



## CONTENTS

Page

## Agenda item 5:

Questions considered by the Security Council at its  
838th meeting on 7 August 1958 (*continued*)..... 115

**President:** Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

## AGENDA ITEM 5

**Questions considered by the Security Council at  
its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958 (*con-  
tinued*)**

1. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon): Ever since the United Nations came into existence, the people of the world, faced with grave problems, have turned towards it in hope and in the belief that it is the surest and the only way to find suitable solutions. Today, in a grave crisis, we seek in this emergency special session such a solution. My delegation believes that this is the appropriate and perhaps the only forum where fruitful discussion leading to the settlement of a crisis, which undoubtedly could disturb the peace of the world, can be undertaken. We therefore hope and believe that the Member States assembled here will succeed. If we are to succeed we must view the situation realistically and courageously, and take whatever action we may deem necessary to secure a peaceful settlement. In order to achieve this end, we should be prepared to look at the problems of the situation objectively, and discarding self-interest as far as one could do so, attempt to find the right solution. This will be greatly facilitated if our approach is guided by those religious precepts which we hold dear, such as for instance as the principle of good neighbourliness and by spiritual as opposed to purely mundane considerations. Spiritual and moral values should always be kept in the forefront and should play an important parts in practical politics, so that precept and practice may be in accord.

2. The situation before us is certainly grave and dangerous and the corresponding responsibility on us is therefore heavy. It is all the more so, as the Security Council has not been successful in finding a solution. We therefore cannot fail. We must not fail. My delegation is optimistic that with a right and sincere approach we shall find a solution acceptable to us all. We on our part shall endeavour in our humble way to contribute to a settlement which we hope will bring stability, economic prosperity and peace to the peoples of the Middle East and to the rest of the world.

3. We are aware and quite conscious of the fact that we are a small country. But there is one thing we would like to assure this Assembly and that is that we like to look at a problem objectively, to find out what is right

and what is wrong, and adopt the course which we sincerely believe to be the right course, irrespective of whether our decision is pleasing to all countries or not. We wish, therefore, to be clearly understood that if we take a view on the present situation, it is a view which is animated by the desire to find the right course. This is sometimes, as my colleague of Burma observed the other day [740th meeting], inconvenient and sometimes difficult. But whatever the difficulties might be, and whatever the risk of being misunderstood might be, we would like to assure this Assembly that the decision which we take is a decision inspired by our desire to do what is the right thing.

4. With these ideas in mind we should like to offer a few brief comments on the important issue raised by the intervention of the armed forces of the United States in Lebanon and the intervention of the armed forces of the United Kingdom in Jordan. This is what we have met here in an emergency special session to consider. It is undoubtedly the most immediate matter we have to consider and solve. We have noted the statements made both by the United States and the United Kingdom explaining the reasons for their action and giving an undertaking that their forces would be withdrawn on the fulfilment of two conditions. We do not doubt the sincerity of the motives which impelled these two Governments to take the course of action they adopted. We have given our most earnest and careful consideration to the matter in its entirety and feel that we cannot agree with the action taken in all the circumstances of the case. It is quite clear to us that the action cannot be justified under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, and it is a moot question whether it can even be justified under the General Assembly resolutions of 1949 and 1950.

5. It is important also to remember that at the time of the intervention the Security Council was seized of the question of Lebanon. In fact, the Security Council had taken action on complaints of subversive activities and massive intervention in Lebanon and it had sent to Lebanon a United Nations Observation Group. Some reports from the Observation Group were already before the Security Council. These reports contained no evidence of massive intervention. It is a question whether in these circumstances, when the Security Council was actually seized of the problem, there was any justification for military interference, even under the General Assembly resolution of 1950. Moreover, it would appear that the intervention did not take place so much because of the subversive activities allegedly directed against Lebanon as because of the sudden events that took place in Iraq and the fear of repercussions as a result of that event in Jordan and Lebanon. In any case, the whole position as to the right of armed intervention is obscure and it is most desirable that the United Nations should have a study made of the considerations involved in armed interference outside the terms of Article 51.

6. We, and, I know, a large number of other countries too, are disturbed by the intervention that has taken place. There is also a fear that, if the intervention in this case is justified, unpopular Governments in other places might seek the assistance of friendly countries to intervene with armed force to support and maintain themselves in power against the wish of a majority of their people and thus deny to the people the elementary right of freedom, namely, of self-determination. This is a matter, therefore, of great importance and is one that should be carefully considered by the United Nations. I do not suggest that it should or could be undertaken at this session, which is an emergency one convened for a special purpose, but I do wish to raise the question here so that attention may be paid to it at the earliest possible date after this session is concluded. Moreover, we need not really go into the question at this stage because the intervention is now complete and can be regarded as a *fait accompli*. The troops are there in Lebanon and Jordan and the real question before us is the question of how best to get the troops out of the two countries.

7. We have noted with great satisfaction the action of the United States in withdrawing some units of its forces from Lebanon. We have no doubt that this withdrawal, even without reference to the conditions it had indicated earlier, is an indication of the sincerity of the Government of the United States of America. We hope that this action will be followed by further action until there is a complete withdrawal of troops and that likewise the United Kingdom will consider the complete withdrawal of their forces also at an early date. We do recognize that the withdrawal of their forces in Jordan could leave an immediate vacuum and create some degree of political instability. It is our view, however, that all the United Nations can do is to prevent aggression against any country from outside. The United Nations should not interfere in any way with the internal affairs of any country. Therefore we do accept the position that if the troops are to be withdrawn it will become necessary for the United Nations to take some kind of action to ensure so far as is possible that no outside interference will take place. For this reason it will be necessary immediately for this Assembly to call upon all Member States to take note of the fact that they have already committed themselves to the principle of mutual respect for the sovereignty of and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It is our view that this principle should be reaffirmed. When that is done that would be, we think, a sufficient guarantee, as we hope that those countries who subscribe to that principle will refrain at all times from action which will be contrary to their affirmation. Furthermore, it is necessary, as has been emphasized both by the Secretary-General and by those who have spoken before me, that suitable United Nations action, which does not extend to the sending of an armed force—and I repeat the words “armed force”—should be taken. It is the view of my delegation that if these two steps are taken at the present time they will meet the needs of the present situation, and it should be possible for the United States and the United Kingdom, satisfied that the purpose they themselves had in view had been achieved, to complete the withdrawal of their troops.

