RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AND DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1986

Part I. Questions considered by the Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security

ITEMS RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The situation in the Middle East

Decisions

At its 2640th meeting, on 13 January 1986, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Israel, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Syrian Arab Republic to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East: letter dated 6 January 1986 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17717)”.2

At its 2641st meeting, on 13 January 1986, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Qatar and Saudi Arabia to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2642nd meeting, on 17 January 1986, the Council decided to invite the representative of Morocco to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

In a letter dated 17 April 1986,3 the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council of his intention, subject to the usual consultations, to appoint Major-General Gustav Hägglund of Finland, who was serving as Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, to replace Lieutenant-General William Callaghan of Ireland as Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. In a letter dated 24 April 1986,4 the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

“I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 17 April 19865 concerning your intention to appoint Major-General Gustav Hägglund of Finland as the new commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in informal consultations held on 24 April and agreed with the proposal contained in your letter.”

At its 2681st meeting, on 18 April 1986, the Council decided to invite the representative of Lebanon to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/17965)”.6

Resolution 583 (1986)

of 18 April 1986

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 9 April 1986,8 and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General of 1 April 1986,7

3 S/18032.
4 S/18033.
5 S/18034.
6 S/18035.
7 S/18036.
9 Ibid., document S/18035.
10 Ibid., document S/18036.
Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of three months, that is, until 19 July 1986;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Council thereon by 19 June 1986.

Adopted unanimously at the 2687th meeting.

Decision

At its 2687th meeting, on 29 May 1986, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/18061)”.

Resolution 584 (1986)

of 29 May 1986

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 30 November 1986;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

Adopted unanimously at the 2687th meeting.

Decisions

At the same meeting, following the adoption of resolution 584 (1986), the President made the following statement:

“In connection with the resolution just adopted on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, I have been authorized to make the following complementary statement on behalf of the Security Council:

“...As is known, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, states, in paragraph 25: ‘Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached.’ That statement of the Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security Council.”

In a letter dated 2 June 1986, the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council of his intention, subject to the usual consultation, to appoint Major-General Gustaf Wehn of Sweden to replace Major-General Gustaf Hagglund of Finland as Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. The President, after consultations with the members of the Council, addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General:

“I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 June 1986 concerning your intention of appointing Major-General Gustaf Wehn of Sweden as Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in informal consultations held on 5 June and agreed with the proposal contained in your letter.”

On 6 June 1986, following consultations, the President of the Council issued the following statement on behalf of the members of the Council:

“The members of the Security Council are gravely concerned at the continuing intensification of the fighting in Beirut, especially in and around the Palestinian refugee camps, with its high toll of casualties and material destruction.

“The members of the Security Council appeal to all concerned to use their influence in bringing about the cessation of the fighting in order to enable the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East as well as other humanitarian organizations to mount emergency operations for the benefit of the populations concerned, including the Palestinian refugees towards whom the international community has a particular responsibility.

“They reaffirm that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon must be respected.
LETTER DATED 1 APRIL 1986 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government has decided to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is due to expire on 19 April 1986, for a further period of six months, in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), as well as of other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

I wish to stress that the Lebanese Government is convinced, despite the current situation in southern Lebanon, that UNIFIL, which symbolizes the will of the international community, continues to be an important factor for stability and the best available option for ensuring peace and security in the region, precisely at this time when further sustained efforts are still needed to enable UNIFIL completely to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

The Lebanese Government would like to express its gratitude on this occasion and to pay tribute to UNIFIL and to the troop-contributing countries for the efforts and sacrifices which they are making in order to serve the cause of peace in Lebanon.

I should be grateful if you would kindly bring the text of this letter to the attention of members of the Security Council and have it circulated as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Rachid PAKHOURY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 11 October 1985 to 9 April 1986)

Introduction

1. In its resolution 575 (1985) of 17 October 1985, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, until 19 April 1986. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978); called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolution 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council.

2. On 16 December 1985, the Secretary-General submitted an interim report to the Security Council on his consultations and on the developments in the UNIFIL area until that date (S/17684). The present report contains an account of developments relating to UNIFIL from 11 October 1985 to 9 April 1986.

