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President: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEM 5

Questions considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958 (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT: I wish to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the documents relating to the agenda item under consideration. In addition to the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [A/3870 and Corr.1], Members have before them communications from the United States [A/3876] and the United Kingdom [A/3877] addressed to the President of the Assembly, and a seven-Power draft resolution [A/3878].

2. Mr. MALIK (Lebanon): The Middle East, in its international aspects, is a fit theme for consideration by the United Nations.

3. Firstly, its nations, since the Conference at San Francisco, have always played an active and, I should hope, constructive role in this world Organization.

4. Secondly, the problems of the Middle East have always been under review, indeed, to some extent, even decisions have been made by the United Nations; in fact, no region of the world has engaged the attention of the United Nations more than the Middle East.

5. Thirdly, the United Nations, as the Secretary-General has pointed out, has proven its relevance to the general area of the Middle East through the many and diverse engagements and activities it has undertaken there.

6. Fourthly, the material resources of the Middle East, which appear to be enormous, are critically needed by the rest of the world.

7. Fifthly, the outstanding strategic importance of the Middle East is obvious to every thinker and statesman, in fact, to everyone who just looks at the map. Any fundamental strategic world planning must include the Middle East as one of its most essential elements.

8. Sixthly, there is compacted in that general area considerable diversity of interest, race, aspiration, outlook and general valuation.

9. Seventhly, even apart from this native diversity, the very geographical location of the area makes it possible and, in fact, inevitable, for multiple influences to bear upon it from all over the world—from the north, from the east, from the south and from the west; and the Middle East has always been the centre of this world confluence, this world convergence.

10. Eighthly, if the Middle East is central in space, it is no less central in time, for, with all respect for other regions, I think it is quite clear that the world has been tremendously influenced and shaken throughout history by movements emanating from the Middle East; for, where would the world be without what was discovered, known, suffered and enacted in Egypt, in Arabia, in Palestine, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Mesopotamia, in Iran, in Asia Minor, in Greece, that great neighbour of ours which has always been in the closest interaction with the peoples of the Middle East?

11. Ninthly, the peoples of the Middle East appear to be caught today in the grip of a great historic revolution, a long-awaited revolution, a revolution long overdue, one that touches every aspect of their life—the political, social, economic, emotional and intellectual aspects. And the rest of the world is naturally profoundly interested in the roots, ideas, aims, tendencies and possible developments of this great revolution.

12. For all these reasons, I say, the Middle East constitutes, in its international aspects, a most fit theme for United Nations consideration.

13. In this complex, colourful, rich, world-significant Middle East, Lebanon has always figured as a distinct entity. There is a fascinating story of the accomplishments of navigators who sailed forth from our shores several millennia back. I shall not go into that here, nor into what the plying back and forth between east and west of these intrepid sailors did for the dissemination of ideas and the awakening of whole continents. Nor need I remind you of the great legend of Europa and her brother Cadmus. The great god Zeus, looking down upon this planet one morning, saw the fairest sight on earth, the Phoenician Princess Europa playing with her maiden friends on the seashore meadows of Tyre. The god forthwith transformed himself into a bull, came down to where the maidens were dancing, carried away our own Europa on his back, abducted her into his dark continent beyond the seas and named that continent forever after her lovely name. Cadmus, grieved by the disappearance of his sister, journeyed far and wide in search of her, fought man, dark battles on his journeys, and finally killed a dragon; and with the twelve teeth of the dragon planted what later matured into the twelve city-states of Hellas. I touch upon this dim historical-mythological past only to show that, as far as we can go back in history, we always find some distinct human entity centred in our mountains and on our shores and engaged in one of the noblest of human pursuits—the peaceful mediation of goods and ideas between race and race, culture and culture, and continent and continent.
14. Leaving the remote past aside, I wish to turn a little more closely to the last few centuries. Although from the seventh century on Lebanon became gradually a part of the new Arab world, it never lost its distinct entity. In the sixteenth century, at the time of the Ottoman conquest, the population of Lebanon exhibited nearly the same communal structure with which it is characterized today. All these communities, notwithstanding their differences and quarrels, lived together in what might be termed a "peaceful symbiosis"; and under the general overlordship of the Emirs of Lebanon—that is to say, the independent national princes—who were their mediators and arbiters, they organized themselves, in fact, into a "federation of equal and free communities", each with its own particular communal laws. Thus, we see that, at a time when all the neighbouring countries formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon enjoyed an independent status.

15. The princes of Lebanon who ruled from 1515 to 1861 belonged at first to the Druze family of Ma' a, and until 1842, after the extinction of this family, to the allied family of Chehab. Between 1697 and 1770, the reigning members of this Chehab family were at one time Moslem-Sunni, at another time, between 1770 and 1842, Christian-Catholic. The new President-elect of Lebanon, General Fouad Chehab, is a scion of this old princely Lebanese family, and in fact he still keeps the title of "Emir".

16. In 1841, on the eve of the fall of the princely régime, a democratic assembly, called Council to the Emir, was created in which seats were distributed among the six existing communities. After the fall of the Emirate in 1842, unrest overtook the country, resulting in a civil war in 1860. In 1861, Lebanon, reduced in its frontiers to "small Lebanon" received a special charter called "Reglement et Protocole", under which Lebanon was guaranteed by the great Powers of Europe. There was a government with wide powers and an assembly, called the administrative council, where all the communities were represented. In this way, Lebanon, from 1861 to 1914, enjoyed an autonomous government, internationally recognized.

17. On 7 October 1918, Lebanon was occupied by the Allies. By the express will of its people, it was constituted on 1 September 1920 in its present frontiers into "the State of Great Lebanon". It was then placed under French mandate, which was subsequently approved by the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922. After its adoption by the representative assembly, the Constitution which made Lebanon into a republic was promulgated on 23 May 1926. This Constitution, after two amendments in 1927 and 1929, acquired its definitive form which it continued to have until 1943.

18. In 1943, the mandate, which was intended from the very beginning to lead to independence, came to an end as a result of a general popular uprising, and the Government of Lebanon became solely responsible for the fate of the country. Under President Bechara El-Khoury, the first government of independence, headed by Riad Solh, amended the Constitution so as to remove from it every trace that might conflict with our sovereignty. The Ministerial Declaration of Riad Solh was unanimously endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies on 7 October 1943. Lebanon was henceforth launched as a completely independent and sovereign State by the unanimous will of its freely-elected representatives.

19. This freely-arrived-at act of independence was the happy outcome of a free understanding between all the elements of our population. This general national understanding issuing in the act of independence has since been known as the "national covenant". The national covenant flowering in the act of independence was a free agreement among all the elements of the population that they would all, from the point of view of political independence, cease to look outside and, firmly clasping hands together, they would all henceforth trust one another and work harmoniously together as equal citizens whose only political loyalty would be to one independent and sovereign State, called Lebanon, with clearly defined and internationally recognized boundaries. The national covenant is a free act of faith, by all communities, in Lebanon and in another.

20. Our independence, thus constituted and thus consecrated, was quickly recognized by all our sister Arab States. In fact, without their active assistance in the decisive crisis of November 1943, it is doubtful whether our independence would have been consummated and consolidated; and Lebanon will always be grateful to them for the assistance given. Lebanon then, on this point, has nothing but surely to take its modest place in the family of nations. It was soon recognized by a score of nations, great and small, with whom it exchanged diplomatic missions. The diplomatic corps in Beirut today is probably the largest in the Middle East, and certainly one of the largest in the world.