8. There are at present before us two draft resolutions. The difference between them appears to be a difference in approach. The draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [A/3870 and Corr.1] recommends the withdrawal of armed forces and action

by the United Nations, with both of which recommendations there would appear to be a very large measure of agreement. The more recent draft resolution submitted by Norway and some other Member States [A/3878] does not contain any language which refers to a request for the withdrawal of troops, an omission which makes it difficult for several countries to accept it. It certainly refers to declarations made in letters submitted by the United States Secretary of State [A/3876] and the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary [A/3877] to you, Mr. President, but in these declarations the proposal to withdraw is made subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. It would have been simpler and perhaps more satisfactory if there could have been something in the draft resolution which would tie up the question of withdrawal of troops with the other clauses of the draft resolution. In the light of the declarations in the letters I have referred to, it is somewhat difficult to understand why the draft resolution itself should not contain a clause relating to withdrawal on the fulfilment of the arrangements which the Secretary-General is to be asked to undertake. It appears, therefore, that there is only a very narrow gulf between those who feel that the General Assembly, which has been convened in special session to deal with this matter, should make a positive recommendation in favour of withdrawal, and those who do not wish to make such a specific reference. Though the gulf is narrow, the difference is an important one.

9. There is a clause in the declarations to which I would like to refer at this point: “whenever as a result of the further action of the United Nations or otherwise their presence is no longer required”. This appears to us to be somewhat vague, but if a meaning is to be given to this clause it could only be that the party to decide when the withdrawal is to take place is the party making the declaration. It would have been more satisfactory if the clause was more precisely related to the action taken by the United Nations.

10. However, the gulf being so narrow, goodwill and a little ingenuity should enable us to devise a formula which will meet both points of view, a formula which will be acceptable to both groups, allaying on the one hand the fears of many with regard to the intervention and continued presence of these troops, and on the other hand recommending that the withdrawal be related to United Nations action and not carried out under compulsion by the General Assembly. Towards this end, several delegations, including my own delegation, have been earnestly trying to formulate a draft resolution which might prove more acceptable to a larger number of Member States than the present draft resolution of Norway and some other Member States. We have succeeded in producing a draft, which is now under further study. A set of amendments to this joint draft resolution having the same aim is also under consideration. It may also be that countries more immediately concerned, such as the main Arab countries themselves, might take a hand in attempting to find a formula which would be generally acceptable.

11. The presence of these troops in these two countries is now a potential danger to peace. It is true that tension has somewhat eased for the time being, but the continued presence of these troops may be like a keg of gunpowder placed in an inflammable area where the smallest spark could touch off a big explosion. God grant it may not happen, but we would be prudent if we took early action to withdraw the troops.

12. I should like now to pass on to the consideration of another aspect, which is perhaps not of such urgency but is nevertheless of great importance. I refer to what I might call the long-term aspect of the situation in the Middle East as a whole. This aspect is very closely related to what has happened in Lebanon and Jordan. In fact, the situation in Lebanon and Jordan could not be effectively and fully dealt with by the immediate action we have just been discussing, unless some attempt is made to get to grips with this long-term problem. What I mean is that it is essential that an immediate start should be made to consider the various factors which would lead to political and economic stability in the whole region of the Middle East.

13. Undoubtedly there is a revolution going on in the minds of people there—a revolution of expectancy it might be, but there has been going on a real Arab reawakening—and as a result there has grown up a very potent force, which is usually referred to as Arab nationalism. It is unwise to ignore or fail to recognize what is a natural growth of human society, and what in the twentieth century is a known phenomenon in all parts of the world. It is not a new manifestation. Throughout history this phenomenon has existed in varying degrees of fervour. It was well known in Europe and it arose on the American continent. It has returned to Asia and the Middle East and is now growing fast in Africa. It is a sentiment which has animated mankind from the dawn of history and is powerful and dynamic. Nationalism claims for a country the right to freedom and independence and the right to shape its destiny according to the genius of its people and to use the resources available to it for the betterment of its people. The Arab peoples too draw their inspiration from the sentiment: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness—words so dear to the hearts of the people of this great country, the United States. The emergence of this force in the Middle East could therefore be no surprise, but it has undoubtedly created difficulties. It has led to conflicts. People animated by this feeling are, naturally, not satisfied to let things remain as they were before and so in hope and expectancy they push forward and often come into conflict with people or countries having different ideas or other interests. This is one of the causes of the ferment one sees in the Middle East. Every possible step has to be taken to prevent such conflicts. For this purpose a recognition that the resources of the country belong to the people and that any exploitation of those resources must be done by the people themselves or by their consent is absolutely essential.

14. There is another problem of recent growth in the Middle East which is important and should be taken care of. I refer to the extension of the struggle between the two great Power groups into this region. This results in unrest and in conflicts between countries in that area. It should, therefore, be considered whether action could not be taken by the great Powers themselves to disengage themselves from such activities. Another serious problem affecting this area is the failure to deal with the Palestinian question, which has caused so much bitterness in the area and in which is also involved the problem of the Arab refugees. It is the view of my delegation that these two important and closely related matters which affect the well-being of the peoples in this region should be considered. That these two matters are highly complicated and that they raise emotional issues I am very well aware.

15. One other matter of great importance which affects the Middle East is the great need for economic develop-

ment. This was admirably dealt with in President Eisenhower's address before this Assembly [733rd meeting]. Similar sentiments were expressed by both the Foreign Minister of the USSR [733rd meeting] and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom [734th meeting]. Here is an instance of agreement between the three great Powers on one of the vital issues affecting this area. We welcome it, and we express the sincere hope that this spirit of co-operation will be carried into other equally vital spheres of activity affecting the lives and well-being of the peoples of the Middle East.

16. It is our hope that something definite and practicable will be worked out in that direction. It is for these reasons that my delegation proposes that these matters should be given serious consideration. It is our view that if any satisfactory solution is to flow from such a consideration, it must be undertaken at the highest level. It must be considered by the great Powers and by the Arabs and other countries concerned. Unless the Heads of Government of these Powers can meet in a spirit of goodwill and with a desire to bring about stability in this area and the advancement of its peoples, nothing can be done. But it is our hope that the great Powers will see how important it is to create stability and development in this area without making it merely an arena for competition.

17. We therefore propose that the Secretary-General should be instructed by this Assembly to take such steps as may be necessary to arrange a meeting of the Heads of Government of the great Powers and the Heads of Government of the Arab countries and other countries concerned. We only suggest at this stage that the Secretary-General should take the necessary steps to arrange such a meeting. The approval of the Arab countries is, of course, a primary consideration. Our proposal is submitted in good faith in the hope that something tangible will be done in regard to the many problems, some of them of the utmost importance, which have not yet been satisfactorily dealt with or solved, perhaps owing to the complications involved. We cannot continue to remain indifferent any longer, and we hope that the Secretary-General, with his deep knowledge and experience of the problems of the area and with his characteristic energy and ability, will succeed in arranging such a meeting.

18. I have concluded, but I would like to refer before I close to one point. The representative of the United States of America, Mr. Lodge, stated last week that we are about to turn over a leaf in human history [732nd meeting]. Let us not hesitate. Let us certainly turn it over but positively and constructively. We must act with courage and imagination. The time has come to cut ourselves away from our swaddling bands and to take bold steps into the future. Delay or procrastination, reluctance or doubt, will be fatal. Let us, therefore, stretch out and seize the opportunity of solving once and for all the entire problem of this region.

