



MFA response to IPC report

The entire IPC document is based on Hamas lies laundered through organizations with vested interests.

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(MFA Spokesperson Announcement)

The IPC has just published a “tailor-made” fabricated report to fit Hamas’s fake campaign.

Unbelievably, the IPC twisted its own rules and ignored its own criteria just to produce false accusations against Israel: the IPC changed its own global standard, cutting the 30% threshold to 15% for this report only, and totally ignoring its second criterion of death rate, solely to serve Hamas’s fake campaign.

The entire IPC document is based on Hamas lies laundered through organizations with vested interests.

There is no famine in Gaza. Over 100,000 trucks of aid have entered Gaza since the start of the war, and in recent weeks a massive influx of aid has flooded the Strip with staple foods and caused a sharp decline in food prices, which have plummeted in the markets.

The laws of supply and demand don’t lie – the IPC does. Every forecast the IPC has made regarding Gaza during the war has proven baseless and completely false.

This assessment too will be thrown into the despicable trash bin of political documents.

<https://www.gov.il/en/pages/mfa-response-to-ipc-report-22-aug-2025>

Footage from Gaza disproves claims of food shortages

As of August 22, 2025, more than 100,000 trucks have transported close to two million tons of food and humanitarian supplies into Gaza.

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As of August 22, 2025, more than 100,000 trucks have transported close to two million tons of food and humanitarian supplies into Gaza. This staggering volume of aid, delivered in coordination with regional and international partners, is a clear testament to the ongoing commitment to meet the basic needs of the population. In addition to overland convoys, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in partnership with Arab and European nations, have coordinated large-scale airdrops and facilitated the delivery of over 23,000 tons of aid since July 27 alone.

Contrary to widely circulated claims of starvation and empty markets, video evidence from inside Gaza shows an abundance of food and goods available in local markets. This visual proof directly undermines the narrative of widespread famine and proves that supplies are reaching their intended destinations.

Despite allegations of famine and deliberate starvation in the Gaza Strip, close examination of facts on the ground, supported by available evidence, discredits these claims and demonstrates a consistent effort to provide humanitarian relief to Gaza's civilian population.

Israel has made it explicitly clear that all humanitarian efforts are intended to support the civilian population of Gaza—not militant factions such as Hamas. The government has consistently refuted any suggestion that starvation is being used as a weapon of war, and has sought to ensure that aid is distributed to those in need.

The main impediment to aid delivery in Gaza, however, stems not from insufficient supply or deliberate withholding, but from the actions of Hamas. The group's interception and diversion of aid for its own benefit undermines the humanitarian mission and prolongs civilian suffering.

Every stolen truckload or misused food parcel strengthens the group's grip on Gaza and perpetuates the conflict.

As these videos clearly show, the allegation of famine in Gaza does not withstand scrutiny when confronted with the facts. While challenges remain, particularly in the form of obstruction and misuse by Hamas, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that there is no orchestrated or widespread famine in Gaza.



Politics Disguised as Science: The Credibility Crisis of IPC “Famine” Analyses in Gaza

Introduction: The Gaza City Famine Declaration

On 22 August 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) issued an analysis declaring famine in Gaza City. While the IPC has previously confirmed famine in other crises, this was the first such declaration for Gaza — and the first based on evidence that fell far short of the system’s own established standards. Famine classifications are meant to be exceptional, invoked only when mortality and malnutrition rates clearly and indisputably exceed the most extreme thresholds. In Gaza City, however, the declaration was issued not only without evidence that would justify it under the IPC’s own criteria, but also on the basis of partial or misrepresented data — most prominently an alleged breach of the acute malnutrition threshold presented as key justification.

Before turning to statistics and methodologies, it should be emphasized that Israel is fully aware of the complex humanitarian challenges in Gaza and has taken numerous steps — some unprecedented in the history of warfare — to mitigate them. These efforts are carried out in close cooperation with a wide array of international partners. Reports that misinform the public are counterproductive to this work and merely politicize a discourse that should remain professional and objective.

Omission and Misrepresentation of Malnutrition Data

The IPC’s conclusion that Gaza City crossed the famine threshold rests on the claim that acute malnutrition among children supposedly rose from about 10% in the first half of July to around 16% in the second half — suggesting not only a breach of the 15% “famine threshold”, but also a sharp upward trend.

