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**President: Mr. Abdul Rahman PAZHwak**  
**(Afghanistan).**

**AGENDA ITEM 5**

Letter dated 13 June 1967 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (continued) (A/6717)

1. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Trinidad and Tobago has asked to speak in order to introduce a new draft resolution on the item before this emergency special session of the General Assembly. I have agreed to give him the floor for the same reasons and in light of the same considerations which I explained at the 1540th plenary meeting, on 28 June, in connexion with the joint draft resolution contained in document A/L.522. Therefore, I now call on the representative of Trinidad and Tobago to introduce the draft resolution, on behalf of its sponsors.

2. Mr. P. V. J. SOLOMON (Trinidad and Tobago): Ever since this emergency special session of the General Assembly was convened, the members of the Latin American group, like all the other Members of the United Nations, have been much concerned in efforts to find a way out of a situation which is both difficult and dangerous. We have spent long hours, day and night, in discussions among ourselves and with representatives of other nations and groups of nations, in an attempt to find some sort of a solution which would represent a fair, just and equitable way of dealing with a very difficult situation.

3. The draft resolution I shall present today on behalf of the Latin American group does not by any means represent all the wishes, all the desires and all the thoughts of every member of that group, let alone all the Members of the United Nations with whom we have had discussions. It would be absurd to expect complete unanimity of views on all points. Nevertheless, in the interest of unity and in the interest of peace in the world, we have arrived at a consensus which represents a fair and, we hope, a decent compromise between conflicting views. Where we have not been able to arrive at agreement on a view which we believe should be generally accepted, we have been guided principally, in fact entirely,

by the provisions of the United Nations Charter and by the principles of justice, equity and fair play such as we know them in the world.

4. It was only at half past ten last night that this draft resolution attained final form, and it was only about an hour ago, if not less, that the members of the Latin American group arrived at a consensus. The draft resolution that I present has received the approval of eighteen of the twenty-three members of the Latin American group. And by that I do not mean that the other five are in opposition; I mean that eighteen members of the Latin American group have received permission from their Governments since this morning to co-sponsor this draft resolution. We have hopes that the others will in due course receive similar approval. The draft resolution is sponsored as of now by the delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, eighteen States whose Governments have ratified and agreed to sponsor the Latin American resolution.

5. May I add that in drafting the text, and in our discussion with the people with whom we have held talks, we have not ignored the representatives of the great Powers. Even though we realize that their support of any draft resolution before this Assembly is of great importance, this is none the less the General Assembly and not the Security Council. The matter was brought here for consideration by the Members of the General Assembly, and while we would be grateful for the support of any or all of the major Powers of the world, we have not sought to trim our sails to suit their convenience, or to sacrifice any of the fundamental interests to suit any of their views.

6. Latin America is not directly concerned in the events of the Middle East, although no country is exempt from the effects of disturbances there or anywhere else. But because we are not immediately involved, we have been able to view the situation more objectively perhaps than those who are directly involved and whose personal feelings and national interests are implicated more deeply than ours are. We hope that as a result of this objectivity we have been able to strike a balance between the interests of all the parties concerned, and to reconcile those interests with the fundamental principles of justice, freedom and equity, as outlined in the Charter.

7. On behalf of the sponsors, I have the honour to present, for consideration by the Assembly, the draft resolution which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Considering that all Member States have an inescapable obligation to preserve peace and, consequently, to avoid the use of force in the international sphere,

"Considering further that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and accepted by the State of Israel and the States of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic is a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, a step which must be reinforced by other measures to be adopted by the Organization and complied with by the parties,

"1. Urgently requests:

"(a) Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic occupied as a result of the recent conflict;

"(b) The parties in conflict to end the state of belligerence, to endeavour to establish conditions of coexistence based on good-neighbourliness and to have recourse in all cases to the procedures for peaceful settlement indicated in the Charter of the United Nations;

"2. Reaffirms its conviction that no stable international order can be based on the threat or use of force, and declares that the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by such means should not be recognized;

"3. Requests the Security Council to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and relying on the presence of the United Nations to:

"(a) Carry out the provisions of operative paragraph 1 (a) above;

"(b) Guarantee freedom of transit on the international waterways in the region;

"(c) Achieve an appropriate and full solution of the problem of the refugees and guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States of the region, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

"4. Reaffirms, as in earlier recommendations, the desirability of establishing an international régime for the city of Jerusalem, to be considered by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session." [A/L.523.]