19. Mr. RAHIM (Yemen): In any discussion concerning the grave events taking place in the Arab world today, it is essential that we first explore the currents which are behind these events. This is particularly necessary if we are to embark on prescribing the right remedy for the situation emerging in the area. I shall, therefore, concentrate my few remarks on the nature of these currents and shall try to analyse some of the remedies proposed by the Secretary-General and other speakers on this rostrum.

20. Before doing so, I would like to stress the fact that the Arab countries have their own regional organization, the Arab League, whose charter contains ample provisions about non-interference in the national affairs of member States. In case of disputes among members, the charter also provides for solution by means of arbitration, conciliation, and mediation. Thus, the Arab League has appropriate machinery for solving any problems which may arise. If given the opportunity, it could prove to be a potent factor in preserving the peace and stability of the area. In the present crisis, unfortunately, the Arab League was denied the opportunity to prove its effectiveness as a regional organization, in the hope entertained by some that the Security Council might be more effective in dealing successfully with this crisis—a hope which proved to be an illusion.

21. When we consider the explosive problems which beset the Arab world, no approach or remedy can be recommended without having an exact idea of the forces of nationalism at work in the area. Ever since the seventh century the people living in the lands between the Atlantic Ocean and the Arabian Gulf have considered themselves part of the Arab nation. Even during the days of the Ottoman Empire, they retained their Arab consciousness and a large measure of their political unity.

22. This is not the time nor the place to turn back the pages of history as far as the twelfth century to trace the original beginnings of Arab nationalism with its subsequent record of noble sacrifices and heroic leaders. Suffice it to say that our nationalism stems from the hearts of the people and springs from the wells of their past and recent sorrows, coupled with their future hopes. Nobody can stamp out this movement or extinguish its sacred light. Nay, no might or force, however big and powerful, can suppress it. It is a strong and torrential current which, instead of being opposed, should be channelled into the best direction and use. Those who would deal with it must ride with this tide or be overwhelmed by it.

23. After the First World War, when the Arabs were denied their promised unity and their lands were arbitrarily separated by artificial boundaries, Arab nationalism waged a vigorous and successful struggle to achieve independence in various parts of the Arab world. On 22 March 1945, these efforts culminated in the foundation of the Arab League by the seven States which had then won their independence.

24. Since the end of the Second World War, the Arabs have continued to fight—and are still fighting—for the independence of areas such as Algeria, Aden and the southern provinces of the Arabian Peninsula, all of which are still under foreign domination. Simultaneously, the Arab national movement has seen the beginning of new consolidations, such as the union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic and the later federation of Yemen with the United Arab Republic in the United Arab States. These important events provide a concrete step in the direction of the long-cherished goal of Arab unity.

25. To understand the current manifestation of Arab nationalism, it is important to consider the movement's three basic principles, principles which it shares with all genuine nationalist movements. These can be described as: first, the desire for unity, based on mutual social, historic, and economic ties; secondly, the urge for social reform and betterment of the lot of the average

man and woman; thirdly, the need for non-alignment in foreign policy to spare time and energy for national growth.

26. Our nationalist movement is distinctly positive, constructive and peaceful. Above all, it is neither pro-Communist nor anti-Western. A voice was heard last Friday from this rostrum—unfortunately, a Middle Eastern voice—describing Arab nationalism as negative. It is lamentable and distressing to find that a Middle Easterner is unable to read the clear handwriting on the wall. I hope that the representative of Iran, and other members of this Assembly, will find in what I am going to say and quote from disinterested observers convincing proof that Arab nationalism is positive, constructive, and peaceful. For there are hopeful indications that these basic characteristics of Arab nationalism, which I have described, are now achieving wider recognition and acceptance.

27. I need not repeat the complimentary and eloquent statements on Arab nationalism made by Prime Minister Nehru and General Franco—statements which were repeated here by their representatives [738th and 739th meetings]. Also, in a recent press conference, the President of the United States declared that, if the Arabs, as a whole, wanted to express their nationalism in the form of a federation of a larger state, the United States had no objections to that. One week later, in his address to this Assembly, President Eisenhower stated his country's position as follows: "The peoples of the Arab nations of the Near East clearly possess the right of determining and expressing their own destiny" [733rd meeting, para. 31].

28. After a recent diplomatic visit to the Arab world, Mr. Murphy, the special envoy of the President of the United States, made the following observation on Arab nationalism:

"The situation is dynamic and there is a very definite movement of the people in that area. It is a fact and not just a theory. There are vast movements among the Arabs to improve their lot. The centre core of opinion is that they want to consolidate a State in which the Arab people can achieve a position of equality."

29. The unity movements now taking place in the Arab world are, indeed, peaceful and voluntary. No force is used to achieve them. Take the first two unity movements which occurred earlier this year—the union of Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic. This merger took place peacefully and voluntarily. Most significantly, unification was accomplished by a universal free plebiscite held in the two merging countries.

30. The federation between my country and the United Arab Republic also took place peacefully and voluntarily. No infiltration or radio barrage was directed against my country urging it to federate with the United Arab Republic. The Crown Prince of Yemen, accompanied by a large delegation from the country, flew to Cairo and signed the declaration of federation in accordance with the will of the Yemeni people.

31. In the future other countries of the Arab world will unite in this same spirit of free choice, and union or federation between brother Arab countries, republics or monarchies, will take place peacefully and voluntarily as it did before. However, when brute force is used against such movements, we are confronted with the present sad spectacle of foreign troops occupying Arab lands. The same and even more violent spectacle will take

place in other countries if the surging tide of nationalism is interfered with.

32. Another important feature of the recent unity movement I have described is the complete equality between partners. No advantage is enjoyed by a strong party over a weaker. Take the example of the federation of my country with the United Arab Republic. More than eight months have elapsed since the creation of the federation; no coercion was employed and no advantage has been taken of Yemeni resources. Only brotherly co-operation and assistance is taking place. The United Arab Republic, although the biggest and most populous among the Arab States, considers itself as one of them with no hegemony or superiority. The Arab unity movement is, and will remain, a unity movement among equals and brothers.

33. As far as other nations are concerned, a most pertinent characteristic of the Arab nationalist movement is its deep respect for international commitments. Two recent examples will illustrate this sentiment.

34. In July 1958 the United Arab Republic signed a compensation agreement with the shareholders of the former Suez Canal Company, to the complete satisfaction of all concerned. Mindful of its international commitments and the importance of its great waterway, the United Arab Republic has honoured and will continue to honour its commitments to the world community. Not only is the traffic in this important international waterway passing smoothly, but it is increasing day by day. And the Egyptian Canal Authority, despite the short period of its operations, has already introduced many improvements and contracted for deepening and widening of the canal at a cost exceeding \$335 million, to be paid out of Canal revenues.