There are, however, two fundamental problems with this claim:

1. **Use of incomplete data**

The report relied on **only half of the data** actually collected in July — five sub-samples covering 7,519 children, described on [pages 49–50 of the FRC report](#), with a combined average of roughly 16% — just above the threshold.

By contrast, a Nutrition Cluster presentation released on August 8 — a week before the August 15 cut-off date — reported the [full July sample of 15,749 children](#). Those results showed unweighted and weighted GAM rates of 13.5% and 12.2%, respectively — both well below the famine threshold.

2. **Misreporting of “trend”**

In addition, the alleged rise from 10% in early July to around 16% later in the month is not supported by the data in the report. In fact, the averages from their own partial dataset are 16.7% for the first half and 16.1% for the second — essentially flat, not rising.

In short: the IPC ignored the complete July data, which placed Gaza City well below the threshold, and instead relied on its partial dataset, misrepresented to suggest an upward trend. This distortion of malnutrition data propped up the famine designation — a designation that would have collapsed had the IPC acknowledged the complete July results.

Mortality Estimates Built on Sand

The IPC itself acknowledged that available data on non-trauma mortality were nowhere near the famine threshold of **2 deaths per 10,000 people per day**. Based on its own population estimate for Gaza Governorate — about 937,600 people — this threshold would correspond to roughly 188 non-trauma deaths per day. By contrast, the Hamas-run Ministry of Health reported that as of 15 August the five-day moving average across all of Gaza was just six “malnutrition-related deaths” per day.

Even if every one of these had occurred in Gaza City and were actual malnutrition-related excess deaths, the non-trauma death rate would still be **an order of magnitude lower than the famine threshold**.

To explain away this gap, IPC claimed that large numbers of deaths went unreported. It cited studies — including one authored by a Famine Review Committee member and [criticised for serious methodological flaws](#) — suggesting that wartime trauma deaths were undercounted by about 60% compared to MoH figures. It also referred to an unpublished Médecins Sans Frontières survey of its staff and families, which estimated a total death rate of 0.4 per 10,000 people (three-quarters trauma, one-quarter non-trauma). Yet neither source supports IPC’s assertion that unreported non-trauma deaths were order of magnitude higher than recorded, or that Gaza City crossed the famine mortality threshold.

With no direct evidence, IPC resorted to inference. It argued that widespread malnutrition, collapsed health and sanitation systems, and outbreaks of disease have historically coincided with high famine mortality. On this basis, it concluded that the alleged “exponential rise” in malnutrition must inevitably be accompanied by an exponential increase in mortality, and presented this assumption as “reasonable evidence” that the famine mortality threshold had been breached.

To summarize – the famine classification in Gaza City rested on a two-stage manipulation:

1. IPC misrepresented partial July data as evidence of a breach in the GAM threshold and a sharp upward trend.
2. It carried this manufactured “exponential rise” in malnutrition into its mortality analysis, using it as the central justification for inferring vast numbers of unreported deaths — despite all available evidence showing mortality rates far below famine levels.

Positive Trends Ignored by the IPC

The analysis also downplayed or disregarded newer information — available well before the 15 August cut-off date — that pointed to clear signs of improvement:

- **Sharp rise in aid deliveries and distributions:** From the second half of July, the volume of food and humanitarian supplies entering Gaza increased markedly, with expanded distribution mechanisms reaching much wider portions of the population.
- **Steep decline in market prices:** Food prices, which had spiked in June and early July, began to fall at the end of July and dropped steeply in early August — a strong indicator of improving availability and access.
- **Documented measures by Israel to expand humanitarian access:** These included daily humanitarian pauses (misleadingly referenced as a single event in the IPC report), the opening of crossings and supply routes, repairs to water and electricity lines, and other steps reported in real time ([this document by COGAT](#)).

A Pattern of Eroding Standards

The issues outlined above — misrepresented malnutrition data, speculative mortality assumptions, and the omission of evidence showing improvement — point to deeper problems in IPC's approach. The Gaza City declaration was not merely an isolated error; it illustrates a broader erosion of standards in IPC's reporting. Since October 2023, thresholds have been blurred until they lost meaning, criteria applied inconsistently, and worst-case assumptions repeatedly elevated as central conclusions — the Gaza City "famine" designation is just the starkest example of this trend.

The second part of this document examines in greater depth the principles the IPC system is meant to uphold and the methodological flaws that have characterized its Gaza reporting since the start of the war.

The IPC and Gaza: A Case Study in Broken Principles

What is IPC?

