4. In my view, the first requirement for arriving at an objective and hence impartial analysis of the issue before us is sincerity. For clarity's sake, we must undergo here a true exercise in sincerity, without concerning ourselves with pleasing any of the parties involved, Brazil's motivation—the sole desire of my Government and of Brazilian public opinion—is to collaborate in the efforts of the United Nations at achieving a just solution to the problem, a solution conducive to establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East. Without sincerity, without the capacity to forget for a moment the ties of sympathy and friendship which link us to Jews and Arabs, no collaboration would be constructive and useful. In this spirit, and putting sentiment aside, I shall try to analyse the problem with which we are now engaged.

5. In the opinion of the Brazilian delegation, the crisis in the Middle East stems basically from an essential fact: the existence, for almost two decades, of a state of belligerence between the Arab States and Israel. The political decisions which aggravated the crisis and the military episodes we recently witnessed are merely links in a continuous political process. What are the fundamental causes of this political process, of the permanent belligerence between Arabs and Jews? On the one hand, we encounter the obstruction on the part of the Arabs in refusing to acknowledge the fact of the legal existence of the State of Israel, which came into being under the aegis of the United Nations and which is a Member of this Organization. On the other hand, there is the refusal on the part of the Government of Israel to seek a just solution for the problem of the Arab refugees of Palestine. This refusal, as obstinate as the refusal of the Arabs to recognize the State of Israel, has poisoned the political panorama in the Middle East. As a consequence of these tightly frozen and totally inflexible positions, the Middle East has lived for almost twenty years under a régime of latent or active belligerence. The truces, suspensions of firing, the periodic lulls, are merely episodes which do not alter the picture of total, fierce and permanent belligerence.

6. It is the opinion of the Brazilian Government that, in order to be able to contribute effectively to the peaceful solution of the problem, the United Nations should recommend a solution based on several principles which appear fundamental to me, among which I shall mention the following:

(1) The recognition of Israel by the Arab States as a sovereign State, Member of this Organization, and hence qualified to enjoy the privileges and the guarantees which the Charter assures Member States.
(2) A formal guarantee on the part of the Government of Israel to settle the problem of the refugees on an equitable and permanent basis.

(3) An equally formal guarantee on the part of Israel not to incorporate into her national territory the areas occupied as a result of her recent military successes and, consequently, the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

(4) A formal guarantee on the part of the United Arab Republic to assure free navigation through the Strait of Tiran under adequate international control.

(5) Negotiations by the Government of the United Arab Republic envisaging the opening of the Suez Canal to ships of any flag, having in mind the sovereignty of the Egyptian Government and the Constantinople Convention of 1888, ratified by the Government of Cairo in its Declaration of 24 April 1957.  

(6) The placing of Jerusalem under permanent international administration, with special guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places with a corpus separatum, in accordance with the spirit of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947. In this connexion, I wish to state that the Government of Brazil gives its full support to the suggestion of the Holy See, Jerusalem, symbol of love and hope, cannot continue being a source of hate and despair. It must be restored to its status as the City of God.

(7) Negotiations for the settlement of all pending problems, including, on the basis of mutual consent, the eventual establishment of demilitarized zones by the methods of peaceful solution envisaged in the Charter and with the collaboration, if required, of a special representative of the Secretary-General. The special representative could play an important role in the problem of establishing contact between the parties and in expediting the negotiations.

7. Prior to the eruption of hostilities, my Government believed that a peace conference might perhaps be the proper way to work towards harmonizing the interests of the parties to the dispute and those of the world community. It appeared to us that such a conference would strengthen the Security Council's capacity to act, and the negotiating and mediating actions of the United Nations, as it would have been convoked by this Organization, constituting a special procedure selected by its organs to assit the parties in conflict to reach a modicum of understanding on the basis of mutual respect. I wish to make it quite clear, however, that the Brazilian Government gives neither priority nor preference to any particular method for resolving the situation. On the contrary, it will accept whichever formula facilitates best the solution of the problem.