35. A second example of nationalist responsibility in the Arab world is provided by the new Government of Iraq. When this new and vigorous republic was established, rumours were spread that the oil flow from Iraq to Europe would stop. Nothing of the sort has happened. Iraqi oil is flowing and will flow for the benefit of Iraq and the whole world, just as traffic is flowing through the Suez Canal for the benefit of the United Arab Republic and the whole world. It is significant that Iraqi leaders lost no time in reassuring the whole world that they would stand by their international commitments and that their oil would continue to flow. In fact, these same leaders have expressed the hope that the flow of oil can be increased, thus adding to their national revenue.

36. After describing the nature and characteristics of this great movement of nationalism in the Arab world—a movement which is behind all the events that we witness today—my delegation would like to examine some of the remedies and solutions proposed in this Assembly. But before examining these measures, I wish to emphasize at the outset that no remedy or solution whatsoever can be effective unless the armed intervention in this area comes to an end and troops occupying Arab lands are withdrawn.

37. Although divided by artificial political boundaries, the Arab people consider themselves as belonging to one country. Hence, the occupation by foreign troops of a part of their homeland naturally constitutes a grave danger to the remaining parts and is bound to cause deep repercussion. This explains why the presence of foreign troops in Arab lands—whether in Algeria, Southern Yemen, Lebanon, or Jordan—is deeply felt

and resented by the Arab people from the Atlantic to the Arabian Gulf.

38. Foreign troops have recently been landed on the pretext of preserving the integrity and sovereignty of certain Arab countries. On the contrary, we firmly believe that the stationing of these troops is actually impairing the sovereignty of these countries and constitutes a real threat to both their integrity and the peace of the area. After all, what mission do these foreign troops have in Arab lands? We cannot imagine any other mission for them except the thankless task of subduing by brute force any expression of national and patriotic sentiment and quelling by military might any tendencies towards the fulfilment of Arab nationalism and liberation.

39. We in the Arab world know better than many other countries the dangers—and the humiliation—of occupation by foreign troops. We experienced it until very recently, and we still have its disagreeable taste. Under a pretext similar to that advanced four weeks ago for landing foreign troops on Arab soil, British troops landed in Egypt in 1881 to defend—they said—the throne of the Khedive and the integrity of Egypt. However, in spite of formal assurances of the immediate withdrawal of these troops, Egypt suffered their presence for more than seventy years. More recently, and fortunately for a short period, Egypt experienced the occupation of a part of her territory by foreign troops in 1956.

40. Other Arab countries have had to go through the same ordeal. The Sudan, as well as Egypt, has experienced foreign occupation. Iraq was under external domination. Libya had the same sad fate until a General Assembly resolution of 1949 granted it independence [resolution 289 (IV)]. And at present there are still Arab lands under foreign domination: Algeria is being bled white for its liberation, and Buraimi and the Southern Arabian provinces are groaning under oppressive foreign domination. No wonder we of the Arab world abhor and condemn foreign occupation; it is because we still taste its bitter fruits.

41. Today, after more than five weeks of having foreign troops stationed in Arab lands, it is appropriate to ask ourselves, "Did those troops improve the prospects of peace and security in the area? Did the explosions, shootings, and unrest cease? Are the sufferings of the people abated?" Unfortunately, the candid and sincere answer must be in the negative. Shootings and explosions are still going on, and the suffering of the people is mounting. In fact, the presence of these foreign troops is a source of great danger; and the future will prove that they constitute a major factor of insecurity and unrest. Rumours are rife—I hope they are untrue—that these troops are destined to become a bridgehead for new and large-scale aggression, reminiscent of the attack in 1956 which called forth the first special session of this Assembly. We refuse to believe these rumours, but the sooner all foreign troops are withdrawn, the better for all concerned and for the cause of world peace.

42. Accordingly, we firmly believe that any remedy to the serious problem confronting us today will be useless and will be doomed to failure unless foreign troops occupying Arab lands are withdrawn. This is the *sine qua non* for stability in the area. If this step is taken, the road will then be clear for peace, security, progress and other constructive national and international programmes.

43. Now, my delegation would like to comment briefly on some of the solutions proposed in this Assembly.

44. It has been proposed, in reference to this troubled area, that the General Assembly take action looking toward the creation of a stand-by United Nations peace force. Although such a force may be useful in certain cases, we must ask ourselves: what would be the purpose, in the case we are dealing with, of such a force? If, as is obvious, it is not permissible for a foreign country to send its forces into the area to suppress a genuine tide of nationalism and prevent the Arab people from exercising its inherent right of self-determination and liberation, it is even less permissible to thrust such a thankless task upon the United Nations, for the United Nations was set up primarily to prevent war. It was not set up to stop liberation movements in the world. If, under the pretext of indirect aggression, the United Nations should undertake such a thankless task, it could well become a body for the perpetuation of tyranny. Such action would debase the United Nations; it would send it to its doom.

45. However, if, to facilitate and supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in Arab lands, the United Nations Observation Group should be strengthened and extended as a temporary measure—and I underline the word "temporary"—my delegation would be wholeheartedly for it. But it should be clearly understood that this enlarged United Nations Observation Group is to be withdrawn immediately at the request of the host country, and this proviso should be included in any resolution passed by the General Assembly concerning it.

46. I should now like to turn to various comments about the economic welfare of the Arab lands. The President of the United States has expressed high and noble sentiments toward the Arab people in regard to their economic development. We are indeed obliged for his general interest and his expression of hope for the future emergence of modern Arab States that would bring this century contributions surpassing those of our predecessors in science, medicine, astronomy and mathematics. I can assure him that the Arab world has awakened and, through its great surge of constructive nationalism, is well on the way to a modern Arab renaissance. However, we still have a long way to go, and we need and welcome a helping hand from friendly nations. I should simply like to emphasize the fact that we are on our way to this goal by our own means and possibilities.

47. It has been suggested in this Assembly that an Arab development institution, on a regional basis, should be established to accelerate progress in such fields as industry, agriculture, water supply and education. It is understood that in such an institution the Arab countries will take a leading role, assisted by the United Nations and other countries willing to take part in such an organization. But before advancing any opinion on such an institution, I would like to stress briefly two points.

48. First, the Arab countries after attaining their independence—some of them as recently as two years ago—have made giant strides in the fields of industry, health, education, agriculture and the use of water resources. This progress has been accomplished mainly by the Arabs, with their own technicians and their own funds, assisted by some foreign funds and technical assistance, for which we are grateful. I should not like to take the time of the General Assembly by

dwelling on the progressive and constructive side of Arab nationalism, citing voluminous statistics, but I shall simply give a very few examples from various fields indicative of this progress.

49. In the past ten years, for example, we find that the Egyptian region of the United Arab Republic has more than doubled its number of schools, students and teachers. During the same period, the Syrian region has almost doubled its highway network and increased its railroads seven-fold, while Lebanon's investments for industrial development have doubled. Yemen has added hundreds of miles to its roadways in the past five years, constructed a new harbour and completed plans for the irrigation of two million acres of additional land.