8. The PRESIDENT: The draft resolution which has just been introduced by the representative of Trinidad and Tobago is now formally before the Assembly. In addition to the proposals now before the Assembly, the delegation of Albania has submitted an amendment [A/L.524] to draft resolution A/L.522/Rev.1, which will be distributed.

9. This afternoon we shall begin our consideration of the draft resolutions which are before the Assembly. At this stage, of course, I shall call on the representatives who wish to explain their votes. I request that if they wish to refer to more than one of the draft resolutions or proposals, they each do so in one intervention.

10. Before calling on the speakers who have inscribed their names on the list, I should like to inform the Assembly of the results of the consultations that I have had with the Members of the Assembly as to the organization of work and the proceedings. I have consulted a great number of delegations in order to find the most desirable way to deal with the various draft resolutions which have been submitted to the Assembly, and I have reached the conclusion that I should make a suggestion on the basis of what I consider to be the consensus of the entire membership.

11. I would suggest that at this meeting we should hear those representatives who wish to speak; that the time-limit for submitting draft resolutions to the Assembly should be set for 12 o'clock tomorrow, 1 July, and the time-limit for submitting amendments should be set for 11 a.m. on Sunday, 2 July; and that the voting on the request for priority for one of the draft resolutions and the voting on that draft resolution, if such priority is granted by the Assembly, should take place on Monday morning, 3 July. I would also suggest that the meeting on Monday morning should be held at 11 o'clock instead of the usual hour of 10.30. If there is no objection to that suggestion, I shall take it that it is accepted unanimously by the General Assembly.

*It was so decided.*

12. The PRESIDENT: I should like to thank the representative of Yugoslavia and the other sponsors of draft resolution A/L.522/Rev.1 for their co-operation with me and for meeting the point of view of their colleagues in the Assembly. I should like to inform the Assembly that some slight modifications have been made in the first revision of the Yugoslav draft resolution and that a second revision will be circulated as soon as possible.

13. The Assembly will now proceed to hear explanations of vote on the various draft resolutions before it. I call first on the representative of Israel.

14. Mr. EBAN (Israel): I shall now comment on the text submitted on 28 June by the delegations of Yugoslavia and a number of other States [A/L.522]. I shall make my Government's observations on the new Latin American proposal after due consideration and consultation.

15. The recommendation proposed by Yugoslavia is identical in purpose and effect with that proposed originally by the Soviet Union. In the view of my Government, this is a prescription for renewed hostility. It calls for the restoration of conditions which have already produced one outbreak of war and which would inexorably produce another. Its implementation would leave the Arab States and Israel confronting each other in a state of uninterminated belligerence; it would bring hostile armies back into contact with each other without any prior modification of the basic relationship between the Governments of the region; Sinai would again become a spring-board for aggressive designs against Israel; the freedom of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba would again be endangered—with all the consequences which flow from acts of war; the Suez Canal would remain blocked to the free passage of all nations and ships of all flags; Syrian guns would again dominate and threaten Israeli

villages; the terrorist infiltrations would be resumed. And all these manifestations of hostility would have General Assembly condonation, since there is nothing in the draft resolution which rules them out. Thus all attempts at a negotiated settlement would be impeded by the action of a United Nations organ.

16. Those who refuse to recognize the sovereign personality of a Member of the United Nations, as do many of the sponsors and supporters of this text, would be confirmed in their attitude of non-recognition. In the atmosphere of reinforced belligerency the arms race, which the Soviet Union is now stimulating at an alarming and irresponsible rate, would take on headlong proportions. For while mankind yearns for a new era of peace in the Middle East, a massive Soviet airlift is now bringing huge quantities of arms into Egypt and Syria in the hope of creating a transition, not from cease-fire to peace, but from cease-fire to renewed tension.

17. The draft resolution would recommend that Israel retreat into a state of siege, with its neighbours' hostility sharpened by the General Assembly's indulgence and support. The third operative paragraph of the draft resolution is especially ominous. It is an invitation to external intervention and self-appointed efforts to impose a solution in favour of one side. It thus threatens the peace of every region and the sovereignty of every State. In short, this document violates peace, justice and international equity. We reject it totally. This is our right under the Charter.

