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THIRD EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

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AGENDA ITEM 5

Questions considered by the Security Council at
its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958 (*con-
tinued*)

1. Mr. FILALI (Morocco) (*translated from French*): The Moroccan Government has welcomed with satisfaction the convening of this third emergency special session of the General Assembly. We think that this United Nations organ, whose functions and purposes have been clearly defined in the Charter, should be the essential instrument of negotiation and conciliation among Member States. That is why we are happy to note that the Members of this General Assembly are approaching the discussion of the Middle East problems in a constructive and realistic manner.

2. This is, unfortunately, not the first time that the United Nations has had to grapple with events in the Middle East. I might even say that these events are a permanent item on the General Assembly's agenda. This is not surprising, however, because, as we all realize, the problems of that area are complex and manifold. It is, of course, the events in Lebanon and Jordan during the last few weeks that led to the convening of this emergency special session. They must certainly engage all our attention and they make it incumbent upon us to find an appropriate solution, but, if we are to limit our efforts to this sole aspect of the Middle East problem, we are likely, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland said [735th meeting], to act like a doctor who tries to treat a symptom without examining the root causes of the disease. It would perhaps be more convenient to isolate the Lebanese and Jordanian problems from the general context and to find a provisional settlement for them, but we think that this method would be artificial and dangerous, because there is no point in applying an apparent solution to a crisis, if the essential problem remains and if the General Assembly has to deal with it again sooner or later.

3. It is in this spirit that I shall outline my Government's view on the situation in Lebanon and Jordan, but I shall first say a few words on what seems to us to be the underlying causes of the unrest in that part of the world.

4. Why do the events of the Middle East constantly hold the stage in international affairs? Why is this part

of the world always in the grip of a most serious crisis? Is it because the Arab peoples are profoundly divided? Is it because the area is particularly sensitive to what is called the cold war? Certainly not. To be quite frank, let me say that we think the principal reason for this unrest lies in the conflict between the national aspirations of the peoples of that area and the stifling of these aspirations by those who fail to understand them.

5. What is the real issue? As you know, the Arab peoples, like some other peoples of Africa and Asia, have suffered for a long time under colonial occupation. This occupation has taken, and still takes, many forms, both direct and indirect: military occupation, political domination, economic exploitation, cultural frustration, to mention only a few aspects. But we have to admit that the world is at present in full evolution. The awakening of the colonial peoples is one of the essential features of our time and there is general agreement that the era of colonialism is over; but actions should speedily be brought into line with words.

6. Everyone is aware that the satisfaction of these peoples' demands is one of the imperative needs of our time. Some countries are still fighting to consolidate their recently acquired independence, others are fighting to gain recognition of the very principle of their independence. Thus, as far as my country is concerned, the Powers involved have certainly recognized the independence of Morocco, but contrary to logic and common sense, foreign armies continue to be stationed in our territory.

7. The Algerian people, who wish only to live in freedom and independence, have for four years been in the throes of a murderous and inhuman war. It will perhaps be thought that we are raising a problem which is not on the agenda. I beg to disagree with that view. It is, in fact, in the interest of the General Assembly, which is seeking to understand the underlying causes of the Middle East crisis in particular and of Arab nationalism in general, to recognize once and for all that freedom is one and indivisible.

8. The struggle of the Middle Eastern countries must be viewed in this general context, and it is not surprising therefore that these countries are participating in these efforts directed against the last vestiges of colonialism. The demands of the peoples of that area are legitimate and natural, and we think it would be unwise to continue to ignore them.

9. We understand and support the purposes of their struggle because we are ourselves engaged in a similar struggle and because, in view of the many ties linking us to the rest of the Arab world, the events in the Middle East, as Mr. Balafrej, Morocco's Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, recently said, have profound repercussions in North Africa.

10. In that part of the world, we are at grips not with abstractions, but with sociological and human realities. We are convinced that Arab nationalism is neither sub-

versive nor dangerous; neither is it negative. On the contrary, it is in line with the Arab tradition of freedom and tolerance and symbolizes long-frustrated aspirations.

11. No doubt, final settlement of the Middle East crisis is not an easy task; to achieve it, we must retain our composure and shed a great many prejudices. We are convinced, however, that the General Assembly is now in a position to draw up a comprehensive settlement in broad outline. In my Government's view, such a settlement should be based on the following principles: first, the recognition that Arab nationalism is justified, which implies that any settlement of the crisis must accord with the wishes of the people of the area and that the Arab peoples must be free to determine their own destiny; second, the Middle East must no longer be considered as an area of international competition, and it must not be exploited for political, economic or military purposes. Following this, I must now say a few words on the situation in Lebanon and Jordan.

12. The General Assembly should, as I said earlier, study the many aspects of the situation in the Middle East; but we are nevertheless faced with the immediate problem of the presence of foreign troops in Lebanon and Jordan, a solution of which is urgently required. In this connexion, I must state that the Moroccan Government regrets the dispatch of United States and United Kingdom troops into these two countries. We consider that there is no legal or practical justification for the presence of these troops in Lebanon and Jordan, and the reasons advanced to justify it appear to us to be artificial. In the first place, we think that the arguments used conform neither with the letter nor with the spirit of the Charter. In the second place, Article 51 of the Charter has been cited. I must point out that, as we see the situation in Lebanon and in Jordan, the difficulties of those countries are purely domestic in character. In fact, as we all know, the Security Council has not established the existence of any aggression against these two countries.

13. That is why our delegation has serious doubts as to the applicability of Article 51 in these circumstances. The presence of the foreign troops is certainly not a means of reducing tension in that part of the world. We consider that the prime objective of the General Assembly should be to seek a settlement which would facilitate the withdrawal of these troops in the shortest possible time. Such a step would alleviate tension in that part of the world and would then enable us to study the other aspects of the Middle East crisis in a more relaxed atmosphere. These are the comments which we have thought useful to make today.

14. The problem is clearly both political and psychological. The psychological aspect of the crisis is very serious, because re-adaptation to the exigencies of national movements is not always as rapid and as sincere as the movements themselves might desire.

15. The Moroccan delegation is happy to note, however, that Arab nationalism is beginning to be recognized as justified. We are convinced that it will triumph over the difficulties it is encountering, because, as His Majesty the King of Morocco recently declared, the Arab peoples have awakened and have taken the road of renaissance. We are certain, the King continued, that, thanks to their unity, they will be able to foil the plots and manoeuvres directed against them and will emerge from the crisis through which they are passing, with their strength intact and their dignity respected,

and that they will shake off the last vestiges of imperialism and all forms of exploitation.

16. Mr. ENGEN (Norway): I wish to make some observations with respect to the draft resolution which Norway, together with Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Liberia, Panama and Paraguay, has submitted to the General Assembly [A/3878].

17. This draft resolution is based on one basic premise, namely, whatever the United Nations can legitimately contemplate doing in the present crisis in the Middle East, it can only be through measures taken, or safeguards created, in order to assist the Governments concerned. The extent to which the United Nations efforts are to be crowned with success or doomed to failure, must ultimately depend on the attitude and the actions taken by the Governments directly concerned.

18. This philosophy, if I may use that expression, has been the point of departure for the endeavours of the sponsors of this draft resolution. We have, through a process of constant negotiations and explorations with the parties most directly concerned, sought to devise not only a formula which could win approval of the constitutional majority of this Assembly, but one which also entrusted the Secretary-General with a task which it is within the realm of reality and possibility for him to accomplish. I am stressing this point because, as we all know, the Secretary-General is the executor of the Assembly's decisions, and it flows from this that the Assembly must take great care in formulating the instructions which it wants the Secretary-General to carry out in order not to put him into untenable positions.

