

Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 8, 2026



Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 8:00 AM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways

1. Geolocated satellite imagery published on March 7 confirms that the IDF struck the Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province, northeastern Iran. The IDF struck buildings at the Shahroud Missile Facility during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War that had previously housed planetary mixers, which are essential for producing ballistic missile solid fuel. Satellite imagery published by the Associated Press in September 2025 showed that Iran had started repairing damaged mixer buildings at Shahroud.
2. The combined force has reportedly targeted at least five internal security sites in and around Esfahan City, central Iran, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 7. These sites include the Esfahan Province Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters, which oversees LEC units in Esfahan Province.
3. The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes against Hezbollah to degrade Hezbollah's ability to launch attacks against IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The IDF stated on March 8 that it has struck more than 600 Hezbollah targets and killed more than 200 Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon since February 28.
4. Iran has continued to target regional countries and Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 7. Iran conducted two separate drone attacks against Kuwait on March 7, targeting the Kuwaiti Social Security Building and fuel storage tanks at the Kuwait International Airport. Unspecified security sources told Reuters that unidentified actors conducted a drone attack targeting the United Nations building in Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan.
5. Hezbollah has claimed 19 attacks targeting IDF positions and forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 7.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

Geolocated satellite imagery published on March 7 confirms that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province, northeastern Iran.[1] An analyst at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies identified that the IDF damaged a mixing building, casting building, and “warhead production line” at the facility.[2] The IDF struck buildings at the Shahroud Missile Facility during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War that had previously housed planetary mixers.[3] Planetary mixers are essential for producing ballistic missile solid fuel. The IDF previously destroyed 12 Iranian planetary mixers, likely including mixers at Shahroud, during its October 2024 strikes on Iran.[4] Satellite imagery published by the Associated Press in September 2025 showed that Iran had started repairing damaged mixer buildings at Shahroud.[5] The Associated Press assessed at the time that Iran had not replaced its destroyed planetary mixers, however.[6] The IDF strikes on the Shahroud Missile Facility come as the *Washington Post* reported on March 7 that two Iranian state-owned vessels recently left a port in the People’s Republic of China that is used to load chemicals, including sodium perchlorate, onto vessels.[7] Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.


The IDF also confirmed on March 7 that it struck the Parchin Military Complex east of Tehran.[8] Satellite imagery from recent days confirms that the combined force has damaged several buildings at Parchin.[9] Iran similarly sought to repair mixer buildings at the Parchin Military Complex following the Israel-Iran War.[10]

The combined force continues to target Iranian internal security institutions. The combined force has reportedly targeted at least five internal security sites in and around Esfahan City, central Iran, since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 7.[11] These sites include the Esfahan Province Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters, which oversees LEC units in Esfahan Province.[12] An OSINT account and anti-regime media reported airstrikes targeting two Basij bases in Najafabad and Shahreza, near Esfahan City.[13] The Basij is a paramilitary force that supports the LEC in protest suppression. CTP-ISW recorded over 70 protests in Esfahan Province during the December 2025-January 2026 protests in Iran.[14] An OSINT account claimed that the combined force struck a “morality police” building in Kosar Town, northwest of Esfahan City.[15] CNN reported that the combined force struck a morality police building in Tehran City on March 5.[16] Morality police operate under both the LEC and Basij and are responsible for enforcing the regime’s laws against “immodesty and societal vices,” including its strict hijab and chastity laws.[17]

The combined force also continues to target internal security sites in Tehran City and northwestern Iran. An OSINT analyst published footage on March 8 of a drone attacking a reported Basij checkpoint in northwestern Tehran.[18] A BBC journalist geolocated a damaged LEC station in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province, in northwestern Iran on March 7.[19]

US and Israeli Strikes Against Internal Security

As of March 8, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



- Targeted IRGC Ground Forces and Headquarters
- Targeted Internal Security Sites
- IRGC Ground Forces and Headquarters
- Internal Security Sites

The IDF struck an oil depot in the Kuhak neighborhood, northwestern Tehran City, on March 7.[20] CTP-ISW reported in its March 7 Evening Update that the IDF struck several oil storage facilities and refineries in Tehran and Alborz provinces on March 7. BBC and CNN journalists reported on March 7 and 8 that the fires caused by the IDF strikes on oil refineries and depots in Tehran have spread across Tehran City and damaged additional infrastructure.[21] Fires at these sites have also resulted in oil infusing into rain clouds.[22]

The combined force continues to target Iranian naval facilities around the Persian Gulf. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account geolocated damage to a naval base entrance in Bushehr City on March 7.[23] The entrance was damaged after the combined force struck an ammunition depot in its vicinity around March 3.[24] The combined force also struck at least eight warehouses at a port in eastern Bushehr City.[25] Anti-regime media published a video of smoke and reported that the combined force targeted an Iranian naval base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on March 8, but did not

specify which base the combined forces targeted.[26] Bandar Abbas Port is home to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Headquarters, the IRGC Navy 1st Naval District, and the Artesh Navy Southern Forward Naval Headquarters.[27] The combined force has attacked Iranian naval assets and facilities in Bandar Abbas in recent days.

The combined force reportedly struck a complex belonging to the Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO) in southwestern Tehran City on March 7, according to a video published by an OSINT analyst.[28] The IAIO is a subsidiary of Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and is responsible for developing and manufacturing drones, helicopters, and fighter jets.[29]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes against Hezbollah to degrade Hezbollah's ability to launch attacks against IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.

The IDF stated on March 8 that it has struck more than 600 Hezbollah targets and killed more than 200 Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon since February 28.[30] The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting key commanders in the IRGC Quds Force's Lebanon Corps in Beirut on March 7.[31] The IDF stated that the Lebanon Corps serves as a link between Hezbollah and Iran and is aiding Hezbollah's reconstitution.[32] The IDF previously killed Lebanon Corps Commander Daoud Ali Zada and Chief of Staff Reza Khazali on March 3.[33] The IDF also struck a rocket launcher on March 7 that Hezbollah previously used to launch rockets at northern Israel.[34]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 7, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 8, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET




- Confirmed Airstrike
- Reported Airstrike
- Report of Explosion With Footage
- Report of Explosion Without Footage

Iranian Retaliation

Iran has continued to target regional countries and Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 7. Iran conducted at least six ballistic missile barrages targeting Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 7 and 8:00 AM ET on March 8.[35] CTP-ISW has not observed any missile impacts in Israel at the time of this writing. Iran conducted a drone attack targeting Salman Port, which is home to the US Navy's Fifth Fleet and US Naval Forces Central Command, in Manama, Bahrain, on March 7.[36] Iran previously struck Salman Port on March 1.[37] Iran conducted two separate drone attacks against Kuwait on March 7, targeting the Kuwaiti Social Security Building and fuel storage tanks at the Kuwait International Airport.[38] An Israeli journalist posted a video of a fire at the Titanic Hotel in Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan, after it was reportedly struck on March 7.[39] Unspecified security sources told Reuters that unidentified actors conducted a drone attack targeting the United Nations building in Sulaymaniyah,


which is located directly next to the Titanic Hotel.[40] The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that Iran launched 17 ballistic missiles and 117 drones at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 8.[41] Iran appears to have increased the number of ballistic missiles it has launched at the UAE since March 6 (see graphic below).




Axis of Resistance Response

Hezbollah has claimed 19 attacks targeting IDF positions and forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 7.[42] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted four rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and directly engaged Israeli forces twice in Aitaroun, Bint Jbeil District, southern Lebanon.[43] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted the IDF Rehavam Camp in Ramla, which is the IDF Home Front Command's headquarters, on

March 7.[44] The Rehavam Camp is approximately 135 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border, which suggests that Hezbollah used medium- or long-range rockets or missiles, such as the Khaibar-1 rocket, Fadi 6 rocket, or Fateh-110 ballistic missile, in this attack.[45] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this attack. Hezbollah claimed that it launched a “squadron” of attack drones targeting the Gilot Base in central Israel, which houses IDF Unit 8200.[46] IDF Unit 8200 is Israel’s signal intelligence unit.[47] Hezbollah also claimed that it launched a barrage of rockets targeting the IDF 91st Division headquarters and “high-quality missiles” targeting the IDF Haifa Naval Base.[48]



Hezbollah Attacks in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 7, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 8, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



POWERED BY:  **BABEL STREET**

Endnotes

[1] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2030425360198984111

[2] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2030425360198984111

[3]

<https://apnews.com/article/iran-missiles-planetary-mixers-israel-war-527bd871b691898b20eee98294dcd>

a64

[4] <https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production>

[5] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-missiles-planetary-mixers-israel-war-527bd871b691898b20eee98294dcd>
a64

[6] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-missiles-planetary-mixers-israel-war-527bd871b691898b20eee98294dcd>
a64

[7] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/07/laden-iranian-ships-depart-chinese-port-tied-key-military-chemicals/>

[8] <https://x.com/IDF/status/2030369126099636533>

[9] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026/>

[10] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-missiles-planetary-mixers-israel-war-527bd871b691898b20eee98294dcd>
a64

[11] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2030512819645350384;

[12]

https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2030532080103195013;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030608165125882162?s=20>;
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030622023228010878>;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030567126113693835?s=20>;
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030612587797246166>

[13] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2030518085933818308;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030558643679047783>

[14] Data available upon request.

[15] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2030512819645350384

[16] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/06/world/video/morality-police-center-in-tehran-destroyed-victims-speak-out-karadsheh-vrtc>; <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/05/world/video/iran-morality-center>

[17] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202510226264>; <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0969>

[18]

<https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030623300116734056>; <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030623302364873108>

- [19] <https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2030507087910797780>
- [20] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030381941413835130>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/>
- [21] <https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2030453808602509744>;
<https://x.com/fpleitgenCNN/status/2030526805589762282>
- [22] <https://x.com/fpleitgenCNN/status/2030526805589762282>
- [23] <https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/2030398989070213429?s=20>
- [24] <https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2030303706625835306?s=20>
- [25] <https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/2030398989070213429?s=20>;
<https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/2030451536137187495?s=20>
- [26] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030618467770961975?s=20>
- [27]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-2-2026/>
- [28] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030359675724574768?s=20>
- [29] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-aviation-industries-organization-iaio>
- [30]
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2026/03/08/iran-israel-us-latest-march-08-2026/de454eca-1ab5-11f1-aef0-0aac8e8e94db_story.html ; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030641475336225102?s=20>
- [31] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030456341748240703?s=20>
- [32] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030456341748240703>
- [33] <https://x.com/CaptainElla1/status/2028740707242918185> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028891077638316340>
- [34] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030398908338495504>
- [35] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030438243989365220> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030488820773183628> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030497996899496034> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030515267378237605> ;
<https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2030610502070522321> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030386865451450765>
- [36] <https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/3/1/huge-fire-at-bahrain-port-home-to-us-navys-fifth-fleet> ; <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2030423815289762124?s=20>
- [37] <https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2028206325780431243>
- [38] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2030429034035945870?s=20> ;

https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030464520582283303

[39] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030405088393543763

[40] <https://x.com/PHREUTERS/status/2030408392653832430>

[41] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2030596754287247788>

[42] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10455> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10459> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10462> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10465> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10468> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10471> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10474> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10477> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10483> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10486> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10490> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10493> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10496> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10499> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10502> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10505> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10508> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10511> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10514>

[43] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10459> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10465> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10486> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10468> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10493> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10499>

[44] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10474> ; <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-to-relocate-11-bases-from-central-israel-to-free-up-land-for-real-estate/>

[45] <https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollahs-rocket-and-missile-arsenal-current-capabilities-and-threat-ranges/> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10474>

[46] <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-to-relocate-11-bases-from-central-israel-to-free-up-land-for-real-estate/> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10477>

[47] <https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-889081>

[48] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10483> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10514>

Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 8, 2026



Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Jessica Sobieski, Anna Thacker, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran's Assembly of Experts selected former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the next Supreme Leader on March 8. Mojtaba's selection as the Supreme Leader represents a victory for hardline factions over more pragmatic figures within the regime. Mojtaba is a hardline cleric who will likely pursue similar domestic and foreign policies to those of his father. Mojtaba will face several immediate challenges, including trying to establish his legitimacy and attempting to unite and gain the support of various regime factions. Mojtaba's connections to the IRGC and the Office of the Supreme Leader may mitigate some of these challenges.
2. Ukraine will send an unspecified number of Ukrainian military personnel with expertise in downing Shahed drones to Gulf states, underscoring how Ukraine's experience in defending against Iranian drones can strengthen the air defenses of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.
3. The US-Israeli combined force continued to target Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure in order to degrade Iranian missile capabilities and ultimately destroy the Iranian ballistic missile program. The IDF has attacked over 400 targets, including ballistic missile launchers and weapons production sites, in western and central Iran over the past day. The IDF has destroyed around 75 percent of Iran's missile launchers.
4. The combined force continued to target Iranian internal security institutions in Tehran City and western Iran. OSINT accounts reported combined force airstrikes targeting LEC headquarters in Borujerd, Lorestan Province, Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, and Abadan, Ilam Province.
5. Iran continued to attack regional countries on March 7 and 8. An Iranian drone damaged a desalination plant in Bahrain. The Saudi Civil Defense Authority reported on March 8 that an unspecified projectile fell on a residential area in Kharj, Saudi Arabia, killing two individuals and wounding 12 others.
6. The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon to degrade

Hezbollah's ability to launch attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The IDF has conducted over 100 strikes in Lebanon in the past 24 hours and a total of 600 strikes using 820 munitions in Lebanon since the war began on February 28.

Toplines

Iran's Assembly of Experts selected former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the next Supreme Leader on March 8.[1] **Mojtaba's selection as the Supreme Leader represents a victory for hardline factions over more pragmatic figures within the regime.** Mojtaba is a hardline cleric who will likely pursue similar domestic and foreign policies to those of his father. Mojtaba fought in the Iran-Iraq War and developed important relationships while serving in the Habib Ibn Mazahir Battalion under the 27th Mohammad Rasoul Allah Division.[2] Many members of the Habib Battalion went on to hold influential positions, particularly in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization.[3] Mojtaba maintained ties to these individuals, such as former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb. Mojtaba used these relationships to cement his role in Iran's security apparatus. Mojtaba reportedly played a leading role in securing former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory in 2009 and subsequently took control of the Basij to crush the protests over Ahmadinejad's election, for example.[4] US President Donald Trump told Axios on March 5 that Mojtaba was an unacceptable candidate to become Iran's new Supreme Leader.[5]

Mojtaba will face several immediate challenges, including trying to establish his legitimacy and attempting to unite and gain the support of various regime factions. Mojtaba's connections to the IRGC and the Office of the Supreme Leader may mitigate some of these challenges, however. Mojtaba is a mid-level cleric like his father was when he assumed the position, which has historically caused his candidacy to be controversial.[6] Prominent clerics have publicly questioned Mojtaba's religious credentials, for example.[7] Mojtaba will also likely face criticisms that the Islamic Republic is transforming into a monarchy with hereditary succession, particularly because Ali Khamenei reportedly opposed hereditary succession.[8] Mojtaba will additionally have to contend with a very fractured regime and attempt to unite and gain the support of various factions at a point when the regime is facing unprecedented internal and external pressure. Anti-regime media recently reported that the IRGC pushed for Mojtaba's selection.[9] It is unclear which specific factions within the IRGC support Mojtaba, but this support may mitigate some of the challenges Mojtaba will face.

Mojtaba's selection represents a victory for hardliners over more pragmatic figures within the regime. Some Assembly of Experts members, such as hardline cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Mehdi Mir Bagheri, wanted the Assembly of Experts to quickly appoint a new Supreme Leader after Ali Khamenei's death, likely, in part, to make it difficult for those who opposed Mojtaba's candidacy to have sufficient time to convince others to oppose Mojtaba.[10] More pragmatic figures within the regime appear to oppose Mojtaba. Anti-regime media reported on March 6 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had wanted his brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, to become the next Supreme Leader, which would have given Ali Larijani immense power within the regime.[11] Anti-regime media previously reported in September 2025 that Ali Larijani was "competing to position [himself] for a potential succession." [12] The *New York Times* reported on February 22 that Khamenei had tasked Ali Larijani with "steering the country" during the recent protests and that Larijani has "effectively been running the country" since then.[13]

NOTE: A version of the following text also appears in The Institute for the Study of War's March 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:

Ukraine will send an unspecified number of Ukrainian military personnel with expertise in downing Shahed drones to Gulf states, underscoring how Ukraine's experience in defending against Iranian drones can strengthen the air defenses of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that an unspecified number of Ukrainian experts and military personnel will depart from Ukraine on March 9 to teach unspecified Gulf states Ukraine's knowledge on how to destroy drones.[14] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will provide the United States and countries in the Middle East with Ukraine's expertise and military experience in combating Shahed drones, cruise missiles, and other aerial threats and noted that three unspecified Gulf states seek to buy Ukrainian Shahed interceptors.[15] Zelensky has also spoken with several leaders from Middle Eastern states in recent days, including Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud, to discuss insights into countering Iranian threats.[16] Iran has fired thousands of drones targeting Gulf states since February 28, inflicting significant damage on US and Gulf military infrastructure and civilian areas and disrupting regional oil, gas, and international shipping industries.[17] Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to combat Iranian strikes because the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.


Several Ukrainian companies have the ability to export battle-tested interceptor drones to the United States and US allies. Reuters reported on March 7 that Ukrainian manufacturers of low-cost interceptor drones stated that they have the capacity to export large volumes of drones.[18] SkyFall, a major Ukrainian drone and drone interceptor manufacturer, estimated on March 7 that it could produce up to 50,000 interceptor drones per month and could export 5,000 to 10,000 drones while still fulfilling Ukraine's needs. Ukrainian drone manufacturer TAF Industries Head Oleksandr Yakovenko stated on March 8 that the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait have already requested or expressed interest in importing Ukrainian interceptor drones.[19] Yakovenko noted that it has taken several months to train drone interceptor operators and that training interceptor operators is the main limiting factor for countries looking to use Ukrainian technology. Ukraine's institutional knowledge has enabled Ukrainian firms to rapidly develop and refine capabilities specifically tailored to counter Iranian-origin weapons, and continued investment into Ukraine's defense industrial base is important for not just Ukrainian security but also for the United States and its allies.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has damaged runways and taxiways and likely destroyed aircraft at several airbases in central Iran, likely to suppress and destroy Iranian air defenses over the area and extend US and Israeli air dominance into central Iran. The combined force struck two airbases in and around Esfahan City on March 7.[20] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) likely struck the 8th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase, north of Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, on March 7.[21] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 8 shows about ten impact points, including extensive cratering on the base's taxiway. The IDF announced on March 8 that it struck structures storing F-14 fighter jets in addition to air defense systems at an unspecified Esfahan airbase, presumably referring to the 8th Tactical Airbase.[22] The base hosts F-14s, F-7s, and PC-7s.[23] The combined force also struck the 4th Artesh Ground Forces Aviation Base in Esfahan City on March 7.[24] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 8 shows damage to several structures north of the base's runway, including several large hangars or warehouses. The 4th Artesh Ground Forces Aviation Base hosts rotary-wing aircraft. The combined force also cratered runways and taxiways at the 3rd Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase in Kabudarahang, Hamedan Province, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[25]

4th Artesh Ground Forces Aviation Base


Esfahan, Esfahan Province, Iran
32.622190, 51.684011



The IDF has struck at least two IRGC Aerospace Force command centers in Tehran since March 6, likely to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities and command and control. The IRGC Aerospace Force is the principal operator of the Iranian missile and drone arsenals.[26] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 6 showed that the IDF struck several warehouses in the southeastern part of an IRGC Aerospace Force air defense command center in southwestern Tehran. The IDF also struck the IRGC Aerospace Force Headquarters in Tehran on March 7.[27]

The US-Israeli combined force continued to target Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure in order to degrade Iranian missile capabilities and ultimately destroy the Iranian ballistic missile program. The IDF has attacked over 400 targets, including ballistic missile launchers and weapons production sites, in western and central Iran over the past day.[28] The IDF has destroyed around 75 percent of Iran’s missile launchers.[29] Commercially available satellite imagery shows damage to the following Iranian missile bases:

- **Shiraz South Missile Base.** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 7 appears to show that the combined force used ground-penetrating munitions to target underground facilities at a missile base south of Shiraz, Fars Province. This base is reportedly one of at least 25 Iranian missile bases that Iran can launch medium-range ballistic missiles from.[30] Israeli strikes during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War caused “light, above-ground damage” to this base, according to the Alma Research and Education Center.[31]



- **Khojir Military Complex.** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 7 shows that the combined force destroyed several structures that were flanked by earthen berms at the Khojir Military Complex in Tehran Province. An analyst at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies assessed on March 6 that the combined force struck mixing and casting buildings at the Khojir Missile Facility.[32] The same analyst assessed on March 7 that the combined force also struck mixing and casting buildings at the Shahroud Military Complex in northeastern Iran, as CTP-ISW reported in its March 8 Morning Update.[33] Satellite imagery published by Reuters in July 2024 showed that Iran had established 30 new buildings at the Khojir facility between August 2023 and April 2024.[34] The IDF previously struck the Khojir Military Complex in June 2025 and October 2024.[35]

Khojir Military Complex


Hajarabad, Tehran Province, Iran
35.69381°N 51.61019°E



- **Chamran Missile Base.** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 6 shows that the combined force damaged above-ground structures at the Chamran Missile Base in Jam, Bushehr Province. Iran stores Qiam-1 ballistic missiles, which have a range of around 800 kilometers, at the Chamran Missile Base.[36]
- **Garmdareh Missile Base.** Commercially available satellite imagery from March 6 indicates that the combined force struck above-ground and underground structures at the Garmdareh Missile Base in Alborz Province. The IDF destroyed a building at an IRGC missile integration facility during the Israel-Iran War that appears to be part of the Garmdareh Missile Base.[37]
- **Shiraz West Missile Base.** Commercially available satellite imagery from March 7 indicates that the combined force struck above-ground and underground structures at a missile base west of Shiraz, Fars Province. The combined force has struck the Shiraz West Missile Base at least twice during the war.[38]
- **Khorgu Missile Base.** Commercially available satellite imagery from March 7 shows that the combined force damaged several structures at the Khorgu Missile Base north of Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province. It is unclear if the damage in the new satellite imagery is from recent airstrikes or airstrikes that the combined force previously conducted against the base around March 1.[39]


Satellite imagery captured on March 7 also confirms that the IDF struck the Shahrud and Parchin military complexes in Semnan and Tehran provinces, respectively, as CTP-ISW reported in its March 8

US-Israeli Strikes to Degrade the Iranian Ballistic Missile Program From February 28, 2026 to March 8, 2026



The combined force continued to target Iranian internal security institutions in Tehran City and western Iran. The IDF announced on March 8 that the IAF conducted airstrikes targeting an IRGC Ground Forces compound, an unspecified “internal security command center,” an unspecified Basij base, and 50 Law Enforcement Command (LEC) ammunition bunkers in Tehran.[41] Two open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts reported and geolocated combined force airstrikes on a Basij base near Yas Boulevard in southeastern Tehran City.[42]


US and Israeli Strikes Against Internal Security Between March 4, 2026 at 4:00 PM ET and March 5, 2026 at 4:00 PM ET



The combined force reportedly struck several internal security sites in western Iran. An OSINT analyst and anti-regime media reported that the combined force struck an IRGC headquarters and an LEC police station in Khorramabad, Lorestan Province, on March 8.[43] OSINT accounts also reported combined force airstrikes targeting LEC headquarters in Borujerd, Lorestan Province, Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, and Abdanan, Ilam Province.[44] CTP-ISW observed protests in Eslamabad-e Gharb, Borujerd, and Abdanan during the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[45]

US and Israeli Strikes Against Law Enforcement Command Headquarters

As of March 8, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The combined force also struck internal security institutions in southwestern and central Iran on March 8. Anti-regime media reported that the combined force airstrike targeted the Artesh Ground Forces 92nd Division in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, on March 8.[46] The Artesh has deployed its ground forces to support protest suppression in previous protest movements.[47] OSINT accounts reported that the combined force also targeted several internal security institutions in Esfahan Province, including an LEC headquarters in Shahin Shahr on March 8.[48]

OSINT analysts reported that the combined force struck a fuel tank at Qeshm International Airport on Qeshm Island in the Persian Gulf on March 8.[49]

The IDF confirmed that it killed newly appointed Supreme Leader Office Military Chief and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Chief of Staff Brigadier General Abu al Qassem Babaeiyan on March 7.[50] Babaeiyan replaced former Supreme Leader Office Military Chief

Mohammad Shirazi after the combined force killed Shirazi on February 28.[51] The IDF reported that Babaeiyan was appointed as the Khatam on Anbia Central Headquarters Chief of Staff after the IDF killed his predecessor, Brigadier General Ali Shadmani, during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[52]



US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

From February 27, 2026 at 4:00 PM ET to February 28, 2026 at 4:00 PM ET



The combined force is reportedly considering deploying special forces at a later time in the war to move Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile out of the country. Four sources with knowledge of the matter told Axios on March 8 that the US administration has discussed a potential future operation to move Iran's HEU out of Iran or dilute it in Iran.[53] The sources added that the combined force would only conduct such an operation if Iran could no longer seriously threaten US or Israeli troops.[54] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said during a congressional briefing on March 3 that "people are going to have to go and get it" in response to a question about whether Iran's HEU would be secured.[55] Iran's HEU is buried underneath rubble at the Esfahan, Fordow, and Natanz nuclear sites, which the United States and Israel struck during the 12-day war.[56] US and Israeli officials told Axios that most of Iran's HEU stockpile is located in the underground tunnels of the nuclear facility in Esfahan, while the rest is split between Fordow and Natanz.[57] An Israeli analyst, citing March 2 satellite imagery, reported that the combined force struck Natanz and severely damaged at least three buildings.[58]

Iranian Internal Security

The IRGC Intelligence Organization announced on March 8 that security forces arrested a 50-member cell “affiliated with a royalist group,” likely in reference to the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province.[59] Security forces reportedly seized the cell’s firearms and knives.[60] The IRGC Intelligence Organization claimed that the group planned to conduct “sabotage” operations.[61] The MEK is an Iranian opposition group.[62]

The LEC Border Guard announced on March 8 that its forces arrested a “terrorist” and seized 20 weapons in an unspecified location in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, southeastern Iran.[63] The LEC Border Guard claimed that the “terrorist” confessed to being a leader in the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[64]**Iran continues to face fuel shortages.** The Tehran Province Governor announced on March 8 that the maximum volume of gasoline that Tehran residents can purchase has decreased from 30 liters to 20 liters.[65] The Petroleum Products Distribution CEO also called on Iranians not to panic buy fuel following Israeli airstrikes targeting oil refineries and depots in Tehran City.[66]

Iranian Retaliation

Iran launched eight missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 7 and 3:00 PM ET on March 8.[67] Israel’s national emergency service, Magen David Adom, reported on March 8 that an Iranian cluster munition wounded at least six individuals in central Israel.[68] Iran has launched at least six missile barrages at Israel per day since March 2.[69]

Iran continued to attack regional countries on March 7 and 8. An Iranian drone damaged a desalination plant in Bahrain.[70] Bahrain’s water and electricity authority stated that the strike has not affected the country’s water supply. Iran also launched two drones targeting the Shaybah Oil Field in Saudi Arabia, but Saudi air defenses intercepted the drones.[71] The Saudi Civil Defense Authority reported on March 8 that an unspecified projectile fell on a residential area in Kharj, Saudi Arabia, killing two individuals and wounding 12 others.[72] The IRGC announced on March 8 that it had targeted radar systems in Kharj.[73]

Saudi Arabia reportedly warned Iran on March 5 that it may retaliate against Iran if Iran continues to attack Saudi territory and critical energy facilities.[74] Four sources told Reuters on March 7 that Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan told Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on March 5 that the Saudi government would permit US forces to use Saudi bases for military operations against Iran if Iran continues to attack critical energy facilities and Saudi territory.[75] Farhan conveyed this warning before Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s March 7 apology to regional countries for Iran’s attacks on them since the start of the war.[76] Iran has continued to conduct drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting Gulf states despite Pezeshkian’s order to suspend strikes on Gulf states unless attacks on Iran originate from their territory.[77]

Axis of Resistance Response

Hezbollah has conducted two attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 8:00 AM ET on March 8. Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 7 attacks as of 3:00 PM ET on March 8, which is significantly fewer attacks than Hezbollah’s 33 claimed

attacks on March 7.[78] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted two rocket attacks targeting the IDF Misgav Base and the town of Kiryat Shmona in northern Israel.[79] The IDF intercepted three drones launched from Lebanon on March 8.[80] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has been launching most of its attacks from positions deep inside southern Lebanon and not from positions along the Israel-Lebanon border.[81] Hezbollah claimed that it attacked the IDF Rehavam Camp in Ramla, which is approximately 135 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border, on March 7, as CTP-ISW reported in its March 8 Morning Update.[82] The IDF's statement regarding Hezbollah's firing position indicates that Hezbollah likely used its medium- or long-range rockets or missiles, such as the Khaibar-1 rocket, Fadi 6 rocket, or Fateh-110 ballistic missile, in this attack.[83] CTP-ISW previously forecasted in a February 28 report that Hezbollah would likely participate in the war and use its long-range weapons to conduct attacks against Israel from central and northern Lebanon.[84]

The IDF reported that Hezbollah attacked an Israeli D9 armored bulldozer in southern Lebanon, killing two IDF soldiers.[85] This attack marks the first time that Hezbollah has killed an IDF soldier since the Fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[86]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah's ability to launch attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The IDF has conducted over 100 strikes in Lebanon in the past 24 hours and a total of 600 strikes using 820 munitions in Lebanon since the war began on February 28.[87] The IDF targeted weapons depots, dozens of military sites, a Radwan Force headquarters, a Radwan Force training compound, rocket launchers, and fighters on March 7 and 8.[88] The IDF confirmed that it killed the following IRGC Quds Force officers in Beirut:

- **Majid Hassani.[89]** Hassani was an IRGC Quds Force commander responsible for transferring Iranian funds to Iranian officials in Lebanon to finance Hezbollah, the IRGC Quds Force's Lebanon Corps and Palestine Corps, and Hamas. Hassani was also responsible for purchasing and procuring weapons for Hezbollah.
- **Ali Reza Beyaz.[90]** Beyaz was the IRGC Quds Force's Lebanon Corps intelligence branch commander. The IDF stated that Beyaz was a "key knowledge center" and gathered intelligence on behalf of Hezbollah.
- **Ahmad Rasouli.[91]** Rasouli was an intelligence officer in the IRGC Quds Force's Palestine Corps. Rasouli was responsible for collecting intelligence for Palestinian militias in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.
- **Hossein Ahmadlou.[92]** Ahmadlou was an intelligence operative who gathered intelligence on Israel. It is unclear if Ahmadlou was a member of Hezbollah or the IRGC Quds Force.
- **Abu Mohammad Ali.[93]** Ali was Hezbollah's representative in the IRGC Quds Force's Palestine Corps. Ali was responsible for coordinating between Hezbollah and the Palestine Corps.

