

Iran Update Special Report, March 22, 2026



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Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. US President Donald Trump threatened on March 21 to “obliterate” Iranian power plants if Iran does not “fully open” the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours. Iran has threatened to attack regional energy infrastructure if the United States attacks power plants in Iran. ISW-CTP has recorded several Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure since the war began on February 28, but the new threats could entail an expansion of such attacks.
2. IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami visited unspecified IRGC Ground Forces units in western and northwestern Iran on March 22. The visit of the IRGC Ground Forces commander to units in northwestern provinces along Iran’s border is notable given the combined force’s efforts to degrade internal security institutions in Iran’s western border region and reports about possible armed Kurdish mobilization along the Iran-Iraq border.
3. The combined force continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Iranian missile production and storage facilities. The combined force targeted sites that produce short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, including the Fath-360 with a maximum range of 120 kilometers (km), Fateh-110 with a maximum range of 300km, the Zolfaghar with a maximum range of 700km, and the medium-range Haj Qasem ballistic missile with a maximum range of 1,400 km. Iran notably has supplied Russia with Fath-360s for Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine.
4. The IRGC has reportedly restructured Hezbollah under a more decentralized command model following Israeli operations that degraded the group’s leadership in 2024. This decentralized structure aimed to improve operational security and reduce vulnerability to Israeli intelligence penetration.

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US President Donald Trump threatened on March 21 to “obliterate” Iranian power plants if Iran does not “fully open” the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours.[1]


Iran has threatened to attack regional energy infrastructure if the United States attacks power plants in Iran. ISW-CTP has recorded several Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure since the war began on February 28, but the new threats could entail an expansion of such attacks. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on March 22 that Iran would strike critical infrastructure and energy facilities in the region if Iranian power plants are attacked.[2] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters released a statement on March 22 and similarly threatened to “completely close” the Strait of Hormuz as well as target regional energy infrastructure and regional companies with US shareholders.[3] Iran’s Permanent Representative to the International Maritime Organization reiterated that Iran will not allow US, Israeli, or US-Israeli allied vessels to transit the strait.[4] Iran has attacked energy infrastructure in at least the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, and Israel since the war began.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on March 21 that an unknown projectile exploded near a vessel 15 nautical miles north of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.[5] The UKMTO later classified the incident as “suspicious activity,” not an attack, because it could not confirm the intended target.[6] The UKMTO has reported 21 confirmed maritime incidents in the Strait of Hormuz since the war began.[7] The last confirmed Iranian attack on a vessel was on March 11.[8] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that they will control which vessels transit the strait and that vessels affiliated with the United States, Israel, or their allies cannot pass.[9]

IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami visited unspecified IRGC Ground Forces units in western and northwestern Iran on March 22.[10] The combined force has struck several Ground Forces units in these areas since the beginning of the war. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media reported that Karami warned that Ground Forces units are ready to confront any “aggressors” on Iran’s borders.[11] The IRGC Ground Forces are structured to confront any invading force while also having units positioned to violently suppress social unrest.[12] The visit of the IRGC Ground Forces commander to units in northwestern provinces along Iran’s border is notable given the combined force’s efforts to degrade internal security institutions in Iran’s western border region and reports about possible armed Kurdish mobilization along the Iran-Iraq border.[13] The combined force has reportedly struck at least two IRGC Ground Forces divisions and one brigade in northwestern and majority Kurdish areas of Iran since February 28 (see map below).[14] The combined force reportedly struck the 31st Ashoura Mechanized Division, which operates in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on March 4. Commercially available satellite imagery from March 4 and 5 also confirmed damage from combined force strikes to the 11th Amir ol Momenin Brigade base in Soltan Abad, Ilam Province, and the Nabi Akram Operational Division in Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province.[15]

US and Israeli Strikes Targeting IRGC Ground Forces in Northwestern Iran

As of March 22, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Iranian missile production and storage facilities. US Central Command (CENTCOM) on March 22 published satellite imagery from March 7 showing damage from airstrikes at Iran's Kuh-e Barjamali short- and medium-range ballistic missile assembly facility.[16] A defense analyst assessed that the site was likely the final site in the production process for solid-propellant missiles on Khojir Aerospace Complex southeast of Tehran City.[17] The analyst noted that the site belonged to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), a subsidiary of the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[18] The analyst added that some of the missiles finalized at the site include short-range ballistic missiles, such as the Fath-360 with a maximum range of 120 kilometers (km), Fateh-110 with a maximum range of 300km, the Zolfaghar with a maximum range of 700km, and the medium-range Haj Qasem ballistic missile with a maximum range of

1,400 km.[19] Iran notably has supplied Russia with Fath-360s for Russia's offensive campaign in Ukraine.[20]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also confirmed on March 22 that it struck a Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry weapons production and storage site east of Tehran City, likely at the Khojir Aerospace Complex.[21] Anti-regime media reported that residents from villages in the vicinity of Damavand town near Khojir Aerospace Complex heard explosions on March 22.[22] Combined force airstrikes have previously struck missile production facilities at Khojir Aerospace Complex.[23] An analyst from the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies identified extensive damage to planetary mixer and casting sites at the Khojir Aerospace Complex, citing March 4 commercially available satellite imagery.[24]

The IDF also confirmed on March 22 that it struck an Artesh base used for personnel training and a missile storage in southwest Tehran City as well as an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force weapons production facility west of Tehran City.[25] It is unclear where this site is located. Anti-regime media reported several explosions in Karaj, Alborz Province, west of Tehran City on March 22, however.[26]

The combined force continued to strike Iranian underground missile sites in southern Iran. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account on March 21 identified damage to the exterior of an underground missile base between Gerash and Lar in Fars Province from combined force airstrikes on March 16 and 22.[27] Another OSINT analyst confirmed on March 22 that CENTCOM struck missile launchers and tunnel entrances at two underground missile bases in Hajjiabad, Hormozgan Province, and Darab, Fars Province on March 20.[28]


The combined force continued to strike the Artesh's tactical air bases across Iran. An OSINT account on X published footage of a fire reportedly at the 8th Tactical Air Base in Esfahan Province on March 22.[29] The combined force previously struck this air base on March 7 and 8.[30] Another OSINT account on March 22 published satellite imagery showing two craters on the runway at Bushehr Airport, where the 6th Tactical Air Base is located, from airstrikes between March 14 and March 22.[31]

The combined force continues to strike defense industrial sites to degrade Iran's drone and missile production capabilities. An Israeli OSINT analyst on March 22 identified damage to the roof of a factory belonging to the Advanced Fiber Development Company from previous Israeli airstrikes targeting the Lia Industrial Zone south of Ghazvin City, Ghazvin Province, in northern Iran.[32] The US Treasury sanctioned the company in May 2025 for manufacturing carbon fibers for the IRGC Aerospace Force.[33] An OSINT account on X published footage of a large explosion at an unspecified warehouse in a non-residential area in Rafsanjan City, Kerman Province, in central Iran on March 21.[34]

The IDF continued to strike internal security institutions and personnel in Tehran on March 22. The IDF reported that it struck an "additional headquarters" belonging to Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry in Tehran.[35] The IDF has pursued other Intelligence and Security Ministry-affiliated targets since the beginning of the war, including headquarters, personnel, and other assets across Iran.[36] The IDF recently killed Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib in an airstrike on March 18.[37] The IDF also struck an "emergency command center" for internal security forces in Tehran on March 22.[38] The reference to an "emergency command center" may refer to improvised facilities necessitated by Israeli strikes on the regular headquarters of the security units. ISW-CTP recently noted that fear and shock have caused some Iranian internal security personnel to abandon established headquarters and bases, set up improvised facilities, and adapt command-and-control structures under pressure.[39]

Geolocated footage posted on March 21 showed damage to the Fars Province LEC


Headquarters in Shiraz.[40] The IDF struck the headquarters on March 17.[41] The combined force has struck several internal security targets in Fars Province and Shiraz in particular since the beginning of the war, including the IRGC Ground Forces Fajr Unit Provincial Unit and 33rd Al Mehdi Airborne Brigade.[42] The combined force does not appear to have yet struck internal security institutions or installations at the same scale as it has in Tehran or northwestern Iran, however.



Iranian Retaliation


Two Iranian ballistic missiles impacted in southern Israeli towns and injured nearly 200 people on March 21.[43] The missiles struck Dimona and Arad in the Negev desert.[44] The IDF failed to intercept the two missiles due to “different and unrelated circumstances.”[45] The IDF said that the two missiles that struck Dimona and Arad were likely Ghadr variants.[46] Ghadr missiles are liquid-fuel,

medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,950 kilometers, which means that Iran can launch Ghadr missiles from positions in central Iran.[47] Iran is increasingly firing missiles from central Iran due to the IDF's destruction of Iranian missile launchers in western Iran, according to the IDF.[48] The Israeli Ministry of Education cancelled in-person classes across Israel on March 22 and 23 following the strikes.[49]



Iran has launched over 400 ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the start of the war, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[50] The IDF has intercepted 92 percent of missiles during the war.[51] This interception rate is close to the Israeli ballistic missile interception rates during Iranian missile attacks on Israel in April and October in 2024 as well as the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[52] Only five missiles carrying conventional warheads with "hundreds of kilograms" of explosives have struck populated areas in Israel throughout the war, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[53]

Iran continues to launch missiles carrying cluster munitions targeting populated areas in Israel, likely to maximize destruction and terrorize Israeli civilians. A cluster munition warhead contains submunitions that disperse over a wide area. Cluster munitions are significantly more difficult for Israeli air defenses to intercept once dispersed. Iran launched at least three missiles carrying cluster munitions targeting Israel on March 22 that impacted across the Tel Aviv area, including in Jaffa, Petah Tikva, Bat Yam, and Holon.[54] Iran likely began using cluster warheads to maximize the damage inflicted by its ballistic missiles given their relatively low accuracy when fitted with standard warheads.[55] Around 70 percent of Iranian missile launches at Israel have reportedly carried cluster munitions.[56] An Israeli military correspondent reported that at least two dozen missiles with warheads have released cluster munitions over populated areas throughout the war.[57] The correspondent noted that there have been over 100 separate impact sites from cluster munitions.[58]




The Gulf states intercepted at least 55 drones and nine missiles from Iran since ISW-CTP's

last data cut off, but ISW-CTP has not observed any recorded impacts on critical Gulf infrastructure or in populated areas as of this writing.[59] Gulf states have reported the following activity:

- The Bahrain Defense Force said that it has intercepted two drones and two ballistic missiles since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off.[60] The IRGC claimed to target the US Fifth Fleet base in Manama, Bahrain, on March 22.[61]
- Iran has fired at least seven drones targeting Kuwait since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on March 21.[62] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces intercepted four drones and the other three fell in open spaces.[63]
- The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that it has intercepted 21 drones and three ballistic missiles since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on March 21.[64] Saudi Arabia intercepted one ballistic missile heading towards Riyadh.[65] The IRGC claimed to target the Prince Sultan Air Base near Riyadh.[66]
- The UAE reported it that intercepted 25 drones and four ballistic missiles from Iran on March 22.[67]


Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 22, 2026



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All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 22, 2026



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 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 22, 2026



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All data from the Kuwaiti Army.



Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 22, 2026



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


Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed 56 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 21 and 3:00 PM ET on March 22.[68] Most of Hezbollah's claimed attacks targeted Israeli forces and military sites with rockets.[69] Hezbollah claimed six drone attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.[70] Israeli sources reported multiple instances of sirens in northern Israel on March 21 and 22 in response to Hezbollah drone attacks.[71] A Hezbollah drone landed in an open area of northern Israel near the Sea of Galilee on March 22, according to an Israeli correspondent.[72] Hezbollah claimed three rocket attacks targeting northern Israeli towns on March 22.[73] Hezbollah is likely continuing to attempt to displace northern Israeli residents from their homes by targeting northern Israeli towns in order to increase political pressure on the Israeli government to halt its war effort against Iran.


Hezbollah Attacks in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon

Between March 21, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 22, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The rate of Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel have varied since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below.

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1, 2026 and March 20, 2026




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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah has also employed a variety of weapons in its attacks against Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon (see below).

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 20, 2026 By Type



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah and Iranian-backed groups across Lebanon. The IDF said it killed Hezbollah ‘Radwan Forces’ commander Abu Khalil Barji in Majdal Selm, Bent Jbeil District, southern Lebanon, on March 21, along with two other fighters.[74] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s elite special operations unit that Hezbollah, with Iranian support, built to conduct major ground attacks into Israel.[75] The IDF also said on March 22 it killed a senior Hamas financier, Walid Mohammad Dib, in an unspecified area of Lebanon.[76] The IDF said that Dib was responsible for transferring funds to various Hamas branches in the West Bank, Lebanon, and other countries.[77] The IDF also said that Dib recruited operatives and directed attacks against Israel in Syria and Lebanon.[78] The IDF has killed two Hamas members in Lebanon since February 28.[79] The IDF 91st Division, with Israeli air cover, also killed nine Hezbollah fighters in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon on March 22.[80]

The IDF continued to strike bridges on the Litani River in southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from reinforcing its positions. The IDF struck the Qasmiyeh Bridge on March 22 after issuing an evacuation warning.[81] This is the fifth bridge the IDF has struck on the Litani River since the war began, according to Israeli media.[82] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on March 22 that he “ordered the army to immediately destroy all bridges over the Litani River” to prevent Hezbollah from reinforcing its positions.[83] Katz added that “we have also ordered the acceleration of the demolition of Lebanese homes in border villages to neutralize threats to Israeli cities, following the model of Beit Hanoun and Rafah in the Gaza Strip.”[84] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun condemned the strikes on bridges over the Litani River in southern Lebanon as “a dangerous escalation” which he said was a prelude to a “Israeli expansion into Lebanese territory.”[85]

The IRGC has reportedly restructured Hezbollah under a more decentralized command model following Israeli operations that degraded the group's leadership in 2024.^[86] Reuters reported on March 21 that the IRGC deployed approximately 100 officers to Lebanon after the November 2024 ceasefire, according to two sources familiar with IRGC activities.^[87] These officers retrained Hezbollah fighters, oversaw rearmament, and reorganized Hezbollah into smaller, compartmentalized units with limited operational knowledge.^[88] This decentralized structure aimed to improve operational security and reduce vulnerability to Israeli intelligence penetration.^[89] The sources added that the IRGC is shaping Hezbollah's force structure and tempo of operations rather than directing tactical targeting decisions.^[90] An academic researcher of Hezbollah told Reuters that the IRGC "has basically reorganized Hezbollah as a far more flat system," which resembles the group's organizational structure during the 1980s.^[91] He described the strategy as a "mosaic defense" similar to what the IRGC employs in Iran, emphasizing decentralized operations to preserve combat effectiveness under sustained pressure.^[92] The Reuters article resembles similar reports from October 2025 saying that Hezbollah has returned to a more decentralized structure.^[93]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' front groups continued to conduct drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces and interests in Iraq and the region. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched two drones at Baghdad International Airport on March 21.^[94] Iraqi air defenses intercepted the drones.^[95] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab claimed that it attacked an unspecified US base in northern Iraq with drones.^[96] The group's claim corresponded with reports of air defense activity at Erbil International Airport.^[97] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed on March 21 that it attacked the former US Victory base with drones.^[98] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly claimed attacks targeting the former US Victory base, which is co-located with the Baghdad International Airport, since the start of the war.^[99] Saraya Awliya al Dam separately claimed on March 21 that it conducted six "qualitative operations" against US bases in Iraq but provided no evidence of the "operations."^[100] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' rocket fire injured at least five Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service members in a separate attack on a facility at the Baghdad International Airport on March 22.^[101] Two drones launched by likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias later impacted near the former US Victory base.^[102] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 21 that it had conducted 21 drone and missile operations targeting US bases in Iraq and the region in the past 24 hours.^[103] The IRI did not provide evidence for this claim.

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions. Likely combined force strikes targeted unspecified Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions in western Mosul City on March 21, according to Iraqi sources.^[104] US airstrikes reportedly targeted the Kataib Hezbollah-associated 13th PMF brigade in Anbar Province, which caused material damage but did not result in casualties, according to Iraqi media.^[105] The combined force also conducted three drone strikes on unspecified PMF positions in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on March 22, according to Iraqi sources.^[106]

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Endnotes

- [1] <https://x.com/TrumpDailyPosts/status/2035527252931395584?s=20>
- [2] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2035665493307130044?s=20
- [3] https://t.me/defapress_ir/53064
- [4] https://t.me/defapress_ir/53086
- [5] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2035519299712860192?s=20
- [6] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2035655936392511963?s=20
- [7] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2035764726022484128?s=20
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- [21] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2035718399230128503?s=20>
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- [33] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0142>
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- [37] <https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U> ;
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Iran Update Special Report, March 23, 2026



Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, Benjamin Schmida, Parker Hempel, Nicholas Carl

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 03:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. US President Donald Trump extended his deadline for Iran to reach a deal with the United States to March 27. In extending the deadline, Trump said that Iran agreed to cease uranium enrichment, relinquish its existing stockpiles, and remain "low-key on the missiles." Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on March 23 that Trump told him that the United States sees an opportunity to "leverage the military achievements of the war" to secure all strategic objectives through an eventual agreement.
2. Ghalibaf publicly rejected reports of United States-Iran negotiations on X on March 23. That Ghalibaf is leading diplomatic engagement with the United States is consistent with reports that he has consolidated tremendous influence in Iran, especially since the current war began.
3. The combined force continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran's missile capabilities. The combined force also struck IRGC Ground Force units at several echelons in central and southern Iran.
4. Two unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iran has decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response. ISW-CTP has observed a relative decrease in Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia since March 22, which corroborates this Israeli media report.
5. Hezbollah claimed 55 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 22 and 3:00 PM ET on March 23. Most of Hezbollah's claimed attacks targeted IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel. Hezbollah is primarily relying on rockets but also increasingly using drones in its attacks against Israel.