19. The basic rule for the Assembly to follow in this respect flows, of course, from the Charter provision that no action by the General Assembly can be carried out in matters directly concerning Member States without the consent of the Governments of those Member States. From this it follows, speaking in practical terms, that the Secretary-General should never be instructed to act from extreme positions. His field of operation is the middle ground, the ground of mutual accommodations, the ground of conciliation and of mutual sacrifice. The draft resolution of the seven sponsors seeks to establish this middle ground position from which the General Assembly may want the Secretary-General to act in these particular circumstances.

20. During the long and extensive discussions which the sponsors have had with all the directly interested parties, one basic fact has emerged. It seems to us to be firmly established that an area of agreement exists between the parties which may be the key to a solution of the present difficulties. This agreement is the following: all the parties want to see established, at the earliest possible date, a situation in the area, where the peoples of that area will be free to shape their own life, undisturbed by violence, interference from outside, and strife. If this is the case, it seems to me that the approach to shaping United Nations actions, is an obvious one: that is, to enable the Organization, through its chief executive officer, to assist Member countries concerned to achieve this goal.

21. This approach explains the philosophy of our draft resolution. It starts out by noting the explicit undertakings of the United States and the United Kingdom, two countries directly concerned in the present situation, with respect to their intentions to withdraw their military forces now in Lebanon and Jordan. The form in which these undertakings are expressed, will be found

in official United Nations documents circulated to the Members of this Assembly. The draft resolution reaffirms the principle of coexistence between States in tolerance and good neighbourly relations, a Charter aim which also has found specific expression during the Asian-African Conference at Bandung more than two years ago.

22. Section I of the operative part seeks to formulate a policy in specific terms, which it would be incumbent upon all Member States to pursue in their relations with each other, and especially in this instance, since we now deal with the Middle Eastern area, with respect to and between the countries of this region. The specific terms of this policy are taken from resolution 290 (IV) of the General Assembly; that is why they are in quotation marks. As all students of United Nations history will know, these formulations have emanated from "both sides of the House", so to speak.

23. The stating of this policy in section I of the draft resolution seems to us to be a necessary basis for the request the Assembly is invited to make to the Secretary-General in section II. In this section, we seek to define the role of the United Nations when assisting the Government directly concerned in establishing the situation of normalcy of which I spoke a moment ago.

24. The terms of the request to the Secretary-General are, admittedly, rather general in nature. We feel, however, that there are very valid reasons for this. In our view, the emphasis should be on the statement of policy and obligations for the Member States, and that is the case as far as section I is concerned. However, when it comes to practical measures which the United Nations, through the Secretary-General, could take in order to assist the Member States in their endeavours to pursue the policy of which I have spoken, then I think we are well advised in not being too specific, but in leaving a fairly wide field for the discretion of the Secretary-General, because, as we must always bear in mind, the practical arrangements which we ask him to make, cannot be made unless it can be with the consent of the Governments concerned. It goes without saying, of course, that membership in the Organization should invite the utmost of co-operation from Member Governments in this respect. In fact, representatives will find such an appeal to Members in paragraph 1, section IV, of our draft resolution.

25. I now come to section III of our draft resolution. The two provisions in this section are, admittedly, of no immediate consequence to the concrete problems before the Assembly. Nevertheless, we have felt that the Assembly should on this occasion lift its eyes for one moment above the immediate business of the day, and take a look into the future. It is not a question of arriving at decisions here, but only of giving the General Assembly, at this emergency session, an accent of a forward-looking spirit and not merely the matter-of-fact spirit of the fire brigade.

26. I am representing a small country which, on occasions, has been able to share in the contributions of many Members to United Nations measures dealing with critical situations. We, for our part, are prepared to carry on with this policy. Our experience is such, however, that we could not but welcome the news that the Secretary-General has been giving thought, for some time, to the many problems of a practical and principal nature which naturally arise in connexion with contributions in personnel or kind in times of emergency. We

have felt that the Assembly should not disperse without expressing a desire to have the Secretary-General's studies thoroughly discussed in the General Assembly, at its thirteenth session. While we recognize that this desire could be expressed in another way, we, for our part, find it natural that it should be done in the way here proposed.

27. With respect to paragraph 2, section III, I should like to say that we are glad that the Arab countries in the area have developed organs for economic co-operation. This corresponds, I am sure, to the deep wishes of the people of the Middle East. If they should want co-operation and assistance in this work from the United Nations and from other agencies outside the area, we feel that such co-operation and assistance should be made available. But in order to meet such requests from the countries, the United Nations must be prepared. It was therefore with real appreciation that we learned from the Secretary-General in his statement on the opening day of this session [*732nd meeting*] that studies have been under way in the Secretariat for some time in order to prepare the United Nations to respond positively to any requests from the countries in the area in this respect. I think that the Assembly could very well encourage the Secretary-General to carry on with his studies of these problems.

28. Finally, I should like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the last paragraph of our draft resolution. This invites the Secretary-General to report, not later than 30 September 1958, on the implementation of this draft resolution. It is our hope, indeed it is our firm belief, that the Secretary-General's first report will show us a picture of the Middle East where tranquillity and normalcy are the reigning features.

29. Members of the Assembly will have noted that I have carefully refrained from entering into any discussion of substance with respect to the situation in the area. To have done so, would certainly have been contrary to the spirit and the purpose of the draft resolution which we have submitted. I have ventured to point out a road forward where the roadblocks of condemnation as well as those of condemnation do not appear. It is a road along the middle ground where the Assembly has its best opportunities, indeed I would say, where the Assembly has its only opportunity for constructive action. The draft resolution we have submitted, may not be perfect, but I know that it contains very fundamental elements representing some of the positions of all the parties directly concerned. This is the reason why we confidently commend its adoption to the Members of the Assembly. We firmly believe that this is the basis upon which the United Nations can act in this situation, and thus avoid the alternative of letting things drift aimlessly into an uncertain future.

30. Mr. SMITH (Canada): I am sure that Members of this Assembly by now have had time to study the draft resolution which the Canadian delegation is pleased to sponsor with the delegations of Colombia, Denmark, Liberia, Norway, Panama and Paraguay.

31. After the lucid presentation of this joint draft resolution by the representative of Norway—with whom it has been an honour and a pleasure for me to co-operate closely during the past week—there is no need for me to analyse again the contents of the draft resolution. Instead, I wish to dwell for a moment on some of the considerations which we have had in mind during the discussions leading up to the introduction of the draft resolution in the form now before us.

32. Along with Mr. Engen, I concede immediately that this draft resolution is not perfect, it is not ideal. It will probably be found entirely satisfactory or perfect to no country or grouping of countries. That is perhaps inevitable, but I do suggest that it is not necessarily a weakness when the objective of the draft resolution is a reconciliation of conflicting interests; for, if it were otherwise, there could be no common ground, no point of departure from which to seek conciliatory and compromise solutions which will safeguard the essential interests of all parties without requiring of any undue risk or sacrifice.

33. This draft resolution is designed, therefore, to serve as a point of departure and a basis of discussion, and we would hope that it would lead to further developments in two main areas where special support to it must be given, if the draft resolution is to achieve its purposes.

34. I speak first, very frankly, of the Arab States themselves, without whose positive and indeed active co-operation there can, of course, be no durable settlement of the problems of the Middle East. It may be that some of the Arab countries have their difficulties with this draft resolution, some parts of which may seem to fall short of what they may believe they have a right to expect. But we earnestly hope that they will weigh the merits of the draft resolution as a whole and find in it not an impediment to evolution, but a new basis for harmony, prosperity and growth in the Middle East.

35. But regional support by itself cannot resolve issues which, as recent events have shown, can have repercussions extending far beyond the Middle East. Complementary to the co-operation of the countries of the area, and not necessarily of secondary importance, is, therefore, the need for special recognition by the major Powers, including the Soviet Union, of the obligations which rest upon them as a consequence of their involvement in different ways in the affairs of the Middle East. Of course, every nation represented in this hall has an interest in seeing to it that the Middle East is not allowed to become a part of the world that endangers global security and peace. I now ask this question: would it not be reasonable to look to the four great Powers for at least their unanimous support of this draft resolution as a form of acknowledgement of the risks which can flow from a great Power confrontation in the Middle East, or perhaps for some more tangible expression of their common interest in pursuing policies of restraint in that troubled area?