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is the UN-backed system for assessing and communicating food insecurity and famine risk. It has become the central reference point for governments, humanitarian agencies, media, and even international legal bodies. Since October 2023, five IPC reports and two alerts on Gaza have been published, cited widely in the UN Security Council, in proceedings before the International Court of Justice, and across international media. The IPC is [funded by a consortium of major donors—including the EU, the UK, Germany, and Canada \(with USAID participating until 2025\)](#), which gives its outputs both political weight and global visibility.

IPC and the Principle of Neutrality

One of the IPC's core principles is **neutrality**. The classification system was designed to avoid politicisation by grounding food security analysis in [transparent, evidence-based, and multi-stakeholder consensus processes](#). To achieve this, the IPC relies on national **Technical Working Groups (TWGs)** that bring together government institutions, UN agencies, NGOs, and donors. Where a TWG cannot function — for example in conflict settings — the IPC permits **Globally-Led Analyses** conducted by its Global Support Unit.

Furthermore, the [IPC official guidance](#) requires that its "analyses are fully transparent as to how findings were reached and conclusions made, ensuring credibility at every stage of the process.", meaning that it must draw "on existing evidence in the public domain" so that "all underlying data should be accessible to anyone."

Gaza as a Case Study in Neutrality Breach

The Gaza IPC reports show how these safeguards broke down. Each Special Brief carried the disclaimer: "Produced by the IPC Global Initiative and not necessarily reflecting the views of stakeholders in Palestine". Strikingly, the sentence makes no mention of stakeholders in Israel, even though both IPC's own reports and international NGOs consistently frame Israel as the actor primarily responsible for humanitarian access into Gaza. More importantly, Israel was not merely omitted in name - it was excluded from active participation in the analysis and denied any opportunity to provide its perspective on the complete body of the evidence or the conclusions drawn.

This absence stripped the process of the rigorous multi-stakeholder validation that IPC methodology normally demands - instead, the Gaza analyses were produced behind closed doors by a small, homogeneous circle of humanitarian experts, whose views remained largely anonymous and unchallenged.

Structural Consequences of Exclusion

The practical effects of excluding Israel were evident in the numerous major factual errors and methodological flaws that appeared in the IPC's reporting on Gaza since October 7.

These flaws were presented in detail both to the IPC's Famine Review Committee and were also published in documents that are available online:

1. [Analysis of the IPC report of March 2024 \(published in May 2024\)](#)
2. [Analysis of the IPC report of June 2024 \(published in August 2024\)](#)
3. COGAT's responses to the "IPC alerts" in [November 2024](#) and [July 2025](#)

Similar critiques were published also by various independent researchers.

The IPC never responded or addressed that criticism, nor were any corrections or retractions made.

They reflect the absence of scrutiny that a genuine multi-stakeholder process would have provided. Lacking a feedback loop, incomplete and erroneous data remained uncorrected, consistently biasing results toward worst-case scenarios.

Forecast Bias: Predicting Decline, Ignoring Improvement

This problem is particularly visible in projections - in every single Gaza analysis since October 2023, forecasts predicted worsening conditions, that is, larger shares of the population in Phase 4 and Phase 5. Yet subsequent reports often showed the opposite trend of improvement.

For example, the March 2024 report projected that the share of people in Phase 5 would rise from 30% to 50%. In reality, the percentage fell to 15%. Yet despite this reversal, the following projection again assumed deterioration, forecasting a rise to 22%. The next report, however, showed further improvement - to just 6%. This pattern reveals a clear directional bias: [worst-case scenarios were systematically deemed as the likely ones](#), while evidence of recovery was consistently downplayed or disregarded

Bending the Rules: Lack of Analytical Rigor

One of the clearest problems in the Gaza IPC reports was the way they handled malnutrition screenings data. Representative weight-for-height (WHZ) surveys, the gold standard for diagnosing acute malnutrition, were never conducted - instead, IPC reports relied almost exclusively on mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) data. While MUAC can be used under IPC rules, the guidelines explicitly clarify that there are no globally developed cut-off thresholds for phase classification and require that the results are carefully [interpreted against local conditions](#), including historical baselines and relationship between MUAC and WHZ. However, none of those safeguards were followed in Gaza.

Normally, MUAC-based rates tend to be lower than those based on WHZ, but in Gaza the situation was reversed – before the war, MUAC prevalence was around five times higher than WHZ ([roughly 4% vs. 0.8%](#)). This striking fact, which IPC’s own methodology requires to be taken into account as critical context for analysing screenings results, was systematically ignored.