8. The war in the Middle East offers the United Nations a challenge and a lesson. The challenge must be accepted, namely, finding the proper solution for the problem. The lesson must be learned, by seeking to eliminate from the hearts of men—Arab and Jewish—the source of hate and belligerence, Ancient Palestine—the land transfigured eternally by the occurrence of the miracle, the land which is a treasury of faith for millions of men of so many nationalities throughout the world—ancient Palestine cannot continue being the field of hatred and violence. Let us exert exceptional efforts of patience, wisdom and political vision to restore peace and happiness to the land that God chose as his dwelling place among men.

9. Peace—only permanent peace—would make possible the full social and economic development of all the countries of the region, for the vast resources expended on armaments today could multiply the existing riches and create new possibilities, enabling Jews and Arabs to wholly utilize the extraordinary qualities of intelligence and creative imagination which characterize the two great civilizations they created.

10. This is the heartfelt desire of the Brazilian people and the Brazilian Government.

11. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand): New Zealand agreed to participate in the work of this emergency special session despite our reservations about the appropriateness in this instance of the procedure used in requesting that the Assembly be convened. We did so in the hope that the Assembly might address itself constructively to the task of laying a sounder foundation for the peace of the Middle East and the welfare of its inhabitants than that which has existed during the last twenty years.

Mr. Zoundsbahr (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Vice-President, took the Chair.

12. What is the purpose of this emergency special session? What is it that we are here engaged in? Is this session to be a serious, long overdue effort by the international community to reduce tensions and human misery in the Middle East? Or is it primarily a propaganda exercise, another occasion for repeating old myths and even for making new ones?

13. New Zealand, caught up in the disputes of the Middle East solely because of its membership in the United Nations, viewed with dismay and mounting despair the years of resentment and hatred in the Middle East and the recurring violence to which these passions inevitably gave birth. We deeply regret the recent outbreak of war and deplore the tragic loss of life, the destruction of property and the waste of resources which it has caused.

14. If it is the intent of those who asked for this session, and their allies, to consider the resulting problems in a serious and constructive spirit we stand ready to cooperate in the search for such agreements as would, so far as is humanly possible, undo the damage that has been done and lay the groundwork for a stable peace. But is it their intent? So far there has been little to indicate it, though there have been constructive and conciliatory contributions from a number of other delegations.

15. It is appropriate, it is symbolic, that the urgent request for this meeting should have come not from any of the immediate and overt parties to the conflict.

---

2/ Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed at Constantinople on 29 October 1884.

in the Middle East but from the Soviet Union. It is appropriate and symbolic because the Soviet responsibility for this conflict is indeed heavy. Let us look at it briefly.

16. As the Soviet representative recollected in opening this debate on 19 June [1526th meeting] the Soviet Union voted for the resolution to partition Palestine in 1947. It was salutary that he reminded the membership of this historical fact, even if it is a fact that undermines the myth, which has become fashionable recently, that Israel was the creation of Western "imperialism and neo-colonialism" and that the Soviet Union could therefore have had no part in this act of creation. New Zealand well remembers how much importance was attached to the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States both strongly supported the creation of a Jewish State. We remember that both great Powers subsequently, after the fighting of 1948-1949, accepted Israel as a Member of the United Nations. We remember that both hastened to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the new State.

17. Having voted for Israel's admission as a Member State of the United Nations, most other Members, including New Zealand, loyally accepted the consequences of that decision [resolution 273 (III)]. But about 1954, the Soviet Union made a dramatic change in its Middle East policy. It is true that it still recognized the State of Israel and broke diplomatic relations only a few weeks ago, at a late stage of the hostilities, In fact, the Soviet representative in this debate repeated that the Soviet Union was "not against Israel". He stressed that everyone enjoyed the right to establish an independent national State of its own and that it was on that basis that the Soviet Union had voted for the United Nations decision in 1947 and that it had later established diplomatic relations with Israel. Obviously, this was a most important declaration. But in 1955 the Soviet Union, through Czechoslovakia, accelerated the arms race in the Middle East and has sustained it ever since. The Soviet Union developed its new policy in full knowledge of the inflammatory tensions in the area and the purpose for which Soviet arms were desired. Let me hasten to add that all the great Powers must share responsibility for this arms race. The point that must be noted is that this great Power appears not to recognize the part which the supply of arms has played in the resulting tragedy, nor the need for agreed limitations on such supplies in the future.

