Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire

October 2025 – June 2026

The coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)

July 9th, 2026

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Executive Brief

This report reviews the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip since the October 2025 ceasefire, with a particular focus on food security, water, sanitation and medical support. Throughout the ceasefire, humanitarian assistance entered Gaza in volumes that substantially exceeded internationally claimed humanitarian requirements, leading to vastly improved conditions. The following analysis presents the data underpinning this assessment and examines the humanitarian trends observed since the ceasefire.

The findings presented in this report are based on operational data collected and continuously validated through the U.S.-led Civil Military Coordination Center (CMCC), including its Joint Coordination Board (JCB), which oversees the ongoing coordination of humanitarian operations. These findings are further corroborated by information provided by the UN and international organizations, publicly available reporting, and independent humanitarian research.

Through the CMCC coordination framework, Israel works closely with the United States and other international partners to monitor humanitarian operations, share operational data, and advance practical solutions that facilitate the humanitarian response in the Gaza Strip. This coordination is carried out within the framework of President Trump's 20-point plan for Gaza and Security Council Resolution (SCR) 2803 (2025). As repeatedly stated by senior BoP officials, the main constraint to further expanding assistance in Gaza and commencing its reconstruction is Hamas' refusal to disarm in accordance with SCR 2803.[1]

The available data clearly proves the following key findings:

1. **The entry of food into the Gaza Strip is nearly threefold the requirements defined by the World Food Program (WFP).**

   Between October 2025 and 7 June 2026, approximately 1.78 million tons of food entered the Gaza Strip. These quantities substantially exceed every humanitarian food requirement benchmark published by WFP concerning Gaza. In July 2025, the WFP asserted that approximately 62,000 metric tons (MT) of food per month were required to meet Gaza's humanitarian needs. In November 2025, following the ceasefire, WFP revised this benchmark further upward to 80,000 MT per month. Even when measured against this higher benchmark, the volume of food entering Gaza vastly exceeded the assessed requirements throughout the

[1] https://institute.global/insights/news/tony-blairs-update-on-gaza-delivered-to-the-united-nations-security-council; https://www.un.org/unispal/document/implementation-of-united-nations-security-council-resolution-2803-2025-report-of-the-board-of-peace-through-the-office-of-the-high-representative-for-gaza-s-2026-418/

ceasefire period, exceeding it by nearly threefold in aggregate. Even humanitarian assistance alone, which amounted to about half of the total food supply, exceeded the higher benchmark while commercial imports further expanded food availability and dietary variety, especially fresh vegetables and fruit and animal protein.

2. **The increased availability of food in Gaza is reflected in food prices which dropped by about 72% between September 2025 and May 2026.** As humanitarian assistance and commercial supplies expanded, the prices of many essential food items fell significantly, reflecting improved market availability. In March 2026 prices saw a temporary increase following the outbreak of the war with Iran but since April their downward trend continued. While during the Iran war, crossing operations were temporarily adjusted to protect civilian truck drivers operating on both sides of the crossings, as well as crossing personnel, from missile attacks, food deliveries remained well above the WFP benchmark throughout the period.
3. **The primary challenges to food availability and affordability are not related to the volume of aid entering Gaza but to its management, taxation, and circulation in the Hamas-controlled areas of the Gaza Strip.** Reports of large food stockpiles alongside documented cases of spoiled and destroyed food suggest significant inefficiencies in storage and distribution. At the same time, Hamas's taxation and control over the circulation of goods, as well as merchant cartel and price fixing continue to distort market conditions and affect civilian access to food. Addressing these internal challenges is essential to improving humanitarian outcomes.
4. **Medical capacity continues to expand through the sustained entry of medicines, medical supplies and advanced medical equipment, while hospital bed capacity has increased by over 50% since the ceasefire, according to WHO.** Since the ceasefire, more than 18,000 tons of medicines and medical supplies have entered Gaza. Recent initiatives such as the expansion of the ICRC field hospital and the establishment of the UAE operated medical clinic, equipped with advanced medical equipment, demonstrate Israel's continued commitment to enabling the entry of sophisticated medical capabilities into Gaza. According to WHO, in May 2026 Gaza had 3,120 hospital beds[2] compared to 2,009 in October 2025,[3] a 55% increase, and a 92% increase in the number of beds since 2022. [4] Where security considerations arise, particularly with respect to dual-use items, Israel works closely with international partners to implement practical,

[2] https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/Sitrep_70b_latest_1.pdf
[3] https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/Sitrep_65.pdf
[4] https://www.moh.gov.ps/portal/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/annual-english-202218-7-2023.pdf ; chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.moh.gov.ps/portal/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/annual-english-202218-7-2023.pdf

coordinated solutions that enable the entry of essential medical equipment while preventing the exploitation of sensitive materials by Hamas.

