

Iran Update, September 1, 2025



Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld

Toplines

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as the SNSC deputy for international affairs on August 29.[1] Bagheri Kani's appointment may aim to placate hardliner criticism about Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's government. Bagheri Kani's appointment comes amid growing criticism from hardliners, particularly members of Saeed Jalili's Paydari Front, toward the Pezeshkian administration. Hardliners oppose the recent resurgence of moderates and pragmatists in the Iranian political sphere following the Israel-Iran War and have criticized Pezeshkian administration officials, such as Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who support renewed negotiations with the United States.[2] An Iranian professor told Iranian reformist media on August 30 that Larijani is a pragmatist and that Bagheri Kani's appointment may be "the result of bureaucratic processes and political bargaining." [3] Bagheri Kani has historically had close ties to Saeed Jalili.[4] Bagheri Kani served as the SNSC deputy secretary under Jalili from 2007 to 2013.[5] Bagheri Kani subsequently managed Jalili's presidential campaign in 2013. Bagheri Kani served as deputy foreign affairs minister and chief nuclear negotiator under former hardline President Ebrahim Raisi between 2021 and 2024. Some Iranian media outlets reported that Bagheri Kani and Jalili came into disagreement during Raisi's administration over Bagheri Kani's support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or 2015 nuclear deal.[6] Bagheri Kani's current position on negotiations is unclear. Larijani may have appointed Bagheri Kani due to his close ties to Jalili as part of an effort to reduce recent fissures between hardliners and more moderate elements of the regime.

An Iranian delegation headed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[7] Representatives from China and Russia, among other countries, attended the summit. Iran, China, and Russia jointly seek to counter Western influence, bypass international sanctions, and undermine US interests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated prior to departing for China that the SCO aims to "confront unilateralism and totalitarianism." Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh similarly stated that organizations such as the SCO and BRICS can help Iran confront "unilateralism." [8]

Reported Houthi Ballistic Missile Strike in the Red Sea As of September 1, 2025



Key Takeaways

1. Iran: Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as the SNSC deputy for international affairs on August 29. Larijani may have appointed Bagheri Kani due to his close ties to Paydari Front leader Saeed Jalili as part of an effort to reduce recent fissures between hardliners and more moderate elements of the regime.
2. Iran: An Iranian delegation headed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order.
3. Iran: Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards' cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on August 30. Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah's operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie-talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.
4. Yemen: The Houthis confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rahwai and 10 other senior Houthi political officials in an airstrike in Haddah District, southern Sanaa City, on August 28. These targeted killings are unlikely to disrupt Houthi military operations against Israel.

Iran

Iran seeks to deepen its ties with SCO member states to undermine international

sanctions. Pezeshkian proposed the formation of a “shared digital infrastructure” using central bank digital currencies to circumnavigate financial sanctions during his speech at the summit.[9] Pezeshkian met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. Pezeshkian and Putin discussed economic cooperation and political alignment on Iran’s nuclear program.[10] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on the sidelines of the summit.[11]

Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards’ cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the *New York Times* on August 30.[12]

Israel used the cellphone location of Iranian officials’ bodyguards to attack a Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) meeting on June 16. The SNSC is Iran’s highest foreign policy and national security decision-making body and includes the heads of Iran’s three branches of government and senior military commanders, among other officials.[13] Israeli and Iranian officials told the *New York Times* that Iranian bodyguards’ “careless” use of cellphones played a “central role” in Israel’s ability to kill Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war.[14] Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah’s operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie-talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.[15]

The Iranian regime has continued to crack down on Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran

War. Three senior Iranian officials and a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the *New York Times* that Iranian authorities have arrested or placed under house arrest dozens of military, intelligence, and government officials, including high-ranking officials, for spying for Israel.[16] The Iranian regime has also arrested hundreds of civilians since the end of the war for allegedly spying for Israel.[17] The IRGC Intelligence Organization recently announced on August 30 that it arrested eight individuals linked to Mossad in Iran’s northeastern Khorasan Razavi Province.[18] The IRGC Intelligence Organization claimed that the individuals had provided Mossad with coordinates for “vital and sensitive” Iranian sites and information about Iranian military officials during the war. The IRGC Intelligence Organization added that the individuals planned to conduct attacks targeting unspecified important sites in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province.

Yemen

The Houthis confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rahwai and 10 other senior Houthi political officials in an airstrike in Haddah District, southern Sanaa City, on August 28.[19] These targeted killings are unlikely to disrupt Houthi

military operations against Israel. The individuals killed in the August 28 IDF strike do not hold positions within the Houthi military chain of command. The prime minister and cabinet positions are largely “ceremonial,” according to local sources.[20] The Houthis have already replaced Rahwai with Deputy Prime Minister Mohammad Ahmed Miftah.[21] A Yemen analyst claimed on September 1 that the Houthis replaced the killed officials with individuals even more committed to the Houthis’ cause.[22] The Houthis confirmed the deaths of the following senior political officials: [23]

- Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Minister Jamal Ahmed Amer
- Economy, Industry, and Investment Minister Muin Hashem Ahmed al Mahaqri
- Electricity, Energy, and Water Minister Ali Saif Mohammad
- Agriculture, Fisheries, and Water Resources Minister Radwan Ali al Rubai
- Justice and Human Rights Minister Mujahid Ahmed Abdullah Ali
- Social Affairs and Labor Minister Samir Mohammad Bajala
- Youth and Sports Minister Mohammad Ali al Mawla


- Culture and Tourism Minister Ali Qasem Hussein al Yafii
- Director of the Prime Minister's Office Mohammad Qasim al Kubaisi
- Council of Ministers Secretary Zahed Mohammad al Amidi

Unverified reports claimed that three senior Houthi security officials were injured or killed in the August 28 IDF airstrike.[24] Israeli media speculated on August 28 that the IDF airstrike killed Houthi Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdulkarim al Ghamari and Defense and Military Production Minister Major General Mohammed Nasser al Atifi.[25] Ghamari and Atifi published statements on August 29 and 30, respectively, criticizing US support for Israel, but neither official has been seen publicly since the August 28 strike.[26] A local source separately claimed on August 29 that the IDF airstrike seriously injured Atifi.[27] A Yemeni journalist circulated unconfirmed reports that the IDF airstrike also killed Houthi Deputy Interior Minister Abdul Majid al Murtada, who is responsible for internal security and suppressing political dissent in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[28] Ghamari, Atifi, and Murtada are all prominent Houthi commanders who are responsible for planning and conducting Houthi military operations, overseeing arms production, and ensuring Houthi domestic control.

The Houthis conducted an unsuccessful ballistic missile attack targeting the Liberian-flagged *Scarlet Ray* oil tanker approximately 40 nautical miles southwest of Yanbu Port, Saudi Arabia, on August 31, possibly in response to the recent Israeli airstrike that killed senior Houthi leaders.[29] The Houthis claimed that they successfully targeted the “Israeli” *Scarlet Ray* oil tanker and stated that this attack was part of their ongoing economic “blockade” on Israel.[30] *Scarlet Ray* is owned by a Liberian-registered shell company that is connected to a Netherlands-registered tanker company owned by Israeli businessman Idan Ofer.[31] The *Scarlet Ray* crew reported on August 31 that a munition fell in the vicinity of the vessel but did not cause any damage or casualties, according to the UK Maritime Trade Operations.[32] The IDF confirmed that the Houthis launched a missile in the direction of Israel that malfunctioned and crashed.[33] This attack marks the first claimed Houthi attack since Israel's August 28 strike that killed the Houthi Prime Minister and several cabinet members.

Iran Update

September 1, 2025



- 1 Tehran, Iran:** Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as the SNSC deputy for international affairs on August 29. Larijani may have appointed Bagheri Kani due to his close ties to Paydari Front leader Saeed Jalili as part of an effort to reduce recent fissures between hardliners and more moderate elements of the regime.
- 2 Tianjin, China:** An Iranian delegation headed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order.
- 3 Tehran, Iran:** Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards' cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the *New York Times* on August 30. Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah's operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.
- 4 Sanaa, Yemen:** The Houthis confirmed that the IDF killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rahwai and 10 other senior Houthi political officials in an airstrike in Haddah District, southern Sanaa City, on August 28. These targeted killings are unlikely to disrupt Houthi military operations against Israel.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

Endnotes ▾ ▴

[1] <https://www.irna dot ir/news/85926174/>

[2] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025> ;