18. From that same time thirteen years ago, the Soviet Union spread the mantle of its diplomatic support over the parties on one side of the dispute; it put at their service the Soviet veto in the Security Council. From that time no resolution implying any criticism of the actions of an Arab State could succeed in the Council, a circumstance which profoundly affected all consideration by the Security Council of Middle Eastern problems. These facts are known to all. Yet the Soviet representative presumed to tell this Assembly that if Israel had any grievance in recent weeks it should have come to the Council for redress.

19. We can document the resulting situation in the United Nations from our own experience. Last year, to take an example, New Zealand joined in the Security Council, along with Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria and Uganda—countries from every region represented in the Council, except one—in sponsoring a very moderately phrased draft resolution much more moderate than the facts of the situation justified. The draft resolution "deplored" the acts of terrorism to which Israel had been subjected; it invited the Government of Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constituted a violation of the General Armistice Agreement; it called on Israel to change its policy and to co-operate fully with the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission; and it called on both Israel and Syria to exercise restraint. That balanced draft resolution was none the less vetoed by the Soviet Union because the Arab States were not prepared to have even an implicit and mild admonition of one of their number recorded on the books of the United Nations.

20. We recall this instance as one within our own immediate experience: it was but one of several occasions over a decade in which the Soviet Union lent its veto to the support of one group of the parties to this underlying dispute. The other party, in the course of this conflict, has often been condemned or censured by the Council for particular acts; there has been no veto, for the Western Powers have not been prepared to abuse the veto by extending to Israel a degree of diplomatic commitment comparable to that so totally given by the Soviet Union. The balance sheet of responsibility for incidents in the Middle East as reflected in the records of the United Nations is therefore utterly deficient. By its partisan stance, one permanent member thus made a mockery of recourse to the Security Council for the settlement of the problems of the Middle East. How then must the Assembly appraise the Soviet statement that Israel should have placed itself in the hands of the Security Council?

21. The Prime Minister of the Soviet Union said many wise things about the madness of war; all were glad, and relieved, to hear him identify himself with the voices of reason. He spoke of the need, in order to avoid military disaster, for us all to focus on common objectives that join peoples and States together, despite political and social differences. Most countries are more than ready to play their part; and certainly New Zealand is. But how can other Member States contribute to such a process when the Soviet Union proceeds, to all appearances, with business as usual? The Soviet Union has recognized the perils of war in the nuclear age and at certain well-known moments of grave crisis has acted with prudent restraint. But is it enough to be prudent only at the final moment of truth? Surely restraint must affect policy at a much earlier stage. If great Powers fail to carry the logic of the nuclear age over into other departments of their daily policy—for instance, to the department of agitation and so-called "wars of national liberation"—if they are prepared to...
permit immediate tactical political advantage to outweigh the fundamental considerations of common interest of which the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union spoke, then may not the world be led to the brink of the abyss just once too often?

22. The Assembly is now confronted with the wreckage in the Middle East to which this gulf between precept and practice, this illusion that one can have it both ways, has made so grave a contribution. To give unstinted military aid to one side; to give virtually unqualified political backing to that side; to push an arms race to immense proportions in the most politically unstable area of the world; to stultify international political processes by the abuse of the veto; this—even if prudence finally supervenes—is surely irresponsibility and surely a recipe for disaster.

23. What then are we to attempt in this Assembly? Is there to be a serious effort to undo such damage as can be undone? If there is, we must clear our minds of myths, old myths and new ones.

24. New Zealand shares the view of others that the General Assembly cannot usefully attempt to ascribe blame for aggression in this instance solely to one side. In this situation, many events and intentions are clearly related. I have indicated one of the most obvious of them. In any fundamental and objective examination one would need to proceed to dissection, layer by layer. This is not a task that can be essayed lightly, without ample time and sufficient evidence. But at least one assertion that has been repeated here over and over again can certainly be questioned.

25. The Soviet Union and those aiding it have placed great weight, in their hypothesis, on the contention that on a certain date in May there was a military concentration in Israel preparatory to a major assault upon Syria. Whatever the nature of statements made by Israeli leaders at this time—and these did not lack a mountain of counterparts in neighbouring countries—only one piece of unquestionably objective evidence on this matter has, at this point in history, been put to Members of this Organization: that is the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 19 May in which he said:

"Reports from observers of the Truce Supervision Organization have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line."3/4

That statement by the Secretary-General has not yet been controverted.