The IDF has continued to conduct "forward defense maneuver[s]" in southern Lebanon.[94] The IDF 769th Regional Brigade (91st Division) identified a Hezbollah cell in southern Lebanon and directed an airstrike against the cell "during the past week." [95] 769th Regional Brigade forces also located a weapons stockpile in southern Lebanon that included explosive devices, light weapons, wireless devices, and ammunition. The IDF issued another evacuation warning for all residents south of the Litani River on March 8.[96]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to claim attacks against US forces. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 7 that it conducted 24 drone and missile attacks targeting "enemy" bases in Iraq and the region in the past 24 hours.[97] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications of Iraqi militias using missiles in their attacks as of this writing. Likely

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Rijal al Baas al Shadid claimed that it conducted three drone attacks targeting the former US Victory Base at Baghdad International Airport on March 7.[98] A security source told Iraqi media on March 8 that air defenses thwarted an attempted attack on the base.[99] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds also claimed on March 7 that it conducted a drone attack targeting Harir Airbase at the Erbil International Airport.[100] An unspecified Iraqi source told Iranian state media on March 8 that a drone hit a radar system at the base.[101]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-us-march-8-2026-f0b20dbffaea9351ae1e54183ffe53ff>

[2] <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/30119166.html>

[3] <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/30119166.html>

[4] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf> ;
<https://web.archive.org/web/20130907001755/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/08/khamenei-s-on-controls-iran-militia>

[5] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/05/iran-leader-trump-khamenei>

[6]
<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/11/khamenei-coerces-qom-into-submission.html>

[7]
<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/11/khamenei-coerces-qom-into-submission.html>

[8] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603052337>

[9] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603048311>

[10] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/394290> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/majority-consensus-reached-irans-next-supreme-leader-mehr-news-reports-2026-03-08/>

[11] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603068645>

[12]
<https://iranwire.com/en/news/144768-exclusive-with-khamenei-unreachable-iranian-officials-fear-for-his-health-and-the-regime/>

[13] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/22/world/middleeast/iran-larjani-khamenei-pezeskian.html>

[14] <https://tsn dot ua/exclusive/ukrayina-vidpravliaye-hrupu-viyskovykh-na-blyzkyi-skhid-shcho-vony->

tam-robytymut-detali-vid-zelenskoho-3036662.html; https://t.me/TCH_channel/212648; <https://suspilne dot media/1258506-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-nastupnogo-tizna-na-blizkij-shid-pribude-persa-grupa-vijskovih-ekspertiv-z-ukraini/>

[15] <https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/vazhlivo-sho-razom-z-niderlandami-viroblyayemo-zbroyu-i-obov-103301>; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18262; <https://suspilne dot media/1258506-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-nastupnogo-tizna-na-blizkij-shid-pribude-persa-grupa-vijskovih-ekspertiv-z-ukraini/>

[16] <https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-proviv-rozmovu-zi-spadkoyemnim-princom-sauidvskoyi-103285>; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18158; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18167; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18168; <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2029255383785615628>; <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2029257929988133298>; <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2029266899318509610>; <https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/mi-pracyuyemo-shob-povernuti-vsih-nashih-lyudej-dodomu-z-ros-103233>; <https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-obgovoriv-iz-korolem-bahrejnu-protidiyu-iranskim-r-103225>; <https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-obgovoriv-zi-spadkoyemnim-princom-derzha-103229>

[17] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2030255098946007524/photo/1>; <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/>

[18] <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraines-interceptor-drone-makers-look-exports-gulf-iran-war-flares-2026-03-07/>

[19] <https://www.ft.com/content/bbd79c63-8131-4b20-9d2d-708bc8acea38>

[20] <https://t.me/kianmeli1/83180>; <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030246113567973544/history>; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030524512547098989>

[21] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030524512547098989>

[22] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030524512547098989>

[23] <https://theaviationgeekclub.com/iaaf-commander-who-led-the-iranian-tomcat-program-tells-the-true-story-of-why-iran-bought-the-f-14-it-was-not-because-of-the-fly-off-at-andrews-afb>; https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf, pg. 75

[24] <https://t.me/kianmeli1/83180>; <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030246113567973544/history>

[25]

[26] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces>

[27] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030285224798572934>; <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030292266573504596> ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzFPZlluDio>

[28] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030585212913000587>

[29] <https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-889169>

- [30] <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/satellite-images-show-iran-repairing-fortifying-sites-amid-us-tensions-2026-02-18/>
- [31] <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/satellite-images-show-iran-repairing-fortifying-sites-amid-us-tensions-2026-02-18/>
- [32] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2029980877577670782
- [33] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-8-2026/>
- [34] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/>
- [35] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-26-2024/> ;
- [36] <https://israel-alma dot org/jam-missile-development-project-of-the-iranian-revolutionary-guard-corps/>
- [37] <https://x.com/trbrtc/status/1933988811228267002>
- [38] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2030061048750108912
- [39] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2028230881132134534
- [40] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-8-2026/>
- [41] <https://x.com/IDF/status/2030679986164638155;>
<https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2030652567328321562>
- [42] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030693373154099352?s=20> ;
https://x.com/mostly_zakhim/status/2030727666941239488
- [43] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030688928399855699?s=20;>
<https://ir.voanews.com/a/multiple-targets-hit-khorramabad-sunday-afternoon/8122625.html>
- [44] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030730847926546654;>
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030673404290814029;>
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030691264773968273?s=20;>
<https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/2030654053529584013?s=20;>
https://x.com/Military_OSTX/status/2030627441148928087?s=20
- [45] Data upon request
- [46] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030672161086513197>
- [47]
- [48] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030698256200602096?s=20;>

[https://x.com/mostly_zakhim/status/2030719121516568592;](https://x.com/mostly_zakhim/status/2030719121516568592)
<https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=32.844882&lon=51.564685&z=17&m=w&show=/3997189/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87%DB%8C-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C&search=32.844745271061974%2C%2051.564928288165376>

[49] [https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030678077576036793?s=20;](https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030678077576036793?s=20)

[https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030691039837671799;](https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030691039837671799)
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030690750887809336>

[50] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030679559780065651>

[51] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030679559780065651>

[52] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030679559780065651>

[53] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/08/iran-ground-troops-special-forces-nuclear>

[54] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/08/iran-ground-troops-special-forces-nuclear>

[55] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/08/iran-ground-troops-special-forces-nuclear>

[56] <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/6/22/us-joins-israel-in-attacks-against-iran-strikes-key-nuclear-sites>

[57] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/08/iran-ground-troops-special-forces-nuclear>

[58] <https://t.me/BenTzionM/6923>

[59] [https://t.me/Tasnimnews/394313;](https://t.me/Tasnimnews/394313)

[60] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/394313>

[61] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/394313>

[62] <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48433>

[63] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/394311>

[64] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/394311>

[65] <https://t.me/farsna/416875>

[66] [https://t.me/farsna/416850 ;](https://t.me/farsna/416850)
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/>

[67] [https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030386865451450765 ;](https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030386865451450765)
[https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030438243989365220 ;](https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030438243989365220)
[https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030488820773183628 ;](https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030488820773183628)
[https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030497996899496034 ;](https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030497996899496034)
[https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030515267378237605 ;](https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030515267378237605)

<https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2030610502070522321> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030620122889462086> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030682205899382989>

[68] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030622824272986450>

[69]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-3-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-4-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-4-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/>

[70] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/08/world/middleeast/desalination-plants-iran-bahrain.html>

[71] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030708325940179375

[72] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030681873316192583> ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030679673735139743?s=20

[73] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030681873316192583>

[74]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-has-told-iran-not-attack-it-warns-possible-retaliation-sources-say-2026-03-07/>

[75]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-has-told-iran-not-attack-it-warns-possible-retaliation-sources-say-2026-03-07/>

[76]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-has-told-iran-not-attack-it-warns-possible-retaliation-sources-say-2026-03-07/>

[77]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-8-2026/> ;
<https://x.com/drpezeshkian/status/2030275830924898555?s=20>

[78] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10480>

[79] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10524> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10517>

[80] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030635931636477979> ; https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-idf-soldiers-killed-in-hezbollah-attack-in-southern-lebanon/?utm_source=article_hpsidebar&utm_medium=desktop_site&utm_campaign=idf-to-relocate-11-bases-from-central-israel-to-free-up-land-for-real-estate

[81] https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-idf-soldiers-killed-in-hezbollah-attack-in-southern-lebanon/?utm_source=article_hpsidebar&utm_medium=desktop_site&utm_campaign=idf-to-relocate-11-bases-from-central-israel-to-free-up-land-for-real-estate

- [82] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10474> ; <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-to-relocate-11-bases-from-central-israel-to-free-up-land-for-real-estate/>
- [83] <https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollahs-rocket-and-missile-arsenal-current-capabilities-and-threat-ranges/> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10474>
- [84] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-limited-options-for-supporting-iran/>
- [85] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/two-idf-soldiers-killed-in-hezbollah-attack-in-southern-lebanon/?utm_source=article_hpsidebar&utm_medium=desktop_site&utm_campaign=idf-to-relocate-11-bases-from-central-israel-to-free-up-land-for-real-estate
- [86] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-israeli-soldiers-killed-southern-lebanon-israel-military-says-2026-03-08/>
- [87] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030691470848528433> ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/two-idf-soldiers-killed-in-hezbollah-attack-in-southern-lebanon/?utm_source=article_hpsidebar&utm_medium=desktop_site&utm_campaign=idf-to-relocate-11-bases-from-central-israel-to-free-up-land-for-real-estate
- [88] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030691470848528433> ; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030638554909389114?s=20>
- [89] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030704660437209180>
- [90] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030705601483821198>
- [91] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030705601483821198>
- [92] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030705601483821198>
- [93] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030705601483821198>
- [94] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030684473147212107?s=20>
- [95] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030684467539464409>
- [96] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030577298408099986>
- [97] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1565>
- [98] <https://t.me/Extremedistress/877> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/879> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/881>
- [99] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/احباط-هجوم-جديد-على-قاعدة-فكتوريا-بمطار-بغداد>
- [100] https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/443; https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/446
- [101] <https://t.me/farsna/416962>

Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 9, 2026



Adham Fattah, Nidal Morrison, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 8:00 AM ET.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.


Key Takeaways

1. The combined force has struck several key Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces sites in Esfahan Province. The IDF struck the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in three provinces. The combined force struck the IRGC Ground Forces 14th Imam Hossein Division, which operates under the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and was deployed to Syria during the Syrian civil war. The IDF also struck the Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit, which has been involved in protest suppression.
2. Iran has continued to attack Israel and other regional countries since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 8. The Turkish Defense Ministry stated on March 9 that a ballistic missile launched from Iran entered Turkish airspace. NATO air defenses intercepted the missile, and some debris from the missile landed in Gaziantep Province, southeastern Turkey. Israeli media separately reported on March 9 that Iranian cluster munitions killed one person and wounded three others at six impact sites in central Israel.
3. The combined force also continued to strike Law Enforcement Command (LEC) institutions in central and western Iran. The IDF confirmed on March 9 that it struck the Esfahan City LEC Headquarters. The combined force previously struck the Esfahan Province LEC Headquarters.
4. Hezbollah claimed that its fighters have engaged Israeli forces advancing into Lebanon on three separate axes since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on March 8.

Toplines

The combined force has struck several key Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces sites in Esfahan Province.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the IRGC Ground Forces Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base in Esfahan on March 8.[2] This base oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Esfahan, and Yazd provinces in central Iran.[3] The combined force


struck the IRGC Ground Forces 14th Imam Hossein Division in Esfahan on March 8, which is one of the divisions that operates under the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base.[4] Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that the combined force destroyed buildings in the northern and central parts of the division's complex. The Imam Hossein Division deployed to Syria to fight for the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.[5] Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 also shows damage to the IRGC Ground Forces 8th Najaf-e Ashraf Armored Division in Najafabad, west of Esfahan City. This division also operates under the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base.[6] The IDF also struck the IRGC Ground Forces Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit in Esfahan on March 9.[7] The Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit has played a role in suppressing protests in Esfahan, including during the Dey protests in 2017-2018.[8]



IRGC Sites Targeted IRGC Sites


The combined force also continued to strike Law Enforcement Command (LEC) institutions in central and western Iran. The IDF confirmed on March 9 that it struck the Esfahan City LEC Headquarters.[9] The

combined force previously struck the Esfahan Province LEC Headquarters, as ISW-CTP reported in its [March 8 Morning Update](#). An Iranian source also posted footage showing destruction to an LEC station in Aleshtar, Lorestan Province, on March 8.[10] The combined force has recently struck several LEC headquarters and stations in western Iran, including in Borujerd and Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, and Abdanan, Ilam Province.[11]




Iran has continued to attack Israel and other regional countries since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 8. The Turkish Defense Ministry stated on March 9 that a ballistic missile launched from Iran entered Turkish airspace.[12] NATO air defenses intercepted the missile, and some debris from the missile landed in Gaziantep Province, southeastern Turkey.[13] NATO air defenses previously intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile that entered Turkish airspace on March 4.[14] Israeli media separately reported on March 9 that Iranian cluster munitions killed one person and wounded three others at six impact sites in central Israel.[15] Iran also conducted a drone attack targeting Sitra

Island, Bahrain, on March 9, injuring 32 people and causing a fire at the country's only oil refinery.[16]



The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that Iran launched 15 ballistic missiles and 18 drones at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 9.[17] This marks a significant decrease in the number of drones that Iran has launched at the UAE since March 8 (see graphic below).

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates since February 28, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Hezbollah has continued to attack Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on March 8. The group claimed that it launched a barrage of missiles or rockets targeting an IDF air defense base in Haifa.[18] Hezbollah also claimed drone and rocket or missile attacks targeting Israeli towns and IDF units along the Israel-Lebanon border in the Galilee Panhandle.[19]

Hezbollah claimed that its fighters have engaged Israeli forces advancing into Lebanon on three separate axes since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on March 8. Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets, mortars, and small arms targeting advancing Israeli forces and vehicles near Odaisseh, which is across the Lebanese border from the Israeli town of Misgav Am.[20] Hezbollah also claimed that it mortared Israeli forces advancing toward al Jadida from Mays al Jabal.[21] The group also claimed at least two mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces advancing toward Aitaroun.[22] A Hezbollah attack on an IDF unit near Manara killed two Israeli soldiers on March 8, marking the first time that Hezbollah has killed IDF soldiers since the Fall 2024 conflict.[23]

Hezbollah Attacks in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon

Between March 8, 2026 at 4:00 PM ET and March 9, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/Joetrzman/status/2030881087917056464> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030881626897461438?s=20>

[2] <https://x.com/Joetrzman/status/2030881087917056464> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030881626897461438?s=20>

- [3] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>
- [4] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>
- [5] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>
- [6] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>
- [7] <https://x.com/Joetrzman/status/2030881087917056464>
- [8] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f4_radio_farda_manager_reacion_revolutionary_guardes/29017713.html
- [9] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030881626897461438>
- [10] <https://t.me/sepehrazadi/204943>; <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030751358580629721?s=20>
- [11] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030730847926546654>;
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030673404290814029>;
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030691264773968273?s=20>;
<https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/2030654053529584013?s=20>;
https://x.com/Military_OSTX/status/2030627441148928087?s=20;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/>
- [12] <https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/2030976072896905461>
- [13] <https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/2030976072896905461>
- [14] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-nato-defences-destroyed-missile-fired-iran-over-mediterranean-2026-03-04/>
- [15] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030940424697737362> ; https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/footage-shows-iranian-cluster-bomb-impacts-in-central-israel/ ;
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/at-least-6-impact-sites-reported-in-central-israel-after-iranian-cluster-bomb-attack/
- [16] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/09/world/middleeast/bahrain-iran-strikes.html> ;
<https://x.com/Summitsoldier/status/2030862362472038789> ;
<https://abcnews.com/amp/Business/wireStory/bahraains-state-oil-company-declares-force-majeure-shipments-130891891>
- [17] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2030969656438079684>
- [18] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10578>

[19] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10530>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10543>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10546>;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10569>; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10575>

[20] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10554>;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10557>;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10572>;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10566>

[21] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10539>

[22] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10560>;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10563>

[23] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030627965046829359>; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29062>;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-israeli-soldiers-killed-southern-lebanon-israel-military-say-s-2026-03-08/>

Iran Update Evening Special Report: March 9, 2026



Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Nidal Morrison, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways


1. The US-Israeli combined force has severely degraded Iran's missile and drone capabilities, which has limited Iran's ability to launch retaliatory attacks in the region.
2. The combined force has degraded Iran's internal security apparatus in Tehran and parts of western Iran. The combined force has struck dozens of internal security institutions across central and western Iran since February 28.
3. The combined force targeted a company in Tehran that is involved in the regime's censorship and filtering of the internet. The combined force struck the Sahab Pardaz Company, which the United States sanctioned in October 2022 for providing "censorship, surveillance, and espionage tools" to the Iranian regime.
4. The IDF confirmed that Hezbollah is using long-range projectiles to attack Israel. Senior Israeli officials said that they expect Hezbollah to increase the volume of its rocket and drone attacks against Israel in "the coming days" as part of an effort to "draw Israeli attention away" from Iran.

Toplines

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has severely degraded Iran's missile and drone capabilities, which has limited Iran's ability to launch retaliatory attacks in the region. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed on March 9 that it destroyed three missile launchers in unspecified locations in Iran that Iran had used to launch missile attacks against Israel.[1] Commercially available satellite imagery on March 8 confirmed that the combined force struck underground facilities at the Esfahan Missile Complex in

Esfahan Province, presumably making it harder for military personnel to access underground missile silos. Commercially available satellite imagery on March 8 also confirmed that the combined force cratered the runway of and caused significant damage to the northeastern area of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force's Ali Akbar Drone Base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, in southwestern Iran near the Iraqi border. The IDF separately confirmed on March 9 that it conducted airstrikes targeting an "IRGC Drone Command Headquarters" in an unspecified location in Iran that Iranian forces used to launch drones against Israel.[2] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts reported that the combined force targeted a vehicle inspection center in Zanjan, Iran, on March 8.[3] One of the OSINT accounts identified a hidden missile launcher at the center in satellite imagery.[4]



ISW-CTP has recorded combined force airstrikes targeting 10 out of Iran's 17 Artesh Air Force tactical airbases and three out of Iran's six Artesh Ground Forces Aviation bases across Iran since February 28 (see map below).[5] The IDF announced on March 9 that the Israeli Air Force (IAF)

has targeted six Iranian airbases since the start of the war on February 28.[6] The IDF confirmed on March 8 that IAF airstrikes on March 7 destroyed F-14 fighter jets at an unspecified airbase in Esfahan. These strikes likely took place at the Artesh Air Force 8th Tactical Airbase. Israeli research and education center Alma confirmed on March 9 that the combined force has dropped at least 12 munitions on the Artesh Air Force 8th Tactical Airbase in Esfahan, citing commercially available satellite imagery from March 8.[7] IAF airstrikes previously destroyed 16 aircraft used by the IRGC Quds Force at the Mehrabad Airport in Tehran on March 6.[8] Alma and OSINT analysts separately confirmed damage to two buildings and the runway at the IRGC Aerospace Force Badr Base at Esfahan Airport in southeastern Esfahan City, citing commercially available satellite imagery from March 8.[9] Alma reported that the combined force struck a surface-to-air missile site at the Badr Base earlier in the war, citing commercially available satellite imagery from March 2.[10] Alma noted that Israeli airstrikes in April 2024 destroyed a radar at the Badr Base, likely referring to the destroyed Tomb Stone target engagement radar of one of Iran's S-300 systems.[11] Another OSINT analyst reported on March 9 that the two damaged buildings at the Badr Base belonged to the Shahed Aviation Industries Production Facility (read more below).[12]


US-Israeli Strikes Targeting Artesh Air Force and Ground Forces Aviation Bases in Iran as of March 9, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The combined force has continued to target defense industrial sites in Iran. Commercially available satellite imagery published on March 8 shows that the combined force struck the Shahed Aviation Industries Production Facility in Esfahan City.[13] Shahed Aviation Industries produces Shahed-136, Shahed-129, and Shahed-171 drones, among other Shahed variants.[14] The United States sanctioned Shahed Aviation Industries in November 2022 for supporting the IRGC Aerospace Force.[15] An OSINT account separately published a video of an explosion in Dolatabad Industrial Town north of Esfahan City.[16] It is unclear what the combined force may have targeted in this town, although Iranian defense industrial sites are often located in industrial zones. An explosion previously occurred at an electronics manufacturing factory in Dolatabad Industrial Town in December 2025, killing nine individuals.[17] The combined force also reportedly struck an “IRGC-affiliated” warehouse in Khorramabad, Lorestan Province, on March 8.[18] It is unclear what the IRGC used the warehouse for.

The combined force has degraded Iran’s internal security apparatus in Tehran and parts of


western Iran. The combined force has struck dozens of internal security institutions across central and western Iran since February 28. The combined force struck the 4th Tehran Municipality Karbala Basij Resistance Regional Base in northeastern Tehran on March 9.[19] This base is one of the 23 Basij regional bases in Tehran.[20] The Basij is a paramilitary force that is responsible for civil defense and social control. The combined force has struck at least 11 other Basij regional bases in Tehran since February 28.[21] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 9 shows damage to the 15th Tehran Municipality Malik Ashtar Basij Resistance Regional Base, which the combined force targeted on March 2.[22] These bases operate under the IRGC Ground Forces Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Provincial Unit, which operates under the IRGC Ground Forces Sarallah Headquarters.[23] An OSINT account separately reported that the combined force targeted an IRGC base in Nazarabad, Alborz Province, which may refer to the Nazarabad Basij Resistance Regional Base.[24]



The combined force continued to strike Law Enforcement Command (LEC) institutions in Tehran and western Iran. The combined force struck the Greater Tehran LEC Relief Unit on March 9.[25] LEC relief units are responsible for suppressing protests, providing assistance to other LEC units, and conducting special operations.[26] The combined force separately reportedly struck an LEC headquarters in Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province, on March 9.[27] It is unclear whether the combined force targeted the Kermanshah City or Kermanshah Province LEC Headquarters. Each Iranian province has a provincial LEC headquarters in its capital that is responsible for overseeing LEC units across the province. The combined force previously struck the Eslamabad-e Gharb City, Kermanshah Province, LEC Headquarters on March 8.[28] The combined force also reportedly targeted local LEC stations in Aleshtar and Khorramabad, Lorestan Province, on March 9.[29]

US and Israeli Strikes Targeting Internal Security Institutions

As of March 9 at 3:00 PM ET




The combined force targeted a company in Tehran that is involved in the regime’s censorship and filtering of the internet. The combined force struck the Sahab Pardaz Company, which the United States sanctioned in October 2022 for providing “censorship, surveillance, and espionage tools” to the Iranian regime.[30] Sahab Pardaz signed a contract worth millions of dollars with a company affiliated with Iran’s Information and Communications Technology Ministry in 2016 to create “a system of cultural and social protection.”[31] The strike on the Sahab Pardaz Company comes as the regime sustained its nationwide internet shutdown for the tenth consecutive day on March 9.[32]

The combined force struck an unspecified intelligence office in Darreh Shahr, Ilam Province, and a reported IRGC Intelligence Organization building in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, on March 9.[33] The intelligence office in Darreh Shahr is located near many local governance institutions, including the Darreh Shahr governor’s office and courthouse.

Anti-regime media claimed on March 8 that the combined force killed the IRGC Ground Forces Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit coordination deputy.[34] The Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit is based in Esfahan and operates under the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base.[35] The coordination deputy most likely died in a combined force airstrike against the Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit on March 8.[36] The IDF announced on March 9 that it has killed 1,900 Iranian commanders and soldiers since the start of the war on February 28.[37]

The combined force continued to attack Iranian naval capabilities. The combined force reportedly struck a Shahid Soleimani-class corvette off the coast of Bandar Lengeh, Hormozgan Province, on March 9.[38] It is unclear which Soleimani-class warship the combined force struck on March 9. The combined force previously struck the IRGC Navy's IRIS *Shahid Sayyad Shirazi*, another Shahid Soleimani-class warship, off the coast of Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on March 3.[39] The United States has sunk over 30 Iranian ships since the start of the war on February 28.[40]



Iranian Domestic Affairs

Prominent Iranian regime figures congratulated Mojtaba Khamenei on his selection as Iran's next Supreme Leader. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani stated on March 8 that Mojtaba can guide Iran "on the path of development."^[41] Ali Larijani's brother and Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, who was considered a possible successor to Ali Khamenei, also congratulated Mojtaba on March 8.^[42] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian congratulated Mojtaba on March 9 and wished him success in building an "independent Iran."^[43] ISW-CTP assessed on March 8 that Mojtaba will likely face several immediate challenges, including trying to establish his legitimacy and attempting to unite and gain the support of various regime factions.^[44]

The IRGC announced on March 9 that forces operating under the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base dismantled an armed anti-regime group in the northwestern region of Kurdistan Province in northwestern Iran.^[45] The IRGC forces reportedly killed one individual, arrested six others, and seized large quantities of weapons and ammunition, including Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and grenades.^[46] The Iranian regime is particularly concerned about anti-regime insurgent groups in Kurdish-populated areas in northwestern Iran.^[47]

Iranian Response

Iran launched nine missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 8 and 3:00 PM ET on March 9. Israeli media and journalists reported that Iranian ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads impacted seven different locations in Israel, killing at least one Israeli civilian and injuring several others.^[48] Iran has used several cluster munition warheads in its ballistic missile attacks on Israel since February 28.^[49] All ballistic missiles have a circular error probable (CEP). The CEP is "the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact."^[50] The stated and publicly known CEPs of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles are between 20 and 500 meters.^[51] The relatively poor accuracy of these missiles compared to precision-guided munitions means that previous Iranian missile attacks against Israeli military targets have been largely ineffective and caused little to no casualties or damage. A cluster munition warhead contains submunitions that disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage.^[52] Iran likely began using cluster warheads to maximize the damage inflicted by its ballistic missiles given their relatively low accuracy when fitted with standard warheads.^[53] Iran may calculate that using cluster munitions is more likely to cause Israeli casualties and impose costs on Israel for its air campaign against Iran.

Iran continued to target Gulf countries on March 8 and 9.^[54] **Gulf countries have reportedly been able to intercept and destroy around 94 percent of Iran's missiles and drones.**^[55]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that 11 countries have requested Ukraine's experience in countering Shahed drones.^[56] Zelenskyy did not specify which countries asked for Ukraine's expertise, but noted that the countries include Iran's neighbors, likely referring to Gulf states.^[57] Gulf countries have continued to condemn Iranian attacks.^[58] Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani stated on March 9 that Iran "betrayed" the Gulf with its "miscalculation" in attacking Gulf countries and noted that Iran has destroyed its relationship with Gulf states, for example.^[59]


US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on March 8 that a US servicemember passed

away from injuries sustained during Iran’s “initial attacks” against regional countries.[60] CENTCOM stated that the servicemember was seriously wounded in an Iranian attack on US forces in Saudi Arabia on March 1.[61] This marks the seventh US servicemember who has been killed since the start of the war.[62] CENTCOM separately announced on March 8 that a US National Guard soldier passed away due to a “medical emergency” in Kuwait.[63]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed 22 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 8 and 3:00 PM ET on March 9. Hezbollah’s claimed attacks suggest that Hezbollah is increasingly focused on preventing Israeli forces from advancing deeper into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it conducted several rocket, mortar, and drone attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions along both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.[64] Hezbollah claimed two separate attacks targeting the Zeev Air Defense Base in Haifa and the IDF 146th Division Headquarters in Jaatoun, northern Israel.[65] The IDF reported that it intercepted dozens of drones launched from Lebanon.[66]

Hezbollah Attacks in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 8, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 9, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



- Assessed Israeli Advances in Lebanon
- Assessed Hezbollah Advances
- Claimed Israeli Advances in Lebanon
- IDF Held Lebanese Territory Since Nov 2024

The IDF confirmed that Hezbollah is using long-range projectiles to attack Israel.[67] Hezbollah’s use of long-range weaponry is notable given that Hezbollah was hesitant to use these weapons in the Fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[68] Hezbollah claimed that it launched “high-quality missiles” targeting the IDF Rehavam Camp in Ramla on March 9.[69] The IDF Rehavam Camp is approximately 135 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border, which indicates that Hezbollah likely used medium- or long-range rockets or missiles, such as the Khaibar-1 rocket, Fadi 6 rocket, or Fateh-110 ballistic missile, in this attack.[70] A Hezbollah missile struck an open area in Mateh Yehuda Regional Council.[71] Israel’s national emergency service, Magen David Adom, reported that Hezbollah’s attacks on Ramla and Mateh Yehuda injured at least 16 people.[72] Hezbollah also launched a barrage of “sophisticated missiles” targeting an IDF satellite communication station in Elah Valley, central Israel.[73] Hezbollah claimed that the station is 160 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border, which suggests that Hezbollah also used medium- or long-range weapons in this attack.[74] The Hezbollah attack caused

some damage to the satellite station, according to an OSINT analyst.[75] ISW-CTP previously forecasted in a [February 28 report](#) that Hezbollah would likely use its long-range weapons to conduct attacks against Israel from central and northern Lebanon.

Senior Israeli officials told Israeli media on March 9 that they expect Hezbollah to increase the volume of its rocket and drone attacks against Israel in “the coming days” as part of an effort to “draw Israeli attention away” from Iran.[76] Senior Israeli defense officials met with Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 9, during which the officials warned that Hezbollah seeks to “wear down” the IDF, specifically in northern Israel, by launching a greater number of missiles and drones.[77] Senior officials told Israeli media that Hezbollah still has a large number of launchers and the capability to launch attacks despite Israeli attacks.[78]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah sites across Lebanon to degrade the group’s ability to launch retaliatory attacks. The IDF has struck more than 120 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon in the past day.[79] The IDF targeted Hezbollah commanders, rocket launchers, and other unspecified military infrastructure on March 8 and 9.[80] The IDF killed Hezbollah Nasr Unit Commander Abu Hussein Ragheb.[81] The Nasr Unit is responsible for the eastern sector of southern Lebanon.[82] Each of Hezbollah’s geographical units possesses independent capabilities, such as combat engineering, rocket operation, logistics, drone, and medical capabilities.[83] The Nasr Unit played a crucial role in Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel after October 7, 2023, and during the Fall 2024 conflict.[84]

The IDF has advanced further into southern Lebanon.[85] An Israeli think tank reported that additional IDF soldiers have deployed to southern Lebanon “over the last few days” and are operating at “strategic observation posts” along the border.[86] The IDF 300th Regional Brigade (146th Division) identified a Hezbollah cell entering an unspecified checkpoint in southern Lebanon and directed the IAF to strike the cell.[87] The IDF announced that the IDF 36th Division, including the 7th Armored Brigade, conducted a targeted raid in Rab el Thalathine, southern Lebanon.[88] The IDF stated that Israeli forces sought to locate and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and killed Hezbollah fighters during the raid.[89] The IDF 401st Brigade, which operates under the 91st Division, is also conducting operations in southern Lebanon to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure.[90] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reported that over 650,000 Lebanese civilians have evacuated from Beirut’s southern suburbs and another 500,000 civilians have evacuated from southern Lebanon following IDF evacuation warnings.[91]

Five sources “with knowledge of the matter” told Axios on March 9 that the Lebanese government proposed immediate direct negotiations with Israel under US auspices to reach a peace agreement.[92] Sources told Axios that Israel rejected the outreach. Lebanese officials, including President Joseph Aoun, have accused Hezbollah of attempting to “collapse” the Lebanese state and have harshly condemned its attacks against Israel.[93] The government’s outreach is notable given that the Lebanese government has long rejected direct and high-level negotiations with Israel because such negotiations would presumably require the Lebanese government to make firm commitments to disarm Hezbollah across all Lebanese territory.[94] The Lebanese government has recently taken steps against Hezbollah and the IRGC in Lebanon, including deeming Hezbollah security and military activity illegal and banning IRGC activity in Lebanon.[95]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have widely welcomed the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new Supreme Leader. Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis, and several Iranian-

backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, all congratulated Iran on Mojtaba's appointment in statements on March 8 and 9.[96]

The United States and Israel continue to attack Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions in Iraq in order to prevent the militias from retaliating against the United States and Israel. The US-Israeli combined force conducted an airstrike targeting the 30th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade in Ninewa Province on March 9.[97] Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias operate under the PMF, and some of these militias answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[98] The combined force has conducted several waves of strikes targeting the 30th PMF Brigade in Ninewa Province since March 2.[99] The 30th PMF Brigade is primarily composed of Shabak fighters and is aligned with the Badr Organization, which is both an Iranian partner militia and a political party.[100]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on March 9 to attack the “economic interests,” businesses, and bases of unspecified Iraqi Kurdish parties if they work with Kurdish opposition groups to destabilize Iran.[101] A military adviser to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba similarly threatened on March 5 to attack an unspecified Barzani family member and his businesses if his militia attacks Iraqi security forces or Iranian-backed Iraqi parties.[102]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to claim attacks against US forces. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 8 that it conducted 26 drone and missile attacks targeting “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region in the past 24 hours.[103] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Rijal al Baas al Shadid separately claimed that it conducted three drone attacks targeting three US bases in Jordan and two drone attacks targeting Harir Airbase at Erbil International Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 8.[104] A security source told Iraqi media on March 9 that US-led coalition air defense systems intercepted drones near Erbil International Airport.[105]

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also targeted the former US Victory Base at Baghdad International Airport on March 8 and 9.[106] A security source told Iraqi media on March 9 that air defenses intercepted missiles and a drone targeting the base.[107] Rijal al Baas al Shadid claimed that it fired two drones targeting the former US Victory Base on March 9.[108] A security source told Iraqi media on March 9 that air defenses shot down two drones targeting the base.[109]

The Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iraq informed the Iraqi Foreign Ministry on March 9 that the Kuwaiti government has recorded attacks originating from Iraqi territory that targeted locations in Kuwait.[110] Two likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front groups claimed drone attacks targeting Kuwait on March 7 and 8.[111] ISW-CTP assessed on March 6 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be using front groups in an attempt to avoid US and Israeli strikes on militia positions and obfuscate culpability.[112]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031052631083291053?s=20>

[2] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031043554055721198?s=20>

- [3] <https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/2030952717825302925?s=20>
- [4] <https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/2030952717825302925?s=20>
- [5] Data upon request
- [6] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2031076263927099423?s=20>
- [7] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2030918654867513600?s=20
- [8] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030524512547098989?s=20>
- [9] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2030918654867513600?s=20; <https://t.me/BenTzionM/7072>;
<https://x.com/byjepstein/status/2030876263536116092?s=20>
- [10] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2030918654867513600?s=20;
- [11] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2030918654867513600?s=20;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-consequences-of-idf-strikes-into/>
- [12] <https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/2031049810799681906?s=20>;
<https://www.aeroflap.com.br/en/saeqeh-the-strange-two-tailed-f-5-of-wrath/>
- [13] <https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/2031049810799681906?s=20> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/>
- [14] <https://x.com/TheIntelLab/status/1582010263619846144> ;
<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1104>
- [15] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1104>
- [16] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030968464395927630?s=20>
- [17] <https://modern.dot.gov/news/550657/>
- [18] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2031014055868346445
- [19] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031025963283169624>
- [20]
<https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%202026.pdf>
- [21] Data available upon request.
- [22]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026/>
- [23]
<https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%202026.pdf>
- [24] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031043867693228347>
- [25] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031034404127101417>
- [26] <https://sarkoobgaran.com/%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%DA%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA/>
- [27] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030989473069076589?s=20>
- [28] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030673404290814029>
- [29] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030750724565381201?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031013029341499482>
- [30] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1048>
- [31] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1048>
- [32] <https://x.com/netblocks/status/2030907746522943767>
- [33] <https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/2030636505404682669?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031028458529136944>
- [34] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030751192033231192?s=20>
- [35]
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>

[36] <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2030881087917056464> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030881626897461438?s=20> ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-9-2026#_ednc3c068e7c38c0db2cc25b137050eac257

[37] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031071772204785815>

[38] <https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2031003449605624014>

[39] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-4-2026>

[40]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-military-says-it-has-sunk-over-30-iranian-ships-so-far-2026-03-05/>

[41] https://x.com/alilarijani_ir/status/2030788355496042989?s=20

[42] <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/iran-names-khameneis-son-as-new-supreme-leader-after-fathers-killing-2> ;
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-will-be-iran-next-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-names/>

[43] <https://x.com/drpezeshkian/status/2031006230093742414?s=20>

[44]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/>

[45] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/185054; <https://t.me/mehrnews/357924>

[46] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/185054; <https://t.me/mehrnews/357924>

[47] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-25-2026/>

[48] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/at-least-6-impact-sites-reported-in-central-israel-after-iranian-cluster-bomb-attack/ ; <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030940424697737362> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030895452409778361>

[49]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-1-2026/> ;
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/number-of-injured-in-missile-attack-in-central-israel-rises-to-12/ ; https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/police-say-iran-shot-cluster-bomb-in-recent-impact-in-central-israel/

[50]
<https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/6805/#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defense%20has%20places%20emphasis,or%20%22The%20probability%20is%200.50%20that%20an>

[51]
<https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/table-irans-missile-arsenal#fn6>

[52] <https://www.clusterconvention.org/files/publications/A-Guide-to-Cluster-Munitions.pdf>

[53]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-24-2025-evening-edition/>

[54] <https://x.com/DanLinnaeus/status/2030983101552230519> ;
<https://x.com/vcdgf555/status/2030864931214831781> ;
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2030805982511591542?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2030816957780418779?s=20>

[55] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030957045730414670>

[56] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030990172569882644>

[57] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030990172569882644>

[58] <https://x.com/KSAmofaEN/status/2030926297287811165> ;
https://www.wsj.com/video/qatar-pm-says-iran-betrayed-gulf-with-attacks/801592AF-0128-4D1D-BB8F-41D83881815C?mod=middle-east_videos_pos1

[59] https://www.wsj.com/video/qatar-pm-says-iran-betrayed-gulf-with-attacks/801592AF-0128-4D1D-BB8F-41D83881815C?mod=middle-east_videos_pos1

[60] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2030727586226360485>

[61] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2030727586226360485>

[62] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2030727586226360485>

[63] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2030765516856734179>

[64] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10530> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10539> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10554> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10557> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10560> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10563> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10566> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10572> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10581> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10584> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10591> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10594>

[65] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10578> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10610>

[66] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030979407037223135>

[67] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031030848414249185>

[68] <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/09/23/hezbollah-israel-hassan-nasrallah-guided-missiles-iran/>

[69] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10603>

[70] <https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollahs-rocket-and-missile-arsenal-current-capabilities-and-threat-ranges/> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10603>

[71] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031055194818228605>

[72] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031057168250843602>

[73] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10600> ; <https://x.com/vcdgf555/status/2031035259081687356>

[74] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10600>

[75] <https://x.com/vcdgf555/status/2031035259081687356>

[76] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/defense-officials-warn-hezbollah-attacks-to-expand-in-bid-to-divert-idf-from-iran-report/

[77] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/defense-officials-warn-hezbollah-attacks-to-expand-in-bid-to-divert-idf-from-iran-report/

[78] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/defense-officials-warn-hezbollah-attacks-to-expand-in-bid-to-divert-idf-from-iran-report/

[79] <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-pushes-deeper-into-south-lebanon-amid-incessant-hezbollah-rocket-fire-on-israeli-towns/amp/>

[80] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030979407037223135> ; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031035869549760980> ; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031052631083291053> ; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030926924113957212?s=20>

[81] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/katz-says-top-hezbollah-man-killed-over-1-million-evacuate-south-lebanon-and-beirut/ ; <https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/bjgmlwnfbx> ; <https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2031028745801228648?s=20>

[82] <https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5249288-israel-says-killed-head-hezbollah-unit-south-lebanon>

[83] <https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollah-southern-front-nasser-unit-elimination-of-unit-commander-and-other-senior-officials-details-and-significance/>

[84] <https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollah-southern-front-nasser-unit-elimination-of-unit-commander-and-other-senior-officials-details-and-significance/> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-23-2024/>

[85] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030933349712228629?s=20>

[86] <https://israel-alma dot org/forward-defense-in-lebanon-how-the-idf-is-preparing-to-prevent-the->

infiltration-of-hezbollahs-radwan-forces/

[87] <https://www.idf dot il/333322>

[88] <https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-889323> ;

<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030933349712228629?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030933458936041944>

[89] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030933349712228629?s=20>

[90] <https://www.idf dot il/333464>

[91] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031022910312169517>

[92] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/09/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-peace-talks>

[93] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2031068427226415120?s=20 ;

<https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/2028436712930545867>

[94] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-20-2026/>

[95] <https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2026/03/05/lebanese-government-bans-all-activity-by-irgc-in-lebanon> ; <https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/2028436712930545867>

[96] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/2030795269093122512 ;

https://x.com/akram_alkabee/status/2031051721758085340?s=46 ;

<https://x.com/PhillipSmyth/status/2031085074121437396> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%89-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86> ; <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2031062250400731143> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10587>

[97] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2030976692291023274 ;

https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2030977214020255922 ; DNGTS: <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/ضربة-جوية-تستهدف-موقعا-تابعا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-سهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/ضربة-جوية-تستهدف-موقعا-تابعا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-سهل-نينوى>

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10587>

[97] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2030976692291023274 ;

https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2030977214020255922 ; DNGTS: <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/ضربة-جوية-تستهدف-موقعا-تابعا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-سهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/ضربة-جوية-تستهدف-موقعا-تابعا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-سهل-نينوى>

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10587>

[98] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/>

[99] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2029162649129259470 ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/استهداف-مواقع-للحشد-الشعبي-في-نينوى> ;

https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2028581779548877138 ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A9> ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2028581779548877138 ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A9> ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A9> ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A9> ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A9> ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A9> ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مقر-لوا-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بسهل-نينوى>

[100]] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-hashd-al-shabak-30th-pmf-brigade>

[101] <https://t.me/centerkaf/5577>

[102] https://t.me/Al_Nojaba/1322

[103] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1568>

[104] <https://t.me/Extremedistress/887> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/891> ;

<https://t.me/Extremedistress/893> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/899> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/885>

Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 10, 2026



Parker Hempel, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 8:00 AM ET.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

ISW-CTP's satellite imagery partner has expanded its imagery restrictions to include Iran and will now delay the release of all satellite imagery from the region by 14 days. ISW-CTP will be unable to confirm strikes or assess damage at sites using satellite imagery from this partner for at least 14 days after a strike occurs. We are exploring other options and methods to confirm strikes and will continue to confirm strikes where possible.

