

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**Pursuant to Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
in the case of**

**APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE IN THE GAZA STRIP**

(SOUTH AFRICA V. ISRAEL)

DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF HUNGARY

12 MARCH 2026

DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF HUNGARY

1. For the attention of the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, Hungary has the honour to submit to the International Court of Justice its Declaration of Intervention pursuant to Article 63 paragraph (2) of the Statute of the Court, in the case concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter: Genocide Convention or Convention) in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel).
2. Article 82 of the Rules of Court provides that a declaration of a State's desire to avail itself of the right of intervention conferred upon it by Article 63 paragraph (2) of the Statute shall specify the case and the convention to which it relates and shall contain:
 - (a) particulars of the basis on which the declarant State considers itself a party to the convention;
 - (b) identification of the particular provisions of the convention the construction of which it considers to be in question;
 - (c) a statement of the construction of those provisions for which it contends;
 - (d) a list of documents in support, which documents shall be attached.
3. The aforementioned elements are addressed in the sequence below following the preliminary observations.

I. CASE AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

4. On 29 December 2023, the Republic of South Africa initiated proceedings against the State of Israel alleging violations by the latter, in the Gaza Strip, of its obligations under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the "Genocide Convention"), to which both South Africa and Israel are Contracting Parties.
5. On 6 February 2024, the Registrar, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the Court, duly notified the Government of Hungary, as a Contracting Party to the Genocide Convention, that South Africa "*seeks to found the Court's jurisdiction on the compromissory clause contained on Article IX of the Genocide Convention and alleges violations of Articles I, III, IV, V and VI of the Convention*" and that it "*therefore appears that the construction of this instrument will be in question in the case.*"¹
6. The Court initially set 28 October 2024 and 28 July 2025 as the time-limits for the filing of the Memorial of South Africa and the Counter-Memorial of the State of Israel, respectively. On 14 April 2025, the Court extended the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial to 12 January 2026, and on 20 October 2025, the Court further extended this time-limit to 12 March 2026.

¹ Letter of Registrar attached at Annex A hereto.

7. Hungary, as a Contracting Party, has a direct interest in the construction that may be placed by the Court in the relevant provisions of the Convention, therefore; Hungary has decided to avail itself of the right conferred upon it by Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute to intervene in the present proceedings. It is not Hungary's intention to become a party to the proceedings.
8. Hungary considers it important, that when interpreting the Genocide Convention, the spirit of the convention with the crime of genocide being of exceptional gravity has to be taken into account. The nature of the Convention can be derived from the very fact that it was elaborated as a consequence of the Holocaust, a crime of unimaginable proportions. This spirit as reflected in the *travaux préparatoires* serves as the basic context for interpreting the Convention.
9. Hungary also deems it important that the circumstances of such case be examined. In this context it is crucial to recall that Hungary unequivocally condemned and continues to condemn the heinous terror attacks perpetrated by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023. Israel was subject to a grievous, savage terrorist attack, which tramped Israeli sovereignty underfoot and which had a major impact on the whole world. The terrorist organization Hamas murdered civilians, taking and keeping hostages, and firing indiscriminate rockets at urban centres, which all constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law. Hungary stands up for Israel's sovereignty, its right to self-defence, and the security of the Israeli people.
10. When interpreting the Genocide Convention, it cannot be dismissed that the circumstances referred to in the current case are during an armed conflict, where a non-state actor, the terrorist organization Hamas has consequently been using civilian infrastructure, families, and children as human shields. The acts of Hamas need careful examination when taking into account civilian casualties and the relevant consequences that these actions might have on the fulfilment of obligations of international humanitarian law, a legal framework that is distinctively broader than the Genocide Convention.

II. PARTICULARS OF THE BASIS ON WHICH HUNGARY IS A PARTY TO THE CONVENTION

11. Hungary acceded to the Genocide Convention and deposited its instrument of accession pursuant to Article XI of the Convention, on 7 January 1952², with reservations relating to its Articles IX and XII. In accordance with Article XIII of the Convention, the accession of Hungary became effective on 6 April 1952. Hungary withdrew the reservation relating to article IX on 8 December 1989³. The requirement stipulated in Article 82 of the Rule of the Court is accordingly met.

III. PROVISIONS OF THE GENOCIDE COVNENTION IN QUESTION

12. With reference to Article 82, paragraph 2(b) of the Rules of Court, Hungary considers that the Articles I, II, III, IV, V and VI of the Genocide Convention are in question. In

² See Annex B of the present declaration.

