, in southern Lebanon.[76]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Houthis launched ballistic missiles targeting southern Israel on April 1.[77] The IDF detected ballistic missiles in southern Israel and Israeli air defenses intercepted all the missiles, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[78] The Houthis claimed that it coordinated the ballistic missile attack on Israel with Hezbollah and Iran.[79] Iranian media similarly claimed Iran coordinated its attacks on Israel with Hezbollah and the Houthis.[80] This attack marks the fourth time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[81]

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force conducted two airstrikes on April 1 targeting the 53rd Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade headquarters in Tal Afar, Ninewa Province.[82] The first strike did not cause casualties, but the second strike, approximately an hour later, killed the commander of the 53rd Brigade's commando regiment, three other PMF members, and wounded others.[83] The Badr Organization mourned the commander of the 53rd Brigade's death.[84] The 53rd PMF Brigade is affiliated with the Badr Organization.[85]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to target Baghdad International Airport on March 31 and April 1. Iraqi air defenses at the Baghdad airport intercepted a likely Iranian-backed militia drone that targeted the airport on March 31.[86] A likely Iranian-backed militia drone later struck the diplomatic support center at the Baghdad International Airport on March 31 but did not cause casualties, according to Iraqi media.[87] A likely Iranian-backed militia drone also struck near the logistics support headquarters at the Baghdad International Airport on April 1 but did not cause casualties, according to Iraqi media.[88] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia have continuously targeted the Baghdad International Airport and its co-located facilities, including the former US military base Camp Victory and the Iraqi Mohammad Alaa Airbase, since the war began.[89]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely targeted US forces in Syria on March 31 and April 1. Multiple sources reported that US air defenses at the Qasrak Base in Hasakah Province intercepted at least five drones launched from Iraq that targeted the base on March 31.[90] A Syrian source reported that likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched more drones that targeted the base on April 1, but the source did not indicate whether US air defenses intercepted the drones.[91] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously targeted Qasrak Base with drones on March 28.[92]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely targeted UK-owned energy infrastructure in northern Iraq on April 1.[93] Three drones struck a storage warehouse owned by the Castrol Oil Company near Erbil City on April 1, while nearby Iraqi air defenses intercepted a fourth drone.[94] The drone strikes started a fire that severely damaged the warehouse but did not cause casualties.[95]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 31 that it conducted 23 drone attacks against "enemy" bases in Iraq and the region.[96] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed it carried out five attacks against US bases in the region.[97]

Iranian Internal Security

The IRGC appears to have further consolidated control over Iran's political system by sidelining the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian's government and restricting access to

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Anti-regime media reported on March 31 that growing friction between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and the IRGC has pushed Pezeshkian into a “complete political deadlock.”[98] The IRGC reportedly blocked Pezeshkian’s decisions, with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi pressuring him and preventing the selection of a new intelligence minister.[99] Vahidi reportedly insisted that all sensitive positions must be selected and managed directly by the IRGC during the war.[100] Anti-regime media also reported on March 31 that a “military council” composed of senior IRGC officers has assumed control over the regime’s core decision-making apparatus and established a security perimeter around Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[101] The “military council” reportedly prevented government reports from reaching him and ignored Pezeshkian’s repeated requests for a meeting with Mojtaba.[102]

Anti-regime media separately reported on March 31 that an “unprecedented crisis” is emerging within the inner circle of Mojtaba, with some close associates reportedly seeking to remove former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, from the Supreme Leader’s office.[103] The report added that this effort stems from Hejazi’s opposition to Mojtaba’s succession, including warnings that Mojtaba lacks leadership qualifications and that hereditary succession is incompatible with the “Islamic Republic.”[104] Hejazi reportedly also warned that Mojtaba’s selection would effectively hand full control of the state to the IRGC and permanently sideline administrative institutions.[105]

These reports are consistent with earlier reports that the IRGC has expanded its influence over regime decision-making following Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection as supreme leader.[106] Senior Iranian sources told Reuters on March 10 that the IRGC “forced through” Mojtaba’s appointment to ensure alignment with hardline policies and overpowered opposing political and clerical figures.[107] Mojtaba’s inner circle is dominated by long-standing IRGC commanders, including Ahmad Vahidi, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Mohammad Ali Jafari, who played key roles in securing his selection and shaping regime decision-making.[108] CTP-ISW previously assessed on March 21 that the IRGC has increasingly filled a leadership vacuum caused by decapitation strikes and Mojtaba’s apparent inability to govern, consolidating control over political, military, and internal security institutions.[109]

The Iranian regime has continued its nationwide counterintelligence and internal security operations. The regime conducted mass arrests and disrupted alleged espionage and militant networks across multiple provinces between March 30 and April 1.[110] Iranian authorities reported over 1,000 arrests in March alone, including individuals for espionage, filming sensitive sites, and supporting adversary-linked networks.[111] The United Nations Human Rights Office reported on April 1 that approximately 2,345 individuals have been arrested in Iran since the start of the war on charges related to national security, including terrorism, dissent, alleged espionage, and “cooperation with the enemy.”[112]

The regime has also expanded public securitization measures, including the deployment of security personnel and equipment across civilian infrastructure and the integration of society into internal defense efforts. Reporting indicates that Iranian forces have operated in at least 70 civilian locations, including schools, hospitals, and mosques.[113] The Basij and affiliated organizations have also increased recruitment and mobilization efforts, including volunteer registration campaigns and, in some cases, the use of minors in checkpoint and patrol roles.[114] Iranian authorities have also reinforced legal deterrence by warning that individuals accused of espionage or collaboration with hostile actors may face execution and asset seizure.[115]

Endnotes

- [1] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2039075765698850942 ;
https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2033972126948937872?s=20 ;
<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603196781> ; <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/399109>
- [2] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2039075765698850942
- [3] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2039193541881008505?s=20 ;
<https://www.marinelink.com/news/oil-tanker-qatari-waters-hit-iranian-537585>
- [4] <https://www.marinelink.com/news/oil-tanker-qatari-waters-hit-iranian-537585>
- [5] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2034415015327871091?s=20
- [6]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bahrain-circulates-revised-un-hormuz-draft-drops-binding-enforcement-2026-04-01/>
- [7]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/uae-iran-war-strait-of-hormuz-9836ecbb?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWETsqcaGB0OYQ67fkMbnz4yKlec1CP6CN_ZmjumsRPTKN0FSb5wQWUvZGQQCzd7Sts%3D&gaa_ts=69cd1559&gaa_sig=Y223LpwPtsZTP6-Qrq3iVkuuV-uhongXYpA1b5_sMO388R-pvdbS9Wpd2psBVHgnwMnHQD27tBeD8djGCZlrA%3D%3D
- [8]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-willing-join-international-force-reopen-strait-hormuz-ft-reports-2026-03-27/>
- [9] <https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-anwar-gargash-0>
- [10] <https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-anwar-gargash-0>
- [11] <https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-anwar-gargash-0> ;
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/uae-iran-war-strait-of-hormuz-9836ecbb?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWETsqcaGB0OYQ67fkMbnz4yKlec1CP6CN_ZmjumsRPTKN0FSb5wQWUvZGQQCzd7Sts%3D&gaa_ts=69cd1559&gaa_sig=Y223LpwPtsZTP6-Qrq3iVkuuV-uhongXYpA1b5_sMO388R-pvdbS9Wpd2psBVHgnwMnHQD27tBeD8djGCZlrA%3D%3D
- [12] <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116329512466946656>
- [13] <https://apnews.com/live/iran-war-israel-trump-04-01-2026#0000019d-496c-d4ed-abff-6f6ec7280000>
- [14]
<https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/26/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump?post-id=cmn7kznb600003b6ozxxbhqz0> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-proposal-end-war-is-one-sided-door-diplomacy-still-open-iranian-official-says-2026-03-26/> ; <https://www.ft.com/content/108ece44-f262-4b90-b2ad-742add22efcf> ;
<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-seeks-no-ceasefire-but-complete-end-to-war-foreign-minister-/3887224>
- [15] <https://x.com/Ebrahimazizi33/status/2039254174748057817?s=20> ; <https://t.me/farsna/425524> ;
- [16] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038916447699669132?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038892785307185199?s=20>
- [17] Commercially available satellite imagery.
- [18] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-3-2025>
- [19] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2039362015567790192> ;
https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2038817557247840624?s=20

- [20] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2039370822939279704>
- [21] <https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2039280013883625699?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2038978953336050147?s=20>
- [22] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039371766657609804?s=20>
- [23] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039371766657609804?s=20>
- [24] <https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=10392> ;
<https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/ministry-defense-armed-forces-logistics-modaf>
- [25] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2039171241311871137?s=20>
- [26] <https://t.me/mehrnews/366612> ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/190590
- [27] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037533868060807418>
- [28] <https://www.dw.com/en/iran-war-strikes-on-steel-deal-painful-blow-to-economy/a-76621439> ;
<https://www.steelradar.com/en/irans-steel-exports-and-production-under-international-pressure/#:~:text=Iran's%20two%20largest%20non%20Doil,are%20making%20transactions%20nearly%20impossible.%E2%80%9D>
- [29] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039100510712594460>
- [30] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039100510712594460>
- [31] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/organization-defensive-innovation-and-research> ;
- [32]
<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm634#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20State%20sanctioned,E.O.>
- [33] <https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/the-islamic-republics-work-on-pharmaceutical-based-agents>
- [34] <https://web.archive.org/web/20260203180734/https://kayhan.ir/fa/news/203192/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AF-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B4%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B4%D8%AF>
- [35] <https://time.com/6260115/iran-schoolgirl-poisonings/>
- [36] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039220582437327111?s=20>
- [37] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039220582437327111?s=20>
- [38] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403052>
- [39] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0015>
- [40] <https://x.com/Philipp27960841/status/2039043346002280621?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/IranNewsAgency0/status/2039396947812106249?s=20>
- [41] <https://x.com/Philipp27960841/status/2039043346002280621?s=20>
- [42] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039213262672187665?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039221375232053481?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039232534937018625?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039351681368936722?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039361450926325963?s=20>
- [43] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039351681368936722?s=20>;
- [44] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039351681368936722?s=20>
- [45]
<https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-news-trump/card/israelis-observe-passover-amid-iranian-missile-barrage-NQBrEGtlcCC3ydijkyXt>
- [46] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039361450926325963?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039213262672187665?s=20>;

<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039221375232053481?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039239282049630630?s=20>

[47] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039215566947320001?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039239282049630630?s=20>;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039363440590901456?s=20>

[48] <https://t.me/mehrnews/366811>

[49] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2039264976259502336 ;
https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2038914333585936633?s=20

[50] https://x.com/moi_bahrain/status/2039161632069169338?s=20

[51] <https://x.com/Currentreport1/status/2039174435656306978?s=20> ;
https://x.com/moi_bahrain/status/2039161632069169338?s=20

[52] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403099>

[53] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/amazons-cloud-unit-reports-fire-after-objects-hit-uae-data-center-2026-03-01/>

[54] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2039303211337822256>

[55] <https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/2039333479280713732>

[56] <https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/2039333479280713732>