5. **The amount of water currently available in Gaza meets international humanitarian standards**. More than 70,000 cubic meters of water are facilitated every day through multiple water sources, including three water lines from Israel, which, together with local desalination plants and coordinated water infrastructure projects, provide water volumes well above basic humanitarian requirements. While significant challenges remain in the fields of sanitation and wastewater management due to the concentration of large civilian populations in limited areas under Hamas's control, Israel continues to work with humanitarian organizations to develop and implement practical solutions in accordance with operational needs identified by its partners. This includes facilitating the entry of water infrastructure, sanitation equipment, chlorine, hygiene supplies, and other essential WASH materials, while advancing projects that expand water distribution methods, increase access points, and improve sanitation conditions across the Gaza Strip.
6. **Repeated predictions that Israel's policies of ending contacts with UNRWA and vetting international NGOs would prevent an adequate humanitarian response in Gaza have thus been proven false.** Israel fully supports and has expanded its cooperation with international organizations and other UN agencies which are committed to the provision of assistance in an impartial manner with zero-tolerance to diversion and abuse of aid by terrorist organizations. Organizations that fail to meet these standards undermine humanitarian operations and, in many cases, serve Hamas's terrorist activities and propaganda. Israel will therefore continue to enforce the registration mechanism and prevent non-compliant organizations from operating in Gaza.

Despite the ceasefire, Gaza remains a challenging and complex area for humanitarian operations mainly due to Hamas's control over most of the population and its continued abuse and diversion of humanitarian aid to finance its organs of oppression and rebuild its terror infrastructure. However, COGAT, in partnership with the CMCC and many international partners, successfully facilitated assistance which not only meets international benchmarks but far exceeds them in key aspects. Any attempt to portray the humanitarian situation in Gaza as one of widespread collapse would be inconsistent with the available evidence and highly misleading. Similarly, claims that Israeli policies are the main obstacle to further improvements in Gaza are not only factually incorrect, but also divert attention from Hamas's continued responsibility for obstructing progress and exploiting humanitarian assistance for its own political and military interests. Those following the situation in Gaza – mainly humanitarians, journalists, researchers

and policymakers – should treat reports that omit from their analysis significant elements of the humanitarian response and Hamas's systematic obstruction and diversion with caution.

Israel remains committed to facilitating humanitarian assistance and working with its international partners to expand practical humanitarian solutions for the civilian population while preventing the exploitation of humanitarian assistance by Hamas.

Food Supply vs Need

The data presented in this report demonstrate that food availability in the Gaza Strip has consistently remained well above assessed humanitarian requirements throughout the ceasefire period. From the start of the ceasefire on 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026, 1.778 million tons of food entered Gaza[5]. In July 2025 WFP set the benchmark at a 62,000 MT per month, increasing it to 80,000 MT in November 2025 after the ceasefire. Even when measured against the higher 80,000 MT monthly benchmark, whose calculation has not been publicly explained, and even if one entirely excludes all supplies provided by non-humanitarian actors (private sector, states, etc.), a surplus of over 241,140 MT has been accumulated above the assessed needs. This amounts to far more than the pre-war stocks within Gaza[6] and is equivalent to three months' supply according to the 80,000 MT benchmark (see table 1).