21. In the Alexandria Protocol of 1944 between the Arab States, the fourth decision was a special decision relating to Lebanon in which the Arab States reaffirmed their respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present boundaries, and declared that the Governments of these States had already recognized this independence and sovereignty after Lebanon had adopted a policy of independence set forth by the Government of Lebanon in its Ministerial Declaration of 7 October 1943.

22. Lebanon was a founding member of the League of Arab States in March 1945. The League, as article 1 of its charter states, was composed of independent Arab States; and its aim, according to article 2, was, among other things, to bring about closer relations between the Member States and to co-ordinate their political plans with a view to promoting closer co-operation among them and to ensuring their independence and sovereignty. Lebanon has taken an active part in the deliberations of the League during the last thirteen years, and will continue to do so, and has been faithful to the spirit and letter of its charter.

23. Lebanon was also a founding Member of the United Nations, and its record in this Organization is well known. We took part in the great debates; we co-operated fully with our sister Arab States in all that appertained to Arab and Middle-Eastern problems; we served on the Security Council, on the Economic and Social Council, on the Commission on Human Rights, and on other organs of the United Nations; we spoke, expounded and published a great deal on United Nations, Middle-Eastern and international matters in general. We knew our existential limitations and we never trespassed beyond our modest place; but that place, such as it was, we occupied firmly, confidently and always with good will.

24. We have had an honourable record at the United Nations, in world circles and at the chancellories of the great Powers in the causes. Whatever events in Morocco before the General Assembly—Third Emergency Session—Plenary Meetings
great Powers in the elucidation and defence of all Arab causes. Whatever the issues were—the question of Morocco before the Security Council in 1953 and 1954 or in the General Assembly, prior to Morocco's independence; Algeria, throughout the past decade until the present; Tunisia, until its independence and, lately, during its differences with France; Libya, when its fate was being decided here at the United Nations in 1948, 1949 and 1950; Egypt with all its issues raised in the United Nations since the Conference at San Francisco; Yemen and the problems it faced at the United Nations; Saudi Arabia with its interests in the Gulf of Agaba and elsewhere; the other struggling Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula; that tremendous issue, Palestine, in all the manifold phases of its development here at the United Nations and in world public opinion; Jordan and the complaints it lodged in the Security Council in 1953 and 1954; Syria with its diverse issues before the Security Council and the General Assembly—in all these matters, the record of Lebanon's service to its Arab brethren is there in the annals of the United Nations and elsewhere for the whole world to see and judge. We are proud of this record and we have always been heartened by the genuine appreciation which our Arab brethren have shown towards us on account of it. Whenever opportunity presents itself again, we shall turn whatever talents and means we have to the service of our Arab kinsmen.

25. In our general international relations we adopted a policy of friendship towards all. We had, to be sure, closer relations with some than with others, but this is part of the normal functioning of international existence; for, pray tell me, which nation has equally close relations with all nations? The important thing is that we do not harbour any hostile intentions towards any nation.

26. Concerning our internal development, I will only say that our economy has flourished during the last fifteen years as never before, and we have enjoyed a goodly measure of social and intellectual freedom. Our currency remains one of the strongest in the world, despite the recent disturbances. We are not ashamed of the economic, social and cultural standards of living of our people. Our internal political problems, real as they have been, have not in any way exceeded what was to be normally expected from a young, struggling nation under the enormous pressures and strains of present-day conditions in one of the most sensitive regions of the world. Despite these strains and tribulations, there has developed on the whole among our people, during the last fifteen years, a mounting zest for life and a healthy confidence in ourselves and our future.

27. This is the account I have wanted to give the Assembly of the stewardship of our independence. Others may have done as well, but I doubt whether any have done better. Surely, there is much room for improvement; we know our weakness and we must attend to it.

28. I have thus shown, I believe, that, throughout the chequered history of the Middle East, there has always been a distinct entity organically related to the Lebanon mountains, and this entity, during the last fifteen years, has been internationally known as the Republic of Lebanon; that the ultimate ground which made the establishment of the Republic of Lebanon possible is most certainly the national covenant among our diverse communities; that the record of our independent existence under this covenant proves to any fair judge that we have not abused that great stewardship, and, therefore, that Lebanon fully deserves to remain free, sovereign and independent.

29. The special, delicate, balanced structure of Lebanon, brought about by the combined will of all the various elements of our people under the national covenant, makes it essential and imperative that Lebanese affairs be conducted solely and exclusively by the Lebanese people themselves. Any external interference of any kind, in any form, from any source or any side, is extremely detrimental to this state of affairs and is likely to break up that delicate structure, thus threatening the existence of the State and jeopardizing the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. This has been amply proven by the recent events in Lebanon which have compelled the Government of Lebanon to appeal to the United Nations for help. I do not need to enter into this matter here, as we have sufficiently dwelt on it elsewhere.

30. The underlying and unchanging attitude of the Government of Lebanon is that it is always ready to settle any differences or disputes it may have with its sister Arab State, directly or through the Arab League, and that only if these two recourses fail, will it find itself compelled to turn to other remedies. It is our absolute desire to live in peace and amity, and to co-operate to the full, with all Arab States, and above all with our neighbour, the United Arab Republic.

31. A United Nations observation group was dispatched to Lebanon with the task of ensuring that there is no illegal infiltration of armed personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders. It was only when experience had shown that this task, owing, among other things, to the special conditions prevailing in Lebanon, was not fulfilled, and only when the danger menacing the independence and integrity of Lebanon became imminent, that the Government of Lebanon, which is the only authority responsible for its independence and integrity, invoked Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and, using its inherent right of self-defence, requested the assistance of friendly countries. But, at the same time, we requested additional assistance from the Security Council, and we explained that the military assistance which was given us by the United States Government, was only temporary and would have to be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations gave us adequate assistance for the maintenance of our independence and integrity. Unhappily, the Security Council failed this time to provide us with the additional assistance needed, and the question, together with the whole situation in the Middle East, had to be brought before the General Assembly at its third emergency special session.

32. There are United States troops today on the soil of Lebanon. These troops are there only because the Government of Lebanon asked for them under Article 51 of the Charter, and the Government of the United States responded to that request. We are grateful to the United States Government for this response. The Government of Lebanon asked for this assistance only to help it secure the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon against subversion directed from without. It follows that, when the Government of Lebanon determines that the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon are secured by adequate United Nations action or in any other way, it will forthwith ask for the withdrawal of these troops. The Government of Lebanon is working and will con-
Meetings realized difficult nut to much more than assure to solve to symbiotically the freedom of his own individual conscience. Let, therefore, that what their ask, Lebanon; the permanent international status of own reveals amidst much know that we have no choice but to live exceedingly should a Lebanon; second, this when it happens, then no Lebanese will turn and this that of existence ideologies, among ourselves and between us and others, for an atmosphere, both national and international, in which all of us in the Arab world can work together in peace, for amity without recrimination, for a new relationship among ourselves and between us and others, for the moment when all will be forgiven and forgotten except friendship and communion in peace.