36. It was precisely because my Government considered that a durable Middle East settlement required the active endorsement of the major Powers that we welcomed, some weeks ago, the original proposal for a meeting of the great Powers at a high level to deal with Middle East matters, and we welcomed the further proposal that these high-level talks should take place within the Security Council, where the responsibility under the Charter for matters affecting international peace and security properly belongs. Those early efforts had to be abandoned, but I for one believe that in the General Assembly today we have been given an equal or even better possibility of engaging great-Power support for a Middle East settlement through the joint endorsement on the part of the great Powers of whatever resolutions and action may flow from this emergency session. One might even be permitted to hope that, on the basis of a recognition of joint great-Power

responsibility in a limited area such as the Middle East, it might be possible to develop a wider approach to other problems requiring four-Power agreement for their effective settlement, problems such as the testing and control of nuclear weapons, disarmament and such other topics fundamental to international peace and security concerning which preparatory discussions for talks at the summit have been proceeding now for many months.

37. I repeat, then, that, in my opinion, the active co-operation of all the Arab States and the identification of all the major Powers with the purposes underlying this draft resolution are essential underpinnings on which its successful fulfilment must be founded. That is not, however, to say that there does not rest upon all of us and, in particular, those with direct interests in the Middle East, a solemn obligation to exercise self-denial and restraint while our search for answers to the immediate needs of the current crisis and for a peaceful and prosperous pattern for that area in the future is in progress. The first responsibility of nations, both inside and outside the area, is to see to it that no word or deed of theirs precipitates a dangerous situation which could jeopardize the whole of the efforts of this Assembly. Any nation which failed to heed this warning, would bear a grave responsibility before the bar of the world opinion.

38. Turning to parts II and III of this draft resolution to which Mr. Engen has referred, dealing respectively with the short- and long-term problems with which we are attempting to grapple, may I say first a word about the Secretary-General's role.

39. The fact that this Assembly is going about its tasks in a purposeful way, can, I think, be attributed in large measure to the Secretary-General's timely intervention on 8 August, at the opening meeting of the emergency special session, when he outlined in such broad but comprehensive terms the course which this Assembly could most usefully steer. In identifying what he described on that day as "basic needs for action in the region", the Secretary-General focused attention on the constructive purposes of the Assembly. He provided us with a cogent survey of the problems of the area which require urgent attention—a survey which has, in fact, guided the discussions here in large measure, from the outset of this session, along productive channels—and that is reflected in no small measure in the proposals embodied in the draft resolution before us. The nature of the Secretary-General's statement illustrated the ever-increasing burden of responsibilities which he has been called upon to assume in recent weeks, acting always within the broad powers which the Charter confers upon him. Because the United Nations is now being called upon to attempt an entirely new role in the maintenance of stability and peace in respect of a particular area, and because the Secretary-General symbolizes the authority of the United Nations, he will be asked, under this draft resolution, to take on even more responsibilities. The draft resolution seeks to strike a balance between the support and guidance which he must have from this Assembly in approaching his task, and the need to give him scope for consultation and effective action on his own initiative, as circumstances may require. None of us should underestimate the difficulties or delicacy of the tasks which we are asking him in this draft resolution to assume, but I am sure that I reflect a unanimous opinion when I express confidence in his unique qualifications to meet successfully this new challenge.

40. The immediate issues with which the Secretary-General is being asked to deal, are those relating to Lebanon and Jordan where there is the matter of troop withdrawal to be faced, and which is not unrelated to the political future of those two countries. Perhaps we should reconcile ourselves now to the thought that no formula can be wholly and universally satisfactory to cover the question of troop withdrawals. We have the statements of the leaders of two great and friendly Powers of their desire to remove their forces as soon as the United Nations has taken action appropriate to the circumstances prevailing in those countries. For our part, we are prepared to accept those assertions at their face value as their earnest desire to withdraw quickly. The United States and the United Kingdom, simultaneously with their landings, recognized the risks and thankless responsibilities which would flow from prolonging their presence in that area, and they then gave thought, and expressed that thought, to their withdrawal. Every consideration, including self-interest, would dictate that their action be brought to an end at an early date. In the letters [A/3876 and A/3877] which each of these nations has delivered to the President of the Assembly, we have renewed evidence to support this judgement, and I urge that all Members of this Assembly accept those letters as a renewed manifestation of their desire and intention to bring about an early termination to a situation which they recognize, and all of us recognize, could have unfortunate consequences.

41. But the problems of Lebanon and Jordan are more complex than the presence of foreign forces on their soil. The search for solutions to the longer-term problems of those countries, and of the Middle East generally, raises, I am bound to observe, very difficult issues of practical policy and questions of principle which could have disturbing and far-reaching implications for the United Nations. The questions of principle relate to the extent to which the United Nations is at liberty to intervene in matters which Member States could regard as of domestic concern. I think that it will be generally agreed that the United Nations has neither the right nor the duty to interfere in a country to support one form of government or one political party, or to prevent another form of government or political party from taking its place. Similarly, the Charter would seem to confer no right or duty on this Organization to promote or prevent a political union of sovereign countries which may wish to merge their separate sovereignties in a larger union or federation.

42. This seems to be clear as far as it goes, and it would be well if we were to recognize the relevance of these principles to the mandate that we are asking the Secretary-General to accept. But does this doctrine mean that the United Nations can have no interest in or answer to questions so fundamental to the original complaints which gave rise to the holding of this emergency session of the Assembly? It may be good international law, but is it an adequate answer to the urgent problems of policy with which the members of the international community are now confronted? It is equally good international law that a duly constituted and legally recognized government can request another government to send troops into its territory to buttress its security, and that the State so invited, is at liberty, under international law, to respond to this request. To describe the response of the United States to the appeal from the Lebanese Government for help, and the response of the United Kingdom to that of the Govern-

ment of Jordan, as aggression, is ridiculous and really makes no sense, and indeed could make nonsense of the most central and serious provisions of the Charter. Having said that, I hasten to make this observation: at the same time, the generalized assertion of such a right to seek and receive assistance from any government willing to give it, could greatly complicate the search for peaceful adjustments of situations that might contain a threat to peace. These are problems of policy for which our present canons of international law do not give adequate guidance.

43. Similarly, the way in which the succession to power in a State is effected, may have a profound impact on the structure and sense of security of neighbouring States. A sudden and violent change of régime in one country may have repercussions which may lead neighbouring countries to feel that their external security is threatened. How can we work out a tolerable reconciliation between the principle, central to the whole conception of the United Nations, that each State has the right to determine for itself what its form of government shall be, and the equally important consideration that no country should have the privilege of jeopardizing the peace and security of its neighbours? These considerations must both be taken into account in attempting to formulate an appropriate United Nations treatment of the problems which are before the Assembly.

44. In attempting such a reconciliation, it will help, I think, for us to recognize that not all the concepts of international law, or all the assumptions on which our Charter is based, are realized with equal fullness and precision in all parts of the world.

45. We in the British Commonwealth of Nations, for example, are independent sovereign countries, freely accepting the obligations which arise from our membership in the United Nations and in the international community. At the same time, we attach a high degree of importance to the special relationships, often very hard to define and delineate, which link us, one with another, in the Commonwealth connexion. We do not think of the other members of the Commonwealth as "foreign". There is a large body of opinion in each of our countries within the British Commonwealth which would, I believe, resent and resist any suggestions which might come from other parts of the world that we should reduce our mutual relationships within the Commonwealth to the bare minimum that international law expects of the relationships between members of the international community.