Key Takeaways

1. The combined force struck several targets in Tehran overnight on March 9 and 10, including the IRGC "Quds Force headquarters" and an IRGC weapons research and development facility.
2. The combined force struck multiple sites in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on March 10, which may have included the Artesh Air Force 9th Tactical Airbase. ISW-CTP has recorded combined force airstrikes targeting 11 out of Iran's 17 Artesh Air Force tactical airbases since February 28.
3. Iran launched three missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and 8:00 AM ET on March 10. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth noted during a Pentagon briefing on March 10 that Iran had fired its lowest number of missiles since the war began over the last 24 hours. The IDF said on March 10 that Iranian missile barrages in recent days have included only a few missiles at a time, but that around 50 percent of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Israel have contained cluster warheads.
4. Hezbollah has claimed 18 attacks targeting IDF positions and forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 9. The IDF confirmed that Hezbollah is using long-range projectiles to attack Israel, after Hezbollah claimed that it launched "high-quality missiles" targeting the IDF Rehavam Camp in Ramla, Central Israel, on March 9.
5. The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah's ability to launch attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The IDF has reportedly continued to advance into southern Lebanon on three

separate axes since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on March 9.

Toplines


The combined force struck several targets in Tehran overnight on March 9 and 10. Reuters reported that US-Israeli strikes in Tehran overnight were the most intense since the start of the war on February 28.[1] There were reported airstrikes in at least eight districts across Tehran Province.[2]

The IDF reported on March 9 that it struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Headquarters in Tehran.[3] The Quds Force is the extraterritorial arm of the IRGC and Iran's primary means of controlling and supporting the Axis of Resistance.[4] The Quds Force provides leadership, materiel, intelligence, training, and funds to Iranian proxy and partner militias across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq. The IDF previously reported that it struck the IRGC Quds Force Headquarters on March 4.[5] It is unclear if the IDF struck the same facility again or targeted another Quds Force facility in Tehran. The Southern Quds Force Unit Headquarters is also located in Tehran, for example. The exact role and responsibility of the Southern Quds Force Unit is unclear.

The IDF also struck an underground weapons research and development facility at Imam Hossein University.[6] The IDF stated that it targeted an underground tunnel where the IRGC conducts ballistic missile production research and testing. The US-Israeli combined force has targeted Iran's ballistic missile infrastructure since February 28 in order to degrade Iranian missile capabilities and Iran's ability to retaliate.[7]

US and Israeli Strikes in Tehran City

Between March 9, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 10, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



- Confirmed Airstrike
- Reported Airstrike
- Report of Explosion With Footage
- Report of Explosion Without Footage

The combined force struck multiple sites in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on March 10, which may have included the Artesh Air Force 9th Tactical Airbase.[8] Anti-regime media posted footage of smoke rising from the 9th Tactical Airbase in Bandar Abbas.[9] ISW-CTP has recorded combined force airstrikes targeting 11 out of Iran's 17 Artesh Air Force tactical airbases since February 28.[10]

US-Israeli Strikes Targeting Artesh Air Force and Ground Forces Aviation Bases in Iran

As of March 10, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 9 that the United States has damaged or destroyed at least 50 Iranian vessels since February 28.[11] Anti-regime media posted footage on March 10 of plumes of black smoke rising from an unidentified Iranian vessel in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[12]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 9, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 10, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



Iranian Retaliation

Iran launched three missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and 8:00 AM ET on March 10.[13] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth noted during a Pentagon briefing on March 10 that Iran had fired its lowest number of missiles since the war began over the last 24 hours.[14] The IDF said on March 10 that Iranian missile barrages in recent days have included only a few missiles at a time, but that around 50 percent of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Israel have contained cluster warheads.[15] The reduction in Iranian missile attacks demonstrates the success of the combined force's efforts to degrade Iran's ability to launch retaliatory attacks. An unspecified senior Israeli official told Israeli media on March 9 that the combined force has destroyed 80 percent of Iran's missile launchers.[16]


An Iranian drone struck the Millennium tower in Manama, Bahrain, on March 9, killing one person and injuring eight others.[17] An Iranian drone also started a fire at the Ruwais Oil Refinery in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on March 10.[18] ISW-CTP assessed on March 2 that Iran is likely targeting energy infrastructure in Gulf countries to compel the United States and its partners to pursue a ceasefire before achieving their objective of toppling the regime.[19] Iranian attacks have killed at least 12 civilians in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain, according to the *New York Times*' tally of official sources.[20]

Axis of Resistance Response

Hezbollah has claimed 18 attacks targeting IDF positions and forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 9.[21] Hezbollah claimed that it attacked Israeli forces and disabled three Israeli Merkava tanks in Khiam, Marjaayoun District.[22] Hezbollah did not offer any proof of their claim. An Israeli defense journalist separately reported that Hezbollah hit a Merkava tank loaded on a transport truck with an unspecified projectile in the Upper Galilee, which is on the Israel-Lebanon border and just south of Khiam.[23] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired rockets and artillery targeting Israeli forces in Markaba and Tal al Hamamis, Marjaayoun District, and Aitaroun, Jabal al Bat, Maroun al Ras, all in Bint Jbeil District.[24] One of Israel's five permanent positions in southern Lebanon that it has occupied since February 2025 is located at Tal al Hamamis.[25] Hezbollah also claimed that it targeted Israeli positions in northern Israel on the Israel-Lebanon border, including three separate attacks targeting an artillery position at al Abbad near Margalioth, northern Israel.[26] Hezbollah previously targeted some of these IDF positions in northern Israel during the October 7 War.[27] Hezbollah also claimed that it targeted multiple IDF bases and an unspecified military factory with drones and rockets on March 10.[28] Hezbollah claimed one drone attack targeting an IDF base in central Israel on March 9.[29] The IDF confirmed on March 9 that Hezbollah is using long-range projectiles to attack Israel, after Hezbollah claimed that it launched "high-quality missiles" targeting the IDF Rehavam Camp in Ramla, Central Israel, on March 9.[30]

Hezbollah Attacks in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon


From March 9, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET to March 10, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



The IDF has reportedly continued to advance into southern Lebanon on three separate axes since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on March 9.[31] A Hezbollah-aligned source claimed on March 10 that IDF tanks advanced from Aadaysit Marjaayoun and Rab El Thalathine toward Taybeh, all in the Marjaayoun District.[32] The source also claimed that IDF units also advanced on March 10 from Maroun al Ras toward the Kanouq neighborhood in Aitaroun, Bint Jbeil District.[33] The source additionally claimed that Israeli tanks and bulldozers advanced towards the Azrael area on the outskirts of Kfarchouba, Hasbaya District.[34]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah's ability to launch attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The IDF reported that it has destroyed 70 Hezbollah missile launchers since the start of the conflict.[35] The IDF also targeted at least three locations linked to al Qard al Hassan, Hezbollah's main financial arm, on March 10.[36] Hezbollah uses funds transferred via al Qard al Hassan

to finance its military operations, pay its fighters, and purchase weapons.[37] The IDF has destroyed 30 al Qard al Hassan sites since the start of the conflict.[38] The IDF also targeted a Hezbollah headquarters in Insar, Nabatieh District.[39] The IDF stated that Hezbollah fired rockets from the village targeting Israel on March 9.[40] Israel issued additional evacuations on March 10 for Lebanese residents in Tyre and Sidon in southern Lebanon, as well as in Beirut's southern suburbs.[41] Israel has issued multiple evacuation notices in southern Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs since the start of the conflict.[42]



Endnotes

- [1] <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-says-oil-blockade-will-continue-until-attacks-end-trump-threatens-hit-2026-03-10/>
- [2] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2031136083245936888> ;
<https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2031320850184442099?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031086087607660975?s=20>
- [3] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031086087607660975?s=20>
- [4] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces>
- [5] <https://x.com/IDF/status/2029246755921871302>
- [6] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2031320850184442099?s=20>
- [7] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026-69ae4679967f0>
- [8] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031310960237986086?s=20>
- [9] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031310960237986086?s=20> ;
https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2031249379458167079
- [10] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-9-2026/>
- [11] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031141236107509958>
- [12] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031323600326623280?s=20>
- [13] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031091884207030417?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031126510099116445?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031277581152981334?s=20>
- [14] <https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4429953/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/>
- [15] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031376994399559949>
- [16] <https://news.walla dot co.il/item/3822710>
- [17] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2031138823887847761?s=20> ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2031152683428483178
- [18] <https://x.com/ADMEDIAOffice/status/2031332643586163042>
- [19] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-2-2026/>

- [20] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/10/world/middleeast/iran-war-migrant-deaths.html>
- [21] Data upon request
- [22] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10656> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10659>
- [23] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031371715834499093>
- [24] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10635> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10638> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10647> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10665>
- [25]
<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-forces-remain-five-locations-southern-lebanon-removal-deadline-rcna192449> ;
<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/southern-lebanon-residents-describe-hardships-under-israeli-military-occupation>
- [26] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10613> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10616> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10619> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10641> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10671> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10662>
- [27] <https://t.me/mmirleb/4219> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/5864>
- [28] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10644> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10650> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10653>
- [29] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10644>
- [30] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031030848414249185> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10603>
- [31] <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15649> ; <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15649> ;
<https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15666>
- [32] <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15649>
- [33] <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15649> ; <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15649> ;
- [34] <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15666>
- [35] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031383200375710191>
- [36] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031251052729712988>
- [37] <https://www.idf dot il/332370>
- [38] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031251052729712988>
- [39] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031286819090755869>
- [40] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031286819090755869>
- [41] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031270457370882273> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031332152218882210>
- [42] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030577298408099986> ;

<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030257251328336226> ;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030311401567240339> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2029135825913475252> ;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2029540312083767393>

Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 10, 2026



Katherine Wells, Parker Hempel, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Adham Fattah, Benjamin Schmida, Ria Reddy, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

ISW-CTP's satellite imagery partner has expanded its imagery restrictions to include Iran and will now delay the release of all satellite imagery from the region by 14 days. ISW-CTP will be unable to confirm strikes or assess damage at sites using satellite imagery from this partner for at least 14 days after a strike occurs. We are exploring other options and methods to confirm strikes and will continue to confirm strikes where possible.

Key Takeaways

1. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 10 that US forces destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian mining efforts are part of a broader Iranian effort to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to try to impose a cost on the Gulf states and the United States. Iranian efforts to mine the Strait of Hormuz will also likely further hinder Iran's ability to export oil, including shipments to China, the largest importer of Iranian oil.
2. The Iranian regime is expanding securitization efforts amid the ongoing conflict, which likely reflects the regime's paranoia about US-Israeli infiltration and signals a shift to prioritization of counterintelligence. The regime similarly prioritized regime security following the June 2025 Iran-Israel War and arrested hundreds of individuals in the days after the conflict as part of a broader effort to strengthen internal control and expand securitization measures.
3. The combined force targeted Iranian internal security institutions in western and northwestern Iran. Refer to the graphic below to see key Iranian internal security sites that have been struck since the start of the war.
4. The combined force continues to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq to limit the ability of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States and Israel.
5. Hezbollah claimed 29 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and 3:00 PM ET on March 10. Hezbollah's 29 claimed attacks are the highest number of claimed attacks in a 24-hour period that ISW-CTP has observed

since the start of the conflict.


Toplines

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 10 that US forces destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait of Hormuz.[1] Iranian mining efforts are part of a broader Iranian effort to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to try to impose a cost on the Gulf states and the United States. CBS News, citing unspecified US officials, reported on March 10 that Iran may be preparing to deploy naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz.[2] The officials added that Iran is using small craft that can carry up to three mines each. US President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social on March 10 that the United States wants any mines that Iran placed in the Strait of Hormuz “removed immediately,” though he added that the United States has “no reports of [Iran] doing so.”[3] Trump also threatened military consequences “at a level never seen before” if Iran fails to remove any mines it has placed.[4] Iran previously laid mines in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War to disrupt international shipping and impose a cost on Iraq and its allies.[5] The United States launched an operation in April 1988 that destroyed at least two Iranian oil platforms, sank at least three Iranian speedboats, and severely damaged or sank two Iranian frigates after an Iranian mine seriously damaged the USS *Samuel B. Roberts* in the Persian Gulf.[6]

Notably, reports of Iran trying to lay mines have emerged three days after the last confirmed Iranian attacks on vessels in the Persian Gulf on March 7.[7] Iran attacked at least three vessels in the Persian Gulf each day from March 1 through March 4.[8] The first phase of the US-Israeli campaign and continued strikes on Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure have limited Iran’s ability to retaliate with ballistic missiles and drones, however. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on March 5 that US strikes have made Iran’s navy “combat ineffective.”[9] Hegseth stated on March 10 that Iran has fired its lowest number of missiles since the war began in the last 24 hours.[10]

Iranian efforts to mine the Strait of Hormuz will also likely further hinder Iran’s ability to export oil, including shipments to China, the largest importer of Iranian oil.[11] Mining is, therefore, an extreme option to which Iran has resorted and does not represent a desirable option for the country’s military officials. Commercial maritime data shows that only three tankers listed as part of Iran’s ghost fleet have crossed the Strait of Hormuz since March 2.[12] This marks a significant decline from the 24 vessels that crossed between February 22 and March 1.[13]

Coalition Strikes on Iranian Naval Facilities and Iranian Attacks on Maritime Vessels As of March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The combined force continues to conduct airstrikes targeting air offensive and defensive capabilities. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that the Israel Air Force (IAF) fighter jets dropped more than 170 munitions targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force in Tehran City, a missile production and storage site and several air defense systems in Esfahan City, and unspecified military infrastructure in Shiraz City on March 9.[14] The IDF also struck a missile launcher and Iranian military personnel in an unspecified location in Iran on March 9.[15] Anti-regime media reported on March 10 that an airstrike targeted a hidden missile launcher in Shiraz's industrial area at an unspecified time.[16] An Israeli open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst also identified that previous combined force airstrikes destroyed several radars and Hawk missile batteries at the Shahid Sattari Rapid Reaction Air Defense site in Ghani Abad, southeast of Tehran City, on commercially available satellite imagery on March 10.[17] Israeli think tank Alma also identified damage to at least six support structures and two radar emplacements on satellite imagery on March 7.[18] Alma reported that this air defense site covers several key Iranian military sites, including the Khojir missile production and Parchin weapons complexes in northern Tehran City - both of which combined force airstrikes have targeted and damaged since February 28.[19] Israel previously targeted this air defense site in October 2024, when it targeted Iran's three of Iran's S-300 air defense systems.[20]

The combined force continues to strike industrial sites affiliated with Iran's missile and drone program that aim to make it harder for Iran to reconstitute its missile and drone stockpiles. An OSINT analyst reported that combined force airstrikes on March 9 targeted the Shahid Hemmat

Industrial Group, which produces liquid-fueled ballistic missiles at a site west of Tehran City.[21] The Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group is a subsidiary company of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry's Aerospace Industries Organization responsible for Iran's missile and drone production program.[22] An OSINT analyst separately geolocated a target of IAF airstrikes on March 6 to a chemical industry complex in Shokuiyeh industrial town in Qom Province on.[23]



The combined force's decapitation campaign has successfully targeted key figures in the Iranian armed forces' command and control and logistics. Anti-regime media confirmed on March 10 that previous combined force airstrikes killed Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Basij chief Asadollah Badfar.[24] Iranian media has yet to confirm Badfar's death at the time of this writing. Iranian media on March 10 announced the funerals of several senior Iranian commanders killed in combined force airstrikes since the start of the war.[25] The following list contains deceased commanders that ISW-CTP has not reported previously:

- IRGC Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Unit Commander for Greater Tehran Brigadier General Hassan Hassanzadeh (operates under IRGC Ground Forces Sarallah Headquarters, which enforces internal security)[26]
- AFGS Logistic head Brigadier General Hassan Ali Tajik[27]
- AFGS Logistics and Industrial Research deputy Brigadier General Mohsen Darrebaghi[28]
- AFGS Plans and Operations head Brigadier General Hosseini Motlagh[29]
- Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization head Brigadier General Gholamreza Rezaian[30]
- LEC Public Places head Brigadier General Khalil Helali (responsible for public establishments and businesses inspections)[31]
- Brigadier General Davoud Askari (unspecified position)[32]

The Iranian regime is expanding securitization efforts amid the ongoing conflict, which likely reflects the regime’s paranoia about US-Israeli infiltration and signals a shift to prioritization of counterintelligence. Iranian security and intelligence services reported several arrests across Iran on March 10, including 30 individuals accused of acting as spies or “media operatives.”[33] Iranian media claimed that intelligence authorities arrested a foreign national in Khorasan Razavi Province, accused of spying for two unspecified Gulf countries by collecting Iranian military and security information.[34] Iranian media also reported arrests tied to alleged militant and anti-regime networks along Iran’s southeastern and northwestern borders.[35] Security forces separately arrested individuals accused of providing footage of strike sites to anti-regime media outlets and communicating with the Iran International network, including the arrest of 81 individuals accused of sharing information with an anti-regime outlet through social media.[36] The regime similarly prioritized regime security following the June 2025 Iran-Israel War and arrested hundreds of individuals in the days after the conflict as part of a broader effort to strengthen internal control and expand securitization measures.[37]

The following series of infographics tracks US and Israeli efforts to target key nodes of the Iranian regime’s internal security apparatus, including the IRGC Ground Forces, Basij, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC). These institutions are critical to Iran’s ability to maintain domestic stability and social control, particularly during periods of internal unrest. Many of the units listed below participated in protest suppression during the winter 2025-2026 protest wave, for example.

Targeted Internal Security Sites in Iran

As of March 10, 2026

The following graphic identifies key Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces units involved in maintaining internal security within Iranian provinces.

Units highlighted in red: CTP-ISW has used satellite imagery to confirm that the US-Israeli combined force has struck these units since February 28.

Units highlighted in yellow: CTP-ISW has observed reports that the US-Israeli combined force has struck these units since February 28.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Operational Bases and Divisions

Northwest Region:

- Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base (Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province)
- Imam Sajjad Operational Base (Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province)
 - 3rd Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Special Forces Division (Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province)
 - 22nd Beyt ol Mughaddas Operational Division (Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province)

North Region:

- Ashoura Operational Base (Zanjan City, Zanjan Province)
 - 31st Ashoura Mechanized Division (Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province)

North Central Region:

- Saheb ol Zaman Operational Base
 - 17th Ali bin Abu Taleb Operational Infantry Division (Qom City, Qom Province)

Northeast Region:

- Samen ol Aemeh Operational Base (Birjand, Khorasan Razavi Province)
 - 5th Nasr Operational Division (Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province)

Tehran Region:

- Sarallah Operational Base (Tehran city, Tehran Province)
 - 10th Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Division (Karaj, Alborz Province)
 - 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division (Tehran City, Tehran Province)

Caspian Coast Region:

- Ghadir Operational Base (Sari, Mazandaran Province)
 - 16th Quds Operational Division (Rasht, Gilan Province)
 - 25th Karbala Operational Division (Sari, Mazandaran Province)

Central Region:

- Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base (Esfahan City, Esfahan Province)
 - 8th Najaf-e Ashraf Armored Division (Najafabad, Esfahan Province)
 - 14th Imam Hossein Division (Esfahan City, Esfahan Province)

Source: Iran's Reserve of Last Resort: Uncovering the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces Order of Battle (January 2020), Marie Donovan, Nicholas Carl, and Frederick W. Kagan.



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

Operational Bases and Divisions (Continued):

West Region

- Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base (Kermanshah Province)
 - 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division (Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province)

South Region:

- Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base (Bandar-e Abbas, Hormozgan Province)
 - 19th Fajr Operational Division (Shiraz, Fars Province)

Southwest Region:

- Karbala Operational Base (Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province)
 - 7th Vali-ye Asr Operational Division (Dezful, Khuzestan Province)

Southeast Region:

- Quds Operational Base (Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province)
 - 41st Sarallah Division (Kerman City, Kerman Province)

IRGC Ground Forces Provincial Units

Alborz Province - Imam Hassan Mojtaba Unit

Ardabil Province - Hazrat-e Abbas Unit

Bushehr Province - Imam Sadegh Unit

Chahar Mahal and Bakhtiari Province - Ghamar Bani Hashem Unit

East Azerbaijan Province - Ashoura Unit

Esfahan Province - Saheb ol Zaman Unit

Fars Province - Fajr Unit

Gilan Province - Quds Unit

Golestan Province - Neynava Unit

Hamedan Province - Ansar ol Hossein Unit

Hormozgan Province - Imam Sajjad Unit

Ilam Province - Amir ol Momenin Unit

Kerman Province - Sarallah Unit

Kermanshah Province - Nabi Akram Unit

Khorasan Razavi Province - Imam Reza Unit

Khuzestan Province - Vali-ye Asr Unit

Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province - Fath Unit

Kurdistan Province - Beyt ol Moghaddas Unit

Lorestan Province - Abol Fazl Unit

Markazi Province - Ruhollah Unit

Mazandaran Province - Karbala Unit

North Khorasan Province - Javad ol Aemeh Unit

Qazvin Province - Saheb ol Amr Unit

Qom Province - Ali bin Abu Taleb Unit

Semnan Province - Ghaem ol Mohammad Unit

Sistan and Baluchistan Province - Salman Unit

South Khorasan Province - Ansar ol Reza Unit

Tehran City - Seyyed ol Shohada Unit

Tehran Province - Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Unit

West Azerbaijan Province - Shohada Unit

Yazd Province - Al Ghadir Unit

Zanjan Province - Ansar ol Mehdi Unit

Units That Operate Under the Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Unit:

Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade

Al Zahra Security Brigade

Imam Hadi Security Unit

Imam Sajjad Security Unit

Imam Reza Security Unit

Saheb ol Zaman Security Unit

Sources: Iran's Reserve of Last Resort: Uncovering the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces Order of Battle (January 2020), Marie Donovan, Nicholas Carl, and Frederick W. Kagan; The Tharallah (Sarallah) Headquarters Unveiled: The Hidden Infrastructure Blocking Regime Change in Iran (January 2026), Saied Golkar and Kastr Aarabi.



Targeted Internal Security Sites in Iran

As of March 10, 2026

Units highlighted in red: CTP-ISW has used satellite imagery to confirm that the US-Israeli combined force has struck these units since February 28.

Units highlighted in yellow: CTP-ISW has observed reports that the US-Israeli combined force has struck these units since February 28.

Basij Organization Units in Tehran

Basij Organization Headquarters

1st Tehran Municipality Region:
Jamaran Basij Resistance Regional Base

Mahalati Township:
Amir al-Momenin Resistance Regional Base

2nd Tehran Municipality Region:
Bahoner Basij Resistance Regional Base

3rd Tehran Municipality Region:
Muftah Basij Resistance Regional Base

4th Tehran Municipality Region:
Karbala Basij Resistance Regional Base

5th Tehran Municipality Region:
Quds Basij Resistance Regional Base

6th Tehran Municipality Region:
Valiasr Basij Resistance Regional Base

7th Tehran Municipality Region:
Motahari Basij Resistance Regional Base

8th Tehran Municipality Region:
Beheshti Basij Resistance Regional Base

9th Tehran Municipality Region:
Hamzah Basij Resistance Regional Base

10th Tehran Municipality Region:
Moqdad Basij Resistance Regional Base

11th Tehran Municipality Region:
Salman Basij Resistance Regional Base

12th Tehran Municipality Region:
Khomeini Basij Resistance Regional Base

13th Tehran Municipality Region:
Kamil Basij Resistance Regional Base

14th Tehran Municipality Region:
Mahalati Basij Resistance Regional Base

15th Tehran Municipality Region:
Malik Ashtar Basij Resistance Regional Base

16th Tehran Municipality Region:
Rajaei Basij Resistance Regional Base

17th Tehran Municipality Region:
Habib Ibn Mazahir Basij Resistance Regional Base

18th Tehran Municipality Region:
Muslim Ibn Aqeel Basij Resistance Regional Base

19th Tehran Municipality Region:
Abu Dhar Basij Resistance Regional Base

20th Tehran Municipality Region:
Basij Resistance Regional Base

21st Tehran Municipality Region:
Maysam Temar Basij Resistance Regional Base

22nd Tehran Municipality Region:
Ammar Yasser Basij Resistance Regional Base

Other Basij Units

Imam Ali Battalions Headquarters
Imam Hossein Battalions Headquarters

Sources:
The Tharallah (Sarallah) Headquarters Unveiled: The Hidden Infrastructure Blocking Regime Change in Iran (January 2026), Saïd Golkar and Kasra Aarabi.
Whatever It Takes to End It: Iran's Shift Toward More Oppressive Governance (December 2021), Nicholas Carl.



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

Targeted Internal Security Sites in Iran

as of March 10, 2026

Units highlighted in red: CTP-ISW has used satellite imagery to confirm that the US-Israeli combined force has struck these units since February 28.

Units highlighted in yellow: CTP-ISW has observed reports that the US-Israeli combined force has struck these units since February 28.

Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters

Tehran Province

- LEC Headquarters (Tehran, Tehran Province)
- LEC Intelligence Organization (Tehran, Tehran Province)
- Tehran Province LEC Headquarters (Tehran, Tehran Province)
- Tehran Province LEC Special Units Headquarters (Tehran, Tehran Province)
- Greater Tehran LEC Headquarters (Tehran, Tehran Province)
- Greater Tehran LEC Public Security Police Headquarters (Tehran, Tehran Province)
- Western Tehran Province LEC Headquarters (Shahriar, Tehran Province)
- Eastern Tehran Province LEC Headquarters (Varamin, Tehran Province)
- Western Tehran Province LEC Special Units Headquarters (Andisheh, Tehran Province)
- 1st Amir ol Momenin Brigade – LEC Special Units (Tehran, Tehran Province)
- 2nd Musa bin Jafar Brigade – LEC Special Units (Khavar Shahr, Tehran Province)
- 3rd Imam Khomeini Brigade – LEC Special Units (Tehran, Tehran Province)

Alborz Province

- Alborz Province LEC Headquarters (Karaj, Alborz Province)
- Karaj LEC Headquarters (Karaj, Alborz Province)
- Alborz Province LEC Special Unit (Mahdasht, Alborz Province)

Ardabil Province

- Ardabil Province LEC Headquarters (Ardabil, Ardabil Province)
- Ardabil City LEC Headquarters (Ardabil, Ardabil Province)
- Ardabil Province LEC Special Unit (Ardabil, Ardabil Province)

Bushehr Province

- Bushehr Province LEC Headquarters (Bushehr, Bushehr Province)
- Bushehr City LEC Headquarters (Bushehr, Bushehr Province)
- Bushehr Province LEC Special Unit (Bushehr, Bushehr Province)

Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province

- Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province LEC Headquarters (Shahr-e Kord, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province)
- Shahr-e Kord LEC Headquarters (Shahr-e Kord, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province)
- Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province LEC Special Unit (Farokhshahr, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province)

East Azerbaijan Province

- East Azerbaijan Province LEC Headquarters (Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province)
- Tabriz LEC Headquarters (Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province)
- East Azerbaijan Province LEC Special Unit (Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province)



Source: Author's research.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters

Esfahan Province

- Esfahan Province LEC Headquarters (Sepahan Shahr, Esfahan Province)
- Esfahan City LEC Headquarters (Esfahan, Esfahan Province)
- Esfahan Province LEC Special Unit (Esfahan, Esfahan Province)

Fars Province

- Fars Province LEC Headquarters (Shiraz, Fars Province)
- Shiraz LEC Headquarters (Shiraz, Fars Province)
- Fars Province LEC Special Unit (Shiraz, Fars Province)

Gilan Province

- Gilan Province LEC Headquarters (Rasht, Gilan Province)
- Rasht LEC Headquarters (Rasht, Gilan Province)
- Gilan Province LEC Special Forces Unit (Rasht, Gilan Province)

Ghazvin Province

- Ghazvin Province LEC Headquarters (Ghazvin, Ghazvin Province)
- Ghazvin City LEC Headquarters (Ghazvin, Ghazvin Province)
- Ghazvin Province LEC Special Forces Unit (Ghazvin, Ghazvin Province)

Golestan Province

- Golestan Province LEC Headquarters (Gorgan, Golestan Province)
- Gorgan City LEC Headquarters (Gorgan, Golestan Province)
- Golestan Province LEC Special Unit (Golestan, Golestan Province)

Hamedan Province

- Hamedan Province LEC Headquarters (Hamedan, Hamedan)
- Hamedan City LEC Headquarters (Hamedan, Hamedan Province)
- Hamedan Province LEC Special Forces Unit (Hamedan, Hamedan Province)
- Malayer LEC Headquarters (Malayer, Hamedan Province)

Hormozgan Province

- Hormozgan Province LEC Headquarters (Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province)
- Bandar Abbas LEC Headquarters (Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province)
- Hormozgan Province LEC Special Forces Unit (Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province)

Ilam Province

- Ilam Province LEC Headquarters (Ilam, Ilam Province)
- Ilam City LEC Headquarters (Ilam, Ilam Province)
- Ilam Province LEC Special Forces Unit (Ilam, Ilam Province)

Kerman Province

- Kerman Province LEC Headquarters (Kerman, Kerman Province)
- Kerman City LEC Headquarters (Kerman, Kerman Province)
- Kerman LEC Special Forces Unit (Kerman, Kerman Province)

Kermanshah Province

- Kermanshah Province LEC Headquarters (Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province)
- Kermanshah City LEC Headquarters (Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province)
- Kermanshah LEC Special Forces Unit (Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province)



Source: Author's research.

Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters

Khorasan Razavi Province

- Khorasan Razavi Province LEC Headquarters (Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province)
- Mashhad LEC Headquarters (Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province)
- Khorasan Razavi Province LEC Special Forces Unit (Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province)

Khuzestan Province

- Khuzestan Province LEC Headquarters (Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province)
- Ahvaz LEC Headquarters (Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province)
- Khuzestan Province LEC Special Unit (Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province)

Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province

- Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province LEC Headquarters (Yasuj, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province)
- Yasuj LEC Headquarters (Yasuj, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province)
- Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province LEC Special Unit (Yasuj, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province)

Kurdistan Province

- Kurdistan Province LEC Headquarters (Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province)
- Sanandaj LEC Headquarters (Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province)
- Kurdistan Province LEC Special Unit (Kurdistan, Kurdistan Province)

Lorestan Province

- Lorestan Province LEC Headquarters (Khorramabad, Lorestan Province)
- Khorramabad LEC Headquarters (Khorramabad, Lorestan Province)
- Lorestan Province LEC Special Unit (Khorramabad, Lorestan Province)

South Khorasan Province

- South Khorasan Province LEC Headquarters (Birjand, South Khorasan Province)
- Birjand LEC Headquarters (Birjand, South Khorasan Province)
- South Khorasan Province LEC Special Unit (Birjand, South Khorasan Province)

Markazi Province

- Markazi Province LEC Headquarters (Arak, Markazi Province)
- Arak LEC Headquarters (Arak, Markazi Province)
- Markazi Province LEC Special Unit (Arak, Markazi Province)

Mazandaran Province

- Mazandaran Province LEC Headquarters (Sari, Mazandaran Province)
- Sari LEC Headquarters (Sari, Mazandaran Province)
- Mazandaran Province LEC Special Unit (Sari, Mazandaran Province)

North Khorasan Province

- North Khorasan Province LEC Headquarters (Bojnurd, North Khorasan Province)
- North Khorasan Province LEC Special Unit (Bojnurd, North Khorasan Province)



Source: Author's research.

Law Enforcement Command Headquarters (LEC)

Qom Province

- Qom Province LEC Headquarters (Qom, Qom Province)
- Qom City LEC Headquarters (Qom, Qom Province)
- Qom Province LEC Special Unit (Qom, Qom Province)

Semnan Province

- Semnan Province LEC Headquarters (Semnan, Semnan Province)
- Semnan Province LEC Special Unit (Semnan, Semnan Province)

Sistan and Baluchistan Province

- Sistan and Baluchistan Province LEC Headquarters (Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province)
- Sistan and Baluchistan Province LEC Special Unit (Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province)

South Khorasan Province

- South Khorasan Province LEC Headquarters (Birjand, South Khorasan Province)
- Birjand LEC Headquarters (Birjand, South Khorasan Province)
- South Khorasan Province LEC Special Unit (Birjand, South Khorasan Province)

West Azerbaijan Province

- West Azerbaijan Province LEC Headquarters (Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province)
- Urmia LEC Headquarters (Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province)
- West Azerbaijan Province LEC Special Unit (Chichakluy-e Bash Qaleh, West Azerbaijan Province)

Yazd Province

- Yazd Province LEC Headquarters (Yazd, Yazd Province)
- Yazd City LEC Headquarters (Yazd, Yazd Province)
- Yazd Province LEC Special Unit (Yazd, Yazd Province)

Zanjan Province


- Zanjan Province LEC Headquarters (Zanjan, Zanjan Province)
- Zanjan City LEC Headquarters (Zanjan, Zanjan Province)
- Zanjan Province LEC Special Unit (Zanjan, Zanjan Province)



CRITICAL THREATS

Source: Author's research.


US and Israeli Strikes Targeting Internal Security Institutions As of March 9 at 3:00 PM ET



The combined force targeted Iranian internal security institutions in western and northwestern Iran. The IDF reported on March 10 that the combined force struck an LEC Special Forces Unit, the LEC Provincial Command headquarters, a police criminal investigation building, the Intelligence Ministry building, and a Basij compound in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province.[38] Regime-affiliated media also reported on March 10 that the combined force struck six other police buildings in East Azerbaijan.[39] The IDF stated on March 10 that it struck the LEC Provincial Command headquarters, the Intelligence Ministry, a Basij compound, and an LEC Special Forces Unit in Ilam Province.[40] The IDF said that it “dismantled most of the central assets” of the LEC and Basij in Ilam Province.[41] LEC Special Forces Units are the regime’s elite anti-riot police.[42] Anti-regime media and OSINT accounts reported on March 10 that the combined force also struck a Basij unit headquarters and an IRGC force headquarters in Kermanshah Province.[43]


US and Israeli Strikes on Internal Security Sites in Ilam Province

As of March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



US and Israeli Strikes on Internal Security Sites in East Azerbaijan Province

As of March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET




Iranian Retaliation

Iran launched at least seven missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and 3:00 PM ET on March 10.[44] One Iranian ballistic missile landed in an open area of Beit Shemesh, Central Israel, on March 10 but did not cause casualties or damage.[45] A previous Iranian missile strike on Beit Shemesh killed at least nine people on March 1.[46] A separate Hezbollah rocket attack struck Beit Shemesh on February 9 but did not cause casualties.[47] The IDF estimates that Iran has fired approximately 300 missiles at Israel since February 28, which is about half the total number Iran fired during the 12-Day War.[48]

Iran continued drone and ballistic missile attacks on Gulf states on March 10. The UAE has detected fewer incoming projectiles since March 9, which suggests that combined force

strikes on Iranian drone launch infrastructure have degraded Iran’s ability to sustain large-scale drone attacks. The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that Iran launched nine ballistic missiles and 35 drones at the UAE on March 10, which is consistent with the significantly lower rate the UAE reported on March 9.[49] The UAE recorded nine drone impacts on March 10, which killed two people.[50] The increase in drone impacts compared to March 9, when there was only one impact, likely reflects variability in interception rates or targeting rather than a recovery in Iranian launch capabilities.[51] Iranian drone launch rates targeting the UAE have declined from roughly 100 drones per day earlier in the campaign to fewer than 50 per day since March 9, likely due to combined force strikes on Iranian launch sites.[52] The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles launched remains relatively consistent with an average of around 13 a day since March 1, however. Iran also launched drones and ballistic missiles targeting Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait between 8:00 am ET and 3:00 pm ET on March 10, but the countries’ respective defense ministries reported that air defense systems intercepted all projectiles.[53]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates since February 28, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



Axis of Resistance Response

The combined force continues to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq to limit the ability of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States and Israel. The combined force reportedly conducted multiple rounds of airstrikes targeting the headquarters of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) near al Qaim, Anbar Province, on March 10.[54] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control brigades within the PMF.[55] Some of the

airstrikes targeted the 18th PMF Brigade, which is affiliated with Saraya Talia al Khurasani, and injured 5 members of the brigade.[56] The combined force struck the 18th PMF Brigade headquarters in the same area on March 9.[57] The combined force also struck several unidentified locations on the Syria-Iraq border on March 10, according to a security source in Anbar Province speaking to Iraqi media.[58] Combined force strikes targeting a 40th PMF Brigade headquarters near Kirkuk City, Kirkuk Province, on March 10, killed at least four Kataib al Imam Ali members.[59] Kataib al Imam Ali controls the 40th PMF Brigade.[60]



Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to conduct and claim to conduct attacks targeting US forces and bases in Iraq and the region. US air defenses at Baghdad International Airport intercepted two drones on March 10, according to Iraqi media.[61] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to claim that the US occupies its former Camp Victory base at Baghdad International Airport, despite the United States withdrawing from the base in 2011.[62] Iraqi air defenses also reportedly intercepted a

drone near Erbil Airport, which houses a US base.[63] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 9 that its forces conducted 37 drone and missile operations targeting US and “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region.[64] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed on March 10 that it intercepted a US MQ9 drone over northern Basra Province.[65] Iraqi media reported two separate instances of drone impacts in Majnoon oil field in northern Basra Province, but it is unclear if the Islamic Resistance of Iraq is connected to these events.[66] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front groups Saraya Awliya al Dam, Kataib Sarqhat al Quds, and Rijal al Bas al Shadid continue to claim attacks targeting US forces and US-affiliated sites in Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as US bases in other regional countries such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan.[67] ISW-CTP assessed on March 6 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be using front groups in an attempt to avoid US and Israeli strikes on militia positions and obfuscate culpability.[68] An OSINT account reported on March 10 that unidentified Iraqi militias conducted a drone attack targeting the UAE consulate in Erbil.[69] The Saudi Foreign Ministry condemned the attack targeting the Emirati consulate.[70]

A spokesperson for Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba told Axis of Resistance-affiliated media on March 10 that the Axis of Resistance is coordinating its efforts across Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen to strike US and Israeli military bases in the region.[71]

Different Axis of Resistance members, such as the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis, have previously coordinated attacks, including during the October 7 War.[72] ISW-CTP has observed no indicators of coordination between Axis members or Axis members and Iran during the current conflict, however. The Houthis have yet to conduct any attacks or even threaten to do so in response to the combined force’s campaign in Iran or Israeli operations in Lebanon. The IDF Spokesman Brigadier General Effie Defrin reported that the IDF has no intelligence indicating that an attack on unspecified sites in central Israel on March 4, with concurrent fire from Iran and by Hezbollah in Lebanon, was a coordinated effort.[73]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military sites in Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against Israel. The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah rocket launch sites in Lebanon on March 9.[74] Israel also released evacuation orders for four additional towns, Yohmor, Western Beqaa District, and Arnoun, Yohmor, Zawtar El Charqiyeh, and Zawtar El Gharbiyeh – all in Nabatieh District – on March 10.[75] The IDF said that any residential site used by Hezbollah for military purposes could be targeted.[76]

Hezbollah claimed 29 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 9 and 3:00 PM ET on March 10. Hezbollah’s 29 claimed attacks are the highest number of claimed attacks in a 24-hour period that ISW-CTP has observed since the start of the conflict.[77] Israeli media reported on March 9 that Israel’s security establishment told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz that Hezbollah will expand its rocket attacks “in the coming days,” striking deeper within Israeli territory at “significant facilities.”[78] Hezbollah has continued to attack IDF forces and positions in southern Lebanon, including launching rockets targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hamamis, Wadi al Asafir, and Khallet al Mahafir, Marjaayoun District.[79] Hezbollah has repeatedly targeted Israeli forces at these locations since the start of the conflict.[80] Hezbollah additionally claimed that it targeted two Israeli military positions on the Israel-Lebanon border, one Israeli military base in northern Israel, and a defense industrial site southeast of Acre, Northern Israel.[81]

Syrian media reported that Hezbollah shelled a Syrian town on the Lebanon-Syria border on March 10.[82] The Syrian Army told Syrian state media on March 10 that Hezbollah fighters shelled the Syrian town of Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on the Lebanon-Syria border.[83] The Syrian Army reported that it has observed Hezbollah reinforcements arriving on the Lebanon-Syria border.[84] The

Syrian army said that it is closely monitoring the situation, assessing next steps, and in contact with the LAF.[85] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara had a phone call on March 10 to discuss coordination to strengthen Lebanon-Syria border control.[86] Syrian authorities have repeatedly interdicted weapons smuggling shipments in Serghaya, almost certainly bound for Hezbollah, in recent months.[87]

The IDF has continued to conduct “forward defense maneuver[s]” in southern Lebanon.[88]

The IDF announced that soldiers from the 7th Armored Brigade (36th Division) conducted raids within southern Lebanon on March 9, in which they identified and killed an unspecified number of Hezbollah fighters who had entered a building near the Israeli force.[89] The IDF also said that 36th Division soldiers raided a weapons depot and a Hezbollah Radwan Force command post in southern Lebanon.[90] The IDF also reported that 769th Regional Brigade (91st Division) soldiers identified a Hezbollah cell and directed airstrikes targeting the individuals in southern Lebanon.[91] The 769th Regional Brigade (91st Division) has operated targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in southern Lebanon in recent months.[92]

Unspecified Lebanese sources told Reuters on March 10 that Hezbollah is employing lessons that the organization learned during the Fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[93]

The four Lebanese sources “familiar with Hezbollah’s military activities” said that Hezbollah has appointed four deputies to each commander to ensure continued operations in the event of the commander’s death.[94] The IDF targeted numerous brigade, company, and platoon-level commanders in southern Lebanon during the Israeli campaign in Fall 2024, which ISW-CTP assessed may have diminished the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah units in organizing an effective defense against Israeli advances.[95] The Lebanese sources also told Reuters that Hezbollah is rationing the use of its anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM).[96] ATGMs are the primary munition that Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon have historically relied upon to defend against Israeli armor.[97] The fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon severely diminished Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles, and the IDF seized tens of thousands of ATGMs from Hezbollah warehouses in southern Lebanon during the campaign.[98]

Axios reported on March 9 that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Rodolphe Haykal has refused to enforce the Lebanese government’s decision to outlaw Hezbollah’s military activity.[99]

The Lebanese Cabinet declared all Hezbollah military and security activity to be illegal on March 2 and demanded that Hezbollah hand over all of its weapons to the state.[100] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam called upon the LAF to take “immediate measures” to implement the government’s decision.[101] The LAF has been historically reticent to confront Hezbollah with force. The LAF has not directly confronted Hezbollah as part of its recent efforts within the past year to disarm Hezbollah, for example, which is a significant barrier to any meaningful disarmament of the group.[102] Haykal’s unwillingness to deploy LAF units to confront Hezbollah fighters is reportedly fueling tensions with Salam.[103]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031489675760640370?s=20>

[2] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-mines-strait-of-hormuz/?linkId=917703318>

[3] <https://x.com/TrumpDailyPosts/status/2031489771554632152?s=20>

- [4] <https://x.com/TrumpDailyPosts/status/2031489771554632152?s=20>
- [5] <https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/middle-east/praying-mantis.html>
- [6] <https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/middle-east/praying-mantis.html>
- [7] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2030305425548046702 ; <https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/irgc-says-it-attacked-marshall-islands-flagged-oil-tanker>
- [8] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2028099126475288999 ; https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20260301-ukmto_warning_007-26.pdf?rev=1310942307354054be18457486b45038 ; https://x.com/MarineTraffic/status/2028104988845543654?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet ; <https://t.me/mehrnews/353209> ; <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2028544254696620415?s=20> ; <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-flagged-products-tanker-hit-by-unknown-projectiles-bahrain-port-sources-say-2026-03-02/> ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542/photo/1 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029603749413441837
- [9] <https://x.com/DeptofWar/status/2029680387576803499>
- [10] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/this-will-be-most-intense-day-of-strikes-on-iran-says-us-defense-secretary-says-this-war-is-not-like-iraq/
- [11] <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-heavy-reliance-iranian-oil-imports-2026-01-13/> ; <https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/tanker-tracker?tab=1>
- [12] <https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/stop-hop-ii-ghost-armada-grows>
- [13] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2028099126475288999 ; https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20260301-ukmto_warning_007-26.pdf?rev=1310942307354054be18457486b45038 ; https://x.com/MarineTraffic/status/2028104988845543654?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet ; <https://t.me/mehrnews/353209> ; <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2028544254696620415?s=20> ; <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-flagged-products-tanker-hit-by-unknown-projectiles-bahrain-port-sources-say-2026-03-02/> ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542/photo/1 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029603749413441837
- [14] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031086087607660975?s=20>
- [15] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031340910932349132?s=20>
- [16] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031349528280932581?s=20>
- [17] <https://t.me/BenTzionM/7078>
- [18] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2030313314727731354?s=20
- [19] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2030313314727731354?s=20
- [20] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2030313314727731354?s=20;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-consequences-of-idf-strikes-into/>
[21] <https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2031136083245936888?s=20>
[22] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-hemmat-industrial-group-shig;>
<https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/aerospace-industries-organization-aio>
[23] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2031245067269103944?s=20;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2029882075642229119?s=20>
[24] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031323589249507682?s=20>
[25] <https://t.me/mehrnews/358460>
[26] <https://fa.alamdotir.com/news/5290221/سردار-حسن-زاده-فرمانده-سپاه-محمد-رسول-الله-ص-تهران-بزرگ-شد>;
<https://www.unitedagainstinucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf>
[27] <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/4-top-iranian-military-officials-killed-in-us-israeli-strikes/3844750>
[28] <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/4-top-iranian-military-officials-killed-in-us-israeli-strikes/3844750>
[29] <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/4-top-iranian-military-officials-killed-in-us-israeli-strikes/3844750>
[30] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/iran-police-intelligence-chief-killed-in-us-israeli-strikes-report/
[31] mojnews.com/tags/سردار-هلالی
[32] <https://t.me/mehrnews/358460>
[33] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/395193> ;
https://t.me/Nournews_ir/336770 ;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/51225
[34] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/395193>
[35] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/395193>
[36] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/395309> ;
https://t.me/Nournews_ir/336770
[37] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-june-25-2025> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-9-2025/>
[38] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031442397897306364> ; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/336638 ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2031403139396505971 ;
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031398902864249188?s=20>
[39] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/336638
[40] <https://x.com/IDF/status/2031417660974497819>
[41] <https://x.com/IDF/status/2031417660974497819> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031414691478540785>
[42] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/indicators-of-iranian-regime-instability/>
[43] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031382120032088351> ;
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2031438906227355682?s=20>
[44] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031091884207030417?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031126510099116445?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031277581152981334?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031330209744507290> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031344909001605556?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031386866721714288> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031425995513700693>
[45] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031393558733688930>
[46] <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/at-least-nine-killed-after-iranian-strike-on-israels-beit->

shemesh

[47] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031416252770533883>

[48] <https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-has-fired-some-300-missiles-at-israel-about-half-with-cluster-bomb-warheads-idf/> ; <https://www.jpost.com/defense-and-tech/article-889435>

[49] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2030989828712759428>;
<https://x.com/modgovae/status/2031360680260153718/photo/1>

[50] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2031360680260153718/photo/1> ;

<https://apnews.com/live/iran-war-israel-trump-03-10-2026#0000019c-d7ff-d847-ab9c-dfff57550000>

[51] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2030989828712759428>

[52] See Below, all Data from the UAE Ministry of Defense

[53] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031145014131081246?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031147323028328776?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031190688868532435?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031258122707206169?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031258122707206169?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031472181201260549?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2031475975276372360> ;

https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2031404661614199239 ;

https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2031470084594581772

[54] <https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82> ;

<https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-5-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82>

<https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-5-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82> ;

<https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-5-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82>

[55] <https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/The20Leadership20and20Purpose20of20IraqE28099s20Popular20Mobilization20Forces.pdf>

[56] <https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82> ;

<https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-5-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82>

https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Iraq20-20ISF20PMF20Orders20of20Battle_0_0.pdf pg. 45

[57] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1>

<https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1>

[58] <https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-5-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82>

%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-
%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[59] <https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2031304263473725921> ; [https://shafaq dot](https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A9-)

com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A9-
%D8%B6%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-
%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-
%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83

[60] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Iraq20-20ISF20PMF20Orders20of20Battle_0_0.pdf pg 44

[61] [https://shafaq dot](https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-)
com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-
%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-
%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-

%D9%81%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-
%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7-
%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[62] <https://t.me/Extremedistress/903> ;
<https://www.nbcnews.com/slideshow/news/us-troops-withdraw-from-iraq-44991270>

[63] [https://shafaq dot](https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-)
com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8
%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-
%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A9-
%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-
%D9%88-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-
%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[64] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1570>

[65] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1571>

[66] [https://shafaq dot](https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-)
com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8
%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-
%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A9-
%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-
%D9%88-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-
%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[67] <https://t.me/awlialdm/252> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/906> ; https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/462 ;
<https://t.me/Extremedistress/914> ; <https://t.me/Extremedistress/908>

[68] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026/>

[69] https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2031366087065972840

[70] <https://x.com/KSAmofaEN/status/2031330005637116302>

[71] <https://qudsn dot co/post/214746>

[72] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/update-houthi-involvement-iraq>

[73] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2029272684048040414>
[74] <https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2031385722649723149>
[75] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031386780532871286>
[76] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031386780532871286>
[77] Data upon request.
[78] <https://x.com/N12News/status/2031068109759545556>
[79] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10686> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10691> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10694> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10697> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10702>
[80]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-4-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-5-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-6-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026/>
[81] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10677> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10683> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10705> ;
<https://t.me/mmirleb/10708> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10713>
[82] <https://sana dot sy/en/syria/2301565/>
[83] <https://sana dot sy/en/syria/2301565/>
[84] <https://sana dot sy/en/syria/2301565/>
[85] <https://sana dot sy/en/syria/2301565/>
[86] <https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/2031365788179874184>
[87]
<https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/12/syria-foils-major-arms-smuggling-attempt-lebanon-what-w-e-know> ; https://x.com/Sana__gov/status/1883434966425772390 ;
<https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1896385152563159113> ;
<https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1907080994697404479>
[88] <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-sends-troops-further-into-south-lebanon-and-strikes-beirut-amid-hezbollah-attacks/>
[89] <https://www.idf dot il/333523>
[90] <https://www.idf dot il/333523>
[91] <https://www.idf dot il/333523>
[92] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-ground-troops-demolished-hezbollah-weapons-depot-anti-tank-missile-storage-facility-in-south-lebanon/ ; <https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/47cnjhls0> ; <https://www.idf dot il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/february-25-pr/activity-of-the-769th-brigade-in-southern-lebanon/>
[93]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-returns-guerrilla-roots-awaits-israeli-invasion-2026-03-10/>
[94]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-returns-guerrilla-roots-awaits-israeli-invasion-2026-03-10/>
[95] <https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100424> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-10-2024/>
[96]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-returns-guerrilla-roots-awaits-israeli-invasion-2026-03-10/>
[97] <https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollahs-anti-tank-missile-arsenal-capabilities-and-threat-assessment> ;
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combats-studies-institute/csi-books/we-were-caught-unprepared.pdf>
[98] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-7-2024/>

[99] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/09/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-peace-talks>

[100] <https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/2028436712930545867>

[101] <https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/2028436712930545867>

[102]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/weakening-hezbollah-requires-faster-international-support-to-lebanon/>

[103] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/09/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-peace-talks>

Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 11, 2026



Benjamin Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 8:00 AM ET.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways


1. Iran has deployed fewer than 10 naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's reticence to deploy the naval mines en masse indicates that while Iran is willing and capable of mining the strait, it remains hesitant to do so due to the far-reaching political and economic costs Iran would incur in doing so.
2. Iran is continuing to target commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to disrupt maritime traffic and threaten freedom of navigation. Iranian media published images on March 11 that show a likely Iranian unmanned surface vessel (USV) impact along the waterline of the Thai-flagged *MAYUREE NAREE* cargo ship.
3. The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian internal security and military targets. ISW-CTP has observed strikes in 10 provinces since March 10 at 3:00 PM ET.
4. Iran continued to attack the Gulf States and Israel. The Saudi Defense Ministry stated on March 10 that it intercepted 13 Iranian drones targeting multiple locations, including the Shaybah oil field.
5. Hezbollah has claimed 13 attacks targeting IDF positions and forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 10. Israeli media reported that Hezbollah has reportedly fired more than 850 rockets at Israel since March 2.

Toplines

Iran has deployed fewer than 10 naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's reticence to deploy the naval mines en masse indicates that while Iran is willing and capable of mining the strait, it remains hesitant to do so due to the far-reaching political and economic costs Iran would incur in doing so. Unspecified US officials told the on March 10 that Iran placed naval mines in the Strait in recent days, but has deployed fewer than 10 mines so far.[1] A 2025 US Congressional Report said that Iran has 5,000-6,000 naval mines in service. CENTCOM said on March 10

that it destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait of Hormuz. A mass deployment of mines would cause major disruptions for all shipping, not just non-Iranian shipping. Iran would incur political costs with China and severely damage the Iraqi economy if it deployed large numbers of mines. The Iraqi economy is heavily reliant on oil exports. Iran uses the Iraqi economy for sanctions evasion, and the collapse of Iraq's economy would have significant negative effects for Iran.

Iran is continuing to target commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to disrupt maritime traffic and threaten freedom of navigation. Iranian media published images on March 11 that show a likely Iranian unmanned surface vessel (USV) impact along the waterline of the Thai-flagged *MAYUREE NAREE* cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz.[2] The USV appears to have struck the ship's rudder and propeller area, likely to immobilize the vessel, and the strike caused a fire onboard.[3] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that an unknown projectile struck the *MAYUREE NAREE*, which caused most of the crew to evacuate the vessel, apart from a skeleton crew.[4] The UKMTO reported two other likely Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz on March 11.[5] A likely Iranian drone struck a separate, unspecified cargo ship on March 11 in the strait. The strike damaged the ship but did not cause casualties.[6] A likely Iranian drone also struck an unspecified bulk carrier off the coast of Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), on March 11 damaged the ship but did not cause casualties.[7]



The combined force continues to degrade the Iranian Navy as part of an effort to limit Iran's

ability to threaten merchant shipping. CENTCOM released footage of additional strikes on Iranian naval vessels and said it sank over 60 Iranian ships on March 11.[8] CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper said on March 11 that CENTCOM destroyed all four IRGC Navy Soleimani Class Warships.[9] CENTCOM previously struck the IRGC Navy's Soleimani Class IRIS *Shahid Sayyad Shirazi* on March 3.[10]

The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian internal security and military targets. ISW-CTP has observed strikes in 10 provinces since March 10 at 3:00 PM ET.[11] The combined force struck police stations in East Azerbaijan, Tehran, and Kurdistan provinces, as well as a Basij center in Tehran and the Imam Reza Basij headquarters in Esfahan.[12] The combined force has repeatedly struck Basij infrastructure, including in Tehran.[13] The Basij is a paramilitary force that is responsible for civil defense and social control. The combined force also struck the 7th Artesh Air Force Fighter Base, which the combined force last struck on March 6.[14] Anti-regime media footage posted on X showed destruction to an unspecified Iranian radar in Badar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[15] The radar is on top of a tower that could be an air traffic control tower.

The combined force struck a Bank Sepah building on March 11.[16] Strikes on Bank Sepah, depending on the severity of damage and the services the strike impacts, could create challenges for Iran as it attempts to pay military personnel. Bank Sepah said that the strike destroyed the building and disrupted in-person and online services.[17] Bank Sepah is responsible for paying IRGC and Artesh personnel and is sanctioned by the United States.[18] The Khatam ol Anbiya Central headquarters spokesperson stated on March 11 that civilians should not be within one kilometer of Iranian banks.[19] Anti-regime media reported on March 11 that the combined force also disrupted services at the regime-affiliated Bank Melli for at least the past two days.[20]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 11, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET




- Confirmed Airstrike
- Reported Airstrike
- Report of Explosion With Footage
- Report of Explosion Without Footage

The combined force struck an unspecified air defense site in Masjed Soleiman, Khuzestan Province.[21] There are numerous Iranian military facilities in Masjed Soleiman, including the 2nd Artesh Ground Forces Aviation Base and an IRGC Aerospace Force missile base.[22]

Military Infrastructure in Masjed Soleiman, Khuzestan Province

As of March 11, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



Anti-regime media reported that the combined force struck the Abadan refinery in Khuzestan Province.[23] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck two oil refineries and two oil storage facilities on March 7.[24] Disruptions to Iran's energy sector will likely worsen the country's ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread and frequent electricity shortages and outages. Iranians have reported daily blackouts due to the energy crisis since February 2025.[25]

US CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper said on March 10 that the United States has struck more than 5,500 targets in Iran.[26] Cooper added that the combined force has air superiority over "vast swathes of Iran."


Iranian Retaliation

Iran continued to attack the Gulf States and Israel. The Saudi Defense Ministry stated on March 10 that it intercepted 13 Iranian drones targeting multiple locations, including the Shaybah oil field.[27] The Saudi Defense Ministry added that it intercepted six ballistic missiles targeting the Prince Sultan Air Base in al Kharj.[28] The Qatari Defense Ministry announced on March 10 that it intercepted a missile, which an OSINT account on X claimed was flying over Doha.[29] The Kuwait Armed Forces stated on March 10 that it intercepted four drones and several others fell “outside the threat area.”[30] Iran also launched at least four missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[31] Israeli media reported on March 10 that Iran is firing fewer missiles per day each day since the war started on February 28, citing IDF assessments.[32] The Israeli media report added that Iran has launched about 300 ballistic missiles at Israel, and about half of them carried cluster bomb warheads.[33]

Lebanon

Hezbollah has claimed 13 attacks targeting IDF positions and forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 10.[34] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah has reportedly fired more than 850 rockets at Israel since March 2.[35] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted several rocket and artillery strikes targeting IDF forces and positions along both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.[36] Nearly all of Hezbollah’s claimed attacks on March 10 and March 11 targeted IDF positions or forces in southern Lebanon, except for one rocket attack on IDF positions in Metula, Northern Israel.[37] The IDF did not report any Hezbollah rocket attacks in northern Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff, but Israeli media reported that Hezbollah conducted at least one drone attack targeting northern Israel on March 10.[38]


Hezbollah Attacks in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 11, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



The IDF has reportedly continued to advance into southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on March 10. A Hezbollah-aligned source claimed on March 10 that IDF units continued to advance into the Kanouq neighborhood in Aitaroun, Bint Jbeil District, under IDF artillery and small arms cover.[39] The IDF reportedly began advancing toward Aitaroun earlier on March 9.[40]

Israeli Strikes in Lebanon

Between March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 11, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah's ability to launch attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The IDF said it struck a Hezbollah headquarters and weapon storage sites in Dahiyeh, southern Beirut, on March 11.[41] The IDF also released evacuation orders to residents of the Haret Hreik and Burj al Barajneh neighborhoods of south Beirut on March 11, 30 minutes prior to its attack.[42] Both neighborhoods are part of the Dahiyeh area. The IDF has continuously struck Dahiyeh since March 2 and has destroyed approximately 30 multi-story buildings in the neighborhood, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[43] The United Nations estimated on March 9 that fighting in Lebanon has internally displaced over 700,000 people.[44]

Endnotes

- [1] <https://caspianpost.com/iran/us-congress-iran-has-thousands-of-naval-mines>
- [2] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/337131
- [3] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/337131
- [4] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031776880106618894/photo/1
- [5] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031647016489492825
- [6] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031647016489492825
- [7] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031632623252975907
- [8] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031456940090372370> ;
<https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031489675760640370> ;
<https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031700131687379148>
- [9] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031700131687379148>
- [10] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2029222307676238030>
- [11] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031457521693495621> ; <https://t.me/IranintITV/325286> ;
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2031464645177881017> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031654670934909216> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031463730806997485> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031523109543498187> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031555541856612691> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031555541856612691> ;
https://x.com/EndlessWint_r/status/2031680282764468517 ;
<https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2031707195641831438>
- [12] <https://t.me/IranintITV/325286> ; <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2031464645177881017> ;
<https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2031707195641831438> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031482563164807555> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031654670934909216>
- [13] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-7-2026>
- [14] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031457521693495621> ;
https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2029951465263947785?s=20
- [15] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031688956991971734>

- [16] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/337035
- [17] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031701096666669137>
- [18] <https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=25580> ;
https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2031732408995733554
- [19] <https://t.me/farsna/418409>
- [20] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031701096666669137>
- [21] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031555541856612691>
- [22] <https://x.com/TheIntelLab/status/1350461480123199488> ;
<https://www.scramble.nl/planning/orbats/iran/islamic-republic-of-iran-army-aviation#OIAI253>
- [23] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031666790544130202>
- [24]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/>
- [25] https://www.iranintl.com/video/ott_586b2876b2344be4abe52d8ed24d380c
- [26] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031700131687379148>
- [27] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031567487142375792?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031567082442084388?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031553711311565130?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031523613103296941?s=20>
- [28] <https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031509263143539138?s=20>
- [29] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2031451195521302957> ;
https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2031443048157028515?s=20
- [30] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031586827216302586>
- [31] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031483618619494464> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031503033926869053> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031559129488150966> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031697425044230565>
- [32] <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/iran-has-fired-some-300-missiles-at-israel-about-half-with-cluster-bomb-warheads-idf/>
- [33] <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/iran-has-fired-some-300-missiles-at-israel-about-half-with-cluster-bomb-warheads-idf/>
- [34] Data upon request.
- [35] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2026_q1/Article-6e1af373e2adc91026.htm

[36]Data upon request.

[37] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10721>; <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15682>

[38] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/sirens-in-north-warn-of-suspected-drone-infiltration-from-lebanon/

[39] <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15686>

[40]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-10-2026/> ;
<https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15649> ; <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15649> ;

[41] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031627315759780263>

[42] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031619689109921828>

[43] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031621287185965159>

[44] <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/03/1167098>

Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 11, 2026



Avery Borens, Benjamin Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran's attacks targeting radars and other missile defense equipment in the Gulf have not achieved the regime's objective of degrading air defenses enough to reliably penetrate them. Interception rates of ballistic missiles have not changed significantly.
2. Iran likely seeks to preserve the option to threaten, disrupt, and selectively control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz without fully halting Iranian crude exports that still rely on the waterway by mining it heavily.
3. The combined force continues to target several key internal security sites in Tehran City and Kurdish-populated areas in northwestern Iran. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported that the combined force struck several internal security sites in Marivan City, Kurdistan Province, which is about 10 miles east of the Iran-Iraq border in northwestern Iran. Marivan City and other mountainous cities in Kurdistan Province are hotspots for anti-regime protests and clashes between Iranian security forces and Kurdish anti-regime groups.
4. Russia is reportedly sharing advanced drone tactics with Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces and assets in the Middle East, which highlights deepening cooperation between key US adversaries. The CNN report comes after three unspecified officials told the *Washington Post* on March 6 that Russia has provided Iran with the locations of US military assets, including warships and aircraft, since the war started on February 28.
5. China continues to supply Iran with precursors for solid fuel to support Iran's ballistic missile program. An OSINT analyst reported on March 11 that the Iranian cargo vessel *Barzin* departed Gaolan Port in China, likely carrying a shipment of missile fuel precursors, and is now en route to Iran.
6. Some elements of Hezbollah's political support appear to be fracturing due to Hezbollah's participation in the war. Hezbollah ally, the Amal Movement, recently voted in favor of the Lebanese cabinet's decision to ban Hezbollah's military activity. The Amal Movement has been

Hezbollah's key political and strategic ally since 2005.