Toplines

US President Donald Trump extended his deadline for Iran to reach a deal with the United States to March 27.[2] Trump had previously threatened to strike Iranian power plants if Iran did not stop attacks around the Strait of Hormuz by March 23.[3] In extending the deadline, Trump said that Iran agreed to cease uranium enrichment, relinquish its existing stockpiles, and remain “low-key on the missiles.”[4] Trump told reporters that his team is “dealing with a man that I believe is the most respected, not the supreme leader, we have not heard from him.”[5] An Israeli official told Axios that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have spoken to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[6] A source with knowledge of the matter told Axios that there “did not appear” to have been direct talks with Ghalibaf, but that Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey have passed messages between the United States and Iran and were pursuing a call between the Trump administration and Ghalibaf.[7]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on March 23 that Trump told him that the United States sees an opportunity to “leverage the military achievements of the war” to secure all strategic objectives through an eventual agreement.[8] Netanyahu conveyed that Trump believed such an agreement could safeguard shared US-Israeli interests, depending on how the emerging diplomatic channel unfolds.[9] A separate source familiar with the matter told Axios that the US Vice President JD Vance discussed United States-Iran negotiations with Netanyahu in a phone call on March 23.[10]

Ghalibaf publicly rejected reports of United States-Iran negotiations on X on March 23.[11] Ghalibaf added that all Iranian officials stand firmly behind Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and the Iranian people’s demand for “complete and remorseful punishment” of the United States and Israel.[12]

That Ghalibaf is leading diplomatic engagement with the United States is consistent with reports that he has consolidated tremendous influence in Iran, especially since the current war began. Ghalibaf is a former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer who maintains close ties to the military establishment but has operated primarily as a politician in recent decades.[13] Ghalibaf reportedly assumed an unprecedented senior command role during the 12-Day War, however, demonstrating his influence and authority in the regime.[14] Ghalibaf was also reportedly behind the formation of the Defense Council after the 12-Day War, which was meant to streamline decision-making and prepare the regime for future conflict against the United States and Israel.[15] More recently, Ghalibaf was reportedly among the small cadre of IRGC officers who aggressively intervened in the supreme leader succession process to ensure that Mojtaba Khamenei replaced his father.[16] Remarks from US and Israeli security officials on March 22 suggest that this inner circle of IRGC figures has been especially empowered since the ascension of Mojtaba, who remains badly wounded.[17] The killing of Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani may have removed yet another constraint on Ghalibaf’s influence, given that Larijani played a similarly dominant role in Iranian foreign and defense policy and had opposed Mojtaba’s accession, instead backing his own brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, for supreme leadership.[18]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran’s missile capabilities. An Israeli military correspondent reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has destroyed or rendered inaccessible approximately 330 of Iran’s estimated 470 ballistic missile launchers, which is consistent with the general declining trend of Iranian missile fire.[19] The IDF destroyed over half the launchers in strikes, while the other half are buried in currently inaccessible

underground missile facilities.[20] The combined force likely struck the Imam Hossein strategic missile base south of Yazd City on March 22.[21] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account geolocated a video of smoke and fire rising from the mountain where the facility is located on March 22.[22] The combined force has repeatedly struck this facility since the war began, including strikes on March 1, 6, and 17.[23] The Imam Hossein strategic missile base stored long-range Khorramshahr missiles in underground tunnels and launched around 60 missiles at Israel during the 12-Day War, according to the IDF.[24] Iran reportedly launched cluster munition-equipped ballistic missiles from this base, which Iran has used consistently against Israel since February 28 and previously during the 12-Day War.[25] An Israeli analyst assessed that the Imam Hossein strategic missile base is responsible for several ballistic missile attacks against Israel since the war began, based on calculations from an Israeli-American scientist.[26] ISW-CTP cannot verify these calculations, however.

The combined force likely struck the Bid Ganeh missile facility in Tehran Province on March 22. An Israeli journalist published a video of an explosion in Bid Ganeh, and anti-regime media reported sounds of explosions in the area on March 22.[27] The combined force likely struck the Modarres missile base complex, which is reportedly associated with the development and production of Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as well as Iran's space program.[28] The Bid Ganeh site also produces medium-range liquid-propellant systems, according to a missile expert.[29] The IDF previously struck Bid Ganeh during the 12-Day War.[30] The strikes may alternatively have targeted the IRGC al Ghadir Missile Command or the Amir al Momenin missile launch site, which are in the vicinity of Bib Ganeh.

The combined force also likely struck the Chamran missile base near Jam City, Bushehr Province, on March 23. Anti-regime media published a video of smoke and fire at the Chamran missile base following a reported combined force strike on the facility.[31] Iran stores Ghiam-1 ballistic missiles, which have a range of around 800 kilometers, at the Chamran missile base, according to an Israeli think tank.[32] The combined force previously struck the Chamran missile base on March 6 and 20.[33] Repeated strikes on these facilities indicate a continued effort to degrade Iran's ability to store, launch, and sustain ballistic missile operations.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) published a video on March 23 of strikes on Iranian drone launch sites in unspecified areas of Iran.[34] The footage showed US strikes targeting an Arash-2 drone, a Shahed-136, and a mobile drone launch platform carrying another Shahed-136.[35] Iran claimed to target Ben Gurion Airport with an Arash-2 drone on March 22.[36]

The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air and air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran. Geolocated footage shows the combined force likely struck the Artesh Ground Forces 4th Aviation Base in Esfahan City several times on March 23.[37] The combined force previously struck the Artesh Ground Forces 4th Aviation Base on March 7, which damaged several buildings at the airbase and the runway's tarmac.[38] The combined force also struck the airbase on March 13 and 19.[39] The Artesh Ground Forces 4th Aviation Base hosts rotary-wing aircraft.[40]

The combined force also likely struck the Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Air Base in Bushehr City on March 22.[41] Iranian opposition media and an Israeli journalist reported sounds of explosions and published videos of smoke rising from the airbase on March 22.[42] The combined force previously cratered the runway at the Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Air Base, which is colocated with Bushehr International Airport, between March 14 and 22.[43] The IDF previously struck the airport during the 12-Day War.[44]

The IDF separately said on March 23 that it struck the IRGC Aerospace Force headquarters in Tehran.[45] The IRGC Aerospace Force is the principal operator of the Iranian missile and drone arsenals.[46] The IDF

previously struck the headquarters on March 7.[47] CENTCOM separately published a video on March 23 of strikes on what appear to be Iranian air defense systems in unspecified areas of Iran.[48]

The combined force continued to strike Iranian naval infrastructure possibly as part of its efforts to limit Iran's ability to threaten international shipping. The combined force likely struck an ammunition depot at the Sijran naval training base in Kerman Province on March 23.[49] Geolocated footage from anti-regime media shows what appears to be munitions cooking off after multiple strikes on the base followed by a large secondary explosion.[50] The combined force previously struck the Sijran naval training base on March 14.[51] Commercially available satellite imagery of the base shows several storage bunkers at the base, which further indicates that Iran used the facility for munitions storage. The combined force previously struck an ammunition depot in Sirjan, Kerman Province, on March 16.[52]


The combined force has continued to strike IRGC Ground Forces units and headquarters across Iran. The regime has historically deployed IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress internal unrest.[53] The IDF announced on March 23 that it struck the IRGC Ground Forces Headquarters in eastern Tehran overnight.[54] The Ground Forces decentralized its command structure in the 2000s and 2010s, establishing 32 provincial units that could operate independently in the event of a decapitation strike against IRGC central leadership.[55]

The combined force has targeted IRGC Ground Forces units at several echelons in central Iran.[56] The combined force struck the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base in Esfahan City on March 8.[57] Operational bases are regional headquarters that oversee IRGC Ground Forces units and security operations typically across two to three provinces.[58] The Seyyed ol Shohada Operational base specifically oversees IRGC Ground Force units in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Esfahan, and Yazd provinces.[59] The following units are subordinate to the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base:

- **Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit.** The IDF struck the IRGC Ground Forces Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit in Esfahan on March 8.[60] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 9 showed damage to buildings in the northeastern and northwestern corners of the base. The strike likely killed the combined force killed the Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit coordination deputy.[61] The Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit has played a role in suppressing protests in Esfahan, including during the Dey protests in 2017-2018.[62]
- **8th Najaf-e Ashraf Armored Division (Najafabad, Esfahan Province).** Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 shows damage to the IRGC Ground Forces 8th Najaf-e Ashraf Armored Division in Najafabad, west of Esfahan City.[63]
- **14th Imam Hossein Division (Esfahan City, Esfahan Province).** Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that the combined force destroyed buildings in the northern and central parts of the division complex.[64] Geolocated footage showed explosions at the 14th Imam Hossein Division headquarters on March 22, suggesting the combined force has struck the facility again.[65] The Imam Hossein Division deployed to Syria to fight for the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.[66]
- **18th Al Ghadir Independent Brigade (Yazd City, Yazd Province).** Iranian sources reported that combined force struck an unspecified military facility south of Yazd City, Yazd Province, on March 23 that may be affiliated with the nearby 18th Al Ghadir Independent Brigade headquarters.[67] The facility appears to host underground infrastructure. It is also located about nine kilometers from the Imam Hossein missile base.
- **44th Ghamar Bani Hashem Brigade (Shahr-e Kurd, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province).** ISW-CTP has not yet observed combined force strikes targeting this brigade.

US and Israeli Strikes Targeting IRGC Ground Forces in Western Iran

As of March 23, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET




The combined force has also targeted IRGC Ground Forces units in southern Iran. The Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Forces in Bushehr, Fars, and Hormozgan provinces.[68] Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 showed damage to hardened structures within and around a base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, that hosts both the Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base and the 34th Imam Sajjad Brigade. The 34th Imam Sajjad Brigade is subordinate to the Imam Sajjad Provincial Unit.[69] The following units are subordinate to the Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base:

- **Imam Sajjad Provincial Unit (Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province).** ISW-CTP has not yet observed strikes targeting the Imam Sajjad Provincial Unit's headquarters in Bandar Abbas. The combined force may have struck facilities affiliated with the provincial unit's 34th Imam Sajjad Brigade, which is co-located with the Madinah ol Munawah Operational Base, as noted above.
- **19th Fajr Operational Division (Shiraz, Fars Province).** ISW-CTP has not yet observed


combined force strikes targeting this unit.

- **2nd Imam Sajjad Special Forces Brigade (Kazeroun, Fars Province).** ISW-CTP has not yet observed combined force strikes targeting this unit.
- **14th Imam Sadegh Infantry Brigade (Bushehr city, Bushehr Province).** Iranian opposition media posted footage on March 12 of smoke rising over the Imam Sadegh Infantry Brigade.[70]
- **33rd Al Mehdi Airborne Brigade (Jahrom, Fars Province).** Satellite imagery from March 6 showed damage to likely warehouses or hangars at the brigade's base in Jahrom.[71]



The combined force has continued to strike internal security institutions in northwestern Iran. Satellite imagery showed that the combined force likely struck several buildings within a compound in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, between March 3 and 13.[72] The compound hosts both the Artesh Ground Forces 21st Hamzeh Infantry Division headquarters and the Tabriz City LEC headquarters, and ISW-CTP is unable to identify which headquarters were struck at this time.[73] The combined force also

struck a Tabriz police station between March 3 and 13.[74] The IDF conducted a wave of strikes targeting internal security institutions in Tabriz on March 10.[75]



The IDF announced that it struck the “IRGC Imam Ali headquarters” in southern Tehran on March 23.[76] The IDF may be referring to the Imam Ali Central Security headquarters, which is the central Basij unit that oversees the Imam Ali Battalions across the country. The Imam Ali Battalions are Basij security units trained and equipped to suppress urban protests and conduct anti-riot operations and intimidate and arrest protesters under IRGC direction.[77] Regional Basij bases maintain operational control over local Imam Ali units.[78]


The combined force has continued to strike industrial sites or companies with ties to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The IDF reported on March 23 that it struck manufacturing industries and additional research sites in various fields of electronics, ballistic

missiles, and warheads in Tehran.[79] Geolocated footage posted on March 23 showed damage to a building affiliated with Iran Electronic Industries in Tajrish, northeastern Tehran.[80] Iran Electronics Industries manufactures a range of military products, including electronic warfare equipment, missile launchers, and tactical communication systems.[81] The United States sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries in 2008 for its ties to the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and its role supporting the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[82] The combined force has so far targeted at least two sanctioned subsidiaries of Iran Electronics Industries: Shiraz Electronics Industries and Esfahan Optical Industries.[83]

The combined force killed a university professor who had supported research and development for Iran's missile program. The strikes killed University of Science and Technology professor Saeed Shamghadri in the Chizar area in northern Tehran City on March 23.[84] Khorasan Razavi Province Governor Gholam Hossein Mozaffari said that Shamghadri had sacrificed his life for “the indigenization of the missile industry,” in a condolence message.[85] Anti-regime media reported that Mozaffari's security deputy was the brother of Shamghadri.[86]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 22, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 23, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



Iranian Response

Iran continued to target Israel on March 22 and 23. Iran has launched four missile waves at Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 22, according to an Israeli journalist.[87] ISW-CTP observed reports of impacts across Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 22 and 3:00 PM ET on March 23. Israeli media reported on March 22 that Iranian cluster munitions and missile fragments impacted in several areas of central Israel.[88] Iranian ballistic missiles reportedly impacted in Tel Aviv, central Israel, and in Kiryat Gat and Ashkelon, southern Israel, on March 22.[89] Israeli media reported on March 23 that fragments fell near Safed, northern Israel.[90] The IDF reported that it has intercepted 92 percent of Iranian missile attacks and noted that Iran has launched over 400 ballistic missiles at Israel since the war began on February 28.[91] Israeli sources reported multiple instances of sirens across Israel on March 22 and 23 in response to missile attacks.[92]

Iranian and Axis Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East Between March 22, 2026 at 3:00 PM and March 23, 2026 at 3:00 PM




Iran has continued to target the Gulf states since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 22. Iranian ballistic missiles reportedly struck two data centers near Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE).[93] Iran has previously targeted data centers in the Gulf states, including an Amazon Web Services data center in the UAE.[94] An Iranian missile also impacted an uninhabited area near Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.[95]

Two unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iran has decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response.[96] Saudi officials have previously made clear, including in discussions with Iran, that their red line is any attack on electricity generation and water desalination facilities.[97] The sources noted that Iran is also avoiding targeting Qatar, but that Iranian strikes against Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE will "continue as usual." [98] ISW-CTP has observed a relative decrease in Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia since March 22 (see below), which corroborates this Israeli media report. The Bahrain

Defense Force reported on March 23 that it intercepted 36 Iranian drones, which is a significant number of Iranian drones launched at Bahrain given previous trends (see below).[99] The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that Iran launched 16 drones at the UAE on March 23.[100]


Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 23, 2026



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 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET




Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 23, 2026



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All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 23, 2026



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All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 23, 2026




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All data from the Kuwaiti Army.



Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response


Hezbollah claimed 55 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 22 and 3:00 PM ET on March 23.[101] Most of Hezbollah's claimed attacks targeted IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel.[102] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rockets targeting IDF positions in northern Israel, including the Dovev Barracks, Beit Hillel Barracks, Zarit Barracks, Mount Neria base, Yiftah Barracks, and Ramot Naftali base.[103] Hezbollah claimed that it fired a "swarm" of drones targeting an Israeli air defense system in Maalot Tarshiha, northern Israel.[104] Hezbollah also claimed six rocket attacks targeting the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona, all of which triggered Israeli sirens.[105] An OSINT account and Israeli media reported on March 23 that Hezbollah rockets impacted at least four sites around Kiryat Shmona, injuring at least two individuals.[106] Hezbollah has claimed to have conducted over 700 attacks against Israel since Hezbollah joined the war on March 1.[107] The number of Hezbollah attacks during the current war surpasses the group's total number of claimed attacks in October 2024, which was the most intense month of fighting during the Fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[108]

Hezbollah Attacks in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 22, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 23, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The rate of Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel has varied since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below.