26. I turn now to some of the immediate problems which confront us in the aftermath of the war. If the Assembly's deliberations were to take a more constructive turn we should wish to go into more detail than seems useful in present circumstances. What are the conditions for a return to stability in the area and, in the longer term, for a permanent settlement?

27. One basic condition, obviously, is acceptance of the existence of Israel, which is virtually the creation of the United Nations, as a sovereign State and a Member of this Organization with all the rights and duties that flow from that double status. We cannot, therefore, condone policies which are based on refusal to admit the existence of a Member State. This is a different matter, I must stress, particularly at this time when we know how deeply passions run, from either the question of political recognition or disagreements over boundaries. And may I repeat at this point the often-stated New Zealand view that if there is an obligation on the Arab States to accept the State of Israel there is conversely an obligation resting on the State of Israel to attempt to make itself acceptable to its neighbours. If ever progress is to be made towards a settlement of the many thorny issues which constitute the Palestine problem there are several things that Israel will have to do.

28. Thus, and always assuming we are working as regards every aspect of this question within the United Nations context, Israeli troops must be disengaged and withdrawn from the Arab territory now occupied by them. The order envisaged by the Charter does not permit territorial aggrandizement through the use of force. To assert that military action, whether of an aggressive or defensive character, may lead to the annexation of territory would be to rob central provisions of the Charter of most of their meaning. Acceptance of the need for withdrawal is required in order that respect for the Charter may be preserved.

29. Having said that, my delegation also recognizes that acceptance of Israel as a sovereign State and disengagement and withdrawal by Israeli forces and far from being the only conditions for a solution to the intractable problems of the area. This withdrawal would assume its full significance only in the context of a settlement that would establish peace, that would guarantee the security and protect the legitimate interests of both Israel and its neighbours, if it is not convincing for the Soviet Union and others merely to reiterate that withdrawal must take place without any accompanying conditions and that other matters can be solved positively thereafter in due course. Such proposals revive memories, not only of previous failures by the Security Council to proceed to the resolution of fundamental problems, but also of a different crisis two years ago, still not resolved, when this Assembly was told that the first essential step was the resumption of the Assembly's normal business, without conditions, after which other important matters would be approached generously. It is not easy for those who have been here through many crises to ignore this Organization's own history.

30. If a willingness of the parties to move to a settlement were to be made clear, then there would be so lack of positive things which might be tackled with the aid and participation of the international community. Clearly and urgently, a special effort should be made to solve the problem of refugees. New Zealand has been a significant contributor, governmentally and privately, to the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees since its inception. But, throughout, we have recognized the limitations of the policy framework within which the agency has been compelled to operate. Last year, in the Special Political Committee of the
General Assembly [505th meeting], my delegation discussed this issue at some length. We noted that the various United Nations decisions on the matter retained their essential validity in the element of justice to which they sought to give expression. Refugees must be afforded the means to return to a normal life, through some form of choice between repatriation, resettlement and compensation. If the refugees are to be denied such opportunity or are to continue to have their status cruelly exploited for fundamentally political purposes, then the prospects for peace in the region will be poisoned in perpetuity.

But, again, a start towards a real solution of the problem depends on the acceptance of certain political facts of life in the region, above all acceptance of the indispensable need to move towards a settlement. Meantime the problem must not be worsened. We feel strongly the responsibility now lying upon Israel to do everything possible, not only to help solve the long-standing refugee problem, but also to prevent the creation of a new refugee problem. On this latter question we take note of the assurance given by the Foreign Minister of Israel in his statement of 26 June [1536th meeting] concerning the measures being taken for the welfare of the people of areas now under Israeli control.