[57] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2039353368712261784>

[58] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2039353368712261784> ;
https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2039184498068238525

[59] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2039219646281244892> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2039449294906818945>

[60] https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2039235844545139122?s=20

[61] Data available upon request

[62] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039196022367236122?s=20>

[63] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13881> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13822>

[64] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13881> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13822>

[65] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-31-2026/> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/13710> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>

[66] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9571> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13029> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-27-2026/>

[67] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039281952054718934?s=20>

[68] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039281952054718934?s=20>

[69] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039281952054718934?s=20>

[70] https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2039063650309120106 ;
https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2039064163876487295

[71] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039357543940534597>

[72] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039357543940534597>

[73] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0331>

[74] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-18-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-13-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026/>

[75] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-18-2026/>

[76] <https://www.idf.il/אתרי-יחידות/יומן-המלחמה/כל-הכתבות/הפצות/תיעוד-מפעילות-כוחות-חטיבת-8-בדרום-לבנון/>

[77] <https://t.me/army21ye/3506>

[78] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039182809693110446?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039184352760730095?s=20>
[79] <https://t.me/army21ye/3506>
[80] <https://t.me/mehrnews/366811>
[81] <https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2038417361154228228> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-28-2026/> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038468746398888338> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038381168307867899>
[82] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/مقتل-مر-فوج-و3-مقاتلين-بقصف-تلعفر> ;
https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2039380826773663969
[83] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/مقتل-مر-فوج-و3-مقاتلين-بقصف-تلعفر> ;
https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2039380826773663969
; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-تلعفر>
84]] <https://t.me/platformB/4469>
[85] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-may-19-2023/>
[86] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/الدفاعات-الجوية-تتصدى-لطار-رة-مسيرة-غربي-بغداد>
87]] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/مسي-رة-مفخة-تنفجر-داخل-مركز-الدم-الدبلوماسي-في-مطار-بغداد>
88]] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/سقوط-مسيرة-في-محيط-مطار-بغداد-الدولي-7>
89]] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-30-2026/> ;
<https://t.me/awlialdm/281> ; <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2011/12/2/us-hands-over-main-base-in-iraq> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/879> ; <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2032963872693563531?s=20> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/>
[90] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/هجوم-مسي-ر-جديد-من-العراق-يستهدف-قاعدة-ميركية-في-سوريا> ;
<https://x.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/2039090833618501648?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2039264623686279292>
[91] <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2039341817733202105>
[92] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-29-2026/> ;
<https://x.com/SipanHemoo/status/2038037297627615327> ;
<https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2038183111775633900>
[93] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردستانيات/تفاصيل-جديدة-لاستهداف-مخازن-كاسترول-في-ربيل-الهجوم-ن-فذ-بسلسلة-من-المسيرات> ; <https://www.gbnews.com/news/iran-war-british-oil-firm-strike-iraq-erbil-castrol>
[94] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردستانيات/تفاصيل-جديدة-لاستهداف-مخازن-كاسترول-في-ربيل-الهجوم-ن-فذ-بسلسلة-من-المسيرات>
من-المسيرات
[95]] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردستانيات/تفاصيل-جديدة-لاستهداف-مخازن-كاسترول-في-ربيل-الهجوم-ن-فذ-بسلسلة-من-المسيرات>
من-المسيرات
[96]] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1618>
[97] <https://t.me/awlialdm/335>
[98] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039119594376622376>
[99] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039119594376622376>
[100] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039119594376622376>
[101] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039121539002761388>
[102] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039121539002761388>
[103] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039125339822281037>
[104] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039125339822281037>
[105] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039125339822281037>
[106] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-21-2026/>
[107]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-new-leader-still-silent-was-elevated-by-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-10/>
[108]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-16-2026/> ;
<https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/16/world/middleeast/iran-mojtaba-khamenei-election-supreme-leader.html>

[109] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-21-2026/>

[110] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403038> ;

<https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403017> ;

https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/190480 ;

https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/190583 ;

https://t.me/defapress_ir/54369

[111]

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-warns-death-penalty-asset-seizures-spying-aiding-enemies-2026-03-31/>

[112]

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/turk-warns-deepening-clampdown-freedom-expression-across-middle-east>

[113] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039045164321116607?s=20> ; <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-891362> ;

<https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4428134/us-forces-issue-safety-warning-to-civilians-in-iran/>

[114] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039045164321116607?s=20> ;

<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9wqgjn7x89o> ;

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/03/30/iran-recruit-children-defend-the-homeland/>

[115] https://t.me/defapress_ir/54230

Iran Update Special Report, April 2, 2026



Ben Rezaei, Parker Hempel, Adham Fattah, Nidal Morrison, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. The combined force has begun striking targets in Iran beyond narrowly defined military targets, such as military vehicles or ammunition depots. The combined force struck the Darou Pakhsh Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company and the Pasteur Institute of Iran in Tehran Province on April 1 and 2. The Japanese government has listed Darou Pakhsh and the Pasteur Institute of Iran as entities associated with Iranian biological and chemical weapons activities. The combined force has also recently targeted Iranian steel factories, which are critical for both Iran's military production capabilities and the Iranian economy.
2. US President Donald Trump stated that the United States' "strategic objectives" for the war are "nearing completion" during a press conference on April 1. Trump said that the United States will continue the war effort until US objectives are "fully achieved." Trump said that the United States will strike Iran over the "next two to three weeks" while indirect talks between the United States and Iran continue.
3. US forces struck the B1 (Bileghan) Bridge connecting Tehran and Karaj, Alborz Province, on April 2 to disrupt Iran's ability to transfer missiles to western Iran. A US official told Axios on April 2 that Iran used the bridge to transport missiles and missile components from Tehran to launch sites in western Iran. Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran.
4. Hezbollah may be increasing fire at Israel during Passover to impose psychological impacts on Israeli civilians. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on April 2 that Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem will pay a "very heavy price" for "the intensified fire toward Israeli civilians as

they...celebrate Passover.”

Toplines

The combined force has begun striking targets in Iran beyond narrowly defined military targets, such as military vehicles or ammunition depots. The combined force struck the Darou Pakhsh Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company and the Pasteur Institute of Iran in Tehran Province on April 1 and 2. The Japanese government has listed Darou Pakhsh and the Pasteur Institute of Iran as entities associated with Iranian biological and chemical weapons activities. The combined force has also recently targeted Iranian steel factories, which are critical for both Iran’s military production capabilities and the Iranian economy.

US President Donald Trump stated that the United States’ “strategic objectives” for the war are “nearing completion” during a press conference on April 1. Trump said that the United States will continue the war effort until US objectives are “fully achieved.” Trump said that the United States will strike Iran over the “next two to three weeks” while indirect talks between the United States and Iran continue.

US forces struck the B1 (Bileghan) Bridge connecting Tehran and Karaj, Alborz Province, on April 2 to disrupt Iran’s ability to transfer missiles to western Iran. A US official told Axios on April 2 that Iran used the bridge to transport missiles and missile components from Tehran to launch sites in western Iran. Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran.

Hezbollah may be increasing fire at Israel during Passover to impose psychological impacts on Israeli civilians. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on April 2 that Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem will pay a “very heavy price” for “the intensified fire toward Israeli civilians as they...celebrate Passover.”

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to target Iranian military bases and missile sites. The IDF stated on April 2 that it struck the Artesh Joint Staff headquarters in Tehran.[1] The Artesh Joint Staff coordinates between the Artesh’s service branches, determines the Artesh’s logistical requirements, and reviews the Artesh’s proposed budget, among other tasks.[2] Satellite imagery from March 29 confirms that the combined force struck the IRGC Navy Besat Barracks in Shiraz, Fars Province.[3] The Besat Barracks houses anti-ship missiles and supports IRGC Navy forces in southern Iran, including in Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh, and Bushehr.[4] The strike on this base is likely part of the combined force’s ongoing effort to degrade Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Anti-regime media separately reported on April 2 that the combined force struck the IRGC Quds Barracks near Mashhad Airport in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi.[5] The combined force conducted strikes in Mashhad for the first time on March 25.[6] The IDF also stated on April 2 that it struck an unspecified ballistic missile storage site in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province.[7] The combined force previously struck the Amand Missile Base near Tabriz on February 28.[8]

US forces struck the B1 (Bileghan) Bridge connecting Tehran and Karaj, Alborz Province, on April 2 to disrupt Iran’s ability to transfer missiles to western Iran.[9] US President Donald Trump stated on April 2 that US strikes destroyed the bridge and warned Iran to “make a deal before it’s too late.”[10] A US official told Axios on April 2 that Iran used the bridge to transport missiles and missile

components from Tehran to launch sites in western Iran.[11] The combined force has significantly degraded Iran's ability to launch missiles from western Iran since the war began on February 28. Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran.[12] Haj Qassem (1,400-kilometer range), Fattah (1,400-kilometer range), and Kheibar Shekan (1,450-kilometer range) ballistic missiles cannot reach Israel from Esfahan in central Iran due to their shorter ranges, for example.[13]


The combined force conducted several strikes targeting islands in the Persian Gulf on April 1 and 2. The combined force likely struck warehouses at a port in eastern Qeshm Island on April 1.[14] Satellite imagery from April 2 showed a large smoke plume rising from the port.[15] It is unclear what the warehouses stored, but Iran stores naval assets on Qeshm Island that it can use to attack vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, such as uncrewed vessels.[16] Iranian media also reported that the combined force struck a building and docked vessels on Hengam Island.[17] Hengam is a smaller island located south of Qeshm.

The combined force has continued its decapitation campaign against Iranian military, intelligence, and political officials. The combined force has targeted the following individuals since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff:

- **Ali Montazeri:** Montazeri was an Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) official and reportedly an Intelligence Ministry officer.[18]
- **Kamal Kharrazi:** The combined force targeted Strategic Council on Foreign Relations Chairman Kamal Kharrazi at his home in Tehran Province on April 1, severely injuring Kharrazi, according to Iranian media.[19] Kharrazi was a senior and trusted member of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's inner circle.[20]
- **Mokkarram Azimi:** The IDF announced on April 2 that it killed the commander of a central ballistic missile unit in Kermanshah Province, Mokkarram Azimi, as well as several battalion commanders in the same unit who were responsible for dozens of missile launches at Israel.[21] Strikes on missile unit commanders such as Azimi likely explain, in part, why Iran has struggled to conduct large-scale missile barrages at Israel.
- **Mohammad Ali Fathali Zadeh:** The combined force killed Fatehin Battalions Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Fathali Zadeh.[22] The Fatehin Battalions are special forces within the Basij Organization that participate in crackdowns on protests, including in January 2026.[23] Fatehin Battalions personnel deployed to Syria to defend the Assad regime.[24]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between April 1, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 2, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Iranian Response


Iran launched over 20 missiles targeting Israel between April 1 and 2.[25] The IDF said on April 2 that Iran launched about 20 missiles within a 24-hour period.[26] One ballistic missile impacted in Petah Tikva, central Israel, on April 2.[27] At least two of the missiles that Iran launched during the 24-hour period contained warheads with cluster munitions.[28] The launch of 20 missiles within a 24-hour period represents a slight uptick in the volume of Iranian fire targeting Israel in recent days. Iran has fired around 10 to 15 missiles targeting Israel per day in recent weeks.[29] The IDF assessed that Iran tried to launch “dozens” more ballistic missiles during the 24-hour period, but that IDF airstrikes thwarted these efforts.[30]

Iranian and Axis Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East Between April 1, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 2, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states. The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 26 drones and nine ballistic missiles on April 2.[31] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces said that it intercepted 13 drones and two cruise missiles on April 2.[32] The Bahrain Defense Force reported that it intercepted 10 drones and two missiles on April 2.[33] The Qatari Defense Ministry also said that it intercepted several Iranian drones on April 2.[34] The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted four drones on April 2.[35] ISW-CTP has observed a slight decrease in Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia since March 23 (see below). Iran reportedly decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response, according to two sources speaking to Israeli media on March 22.[36]


Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and April 2, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and April 2, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and April 2, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Kuwaiti Army.



Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and April 2, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs announced that Iran agreed to allow Philippine-affiliated vessels to safely transit through the Strait of Hormuz.[37] The Philippines' Foreign Affairs Secretary, Ma Theresa P. Lazaro, spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on April 2.[38] Araghchi told Lazaro that Iran will allow the safe passage of Philippine-flagged vessels, energy sources, and Filipino sailors through the strait.[39] Araghchi reiterated on April 1 that Iran will only allow vessels that are not "involved" in the US-Israeli war effort against Iran to transit the strait.[40] Senior officials in Tehran have signaled that they seek to use the Strait of Hormuz and energy flows around it as points of leverage that Iran can use after the war to extract concessions and secure its strategic aims.[41]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 28 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on April 1 and 2:00 PM ET on April 2.[42] Hezbollah claimed that it attacked IDF units operating in southern Lebanon, particularly near Ainata, Bint Jbeil District, and Qantara and Taybeh, both in Marjaayoun District, with anti-tank guided missiles, mortar fire, and rockets.[43] Hezbollah also claimed that it conducted an attack targeting an IDF Merkava tank with an improvised explosive device near Ainata, Bint Jbeil District.[44] Israeli media reported on April 2 that Hezbollah has increasingly begun using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to attack Israeli forces and tanks in southern Lebanon.[45] Fiber-optic FPV drones are immune to jamming and can be outfitted with strike

capabilities to conduct precise targeting.[46] The drones have small ranges and generally carry small payloads.[47] Russia and Ukraine have extensively used FPV drones in their war.[48] Hezbollah did not claim any FPV drone attacks against the IDF between 2:00 PM ET on April 1 and 2:00 PM ET on April 2. Hezbollah previously claimed six FPV drone attacks against IDF armored vehicles between March 31 and April 1.[49]


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and April 1, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and April 1, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.


Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 32 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 1 and 2:00 PM ET on April 2.[50] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted multiple IDF positions and bases in northern Israel, including the 146th Reserve Division Headquarters in Jaatoun and the IDF Northern Command Headquarters in Safed.[51] 146th Reserve Division units are operating in southwestern Lebanon near Naqoura, according to a geospatial analyst on March 24.[52]

Hezbollah Attacks in Lebanon

Between April 1, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 2, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Hezbollah may be increasing fire at Israel during Passover to impose psychological impacts on Israeli civilians. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on April 2 that Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem will pay a "very heavy price" for "the intensified fire toward Israeli civilians as they...celebrate Passover." [53] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rocket barrages at multiple northern Israeli towns, including Krayot, Kiryat Shmona, Shlomi, Metula, and Nahariya. [54] Israeli media reported on April 2 that multiple Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israeli towns caused damage and injuries, including Hezbollah rocket attacks that injured two people in Kiryat Shmona and two people in Biina. [55]

ISW-CTP has also observed a slight uptick in the volume of Iranian ballistic missile fire targeting Israel, coinciding with Passover (see above). It is unclear if this uptick indicates a concerted Iranian effort to increase its rate of missile fire at Israel during Passover, however.

The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites and personnel throughout Lebanon. The IDF

announced that the IAF struck dozens of Hezbollah headquarters, weapons depots, launch sites, and anti-tank missile launch positions and killed 40 Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon over the past 24 hours.[56] The IDF Navy also “precisely attacked” a Hezbollah weapons depot in southern Lebanon.[57] An Israeli military correspondent reported on April 2 that the IDF has killed around 1,000 Hezbollah operatives, including hundreds of Radwan Force members, since the start of Israeli operations in Lebanon on March 2.[58]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on April 2:

- **Southeastern Lebanon:** The IDF reported on April 2 that 91st Territorial Division units killed members of a Hezbollah cell and destroyed dozens of Hezbollah sites, including observation posts and anti-tank missile launch sites.[59] A geospatial analyst reported that the 91st Division’s 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade and 401st Armored Brigade advanced toward Ainata, Bint Jbeil District, on March 28.[60] 36th Division forces engaged three Hezbollah fighters on motorcycles in southern Lebanon.[61] The 36th Division has killed around 10 Hezbollah fighters and destroyed dozens of Hezbollah sites in the past 24 hours, according to the IDF.[62] 36th Division units are operating in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District, according to a geospatial intelligence analyst on March 24.[63]
- **Central Southern Lebanon:** The 401st Armored Brigade and 933rd (Nahal) Brigade, which both operate under the 162nd Division, located numerous Hezbollah weapons caches that included anti-tank missiles, Kalashnikov rifles, ammunition, and grenades.[64] The IDF separately reported on April 2 that two Nahal Brigade soldiers were “lightly wounded” during an engagement with a Hezbollah fighter in southern Lebanon.[65] The Nahal Brigade soldiers engaged the Hezbollah fighter at close range and killed the fighter. The Nahal Brigade soldiers seized weapons, including grenades, and vests from the engagement site.[66] An OSINT source claimed that IDF units entered Beit Lif and Rachaf, both in Bint Jbeil District, on April 2.[67]
- **Southwestern Lebanon:** The IDF reported that the 146th Division has destroyed more than 180 Hezbollah sites, including anti-tank missile launch sites, observation posts, underground shelters, and weapons depots, since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[68] The 146th Division has reportedly advanced near al Biyyadah, Tyre District, in southwestern Lebanon, according to a geospatial analyst on March 27.[69]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting southern Israel on April 2.[70] The IDF intercepted the missile, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[71] The Houthis claimed that they coordinated the missile attack with Hezbollah and Iran.[72] This attack marks the fifth time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[73] The Houthis’ involvement in the war thus far appears calibrated to try to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.[74] Unspecified European officials told Bloomberg on March 30 that Iran is pushing the Houthis to prepare for a renewed campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea if the United States “further escalat[es]” against Iran.[75]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on April 1 that it conducted 41 drone attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region.[76] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed on April 1 that it conducted six attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region.[77] The US State Department issued a warning on April 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may conduct attacks targeting US citizens and interests in central Baghdad in the next 24-48 hours.[78]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee issued a statement on April 2 that demanded that the Iraqi government “punish” Jordan for allegedly allowing the United States to launch strikes targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units from Jordanian territory by closing the land border crossing between Iraq and Jordan.[79] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee includes Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah Awfiya, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[80] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Coordination Committee members, control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[81] The combined force has repeatedly struck units controlled by Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee members since the start of the conflict.[82]

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck two Tribal Mobilization Forces brigades in Anbar and Ninewa provinces on April 2.[83] Tribal Mobilization Forces brigades are typically largely comprised of Sunnis.[84]

Likely Kataib Hezbollah front group Alwiyyat al Waad al Haq threatened on April 1 to attack the Emirati Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in Abu Dhabi, the UAE, due to the Emirati government’s alleged support for the US-Israeli campaign against Iran.[85] This group previously claimed several drone attacks against Emirati targets in 2021 and 2022.[86]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039724913351647556?s=20>

[2] <https://web.archive.org/web/20211006074809/http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/91404>

[3] <https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2039603997539983424?s=20>

[4] <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/31154074.html> ;
<https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2039603997539983424?s=20>

[5] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039648176706089390?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039617393668792429>

[6] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-26-2026/>

[7] <https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2039609334477287722>

[8] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027663326864392699?s=20>

[9] <https://www.axios.com/2026/04/02/trump-iran-bridge-stone-age>

[10] <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116336091138489301>

[11] <https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2039755384420786195?s=20>

- [12] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-21-2025-evening-edition/>
- [13] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-21-2025-evening-edition/>
- [14] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2039410085345054752; <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403701>
- [15] https://x.com/tom_bike/status/2039786019470352544 ;
<https://x.com/supbrow/status/2039759078000611512>;
https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2039790631569240409
- [16] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-evolving-approach-asymmetric-naval-warfare-strategy-and-capabilities-persian>
- [17] https://www.bbc.com/persian/live/c70dnnxwpq8t?at_bbc_team=editorial&at_link_id=69099E20-2DF9-11F1-B5D6-A7D800F09364&at_campaign_type=owned&at_link_origin=bbcpersian&at_ptr_name=twitter&at_medium=social&at_campaign=Social_Flow&at_format=link&at_link_type=web_link&post=asset%3Aacd7609a-c8fe-481c-b5fe-dde4a6131514&post=asset%3Aacd7609a-c8fe-481c-b5fe-dde4a6131514#asset:acd7609a-c8fe-481c-b5fe-dde4a6131514
- [18] <https://x.com/Philipp27960841/status/2039422386693448155?s=20> ; <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/823935>
- [19] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/344355
- [20] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-leader-khamenei-sees-his-inner-circle-hollowed-out-by-israel-2025-06-17/>
- [21] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039757065531559941> ;
- [22] https://t.me/defapress_ir/54453
- [23] <https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cw0ww7k1edxo> ;
- [24] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-basij-mull-wider-domestic-and-regional-role> ;
<https://www.longwarjournal dot org/archives/2016/10/irgc-to-expand-basij-special-forces.php>
- [25] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57309>; <https://t.me/manniefabian/57314>
- [26] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57309>
- [27] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57316>

- [28] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57309>
- [29] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038904965956038878?s=20>
- [30] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57309>
- [31] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2039665931136512488>
- [32] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2039665931136512488>
- [33] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2039630309042381031
- [34] https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2039716865438556252
- [35] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2039569527810216347>
- [36] <https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890833>
- [37] <https://x.com/DFAPHL/status/2039629341932622288/photo/1>
- [38] <https://x.com/DFAPHL/status/2039629341932622288/photo/1>
- [39] <https://x.com/DFAPHL/status/2039629341932622288/photo/1>
- [40] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403745>
- [41] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/>
- [42] Data upon request.
- [43] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13924> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13926> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13928> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13930> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13932> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13944> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13946> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13948> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13952> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13988> ; <https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/61475> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14011> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14022> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14022>
- [44] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13932>
- [45] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/hezbollah-increasingly-relying-on-drone-technology-used-by-russia-in-ukraine-to-attack-idf/
- [46]
<https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/electronic-warfare-how-fiber-optic-fpv-drones-are-redefining-the-ukrainian-battlefield>
- [47]
<https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/electronic-warfare-how-fiber-optic-fpv-drones-are-redefining-the-ukrainian-battlefield>
- [48]
https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf ;
<https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/defense-taiwan-ukrainian-characteristics-lessons-war-ukraine>

-western-pacific

[49] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13881> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13822> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13710> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>

[50] Data upon request.