Metric	Figure
Recorded food entry, Oct. 2025-7 Jun. 2026	1,778,363
Declared humanitarian aid tonnage	891,637 MT
Declared private sector tonnage	886,726 MT
Elapsed period, 10 Oct. 2025-7 Jun. 2026	241 days = 8.033 30-day months
Implied requirement at 62,000 tons/month	498,046 MT
Implied requirement at 80,000 tons/month	642,640 MT
Implied surplus using 62,000 tons/month	1,280,317 MT
Implied surplus using 80,000 tons/month	1,135,723 MT

Table 1: Cumulative food delivery and surplus according to different needs benchmarks

[5] To clarify: COGAT's tonnage data is based on the self-declaration of humanitarian organizations and private sector providers. Wartime conditions, the massive volume of aid which needs to be transferred through the checkpoints, and the need to scan the aid for contraband, all within the daylight hours in which the border crossings operate, make it impossible to weigh the contents of each pallet on every truck without severely reducing throughput.
However, pallet number are counted and contents are compared to the coordination requests and self-reports during the security clearance. Only negligible divergence (around 5%) has been detected on a day-to-day basis. A more significant, but still small, divergence was found when comparing the records of some aid providing partners concerning food offloaded to Gaza warehouses with their coordination requests on a monthly basis. These deviations are not large enough to materially change our conclusions.

[6] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/41192926/ Checchi F, Ververs M, Jamaluddine Z. Wartime food availability in the Gaza Strip, October 2023 to August 2024: a retrospective analysis. BMJ Glob Health. 2025 Nov 4;10(11):e020648. doi: 10.1136/bmjgh-2025-020648. PMID: 41192926; PMCID: PMC12587993.

Throughout this period, Israel consistently prioritized humanitarian shipments in the coordination and entry process, therefore their share of the total supply (50%) simply represents the coordination requests submitted by humanitarian organizations themselves rather than any Israeli policy.

This operational priority was maintained even during periods of exceptional security challenges. During the Iran war, UN aid continued to enter the Gaza Strip in comparable levels despite temporary operational constraints on crossing activities. Israel could not operate the crossings at full capacity without exposing civilian truck drivers on both sides of the crossings, as well as crossing personnel, to ongoing missile attacks. As a result, crossing operations were temporarily adjusted, leading to a short-term reduction in private sector throughput during March 2026. Nevertheless, even during that month the aid that entered reached 99% of WFP's 80,000 MT monthly benchmark. Once operational conditions improved, humanitarian coordination gradually enabled higher volumes in accordance with the agreed humanitarian framework, supplying about double WFP's higher needs benchmark in April and May (see figure 1, table 2). These data demonstrate that even under exceptional security conditions, humanitarian assistance continued to enter Gaza in quantities that exceeded assessed humanitarian requirements.



Figure 1: Supply of food into Gaza by provider

Month	Total food entry	UN	NGO	State	Private
October 2025	174,323	27,837	77,608	8,158	60,720
November 2025	262,644	39,733	86,521	10,190	126,200
December 2025	288,206	71,112	112,135	10,119	94,840
January 2026	313,322	37,300	114,117	7,545	154,360
February 2026	298,892	31,706	56,364	6,882	203,940
March 2026	79,371	26,361	19,385	4,345	29,280
April 2026	158,995	34,579	31,315	2,660	90,441
May 2026	161,406	32,069	25,612	2,175	101,550
1-7 June 2026	41,204	7,716	6,983	1,110	25,395
Total	1,778,363	308,413	530,040	53,184	886,726

Table 2: Food entry into Gaza by sector and month. Note that the Egyptian Red Crescent is included in the NGO category and represents the largest such partner by far.

As these figures show, the existing logistical arrangements at the crossing points to the Gaza Strip are more than capable of addressing the current humanitarian needs in Gaza. Therefore, repeated unfounded calls by some governments and organizations to open additional crossings into Gaza are detached from the reality on the ground, make little sense from logistical, financial, and security perspectives thus distracting attention from the actual challenges. Much of the misguided rhetoric on this issue stems from the continued practice by the UN and the IPC to base their reporting and analyses of food supply to Gaza on statistics covering only a subset of humanitarian supplies (UN and certain NGOs), thereby omitting over half of the quantity entering Gaza.

Commercial and Humanitarian Aid:

Humanitarian assistance and commercial imports served complementary functions throughout the reporting period. Humanitarian aid, which consistently received operational priority in Israel's coordination efforts, was primarily focused on staple foods and basic nutritional needs. Commercial imports complemented these efforts by supplying a wide variety of food products, including fresh produce, dairy products, eggs and meat. Throughout the reporting period, Israel consistent prioritization of the coordination and entry of humanitarian assistance over all other supply channels, demonstrated its continued commitment to ensuring that humanitarian aid entered the Gaza Strip without interruption. Humanitarian assistance is intended to provide the direct and equitable distribution of basic necessities to the civilian population. Humanitarian organizations generally avoid coordinating lower calorically dense fresh products, including fruits, vegetables, dairy products, eggs and meat, which are more commonly supplied through commercial channels (see table 3). Where humanitarian assistance does not reach the civilian population equitably, this reflects challenges in its distribution and accessibility within the Hamas-controlled area of Gaza Strip rather than limitations on the volume of aid entering it.