46. I cite the Commonwealth example because I venture to suggest that we would do well to recognize that the members of the Arab region in the Middle East may feel that they too are in a special relationship with one another. Their relationship with one another may come under the heading of external affairs, but it is probably misleading to regard them as foreign affairs in the classical meaning which diplomacy gives the term. The relations among the Arab nations in the Middle East have been developing and evolving very rapidly. Similarly, national sentiments and aspirations are rapidly taking political and constitutional shape in what, not so long ago, were the non-self governing parts of the British Commonwealth and Empire. In a sense, the emergence of new national governments and groupings in the Arab area represents a challenge to the imagination and sympathy of older and longer-established members of the international community in

somewhat the same way as the emergence of new Asian and African Commonwealth countries has represented a challenge to the sympathy, the understanding and the support of older members of our British Commonwealth.

47. It is for reasons like these that I should be doubtful of the wisdom of anyone attempting from the outside to prescribe and codify any very precise pattern for the relationships of the Arab countries *inter se*, or even for their individual or collective relationship to the countries that make up the rest of the world. The United Nations has, perhaps, a collective responsibility to show its sympathetic concern for the political evolution of the Arab countries, but even the United Nations cannot dictate the pace of that development or attempt to influence the political form that it may ultimately assume. What is important, particularly in this transitional stage, is that we should recognize that the pattern of economic and political relationships has not reached a settled equilibrium in the Middle East any more than it has reached an equilibrium in the British Commonwealth or, for that matter, in Western Europe, where economic, social and political forces are creating new systems of international and, in some cases, supranational co-operation in forms whose ultimate shape none of us can foresee.

48. While these processes, all natural enough, perhaps even inevitable, are working themselves out, our chief responsibility in the United Nations is to see that our thinking and that our institutions should be sufficiently flexible and realistic to accommodate themselves to the facts of change. Changes will have to come, but they must come peacefully. This much the world has a right to expect, and all our efforts, either within this Organization or in fields of policy beyond it, should be directed to this task. This is in the common interest of all of us, whether we are members of the Warsaw Pact, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or whether we belong to that group sometimes referred to as the uncommitted nations in the cold war. The whole world has ultimately a single interest in preventing the strains and stresses arising from rapid and unequal rates of development in these areas, from bringing us all into fatal collision.

49. I am on surer ground when I turn to the economic provisions of the draft resolution before us. Just as the unequal pace of political development in the Middle East has produced stresses in the relations among the States of the area, so also has the unequal distribution of economic resources had its impact on the rate of economic and social development in various parts of the Middle East. The invitation—that is what it is—to the Arab States to create for themselves, with the technical assistance available through the United Nations specialized agencies and other United Nations organizations, development institutions serving the interests of the region as a whole, is an attempt to make possible the lessening of the economic disparities between one part of the area and another.

50. The need for a regional approach of this nature was foreshadowed in the Secretary-General's able statement on 8 August, to which I have referred, and has already met with a quick and constructive response on the part of the United States Government. The proposals which President Eisenhower outlined on 13 August [733rd meeting] from this platform, could have far-reaching and beneficial consequences for the Middle East, and no one, I suggest, should underestimate the

significance of the new policies which President Eisenhower thereby enunciated. The willingness of the United States to support materially and technically the kind of initiative envisaged by the Secretary-General to solve problems which have been a source of friction and an obstacle to progress in the Middle East for so long, is to be highly commended, as is the recognition on the part of the United States that it is through the United Nations that the means to carry out these proposals should be found. It is unfortunate that bilateral economic programmes which ought to have benefitted this area, should often, in the past, have been spurned for political reasons, or have been the occasion for an intensification of political rivalries within the area and political rivalries between the great Powers. The Canadian Government, for its part, has already endorsed in principle the concept of a Middle East regional economic development plan under United Nations auspices, and we would sincerely hope that the Arab States will themselves see the advantage of taking the initiative to implement the suggestions contained in paragraph 2 of section III of the draft resolution.

51. A further long-term project which will be carried a step further, if the present draft resolution receives the general support that it deserves, is that relating to the creation of a stand-by United Nations peace force. The Canadian Government's support, over many years, for the creation of such a force is a matter of record in this Assembly, reaffirmed as recently as in September 1957, when Prime Minister Diefenbaker addressed the opening meeting of the twelfth regular session [683rd meeting].

52. It is indeed an essential element in Canadian policy to accord high priority to the honouring of commitments to preserve the peace through United Nations action, and to provide the Organization with instrumentalities to accomplish its purposes. Canada welcomes a new, or perhaps I should say a renewed effort in the direction of a more permanent and workmanlike arrangement to meet the requirements of the United Nations in this regard. Our willingness to respond to specific United Nations requests has led to a long record of our service to the Organization of which Canada is justly proud.

53. Operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza have required the greatest numerical contribution on the part of Canada, but we have borne, with equal willingness, our share of responsibility in other United Nations peace efforts: in Kashmir, in the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, and now in the Observation Group in Lebanon. It is no more than a coincidence that three of these efforts in which Canada has found itself involved under the aegis of the United Nations, are in the Middle East, a region in which we otherwise would have no more direct interest than that which flows from the normal cultural and commercial intercourse between nations. But, as a middle Power, we do, however, have a very direct interest in the preservation of international peace and the promotion of understanding among nations, and it is as a manifestation of that interest that Canada has men in the Middle East participating in the United Nations Emergency Force, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, and now in the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon.

54. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, at this emergency session of the General Assembly [734th meeting], has endorsed the sug-

gestion that a stand-by United Nations peace force should be created to make possible quick action in an emergency, and he has referred to the studies which the Secretary-General has been conducting. This important matter will require most careful study. The experience of the past has shown that United Nations requirements can involve a wide variety of types of service, none of which may offer an exact precedent for a permanent stand-by force. The further examination of alternative possibilities will be greatly assisted by the report which the Secretary-General will make to the General Assembly, at its thirteenth session, next month.

55. Although the immediate situation with which we are faced may perhaps not require the kind of action for which a stand-by force may be designed, it will give, I pray, renewed impetus towards the creation of such an instrumentality, an objective which was clearly in the minds of the authors of the Charter in 1945, and which we would do well to explore further at a moment when the role of the United Nations as a peace-preserving body is once more uppermost in our minds. Despite the darkness of this crisis, there are lessons to be learned from it; may we profit from them and let us not forget them.

56. There is a third long-term objective that we hope to see result directly or indirectly from our present deliberations. This objective is not to be found in the draft resolution. I refer to Canada's hope that there could be laid a network of interlocking non-aggression agreements in the Middle East region, which could guarantee the independence and the integrity of each and all of the States of the area, and thus provide a solid basis for the economic and other constructive proposals which are within the grasp of the States of that area, if this draft resolution accomplishes the objectives which we and the other co-sponsors have in mind.

57. I have spoken about the results which we are confident would flow from individual parts of the draft resolution, but I would revert to the thought that I expressed earlier, that the draft resolution be assessed as a comprehensive approach which attempts to reconcile widely divergent points of view. It deserves careful study, for it points the way to constructive action through and by the United Nations.

58. The draft resolution does not attempt to apportion responsibility for the past in relation to the problems of the Middle East. It does not invite the Assembly to commend or condemn the national policies that any of us has pursued. It asks us all to recognize the situation that exists *de facto*, and outlines a course of action which, if we all pursued it scrupulously, could lead us out of that situation. It requires good will and restraint, and it will require the best efforts of the Secretary-General, on whose shoulders we have perforce to place so heavy a load.

59. It is our hope, in commending this draft resolution to the Assembly, that every one of us will find it possible to endorse it. This, I believe, is a moment in the history of the United Nations where a conventional majority is not enough. In the minds of some, this may not be a perfectly balanced draft resolution, but time does not always work on the side of peace. It is important to make a beginning, and a beginning in the right direction. If we could all—and I address this argument directly to the members of the Soviet delegation—vote for this draft resolution, we would have made a start—a transforming start—in the slow process of bringing

order and mutual respect into our several approaches to the questions relating to the Middle East. This emergency session of the General Assembly would thus make a great, a unique, contribution towards the foundation of peace in an area from which war could all too easily come.