[51] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13934> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13982> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14040>

[52] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505805827219650>

[53] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57298>

[54] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14002> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14033> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13968> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14006> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14009>

[55] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039613609743958214> ; <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039730276880789712> ; <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039679852463190184> ; https://t.me/N12_News/37637

[56] <https://www.idf dot il/336422> ; <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039635748538798089>

[57] <https://www.idf dot il/336422> ; <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039635748538798089>

[58] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039723308195705325>

[59] <https://www.idf dot il/336422>

[60] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039112886573031888>

[61] <https://www.idf dot il/336422>

[62] <https://www.idf dot il/336422>

[63] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505794368143655?s=20> ; <https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2036437717484269799>

[64] <https://www.idf dot il/336422>

[65] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039687496640917522>

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039687496640917522?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2039687496640917522%7Ctwgr%5Edbf7db7a61f821dbc93f2fae18054f4eafc68d2f%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.timesofisrael.com%2Fliveblog_entry%2Ftwo-troops-wounded-in-exchange-of-fire-with-hezbollah-operative-in-southern-lebanon%2F

[67] <https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2039671079984038359>

[68] <https://www.idf.il/336422>

[69] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2037510472614699252>

[70] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57319> ; <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2039774880833392809>

[71] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57319>

[72] <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2039774880833392809>

[73] <https://t.me/army21ye/3506> ; <https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2038417361154228228> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-28-2026/> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038468746398888338> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038381168307867899> ;

[74]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2026#_edn2aa32cd39d3190333a5f7d7945261d891

[75]
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-30/iran-presses-houthis-on-red-sea-shipping-european-officials-say>

[76] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1620>

[77] <https://t.me/awlialdm/337>

[78] <https://x.com/TravelGov/status/2039588779443569016>

[79] <https://t.me/centerkaf/5610>

[80] <https://t.me/centerkaf/5388>

[81] <https://t.me/centerkaf/5388> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/>

[82] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-18-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-14-2026/> ;
<https://www.shafaqdot.com/ar/أمن/كثير-من-120-قتيلا-وجريحا-بارتفاع-حصيلة-القصف-على-الحشد-في-ال-نبار/> ;
<https://www.shafaqdot.com/ar/أمن/جرحي-ثر-قصف-استهدف-لوا-12-في-الحشد-شمال-بغداد/>

[83] <https://shafaqdot.com/ar/أمن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-موقعا-للحشد-العشائري-جنوب-الموصل/> ; <https://shafaqdot.com/ar/أمن/قصف-جوي-يطال-لوا-57-بالحشد-الشعبي-في-ال-نبار/>

[84] <https://tcf.org/content/report/sunnis-iraqs-shia-paramilitary-powerhouse/>

[85] <https://t.me/alwwadalhaaq/16> ;
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-alwiat-al-waad-al-haq>

[86]
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kataib-hezbollahs-facade-group-threatens-gulf-states-again> ; <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/3/true-promise-brigades-iraqi-militia-attacks-uae>

Iran Update Special Report, April 3, 2026



Ria Reddy, Parker Hempel, Ben Rezaei, Daniel Mealie, Kelly Campa, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran's ballistic missile program is a military organization that consists of both combat and support elements, and it is impossible to evaluate the overall degradation of Iran's ballistic missile program based on one element of the system. The ballistic missile program consists of combat elements such as Iran's missile stockpile and launchers, but it also includes support elements, such as research facilities, development institutions, and industrial facilities.
2. The majority of Iranian ballistic missiles are combat ineffective, even if they remain "intact." A missile launcher that is buried is combat ineffective for the period it is buried. It is also combat ineffective if it cannot move from its underground storage facility.
3. The combined force has rendered many of Iran's missile launchers combat ineffective, but it is entirely unclear whether these "launchers" refer to launchers for medium-range or short-range systems or whether any of the launchers are interchangeable between medium-range and short-range systems.
4. The US-Israeli campaign has solidified the operational success generated by rendering launchers combat ineffective and destroying missile stockpiles by targeting Iran's defense industrial base extensively. Strikes on these sites will make it more challenging for Iran to reconstitute its missile and drone program over the long-term.
5. Unspecified US and Israeli officials confirmed that Iran shot down a US Air Force F-15E over Iran on April 3. This incident is the first known US combat aircraft lost over Iranian territory since the beginning of the war.
6. The IDF announced that it has prepared a plan to establish a "security zone" along the Israel-Lebanon border, which includes the destruction of Lebanese villages within the defined zone. Hezbollah would likely use the expanded Israeli presence in southern Lebanon and the

displacement of southern Lebanese Shia to justify its position as the “defender” of Lebanon.

Toplines

Iran’s ballistic missile program is a military organization that consists of both combat and support elements, and it is impossible to evaluate the overall degradation of Iran’s ballistic missile program based on one element of the system. The ballistic missile program consists of combat elements—Iran’s missile stockpile and launchers—but it also includes support elements, such as research facilities, development institutions, and industrial facilities. Any evaluation of the degradation that discounts the status of the support elements of the program is therefore incomplete. The US-Israeli campaign has targeted nearly every element of Iran’s ballistic program (see below).

The majority of Iranian ballistic missiles are combat ineffective, even if they remain “intact.”[1] About 50 percent of Iranian missile launchers are still “intact,” according to recent US intelligence assessments.[2] This figure, however, appears to include launchers that have been damaged or rendered inaccessible. A unit is considered combat ineffective when it cannot accomplish its assigned mission. A unit does not necessarily need to be destroyed to be considered combat ineffective. A missile launcher that is buried is combat ineffective for the period it is buried. It is also combat ineffective if it cannot move from its underground storage facility.[3]

Assessing Iran’s missile threat accurately requires distinguishing between different missile types. Iran possesses short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles in its arsenal. Iran relies on medium-range ballistic missiles to target Israel. Iran fires its short-range missiles to target Gulf states and US assets in these countries. Estimates on the status of Iran’s missile program do not distinguish between the two, which limits the ability to use these estimates to completely understand the status of Iran’s missile program.

The combined force has rendered many of Iran’s missile launchers combat ineffective, but it is entirely unclear whether these “launchers” refer to launchers for medium-range or short-range systems or whether any of the launchers are interchangeable between medium-range and short-range systems. The combined force has struck several tunnel entrances and at least five underground missile facilities to prevent Iranian forces from being able to access missile launchers in these facilities.[4] CNN analyzed 107 Iranian tunnel entrances on March 21 and found that the combined force had struck 77 percent of the tunnel entrances.[5] The status of the launchers in these underground facilities is unclear, but striking these tunnel entrances has at least temporarily rendered these launchers combat ineffective. The combined force has also targeted Iran’s efforts to clear rubble from collapsed tunnel entrances.[6] Western media also reported that Iran retains 50 percent of its drone capabilities.[7] Combat ineffectiveness is a temporary state, but other combined force strikes have worked to make it more difficult for Iran to make its ballistic missile forces combat effective again (see below for information on defense industrial strikes).

The rate of Iranian missile fire suggests that Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile force has been significantly degraded. The US military assessed that Iranian missile fire has reduced by around 90 percent since the start of the war.[8] ISW-CTP previously observed that Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo, and sometimes just one, at Israel in recent weeks.[9] Smaller salvos are relatively easier for the IDF to intercept, as demonstrated by their performance against small Houthi salvos between 2023 and 2025.

The short-range ballistic missile force has continued to conduct attacks at a steady rate, but the status of the short-range missile force remains unclear. Iranian missile fire targeting the Gulf states has remained relatively steady since the start of the war, excluding Iran’s large missile launches targeting the UAE on the first day of the war. Iran’s relatively consistent rate of missile fire at the Gulf states in the weeks since may reflect constraints in specific types of missiles compared to others. The status of Iranian short-range missile capabilities, which target the Gulf states, is difficult to assess using open-source information at this time. Missile fire at the Gulf states has remained relatively steady in recent weeks, but there is limited clarity about how large the remaining stockpiles are and what tactical limitations the Iranian short-range missile units are facing.


The combined force has also targeted Iran’s drone program, including drone launchers, but the status of the program is unclear.[10] Western media estimated that Iran retains 50 percent of its drone capabilities.[11] Neither the United States nor Israel has released information about the total number of drone targets struck, but reports suggest drone launches have decreased since the start of the war.[12]

US-Israeli strikes, particularly decapitation strikes, have also created a pervasive fear that may cause Iranian forces to prioritize their survival and impede their ability to execute their assigned mission. US and Israeli strikes have severely degraded Iran’s medium-range missile capabilities. Iranian missile fire targeting Israel has steadily declined since the beginning of the war. Iran has, on average, fired only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20. This impact is less clear within the short-range missile force. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 31 that combined force airstrikes have degraded the Iranian military’s morale and even led to “widespread desertions, key personnel shortages, and caused frustrations amongst senior leaders.[13] The IDF stated on March 24 that ballistic missile units have refused to go to launch sites due to fear of IDF strikes.[14] Iranian forces also appear to be struggling with recruitment and retention.[15] Some reserve forces have reportedly failed to show up at military centers, for example.[16] These factors can render missile systems combat ineffective because they lack available or willing forces to operate them.

The US-Israeli campaign has solidified the operational success generated by rendering launchers combat ineffective and destroying missile stockpiles by targeting Iran’s defense industrial base extensively. Strikes on these sites will make it more challenging for Iran to reconstitute its missile and drone program over the long-term. Iran retains an unclear number of missiles and drones in its stockpiles, but ongoing strikes on Iranian defense industrial sites degrade Iran’s ability to rebuild these stockpiles. Iran has also used a sizable portion of its weapons stockpiles in attacks on Israel and the Gulf since the war began. The force has conducted extensive strikes targeting Iran’s missile and drone production capabilities. The IDF announced on March 31 that it estimates that it has targeted nearly 70 percent of Iran’s defense industry.[17] Combined force strikes have severely damaged Iran’s four major missile production sites, including the Khojir, Shahroud, Parchin, and Hakimiyyeh facilities, for example.[18] Strikes on defense industrial targets have degraded several components of the missile program, including research, fuel production, components, and testing facilities. The combined force has targeted Iran’s steel production capabilities, which are critical for Iran’s ballistic missile production capabilities.[19] Iran has ceased operations at its main steel production facility in Esfahan Province, due to damage from repeated airstrikes.[20] The IDF announced on April 3 that it had destroyed 70 percent of Iran’s steel production capacity.[21]

Concentration of US-Israeli Strikes by Location Since February 28

As of April 3, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Average Date of Airstrike per Cell

Older Recent

The pattern of recorded US-Israeli strikes shows a gradual shift towards targets in central and eastern Iran in more recent weeks of the campaign, but this effect could be the result of existing data limitations.