31. Plainly, the burden of agreeing upon a settlement rests in the last analysis distinctly upon the States of the region. The United Nations has a role to play in assisting those States to reach an agreement or agreements. It might be that the United Nations could appoint a special representative, as suggested by a number of delegations, to assist the parties in negotiation and to make recommendations. And a stronger and more effectively-based United Nations presence in the region might be thought both necessary and desirable. It would, of course, need to be established more securely than the United Nations Emergency Force turned out to be—a matter on which my delegation may have some observations to make in another and more appropriate context. But we should not again accept the position where the United Nations, through its peace-keeping operations insulates the States of the area from the need to seek a basic and peaceful solution of their conflicts.

32. A process of accommodation along these lines, producing a lasting settlement, would require disengagement and withdrawal of forces, acceptance of the existence of Israel—involving the ending of the state of belligerency—and respect for the security of all States of the region. It requires, equally urgently, a renewed effort to solve the problem of the refugees. My Government also believes—and has consistently taken this position—that a further and necessary ingredient in any settlement in the area must be the recognition of freedom of access to international waterways. The normalization of relations between the Arab States and Israel and the removal of all trade barriers might follow. Finally, it might be hoped that accompanying such a settlement—surely, indeed, preceding it—there will be a reciprocal restraint by the great Powers in the supply of arms to the region.

33. None of this will be achieved easily. Even in the most favourable of circumstances the process of negotiation, adjustment, and accommodation will take time. My delegation believes that we would best serve the cause of peace by requesting the Security Council to begin detailed, patient and objective consideration of the whole complex of problems involved. And if this Assembly should adopt any expression of opinion which the Security Council might take into account, let its resolution be a constructive one, not a mere endorsement of some partisan position.

34. Mr. USHER (Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ivory Coast) (translated from French): For over twenty years, Arabs and Israelis have been living in a state of armed hostility which has just, and for the third time, erupted into war. The Security Council, after considering the matter, adopted a number of resolutions which have luckily led to a cease-fire accepted and applied by all concerned.

35. The question was, however, still pending before the Council when it was submitted to the General Assembly. We are sure that this was no Pontius Pilate gesture on the part of the organ responsible for the maintenance of peace, but stemmed rather from the keen desire of its members to be informed of the feelings of the small States, including the Ivory Coast, which are dedicated to the maintenance of peace in the world.

36. There is therefore no need to stress unduly the legal side of the calling of this session of the General Assembly, especially since, contrary to our apprehensions, we have been hearing in this hall conciliatory speeches, moderate in tone, and perhaps auguring a happy outcome of our discussions.

37. A historic, if contested, vote was taken on 29 November 1947 whereby a sub-committee's report was adopted and the partition of Palestine decided upon. That sub-committee included the United States and the Soviet Union among its members.

38. Since then, we have all been tossed about in the whirlwind of the giants' global policies and, through no doing of ours, brought face to face with the single-minded and passionate violence of the men who have created this conflict and with the violence to which the conflict, in turn, has given rise.

39. The political instability within the Arab States and the bloodshed and serious disturbances which have occurred time and again in that region have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the problem of Palestine.

40. These chain reactions seem to have no end. This perturbs us greatly, for we have been vainly seeking a solution for twenty years, and these reactions threaten to set off a third world war.

41. In 1967, the war lasted five days, but that was long enough to shed a tragic light both on the dangers to which the continuance of this explosive situation in the Middle East exposes the whole world and on those which threaten the small Powers when they are caught up in the political schemes of the great.

42. However short these intermittent wars may be, they are futile and cruel, in that they produce the painful consequences which every war brings in its wake: death and physical or moral injuries for tens of thousands of human beings, soldiers and civilians.
alike, men, women and children; despair for thousands of prisoners and refugees; destruction of towns and villages; enormous waste of money and equipment; and, last but not least, exacerbation of that hatred and contempt which have already done so much harm in that unhappy part of the world, as evidenced by the tragic episodes of 1948, 1956 and 1967.

43. Who, then, is to be held responsible for this situation? Israel? The Arab States? The great Powers?

44. I must confess that, because of the swiftness of the events, the complexity of the diplomacy, and the skill with which the great Powers have been moving their pawns on the chessboard of the world, the Ivory Coast feels reluctant to make a judgement and hopes that the General Assembly will not waste its energy on assigning responsibility but will instead pinpoint the causes and consequences of the conflict and will suggest, in so far as it is able and competent to do so, ways and means of attaining a just and lasting peace.