<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-11-2025> ;
<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/world/middleeast/where-is-khamenei-iran-supreme-leader.html>
[3] <https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/882658>
[4] <https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/882658> ; <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/5/21/who-is-ali-bagheri-kani-irans-acting-foreign-minister> ;
<https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/news/408647>
[5] <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/5/21/who-is-ali-bagheri-kani-irans-acting-foreign-minister>
[6] <https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/news/426209> ; <https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/news/408647>
; <https://fararu dot com/fa/news/899678>
[7] <https://www.uscc.gov/research/shanghai-cooperation-organization-testbed-chinese-power-projection>
[8] <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/774376>
[9] <https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1962459137293312030>
[10] <https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1962537476381090046> ; <http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77899>
[11] <https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1962561845119655943>
[12] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/30/us/politics/israel-iran-assassination.html>
[13] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-7-2025>
[14] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/30/us/politics/israel-iran-assassination.html>
[15] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-20-2024>
[16] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/30/us/politics/israel-iran-assassination.html>
[17] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/world/middleeast/iran-executes-nuclear-scientist-espionage.html>
[18] <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/773854>
[19] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/prime-minister-yemens-houthi-run-government-killed-israeli-strike-2025-08-30/> ; <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962477995379048773> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962465959890833455> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962462903044366626> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962459891362103379> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961837774354423978> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961836633445040318>
[20] <https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1961184455168815265> ;
https://x.com/A_ALGABARNI/status/1961184976327852134 ; <https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/325101>
[21] <https://x.com/2011arabrevolut/status/1962428232596382062>
[22] <https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1962506372769063293>
[23] <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962477995379048773> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962465959890833455> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962462903044366626> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962459891362103379> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961837774354423978> ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961836633445040318>
[24] <https://x.com/N12News/status/1961113600514257337> ;
<https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1961860650139013551> ;
<https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1961510115355570214> ;
<https://x.com/ariheist/status/1961516892683661713>
[25] <https://x.com/N12News/status/1961113600514257337> ;
<https://x.com/Osint613/status/1961075938956902592> ;
<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/06/the-houthis-leadership-structure/>
[26] <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961550661520183394> ;

<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961808505981071693>;
[27] <https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1961860650139013551>
[28] <https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1961510115355570214>;
<https://x.com/ariheist/status/1961516892683661713>
[29] <https://t.me/army21ye/3330?single> ;
https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1962238487647678768
[30] <https://t.me/army21ye/3330?single>
[31] Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Available by subscription at
<https://www.starboardintelligence.com/>
[32] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1962238487647678768
[33] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/24987>

Iran Update, September 2, 2025



Ben Rezaei, Nidal Morrison, Carolyn Moorman, Benjamin Schmida, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Ria Reddy, Brian Carter

Toplines


Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told UK-based website *Oil Price* on September 1 that Iran is working closely with Russia, China, and North Korea to advance its weaponization knowledge and missile development.[1] The source stated that Russia has sent dozens of nuclear scientists to Iran since June 2024.[2] The source added that North Korea also sent three missile experts to Iran after June 2024.[3] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports. Iran has previously sought Russian support to develop Iran's nuclear program.[4] The *Financial Times* reported on August 5 that five Iranian nuclear scientists traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian institutes that produce dual-use technology relevant to nuclear weapons research.[5] Western media reported in January 2025 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran's nuclear program.[6]

Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held separate meetings with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on September 2, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China.[7] Putin and Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade, the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Agreement, and coordination on international issues, including the nuclear issue.[8] Xi and Pezeshkian discussed the 25-year Iran-China strategic cooperation agreement.[9] Xi reaffirmed China's support for Iran's nuclear rights and emphasized China's commitment to expanding bilateral economic and energy cooperation. These meetings come after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[10]

Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions. Pezeshkian told Chinese media on September 2 that Iran supports China's efforts to combat unilateralism and emphasized that rejecting unilateralism requires the serious implementation of SCO agreements, which call for circumventing international sanctions.[11] Pezeshkian's interview comes amid Chinese and Russian efforts to propose resolutions for the UNSC that may ease pressure on Iran and undercut the E3's position. A *Wall Street Journal* journalist reported on September 2 that Russia circulated a new draft resolution which urges all JCPOA participants to resume talks, removes a clause outlawing snapback under UNSCR 2231, and leaves the issue of snapback "ambiguous." [12] Russia previously introduced a UNSC draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, to extend the snapback deadline by six months without requiring any concessions from Iran.[13] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months that would require Iran to restore full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume negotiations with the United States, and account for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[14] The Russia-China resolution does not appear to impose any conditions on Iran.

The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarraï and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil. [15] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Samarraï as well as nine vessels and seven entities, tied to Samarraï as part of a broader US effort to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[16] Samarraï's network blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before marketing it to international buyers and generated millions of dollars in revenue for Samarraï and the Iranian regime.[17] Samarraï used a fleet of oil tankers operated by one of his UAE-based companies to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with US-sanctioned Iranian vessels.[18] The Iraqi Navy seized one of Samarraï's tankers in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Basra Province, Iraq, on August 6, for lacking proper documentation.[19] Smugglers who transport sanctioned Iranian oil frequently use forged documentation to misrepresent Iranian crude oil as Iraqi oil to evade sanctions.[20]

Likely Illicit Oil Transfer in the Persian Gulf by US-Sanctioned Entities since August 27, 2025




These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq's role in Iranian oil smuggling. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[21] The United States sanctioned six entities and four vessels on July 3 that are involved in smuggling Iranian oil, including a network of companies run by Iraqi businessman Salim Ahmed Said.[22] The United States threatened in July 2025 to sanction the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization and block access to 350 million USD of Iraqi oil revenue if the Iraqi federal government failed to prevent Iranian oil smuggling.[23]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias' continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds, formerly known as Ashab al Kahf, stated on August 29 that the US withdrawal to the Iraqi Kurdistan region is a "redeployment [within Iraq]" and reaffirmed the group's commitment to the removal of US forces from Iraq.[24] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee similarly reiterated its demand for US forces to withdraw from Iraq in a statement on August 21.[25] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[26] The United States is expected to complete the first phase of the withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces to Iraqi Kurdistan by the end of September 2025.[27] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that the coalition forces remaining in federal Iraq after September 2025 would withdraw by the end of 2026.[28] The removal of US forces from Iraq is a long-standing objective shared by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[29] The effort by Iranian-backed militias to justify their continued existence comes amid US pressure for the Iraqi federal government to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq, especially via the dissolution of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[30]

Key Takeaways

- Iran:** Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website, *Oil Price*, on September 1 that Russia and North Korea have sent nuclear scientists and missile experts, respectively, to Iran since June 2024.
- Iran:** Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions.
- Iraq:** The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance. These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq's role in Iranian oil smuggling.
- Iraq:** Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias' continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq.



- 1 **IRAN.** Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website *Oil Price* on September 1 that Russia and North Korea have sent nuclear scientists and missile experts, respectively, to Iran since June 2024.
- 2 **IRAN.** Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally.
- 3 **IRAQ.** The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarra and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil. These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq's role in Iranian oil smuggling.
- 4 **IRAQ.** The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarra and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil. These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq's role in Iranian oil smuggling.

Iran

The Institute for Science and International Security (The Institute) reported on September 2 that Iran has moved almost all the chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at the Natanz Enrichment Complex to more secured areas based on satellite imagery.[31] The Institute assessed that Iran has likely moved the chillers to make the chillers less vulnerable to future airstrikes. Satellite imagery from August 30 shows that Iran has dispersed 19 of the 24 total chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the FEP.[32] Chillers help an HVAC system maintain certain temperatures within a facility to protect critical equipment and personnel at the facility and enable optimal functioning. The Institute reported that the chillers are currently not in use because the centrifuges at FEP are still inoperable, and there is no electric power.[33] Israeli airstrikes damaged electrical substations and support buildings critical to the power supply at Natanz.[34] US and Israeli airstrikes rendered the underground centrifuges at Natanz inoperable due to the "sudden loss of external power," according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi.[35]

Senior Iranian officials met with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan to discuss Iranian concerns about the Zangezur Corridor. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani and his newly appointed Deputy for International Affairs, Ali Bagheri Kani, met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss the recent US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement that would grant the United States exclusive development rights to a strategic corridor in the southern Caucasus.[36] Grigoryan stated that Armenia is "ready to provide guarantees to Iran" in order to preserve Iran-Armenia relations.[37] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss Iran's opposition to the presence of US soldiers along the new corridor and emphasized Iran's commitment to deepening bilateral military relations.[38] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 and stated that Iran's concerns about the presence of foreign forces in the southern Caucasus have been "largely resolved" following Larijani and Grigoryan's meeting.[39] Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence while increasing US influence.[40]

Unspecified armed fighters attacked an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base and killed an IRGC officer in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on August 30.[41] The attack follows a series of recent attacks by Salafi-jihadi Baloch militant group Jaish al Adl on Iranian security forces.[42] Iranian security officials have recently announced the deployment of new technologies to help secure its borders in southeastern Iran.[43] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi discussed enhancing border security along the Iran-Pakistan border in a phone call with Pakistani Army Commander Asim Munir on August 26.[44] Iran has increased efforts to combat terrorism in southeastern Iran since the uptick in anti-regime militant attacks in December 2023.[45]

Iraq


A parliamentarian from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah's Haquq movement filed a complaint with the Iraqi electoral commission on August 31 to bar Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar from the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections for "insulting the Iraqi people."^[46] Khanjar reportedly said he would defend Iraqi Sunnis from the "mob."^[47] An Iraqi Kurdish journalist said on August 31 that Khanjar's comments are "old" and referred to Iraqis who committed "transgressions" near a mosque.^[48] It is notable that this complaint follows the Iraqi electoral commission's request on June 11 for the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to clarify if Khanjar is under investigation for suspected Baath party links.^[49] Shia political parties have historically manipulated the AJC to target political opponents, including Sunnis.^[50] CTP-ISW assessed on August 20 that former Prime Minister and State of Law coalition head Nouri al Maliki may be using the AJC to sideline political opponents ahead of the elections.^[51] The State of Law coalition and the Haquq movement are both part of the governing Shia Coordination Framework, which is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, including some backed by Iran.^[52]