A new and (p. 90) East. Men of good will in hastening that the world to gra­

46. We meet on in the way in which we Near East may have history. Twice in time we have brought the world to war, momentarily, each time, a has been obtained in the troubled state and, remain, where an peace world is no General Assembly is and consider the curre­

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33. Three concepts sum up Lebanon's essence: independence, freedom and the human person. The Lebanese are a fairly independent race. This is expressed both by their firm attachment to their political independence and by the independent lines of action they take in the diverse walks of life. Freedom to us means much more than political freedom, much more than the freedom whereby the people determine their own political destiny. Freedom to us is primarily freedom of thought and conscience; it is, therefore, fundamental existential freedom. The amount and intensity of free discussion, free criticism, free inquiry, free search, free self-determination of individual conscience and thought, is as great proportionately in Lebanon as anywhere else in the world. This atmosphere of freedom, which is quite offensive and even repulsive to the superficial observer, because it appears to him to border on anarchy, is the most striking feature of our life. We prefer freedom, even if it should border on anarchy, to regimentation, even if it should embody the most perfect exhibition of order.

34. If one studies our history, our traditions, our customs, our practices, the political system under which we live, we will find that the inviolability of the individual human person is the first principle of our existence. This principle has made it possible for diverse religious communities to live happily and symbiotically with one another in Lebanon. To us, the human person, the freedom of his own individual conscience and self-determination, come first; everything else, including the State, systems, ideas, philosophies, and ideologies, comes second. These are the three ultimate values which we try to realize in our being amidst much trial and tribulation: independence, freedom, and the sanctity of the human person.

35. There is no incompatibility whatsoever between Arab nationalism, on the one hand, and an independent Lebanon, on the other. It redounds to the glory of Arab nationalism to respect the existence of an independent Lebanon, and Lebanon can best serve the Arab cause on a basis of independence. In fact, Lebanon's intellectual, social, economic, and even political contributions to Arab awakening have so far been second to none. If Lebanon feels secure in its independence, if it can live its life in secure freedom, then, I assure you, there is no end to the good it can do for itself, for the Arab world, and for the world at large.

36. When we are asked: Why should Lebanon cling to its independence? Is there still room today for small States? Would not Lebanon and everybody else be happy if Lebanon just let itself go? What is the justification for the continued existence of a tiny independent Lebanon? When these fair questions are put to us, we answer as follows:

37. An independent Lebanon is necessary, because, first and foremost, the independent and sovereign people of Lebanon want an independent Lebanon; second, there has always been a distinct entity in our mountains and on our shores; third, the ultimate values of independence, freedom, and the sanctity of the human person in which we firmly believe, can, so far as we are concerned, best be realized in an independent Lebanon; fourth, whatever meaning we may have for the Arab world and whatever service we can render it—and we absolutely refuse to be isolated from the Arab world, because we are part of it—can best be achieved in an atmosphere of tranquillity and peace of mind of an independent Lebanon; fifth, peace and stability in the Middle East are the outcome of an exceedingly delicate equilibration of forces, and an independent Lebanon is one of the equilibrating elements; and, sixth, in this age in which the world has miraculously shrunken to a neighbourhood and in which, therefore, problems of coexistence have become most crucial, there is something inherently worth while for the whole world in the continued existence of a small country in the Middle East in which diverse outlooks and traditions can co-exist together in peace in an atmosphere of freedom and of complete mutuality of respect. Lebanon, therefore, reveals itself in the end as a necessity in itself, a necessity for the Arab world, a necessity for the Middle East, and a necessity for the whole world.

38. This is the ground on which we base our appeal to everybody, far and near, to respect our independence, to help us preserve and strengthen it, to assure us the peace of mind under which we can live and create in freedom. This is not too exact an appeal. I am sure, the resources of diplomacy, good will and sheer realism are not unequal to this task.

39. There is a deep-seated fear in Lebanon that what is really at stake is the very existence of an independent, sovereign, and free State. We ask that this fear be allayed. It is no arguing that this fear is unfounded. Founded or unfounded, it is there, and those who hold it are absolutely sure that it is well founded, and they can clearly set forth the grounds on which their fear is based.

40. Is it impossible, I ask, for international wisdom and determination to give us adequate assurance that our independent existence will not be endangered, that we will really be left to solve our own problems in our own way, without any interference from outside, that nobody is going to impose upon us any other course than the one we wish to chart for ourselves? We do not believe so. Let, therefore, this wisdom and determination come forward and properly manifest themselves to the end that there be left no doubt in people's minds and, above all, in the minds of the peoples of Lebanon that Lebanon is safe and secure.

41. Until that happens, there will always be difficulties and complications, because we are a very difficult nut to crack. But when it happens, then no Lebanese will turn either to the right or to the left; then all of us will settle down to constructive and co-operative effort; then, we will all know that we have no choice but to live with one another in amity and concord.

42. We are grateful for the interest evoked in our case throughout the world and for all the real concern shown for us here at the United Nations. In the end, it is our people alone, discussing these matters freely among themselves and allowing their ideas to mature in an atmosphere of national reconciliation, who can really determine the permanent international status of Lebanon. This process of reconciliation takes some time.

43. The people of Lebanon crave for peace and understanding, for the opportunity for positive endeavour, for respectful co-operation with one another and with others, for an atmosphere, both national and international, in which all of us in the Arab world can work together in peace, for amity without recrimination, for a new relationship among ourselves and between us and others, for the moment when all will be forgiven and forgotten.
except friendship and love, for the joy of comradeship and communion in the great constructive tasks ahead.

44. A new and glorious day is dawning in the Near East. Men of good will everywhere are called to help in hastening that day. If the crisis of Lebanon causes the world to grapple with the deeper issues, the ultimate causes, then the anguish our people have gone through will not have been in vain.

45. Prince Aly KHAN (Pakistan): Mr. President, it is indeed a matter of gratification to the Pakistan delegation that this emergency session is being guided by a distinguished a representative as yourself. The admirable manner in which you presided over the deliberations of the General Assembly at its twelfth session makes us confident, that under your able guidance, we shall find satisfactory solutions of the problems which now so urgently confront us.

46. We meet once again in crucial times, and the way in which we deal with the present crisis in the Near East may have profound effects on the course of history. Twice in the last two years, events in that area have brought the world face to face with the threat of modern war, with all its terrifying aspects. Fortunately, each time, good sense has prevailed and a respite has been obtained. But the Near East continues in a troubled state and, as long as sensitive spots like this remain, where an explosion can occur at any time, world peace is not secure. For this reason, the General Assembly is called upon in this special session to consider the current situation in the Near East, to devise solutions which, in the collective wisdom of the nations assembled here, would help bring about peace in the area and assist the Arab peoples to achieve their legitimate aspirations.

47. For the past several days, I have listened carefully to the statements made by various representatives on the current situation in the Near East. As I see it, the main issue is whether, after years of foreign domination, the weaker nations, who have but recently achieved their independence, shall lose it once again to new forms of political colonialism.