Toplines

Iran's attacks targeting radars and other missile defense equipment in the Gulf have not achieved the regime's objective of degrading air defenses enough to reliably penetrate them with ballistic missiles. Interception rates of ballistic missiles have not changed significantly.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf claimed on March 11 that Iranian strikes on US radar and air defense systems now allow Iran to strike any target with fewer missiles.[1] Western media published satellite images on March 11 that show damage to US and allied air defense systems in the Gulf.[2] The *New York Times* published a satellite image of a damaged Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) radar in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 1.[3] The UAE, which has received the most Iranian attacks since the war began, has intercepted 241 of 262 ballistic missiles as of March 10, which is an interception rate of 92 percent.[4] This interception rate is equivalent to the Israeli ballistic missile interception rates in April 2024, October 2024, June 2025, and during the current war.[5] Only two missiles of the 21 that the UAE did not intercept hit UAE territory; the remainder landed in the sea.[6] Air defense systems usually choose not to engage incoming projectiles that will not hit any target of note. Iran appears to be targeting US radars and air defense assets, but Iran's missile force is failing to achieve its objectives of degrading or destroying allied air defenses.

Other countries are having similar success, though it is difficult to determine exact interception rates from the available data. The last reported Iranian ballistic missile strike in the Gulf occurred on March 5, when two missiles struck a Bahraini refinery near Mahmeer, Bahrain.[7] There are likely some unreported missile impacts, but citizens in Gulf countries have routinely publicized images of missile strikes on social media. The widespread publication of this proof makes it very unlikely that a substantial number of missile impacts are going unreported.

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates between February 28, 2026, and March 11, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



Drones continue to pose a threat, but degrading the THAAD system is largely irrelevant to counter-drone operations. The THAAD radar handles target acquisition and engagement for the THAAD missile battery.[8] THAAD missile interceptors do not target drones. Fighter jets and helicopter gunships, such as the UAE's US-supplied AH-64 Apache helicopter, handle drone interceptions using guns and air-to-air missiles. Ukraine has similarly offered to assist by providing Ukrainian interceptor drones to intercept Iranian Shahed drones and other technologies such as acoustic sensors and electronic warfare, though that assistance will take time to arrive.[9]

Iran continued drone attacks on Gulf states on March 11. The UAE intercepted 39 drones on March 11.[10] Two Iranian drones struck near the Dubai International Airport, which injured four workers, according to a local media report.[11] Iranian drones previously struck the Dubai International Airport on February 28.[12] Iranian strikes on airports and the broader conflict have significantly reduced flight traffic in the region, according to Reuters.[13] An Iranian drone also struck gasoline storage tanks at the Port of Salalah in southern Oman, which set several on fire.[14] Iran likely targeted the same gasoline storage tanks at the Port of Salalah during a previous drone strike on March 3.[15]

Iran likely seeks to preserve the option to threaten, disrupt, and selectively control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz without fully halting Iranian crude exports that still rely on the waterway by mining it heavily. The *Wall Street Journal* reported on March 10 that Iran exported slightly more oil through the Strait of Hormuz during the war than it did before the war.[16] Tankers loaded a daily average of 2.1 million barrels of Iranian crude over the previous six days, compared with 2 million barrels per day in February.[17] Iran has recently deployed "less than ten" naval mines in the



Strait of Hormuz, but intense mining would prevent Iran from exporting any oil.[18] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 10 that US forces destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait, indicating that Iran had begun efforts to mine the waterway.[19] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on March 11 that it received 17 incident reports affecting vessels operating in and around the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman between February 28 and March 11, including 13 attack reports and four reports of suspicious activity.[20] Iran maintains an estimated inventory of more than 5,000 naval mines as of 2019 that it can rapidly deploy in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[21]

Iran could calculate that the Goreh-Jask pipeline and Jask terminal provide a plausible workaround to preserve some exports. The Goreh-Jask pipeline has the capacity to handle one million barrels of oil per day, so reliance on this facility would cut Iran's exports in half. The pipeline is also far from secure from airstrikes.[22] The Goreh-Jask pipeline is a major Iranian oil pipeline designed to move crude oil from the oil fields in southwestern Iran to the Jask export terminal on the Gulf of Oman, allowing Iran to export oil without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.[23]

The combined force continues to target several key internal security sites in Tehran City and Kurdish-populated areas in northwestern Iran. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) confirmed that dozens of its fighter jets struck an unspecified number of Basij and internal security sites in Tehran City on March 11.[24] Iranian regime-affiliated media also reported that Israeli drones targeted Basij and internal security checkpoints in District 1 in northern Tehran City and Districts 14, 15, and 16 in southwestern Tehran City on March 11, killing at least ten Basij and security personnel.[25] The IAF also confirmed that it struck an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) intelligence building in northwestern Iran on March 11.[26] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported that the combined force struck several internal security sites in Marivan City, Kurdistan Province, which is about 10 miles east of the Iran-Iraq border in northwestern Iran.[27] These sites included an IRGC intelligence building and a border guard headquarters in Marivan City and three observation points surrounding the city.[28] The combined force previously conducted airstrikes on IRGC and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) sites in Marivan City on March 3.[29] Marivan City and other mountainous cities in Kurdistan Province are hotspots for anti-regime protests and clashes between Iranian security forces and Kurdish anti-regime groups.[30]


US and Israeli Strikes Targeting Internal Security Institutions and Historical Protest Data

As of March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



US and Israeli Strikes on Internal Security Sites in Marivan City


As of March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



Map by Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Lea Corticchiato, Megan Ewert, Carolyn Weinstein, Eliana Ornelas, Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, and Parker Hempel
 © 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

US and Israeli Strikes on Iranian Internal Security Sites in Kurdistan Province

Between March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



Map by Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Lea Corticchiato, Megan Ewert, Nathaniel Kramer, Carolyn Weinstein, Eliana Ornelas, Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Bogens, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Zahra Wakilzada, and Parker Hempel
 © 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

-  Internal Security Sites
-  Targeted Internal Security Sites
-  IRGC Ground Forces Units and Headquarters
-  Targeted IRGC Ground Forces Units and Headquarters

Russia is reportedly sharing advanced drone tactics with Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces and assets in the Middle East, which highlights deepening cooperation between key US adversaries. An unspecified Western intelligence official told CNN on March 11 that Russia is helping Iran develop advanced drone tactics based on its experience from its war in Ukraine.[31] The CNN report comes after three unspecified officials told the *Washington Post* on March 6 that Russia has provided Iran with the locations of US military assets, including warships and aircraft, since the war started on February 28.[32] Iran and Russia signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in January 2025 that outlines bilateral knowledge and technology transfers, among other forms of cooperation.[33]

China continues to supply Iran with precursors for solid fuel to support Iran's ballistic missile program.[34] An OSINT analyst reported on March 11 that the Iranian cargo vessel *Barzin* departed Gaolan Port in China, likely carrying a shipment of missile fuel precursors, and is now en route to

Iran.[35] Gaolan Port is a Chinese port that loads chemicals, including sodium perchlorate, a key precursor for solid missile propellant. The *Barzin* has completed several trips between China and Bandar Abbas in southern Iran in the past year, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence. The *Barzin* most recently left Gaolan Port on March 1. China has previously supplied sodium perchlorate to support Iran's ballistic missile program.[36] These shipments follow a March 6 report that China may be preparing to provide Iran with financial assistance and missile components.[37]

The combined force continues to conduct airstrikes targeting missile and drone facilities on March 11.[38] US CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated on March 11 that US forces have struck 5,500 targets in Iran, including an Iranian ballistic missile and drone facility.[39] The combined force separately targeted the Jey industrial site in Esfahan Province, which was linked to optical and drone-related production.[40] Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 shows damage at the Shahroud missile complex's solid-fuel production lines, damage to Hormozgan Khorgu missile site, the IRGC Kerman missile site, and the Darab missile site.[41] The Shahroud missile facility supports Iran's solid-fuel ballistic missile development and production infrastructure, which conducts solid propellant mixing and casting for missile motors, including those used in advanced Iranian ballistic missiles, such as the Kheibar Shekan and Fattah-1.[42] Damage to these facilities likely constrains Iran's ability to manufacture solid-fuel ballistic missiles. The facility previously sustained strike damage during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, but Iran repaired it and returned it to operation within months.[43] An Israeli journalist reported that more than two-thirds of the Iranian missiles capable of reaching Israel are no longer operational.[44] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated on March 11 that it had destroyed more than 300 Iranian ballistic missile launchers, or around 60 percent of Iran's total launcher stockpile.[45] US officials separately told lawmakers on March 10 that Iran still retains as many as 50 percent of its missiles and launchers.[46] There is insufficient evidence to determine why these inconsistencies in reported launcher attrition exist.

Darab Missile Base

Fars Province, Iran
28.713, 54.645



Damaged Buildings



•Tehran


Darab



August 20, 2025

Satellite image
©2026 Vantor.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.



The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air force capabilities to maintain air superiority over Iran. Satellite imagery from March 9 shows damage to an Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft at the Iranian Artesh Air Force 8th Tactical Air Base (TAB) in Esfahan Province.[47] Israel previously targeted Iranian F-14 Tomcats at the same air base during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[48] US CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated on March 11 that the combined force is exercising air superiority over “vast swathes of Iran” after striking thousands of targets across Iran since the start of the campaign.[49]

**8th Artesh Air Force Tactical Base,
Esfahan**

Esfahan, Esfahan Province, Iran
32.748000°N 51.871000°E



US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The IRGC forced through the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new supreme leader, according to senior Iranian sources speaking to Reuters on March 10.[50] This is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that Mojtaba’s selection represents a victory for hardliners over more pragmatic factions within the regime.[51] Senior Iranian sources told Reuters that the IRGC “forced through” Mojtaba’s appointment because they saw him as more easily influenced than Ali Khamenei and would support IRGC hardline policies, despite the concerns of pragmatists.[52] The sources added that the IRGC overpowered senior political and clerical figures who opposed the choice and delayed the decision.[53] ISW-CTP also assessed that Mojtaba will likely pursue similar domestic and foreign policies that are similar to those of Ali Khamenei.[54] Three of the senior Iranian sources, including a reformist former official, added that Khamenei’s selection may lead to an even more oppressive domestic policy and aggressive foreign policy.[55] Iranian LEC Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan stated on March 11 that any Iranian who tries to protest will be treated as an enemy,

and that security forces “have their fingers on the trigger.”[56] One official told Reuters that Mojtaba has built close ties to the IRGC, particularly second-tier commanders who have replaced top generals killed in the war.[57] Mojtaba fought during the Iran-Iraq War and formed many relationships that he later used to cement his role in Iran’s security apparatus.[58] Mojtaba reportedly played a leading role in securing former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in 2009 and subsequently took control of the Basij to crush the protests over Ahmadinejad’s election, for example.[59]

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on March 11 that the US-Israeli campaign against Iran will continue until “all objectives” are accomplished.[60] Katz stated that one of Israel’s aims is to “allow the Iranian people to rise, act, and overthrow [the Iranian] regime.”[61]

Iranian Retaliation

Iran continued missile attacks on the UAE on March 11. The Emirati Defense Ministry said its air defense systems engaged six Iranian ballistic missiles and seven cruise missiles.[62]

Israeli media reported on March 11 that over two-thirds of Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles are combat ineffective, which likely explains the continued decrease in the number of ballistic missiles that Iran is firing at Israel.”[63] Iran launched at least five missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 10 and 3:00 PM ET on March 11.[64] ISW-CTP did not observe any Iranian ballistic missile impacts in Israel on March 11.


Axis of Resistance Response

Hezbollah claimed 14 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 10 and 3:00 PM ET on March 11.[65]

Hezbollah claimed several rocket and mortar attacks targeting IDF forces and positions along both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.[66] Hezbollah also launched several rocket barrages targeting several areas of northern Israel.[67] One of Hezbollah’s rocket barrages reportedly contained over 100 rockets.[68] OSINT analysts reported over 12 impacts across northern Israel, including in Haifa, Binaa, and an unspecified area of the Galilee region.[69] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah’s attacks wounded at least five individuals.[70] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah almost certainly coordinated the timing of its rocket barrages with Iran.[71] Axis-affiliated media confirmed that Iran and Hezbollah launched coordinated attacks.[72] This is the first time that Iran and Hezbollah have coordinated attacks since the war began on February 28. Two Israeli sources “familiar with the matter” told CNN on March 11 that Israel is preparing for a potential “significant expansion” of Hezbollah and Iranian attacks.[73] Hezbollah announced a new operation at 2:26 ET on March 11.[74]

The rate of Hezbollah attacks has varied since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below. Hezbollah has also employed a variety of weapons in its attacks against Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon (see below).


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 1, 2026 and March 10, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 10, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks, in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry used




Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem sent a message to Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on March 11, in which Qassem renewed Hezbollah's pledge to the Iranian supreme leader.^[75] Qassem stated that Hezbollah looks forward to Mojtaba's "promising leadership."^[76] Qassem also issued a video statement on March 11, in which he reaffirmed Hezbollah's readiness to confront "any aggression against our country and our dear people."^[77] Qassem called on Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers to "stand" with Hezbollah against Israel.^[78]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah's ability to launch attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The IAF reported on March 11 that it had conducted 200 strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut since February 28.^[79] The IDF has targeted Hezbollah infrastructure, weapons depots, central command centers, 50 high-rise buildings that Hezbollah used, and the IRGC Aerospace Headquarters in Beirut.^[80] The IDF continued its large-scale airstrikes in Beirut and Beirut's southern suburbs on March 11.^[81] The IDF also struck launchers and additional Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon.^[82]

Israeli Strikes in Lebanon

Between March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations and deploy forces to southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 8:00 AM ET on March 11. The IDF reported that the IDF 36th Division is conducting "focused raids" in southern Lebanon.[83] The IDF 36th Division directed an IAF airstrike on Hezbollah fighters and uncovered large quantities of combat equipment, including rifles, ammunition, and combat vests, during its raids.[84] The IDF has also continued to deploy forces to northern Israel and southern Lebanon. IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir ordered that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade move from the Southern Command to the Northern Command and ordered unspecified reinforcements for the Northern Command on March 11.[85] The *New York Times* also reported on March 11 that the IDF sent an additional infantry battalion to Israel's northern border with Lebanon.[86]

The IDF issued more evacuation warnings for Lebanese residents on March 11. The IDF issued evacuation warnings for seven areas in Beirut's southern suburbs, which called on Lebanese residents to evacuate and not return to the area.[87] The IDF also issued evacuation warnings for residents in 12

southern Lebanese villages.[88]

An unspecified senior Israeli official told Israeli media on March 11 that Israel is conducting indirect talks with the Lebanese government.[89] The Israeli official noted that Israel is demanding that the LAF begin acting against Hezbollah immediately. Israel also reportedly threatened to strike the national infrastructure in Lebanon. This Israeli media report follows a March 9 Axios report that the Lebanese government proposed immediate direct negotiations with Israel under US auspices to reach a peace agreement.[90]


The Lebanese Parliament has extended its term by two years due to the ongoing war.[91] The Lebanese government was previously expected to hold parliamentary elections in May 2026. Hezbollah's 13-member Loyalty to the Resistance bloc voted in favor of the extension.[92] Hezbollah likely voted in favor to prevent a new election that could have further weakened its political position.

Some elements of Hezbollah's political support appear to be fracturing due to Hezbollah's participation in the war. Hezbollah ally, the Amal Movement, recently voted in favor of the Lebanese cabinet's decision to ban Hezbollah's military activity.[93] The Amal Movement has been Hezbollah's key political and strategic ally since 2005.[94] Amal Chairman and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri is also reportedly "furious" over Hezbollah's decision to attack Israel.[95] Hezbollah's attacks against Israel have previously caused the group to lose a political ally. The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), a Lebanese political party, ended its two-decade alliance with Hezbollah in October 2024 after Israel began its campaign against Hezbollah, for example.[96] There is also reportedly growing frustration among Hezbollah's popular support base.[97] Several Lebanese residents in Hezbollah strongholds have told Western media that they are against Hezbollah's decision to enter the war.[98] Other Lebanese civilians have noted that they could not tolerate Israeli airstrikes anymore and that the result would have been the same even if Hezbollah did not attack first, however.[99] These reports are anecdotal and should not be over-generalized, but they do represent real sentiment among the Lebanese people.

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions in Iraq to limit the ability of the militias to target the United States and Israel. The combined force separately struck 30th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade positions and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada positions in Ninewa Province, according to Iraqi media and open source intelligence accounts.[100] The PMF includes multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[101] The 30th PMF Brigade is primarily composed of Shabak fighters and is closely tied to multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[102] An Iraq analyst posted a video that purportedly shows secondary explosions after a strike on PMF rocket storage in Wasit Province, which reportedly belongs to Asaib Ahl al Haq.[103] A security source in Ninewa Province told Iraqi media on March 11 that two airstrikes struck the headquarters of the 24th Regiment of the 59th PMF Brigade. The Ninewa Guards, which Turkey and the United States helped train after former Ninewa Governor Atheel al Nujaifi formed the group to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in 2024, integrated into the 59th PMF Brigade in 2017.[104] Security sources separately told Iraqi media on March 11 that airstrikes targeted a PMF base in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and killed one fighter and injured five others. Another strike targeted a PMF base in Musayyib, Babil Province.[105]

US and Israeli Strikes on Iraq

Between March 10, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to attack US forces in Iraq. Unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched at least six drones targeting the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center at Baghdad International Airport on March 11.[106] US air defenses intercepted five of the drones, while one hit a “guard tower,” according to the US State Department.[107] No militia has claimed responsibility for this attack as of ISW-CTP’s data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 11. Iraqi air defenses also intercepted a drone that targeted Erbil International Airport on March 11.[108] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi called on March 11 for the population of Arab countries hosting US troops to follow the example of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and form armed groups to liberate their countries.[109] Kaabi offered Iraqi militia “expertise and capabilities” in support of this effort.[110]

The PMF reportedly prevented the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) from inspecting a PMF building in Baghdad City on March 10.[111] An Iraq news account reported that CTS forces dispatched for the inspection of a PMF building on Palestine Street in Baghdad on Prime Minister

Mohammad Shia al Sudani's orders due to a suspicion that the site stored drones and missiles.[112] The Iraq analyst reported that the PMF blocked CTS forces from entering the compound.[113] The PMF denied on March 11 that any federal security agencies searched its headquarters.[114] Sudani's reported orders for CTS to search a PMF facility follow a phone call between Sudani and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on March 9, during which Rubio reiterated the importance of the Iraqi federal government protecting US diplomatic personnel and facilities.[115] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias under the PMF have routinely blocked Iraqi government access to areas under PMF control in recent years.[116] The Iraqi government is unable to access certain parts of Babil Province, such as Jurf al Sakhar, due to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, primarily Kataib Hezbollah, maintaining a stronghold in the area.[117]

Kataib Hezbollah threatened on March 11 to attack Syria if Syrian President Ahmed al Shara makes any "hostile move[s]" towards Lebanon or attempts to interfere with Lebanese Hezbollah activity.[118] Kataib Hezbollah, like other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has a close relationship with Hezbollah because Hezbollah helped Iran train and arm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias after the US invasion of Iraq.[119] Kataib Hezbollah's statement follows Hezbollah reportedly shelling a Syrian town on the Syria-Lebanon border on March 10.[120] The Syrian Army told Syrian state media on March 10 that it has observed Hezbollah reinforcements arriving on the border, is assessing next steps, and is in contact with the LAF.[121]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2031756618128396457?s=20

[2]

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/03/11/world/middleeast/iran-us-military-bases-strikes-map.html>

[3]

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/03/11/world/middleeast/iran-us-military-bases-strikes-map.html>

[4] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2031360680260153718>

[5]

<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/live-updates-israel-says-it-intercepted-99-percent-of-irans-drones-and-missiles/> ;

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2025/06/30/how-did-israels-air-defenses-fair-against-irans-ballistic-missiles/> ;

<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/07/02/israeli-assessment-of-recent-conflict-with-iran-reveals-86-percent-success-rate-in-missile-interception/> ; <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2026-03-08/ty-article/.premium/israels-defense-systems-arent-the-only-ones-that-are-battle-tested-anymore/0000019c-cc86-d95f-ad9c-ccaffe770000>

[6] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2031360680260153718>

[7] <https://x.com/Faytuks/status/2029597951967015230> ;

https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2029591140505166096 ;

<https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2029588806144311712> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026/>

[8] <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12645>

- [9] <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-qatar-discuss-acquiring-ukrainian-drones-down-irans-shaheds-source-says-2026-03-05/>
- [10] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2031837588127138255>
- [11] <https://x.com/DXBMediaOffice/status/2031635783304753169>
- [12] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2027855426075623439
- [13] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-drones-fall-vicinity-dubai-airport-iran-crisis-shows-no-sign-easing-2026-03-11/>
- [14] <https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2031738287216263350>
- [15] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028781603527291213
- [16] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-control-of-hormuz-means-its-exporting-more-oil-today-than-before-the-war-edec3cd91?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos4
- [17] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-control-of-hormuz-means-its-exporting-more-oil-today-than-before-the-war-edec3cd91?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos4
- [18] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/11/trump-iran-war-end-withdrawal> ;
<https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/middleeast/iran-mine-strait-of-hormuz-intl>
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/us-israel-iran-war-2026/card/iran-lays-mines-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-RHQ7V5QBBBD1C0zWOJMF?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWetsqeM-PNamjsBSGX-40yZAmqTegnWHh-89f-DZsid_GxZyu2xxpc0K9nl&gaa_ts=69b209d4&gaa_sig=SgRTZJBxOnW-zkEbCRZTaRSiEKyfd0e20ZpaVg0o3o2on2Emv0wTzm_ses6dBP3LXaIrWtCdeffaLGe1s6AlEw%3D%3D
- [19] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/10/hormuz-strait-mines-war-trump> ;
<https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031489675760640370>
- [20] <https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incidents>
- [21] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf
- [22] <https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/goreh-jask-crude-oil-pipeline/>
- [23] <https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/goreh-jask-crude-oil-pipeline/>
- [24] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031782486682816958?s=20>
- [25] <https://t.me/farsna/418560>
- [26] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031782486682816958?s=20>
- [27] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031719888834695259>
- [28] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031719888834695259>
- [29] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-3-2026>;
<https://iranwire.com/en/news/149749-hengaw-marivan-prison-emptied-after-israeli-us-bombing/>
- [30] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-crisis-update-october-30/>;
<https://kurdistanhumanrights.org/en/news/2023/06/14/irgc-continues-bombing-kurdistans-mountains-in-west-iran>;
<https://kurdistanhumanrights.org/en/news/2025/10/10/iran-security-forces-kill-pjak-member-another-civilian-in-marivan>
- [31] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/middleeast/russia-iran-advice-drone-tactics-intl>
- [32] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/06/russia-iran-intelligence-us-targets/>
- [33] <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The-Russia-Iran-Coalition-Deepens.pdf?x85095>
- [34] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/06/politics/russia-aiding-iran-targeting>
- [35] <https://x.com/supbrow/status/2031603781536985350?s=20>
- [36] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/07/laden-iranian-ships-depart-chinese-port-tied->

key-military-chemicals/ ;
<https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/29/middleeast/iran-rebuilding-ballistic-weapons-program-intl> ;
<https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/13/middleeast/iran-is-rearming-its-missile-program-and-a-ship-of-supplies-j-ust-arrived-from-china-western-sources-say> ;
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/China-Iran_Relations.pdf ;
<https://www.ft.com/content/f0bc9fcc-11b3-4615-bd24-163f8938f2a5>
[37] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/06/politics/russia-aiding-iran-targeting>
[38] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031678383050875106> ;
<https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031700131687379148?s=20>
[39] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031700131687379148?s=20>
[40] <https://x.com/TheGoodSIS/status/2031446747143352752?s=20>
[41] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2031127020453953902?s=20 ;
<https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2031600094991057271?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2031603478733234258?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2031611201260576966?s=20>
[42]
<https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-attack-shahroud-guard-base-satellite-photos-b9cdb18b252d6dd9014dc4dcb3dd4b2f>
[43] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/06/world/middleeast/iran-missile-nuclear-repairs.html>
[44] <https://www.nadaveyal.com/p/missiles-at-438-am-politics-by-noon>
[45] <https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-has-fired-some-300-missiles-at-israel-about-half-with-cluster-bomb-warheads-idf/>
[46] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/10/us/politics/iran-military-tactics.html>
[47] <https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2031595710949273721?s=20>
[48] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936486190254866539?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936489005719118209>
[49] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031700131687379148?s=20>
[50]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-new-leader-still-silent-was-elevated-by-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-10/>
[51]
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026-69ae4679967f0>
[52]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-new-leader-still-silent-was-elevated-by-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-10/>
[53]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-new-leader-still-silent-was-elevated-by-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-10/>
[54]
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026-69ae4679967f0>
[55]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-new-leader-still-silent-was-elevated-by-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-10/>
[56]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-new-leader-still-silent-was-elevated-by-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-10/>
[57]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-new-leader-still-silent-was-elevated-by-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-10/>

[58] <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/30119166.html>

[59] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf> ;
<https://web.archive.org/web/20130907001755/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/08/khamenei-s-on-controls-iran-militia>

[60] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/defense-minister-campaign-against-iran-will-continue-without-any-time-limit/

[61] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/defense-minister-campaign-against-iran-will-continue-without-any-time-limit/

[62] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2031837588127138255>

[63] <https://www.nadaveyal dot com/p/missiles-at-438-am-politics-by-noon>

[64] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031483618619494464> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031503033926869053> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031559129488150966> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031697425044230565> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031787564265333181>

[65] Data upon request.

[66] Data upon request.

[67] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031758181119004820> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031791721122533732?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2031792893728272872?s=20> ; <https://t.me/QudsN/674374>

[68] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/29087> ; <https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-889639>

[69] <https://x.com/WarMonitors/status/2031806686324015245> ;
<https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2031802920992125270?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2031800605652418829> ;
<https://x.com/guyelster/status/2031804944546722006> ;
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2031800140487434285>

[70] <https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-889639>

[71] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/tv-report-ministers-told-rocket-fire-will-be-heavier-tonight/ ; <https://x.com/newsisrael13/status/2031797501796204956?s=20>

[72] <https://t.me/QudsN/674366>

[73]
<https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-11-26?post-id=cmmm9wlqe0000356u3j4a9eqn>

[74] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10772>

[75] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10765>

[76] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10765>

[77] <https://almanar dot com.lb/article/628237/>

[78] <https://almanar dot com.lb/article/628237/>

[79] <https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2031793381492355349>

[80] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031799695710855334>

[81] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031807524609855747> ;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031676548281946352> ;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031498466652721205>

[82] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031798125543710922>

[83] <https://x.com/CaptainElla1/status/2031735228394344960?s=20>

[84] <https://x.com/CaptainElla1/status/2031735228394344960?s=20>

[85] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031654107245650189>

[86]

<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/11/world/iran-war-news-trump-oil-israel/israel-sends-an-extra-infantry-battalion-to-lebanons-border?smid=url-share>

[87] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031745716817690684>

[88] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031644162743824789> ;
<https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031703698112393252>

[89] <https://x.com/ltayBlumental/status/2031798130568573001?s=20>

[90] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/09/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-peace-talks>

[91] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-parliament-extends-its-own-mandate-two-years-war-intensifies-2026-03-09/>

[92] <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/lebanese-parliament-extends-term-by-2-years-as-israel-intensifies-attacks-on-lebanon>

[93] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/06/world/middleeast/lebanon-hezbollah-iran-disarm.html>

[94] <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hezbollahs-record-war-politics>

[95] https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/cracks-in-the-cooperation-between-hezbollah-and-its-shiite-partner-amal/

[96] <https://alestiklal.net/en/article/are-hezbollah-s-alliances-in-lebanon-fracturing-after-split-with-free-patriotic-movement>

[97] <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/06/world/middleeast/lebanon-hezbollah-iran-disarm.html>

[98] <https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-shiites-base-criticism-84d6e421181c33aac2dee8c42ecdcb9c>

[99] <https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-shiites-base-criticism-84d6e421181c33aac2dee8c42ecdcb9c>

[100] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/أمن/مروحية-مجهولة-تستهدف-قوة-تابعة-للحشد-الشعبي-في-سهل-نينوى> ;
https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2031748427650842766

[101] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/>

[102] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-hashd-al-shabak-30th-pmf-brigade>

[103] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2031723619001237519?s=20 ;
<https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2031780228167586106>

[104] <https://www.alahad.iq/?page=article&itemId=220053> ;
<https://greydynamics.com/popular-mobilization-forces-exploring-iraqs-armed-entities/> ;
<https://www.kurdistan24.net/ar/story/285760> ;
<https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907015362056450103>

[105] <https://www.shafaq.com/ar/أمن/قتيل-وجرحى-خلال-قصف-استهدف-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-قلم-ال-نبار> ;
<https://www.shafaq.com/ar/أمن/بابل-طائرة-مسيرة-تستهدف-كراج-سيارات-في-المسيب-ب-فيديو>

[106] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/10/baghdad-diplomatic-drone-strike/>

[107] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/10/baghdad-diplomatic-drone-strike/>

[108] <https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A->

%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[109] https://t.me/Al_Nojababa/1335

[110] https://t.me/Al_Nojababa/1335

[111] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2031503145340166635?s=20

[112] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2031503145340166635?s=20

[113] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2031503145340166635?s=20

[114] <https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/558479/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87>

[115]

<https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/secretary-rubios-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-mohammed-shiaa-al-sudani-4/>

[116] <https://nirij dot org/en/2024/07/10/displaced-people-from-salah-al-din-are-banned-from-returning/> ;
<https://alhurra dot com/en/14420>

[117] <https://alhurra dot com/en/14420>

[118] <https://t.me/centerkaf/5588>

[119] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollah-iraq-little-help-can-go-long-way>

[120] <https://sana dot sy/en/syria/2301565/>

[121] <https://sana dot sy/en/syria/2301565/>

Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 12, 2026



Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Nidal Morrison, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 8:00 AM ET.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways

1. The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian internal security, defense industrial, and military targets across Iran. ISW-CTP has observed strikes in 11 provinces since 3:00 PM ET on March 11.
2. Iran is continuing to target commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to disrupt maritime traffic and threaten freedom of navigation. Suspected improvised Iranian unmanned surface vessels (USV) hit the US-owned Marshall Islands-flagged *SAFESEA VISHNU* and the Malta-flagged *ZEFYROS* off the coast of Basra, Iraq, overnight on March 11 and 12.
3. Iran continued to attack the Gulf States and Israel. Iran launched projectiles targeting civilian and oil infrastructure in the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
4. Hezbollah has claimed 27 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 11. Hezbollah's 27 claimed attacks mark the highest number of attacks claimed by Hezbollah in an 18-hour period that ISW-CTP has observed since the start of the conflict.
5. The IDF is preparing to expand its ground activity in southern Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Katz and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed the IDF to prepare for an "expansion of IDF activity in Lebanon."

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian internal security and military targets. The combined force struck five internal security facilities, including the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) station in Khorramabad, the LEC Station and a Basij base in Sahneh, Kermanshah Province, the Amir al Momenin Basij Resistance Base in Shahriar, Tehran Province, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Imam Sadegh Unit in Bushehr Province.[1] These strikes are

notable because the LEC, Basij, and IRGC play key roles in regime repression and internal security operations.[2] The combined force also struck two military bases, including the Iranian Artesh 92nd Armored Division in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and the 56th Younes Artillery Group ammunition depot in Sarvestan, Fars Province.[3]

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Taleghan 2 site at the Parchin military complex in Tehran Province on March 12.[4] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[5] Israel destroyed equipment at the site during an airstrike in October 2024.[6] Iran began reconstructing and has taken steps to harden the rebuilt structure with concrete and earth coverings, likely to protect it from future airstrikes.[7]

The combined force struck three defense industrial facilities across Iran. Iran's industrial zones often host companies tied to Iran's defense industrial base and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[8] The combined force struck Defense Industries Organization facilities in Yazd Province, an IRGC warehouse in the Fath ol Mobin Industrial Zone in Kashan, Esfahan Province, and a missile and drone component production facility in the Parand Industrial Zone in Tehran Province.[9]

The combined force also struck three airbases, including the Naval Aviation Base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, the Artesh Air Force 4th Tactical Air Base (TAB) in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, and the Artesh Air Force 7th TAB in Shiraz, Fars Province.[10] These strikes support the ongoing effort to degrade Iran's ability to challenge combined force air dominance and launch retaliatory attacks from dispersed airfields. The combined force previously struck the 4th and 7th TAB on March 6.[11]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 12, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



Iranian Retaliation

Iran has continued to attack the Gulf States and Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 11. Iran conducted drone attacks targeting the Address Creek Harbour hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Kuwait International Airport in Kuwait.[12] The Kuwaiti Public Authority for Civil Aviation reported that the Iranian drone attack on the Kuwait International Airport caused material damage.[13] The Bahraini Interior Ministry reported on March 11 that Iran targeted fuel tankers at an unspecified facility in Muharraq Governorate, Bahrain, which is adjacent to Manama.[14] Saudi forces also intercepted six Iranian drones attempting to target the Shaybah Oil Field in Saudi Arabia.[15] Iran has attempted to target the oil field several times since March 7.[16] The Shaybah oil field is crucial to Saudi oil production and is operated by state-owned Saudi Aramco, which is the world's largest oil company.[17]

Iranian Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East


Between March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 12, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



The IRGC claimed several attacks targeting US and Israeli bases in the region. ISW-CTP has not observed any evidence on impacts on US or Israeli bases at the time of this writing. The IRGC Public Relations Department claimed on March 12 that Iran struck US forces on Sheikh Zayed Road in Dubai, UAE, and at Ahmed al Jaber Airport in Kuwait.[18] The UAE successfully intercepted this attack.[19] The IRGC also claimed that Iran struck the al Dhafra Airbase south of Abu Dhabi, UAE, which hosts a large number of US forces.[20] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts previously reported damage at the al Dhafra Airbase on March 9 and 10.[21] The Iranian Armed Forces reported on March 12 that Iran conducted drone attacks targeting the Israeli Air Force (IAF) Palmachim Airbase and Shin Bet Headquarters near Tel Aviv, and the IAF Ovdah Airbase north of Eilat.[22] ISW-CTP has not observed any impacts near these sites, which is notable because they are in densely populated areas where locals would presumably film or photograph any impacts or damage. The Shin Bet Headquarters is located in northwestern Tel Aviv, which has over 4 million residents, for example.[23] The lack of evidence of

Iranian attacks on US and Israeli bases, especially in populated Israeli cities, indicates that Iran is attempting to make their attacks seem more effective than the attacks are in reality.