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1, 2026 and March 22, 2026




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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah is primarily relying on rockets but also increasingly using drones in its attacks against Israel. An Israeli think tank noted that drones are increasingly becoming “a significant component of [Hezbollah’s] campaign.[109] Hezbollah claimed 11 drone attacks between 3:00 PM ET on March 22 and 3:00 PM ET on March 23.[110] Hezbollah prioritized domestic drone production and shifted its munition rehabilitation budget to focus on drones in June 2025.[111] The IDF also claimed in June 2025 that Hezbollah’s Unit 127, which is the group’s aerial unit responsible for drone production, has produced thousands of drones.[112] Hezbollah has long assembled the cheap Ayoub and Mersad models within Lebanon using civilian parts ordered online.[113] ISW-CTP previously forecasted in a February 28 report that Hezbollah would likely use low-cost weapons, such as drones, to conduct attacks against Israel.[114]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 22, 2026 By Type



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



Hezbollah Political Council member Wafiq Safa said on March 23 that Hezbollah is preparing itself for a long war with Israel and noted that Israel should expect “surprises in the near future,” especially regarding one-way attack drones.[115] Safa added that Hezbollah will “force” the Lebanese government to reverse its decision to ban Hezbollah’s military activities after the war “no matter how we do it.”[116] The Lebanese Cabinet declared all Hezbollah military and security activity to be illegal on March 2 and demanded that Hezbollah transfer its weapons to the state.[117] Lebanese officials have reiterated the government’s commitment to the cabinet’s March 2 decision.[118] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated on March 22 that the Lebanese government will not back down from its decision to disarm Hezbollah and noted that Hezbollah’s threats will not scare the government.[119] Salam added that the IRGC is present in Lebanon illegally and is the one leading military operations.[120] Salam stated that IRGC elements fired drones from Lebanon at Cyprus and noted that the government is working to remove the IRGC from Lebanon.[121] An Iranian drone that was reportedly launched by Hezbollah struck the UK RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus on March 1.[122] Cypriot authorities intercepted two additional drones on March 2.[123]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon. The IDF struck 15 Hezbollah sites in Nabatieh, southern Lebanon, and an IRGC Quds Force unit in Beirut on March 22 and 23, respectively.[124] The IDF struck the Dallafa Bridge in southern Lebanon on March 23 after issuing an evacuation warning.[125] A British journalist reported on March 23 that the IDF has struck seven bridges that cross the Litani River.[126] The IDF stated that Hezbollah fighters have used bridges to send fighters and thousands of weapons from northern to southern Lebanon to fight against Israeli forces.[127] The IDF reported that the IDF 84th

(Givanti) Infantry Brigade (91st Division) has located a large quantity of Hezbollah weapons and arrested Radwan Force fighters in southern Lebanon.[128] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah's elite special operations unit that Hezbollah, with Iranian support, built to conduct major ground attacks into Israel.[129] The IDF stated that the arrested fighters set up anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launchers and planned to fire ATGMs at Israeli forces and towns.[130] The IDF noted that the fighters moved from the Bekaa Valley in northeastern Lebanon to the south at the beginning of the war.[131] The IDF also reported on March 23 that the Hasmonean Infantry Brigade is operating in southern Lebanon for the first time ever.[132]

IDF forces continued to advance deeper into southern Lebanon on March 22 and 23. A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 22 that IDF 810th Mountain Brigade (210th Division) forces advanced two and a half kilometers past the Lebanese border and are positioned on Jabal al Sedana, north of the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms.[133] Jabal al Sedana is an operationally significant hilltop that overlooks Kfarchouba, Shebaa, and several roads in southeastern Lebanon.[134] The analyst noted that IDF forces have also advanced towards the center of Khiam, southern Lebanon, and are expected to advance deeper into the town.[135] Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah can fire into northern Israel, and it also grants Hezbollah a vantage point to observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee Panhandle.[136] Israeli media reported on March 23 that the IDF has expanded the Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon with some units positioned between nine and 11 kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory.[137] An unspecified senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on March 23 that the IDF has doubled its forward defense positions in southern Lebanon, which have removed the threat of a coordinated Hezbollah cross-border infiltration into northern Israel.[138] The officer noted that the IDF's current objective is to push Hezbollah forces back to limit their ability to fire ATGMs targeting northern Israeli towns.[139]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah agreed on March 22 to extend its temporary and conditional suspension of attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad for an additional five days.[140] An unspecified Shia Coordination Framework adviser confirmed to a Kurdish journalist on March 19 that most Shia Coordination Framework leaders "pushed for an immediate halt" to Kataib Hezbollah attacks.[141] ISW-CTP previously reported on March 19 that, according to an Iraq analyst, Kataib Hezbollah may have issued the temporary ceasefire due to mounting political and military pressure on the group.[142] Kataib Hezbollah's political wing is notably a member of the Shia Coordination Framework.[143] Kataib Hezbollah added that they see no benefit in targeting the Iraqi Intelligence Service but noted that the Iraqi Intelligence Service must intensify efforts to reassess its officers' loyalty and patriotism.[144] Kataib Hezbollah claimed that all Kurdish intelligence officers are Mossad officers and that Sunni officers work for Jordan and the UAE.[145] A likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia conducted a one-way drone attack targeting the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) headquarters in Baghdad City on March 21, killing an Iraqi intelligence officer.[146] The Shia Coordination Framework and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq's political wing condemned the attack.[147] Kataib Hezbollah also called out Iraqi politicians who condemn the Iraqi resistance attacks on US assets and turn around and condemn bombings on the Popular Mobilization Forces positions.[148]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' front groups continued to conduct drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces and interests in Iraq and the region. Likely front group Kataib Sarkhat al Quds claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting an "alternative Mossad spy headquarters" in Erbil on March 22.[149] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab claimed that it launched drones at Camp Victory in Baghdad on March 22.[150] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly claimed attacks targeting the

former US Victory base since the war began on February 28.[151] Syrian and Iraqi sources reported on March 23 that Iraqi militias reportedly launched rockets from Rabia, Nineveh Province, targeting the former US Rumaylan Landing Zone Base in Hasakah Province, Syria.[152] A Syrian source reported that US forces withdrew from Rumaylan Landing Zone in late February 2026.[153] The Syrian Army 60th Division backfilled the base on March 14.[154] Two Iraqi security sources told Reuters on March 23 that Iraqi security forces seized a burnt-out truck with a rocket launcher platform in Rabia after the attack.[155] This is the first reported attempted attack targeting US forces in Syria.[156]

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions. The combined force conducted strikes targeting the 15th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade headquarters in Salah al Din Province and the 27th PMF Brigade headquarters in Anbar Province on March 23.[157] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[158] The Iranian-backed Badr Organization controls the 27th PMF Brigade.[159]

The United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are working to prevent the Houthis from opening another front in the war against Iran. Saudi authorities are reportedly trying to sustain diplomatic channels with the Houthis to ensure that they remain outside the war, according to a US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[160] The same official added that the United States and Israel are simultaneously being cautious to avoid actions that could provoke Houthi involvement and further complicate the war.[161]

Iranian Internal Security

Iranian security forces continued to arrest individuals on charges of espionage in Tehran, East Azerbaijan, Kerman, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Khuzestan, Fars, Yazd, and North Khorasan provinces across Iran on March 22 and 23.[162] The LEC arrested two "mercenaries" in East Azerbaijan Province, on March 23, and seized a large amount of "satellite equipment," possibly referring to Starlink devices.[163] The LEC also arrested an individual attempting to procure and distribute various bladed weapons in Shiraz, Fars Province, on March 23.[164] The forces seized 2,076 such weapons, including knives, machetes, swords, and axes.[165]

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Endnotes

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Iran Update Special Report, March 24, 2026



Avery Borens, Kelly Campa, Benjamin Schmida, Parker Hempel, Carolyn Moorman, Nidal Morrison, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: *ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.*

Key Takeaways

1. Iran is reportedly requiring some vessels to pay a fee to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime intelligence company Lloyd's List reported on March 23 that over 20 vessels have taken a "Tehran-approved route" to transit the Strait of Hormuz through Iranian territorial waters since the war began. Lloyd's List reported that at least two vessels, including a Chinese state-owned feeder tanker, have paid Iran a fee in exchange for safe passage through the strait.
2. The combined force continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran's missile capabilities. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it has conducted more than 600 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile sites since the start of the war.
3. The combined force continued to strike industrial sites and companies with ties to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The IDF reported that it conducted an "extensive" wave of strikes targeting Iranian "production sites" in Esfahan Province and other areas of Iran on March 24.
4. Iran has launched nine waves of missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff. Iran continued to fire cluster munitions targeting Israel on March 24, likely to maximize destruction and terrorize Israeli civilians.
5. Hezbollah claimed 54 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 23 and 3:00 PM ET on March 24. The IDF is preparing to expand its ground operations and air campaign in Lebanon.

Toplines

Iran has reportedly mined the Strait of Hormuz with about a dozen Maham 3 and Maham 7 limpet mines.[1] US officials told CBS News that Iran has laid at least a dozen Maham 3 and Maham 7 mines, but a separate US official told CBS that Iran has laid fewer than a dozen mines in the strait.[2] The Maham 3 is a high-explosive “moored, buoyant, anti-shipping” naval mine with a maximum depth of 100 meters, according to the Collective Awareness to Unexploded Ordnance (CAT-UXO) organization.[3] The Maham 3 is equipped with magnetic and acoustic sensors, which it uses to target vessels.[4] The Maham 3 can determine a ship’s presence from around three meters in all directions, according to CAT-UXO.[5] The Maham 7 is a high-explosive “bottom influence” mine that sits on the seafloor and is equipped with magnetic and acoustic sensors that it uses to target medium-sized ships, landing crafts, and small submarines.[6] The Maham 7 is lightweight and can be deployed by surface vessels as well as via parachute from aircraft or helicopters.[7] The number of mines that Iran has reportedly laid is relatively consistent with a March 10 *Wall Street Journal* report that Iran had laid fewer than ten mines.[8] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine said on March 19 that US Central Command (CENTCOM) has destroyed 44 Iranian minelaying vessels.[9]


Iran is reportedly requiring some vessels to pay a fee to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime intelligence company Lloyd’s List reported on March 23 that over 20 vessels have taken a “Tehran-approved route” to transit the Strait of Hormuz through Iranian territorial waters since the war began.[10] A senior reporter at Lloyd’s List reported that vessels that transit through the approved route pass by Larak Island, where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) verifies vessel details and, in some cases, requires vessels to pay a fee.[11] Lloyd’s List reported that at least two vessels, including a Chinese state-owned feeder tanker, have paid Iran a fee in exchange for safe passage through the strait, with one fee reported to have been around \$2 million USD.[12]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed former IRGC Deputy Commander and Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary on March 24, replacing Ali Larijani.[13] Pezeshkian reportedly appointed Zolghadr with Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s approval.[14] Zolghadr is a hardline figure with deep connections to Iran’s military and judicial apparatuses. Zolghadr commanded the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters during the Iran-Iraq War.[15] Zolghadr served as the IRGC coordination deputy between 1989 and 1997 and IRGC deputy commander between 1997 and 2005.[16] Zolghadr was heavily critical of former reformist President Mohammad Khatami and was one of the primary architects of former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005.[17] Zolghadr served as the security deputy in the Interior Ministry during Ahmadinejad’s term and later served as the Armed Forces General Staff deputy for Basij affairs, playing a large role in suppressing the 2009 Green Movement.[18] The UN sanctioned Zolghadr in 2007 for his involvement in developing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[19] Ali Larijani’s brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, appointed Zolghadr as Expediency Discernment Council secretary in 2021.[20]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran’s missile capabilities. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it has conducted more than 600 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile sites since the start of the war.[21] The Israeli Air Force struck more than 50 targets in northern and central Iran, including sites used to launch and store ballistic missiles, on March 23 and 24.[22] IDF Military Intelligence has identified “low morale, absenteeism, and

burnout” among IRGC ballistic missile units within the past week.[23] The IDF said that ballistic missile unit soldiers have refused to go to launch sites due to fear of IDF strikes.[24] The combined force reportedly struck the IRGC Amand Missile Base, north of Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on March 24.[25] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account published a video of smoke rising from the mountain where the base is located on March 24.[26] The combined force struck this base at the beginning of the war on February 28.[27] The base reportedly stores Ghadr medium-range ballistic missiles, which Iran has used to attack Israel during this war and during previous rounds of conflict.[28]



The combined force also continued to target Artesh Air Force bases. Anti-regime media published footage of a combined force strike on the Artesh Air Force 7th Tactical Airbase in Shiraz, Fars Province, on March 24.[29] The combined force previously struck the 7th Tactical Airbase on March 13.[30]

The combined force continued to strike industrial sites and companies with ties to the Iranian


Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The IDF reported that it conducted an “extensive” wave of strikes targeting Iranian “production sites” in Esfahan Province and other areas of Iran on March 24.[31] The IDF separately reported that it struck Iran’s “main” explosives production facility southwest of Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[32] The IDF said that the factory was used to manufacture explosives for various Iranian weapons.[33] Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 shows damage to this facility, which indicates that the combined force previously struck this site around March 9. The IDF said that it previously targeted the facility during the June 2025 war.[34] Anti-regime media reported in late June 2025 that the IDF had targeted Lenjan Defense Industries in Esfahan during the June 2025 war.[35] It is unclear if the facility that the IDF targeted on March 24 is associated with Lenjan Defense Industries, although the facility is located near the town of Lenjan.

Geolocated footage posted on March 24 shows extensive damage to a building affiliated with Esfahan Optics Industries in Esfahan Province.[36] The geolocated footage shows that multiple floors of the building collapsed, and the majority of the building’s facade is destroyed.[37] Esfahan Optics Industries is a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries, which is owned by the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.[38] Esfahan Optics Industries produces complex lenses and prisms that Iran uses in a variety of military weapons systems, including small arms, tanks, and drones.[39] The United States sanctioned Esfahan Optics Industries in October 2023 for supporting Iran’s drone and missile programs.[40] The IDF previously struck a facility associated with Iran Electronic Industries in Tajrish, northeastern Tehran, on March 23.[41] Iran Electronics Industries manufactures various military products, including electronic warfare equipment, missile launchers, and tactical communication systems.[42]

Geolocated footage shows that the combined force also struck the Malek Ashtar University of Technology in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province.[43] The university is linked to the Defense Industries Organization, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.[44] The combined force previously struck the Malek Ashtar University Aerospace Complex in Pasdaran, Tehran City, on March 2.[45]

An OSINT account geolocated footage on March 24 of a combined force strike on a Shahid Tamjidi Offshore Industries building in Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province.[46] Shahid Tamjidi Offshore Industries is affiliated with the Marine Industries Organization, which is a subsidiary of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization.[47] The combined force previously struck this site, along with the 4th Artesh Naval District Headquarters at Bandar Anzali Port, on March 18.[48]

Iranian Defense Industrial Base Hierarchy




Source: Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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Satellite imagery from March 22 shows that the combined force has inflicted substantial damage to Iranian naval and air infrastructure in the Nazeat Islands near the Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to degrade Iran's ability to threaten international shipping.[49]

The Nazeat Islands, which include the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri islands, are strategically located along key maritime approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. US strikes damaged or destroyed communications infrastructure, fuel depots, maintenance facilities, an aircraft hangar, and port facilities on Greater Tunb Island, according to commercially available satellite imagery, an OSINT account, and an Israeli think tank.[50] Imagery from March 22 shows extensive damage to the island's port, including strikes on berths, nearby buildings, and many docked fast attack craft.[51] US strikes also targeted facilities that support a "vast network of underground bunkers," according to the Israeli think tank.[52] The think tank reported that these bunkers store anti-ship cruise missiles and other weapons that Iran can use to threaten shipping.[53] US strikes also targeted an aircraft hangar and a nearby

vehicle repair building at Greater Tunb Island's airbase but did not target the runway itself, unlike other combined force strikes on Iranian airbases.[54] The lack of strikes on the runway may suggest that the US strikes were focused on degrading specific operational capabilities, such as drone operations or aircraft maintenance, rather than rendering the airfield unusable. The cumulative damage to communications, port, and airfield infrastructure has likely degraded Iran's ability to coordinate and sustain maritime operations from Greater Tunb Island.



Greater Tunb Island Port and Berth

Greater Tunb, Iran
26.265025, 55.324379




Commercially available satellite imagery from March 22 shows that the combined force similarly struck Abu Musa Island. Combined force strikes on Abu Musa Island appear to have targeted both the island's port facilities as well as aircraft hangars adjacent to the island's airstrip. Strikes on the island's eastern port appear to have targeted the port's berths and an adjacent warehouse, while strikes on the western port targeted an unspecified structure on the port's wharf that was constructed after August 2022.[55] Strikes also targeted three aircraft hangars on the eastern end of the island's airstrip but did not strike the main airport building on the western end.[56] The combined force's strikes on Abu Musa Island have likely similarly degraded Iran's ability to coordinate and sustain maritime operations from the island.

**Abu Musa
Western Port**

South of Bandar Lengeh, Hormozgan Province, Iran
25.8714204°N 55.0132354°E



Strike Damage



March 7, 2026

Imagery
© Satellogic

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
Abu Musa
Eastern Port

South of Bandar Lengeh, Hormozgan Province, Iran
25.8722016°N 55.0534291°E



The combined force likely struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region Headquarters in Bushehr City on March 23.[57] Anti-regime media published a video that shows a large plume of smoke following a strike on a naval base in Bushehr.[58] The IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region Headquarters oversees parts of the northern Persian Gulf.[59] The combined force likely previously struck this base on March 7, March 14, and March 21.[60]

Traffic Through the Strait of Hormuz As of March 24, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



Iranian Response

Iran has launched nine waves of missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff.[61]

This rate is generally consistent with the daily rate of Iranian missile barrages against Israel in recent days. A ballistic missile impacted in Tel Aviv on March 24, injuring four individuals.[62] Israeli police assessed that Iran fired a missile with a 220-pound (nearly 100-kilogram) warhead in the attack, which is around half the weight of the warheads in missiles that Iran has previously fired at Israel during this conflict.[63] Iran has typically fired missiles with 520-pound (236-kilogram) warheads, according to an Israeli security official.[64]

An Iranian missile fragment landed in Hares in the northern West Bank on March 24.[65] A missile expert identified the fragment as belonging to an Iranian Fattah-series medium-range ballistic missile.[66] An

Iranian ballistic missile also fell in Safed, northern Israel, injuring two people.[67]



Iran continued to fire cluster munitions targeting Israel on March 24, likely to maximize destruction and terrorize Israeli civilians. An Israeli military correspondent posted footage of an Iranian cluster munition over Haifa, which caused damage to a home in a Haifa suburb.[68] Iranian cluster munitions also dispersed over central Israel and impacted in Bnei Brak and Petah Tikvah.[69] Seven people were injured in Bnei Brak.[70] Around 70 percent of the missiles that Iran has launched at Israel have reportedly contained cluster munitions.[71]

An unspecified actor intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile over Lebanon on March 24.[72] Two Lebanese security sources told a Reuters journalist that a “foreign naval vessel” intercepted the missile.[73] Iranian ballistic missile fragments landed in several villages along the Lebanese coast about nine miles north of Beirut.[74] An unspecified senior US official told Israeli media that the missile may

have been targeting Cyprus.[75] Lebanese media speculated that the missile was targeting US assets in Lebanon.[76] Two Iranian missiles fell in southern Lebanon on March 23.[77]

Iran is attempting to conduct cyberattacks targeting Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states as part of its asymmetric strategy to try to degrade the combined force's willingness to continue their war effort.[78] Israel National Cyber Directorate Chief Yossi Karadi said on March 24 that dozens of Iranian hacker groups have attempted to conduct both kinetic and cyber-attacks targeting Israeli utilities and businesses, as well as Gulf states' infrastructure.[79] Karadi said that a hacker group broadcast false messages on Israel Railways' monitors in a few locations on March 11.[80] Karadi also noted that Iran has increasingly coordinated cyberattacks with Hezbollah.[81] An Iranian-linked hacker group previously conducted a cyber-attack targeting a US healthcare company on March 11, likely to try to impose political pressure on the US administration.[82] The US Justice Department seized domains linked to the Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry involved in recent cyberattacks or hacking attempts on March 19.[83]

Iran appears to have refrained from attacking Qatar since March 18, likely due to President Trump's March 18 warning that the United States would attack Iran's South Pars Gas Field if Iran continued to attack Qatar. Trump warned on Truth Social on March 18 that the United States would "massively blow up the entirety" of the South Pars Gas Field if Iran attacked Qatar again.[84] Trump's warning came after Iran struck Qatar's Ras Laffan Industrial City and damaged Qatari liquefied natural gas facilities on March 18 in retaliation for Israel's attack on South Pars.[85] ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian missile or drone attacks targeting Qatari territory since Trump's statement. Iranian state media issued a statement denying the validity of an alleged IRGC graphic that threatened Qatar on March 21.[86] The South Pars Gas Field is central to Iran's domestic natural gas supply and broader energy system.[87]


Iran may be increasing its rate of drone attacks targeting Bahrain to compensate for its apparent pause in attacks targeting Qatar. Iranian drone attacks against Bahrain have increased in recent days. Iran fired 36 and 19 drones targeting Bahrain on March 23 and 24, respectively, compared to two drones on both March 21 and 22 (see graphs below).[88] The timing of this increase suggests that Iran may be redirecting drone fire away from Qatar and toward Bahrain.