The map above depicts reported and confirmed combined force airstrikes throughout the five weeks of the campaign. The strike data is aggregated in a series of tessellated cells in which each cell represents the average date of reported strikes within a given area. The combined force concentrated airstrikes targeting West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces at the beginning of the campaign, for example. The combined force gradually began to target Gilan, Yazd, Markazi, and Mazandaran provinces in central Iran at a greater scale during the later weeks of the campaign. The combined force has consistently struck Iranian targets in Tehran and Esfahan provinces throughout the campaign, likely given both regions relative importance to the Iranian military and defense industrial apparatus.

This map only depicts a small sample of the combined force's overall strike pattern and reflects the data

limitations created by several conditions, including the Iranian regime's internet shutdown. Unverified textual reporting on strikes was excluded from the assessment. Restrictions upon commercially available satellite imagery limit ISW-CTP's ability to visually confirm strikes. ISW-CTP defines confirmed airstrikes as kinetic activity that Israel or the United States confirmed through official channels or that were geolocated by visual means. ISW-CTP defines reported airstrikes as kinetic activity reported by authoritative sources with or without footage, but has not been confirmed with collaborative evidence.

Unspecified US and Israeli officials confirmed that Iran shot down a US Air Force F-15E over Iran on April 3.[22] This incident is the first known US combat aircraft lost over Iranian territory since the beginning of the war.[23] An unspecified Israeli official and a second source with knowledge of the situation told Axios on April 3 that the two crew members ejected safely after the aircraft was hit.[24] Unspecified US and Israeli sources told the *New York Times* on April 3 that US forces rescued one crew member and are searching for a second crew member.[25] An unspecified senior Israeli official told Axios on April 3 that Israel canceled planned strikes in Iran to avoid disrupting the rescue effort.[26] Unspecified US officials told CBS News on April 3 that two helicopters participated in the search-and-rescue mission and recovered the F-15E pilot after ejection.[27] The officials added that small arms fire hit the helicopter carrying the recovered pilot, wounding crew members on board, but that the helicopter landed safely.[28] A US A-10 Warthog involved in the search and rescue mission crashed near the Strait of Hormuz.[29] Unspecified US officials said that the aircraft came under Iranian fire and was damaged.[30] The pilot was safely recovered.[31]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between April 2, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 3, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Iran has reportedly informed mediators that Iran is unwilling to meet US demands for a ceasefire and will not meet US officials in Islamabad for talks in the coming talks.[32] Pakistan has mediated indirect talks between the United States and Iran over the past week.[33] Unspecified mediators told the *Wall Street Journal* on April 3 that the talks have reached a “dead end.”[34] Turkey and Egypt are reportedly considering new proposals and venues for the talks.[35]

The IDF announced that it has prepared a plan to establish a “security zone” along the Israel-Lebanon border, which includes the destruction of Lebanese villages within the defined zone.[36] The IDF told Israeli media on April 3 that the IDF’s “security zone” will expand between two and four kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border, depending on terrain.[37] The IDF stated that the plan would include the destruction of “first line” Lebanese towns between Kfar Kila, Marjaayoun District, and Naqoura, Tyre District, except for a “small number” of Lebanese Christian villages.[38] The IDF said that the plan is an adaptation of the October 2025 “Yellow Line” demarcation plan in Gaza.[39] A senior

IDF officer said that the plan will avoid complications encountered in the 1982-2000 Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon by depopulating the buffer zone entirely.[40] The IDF would also establish a line of outposts to establish control over the zone.[41] The IDF plan would reportedly not seek to completely dismantle Hezbollah as a part of its campaign objectives in Lebanon but rather “weaken” the group.[42] A senior IDF officer told an Israeli Army Radio correspondent that a smaller security zone along the border will be easier for the IDF to control and defend.[43]

Hezbollah would likely use the expanded Israeli presence in southern Lebanon and the displacement of southern Lebanese Shia to justify its position as the “defender” of Lebanon. Hezbollah has consistently argued that the group must continue to retain its weaponry to “defend” Lebanon against Israeli invasion and “liberate” Lebanese territory from Israeli control.[44] The destruction of southern Lebanese villages along the Lebanon-Israel border and the displacement of the predominantly Shia southern Lebanese population could result in Hezbollah garnering more support from its Shia support base and strengthening Hezbollah’s narrative that the group remains a viable “defender” of Lebanon.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force strikes killed an IRGC Aerospace officer on April 1 as part of the decapitation campaign against Iranian military officials. Iranian media reported on April 3 that the combined force killed IRGC officer Mohammad Hossein Sufi in Khorramabad, Lorestan Province, on April 1.[45] Lorestan Province’s IRGC Public Relations Department reported that Sufi had deployed alongside IRGC Aerospace Forces personnel during the current conflict.[46] IRGC-affiliated media reported that Sufi spent six years in Syria, which suggests that Sufi participated in Iran’s expeditionary operations in support of the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.[47]

The combined force struck a likely IRGC Ground Forces munitions depot in Esfahan Province as part of its effort to degrade Iranian internal security institutions. The combined force struck a likely munitions depot at the IRGC Ground Forces 14th Imam Hossein Division’s base in Esfahan Province on April 2.[48] The combined force previously struck buildings in the central and northern parts of the division’s complex on March 8 and possibly again on March 22.[49] The Imam Hossein Division deployed to Syria to fight for the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.[50] The regime has also historically deployed IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress internal unrest.[51]

The combined force struck the Laser and Plasma Research Institute (LAPRI) on April 3, which is a specialized research center at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran Province.[52] The Shahid Beheshti University plays a role in Iranian nuclear weapons research and development, including researching centrifuge cascades, uranium separation, and neutron transport.[53] The university also cooperates with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.[54] The European Union listed Shahid Beheshti University in 2011 as an entity owned or controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) that carries out scientific research related to nuclear weapons.[55] The LAPRI, a subordinate research institute at Shahid Beheshti University, contributes to research on lasers, photonics, and plasma for defense industries and sciences.[56] Israel killed five senior nuclear scientists from the university during the opening days of the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, including Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi.[57] Tehranchi served as a supervisor in Iran’s pre-2004 Amad Plan and previously served as vice chancellor for research at the LAPRI and as head of Shahid Beheshti University.[58]

The combined force struck underground fuel storage tanks at two Artesh Tactical Air Bases (TAB), including the 8th TAB in Esfahan Province and the 10th TAB in Sistan and Baluchistan

Province.[59] The combined force previously struck Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft at the 8th TAB.[60] The base hosts F-14s.[61] The combined force also struck the underground fuel complex at the 10th TAB in Konarak, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[62] The combined force previously struck buildings where Iranian air force planes were parked at the 10th TAB.[63] The combined force has also targeted refineries.[64] The combined force has targeted Iran's fuel stockpile as well as refineries to hinder Iran's ability to replace the stockpiles.

Iranian Response

Iran has launched at least nine missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cut off on April 2.[65] This figure is estimated from IDF and Israeli media reports about IDF-issued missile detections and interceptions. Iran launched the missiles in eight waves of attacks, which suggests that most of the launches only contained one or two missiles.[66] This rate is consistent with recent Iranian launch rates targeting Israel over the past few weeks, but Iran has fired slightly fewer barrages targeting Israel in the past three days.[67] The IDF intercepted several of the missiles, while at least two missiles likely failed mid-flight over Israel.[68] At least two missiles contained cluster munitions, which dispersed over the Haifa and Krayot areas.[69]

Iranian and Axis Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East Between April 2, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 3, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET




Iranian strikes and intercepted fragments damaged several Gulf energy facilities on April 3.

Iran continues to target Gulf energy infrastructure, which is part of the Iranian effort to drive up global energy prices and coerce the Gulf states into pressuring the United States and Israel to end their campaign. An Iranian drone struck Kuwait's Mina al Ahmadi Refinery, causing a fire.[70] The Kuwaiti government also acknowledged that an Iranian attack inflicted "material damage" to an unspecified Kuwaiti power and water desalination plant.[71] Iran previously attacked a Kuwaiti desalination plant on March 29.[72] Debris from an unspecified Iranian projectile led to two fires and caused "significant damage" to Abu Dhabi's Habshan Gas Complex.[73] At least one person was killed.[74]

Iranian Strikes Targeting Gulf Oil and Gas Facilities


Between April 2, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 3, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



Iran fired slightly more projectiles targeting the UAE on April 3 than on any day within the last week. Iran fired 47 drones, 18 ballistic missiles, and four cruise missiles targeting the UAE and killed at least one person (as noted above).[75] The volume of Iranian missile and drone fire targeting the UAE this week is about less than half of the volumes that Iran fired during the first week of the war, however (see graph below). The drop in volume after the first week of the war is likely the result of combined force strikes targeting Iranian missile and drone assets.

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates

Between February 28, 2026 and April 3, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Iran continues to launch cruise missiles targeting Gulf states. Iran launched four cruise missiles targeting the UAE and two cruise missiles targeting Kuwait on April 3.[76] Iran has launched at least 45 cruise missiles targeting Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE since the beginning of the war.[77] Iran has used cruise missiles to target civilian ships in the Persian Gulf and also the Gulf states' territory.

Iran fired 16 drones targeting Bahrain on April 3.[78] Bahrain intercepted all of the drones.[79]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Bahrain

Between February 28, 2026 and April 3, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.



Iran fired 26 drones, seven ballistic missiles, and two cruise missiles targeting Kuwait on April 3.[80] A drone and an unspecified munition inflicted damage to a Kuwaiti oil refinery and desalination plant, respectively, as noted above.[81]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Kuwait

Between February 28, 2026 and April 3, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Kuwaiti Army.



Iran fired 14 drones targeting Saudi Arabia on April 3.[82] Saudi air defenses intercepted all of the drones.[83]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia

Between February 28, 2026 and April 3, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET



Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 15 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on April 2 and 2:00 PM ET on April 3.[84] This marks the lowest number of claimed Hezbollah attacks against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since March 19. Hezbollah claimed it detonated an improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces near al Biyyadah, Tyre District.[85] Hezbollah also claimed that it conducted four rocket and mortar attacks on IDF forces near Ainata, Bint Jbeil District.[86]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and April 2, 2026 By Type




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and April 2, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 29 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 2 and 2:00 PM ET on April 3.[87] Hezbollah published a video in which it claimed that it launched a rocket targeting the Israeli Ministry of Defense headquarters in HaKirya, Tel Aviv.[88] An independent missile analyst assessed that the projectile in the Hezbollah video was a Zelzal rocket that had been retrofitted with a precision guidance system.[89] Hezbollah also claimed it fired a rocket at the 769th (Hiram) Regional Brigade headquarters in Kiryat Shmona.[90] Hezbollah claimed it fired seven additional rockets and drone attacks targeting Kiryat Shmona.[91] Israel issued multiple "Red Alerts" warnings for Kiryat Shmona on April 2 and 3.[92] An unnamed lieutenant colonel from IDF Northern Command said on April 3 that Hezbollah has between 8,000 and 10,000 rockets left in its arsenal compared with 40,000 before October 2023.[93] The officer said that Hezbollah still maintains between 300 and 400 operable launchers.[94] The officer also said that Hezbollah has launched roughly 70 percent of its rocket attacks on Northern Israel since the start of the war from positions north of the Litani River.[95] ISW-CTP previously assessed on February 28 that Hezbollah would likely use its long-range weapons to conduct attacks against Israel from central and northern Lebanon.[96]