Organization of the Force

3. As of April 1986, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Infantry battalions

- Fiji   626
- Finland 511
- France  609
- Ghana  580
- Ireland 644
- Nepal  800
- Norway 650
In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL was assisted by 75 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). These unarmed observers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and are under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan.

4. On 24 October 1985, the Netherlands Infantry Company withdrew from UNIFIL (see S/17557, para. 12), and its area was taken over by the Fijian and Nepalese battalions. At the request of the Secretary-General, the Government of Nepal made available an additional infantry company, which joined the battalion on 25 February 1986. The deployment of UNIFIL as of April 1986 is shown on the annexed map.

5. The military observers of UNTSO continued to man the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line and a post at Chateau de Beaufort. They also maintained teams at Tyre and Metulla. In addition, they operated six mobile teams within the UNIFIL area of operation, and a seventh mobile team was added on 1 April 1986.

6. The Lebanese internal security forces continued to co-operate with UNIFIL in maintaining order in its area of deployment and assisted it in special investigations of mutual concern. The Lebanese army unit serving with UNIFIL maintained a strength of some 100, all ranks. One part of the unit was stationed in Tyre and the other part was deployed in the UNIFIL area and attached to different battalions.

7. Logistic support for UNIFIL continued to be provided by the logistic branch comprising the French logistic component, the Norwegian maintenance unit, the Ghanaian engineer unit, the Swedish medical company and the Italian helicopter wing. UNIFIL continued to experience difficulties in transporting goods from Beirut to its area. In these circumstances, the largest part of UNIFIL supplies had to be shipped through Tel Aviv and Haifa. Despite the difficulties involved, certain supplies, particularly fresh rations, petroleum products and other commodities, were procured from Lebanese sources. A small transit base was established in Tyre for this purpose and became operational in mid-February 1986.
8. The Italian helicopter wing continued to provide logistic support to UNIFIL, as well as humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. On 5 February 1986, a helicopter on its way from Beirut to Naqoura was forced inland near Sidon by strong winds. A few kilometres east of Sidon it was hit by ground fire from a local militia and forced to land. The militia men explained that they had opened fire in the belief that it was an Israeli helicopter. The helicopter was damaged beyond repair, but passengers and crew escaped serious injury.

9. In addition to its other tasks, the French engineer company continued to demolish unexploded mines, shells and bombs discovered by UNIFIL patrols or local inhabitants. It demolished 12 roadside bombs, 38 Katyusha rockets and numerous other explosive charges. A new development during the period was the appearance of booby-trapped explosive devices and advanced remote control mechanisms.

10. During the period under review, 10 members of the Force died. Three (a Fijian, a Ghanaian and a Nepalese) were killed by hostile gunfire. The other 7 (1 Fijian, 1 Finn, 2 Frenchmen, 2 Ghanaians and 1 Norwegian) died from accidents or other causes. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 121 members of the Force have died; 47 of them as a result of firing and mine explosions, 56 in accidents and 18 from other causes. Some 164 have been wounded in armed clashes, shellings and mine explosions.

11. The discipline and bearing of the members of UNIFIL, as well as of the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force, have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, their commanders and their countries.

Situation in the UNIFIL area

12. Israel has continued to maintain in southern Lebanon a "security zone", which is manned by the so-called "South Lebanon Army" (SLA) with the assistance of elements of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). The boundaries of the "security zone" have not been defined but are in effect determined by the positions maintained by IDF and SLA in southern Lebanon and the patrols they conduct between them. It embraces all of the area adjacent to the international border in which UNIFIL had previously been unable fully to exercise its functions (the "enclave"), parts of the areas of deployment of the Nepalese, Irish, Ghanaian and Finnish battalions, the whole of the area of deployment of the Norwegian battalion and extensive areas to the north of the UNIFIL area of deployment. Within the UNIFIL area, IDF and SLA at present maintain 15 positions, which are marked in red on the map annexed to this report. When the UNIFIL area overlaps the "security zone", IDF/SLA personnel impose restrictions on the movement and deployment of UNIFIL similar to those obtaining in the "enclave".