Syria

The recent ceasefire violations around Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, Syria, between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are reconnaissance efforts along the frontline.^[53] A MoD source told Syrian state media on August 31 that SDF and MoD forces clashed after the MoD engaged an SDF force during an SDF effort to reconnoiter MoD positions near Tal Maaz, Aleppo Province.^[54] The frontlines between MoD and SDF forces on the Deir Hafer-Tal Maaz axis are separated by a 20-meter-wide canal, which acts as a barrier that forces must cross to access the other side. This canal is probably the line separating MoD-controlled and SDF-controlled territory near Deir Hafer. The MoD position in Tal Maaz is located on a tactically significant 30-meter-high hill, which likely provides MoD forces with relatively clear lines of sight to SDF positions below. The source said that SDF fighters stationed in Umm Tina and Deir Hafer suppressed the MoD's Tal Maaz position with small arms fire, likely to allow the ambushed SDF reconnaissance force in contact near Tal Maaz to begin their withdrawal across the canal.^[55] The small arms fire was probably insufficient to suppress the MoD positions near Tal Maaz because Tal Maaz is 3 kilometers north of the canal. The distances involved required the SDF to fire artillery and heavy weapons, which suppressed the MoD and enabled the SDF reconnaissance force to break contact and withdraw north of the canal.^[56] The MoD responded to this shelling by reinforcing its positions near Tal Maaz and conducting counter-battery fire.^[57] The SDF claimed that the reported engagement was "completely fabricated" and that the clashes were instead between MoD factions.^[58] The MoD and SDF previously conducted reconnaissance operations along the Deir Hafer axis on August 12, which also caused minor engagements.^[59]

Assessed Control of Terrain around Aleppo

September 2, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST




The Deir Hafer axis is a significant SDF salient that protrudes into the rear of the MoD forces arrayed along the Euphrates River. This protrusion means that in the event of a ceasefire breakdown, the SDF could attempt to maneuver into the MoD's rear, and the MoD could attempt to rapidly crush the salient. An SDF negotiator confirmed on August 22 that negotiations between the two sides had stalled after Damascus refused to hold a new round in Paris.[60] Both the Syrian transitional government and SDF have reiterated their commitment to dialogue and diplomacy to negotiate the integration of the SDF into the MoD as outlined in the March 10 agreement.[61]

Two likely Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters attempted to conduct a suicide attack on a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) checkpoint in northern Raqqqa Province on August 31.[62] The SDF said that its forces engaged the two suspected ISIS fighters at the checkpoint with small arms fire and killed one fighter and injured the other.[63] The injured fighter managed to detonate his suicide vest, which wounded three SDF members.[64] CTP-ISW has not observed any ISIS attack claim as of the time of writing.[65] ISIS recently attempted to conduct a suicide attack against Syrian transitional government forces in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province, on August 22.[66] ISIS remains active throughout Syria.[67] ISIS's ability to construct and deploy SVESTs may indicate that ISIS has reestablished support zones from which it can launch attacks into SDF- or government-held territory. ISIS would need to maintain secure manufacturing facilities, safehouses for suicide attackers, and access to explosives caches to construct and deploy SVESTs.

Assessed Control of Terrain around Raqqa

September 2, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched four drones targeting the Israeli Defense Ministry and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff Headquarters in Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion Airport, a power station in Hadera, and Ashdod Port, Israel, on September 1.[68] The attack is likely a response to the Israeli airstrike on August 28 that killed several Houthi officials. The IDF Air Force intercepted a drone outside of Israeli territory on September 1.[69] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their


campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[70] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned on August 28 that Israel will continue to respond to Houthi attacks on Israel.[71]

The Houthis claimed that they launched two drones and an anti-ship cruise missile targeting a Liberian-flagged container ship, *MSC ABY*, at an unspecified location in the northern Red Sea on September 2, as part of their economic “blockade” on Israel.[72] The *MSC ABY* travelled from Port Said, Egypt, on August 31, to Jeddah Port, Saudi Arabia, on September 2, according to commercial shipping data.[73] The *MSC ABY* is part of the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC)’s network that operates globally, including at Israeli ports.[74] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations has not reported an incident in the Red Sea at the time of this writing. The Houthis recently conducted an unsuccessful ballistic missile attack targeting a Liberian-flagged oil tanker with ties to a prominent Israeli businessman approximately 40 nautical miles southwest of Yanbu Port, Saudi Arabia, on August 31.[75]

Israeli airstrikes on August 28 targeting a residential building in Haddah District, Sanaa City, reportedly killed at least 35 Houthi personnel and severely injured 10 others, including senior officials, according to local sources.[76] The Houthis previously reported that the IDF airstrike killed 11 senior Houthi officials, including the Houthi prime minister and eight cabinet ministers.[77] Those that the Houthis confirmed dead do not command Houthi military forces, and exercise little real power. Power within the Houthi system is frequently exercised by the deputy ministers and Houthi supervisors.[78] Israeli media reported on August 28 that the IDF airstrike killed Houthi Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdulkarim al Ghamari, who is responsible for planning and conducting military operations, and Defense and Military Production Minister Major General Mohammed Nasser al Atifi, who is responsible for overseeing arms production.[79] A local source separately claimed on August 29 that the IDF airstrike seriously injured Atifi.[80] Ghamari and Atifi published statements on August 29 and 30, respectively, criticizing US support for Israel, but neither official has made public appearances since the August 28 strike.[81] A Yemeni journalist circulated unconfirmed reports that the IDF airstrike also killed Houthi Deputy Interior Minister Abdul Majid al Murtada, who is responsible for internal security and suppressing political dissent in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[82]

Israeli Airstrikes Against Houthi Targets in Sanaa City

On August 28, 2025



IDF Airstrike Targeting Houthi Cabinet Meeting on August 28

Sanaa, Yemen
15.2962, 44.1915



Palestinian Territories & Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

POWERED BY:  BABELSTREET

Endnotes 

- [1] <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Europe-Triggers-Iran-Sanctions-Snapback.html>
- [2] <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Europe-Triggers-Iran-Sanctions-Snapback.html>
- [3] <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Europe-Triggers-Iran-Sanctions-Snapback.html>
- [4] <https://www.ft.com/content/00f6f94c-d584-430c-b6d7-cc85933fc3e6>
- [5] <https://www.ft.com/content/00f6f94c-d584-430c-b6d7-cc85933fc3e6>
- [6] <https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/iran-russia-nuclear-talks-deal-lfzbdh7z7>
- [7] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/11/3390803>
- [8] <http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77899>
- [9] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/11/3390621>
- [10] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-launch-un-sanctions-process-against-iran-drawing-tehran-ire-2025-08-28/>
- [11] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/11/3390463>
- [12] <https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1962931999175237910>
- [13] <https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/russia-puts-forward-draft-resolution-on-extension-of-snapback>
- [14] <https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/russia-puts-forward-draft-resolution-on-extension-of-snapback>
- [15] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0233>
- [16] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0233>
- [17] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0233>
- [18] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0233>
- [19] <https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/536171/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9> ;
<https://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels/details/9297905>

- [20] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fuel-oil-smuggling-network-rakes-1-billion-iran-its-proxies-2024-12-03/> ;
- [21] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fuel-oil-smuggling-network-rakes-1-billion-iran-its-proxies-2024-12-03/> ;
- <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctions-on-oil-smugglers-exporting-iranian-oil/>
- [22] <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctions-on-oil-smugglers-exporting-iranian-oil/>
- [23] <https://www.kurdistan24.net/ckb/story/851317>
- [24] https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/290
- [25] <https://t.me/centerkaf/5229>
- [26] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-20-2024>
- [27] <https://www.rudaw.net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/290820255>
- [28] <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/>
- [29] <https://apnews.com/article/57a346b17d6da07ae732ba1437520fd2> ; <https://isw.pub/IranUpdate032025>
- [30] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-25-2025>
- [31] <https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1962888661856358440>
- [32] <https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1962888661856358440>
- [33] <https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1962888661856358440>
- [34] <https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1933539314148823467>
- [35] <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iaea-chief-says-no-further-damage-iranian-enrichment-facilities-2025-06-16/> ;
- https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-evening-edition#_edn3be3c803d544bf781aed379dcae01ecd16
- [36] <https://www.hamshahrionline.com/dotir/news/974606> ; <https://defapress.com/ir/fa/news/773929>
- [37] <https://www.hamshahrionline.com/dotir/news/974606> : <https://defapress.com/ir/fa/news/773929>
- [38] <https://defapress.com/ir/fa/news/773995>
- [39] <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/06/08/3388196>
- [40] <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/09/04/3153204> ; https://farsnews.com/ir/Rahgozar_b/1732600179143718172/Leader-Advisor%3A-Iran-Thwarts-US-Plot-to-Expand-Influence-in-South-Caucasus
- [41] <https://x.com/IranIntlEn/status/1961899060735926369>
- [42] SITE Intelligence Group, "Claiming Attack on Iranian Police in IranShahr, Jaysh al-Adl Advises Military/Security Personnel to Seek 'Honorable Occupations'" August 22, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com. ;
- <https://x.com/IranIntlEn/status/1956451382728269920> ; <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088>
- [43] <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/06/05/3385753>
- [44] <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/06/04/3385344>
- [45] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-1-2025>
- [46] <https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Huqooq-files-complaint-to-bar-Khamis-al-Khanjar-from-Iraq-elections>
- [47] <https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Huqooq-files-complaint-to-bar-Khamis-al-Khanjar-from-Iraq-elections>
- [48] <https://x.com/shahokurdy/status/1962197319241089130>
- [49] <https://www.alsumaria.com/tv/news/politics/529354/رغم شموله سابقا-مفوضية الانتخابات-تستقصر-عن إدراج خميس-الخنجر في-اجتات>
- [50] <https://understandingwar.org/publications/commentaries/iraqi-parliament-passes-accountability-and-justice-law> ;
- <https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf>
- [51] <https://isw.pub/IranUpdate082025>
- [52] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-hoquq-movement> ; <https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Shiite-Coordination-Framework-cracks-wide-open-ahead-of-Iraq-2025-Vote>
- [53] <https://www.enabbaladi.net/772170/%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b4-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d8%a8%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%ad/>
- [54] <https://www.enabbaladi.net/772170/%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b4-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d8%a8%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%ad/> ; <https://sana.sy/locals/2275870/>
- [55] [https://www.enabbaladi.net/772170/%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d](https://www.enabbaladi.net/772170/%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b4-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d8%a8%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%ad/)