³ See Annex C of the present declaration.

its present Declaration of Intervention Hungary focuses on Article II of the Convention, which records the elements of genocide as follows:

“genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”⁴

13. Hungary considers that the present case raises questions regarding the interpretation of Article II of the Convention, including mainly the requirement of the specific intent and the evidentiary threshold connecting to the establishment of such intent.

14. As a party to the Genocide Convention, Hungary has a genuine interest in how the Convention is being interpreted when it comes to allegations of genocide. It follows from the international community’s common interest in the rights and duties enshrined in the Convention and their *erga omnes* character that all States parties have an interest of their own in the proper interpretation, application and fulfilment of those obligations.

IV. ELEMENTS SHALL BE EXAMINED IN THIS CASE

A. The unique nature of the crime of genocide

15. Genocide is recognized as one of the most heinous and special crime that a state and state actors may be guilty of under international law. The defining feature which distinguishes genocide from other grave violations of international law is the presence of a specific mental element, namely the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such. The requirement of this specific intent constitutes the central and most restrictive element of the crime of genocide under Article II of the Genocide Convention. Based on its unique nature, the crime of genocide is one of exceptional gravity, and for this reason was defined very precisely by its drafters. Accordingly, every State party to the Genocide Convention has a genuine interest in how the Convention is interpreted.

16. Established by the Court, the jurisdiction of the Court is exclusively restricted to the Convention.

⁴ Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

*“The court has no power to rule on alleged breaches of other obligations under international law, not amounting to genocide, particularly those protecting human rights in armed conflicts. That is so even if the alleged breaches of obligations under peremptory norms, or of obligations which protect essential humanitarian values, and which may be owed erga omnes.”*⁵

17. Recent attempts to broaden the interpretation of the crime of genocide risk diluting the specific normative function of the Convention, blurring its boundaries with other international obligations, and eventually undermining the framework of the Convention. As widely recognized in international criminal law doctrine and jurisprudence, genocide is not established merely by demonstrating large-scale violence, civilian casualties, or even grave breaches of international humanitarian law. Rather, what distinguishes genocide from other serious international crimes is the presence of a deliberate purpose to bring about the physical or biological destruction of a protected group. Hungary underlines that the *travaux préparatoires* of the Genocide Convention demonstrate the concern of the drafters regarding potential abuse of the Convention in order to provide a pretext for interference in matters, which fall outside its scope. Therefore, they sought to maintain a clear and narrow definition of genocide, recognizing that an overbroad definition could serve merely as pretexts to harass State Parties.
18. This consideration is particularly important in light of Article IX of the Convention, which permits any State party to submit disputes concerning the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention to the Court. The Court has recognized that the obligations under the Convention are owed *erga omnes partes*, with the broad consequence that any State – even if not directly affected by the alleged conduct – may nonetheless initiate proceedings. This broad access to the Court makes it all the more important that the legal threshold for establishing genocide, in particular the requirement of specific intent, are applied with strict rigor, thereby safeguarding the Convention from politicized or strategic litigation.
19. Hungary is in the view of that applied to this treaty; good faith provides a “guarantee against any risk of misuse of rights” which might lead to a manifestly unreasonable outcome in the light of its special object and purpose, thereby maintaining the integrity of the Convention.
20. It would not be permissible to use the Genocide Convention as a means of bringing before the International Court of Justice (hereinafter: Court) a dispute regarding alleged violations of other rules of international law. The Court has stated that the definition of genocide must be interpreted strictly, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, its context, its object and purpose. It cannot be extended by analogy to cover other alleged serious violations of the international law.⁶

⁵ Application of the of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement, I-C.J Reports 2007, p. 104, para. 147. and p. 155, para. 277.

⁶ Application of the of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement, I-C.J Reports 2007, pp. 110-111, paras. 161-162.