Iran continued to target Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 24. Unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iranian strikes against Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE will "continue as usual" even though Iran is reportedly avoiding attacking Qatar and Saudi Arabia.[89] Two unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iran has decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response.[90] The volume of Iranian drones targeting Saudi Arabia has fluctuated in recent days. Iran launched 47 drones at Saudi Arabia on March 23 but only launched one drone at Saudi Arabia on March 24 (see graph below). Iran also conducted the following attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE on March 24:

- **Bahrain:** Iran launched 19 drones and six missiles targeting Bahrain on March 24.[91] The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that an Emirati army contractor was killed in an Iranian ballistic missile attack on Bahrain.[92] The attack also injured five other Emirati soldiers.[93]
- **Kuwait:** Iran launched a slightly higher volume of missiles and drones targeting Kuwait on March 24 than it has in the past three days (see graph below). Iran fired 13 drones and 17 missiles targeting Kuwait.[94]
- **UAE:** Iran launched 17 drones and five ballistic missiles targeting the UAE on March 24.[95] These volumes of drones and missiles are consistent with Iranian fire volumes over the past week

targeting the UAE (see graph below).[96]


Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 24, 2026



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All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 24, 2026



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All data from the Kuwaiti Army.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 24, 2026



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 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 24, 2026



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All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Iran launched multiple ballistic missiles targeting a Peshmerga base near Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on March 24, killing six soldiers and wounding thirty others.[97] The Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) Peshmerga Affairs Ministry released a statement condemning the attack and affirming the KRG's right to respond to threats against Iraqi Kurdistan.

ISRAELI CAMPAIGN AGAINST HEZBOLLAH AND HEZBOLLAH RESPONSE


Hezbollah claimed 54 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 23 and 3:00 PM ET on March 24.[98] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rockets and drones targeting IDF sites in northern Israel, including the Liman Barracks and Ramot Naftali Base.[99] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rockets targeting the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems complex in Acre, northern Israel, which Hezbollah has previously targeted in the Fall 2024 conflict and during this war.[100] Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is an Israeli state-owned organization that develops weapons and military technology for the IDF.[101] An Israeli journalist reported on March 24 that Hezbollah launched a barrage of approximately 30 rockets toward the Upper Galilee.[102] One of the rockets impacted near the Mahanayim Junction, northern Israel, killing one individual and injuring two others.[103] Hezbollah launched another barrage of 30 rockets toward the Haifa Bay area in northern Israel on March 24.[104] Israeli sources reported multiple instances of sirens in northern Israel on March 23 and 24 in response to

Hezbollah drone and rocket attacks.[105] An Israeli military official told the *Wall Street Journal* that the IDF estimates that Hezbollah currently has between 11,000 and 13,000 missiles and rockets in its arsenal.[106]



Hezbollah conducted 36 attacks against Israeli forces and towns in northern Israel on March 23, which marks the highest number of attacks against Israel that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the start of the war.[107] The rate of Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel has varied since the group joined the war on March 1 (see below).

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1, 2026 and March 23, 2026




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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah is primarily using rockets, but is increasingly also using drones, to attack Israel. Hezbollah has recently maintained a high number of rocket attacks against IDF targets, conducting over 20 rocket attacks per day since March 17 (see below).[108] Hezbollah claimed 14 drone attacks on March 23, which marks the highest number of drone attacks that Hezbollah has claimed since the group joined the war on March 1.[109] Hezbollah also claimed 12 drone attacks between 3:00 PM ET on March 23 and 3:00 PM on March 24.[110] An Israeli think tank previously noted that drones are increasingly becoming “a significant component of [Hezbollah’s] campaign.”[111] Hezbollah prioritized domestic drone production and shifted its munition rehabilitation budget to focus on drones after the Fall 2024 conflict.[112] Hezbollah has long assembled low-cost Ayoub and Mersad drones in Lebanon using civilian parts ordered online.[113] ISW-CTP previously forecasted in a [February 28 report](#) that Hezbollah would likely use low-cost weapons, such as drones, to conduct attacks against Israel.[114]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 23, 2026 By Type



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



The IDF continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon on March 23 and 24. The IDF struck several Hezbollah sites and command centers, including a Radwan Force command center and a Hezbollah Intelligence Division command center, in Beirut.[115] The IDF struck a Hezbollah command center in a building belonging to the Hezbollah-owned al Nour radio station in southern Lebanon.[116] The IDF killed IRGC Quds Force member Mohammad Ali Kourani in an airstrike in Beirut on March 24.[117] The IDF conducted a wave of airstrikes targeting Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations across Lebanon on March 24.[118] The Amana Fuel Company is owned by Hezbollah, operates a network of gas stations in Lebanon, and manages Hezbollah’s fuel supplies.[119] The United States sanctioned the Amana Fuel Company in February 2020 for its role in supporting Hezbollah.[120] The United States stated in February 2020 that Hezbollah profits from the sale of essential goods, such as pharmaceuticals and gasoline.[121]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 24. The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division) is conducting targeted raids in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[122] Forces from the 810th Brigade located a Hezbollah tunnel and a Hezbollah weapons complex in the area.[123] The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) conducted targeted raids in southern Lebanon, during which forces killed eight Hezbollah fighters, destroyed a Hezbollah underground tunnel, and located dozens of Hezbollah weapons.[124] IDF Spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin stated that Israel intends to deploy additional soldiers to Lebanon “in the coming days” to reinforce and “intensify” the IDF’s ground operations.[125] The following brigades are currently operating in southern Lebanon:

- **300th Infantry Territorial Brigade (146th Reserve Division).** The IDF 300th Infantry Territorial Brigade typically operates under the IDF 91st Territorial Division but is currently operating under the IDF 146th Reserve Division.[126] The IDF reported on March 18 that the brigade had conducted several raids to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon over the past week.[127] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the 146th Division is advancing deeper into Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon.[128]
- **810th Mountain Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division).** The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade is conducting targeted raids in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[129] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 22 that the brigade is expanding its operations near Kfarchouba, southwestern Lebanon, and currently controls Jabal Sedana, which is located west of Mount Hermon.[130]
- **188th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division).** A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the 188th Armored Brigade largely controls Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon, and has started to conduct large-scale demolitions in the area.[131]
- **1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division).** The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade conducted targeted raids in southern Lebanon.[132] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade is operating in Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon.[133] An OSINT account reported on March 24 that the brigade destroyed buildings near the Taybeh Mosque.[134] IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir previously ordered the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade to move from the Southern Command to the Northern Command on March 11.[135]
- **84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** The IDF 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[136] The IDF reported on March 22 that the 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade killed several Hezbollah members during an engagement in southern Lebanon.[137] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the brigade is conducting clearing operations in Khiam, southeastern Lebanon, and noted that Israeli forces have seized the majority of the town.[138]
- **401st Armored Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** The IDF 401st Armored Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[139] The IDF reported that the IDF 401st Armored Brigade destroyed a weapons depot and discovered Hezbollah weapons in southern Lebanon on March 16.[140] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 17 that the brigade advanced deeper into Aita al Shaab, southeastern Lebanon, and conducted demolition operations in the town.[141] The analyst reported on March 24 that the brigade is likely spearheading the IDF's advance toward Beit Lif, north of Aita al Shaab.[142]
- **613th Hasmonean Infantry Brigade (146th Reserve Division).** The IDF reported on March 23 that the 613th Hasmonean Infantry Brigade is operating in southern Lebanon for the first time.[143] It is unclear where specifically the brigade is operating. A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the 146th Division is advancing deeper into Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon, however.[144]
- **7th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division).** The IDF noted on March 9 that the IDF 36th Armored Division, including the 7th Armored Brigade, conducted a targeted raid in Rab el Thalathine, southeastern Lebanon.[145] The IDF reported on March 14 that the 7th Armored Brigade had conducted raids that destroyed Hezbollah infrastructure and killed Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon over the past week.[146] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 18 that the 36th Armored Division is conducting clearing operations in Kfar Kila, north of Rab el Thalathine.[147]
- **7338th Artillery Brigade (91st Territorial Division).** Israeli media reported on March 13 that

the 7338th Artillery Brigade directed an Israeli airstrike against Hezbollah fighters in Tyre, southwestern Lebanon.[148]

The IDF is preparing to expand its ground operations and air campaign in Lebanon. The IDF stated that IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir approved the IDF's plans to "advance the targeted ground operations and strikes" against Hezbollah and noted that this would be a "prolonged operation." [149] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on March 24 that Israel seeks to control a "security zone" in southern Lebanon that expands up to the Litani River, which is approximately 29 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[150] Katz noted that the IDF also seeks to control the remaining bridges over the Litani River.[151] Senior Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah responded to Katz's comment and stated that any Israeli control of territory south of the Litani would be met with resistance.[152]

The Lebanese government has continued to act against Hezbollah and Iran. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry withdrew on March 24 accreditation from Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani, declaring him persona non grata and demanding that he leave Lebanon.[153] Hezbollah condemned the Lebanese Foreign Ministry's decision, stating that "it constitutes a coup against [Hezbollah]." [154] Hezbollah added that the decision "opens the doors to internal division, deepens the national rift, and plunges the country into a highly dangerous path of dependency, weakness, and vulnerability." [155] Lebanese authorities also reportedly arrested eight Hezbollah operatives transporting 21 rockets to southern Lebanon on March 24.[156] The Lebanese government's actions are notable because no previous Lebanese government has taken such direct steps against Hezbollah or the IRGC.

OTHER Axis of Resistance Response

The US and Israeli combined force struck an Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) base near al Habbaniya District, eastern Anbar Province, Iraq, on March 24.[157] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[158] The PMF announced that the strikes killed Anbar Operations Commander Saad al Bajili.[159] The strikes reportedly killed at least 13 other PMF members and injured 30 others.[160] Qasim Musleh al Khafaji, who is affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah, is often characterized by the PMF as the Anbar Operations Commander.[161] It is unclear how Bajili and Khafaji's responsibilities differed. Iraqi security sources speaking to Reuters said that the strikes occurred during a meeting attended by senior PMF commanders.[162]

Combined force strikes targeted the Mosul residence of Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh on March 24.[163] Fayyadh was not at the residence during the strikes and reportedly only uses the residence when he is in Mosul. A security source told Iraqi media on March 24 that combined force strikes separately targeted a site in Mosul linked to Fayan al Kildani, who commands the Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated 50th PMF Brigade.[164] The combined force previously struck a checkpoint belonging to the 50th PMF Brigade north of Mosul on March 2.[165] An Iraqi security source also told Iraqi media on March 24 that airstrikes targeted a 31st PMF Brigade base in Baiji District, Salah al Din Province, killing seven PMF members.[166]

Iraqi authorities reportedly arrested four people in al Rabia, Ninewa Province, for their involvement in the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia rocket attack targeting the former US Rumaylan Landing Zone base in Hasakah Province, Syria, on March 23.[167] Syrian and Iraqi sources reported on March 23 that Iraqi militias launched rockets from al Rabia, Ninewa Province, targeting the base.[168] A Syrian source reported that US forces withdrew from Rumaylan Landing Zone

in late February 2026.[169] The Syrian Army 60th Division backfilled the base on March 14.[170] Two Iraqi security sources told Reuters on March 23 that Iraqi security forces seized a burnt truck with a rocket launcher platform in al Rabia after the attack.[171]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to launch and claim attacks on US and foreign targets in Iraq. An OSINT account posted footage on March 23 of an air defense system intercepting drones over Erbil.[172] British media reported that British troops based in Erbil intercepted 12 drones between March 23 and 24.[173] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have consistently targeted US and foreign forces in Iraqi Kurdistan since the war began.[174] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Jaysh al Ghadb claimed on March 23 that it conducted an “air attack” targeting unspecified US interests in Erbil.[175] Kataib Sarqhat al Quds, which is considered a front group for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, also claimed on March 24 that it conducted a drone attack against US forces in northern Iraq.[176] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq said it conducted 23 attacks against “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region using dozens of missiles and drones in the past 24 hours.[177] ISW-CTP has not observed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias using drones in the war at the time of this writing.

Other Activity

US President Donald Trump told reporters on March 24 that the United States is negotiating with Iran.[178] Trump said that Iran would “like to make a deal.”[179] Unspecified sources told Axios on March 24 that the United States and regional partners, including Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, have discussed holding high-level peace talks with Iran on March 26 but are waiting for Iran’s response.[180] Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said on March 24 that Pakistan would be willing to host the US-Iran talks.[181] An unspecified Iranian source told CNN on March 24 that the United States reached out to Iran via various intermediaries.[182] The source claimed that there have not been “full-on negotiations” between the United States and Iran.[183] Three senior sources in Tehran separately told Reuters on March 24 that Iran is hardening its position in any potential talks with the United States.[184] Iran would demand guarantees against future military action, compensation for wartime losses, formal control of the Strait of Hormuz, and no limits on its ballistic missile program, according to the sources.[185] Trump previously extended his deadline for Iran to reach a deal with the United States to March 27.[186]

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Endnotes

[1] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/strait-of-hormuz-mines-iran-talks-officials/>

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- [11] <https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156694/Zombie-tankers-take-Tehran-Toll-Booth-route-as-more-vessels-make-detour>
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- [16] <https://www.ifmat.org/09/21/irgc-hand-appointed-secretary-iran-expediency-council/>
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Iran Update Special Report, March 25, 2026



Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Benjamin Schmida, Parker Hempel, Avery Borens, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. The United States presented a 15-point proposal to Iran via Pakistan on March 24. The 15-point proposal reportedly includes provisions requiring Iran to dismantle its nuclear program, end uranium enrichment, hand over its enriched uranium stockpile, limit its missile capabilities, cease support for the Axis of Resistance, and ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, among other demands. The Trump administration has reportedly not yet received a formal Iranian response to the US proposal. The White House threatened on March 25 to conduct further military action against Iran if the regime does not agree to a deal to end the conflict.
2. Iran sent a letter to International Maritime Organization member states on March 22 stating that “non-hostile” ships can pass through the Strait of Hormuz if they coordinate with Iran. Ships associated with the United States, Israel, or other “participants in the aggression” are not eligible for safe passage. Vessel operators are required to contact intermediaries with connections to the IRGC before transiting through the strait.
3. A longtime observer of drone operations suggested on March 25 that drone footage posted by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq on March 24 is consistent with a fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone. ISW-CTP is unable to authenticate the Islamic Resistance in Iraq's video. Iran's ability to manufacture and operate fiber-optic FPV drones and transfer this technology to its regional proxies and partners would pose a significant challenge to US interests in the Middle East, if the footage is authentic.
4. ISW-CTP has recorded an uptick in combined force strikes targeting Iranian defense industrial sites since its last data cutoff. This uptick comes amid a report that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to destroy as much of Iran's arms industry as

possible over the next 48 hours.