	Private Sector	**Humanitarian Aid**
Flour, food baskets and basic foods	12.1%	82.3%
Fruits and vegetables	24.9%	9.6%
Dairy and eggs	5.8%	0.9%
Meat	17.1%	2.9%
Oil and fats	6.6%	1.4%
Unclassified/Mixed	40.1%	4.3%

Table 3: Distribution of food types in humanitarian assistance versus private sector For March-May 2026. Data is presented as percentage of actually measured pallets. High level of unclassified private sector pallets reflects non-standard arrangement of small amounts of varied goods.

It is for precisely this reason that since 2008 physical aid has been commonly supplemented by the WFP and other aid organizations with cash-based transfers (CBTs) and WFP food vouchers, which can be delivered electronically and may be easier to access and harder to divert. CBTs are not designed as an equal per-capita distribution mechanism. They are a targeted assistance modality, typically directed to

households assessed as vulnerable or food-insecure, and can help beneficiaries obtain food through functioning markets rather than relying solely on physical aid collection points. [7]

At the same time, Throughout the war and the ensuing ceasefire, COGAT has prioritized the entry of UN, NGOs (of which the Egyptian Red Crescent is the largest partner) and State supplies over the Private sector. Thus, during war with Iran, UN-associated supplies remained almost unchanged (26,361 in March compared to 31,706 in February), whereas private sector supplies fell sharply (from 203,940 tons in February to 29,280 in March). COGAT does not determine the contents of commercial food shipments or humanitarian food aid. All items, including fruits and vegetables and animal protein are permitted.

It is important to stress at this point that there are no Israeli interference or barriers to transportation within Hamas-controlled Gaza where the overwhelming majority of Gaza's population resides. Nor are there any significant backlogs in aid pick-up from the Gazan border under ceasefire conditions.

[7] Cash and Vouchers Manual SECOND EDITION 2014 ; chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.calpnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/cash-and-vouchers-manual-wfp-second-edition.pdf

Food Prices

The available price data shows a remarkable post-ceasefire correction in Gaza food prices. By May 2026, the food CPI was approximately 72 percent lower than in pre-cease fire September 2025 (see figure 2). With the exception of March 2026, when increased demand caused by Ramadan, increased global food and transport prices caused by the Iran War, and constraints on Private Sector transport into the Gaza Strip due to missile fire resulted in a short lived price spike, prices have steadily declined every month, albeit at a reduced rate compared to October-December 2025, indicative of saturation of market absorption capacity.



Figure 2: Declining to a Plateau. Post ceasefire food prices in Gaza stabilize.

For the ten commodities with complete data across Gaza/North, Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, the simple Strip-wide average price fell in every case. The largest reductions were recorded for dry onions, which fell by approximately 86%, tomatoes by about 81%, rice by about 73%, red lentils by about 71%, and potatoes by about 70%. Flour, a core staple, fell from an average of about 156 NIS per 25 kg bag in September 2025 to about 60 NIS in May 2026, a decline of roughly 61%. For eggs, for which comparable data was available only for northern Gaza, the price drop was from 450 NIS to 60 NIS, 86.7% (table 4).

This improvement is consistent with the aggregate supply pictured in Table 1. From 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026, approximately 1.778 million tons of food entered Gaza, including roughly 891,637 tons

declared as humanitarian aid and 886,726 tons declared as private-sector supply. The cumulative total substantially exceeded both WFP's 62,000 MT monthly requirement and its later 80,000 MT monthly benchmark; humanitarian food alone also exceeded the higher benchmark over the covered period.

The sustained decline in food prices demonstrates that the substantial increase in food entering Gaza has had a direct and positive impact on market availability. Current price levels are increasingly influenced by internal market conditions rather than by the availability of food entering the Gaza Strip. These factors include Hamas's taxation of goods, its control over the circulation and release of commodities, and its continued interference in the functioning of local markets.