%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%aa%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d9%86%d9%82%d8%b7%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%80%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d9%82/

[66] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2025> ;
<https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1958928045076513205>

[67] <https://www.enabbaladi.net/772105/%d9%87%d8%ac%d9%88%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%aa%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d9%86%d9%82%d8%b7%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%80%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d9%82/>

[68] <https://t.me/army21ye/3337>

[69] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1962816648030622187>

[70] <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php> ;
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/

[71] https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1961075591437758695

[72] <https://t.me/army21ye/3337>; <https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1962894021384143012>

[73] <https://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels/details/9166778>

[74] <https://www.msc.com/en/local-information/middle-east/israel>

[75] <https://t.me/army21ye/3330?single> ;

https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1962238487647678768 ; <https://t.me/moriahdoron/24987> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-1-2025>

[76] <https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1962584486807326914>

[77] <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962477995379048773>; <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962465959890833455>;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962462903044366626>; <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1962459891362103379>;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961837774354423978>; <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961836633445040318>

[78] <https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022/18144> ;
https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system_0.pdf

[79] <https://x.com/N12News/status/1961113600514257337> ; <https://x.com/Osint613/status/1961075938956902592> ;
<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/06/the-houthis-leadership-structure>

[80] <https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1961860650139013551>

[81] <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961550661520183394> ; <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1961808505981071693> ;

[82] <https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1961510115355570214> ; <https://x.com/ariheist/status/1961516892683661713>


[83] <https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/31/middleeast/houthis-un-building-yemen-israel-intl> ;
<https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1962824265629155382>

[84] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-rebels-raid-un-premises-yemen-detain-least-11-people-2025-08-31/>

Iran Update, September 3, 2025

Toplines

Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press.[1] The Associated Press reported on September 3 that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 32.5 kilograms between May 17 and June 13, citing the unreleased IAEA report.[2] Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile is equivalent to approximately 10.5 significant quantities, which refers to the "approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded." [3] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely to be able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however. The IAEA report added that Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,874.9 kilograms.[4] This amount marks a 627.3 kilogram increase in Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium since May 17.[5] The IAEA reported that the IAEA has not inspected any Iranian nuclear site except the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant since the Israel-Iran War.[6] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on September 3 that Iran has provided the IAEA with no information on the status of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile since June 13.[7] CIA Director John Ratcliffe stated in July 2025 that the US and Israeli strikes during the war buried the "vast majority" of Iran's enriched uranium at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow and that it would be "extremely difficult" for Iran to extract the material.[8] The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence that Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the ENTC since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery.[9] Grossi said that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, including those that Israel and the United States struck during the war.[10]



Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[11] The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3's activation of the snapback mechanism.[12] The directive advised media outlets to frame potential sanctions as a sign of European dependence on the United States, emphasize Iran's ability to withstand economic pressure, and avoid portraying Iran's future negatively.[13] Iranian Judiciary Spokesperson Asghar Jahangir stated on September 3 that the E3's decision to trigger the snapback mechanism was "a propaganda and psychological tool to target the people's morale through psychological warfare." [14] Jahangir urged Iranian media outlets to act "intelligently" and "maintain national cohesion and unity." [15] Iranian media outlet Nour News separately published an op-ed on September 2 that encouraged Iranian civilians and officials to maintain "national self-confidence" and avoid "simplistic and exaggerated rhetoric" regarding the E3's snapback decision.[16] The Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent reports about the negative economic impacts of sanctions from further increasing public frustration about Iran's poor economic conditions and potentially driving economic-related unrest.

The regime's efforts to control the Iranian media space come as the Iranian rial has depreciated to near record-low levels in recent days and the Iranian economy faces exorbitant inflation.[17]

Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government's plan to disarm Hezbollah.

Lebanese media reported on September 2 that likely Hezbollah officials discussed various tactics that Hezbollah could employ to bypass the government's decision to disarm Hezbollah.[18] Hezbollah officials reportedly discussed compelling the Lebanese government to delay Hezbollah's disarmament until Israel and Syria commit to the US disarmament proposal.[19] The Lebanese media report did not specify how Hezbollah may attempt to compel the Lebanese government. The US proposal includes an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days and Hezbollah's complete disarmament by the end of 2025.[20] The Israeli government reportedly will not discuss the US proposal and has no intention of responding to it.[21] Hezbollah officials also reportedly proposed that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could exempt Hezbollah from being disarmed due to the LAF's "lack of readiness." [22] Lebanese media noted that all options for "escalation" are on the table if Hezbollah cannot find a "suitable formula" to bypass the government's decision.[23] Hezbollah reportedly threatened on September 2 to halt its cooperation with the LAF by refusing to hand over its weapons south of the Litani River if the Lebanese government approves and implements the LAF's disarmament plan.[24] A Lebanese source previously told Saudi media on August 28 that the LAF has confiscated various types of weapons in southern Lebanon without any objection from Hezbollah.[25] The LAF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have continued to discover Hezbollah weapons depots that Hezbollah did not disclose to the LAF, however.[26]

Hezbollah's proposed tactics to delay and ultimately prevent its disarmament appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials' concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon, Israeli compliance with the US proposal, and the LAF's capabilities. LAF and Lebanese officials have previously raised concerns about conflict breaking out between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[27] Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have continuously threatened potential confrontation and anti-government protests if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah.[28] Lebanese, US, and UNIFIL officials have also expressed concerns about the LAF's capability to disarm Hezbollah.[29] Hezbollah and Hezbollah-aligned media channels have amplified reports about Lebanese security forces' alleged unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah.[30] Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri separately criticized recent US efforts to Saudi media on August 27, stating that the United States gave Lebanon "the opposite" of what it promised.[31] Berri's statement came amid Lebanese authorities' concern that Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon until Hezbollah is fully disarmed.[32]


Some of Hezbollah's tactics may have produced favorable results for Hezbollah. The Lebanese cabinet announced on September 3 that it would add four items to the agenda for its cabinet session on August 5 after Hezbollah threatened to boycott the session if the cabinet did not add items other than Hezbollah's disarmament to the agenda.[33] Hezbollah has reportedly agreed to the updated agenda, which represents an example of the state acceding to Hezbollah's demands.[34]

Key Takeaways

1. **Iran's Enriched Uranium:** Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely to be able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however.
2. **Iranian Domestic Censorship:** Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3's activation of the snapback mechanism.
3. **Hezbollah's Anti-Disarmament Campaign:** Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government's plan to disarm Hezbollah. Many of Hezbollah's proposed tactics appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials' concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) capability to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran Update

September 3, 2025



Region in Focus

Pro-Erdogan Turkish politicians have continued to threaten military action against the SDF by Ankara and Damascus to pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state.