13. During the period under review, the UNIFIL area outside the "security zone" remained relatively quiet. Within the "security zone", however, the situation continued to be very tense. Armed resistance groups continued to launch frequent attacks against IDF and SLA in the "security zone". IDF/SLA personnel carried out a number of search operations in that part of the "security zone" that overlaps the UNIFIL area of deployment. The incidents that took place during the first two months of the reporting period were described in the Secretary-General's interim report of 16 December 1985 (S/17664).
14. At the end of December 1985, the situation further deteriorated. Incidents became more violent, and there were more casualties. The main incidents are summarized in the following paragraphs.

15. On 30 December, two civilian cars transporting IDF/SLA personnel were attacked by unidentified persons near the village of Kunin in the border area between the Irish battalion sector and the enclave. Two SLA personnel were killed and four were wounded. One Israeli soldier was also injured. Shortly after that incident, a group of IDF/SLA personnel arrived in the village of Kunin and all the inhabitants left the village. Ten villagers in the nearby village of Bayt Yahun were also reported to have been expelled. Later the same day, after a "security zone" position had been hit by four rockets from an unidentified source, SLA personnel in that position fired on the villages of Haddathah and Ayta Az Zutt - also in the Irish sector - with heavy machine guns. On the following morning, a group of SLA personnel went back to the village of Kunin, looted some houses and blew up two of them. On 1 January, a group of unidentified armed elements made an incursion into a security zone position near Brashit. SLA personnel in a nearby position then fired on Tibnin, Haddathah and Ayta Az Zutt, using tanks and heavy machine guns. Thirteen houses in Tibnin and Haddathah were damaged.

16. UNIFIL troops were not deployed in the Kunin area but upon learning of the incident of 30 December, a group of United Nations military observers was dispatched to the area to monitor the situation. UNIFIL gave the displaced persons food, shelter and other humanitarian assistance and provided transport facilities for those who wanted to proceed to other villages where they had relatives. During the same week, there were also reports of several rockets fired across the border into northern Israel; on 2 January, a rocket landed in Kiryat Shemona, causing some damage.

17. In connection with these incidents in and near Kunin, UNIFIL maintained close contact with the Israeli authorities and other parties concerned in order to quieten the situation. In particular, it endeavoured to establish a presence in the area in order, inter alia, to facilitate the return of the displaced villagers to Kunin. Unfortunately, its proposals were not accepted by the Israeli authorities.

18. On 16 January 1986, a car accompanying a light truck carrying an Israeli soldier and five SLA personnel was damaged by a roadside bomb near At Tiri and two of its occupants were injured. Shortly afterwards, an IDF/SLA convoy arrived on the scene. Eight local inhabitants were detained temporarily. The next day, IDF/SLA personnel carried out a search operation at At Tiri. Two villagers were taken prisoner and some houses were damaged.

19. On the evening of 21 January, a "security zone" position west of Bayt Yahun was attacked by unidentified armed elements with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. The personnel manning the positions returned fire and also shelled Haddathah, damaging two houses. In a similar incident on 25 January, after an exchange of fire with unidentified armed elements, the personnel in a "security zone" position east of Yatar fired five tank rounds and two mortar rounds into Kafra, killing a young woman as well as a Nepalese soldier of UNIFIL who was on patrol. In addition, three women and two men were wounded in the firing, and
two houses were damaged. Later that day, six mortar rounds were fired from the "security zone" position west of Bayt Yahun. One of these rounds impacted in Ayta Az Sutt, four rounds in the vicinity of Haris and one round near a UNIFIL vehicle travelling between Haddathah and Rshaf. Further, on 29 January, a tank round was fired into Haris from the "security zone" position east of Yatar. The round did only light damage to a house, but it landed close to a school, which was full of children at the time. These incidents of indiscriminate firing into villages were protested to the Israeli authorities.

20. On 12 February, a roadside bomb exploded on a track west of Saff al Hawa, killing one member of SLA and wounding three others. Subsequently, IDF/SLA personnel entered At Tiri, firing indiscriminately, and proceeded to search the village. A man was hit by a bullet and later evacuated by UNIFIL to Tibnin. The search party arrested one man. It also set fire to three houses. That same day, an explosion took place on the road leading to the "security zone" position east of Yatar. The personnel in the position then fired five tank rounds into Kafra, damaging a vacant building.