Item	**Unit**	**Sep-25**	**May-26**	**% change**
Eggs*	2 Kg	450 NIS	60 NIS	**-86.70%**
Dry onions	1 kg	55.6 NIS	8 NIS	**-85.60%**
Tomatoes	1 kg	64.4 NIS	12.2 NIS	**-81.10%**
Egyptian rice	1 kg	9.8 NIS	2.7 NIS	**-72.40%**
Red lentils	1 kg	7 NIS	2 NIS	**-71.40%**
Potatoes	1 kg	26.1 NIS	7.8 NIS	**-70.00%**
Sugar	1 kg	14.7 NIS	5 NIS	**-66.00%**
Flour	25 kg	156.1 NIS	60.3 NIS	**-61.40%**
Sunflower oil	3 L	65.2 NIS	30 NIS	**-54.00%**
Chickpeas	1 kg	11.8 NIS	7 NIS	**-40.70%**
Salt	1 kg	6.1 NIS	4.3 NIS	**-29.50%**

Table 4 – Itemized food price changes between September 2025 to May 2026. Prices are unweighted average of South/Khan Yunes, Center and North/Gaza City except for eggs where comparable data exists only for Gaza City.*

Unaddressed Distribution Blockers

The data presented in this report demonstrate that the principal humanitarian challenges affecting food access in Gaza arise after humanitarian assistance enters the Strip, rather than from limitations on the volume of aid entering it. Available evidence points to significant inefficiencies in the management and distribution of humanitarian assistance within Gaza. Reports of large food stockpiles exist alongside documented cases of food being spoiled, discarded, or destroyed before reaching civilians, indicating that available supplies are not always managed or distributed effectively.

At the same time, Hamas continues to influence the movement and circulation of goods within Gaza through taxation, control over the release of commodities and interference in commercial activity. These practices distort market conditions, affect food availability and undermine the equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance.

One key barrier to efficient aid distribution is storage, wastage, and controlled circulation. The Hamas-controlled Gaza Chamber of Commerce stated on 12 June 2026 that Gaza had more than six months of food and clothing stocks, compatible with our own calculations of entry vs the need[8]. The surplus food accumulated during the ceasefire period is substantially greater than the pre-war food stocks in Gaza, according to one study.[9] While WFP and the Nutritional Cluster have expanded storage capacity in Gaza in coordination with COGAT and the CMCC, it appears that storage capacity is insufficient to meet the incoming supply which, as shown above, exceeds the assessed needs.

Reports from Gaza reinforce the concern. On 22 June 2026, authorities reported 423 kg of spoiled refrigerated chicken in the Central Governorate[10]; more than 5 tons of rotten, insect-infested cheese in Gaza Governorate[11]; and at least 294 kg of mortadella, meat and frozen chicken destroyed or seized at Yarmouk Market[12]. Khan Younis reports identified 1,000 kg of spoiled frozen food and dairy products

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[8] https://t.me/ShehabTelegram/664658

[9] Checchi F, Ververs M, Jamaluddine Z. Wartime food availability in the Gaza Strip, October 2023 to August 2024: a retrospective analysis. BMJ Glob Health. 2025 Nov 4;10(11):e020648. doi: 10.1136/bmjgh-2025-020648. PMID: 41192926;. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/41192926/ ;estimated pre-war stocks held by merchants, WFP, UNRWA and households at 314.1 billion kcal, or about 125,640 tons using 2.5 kcal/kg. It should be noted that this author has produced several controversial articles on Gaza since October 7 which were consistently negative towards Israel. This assessment of pre-war stocks is cited here as a reference precisely because it cannot be suspected of being biased in Israel's favor.

[10] Ministry of National Economy - Southern Governorates, Facebook post, 22 June 2026, 13:27. https://www.facebook.com/mneps1/posts/pfbid0uLJSFPBvcqRi3ABLm8WYhx14nNz1EHidYH9bXjaZ9C43UCzdeA94nxjjK79wf376l

[11] Ministry of National Economy - Southern Governorates, 22 June 2026, 13:23https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18pw8wFcUg/

[12] Ministry of National Economy - Southern Governorates, , 22 June 2026, 13:29. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1RgxyHTKLc/

on 20 April[13][14] and 600 kg of spoiled chicken and fish on 9 May[15][16]. Additional incidents include 8 tons of spoiled frozen meat discarded by merchants[17], 2.5 tons of spoiled frozen food after poor merchant storage[18], and 704 kg of expired toast/rusks and biscuits in Nuseirat[19]. While these incidents are not exhaustive or representative accounting of waste, they serve as an indication that large scale spoilage is indeed occurring.