45. Certainly, both sides are making a commendable effort to convince us that their position is right; but we may not choose one of these positions and give it our support—we must at all times work for reconciliation.

46. The succession of events has caused a trauma which those concerned cannot readily shake off; but we must all find it within ourselves to forget the past, because of the tragic plight in which hundreds of thousands of refugees have found themselves for the last twenty years. Their position must be reason enough for all to make reciprocal concessions and to lay aside personal pride in order to restore to them their human dignity.

47. To envision any solution of this problem predicated on the destruction of Israel is utterly unrealistic; equally, however, to advocate a political status quo in the region is to seek escape from an ugly situation only to be brought face to face with it once again. What I mean is that war is incapable of solving anything it has never settled anything; it settles nothing now, and it will never settle anything in the future; this is as true of the recent war as of the wars of 1956 and 1948—and that the conflict between Israel and the Arab world can be resolved only by means of negotiation.

48. There is no other way of avoiding fresh hostilities as bloody and futile as those that have gone before.

49. A friendly and fruitful dialogue requires a climate of mutual understanding and tolerance, and such a climate cannot be brought about until the constant agitation, the verbal violence and the threats of the use of force which are so common in the region have been done away with; until the desire for territorial expansion or reconquest is held in check; and, lastly, until military conquest is not allowed to lead to any right of territorial occupation or annexation. At that time, a genuine policy of understanding between the great Powers may result in a peaceful solution of the Israel-Arab conflict and put an end to the futile and costly arms race. Let but the dialogue begin, and the solutions will follow.

50. And what can the General Assembly do? In a case such as this, concerning a highly dangerous situation, one in which a bomb has to be disarmed, I fail to see what measures it could recommend that would bring about a rapid settlement.

51. Actually, under Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter and resolution 277 (V) of 3 November 1950 we have three possibilities open to us. Either, after discussing the problem, we come to the conclusion that the situation calls for no specific action on the part of the United Nations, and we are then free to make to the parties recommendations which, unfortunately, are likely not to impose a legal obligation on them; or we conclude that action is called for, and in that case we are obliged to refer the question to the Security Council, either before or after discussion, although we may call the attention of the Security Council to the situation as being likely to endanger international security; or else, under the terms of the resolution of 3 November 1950, a resolution whose legality has been questioned so often, the General Assembly may conclude that there has been a breach of the peace, an aggression, and make recommendations to Member States or collective measures to be taken, including the use of force.

52. It seems to my delegation that none of these three possibilities gives the General Assembly adequate and appropriate means for an effective and realistic solution of the problem.

53. What would be the effect of a General Assembly recommendation which stood no chance of acceptance by the parties to the conflict? What consequences would it have in the Middle East and what would such a failure do to the prestige of the United Nations?

54. A consensus is emerging on one point: that the consequences of the recent events should be eliminated, and there is a general desire to find a solution which would make for a fair and lasting peace.

55. The differences lie in that, according to some, those consequences must be eliminated at once, even before any substantive discussion of the problem, while according to others, the two operations should proceed simultaneously.

56. My delegation believes that the General Assembly should be able to agree on the following compromise:

1. Secure an end of the state of war and belligerence and the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East;

2. Call for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the removal of all forces to the positions at which they were stationed before the crisis;

3. Recommend a special status for the Holy Places of Jerusalem so that all may have free access to them and so that they may be protected from profanation resulting from acts of war;

4. Recall the obligations of States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, which provides that Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; and
1540th meeting -- 28 June 1967

65. Success in arms is, as we all know, as unpredictable as it is evanescent. I need hardly remind this Assembly of several statements repeatedly made by responsible leaders and high government officials of Israel, that Israel was not engaged in an offensive war and had no ambitions or intentions of territorial aggrandizement. We are prepared to accept these assurances and we would like to remind the Government of Israel of the intention with which the representatives of the Security Council and the General Assembly agreed to the convening of this session bears testimony to the seriousness with which they quite rightly view the current crisis in international relations which has inevitably resulted from the tragic events of two weeks ago in that part of the world.