21. This limitation is also reflected in the drafting history of the Convention. The drafters made the deliberate decision to *exclude* certain acts, such as “cultural genocide”, including the prohibition of the use of a language or the destruction of cultural expressions, from the final text of the Convention. Similarly, certain groups, including political groups, were not included among the protected groups enumerated in Article II. These deliberate exclusions confirm the intention of the drafters to define the crime in a limited and precise manner.
22. International jurisprudence consistently confirms that the evidentiary threshold required to establish genocidal intent is exceptionally high. The Court repeatedly emphasized⁷ that genocidal intent must be demonstrated by evidence that is fully conclusive and that any inference of such intent must be the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the pattern of conduct in question. In the absence of direct evidence, the Court requires that surrounding circumstances point unequivocally to the existence of such intent and exclude alternative explanations.
23. It has been suggested that genocidal intent may co-exist with other purposes and that the threshold should therefore be lowered. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the text of the Convention and contrary to the Court’s long and well-established jurisprudence. Moreover, it would create a risk that allegations of genocide could be used as a means of bringing broader armed conflicts before the Court, even where the legal elements of genocide are not existing, thereby erasing the unique nature of the crime of genocide. This would encourage the politicization of genocide litigation and risks opening the Court’s doors to political litigation of armed conflicts through the strategic invocation of the Convention.

B. The elements of the Crime of Genocide including Genocidal Intent

24. The crime of Genocide consists of three cumulative legal elements: a physical act (*actus reus*), the intent to commit that act (*dolus generalis*), and the specific intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” (*dolus specialis*). Genocide is distinguished from all other international crimes by this defining mental element. The Court emphasized *dolus specialis* as the essence of the offence of genocide in the Croatia Merits Judgment.⁸

1. The intent to commit the act (*Dolus generalis*)

25. The acts contained in the Article II of the Convention must be assessed in the light of deliberate nature of each underlying act.
26. Regarding the requirement of intentionally, this element has been also established by the Court, as follows:

⁷ See Croatia v. Serbia case (2015) and Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case (2007)

⁸ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 62, para. 132.

*“killing within the meaning of this article always presupposes the existence of an intentional element, namely the intent to cause death. It follows that, if one takes the view that the attacks were exclusively directed at military targets, and that the civilian casualties were not caused deliberately, one cannot consider those attacks, inasmuch as they caused civilian deaths, as falling within the scope of Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention.”*⁹

27. It is important to emphasize that the imposition of difficult or restrictive conditions, does not in itself satisfy the material elements of genocide under the Convention. It is also required that the measures were imposed deliberately, with conscious awareness of the harm they were intended to cause to members of the protected group.
28. The question of *dolus generalis* comes up in the context of armed conflicts, where civilian casualties and incidental harm are during hostilities. General intent ensures that the prohibited acts of genocide are deliberate, rather than incidental or collateral to lawful military operations. It is also important that attacks exclusively directed at military targets resulting in civilian casualties do not fall within the scope of Article II(a) of the Convention, as they will not satisfy the intent requirement.
29. Hungary recalls that even if the Court finds serious international humanitarian law breaches or disproportionate attacks in the territory of Gaza, the Bosnia case shows that such findings do not automatically imply genocide.
30. Regarding *dolus generalis* it is important to emphasize that any attempt to equate operational or security motives with genocidal intent constitutes a mischaracterization of the crime of genocide, and it risks criminalizing legitimate military actions or conflating lawful conduct with genocidal intent.
2. The specific intent to destroy in whole or in part, the protected group (*Dolus specialis*)
31. Besides *dolus generalis*, genocide also requires *dolus specialis*, namely and the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. This specific intent distinguishes this crime from other serious crimes.¹⁰ The provision demands that the perpetrator act with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such. Accordingly, solely those acts performed with the conscious purpose of effecting the physical or biological destruction of the group – whether entirely or partially – may be classified as genocidal acts.¹¹
32. Even if the *dolus generalis* requirement would be satisfied as unlawful killings are deliberately carried out against members of a protected group, it is insufficient to establish *dolus specialis*. The additional intent must also be established, and is defined very precisely.¹²

⁹ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 138, para. 474.

¹⁰ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 63, para. 132.

¹¹ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 64, para. 136.

¹² Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 121, para. 187.