60. I am not saying this by way of winding up my remarks, but I say it very solemnly and with deep feeling. Humanity today awaits our decisions. Will we fail humanity?

61. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): The United Nations was founded on the assumption that complete harmony and co-operation would prevail among the great Powers. Unfortunately, the signatures on the Charter were not yet dry when this assumption was gravely undermined. And yet, in spite of that, a true miracle has occurred. The United Nations has performed its function. In the atmosphere of faith in justice and peace which it created, war-ravaged Europe has, with the generous help of the United States and through its own efforts, achieved a remarkable recovery. Greece and Turkey have revived, and in this same atmosphere of hope we have witnessed the splendid recovery of Germany, Italy and Japan.

62. In spite of the disagreement among the great Powers, the United Nations—and this is a truly extraordinary fact in the history of mankind—has surmounted such grave crises as the Berlin blockade, Korea and Suez. Before that, it solved the seemingly insoluble problem which attended its creation: that of achieving universality, which was absolutely necessary if we were to speak with complete authority and in the name of all mankind.

63. This brief historical sketch, which I have felt it useful to present, even though it is familiar to all of us, enables me to begin my speech with words of faith and hope. But we have another reason for faith: the Charter. The United Nations Charter, so far as it concerns measures for the pacific settlement of disputes, is a document of profound wisdom. The Charter has imposed a tremendous responsibility upon us, for it has provided us with all the means for achieving peace. Perhaps we have difficulty in taking enforcement measures; it is true that we lack certain machinery. The Security Council has not functioned well or has been unable to function. With regard to the maintenance of peace, however, the powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and of the General Assembly when the Security Council is unable to act, are so broad that we cannot evade the performance of this task without assuming a tremendous responsibility before mankind and before history.

64. Indeed, there are no limitations on those powers. Apart from the provision stating that recourse must be had to the means specifically agreed upon by the parties, which must take precedence inasmuch as the will of the parties is sovereign, there are no limitations on the pacific settlement of disputes. There is no limitation with regard to subject-matter, for both disputes and situations are submitted to us, and every problem is either a dispute or a situation. There is no limitation with regard to time, for the Charter clearly states that, at any stage of a dispute or situation, we may examine it in the Security Council and, hence, in the General Assembly. Finally, there is no limitation with regard to the means that may be employed. Article 37, which vests powers in the Security Council—powers which may be transferred to the

General Assembly when an emergency session has been convened—authorizes us to adopt a resolution. But Article 36 has even broader scope. If we are unable to adopt a resolution, we may recommend procedures or methods of adjustment, i.e., a compromise, a means of bringing the opposing points of view closer together, a solution which, at all events, ensures the maintenance of peace. We must therefore ponder, before voting for any draft resolution, the tremendous responsibility of the Members of the United Nations to find, at all costs, a peaceful solution of these problems. That has been the spirit of the Charter. That is also the spirit which has prevailed in Europe in spite of the conflict among the great Powers.

65. At this point, I should like to recall a statement by Disraeli, which, if I remember correctly, was made on 9 February 1876 in the House of Commons. Observing that the world was subjected to continuous changes, Disraeli declared that transactions and compromise must be accepted, the rights of others respected and reconciled with one's own assertions, and problems must be settled by peaceful means. If, then, a great British Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party said in 1876 that it was necessary to respect the rights of others, to try to reconcile them with one's own rights, to accept compromise or adjustment, as our Charter states, and solve all problems by peaceful means, then today, more than eighty years later, we must surely follow the same principle, which not only is in keeping with the generous spirit of all the peoples of the earth but is the legal and binding obligation imposed by the Charter.

66. However, I am aware that, in spite of the great prestige of the United Nations and the broad powers conferred by the Charter, we face today an exceedingly grave problem. This problem cannot be viewed merely in its own terms but must be viewed against the background which explains it, in its larger context and surrounding atmosphere. In my opinion, it would be a mistake to try to employ in diplomacy, history or sociology the method which is possible in the mathematical sciences and even in philosophy, and which consists in isolating the various factors of a problem and considering it purely in a specific situation and from a specific point of view. This method is impossible in international affairs.

67. The problem of the Middle East does have its own special aspects. We are well aware that complex economic questions remain after the liquidation of the old spheres of influence. These are obviously the legacy of the old colonialist policies. However, these are not the only questions existing in the Middle East. We must bear in mind that today, more than ever, all international problems are related. We are living today in an era of international tension, in a situation that is far graver than those which prevailed in earlier days, when there were periods of stability in which favourable conditions could be created for the solution of problems, when, in any event, there was some limit to the elements which could be employed in the struggle between the political forces, the struggle for power, the conflict among the great Powers. There were factors then which made it possible to calculate the risks or, at least, estimate them.

68. In recent years, whether because a striving for power has encountered a spirit of resistance, or because of an arms race caused by mutual distrust, or because of attempts to achieve a psychological ascendancy which

would make it possible to gain the fruits of a victorious war without having fought one, or perhaps because of all these factors, mankind has been living in a state of acute anxiety.

69. We are not merely living in an atomic age, for the word "atomic" has been replaced by the word "nuclear". It would be more accurate to say that we are living in a 'nucleo-ballistic' age which is fraught with the greatest dangers. Mankind is truly living in an age of anxiety. Our daily life seems to make us less conscious of our extreme peril, but world events quickly bring this agonizing consciousness back to us. It is in this awareness and with this tragic sense of reality that we must view the problem of the Middle East. Certain aspects of the problem can be explained only by the existence of these dark forces which today weigh upon mankind, by the fact that we live in danger of extinction, that the very existence of human civilization and life is threatened.

70. Now, however, I wish to turn to the practical aspects of the problem. We are dealing with a problem which concerns primarily the inhabitants of the Middle East region, and the Arab countries in particular. I wish to state at this point that a close bond exists between the Latin American countries and the new nations of Africa and Asia. I have said so before from this rostrum, and the sincerity of my words is attested by the fact that they were spoken on earlier occasions than this one. Whereas the nineteenth century was marked by the emergence of the Latin American countries, the twentieth century is marked by the emergence of new nations in that part of the world where human civilization was born. We have a feeling of solidarity with those peoples and, particularly, with the Arab countries. Yesterday, we heard the magnificent speech in which the representative of Spain, full of wisdom and eloquence, described this intimate bond between Spanish and Arabic civilization. In our own America, there are still vestiges of what might be called Arabic influence: the Moorish balconies which are to be found in some Latin American capitals, principally that of Peru, and perhaps the veil worn by our women. How many aspects there are to this, quite apart from the Arab peoples' magnificent contributions to the civilization, we heard extolled here in the highly authoritative words of the President of the United States.

71. Thus, there is a close bond between these countries and ourselves. In addition to this sentimental tie, however, we have an even closer feeling of solidarity. What is it that these countries desire? Freedom and independence, complete self-government, which is what we ourselves need, what we desire, what we have fought for and shall go on fighting for. What is it that they need? First of all, development based on work, and, secondly, peace. A programme of freedom, work and peace has created an indissoluble, sacred bond between the countries of Africa and Asia of the Old World and the young democracies of the New World.

72. Consequently, any problem that affects them affects us as well. Any legitimate aspiration of theirs must be viewed by us with sympathy and understanding. It has been stated here—without dissent—that the powerful movement of Arab nationalism must be respected. Nationalism is one of the great dynamic forces of history. It might be said that modern history, which begins with the American and French Revolutions, is the age of nationalism. The entire history of nineteenth-century Europe revolves around nationalism. Our own history

is one of nationalism. Our freedom is a product of our nationalist sentiments. Thus, when nationalists and nationalism are being discussed, Latin America has something to say, has principles to state; for the emergence of nations in Europe was, as the professors of law would say, extra-legal, whereas in America nations arose on the basis of certain legal standards, on the basis of the legal principle of self-determination.