Toplines

The United States presented a 15-point proposal to Iran via Pakistan on March 24.[1] Pakistani Army Commander Asim Munir, who has reportedly served as the “key interlocutor” between the United States and Iran, delivered the proposal to Iran.[2] Munir also contacted Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and offered to host talks between the United States and Iran.[3] The 15-point proposal reportedly includes provisions requiring Iran to dismantle its nuclear program, end uranium enrichment, hand over its enriched uranium stockpile, grant full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to Iranian nuclear facilities, limit its missile capabilities, cease support for the Axis of Resistance, and ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.[4] Three unspecified sources familiar with the details of the proposal told Israeli media on March 24 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are trying to establish a month-long ceasefire during which the United States and Iran would negotiate the 15-point proposal.[5] Iran separately proposed five conditions for a ceasefire, including the complete cessation of US and Israeli attacks, establishment of a mechanism to prevent renewed conflict, compensation for wartime damages, an end to attacks on the Axis of Resistance, and international recognition of Iran’s authority over the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Unspecified Iranian officials told Iranian media that no direct negotiations are currently taking place between the United States and Iran and that Iran will set the timing and conditions for ending the war.[7] An Axios correspondent reported on March 25 that the Trump administration has not yet received a formal Iranian response to the US proposal for negotiations, citing an unspecified US official.[8] The White House threatened on March 25 to conduct further military action against Iran if the regime does not agree to a deal to end the conflict.[9]

A longtime observer of drone operations suggested on March 25 that drone footage posted by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq on March 24 is consistent with a fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone.[10] **ISW-CTP is unable to authenticate the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s video, however.** The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed that it attacked the former US Victory Base at Baghdad International Airport and posted drone footage of the attack.[11] The United States transferred control of the Victory Base to the Iraqi federal government in 2011, but Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continuously claimed attacks targeting the base since the start of the war.[12] The drone footage shows that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted a helicopter and a US radar system.[13] ISW-CTP has not observed any evidence to support the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s claim that it attacked the Victory Base around March 24. Iraqi media reported two separate drone attacks targeting Baghdad International Airport on March 22 but did not provide enough information for ISW-CTP to assess whether the video that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq posted on March 24 was from one of those attacks.[14] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam posted footage on March 17 that open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts also assessed to be from a fiber-optic FPV reconnaissance drone flying inside the parameter of the US Embassy in Baghdad.[15] ISW-CTP assessed on March 17 that the group’s decision to advertise its possession of such a weapon represented a threat aimed at the United States.[16]


If the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s video is authentic, Iran’s ability to transfer this technology to its regional proxies and partners would pose a significant challenge to US interests in the Middle East. Fiber-optic FPV drones are immune to jamming and can be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or outfitted with strike capabilities to conduct precise targeting.[17] The drones have small ranges and generally carry small payloads but can impose financial costs when used to target expensive assets.[18] Russia and Ukraine have extensively used FPV drones in their

war.[19] Russia has given drone components to Iran, and Russia would be the most likely actor to have provided Iran with fiber-optic drone capabilities.[20]

Iran sent a letter to International Maritime Organization member states on March 22 stating that “non-hostile” ships can pass through the Strait of Hormuz if they coordinate with Iran, according to the *Financial Times*. [21]

Ships associated with the United States, Israel, or other “participants in the aggression” are not eligible for safe passage. This report is consistent with reports that at least 26 vessels have taken an Iranian-approved route through the Strait of Hormuz as of March 25.[22] Iran has reportedly required some of these vessels to pay a fee to transit the strait. Maritime intelligence firm Lloyd’s List, citing three sources with direct knowledge of the new system, reported that vessel operators are required to contact intermediaries with connections to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) before transiting through the strait.[23] Lloyd’s List reported that 92 percent of the current traffic in the strait is comprised of Iranian (67 percent), Greek (15 percent), and Chinese (10 percent) vessels.[24]

Traffic Through the Strait of Hormuz As of March 25, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET




The *Wall Street Journal* confirmed on March 24 that Israeli strikes on a major Caspian Sea port in northern Iran last week targeted Russian support for Iran in the ongoing war, according to unspecified people familiar with the matter.[25] This report is consistent with ISW-CTP's previous reporting that the IDF struck a Caspian Sea port that Iran uses to trade both military and non-military goods with Russia.[26] The IDF targeted "dozens" of vessels, a command center, and a shipyard at Bandar Anzali Port, Gilan Province, on March 18.[27] The Israeli strike on the port followed reports that Russia has provided Iran with satellite imagery and Shahed drones since the war began.[28] Israeli media reported on March 19 that the Israeli strikes in Bandar Anzali "shut down" a critical supply line between Iran and Russia for both basic goods, such as wheat imports, and military equipment.[29] The *Wall Street Journal* added on March 24 that Russia uses the Caspian Sea to receive Iranian Shahed drones as well as artillery shells and other ammunition to resupply its troops on the front lines with Ukraine.[30] More than 300,000 artillery shells and a million rounds of ammunition

were shipped from Iran to Russia in 2023 via the Caspian Sea, according to unspecified documents seen by the *Wall Street Journal*.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran's missile capabilities. Commercially available satellite imagery from March 14 indicates that the combined force struck the Imam Javad Missile Base north of Shiraz, Fars Province. Combined force strikes targeted three tunnel entrances to underground facilities as well as five adjacent storage bunkers at the base.[31] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that the IDF previously struck the base's administrative support buildings and missile assembly hangar during the 12-Day War.[32] The combined force likely struck the Imam Javad Missile Base again on March 25. Anti-regime media published a video that shows smoke rising from a military facility near the "Imam Javad Barracks," which suggests that the combined force likely struck the Imam Javad Missile Base.[33] The IDF said on March 20 that it has observed an increase in Iranian ballistic missile launches toward Israel from central Iran due to the combined force's degradation of Iranian launch capabilities in western Iran.[34] It is possible that the combined force struck the Imam Javad Missile Base in response to Iranian attempts to launch missiles from the base. The Imam Javad Missile Base is an underground missile base that contains Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, according to an Israeli think tank.[35]



The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air and air defense capabilities to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran. Multiple OSINT accounts geolocated footage of US Central Command (CENTCOM) strikes on ammunition bunkers at the 9th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on March 25.[36] CENTCOM footage shows at least four strikes on bunkers at the airbase, followed by a large secondary explosion.[37] The combined force previously struck the 9th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase on March 10, March 15, and March 20.[38]

The combined force likely struck the 14th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, on March 25, which marks the most northeastern site the combined force has targeted since the start of the war.[39] An Iranian OSINT account published a photo of strikes near the Mashhad International Airport on March 25.[40] The 14th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase is co-located with the Mashhad International Airport. Iranian officials confirmed the strikes to Iranian media on March 25.[41]

ISW-CTP has recorded an uptick in combined force strikes targeting Iranian defense industrial sites since its last data cutoff. This uptick comes amid a report that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to destroy as much of Iran's arms industry as possible over the next 48 hours.[42] The New York Times reported on March 25 that Netanyahu ordered the IDF to maximize its destruction of Iran's arms industry over the next 48 hours, citing two senior Israeli officials.[43] The IDF reported that it struck two facilities in Tehran where Iran manufactured naval cruise missiles.[44] One strike targeted a building in the Shiyan neighborhood in eastern Tehran, while the other targeted the Shahid Motahari Applied Scientific Education Center in Imam Khomeini Town, northeastern Tehran.[45] The IDF said on March 25 that it also struck an air and naval weapons production site near Vandar, Ghazvin Province.[46] The IDF separately said on March 25 that it struck the Underwater Military Equipment Research and Development Center in northern Esfahan City, which is responsible for designing and developing submarines and support systems.[47] The IDF said that the facility is the only site in Iran responsible for developing submarines and auxiliary systems.[48] The submarine facility is located next to the Defense Industries Organization-affiliated Malek Ashtar University of Technology in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province, which the combined force struck on March 24.[49] These IDF strikes are consistent with the combined force's effort to degrade Iran's ability to threaten shipping in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

The combined force continued to strike industrial sites and companies with ties to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Geolocated images from an OSINT account on March 25 show that combined force strikes destroyed a hangar and a building at the Pars Aviation Services Company (PASC) at the Mehrabad International Airport in Tehran.[50] Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that the combined force struck the hangar and building between March 8 and 9. The strikes may have targeted aircraft in the hangar, given that commercially available satellite imagery shows an Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft outside the hangar. The PASC is an Iranian aircraft supply and repair company that is affiliated with the IRGC and sanctioned by the United States, the United Nations, and several other Western nations.[51] PASC is responsible for the calibration of Iranian aerial equipment, the design and construction of aerial systems, and the supply and repair of aircraft and helicopter parts.[52] The combined force previously struck Mehrabad Airport on February 28, March 7, and March 19.[53] Combined force strikes on March 7 targeted aircraft near the PASC hangar but not the PASC hangar itself.[54]

The combined force likely struck the Alborz Industrial Zone for the first time on March 25, possibly targeting a building belonging to Shahid Shafi Zadeh Industries.[55] An Israeli OSINT account published a video on March 25 that shows multiple combined force strikes on the Alborz Industrial Zone, followed by secondary explosions.[56] The OSINT account reported that the strikes may

have targeted the Shahid Shafi Zadeh Industrial Complex, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense Ministry's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).[57] The Shahid Shafi Zadeh Industrial Complex manufactures components for ballistic missiles.[58]

The combined force may have struck the Parchin Military Complex in Tehran Province on March 25.[59] Anti-regime media published a video of smoke rising from Parchin following possible combined force strikes on the complex.[60] The combined force has struck Parchin on at least three previous occasions, including on March 3, March 7, and March 12.[61]

The combined force has continued to target IRGC commanders. IRGC-affiliated media reported on March 23 that the combined force killed IRGC 1st Naval District Commander Mosayeb Bakhtiari.[62] The combined force reportedly killed Bakhtiari in a strike in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[63] The combined force has repeatedly struck Iranian naval facilities at the Bandar Abbas Port, which houses the IRGC Navy 1st Naval District and IRGC Navy Headquarters.[64] Iranian media also announced the death of the IRGC Ground Forces 41st Sarallah Division Commander Amir Mohammadi.[65] The combined force reportedly targeted the 41st Sarallah Division headquarters in Kerman City, Kerman Province, on March 20.[66] IRGC-affiliated media also confirmed on March 16 that IRGC commander Javad Bagheri was killed in combined force strikes.[67] Bagheri is the brother of former Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, whom Israel killed during the 12-Day War.[68]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant did not sustain damage after a projectile landed on the facility's premises. Iran notified the IAEA that an unspecified projectile landed in the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant facility's premises on March 24.[69] Iran previously notified the IAEA of a "projectile incident" near the plant on March 17 that also caused no damage.[70] The Institute for Science and International Security identified an impact crater about 350 meters from the power plant's reactor in March 18 satellite imagery.[71] Rosatom reportedly evacuated 163 Russian technicians from the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant on March 24.[72] Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev said that 300 Russian technicians currently remain at the power plant.[73] Likhachev stated that more Russian technicians will evacuate the plant in the future.[74] No technicians were injured in the March 17 and 24 incidents.

An Israeli geospatial analyst and an Israeli think tank published satellite imagery from March 22 showing damage to a chemical plant near Garmsar, Semnan Province.[75] The chemical plant consists of multiple facilities.[76] The satellite imagery shows damage to two unspecified buildings in the plant's western facility and one building in the plant's eastern facility.[77] The IDF previously struck one of the facilities during the 12-Day War and described the facility as a liquid fuel production facility for Iranian ballistic missiles.[78]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 24, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 25, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



- Confirmed Airstrike
- Reported Airstrike
- Report of Explosion With Footage

Iranian Response

Iran has launched seven waves of missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff.[79] Six of the seven waves reportedly included only a single missile that the IDF intercepted.[80] An Iranian missile impacted near the Orot Rabin Power Plant in Hadera, Israel, on March 25.[81] The Israeli Electric Corporation stated on March 25 that there was no damage to the plant's infrastructure.[82] An OSINT account reported that one missile impacted in southern Israel on March 25, injuring at least two people.[83]


Iranian and Axis Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East

Between March 24, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 25, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



Iran continued to target Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 25. Two unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iran had decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response.[84] The rate of Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia has fluctuated since then, however. Iran launched 7 drones at Saudi Arabia on March 22, 47 drones on March 23, 32 drones on March 24, and 6 drones on March 25.[85] Iran separately fired nine drones and 20 ballistic missiles targeting Kuwait on March 25.[86] One of the Iranian drones struck a fuel tank at the Kuwait International Airport in Kuwait City.[87] Iran launched thirty drones targeting Bahrain on March 25.[88] ISW-CTP previously noted that Iran may be increasing drone attacks against Bahrain to compensate for an apparent pause in drone attacks against Qatar. Iran also launched nine drones targeting the UAE on March 25.[89]


Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 25, 2026



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 All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 25, 2026



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
Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 25, 2026



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 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 25, 2026




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All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response


Hezbollah claimed 79 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 24 and 3:00 PM ET on March 25.[90] This marks the highest number of attacks against Israeli forces in Israel and southern Lebanon that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the start of the war. Hezbollah claimed that it launched drones and rockets targeting IDF sites in northern Israel, including the Kerem Ben Zimra Logistics Base and the IDF Meron Air Operations and Control Base.[91] Hezbollah also claimed that it conducted 20 rocket, mortar, drone, and anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in southern Lebanon.[92]

Hezbollah Attacks in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 24, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 25, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



The rate of Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel has generally increased since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below.

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1, 2026 and March 24, 2026




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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah has sustained a high rate of drone attacks against Israeli targets since March 22. Hezbollah claimed 21 drone attacks between 3:00 PM ET on March 24 and 3:00 PM ET on March 25, which marks the highest number of drone attacks that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the group joined the war on March 1.[93] Hezbollah previously claimed 14 drone attacks on March 23.[94] An Israeli think tank previously noted that drones are increasingly becoming “a significant component of [Hezbollah’s] campaign.”[95] Hezbollah prioritized domestic drone production and shifted its munition rehabilitation budget to focus on drones after the Fall 2024 conflict.[96] Hezbollah has long assembled low-cost Ayoub and Mersad drones in Lebanon using civilian parts ordered online.[97] ISW-CTP previously forecasted in a February 28 report that Hezbollah would likely use low-cost weapons, such as drones, to conduct attacks against Israel.[98]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 24, 2026 By Type



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 25. The IDF reported that the 7th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division) destroyed a weapons depot in southern Lebanon.[99] The IDF also reported that the 1st Golani Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) killed an armed Hezbollah fighter in southern Lebanon.[100] The IDF said on March 25 that the 401st Armored Brigade (91st Territorial Division) killed a group of Hezbollah fighters after the fighters fired an anti-tank guided missile targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.[101] An Israeli journalist reported on March 25 that the “Egoz Unit” captured a Lebanese Resistance Brigades cell leader in Mount Dov, Lebanon.[102] The Lebanese Resistance Brigades is a Hezbollah-allied militia that has participated in Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces.[103] The “Egoz Unit” is an elite commando unit that operates under the 89th Brigade (36th Armored Division).[104]

The IDF continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon on March 25. The IDF said that it struck a Hezbollah “command center” in Dahiyeh, Beirut City.[105] The IDF also said that it struck several Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations in Lebanon on March 25. The IDF previously conducted a wave of airstrikes targeting Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations across Lebanon on March 24.[106] The Amana Fuel Company is owned by Hezbollah, operates a network of gas stations in Lebanon, and manages Hezbollah’s fuel supplies.[107] The United States sanctioned the Amana Fuel Company in February 2020 for its role in supporting Hezbollah.[108]

The IDF issued new evacuation orders for several southern Lebanese villages on March 25. The IDF called on residents in these villages to move north of the Zahrani River.[109] The Zahrani River is further north than the Litani River and is located approximately 56 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon

border.[110]

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem rejected negotiations with Israel in a statement on March 25.[111] He urged the Lebanese government to stop acting against Hezbollah, called for national unity, and described resistance as a “national responsibility.”[112] The Lebanese government has recently taken several actions against Hezbollah, including arresting eight Hezbollah operatives who were transporting rockets to southern Lebanon on March 24.[113]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to degrade the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ ability to attack US interests and Israel. Iraqi media reported on March 25 that airstrikes targeted an intelligence headquarters located at an Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) base near al Habbaniya District, eastern Anbar Province.[114] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[115] Combined force strikes targeting the same base on March 24 killed the Anbar Operations Commander and at least 13 other PMF members.[116] The Iraqi Ministerial Council for National Security announced in response to the attack on the PMF base in al Habbaniya District that the principle of self-defense applies to the PMF confronting “military aggressions” but did not provide further details.[117] Combined force strikes also targeted Kataib Hezbollah sites in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and sites associated with the 31st PMF Brigade in Baiji, Salah al Din Province.[118]

Airstrikes targeting an Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) clinic and command site in al Habbaniya District, Anbar Province, on March 25 killed seven Iraqi soldiers and wounded 13 others.[119] A Kurdish journalist reported on March 25 that PMF members who were injured in the combined force strike on the PMF base in al Habbaniya on March 24 were transferred to the MoD site for medical assistance.[120] The Kurdish journalist added that the combined force campaign in Iraq has focused on killing commanders and “key military personnel” directly responsible for running Iranian-backed Iraqi militia units within the PMF.[121] A US State Department official separately told the New Arab on March 25 that the Iraqi federal government has not provided information to the United States about the location of Iraqi Security Forces units despite continuous US requests for this information to protect Iraqi soldiers.[122]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba front group Kataib Sarqhat al Quds claimed on March 24 that it conducted a drone attack targeting US and Israeli interests in Jordan.[123] Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan issued a joint statement on March 25 condemning Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting their countries.[124] Saraya Awliya al Dam, which is considered a front group for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, responded to the statement and claimed that its attacks on these countries only target US assets.[125] Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed that its attacks on these countries will “intensify” due to US troop deployments to the Middle East and claimed that recent attacks targeting the PMF and MoD were launched from bases in the Gulf countries and Jordan.[126] Saraya Awliya al Dam separately claimed on March 24 that it targeted sites belonging to Iranian opposition groups in northern Iraq, where Israeli Mossad agents were reportedly present.[127]

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Endnotes

- [1] <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/israel-strikes-tehran-trump-says-us-negotiating-end-war-2026-03-25/>
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Correction: CTP-ISW incorrectly suggested that Iran has the capability to manufacture fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones. We have no evidence to suggest that Iran has this capability, and we assess

that it is more likely that Russia provided Iran with fiber-optic FPV drones. We have corrected this update as of March 26, 2026. We apologize for this error.