66. One of the obvious and by now unanimously accepted phenomena of the conduct of nations is that armed violence or the resort to force cannot and must not be used as an instrument of policy or of territorial readjustment of boundaries. We cannot accede to a
situation which would in any way be tantamount to a violation of such a cardinal consideration in the field of international intercourse in this time and age. The suggestion that Israel was, and still is, prepared to withdraw her armed forces from certain of the areas occupied by her outside her own boundaries, provided that the neighboring States—and indeed all Arab States—fulfill certain conditions, is repugnant to our view of the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. For, to agree with such a suggestion would be to set a premium on resort to armed force in order to compel from others an agreement which would otherwise be difficult of achievement. To do so would surely be to enforce settlements under duress—a course of action which is not only a violation of the basic tenets of the Charter but also an exercise in futility, since we all know that acceptance under duress under any circumstances is but the surest way of ensuring the very thirst for revenge and readjustment in the future which, we are all agreed, must needs be avoided.

67. Every single speaker from this rostrum has reiterated the need for a permanent and stable peace in the Middle East. On behalf of my Government, I fully endorse this desire. But the surest way of defeating this self-same purpose would be for us to seek to persuade States, which as a result of defeat in battle find themselves in a temporarily weakened position, to accept conditions which would be both derogatory of their dignity as sovereign States and inconsistent with their rights as Members of this Organization. It is for this reason that the Government of Ceylon is of the view that the first and most urgent step in the present situation is a withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel, before any useful and meaningful negotiations can be commenced on the many other issues which must necessarily be considered without too much delay. I refer, of course, to questions such as the resettlement of the very large numbers of Arab refugees, which has surely by now become a burden on the conscience not only of any one Member State, but of the entire family of nations.

68. My delegation endorses most whole-heartedly, Mr. President, your declaration of 26 June, that "this is so clearly a major humanitarian issue, transcending national or ideological boundaries" [155th meeting para. 29]. I refer also to questions such as the right of every State to exist as a political entity and the agreed resolution of whatever disputes may appear to exist relating to the use of waterways in geographical areas considered vital to the economic life of Member States. In regard to the latter we are, however, mindful of the fact that there are admirable precedents which the wisdom of international co-operation has devised to cover seemingly conflicting interests between neighboring States in relation to such disputes. We are not so sure that some of these precedents cannot be looked into with profit to overcome some of the difficulties which the present crisis in the Middle East has laid bare.

69. Before I conclude, I must also place on record my delegation's endorsement of the Secretary-General's view that the United Nation Emergency Force was on United Arab Republic soil with the express consent of the United Arab Republic Government, and that once that consent was withdrawn the Force could not possibly continue to be there, except as an occupation force. My delegation expressed this view as far back as February 1957 [651st meeting], and we reaffirm it now. My Government would wish further to place on record its deep appreciation of the dedicated manner in which the Secretary-General endeavoured, not only in the exercise of his high office but also by the use of his personal prestige, to prevent the tragic events of which we are all aware.

70. We wish to reiterate our firm commitment to the following positions of principle:

(a) We would, with all sincerity and humility, call for the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel from the territories belonging to Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic occupied as a result of the recent hostilities.

(b) We state that such withdrawal should not be subject to preconditions nor indeed be tied to negotiations on wider issues relating to the establishment of a more stable state of affairs in that region.

(c) We subscribe to the theory enshrined in international law and practice as well as international custom that the sovereign rights of States over their territories, on land, at sea and in the air, should be respected. We think that any adjustment of the use of such territorial land, sea or air should be as a result of negotiations and discussions within the framework of the United Nations independently of the issue of the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and with full regard to the recognition of the sovereign rights of States.

(d) We sincerely believe that any attempt to compel recognition of the State of Israel by the Arab States in the present context would amount to a proposal which would place the Arab States under duress to do so, and this we are unable to support since it would be neither wise nor virtuous.

(e) Lastly, the Government of Ceylon will firmly support any proposal or suggestion for the establishment or reactivation of any United Nations presence or peace-keeping force which, in the collective view of this Assembly, may contribute to a possible easing of the tension existing between Israel and her neighboring States and thereby give what the Secretary-General referred to as "a breathing spell" before final and long-term solutions are sought to be achieved. It is our view that such a presence or peace-keeping force on their respective territories should be supported and accepted by both Israel and her neighboring States. However, we must realize that the presence of such a force must necessarily be symbolic, and a lasting solution can only evolve in a climate of peace and by peaceful means.