21. On 17 February, two vehicles transporting IDF/SLA personnel were ambushed by unidentified armed elements near the village of Kunin in the same area as the incident of 30 December 1985. Two persons believed to be Lebanese were killed and two Israeli soldiers were abducted. Following this incident, an Israeli force of about three mechanized battalions accompanied by members of SLA and supported by tanks and helicopter troop carriers and gunships carried out a series of cordon and search operations in the UNIFIL area from 17 to 22 February. The villages affected included Brashit, Haddathah, Tibnin, Shaqrah, Haris and Safad in the Irish battalion sector, Tayr Zibna, Kafr Dunin, Khirbat Silm, Qabrikha, As Sawwannah, Tulin, Majdal Silm and As Sultaniyah in the Ghanaian battalion sector and Burj Qallawiya, Dayr Kifa and Frun in the Finnish battalion sector. UNIFIL reported that 6 persons, including 1 IDF soldier, were killed in the operations, 10 were wounded and about 140 others were taken prisoner by IDF/SLA. Of those taken prisoner, approximately 60 are still under detention at the time of reporting. Additionally, one Irish soldier was wounded when SLA personnel fired on an Irish camp near Haris and a member of the Ghanaian battalion sustained injuries when IDF/SLA personnel opened fire on the Ghana battalion headquarters in Kafr Dunin.

22. During the above operation, UNIFIL personnel monitored the situation as closely as possible and tried to prevent acts of violence against the local population. They observed some cases of what appeared to be unacceptable treatment of prisoners by IDF/SLA personnel. The UNIFIL reports of these incidents were transmitted immediately to the Israeli authorities and their comments invited. In his reply, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that the IDF had received clear instructions on how to behave towards the local civilian population before and during the operation and that follow-up investigations of all the IDF units had found no deviation from these instructions. The Permanent Representative added that, according to SLA headquarters, irregularities committed by "persons from the security zone" had been recently exposed and disciplinary action had been taken against them. UNIFIL also protested all incidents of indiscriminate firing to the Israeli authorities. It further provided food and water and other assistance to the local population. In several cases, UNIFIL teams searched houses and shops at the request of their owners, who feared that explosives might have been placed in them by IDF/SLA personnel.
23. Throughout the operation, UNIFIL maintained close contact with the Lebanese authorities in Beirut and Lebanese local leaders in the south. UNIFIL was also in touch with the Israeli military authorities and, on 10 February, General Callaghan met the Israeli Chief of Staff and asked him to call off the operation. The Israeli officials stated that their sole aim was to find the two soldiers captured on 17 February and that they had no intention of expanding the IDF deployment in Lebanon or using the operation for other purposes.

24. On 20 February, the Secretary-General summoned the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations in order to express his anxiety about Israel's new military operation in southern Lebanon. After the meeting, the Secretary-General issued a statement saying that he understood the Israeli Government's concern about the fate of the two captured soldiers but that such incidents were bound to occur as long as Israel maintained a "security zone" and a military presence in Lebanon. The Secretary-General addressed an urgent appeal to the Israeli Government to withdraw its forces from the area and to exercise maximum restraint vis-à-vis the civilian population.

25. IDF called off its operation on 22 February and withdrew its forces from the UNIFIL area of deployment, leaving one armoured company near Kunin.

26. Following the above operation, UNIFIL received reports of an increased number of incidents in the border area. On 26 February, an IDF patrol was ambushed by unidentified armed elements south of Jabal Basil and an Israeli soldier was reportedly killed. On 1 March, a group of armed elements was intercepted by IDF after crossing the border into Israel. On 6 March, two explosions in the vicinity of Bint Jubayl reportedly killed a member of SLA and injured several others. On the afternoon of that day, some 160 artillery, tank and mortar rounds were fired from positions in the "security zone" at 14 villages in the UNIFIL area of deployment and at Tyre. One person was killed and several others injured. Two schools and 29 houses were damaged. This indiscriminate shelling was strongly protested by UNIFIL to the Israeli authorities. On the night of 8/9 March, a confrontation took place between IDF and armed elements south of Zibain. An Israeli soldier was reportedly killed and several others wounded. Three armed elements were also reported killed and one was wounded. On the morning of 27 March, several Katyusha rockets were fired across the border at the town of Kiryat Shemona, reportedly causing injuries to six people. This attack was the subject of a communication addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Israel (A/41/259-S/17963). Later on 27 March, and again on 7 April, Israeli aircraft bombed areas inhabited by Palestinians near Sidon. On the morning of 8 April a car bomb was detonated near Kaoukaba in the Norwegian battalion sector, reportedly killing the driver of the car and two local civilians, and injuring four SLA personnel and two other civilians.