Iran Update Special Report, March 26, 2026



Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Parker Hempel, Benjamin Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Nidal Morrison, Carolyn Moorman, Jennie Olmsted, Nicholas Carl

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways


1. The combined force conducted strikes around Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, on March 25 and 26, marking the northeastern-most strikes conducted so far in the war. The combined force has slowly swept across Iran west to east and is now getting to some of the furthest targets of the campaign.
2. The IDF has continued targeting senior Iranian commanders to disrupt Iranian command and control and operations broadly. The IDF announced on March 26 that it killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.
3. An IRGC cultural official told state media that the IRGC has lowered the minimum recruitment age to 12. This decision follows reports that the IRGC is facing difficulties with recruiting new personnel and managing broader operational disruptions.
4. Hezbollah continues to claim a high rate of attacks against Israeli targets in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed to conduct 73 attacks targeting Israeli forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 2:00 PM ET on March 25 and 2:00 PM ET on March 26.

Toplines

The combined force conducted strikes around Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, on March 25 and 26, marking the northeastern-most strikes conducted so far in the war. The combined

force has slowly swept across Iran west to east and is now getting to some of the furthest targets of the campaign. An Iranian OSINT account and anti-regime media footage of strikes near Mashhad International Airport on March 25.[1] The 14th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase and 5th Artesh Ground Forces Aviation Base are co-located at the Mashhad International Airport.[2] The IDF previously struck an Iranian refueling aircraft at Mashhad International Airport during the 12-Day War.[3] Anti-regime media also posted footage of smoke plumes rising in Mashhad, suggesting that the combined force may have struck additional targets in the area.[4] Mashhad is the second most-populated city in Iran.[5]

Iranian Nuclear, Military, and Energy Infrastructure in Mashhad City
As of March 26, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



The combined force likely struck additional targets in Khorasan Razavi Province on March 25 and 26.[6] Two OSINT accounts published footage of likely combined force strikes around Neyshabour Industrial Town, Khorasan Razavi Province.[7] An Iranian OSINT account published footage on March 25 purportedly showing Iranian air defenses engaging unknown targets, presumably combined force aircraft, over

Taybad, Khorasan Razavi Province.[8]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper said on March 25 that the combined force has struck over 10,000 sites across Iran since the war began.[9] The combined force has concentrated strikes around Tehran as well as western and central Iran.[10]

The IDF has continued targeting senior Iranian commanders to disrupt Iranian command and control and operations broadly. The IDF announced on March 26 that it killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[11] Tangsiri had served as IRGC Navy commander since August 2018.[12] Tangsiri previously served as IRGC Navy deputy commander from 2010 to 2018 and the Bandar Abbas-based IRGC 1st Saheb ol Zaman Naval District commander.[13] The Saheb ol Zaman Naval District has the central mission of controlling the Strait of Hormuz.[14] Its area of operations includes the IRGC Navy headquarters and command center as well as the 2nd Imam Sajjad Special Forces Brigade, the 16th Assef Coastal Missile Group, the 112th Zolfaghar Surface Combat Brigade, and underground fortifications on Abu Musa.[15] The IDF also killed IRGC Navy Intelligence Deputy Behnam Rezaei in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[16] Rezaei reportedly was responsible for regional intelligence collection and coordination.[17] Tangsiri oversaw IRGC Navy operations, including attacks on international shipping and threats to US forces in the region.[18] The United States sanctioned Tangsiri in June 2019 for acting on behalf of the IRGC and his role in threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz and overseeing IRGC Navy activities responsible for the sabotage of vessels in international waters.[19]

The IRGC has reportedly continued to consolidate power within the Iranian regime and play an increasingly central role in key leadership decisions. Anti-regime media reported on March 26 that the IRGC pressured Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to appoint Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary, citing unspecified sources.[20] Zolghadr is a hardline figure with deep ties to Iranian military and judicial establishments.[21] The sources said that IRGC Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi was among the IRGC officers who pressured Pezeshkian.[22] The sources also said that there are no clear signs that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei influenced the decision to appoint Zolghadr, raising continued questions about how involved Mojtaba is in key decisions.[23] The sources added that Pezeshkian and other senior officials opposed Zolghadr's appointment.[24] The reported IRGC role in Zolghadr's appointment comes after a small group of IRGC officer intervened aggressively in the supreme leader succession process to ensure that Mojtaba replaced his father.[25] Statements from US and Israeli security officials indicate that this group of IRGC officers have gained significant influence since Mojtaba became supreme leader.[26]

An IRGC cultural official told state media that the IRGC has lowered the minimum recruitment age to 12.[27] This decision follows reports that the IRGC is facing difficulties with recruiting new personnel and managing broader operational disruptions. The official said that the IRGC is recruiting individuals to support patrols, checkpoints, and logistics.[28] Unspecified informed sources told anti-regime media on March 12 that IRGC efforts to mobilize reserve forces failed because many individuals did not report to military centers.[29] CTP-ISW assessed on March 19 that Israeli strikes on Iranian internal security forces, including decapitation strikes, have likely caused shock and confusion within the internal security apparatus and disrupted operations to some extent.[30]

Reuters reported on March 26 that Iranian hardliners have intensified calls to develop a nuclear weapon, citing unspecified sources in Iran.[31] Some hardliners have urged Iranian leadership to revise the nuclear doctrine, meaning pursue a nuclear weapon, to restore deterrence since October 2024. Iranian parliamentarians signed separate letters in October 2024—after the April and October Iranian missile attacks on Israel—and in September 2025—after the June 2025 Israel-Iran

war—urging a revision of Iranian defensive doctrine.[32] They called on the SNSC to authorize and support nuclear weapons production.

IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published an op-ed on March 26 that urged Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[33] The Tasnim op-ed emphasized that Iran is committed to a peaceful nuclear program, however.[34] Iranian officials have threatened to withdraw from the NPT previously to deter Western action against Iran.[35]

Iranian state media reported that Iran officially sent its response rejecting the 15-point US proposal and is awaiting the US response.[36] The United States presented the proposal to Iran via Pakistan on March 24.[37] The proposal reportedly includes provisions requiring Iran to dismantle its nuclear program, end uranium enrichment, hand over its enriched uranium stockpile, grant full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to Iranian nuclear facilities, limit its missile capabilities, cease support for the Axis of Resistance, and ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.[38] The informed source added that Iran’s response reiterated its demands for a ceasefire which include the complete cessation of US and Israeli attacks, the establishment of a mechanism to prevent renewed conflict, compensation for wartime damages, an end to attacks on the Axis of Resistance, and international recognition of Iran’s “sovereignty” over the Strait of Hormuz.[39] A senior Iranian official speaking to Reuters confirmed that unspecified senior Iranian officials and a representative of Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei reviewed the US proposal.[40] The senior Iranian official added that the proposal asks Iran to forgo its ability to defend itself in turn for a promise to lift sanctions.[41] The official reiterated that the United States and Iran have not arranged negotiations and that negotiations do not seem realistic at this stage of the conflict.[42]

NOTE: A version of the following text will also appear in the Institute for the Study of War’s March 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:

Russia continues to expand its military cooperation with Iran to facilitate Iranian strikes on US and Israeli forces in the Middle East. The *Financial Times* (FT) reported on March 25, citing Western intelligence reports, that Russia is close to completing a phased shipment of unspecified drones, medicine, and food to Iran.[43] Two officials briefed on the intelligence told FT that Russia and Iran began discussing drone deliveries soon after the US-Israeli campaign began and that subsequent deliveries processing started in early March. The officials stated that they expect Russia to complete the deliveries by the end of March. A Western security official told FT that the specific drone type that Russia agreed to send to Iran is unclear, but that Russia is likely only in a position to deliver models such as the Geran-2. Current and former Western officials told FT that Russia denied Iran’s request for S-400 air defense systems. Russia has reportedly already been providing Iran with modified Shahed drone components and satellite imagery to assist recent Iranian strikes on US forces in the Middle East and US allies in the region.[44] ISW continues to assess that Russia sees aiding Iran’s strike campaign as an effort to weaken the United States, as Russia has self-defined the United States as one of its primary geopolitical adversaries.[45]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian missile forces and launchers as well as missile storage and production facilities. The IDF conducted multiple waves of airstrikes on March 26, using over 60 fighter jets and over 150 munitions against weapons production infrastructure across Tehran Province and central Iran.[46] The IDF struck key facilities at the Parchin military complex, including sites used to produce air defense systems, cast and fill explosive warheads, produce ballistic

missile engines, and manufacture critical components for solid-fuel ballistic missiles.[47] CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper said on March 25 that the combined force has destroyed over two-thirds of Iran’s missile, drone, and naval production facilities.[48]



The combined force has intensified its strikes targeting the Iranian defense industrial base amid a report that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to destroy as much of Iran’s arms industry as possible.[49] The *New York Times* reported on March 25 that Netanyahu ordered the IDF to maximize its destruction of Iran’s arms industry over the next 48 hours, citing two senior Israeli officials.[50] The IDF reported that it struck an IRGC Quds Force weapons production site and a “major” defense industry site in Esfahan Province as well as other weapons production facilities used to supply Iran and its partners, including Hezbollah and the Houthis.[51] CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper reported on March 25 that the combined force struck the Esfahan Province Mobarakeh munitions plant.[52] Cooper said that the combined force strikes on Iranian

“large-scale manufacturing capacities” has removed Iran’s ability to build naval vessels, ballistic missiles, and one-way attack drones and share these weapon systems with regional and global “bad actors.”[53]


The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air and air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance in Iran. The combined force likely struck the 7th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase in Shiraz, Fars Province.[54] An Iranian OSINT account published footage and reported smoke rising from multiple explosions near Shiraz International Airport, Fars Province, on March 25.[55] The 7th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase is located at the Shiraz International Airport.[56] The combined force has struck the airbase at least five times since the start of the conflict.[57]


The combined force continued to strike Iranian repressive institutions as part of the broader combined effort to degrade the regime’s coercive capacity. The combined force reportedly hit the IRGC Ground Forces Ansar ol Hossein Provincial Unit in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[58] The IRGC Ground Forces plays a significant role in countering internal threats, including by violently suppressing protest activity.[59] The provincial units oversee IRGC ground elements that are largely dispersed across population centers.[60] The combined force previously struck Law Enforcement Command (LEC) sites in Hamedan City.[61] The LEC is Iran’s national police force and the regime’s first line of defense during civil unrest.[62] The IDF struck an IRGC headquarters around Bonab, East Azerbaijan Province.[63] The combined force previously struck an LEC building in Bonab.[64]

Satellite imagery from March 15 shows that the combined force has inflicted significant damage to Iranian naval and air infrastructure at the IRGC 4th Sarallah Naval District in Bushehr Province as part of efforts to degrade the Iranian ability to threaten international shipping.[65] The 4th Sarallah Naval District is responsible for controlling the central Persian Gulf, including the South Pars gas field, and is commanded by Commander Mansour Ravankar, who has held the position since 2016.[66] An American OSINT analyst published satellite imagery along with a battle damage assessment of what the combined force targeted on March 26.[67] The strikes likely occurred on or immediately before March 15, given that rising smoke is visible at the naval base.[68] Imagery shows that the combined force struck a hangar adjacent to the naval base’s airstrip on the northwest side of the base but did not strike nearby support buildings.[69] The analyst observed that the combined force struck support buildings and storage facilities, which likely degraded the base’s logistics network.[70] The imagery shows strikes destroyed six support buildings adjacent to the base’s pier.[71] Imagery also shows that the combined force targeted the base’s pier, multiple docked vessels, and six nearby support or storage buildings.[72] The analyst assessed that combined force strikes damaged or destroyed most of the base’s administrative and support buildings.[73] The cumulative damage to logistics, support, administrative, and operations assets has likely severely disrupted operations at the 4th Sarallah Naval District.

IRGC Navy 4th Sarallah Region Base (North)

Bushehr Province, Iran
27.356726, 52.617878






Iran is reportedly reinforcing defenses at Kharg Island.[74] Unspecified sources familiar with US intelligence reports told CNN on March 26 that Iran has reinforced Kharg Island with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) in recent weeks.[75] Iran primarily operates domestically produced Misagh MANPAD, a variant of the Chinese QW-2 Vanguard missile system.[76] Iran recently signed an arms deal with Russia in December 2025 to acquire 500 Russian Verba MANPADS, but it is unclear if Russia delivered any before the start of the war.[77] The source added that Iran has also laid anti-personnel and anti-armor mines around the island, including on the shoreline.[78]

Iranian Response

Iran has launched eight waves of missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff.[79] An Israeli military correspondent reported on March 26 that an Iranian cluster munition impacted in Tel Aviv, injuring two people.[80]

Iran continued to fire at Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates on March 26. Iran launched 37 drones at Saudi Arabia between 2:00 PM on March 25 and 2:00 PM on March 26.[81] Iran launched 19 drones and one missile at Bahrain.[82] Iran launched one drone and six ballistic missiles at Kuwait.[83] The Kuwaiti Army reported that the six missiles landed in open areas.[84] The Emirati Defense Ministry stated that it intercepted 11 Iranian drones and 15 missiles.[85]


Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 26, 2026



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 All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 26, 2026



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All data from the Kuwaiti Army.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 26, 2026



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 All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 26, 2026




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All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah continues to claim a high rate of attacks against Israeli targets in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed to conduct 73 attacks targeting Israeli forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 2:00 PM ET on March 25 and 2:00 PM ET on March 26.[86] Hezbollah has fired an average of about 150 rockets per day since joining the war on March 1, according to the IDF.[87] The IDF said that about two-thirds of the daily rocket fire has been directed at Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and along the border.[88] Hezbollah has directed one-third of its fire targeting northern and central Israel.[89] Hezbollah has claimed to conduct 35 attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian targets in northern and central Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off.[90] Hezbollah rocket fire killed an Israeli man in Nahariya on March 26.[91]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and March 25, 2026



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.




The IDF killed a senior Hezbollah anti-tank unit commander in southern Lebanon on March 25, likely as part of the IDF effort to reduce the threat that Hezbollah anti-tank guided missiles pose to northern Israel.[92] The commander has reportedly directed anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli towns for the past two years.[93] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on March 25 that the IDF is expanding operations in southern Lebanon in order to remove the "anti-tank missile threat" to Israeli communities.[94]

Hezbollah has continued to defend against Israeli advances in southern Lebanon. Israeli forces reportedly attempted on March 25 and 26 to advance from Taybeh toward two Lebanese towns: southwest toward Qantara and northwest toward Deir Seryan.[95] Qantara is located about seven kilometers west from the Lebanon-Israel border. Hezbollah claimed that its fighters engaged Israeli forces and armor advancing from Taybeh towards Qantara with rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms.[96] Hezbollah also said that fighters engaged Israeli forces in Deir Seryan with anti-tank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.[97]

Hezbollah also claimed to engage Israeli forces in Marwahin and Debl, in southeastern Lebanon, and in Qouzeh, in southwestern Lebanon.[98] Hezbollah attacks inflicted at least three IDF casualties on March 25 and 26.[99]

Iranian and Hezbollah Attacks in Israel and Lebanon

Between March 25, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and March 26, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



The IDF is preparing to deploy the 98th Paratrooper Division (Res.) to southern Lebanon, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[100] The 98th Division will be the sixth division that the IDF has deployed in southern Lebanon as part of efforts to create a "new security zone." [101] Brigades of the 98th Division last operated in southern Lebanon in Fall 2024. [102]

Iran reportedly seeks to include Hezbollah in any ceasefire agreement with the United States and Israel. Six unspecified regional sources "familiar with Iran's position" told Reuters on March 25 that Iran has told mediators that any ceasefire agreement with the United States and Israel must also end Israeli operations in Lebanon. [103] One regional source said that Iran had given Hezbollah "guarantees" that it would include Hezbollah in any agreement to end the war. [104] Israeli officials have expressed that they expect Israeli operations in southern Lebanon to extend beyond the conclusion of the war in Iran. [105]

The IDF continued to strike Hezbollah targets across southern Lebanon and in Beirut on March 26.[106] Lebanese state media reported that IDF strikes killed at least five people.[107]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed attacks targeting US interests and Israel. The combined force struck the 63rd Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) base in Amerli District, Salah al Din Province, on March 26.[108] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[109] The combined force previously struck the 63rd PMF Brigade on March 19.[110] The combined force separately struck a 61st PMF Brigade site in Dibis, Kirkuk Province on March 19.[111] The 63rd and 61st PMF brigades operate under the Badr Organization-affiliated PMF East Tigris Operations Command.[112] **Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East.** The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 25 that it conducted 23 drone attacks against “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region.[113] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab separately claimed on March 25 that it conducted an unspecified “air attack” targeting the former US Victory base at Baghdad International Airport with “appropriate weapons.”[114]

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[91] <https://www.timesofisrael.com/man-killed-another-seriously-hurt-in-hezbollah-rocket-attack-on-nahariya/>
[92] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2037222305018110208>
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[100] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037190204511945063>
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[102] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/army-says-98th-division-started-operations-in-

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<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-wants-lebanon-included-any-ceasefire-sources-say-2026-03-25/>

[104]

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[105] https://www.ynetnews.com/article/syje2cx911l#google_vignette

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[108] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/أمن/طيران-حربي-يستهدف-مقرا-عسكريا-شرقي-صلاح-الدين>

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<https://www.shafaq.com/ar/أمن/استهداف-مقر-للحشد-الشعبي-بضربتين-جويتين-في-صلاح-الدين>

[111] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/أمن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-الحشد-الشعبي-في-كركوك>

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[113] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1606>

[114] https://t.me/Jaysh_ALGhadab/155

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Iran Update Special Report, March 27, 2026



Kelly Campa, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Nidal Morrison, Grace Mappes, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran may be attempting to maximize the effects of its limited capacity to launch large missile salvos at Israel by launching small missile salvos throughout the day to impose psychological effects on Israeli civilians by consistently forcing them to take shelter and keeping the country under constant alert. Iran is spreading out its launches throughout the day, often pausing for several hours between launches. Spreading out ballistic missile launches over a long period of time presumably increases the number of times per day that Israeli civilians must seek shelter.
2. Such a strategy is suboptimal and likely reflects the US-Israeli combined force's degradation of Iran's ability to launch large-scale missile attacks. The combined force's degradation of Iran's missile capabilities has prevented Iran from consistently launching large-scale missile attacks against Israel during the current conflict, however.
3. Iran has increasingly used cluster munitions in its attacks on Israel during the war, which likely reflects Iran's inability to meaningfully threaten discrete military targets in Israel and efforts to inflict psychological effects on Israeli civilians.
4. Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27. The Ukrainian Presidential Office reported that Ukraine will help Saudi Arabia with air defenses under the agreement, which also outlines the foundations for further contacts and includes technological cooperation and investments.
5. The combined force has continued to disrupt Iran's ability to launch missile attacks, including by disrupting Iranian efforts to regain access to missile launchers in underground bases. US Central Command (CENTCOM) published footage on March 27 showing that it struck bulldozers and loaders that Iran was likely using to try to clear debris and reopen tunnel entrances to underground

facilities.