71. The PRESIDENT: May I be permitted to clarify the situation at this stage for Members of the General Assembly. The Assembly has before it three draft resolutions which have been formally proposed and circulated [A/L.520, A/L.521, and A/L.522]. The representative of Yugoslavia has asked to speak in order to introduce a new draft resolution under the item before the Assembly. I have agreed to call on him because I think that Members of the Assembly will have more time to consider the contents of the
proposals if they are introduced at the earliest possible time.

72. When we have concluded the general debate and reach the stage of considering the draft resolutions, all Members will be fully acquainted with the contents of the drafts, as well as with the purpose of those contents as envisaged by the authors. That, in my opinion, will expedite the work of the General Assembly.

73. Therefore, I now call on the representative of Yugoslavia to introduce the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors.

74. Mr. LEKIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, I am grateful to you for permitting me to speak this afternoon for the purpose of introducing a draft resolution on the primary question before the Assembly: namely, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the areas they have occupied.

75. The fact that the Parliament of Israel has already enacted a law on the annexation of the Jordanian part of the City of Jerusalem, an act constituting a flagrant violation of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter, reinforces the need and urgency of this step. It is all the more underlined by the gravity of the situation, in which thousands of Arab refugees feel compelled to leave because they do not want to live under alien rule. I do not intend at this juncture to elaborate on this matter, but only to point to the statement made by the President of the General Assembly and to other statements relative to this problem that have been made in the General Assembly.

76. This action of Israel is in glaring contradiction to the almost unanimously expressed opinion in the general debate, to the effect that the United Nations cannot accept any territorial expansion or gain of other special advantages by the violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty through the use of force.

77. For nearly two weeks now, the non-aligned delegations have been exchanging views in regard to the current grave situation in the Middle East. It was, and is, the view of these delegations that the Security Council took only the first necessary step in demanding a cease-fire in the Middle East. A cease-fire, however, should be linked with withdrawal. The non-aligned delegations have therefore concerted their efforts in order to arrive at a suitable formulation in regard to withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces to positions behind the armistice lines.

78. It is my privilege to introduce in this Assembly, on behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Burundi, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia, the following draft resolution:

"The General Assembly,

Having discussed the grave situation in the Middle East,

Noting that the armed forces of Israel occupy areas including territories belonging to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic,

1. Calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab countries;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure compliance with the present resolution and, with the assistance of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization established by the Security Council, to secure strict observance by all parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab countries;

3. Calls upon all States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on Israel's compliance with the terms of the present resolution;

5. Requests the Security Council, after the withdrawal of Israel's armed forces behind the armistice lines has been completed, to give consideration to questions pertaining to the situation in the area;"

79. Members will note that the draft resolution, which has been sponsored so far by fourteen delegations, is not now confined to non-aligned delegations alone. Some other delegations, which feel as strongly as we do that the first order of priority must be the securing of withdrawal, have joined our effort. It is our hope that once withdrawal has been completed, the Security Council will meet to give thorough consideration to the problems of the area and arrive at just solutions.

80. We know that there are many disputes which have not been settled over the last twenty years. However, it is not possible, and it cannot be conceived, that there could be any just settlement in the Middle East unless and until Israel had first withdrawn its armed forces to positions behind the armistice lines.

81. The delegations which have co-sponsored this draft resolution are of the firm view that the Assembly should not concern itself with ancillary questions at this moment. We would therefore request that the Assembly give priority to the draft resolution which we have co-sponsored over other draft resolutions already before it. It is not our intention to stifle the debate which is now going on. Nevertheless, it is hoped that it will be possible to vote on our draft resolution at the latest by next Friday afternoon.

82. The PRESIDENT: The draft resolution that has just been introduced by the representative of Yugoslavia is now formally before the Assembly.

83. I should like to make the following observations on two points raised by the representative of Yugoslavia. The question of new developments in Jerusalem is not yet before the Assembly. The second question, that of giving priority to the draft resolution, will come before the Assembly only after it has concluded the general debate and when it proceeds to the consideration of the various draft resolutions before it.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.