27. During the period under review, UNIFIL continued its efforts to control movement in its area of deployment and to prevent persons carrying arms from entering it. Attempts by armed elements to do so increased during periods of tension and were particularly frequent during the IDF operation in mid-February.
28. A number of confrontations occurred when UNIFIL denied passage to armed personnel through its check-points. A serious incident occurred on 28 January 1986 when four men in a car were stopped at a check-point east of Jwayya, after trying to force their way through. Within a few minutes, some 40 armed men arrived and one of them placed his gun against the head of the soldier in charge of the check-point. In defence of his comrade, another soldier fired one shot, wounding the man with the gun in the leg. Subsequently, more than 100 armed men threatened UNIFIL personnel in Jwayya, and in another village some 40 armed men tried to take a UNIFIL platoon leader hostage. The situation was defused after contacts with local leaders of Amal. Incidents at UNIFIL check-points became more frequent after the IDF operation, and in one case, on 23 March, an Irish soldier was shot and wounded at a check-point north of Tibnin.

29. Further serious incidents took place on 28 and 29 March in the Fijian and Ghanaian battalion sectors. On Friday, 28 March, a temporary check-point established by members of the Fijian battalion near the village of As Siddian was attacked by armed elements using rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire. One Fijian soldier sustained serious injuries and died the following day in the UNIFIL hospital in Naqoura.

30. Earlier that day, in an unrelated incident, some armed elements had established a check-point near the village of Kafr Dunin in the Ghanaian battalion sector. An attempt by Ghanaian battalion personnel to have the check-point removed led to a confrontation that resulted in an exchange of fire between Ghanaian battalion personnel and the armed elements. One armed element was shot and a Ghanaian soldier was slightly injured. Early on 29 March, two civilian cars with eight armed elements were denied passage through a Ghanaian battalion check-point near Majdal Silm. About an hour later, the armed elements in one of the cars involved came to another Ghanaian check-point north of Majdal Silm and threatened its personnel. Shots were fired by both sides and in the process one Ghanaian soldier was hit and subsequently died at the UNIFIL hospital in Naqoura. At about the same time, three other Ghanaian positions were fired upon by the armed elements and a Nepalese vehicle, which happened to be passing near one of those positions, was caught in the fire and two Nepalese soldiers were wounded. The same morning, a Ghanaian battalion supply vehicle with three soldiers was fired on at the village of Khirbat Silm. A firefight ensued and one Ghanaian soldier was wounded.

31. Following these incidents, General Callaghan and his senior staff contacted the Amal leadership both in Beirut and in the south to defuse the situation. Since then, the situation has been calm.

32. UNIFIL also continued its efforts to contain SLA activities in its area of deployment. During the reporting period, movement by SLA within the UNIFIL area was largely confined to participation in operations led by IDF, although SLA continued to man a number of fixed positions. Incidents of firing close to UNIFIL positions by SLA decreased during November and December 1985 but increased again in January and occurred frequently in February 1986. All such incidents were protested to the Israeli authorities.
33. Over the years, IDF has built a number of fortified positions on the Lebanese side of the border. IDF has continued to improve its fortifications, building connecting roads that are protected by fences and in some areas, for example near observation post MAR, also by minefields. During the reporting period, such a fence and road were built north and east of Metulla, up to about one kilometre away from the border. UNIFIL reported this development to the Lebanese authorities and raised it with the Israeli authorities. It was the subject of communications addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of Lebanon (A/41/169-S/17839) and Israel (A/41/203-S/17901).

34. In extending assistance to the local population, UNIFIL continued to co-operate with the Lebanese authorities, as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In some locations, UNIFIL escorted farmers so that they could tend their fields without being fired at from nearby "security zone" positions. A significant number of Lebanese were treated at UNIFIL medical centres, in addition to members of the Force. The Swedish staff at the UNIFIL hospital at Na'oura performed 294 surgical operations and treated 4,600 patients, including 360 in-patients.