Iranian and Hezbollah Attacks in Israel and Lebanon

Between April 2, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 3, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites and personnel throughout Lebanon. The IDF said that it has attacked more than 3,500 targets since the start of Israeli operations in Lebanon on March 2.[97] The IDF issued evacuation warnings for Lebanese citizens near two bridges that the Litani River connects Sohmor and Machghara, both in the Western Bekaa District.[98] The IDF reported that Hezbollah used these bridges to move weapons and personnel from northern Lebanon to southern Lebanon.[99] The IDF has previously struck five bridges on the Litani River since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[100]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on April 2:

- **Southeastern Lebanon:** The Multidimensional (Refaim) Unit (36th Armored Division) has killed more than 40 Hezbollah fighters and carried out around 75 strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure since March 2.[101] The IDF announced that the Multidimensional Unit killed three Hezbollah

- operatives who were planning to launch rockets at Israel from southern Lebanon on April 2.[102]
- **Central Southern Lebanon:** An Israeli military correspondent reported on April 3 that soldiers from the 50th Battalion, 933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) seized a Hezbollah weapons cache in southern Lebanon.[103] The cache included several first-person view (FPV) drones, a sniper rifle, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), small arms, and ammunition.[104] ISW-CTP's analysis of the imagery indicates that the FPV drones have been fitted with large batteries, and the manufacturers fitted the drones with rocket-propelled grenades that the drones could drop on Israeli forces.[105] Hezbollah previously claimed six FPV drone attacks against IDF armored vehicles between March 31 and April 3.[106] A geospatial analyst reported that the 933rd Infantry Brigade has advanced toward the center of Beit Lif, Bint Jbeil District.[107] The 933rd Infantry Brigade's reported location suggests that the 933rd Infantry Brigade may have uncovered the Hezbollah weapons cache in the general vicinity of Beit Lif.
 - **Southwestern Lebanon:** The IDF reported on April 3 that the 213th Artillery Brigade (Res.) and 226th Paratroopers Brigade (Res.) (both 146th Armored Division (Res.)) directed airstrikes targeting Hezbollah operatives in southwestern Lebanon.[108] The 213th Artillery Brigade directed a separate airstrike that targeted and killed a Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) crew.[109] The 213th also found and seized rifles, flak jackets, and frag grenades at the ATGM crew's position.[110]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on April 2 that it carried out 23 drone and rocket attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region.[111] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed on April 2 that it conducted five attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region.[112] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab claimed it launched an unspecified number of drone attacks against "Zionist-American" interests in northern Iraq and Bahrain on April 2.[113]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to target Baghdad International Airport on April 2 and 3. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam released undated FPV drone footage on April 2 showing an attack targeting fuel tanks at Camp Victory, a former US military base located at the Baghdad International Airport.[114] An Iraq analyst reported on March 17 that Saraya Awliya al Dam is a front group for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[115] A security source told Iraqi media on April 2 that two likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drones struck the diplomatic support center at the Baghdad International Airport, causing unspecified damage.[116] A separate Iraqi security source told Iraqi media on April 2 that two additional Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drones targeted the diplomatic support center, but neither drone hit the facility.[117] Another Iraqi security source told Iraqi media on April 3 that a likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone targeted the diplomatic support center but again failed to hit the facility.[118] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia have continuously targeted the Baghdad International Airport and its co-located facilities, including the former US military base Camp Victory and the Iraqi Mohammad Alaa Airbase, since the war began.[119] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah similarly conducted a FPV drone attack on the Victory Base on March 15.[120]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeted the Trebil border crossing on the Iraq-Jordan border on April 2. A security source told Iraqi media on April 2 that a likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone "crashed" near the Iraq-Jordan Trebil border crossing in western Anbar Province.[121] The source said that the drone did not cause any damage or casualties.[122] It is unclear which militia or actor conducted the attack. A front group for Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed to fire drones targeting US and Israeli

interests in Jordan on March 24.[123]

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. An Iraqi security source told Iraqi media on April 2 that an airstrike hit the 30th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade in Bartella, Ninawa Province, causing no casualties.[124] The 30th PMF Brigade is affiliated with the Badr Organization.[125]

Other Activity

Lorem

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036100573859131621>

[2] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/02/politics/iran-missiles-us-military-strikes-trump?cid=ios_app

[3] <https://www.nadaveyal.com/p/missiles-at-438-am-politics-by-noon> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/>

[4] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-29-2026> ; <https://t.me/BenTzionM/7193> ;
<https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2034945368077537474?s=20> ; <https://youtu.be/LYZXCUhZ3CU?t=40>

[5]
<https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-21-26?post-id=cmmz8n2ln001726p403ex2jiy>

[6] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2037990151834456436> ;
<https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2037487683618959540>

[7] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/02/politics/iran-missiles-us-military-strikes-trump?cid=ios_app

[8] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2036908415956521033?s=20>

[9] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-27-2026/>

[10] <https://t.me/BenTzionM/6912> ; <https://t.me/BenTzionM/6932> ;
https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2028909071835730141?sort_replies=likes

[11] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/02/politics/iran-missiles-us-military-strikes-trump?cid=ios_app

[12] <https://x.com/lbrahimJalalYE/status/2032597256210133413?s=20>

[13]

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hegseth-says-he-visited-us-troops-middle-east-2026-03-31/>

[14] <https://www.idf dot il/335268>

[15] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-26-2026/>;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/53680 ; <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603127596>

[16] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603127596>

[17] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038922812711141556?s=20>

[18] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-29-2026> ;
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/29/iran-ballistic-missile-sites/>

[19] <https://t.me/mehrnews/366612> ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/190590 ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037533868060807418>

[20] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2040086022130716701?s=20> ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/190590 ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037533868060807418>

[21] https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2040038025741164627?s=20

[22] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/03/us/politics/us-fighter-jet-iran.html> ;

[23] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/03/us/politics/us-fighter-jet-iran.html>

[24] <https://www.axios.com/2026/04/03/iran-us-fighter-shot-down>

[25] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/03/us/politics/us-fighter-jet-iran.html>

[26] <https://www.axios.com/2026/04/03/iran-us-fighter-shot-down>

[27] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/american-fighter-jet-f15e-downed-over-iran/>

[28] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/american-fighter-jet-f15e-downed-over-iran/> ;
<https://www.axios.com/2026/04/03/iran-us-fighter-shot-down>

[29] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/american-fighter-jet-f15e-downed-over-iran;>
<https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/03/us/politics/us-fighter-jet-iran.html>

[30] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/american-fighter-jet-f15e-downed-over-iran/>

[31] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/03/us/politics/us-fighter-jet-iran.html>

[32]
<https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-news-2026/card/mediators-latest-efforts-to-reach-cease-fire-h-it-dead-end-g4ee6afUWAumzrGuZ1N7?msocid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b>

[33] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/24/world/middleeast/us-iran-peace-plan.html>

[34]
<https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-news-2026/card/mediators-latest-efforts-to-reach-cease-fire-h-it-dead-end-g4ee6afUWAumzrGuZ1N7?msocid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b>

[35] <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-news-2026/card/mediators-latest-efforts-to-reach-cease-fire-h-it-dead-end-g4ee6afUWAumzrGuZ1N7?msocid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b>

[36] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29404>

[37] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29404>

[38] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29404>

[39] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29404>

[40] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29404>

[41] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29404>

[42] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29404>

[43] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29404>

[44] <https://www.almanar.com.lb/article/124377/> ;
<https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/fe-4195420092.pdf>

[45] <https://web.archive.org/web/20260403164454/https://farsnews.ir/beiranvandnasrin/1775207720180354953/%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%81%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%A2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF>

[46] <https://web.archive.org/web/20260403164454/https://farsnews.ir/beiranvandnasrin/1775207720180354953/%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%81%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%A2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF>

[47] x <https://web.archive.org/web/20260403164454/https://farsnews.ir/beiranvandnasrin/1775207720180354953/%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%81%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%A2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF>

[48] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2039886159103266923> ;

[49] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-9-2026>;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-23-2026>

- [50] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>
- [51] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>
- [52] <https://x.com/MizanNewsAgency/status/2040079867446706370> ;
- [53] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-beheshti-university>
- [54] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-beheshti-university>
- [55] <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:136:0026:0044:EN:PDF>
- [56] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/laser-and-plasma-research-institute>
- [57] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-on-iran-june-13-2025-200-pm-et/> ;
<https://web.archive.org/web/20250628113310/https://www.irna.ir/amp/85861286/>
- [58] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/mehdi-teranchi>
- [59] <https://t.me/BenTzionM/7325> ; https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2040085104094306386?s=20
- [60] <https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2031595710949273721?s=20>
- [61] <https://theaviationgeekclub.com/iaaf-commander-who-led-the-iranian-tomcat-program-tells-the-true-story-of-why-iran-bought-the-f-14-it-was-not-because-of-the-fly-off-at-andrews-afb> ;
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf,
pg. 75
- [62] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2040085104094306386?s=20
- [63] <https://t.me/BenTzionM/6914>
- [65] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57324>; <https://t.me/manniefabian/57332>;
<https://t.me/moriahdoron/29424>; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29432>; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29450>;
<https://t.me/manniefabian/57348>; <https://t.me/manniefabian/57354>; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29460>
- [66] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57324> ; <https://t.me/manniefabian/57332> ;
<https://t.me/moriahdoron/29424> ; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29432> ; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29450> ;
<https://t.me/manniefabian/57348> ; <https://t.me/manniefabian/57354> ; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29460>
- [67] See author for data.
- [68] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29458>; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29424> ; <https://t.me/manniefabian/57354>;
<https://t.me/moriahdoron/29432>

[69] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57324> ; <https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2039982792050610583>

[70]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drones-hit-kuwaits-mina-al-ahmadi-refinery-fires-reported-no-injuries-2026-04-03/> ; <https://x.com/kpcofficialkw/status/2039931610473074785> ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2040048935163621468

[71]
<https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cgj0gn36px8t?post=asset%3A6e6e67e7-0bbe-4dd2-b417-501cffdc5484#post>

[72]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-worker-killed-iranian-attack-kuwait-power-desalination-plant-2026-03-29>

[73]
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/least-one-killed-uae-habshan-190852648.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAA1AojpB8MVAO2VcHPvWJC_Pol6npfP-f-tbSOT-qU77IENCemY9K3-SkvDst6poeLPhOA_GYcnAZIt1x8wUALv94hESTqpnDkjHs6lyb52eKEzR9R91vk5vTY4S4pCyLwhoxwwWySUEjxcHX9fAuupTbD55XF7Xf9DE7Zzf8Eb

[74] <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2026/4/3/at-least-one-killed-at-uaes-habshan-gas-facility-after-intercepted-attack>

[75] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2040027344208068616>

[76] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2040027344208068616> ;

[77] See author for data.