73. In the New World, this principle determined the independence and establishment of nations. While in North America the process has been one of integration, in Spanish or Latin America it has been one tending towards self-determination, to differentiation of the various national identities. Necessarily, therefore, we know something about nationalism. We know perfectly well how respectable Arab nationalism is, but we also know that nationalism operates and moves within certain principles. America has contributed two great principles to the development of a universal law: the principle of self-determination in the establishment of nations and that of non-intervention in their development. These principles are complementary, they are the two sides of the same coin. Any nationalist movement, whether it is directed towards integration or whether, inspired by a respectable group feeling, it tends towards differentiation, towards the creation of new national entities, must act spontaneously, from purely internal motives, involving none but internal factors and no material foreign influence. Spiritual influences must always be respected, because they are intangible and uncontrollable and must be exerted in accordance with the principle of non-intervention.

74. We, in Latin America, studied the question of intervention at the Ninth Conference of American States held at Bogotá in 1948, and succeeded in defining the personality of the State, which should be respected not only with regard to its territory, its economic structure and its political institutions, but also in regard to its cultural features. Such delicate respect, such an attitude of absolute respect is a prerequisite of what we might term the fulfilment of nationalism. We have therefore been gratified to see that from all groups represented at the General Assembly voices have been raised to assert that no one can contest the right of the Arab countries to integrate themselves by peaceful means, with due respect for the national features and the special personality of those sectors or nations which may wish to retain their own identity within a higher association integrated either from an economic point of view or from a point of view of international policy.

75. These are the problems facing us. What solution can we offer? Of course, there are, as I have said, underlying factors. What can we do beyond simply wishing for international tension to disappear? We can use this emergency special session of the General Assembly to address a sincere appeal to the great Powers that they should at once set up legal machinery to control armaments and substitute a policy of co-operation for one of armament rivalry.

76. As far as the problem itself is concerned, there is no better solution than the presence of the United Nations in the Middle East. But we must clearly define the meaning of this presence. It represents solely a moral authority offensive to no one. The advantage of a moral authority is that it does not detract from anyone's dignity or restrict anyone's freedom; that it is a means of exploration, of negotiation; and negotiation must be free. Lastly, it is an agency for economic aid.

77. If we conceive the United Nations in this three-fold aspect, as a moral authority, as a means of negotiation, exploration, compromise, bargaining and settlement, and as an agency for economic aid, how can it be asserted that the presence of the United Nations in the Middle East can constitute a form of trusteeship, a form of collective action to fill the so-called "vacuum", which for me cannot and does not exist, seeing that there are sovereign and autonomous entities in that area?

78. Spheres of influence or dependence are a thing of the past. The United Nations is simply a juridical institution based on complete equality. It has, as its history and actions reveal, treated large and small countries as equal. Its most recent action has again demonstrated this. In the missions so successfully undertaken by the Secretary-General, the United Nations has carefully respected that principle. For each action, the full consent of the countries concerned was sought. The United Nations Emergency Force has strengthened peace, and no complaint has been laid against it. United Nations observers are there, because they are the foremost and most respectful protectors of the freedom of the countries they have visited.

79. In the United Nations, and above all, in the Secretariat, we have an instrument which is eminently suitable for this work of moral authority, investigation, exploration and negotiation, and, under the auspices of this Organization, the Arab countries can, with the co-operation of all States, of the great Powers, and of the countries which have economic interests in the Middle East, set up machinery for the rehabilitation and economic development of their peoples.

80. The United Nations Charter has given the Secretary-General a great many powers; but the life and the needs of the Organization have increased these powers within the Charter itself. Let us make use of this apostolic mission in which our Secretary-General, so admirably fitted for his task, has been engaged with the General Assembly's approval. We cannot take a decision on the question now. We must first obtain the consent of the countries concerned, and this will be sought by the Secretary-General.

81. We can thus affirm today, more confidently than ever before, that the United Nations has a part to play in the liquidation of whatever is outmoded and a survival of the old spheres of influence, and, above all, in preventing the use of the frightful and uncontrollable force of the machines which man has created, machines which are useful for the domination of nature but a scourge when used to dominate other men, which turn the individual into a slave and a victim of his own invention. The United Nations can avert a prospect terrible to contemplate for humanity: the extension over any part of the world of what I would call spheres of domination.

82. There is, however, another very important point. The new law is based, not on the simple coexistence and coincidence of freedoms, as Kant thought, but on the close solidarity between human personalities in individual relations, and between international entities. Let us all form a community, so that we shall not only coexist, but live together in mutual co-operation. This involves not simply a negative obligation, but also a positive obligation of assistance.

83. Co-operation between the principal Powers must replace the struggle and rivalry between them and the so-called spheres of influence. There must be generous and human co-operation. In this connexion, I can do

no less than offer high praise for both the Secretary-General's plan [732nd meeting] and the admirable words spoken by President Eisenhower from this rostrum [733rd meeting].

84. We cannot disregard the economic aspect, because, without being Marxists, we must admit that many aspects of human life are related to and depend entirely on the economic factor. Economic co-operation, however, is merely a likeness, a reflection, a symbol of something more valuable: spiritual co-operation and understanding, which constitute the true foundation of peace. Briefly, therefore, I believe that this programme provides the basis for a draft resolution such as that submitted jointly by Norway, some Latin American countries, Canada and other Powers [4/3878].

85. It is our duty to find a way out of the present difficult situation, perhaps the gravest that we have yet come to, which may be the cross-roads in the history of the United Nations. I ask in fear and trembling, even in terror: what would happen if the United Nations does not adopt a resolution, if failure in the Security Council is followed by failure in this Assembly when the eyes of humanity and the hopes of all are focused upon it; what would be our situation if a resolution were approved with less than a two-thirds majority, or with a bare majority, which would mean that there is no real possibility of co-operation and joint effort?

86. So many interesting speeches have been made and, with a few exceptions, the debate has maintained the level which the President expected and recommended to us. There is in all of us the will to do what is right and an ardent desire for peace; we have an irrevocable mandate from humanity to find a solution, and I cannot, therefore, resign myself to the possibility that we may not find it.

87. I cannot resign myself to that thought and I believe that, with the co-operation of all concerned and making use of all the elements at our disposal—first and foremost the Charter, which is imperative, categorical and binding, the plan outlined by the Secretary-General, the admirable speech made by President Eisenhower, and all the various ideas and suggestions which have been made here, including even the last part of the Soviet draft resolution, which recognizes the jurisdiction of the United Nations—we may find an agreed solution such as that proposed by Norway and the other co-sponsors of the draft resolution. The solution will not be a perfect one, but there is a wise old proverb which says that the better is the enemy of the good and that theoretical perfection is often incompatible with that perfection which we are compelled to seek: the possible and the practical.

88. I represent a country which has behind it a long juridical tradition, one going back over a thousand years—because I include not only our Spanish culture but also the admirable Inca and pre-Inca cultures. I belong to a group of people who have lived and wish to live under the sign of freedom, justice and peace, and I wish to make an appeal to all countries, without exception. Let us wind up this emergency special session of the General Assembly with a further triumph for the United Nations which will represent a further triumph for the cause of humanity.

89. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): This emergency special session of the General Assembly has been convened at the proposal of the Soviet Union to

consider the present situation in the Near and Middle East caused by the intervention of the United States in Lebanon and of the United Kingdom in Jordan, and to seek solutions which will prevent the situation from deteriorating and help to safeguard security in that region of the world.