[13] Khan Yunes Municipality: : https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19nSnuJBzi/?mibextid=wwXIfr
[14] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19nSnuJBzi/?mibextid=wwXIfr
[15] Aswar al-Suq Gaza / Khan Younis municipal report, 9 May 2026. https://did.li/vY2ZH
[16] https://did.li/vY2ZH
[17] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DXttBeDFeq6/?igsh=MXhuc2Y2cmZoaXJsZg==
[18] https://t.me/ShehabTelegram/649295
[19]https://www.facebook.com/mneps1/posts/pfbid0uLJSFPBvcqRi3ABLm8WYhx14nNz1EHidYH9bXjaZ9C43UCzdeA94nxjjK79wf376l?rdid=9C3saSp7fx0ggRNs&share_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fshare%2Fp%2F17uJ1Vovfn%2F#

WASH and Medical response

Water, Sanitation, Hygiene, and Medical Supply: approvals, infrastructure and delivery execution

In close coordination with UN agencies, international organizations and partner countries, Israel continues to facilitate humanitarian initiatives that expand water access, strengthen medical services, and improve WASH conditions across the Strip. While significant challenges remain, particularly in sanitation and wastewater management due to the concentration of large civilian populations in limited areas under Hamas' control, the following sections outline the practical measures taken to address these challenges and improve humanitarian conditions across the Gaza Strip.

WASH

The current water supply to Gaza is significantly above the basic humanitarian threshold. According to the commonly used WHO emergency benchmark of 20 liters per person per day,[20] Gaza's population of approximately 2.1 million people requires roughly 42,000 cubic meters of water per day for drinking, cooking and basic hygiene. According to that standard, about 10-15 percent of this volume should be drinking water and the rest used for cooking, washing and basic sanitation. Currently, facilitated supply from external water lines and desalination facilities exceeds 70,000 cubic meters per day on average, excluding an unknown amount being pumped from local wells.[21] This place the likely supply per capita in practice to at least 40 liters per day.

The main sources are three water lines from Israel: the Bani Suheila and Birkat Sa'id water lines, each providing approximately 14,000 cubic meters per day, and the Nahal Oz water line, supplying approximately 16,000 cubic meters per day; the Emirati line from Egypt, supplying more than 5,000 cubic meters per day; and the southern desalination facilities, which provide approximately 18,000 cubic meters per day. In addition, at least 170[22] local wells and pumping facilities continue operating across the Strip through fuel and maintenance coordination with the UN and international organizations.

According to operational data reported by humanitarian organizations, water distribution across the Gaza Strip relies on a combination of water trucking, transmission networks and public distribution points Approximately 250 water trucks operate daily across the Strip, distributing an estimated 12,500 cubic meters of water per day, including roughly 90 trucks in the north and 160 trucks in the south. Internal

[20] https://www.who.int/teams/environment-climate-change-and-health/water-sanitation-and-health/environmental-health-in-emergencies/humanitarian-emergencies

[21] Before the October 7 Hamas attack and the ensuing war, some 87% of Gaza's water supply originated from local wells according to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics.

[22] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JlygFp0efaWfCsqD7jfxGlmm2Y0kefuW/view

transmission networks also move water from wells or desalination facilities to shelter compounds, camps and distribution points. More than 50 water filling points and approximately 2,800 water distribution points operate with support from the international community and local authorities providing broad coverage across the Gaza Strip.