Iran is continuing to target commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to disrupt maritime traffic and threaten freedom of navigation. Suspected improvised Iranian unmanned surface vessels (USV) hit the US-owned Marshall Islands-flagged *SAFESEA VISHNU* and the Malta-flagged *ZEFYROS* off the coast of Basra, Iraq, overnight on March 11 and 12.[24] Western and Iraqi media confirmed on March 12 that the strike killed at least one crew member on one of the vessels.[25] The IRGC claimed on March 12 that it hit the vessel after disobeying IRGC Navy orders.[26] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) separately reported on March 12 that an unknown projectile struck an unspecified container ship in the Strait of Hormuz.[27] Iran previously attacked three civilian cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz on March 11.[28]



Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed 27 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 11 and 8:00 AM ET on March 12.[29] Hezbollah's claimed 27 attacks are the highest number of claimed attacks in an 18-hour period that ISW-CTP has observed since the start of the conflict.[30] An Israeli journalist reported that Hezbollah launched 200 missiles towards Israel on March 11.[31] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted rocket, missile, and drone attacks targeting 14 IDF bases in

northern and central Israel.[32] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems' military industries complex in Acre, northern Israel, which Hezbollah has previously targeted in the Fall 2024 conflict and during this war.[33] Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is an Israeli state-owned organization that develops weapons and military technology for the IDF.[34] Hezbollah claimed it launched a barrage of "high-quality missiles" targeting the Gilot Base in central Israel, which houses IDF Unit 8200.[35] The Gilot base is reportedly 110 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border, which suggests that Hezbollah used medium- or long-range missiles in this attack.[36] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah has over 1,000 long-range missiles.[37] Hezbollah also claimed several attacks targeting northern Israeli villages.[38] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Hezbollah is likely continuing to attempt to displace northern Israeli residents from their homes to place political pressure on the Israeli government to curtail its war effort.[39]



The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon to degrade

Hezbollah’s ability to launch retaliatory attacks against Israel. The IDF struck ten Hezbollah command centers, including Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters, Radwan Force headquarters, and other unspecified headquarters, in Beirut’s southern suburbs on March 11.[40] An Israeli journalist reported on March 12 that Israeli airstrikes have killed over 100 Radwan fighters and destroyed 60 Radwan command centers since the war began on February 28.[41] The IDF also conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters, rocket launchers, and unspecified military infrastructure across Lebanon on March 12.[42]

The IDF is preparing to expand its ground activity in southern Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned the Lebanese government that Israel “will take the territory” and prevent Hezbollah from attacking Israel if the Lebanese government does not do so itself.[43] Katz and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed the IDF to prepare for an “expansion of IDF activity in Lebanon.”[44] Katz’s statement comes amid ongoing Israeli ground activities in southern Lebanon. The IDF 810th Infantry Brigade (210th Division) is operating at several points in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[45] The IDF reported that the brigade located Hezbollah-affiliated sites that Hezbollah used as launch platforms and storage facilities for military equipment, such as mortar shells.[46] The IDF also expanded its main evacuation line for southern Lebanese residents to north of the Zahrani River on March 12.[47] The IDF previously called for southern Lebanese residents to move north of the Litani River.[48] The Zahrani River is further north than the Litani River and is located approximately 56 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[49]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2031807859411796010?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2031866491771949462?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2032034970298978751?s=20> ;

<https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/2032053821766078709?s=20>

[2]

<https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf> ; <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/security-structures-of-iran>

[3] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031962464925917668?s=20> ;

<https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/2032025730045931979?s=20>

[4] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032038295572562273?s=20> ;

<https://twitter.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/2031854445563150738?s=20>

[5]

<https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-precision-strikes-on-the-bunkered-taleghan-2-facility>

[6]

<https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-precision-strikes-on-the-bunkered-taleghan-2-facility>

[7]

<https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-precision-strikes-on-the-bunkered-taleghan-2-facility>

[8] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026>

[9] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2031814110841602407?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032038744379822146?s=20> ;
<https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/2032056109926596939?s=20>

[10] <https://x.com/SoarAtlas/status/2031904611427369116?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032010970776621526?s=20> ;
<https://twitter.com/Osint613/status/2032039348409954474?s=20>

[11] <https://ir.voanews.com/a/8121997.html> ;

<https://www.iranintl.com/202603061908>

[12] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2031869962487214548> ;
https://x.com/kuna_en/status/2032014319882285545?s=20

[13] https://x.com/kuna_en/status/2032014319882285545?s=20

[14] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2031883164273000837> ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2031883243515973919

[15] <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2031934204897083546> ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2031898337612288108

[16] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030469117128417552 ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030708325940179375 ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031472181201260549> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031546529970782538> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031552965308281279> ;
<https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2031797767320764850> ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2031898337612288108

[17] <https://www.ndtv dot com/world-news/iran-israel-us-war-saudi-arabia-intercepts-drone-targeting-shaybah-oil-field-amid-iran-war-middle-east-conflict-11203448> ;
https://x.com/GlobeEyeNews/status/2031070703265657150?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet

[18] https://t.me/defapress_ir/51655

[19] <https://madhyamamonline dot com/middle-east/uae/dubai-confirms-drone-incident-in-al-badaa-debris-hits-sheikh-zayed-road-building-1502403>

- [20] https://t.me/defapress_ir/51655 ;
<https://www.stanleyconsultants.com/solutions/planning-consulting/project/al-dhafra-master-plan>
- [21] <https://x.com/vcdgf555/status/2031413405521994144> ;
<https://x.com/EGYOSINT/status/2031101892860727558>
- [22] https://t.me/defapress_ir/51636
- [23] <https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/israel/tel-aviv>
- [24]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/cargo-ship-hit-by-projectile-strait-hormuz-crew-evacuates-2026-03-11/> ;
<https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/-أمن/خماذ-حريق-الناقلتين-المستهدفتين-قرب-البصرة-وفرق-ال-نفاذ-تواصل-البحث-عن-ضحايا-محتملين> ;
<https://x.com/mercoglianos/status/2031881472148156906> ;
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2032059628876406840?s=20> ;
https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031936127871938574
- [25] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/زورق-مفخخ-يستهدف-ناقلة-نفط-ثالثة-قرب-البصرة> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/cargo-ship-hit-by-projectile-strait-hormuz-crew-evacuates-2026-03-11/>
- [26] https://t.me/defapress_ir/51643
- [27] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031936127871938574
- [28]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-11-2026/> ;
https://t.me/Nournews_ir/337131 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031776880106618894/photo/1 ;
https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031647016489492825 ;
https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031632623252975907
- [29] Data upon request.
- [30] Data upon request.
- [31] <https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2032050807235899815>
- [32] Data upon request.
- [33] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10819> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10253> ;
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-ramp-up-cross-border-attacks-as-war-moves-closer-19f6bfff?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
- [34]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-ramp-up-cross-border-attacks-as-war-moves-closer-19f6bfff?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ;
<https://www.iafastro.org/membership/all-members/rafael-advanced-defense-systems-ltd.html> ;
<https://caat.org.uk/data/companies/rafael/>
- [35] <https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-to-relocate-11-bases-from-central-israel-to-free-up-land-for-real-estate/> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10477>
- [36] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10838> ; <https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollahs-rocket-and-missile-arsenal->

current-capabilities-and-threat-ranges/

[37] <https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-889682>

[38] Data upon request.

[39]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026/>

[40] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031882088517882140>

[41] <https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2032064171773223124>

[42] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031963866821730687>

[43] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/12/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-war/>

[44] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/katz-if-lebanon-doesnt-prevent-hezbollah-attacks-israel-will-take-the-territory-and-do-it-ourselves/

[45] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031986622477058449>

[46] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031986622477058449>

[47] <https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2032080147197935695>

[48] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2030577298408099986>

[49]
<https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-israel-gulf-allies-strait-of-hormuz-attacks-oil-prices-stocks/#post-update-c220177e>

Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 12, 2026



Avery Borens, Ria Reddy, Adham Fattah, Nidal Morrison, Benjamin Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, Brian Carter

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 03:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways

1. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued his first statement on March 12 after the Assembly of Experts selected him as the new supreme leader on March 8. Khamenei reaffirmed the regime's commitment to Iran's war effort in order to achieve Iran's long-standing objectives, including the erosion and eventual expulsion of American influence from the Middle East and the destruction of the Israeli state.
2. An Iranian-linked hacker group conducted a cyberattack on a US healthcare company on March 11, which is likely part of an Iranian effort to target the US healthcare system in order to impose political pressure on the US administration. Iran has undertaken a similar effort to impose political pressure on the United States by striking oil infrastructure in the region and oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.
3. The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian internal security and military sites across Iran. CTP-ISW has observed strikes in ten provinces since 8:00 AM ET on March 12.
4. Anti-regime media reported that the Iranian armed forces are facing deepening fractures between the Artesh and the IRGC amid severe supply shortages, citing unspecified informed sources. Some Western media reports have indicated that there are no signs of mass defections within the Iranian armed forces or fractures within the regime yet, however.
5. Recent US Central Command (CENTCOM) operations are attempting to limit Iran's ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM said on March 12 that it has destroyed over 30 Iranian minelaying ships and that it has targeted naval mine warehouses and manufacturing facilities across Iran.
6. Hezbollah appears to be relying more heavily on drones to attack IDF forces and positions. Hezbollah's reliance on drones is notable given that Hezbollah did not heavily rely on drones during the October 7 War.

Toplines

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued his first statement on March 12 after the Assembly of Experts selected him as the new supreme leader on March 8.[1] Khamenei reaffirmed the regime's commitment to Iran's war effort in order to achieve Iran's long-standing objectives, including the erosion and eventual expulsion of American influence from the Middle East and the destruction of the Israeli state. A news anchor read Khamenei's statement on state media. Khamenei made the following key points in his statement:

- **Reaffirmed Iran's commitment to disrupt international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.** Khamenei stated that Iran "must continue" to block the Strait of Hormuz. He added that Iran may "[open] additional fronts where the enemy is extremely vulnerable." [2] Khamenei did not specify what "fronts" he was referring to. The Houthis have not conducted attacks in response to the combined force's campaign in Iran or Israeli operations in Lebanon; they have likewise issued no threats or signaled intent to retaliate for US-Israeli strikes in Iran. [3]
- **Reaffirmed Iran's intent to attack regional countries that host US bases.** Khamenei falsely claimed that Iranian strikes in regional countries target only US facilities rather than the host countries themselves. [4] Iran has struck sites in Middle Eastern countries since the start of the war that are not US bases, including a drone strike on the Hayat Palace Hotel in Bahrain on March 3 and strikes on energy and maritime infrastructure in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). [5] Khamenei stated that Iran will continue to attack regional countries. [6]
- **Reaffirmed Iran's support for the Axis of Resistance.** Khamenei described the resistance movement as "an inseparable part of the Islamic Revolution's values." [7] The "Axis of Resistance" is the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. Iran provides these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for influence or control over their actions. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have carried out numerous attacks on US assets across the region. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and Lebanese Hezbollah have launched attacks on US and Israeli assets, respectively, since the start of the war on February 28. [8]

Khamenei also emphasized the importance of unity among the Iranian people. He encouraged Iranians to attend Quds Day ceremonies on March 13, likely, in part, to project an image of unity amid the war and concerns about regime stability. [9] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) similarly called on Iranians to attend the Quds Day march. [10]

An Iranian-linked hacker group conducted a cyberattack on a US healthcare company on March 11, which is likely part of an Iranian effort to target the US healthcare system in order to impose political pressure on the US administration. [11] An Iranian-linked hacker group launched a cyberattack targeting Stryker, disrupting the company's global network and IT system. [12] Stryker is a US-based healthcare company that provides health equipment and services to more than 150 million patients. [13] Handala claimed responsibility for the Stryker hack. [14] Handala is an Iranian-linked hacker group that emerged in 2022 and has claimed several other cyberattacks. [15] This cyberattack is the first Iranian cyberattack on a US company since the conflict began on February 28 and represents a threat to US healthcare infrastructure. [16]

Iran has undertaken a similar effort to impose political pressure on the United States by striking oil infrastructure in the region and oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. [17] Iranian officials have stated that Iran will not allow oil to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and warned that oil prices could reach \$200 USD per barrel. [18] Crude oil prices have increased more than 25 percent since the start of the conflict and rose to \$119.48 USD per barrel this week, which is the highest crude oil price in nearly four

years.[19] Several countries, including the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, and Bahrain, have cut oil output by nearly seven million barrels a day, which in turn will influence the global energy markets because the region is a global exporter of refined oil.[20] Rising oil prices and threats to healthcare infrastructure could trigger discontent among the US population and disrupt the US economy, which in turn could impose political pressure on the US administration if Iran continues to attack healthcare and energy infrastructure.


US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to target Iranian military sites and degrade Iranian air defenses. Commercially available satellite imagery from March 11 shows that the combined force struck a military garrison and air defense system in Hakimabad, Tehran. The imagery also shows that the combined force struck the IRGC Ground Forces 20th Ramezan Independent Armored Brigade, which is one of the three brigades under the IRGC Ground Forces Sarallah Headquarters.[21] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account on X posted a video on March 12 Showing combined force strikes on the air defense barracks in Garmdareh, Alborz Province.[22] The combined force also struck the General Directorate of Intelligence in Qom Province on March 10, according to an Israeli analyst citing satellite imagery from March 12.[23] OSINT accounts on X reported on March 12 that the combined force struck the IRGC Navy Imam Ali Naval Base in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[24] The combined force previously struck the base on February 28.[25]




The combined force struck several internal security institutions. The combined force targeted multiple IRGC Ground Forces units, which are the regime's last resort for dealing with serious internal security threats.[26] At least two of the strikes targeted IRGC Ground Forces sites in Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran.[27] Anti-regime media and an OSINT account on X reported on March 12 that the combined force struck the IRGC Ground Forces Karbala Operational Base and 1st Hazrat-e Hojjat Independent Armored Brigade in Ahvaz.[28] This armored brigade deployed to Syria to support the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War.[29] IRGC-affiliated media reported on March 12 that the combined

force struck an unspecified site in Behbahan, Khuzestan Province.[30] The IRGC Ground Forces 15th Imam Hassan Mojtaba Special Forces Brigade operates out of Behbahan and was likely involved in suppressing protests in Izeh, Khuzestan Province, during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[31] The combined force also targeted security forces in Tehran. An OSINT account on X stated on March 12 that the combined force struck a security checkpoint “packed with IRGC personnel” in southwestern Tehran.[32] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that the combined force struck the Khavar Shahr Military Garrison in Tehran.




US and Israeli Strikes Targeting Internal Security in Tehran As of March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The Institute for Science and International Security reported on March 12 that the Israeli strike on the Taleghan 2 site at the Parchin military complex in Tehran Province successfully penetrated the high-explosive testing chamber at the site.[33] The Institute reported that the bunker buster bombs penetrated the encasing concrete sarcophagus at the suspected high-explosive test chamber hall and entered the interior of the facility. The Institute reported in January 2026 that Iran is encasing a newly-built facility at Taleghan 2 with a concrete “sarcophagus” to harden the facility against potential airstrikes.[34] CTP-ISW reported out the Israeli strike on Taleghan 2 in its March 12 Morning Update and noted that the regime previously used the facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[35] The Institute said that the Israeli strikes also damaged a few other support buildings by the main facility.[36]

US and Israeli Strikes Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities

As of March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



Iranian Inter-Regime Dynamics

Anti-regime media reported that the Iranian armed forces are facing deepening fractures between the Artesh and the IRGC amid severe supply shortages, citing unspecified informed sources.[37] The sources stated that IRGC forces have refused to transport wounded Artesh soldiers to hospitals despite access to medical facilities. IRGC officials have reportedly rejected Artesh requests for additional support because of limited resources. The sources added that the Artesh faces a severe shortage of ammunition and basic supplies such as food and water. The sources stated that even traditionally well-resourced elements of Iran's military, including the IRGC's missile units, are facing supply shortages. IRGC leadership has reportedly prioritized the delivery of technical components to keep missile systems operational over sending basic resources or individual equipment to forces. The sources also said that the IRGC attempted to mobilize reserve forces earlier this week, but several individuals did

not report to military centers. Some Western media reports have indicated that there are no signs of mass defections within the Iranian armed forces or fractures within the regime yet, however.[38]

Iranian Response

Iran launched four missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 11 and 3:00 PM ET on March 12.[39] The Israeli Foreign Ministry reported on March 12 that one Iranian missile impacted in Jerusalem near the Western Wall and al Aqsa Mosque.[40]


Iran or Iranian-backed Iraqi militias almost certainly conducted several attacks targeting US and European forces in Iraq on March 11 and 12.[41] British Defense Secretary John Healey confirmed that British forces in Iraq shot down two Iranian drones overnight on March 11 and 12.[42] Other unidentified drones hit the coalition base in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, injuring several US soldiers, however.[43] British Brigadier Guy Foden told BBC on March 12 that unspecified projectiles struck the coalition base in Erbil and another unspecified base in Baghdad "a number of times" on March 11.[44] US air defense systems belonging to the US Consulate in Erbil shot down two unidentified drones on March 12, according to Iraqi media.[45] An OSINT account published a video of smoke rising near the US Consulate.[46] The Italian Defense Ministry also reported that unidentified drones struck Camp Singara in Erbil overnight on March 11 and 12.[47] Camp Singara is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base that operates as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, which is the coalition military operation against ISIS.[48] Both Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have targeted US forces and bases in Iraq since the conflict began on February 28.[49]

Iranian and Axis Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East Between March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM and March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM



The Gulf States have continued to intercept Iranian missile and drone attacks on March 11 and 12. The Kuwaiti Army reported that it intercepted five Iranian drones and four ballistic missiles on March 12.[50] The Kuwaiti Army reported that two Iranian drones and one Iranian ballistic missile fell in open areas.[51] The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted over 47 Iranian drones and three ballistic missiles on March 11 and 12.[52] Saudi air defense systems have intercepted over 151 Iranian drones since the conflict began on February 28.[53] Fifty-four of the 151 Iranian drones have targeted the Shaybah oil field, which is operated by state-owned Saudi Aramco and crucial to Saudi oil production.[54] Bahrain reported on March 12 that it has intercepted 186 Iranian drones and 112 Iranian ballistic missiles since February 28.[55] The UAE reported on March 12 that it has intercepted 1,540 Iranian drones and 278 Iranian ballistic missiles since February 28, which demonstrates that the UAE has borne the brunt of Iranian attacks.[56] Iranian drones and missile targeting the UAE have decreased relative to the peak of attacks since March 8, however (see graphic below).

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates between February 28, 2026 and March 12, 2026




© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



Recent US Central Command (CENTCOM) operations are attempting to limit Iran's ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM said on March 12 that it has destroyed over 30 Iranian minelaying ships and that it has targeted naval mine warehouses and manufacturing facilities across Iran.[57] CENTCOM previously said on March 10 that it had destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait of Hormuz.[58] Unspecified US officials told the *Wall Street Journal* on March 10 that Iran has deployed fewer than 10 naval mines in the Strait so far, which means that Tehran has not yet attempted a large-scale mining campaign.[59] Iran instead is relying on tactics that will cause less economic damage to Iran, including unmanned surface vessels (USV) and drones, to threaten commercial shipping while avoiding the economic and political consequences of mining the Strait. Iran will therefore likely continue to employ these tactics as long as it is able to do so.[60]

Suspected Iranian USVs struck two oil tankers conducting a ship-to-ship transfer off the coast of Basra, Iraq, overnight on March 11 and 12, killing at least one crew member on one of the vessels.[61] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) separately reported on March 12 that an unknown projectile struck the Chinese-state-owned Liberian-flagged *SOURCE BLESSING* in the Strait of Hormuz, which caused a fire but did not injure the crew.[62] The UKMTO reported more than 20 maritime incidents in and around the Strait since March 1 and assessed that likely Iranian attacks do not show a consistent pattern of targeting Western vessels, as exemplified by the strike on a Chinese-owned vessel.[63] This pattern indicates that Iran is pursuing a strategy to broadly disrupt maritime traffic rather than selectively target the shipping of Western nations. Other Iranian-backed groups, like the Houthis, have also had difficulties selectively targeting Western shipping.

Iranian Attacks Against Civilian Vessels in the Persian Gulf As of March 12, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET




Israeli Campaign against Hezbollah and Hezbollah response

Hezbollah claimed 36 attacks targeting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions and forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 11 and 3:00 PM ET on March 12.[64] The majority of Hezbollah's claimed attacks targeted IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel.[65] Hezbollah claimed 14 attacks on IDF bases and 20 attacks on Israeli towns in northern Israel.[66] Hezbollah is likely continuing to attempt to displace northern Israeli residents from their homes by targeting northern Israeli towns in order to place political pressure on the Israeli government to curtail its war effort.

Hezbollah appears to be relying more heavily on drones to attack IDF forces and positions. Hezbollah's reliance on drones is notable given that Hezbollah did not heavily rely on drones during the October 7 War.[67] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted ten drone attacks on March 11, which is the most Hezbollah-claimed drone attacks since the conflict began on February 28.[68] Hezbollah's number of claimed drone attacks on March 11 is also a considerable increase compared to Hezbollah's one to two daily drone attacks since March 8. Hezbollah prioritized domestic drone production and shifted its munition rehabilitation budget to focus on drones in June 2025.[69] The IDF also claimed in June 2025 that Hezbollah's Unit 127, which is the group's aerial unit responsible for drone production, has produced thousands of drones.[70] Hezbollah has long assembled the cheap Ayoub and

Mersad models within Lebanon using civilian parts ordered online.[71] CTP-ISW previously forecasted in a February 28 report that Hezbollah would likely use low-cost weapons, such as drones, to conduct attacks against Israel.[72]


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 1, 2026 and March 11, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 11, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks, in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry used



The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure that is crucial to the group's ability to operate. The IDF struck a Hezbollah site that the group used to hide millions of dollars in Bashura neighborhood, Beirut, on March 12.[73] The IDF has also destroyed 30 al Qard al Hassan locations, which is Hezbollah's main financial arm, since the start of the conflict.[74] Hezbollah uses funds transferred via al Qard al Hassan to finance its military operations, pay its fighters, and purchase weapons.[75] These strikes may impact Hezbollah's ability to acquire and store funds, which in turn could affect Hezbollah's ability to maintain its financial commitments and support base. Hezbollah's ongoing financial struggles have previously generated unprecedented discontent among its Lebanese Shia support base, which could grow over time if Hezbollah is unable to fulfill these commitments.[76]

The IDF also confirmed that it killed several Hezbollah officials and affiliates:

- **Ali Muslim Tabaja.[77]** Tabaja served as the Imam Hussein Brigade Commander and was one of the prominent leaders executing attacks against Israel. The Imam Hussein Brigade is a military force that the Iranian IRGC Quds Force uses to bolster Iran's Axis of Resistance and employ forces against Israel. The brigade also serves as a significant military unit for Hezbollah, comprising thousands of fighters, and has launched operations from Lebanon. Tabaja also held several military positions within Hezbollah.
- **Jihad al Safira.[78]** Safira served as the Imam Hussein Brigade Deputy Commander.
- **Sajjid al Handasa.[79]** Handasa served as a drone operative in the Imam Hussein Brigade.
- **Abu Ali Rayyan.[80]** Rayyan was the Hezbollah Radwan Force Commander in southern Lebanon. The Radwan Force is Hezbollah's elite special operations unit that Hezbollah, with Iranian support,

built to conduct major ground attacks into Israel in the event of war.[81] The IDF stated that Rayyan directed the Radwan Force's operations in southern Lebanon and was the central figure responsible for coordinating operations, recruiting fighters, and managing the forces' supply chain.[82]

- **Abu Dhar Mohammadi.[83]** Mohammadi was an IRGC commander who served in Hezbollah's ballistic missile unit in Beirut. The IDF stated that Mohammadi was a central figure in coordinating between Hezbollah and Iran, and in rebuilding Hezbollah's missile capabilities. Mohammadi helped Hezbollah's missile unit plan and launch missiles against Israel during the Fall 2024 conflict and the current war.

The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations and deploy forces in southern Lebanon.


The IDF reported that IDF forces have conducted nocturnal offensive operations in southern Lebanon during the past week.[84] IDF forces raided and destroyed Hezbollah Radwan Force infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[85] The IDF reported on March 12 that IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir ordered the reinforcement and deployment of additional IDF forces to the northern front.[86] Zamir stated that the IDF will continue to operate "forcefully" and will bring additional forces and capabilities to the north.[87] Israeli media on March 12 that Israeli officials are discussing a "massive operation" in Lebanon that will begin within a week.[88] Israeli political and security officials are scheduled to meet on March 12 to discuss expanding Israeli strikes and ground operations in Lebanon.[89] A senior Israeli official told Israel media on March 12 that the goal is "to take control of southern Lebanon and establish more control points." [90]

Other Axis response

The combined force continues to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq to limit the ability of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States and Israel. The combined force separately struck the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya-controlled 19th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and the PMF General Secretariat Special Forces Regiment headquarters in Kirkuk Province on March 11.[91] Iraqi media reported that the strikes in al Qaim killed 20 PMF fighters and injured dozens of others, and the strike in Kirkuk killed one PMF member.[92] The combined force also separately struck a Kataib Hezbollah base in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, and Camp Saqr in Baghdad City, Baghdad Province, on March 12.[93] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias affiliated with the PMF have used Camp Saqr to store ammunition.[94] The strike on Camp Saqr reportedly killed one PMF member and wounded three others.[95] The PMF stated on March 12 that the United States has carried out 32 airstrikes targeting PMF bases in Diyala, Kirkuk, Anbar, Salah al Din, Wasit, and Babil provinces since the beginning of the war, killing 27 PMF members and injuring 50 others.[96]

US and Israeli Strikes on Iraq

Between March 11, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The Iraqi Ministry of Defense condemned on March 11 repeated attacks targeting two Iraqi air bases in Baghdad and Salah al Din Provinces.[97] A security source told Iraqi media on March 10 that unspecified actors targeted Balad Air Base in Salah al Din Province with a drone.[98] The source added that the drone crashed before reaching the base.[99] Unidentified actors previously targeted Imam Ali Airbase in Dhi Qar Province and Balad Air Base on March 4 with “unspecified projectiles.”[100] The Iraqi Joint Operations Command previously reported on February 28 that Iraqi air defenses intercepted nine drones that unspecified actors launched at Iraqi military sites in Dhi Qar and Basra provinces.[101] No group has claimed responsibility for these attacks at the time of this writing. No group similarly ever claimed responsibility for drone attacks targeting Camp Taji, Baghdad Province, and Imam Ali Air Base, Dhi Qar Province, in late June 2025 that “severely damaged” Iraqi radars at those sites.[102]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to conduct and claim attacks targeting US bases in Iraq

and the region. A security source told Iraqi media on March 12 that air defenses at Baghdad International Airport intercepted a drone targeting the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center.[103] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched six drones at the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center on March 11.[104] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 11 that it conducted 13 drone attacks against “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region.[105] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam also claimed on March 11 that it carried out seven attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region in the past 24 hours.[106] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be using front groups in an attempt to obfuscate culpability.

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

- [1] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396004> ;
<https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-us-march-8-2026-f0b20dbffaea9351ae1e54183ffe53ff>
- [2] https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/2032102626972610707?s=20 ; <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396004>
- [3] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026>
- [4] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396004>
- [5] <https://x.com/BoxOfChocol8s/status/2028956566939156524> ;
<https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2028026806259900781> ;
<https://x.com/hubofintel/status/2028080379186573500?s=20> ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028400508407362006?s=20
- [6] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396004>
- [7] https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/2032102626972610707?s=20 ; <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396004>
- [8] <https://x.com/TheLukeReport/status/2027952774055346653?s=20> ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028251972541763888?s=20 ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-11-2026>
- [9] https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/2032102626972610707?s=20
- [10] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396079>
- [11] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/politics/pro-iran-hackers-cyberattack-medical-device-maker>
- [12] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/politics/pro-iran-hackers-cyberattack-medical-device-maker>
- [13] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/politics/pro-iran-hackers-cyberattack-medical-device-maker>
- [14]
https://www.wsj.com/articles/stryker-hit-with-suspected-iran-linked-cyberattack-52f6615c?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWETsqdFeEm1wmXlCSCsejFH25Zn4q8Lqiiupz8vg-q_hgn-

OAIKdC0vEKhe&gaa_ts=69b31155&gaa_sig=e6MsmEhJLRfD-
vqMKE58yaSKBMUXDQfkogxsOAnQCbQA6QR7XtQq_Rb4KCcSHP5PHj3wRm5ZTiiiFEXuNoG5Yg%3D%3D

[15]
https://www.wsj.com/articles/stryker-hit-with-suspected-iran-linked-cyberattack-52f6615c?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdFeEm1wmXlcSCsejFH25Zn4q8Lqiiupz8vg-q_hgn-OAIKdC0vEKhe&gaa_ts=69b31155&gaa_sig=e6MsmEhJLRfD-vqMKE58yaSKBMUXDQfkogxsOAnQCbQA6QR7XtQq_Rb4KCcSHP5PHj3wRm5ZTiiiFEXuNoG5Yg%3D%3D

[16]
<https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-appears-conducted-significant-cyberattack-us-company-first-war-st-rcna263084>

[17]
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/12/first-thing-iran-escalates-attacks-infrastructure-transport> ;
<https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-israel-gulf-allies-strait-of-hormuz-attacks-oil-prices-stocks/>

[18]
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikestunson/2026/03/11/oil-prices-could-reach-200-a-barrel-iran-official-says/>

[19] <https://www.iea.org/topics/the-middle-east-and-global-energy-markets> ;
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikestunson/2026/03/11/oil-prices-could-reach-200-a-barrel-iran-official-says/>

[20] <https://www.iea.org/topics/the-middle-east-and-global-energy-markets>

[21] <https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/irans-security-apparatus-is-designed-to-quash-protests-so-how-did-the-uprising-persist/>

[22] <https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2032185596798542214?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2032190467509518842?s=20>

[23] <https://t.me/BenTzionM/7095>

[24] <https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2032086870281036101?s=20>

[25] <https://x.com/boringosint/status/2027754830677131440?s=20>

[26]
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>

[27] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2032102226743738698> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032153914154356768> ; <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/395999>

[28] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2032102226743738698> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032153914154356768> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>

- [29] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>
- [30] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/395999>
- [31] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf> ;
<https://justice4iran.org/persian/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Waging-war-on-civilians-1.pdf> 181-182
- [32] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2032106863349633064
- [33] <https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/2032184656947528135?s=20>
- [34] <https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/imagery-update-concrete-sarcophagus-at-taleghan-2-nears-completion>
- [35] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-12-2026>
- [36] <https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/2032184656947528135?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/2031915600939983043?s=20>
- [37] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603127596>
- [38] https://www.nadaveyal.com/p/irans-new-khamenei-and-the-wars-critical?r=hv92n&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&triedRedirect=true&_src_ref=t.co ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-bets-endurance-energy-disruption-outlast-us-israel-2026-03-10/>
- [39] Data upon request.
- [40] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2032093859782541725>
- [41] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0e531gve7do> ;
<https://x.com/Osint613/status/2032078733218078781> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/italian-base-iraqi-kurdistan-hit-by-missile-defence-ministry-says-2026-03-12/>
- [42] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0e531gve7do>
- [43] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0e531gve7do>
- [44] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0e531gve7do>
- [45] <https://shafaq.com/ar/كوردستانيات/ربيل-سقاط-طارتين-مسيرتين-حاولت-استهداف-الفنصلية-ال-ميركية>
- [46] <https://x.com/Osint613/status/2032078733218078781>
- [47] <https://www.reuters.com/world/italian-base-iraqi-kurdistan-hit-by-missile-defence-ministry-says-2026-03-12/>

[48] <https://www.reuters.com/world/italian-base-iraqi-kurdistan-hit-by-missile-defence-ministry-says-2026-03-12/>

[49] <https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/2027808048736022833> ;
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/10/baghdad-diplomatic-drone-strike/> ;
<https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA>

[50] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2032119680316686691>

[51] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2032119680316686691> ;
<https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2032119680316686691>

[52] Data upon request.

[53] https://x.com/AlArabiya_Brk/status/2031649024764162228

[54] <https://www.ndtv dot com/world-news/iran-israel-us-war-saudi-arabia-intercepts-drone-targeting-shaybah-oil-field-amid-iran-war-middle-east-conflict-11203448> ;
https://x.com/GlobeEyeNews/status/2031070703265657150?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet ; https://x.com/AlArabiya_Brk/status/2031649024764162228

[55] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2032013056348143905

[56] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2032153286430900465>

[57] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2032124369162379513>

[58] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031489675760640370?s=20>

[59] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/us-israel-iran-war-2026/card/iran-lays-mines-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-RHQ7V5QBBBD1C0zWOJMF?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWetsqfg7G1ps779YDGWnt11llxqy7wFrahGqZfsUsiUvi8Ud8tZyMzYhsDxelk_CA%3D&gaa_ts=69b356c3&gaa_sig=jmhDPPcQ2V8tvH1wbakG2TAVV2qBeZUqGd6vGHFwq_JHw269piE0x3ADWrSyuEdqdO_HkF49U0PV2EzUEVHR0g%3D%3D

[60] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-10-2026/>

[61] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zefyros-tanker-hit-by-unknown-projectile-iraqi-anchorage-ship-ma-nager-2026-03-12/> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/امن-زورق-مفخ-يستهدف-ناقلة-نفط-ثالثة-قرب-البحر> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/cargo-ship-hit-by-projectile-strait-hormuz-crew-evacuates-2026-03-11/>

[62] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2032138885388444034/photo/1 ;

https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-012—jmic-advisory-note-12_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=1c4c140d79ae41598ae78e6c14858729 ;

<https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:437989/mmsi:636020939/imo:9243198/vessel:SOURCE%20BLESSING>

[63] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-012—jmic-advisory-note-12_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=1c4c140d79ae41598ae78e6c14858729

[64] Data upon request.

[65] Data upon request.

[66] Data upon request.

[67] <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hyobzilreg>

[68] Data upon request.