6. The IDF struck Iranian nuclear infrastructure on March 27, including sites involved in plutonium production and the uranium fuel cycle. The IDF struck the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility in Arak, Markazi Province, following repeated Iranian attempts to restore the site following IDF strikes on the site during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. The IDF also struck the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant in Yazd Province.

Toplines

Iran may be attempting to maximize the effects of its limited capacity to launch large missile salvos at Israel by launching small missile salvos throughout the day to impose psychological effects on Israeli civilians by consistently forcing them to take shelter and keeping the country under constant alert. Iran has launched between five and 11 missile barrages at Israel per day over the past week.[1] The IDF reported on March 27 that Iran has launched about 10 missiles at Israel per day, which suggests that each Iranian barrage has consisted of either a single missile or a small number of missiles.[2] Iran is spreading out its launches throughout the day, often pausing for several hours between launches. Ballistic missiles take about 10 minutes to reach Israel once launched from Iran.[3] Spreading out ballistic missile launches over a long period of time presumably increases the number of times per day that Israeli civilians must seek shelter.

Such a strategy is suboptimal and likely reflects the US-Israeli combined force's degradation of Iran's ability to launch large-scale missile attacks. Iran has long sought to overwhelm Israeli air defenses through large missile and drone strike packages.[4] Iran launched hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles and one-way attack drones targeting Israel in April and October 2024, for example.[5] The combined force's degradation of Iran's missile capabilities has prevented Iran from consistently launching large-scale missile attacks against Israel during the current conflict, however. The combined force has struck missile launchers, missile storage facilities, and dropped heavy munitions on hardened Iranian missile bases during the war.[6] Iran could be launching smaller salvos due to its depleted missile stockpile. The United States assesses "with certainty" that the combined force has destroyed about a third of Iran's missile stockpile and assesses that the combined force has likely "damaged, destroyed, or buried" another third of Iran's missile stockpile, according to five people familiar with US intelligence speaking to Reuters on March 27.[7] The decline could also reflect a deliberate Iranian strategy to protect missile launchers from combined force airstrikes by only fielding a small number of launchers at a time. The IDF has destroyed or rendered inoperable around 330 out of Iran's 470 missile launchers.[8] An Israeli OSINT account posted footage of an Iranian missile launch from the Yazd Missile Base on March 27.[9] The combined force struck the base several hours later, which highlights how the combined force is patrolling Iranian airspace and striking targets as they appear.[10]


The combined force's degradation of Iran's ballistic missile capabilities has likely caused the rate of Iranian fire at Israel to steadily decline since the start of the war on February 28. The current average of 10 missiles per day is a significant decrease from the volume of daily Iranian missile fire targeting Israel in the first week of the war.[11] Iran fired around 90 missiles targeting Israel on February 28 and 60 missiles on March 1, for example.[12] The rate of Iranian fire reduced to an average of 20 missiles per day over the subsequent four days of the war.[13] An average of 10 missiles per day in the campaign's fourth week is consistent with US military assessments that Iranian missile fire has reduced by around 90 percent since the beginning of the campaign.[14] Other factors may also be contributing to the decline in Iranian fire, such as reported desertions among Iranian missile crews.[15]

Iran has increasingly used cluster munitions in its attacks on Israel during the war, which likely reflects

Iran’s inability to meaningfully threaten discrete military targets in Israel and efforts to inflict psychological effects on Israeli civilians. Cluster munitions disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage. Many of the Iranian missile attacks that have caused damage and casualties in Israel have involved missiles with cluster munition warheads. The IDF said on March 10 that around 50 percent of the missiles that Iran was firing at Israel contained cluster munition warheads.[16] This percentage has since increased to around 70 percent.[17] Iran launched a cluster munition on March 27 that dispersed over central Israel.[18]

Hezbollah may be pursuing a similar strategy through its increasing rocket and drone attacks targeting Israeli towns. Hezbollah is currently conducting a campaign intended to impose costs on Israel for its involvement in the war against Iran and its operations in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has conducted an increasing number of attacks targeting Israeli forces or positions and Israeli towns since joining the war on March 1 (see graph below). Hezbollah claimed 48 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern and central Israel on March 26, for example.[19] This marks the highest number of attacks that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period in the conflict thus far.[20] Hezbollah may be attempting to achieve a similar effect as Iran by sending Israelis to shelters throughout the day and disrupting normal life. Israelis along the northern border are often given 15 seconds of warning or less to take shelter.[21] It is unclear if Hezbollah is coordinating with Iran to achieve this effect. Hezbollah has coordinated its fire with Iran in at least one instance during the war.[22]

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and March 26, 2026



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



US President Donald Trump announced on March 26 that the United States will refrain from attacking Iranian energy plants until April 6 at the Iranian regime’s request.[23] Trump had

originally set a five-day deadline for Iran to reach a deal with the United States that was set to expire on March 27. Trump said that talks with Iran are “ongoing” and “going very well.”[24] The United States sent a proposal to Iran through Pakistan on March 24.[25] Iranian state media reported on March 26 that Iran rejected the proposal and is awaiting the United States’ response.[26] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on March 26 that “some concrete progress has been made” toward an agreement with Iran.[27]

NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW’s March 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:

Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27. The Ukrainian Presidential Office reported that Ukraine will help Saudi Arabia with air defenses under the agreement, which also outlines the foundations for further contacts and includes technological cooperation and investments.[28] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the agreement ahead of further talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud. Zelensky stated that such cooperation can be mutually beneficial as Saudi Arabia has “something that Ukraine is interested in.”[29] Zelensky and al Saud discussed possible energy cooperation. Zelensky also met with Ukrainian military experts who have been supporting air defense operations in Saudi Arabia for over a week (since at least March 20) and discussed additional measures to support Saudi Arabia’s air defense operations.[30] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to counter Iranian strikes, as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.[31]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to disrupt Iran’s ability to launch missile attacks, including by disrupting Iranian efforts to regain access to missile launchers in underground bases. The combined force struck the Mount Sofeh Missile Base in Esfahan Province and the Yazd Missile Base in Yazd Province on March 27.[32] The combined force struck the Yazd Missile Base after a missile was launched from the base earlier in the day.[33] The combined force has struck the Yazd Missile Base at least five times since the beginning of the war.[34] The repeated targeting of the Yazd Missile Base, as well as other Iranian missile bases, suggests that there are entrances and exits to these bases that the combined force has not struck..[35] CNN reported on March 20 that the combined force had struck around 77 percent of known tunnel entrances to underground missile facilities to prevent Iranian forces’ access to launchers in these facilities.[36] The combined force has disrupted Iranian efforts to reopen tunnel entrances that the combined force previously struck. US Central Command (CENTCOM) published footage on March 27 showing that it struck bulldozers and loaders that Iran was likely using to try to clear debris and reopen tunnel entrances to underground facilities.[37]

The IDF separately struck a base used for training soldiers and storing missiles, a ballistic missile components production site, and a site used for producing weapons batteries in Tehran Province on March 27.[38]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 26, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and March 27, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



- Confirmed Airstrike
- Reported Airstrike
- Report of Explosion With Footage

The combined force struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Headquarters in Tehran Province and likely struck an IRGC Aerospace Force base in Lar, Fars Province, on March 26 and 27.[39] Iranian media claimed that the combined force struck a local market in Lar.[40] An IRGC Aerospace Force base is located approximately 1,300 feet south of the claimed location, however.[41] The IRGC Aerospace Force oversees Iran’s ballistic missile and drone arsenals and operates Iran’s missile and drone forces.[42]

The IDF struck Iranian nuclear infrastructure on March 27, including sites involved in plutonium production and the uranium fuel cycle.[43] The IDF struck the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility in Arak, Markazi Province, following repeated Iranian attempts to restore the site following IDF strikes on the site during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[44] Heavy water reactors produce plutonium as a byproduct, which can be used to develop nuclear weapons.[45] Israeli strikes previously damaged the reactor’s containment dome and associated infrastructure.[46] Iran began construction of

the heavy water reactor in 1997, but the reactor never became operational.[47] Iran agreed to redesign the facility to alleviate international concerns about possible plutonium production as part of the 2015 nuclear deal.[48] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran stated on March 27 that the strike on the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility caused no casualties and posed no risk of contamination to nearby communities.[49] The IDF issued an evacuation notice for the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility before striking the site.[50] The IDF also struck the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant in Yazd Province, which is Iran's sole facility for processing mined uranium into raw materials that are used in uranium enrichment.[51] The Ardakan facility processes uranium ore from the Saghand mine in Yazd Province into uranium concentrate.[52] CTP-ISW did not observe strikes on the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant during the 12-Day War.


The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran. The IDF struck an air defense systems production site in eastern Tehran Province on March 26.[53] CENTCOM separately published footage on March 27 showing strikes on an Iranian radar in an unspecified location.[54]

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian defense industrial targets across Iran to degrade Iran's missile and drone production capabilities. The IDF has struck over 1,000 Iranian weapons production sites during the war thus far.[55] CTP-ISW has observed an uptick in strikes on defense industrial sites in recent days. Part of the combined force's effort has involved disrupting Iran's ability to manufacture munitions that Iran could use to threaten international shipping. The IDF struck an anti-ship missile and naval mine manufacturing facility in Yazd Province on March 27.[56] The IDF also struck two facilities in Tehran that manufactured anti-ship cruise missiles on March 25.[57] The combined force is also striking likely defense industrial targets in eastern Iran. The combined force reportedly struck targets in an industrial town near Nishapour, Khorasan Razavi Province, on March 26.[58] The combined force has gradually swept across Iran from west to east and is now striking some of its furthest targets of the campaign.

The combined force struck several Iranian steel plants on March 27. The IDF struck the Mobarekeh Steel Company south of Mobarekeh, Esfahan Province, and the Khuzestan Steel Company near Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[59] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the Mobarekeh and Khuzestan steel factories are partially owned by the IRGC and that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz ordered the strikes on the factories.[60] The United States sanctioned Mobarakeh Steel Company in 2018 for providing material support to an IRGC-affiliated organization.[61] The correspondent added that the strikes on the factories are "expected to cause major damage" to the Iranian economy.[62] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that Iran will exact a "heavy price" for the IDF's strikes on the Mobarekeh and Khuzestan steel factories.[63] The combined force also reportedly struck the Saba Steel Plant near Zarrinshahr, Esfahan Province.[64]

US and Israeli Strikes Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities

As of March 27, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



The combined force reportedly killed an IRGC Aerospace Force commander at an IRGC missile base in western Iran. OSINT accounts circulated footage on March 27 of a funeral for an IRGC Aerospace Force commander, Colonel Nouraldin Gholipour, who reportedly died in combined force airstrikes targeting the IRGC Aerospace Force Imam Ali Missile Base in Khorramabad, Lorestan Province.[65] An analyst from the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies confirmed damage to the Imam Ali Missile Base on March 1 and assessed that B-2 bombers dropped bunker buster munitions on the base.[66]


An OSINT account posted satellite imagery on March 27 that shows damage from combined force strikes to multiple buildings at the Esfahan Province Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Special Units Headquarters in Esfahan City on March 23.[67] The LEC is Iran’s national police force and the regime’s first line of defense against civil unrest. The combined force also struck the Esfahan LEC Criminal Investigation Department, according to the OSINT account’s analysis of satellite

imagery from March 23.[68] The combined force has continuously struck Iranian internal security targets throughout the war.

Iranian Response

Iran continued to attack Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates on March 27. Iran launched 28 drones and six ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia between 2:00 PM ET on March 26 and 2:00 PM ET on March 27.[69] The Bahrain Defense Force said on March 27 that it intercepted 12 drones.[70] The Kuwaiti Army stated on March 27 that four Iranian drones struck the unfinished Mubarak al Kabir Port on Bubiyan Island and the Shuwaikh Port, causing material damage.[71] An Iranian cruise missile also struck the Mubarak al Kabir Port on March 27.[72] Iranian state media claimed on March 27 that the IRGC Navy conducted a drone and missile attack targeting US-Israeli “gathering centers” on Bubiyan Island.[73] The Emirati Defense Ministry stated that it intercepted nine drones and six ballistic missiles on March 27.[74]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 27, 2026




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All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 27, 2026



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 All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 27, 2026




Kuwait did not announce attacks on February 28, March 2-5, and March 11. Kuwait did announce 283 ballistic missile attacks and 93 drone attacks on March 1, but it is unclear how many of these attacks took place on March 1 and how many took place on February 28

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All data from the Kuwaiti Army.



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 27, 2026



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All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




The IRGC announced on March 27 that it prevented three container ships belonging to various countries from passing through the Strait of Hormuz.[75] MarineTraffic data confirms that two Chinese container ships, the CSCL Indian Ocean and CSCL Arctic Ocean, turned around near Larak Island on March 27.[76] Commercially available maritime data shows that the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged SAPHIRA turned around further away from Larak Island on March 27. Maritime intelligence company Lloyd’s List reported on March 23 that over 20 vessels had taken a “Tehran-approved route” through the Strait of Hormuz, passing by Larak Island for the IRGC to verify their vessel details.[77] Lloyd’s List reported that at least two vessels paid Iran a fee in exchange for safe passage through the strait.[78] The IRGC reiterated on March 27 that the Strait of Hormuz is closed to ships going to and coming from the United States, Israel, or their allies.[79]


The UAE is reportedly willing to deploy its navy to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and is encouraging other Gulf countries to join a multinational maritime task force to protect shipping in the Strait.[80] Sources familiar with the situation told the Financial Times on March 27 that senior Emirati Minister Sultan al Jaber has discussed this initiative with US Vice President JD Vance.[81] The Financial Times reported that Bahrain is the only other Gulf country that has expressed interest in joining a potential maritime task force and is working with the UAE on a UN Security Council Resolution to provide a potential task force with a mandate.[82] The UAE has reportedly approached Saudi Arabia and other unspecified international partners about the task force.[83]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 99 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli communities, between 2:00 PM ET on March 26 and 2:00 PM ET on March 27.[84] This marks the highest number of attacks that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the group joined the war on March 1. Fifty-seven percent of these claimed attacks targeted Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah launched anti-tank guided missiles, drones, and rockets at Israeli forces attempting to advance into al Biyyadah, Tyre District.[85] Hezbollah also claimed that it launched 36 rocket attacks, 12 drone attacks, and two mortar attacks targeting Israeli positions, forces, and communities in northern Israel.[86]



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 26, 2026 By Type



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



An OSINT analyst posted unverified photos on March 27 of fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones that Hezbollah has reportedly fired in southern Lebanon.[87] The drones reportedly failed to explode.[88] CTP-ISW is unable to verify the authenticity of the photos. Hezbollah posted FPV drone footage of an attack targeting an Israeli tank in Houla, southern Lebanon, on March 25.[89]

The IDF 91st Division continued to operate in Khiam, southern Lebanon, on March 27. The 84th Givati Brigade identified a Hezbollah tunnel underneath a church in Khiam that the IDF said it had previously cleared in December 2024.[90] The IDF said that Hezbollah had created new tunnel shafts in the months during the ceasefire.[91] Israeli naval commandos also raided a school in Khiam and seized weapons stored there, including anti-tank guided missiles and mines.[92] Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces in close combat in Khiam on March 26, but has only claimed three attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khiam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff.[93] Hezbollah has claimed high rates of attacks defending Khiam in recent days.[94] The decline in Hezbollah defensive attacks since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff suggests that the IDF may have pushed Hezbollah fighters out of the town or that Hezbollah has decided to prioritize other defensive operations.

The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon on March 27.[95] The IDF warned residents of Beirut's southern suburbs that Israeli aircraft were going to launch a round of airstrikes imminently in the area on March 27.[96]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck a 13th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade base in al Qaim District, Anbar Province, on March 27.[97] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[98] The 13th PMF brigade is closely linked to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[99]

Other Activity

Iranian security forces continued to arrest dozens of individuals on charges of espionage. Security forces arrested several individuals in Golestan, West Azerbaijan, Kerman, Esfahan, Ilam, Kermanshah, and Semnan provinces on March 26 and 27.[100]

Iranian regime media reported that security forces arrested individuals for organizing “street riots” and disrupting pro-regime gatherings. This report is the first Iranian state media report that CTP-ISW has observed since the start of the war that has acknowledged opposition activity against the regime. Mehr News reported on March 27 that the IRGC Ground Forces Amir ol Momenin Provincial Unit arrested five individuals for “organizing street riots and creating insecurity” and 15 individuals for attempting to disrupt nightly pro-regime gatherings in Ilam Province.[101] Regime media has consistently reported arrests of individuals accused of communicating with “hostile networks” and spying for the United States and Israel. This report marks the first time that CTP-ISW has observed regime media reporting the arrests of individuals for engaging in anti-regime activity since the start of the war, however.[102] It is notable that Mehr News published this report, given that it is contrary to the regime’s interests to admit that any type of anti-regime activity is taking place.