48. As a sovereign, independent State, Pakistan has existed for little more than a decade. But the people of Pakistan, like those of many other countries of Asia and Africa, of the Near and Middle East, have existed for centuries. The history of each of these peoples has been a long struggle towards a national identity, towards an independent political existence, towards a sovereign territorial integrity and towards economic and social security. Out of the struggle against oppression, against the evil forces of hunger and famine, of disease and ignorance, a considerable number of new nations, like Pakistan, have been born. It is tragic, but true, that the cataclysmic terrors of the last World War had to precede, and in many different ways were responsible for, the birth of these countries.

49. The struggles of the new nations may be compared with the struggles of their young people. This youth, born during the war, with but a bleak future before them, exemplifies the aspirations, the hopes and fears of the nations themselves. To the youth of these countries, of all countries indeed, we must pay tribute; to them we must be true in the tasks before us.

50. Some of the new nations are small; all of them, in relation to the great Powers, are weak. They are weak in many different ways—geographically, politically and economically. But there is one way in which they are not weak. They are not weak spiritually. They possess the God-given, inexhaustible spiritual resources of the human soul. With these resources, they are strong in their determination to overcome all obstacles, to survive, and to succeed in the development of their free and independent political, economic and social institutions.

51. The objective of each of these new nations, indeed of every nation, must be to preserve and protect its political independence and territorial integrity in order to safeguard two things: first, the orderly, non-violent evolution of its democratic political system—the ever-increasing fulfilment of the individual’s right to participate in, and control, the processes of his government; second, the progressive development of its economic and social system in order to provide for the increasing welfare of all its citizens.

52. These are the objectives which the Government of Pakistan cherishes for its own people. Consistent with those objectives and with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter, Pakistan’s earnest desire is to live, and let live, in peace and friendship with all its neighbours, both in the immediate geographic area, the Near and Middle East, and throughout the world.

53. The most solemn obligation of any sovereign government is to preserve and protect the independence and integrity of the State. It is also a right that cannot be disputed or denied, except by sophistry of the most misleading kind. The right of a sovereign government to protect the State from aggression, direct or indirect, may be exercised in different ways. A sovereign government may rely altogether on its own resources, if it considers them adequate, to cope with any threat to its territorial integrity or political independence. If, however, a sovereign government considers that its own resources are not adequate, it may choose to have recourse to outside assistance. It may, for example, appeal to the United Nations Security Council or to the General Assembly. If it considers, however, that the situation confronting it is so grave and so urgent that the United Nations would be unable to deal with it rapidly enough, then a sovereign government may turn to other friendly governments for assistance.

54. The right of a sovereign government to request assistance from another government cannot be denied or alienated. The whole concept of sovereignty would be virtually meaningless if a government were not free to decide, first, when and by whom it felt its life threatened and in what way, and, second, to request assistance from whatever sources or combination of sources it might choose. The government to which any such request is made is free to respond to the request or to refuse to do so. It must determine for itself whether it considers the request to be meritorious and whether, and in what way, it will respond. The government of any country may also choose to join collective security organizations, such as the Baghdad Pact, which, contrary to assertions made during the present debate, is a purely defensive arrangement designed to safeguard the peace and stability of the region and to promote its economic prosperity. The Baghdad Pact is fully in accord with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles adopted unanimously in 1955 by the Asian-African Conference at Bandung.

55. All of this might have seemed self-evident, had not efforts been made—and I am certain they will turn out to have been abortive ones—to deny these principles.
The application of these principles to the issues of peace and political stability in the Near East is the first aspect of the problem before us.

56. Although Pakistan is not a part of the Near East, both the Near East and Pakistan are parts of the larger area of the Middle East. For this reason, any development that affects the political stability or the peace and security of the Near East is a matter of vital concern to Pakistan. This is true in another sense. Pakistan is not an Arab State, but it is, like the Arab countries, a Moslem State. As such, the people and the Government of Pakistan have the warmest and most affectionate feelings of brotherhood for the Arabs, as well as for all other Moslem peoples. These sentiments arise from centuries of common religion, culture and tradition. We are particularly proud of our close relations with the great peoples of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.

57. Incidentally, during the course of this debate, we have listened with amazement and profound regret to charges and threats made by certain representatives against Turkey. Courageous and determined in the defense of their homeland, yet faithful in their devotion to peace, the great Turkish nation and its Government are the last to be intimidated by any such threats. May I take this opportunity of paying tribute to the people and the Government of Turkey, with whom we are united by the warmest and very closest of ties.

58. We have been greatly concerned and deeply saddened by recent developments in Lebanon and Jordan and by the disension among the Arab States. It is not my present purpose to pass judgement upon current charges and denials of indirect aggression in the Arab world. However, in the light of the debates and statements in the Security Council, and, thus far, in this Assembly, I believe that the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan acted fully within their rights, and in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, in requesting assistance from the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.

59. I also believe that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom acted fully within their rights, and in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Charter, in responding promptly to the requests by the United Nations for the assistance of these small countries at the urgent request of their lawfully constituted Governments. Their action has already provided valuable time for responsible thought and the orderly disposal of the problems that confront us. It is absurd to suggest that this assistance, rendered to countries who considered their very existence at stake, constitutes an aggression or a violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

60. The armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom should and must be withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan as soon as practicable, and it is clear to me that no Government represented in the Assembly would agree more readily with this than the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. If any further evidence of the good faith of those two Governments were needed, it has been amply provided by the letters circulated to the Assembly yesterday by their respective Secretaries of State [A/3876 and A/3877]. It would be unwise for us, however, to follow a course which might lead to an even more dangerous situation than that which recently prevailed. This risk, the Assembly should sec: to prevent.

61. I should like to pay warm tribute to the great skill and devotion of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General, in organizing the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. His experience offers the best chance we have of relating the course the way for the earliest possible withdrawal of the United States and United Kingdom forces from Lebanon and Jordan and for restoring stability in the area. Therefore, I believe that we should ask the Secretary-General to develop such measures as might best assist Lebanon and Jordan in the present situation. I think we should also ask the Secretary-General to study the general problem of indirect aggression and to make at least a preliminary report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirteenth session.

62. Perhaps one of the most dangerous of the weapons employed by some countries in their campaigns of indirect aggression is the use of broadcasting and other publicity media. For a number of years, the peoples of the United Arab Republic and their Members have been subjected to a barrage of propaganda over the air and through the written word, stimulating hatred against lawful Governments and openly inciting the violent overthrow of their authority. This hate propaganda must stop. Good-neighbourly relations are impossible as long as it continues. This problem is not at all unique in the Near East. It exists in virulent form in other areas, and methods of control in the Near East should also be applicable elsewhere. While considering the control of subversive radio broadcasts beamed across national frontiers and inciting to violence and crimes against the State, it is essential to take into account, not only the large, official stations, but also the small, clandestine ones which are allowed to flourish with the tacit approval of governments.

63. In the evolution of the Near East, Arab nationalism has been a most potent force and, as in the case of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, it may be an enormous force for peace and human welfare. The Arab people have, in the course of their history, made magnificent and lasting contributions to human civilization. Their empire once stretched over three continents. They were mediaeval and renaissance scholars invaluable commentators on the works of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers.

64. Today, the Arab world is again on the march. Arab nationalism represents the drive of the Arab people to revoltize their society and to assume a position of honour and strength in the modern world. The Renaissance of Arab culture and the economic, social and political modernization of the resurgent Arab world provide a basis for the development of whatever forms of unity they themselves consider best suited to their needs and aspirations.