[69] <https://aawsat.com/شؤون-إقليمية/5198751-تقديرات-إسرائيلية-عن-إعادة-بناء-حزب-الله-قدراته-العسكرية> ;
<https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hyobzilreg>

[70] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1930753541846487369>

[71] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/>

[72] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-limited-options-for-supporting-iran/>

[73] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032139114103861551>

[74] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031251052729712988>

[75] <https://www.idf.il/332370>

[76] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/04/world/middleeast/hezbollah-weapons-lebanon.html>

[77] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032120064598503732>

[78] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032120064598503732>

[79] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032120064598503732>

[80] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032063318475657222>

[81] <https://israel-alma.org/the-threat-posed-by-hezbollahs-comando-unit-radwan-unit-to-the-state-of-israel/> ;

<https://www.ajc.org/news/hamas-october-7-massacre-plan-was-inspired-by-hezbollahs-radwan-heres-what-to-know-about-the> ;

<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/20/world/middleeast/hezbollah-radwan-ibrahim-aqeel.html>

[82] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032063318475657222>

- [83] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032048840803524687>
- [84] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032154980094788041>
- [85] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032154980094788041>
- [86] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032128510043500811>
- [87] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032128510043500811>
- [88] <https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2032155294151627242> ; <https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/1011176/>
- [89] <https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2032155294151627242> ; <https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/1011176/>
- [90] <https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/1011176/>
- [91] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-نبار-في-ال-الحشد-الشعبي-في-ال-نبار> ; <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2031939929958502808> ; https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2031871163362676912 ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/-/استهداف-مآنة-السر-العام-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بكر-كوك>
- [92] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-نبار-في-ال-الحشد-الشعبي-في-ال-نبار> ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/استهداف-مآنة-السر-العام-في-الحشد-الشعبي-بكر-كوك>
- [93] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-غارة-جوية-تستهدف-مقرا-لكتاب-حزب-الله-شمال-بابل> ; <https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2032105231115247882> ; https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2032108637632573550 ; <https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/One-killed-three-wounded-in-airstrike-on-Baghdad-s-Saqr-Camp>
- [94] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/militias-are-threatening-public-safety-iraq>
- [95] <https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/One-killed-three-wounded-in-airstrike-on-Baghdad-s-Saqr-Camp>
- [96] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-حشد-الشعبي-32-ضربة-جوية-استهدفت-مقراتنا-ودت-بجياة-27-مقاتلا>
- [97] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-دفاع-قاعدة-الشهيد-محمد-علا-عراقية-وستتصدى-ل-مستهدفها> ; <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/11/us-condemns-iranian-and-militia-attacks-in-iraq-amid-unclaimed-airstrikes-on-tehran-backed-militias/>
- [98] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-هجوم-مسي-ر-يستهدف-قاعدة-بلد-في-صلاح-الدين>
- [99] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-هجوم-مسي-ر-يستهدف-قاعدة-بلد-في-صلاح-الدين>
- [100] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-هجوم-جديد-يستهدف-قاعدة-بلد-بصلاح-الدين> ; <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-بعد-بلد-قصف-يستهدف-قاعدة-ال-مام-علي-في-الناصرية>
- [101] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-عمليات-المشتركة-9-مسيرات-استهدفت-مواقع-عسكرية-عراقية>
- [102] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/ال-عراق-يعلن-التصدي-لطارات-انتحارية-مسي-رة-خرقت-اجواه>

[103] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/سقاط-طائرة-مسيرة-قرب-مطار-بغداد-الدولي>

[104] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/10/baghdad-diplomatic-drone-strike/>

[105] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1574>

[106] <https://t.me/awlialdm/260>

Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 13, 2026



Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 8:00 AM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways


1. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck multiple internal security sites in Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran overnight on March 12 and 13, including the Khuzestan Province Law Enforcement Command Headquarters, Artesh Ground Forces 292nd Armored Brigade, and an unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces headquarters.
2. The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian air defense systems in order to degrade Iran's ability to defend against combined force attacks. Bloomberg, citing Israeli assessments, reported on March 12 that US-Israeli strikes have destroyed up to 80 percent of Iran's air defenses.
3. The combined force has also continued to target Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure. Two Western assessments on March 12 estimated that combined force strikes have destroyed around 60 percent of Iran's missile launchers, with one of the assessments estimating that the combined force has degraded up to 80 percent of Iran's "offensive capability."
4. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on March 12 that six US servicemembers died in an incident involving a US KC-135 refueling tanker and another aircraft in "friendly airspace" in western Iraq. CENTCOM noted that the incident was not caused by hostile or friendly fire.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck multiple internal security sites in Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran overnight on March 12 and 13. The IDF struck the Khuzestan Province Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[1] The IDF stated that the LEC coordinated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) at this headquarters. The LEC is Iran's premier internal security and law enforcement service, and its chief mission is to conduct ordinary police activities and ensure regime stability. The LEC is the regime's first line of defense against protests. The

combined force has struck several other LEC headquarters across Iran since the start of the war, including in Tehran, Ilam, Kermanshah, Kurdistan, and Mazandaran provinces, according to commercially available satellite imagery.

The IDF also struck an “IRGC Ground Forces headquarters” in Ahvaz.[2] Multiple IRGC Ground Forces units are based in Ahvaz, including the Karbala Operational Base.[3] The Karbala Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Khuzestan, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad, and Lorestan provinces. The Karbala Operational Base oversees the 1st Hazrat-e Hojjat Independent Armored Brigade, among other units, which is also based in Ahvaz. The IDF also struck the Artesh Ground Forces 292nd Armored Brigade in Dezful, Khuzestan Province.[4] The Artesh Ground Forces have previously played a role in protest suppression. The IDF targeted the 292nd Armored Brigade during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[5] The 292nd Armored Brigade operates under the 92nd Armored Division, which the combined force struck in recent days.[6]




The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian air defense systems in order to degrade Iran's ability to defend against combined force attacks. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account geolocated footage that US Central Command (CENTCOM) published on March 11 showing a strike on a surface-to-air missile system in Bandar Imam Khomeini, Khuzestan Province.[7] The combined force also targeted a radar dome in Behshahr, Mazandaran Province, on March 12. [8] Bloomberg, citing Israeli assessments, reported on March 12 that US-Israeli strikes have destroyed up to 80 percent of Iran's air defenses.[9]

The combined force has also continued to target Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that it struck an underground missile facility in Shiraz, Fars Province, that Iran used to manufacture and store ballistic missiles.[10] The combined force also targeted a missile site in Borazjan, Bushehr Province.[11] These strikes aim to degrade Iran's ability to produce and launch ballistic missiles. Two Western assessments on March 12 estimated that combined force strikes have destroyed around 60 percent of Iran's missile launchers, with one of the assessments estimating that the combined force has degraded up to 80 percent of Iran's "offensive capability." [12]

The combined force struck the Hajiabad Industrial Zone in Arak, Markazi Province, on March 12.[13] Iran's industrial zones often contain companies tied to Iran's defense industrial base and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[14] The Hajiabad Industrial Zone contains the Pegah Aluminum Arak Company, which the United States sanctioned in April 2025 for manufacturing aluminum products for the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA), which supports Iran's nuclear program.[15] The Hajiabad Industrial Zone is located near the Arak Air Defense Site and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC)[16]Malek Ashtar Training Center.[17] It is unclear whether the combined force targeted these sites. The IDF also issued an evacuation order on March 12 for the Lia Industrial Zone in Ghazvi Province.[18]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 13, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET




Iranian Retaliation

Iran has continued to attack Israel and the Gulf states. Iran has launched five missile waves at Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 12.[19] A missile impacted Zarzir, east of Haifa, wounding dozens of individuals and causing "extensive damage" to nearby homes.[20] Geolocated footage posted on X shows that an Iranian attack damaged the Dubai Financial Center on March 13. The Saudi Defense Ministry announced on March 12 that Saudi Arabia intercepted nine Iranian drones.[21] The Turkish Defense Ministry separately announced on March 13 that NATO air defenses intercepted an Iranian missile that entered Turkish airspace.[22] Data compiled by Bloomberg estimates that Iran has fired more than 2,400 Shahed-136 drones at Israel and other regional countries since the war began, compared to at least 789 ballistic missiles and 39 cruise missiles.[23]

Iranian and Axis Retaliatory Strikes in the Middle East

Between March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 13, 2026 at 8:00 AM ET



Axis of Resistance Response

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on March 12 that six US servicemembers died in an incident involving a US KC-135 refueling tanker and another aircraft in “friendly airspace” in western Iraq.[24] CENTCOM noted that the second aircraft landed safely and that the incident was not caused by hostile or friendly fire.[25] The Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, falsely claimed on March 12 that it shot down one KC-135 aircraft and forced a second KC-135 aircraft to land at an “enemy airport.”[26]

Hezbollah has claimed 18 rocket, drone, and missile attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as Israeli towns in northern Israel, since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 12.[27] Hezbollah claimed six rocket

attacks targeting IDF positions in northern Israel, a missile attack targeting a base in northern Israel, and two drone attacks targeting IDF barracks in northern Israel.[28] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted five attacks, including one drone attack and four rocket attacks, targeting civilian areas in northern Israel.[29] A Hezbollah rocket impacted in Kabri, lightly injuring two people.[30] Hezbollah also claimed four rocket attacks, as well as one combined mortar and rocket attack, targeting IDF forces and positions in southern Lebanon on March 12.[31] CTP-ISW will cover Israel's strikes in Lebanon, including in Beirut, as well as the IDF's ground operations in Lebanon, in its March 13 evening update.

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032359784830116131>

[2] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032359784830116131>

[3]

<https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>

[4] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032381418077139321?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/acceldealer/status/2032426086429037021>

[5] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/order-of-battle-of-the-iranian-artesh-ground-forces>

[6] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/>

<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-12-2026/>

[7] <https://x.com/mhmiranusa/status/2032172702098681905?s=20>

[8] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2032425716923404627?s=20 ;

[9]

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-12/iran-s-missile-launcher-arsenal-holds-steady-despite-strikes>

[10] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032359784830116131?s=20> ;

https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/2032375294447808992?s=20

[11] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032399328765960621?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/TehranToNews/status/2032164501303316500?s=20>

[12]

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-12/iran-s-missile-launcher-arsenal-holds-steady-despite-strikes>

[13] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032424431750877545?s=20>

[14] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026> ;

<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-12-2026/>

[15] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/pegah-aluminum-arak-company> ;

<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0077>

[16] <https://maps.app.goo.gl/MmrtMa1Ydzk84oPg8> ;

<https://maps.app.goo.gl/N15cu9xJMTUwMcMZ8>

[17] <https://maps.app.goo.gl/GaTSAzzWSNSS2zKw9> ;

<https://maps.app.goo.gl/AMpXemxD6LpSGYU88>

[18] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032361751212184020?s=20>

[19] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032179692208304280> ;

<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032242194052997201> ;

<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032249940383019079> ;

<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032336057950199894> ;

<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032418378778886644>

[20] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2032296316173226388>

[21] https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2032238081152057760?s=20

[22] <https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2032396663235461336?s=20>

[23] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-12/iran-s-missile-launcher-arsenal-holds-steady-despite-strikes?srnd=homepage-europe>

[24] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2032460946770202725> ;

<https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2032211709478502626>

[25] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2032460946770202725> ;

<https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2032211709478502626>

[26] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1575> ; <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1577>

[27] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10906> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10915> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10918> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10944> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10947> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10958> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10918> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10912> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10952> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10955> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10961> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10964> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10909> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10932> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10935> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10938> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10941>

[28] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10906> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10912> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10915> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10918> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10944> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10947> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10958> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10918>

[29] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10912> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10952> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10955> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10961> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10964>

[30] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2032418330175234104> ;

<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2032412262367940795>

[31] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10909> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10932> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10935> ;

<https://t.me/mmirleb/10938> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10941>

Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 13, 2026



Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Nicholas Carl

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will not publish morning updates covering the war with Iran on March 14 and 15. ISW-CTP will publish threads on its social media channels in the morning on these days that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

CORRECTION: ISW-CTP removed a sentence that incorrectly stated that the K1 base in Iraq hosts US and foreign troops. The Iraqi government assumed control of the base in 2020. ISW-CTP is also updating its assessment that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the attack on the K1 base upon further reports that a combined force strike targeted PMF positions at the base.

Key Takeaways


1. The US-Israeli combined force continued to target Iranian internal security infrastructure on March 13 in order to degrade the regime's repressive capabilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on March 12 during his first press conference since the war started that Israel is "creating the optimal conditions for toppling the regime."
2. The combined force has continued to target Iranian defense industrial sites across Iran. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on March 13 that US and Israeli strikes have "functionally defeated" Iran's ballistic missile production capacity by destroying Iran's defense companies and production lines across Iran that manufacture missile components.
3. Iran is selectively allowing some ships to transit through the Strait of Hormuz. ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian attacks against civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz since Iran struck a Chinese-state-owned Liberian-flagged vessel at 10:19 PM ET on March 11. Iran seems to be trying to disrupt commercial shipping with missiles and drones while avoiding the economic and political consequences of mining the Strait completely.
4. Israeli officials are reportedly discussing the potential expansion of Israeli ground operations in Lebanon. Israeli media reported that Israeli security and defense officials are examining several options, ranging from an expansive ground operation reaching the Litani River to more limited

actions in southern Lebanon.

Toplines

The US-Israeli combined force continued to target Iranian internal security infrastructure on March 13 in order to degrade the regime's repressive capabilities. The combined strikes targeted Law Enforcement Command (LEC) sites, specifically connected to the traffic and economic security police units, in Gharchak, Tehran Province.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) separately struck Basij checkpoints in Tehran Province on March 12 and 13, including two in northeastern and southeastern Tehran Province.[2] Basij and other Iranian security personnel have dispersed from fixed checkpoints and taken cover in locations, such as highway underpasses and bridges in cities, including Rasht, Gilan Province, and parts of Tehran Province, likely to reduce exposure to drone surveillance and follow-on strikes.[3] The combined force has repeatedly targeted elements of Iran's internal security apparatus, including the LEC, Basij, and IRGC units, that are responsible for suppressing protests and maintaining domestic control.[4] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on March 12 during his first press conference since the war started that Israel is "creating the optimal conditions for toppling the regime." [5] Netanyahu noted that a regime needs to be "topped from the inside" but added that "[Israel] can definitely help" and is helping.[6] The IDF also reported that it targeted IRGC, LEC, and Basij command elements in Tehran during a new wave of strikes on March 13.[7]

A Decade of Anti-regime Protests in Iran And Struck Internal Security Targets As of March 13, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The combined force has severely degraded Iran's missile and drone capabilities, which has limited Iran's ability to launch retaliatory attacks in the region. A senior IDF official said that Israel has destroyed 160 to 190 launchers and disabled another 200 launchers.[8] Bloomberg reported on March 12 that Western countries estimate that the combined forces' strikes have destroyed 80 percent of Iran's total offensive capability.[9] The senior IDF official noted that Iranian missile crews are reportedly afraid to go out and that there are desertions as well as refusals to follow orders.[10] The official added that Iranian security force casualties are estimated to be at least 10,000.[11] Anti-regime media, citing informed sources, previously reported that the IRGC attempted to mobilize reserve forces earlier this week, but several individuals did not report to military centers.[12]

Iran is selectively allowing some ships to transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Sources with direct knowledge of the matter told Reuters on March 13 that Iran has allowed two Indian-flagged liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carriers to sail through the Strait.[13] A crude tanker is also reportedly

expected to arrive in India on March 14 with Saudi Arabian oil after sailing through the Strait on March 1.[14] The Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister separately said that Iran allowed a Turkish-owned ship to traverse the Strait.[15] Fars News reported that it allowed the Turkish ship passage because it was using an Iranian port.[16] Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadegh said on March 13 that Iraqi oil tankers are permitted to pass through the Strait if they provide their identity and destination and certify that they are not owned by a US or Israeli company.[17] United Nations data shows that maritime traffic through the Strait has dropped by 97 percent since the war began.[18]

CTP-ISW has not observed any Iranian attacks against civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz since Iran struck a Chinese state-owned Liberian-flagged vessel at 10:19 PM ET on March 11.[19] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) has reported over 20 maritime incidents in and around the Strait since March 1, however.[20] Iran seems to be trying to disrupt commercial shipping with missiles and drones while avoiding the economic and political consequences of mining the Strait completely. Unspecified US officials told the *Wall Street Journal* on March 10 that Iran has deployed fewer than 10 naval mines in the Strait so far, which means that Tehran has not yet attempted a large-scale mining effort.[21]


US and Israeli Strike Campaign

The combined force has continued to target Iranian defense industrial sites across Iran. The combined force struck Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI) in Shiraz, Fars Province, on March 12.[22] Iran's industrial zones and defense-industrial sites often contain companies tied to Iran's defense industrial base and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[23] SEI is a MODAFL-affiliated subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) that the United States sanctioned in 2008 for producing military electronics for the Iranian armed forces, including radars, avionics, missile-guidance technology, and other electronic systems.[24] The combined force separately struck the Hajarabad Industrial Zone in Arak, Markazi Province, on March 13.[25] The zone hosts Pegah Aluminum Arak Company, which the United States sanctioned in April 2025 for manufacturing aluminum products for the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA), a key entity supporting Iran's uranium enrichment program.[26] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on March 13 that US and Israeli strikes have "functionally defeated" Iran's ballistic missile production capacity by destroying Iran's defense companies and production lines across Iran that manufacture missile components.[27]

The IDF also targeted Iranian air defense systems in Tehran Province on March 13.[28] The IDF reported that Israeli aircraft dropped 200 munitions against targets across Tehran Province, including air defense systems at one of the first air defense bases that Iran established in Tehran Province.[29] These strikes are consistent with the broader campaign to degrade Iran's integrated air defense network and expand Israeli freedom of operation over Iranian airspace.[30] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 13 that "Iran has no air defenses." [31]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 13, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



- Confirmed Airstrike
- Reported Airstrike
- Report of Explosion With Footage
- Report of Explosion Without Footage

Iranian Inter-Regime Dynamics

Anti-regime media reported on March 13, citing unspecified sources, that some clerics in Iran have raised concerns about Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's physical condition and capacity to govern.[32] Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's deputy chief of staff for political and security affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, and Guardian Council member Alireza Arafii reportedly rank among the clerics who question Khamenei's health and leadership competence.[33] Hejazi and Arafii have reportedly urged senior Iranian officials to reinstate the Leadership Council. The Iranian constitution states that a Leadership Council — composed of the president, the judiciary chief, and a Guardian Council member — will assume the Supreme Leader's duties until the Assembly of Experts convenes to select a new leader.[34] The Assembly of Experts previously selected Arafii as the Guardian Council member to serve as the third member of this council after Ali Khamenei died.[35] The March 13 report about concerns


regarding Mojtaba Khamenei's leadership and efforts to reinstate the Leadership Council follows reports that some senior Iranian officials and members of the clerical establishment opposed Mojtaba's selection as supreme leader before the Assembly of Experts chose him for the position on March 8.[36]

Iranian Retaliation

Iran launched seven missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 12 and 3:00 PM ET on March 13.[37] An Israeli journalist reported on March 13 that suspected Iranian missile fragments or cluster munitions struck a building in Shoham and damaged cars in Rishon Lezion, central Israel.[38] An OSINT account reported on March 13 that several Iranian cluster munitions impacted in Mishmar Hashiva, south of Tel Aviv.[39] IDF-affiliated media reported that there have been 28 impacts on residential buildings and 27 projectiles have fallen in open areas in Israel since the conflict started on February 28.[40]

Iran continued to fire at the Gulf states on March 12 and 13, but Gulf air defense systems have largely intercepted Iranian projectiles. Iran has fired roughly 2,000 projectiles at the Gulf since the conflict started on February 28.[41] ISW-CTP only observed one impact in the Gulf states between 3:00 PM ET on March 12 and 3:00 PM ET on March 13. An Iranian drone struck the al Awhi Industrial Zone in Sohar, Oman, on March 13, killing two workers.[42] Saudi Arabia reported that it intercepted 51 Iranian drones on March 13.[43] The Kuwaiti Army reported that it detected one Iranian ballistic missile on March 13, which fell outside "the threat area." [44] The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted seven Iranian ballistic missiles and 27 Iranian drones on March 13.[45] Iranian drones and missiles targeting the UAE have decreased relative to the peak of attacks since March 8, however (see graphic below). US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 13 that Iranian missile volume is down 90 percent and one-way attack drone volume is down 95 percent since the start of the war.[46]

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates between February 28, 2026 and March 13, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.




Three unspecified US officials told the *Wall Street Journal* on March 13 that elements of an amphibious ready group, including Japan-based USS Tripoli and its Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), are deploying to the Middle East, following US Central Command (CENTCOM)'s request.[47] The USS Tripoli and its attached marine unit, the 31st MEU, are part of the Tripoli Expeditionary Strike Group, which also includes a guided-missile cruiser and a guided-missile destroyer.[48] The 31 MEU is a combat-ready force able to conduct "joint, maritime, and amphibious multi-domain operations," according to the US Navy.[49]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed 25 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 12 and 3:00 PM ET on March 13.[50] Hezbollah claimed several rocket and drone attacks targeting IDF positions and forces along both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.[51] Hezbollah claimed two separate missile attacks targeting the IDF Meron Air Operations and Control Base at Mount Meron, northern Israel, and the Givaa Drone Base east of Safed, northern Israel.[52] Hezbollah previously targeted both sites on March 3 and 4, respectively.[53] An IRGC social media account reported on March 12 that Hezbollah launched the missile that struck Zarzir, northern Israel, damaging 300 homes and injuring 60 Israeli residents.[54] Israeli media previously reported that an Iranian missile struck Zarzir.[55] Most of Hezbollah's rockets and missiles come from Iran or are built using Iranian technology.[56]

The rate of Hezbollah attacks has varied since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below. Hezbollah has also employed a variety of weapons in its attacks against Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon (see below).


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 1, 2026 and March 12, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 12, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.

Note: There are some attacks, in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry used




The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon. The IDF has conducted over 1,100 strikes in Lebanon since the conflict began on February 28.[57] The IDF has struck 190 Radwan Force sites, 200 Hezbollah missile launchers, 35 Hezbollah command centers, and 80 other Hezbollah sites.[58] The IDF has also killed over 380 Hezbollah fighters.[59] The IDF continued its strikes on March 12 and 13, targeting Hezbollah headquarters, fighters, weapons depots, and other infrastructure in Beirut's southern suburbs, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon.[60] The IDF struck the Zrariyeh bridge, which spans the Litani River, on March 13.[61] The IDF stated that Hezbollah used the bridge to move its fighters from northern to southern Lebanon to fight against Israeli forces.[62] The IDF added that Hezbollah positioned launchers near the bridge and conducted launches against Israel from there.[63] The IDF also killed Hezbollah Unit 127 operative Murtada Hussein Srour in an airstrike in Beirut on March 13.[64] Unit 127 is Hezbollah's aerial unit responsible for developing, producing, and launching attack drones.[65] The IDF stated that Srour was a prominent figure and a "center of knowledge" in weapons manufacturing within Hezbollah.[66]

The IDF has also continued to target Hezbollah organizations that provide financial and social services. The IDF struck several al Qard al Hassan branches, Hezbollah's main financial arm, across Lebanon on March 13.[67] Hezbollah uses funds transferred via al Qard al Hassan to finance its military operations, pay its fighters, and purchase weapons.[68] The IDF has destroyed 30 al Qard al Hassan sites since the start of the conflict.[69] The IDF reported that al Qard al Hassan has completely stopped its activities due to the IDF's recent strikes.[70] The IDF also reportedly struck two Islamic Health Authority centers in southern Lebanon on March 13.[71] The Islamic Health Authority is a Hezbollah-controlled organization that provides medical services to most of Lebanon's Shia population.[72]

Israeli Strikes in Lebanon

From March 12, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET to March 13, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations and deploy forces to southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 12. The IDF reported that the IDF 91st Division reconnaissance forces identified several Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon and directed an IAF strike on them.[73] Israeli media reported that the IDF 91st and 36th divisions are advancing deeper into southern Lebanon.[74] The IDF reported that the IDF 146th Division destroyed a Hezbollah weapons depot, rocket launch platforms, reconnaissance devices, and buildings in southwestern Lebanon on March 13.[75] The division fired artillery at approximately 400 targets during its operations.[76] The IDF reported on March 13 that IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir ordered a broad reinforcement of forces in the Northern Command and noted that additional forces, including a division, two brigades, and engineering battalions, will deploy to the northern border.[77] Israeli media reported that the IDF 98th Paratrooper Division will deploy to the Israel-Lebanon border.[78] **Israeli officials are reportedly discussing the potential expansion of Israeli ground operations in Lebanon.** Senior

Israeli officials told Israeli media on March 12 that Israel's campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon could continue even if Israel's campaign against Iran ended soon.[79] Israeli defense officials have reportedly spoken about Israel's campaign against Hezbollah being months-long rather than several weeks.[80] Israeli media reported that Israeli security and defense officials are examining several options, ranging from an expansive ground operation reaching the Litani River to more limited actions in southern Lebanon.[81] An unspecified Israeli security source also told Israeli media on March 13 that Israel intends to create a seven-to-eight-kilometer buffer zone in southern Lebanon similar to the "yellow line" in the Gaza Strip.[82] The IDF is reportedly working to establish 20 outposts deep inside Lebanese territory as part of this plan.[83]

Other Axis Response


Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are continuing to attack US forces and interests in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are almost certainly responsible for at least three drone attacks targeting sites at the Baghdad International Airport since 3:00 PM ET on March 12.[84] The Iraqi militias have repeatedly claimed attacks since the start of the war targeting the former US Victory base at the airport, although the United States withdrew from the base in 2011.[85] The Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, which the Iraqi militias have previously attacked, is also co-located at the airport.[86] Footage posted on X on March 13 shows a fire at a power station near the airport following a drone attack.[87] The drone probably crashed before reaching the airport, assuming the militias launched it.

Two drones targeted the radar of an oil field in northern Basra Province on March 12, according to a security source speaking to Iraqi media.[88] One of the drones reportedly crashed into the outer tower of the radar but did not cause any damage.[89] Iraqi media also reported two separate instances of drone impacts in the same oil field on March 10.[90]

Three Iraqi security sources and two sources close to the militias told Reuters on March 12 that the militias have increased the pace of their drone and missile attacks over the last three to four days.[91] CTP-ISW has not yet observed definitive indicators that the militias have launched missiles, although the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, did use cruise missiles to attack Israel during the Gaza War.[92] Iran also began supplying the Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles in 2018.[93] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on March 12 that it had conducted 31 drone and missile operations targeting occupation bases in Iraq and the region in the past 24 hours.[94] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam also claimed on March 12 that it conducted 6 operations targeting US bases inside and outside of Iraq, as well as an attack targeting US interests in Kuwait.[95] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada head Abu Alaa al Walai said on March 13 that the Islamic Resistance's operations are entering their second phase with unspecified "qualitative objectives" that signal a shift to a "new level of pressure and deterrence." [96]


Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to target foreign targets in Iraq. A likely militia drone attack on a French base in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on March 12 killed one French service member and wounded at least six others.[97] Likely front group Kataib Sarqhat al Quds claimed responsibility on March 13 for a drone attack on US-Israeli interests in Erbil but did not provide further attribution.[98] The group admitted to working under the instructions of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba on March 5.[99] Kataib Sarqhat al Quds also published a statement earlier on March 13 in which the group threatened French interests due to the reported arrival of French aircraft in the Middle East.[100] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on March 9 that France will send ten additional warships to the Middle East to escort commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz.[101] The Italian Defense Ministry also reported on March 12 that unidentified drones struck Camp Singara in Erbil overnight on March 11 and 12.[102]

Camp Singara is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base that operates under Operation Inherent Resolve.[103] Kataib Sarqhat al Quds released an additional statement on March 13, threatening Iraqis in Ninewa, especially the Counterterrorism Service, to expel US forces from the province.[104] The group claimed that French and Italian forces had begun to withdraw from Iraq, with France suspending its work in the international coalition.[105] An OSINT account also reported on March 10 that unidentified Iraqi militias conducted a drone attack targeting the UAE consulate in Erbil.[106]



The combined force has struck additional Iraqi militia targets since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. Geolocated footage posted on X on March 12 shows a US drone purportedly striking a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) warehouse in Makhmour, Ninewa Province.[107] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[108] A security source told Iraqi media on March 13 that an airstrike targeted a Kataib Hezbollah headquarters in Fallujah, Anbar Province.[109] Multiple airstrikes also targeted PMF positions near Tikrit, Salah al Din

Province.[110] A security source told Iraqi media that the strike hit an Asaib Ahl al Haq headquarters.[111]



The PMF Anbar Operations Command head reportedly ordered the evacuation of the PMF Anbar Operations Command headquarters in western Anbar Province to avoid combined force strikes.[112] The Anbar Operations Command head is associated with Kataib Hezbollah.[113] The combined force has repeatedly struck Kataib Hezbollah positions since the start of the war.[114] The headquarters facility reportedly hosts about 250 PMF members, according to a security source speaking to Iraqi media, which demonstrates the extent of the concerns about combined force targeting.[115] The Operations Command headquarters have not yet been evacuated as of 3:00 PM ET on March 13. The Anbar Operations Command head's evacuation order appears to have also caused another PMF Brigade in the area to evacuate its headquarters, however. Another security source separately told Iraqi media that the Badr Organization-affiliated 55th PMF Brigade evacuated its headquarters as a precautionary

measure, with all of its personnel and vehicles leaving the area.[116]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

[1] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032438604807405842>

[2] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032141275541979150?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/Stinky915846091/status/2032278966338281659?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032487200097476973?s=20>

[3] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032199219482710138?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032194007623782878?s=20>

[4] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-1-2026> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-10-2026>

[5]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-threatens-irans-new-supreme-leader-defends-joint-assault-with-us-2026-03-12/>

[6]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-threatens-irans-new-supreme-leader-defends-joint-assault-with-us-2026-03-12/>

[7] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032519173855682613?s=20>

[8] <https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2032365394451694063?s=20>

[9]
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-12/iran-s-missile-launcher-arsenal-holds-steady-despite-strikes>

[10] <https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2032365394451694063?s=20>

[11] <https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2032365394451694063?s=20>

[12] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603127596>

[13]
<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-allows-two-gas-tankers-sail-india-through-hormuz-sources-say-2026-03-13/>

[14]
<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-allows-two-gas-tankers-sail-india-through-hormuz-sources-say-2026-03-13/>

[15]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-owned-ship-allowed-pass-through-strait-hormuz-minister-says-2026-03-13/>

[16] <https://t.me/iribnews/322473>

[17] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2032252764051370367

[18] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-unleashes-oil-shock-blunt-us-firepower-2026-03-13/>

[19]
<https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:437989/mmsi:636020939/imo:9243198/vessel:SOURCE%20BLESSING>

- [20] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-012—jmic-advisory-note-12_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=1c4c140d79ae41598ae78e6c14858729
- [21] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/us-israel-iran-war-2026/card/iran-lays-mines-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-RHQ7V5QBBBD1C0zWOJMF?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWetsqfg7G1ps779YDGWnt11llxqy7wFrahGqZfsUsiUvi8Ud8tZyMzYhsDxelk_CA%3D&gaa_ts=69b356c3&gaa_sig=jmhDPPcQ2V8tvH1wbakG2TAVV2qBeZUqGd6vGHFwq_JHw269piE0x3ADWrSyuEdqdO_HkF49U0PV2EzUEVHR0g%3D%3D
- [22] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032515419844600112?s=20>
- [23] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026> ;
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-12-2026/>
- [24] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shiraz-electronics-industries-sei> ;
<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145>
- [25] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032424431750877545?s=20>
- [26] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/pegah-aluminum-arak-company> ;
<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0077>
- [27] <https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4434484/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da/>
- [28] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032519173855682613?s=20>
- [29] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032519173855682613?s=20>
- [30] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026> ;
- [31] <https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4434484/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da/>
- [32] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603132154?source=share-link>
- [33] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603132154?source=share-link>
- [34] https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989
- [35] <https://x.com/michaelh992/status/2028062050174238887?s=20>
- [36] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603052337?source=share-link> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-new-leader-still-silent-was-elevated-by-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-10/> ;
<https://iranwire.com/en/news/150272-exclusive-irgc-intelligence-threatened-experts-and-their-families-to-select-mojtaba-khamenei/>
- [37] Data upon request.
- [38] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2032523479984030088>
- [39] <https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2032477952680583520>
- [40] https://x.com/nakash_noam/status/2032169303785525585?s=20
- [41] <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/12/middleeast/trump-gulf-allies-resisting-iran-war-intl>
- [42] https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2032459887280550241
- [43] <https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/03/13/saudi-arabia-targeted-with-50-drones-in-hours-as-iran-launches-new-wave-of-attacks-on-gulf/>
- [44] <https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2032480523755331811>
- [45] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2032438211189018955?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet
- [46] <https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4434484/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da/>

irman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da/

[47]

<https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/us-israel-iran-war-news-2026/card/pentagon-sends-marine-expeditionary-unit-to-middle-east-WeoODg0Xlle31W3np2al>

[48]

<https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/Media/News/Article/4393151/tripoli-expeditionary-strike-group-operates-in-7th-fleet/>

[49]

<https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/Media/News/Article/4393151/tripoli-expeditionary-strike-group-operates-in-7th-fleet/>

[50] Data upon request.

[51] Data upon request.

[52] <https://t.me/mmirleb/10973> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/10958>

[53] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-3-2026> ;

<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-4-2026>

[54] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/186207 ; <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/skzjchw5zx>

[55] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2032296316173226388>

[56]

<https://www.ajc.org/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-hezbollah-the-anti-israel-terror-group-with-more-firepower-than>

[57] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032464708679221619?s=20>

[58] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032464708679221619?s=20>

[59] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032464708679221619?s=20>

[60] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032370825303589100> ;

<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032295111732674843> ;

<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032206218136015343>

[61] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032340617309659317>

[62] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032340617309659317>

[63] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032340617309659317>

[64] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032395880410587471>

[65] <https://israel-alma.org/hezbollahs-uav-array-its-transformation-from-a-potential-strategic-threat-to-a-actual-strategic-threat/> ;

<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/flash-briefs/2025/06/06/idf-strikes-hezbollah-uav-factories-and-storage-in-beirut-and-southern-lebanon/>

[66] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032395880410587471>

[67] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032370825303589100>

[68] <https://www.idf.il/332370>

[69] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031251052729712988>

[70] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032370825303589100>

[71] <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15795> ; <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15777>

[72] <https://israel-alma.org/the-islamic-health-organization/>

[73] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032450988565528645>

[74] <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-889818>

[75] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032383945174663230>

[76] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032383945174663230>

[77] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032464874350006651> ; https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-to-further-bolster-troops-in-north-amid-fighting-with-hezbollah/

[78] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-to-further-bolster-troops-in-north-amid-fighting-with-hezbollah/

- [79] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/syje2cx9111#google_vignette
- [80] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/syje2cx9111#google_vignette
- [81] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/syje2cx9111#google_vignette
- [82] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2026_q1/Article-88e063ffc14ec91027.htm
- [83] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2026_q1/Article-88e063ffc14ec91027.htm
- [84] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A> ;
https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2032496393764434030 ;
https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2032518389113971049
- [85] <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2011/12/2/us-hands-over-main-base-in-iraq> ;
<https://t.me/Extremedistress/879>
- [86]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drone-strike-hits-us-diplomatic-facility-iraq-reports-washington-post-2026-03-11/>
- [87] https://x.com/Alhadath_Brk/status/2032500586654953852?s=20
- [88] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9>
- [89] <https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9>
- [90] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82>
- [91]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-shiite-allies-step-up-strikes-despite-weakened-hand-2026-03-12/>
- [92] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1786303696915046671
- [93]
<https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-iran-moves-missiles-to-iraq-in-warning-to-enemies-idUSKCN1LG0W7/> ;
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2024/10/01/houthis-and-iraqi-militias-target-israel-amidst-lebanon-escalation/>
- [94] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1576>

%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84-
%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86 ; https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-
%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1-
%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84-
%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86


[115] https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-
%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-
%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%87-%D8%A8-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%AF-
%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%83-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7-
%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A

[116] https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7-55-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-
%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1

Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates between February 28, 2026 and March 14, 2026



Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Drones Launched at the United Arab Emirates between February 28, 2026 and March 14, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the UAE Ministry of Defense.