50. Iraq's allocations for economic development have multiplied ten times since 1951, and Saudi Arabia's educational budget has jumped eleven-fold since this same year. In the Sudan, economic development allocations have increased three-fold since 1956, and Jordan's phosphate production has multiplied six times since 1953. Similar and more spectacular progress has been made by Morocco and Tunisia. These are but a few examples from many I could have chosen.

51. The second and important point I would like to stress is the existence of the Economic Council of the Arab League. The Economic Council of the Arab League, as far back as 1953, was studying plans for an economic institution similar to the one proposed in this Assembly. And on 4 June 1957, the Council of the Arab League approved the recommendation of its Economic Council to establish an Arab financial organization for economic development. Its aims, as its name indicates, are to encourage the development of public, as well as private projects, in the various Arab States, either by extending loans, participating directly in these projects, or preparing necessary blueprints.

52. The initial capacity of this financial organization is modest, as a beginning—\$56 million. But it is noteworthy that the Arab League, in planning this organization, has drawn amply upon the help and experience of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Arab League would certainly welcome all possible co-operation in this and other programmes from the United Nations, and my delegation believes that the United Nations is well advised to co-operate in this direction.

53. By the same token any future economic assistance, particularly if it comes from the United Nations, or through it, will be welcomed by the Arab countries, because we feel that financial or technical assistance from the United Nations is given whole-heartedly and with no strings attached.

54. It is true that we need technical assistance, economic aid and economic institutions. But first and foremost we believe that man does not live by bread alone. We believe in our unity, in our freedom from foreign domination, and in our dignity. Our problems, although basically economic and social, are much more political in nature. This we must take into consideration if we hope for stability and peace in the area.

55. In the light of these remarks, I should like to give the views of my delegation on the draft resolution submitted by Norway and other sponsoring countries [A/3878].

56. We earnestly believe that this draft resolution fails completely to meet the emergency we are facing, and offers no clear-cut solution to the crisis. On the contrary, by delaying firm decision on the matter, it enhances

the prospect of further unrest and complications. And in particular, this draft resolution fails to call for the immediate withdrawal of troops, which, in the view of my delegation, is an essential prerequisite to any acceptable solution. In its preamble it refers faintly to this matter by referring to two letters addressed to you, Mr. President, by the United Kingdom [A/3877] and the United States [A/3876], in which they offer to withdraw their troops conditionally and not immediately. This postponed and conditional withdrawal of troops makes this draft resolution totally unacceptable.

57. Three important points should always be kept in mind, for they constitute the essential prerequisites for any real and lasting solution to our problems. First, before any other steps are considered, there must be an immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Arab lands. Secondly, the world, East and West, should recognize and understand the nature of the great tide of nationalism that is surging through the Arab world. Both camps should learn to live with this movement and accept it as an accomplished fact to be reckoned with. Thirdly, last but not least, the Arab world wants to be kept away from pacts and doctrines which sow the seeds of discord and make inroads in its unity and tranquillity, and which, beyond doubt, form one of the major causes of strife at the present time.

58. In other words, we believe that the world should keep the Middle East out of the cold war and disengage it from East-West rivalries and antagonisms, and so allow the Arab world and the Arab people to solve their own problems among themselves and to pursue an independent course towards their dignity, prosperity and unity.

59. Mr. ALEMAYEHOU (Ethiopia): The General Assembly has been called, once again, in an emergency session to find a peaceful solution for another crisis in the Middle East, or at least, to prevent such a crisis from degenerating into a general world-wide conflagration.

60. This is not the first time that events in the Middle East have almost led the world into a general conflict. The chain of crises that disrupted the peace and tranquillity of the area, and which threatened to disrupt the peace and tranquillity of the world in recent years, is still too fresh in the minds of all present here to require enumeration.

61. It is perhaps difficult to lay the responsibility upon one State or group of States for this recurring crisis in the Middle East. But, whoever is responsible, whoever is to blame, the fact remains that there have been in recent years, and there is today, more tension, more unrest, and perhaps more fighting in the Middle East than in any other part of the world. And that is not all. The most disturbing thing is that this tension, this unrest, and these small local wars threaten to transform the Middle East area into a battlefield of a destructive world war.

62. We all recall the repeated warnings that the crisis in the Middle East could lead to a third world war. It is all very well to be calm, not to be disturbed, as long as these warnings remain mere warnings. But who can say for sure that these warnings could not, one day, be followed by action? Suppose these warnings were to be followed by action, what would happen primarily to the Middle East and then to the world at large? The answer is, of course, very clear.

63. In the view of my delegation, it would be folly, indeed a great mistake, to conclude that warnings would

not be followed by action, simply because such was the case once. Such a conclusion, I submit, is very dangerous gambling. I do not believe, that any one nation or group of nations have the right to gamble with the very existence of man and his intellectual, moral and material heritage, achieved through millennia and millennia. On the contrary, every nation, be it great or small, is duty-bound, I believe, to do its utmost to contribute to the preservation of mankind and its civilization and to the prevention of their destruction. Such a destructive war may not necessarily result from action alone. It may result from omission as well.

64. In the present case, unless something is done to ease the tense situation in the Middle East, war can result from omission as it does from action. It is therefore the duty of every State represented here, and primarily of the States directed involved, to take measures designed to control any activities which might create or increase tension in the Middle East. It is their primary responsibility not to do anything to create and increase tension and unrest in their region, as it is their responsibility to do everything to free their region from such tension and unrest, so that the Middle East is not exposed to the danger of nuclear war.

65. My country, Ethiopia, situated as it is on the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, is affected by events happening in these regions. It is natural, therefore, that we are now deeply concerned about the existing situation in the Middle East.

66. Ethiopia, apart from being a neighbour, has a traditional and close friendship with each of the Middle Eastern countries. The people and the Government of Ethiopia respect the natural rights of the Arab peoples to determine their own way of life and sympathize with their legitimate aspirations. Their decision to form the kind of government which cannot be contested, be it separate or otherwise, is their exclusive right. But we believe that such decision, to serve the interests of all concerned and not to disrupt the peace and tranquillity of the region, which affects us all, must be made by all parties concerned, freely and without intimidation, threat or aggression of any kind.

67. For our part, we do not want external interference in our internal affairs, whether in the form of fomenting civil strife, vilification of lawfully instituted Governments or military intervention. The people of every country, being the sole judge of what is best for themselves, must be left free to determine their own way of life. And as we do not want to admit any external interference in our internal affairs, it is natural that we do not like it to happen to others.

68. Is a people want to lead a separate, independent life, no amount of physical force will be able to stop their march towards their ultimate goal. The record of history is full of these facts, and we have seen even in recent years many peoples, armed not so much with guns but with unanimous national will and determination, breaking through formidable physical barriers to reach their ultimate goal independence.