65. Pakistan, as an Islamic country and having itself emerged in recent times from colonial status and foreign rule, fully empathizes with Arab aspirations and will support them to the fullest extent of its power. The record in the United Nations bears witness that Pakistan has always stood for the legitimate rights of peoples, for their liberty and freedom, and for the exercise of their birthright of self-determination. Our attitude con-
66. If the Arab countries need help in their development, everything possible should be done to help them. The question arises, from what sources and by what means can help best be provided in accordance with their own wishes and their own needs. To my mind, the best source of help is the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In largely supplanting the foreign Powers, which formerly dominated the area and may or may not have been guided by self-interest, the United Nations has a unique opportunity to prove its capability, its power and its greatness.

67. If necessary, we should use the means already at our disposal or fashion new ones, whereby the United Nations may most effectively support the efforts of the States of the Near East to improve their political stability and economic condition. The United Nations will become no more than a philosophical abstraction, unless its Members, not merely by their votes on resolutions, but by their actions in compliance with United Nations decisions, provide the Organization with the tangible and physical means necessary to fulfill these objectives.

There are two specific items in regard to which I believe the General Assembly, at this emergency session, should take affirmative decisions.

69. First, it should decide in principle that a stand-by United Nations force should be established which could be sent to any country, anywhere in the world, at the request of the Government of that country, whenever it considered itself threatened by outside forces. For many years, my Government has been convinced that it is essential for the United Nations to have such an organization at its disposal. To be effective, a United Nations force must be speedily available. It is obviously better to have such a force in readiness than to try to create it after an act of aggression.

70. In order to be able to reach a position where the decisions of the United Nations will be respected and carried out by all concerned, it seems necessary—and here I repeat what the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country said in the General Assembly, at the eleventh session [601st meeting]—that there should be constituted a permanent United Nations force which should act as a preventive police force. Unless this is done, the United Nations will remain unequal to the tasks for which, by the common consent of the participating countries, it was designed.

71. Had a United Nations stand-by force existed, the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan would certainly have called upon it for assistance, rather than upon the United States and the United Kingdom, and the present crisis might not have arisen. I do not wish to discuss at the moment the details of the organization and use of a stand-by force. However, I would suggest that in order to make it speedily available, which is essential, the Secretary-General should have the authority in an emergency, possibly subject to later review by the Security Council or the General Assembly, to send such a force to any country that requests it. It is my hope that the Secretary-General, in connexion with the report which I understand he is making to the General Assembly, at its thirteenth session, will make recommendations concerning the establishment of a stand-by police force.

72. The second affirmative decision which the Pakistan delegation believes might well be taken in principle, at this session, concerns the establishment of a regional Arab development organization, provided it is acceptable to the Governments concerned. If the Arab States consider that such an organization would be helpful in the development of their countries' resources and would help raise the standard of living of their peoples, Pakistan would be glad to give its fullest possible support.

73. In connexion with the possible establishment of a regional Arab development organization, I should like to make an urgent plea for thorough reconsideration of the tragic plight of the Arab refugees, which was referred to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland in his very able address on 14 August 1958 [735th meeting]. This most serious problem has grown, and not diminished, with time. The United Nations has made a worthy effort to alleviate the condition of these unfortunate people and, through the United Nations, substantial sums of money have been spent to this end. But what has been done thus far is not nearly enough.

74. In addition to deciding in principle to support, in accordance with the needs and wishes of the Arab States, the establishment of a regional Arab development organization, I believe that we should request the Secretary-General to consult the Governments concerned, and make recommendations to the General Assembly, at its thirteenth session, concerning the establishment of such an organization, and the means of dealing with the refugee problem.

75. Before summarizing the views of the Pakistan delegation on the item before us, I consider it necessary to refer to a very fundamental aspect of the whole problem in the Near East, which underlies the instability of the area. The representatives of Pakistan were among the first to warn the General Assembly, at the time of the partition of Palestine, of the tragic consequences that would follow that decision. Today, more than ten years later, ferment continues between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The uneasy truce, based on the general armistice agreements, which was violated two years ago, may be violated again. While this uneasy situation continues, there can be no hope of peace in the Near East. Neither the great Powers nor the United Nations as a whole can escape responsibility for this continued threat to the peace in the area. They cannot avoid responsibility by ignoring the problem, by professing that it no longer exists, or by locking it up in the cupboard.

76. What we are witnessing in the Middle East today flows directly from this situation. We regret to say that the Members of the United Nations and, in particular, the permanent members of the Security Council, whose authority and influence alone brought about the partition of Palestine, have not thrown the full weight of their power behind the efforts to secure compliance with the resolutions of the General Assembly, and to restore the fundamental human rights of the Arab refugees.

77. We do not in any manner share the views of those so-called friends of the Arab world, who have recently voiced their opinion by saying that the Arabs must acquiesce in the present situation in Palestine. Those who make such statements are no friends of the Middle East. We believe that, in order to achieve peace and tranquillity in the Near East, we must proceed forward from the original General Assembly resolution [reso-
There is also public opinion, the significance of which must be taken into consideration. Since, however, in advancing the argument of so-called indirect aggression, the word "aggression" is so often used as a synonym for intervention, this contention has just been disproved once again by the third consecutive report of the United Nations Observation Group [5/4085]. Nor have we heard, in this Assembly, the least scrap of convincing evidence in support of this argument. Most important of all, however, it is clear from Article 51 and from the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter that nothing, apart from armed attacks against a Member of the United Nations, can justify the use of armed force in the territory of another country. As we well know, no one has attacked or had any intention of attacking Lebanon or Jordan.

The third fact is that the armed intervention of United States and United Kingdom troops in the affairs of Lebanon and Jordan is a result of the alleged indirect aggression on the part of the United Arab Republic, continues to recur in these debates. Yet, this contention has just been disproved once again by the third consecutive report of the United Nations Observation Group [5/4085]. Nor have we heard, in this Assembly, the least scrap of convincing evidence in support of this argument. Most important of all, however, it is clear from Article 51 and from the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter that nothing, apart from armed attacks against a Member of the United Nations, can justify the use of armed force in the territory of another country. As we well know, no one has attacked or had any intention of attacking Lebanon or Jordan.

86. A fourth fact, then, is that the armed intervention of United States and United Kingdom troops in the affairs of these countries took place without the approval of the United Nations, was contrary to the Charter, and has dealt a blow to the authority of the United Nations. This is all the more true, since the action took place after decisions had been taken by United Nations bodies concerning Lebanon and under the very eyes of the United Nations observers.

87. As the facts speak for themselves, there is little for us to say. Since, however, in advancing the argument of so-called indirect aggression, the word "aggression" is so often used as a synonym for intervention, this contention has just been disproved once again by the third consecutive report of the United Nations Observation Group [5/4085]. Nor have we heard, in this Assembly, the least scrap of convincing evidence in support of this argument. Most important of all, however, it is clear from Article 51 and from the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter that nothing, apart from armed attacks against a Member of the United Nations, can justify the use of armed force in the territory of another country. As we well know, no one has attacked or had any intention of attacking Lebanon or Jordan.