© 2025 Institute for the Study of War and AET's Critical Threats Project

- 1 **IRAN.** Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however.
- 2 **IRAN.** Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3's activation of the snapback mechanism.
- 3 **LEBANON.** Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government's plan to disarm Hezbollah. Many of Hezbollah's proposed tactics appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials' concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon and the LAF's capability to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run media highlighted in an op-ed on September 3 that the IRGC Navy could confront the United States in the Strait of Hormuz.[35] The outlet argued that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz by sinking vessels or deploying fast attack craft to harass ships in the strait. Some Iranian officials have suggested after the Israel-Iran War that Iran should disrupt international shipping to deter future US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[36] The Iranian parliament approved a measure on June 22 to close the Strait of Hormuz.[37] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council has not yet approved the measure, however.[38] Around 20 percent of global oil exports flow through the Strait of Hormuz.[39] Iran has previously used fast attack craft to harass vessels in the Persian Gulf.[40] Iran may have jammed the global positioning systems (GPS) of several vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in May 2025 to create conditions to seize vessels that inadvertently drifted into Iranian territorial waters as a result of the navigation disruption.[41] Iran similarly used GPS jamming in the Strait of Hormuz in 2019 amid tensions with the United States over US President Donald Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign.[42]

Iraq

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araj said on September 3 that the Council of Ministers requested that parliament postpone voting on the Popular Mobilization Authority bill until after the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[43] Araj stated that the law may need "internal and external marketing" before parliament votes on it.[44] The Popular Mobilization Authority bill would likely increase Iran's influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[45] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is comprised of many militias, some of which answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[46] Dawa Party parliamentarian Aref al Hamimi told Kurdish media on September 3 that the Council of Ministers withdrew the law with the "consent of all parties" due to time constraints rather than political pressure.[47] Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki leads the Dawa Party. Araj and Hamimi's statements follow Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani's withdrawal of the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from parliament on August 27, reportedly due to US threats

to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill.[48] The Council of Ministers, which Sudani leads, approved the bill and submitted it to parliament in February 2025.[49] The Iraqi parliament completed its first and second readings of the draft bill, but has not yet voted on it.[50] The Council of Ministers can reintroduce the bill to parliament at a later date, despite Sudani's withdrawal of the bill at this time.[51]


Syria

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reconnaissance efforts along the al Buhamad-Ghanem Ali axis in Raqqa Province likely caused an exchange of fire between the SDF and Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces on September 2.[52] A pro-government northern Syria-based source reported on September 3 that the MoD engaged a likely SDF reconnaissance team that attempted to infiltrate MoD positions in al Buhamad, southern Raqqa Province.[53] MoD forces in al Buhamad fired on and reportedly killed five SDF fighters and forced the SDF reconnaissance team to retreat to Ghanem Ali.[54] The SDF reportedly reinforced its positions in Ghanem Ali after the engagement.[55] The SDF likely tried to reconnoiter MoD positions in al Buhamad to gain tactical intelligence of the frontline, similar to an SDF reconnaissance attempt on MoD positions in Tal Maaz, Aleppo Province, on August 31.[56] The SDF has not commented on the engagement at the time of this writing. It is unclear why the SDF attempted to reconnoiter MoD positions in al Buhamad, as the area appears to hold less strategic importance than the Deir Hafer axis.

Pro-Erdogan Turkish politicians have continued to threaten military action against the SDF by Ankara and Damascus to pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state. Erdogan-allied Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli told Turkish media on September 3 that the SDF must comply with the March 10 agreement to integrate into the Syrian MoD or face joint military intervention.[57] Bahceli stated that SDF proposals for federalism in Syria pose an "extreme security threat" to both Syria and Turkey.[58] Bahceli accused the SDF of aligning itself with the United States and Israel, which Bahceli accused of "targeting Syria's political and territorial integrity." [59] The March 10 agreement outlines a framework to bring SDF-controlled territory under Syrian government authority, but neither Damascus nor the SDF has negotiated the framework's exact terms.[60] Turkey recently pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris, which SDF negotiators claimed had stalled any further integration negotiations.[61] Turkish media have repeatedly warned that a joint Turkish-Syrian military intervention is imminent, likely in an attempt to coerce the SDF to surrender to the transitional government.[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain around Raqqa

September 3, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched two ballistic missiles targeting “sensitive” sites in Tel Aviv, Israel, on September 3.[63] The Houthis claimed that they used a “Palestine 2” missile that contained a cluster warhead in the attack. This attack marks the first time that the Houthis have claimed to launch a cluster munition at Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force successfully intercepted a Houthi missile on September 3, but did not specify whether the missile contained a cluster warhead.[64] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis

The Houthis detained at least 19 United Nations (UN) employees during a Houthi raid on the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) and Children's Fund (UNICEF) offices in Sanaa and Hudaydah governorates on August 31, according to the UN Secretary General's spokesperson.[67] One of the detained employees is reportedly the UNICEF Deputy Representative in Yemen and a Jordanian national, according to local sources.[68] The Houthis frequently arrest UN and aid workers under the false pretext of espionage.[69] UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg confirmed that the Houthis have detained 23 UN staff since 2021.[70]

UNIFIL reported that Israeli drones dropped four grenades near UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on September 2.^[71] UNIFIL stated that the peacekeepers were clearing roadblocks that hindered access to a nearby UN position near Marwahin, southern Lebanon.^[72] UNIFIL reported that UNIFIL had informed the IDF of its road clearance work in advance.^[73] An IDF spokesperson stated that the IDF identified suspicious activity in the area and used several stun grenades to “disrupt and remove the potential threat.”^[74] The IDF spokesperson added that several nearby UNIFIL workers simultaneously reported being subject to direct fire.^[75] The IDF spokesperson stated that the IDF and UNIFIL clarified the incident via the military liaison channel and emphasized that the IDF did not intentionally fire at UNIFIL personnel.^[76]



- [1] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-c3ae6a8aae96d54355df73842916a324> ;
<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf>
[2] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-c3ae6a8aae96d54355df73842916a324>
[3] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf
[4] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-c3ae6a8aae96d54355df73842916a324>
[5] <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf> ; <https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-c3ae6a8aae96d54355df73842916a324>
[6] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-c3ae6a8aae96d54355df73842916a324>
[7] <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/un-nuclear-chief-presses-iran-strike-deal-inspections-soon-2025-09-03/> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-parliament-approves-bill-suspend-cooperation-with-un-nuclear-watchdog-2025-06-25/>
[8] <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/new-us-assessment-finds-american-strikes-destroyed-only-one-three-iran-rcna218761>
[9] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-27/no-evidence-iran-nuclear-material-has-moved-un-watchdog-says?embedded-checkout=true>
[10] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-c3ae6a8aae96d54355df73842916a324> ;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/china/un-nuclear-chief-presses-iran-strike-deal-inspections-soon-2025-09-03/>
[11] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-sanctions-snapback-nuclear-e3-explainer-49a5ccebbaeecc3578f3d19db318a42c>
[12] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508291204>
[13] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508291204>
[14] <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/774778/>
[15] <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/774778/>
[16] <https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/242863>
[17] <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/1/irans-currency-hits-new-low-as-snapback-looms-over-nuclear-programme>
[18] <https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/1962924578230923729>
[19] <https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/1962924930552467601>
[20] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/> ;
<https://t.me/moriahdoron/24885>
[21] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/24885>
[22] <https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/1962924930552467601>
[23] <https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/1962924578230923729>
[24] <https://x.com/ibrahimtmajed/status/1962982328072130904>
[25] <https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2613343/amp>
[26] <https://www.jns dot org/unifil-has-found-225-hezbollah-weapons-caches-since-ceasefire/>
[27] <https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314684-report-army-hezbollah-panel-to-be-formed-to-implement-disarmament-plan> ; <https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/> [هيكل ير فض-الصدام مع مكون-أساسي ويدعو-إلى حوار و تقاهم-تحريرى](https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/) ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-15-2025> ; <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-cabinet-meets-discuss-hezbollahs-arms-after-us-pressure-2025-08-05/>
[28] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-15-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-25-2025> ; <https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/124377/> ; <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/hezbollah-threatens-to-resume-firing-missiles-at-israel-if-it-intensifies-operations-in-lebanon> ; <https://x.com/mayadeenlebanon/status/1959974548280914103>
[29] <https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/> [هيكل ير فض-الصدام مع مكون-أساسي ويدعو-إلى حوار و تقاهم-تحريرى](https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/) ; <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/us/2025/07/11/tom-barrack-lebanon-hezbollah/> ; <https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2025/08/29/> [اليونيفيل-للعربية-سينساعده-الجيش-](https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2025/08/29/)
اللبناني-يعمليات-نزح-السلح
[30] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-29-2025>
[31] https://www.nidaalwatan dot com/article/340611-?utm_source=CMS-6&utm_campaign=Post-234637&utm_medium=twitter ; <https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/148032/?s=tg>
[32] <https://aawsat dot com/grandserail/status/1963153428793684171> [5179133/لبنان-جمهورية-ك-عادت-إلى-نقطة-الصفير](https://aawsat dot com/grandserail/status/1963153428793684171) [العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي](https://aawsat dot com/grandserail/status/1963153428793684171)
[33] <https://x.com/grandserail/status/1963153428793684171> ; <https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1475986/four-items-added-to-fridays-cabinet-agenda.html>
[3