69. By the same token, if the people of one country wish to join with the people of another country, no external propaganda or foreign incitement to civil strife is needed. What is needed is simply general national will.

70. But whenever and wherever there is external interference by the promotion of certain ways of life, be such interference in the form of subversion or military intervention, then one has to conclude that those ways of life are being imposed upon the people or peoples con-

cerned against their will. In this connexion, the plan proposed in the address of the President of the United States at the opening of this session [733rd meeting], that the General Assembly should consider means for monitoring radio broadcasts directed across national frontiers in the Middle East and for examining complaints from States there, seems to my delegation deserving of the General Assembly's serious consideration.

71. I come now to the central question before the emergency special session of the General Assembly; that is, the complaints of Lebanon and Jordan to the United Nations and the presence of United States and United Kingdom troops in Lebanon and Jordan respectively. In the view of my delegation, this question has its juridical and political aspects, and these two aspects must, therefore, be considered separately.

72. In clarifying the position of my country on this fundamental question, I should say that the Ethiopian Government deplores the deterioration to such an extent of the situation in Lebanon and Jordan that the Governments of these two countries found it necessary to appeal to the United Nations and to request military assistance from friendly Governments.

73. As to the legality of such appeals and requests for assistance, the view of my delegation, which I would like to be recorded, is this: Every Government of a sovereign State has the inherent and inalienable right to make such an appeal and to request and receive military or other assistance whenever it feels that its territorial integrity or political independence is threatened. It is also the inherent and inalienable right of any sovereign Government to give or to refuse military assistance when requested by another Government. Consequently, the presence of United States and United Kingdom troops in Lebanon and Jordan, in so far as such presence is at the specific requests of the lawfully constituted Governments of those two countries, to safeguard the integrity and independence of Lebanon and Jordan, seems to my delegation to be in order.

74. My country is a small, under-developed country with no adequate military strength to protect its territorial integrity and independence in case of aggression by a powerful enemy, nor does it belong to any military grouping or bloc. The only protection my country hopes for, if and when it feels threatened by outside aggression, is from the United Nations or from friendly countries. I believe, therefore, that small countries like mine should not be denied this opportunity.

75. On the other hand—and this is also an important point which I want to place on record—Ethiopia strongly opposes any introduction or maintenance of troops by one country within the territory of another country under the pretext of protection of national interest, protection of lives of citizens or any other excuses. This is a recognized means of exerting pressure by stronger Powers against smaller ones for extortion advantages. Therefore, it must never be permitted.

76. The introduction and maintenance of foreign troops in a given territory must be permitted either when requested by the territorial Government in defence of its integrity and independence or only and exclusively under the terms and conditions freely agreed to by the Government of the territorial State concerned. In fact, that is what the situation is in many of the Western and Eastern European countries, in the Near and Middle East and in Asia and Africa where foreign troops are stationed today in agreement with the respective Governments concerned.

77. It is true that in an ideal world situation the stationing of foreign troops in the various countries of the world would not have been necessary. But we are not living in an ideal world. We are living in a troubled and uneasy world, and these troubled and uneasy world conditions have made it necessary for the Governments of many countries to conclude agreements for stationing foreign troops in the respective countries as we know them today. It is an unsatisfactory and deplorable situation, but its legality has never been contested.

78. With regard to the appeal of the Lebanese and Jordanian Governments to the United Nations for adequate measures to assist them in their difficulties, opinions have been voiced that the taking of measures by the United Nations such as the sending of a United Nations peace force or similar measures would be an intervention on the part of the United Nations in the internal affairs of Lebanon and Jordan and that, therefore, such measures should not be taken. My delegation cannot share this opinion.

79. Furthermore, the Lebanese and the Jordanian Governments, whose constitutional authority has never been contested, who are represented here in the United Nations, and who alone conduct the international affairs of their respective countries on behalf of the peoples of Lebanon and Jordan, have appealed to the United Nations for adequate measures to safeguard their integrity and independence. It is the Lebanese and the Jordanian peoples, through their lawfully constituted Governments, who have appealed to the United Nations for assistance. These peoples have no authorized media to request assistance from the United Nations except through their respective Governments. Can the United Nations reject such appeals? No. In the view of my delegation, the United Nations should not and cannot refuse assistance to its Members when the Members request it.

80. As to the type and extent of the measures to be taken by the United Nations, it is again the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan alone who must determine what measure or measures would adequately meet their need. It must be clear, however, that any measure taken by the United Nations, be it the sending of a United Nations peace force or the sending of observation groups to Lebanon and Jordan, must have to limit its activities exclusively to the prevention of foreign interference, thus making it possible for the Lebanese and Jordanian peoples to decide their own fate free from any outside interference or pressure.

81. Having thus made clear the juridical position of my country, I should like now, with your permission, to consider the political aspect of the question.

82. As I said a while ago, the political situation in the Middle East is so tense, so inflamed, that any move which would increase tension in the area, even to a slight degree, may result in dangerous consequences. It is, therefore, in the light of such political conditions that the presence of the United States and United Kingdom troops in Lebanon and Jordan, however legally correct, must have to be considered.

83. We all know the violent reaction of many Governments in and outside the Middle East to the landing of United States and United Kingdom troops in Lebanon and Jordan, which reaction added to the already inflamed situation. I would, therefore, venture to appeal, on behalf of a small peace-loving country, to all the parties concerned to agree on a formula which would, on the one hand, allay the fear of the Lebanese and

Jordanian Governments and provide, on the other hand, for the withdrawal of the foreign troops stationed in Lebanon and Jordan. I am making this appeal because I believe that a formula reconciling the opposing viewpoints is not difficult to find in view of the fact that the difference between those views has been considerably narrowed down from what it was when this question was discussed by the Security Council.

84. We have heard the President of the United States declare at the opening of this special session that the United States will withdraw its forces from Lebanon when the United Nations has taken measures, and we have also noted the latest declaration of the United States to that effect. A similar declaration has been made by the United Kingdom delegation in regard to Jordan. Thirdly, the Soviet draft resolution submitted to this special session [*A/3870 and Corr.1*] is an improvement over the one submitted to the Security Council<sup>1</sup> by that delegation. Finally, the plan outlined in the statement of the Secretary-General at the opening of this session [*732nd meeting*] seems to have important elements which could be taken into account in working out a compromise formula acceptable to all concerned.

85. All this gives sufficient reason to my delegation to be optimistic. I am confident that the remaining small differences can very easily be bridged if the statesmen of the world assembled here exert determined efforts to reach agreement in the interest of the preservation of world peace. My delegation will co-operate with other delegations on any plan designed to calm the tense situation in the Middle East and to safeguard the right of the Lebanese and Jordanian peoples to determine their own destiny without any external interference.