88. To that end, it is clearly desirable that any decision taken at this session be the outcome of general agreement. Nevertheless, in our anxiety to reach such agreement, we should on no account do anything that might be construed as a justification, albeit indirect, by the General Assembly of armed intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. A decision with such implications would deal a fresh blow, and one that would be hard to remedy, to the prestige of the United Nations and would ill serve the interests of peace.

89. In this connexion, we should recall that this is the second time in less than two years that an emergency special session of the General Assembly has been summoned to consider a serious act of armed territorial aggression against Arab countries. Even our present debates are not of a kind calculated to allay our fears for the future. Speakers on this rostrum have not been content merely to try to justify past events. There is also reason to suppose that in influential circles in the
United States there is a tendency to consider the action in Lebanon as a precedent for the future, a tendency to treat armed intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, provided it is at the request of the Governments concerned, as a principle of international relations. We consider that the General Assembly has a special duty to do all it can to ensure that this intervention is the last act of its kind and not a forerunner of further actions which could only bring disaster upon mankind.

90. The main object of the General Assembly at this session is to eliminate the threat to the peace and independence of the peoples of the Middle East. The Polish delegation is convinced that the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan is essential for this. We recall recent facts and statements proving that the original destination of these troops was Iraq. We also know that this plan could not be carried out on account of the exceptionally unanimous attitude of the people and the rapid success of the revolutionary Government in Iraq, and also because the international situation took a turn that was unpropitious to such action. Apart, however, from the question of Iraq, what the operation embarked on after the collapse of the Baghdad Pact really amounts to is a fresh attempt at widening the breach between the Arab countries and, eventually, bringing them back under subjection. That is why we share the opinion of the representatives of the Arab countries that are neighbours of Lebanon and Jordan, as well as of the representatives of other countries whose peoples have experienced the colonialist yoke, namely, that the presence of interventionist forces in the Middle East is a direct threat both to their own nationals and to the entire Arab world, and a serious danger to peace.

91. Certain proposals concerning the economic development of the Middle East and the future of the area in general have been submitted to this Assembly. The Polish delegation is in favour of examining these proposals at the proper time, in a suitable atmosphere, and after more detailed preparation, but the success of any long-term endeavour in the Middle East must inevitably depend on restoring peace and respect for the rights and independence of the peoples of that area. This is what we consider the main purpose of the General Assembly at this emergency special session.

92. We categorically state that we are in favour of the prompt withdrawal of the interventionist troops from Lebanon and Jordan, but we do not consider that this withdrawal should exonerate the countries of that area, or the United Nations, from the obligation to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. We therefore believe that the activity of the United Nations Observation Group might be prolonged for a further period. These same ideas are expressed in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [A/3870 and Corr.1]. I agree with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic in his description of this draft as clear and extremely moderate. The Polish delegation fully supports this draft resolution.

93. We cannot, however, lend our support to the draft resolution submitted by the Norwegian delegation and certain other delegations [A/3873]. As it stands, this draft could be interpreted as sanctioning the armed intervention in the Middle East. It does not guarantee the necessary prerequisite for the easing of tension in the Middle East, namely, the rapid withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and Jordan. The submission of such a draft resolution can only make it harder for the General Assembly to arrive at some kind of general agreement.

94. I should like to make some further remarks of a more general nature concerning the background to the events in the Middle East. It is difficult not to see a connexion between the steady deterioration of the situation, the intermittent crises in the area and a particular line of thinking which still continues to dominate the foreign policy of such countries as the United States and the United Kingdom. A refusal to recognize historical laws and a tendency to use force to obstruct the inevitable course of history are characteristics of this way of thinking. That is the mainspring of the policy of force against the socialist countries and against the countries which have been liberated or are in the process of being liberated from colonial dependence. It is typical of that way of thinking and of seeing forever sinister forces at work, where, quite obviously, there is only the very understandable aspiration of a country to achieve national independence and economic sufficiency—an aspiration which is an integral part of the great movement towards national emancipation that is sweeping entire continents. This movement is one of the fundamental processes of our era, and it is an inevitable process.

95. The Polish people, who, for a century and a half, have fought an extremely arduous battle for their independence, are following this movement with the keenest sympathy and support the legitimate aspirations of the Arab community to complete independence and the right to decide for themselves the question of their unity and domestic affairs. This is a question of principles—the same principles which constitute the basis of Poland's sovereign existence.

96. At the same time, however, it is one of the most vital questions affecting peace. The events of the past month are a striking example of this truth. The attempt to pit armed force against Arab national aspirations has turned the internal disputes of two Arab countries into an international conflict. In the course of a few days, countries of three different continents, the Federal Republic of Germany and Libya, Cyprus and Israel, have become involved in the conflict as a result of foreign troop movements within their territories.

97. In an atmosphere thick with radioactive fall-out, imperialists and colonialists have set in motion a mechanism inspired by a doctrine of military bases and pacts. We have seen where this is leading mankind.

98. The events of the past month serve as a fresh warning. We cannot continue in this manner. This is, fortunately, becoming more and more obvious. A policy of coexistence instead of a policy of force is the only solution. A system of political thinking based on this principle is gaining more and more ground in the most disparate and ever-growing circles of society as well as among the intellectuals and statesmen of the West. This can most certainly facilitate constructive discussion at the international level.

99. Each manifestation of the policy of force, as we can see now in the situation in the Middle East, meets with increasingly stubborn popular opposition. Each peaceful and constructive proposal, whatever its origin, is receiving steadily greater support. This is the reason for the strong international movement for the cessation of nuclear tests.

100. We are also gratified by the serious interest and encouraging support—particularly in Europe—which
has been received by the Polish Government’s proposal for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that demands for summit negotiations are becoming more and more numerous and insistent. Such negotiations would enable joint efforts to be made towards the progressive elimination of sources of danger. They would also make it possible to solve the difficult international problems which are such a heavy burden for the peoples of the world.

101. It is true that all these positive measures are meeting with great obstacles. It is true that the dangers threatening the world are far from being removed. But, in spite of the fact that we are gathered together here by reason of such a serious conflict and at a time of heightened tension—or, rather, on account of this very tension—the General Assembly, at its present session, could and should constitute an important step towards the easing of tensions, towards a better mutual understanding and towards the fostering of peaceful coexistence among nations.

102. U Thant (Burma): I take the floor with a good deal of trepidation, since any expression of opinion, however sincere, on the present crisis in the Middle East is bound to be interpreted as taking sides one way or the other. Perhaps a passage here or a paragraph there may be torn out of context and presented as reinforcing any such interpretation. However, as the record of our delegation’s activities in this world Organization in the last ten years will show, our approach to problems is solely governed by considerations of what seems to us to be right or wrong. There is, unfortunately, a very pronounced school of thought that still believes that a nation which does not choose sides and加入 one or the other camp in the heavily armed uneasy truce that exists in the world today, lacks courage and conviction. And very often the inference which seems to be drawn is, “If you are not with us, then you are against us”. Let me take this opportunity of reiterating once again that Burma, while not irrevocably attached to any armed camp, is not against any. This somewhat detached position enables us, I believe, to view the problems around us with a considerable measure of objectivity.