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Endnotes

- [1] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034875300580831685>;
- <https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/2034883281942933982>;
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Iran Update Special Report, March 28, 2026



Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, Katherine Wells, Grace Mappes, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: *ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.*

Key Takeaways

1. The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack and a drone and cruise missile attack targeting southern Israel on March 27 and 28, marking the group's first involvement in the war. The Houthis' decision, as of now, to participate in the war by conducting drone and missile attacks against Israel instead of attacking international shipping suggests that the Houthis may be pursuing a relatively cautious approach designed to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's Telegram channel published an infographic about the regime's long-standing concept of a "resistance economy" on March 28. The publication of this type of infographic is disconnected from the present economic and social realities, particularly amid the ongoing military conflict. The publication of this infographic may also reflect an effort to portray Mojtaba as an active leader amid reports that he is seriously wounded.
3. Iran and Russia have held "very active" discussions in March about transferring a limited shipment of "upgraded" Russian drones to Iran, according to US and European officials speaking to the Associated Press. This report follows recent Western media reports that Russia is providing Shahed drones to Iran.
4. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that Ukraine and Qatar signed a 10-year defense agreement that includes developing technologies, air defenses, counter-drone measures, military training, experience sharing, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence (AI), and control systems.
5. The combined force continued to strike Iranian defense industrial sites, including Iran's Marine Industries Organization (MIO) and Parchin Military Complex in Tehran City and the Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA) in Bushehr Province.

6. US Central Command stated on March 27 that US forces struck a border guard outpost in Siranband, Kurdistan Province, along Iran's western border with Iraqi Kurdistan.

Toplines

The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack and a drone and cruise missile attack targeting southern Israel on March 27 and 28, marking the group's first involvement in the war.[1] Israeli air defense systems intercepted both attacks, and neither attack caused any injuries.[2] Israeli air defense systems intercepted a Houthi drone over Eilat in southern Israel. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed that the Houthis launched a barrage of ballistic missiles targeting "sensitive" Israeli military sites in southern Israel and a barrage of drones and cruise missiles targeting "vital and military sites" in southern Israel.[3] The spokesperson stated that the Houthis will continue to conduct unspecified operations until the United States and Israel cease their operations against Iran and the Axis of Resistance.[4] The Houthis repeatedly conducted drone and missile attacks targeting Israel and international shipping during the October 7 War.[5] The Houthis launched multiple drone and missile attacks targeting Israel during the 12-Day War in June 2025.[6] ISW-CTP has not recorded any Houthi attacks on international shipping since September 2025.[7] The Houthis' decision, as of now, to participate in the war by conducting drone and missile attacks against Israel instead of attacking international shipping suggests that the Houthis may be pursuing a relatively cautious approach designed to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's Telegram channel published an infographic about the regime's long-standing concept of a "resistance economy" on March 28.[8] **The publication of this type of infographic is disconnected from the present economic and social realities, particularly amid the ongoing military conflict.** The infographic explained the "path to defeating the enemy in the economic war," and emphasized the themes of national unity and sanctions evasion.[9] Mojtaba recently declared "resistance economy in the shadow of national unity and national security" as Iran's Nowruz slogan.[10] Mojtaba's predecessor and father, Ali Khamenei, had for years called for the development of a "resistance economy" to resist Western economic pressure, particularly international sanctions.[11] The publication of this infographic may reflect an effort to project normalcy and portray Mojtaba as a conventional Supreme Leader, particularly around Nowruz, when it is customary for the Supreme Leader to highlight his chosen Nowruz slogan. The publication of this infographic may also reflect an effort to portray Mojtaba as an active leader amid reports that he is seriously wounded.[12]

Iran and Russia have held "very active" discussions in March about transferring a limited shipment of "upgraded" Russian drones to Iran, according to US and European officials speaking to the Associated Press.[13] An unspecified US defense official stated that the scale, frequency, and transport method of the potential shipment remain unclear.[14] The United Kingdom's latest intelligence assessment indicates that Russia has already provided Iran with drone-related training, intelligence, and electronic warfare support.[15] This report follows a March 25 *Financial Times* report, citing Western intelligence, that Russia is close to completing a phased delivery to Iran of unspecified drones alongside food and medicine.[16] The *Financial Times* reported that officials said that Russia is likely only able to supply Iran with systems such as Geran-2 drones and denied Iran's request for S-400 air defense systems.[17] Israeli media separately reported on March 19 that Russia had begun providing Iran with modified Shahed drone components and satellite imagery to support Iranian strikes in the region.[18] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told CNN on March 15 that Russia had been providing Iran with drones with "Russian details." [19] Russia began domestically producing Shahed drones in 2023 and has adapted them to increase their firepower and defensive capabilities.[20] These

adaptations include equipping Shaheds with Verba shoulder-fired man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to increase their capacity to target enemy aircraft.[21] Iran recently purchased 500 Verbas and 2,500 9M336 infrared homing missiles from Russia in December 2025, according to the *Financial Times* in February 2026.[22]

NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW's March 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:

Ukraine continues to conclude bilateral defense cooperation agreements with Gulf states.


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that Ukraine and Qatar signed a 10-year defense agreement that includes developing technologies, air defenses, counter-drone measures, military training, experience sharing, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence (AI), and control systems.[23] Zelensky stated that the agreement includes building joint production factories in both Ukraine and Qatar.[24] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will soon conclude a similar agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) but noted that these agreements do not mean that Ukraine is obligated to help defend these states.[25] Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27.[26] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to counter Iranian strikes, as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.[27]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to degrade Iran's ability to launch missile attacks by targeting Iranian missile bases and production facilities. The combined force struck the Yazd Missile Base in Yazd Province on March 28.[28] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account published a video on March 28 that shows two missiles being launched from the Yazd Missile Base.[29] It is unclear whether Iranian forces launched the two missiles before or after the combined force strikes. The combined force has struck the Yazd Missile Base at least six times since the beginning of the war.[30] The combined force last struck the base on March 27 after Iranian forces launched a missile from the base. The Yazd Missile Base is a deeply buried underground missile complex with extensive tunnel networks.[31] The IDF separately targeted a site used to produce a variety of munitions and a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)-affiliated site used for developing advanced explosive charges in Yazd Province on March 28.[32]

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian defense industrial targets across Iran to degrade Iran's ability to produce military systems. The IDF struck Iran's Marine Industries Organization (MIO) in Tehran on March 28.[33] MIO is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and oversees the production of naval systems and vessels for the Iranian armed forces.[34] The combined force separately struck the Parchin Military Complex in eastern Tehran on March 28.[35] The complex is controlled by the DIO and is used to produce advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.[36] Western officials have long suspected that Iranian activities at the site could be relevant to nuclear weapons development.[37] The combined force additionally struck the Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA) in Bushehr Province on March 28, which supports Iran's maritime industrial base.[38] The United States sanctioned SADRA in 2012 for being a subsidiary of the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters.[39] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the Iranian economy.[40]

Iranian Defense Industrial Base Hierarchy




The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran. The IDF struck a site involved in producing air defense system components in Arak, Markazi Province, on March 28.[41] The combined force also struck the Bushehr Airport and the adjacent Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase in Bushehr Province on March 28.[42]

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian steel factories that likely support Iran's defense industrial base. The combined force struck the Kavar Steel Company in Kashan, Esfahan Province, on March 28.[43] Steel is used to produce a variety of weapons, and the United States has previously sanctioned Iranian steel companies for generating revenue that the Iranian regime uses to support its nuclear program and Axis of Resistance.[44] The IDF struck two major Iranian steel plants on March 27, including the Mobarakeh Steel Company in Esfahan Province and the Khuzestan Steel Company near Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[45]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 27, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 28, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



US Central Command stated on March 27 that US forces struck a border guard outpost in Siranband, Kurdistan Province, along Iran's western border with Iraqi Kurdistan.[46] The Siranband border crossing connects Sulaymanieh Province in Iraqi Kurdistan to Kurdistan Province in Iran.[47]

Anti-regime media reported on March 28 that the combined force struck the Artesh 44th Artillery Group in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[48] It is unclear what the combined force specifically targeted at this site. The 44th Artillery Group is located near the Artesh 55th Artillery Group and the IRGC Ground Forces Saheb ol Zaman Unit.[49]

US and Israeli Strikes on the Artesh 44th Artillery Group As of March 28, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET



◆ Artillery Base

◆ IRGC Base

■ Military Land Use

OSINT accounts reported on March 28 that the combined force struck the Physics Department at Iran's University of Science and Technology (IUST) in Tehran.[50] IUST is designated by the US Department of Defense as an entity "engaged in problematic activity." [51] IUST has been involved in research related to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[52] The IDF killed an Iranian nuclear scientist who was a graduate of IUST during the 12-Day War.[53] The IDF also killed Saeed Shamghadari in a strike in Tehran Province on March 23.[54] Anti-regime media described Shamghadari as an IUST professor who was involved in efforts to localize Iran's missile industry.[55]


US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that US Sailors and Marines aboard the USS Tripoli arrived in CENTCOM's area of responsibility on March 27.[56] The USS Tripoli is an America-class amphibious assault ship and is the flagship of the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group.[57]

Iranian Response

Iran has launched six missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff.[58] An Iranian cluster munition impacted in Ramat Gan on March 27, killing one man.[59] An Israeli military correspondent reported on March 28 that an Iranian missile hit Moshav Eshtaol, damaging homes and injuring 11 people.[60] ISW-CTP assessed on March 27 that Iran may be trying to maximize the effects of its limited capacity to launch large missile salvos at Israel by launching small missile salvos throughout the day to impose psychological costs on Israeli civilians.[61]

Iran continued to attack the Gulf states on March 28. Iran launched five drones and one missile at Saudi Arabia between 2:00 PM ET on March 27 and 2:00 PM ET on March 28.[62] The Bahrain Defense Force said on March 28 that it intercepted 23 Iranian drones and 20 missiles.[63] Several Iranian drones struck Kuwait International Airport on March 28, damaging a radar system and setting some fuel tanks on fire.[64] Omani authorities stated on March 28 that two Iranian drones struck the Salalah Port, causing some damage and injuring a worker.[65] Danish container shipping company Maersk said it temporarily halted its loading operations at the port due to the attack.[66] The Abu Dhabi Media Office separately reported on March 28 that debris from a ballistic missile interception injured six people and ignited three fires in the Khalifa Economic Zone.[67]


Iranian Ballistic Missiles and Drones Launched at Saudi Arabia Between March 1, 2026 and March 28, 2026



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All data from the Saudi Defense Ministry.
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET




Iranian Missiles and Drones Launched at Bahrain Between February 28, 2026 and March 28, 2026



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 All data from the Bahrain Defense Force.




Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles and Drones Launched at Kuwait Between February 28, 2026 and March 28, 2026



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All data from the Kuwaiti Army.



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates Between February 28, 2026 and March 28, 2026



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All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




The Qatari Defense Ministry said on March 28 that it intercepted several Iranian drones.[68] This marks the first Iranian attack targeting Qatari territory since US President Donald Trump warned on Truth Social on March 18 that the United States would “massively blow up the entirety” of the South Pars Gas Field if Iran attacked Qatar again.[69] Trump’s warning came after Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City and damaged Qatari liquefied natural gas facilities on March 18.[70]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 53 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli communities, between 2:00 PM ET on March 27 and 2:00 PM ET on March 28.[71] The IDF said on March 28 that Hezbollah had launched about 250 rockets from southern Lebanon within a 24-hour period.[72] Hezbollah claimed seven drone attacks targeting IDF positions and sites in northern Israel. An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF intercepted five Hezbollah drones in northern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on March 27 and 2:00 PM ET on March 28, while one Hezbollah drone impacted in an unspecified open area in northern Israel.[73] Hezbollah has also continued to attempt to defend against Israeli ground activity in Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed on March 27 that it fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), mortars, and drones targeting IDF forces attempting to advance in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District.[74] Hezbollah also said that it conducted 13 attacks on IDF forces in al Biyyadah, Marjaayoun District, including a combined rocket, drone, and mortar attack.[75]


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting Israeli Forces and Positions in Israel Between March 1 and March 27, 2026



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 27, 2026 By Type



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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used




The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah positions throughout Lebanon.[76] The IDF said on March 28 that it has struck more than 170 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon in recent days and killed more than 800 Hezbollah fighters since the start of the war.[77] Two sources familiar with Hezbollah's casualty count told Reuters on March 27 that Israel has killed more than 400 Hezbollah fighters since March 2.[78] The IDF struck dozens of Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon on March 27 and 28, including weapons storage facilities, launchers, and buildings.[79] The IDF killed two news correspondents who worked for Hezbollah-controlled and -affiliated news outlets on March 28.[80] The IDF said that one of the correspondents was a member of Hezbollah's Radwan Force.[81] The IDF also announced on March 28 that it killed senior Hezbollah commanders Ayyoub Hussein Yaacoub and Yasser Mohammad Mubarak, who were members of Hezbollah's communications unit.[82] Both individuals had previously held positions in Hezbollah's rocket unit.[83]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 24. The Brigade Combat Team of the 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) has destroyed more than 100 Hezbollah sites in recent days.[84] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade was operating in Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon.[85] Geolocated footage posted on March 28 shows Israeli forces conducting a controlled demolition of a building in Taybeh.[86] The Brigade Combat Team of the 7th Brigade, which also operates under the 36th Division, located a weapons cache that included RPGs, mines, and small arms.[87] It is unclear where this brigade is operating. The IDF said on March 28 that IDF 91st Division forces shelled and killed an armed Hezbollah fighter operating in the same area as Israeli forces.[88] The IDF said on March 28 that IDF 162nd Division forces killed multiple Hezbollah fighters, including a fighter who shot at Israeli forces.[89] The IDF also

said that IDF 146th Division forces killed four Hezbollah fighters who fired rockets at Israeli forces.[90]

The IDF announced on March 28 that nine Israeli soldiers were wounded in southern Lebanon on March 27.[91] Hezbollah anti-tank fire seriously injured one soldier and moderately injured another soldier.[92] Hezbollah rocket fire targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon seriously wounded one soldier and moderately injured six other soldiers.[93]



Other Axis of Resistance Response

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck an Asaib Ahl al Haq headquarters in Wasit Province on March 27.[94] An OSINT account reported

on March 27 that aircraft struck unspecified Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) sites in Jurf al Sakhr, which is a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold south of Baghdad.[95] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[96] The combined force has repeatedly struck militia positions in Jurf al Sakhr since the start of the war.[97] The combined force also conducted airstrikes targeting the PMF Northern and East Tigris Operations Command headquarters in Kirkuk Province on March 28, killing three PMF fighters and wounding six others.[98]

Unspecified actors conducted a drone attack targeting Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani's home in Dohuk Province on March 28.[99] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. Iraqi security sources stated that one drone crashed near Barzani's house, which was empty at the time, and caused a fire.[100] Air defenses shot down a second drone.[101] Multiple Iraqi political figures, including Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, and the IRGC condemned the attack.[102] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened to attack Kurdish interests due to the Kurdistan Regional Government's perceived cooperation with Israel, the United States, and Kurdish opposition groups.[103]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah announced on March 27 that it will extend its temporary and conditional suspension of attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad for an additional five days.[104] This marks the second time that Kataib Hezbollah has extended its pause on attacks on the embassy.[105] An Iraq analyst previously assessed that Kataib Hezbollah may have paused its attacks on the embassy due to mounting political and military pressure on the group.[106]

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted separate one-way drone attacks targeting the Majnoon oil field in Basra Province and the Iraqi Balad Airbase in Salah al Din Province on March 28.[107] No group has claimed responsibility for either attack at the time of this writing. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted several drone attacks targeting the Majnoon oil field and Balad Airbase since the start of the war.[108] Hundreds of US contractors who are employed at Balad Airbase to support the Iraqi government's F-16 fighter jet program are "stranded" at the base, according to three sources speaking to *The Guardian* on March 18.[109]

Iranian Internal Security

Iranian security forces arrested individuals in Khuzestan, Ardabil, Kerman, Esfahan, Tehran, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces on March 28.[110] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry reported that security forces arrested 19 individuals allegedly linked to US-Israeli networks in Khuzestan, Ardabil, and Kerman provinces.[111] The ministry announced that security forces also killed five "separatist militants" who had "bombed" civilian sites in an unspecified location.[112]

Other Activity

Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced on March 28 that Thailand reached an agreement with Iran to allow Thai oil tankers to pass through the Strait of Hormuz safely but did not provide further details about the agreement.[113]

Thailand is the first country that has publicly announced an "agreement" with Iran about passage through the strait. UK-based shipping intelligence firm Lloyd's List reported on March 18 that India, Pakistan, Iraq, Malaysia, and China are negotiating with Iran to allow their vessels to transit through an IRGC-managed "safe corridor" in the strait.[114] Lloyd's List reported on March 23 that over 20 vessels had taken the Iranian-approved route through the strait, passing by Larak Island for the IRGC to verify

their vessel details.[115] Lloyd's List reported that at least two vessels paid Iran a fee in exchange for safe passage through the strait.[116]

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