18. The General Assembly, meeting in what so many Members have described as doubtful juridical circumstances, would, by accepting the draft resolution, be endorsing the unbalanced and one-sided position which the Security Council prudently refused to accept. This is a draft resolution that the Security Council—which has primary responsibility for international peace and security—had before it and refused to accept. So we have a text in which objectivity is abandoned, justice set aside, and hope of peaceful dialogue obstructed. This cannot form the basis of any advance towards peace and security in the Middle East.

19. We cannot overlook the fact that the initiative for the present discussion in the General Assembly was taken by the Soviet Union, which has ignored every General Assembly recommendation which did not conform with its national policies. It has been supported by Arab States which, in their relations with Israel, defy every General Assembly resolution on peaceful relations between States, and which have refused to recognize any Assembly recommendation or Security Council resolution against belligerency.

20. For example, the United Arab Republic is represented here today by the representative who said in 1948:

"The recommendations of the General Assembly are not imperative for us. No one can say that our compliance is imperative. We do not choose to comply with the General Assembly's resolution on Palestine. This is our privilege under the Charter"

21. Israel of course has the same Charter privileges as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the Arab States. But that is not the point at issue here. The point is that there is something profoundly incongruous in the attempted use of the General Assembly in favour of States which have placed their hostility to Israel above and beyond their Charter obligations and above and beyond every recommendation by any United Nations organ.

22. In the context of this draft resolution, there is no validity in the hint that the Security Council could take up other matters at a later stage, because we all know in the depths of our hearts that there would be no later stage. During the two weeks before the outbreak of armed hostilities, when it would still have been possible to prevent hostilities from breaking out, the Security Council was prevented by Soviet and Arab pressure even from pronouncing a mild opinion against belligerency. Thus the United Nations was eliminated as a war-preventing influence. Having been unable to prevent the war, the United Nations would be invited by the draft resolution to prevent a peace.

23. There is a vast incongruity in satisfying Arab interests in the General Assembly, whilst submitting Israel's vital interests to discussion in a body where for thirteen years an automatic veto has prevented the adoption of any resolution which took Israel's interests into the slightest account. The Security Council, which was prevented from endorsing a harmless, constructive irrigation plan; which was prevented from criticizing a continued blockade of the Suez Canal; which was prevented from expressing the slightest regret about Israelis killed, according to United Nations evidence on Israeli soil; which was prevented from criticizing the shelling of our communal villages; which was prevented from expressing mild criticism of a movement of terrorist infiltration from Syria—to this body an Israel in a **new state** of siege and blockade is to be handed over.

24. The sponsors of the draft resolution direct us to a door which they know has been firmly locked for thirteen years. In other words, this is a text which calls for withdrawal from territory without calling for any withdrawal from belligerency, from hostile acts, from war preparations, from the obdurate refusal to recognize the sovereign equality of States. It is based on the assumption that Arab States, while maintaining a state of war, must be made immune from the consequences of the war which they maintain, threaten and intend.

25. The United Nations has been unable to give Israel its elementary right to security, uninterrupted development, maritime freedom and peaceful existence. This is not because of defects in the Charter, but because of the power balance within the United Nations membership, because of the anti-Charter attitude of Arab States towards Israel, because of the automatic and one-sided use of the veto power in the Security Council, and because of the numerical preponderance of one party as against another in the General Assembly. When we stood alone, embattled and gravely threatened, we knew, in full realism, that the United Nations, for the reasons which I

have stated, would not be able to defend our existence, to protect our rights, or to act—or even to pronounce itself—against belligerency and against the aggression which threatened to engulf us. The virtual paralysis of the Security Council in the weeks preceding the outbreak of hostilities brought this home to our people and to its adversaries in vivid form. Indeed, the inability of the responsible organ of the United Nations to take any action when the ring of hostility closed around us must be counted as amongst the elements which led to the outbreak of hostilities. Surely, the least that the General Assembly can do is to avoid the exacerbation of tension that would result from the adoption of a one-sided text through a majority largely composed of States which decline to recognize our nation's sovereignty and inherent rights. That is why we think that a vote against this text is a vote for the opportunity of peace; a vote in favour of it is a reinforcement of all the conditions making for renewed hostilities.

26. Israel's objectives are peace and security. These can only be advanced by a strict reciprocity of relationships within our area. If, for example, Egypt, as it says, is in a state of war with Israel, then Israel is, by definition, in a reciprocal state of war with Egypt; and then Egypt cannot claim that Israel owes it any duty to facilitate the fulfilment of its belligerent ambitions.