[78] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2040001890314752235/photo/2

[79] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2040001890314752235/photo/2

[80] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2040078154237116637>

[81]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drones-hit-kuwaits-mina-al-ahmadi-refinery-fires-reported-no-injuries-2026-04-03/> ; <https://x.com/kpcofficialkw/status/2039931610473074785> ;
<https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cgj0gn36px8t?post=asset%3A6e6e67e7-0bbe-4dd2-b417-501cffdc5484#post>

[82] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2039933327109435714> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2039810812215271822> ;

[83] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2039933327109435714> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2039810812215271822>

[84] Data upon request.

[85] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14058>

- [86] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14110>
- [87] Data upon request.
- [88] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14112>
- [89] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/2040110263643312215?s=20
- [90] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14083>
- [91] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14128> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14075> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14077> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/14079> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14096> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14103> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/14071>
- [92] https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/38610 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/38586
- [93] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29422>
- [94] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29422>
- [95] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29422>
- [96] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-limited-options-for-supporting-iran/>
- [97] <https://www.idf dot il/336496>
- [98] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2040021044740681980>
- [99] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2040021044740681980>
- [100] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-warns-it-will-bomb-two-more-bridges-in-southern-lebanon-citing-hezbollahs-use-of-them/
- [101] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040052271615037565?s=20>
- [102] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040052271615037565?s=20>
- [103] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57340?single>
- [104] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57340?single>
- [105] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57340?single>
- [106] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13881> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13822> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13710> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [107] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039849122954420322>
- [108] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039948105622184013?s=20>
- [109] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039948105622184013?s=20>
- [110] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039948105622184013?s=20>

- [111] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1622>
- [112] <https://t.me/awlialdm/342>
- [113] https://t.me/Jaysh_ALGhadab/195 ; https://t.me/Jaysh_ALGhadab/196
- [114] <https://t.me/awlialdm/340>
- [115] <https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2033841863354892748>
- [116] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/6-بغداد-في-انفجارات-دوي-اسماع-دوي-انفجارات-في-بغداد-6>
- [117] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/1-أمن-استهداف-جديد-لمحيط-مطار-بغداد-الدولي-1>
- [118] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/1-أمن-مسيرة-تستهدف-محيط-مطار-بغداد-الدولي-1>
- [119] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-30-2026/> ; <https://t.me/awlialdm/281> ; <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2011/12/2/us-hands-over-main-base-in-iraq> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/879> ; <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2032963872693563531?s=20> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/>
- [120] <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2032963872693563531?s=20>
- [121] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن-سقوط-مسي-رة-في-منفذ-طربيل-الحدودي-بال-نبار>
- [122] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن-سقوط-مسي-رة-في-منفذ-طربيل-الحدودي-بال-نبار>
- [123] https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/542
- [124] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن-قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-سهل-نينوى>
- [125] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-hashd-al-shabak-30th-pmf-brigade>

Iran Update Special Report, April 4, 2026



Nidal Morrison, Parker Hempel, Ben Rezaei, Benjamin Schmida, Ria Reddy, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: *ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.*

NOTE: *Planet Labs has expanded its imagery restrictions with an indefinite hold on satellite imagery from the region until the end of the conflict. ISW-CTP will be unable to confirm strikes or assess damage at sites using satellite imagery from Planet Labs. We are exploring other options and methods to confirm strikes and will continue to confirm strikes where possible.*

Key Takeaways


1. The loss of two US aircraft does not indicate that the combined force has lost or is losing air superiority over Iran. Friendly forces can maintain air superiority even if the enemy is attempting to shoot down friendly aircraft, so long as the enemy air defenses do not seriously impede friendly operations. Iranian attempts to challenge US and Israeli air superiority have not seriously impeded the combined force's ability to conduct operations over Iran, as demonstrated by the persistent strikes nationwide.
2. China's efforts to help Iran reconstitute Iran's ballistic missile program could undermine the combined force efforts to degrade or destroy the supporting elements of the ballistic missile program.
3. The combined force targeted the Iran-Iraq border crossing in Shalamcheh, Khuzestan Province, amid reports that PMF fighters have deployed to Basij bases in the province via the crossing.

Toplines

The loss of two US aircraft does not indicate that the combined force has lost or is losing air superiority over Iran. Iranian forces shot down a US F-15E and an A-10 on April 3, marking the first such aircraft losses since the start of the conflict.[1] The combined force has maintained air superiority

over Iran since the first phase of the campaign by degrading Iranian air and air defense capabilities.[2] Air superiority is when air power creates the conditions that allow one force to operate at “a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats.”[3] Achieving air superiority does not mean that there is no risk to aircraft, and air superiority is not constant at all times, in all places, or at all altitudes.[4] Friendly forces can maintain air superiority even if the enemy is attempting to shoot down friendly aircraft, so long as the enemy air defenses do not seriously impede friendly operations. Iranian attempts to challenge US and Israeli air superiority have not seriously impeded the combined force’s ability to conduct operations over Iran, as demonstrated by the persistent strikes nationwide.

China is helping Iran reconstitute the Iranian missile program amid US-Israeli efforts to degrade it. *The Telegraph* reported that five shipments of likely sodium perchlorate, a key precursor for solid missile propellant, have arrived in Iran from China.[5] All the vessels are owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line Group (IRISL), which the United States sanctioned in 2021.[6] Four of the vessels are docked or floating near the port in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, and one of the vessels is docked or near Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence. China has previously supplied sodium perchlorate to support Iran’s ballistic missile program.[7] The combined force has targeted several elements of the Iranian ballistic missile program, including missile fuel and solid propellant motor production sites. China’s efforts to help Iran reconstitute could undermine the combined force efforts to degrade or destroy the supporting elements of the ballistic missile program, however.



US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force targeted the Iran-Iraq border crossing in Shalamcheh, Khuzestan Province, on April 4 for at least the second time since the war began as part of its ongoing efforts to target Iran's repressive capabilities.[8] Iraq has closed the border crossing following the strikes, according to a security source.[9] The strikes come amid reports that at least 1,000 Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters have deployed to Basij bases in Khuzestan Province via the Shalamcheh crossing.[10] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[11]

The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities to maintain air dominance in Iran. The IDF struck an S-300 surface-to-air (SAM) air defense site in Kahrizak, Tehran Province, on April 4.[12] It is unclear what part of the site the IDF struck. An S-300 battery consists of engagement and detection radars, command-and-control centers, fire-control units, and launchers to operate as a functional SAM system.[13] Israel previously rendered Iran's three remaining S-300 systems combat ineffective in October 2024 by destroying their TOMBSTONE radars.[14] Iran reportedly paired S-300 systems with domestic radars sometime after October 2024.[15]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran informed it that a projectile struck near the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) on April 4.[16] A projectile fragment reportedly killed one member of the site's physical protection staff, and shockwaves and fragments damaged a building on site.[17] The IAEA reported no increase in radiation levels.[18] Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev announced on April 4 that authorities evacuated 198 personnel from the BNPP as part of an ongoing evacuation operation.[19] Rosatom previously evacuated 163 Russian technicians from BNPP on March 25.[20]

The IDF struck Iran's petrochemical facilities in Bandar-e Imam Khomeini, Khuzestan Province, on April 4, which the IDF said the regime used to manufacture materials for ballistic missiles.[21] The IDF stated that the strike targeted a site within the complex that constitutes one of two central facilities used to produce materials for explosives, ballistic missiles, and other weapons, including a key material necessary for ballistic missile production.[22] The IDF struck Fajr Petrochemical Company, Rejal Petrochemical Company, and Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company, according to Iranian media.[23] The United States sanctioned Fajr Petrochemical Company in 2019 for being owned or controlled by Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC).[24] The United States sanctioned the PGPIC and its network of subsidiaries in 2019 for providing financial support to Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters, which is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the Iranian economy.[25] The United States sanctioned Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company in 2023 for materially assisting Triliance Petrochemical Company, a previously designated firm involved in brokering the sale of Iranian petrochemicals.[26] The US Treasury reported in February 2023 that Amir Kabir facilitated the export of petrochemical products to buyers in East Asia, supporting Iranian efforts to evade sanctions and sustain export revenue.[27]

The combined force targeted an Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) radio and television station in Jamaran, northern Tehran Province, on April 3.[28] Iranian media have described Jamaran Station as the most important and "strategic" broadcast transmitter in Iran.[29] The IDF previously targeted the IRIB headquarters in Tehran on March 2, which is similarly responsible for spreading regime propaganda.[30]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between April 3, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 4, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Response

Iran has launched at least eight missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cut off on April 3.[31] This figure is estimated from IDF and Israeli media reports about IDF-issued missile detections and interceptions. Iran fired at least one ballistic missile equipped with cluster munitions toward Israel on April 4.[32] Israeli media reported that cluster munitions from the missile impacted at least ten locations across central Israel on March 4.[33] The cluster munitions wounded at least six people in central Israel on April 4, according to Israeli media.[34] Israeli media also reported that cluster munitions struck near the IDF's headquarters, the Kirya in Tel Aviv, and struck a nearby school, causing damage but no casualties in both instances.[35] Iran has continuously launched ballistic missiles equipped with cluster munitions since the war began on February 28.[36]

Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against certain Gulf states. Neither the Saudi nor the Qatari defense ministries reported Iranian missile or drone detections since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on April 3.[37] This is the first day that Iran has fired no projectiles at Saudi Arabia since the war began, assuming Saudi Arabia did not report detections because Iran fired no missiles or drones. Iran continued to launch slightly more drone and ballistic missile attacks against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 4, however.[38] The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 56 drones and 23 ballistic missiles on April 4.[39] Emirati authorities reported on April 4 that intercepted Iranian projectile debris fell on the Oracle building in the Dubai Internet City but caused no casualties.[40] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces separately said that it intercepted 19 drones and 8 ballistic missiles on April 4.[41] The Bahrain Defense Force also reported that it intercepted 8 drones but no ballistic missiles on April 4.[42]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia

Between February 28, 2026 and April 4, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates

Between February 28, 2026 and April 4, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Kuwait

Between February 28, 2026 and April 4, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Kuwaiti Army.



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at Bahrain

Between February 28, 2026 and April 4, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.



Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 19 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on April 3 and 2:00 PM ET on April 4.[43] Hezbollah claimed eight rocket attacks against IDF units in Bint Jbeil District, with five claimed attacks in Ainata and three in Maroun al Ras.[44] Hezbollah published footage on April 4 that Hezbollah claimed shows first-person view (FPV) drone attacks conducted on March 24 against an Israeli bulldozer and a tank in Khiam and Taybeh, both in Marjaayoun District.[45] The FPV drones used in the two attacks were likely not fiber-optic FPV drones. Hezbollah previously claimed six FPV drone attacks against IDF armored vehicles between March 31 and April 3.[46]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and April 3, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.


Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 23 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 3 and 2:00 PM ET on April 4.[47]

Hezbollah claimed it launched three rocket barrages at Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel.[48] An Israeli military correspondent reported that a Hezbollah rocket struck Kiryat Shmona without causing any casualties on April 4.[49] The IDF reported on April 4 that an initial investigation indicated that the early warning system had a "localized" malfunction that resulted in the warning system failing to issue an alert prior to the Hezbollah rocket impact.[50] Hezbollah claimed it launched two rocket attacks targeting Metula, northern Israel.[51] Hezbollah also launched a rocket attack targeting IDF infrastructure in Safed.[52] Israeli Army Radio confirmed that a Hezbollah rocket hit a building in Safed, northern Israel, causing unspecified damage and no reported casualties.[53]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and April 3, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah Attacks in Israel and Lebanon

Between April 3, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and April 4, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah-affiliated sites and personnel throughout Lebanon.