35. During the period under review, the Commander of UNIFIL and his civilian and military staff maintained contact with the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese regional authorities. They also maintained contact with the Israeli authorities on matters pertaining to the functioning of the Force.

36. Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, visited UNIFIL headquarters and held discussions with government officials in the region in January 1986. Mr. Marrack I. Goulding, who succeeded Mr. Urquhart upon the latter's retirement in February 1986, made a visit to the Middle East in March 1986, when he toured the UNIFIL area of deployment and held extensive talks with Lebanese and Israeli officials, as well as with other interested parties.

Financial aspects

37. By section IV of its resolution 40/246 A of 18 December 1985, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed $11,957,500 gross ($11,762,500 net) per month for the period from 19 April to 18 December 1986 inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 575 (1985), subject to obtaining the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the actual level of commitments to be entered into for each mandate period that might be approved subsequent to 19 April 1986. Should the Council extend the UNIFIL mandate beyond 19 April 1986, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining UNIFIL during the period of extension will be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 40/246 A, assuming continuance of the Force's existing strength and responsibilities.
38. It may be recalled that when the Security Council established UNIFIL on 19 March 1978, it decided that the costs of the Force should be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by Member States, as apportioned by the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. From the inception of UNIFIL until 18 April 1986, the General Assembly has appropriated a total amount of some $1,164.1 million for the Force. However, because certain Member States, 1/ have declined to participate in the financing of UNIFIL and have therefore withheld their assessed contributions, there was at the beginning of April 1986 an accumulated shortfall in the UNIFIL Special Account of approximately $237.7 million. This shortfall, in recent years, has been increasing at an annual rate of approximately $25 million, which represents some 18 per cent of the annual budget of UNIFIL.

39. As a result of the shortfall, the United Nations has not been able to pay the troop-contributing Governments the full rate of reimbursement set by the General Assembly. Whereas the current standard rate of reimbursement is $950 a person a month for basic pay for all ranks, plus an additional $280 a person a month for a limited number of specialists and $70 a person a month for all ranks for the usage factor for personal clothing, gear and equipment, the United Nations now reimburses only $750 a person a month. Thus, at the beginning of April 1986, the United Nations owed to the UNIFIL troop-contributing Governments an amount approximating to the shortfall of $238 million. This includes amounts still owing to troop-contributing Governments 2/ whose personnel are no longer serving with UNIFIL.

40. The United States Administration has informed the Secretariat that the United States Congress decided in December 1985 to withhold approximately 50 per cent of the United States assessed contribution to the costs of UNIFIL during fiscal 1986. The effect of this decision, if it is implemented, will be that the United States will make no contribution to the costs of the mandate period beginning on 20 April 1986, if the Security Council decides to extend the Force's mandate. As a result, there will be a further sharp reduction in the sums reimbursed to the troop-contributing Governments.

Observations

41. In my interim report of 16 December 1985 (S/17684), I stated that the then situation of UNIFIL was not acceptable and that "it could well deteriorate if the level both of resistance to the 'security zone' and of the reaction to such resistance increases in the coming months". I regret to have to report to the Security Council that the concern I expressed has proved to be justified. The level of violence has increased and continues to do so. UNIFIL casualties from gunfire during the current mandate period, up to 7 April 1986, have been 3 dead and 15 wounded, compared with 1 dead and 3 wounded in the preceding mandate period. This deterioration on the ground has been accompanied by a severe financial crisis, which could itself threaten the future of the Force. The decision facing the Council on whether to extend the Force's mandate is thus a difficult one and requires the Council to make a thorough and careful assessment both of the situation confronting UNIFIL and of the Council's own readiness to fulfil the conditions that were identified in 1978 as being necessary for the Force to be effective (S/12611 of 19 March 1978, para. 3).