%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-
%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD
[35] <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/736574/>
[36] <https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2087276/>; <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/>; <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/23/3311610>
[37] <https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/06/22/750031/iranian-parliament-moves-close-strait-hormuz-after-us-aggression-lawmaker>
[38] <https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/06/22/750031/iranian-parliament-moves-close-strait-hormuz-after-us-aggression-lawmaker>
[39] <https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/fossil-fuels/gas-and-oil/persian-gulf-oil-exports-and-the-strait-of-hormuz/#:~:text=its%20nuclear%20facilities.-,About%2020%25%20of%20global%20petroleum%20liquids%20consumption%20and%20around%20one,e>
[40] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025#:~:text=Iran%20may%20have%20jammed%20vessel,military%20makes%20a%20mistake.%E2%80%9D%5B;>
https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250511_ukmto_advisory_incident-016-25-1.pdf?rev=7415aac6479848b68a34f2907a287cf1
[41] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025#:~:text=Iran%20may%20have%20jammed%20vessel,military%20makes%20a%20mistake.%E2%80%9D%5B;>
https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250520_ukmto_advisory_incident-020-25.pdf?rev=9fb0ce7704fa410c922d519d1992fa3e;
<https://www.noaa.gov/jurisdiction-over-vessels#:~:text=Thus%20a%20State%20has%20jurisdiction,nationality%20or%20the%20vessel's%20flag>
[42] <https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-is-jamming-ship-gps-navigation-systems-to-seize-them-2019-8>
[43] <https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/861461/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF>
[44] <https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/861461/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF>
[45] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2025> ; [https://www.rudaw dot net/Library/Files/Uploaded%20Files/07/NewFolder/175%20175%20175%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.rudaw dot net/Library/Files/Uploaded%20Files/07/NewFolder/175%20175%20175%20(1).pdf)
[46] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces>
[47] <https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/861461/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF>
[48] <https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/270820253>
[49] <https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/250220253>
[50] <https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/270820254>
[51] https://www.iraqiembassy.us/sites/default/files/documents/Constitution_of_Iraq_0.pdf
[52] <https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1963137326437024163>
[53] <https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1963137326437024163>
[54] <https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1963137326437024163> ; <https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/151801>
[55] <https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/151802>
[56] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-2-2025>
[57] <https://www.hurriyet dot com.tr/gundem/bahceliden-sdg-ypg-cikisi-42935355>
[58] <https://www.hurriyet dot com.tr/gundem/bahceliden-sdg-ypg-cikisi-42935355>
[59] <https://www.hurriyet dot com.tr/gundem/bahceliden-sdg-ypg-cikisi-42935355>
[60] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025>
[61] <https://www.syriaintransition.com/doubleorquits> ; <https://www.enabbaladi dot net/771884/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%81%d9%8e%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b7%d9%88%d9%8a%d9%84-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%85%d8%b4%d9%82-%d9%88%d9%82/>
[62] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/> ; <https://www.turkiyegazetesi dot com.tr/gundem/isgalci-ypg-sabirlari-tasirdi-operasyon-icin-son-uyari-1138003>
[63] <https://t.me/army21ye/3343>
[64] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1963131286454731167>
[65] <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php> ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/
[66] https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1961075591437758695
[67] <https://apnews.com/article/un-yemen-houthi-raid-3d931cd515402497466a71a985c47fcf>
[68] <https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1962945266773877116>
[69] <https://www.state.gov/un-staff-detained-by-houthis> ; <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/07/yemen-houthis-detain-un-staff-and-civil-society-representatives>
[70] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-rebels-raid-un-premises-yemen-detain-least-11-people-2025-08-31/>
[71] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1963110019286593671
[72] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1963110033727635477 ; https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1963110019286593671
[73] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1963110033727635477
[74] https://x.com/LTC_Shoshani/status/1963221844342747560
[75] https://x.com/LTC_Shoshani/status/1963221844342747560
[76] https://x.com/LTC_Shoshani/status/1963221844342747560

Iran Update, September 4, 2025



Benjamin Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Adham Fattah, Avery Borens, Brian Carter, Parker Hempel

Toplines

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare.[1] The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”[2] The Tasnim report outlined the following three main areas that Iran must address to withstand hybrid warfare:

- **Redefining Governance Structures and Processes:** Tasnim called for re-engineering Iran’s governance system and warned that a centralized bureaucracy is too slow and brittle for hybrid war.[3] Tasnim urged the regime to create mechanisms to monitor internal divisions, accelerate bureaucratic processes, and provide more authority to governors and local officials. It argued that decentralized power would make governance more flexible and resilient, which would speed up the regime’s responses to crises such as unrest, cyberattacks, or supply disruptions.
- **Reforming the Relationship Between the Regime and People:** Tasnim called for the regime to treat the Iranian people as Iran’s main strategic asset rather than dependents of the state.[4] It stressed that victory in hybrid war requires citizens to actively participate in governance, including via neighborhood security, the economy, and cultural resistance. Tasnim highlighted that small, agile grassroots groups involved with technology, media, and culture would counter stronger adversaries and shape public opinion so that people accept hardships as part of a larger struggle for independence and survival.
- **Developing Iran’s “resistance economy:”** Tasnim called for the regime to turn the economy into a “defensive stronghold.”[5] It emphasized the need to end dependence on crude oil sales, cut reliance on food imports and gas consumption, and enforce tight control over foreign exchange and trade. Tasnim also called for building long-term cooperation with Axis of Resistance members, neighboring states, and emerging powers such as Russia and China to secure essential goods and bypass Western economic pressure.

Tasnim also warned that adversaries use media narratives to target the minds and will of the people, which the outlet referred to as “narrative warfare.”[6] Tasnim’s call to prioritize narrative warfare is consistent with recent regime efforts to control domestic reporting on snapback sanctions.[7] Iranian officials have recently directed outlets to downplay the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) activation of the snapback mechanism and avoid negative portrayals of Iran’s future.[8]

Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats.[9] Nour News is affiliated with Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. The Supreme National Security Council established the Defense Council following the Israel-Iran War to address emerging national security threats and streamline decision-making during wartime.[10] Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.[11] Nour News stated that the Defense Council is responsible for setting and executing priorities for Iran's armed forces to prepare Iran to confront such threats.[12] Nour News identified the following recommendations for Iran to address these emerging threats: build multi-layered deterrence, conduct active diplomacy, and manage domestic public opinion.[13] Nour News' emphasis on public opinion is consistent with previous calls by Iranian media and moderate and pragmatic regime officials to increase public trust and societal resilience, as well as resolve disputes between the regime and the Iranian people.

Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian proposal would allow Iran to determine how Iran's nuclear activities would be investigated.[14] Iran also revoked the accreditations of two experienced IAEA inspectors in August for mistakenly taking documents from Fordow to Vienna that reportedly described the facility's interior.[15] The IAEA stated that the revocation was unjustified because the documents did not include any information that would compromise the facility's security.[16] This comes after the Iranian parliament passed a law on June 25 suspending all cooperation with the IAEA.[17] IAEA Director General Grossi said on September 3 that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, but it is unlikely that any agreement will be reached due to Iran's opposition.[18]

Emirati media reported that the United States has decreased its opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) efforts to have greater autonomy in post-war Syria, which is consistent with recent changes in US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack's public statements about the SDF's integration under the Syrian transitional government.[19] A Washington, D.C.-based source implied to Emirati media on September 3 that the US State Department has softened its stance toward the SDF's negotiating position in integration talks with the transitional government in response to the transitional government's conduct in Suwayda Province.[20] Syrian transitional government forces conducted atrocities against Druze fighters and civilians after they gained control of parts of Suwayda Province on July 15.[21] The source said that State Department officials are "listening to them [the SDF] more than before." [22] This report is consistent with US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack's comments to the *Washington Post* on August 23 that the transitional government may "need to consider alternatives to a highly centralized state," following the violence in Suwayda Province.[23] Barrack had previously rejected SDF demands for federalism during previous rounds of integration negotiations prior to the start of intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province on July 13.[24]


The State Department continues to demand that the SDF make concessions to the transitional government, however.[25] These concessions include requests for the SDF to relinquish control of Arab-majority areas within SDF territory and the SDF's monopoly on oil production in northeastern Syria.[26] US mediators now reportedly seek a compromise in which the SDF would partially integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) but retain limited autonomy.[27] The source told Emirati media that an SDF negotiation delegation will travel to Damascus "in the coming days" for a new round of talks with the transitional government.[28] Autonomous Administration of North and

East Syria (AANES) officials announced on September 4 that they have not yet received an official date from the transitional government for the resumption of negotiations, however.[29]

The SDF is also unlikely to relinquish demands for security guarantees from the transitional government due to fear of ethnic cleansing by Turkey and Turkish-backed groups that have integrated into the Syrian MoD. Turkey and Turkish-backed groups previously conducted ethnic cleansing against Syrian Kurds through the creation of “safe zones” in Turkish-controlled Syria, in which Turkey displaced Kurdish civilians and replaced them with Syrian refugees from Turkey.[30] These SDF fears are particularly relevant due to US pressure on the SDF to relinquish control of SDF areas east of the Euphrates River. The Euphrates River is a significant defensive terrain feature that would enable the SDF to defend against any Syrian transitional government incursion from the western bank with relative ease. There are no significant defensive terrain features east of the Euphrates until the Khabour River. The majority of Syrian Kurds east of the Euphrates live behind the Khabour River. Defensive positions on the Khabour or Euphrates could be turned by an attack from the north out of Turkish territory, however. An unspecified Western diplomat said to Emirati media on September 4 that Turkey’s hardline position against the SDF will complicate negotiations even if the SDF and transitional government come to an agreement with US mediation.[31] The diplomat added that “the problem is that even if [President Ahmed] al Shara accepts devolution, Turkey will not, and he [Shara] cannot go against Ankara.”[32]

Iran Update

September 4, 2025



- 1 Iran.** Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare. The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”
- 2 Iran.** Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats. Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.
- 3 Iran.** Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War.