The IDF reported that it has killed over 1,000 Hezbollah operatives since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[54] The IDF also said that it conducted strikes on 140 Hezbollah targets between April 3 and April 4.[55] The IDF reported that it struck an IRGC Quds Force Lebanon Corps headquarters in Beirut on April 3.[56] The IDF stated that the Lebanon Corps serves as a link between Hezbollah and Iran and is aiding Hezbollah's reconstitution.[57] The IDF previously killed IRGC Quds Force Lebanon Corps commanders in airstrikes in Beirut on March 3 and 7.[58] The IDF also struck two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) headquarters in Beirut on April 3.[59] The IDF said that senior PIJ members coordinated attacks against Israel with Hezbollah at these headquarters.[60] The IDF also struck a rocket launcher on April 3 that Hezbollah previously used to launch rockets at northern Israel.[61]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southeastern Lebanon on April 3 and 4.

The IDF reported on April 4 that 91st Territorial Division units killed 35 Hezbollah operatives in southern

Lebanon over the past week.[62] The IDF said that soldiers of the 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division) directed an airstrike targeting and killing a Hezbollah squad in southern Lebanon.[63] The IDF said the 84th Infantry Brigade has conducted numerous targeted raids against Hezbollah infrastructure, including weapons caches that included anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), rockets, small arms, and ammunition.[64] The 91st Division also attacked multiple Hezbollah headquarters and ATGM launch positions.[65] A geospatial analyst reported on March 28 that the 91st Division units, including the 84th Brigade, are operating near Ainata, Bint Jbeil District.[66] The IDF also said that the 282nd Artillery Brigade (36th Armored Division) fired over 400 shells at Hezbollah targets in the past 24 hours.[67] 36th Division units are operating in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District, according to a geospatial intelligence analyst on March 24.[68] The IDF announced that IDF forces killed a Maglan Unit, 89th (Oz) Commando Brigade (98th Paratrooper Division) soldier and “seriously wounded” another in a friendly fire incident in Shebaa, Hasbaya District, between April 3 and 4.[69] Israeli military correspondents reported on April 4 that the Maglan Unit was conducting an operation to detain a Hezbollah-affiliated individual in Shebaa.[70]

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) reported on April 3 that an unknown actor fired a projectile that struck a UNIFIL position and injured three UN peacekeepers in Odaisseh, Marjaayoun District.[71] The IDF said on April 3 that the launch trajectory of the projectile “clearly indicates” that Hezbollah launched a rocket at the UNIFIL position.[72] Unspecified actors conducted attacks on a UNIFIL position and a vehicle on March 29 and 30, respectively, killing three UNIFIL peacekeepers.[73]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile with a cluster munition warhead and drones targeting central and southern Israel on April 4.[74] The Houthis claimed that they launched a ballistic missile with cluster munitions and several drones at the Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, as well as “vital military targets” in southern Israel.[75] The IDF said that it detected a ballistic missile launch from Yemen but allowed the missile to land in an open area, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[76] The IDF did not indicate whether the Houthi missile included a cluster munition warhead and did not report any drone interceptions, however.[77] The Houthis claimed that they coordinated the missile attack with Hezbollah and Iran.[78] The Houthis previously launched ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads at Israel in 2025.[79] This attack marks the sixth time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[80] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the Houthis’ involvement in the war thus far appears calibrated to try to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.[81]

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck a Kataib Hezbollah-controlled 45th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade headquarters in Anbar Province on April 4, killing two PMF fighters.[82]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely targeted Western-owned energy infrastructure in Basra on April 4. Security and energy sources told Reuters on April 4 that two drones hit the BP-operated North Rumaila oilfield in Basra, wounding three Iraqi workers.[83] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously conducted a drone attack targeting a British oil company-owned storage warehouse in Erbil on April 1.[84]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US

targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on April 4 that it carried out 19 drone and rocket attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region.[85]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

- [1] <https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-uses-asymmetric-warfare-to-inflict-pain-from-a-weakened-position-c054df77>
- [2] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026/> ; <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038638476329886178?s=20>
- [3] https://edocs.nps.edu/dodpubs/topic/jointpubs/JP3/JP3-01_120323.pdf
- [4] https://edocs.nps.edu/dodpubs/topic/jointpubs/JP3/JP3-01_120323.pdf
- [5] <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/04/03/china-delivers-missile-fuel-chemicals-to-iran/>
- [6] <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/04/03/china-delivers-missile-fuel-chemicals-to-iran/> ; <https://2017-2021.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-related-to-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-shipping-lines-and-iranian-shipping-entities/>
- [7] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/07/laden-iranian-ships-depart-chinese-port-tied-key-military-chemicals/> ; <https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/29/middleeast/iran-rebuilding-ballistic-weapons-program-intl/> ; <https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/13/middleeast/iran-is-rearming-its-missile-program-and-a-ship-of-supplies-just-arrived-from-china-western-sources-say/> ; https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/China-Iran_Relations.pdf ; <https://www.ft.com/content/f0bc9fcc-11b3-4615-bd24-163f8938f2a5>
- [8] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2040379827618787386> ; <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038334232284549277?s=20>
- [9] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-closes-shalamchek-crossing-with-iran-after-airstrikes-kill-iraqi-2026-04-04/>
- [10] <https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2038687132890398778> ; <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038637015466455218?s=20> ; <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038334232284549277?s=20>
- [11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-30-2026#_ednbb78f57

56e09bbf89e6851f510703c5c12

[12] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040305473895711206> ;
<https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.512003&lon=51.375589&z=16&m=w&show=/18783057/%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B8%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-&search=35.514120%2C%2051.37451178>

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Harmer_Strategic_Impact_S-300_Iran.pdf

[14] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-consequences-of-idf-strikes-into/>;
<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/israel-air-defenses-iran-energy-sites.html>

[15] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-june-2-2025/>

[16] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2040360500047819000>

[17] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2040360500047819000>

[18] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2040360500047819000>

[19]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-evacuates-198-more-staff-irans-bushehr-nuclear-plant-agencies-report-2026-04-04/>

[20]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-evacuates-163-more-staff-irans-bushehr-nuclear-plant-300-remain-2026-03-25/>

[21] <https://x.com/Iran/status/2040344958398345527> ;

<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040482500397396031?s=20> ;
<https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/2040482500397396031?s=20>

[22] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040482500397396031?s=20>

[23] https://x.com/Tasnimnews_EN/status/2040340811959644573 ;
<https://twitter.com/Iran/status/2040344958398345527?s=20>

[24] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm703>

[25] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm703> ;

[26] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1257>

[27] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1257>

[28] <https://x.com/acceldealer/status/2040166906804465895?s=20>

[29] <https://web.archive.org/web/20191030104341/http://qom.irib.ir/-/%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%BE%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87->

%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-
%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF-
%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%B2

[30] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-destroys-iranian-state-broadcaster-building-says-irgc-used-it-for-military-purposes/

[31] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040194376693957019>
<https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/2040201143976972673>

; <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040349833060319619> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040396226542080450> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040418923158413531>
<https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/2040439795474690311>
<https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/2040450754612252770>
<https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/2040465547901452581>

[32] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040399613945934328>

[33] <https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hyrfgkrizl#autoplay>

[34] <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/5-wounded-as-iran-cluster-bombs-damage-homes-in-central-israel-idf-hits-iran-infrastructure/>

[35] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040429270783205813> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040431600815517845>

[36] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-3-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-2-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-29-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-28-2026/> ;

[37] <https://x.com/modgovksa?lang=en> ; https://x.com/MOD_Qatar

[38] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2040392166829334948>

[39] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2040392166829334948>

[40] <https://x.com/DXBMediaOffice/status/2040264748181471655>

[41] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2040440862572749120>

[42] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2040353337711657086 ;
https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2040001890314752235

[43] Data upon request.

[44] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14138> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14140> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14142> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/14146> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14187> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14150> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/14162> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14172>

- [45] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14177>
- [46] <https://t.me/mmirleb/13881> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13822> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13710> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/13720>
- [47] Data upon request.
- [48] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14174> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14175> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14191>
- [49] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040324704863502535> ; <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040460603601330486>
- [50] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040460145524679129>
- [51] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14176> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/14205>
- [52] <https://t.me/mmirleb/14203>
- [53] <https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2040442341564063851>
- [54] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2040444450518802489>
- [55] <https://www.idf dot il/336555>
- [56] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040381244064616558>
- [57] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040381244064616558>
- [58] <https://x.com/CaptainElla1/status/2028740707242918185> ; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030456341748240703?s=20>
- [59] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040179757761871998>
- [60] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040381244064616558>
- [61] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040179757761871998>
- [62] <https://www.idf dot il/336555>
- [63] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040433839055491314>
- [64] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040433839055491314>
- [65] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040433839055491314>
- [66] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039112886573031888>
- [67] <https://www.idf dot il/336555>
- [68] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505794368143655?s=20> ; <https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2036437717484269799>
- [69] <https://idfanc dot activetrail.biz/ANC04042026382393>

- [70] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040469871893320190> ; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29509>
- [71] https://t.me/UNIFIL_Lebanon/890
- [72] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040149057750827510>
- [73] https://t.me/UNIFIL_Lebanon/881 ; https://t.me/UNIFIL_Lebanon/882
- [74] <https://t.me/army21ye/3519>
- [75] <https://t.me/army21ye/3519>
- [76] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040482997506302230> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040484790802010165>
- [77] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040482997506302230> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040484790802010165>
- [78] <https://t.me/army21ye/3519>
- [79] <https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-865177>
- [80] <https://t.me/manniefabian/57319> ; <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2039774880833392809> ;
<https://t.me/army21ye/3506> ; <https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2038417361154228228> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-28-2026/> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038468746398888338> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038381168307867899> ;
- [81]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2026#_edn2aa32cd39d3190333a5f7d7945261d891
- [82] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/ال-نبار-ال-غربي-الشعبي-للحشد-باستهداف-مقر-للحشد-الشعبي-غربي-ال-نبار> ;
<https://al-hashed.gov dot iq/2026/04/04/ال-شهييد-وجرحى-بعدوان-صهيو-امريكي-استهدف-ال> ;
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah>
- [83]
<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/fire-reported-foreign-oil-companies-storage-facilities-iraq-after-drone-strike-2026-04-04/>
- [84] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/> ;
<https://shafaq dot com/ar/-مخازن-كاسترول-في-ربيل-الهجوم-ن-فد-بسلسلة-من-كوردستانيات/تفاصيل-جديدة-لاستهداف-مخازن-كاسترول-في-ربيل-الهجوم-ن-فد-بسلسلة-من-المسيرات> ; <https://www.gbnews.com/news/iran-war-british-oil-firm-strike-iraq-erbil-castrol>
- [85] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1625>