/...
42. As reported in paragraph 12 above, Israel has maintained in southern Lebanon a "security zone" manned by the "South Lebanon Army" (SLA), with the assistance of elements of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). This continuing occupation of parts of southern Lebanon by IDF has inevitably provoked a reaction. During the current mandate period, there has been an increase in attacks against the IDF and its SLA allies in the "security zone". There have also been several rocket attacks against targets in northern Israel. Some of these attacks have been carried out by forces indigenous to southern Lebanon, others by elements who have entered the area for this purpose. The attacks have in turn led to counter-action by IDF and SLA, including a major incursion into the UNIFIL area by IDF in brigade strength from 17 to 22 February 1986 (as described in para. 21 above), the taking and interrogation of prisoners and the indiscriminate shelling of villages after attacks have taken place in their vicinity. These counter-actions have resulted in further resentment on the part of the population. And so the violence increases.

43. In discussions with me and members of my staff, and in public statements, the Israeli authorities have stated that they have no designs on Lebanese territory and that Israel's sole concern is that Lebanon should not serve as a base for cross border attacks against Israel. They have described the "security zone" as a temporary arrangement, which would be dismantled if the threat of cross border attacks were removed or if alternative security arrangements satisfactory to Israel could be put in place.

44. One of the tasks laid upon UNIFIL by Security Council resolution 425 (1978) was the restoration of international peace and security. That mandate will not be fulfilled unless the security of both Lebanon and Israel is assured. Israel has a legitimate concern over the security of its northern border, across which it has been in the past, and still is, subjected to attack. But the present "security zone" is not a legitimate means of meeting Israel's security concerns; nor is it an effective one. It is not legitimate, because it contravenes Council resolution 425 (1978), which called for "strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries" and called upon Israel "immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory". In addition, the "security zone" is not effective in ensuring Israel's security because the continuing occupation by IDF of Lebanese territory and the often brutal behaviour of SLA build up resentment of Israel among the local population and encourage use of the area as a base for attacking Israel across the international frontier.

45. In short, I believe that, in addition to Israel's obligation to carry out Security Council resolution 425 (1978), its own interests would be advanced if it were to complete the withdrawal of its forces, allow deployment of UNIFIL to the international frontier and thus give full scope to the overwhelming wish of the local people for peace and quiet and for an end to the hostilities that have plagued their lives for the last decade. This would permit the Government of Lebanon to begin to re-establish its authority in the area, with the assistance of UNIFIL. The restoration of international peace and security would also be facilitated by discussions, under United Nations auspices, between Israel and Lebanon concerning problems that might arise on their common border. If the
parties were not prepared for discussions on these problems on the basis of the Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement of 1949 or to resume the Naqoura talks adjourned in January 1985, I would be ready to assist, as might be required, in setting up acceptable arrangements.

46. During the period under review, I and my staff have repeatedly made the above arguments to the Government of Israel at all levels. I regret that we have failed so far to persuade them that completion of their withdrawal and deployment of UNIFIL to the international frontier would facilitate the restoration of international peace and security and thus provide a better answer to Israel's security needs than its present reliance on the "security zone". The Israeli authorities have argued that the Government of Lebanon does not at present exercise effective political and military authority in the area and that UNIFIL, being a peace-keeping force, is not mandated to assume the functions of a central government and take the forceful action necessary to control cross-border attacks. They state that they are neither for nor against the UNIFIL presence; but they will not agree to its deployment to the international frontier in the prevailing circumstances. I nevertheless continue to hope that the Government of Israel will eventually see the virtues of allowing UNIFIL to carry out the mandate entrusted to it. If the Council decides to extend its mandate for a further period, I shall of course maintain my efforts, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon and other parties concerned, to make progress towards full implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

47. Meanwhile, those Member States that contribute troops to UNIFIL have become increasingly worried. Their main concern is caused by the fact that the Force has been prevented from deploying to the international frontier and thus from carrying out its mandate to the full. They are also worried about the security of their personnel who run the risk of becoming involved in the increasing hostilities between Israel and SLA on the one hand and various groups of armed elements on the other. It is the troop contributors, also, that have to bear the consequences of the financial crisis facing the Force. The results for them of Member States' failure in the past to pay their assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account are described in paragraph 39 above. If the recent decision of the United States Congress to withhold the United States' assessed contribution after the end of the current mandate period is implemented, there will be a further drastic cut in reimbursements to them. Without the troop-contributing countries' staunch and generous support, there would be no UNIFIL. I believe it is essential, therefore, that the Council pay serious attention to their concerns.