86. Before concluding my statement, I should like to say a word on the plan for economic development proposed in the statements of the President of the United States and of the Secretary-General. This plan is certainly constructive and deserving of the consideration of the parties primarily concerned; and if any resolution embodying an economic development plan such as this is to be adopted by this Assembly, such plan must, in the view of my delegation, be in the form of an offer by the United Nations which will benefit the interested countries when they are ready to avail themselves of such an offer.

87. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) (*translated from French*): In intervening at this stage of the debate, when the General Assembly has already heard detailed and sometimes contradictory accounts of the circumstances which led to the convening of this emergency special session, the French delegation does not intend to add to the charges and counter-charges or to introduce new arguments into a controversy which is sterile in itself; on the contrary, we want, with all the objectivity appropriate to such debate, to draw the lesson from recent events in the Middle East and thus demonstrate France's desire for a constructive solution to be found to the problems we are faced with today in that area.

88. The French Government in no way underestimates the seriousness and complexity of these problems; in the letters on this subject recently exchanged between the Heads of certain Governments, it has clearly

indicated its desire that they should be faced and solved in an effective and positive manner. It is in this spirit that I wish to offer a brief résumé of recent events and indicate how, in our opinion, we should proceed if a lasting and stable settlement is to be achieved.

89. It was Lebanon's appeal to the Security Council on 22 May 1958<sup>2</sup> which showed the international community the full extent of the crisis in that country, one which has traditionally been peaceful and prosperous and whose national entity and political stability have been so remarkably demonstrated over the last fifteen years. Its institutions, shining examples of tolerance and wisdom, ensured a harmonious balance between its inhabitants, whatever their religion or opinions. It had a flourishing economy and the natural inclination towards conciliation which is a characteristic of the Lebanese people seemed likely to protect it for ever from over-violent shocks.

90. Their difficulties arose in recent months between the Government and the Opposition in connexion with consultations over the re-election of the Chief of State. These disagreements, although frequent in the political life of any democratic State, have unfortunately degenerated into open rebellion. It is difficult to believe, however, that the very existence of the country could have been jeopardized if the conflict had not somehow passed from the national to the international plane.

91. It is true that the conclusions of the observers sent to Lebanon in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 11 June 1958<sup>3</sup> did not confirm all the complaints made by the Lebanese Government. We should remember, however, that the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was given very narrow terms of reference both as regards the object it was to pursue and, even more, the means it was to employ, as is confirmed by its report. Its findings do not, therefore, relieve us of the necessity of asking certain questions; on the contrary, they require us to ask these questions in so far as the preservation of peace basically depends on the drawing of a distinction between the legitimate expression of internal opposition, which is one of the prerequisites of democracy, and the transformation of such opposition, as a result of external support, into an attack on the State itself.

92. Meanwhile, the Baghdad *coup d'état* exploded. Its very suddenness and the dramatic occurrences connected with it heightened, throughout the area, the feeling of crisis already created by the events in Lebanon. A chain reaction seemed to be starting which might have involved all the States of the Middle East one by one, and, through them, might finally have jeopardized world peace.

93. In these circumstances, Lebanon and subsequently Jordan appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom. The French Government has already stated its view of the steps then taken by its allies. Its view has not altered. As the United States and United Kingdom troops entered these two countries in response to a request from the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan, there can be no serious question of aggression. These troops were not told to impose solutions by force but to safeguard for a time the existence of two States which felt themselves threatened from out-

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1958.* document S/4047/Rev.1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1958, document S/4007.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/4023.

side and thus to make it possible, when order and security were re-established, to work out solutions in harmony with the aspirations and wishes of their peoples.

94. This does not mean that those troops should not be withdrawn as soon as possible. The United States and United Kingdom Governments are the first to wish this, as we do ourselves. From the very first, these Governments have never ceased to call on the United Nations to adopt effective measures to replace the emergency measures they had been obliged to take at the request of the countries concerned. And it is within the framework of the United Nations that solutions of this kind must now be sought.

95. Our Organization already has heavy responsibilities in the Middle East. The Secretary-General very properly reminded us of these in the most objective statement he made at the opening of this special session. The Truce Supervision Organization, the Emergency Force, the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and more recently the Observation Group in Lebanon, are tangible evidence of the interest our Organization takes in that part of the world.

96. It is only fair to pay a tribute to the efforts which have helped to bring about an improvement of the situation, an improvement which is only relative, admittedly, but which nevertheless clearly shows how exaggerated an appraisal of the present crisis certain Governments still seem to be making.

97. In Lebanon, General Chehab has been chosen to succeed Mr. Chamoun by means of a presidential election in accordance with constitutional procedure. The patriotism and moderation shown by the representatives of the Lebanese people on this occasion are a good omen for the future. There are still some obstacles, of course, but a common determination to overcome them has been asserted. The Lebanese people have shown that they are both determined and able to remain masters of their own fate.

98. In Iraq, the new Government has shown a commendable concern to proclaim that it will respect its international obligations and the United Nations Charter.

99. In Jordan, the country's integrity has been maintained. The mere presence of the friendly forces sent in answer to the Government's appeal prevented the situation from deteriorating and thus avoided the tragic consequences for the maintenance of peace which an attack on the integrity and perhaps the very existence of Jordan might have entailed.

100. And so a certain balance has been established. We should not, however, blind our eyes to the fact that this balance is precarious and threatened, that it depends on measures the provisional nature of which has been recognized by all and that the causes for disquiet have not disappeared. But, however precarious, this period of calm is a fact. It gives us a respite of which we must take advantage to consolidate the situation.

101. If we are now considering this problem together, it is because world security and world peace are one and indivisible. We have all, without exception, a vital interest in consolidating the situation, which does not mean that any of us intend to arrogate to ourselves the right to supervise or control the affairs of the countries concerned. It is for these countries them-

selves finally to choose their path and build a future according to their interest, their resources and their aspirations. What we should try to do here is to enable the Governments and peoples concerned to take whatever decisions are necessary themselves, in an orderly manner and without outside interference.

102. The immediate task of this special session is to consider the urgent problems of Lebanon and Jordan. Some interesting suggestions have been made during the debate which have been reflected in all the statements made here and in the various draft resolutions which have been submitted.

103. I shall first take the case of Lebanon. The guarantees extended by the Charter to all the Members of the United Nations and those additional guarantees which, if I am not mistaken, Lebanon derives from its membership of the Arab League should be enough in the normal way to safeguard its independence and territorial integrity. But the circumstances are not normal, which is why special measures should be considered. These include the strengthening of the United Nations Observation Group, a measure which my Government would be happy to see implemented in conformity with the resolution to be adopted by this Assembly.

104. It may be advisable to go still further. Some ideas have been put forward—the Secretary-General mentioned them in his statement of 8 August 1958 [732nd meeting]—which would tend to provide an international guarantee for the very special character of this country. This is a question on which neither the United Nations nor any particular country is entitled to make proposals. Lebanon itself must take whatever initiative it considers appropriate. It may rest assured, in any event, that any suggestions it might put forward will have the active and disinterested support of France, which is bound to Lebanon by ancient bonds of friendship and hence affinities of all kinds.