Key Takeaways

- 1. Iran:** Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare. The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”

2. **Iran:** Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats. Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.
3. **Iran:** Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War.
4. **Syria:** Emirati media reported that the United States has decreased its opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) efforts to have greater autonomy in post-war Syria, which is consistent with recent changes in US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack's public statements about the SDF's integration under the Syrian transitional government. The State Department continues to demand that the SDF make concessions to the transitional government, however.

Iran

Iran is taking steps to rebuild its integrated air defense system after its air defenses were severely degraded during the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission met with Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi on September 2 to discuss efforts to strengthen the Iranian armed forces.[33] The Iranian government has reportedly allocated funds to the AFGS to repair Iran's air defense systems.[34] Israel significantly degraded Iran's air defenses during the Israel-Iran War.[35] National Security and Foreign Policy Commission member Fadah Maliki claimed that Iran is interested in purchasing defense systems from Russia or China and added that agreements have reportedly been signed and are waiting to be implemented.[36] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Russia is unlikely to supply Iran with new air defense systems due to the commitment of Russian systems to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[37] Senior Iranian officials have held a series of multilateral meetings with Russian and Chinese officials in recent days on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit to discuss expanding cooperation in all fields.[38]

Iranian media confirmed on September 4 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi as the new Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander.[39] Israel killed former Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid during the Israel-Iran War.[40] CTP-ISW previously covered Abdollahi's appointment in its July 2 update.[41]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.


Syria

Syrian media reported on September 4 that the International Coalition likely conducted a drone strike that targeted a suspected Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader's vehicle near the Aleppo International Airport.[42] The drone reportedly fired two missiles that killed the driver.[43] The US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not claimed responsibility for the strike at the time of

this writing. US CENTCOM has repeatedly targeted members of designated terrorist organizations in Syria since the fall of Assad, including ISIS and Hurras al Din, which is an al Qaeda affiliate.[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain around Aleppo

September 4, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours	Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)	SNA-SDF Contested
Pro-Regime Insurgent Presence in Spring 2025	Al Tanf Deconfliction Zone	HTS-SDF Contested
HTS-led Interim Government	Unidentified Opposition Groups	Lost Regime Territory
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)	Israel Defense Forces (IDF)	

Unspecified individuals conducted a car bomb attack targeting a General Security Services (GSS) commander in Damascus City on September 3.[45] Local Syrian media reported on September 4

that an IED placed on a parked vehicle detonated in Damascus City's al Mezzeh neighborhood and caused no casualties.[46] The GSS cordoned off the area and conducted a preliminary investigation after the attack.[47] Unspecified individuals detonated a similar explosive device in al Mezzeh on August 16, which also caused no casualties.[48] ISIS may be responsible for the recent attacks in al Mezzeh, given the intended target of the attack and previous ISIS attacks in the area before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[49] Assadist insurgents, who have recently demonstrated their ability to conduct roadside IED attacks against vehicles, could also be responsible.[50] Assadist remnants released a video on September 3 that showed an IED attack against a traveling MoD vehicle on August 14 in Jableh, Latakia Province, which caused no casualties.[51]

Arabian Peninsula

Likely Houthi fighters targeted a vessel approximately 178 nautical miles northwest of Hudaydah, Yemen, on September 4.[52] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that an unknown projectile impacted near the vessel.[53] The vessel also experienced "severe electronic interference" during the incident. UKMTO added that the vessel and crew safely continued to their next port, and authorities began an investigation.[54] The Houthis previously conducted complex rocket-propelled grenade and naval surface drone attacks targeting the Liberian-flagged *Magic Seas* and *Eternity C* vessels off the coast of Hudaydah in early July 2025.[55]

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting a site west of Jerusalem and a drone targeting an unspecified site in Haifa on September 3.[56] The Houthis separately launched another ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion International Airport on September 4.[57] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both missiles and the drone.[58] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic "blockade" on Israel in October 2023.[59]

Houthi Missile Activity in the Red Sea

On September 4, 2025



Palestinian Territories & Lebanon

Iran is attempting to smuggle funds to Hezbollah via supply routes through Syria and Iraq, which indicates that Iran continues to value Hezbollah's ability to support Iranian objectives in the region

despite setbacks since October 2023. Unspecified sources told Saudi media on September 4 that Lebanese and Syrian security agencies have identified increased Iranian attempts to smuggle funds to Hezbollah “in recent weeks,” some of which have reportedly been successful.[60] The United States similarly identified “millions of dollars” worth of Iranian financial payments to Hezbollah that Iran facilitated via traditional money transfer systems and overland smuggling, according to the unspecified sources.[61] A senior Iraqi official reportedly did not respond to a request by an unspecified Iranian official to allow Iranian money transfer shipments for Hezbollah to transit through the al Qaim border crossing between Iraq and Syria.[62] Iran’s reported request to use official border crossings to smuggle money to Hezbollah comes amid Iran’s recent struggles to transfer funds via illegal border crossings due to US drone operations and increased Syrian MoD presence along the Syria-Iraq border.[63] Iran also reportedly told Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework leaders to find new ways to rebuild its ground lines of communications across Iraq to supply Hezbollah.[64] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iran is similarly attempting to utilize its former supply routes in Syria to transfer funds to Hezbollah.[65]

Two unspecified Syrian sources told Saudi media that Iran “still maintains ties to old smuggling networks in Syria,” which is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment of post-war smuggling networks in Syria.[66] One of the sources noted that Iran may have established relations with new, unspecified groups in Syria to retain these supply routes after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[67]

Hezbollah’s recent financial challenges suggest that Iran’s attempts to transfer funds have not yet made a major impact. Hezbollah has recently struggled to maintain its financial commitments to its fighters, which led the group to indefinitely freeze compensation payments in June 2025 and reduce the salaries of Hezbollah-affiliated workers in August 2025.[68]



Endnotes ▼ ^

- [1] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/12/3391382>
- [2] <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf>
- [3] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/12/3391382>
- [4] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/12/3391382>
- [5] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/12/3391382>
- [6] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/12/3391382>
- [7] <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508291204> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-3-2025/> ;
<https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/774778/> ;
- [8] <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/774778/> ;
<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508291204>
- [9] <https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/243054/>
- [10] <https://t.me/farsna/384580> ; <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-4-2025>
- [11] <https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/243054/>
- [12] <https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/243054/>
- [13] <https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/243054/>
- [14] <https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1963256855989293341>

- [15] <https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1963256855989293341> ; <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/774960/>
- [16] <https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1963256855989293341>
- [17] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-parliament-approves-bill-suspend-cooperation-with-un-nuclear-watchdog-2025-06-25/>
- [18] <https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-c3ae6a8aae96d54355df73842916a324> ; <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/un-nuclear-chief-presses-iran-strike-deal-inspections-soon-2025-09-03/>
- [19] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [20] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [21] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025> ; <https://syriaaccountability.org/verified-evidence-reveals-rights-violations-in-suwayda/>
- [22] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [23] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/23/syria-minorities-druze-alawites-kurds-sharaa/>
- [24] <https://levant24 dot com/news/2025/07/talks-stalled-in-damascus-as-sdf-remains-uncompromising/> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-14-2025/>
- [25] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [26] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [27] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [28] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [29] <https://www.enabbaladi dot net/772620/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b0%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%aa%d8%b8%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%88%d8%b9%d8%af-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%a6%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%81-%d8%a7/>
- [30] <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/understanding-dangers-turkish-safe-zone-syria>
- [31] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [32] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/03/us-renews-push-to-avert-all-out-conflict-between-syrias-kurds-and-damascus/>
- [33] <https://www.etemadonline dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/733829-%D9%81%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%DA%86%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%87>
- [34] <https://www.etemadonline dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/733829-%D9%81%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%DA%86%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%87>
- [35] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition>

[36] <https://www.etemadonline dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/733829-%D9%81%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%DA%86%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%87>

[37] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-20-2025>

[38] <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/774376> ; <https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/02/sco-summit-2025-key-takeaways.html>

[39] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/13/3392194/>

[40] <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1934857278898721093> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025>

[41] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-2-2025>

[42] <https://www.enabbaladi dot net/772630/%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%b7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%82-%d9%85%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1/> ; <https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/151920>

[43] <https://www.enabbaladi dot net/772630/%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%b7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%82-%d9%85%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1/>

[44] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-june-10-2025/>

[45] <https://www.enabbaladi dot net/772518/%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%81%d8%ac%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d8%b9%d9%86%d8%b5%d8%b1%d9%8b%d8%a7-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a/> ; <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1963342988974985342>

[46] <https://www.enabbaladi dot net/772518/%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%81%d8%ac%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d8%b9%d9%86%d8%b5%d8%b1%d9%8b%d8%a7-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a/> ; <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1963342988974985342>

[47] <https://www.enabbaladi dot net/772518/%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%81%d8%ac%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d8%b9%d9%86%d8%b5%d8%b1%d9%8b%d8%a7-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a/> ; <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1963342988974985342>