27. If, however, there is a renunciation of the state of war, with abstention from all hostile activities, and the establishment of a normal political and juridical relationship between States, then the disposition of troops immediately takes on an entirely different aspect. That is why the problem of the withdrawal of troops is integrally linked, in law and reality, to withdrawal from a state of war, with a corollary advance to peace and the establishment of conditions of security. By its refusal to face this inexorable link, the draft resolution before us leaves the situation in a state of immobility, instead of helping us to advance towards a normal situation.

28. The Government and the delegation of Israel are not alone in considering that a request for an unconditional withdrawal, unaccompanied by peace, is in fact a prescription for renewed hostilities. This phrase, "a prescription for renewed hostilities", was the description of unconditional withdrawal made by the United States on 20 June.

29. In the succeeding days, the Prime Minister of Denmark stated that "it must be accepted that the aim should be not to re-establish the unstable conditions existing before the outbreak of hostilities." [1529th meeting, para. 70.]

30. The Prime Minister of Italy stated:

"The withdrawal of troops... is not sufficient. If the United Nations confined itself to this, it would share the blame for a return to the situation which has been the cause of two wars in two decades." [1530th meeting, para. 13.]

31. The Foreign Minister of Belgium said that "If any... over-all settlement is not seriously sought and... obtained, the law of the Near East will remain the law of force and insecurity." [1531st meeting, para. 74].

32. The Foreign Minister of Canada, quoting his Prime Minister, stated:

"What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the status quo? Such a return would not be to a position of security... but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents... and ultimately another explosion..." [1533rd meeting, para. 115.]

33. The Foreign Minister of Brazil stated that the problem of withdrawal cannot be envisaged as an isolated step.

34. The Foreign Minister of Ireland spoke of the necessity to conclude peace treaties.

35. The Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast stated: "Let but the dialogue begin, and the solutions will follow." [1540th meeting, para. 49.]

36. The representative of New Zealand stated that "withdrawal would assume its full significance only in the context of a settlement that would establish peace." [*Ibid.*, para. 29.]

37. The Foreign Minister of Argentina stated that "the simple withdrawal of forces would not bring with it a return to peace." [1537th meeting, para. 119.]

38. The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands expressed himself in almost identical terms.

39. The representative of Nigeria stated: "The... reality is the difficulty of contemplating a complete return to the status quo as it existed on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities." [*Ibid.*, para. 76.]

40. The Foreign Minister of Uruguay stated that the withdrawal of military forces should take place in conditions which would "ensure that the return to former positions would not generate former tensions such as those which we are endeavouring to eliminate." [1543rd meeting, para. 86.]

41. I shall not quote all the expressions in the same sense made in this General Assembly. In our view, these two problems—withdrawal and peace—are inseparable at every stage of discussion and implementation. The principle of reciprocity demands that this link be respected.

42. The draft resolution presented by Yugoslavia is described as a non-aligned proposal. The question is whether it is aligned with peace and security. In our view, it is not; it is aligned with the concept of continued belligerency, which is nowhere ruled out of order in its text. In short, it says that one party must behave as though there is peace, while the others may continue to behave as though there is a state of war. That is what this text says.

43. If the General Assembly rejects the extreme and unbalanced Yugoslav draft, the way will be opened for advance towards agreed solutions conforming with the aims pursued by the responsible body of impartial opinion in the General Assembly. I speak of the body of opinion composed of those who respect the statehood and vital interests both of Israel and of the Arab States, and who recoil from the idea that the General Assembly should reconstruct the explosive mixture which has already caused so much death, anguish, hardship and tension.

44. Therefore, to oppose this draft resolution is the first and indispensable step towards any peaceful horizon.

45. The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank all Members for the spirit of co-operation and understanding they have shown.

46. I should also like to say this: In the consultations regarding a delay in voting on the various draft resolutions, it was understood that those who favoured such a delay had in mind, among other considerations, the

fact that the time would be used in undertaking further consultations designed to achieve some fruitful results. Now that there will in fact be some additional time before the General Assembly comes to the moment of decision, I would appeal to all Members to bear in mind this objective of using that time for further consultations in order to arrive at some fruitful results.

*The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.*