90. It is quite obvious to the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that our duty at the present session is to put an end to the aggressive actions of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Near and Middle East and to secure the withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon and Jordan. Hence, Mr. Lloyd's contention that the purpose of the present emergency session is to consider the complaints of Lebanon and Jordan is strange, to say the least. Those present here are well aware that, if the world is apprehensive, it is not because the stormy gusts of revolution—set in motion by purely internal processes—have swept away the corrupt former régime in Iraq. Millions of people are still deeply concerned not because social and political forces have been mobilized in Lebanon for the purpose of solving that country's own problems, but because the United States and the United Kingdom have invaded Lebanon and Jordan with their armed forces and have thus brought the world to the brink of a military catastrophe.

91. Hence, there is no justification for obscuring the basic question with which the General Assembly, at its emergency special session, is confronted. The United Nations cannot under any circumstances conceal the fact that there has been armed intervention in the Near and Middle East and blatant interference in the domestic affairs of two small Arab States. We are here not to endorse aggression but to oppose it. The United States and the United Kingdom, by committing flagrant armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, have violated the United Nations Charter which calls upon States to "refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State . . ." [Art. 2, para. 4]. They have also violated General Assembly resolution 1236 (XII) concerning peaceful and neighbourly relations among States. In addition to defining other important principles of peaceful coexistence, this resolution, adopted unanimously less than a year ago, calls upon States to show mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity and to refrain from intervention in one another's internal affairs.

92. The events in the Near and Middle East which now confront the United Nations are not completely unrelated to disturbing events of the recent past. The aggressive attack upon Egypt in 1956, the military campaign prepared against Syria in 1957 and the present intervention in Lebanon and Jordan are part of one and the same policy of suppressing the national liberation movement. That very aim is frankly stated in the notorious "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine" and the military Baghdad Pact. These are facts we cannot forget, even though there are some who, for understandable reasons, do not at present bear them in mind. The causes of the extreme aggravation of tension must be sought, not in the far-reaching and natural internal processes which are occurring in the countries of the Arab East, but in the attempts by the colonial Powers to thwart the invincible desire of the peoples for a change in their old way of life, and thus to preserve their dominant position in these countries and retain the possibility of extracting oil and other resources from the area.

93. We are living in an age when the flood tide of the national liberation movement is erasing the shame of colonialism from the face of the earth. Just as the Nile floods quench the thirst of the fields, so does this flood, in the words of Arab patriots, quench the age-old thirst of the people for national freedom and independence. Thus the Republic of India, that great Eastern State, was born, thus did Indonesia gain its freedom and unity and thus, finally, did the United Arab Republic emerge as the living embodiment of the idea of the unity of the Arab nation. The world-wide colonial system is collapsing before our very eyes. That is why the imperialistic circles of certain western powers, particularly those which brought into being such monstrosities as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the South-East Asia Collective Defence Organization and the like, designed to preserve colonialism and to oppose the freedom of peoples, are resorting to every possible device in order to retain their privileges.

94. The economic advantages which the monopolies of the United States, the United Kingdom and certain other western countries have derived by plundering the wealth of small and economically under-developed countries, coupled with their reluctance to forego their privileges, are driving the western countries into the most reckless adventures. It is common knowledge that powerful United States monopolies own over half the oil reserves of the Near East. Fabulous profits flow through the pipe-lines into their coffers. However, as was rightly stated by Mr. Shukairy, head of the Saudi Arabian delegation [736th meeting], Arab oil constitutes the national wealth of the Arab States. Does their just and legitimate desire that this oil should in the first instance benefit the Arabs themselves create a threat to the United States farmer? Are the Arabs cutting into the revenue which the United States can and does obtain from mining its own oil? Of course not.

95. The oil monopolies which determine the trend of United States foreign policy in the Near and Middle East nevertheless completely rule out the possibility of a relationship with the Arab countries based on equality. When the Arab peoples insist, in one form or another, upon satisfaction of their aspirations and upon recognition of their right to attempt to solve their problems themselves, the United States and the United Kingdom defend the interests of their monopolies and their puppets by force of arms.

96. In this connexion, it is useful to recall the statement made by Senator Kefauver in the United States Congress on 1 March 1957, during the consideration of the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine" to which I have already referred. He said on that occasion that it had been indicated that Mr. Dulles wanted to bring about international intervention (referring, of course, to the Near East) which might include going to war simply for the purpose of protecting the enormous profits and holdings of some of the international oil companies. This warning was confirmed sooner than could have been foreseen even by a United States politician so well-informed as Senator Kefauver.

97. Having played at anti-colonialism, the United States of America is now openly defending colonialism. There is no escaping this reality and no "plans" can conceal it. United States intervention has become an accomplished fact. The armed forces of the interventionists have invaded the territory of Lebanon and Jordan and, for more than a month now, have been keeping the inhabitants of these two Arab States covered

by the muzzles of their guns. Although there has been more than enough time to take steps to put an end to aggression, the United Nations organ primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace, namely the Security Council, because of its present composition and the position taken by the Governments of the States which have committed armed aggression, has proved incapable of discharging its duty to maintain peace and to remove the danger of a military conflict. Can it be that the General Assembly, too, will be unable to make a useful contribution towards ending the intervention?

98. We are told that, had the Security Council not rejected the resolutions submitted by the United States [S/4050/Rev.1] and the Government of Japan [S/4055/Rev.1] the United States forces would have already been withdrawn. This slick formula cannot mislead anyone, because it is contrary to the facts and reflects the wide gulf between United States words and deeds. As we know, the Security Council decided [825th meeting] to despatch observers, who proceeded to discharge their duty of ensuring that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders. These observers found that there was no infiltration and no intervention by some Arab States in the affairs of others. But Mr. Dulles, speaking yesterday before the convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, said again that there was such infiltration and that indirect aggression of some kind was taking place.

99. Whom are we to believe here—the impartial United Nations observers who are in Lebanon or Mr. Dulles who claims in New York that he has a better view of what is happening in Lebanon from the other side of the ocean? No, in this case we shall believe the United Nations observers, not Mr. Dulles.

100. The Security Council has not determined the existence of a threat to international peace. This threat arose after the United States committed armed intervention in Lebanon. The purpose of the United States draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on 15 July 1958 [829th meeting] was to obtain the cover and sanction of the United Nations' name and authority for this intervention.

101. A somewhat paradoxical situation has arisen: the United States has engaged in intervention and now seeks to justify the presence of its troops in Lebanon on the ground that the Security Council rejected its resolution which would, in effect, have sanctioned the military invasion.

102. We have heard statements from this rostrum minimizing the degree of tension in the Near East. Moreover, some speakers virtually describe the invasion of Lebanon and Jordan by United States and United Kingdom forces as a righteous peace move. However, it is obvious to all who do not wish to close their eyes to what is actually happening in that region that the United States and United Kingdom troops sent to Lebanon and Jordan have created a situation in which the advocates of a brink of war policy already have one foot over that dangerous brink.

103. History teaches us that great wars begin with attacks on small States. Can we accept this state of affairs? No, we cannot. There is absolutely no justification for the action of the United States and the United Kingdom. If we are genuinely concerned to remove the threat of a world conflict, we must not accept a situation in which aggressors achieve their objectives by force nor take the line of appeasing those guilty of a

breach of the peace. Only the immediate withdrawal of the aggressors' troops from Lebanon and Jordan will reduce tension and restore conditions to normal in the Near East and throughout the world.

104. Reports are being circulated to the effect that the United States Department of Defense intends to withdraw another battalion of marines from Lebanon. But to where will they be withdrawn? They are to be transferred to United States warships in Lebanese waters. The United Kingdom Government resorted to similar tactics towards the end of November 1956, when it announced the withdrawal of a battalion of troops from Egypt. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom battalion was represented as a symbol of United Kingdom virtue by the zealous champions of the Atlantic policy and was used for discreditable manoeuvres in the General Assembly against the immediate and complete withdrawal of all the aggressor's troops from Egypt.

105. An amazing coincidence of tactics! But is the General Assembly meeting in order to be misled by such tactics? What is expected of the General Assembly at this time? In the first place, a decision calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan. Once this is done, we can consider other matters.