Even more problematic, [the most recent IPC alert](#) described the 15 percent MUAC reference point as a “famine threshold”, even though the IPC manual defines it solely as the cut-off for Phase 4 (‘Emergency’), not Phase 5 (‘Famine’). By using the “famine threshold” misnomer, IPC blurred a key distinction in its own classification system, lowering the bar for famine designations and making the situation appear worse than the data justified.

Facility Screenings Misused as Representative Data

A further problem was IPC’s reliance on **clinic-based screenings**. Sentinel sites in hospitals and health centres can provide useful early-warning signals, but they do not represent the general population. Children brought to clinics are more likely to be sick or undernourished than those in the wider community, which naturally pushes prevalence rates upward. **Consequently, IPC guidance** [explicitly prohibits using such data in IPC analysis](#).

In Gaza, however, those guidelines were ignored and health facility screenings have been routinely used as an integral part of the malnutrition dataset. In other words, what should have been flagged as **indicative signals**, at best, were instead treated as hard evidence, distorting the overall picture of nutritional conditions.

Taken together, these practices show a consistent lack of analytical rigor and consistency. MUAC was stripped of the contextualisation required by IPC's own rules, thresholds were misrepresented, and clinic screenings were treated as if they were population surveys. Each of these shortcuts tilted the analysis toward more severe classifications than the evidence could sustain.

Conclusions at Odds with the Evidence

Beyond methodological shortcuts, several IPC Gaza outputs reached conclusions that were directly inconsistent with the evidence presented.

[Mortality data ignored or downplayed](#). Throughout the war, the IPC analysis ignored the fact that official figures for malnutrition-related deaths were orders of magnitude below the thresholds it prescribes for crude death rates (CDR) and under-five mortality. At no point did the mortality evidence come close to justifying a famine declaration, or even a Phase 4 classification. When a systematic mortality survey — required under IPC methodology — was finally conducted, its results conflicted with the phase classifications being advanced. Instead of prompting correction, the inconsistency was downplayed: only the aggregate death rates were released, while [the more decisive non-violent mortality figures, central to famine determination, were withheld](#) and requests to release the full survey data were ignored, in direct violation of the transparency principle. However, even the published total death rates remained well below famine thresholds - a fact that was brushed aside in the final conclusions.

Malnutrition rates not consistent with phase designation. Similarly, the MUAC prevalence rates themselves rarely supported the severity of the classifications. For much of the period, they were below the 15 percent Phase 4 threshold, and in most cases [well within Phase 3 or even Phase 2 territory](#). Yet the reports continued to project worsening conditions and “imminent famine”.

The June 2024 Famine Review Committee report. The clearest example of conclusions contradicting evidence came in the June 2024 FRC review. That report presented a number of food consumption indicators that pointed to a relatively small share of the population in Phase 4 and Phase 5. However, [the percentages cited in the final report were several times higher than what the actual hard data suggested](#). This demonstrated not only weak methodology, but also a willingness to override the data to sustain a narrative of crisis.

Lack of Transparency

Although the IPC formally upholds transparency as one of its guiding principles, the Gaza analyses often fell short of this standard. Repeatedly, the reports relied on datasets that were not publicly available, preventing independent verification. At the same time, requests to access the underlying data - or even to obtain clarification on the reasoning process that produced the final classifications - were routinely ignored. The result was a process that not only lacked

transparency in practice, but also undermined confidence in the credibility and robustness of the conclusions.

Conclusion: A Systemic Bias and Credibility Problem

The Gaza IPC reports reveal more than isolated technical errors. They expose a systematic lowering of standards: neutrality safeguards abandoned, critical stakeholders excluded, data selectively used, projections skewed toward worst cases, famine thresholds bent until they no longer matched the IPC manual, and transparency sidelined as key datasets and analytical reasoning remained inaccessible to outside scrutiny.

Analyses that should have reflected transparent, evidence-based consensus were instead produced by a narrow circle of actors, relying on non-public data, without the inclusive multi-stakeholder validation that IPC requires, and in disregard of the system's own rules. Given the enormous political and legal weight attached to IPC outputs, this pattern is not just a technical flaw — it is a credibility crisis for the IPC system as a whole.

<https://govextra.gov.il/mda/ipc/gaza/>