Since the ceasefire, Israel has coordinated repeated repairs and operational interventions to preserve and restore water transmission infrastructure. These included repairs to the Nahal Oz, Birkat Sa'id, and Bani Suheila water lines, as well as repeated repairs to the Kela electricity line, which feeds the southern UNICEF desalination facility. The repair log shows repeated coordination between September 2025 and June 2026, including repairs to the Nahal Oz line in September 2025, February 2026, March 2026, and May 2026; repairs to the Birkat Sa'id line in October 2025 and March 2026; repairs to the Bani Suheila line in December 2025, March 2026 and June 2026; and several repairs to the Kela electricity line in January, March and April 2026. Thus, COGAT not only facilitates water flow **into** Gaza, but also the maintenance of the infrastructure that enables water production and distribution **within** Gaza. All this is done in spite the continued efforts by Hamas to divert WASH-related material for rebuilding its terror infrastructure, particularly pipes of different kinds which is uses for weapons production.[23]

At the same time, important sanitation challenges remain, particularly in the fields of wastewater management, solid waste disposal and sewage infrastructure in densely populated areas. In response, Israel and international partners continue to advance practical solutions, including the entry of approximately 900 water distribution kits for shelters, dozens of water tankers and waste collection vehicles, nearly 200,000 sanitation and pest control items, and approximately 200 tons of pesticides, traps and pest control equipment. A UNDP-coordinated pest-control campaign has already reached approximately 1,800 locations, with additional locations planned. International organizations are also implementing complementary projects, including pumping stations, restoration of sewage lines, construction of more than 100,000 cesspits, chemical toilet compounds, expanded water trucking operations and additional waste management solutions across the Gaza Strip.

Israel continues to facilitate the entry of WASH equipment and infrastructure repairment coordinations by humanitarian organizations. However, the WASH supply pipeline shows a sharp gap between approvals and implementation. Since the beginning of 2026, 22,102 pallets of WASH-related supplies were approved for UN agencies and international organizations through the UN2720 mechanism, much of it routed through Jordan. In practice, only 1,999 pallets, 9 percent of the total, were coordinated and

[23] Hamas has not been hiding this practice, as shown in this video published by the terror organization in 2023: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZn2h_UQ-Hk

brought into Gaza. The remaining 91 percent were never brought to Kerem Shalom or the relevant Israel-Jordan crossing by the organizations that requested and received the approvals (see figures 2 & 3).

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

Figure 2*: Entry of WASH and Medical products between January-May 2026.*



Figure 3: *91% of WASH and 69% percent of Health products between January-May 2026 were never delivered.*

Medical response: supply, approvals and operational expansion

Since the beginning of the ceasefire, 18,000 tons of medical supplies and medicines have entered Gaza, in accordance with requests submitted by the UN, international organizations and other medical partners. These supplies include medicines, ultrasound machines, blood-testing devices, first-aid kits, medical laboratory equipment, hospital beds, X-ray machines, ventilators, generators, dialysis-related supplies, orthopedic equipment, surgical equipment, pharmacy refrigerators, cardiac pacemakers and additional medical equipment. These supplies are used by permanent hospitals, field hospitals, medical centers and dozens of clinics operated or supported by the UN, international organizations and partner countries. In northern Gaza, there are currently 8 permanent hospitals, 2 field hospitals and 4 medical centers operating. In southern Gaza, there are 3 permanent hospitals, 9 field hospitals and 2 medical centers, alongside additional medical facilities and clinics supported by international organizations.

The humanitarian surge which followed the ceasefire brought on a rapid increase in the capacity of health facilities in Gaza. According to WHO, the number of hospital beds increased from 2,009 in the beginning of October 2025[24] to 3,120 by the end of May 2025,[25] a 55% increase which brought this figure close to its pre-war level (3,412).[26] During the same period, the number of Intensive Care Units (ICUs) in Gaza increased by 60% from 67 to 107.

Israel has never, and still does not, subject the supply of medicines to Gaza under any restrictions or quotas. In line with this policy, all submitted requests for medicines since the ceasefire have been approved, and medical supplies have continued entering Gaza according to the requests of international health organizations and partners. In contrast to claims framing medical shortages as resulting from an Israeli prohibition or cap on medicines the record points elsewhere: since the beginning of 2026, 10,336 pallets of health products, 51 percent of them medicines, were approved by Israel through the UN2720 mechanism, operated in cooperation with UNOPS, for UN agencies and international organizations. Yet, only 3,238 pallets were actually brought into Gaza, meaning that 69 percent of approved health products were not brought to the crossing by the organizations that requested and received approval for them. [27] As with WASH-related requests, this points to a delivery bottleneck rather than a COGAT controlled supply bottleneck, at least in the UN 2720 program.