48. Against this most difficult background, I turn to the question of whether the Council should decide to renew the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months. The Government of Lebanon has formally requested that the Council should do so decide (S/17968). Those of my staff who have recently visited Lebanon and neighbouring Arab countries have been told by all their interlocutors that they want UNIFIL to remain. My staff have also received moving petitions in the same sense from the inhabitants of southern Lebanon. The wishes of the Government of Lebanon and of the people of that country are not in doubt.
49. The future of the Force has nevertheless been called in question by a number of recent developments - Israel's unwillingness to complete its withdrawal, harassment of UNIFIL by SLA and other armed elements, the actual or threatened withholding of assessed contributions by various Member States and the resulting worries of the troop contributors. I have had to consider carefully whether I should not recommend to the Council that as the Force has been prevented from fulfilling its mandate, and given the lack of adequate financial support for it, it should now be withdrawn.

50. I have come to the conclusion, however, that such a recommendation would be a mistake. I am convinced that the maintenance of international peace and security requires that the Force's mandate be extended. If it were to be withdrawn, there would be an immediate escalation of fighting in southern Lebanon, including fighting for control of positions at present occupied by UNIFIL. This fighting would probably lead to an increase in attacks against Israel and to an escalation of military action by Israel against Lebanon. A further major crisis could easily result. More positively, I believe that the mandate given to UNIFIL in Security Council resolution 425 (1978) remains fulfillable and that deployment of the Force to the international frontier is the best available way of restoring international peace and security and of ensuring the return of the Government of Lebanon's effective authority in the area. As long as that possibility exists, it would in my view be wrong for the Council to decide to withdraw the Force. Moreover, such withdrawal would remove the humanitarian help that UNIFIL at present gives the inhabitants of the area by protecting them from the worst consequences of the hostilities amongst which they have to live. For all these reasons, and taking into account the request submitted by the Government of Lebanon, I recommend that the Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months.

51. In making this recommendation, however, it is my duty to advise the Council that it will not be enough simply to renew the mandate of UNIFIL. If that decision is to have the desired result - namely, completion of the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the restoration of international peace and security and the return of the Government of Lebanon's effective authority in the area - it will be necessary for the Council and all its members to make a determined effort to fulfil a condition that was identified in 1978 as being essential for the Force to be effective. This was that it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. I regret that that condition has not been fully met. I therefore appeal again to all Member States to give the Force full political backing and to meet their assessed share of its costs.

52. In concluding this report, I wish to express again my sincere appreciation to the troop-contributing countries for their steadfast and generous support of the Force. I also wish to pay tribute to the Commander of UNIFIL, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan, and his staff, civilian and military, and to the officers and men of UNIFIL, as well as to the UNTSO military observers assigned to OGL. All of them have performed their difficult tasks with exemplary dedication and courage.

General Callaghan, who has been the Commander of UNIFIL since February 1981, will relinquish his command in May 1986. The United Nations owes him a deep debt of gratitude for the distinguished services he has rendered.
Notes

1/ Albania, Algeria, Benin, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Poland, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam and Yemen.

2/ Canada, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Netherlands, Nigeria and Senegal.
UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF APRIL 1986

DEPLOYEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS D’AVRIL 1986

ДИСПЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНГ НА АПРЕЛЬ 1986

DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN ABRIL 1986

**Operative boundaries**

- **Observation post**
- **Poste d’observation**
- **Puesto de observación**
- **Road block**
- **Poste de contrôle routier**
- **Punto de control**
- **Barrera de caminos**

**Units**

- **Lebanese unit**
- **Unité libanaise**
- **Unidad libanesa**

**Positions**

- **Israel Defence Forces**
- **Forces de défense israéliennes**
- **Fuerza de Defensa de Israel**
- **South Lebanese Army**
- **Armée du Liban du Sud**
- **Ejército del Líbano meridional**

Positions outside UNIFIL area of deployment are not indicated.

Les positions situées en dehors de la zone de déploiement de la FINUL ne sont pas indiquées.

No se indican las posiciones fuera de la zona de despliegue de la FPNUL.