103. It is the view of my delegation that the immediate problem of the Middle East is more political than economic in nature, and, therefore, any attempt to solve it speedily must necessarily be focused on the political character of the crisis. Fortunately, the general debate in this world Organization in the last few days has cleared the foul air of recriminations and accusations, and the positions of the two contending blocs are within negotiating distance of really effective and imaginative proposals. There is, no doubt, a consensus of opinion that, given the background of the present situation in the Middle East and, particularly, the complex forces at play in that area, the entry of foreign troops could only create more problems than it could solve. There also seems to be a general agreement among the nations that these problems will become more complex and difficult as the stay of the foreign troops in the area is prolonged. Therefore, the only logical step for the United Nations is to find some suitable ways and means whereby the foreign troops may be speedily withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan and stability restored to the area.

104. There also appears to be a general agreement that some kind of United Nations presence in these two countries is necessary to ensure the speedy withdrawal of foreign troops. Only some Member States favour the strengthening of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in accordance with the plan presented by the Observation Group in its second report [S/4069], and to send a fresh United Nations observation group to Jordan to perform similar functions. The advocates of this action insist that the enlargement of the functions of the Observation Group is not warranted by the prevailing circumstances. Some other countries, however, prefers to enlarge the functions of the United Nations force. It advocates some kind of international constabulary with police, if not strictly military, functions. The functions of this constabulary, recruited from among the small nations, if my interpretation is corrected, would fall short of the normal functions of a fighting force. It would be authorized to shoot, but would carry only small arms.

105. On the basis of all available information in the Middle East, my delegation cannot agree to the substitution of the Observation Group by an international police force that would be expected to enforce its authority by force of arms. In the uneasy political climate prevailing in the Middle East, the presence of such a force will certainly pose additional problems. Apart from the increased financial obligations to be imposed on all Member States, various intricate issues will emerge. What will be the criteria in selecting the countries from which the projected constabulary is to be drawn? By what authority would the force act? What would be its code of conduct? What steps need to be taken to ensure that it would not be dragged into local conflicts and civil wars? Would the supply of such an international force be able to cope with the demands which are likely to increase if a precedent is once set?

106. I do not want to be misunderstood. Perhaps it is worth while exploring the possibilities of building up a stand-by United Nations constabulary, defining its specific functions, with a view to its utilization in future contingencies, when the cold war atmosphere no longer exists. But in the existing circumstances, when fear and suspicion still dominate the political scene, the formation of an international semi-military force is bound to aggravate the situation rather than to ease it. And there is, in the added danger of this world Organization inadverstly assuming the rising tide of national and progressive forces rampant everywhere against the forces of outmoded and obsolete legacies of the past.

107. As an Asian, let me confess that a major weakness of Asia is religion employed as a weapon for political ends, as well as the existence of politics based on community or language, or a combination of all. These undesirable forces corrode within and foul the relations existing between nations. Asia has to overcome these forces in order that the potential strength of the masses for a more peaceful and good-neighbourly feeling may be fully developed. The most effective way to fight this malady is to develop and encourage democratic institutions and legitimate national aspirations and to combat prejudice and ignorance. The United Nations, in the view of my delegation, has a significant role to play in this fight.

108. Coming to the economic aspect of the Middle East crisis, one feature emerges clearly: Middle Eastern dependence upon revenues from oil and Western dependence upon this oil. The simple recognition of this fact can lead to the right solution. The first
task of statesmanship in the immediate future is the substitution of a purely commercial relationship between the West and the Middle East for an imperial or military relationship which has proved to be not only outdated but dangerously dangerous. The continued presence of foreign troops in the area will not facilitate the "solution" of this task. On the contrary, it will make it much harder. The sooner the troops leave, the sooner a more favourable climate of opinion will be created among the Arab States. The problem is how to do it without too much heaping of blame on past actions and without leaving chaos and anarchy behind. From all accounts, it will be comparatively easy in Lebanon, but immensely difficult in the case of Jordan whose people have been made to believe that their wish will be respected in the event of his departure. Perhaps the Secretary-General, whose sincerity and ability no one doubts, will be in the best position to bring about a reversal of that attitude. His Majesty King Hussein has given every evidence of personal courage, and, in the view of my delegation, he would also not be found wanting in giving evidence of nobility, if the right approach were made, by showing his personal interest in the welfare of his people by responding to their legitimate needs and aspirations.

109. What the Middle East requires is to be left alone, converted neither into a battleground nor a recruiting field for the contending Great Powers. Any programme or plan designed for this area will not work, if it is not acceptable to the countries concerned. Similarly, any attempt by any of the Middle East countries to alter their frontiers by armed force will be catastrophic. Once stability is restored in the area, peaceful progress should be the sole concern of all the peoples of the area.

110. In this second half of the twentieth century, man must learn to live with himself. Regardless of his beliefs, traditions, ideologies, and the economic, social and political systems to which he subscribes, he must learn to live with his neighbours. This calls for a new outlook, a new approach, even for a new philosophy. Past history, dealing with a completely different kind of era and circumstances, will no longer stand him in good stead. He must rise to the challenge of the thermonuclear age. More than ever, he needs to exercise courage, patience, tolerance and imagination. Fear and suspicion which, for so long, have characterized international relations, must no longer feature in this hydrogen age. In this new situation, how are the nations of the world to be guided in their relations with one another? I believe the answer is to be found in the most sensible art of living together in peace.

111. Let me express the hope of my delegation that the deliberations in this Assembly will not only lead to the formulation of a sound, sensible and just solution to the immediate problems of the Middle East, but also lay firm foundations for an enduring peace in the area.

112. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): The events which led to the convening of the present emergency special session of the General Assembly are known to all. I am equally certain that we are all fully aware of the gravity of the situation with which we are confronted both in the Middle East and in this Assembly. We must find a satisfactory solution of this problem which will allow us gradually to eliminate the deeper causes of the present crisis and thus prevent any recurrence in the future.

113. We all know what the facts are, but that is almost all. In an attempt to explain the significance and origin of these facts, various interpretations have been put forward. The character of these interpretations depends largely in large measure on the degree of impartiality of which their authors are capable, having regard to the interests that guide them and the views they profess. That is why the real reasons for the policies followed do not necessarily coincide with the explanations offered after the event. Here, for example, representatives frequently refer to general or generally recognized principles and to the fact that certain acts are or are not, it is said, in accordance with those principles. Elsewhere, the problem is discussed in different views and on a more down-to-earth basis. Thus, in the Press the talk is mainly of vital interests, positions maintained or lost, the need to gain time, etc.

114. I would not, of course, go so far as to say that no principles are at stake; they are, and they are extremely important. My point is that, if we are to solve the problem, we must take into account every aspect of the situation including negative aspects and facts, which are bound to disappear with time and which should be removed by a common effort, but which continue to operate for the time being.

115. I do not mean that there is no need to speak of guilt or responsibility where they exist; to pass them over in silence in such a case would be tantamount to condoning them. I merely wish to say that, in view of the situation facing us, we must spare no effort to surmount the current crisis in the form in which it presents itself. To do so is obviously in the general interest; if we succeed, we shall have ensured that reason and peace prevail and that our action have powerfully reaffirmed the principles of the Charter, which we are all pledged to follow and to serve.