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[24] https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/Sitrep_65.pdf
[25] https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/Sitrep_70b_latest_1.pdf
[26] According to the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Health's Annual Report 2022 (published in May 2023) there were 3,412 hospital beds in Gaza in 2022.
[27] To clarify, this figure refers only to UN2720 mechanism mediated medical supplies since January 2026. Much larger quantities of medical have been transported through other channels since October 2025, as detailed above.

Certain medical items may include dual-use components that can be exploited by Hamas for military purposes. Israel therefore reviews these items carefully. However, dual-use review does not amount to a blanket ban. When a specific item raises a security concern, Israel works with the requesting international organization to identify approved alternatives or technical replacements that meet the same civilian medical need while reducing the risk of diversion or misuse. The actual entry of dual-use and sensitive medical equipment into Gaza shows that the system is not arbitrary: advanced equipment enters when it is coordinated with and supervised by recognized international organizations.

Recent examples demonstrate this point. More than 50 pallets of dual-use medical supplies donated by the ICRC and WHO entered Gaza, including dermatomes, surgical instrumentation kits, orthopedic equipment, dialysis solutions, pharmacy refrigerators, pacemakers and other critical medical equipment. The entry of those supplies was coordinated with the international organizations which requested them to ensure that the equipment reaches its medical destination and is not exploited by Hamas. Similarly, the ICRC field hospital in Al-Mawasi has undergone a major upgrade and expansion through coordinated entry of advanced medical systems, laboratory equipment, ventilators, generators and dozens of new beds. The project expanded hospital capacity, upgraded surgery, emergency medicine and maternity care, added new X-ray systems and generators, improved pediatric and maternity wards, and strengthened mass-casualty preparedness.

The UAE operated medical center in the Khan Younis area provides another example of needs-based medical coordination. Equipment delivered for the Emirati clinic included ultrasound machines, blood-testing devices, first-aid kits, medical laboratory equipment, hospital beds and X-ray machines. The clinic is intended to provide family medicine, pediatric care, dermatology and maternal-health services, and is expected to strengthen access to outpatient and primary medical services in southern Gaza. A separate UK-Med medical center was also established in Gaza City. These examples show that when international partners develop concrete medical projects and coordinate them responsibly, Israel facilitates the entry of the equipment needed to make them operational.

At the same time, since the ceasefire new testimonies have emerged pointing to Hamas's abuse of health facilities in Gaza,[28] a phenomenon which is only rarely acknowledged by humanitarian organizations.[29] In health assistance, as with food and WASH, Hamas remains the main obstacle to further improvement of the humanitarian response.

[28] https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-he-was-torturing-me-inside-the-room-kurdish-doctor-tells-i24news-the-dark-realities-of-living-under-hamas; https://x.com/afalkhatib/status/2069588896133087244;

[29] Medicine San Frontiers (MSN) acknowledged that in Nasser Hospital its "colleagues witnessed a series of incidents, including the presence of masked armed men, others engaging in intimidation and carrying out arbitrary arrests of patients, and one incident that involved the suspected movement of weapons". https://www.msf.org/addressing-frequently-asked-questions-and-allegations-about-msf-work-gaza-palestine.

Conclusion

Hamas remains the principal impediment to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in the Gaza Strip and to any sustainable political or security progress concerning Gaza's future. Its continued refusal to disarm undermines efforts to advance President Trump's Twenty-Point Plan, the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803, and broader international initiatives aimed at stabilizing the situation in the Gaza Strip and paving the way for recovery efforts.

These concerns are increasingly reflected in assessments by the United Nations itself. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recently condemned Hamas' execution of a Gaza resident, while OCHA has documented and criticized Hamas' interference with, and obstruction of, humanitarian operations, highlighting the organization's detrimental impact on the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Concurrently, the humanitarian response is facing growing operational constraints as major UN agencies and international NGOs scale back their activities due to declining donor funding. This reduction in resources is limiting the operational capacity of key humanitarian actors to sustain critical assistance programs.

Despite these challenges, namely Hamas's continued obstruction of humanitarian operations and the growing constraints on humanitarian actors resulting from declining international funding, Israel remains committed to facilitating the humanitarian response in the Gaza Strip in close coordination with the United States, the United Nations and international partners. Through continuous operational coordination, practical solutions and ongoing adaptation to evolving operational conditions, Israel will continue to facilitate humanitarian assistance and support efforts to improve humanitarian conditions for the civilian population of the Gaza Strip, while preventing the exploitation of humanitarian aid by Hamas.