[48] <https://sana dot sy/governorates/damascus/2265992/>

[49] <https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2017/7/2/deadly-car-bomb-blasts-rock-syrias-damascus>

[50] <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1963323683700625911>

[51] <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1963323683700625911> ; <https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1956264867922313588>

[52] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250904-ukmto_warning_incident_030-25.pdf?rev=921266660e134d79ba17351ff6273bdc

[53] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250904-ukmto_warning_incident_030-25.pdf?rev=921266660e134d79ba17351ff6273bdc

[54] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250904-ukmto_warning_incident_030-25.pdf?rev=921266660e134d79ba17351ff6273bdc

[55] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-8-2025#_edn689ce77bab67321cfcd44f4ae5fea2a625 ;

https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1942297199620042879 ;
<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1942206979847458876>
[56] <https://t.me/army21ye/3351> ;
<https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1963324051826565421>
[57] <https://t.me/army21ye/3358> ;
<https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1963493187063787809>
[58] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1963318140760461633> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/1963611724797366453> ;
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/1963431466588651934>
[59] <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php> ; https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/
[60] <https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5182791-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87>
[61] <https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5182791-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87>
[62] <https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5182791-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87>
[63] <https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5182791-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87>
[64] <https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5182791-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87>
[65] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-9-2025/>
[66] <https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5182791-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87>
[67] <https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5182791-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87>

%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-
%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-
%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87
[68] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-14-2025/>

Iran Update, September 5, 2025



Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore, Brian Carter

Toplines

Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program. The E3 triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[1] The E3 previously told Iran that they would delay the reimposition of UN sanctions by up to six months if Iran met three key conditions, which include restoring the IAEA's access to Iranian nuclear facilities, addressing concerns about Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, and engaging in direct talks with the United States.[2] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 4 in Qatar to discuss Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the resumption of IAEA access to Iran's nuclear sites.[3] A *Wall Street Journal* reporter stated on September 4 that the talks produced no progress, and neither side shifted its stance during the talks.[4] Iran and the IAEA are expected to meet in Vienna on September 5.[5] Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in Vienna, Reza Najafi, stated on September 5 that the discussions will define cooperation under Iran's parliamentary law and establish the "new form of cooperation" with the agency.[6] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA.[7] Iran recently allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to monitor fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), but has barred them from accessing or inspecting damaged nuclear sites.[8]

The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah.[9] The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plan to place all weapons under the state's control during a cabinet session on September 5.[10] The Lebanese Council of Ministers ordered the LAF to create a plan on August 5 that will attempt to establish a state monopoly over arms in Lebanon.[11] The Lebanese cabinet has decided to keep the details of the LAF's plan and the cabinet's deliberations confidential.[12] The LAF plan will reportedly take fifteen months to implement and will focus on clearing weapons in five geographical sectors, starting with Beirut, according to Lebanese media.[13] It is unclear what the other four geographical sectors are. Lebanese Information Minister Paul Morcos announced that the LAF will begin implementing its plan in accordance with its available resources and logistics, which suggests that the LAF faces certain resource and logistical constraints but does not specify the constraints.[14] Morcos noted that the LAF's implementation process is contingent upon Israeli compliance with the US proposal.[15] The US proposal stipulates an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the agreement's implementation, and that the LAF will completely disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[16] The fifteen-month plan would not disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025, meaning that

Israel could operate in Lebanon even under the US proposal as currently written and reported. Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed, however.[17] Hezbollah has not released any official statements on the Lebanese government's approval of the LAF plan. Hezbollah and its Shia allies symbolically withdrew from the cabinet session during discussions on the LAF plan and have vehemently opposed the plan in public statements before the approval.[18]

Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF's campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the 15-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah's reconstitution efforts and prevent the group's disarmament. Senior Hezbollah officials have repeatedly argued that Hezbollah should not be subject to disarmament, given its "unique" status as defenders of Lebanon against Israel.[19] Hezbollah has repeatedly initiated offensive wars against Israel on its own accord, which undermines the sovereignty of the Lebanese government.[20] These wars have frequently wrought significant destruction across Lebanon.[21] The group has already threatened to use force against the Lebanese government to coerce or compel it to cease its disarmament plans, which indicates that Hezbollah will attempt to subvert any disarmament efforts.[22]

A Hezbollah effort to delay or stop LAF efforts to disarm it would enable it to reorganize and regenerate its forces and possibly defeat a disarmament effort before disarmament can be successful. Hezbollah has undergone a review of its strategy in Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire to shape its reconstitution effort and reduce reliance on external support.[23] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons and restructured its financial system in August 2025 to confront its financial challenges.[24] Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah began appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[25] Iran has reiterated that it will support Hezbollah in its efforts to rebuild and has even reportedly attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah in recent weeks.[26] Hezbollah will strengthen slowly as a result of these efforts unless it is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government's disarmament effort.


The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. US officials told the *New York Times* on September 4 that the Lebanese government would likely receive significant amounts of money for military equipment and LAF salaries if the Lebanese government implements a "serious disarmament plan." [27] Lebanese officials said on September 5 that unspecified foreign countries have pledged to provide Lebanon with aid, but that Lebanon will not receive any economic investments unless it restricts arms to the state.[28] These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah's ability to build support among the Lebanese population by providing services that the government fails to provide. The influx of aid would also increase support for the government, should the government prove able to provide reconstruction funds and other social services historically provided by Hezbollah. Hezbollah previously led such reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to access funds to pay for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure following the conflict with Israel in late 2024.[29] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[30] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[31] This economic stimulus within communities from the Lebanese government would complement the LAF's disarmament campaign by reinstating the Lebanese government as the primary service and security guarantor in Hezbollah strongholds.

Key Takeaways

1. **Snapback Sanctions:** Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program.
2. **Hezbollah Disarmament:** The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF's campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the fifteen-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah's reconstitution efforts and prevent the group's disarmament. Hezbollah will reconstitute slowly unless its reconstitution is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government's disarmament effort.
3. **Economic Support for Lebanon:** The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah's ability to build support among the Lebanese population by enabling the government to provide services that Hezbollah previously provided.

Iran Update

September 5, 2025



- 1 IRAN:** Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program.
- 2 LEBANON:** The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF's campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the 15-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah's reconstitution efforts and prevent the group's disarmament.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories & Lebanon

See topline section.



Endnotes ▼ ^

- [1] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-launch-un-sanctions-process-against-iran-drawing-tehran-ire-2025-08-28/>
- [2] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uk-france-germany-urge-iran-agree-deal-delay-un-sanctions-2025-08-29>
- [3] <https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/775208>
- [4] <https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1963726827761082739>
- [5] <https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/883345>
- [6] <https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/883345>
- [7] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-parliament-approves-bill-suspend-cooperation-with-un-nuclear-watchdog-2025-06-25/>
- [8] <https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6572432/>
- [9] <https://www.newarab dot com/news/lebanese-cabinet-backs-army-plan-hezbollah-disarmament>
- [10] <https://www.newarab dot com/news/lebanese-cabinet-backs-army-plan-hezbollah-disarmament>
- [11] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-tasks-army-with-limiting-arms-state-forces-challenge-hezbollah-2025-08-05/> ; <https://x.com/nawafasalam/status/1952798986470916262>
- [12] <https://www.nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/ا-الى-خطة-الجيش-ورحب-بها-ا/سياسة/806693/مرفص-مجلس-الوزراء-استمع-الى-خطة-الجيش-ورحب-بها-ا>
- [13] <https://www.mtv dot com.lb/en/news/Local/1608479/disarmament-set-for-15-months-two-ministers-set-conditions>
- [14] <https://www.nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/ا-الى-خطة-الجيش-ورحب-بها-ا/سياسة/806693/مرفص-مجلس-الوزراء-استمع-الى-خطة-الجيش-ورحب-بها-ا>
- [15] <https://www.nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/ا-الى-خطة-الجيش-ورحب-بها-ا/سياسة/806693/مرفص-مجلس-الوزراء-استمع-الى-خطة-الجيش-ورحب-بها-ا>
- [16] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/>
- [17] <https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2603593/amp>
- [18] <https://www.newarab.com/news/lebanese-cabinet-backs-army-plan-hezbollah-disarmament>
- [19] <https://www.dw.com/en/lebanons-hezbollah-rejects-disarmament-warns-of-civil-war/a-73730563> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-26-2025/>
- [20] <https://jstreet dot org/israel-hezbollah-and-the-potential-for-full-scale-war/>
- [21] <https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-world-bank-damages-israel-hezbollah-war-reconstruction-33dc0fe973d5fbd3fd3d3fc6ff2e82ff>

- [22] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-3-2025/>
- [23] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-5-2025/>
- [24] <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/by11zol4mxl> ; <https://aawsat.com/-/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906>
- [25] <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-7-2025/>
- [26] <https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5182791-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87> ;
- <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-13-2025/>
- [27] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/04/us/politics/lebanon-hezbollah-disarm.html>
- [28] <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/2025/09/05/لبنان-وزراء-امل-وحزب-الله-ينسحبون-من-جلسة-الحكومة-حول-حصار-السلاح>
- [29] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024>
- [30] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2025>
- [31] <https://ict.org.il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/>