106. A Soviet draft resolution [*A/3870 and Corr.1*] has been submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration. Under it, the General Assembly would recommend the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw their troops from the territory of Lebanon and Jordan without delay, and instruct the Secretary-General to strengthen the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon and to send an observation group to Jordan with a view to the supervision of the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops, and of the situation along the frontiers of those countries.

107. The Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic fully endorses and supports the constructive Soviet proposals in the draft resolution. It is convinced that adoption and implementation of the Soviet Union's proposals would remove the danger to peace in that region, put an end to actions which violate the United Nations Charter, and increase the peoples' confidence in the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, implementation of the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of troops is a first and essential condition for the settlement of other Near and Middle Eastern problems on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and in accordance with the national interests of the peoples of the Near Eastern countries. Without a settlement of the question of the immediate withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan, it is useless to think in terms of stabilizing the situation in the Near and Middle East and of settling Near Eastern problems in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter.

108. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is guided by these considerations in assessing the plan outlined in the statement made by the President of the United States. What strikes us first about this plan is that, while it claims to lay the foundations for a great new prosperous era of Arab history, it makes no reference to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan. It would seem that the United

States wants to found a new era of Arab history on the bayonets of the United States marines.

109. While this is not the time to consider general plans relating to Near Eastern problems, since to do so would be to divert the emergency special session of the General Assembly from its primary task, we must refer to the proposal for the creation of a stand-by United Nations peace force.

110. The argument used in support of the need to set up a special United Nations armed force does not hold water. Those who, like the United States representatives, try to attribute the development of tension in the Near and Middle East to the existence of some kind of indirect aggression are distorting the real state of affairs, I need hardly say, to further their own ends.

111. The threat to peace and security in the Near and Middle East does not arise from the desire of the Arabs to be masters in their own house or their desire to control their own wealth, but from interference by the United States and the United Kingdom in their domestic affairs. If you, gentlemen, desist from interfering in Arab affairs, you will soon see how well they will settle their domestic affairs and solve their domestic problems, both in their own interests and in those of the whole world.

112. Attempts to replace United States and United Kingdom intervention by United Nations intervention are also useless. No self-respecting people will allow itself to be deluded by the title "stand-by United Nations Peace Force". Such a force is a screen for one thing only, namely, the desire of certain circles in the United States and the United Kingdom to keep the peoples of the Arab countries dependent on them. What will this force do in these countries? Against whom is it to be stationed there? Perhaps it is to defend the Arabs against Israel? Of course not. The intention is, with the help of this United Nations police force, to bring in through the back door what could not be brought in through the front. In other words, the way is being cleared for the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine".

113. The United Nations is an international organization for the defence of peace, not a body for the suppression of the freedom and independence of peoples. If we take the course proposed here by the United States of America, the United Nations will be turned into an instrument of aggression. This must not happen. But that is precisely how the function of a special United Nations armed force is interpreted by Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of State of the United States, who said at his news conference on 31 July 1958 that there ought to be a standing group of the United Nations which could go to any place which felt itself endangered by indirect aggression and throw a kind of mantle of security around it. Today this force is being used in the East, tomorrow it will be used against the countries of Latin America, and the day after tomorrow Mr. Dulles will begin to settle the affairs of the United Kingdom and France themselves.

114. We cannot support those who are impelling the United Nations into a course which will be fatal to itself. It is not the introduction of any new troops, even though they might be United Nations troops, but the withdrawal, and only the withdrawal, of all foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan that is the first and most important condition for restoring the situation to normal in the Near and Middle East.

115. By juggling with the concept of indirect aggression, the United States and United Kingdom representatives to the General Assembly are taking the at-

titude of accusers. But, as a proverb says, "not every water jug can be carried to its destination". The fiction of "indirect aggression" is indeed a fragile burden for both the United States of America and the United Kingdom to carry. Who can name any country other than the United States of America where subversive activity against other States has been promoted to the level of official State policy and confirmed by legislation? On 10 October 1951, President Truman of the United States of America signed the so-called Mutual Security Act providing for a special appropriation of \$100 million for the purpose of giving financial assistance to any selected persons who are residing in or are escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, with a view to forming such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes. This Act incorporated the Kersten Amendment, its purpose being to provide for the possibility of extending assistance to subversive organizations which may exist in these countries.

116. I should like to know whether President Eisenhower had this Act in mind when he said here: "If we, the United States, are one of those who have been at fault, we stand ready to be corrected." [733rd meeting, para. 25.] The Act of 10 October 1951 is more than a mere fault. Are we to understand the President's words to mean that the United States is now prepared to abrogate this Act, unprecedented in history, and thus to correct one of its many faults? There is much evidence that this Act is being used against other countries also and, in particular, against the States of the Arab East. This may be illustrated by the generally known fact of the close ties between the conspirators who were preparing a *coup d'Etat* in Syria in 1957, and the relevant Government agencies of the United States.

117. The United States has brought no less discredit upon itself by its open support of King Hussein of Jordan when he carried out a reactionary *coup d'Etat* in his country in April 1957, overthrew the democratically constituted Nabulsi government and ended the work of the popularly elected Parliament. The direct, armed intervention in the Near East is the logical continuation of indirect aggression.

118. In the light of all these facts, you may judge for yourselves whether it is proper and fitting for the United States and United Kingdom representatives here to set themselves up as defenders of the independence of small countries. Nearly all the small countries are Members of the United Nations, which is called upon by the Charter to defend its Member States from interference in their domestic affairs and from the threat of direct and indirect aggression. Why, then, do the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom arbitrarily assume the right to judge and dispose as they themselves see fit? This is an absolute repudiation of all the rules of international law. Today they wish, with the help of their troops, to teach good sense to the Lebanese and the Jordanians, and tomorrow they may want to turn their attention to other countries. How far we have departed from the principles of Grotius! This is more like the law of the jungle.

119. Small countries have equal rights with others. They make their contribution to world culture and to the general cause of the maintenance of peace. Their line of conduct must not be dictated to them; they must be treated as equals. They must not be subjected to dictatorship by the United States and United Kingdom oil monopolies, but must be helped to strengthen their independence and to develop their economy and culture. This must be done without introducing troops, without threats of atom bombs and without brandishing the imaginary menace of indirect aggression. The small countries, especially those which have recently attained their independence, need nothing more than to be left alone by the oil and banana monopolies of the United States and other western countries. The independence of small States must be genuinely respected. This can only serve to promote the cause of world peace, which is so fervently desired by all peoples.

120. Another draft resolution on the question before the General Assembly has been submitted for our consideration. I am referring to the draft resolution which Norway and several other countries submitted to the Assembly today [A/3878].

121. In our delegation's opinion, this draft resolution bypasses the main question which this emergency special session of the General Assembly has been convened to discuss. The very name of the session implies that it has been convened to discuss an urgent problem. The possibility of war in the Near and Middle East must be averted. This can be done by withdrawing United States and United Kingdom forces. But this draft resolution contains no recommendation for the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom forces from Lebanon and Jordan. Moreover, its second preambular paragraph proposes that the Assembly should note the letters of the United States of America [A/3876] and the United Kingdom [A/3877] addressed to the President of the General Assembly, and thus indirectly endorses the motives for the intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Near East.

122. The draft resolution is nothing more than a slightly reworded version of proposals which have already been discussed and which would, in effect, impel the United Nations into interference in the domestic affairs of countries in the Near and Middle East, to suit the interventionists.

123. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, therefore, considers the joint draft resolution unacceptable and will vote against it.

124. The Ukrainian people and the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, being concerned at the situation that has arisen in the Arab East, strongly urge that those who are prepared to gamble with the future of millions of human beings in order to achieve their covetous aims should be made to see reason.

125. Our delegation, therefore, supports the proposals of the Soviet Union, the purpose of which is to seek for solutions capable of leading to a relaxation of tension in the Near and Middle East in the interests of the preservation of world peace.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.