33. The Court has recognized that element of genocidal intent may be inferred indirectly from the surrounding circumstances. The Court emphasizes that for pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of the existence of *dolus specialis*, it would have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent.¹³
34. Any attempts to lower the standard for establishing genocidal intent would also necessarily undermine the high evidentiary threshold required to prove *dolus specialis*, as consistently recognized by the Court. A direct consequence of the exceptional gravity of the crime of genocide is that the standard of proof applicable to allegations of genocidal intent is necessarily and exceptionally high. In this regard the Court “claims against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive. The Court requires that it be fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings, that the crime of genocide or the other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed, have been clearly established.”¹⁴
35. The evidentiary threshold of genocide had been set up exceptionally high to avoid the risk of blurring the distinction between genocide and other violations of international law. This is especially relevant considering the Court’s jurisdiction. In the Bosnia case, the Court established that it has no power to rule on alleged breaches of other obligations under international law. The subject of the dispute must relate to the Convention itself, and it is not permissible to invoke the Convention in order to refer a dispute to the Court involving alleged violations of other rules of international law.
36. The Court also requires that the inference drawn from the pattern of conduct be not merely plausible or reasonable, but compelling and unambiguous. And the evidentiary material must be such that it leads conclusively to the existence of genocidal intent, excluding alternative explanations and ensuring that the inference meets the rigorous threshold imposed by the Court’s jurisprudence.¹⁵
37. Hungary considers that any dilution of the threshold of *dolus specialis* would risk undermining the Convention’s normative framework and its role in addressing the gravest of crimes, and it would be contrary to the intention of the drafters. The integrity of the Convention requires that findings of genocidal intent remain grounded in the Court’s settled approach and not to be expanded or reinterpreted in ways that facilitate its misuse for purposes beyond those for which the Convention was drafted.
38. Hungary distances itself from any endeavours that would lead to the de facto lowering of the standard for the establishing of genocidal intent, as otherwise there would be a danger that the crime of genocide being expanded indefinitely to include the law of war,

¹³ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 196-197, para. 373.

¹⁴ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 129, para. 328.

¹⁵ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 175, para. 319. and p. 179 para. 328.

the right of peoples to self-determination, the protection of minorities and the respect of human rights.

39. Hungary further emphasizes that any examination of alleged violations of the Genocide Convention by the Court must take the actions of all relevant actors into consideration. An assessment that focuses exclusively on the conduct of a single party, without taking into account the broader circumstances in which that conduct occurred, risks producing incomplete or misleading conclusions regarding the existence of intent.
40. This is especially true in situations of armed conflict, which unfortunately often result in significant civilian harm even where parties assert compliance with applicable rules of international law. The occurrence of civilian casualties in the course of armed conflict, however grave, does not in *itself* provide evidence of genocidal intent. The protection of civilians and the obligation to minimize civilian harm arise primarily under the relevant rules of international humanitarian law, which constitute a distinct legal framework governing the conduct of hostilities. These obligations must therefore be assessed within that legal framework, rather than within the specialized and narrower scope of the Genocide Convention¹⁶.
41. The present situation arises in the context of an armed conflict between a State and a non-state armed organization, which has repeatedly demonstrated disregard for the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law. Widely documented practices attributed to Hamas include the deliberate embedding of military infrastructure within densely populated civilian areas, the use of civilian objects for military purposes, and the use of civilians as human shields. Such conduct fundamentally complicates the operational environment and increases the risk of incidental civilian harm during military operations directed at legitimate military objectives. These military operations conducted by Israel were responses to a serious terrorist attack and Israel has exercised its right to self-defence. During the conflict, Israel has shown a willingness to negotiate on several occasions and presently there is ceasefire between the parties of the conflicts.
42. Finally, the existence of precautionary measures aimed at reducing civilian harm is inconsistent with the presence of genocidal intent. In particular, operational practices such as issuing advance warnings to civilians before military strikes, actively evacuating civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance (including humanitarian evacuation corridors), and making efforts to ensure the provision of food, water and medicine all demonstrate efforts to mitigate civilian casualties.

C. Evidentiary threshold

43. Regarding this topic, the Court ensures that any findings, especially those relating to allegations of genocide, are grounded in evidence of sufficient probative value to meet the exceptionally high standard of proof required. The Court furthermore establishes that Claims against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proven by

¹⁶ UN Doc. E/447 p. 23

evidence that is fully conclusive and must fully convince the court that such allegations have been clearly established.¹⁷ This assessment must be objective and based on all available information, in particular independent and credible sources.

44. In recognition of the exceptional gravity of allegations of violations of the Genocide Convention, the Court has long recognized that great care must be exercised in ascertaining whether the evidence before it shows a sufficiently clear manifestation of all elements of the crime, including specific genocidal intent (*dolus specialis*).¹⁸
45. Hungary recalls where direct evidence of specific intent is absent, the Court has emphasized that “*great care must be taken in finding in the facts a sufficiently clear manifestation of the requisite specific intent*”, and determined that “*in order to infer the existence of dolus specialis from a pattern of conduct, it is necessary and sufficient that this is the only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the acts in question*”.¹⁹
46. It is also important that fabrication of evidence of genocide, disregarding evidence indicating that genocide is not occurring, or asserting a serious risk of genocide without an objective and genuine assessment of the relevant facts, are all violations of fundamental principles of international law, and their duty towards the Court.
47. Hungary considers that it is crucial that the Court evaluate materials critically, bearing in mind that certain materials may be based on incomplete information, contested factual premises, or advocacy-driven narratives, which cannot meet the rigorous evidentiary standards required for a finding of genocide.

V. DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT DECLARATION

48. The following is a list of the documents submitted in support of this Declaration, which documents are attached thereto:
 - (a) Letter of 6 February 2024 from the Registrar of the International Court of Justice to the Contracting Parties of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, of 9 December 1948;
 - (b) United Nations Depository Notification concerning Hungary’s Accession to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, dated 28 March 1952; and

¹⁷ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 175, para. 319. and p. 179 para. 328.

¹⁸ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 121, para. 187 and p.122. para. 189.

¹⁹ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, at p. 67, para. 148.

- (c) United Nations Depository Notification concerning the withdrawal of the reservation submitted by Hungary to Article IX of the Convention, dated 30 January 1990.

VI. CONCLUSION


49. On the basis of the foregoing, Hungary hereby avails itself of the right conferred upon it by Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Statute to intervene in the proceedings brought by South Africa against the State of Israel in this case.
50. Hungary attaches great value to the international judicial system, in particular to the work of the International Court of Justice. It is in this vein that Hungary is lead by the conviction that action brought before the Court require careful examination taking into all circumstances of such actions. The Court itself must not become a “battleground”, an arena for political debate. The dangers of so-called strategic litigation must be duly examined avoiding politicisation and upholding strict judicial standards. Hungary thus wishes to base its observations on the interpretation of the Genocide Convention on the legal arguments detailed in this Declaration.
51. On the basis of the arguments detailed in this Declaration, Hungary submits the following conclusions:
- a. In light of the foregoing considerations, Hungary emphasizes the exceptional and unique nature of the crime of genocide under international law. The Genocide Convention was designed to address the gravest form of collective violence, and its definition reflects the intention of its drafters to maintain a strict and precise legal threshold. Central to this framework is the requirement of specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such.
 - b. The jurisprudence of the Court has consistently confirmed that the establishment of such intent requires evidence of the highest probative value. Genocidal intent may only be inferred from a pattern of conduct where that inference is the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the available facts. This demanding evidentiary threshold reflects the exceptional gravity of the crime and safeguards the integrity of the Genocide Convention.
 - c. Hungary therefore considers that the interpretation of Article II of the Genocide Convention must remain consistent with the Court’s established jurisprudence and the original object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. Expanding the concept of genocide beyond its carefully defined legal elements would risk blurring the distinction between genocide and other serious violations of international law and would ultimately undermine the normative function of the Genocide Convention.

- d. Hungary respectfully submits that the interpretation of the Genocide Convention in the present proceedings must remain faithful to these principles.
52. Hungary believes that this Declaration meets the requirements set out in Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules and respectfully submits that the Court declare it admissible.
53. Hungary reserves the right to supplement or amend this Declaration, and any written statements submitted with respect to it, as it considers necessary and in response to subsequent developments in these proceedings.
54. Hungary has appointed Mr. Gergő Kocsis, Deputy State Secretary for International Cooperation as Agent and Mr. Dániel Horogszegi Szilágyi-Landeck, Ambassador of Hungary to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Co-Agent for the purposes of this Declaration and the present proceedings.
55. The Registrar of the Court is kindly requested to transmit all communication with respect to these proceedings to the following address:

Embassy of Hungary to the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Hogeweg 14, 2585 JD
The Hague
The Netherlands

Email: nefhat@mfa.gov.hu;
jhat@mfa.gov.hu
mission.hga@mfa.gov.hu

Yours faithfully,


Dániel Horogszegi Szilágyi-Landeck,
Ambassador of Hungary,
Co-Agent of the Government of Hungary



Annex A: Letter of 6 February 2024 from the Registrar of the International Court of Justice to the Contracting Parties of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, of 9 December 1948.

Annex B: United Nations Depository Notification concerning Hungary's Accession to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, dated 28 March 1952 – English and French version.

Annex C: United Nations Depository Notification concerning the withdrawal of the reservation submitted by Hungary to Article IX of the Convention, dated 30 January 1990 – English and French version.