116. My delegation, for its part, has made every effort to this end and will continue to do so. As I have already indicated, a constructive approach to the problem cannot and must not imply that one should conceal the truth. I feel, therefore, that it is my duty clearly to reaffirm the view which my Government has held since the beginning of the present crisis and which is in complete accord with the fundamental principles of my country’s foreign policy. We consider the landing of United States armed forces in Lebanon and of United Kingdom armed forces in Jordan an inadmissible act of armed intervention in the domestic affairs of those two countries.

117. What is the issue before us? We are witnessing the emergence of a powerful force: Arab nationalism. It is a movement of vast scope, historically inevitable and hence legitimate, which nothing can stop. This movement is developing in new circumstances, but in a general direction analogous to that followed in the past by the social and political development of many other nations. It is manifestly progressive, from the point of view of both the domestic development of the countries concerned and their international relations, because it seeks to secure and strengthen the independence and equality of rights of the countries involved.

118. The international crisis arising out of events in the Middle East does not merely reflect the natural aspirations of the Arab people to emancipation, aspirations which are finding expression in a profoundly democratic movement. The origin of the crisis must, on the contrary, be sought in the lack of understanding of this process and resistance to it, primarily in
other countries, based on attitudes that have been utterly condemned by history.

119. Because of the very scale of this social and political development, more or less dramatic upheavals are inevitable. It is important that these upheavals should not be made more difficult and more dangerous by outside interference of the kind which has only too often been stubbornly attempted. It seems to us that armed foreign intervention has, in this case again, been primarily the regrettable consequence of the policy previously followed by the intervening Powers themselves. Military intervention became "inevitable" because that policy was mistaken, and therefore, doomed to failure. Armed intervention is therefore, we believe, the most telling criticism and condemnation of that policy.

120. There have been frequent references to the need for stabilization in the Middle East. But what does that term mean? If it means the maintenance of the previous state of affairs, based on inequality and exploitation, stabilization is neither possible nor desirable. It would inevitably aggravate the crisis.

121. It must, on the contrary, be recognized that stabilization is possible only if policies are adjusted to take new developments into account. We, for our part, are convinced that that is also the best means of safeguarding the material interests of the West itself. In future, it will only be possible to satisfy those interests on a basis of equality. So far, Western policies have generally followed an opposite course with the tragic results we now see.

122. Reference has also been made to the area's strategic importance. It is true that, in a world divided into blocks of opposing Powers, considerations and actions of a strategic nature have a considerable bearing on the destinies of this area. However, the peoples of the Middle East and their right to peace, freedom and progress must come first. The crises in the Middle East, which have repeatedly endangered world peace, have resulted primarily from the fact that respect has not been shown for the desire of the people concerned to follow their own path in international relations and to avoid being dragged into a struggle in which they have nothing to gain and everything to lose. This "positive neutralism", as it is generally called in the Middle East, is a natural aspect of the liberation movement which seeks independence and the elimination of the vestiges of colonialism. It is a powerful force for peace and should be treated as such. Thus, it is obvious that equality and non-interference are essential to the normal and peaceful development of the entire region.

123. Much stress has been laid on the right of a government to lend military assistance to another government, if the latter so requests. Recognition of this principle would create a dangerous precedent in more than one respect. It would mean—as other speakers have said! before me—sanctioning foreign intervention in a country's internal affairs at the request of a government which does not enjoy the support of its people and which cites an alleged threat to the independence of its country. That, it seems to us, is what has happened in the case which we are considering. As regards Lebanon, this is clear from the third report of the United Nations Observation Group dated 14 August 1958 [S/4083], and from its earlier reports [S/4040 and Corr.1 and Add.1, S/4069]. As regards Jordan, no request was even made for the dispatch of United Nations observers. May I remind representatives that the principal reason originally advanced to justify the intervention, i.e., the events in Iraq, has since completely vanished. No one, or virtually no one, any longer maintains that those events were the result of indirect aggression. I wish to say at this point that I am happy to be able to express, on behalf of my Government and my delegation, our pleasure at the presence among us of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the delegation of the Republic of Iraq.

124. We are strongly convinced that the question of "indirect aggression", in the form in which it was presented, was consistent neither with the Charter nor with the demands of collective security. It is obvious that such vast popular movements can be neither brought into being nor suppressed in any lasting manner from outside. It should also be borne in mind that the presence of foreign armed forces can only make the solution of internal problems more difficult and—what is even more dangerous—that it involves the risk of extremely grave international repercussions. That is in fact what has just happened. The country which I represent has been the victim of aggression and other forms of pressure sufficiently often not only to appreciate the value of collective security—a fact which I trust everyone will recognize—but also to distinguish between collective security and something which is fundamentally different.

125. There has also been much talk in certain quarters of the possibility of military action by Israel in the event of a change of régime in Jordan. Those who talk in this fashion are, in our opinion, doing a disservice both to peace and to Israel-Arab relations. No one has the right to envisage such a possibility as likely and thus to sanction it in advance. On the contrary, it should be ruled out in advance and prevented from occurring, in the same way as any other act of aggression. The United Nations is surely capable of accomplishing this.

126. How does the situation in the General Assembly appear to us, and what should be done? It is to be assumed that there is a general desire to reach a solution; even the Powers which sent troops to the Middle East have stated on several occasions that they wish to withdraw them as soon as possible. We cannot but want to help them take the next and essential step. In view of this fact, and of all that has been said in the Assembly, a basis for agreement must surely exist; and, if agreement exists, it should be possible to find the necessary formula. Unfortunately, the converse is also true. If we do not succeed in working out a suitable formula, even though it is possible to do so, if we do not arrive at an agreement, that can only mean that some people do not wish such an agreement, do not wish a solution in the United Nations, and they would bear a heavy responsibility. If this happens, no subtlety of phraseology, no procedural "victory", will be able to conceal our common failure. Now, as we seek a practical solution that is acceptable to all, it is not a question of insisting on either condemnation or approval of the action taken by the United States and the United Kingdom, but of eliminating the dangerous situation which has been created.

127. Judging by all that has been said in this Assembly, there are no longer any profound differences of opinion concerning the necessity for some form of United Nations presence and responsibility in the Middle East, including an important role for our Secretary General. Nevertheless, I should like to point out that a United Nations body cannot, in the Middle East or elsewhere, exercise powers or functions other than those.
which are essential to the purposes of the United Nations Charter and to those purposes alone. Under no pretext should the United Nations be led to interfere directly or indirectly in a country’s internal affairs. Its function is to maintain peace and ensure general conditions for the peaceful development of international relations.

128. My delegation will, in due course, state its views on the draft resolutions which have been or may be submitted.

129. In our opinion, an agreement on the basis of the following main points is both desirable and possible: withdrawal with the least possible delay of the foreign troops which are now in Lebanon and Jordan, and if a time limit can be set for their evacuation now, so much the better; the presence of the United Nations in an appropriate form in order to prevent all foreign interference; broad international guarantees, if that is deemed necessary, against any possibility of aggression in that part of the world.

130. We do not expect this session to do more than is feasible in the present circumstances. However, we feel we are entitled to hope that the Assembly will take decisions which will permit the free and unhampered development of the peoples of the area, which will put an end to the abnormal situation that now exists in the Middle East, and which will ultimately result in a relaxation of tension and in that improvement of the international climate which the world so badly needs.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.