105. In Jordan the United Nations has been active for some time in the field of truce supervision. I have noted with interest that several delegations, although they had differing viewpoints, agreed on the necessity of strengthening the presence of the United Nations in Jordan. This has been the case both for the Soviet draft resolution [A/3870 and Corr.1] and for the seven-Power draft resolution [A/3878]. My delegation will be happy to support any suggestions that may be formulated to achieve this purpose. Of course Jordan itself must agree to the nature and the scope of the assistance to be granted to it but I am sure that Jordan will understand that it is not in its interest to refuse the assistance of our Organization.

106. As these are our general views on the immediate action our Organization should take, the French delegation cannot but be favourable to the draft resolution submitted by the seven Powers. The essential point of this draft resolution, as we see it, is the mission to be entrusted to the Secretary-General, on which he is to report to us before 30 September 1958. In view of the tenseness of the atmosphere here and of the present circumstances, I do not think that the General Assembly can precisely define what measures will enable the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw their troops from Lebanon and Jordan, in compliance with their own wishes, without any risk of serious trouble. The best thing is to place our confidence in the Secretary-General, whose experience of this problem has been amply proven. He will go to the Middle East, discuss the situa-

tion with the different Governments, take whatever measures he is able to decide upon himself and will submit to the General Assembly those which require action on part.

107. The passage of such a resolution would enable us to face our immediate responsibilities; but it should not make us forget the more general problems in the Middle East, which are our chief concern.

108. The first group of problems is economic. The French Government has noted with interest the constructive proposals submitted by the Secretary-General, by the President of the United States and by a certain number of other speakers. An emergency special session of the General Assembly, convened in connexion with a specific political crisis, is probably not the best place for a fruitful discussion of these proposals. Nevertheless we are glad that such ideas have been put forward and that assistance has been offered. As has already been pointed out, it is up to the Middle East countries themselves to develop their resources and to seek means of expanding their economy, in co-operation with others and respecting the rights of all. In this field, moreover, much depends on the re-establishment and proper functioning of normal trade relations which should enable the countries concerned eventually to develop their resources and thereby obtain a substantial part of the capital they require to buy equipment. My Government is always prepared to participate in any joint action in this direction, which must be entirely disinterested.

109. However, economic questions are not the decisive factor in the Middle East any more than they are in other parts of the world. In the Middle East, as elsewhere and as always, politics are the primary factor, as has been abundantly demonstrated in the last few years.

110. Politics are ingrained in the very fibre of the Middle East, not only because of the temperament of the people who live there but also because of its geographical position, the nature of its resources and a long tradition which has made it for thousand of years the centre of almost every great international conflict.

111. At the present time, two fundamental factors combine to make it one of those danger points which engage the responsibility of the international community. The first is external to the Middle East itself; it is the cold war. The second is the development of national movements.

112. It was because the French Government was fully alive to the possible consequences of the first of these two factors that it recently accepted the proposal for a "summit" meeting between the Governments of certain Powers. There it would have hoped to find, in particular through agreements regarding the respect of the territorial *status quo* and non-interference in the internal affairs of all the Middle East countries, a means of putting an end to acts which might produce serious crises and which, in any case, would impede the work of stabilization and the normal development of the States concerned.

113. Any conclusions reached by such a conference would, of course, have been submitted to the United Nations. In any case, there could have been no question of settling problems of concern to the Middle East countries without their participation. On the contrary it was a question of enabling them to take their own decisions quite independently. In this connexion I should like to say that the French Government, like other Governments, has no intention of opposing legitimate national aspirations or of trying to maintain an outmoded state of affairs. All it asks is that any changes shall be the

outcome not of external pressure, whatever the source, but of the freely accepted and clearly expressed wishes of the peoples whose future is at stake. We are convinced that it is on this condition alone that the countries of the Middle East will once more find a basis for genuine stability in harmony with their historical background.

114. Although appearances may be to the contrary, the present situation may provide greater possibilities of achieving such a goal than ever before existed. With a little goodwill on the part of everyone, expressed by the reaffirmation of and respect for the fundamental principles of the Charter, it is probable that those possibilities would gradually become concrete realities.

115. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Iran desires to make an explanation of a portion of his previous speech, and with the consent of the General Assembly, I propose to call upon him now.

116. Mr. ABDOLAH (Iran) (*translated from French*): I am grateful to you, Sir, for allowing me briefly to clear up a misunderstanding which has arisen in the mind of my colleague, the representative of Yemen. In his speech this morning, Mr. Kamil Abdul Rahim, whom I greatly respect and admire, referred to a speech I made last week in this Assembly [736th meeting] and attributed to me an idea which was not present either in my mind or in the text of my speech. While I regret that incorrect interpretation of my thinking, I am grateful to him for having thus provided me with an opportunity to clarify an idea which, unfortunately, has also been distorted in a certain sector of the international press.

117. It goes without saying that a reading of the records of the General Assembly would, in itself, provide sufficiently convincing proof that the Iranian delegation has been and still is a sincere and determined supporter of Arab nationalism in all its constructive and positive achievements. It is proud to have been an active proponent of the cause of Arab nationalism wherever it gained expression: in Algeria, in Tunisia and in Morocco, as well as in Egypt and elsewhere. In its time, it did everything in its power to bolster the cause of the Arab countries in their struggle against the military intervention which followed the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Thus, it favoured and continues to favour the emancipation movement which has been identified with the cause of Arab nationalism.

118. I emphasized that idea in the speech I made last week. Unfortunately, that speech gave rise to the misunderstanding to which I referred. Yet, I made it clear that my country wholeheartedly supports the struggle of the peoples of the Middle East for their total emancipation. In the same spirit, I ventured to make a brief analysis of what I called the negative ingredients which inevitably creep into a cause which we, as much as the Arabs, consider to be just and sacred. By its very nature, any movement, any manifestation of life and progress contains positive and negative elements. Nationalism like other manifestations of life and progress is not free from negative elements. Recognition of that fact should certainly not be interpreted as an expression of suspicion with regard to the movement growing out of nationalism. On the contrary, it is a guarantee of its success. Consequently, we would wish from the bottom of our hearts, that our Arab brethren who are promoting nationalist movements, in their own interest, in the interest of the very struggle in which they are involved, should be ever watchful and aware of the dangers which accompany the progress of some of those negative ingredients to the detriment of the positive elements of nationalism. In our opinion,

that is still an essential requirement for success and progress.

119. I would therefore ask the representative of Yemen to re-read my speech, which, in principle, ought better to reflect my thinking than what was unfortunately at-

tributed to me in a certain international *milieu*. That will likewise make it unnecessary for me to refute an idea which was never in my mind anyhow and on which I believe I have sufficiently elaborated.

*The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.*