The United States and Israel have degraded Iran’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks across the Middle East. This graphic shows the decrease in Iranian ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone attacks targeting the United Arab Emirates since the start of the US-Israeli combined force’s war with Iran on February 28, 2026.

Iran Update Special Report, March 14, 2026



Parker Hempel, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Nidal Morrison, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld

Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 3:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance's response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will not publish morning updates covering the war with Iran on March 14 and 15. ISW-CTP will publish threads on its social media channels in the morning on these days that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

1. Israeli and US officials told Axios on March 13 that Israel is planning to “significantly expand” its ground campaign in Lebanon to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure south of the Litani River. A senior Israeli official said that Israel’s objectives are to “take over territory, push Hezbollah’s forces north and away from the border, and dismantle [Hezbollah’s] military positions and weapons depots in [southern Lebanese] villages.”
2. Neither Iran nor the United States is prepared to hold discussions to reach a ceasefire despite mediation efforts by Oman and Egypt, according to Iranian, regional, and White House officials speaking to Reuters on March 14. Three sources familiar with the efforts told Reuters that the Trump administration rejected efforts by Middle Eastern allies, including Oman and Egypt, to start diplomatic talks to end the war with Iran.
3. The United States struck Iranian military infrastructure on Kharg Island in Bushehr Province on March 13, in part to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that US forces conducted large-scale precision strikes targeting Kharg Island, destroying naval mine storage facilities, missile storage facilities, and other military sites.
4. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on March 14 that it has not observed any confirmed vessel attacks in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman in the past 48 hours. UKMTO warned that the threat environment in these areas remains critical, however.
5. Hezbollah claimed 43 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 13 and 3:00 PM ET on March 14. This marks the highest number of attacks that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the start of the war.

Toplines

Israeli and US officials told Axios on March 13 that Israel is planning to “significantly expand” its ground campaign in Lebanon to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure south of the Litani River.

[1] A senior Israeli official said that Israel’s objectives are to “take over territory, push Hezbollah’s forces north and away from the border, and dismantle [Hezbollah’s] military positions and weapons depots in [southern Lebanese] villages.”[2] Israeli and US officials said that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) seeks to seize “the entire area” south of the Litani River to dismantle Hezbollah military infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[3] US and Israeli officials said that the United States supports the proposed Israeli operation to disarm Hezbollah.[4] The United States has reportedly asked Israel not to target the Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport and other Lebanese state infrastructure, however.[5] US officials said that Israel agreed not to target the Beirut airport and would consult with the United States on a “case-by-case basis” about striking other Lebanese state infrastructure.[6] Israeli media reported on March 12 that the Israeli operation in Lebanon “will begin within a week.”[7] Israeli officials told Israeli media on March 12 that Israeli operations could continue in Lebanon for months even if the conflict with Iran ends soon.[8]

The IDF continues to deploy additional forces to northern Israel to support operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The IDF reported that the IDF Northern Command, which commands IDF units operating on the Israel-Lebanon border, will receive additional forces “during the coming week.”[9] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir ordered the deployment of additional forces to the Northern Command on March 12. Zamir stated on March 13 that the reinforcements will include a division, two brigades, and multiple engineering battalions.[10] These reinforcements will supplement the three IDF divisions that have been deployed on the Israel-Lebanon border since the start of the war.[11] Israeli media reported on March 14 that Israeli tank transporters and armored personnel carriers are moving toward the Israel-Lebanon border as part of preparations for a potential “large-scale” IDF ground maneuver.[12]

Israeli and Lebanese officials are reportedly preparing to hold direct talks mediated by the United States “in the coming days.”[13] Two sources familiar with the matter told Israeli media that Israeli and Lebanese delegations are expected to meet for direct talks in either Paris or Cyprus “in the coming days.”[14] Senior US and Israeli officials told Axios and Israeli media on March 14 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tasked former Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer with the “Lebanese file” and leading initial Israeli negotiations with the Lebanese government.[15] An unspecified Lebanese official told Qatari media on March 14 that the Lebanese government is preparing to form a negotiating delegation comprised of Lebanese diplomats to discuss de-escalation with Israel.[16] The Lebanese official said that Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri agreed not to include a Hezbollah or Amal Movement representative in the delegation.[17] The Lebanese official said that the Lebanese government has called for Israel and Lebanon to reimplement the November 2024 ceasefire agreement before negotiating further.[18] US mediation efforts will reportedly be led by either US Senior Adviser for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos or Jared Kushner.[19] Five sources “with knowledge of the matter” told Axios on March 9 that the Lebanese government proposed immediate direct negotiations with Israel under US auspices to reach a peace agreement.[20] An unspecified senior Israeli official told Israeli media on March 11 that Israel had begun to hold indirect talks with the Lebanese government.[21] Israel reportedly demanded that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) act against Hezbollah immediately.[22]

France has reportedly proposed a peace plan between Israel and Lebanon that would include Lebanon normalizing relations with Israel.

[23] Three sources familiar with the details of the plan told Axios on March 14 that the French government has drafted an Israel-Lebanon peace plan

proposal.[24] The proposal includes multiple stages of negotiations that would be mediated by both the United States and France.[25] The negotiations would reportedly begin with negotiations between Israeli and Lebanese diplomats before advancing to talks between Israeli and Lebanese political leaders.[26] The French peace plan proposal includes the following stages:

- **Stage 1:** Lebanon and Israel initiate negotiations and agree to a “political declaration” within one month.[27] The sources stated that Lebanon would agree to respect Israeli sovereignty and territorial integrity as part of the “political declaration.”[28] The declaration would also reportedly include Lebanon’s “initial recognition of Israel.”[29] The Lebanese government would additionally commit to preventing any attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory and disarming Hezbollah.[30] Israel and Lebanon would affirm their commitment to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War, and the November 2024 ceasefire agreement.[31]
- **Stage 2:** The LAF would redeploy forces south of the Litani River as the IDF withdraws from Lebanese territory that it has seized in the current conflict.[32] Israel and Lebanon would also commit to engaging through the US-led ceasefire monitoring committee to address ceasefire violations during this period.[33] UNIFIL peacekeepers would reportedly verify that the LAF was sufficiently disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River, while an unspecified UNSC-mandated “coalition of countries” would oversee Hezbollah’s disarmament throughout the rest of Lebanon.[34]
- **Stage 3:** Lebanon would be required to sign a permanent non-aggression agreement with Israel within two months of signing the “political declaration” in stage one.[35] The non-aggression agreement would formally end the state of war between Israel and Lebanon that has existed between the two countries since 1948.[36]
- **Stage 4:** Israel would withdraw its forces from the five positions in Lebanon that the IDF has occupied since February 2025 over an unspecified period.[37] Lebanon would also be expected to complete negotiations with Israel and Syria to demarcate Lebanon’s borders by the end of 2026.[38]

Neither Iran nor the United States is prepared to hold discussions to reach a ceasefire despite mediation efforts by Oman and Egypt, according to Iranian, regional, and White House officials speaking to Reuters on March 14.[40] Three sources familiar with the efforts told Reuters that the Trump administration rejected efforts by Middle Eastern allies, including Oman and Egypt, to start diplomatic talks to end the war with Iran.[41] Two senior Iranian officials said that Iran rejected the possibility of a ceasefire until the United States and Israel stop striking Iran and meet Iranian demands, which reportedly include compensation.[42] A third Iranian source stated that previous diplomatic efforts between Iran and the United States are “irrelevant now.”[43] The source added that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials “strongly believe that if they lose control over the Strait of Hormuz, Iran will lose the war.”[44] A senior White House official told Reuters that President Donald Trump is “not interested in [diplomatic talks] right now.”[45]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The IDF confirmed on March 14 that it killed two senior Iranian Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters intelligence officials, Abdollah Jalali Nassab and Amir Shariat, on March 13.[46] The IDF stated that Nassab and Shariat had replaced Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Intelligence Chief Saleh Asadi, whom Israel targeted and killed in airstrikes on February 28.[47] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters oversees and coordinates Iranian military activities, serving as the main authority for operational command and control.[48]

The United States struck Iranian military infrastructure on Kharg Island in Bushehr Province on March 13, in part to degrade Iran's ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that US forces conducted large-scale precision strikes targeting Kharg Island, destroying naval mine storage facilities, missile storage facilities, and other military sites.[49] CENTCOM added that it struck over 90 Iranian military targets on the island.[50] Several open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts, including "Stinky," "Pixel," "Wooltiger Hunter," and Mitchell Ulrich, geolocated CENTCOM footage that shows that the United States struck Kharg Airport, the Kharg Air Defense Complex, and a Matla ul Fajr radar on Kharg Island.[51] The Matla ul Fajr radar reportedly has long-range early warning and air surveillance capabilities with a detection range of up to 500 kilometers for identifying and tracking aerial targets.[52] US President Donald Trump stated on March 14 that the US strikes targeted military installations on the island but did not target oil infrastructure.[53] Trump warned that the United States could decide to target oil infrastructure on the island if Iran continues to interfere with shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.[54] CENTCOM previously reported on March 10 that US forces had destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait of Hormuz.[55] Iran has so far deployed fewer than 10 naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz.[56] A 2025 US Congressional Report said that Iran has 5,000-6,000 naval mines.[57]

US Strikes on Kharg Island Military Sites As of March 14, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



Map by Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Lea Corticchiato, Megan Ewert, Nathaniel Kramer, Carolyn Weinstein, Eliana Ornelas, Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Zahra Wakilzada, and Parker Hempel
 © 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
 Locations sourced from @ayatsubzero, @Stinky915846091, @Wolltigerhueter, and @Mitch_Ulrich on Twitter

- Targeted Air Defense Site
- Targeted Airbase
- Oil Infrastructure and Land Use
- Military Land Use

US and Israeli Strikes in Iran

Between March 13, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 14, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET




The combined force has continued to target Iranian industrial zones, which often contain companies tied to Iran's defense industrial base and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). The combined force struck the Jey Industrial Zone in Esfahan Province on March 14 after previously targeting the area on March 6.[58] The Jey Industrial Zone contains facilities tied to Iranian drone manufacturing and defense industrial activities.[59] The United States previously sanctioned Kimia Part Sivan Company, which is located in the Jey Industrial Zone, for supporting the IRGC Quds Force.[60] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on March 13 that US and Israeli strikes have "functionally defeated" Iran's ballistic missile production capability by destroying defense companies and production lines across Iran that manufacture missile components.[61]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Iranian Space Research Center in Tehran City on March 14, likely to disrupt Iranian space and missile-related research that could support long-range strike capabilities.[62] The Iranian Space Research Center is a subsidiary of the Iranian

Space Agency and operates under Iran's Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.[63] The United States sanctioned the Iranian Space Research Center in September 2019 for supporting Iran's space launch vehicle program.[64] The US Treasury Department stated in 2019 that the Iranian Space Research Center conducts research and development activities for the Iranian Space Agency and has worked with the UN-designated liquid propellant ballistic missile organization Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group.[65] The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has assessed that Iran's space launch vehicle program could enable the regime to develop a militarily viable intercontinental ballistic missile by 2035 if it chose to pursue the capability, which highlights US concerns about the overlap between Iran's space launch vehicle program and intercontinental ballistic missile development.[66]

The combined force has continued to target Iranian internal security institutions in Tehran that the regime previously used to suppress protests. The combined force struck Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Station 108 in the Navab neighborhood of Tehran and LEC Station 148 in the Enghelab neighborhood of Tehran on March 14.[67] The LEC plays a central role in regime repression and internal security operations, including suppressing protests.[68] Iranian security forces previously used several LEC stations in Tehran, including those in Navab and other neighborhoods, to respond to and suppress protest activity during the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[69] These strikes, therefore, likely seek to degrade the regime's internal security apparatus and its ability to quell unrest. Satellite imagery from March 6 also confirms that the combined force destroyed an intelligence office in Sarpol-e Zahab, Kermanshah Province.[70]

US and Israeli Strikes Targeting Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Stations in Tehran As of March 14, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET




The IDF has continued to degrade Iran's air defense network. The IDF reported on March 14 that it struck sites used to produce air defense systems west of Karaj, Alborz Province, and in western Tehran.[71] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 13 that "Iran has no air defenses." [72]

The combined force also struck several Artesh and IRGC bases on March 13 and 14, including the Artesh Air Force 7th Tactical Airbase in Shiraz, Fars Province, the IRGC Navy Shahid Asari Nejad Barracks in Shiraz, a naval base in Sirjan, Kerman Province, and the 4th Artesh Ground Forces Aviation Base in Esfahan Province.[73]

Iranian Response

Iran has continued to attack Israel and the Gulf states. Iran has conducted seven missile attacks against Israel since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 13.[74] An Iranian cluster munition impacted in Eilat on March 14, wounding three people.[75] An Iranian cluster munition also impacted in central Israel on March 14.[76] The Saudi Defense Ministry announced on March 14 that Saudi air defenses had intercepted 20 drones and one ballistic missile since March 13.[77] The Emirati Defense Ministry separately announced that Emirati air defenses engaged 33 Iranian drones and nine ballistic missiles on March 14.[78] Unspecified industry sources told Western media on March 14 that Iran conducted a drone attack targeting Fujairah Port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 14, which Emirati air defenses intercepted.[79] The sources stated that oil operations at Fujairah Port were suspended after debris from the interception caused a fire at the port.[80]



Iran conducted drone attacks targeting Citibank buildings in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Manama, Bahrain, on March 13 in retaliation for a combined force strike on an Iranian state-run bank on March 11.[81] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Western media on March 14 that Iran responded “in kind” to the combined force’s strike on a Bank Sepah building on March 11.[82]


United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on March 14 that it has not observed any confirmed vessel attacks in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman in the past 48 hours.[83] UKMTO warned that the threat environment in these areas remains critical, however.[84] UKMTO stated that it has observed 20 confirmed maritime incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure since March 1.[85] UKMTO stated that Iran has not consistently targeted vessels with Western owners, which it assessed suggests that Iran is conducting a broader campaign aimed at “broad maritime disruption rather than selective vessel targeting.”[86] UKMTO also reported that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has sharply declined, noting that around 138 vessels usually transit through the strait per day, but that currently only around two vessels are transiting through the strait per day.[87] US President Donald Trump stated on March 14 that multiple countries affected by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, including China, France, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, will “hopefully” deploy warships alongside the United States to protect international shipping.[88]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed 43 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 13 and 3:00 PM ET on March 14.[89] This marks the highest number of attacks that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the start of the war. Hezbollah said that it launched seven rocket attacks at northern Israeli communities.[90] The IDF reported on March 14 that Hezbollah has launched an average of around 100 rockets per day targeting Israel since March 2.[91] Several drones fired from Lebanon were either intercepted by the IDF or landed in open areas in northern Israel on March 14, causing no damage or casualties.[92] Israeli Army Radio reported that rockets fired from Lebanon fell in open areas in Krayot, causing no casualties.[93] Hezbollah claimed a drone attack targeting IDF soldiers at a “rehabilitation and maintenance center” south of Haifa.[94] Hezbollah also claimed that it conducted three rocket and missile attacks targeting IDF sites in northern Israel and engaged two Israeli Merkava tanks at the Jal al Alam site, which is just over the Blue Line that demarcates the Israel-Lebanon border.[95]

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted seven rocket attacks and a missile attack targeting Israeli forces in Lebanon.[96] Hezbollah also claimed that it shelled Israeli soldiers in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District, causing casualties.[97] A Hezbollah-aligned source claimed on March 10 that IDF tanks had begun advancing toward Taybeh from Aadaysit Marjayoun and Rab el Thalathine, Marjaayoun District.[98]


Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Targeting IDF Forces and Positions in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon Between March 1, 2026 and March 13, 2026



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.
All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.



Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 13, 2026 By Type



© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.


Note: There are some attacks in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry it used



The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon. The IDF said on March 14 that it has struck around 110 Hezbollah headquarters since the start of the war.[99] The IDF conducted multiple rounds of strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut and southern Lebanon on March 13.[100] Footage geolocated by "Stinky" on X on March 14 shows that the IDF struck a Hezbollah missile depot east of Mjadel, Tyre District.[101] The IDF said on March 13 that it killed a member of Hezbollah's aerial unit and a leading weapons manufacturer in Beirut.[102] Israeli strikes in Beirut on March 12 also killed Hezbollah communications unit commander and IRGC Quds Force Palestine Corps member Hisham Abdul Karim Yassin.[103] The IDF said that Yassin was responsible for rebuilding Hezbollah's capabilities and deepening Iran's presence in Lebanon.[104] Yassin is the fifth Quds Force commander and third commander from the Palestine Corps that the IDF has killed since the start of the conflict.[105]

Israeli Strikes in Lebanon

Between March 13, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 14, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon. The IDF reported that the 7th Armored Brigade (36th Division) has conducted raids that destroyed Hezbollah infrastructure and eliminated Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon over the past week.[106] The 7th Armored Brigade has destroyed “dozens” of Hezbollah sites, including weapons depots, headquarters, and observation posts.[107]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack US forces and interests in Iraq. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted a drone attack targeting the US Embassy in Baghdad overnight on March 13 and 14. A security official told Western media on March 14 that two drones hit


the embassy, causing a fire on the embassy's roof. The fire damaged a satellite communications system.[108] The *New York Times* reported on March 14 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attack.[109] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously conducted a rocket attack targeting the US Embassy in Baghdad on March 7, which US air defenses intercepted.[110] The US Embassy in Baghdad stated on March 14 that all US citizens should leave Iraq immediately due to repeated Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against US citizens and interests.[111]

Likely militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam also claimed on March 13 that it conducted eight "operations" targeting US bases in and outside of Iraq.[112] The group also claimed on March 14 that it conducted a drone attack targeting an unspecified US base at Erbil International Airport on March 13.[113] An Iraqi media correspondent reported on March 13 that air defenses at Harir Base near Erbil International Airport shot down several drones targeting the base.[114] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq separately claimed on March 14 that it had conducted 27 drone and missile attacks against "enemy" bases in Iraq and the region in the past 24 hours.[115] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are almost certainly responsible for two drone attacks that targeted the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center at Baghdad International Airport on March 14.[116] Air defenses shot down the drones.[117]

The combined force conducted strikes targeting Kataib Hezbollah members in central Baghdad on March 14, likely to disrupt Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' ability to conduct drone and missile attacks.[118] The strikes reportedly killed three Kataib Hezbollah members, including a missile commander, and a Badr Organization member.[119] A Kurdish journalist reported on March 14 that the Badr Organization member oversaw missile attacks.[120]

US and Israeli Strikes in Iraq

Between March 13, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET and March 14, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET



The combined force has struck additional Iraqi militia targets since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 13. The combined force struck an 18th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade base in al Qaim, Anbar Province, on March 13.[121] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[122] The combined force also conducted strikes targeting two Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada "cultural centers" in Ninewa Province on March 13 and 14.[123] The combined force separately conducted drone strikes targeting four 52nd PMF Brigade sites in eastern Salah al Din Province on March 14, wounding one PMF fighter.[124] The Iranian-backed Badr Organization controls the 52nd PMF Brigade.[125] Unspecified actors conducted a drone attack targeting the Lanaz oil refinery in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on March 14.[126] The attack caused a fire and forced the refinery to shut down.[127] Unspecified actors separately conducted a drone attack against the UAE consulate in Erbil on March 14, injuring two security personnel.[128] No group has claimed responsibility for either of these attacks at

the time of this writing.

Iranian Internal Security

Iranian security forces have conducted a series of arrests targeting individuals accused of espionage, gathering intelligence, or conducting other anti-regime activities across Iran since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 13.[129] Iranian media reported the following arrests on March 13 and 14:

- LEC forces in Lorestan Province arrested an individual with alleged ties to Mossad and six other members of an “espionage network” on March 13.[130]
- Iranian authorities arrested four individuals in Robat Karim, Tehran Province, for filming “sensitive” locations and eight individuals allegedly linked to “terrorist groups” in Hamedan, western Iran, for collecting imagery of military and law enforcement facilities.[131]
- Iranian security forces arrested three individuals in Khuzestan Province who had reportedly conducted “armed attacks against security guards and public places” in recent days.[132]
- Security forces arrested 13 individuals and seized three Starlink devices in Qom Province, arrested two cells in Fars Province that had allegedly sent manipulated images to anti-regime media, and arrested two ten-person cells in Khorasan Razavi and Mazandaran provinces for allegedly sharing sensitive information about military and economic sites with foreign intelligence services.[133]
- Iranian authorities arrested 14 individuals who allegedly intended to incite unrest and “chaos” in Kerman Province, southeastern Iran.[134]
- The LEC arrested 54 alleged “monarchist operatives,” likely referring to individuals with ties to the MEK, and seized a variety of small arms and ammunition in an unspecified location.[135]
- Iranian forces seized 54 Starlink devices in Hormozgan Province on March 14.[136]

Other Activity

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 14 that British fighter jets conducted air defense operations in the Middle East.[137] The MoD stated that British fighter jets conducted air defense operations in Qatar, Cyprus, the UAE, and Bahrain to defend British interests and allies.[138] The MoD also reported that a British counter-drone unit intercepted several drones targeting coalition bases.[139]

POWERED BY:  BABEL STREET

Endnotes

- [1] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah>
- [2] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah>
- [3] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah>
- [4] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah>
- [5] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah>
- [6] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah>

- [7] <https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/1011176/>
- [8] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/syje2cx9111#google_vignette
- [9] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032878451925848281>
- [10] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032128510043500811> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032464874350006651>
- [11] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah>
- [12] <https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-889909>
- [13] <https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-03-13/ty-article-live/iranian-missile-barrage-hits-several-central-israeli-towns-no-injuries-reported/0000019c-e8ff-d02e-abdf-e9ff35360000?liveBlogItemId=1012056298#1012056298>
- [14] <https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2026-03-14/ty-article/.premium/israeli-and-lebanese-expected-to-hold-direct-talks-in-coming-days/0000019c-ece1-df50-a9de-eef92e960000>
- [15] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah> ;
<https://x.com/N12News/status/2032524205200134440>
- [16] [عاجل-مصدر-رسمي-لبناني-للجزيرة-مشاورات](https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/3/14/عاجل-مصدر-رسمي-لبناني-للجزيرة-مشاورات)
- [17]] [عاجل-مصدر-رسمي-لبناني-للجزيرة-مشاورات](https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/3/14/عاجل-مصدر-رسمي-لبناني-للجزيرة-مشاورات)
- [18]] [عاجل-مصدر-رسمي-لبناني-للجزيرة-مشاورات](https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/3/14/عاجل-مصدر-رسمي-لبناني-للجزيرة-مشاورات)
- [19]] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion-hezbollah> ; <https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2026-03-14/ty-article/.premium/israeli-and-lebanese-expected-to-hold-direct-talks-in-coming-days/0000019c-ece1-df50-a9de-eef92e960000>
- [20] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/09/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-peace-talks>
- [21] <https://x.com/ltayBlumental/status/2031798130568573001?s=20>
- [22] <https://x.com/ltayBlumental/status/2031798130568573001?s=20>
- [23] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [24] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [25] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [26] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [27] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [28] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [29] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [30] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [31] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [32] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [33] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [34] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [35] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [36] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [37] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france> ;
<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-forces-remain-five-locations-southern-lebanon-removal-deadline-rcna192449> ;
<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/southern-lebanon-residents-describe-hardships-under-israeli-military-occupation>
- [38] <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/14/israel-lebanon-war-peace-hezbollah-france>
- [39] <https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/2032755123747749906>
- [40]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-rejects-efforts-launch-iran-ceasefire-talks-sources-say-2026-03-14/>
- [41]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-rejects-efforts-launch-iran-ceasefire-talks-sources-say-2026-03-14/>

2026-03-14/

[42] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-rejects-efforts-launch-iran-ceasefire-talks-sources-say-2026-03-14/>

[43] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-rejects-efforts-launch-iran-ceasefire-talks-sources-say-2026-03-14/>

[44] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-rejects-efforts-launch-iran-ceasefire-talks-sources-say-2026-03-14/>

[45] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-rejects-efforts-launch-iran-ceasefire-talks-sources-say-2026-03-14/>

[46] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032853331199053890?s=20>

[47] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032853331199053890?s=20>

[48] <https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/government-institution/armed-forces-general-staff-and-khata-m-al-anbiya-central-headquarters>

[49] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2032777791247155482>

[50] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2032777791247155482>

[51] <https://x.com/Stinky915846091/status/2032648914805858670> ;

<https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/2032634874490765680> ;

<https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/2032640175763820755> ;

<https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/2032636733448204615> ;

<https://x.com/Wolltigerhueter/status/203264655367358917?s=20> ;

https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2032633692938539170?s=20

[52] <https://www.ilna dot ir/بخش-سیاسی-3/افتتاح-طرح-راداری-ناوبری-وزارت-دفاع-421464> ;

<https://fa.alalam dot ir/news/1876003/رونمایی-از-جدیدترین-رادار-ایرانی-با-نام-مطلع-الفجر-۳-ویزگیها-وتصا>

[53] <https://x.com/DOWResponse/status/2032591643694739823>

[54] <https://x.com/DOWResponse/status/2032591643694739823>

[55] <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031489675760640370> ;

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-mines-strait-of-hormuz/?linkId=917703318>

[56] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-us-israel-trump-2026/card/iran-lays-mines-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-57THxxr9LISh6lvqg8tv?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtSqdlSZeEMeBOE_O-JDtaOA5EoKaz-Jmwnh45g6TQUWBzgVoQ9WmFu5CNdRra4HM%3D&gaa_ts=69b5d295&gaa_sig=ZyEh8cmZ2792sm9LEtVEifUsUOQzwVlJKWxdgskk8XMW_75uZTsMStkB3rLMoOOruYk10VvInwBadXjqK7QhnA%3D%3D

[57] <https://caspianpost.com/iran/us-congress-iran-has-thousands-of-naval-mines>

[58] <https://t.me/farsna/419902> ;

<https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/2031446747143352752?s=20>

[59] <https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/2031446747143352752?s=20>

[60] <https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=33575>

[61] <https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4434484/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da>

[62] <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032778332991865176?s=20> ;

<https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032776185445302296>

[63] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-space-research-center>

[64] <https://2017-2021.state.gov/new-sanctions-designations-on-irans-space-program/>

[65] <https://2017-2021.state.gov/new-sanctions-designations-on-irans-space-program/>

[66] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/golden_dome.pdf ; <https://www.factcheck.org/2026/03/assessing-trumps-claims-on-irans-nuclear-and-missile-capabilities/>

[67] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2032833635032678669> ;
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/2032853967521096031>

[68] <https://www.aei.org/articles/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/>

[69] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2013500104716505205> ;
<https://x.com/etelaf10/status/2007077376589750552> ;
<https://x.com/iranhrs99/status/2016795749611098424> ;

[70] <https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2032856942490616116?s=20>

[71] <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2032776185445302296>

[72]
<https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4434484/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da/>

[73] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/2032623293224615953> ;
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/2032843889917166039> ;
<https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032728284702629951> ;
<https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2032846675568382001>

[74] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032565131398312115> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032613607633011121> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032769205863391522> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032799004585517074> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032804184399974463> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032825809455431966> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032866650119119225>

[75] <https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-missiles-wound-3-in-eilat-including-child-israel-hits-hundreds-of-iran-sites/> ; <https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2032816588286513602> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032825809455431966>

[76] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2032833045401682143?s=20> ;
<https://x.com/Stinky915846091/status/2032841845454102965?s=20>

[77] <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636336/saudi-arabia>

[78] <https://x.com/modgovae/status/2032778834957971490>

[79]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fire-occurred-uaes-fujairah-after-debris-fell-during-interception-drone-no-2026-03-14/> ;
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-14/some-fujairah-oil-operations-suspended-after-drone-attack-fire>

[80]
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fire-occurred-uaes-fujairah-after-debris-fell-during-interception-drone-no-2026-03-14/> ;
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-14/some-fujairah-oil-operations-suspended-after-drone-attack-fire>

[81] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396875>

[82]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-11-2026/> ;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHjjRgpvXO4>

[83]
https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-014—jmic-advisory-note-14_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=85c7878cf35a44739b699a38a537dad2

- [84] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-014—jmic-advisory-note-14_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=85c7878cf35a44739b699a38a537dad2
- [85] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-014—jmic-advisory-note-14_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=85c7878cf35a44739b699a38a537dad2
- [86] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-014—jmic-advisory-note-14_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=85c7878cf35a44739b699a38a537dad2
- [87] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-014—jmic-advisory-note-14_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=85c7878cf35a44739b699a38a537dad2
- [88] <https://x.com/TrumpTruthOnX/status/2032824679090762216?s=20>
- [89] Data available upon request
- [90] <https://t.me/mmirleb/11075> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11081> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11084> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11087> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11090> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11093> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11096>
- [91] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/no-injuries-reported-from-hezbollah-rocket-drone-attacks-on-northern-israel/
- [92] https://www.mako.co.il/news-world/2026_q1/liveblog-33e9394445dec91027.htm?utm_source=copy_link&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=n12_article#0c86194440dec910VgnVCM100000700a10acRCRD
- [93] <https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2032839868494086157>
- [94] <https://t.me/mmirleb/11104>
- [95] <https://t.me/mmirleb/11068> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11071> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11078> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11133>
- [96] <https://t.me/mmirleb/11064> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11107> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11110> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11114> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11117> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11124> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11127> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11130>
- [97] <https://t.me/mmirleb/11101> ; <https://t.me/mmirleb/11120>
- [98] <https://t.me/alichoeib1970/15649>
- [99] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032755466405634352>
- [100] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032758072163061765>
- [101] <https://x.com/Stinky915846091/status/2032837569562488939?s=20>
- [102] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032557329594380566>
- [103] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032818929807016408> ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2032818189671747688
- [104] https://x.com/ariel_oseran ; <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032818929807016408>
- [105] <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032818929807016408> ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2032818189671747688
- [106] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032878451925848281>
- [107] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032878451925848281>
- [108] <https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-14-26?post-id=cmmqg7xe600003b6ssp69tk40>
- [109] <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/14/world/iran-war-trump-oil-israel/here-is-the-latest?smid=url-share>
- [110] <https://www.shafaq.com>

com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8-%D9%83%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7 ;
https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2030347350753820732 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/>
[111] <https://x.com/USEmbBaghdad/status/2032865661869797409>
[112] <https://t.me/awlialdm/267>
[113] <https://t.me/awlialdm/269>
[114] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردستانيات/الدفاعات-الجوية-تعرض-طا-رتين-مسيرتين-في-سما-ربيل>
[115]] <https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1582>
[116] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/حباط-استهداف-جديد-لمركز-الدعم-الدبلوماسي-في-مطار-بغداد> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/سقاط-طا-رة-مسي-رة-اقتربت-من-مطار-بغداد-الدولي>
[117]] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/حباط-استهداف-جديد-لمركز-الدعم-الدبلوماسي-في-مطار-بغداد> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/سقاط-طا-رة-مسي-رة-اقتربت-من-مطار-بغداد-الدولي>
[118]] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/انفجار-لم-تعرف-طبيعته-في-منطقة-الكرادة-وسط-بغداد> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/بعد-حادثه-العرصات-العمليات-المشتركة-استهداف-ال-حيا-السكنية-جريمة-مكتملة-ال-ركان> ;
<https://x.com/obretix/status/2032811962522886209>
[119] <https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2032899080586723562> ; <https://t.me/centerkaf/5592> ;
<https://t.me/centerkaf/5593> ; <https://t.me/centerkaf/5594>
[120] <https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2032899080586723562>
[121] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2032556417165480100 ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/ضربة-جوية-تطال-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-غربي-العراق>
[122]] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/>
[123] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/قصف-يستهدف-مجمعا-تابعا-لكتاب-سيد-الشهدا-في-سهل-نينوى> ;
https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2032583378562588765 ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/تفاصيل-استهداف-م-سسه-لممثل-المرشد-الايروبي-في-نينوى>
[124]] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/استهداف-جديد-يطال-4-مواقع-للحشد-الشعبي-في-صلاح-الدين> ; <https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمن/مسي-رة-تستهدف-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-شرق-صلاح-الدين>
[125]] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Iraq20-20ISF20PMF20Orders20of20Battle_0_0.pdf
[126] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردستانيات/بعد-استهدافها-تعلق-العمل-بمصفاة-نفطية-في-ربيل>
[127]] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردستانيات/بعد-استهدافها-تعلق-العمل-بمصفاة-نفطية-في-ربيل>
[128]] <https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/900477/uae-says-two-security-personnel-injured-in-attack-on-consulate-in-erbil>
[129] <https://t.me/mehrnews/360368>; <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396743>
[130] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396611>
[131] <https://t.me/mehrnews/360319>; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/186580
[132] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396776>
[133] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396743>; <https://t.me/mehrnews/360251>; <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396776>
[134] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396747>
[135] <https://t.me/Tasnimnews/396755>
[136] <https://t.me/mehrnews/360368>

[137] <https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/2032859994412974437?s=20>

[138] <https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/2032859994412974437?s=20>

[139] <https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/2032859994412974437?s=20>