



Monday, 18 August 1958,
at 10.30 a.m.

THIRD EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

New York

CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 5:	
Questions considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958 (<i>continued</i>).....	59

President: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEM 5

Questions considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958 (*continued*)

1. The PRESIDENT: I apologize to the Members of the General Assembly for the delay in opening the meeting, but it is due to the fact, as no doubt you all know, that certain conversations are taking place. In the circumstances, I thought this delay was in the best interests of the General Assembly.
2. There is now being reproduced a draft resolution¹ which I hope will be in the hands of the Members of the Assembly very shortly, certainly before noon. Furthermore, I have received two letters: one from the Secretary of State of the United States,² and the other from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.³ Those letters are being reproduced, and I hope that they will also be distributed to the Members of the Assembly by midday.
3. I think I can appropriately suggest to the Assembly that the list of speakers should be closed by 6 p.m. today, and, in the absence of any objection, I will consider that it has been so decided.
4. The representative of Jordan has requested permission to make a brief statement by way of explanation and, with the assent of the General Assembly, I now call on him.
5. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan): Thank you for allowing me to make this statement. The views of my Government regarding the presence of British troops in Jordan seem to have been inaccurately interpreted by some. My delegation would therefore like to clarify this point.
6. In the statement of my delegation on 14 August last [735th meeting], I said in very clear and emphatic language that the presence of British troops in Jordan is a temporary measure necessitated by the existing difficult circumstances.
7. My delegation wishes to restate today that King Hussein and the Jordan Government have declared officially, and on more than one occasion, that the presence of British forces in Jordan is only a temporary measure.

¹ Subsequently circulated as document A/3878.

² *Idem.*, A/3876.

³ *Idem.*, A/3877.

As soon as the General Assembly takes real action and makes adequate arrangements to deal with the present difficult situation involving Jordan, the Jordan Government will, without any delay, ask for the immediate withdrawal of these troops.

8. The idea of dispatching a United Nations force similar to that which was sent to Egypt, or sending a United Nations observer group similar to the group which is at present in Lebanon is being considered by some. My delegation wishes to remind the Members that when the General Assembly at its First Emergency Special Session in 1956 decided to send a United Nations force to Egypt with the ultimate purpose of separating Egypt and Israel, some representatives made reservations in respect to the tasks and responsibilities of that force. On 28 January 1957, the representative of Jordan stated in the General Assembly:

"The position which the Force finally takes up will be at the Egyptian-Israel armistice line, in such a way as to bestride that line. Therefore it cannot be transferred, under the terms of its present task, to other armistice lines in the Palestine area, but must be confined to the Israel-Egyptian line. It also cannot take up a final position on Egyptian territory . . ."
[644th meeting, para. 88].

This shows that we were opposed to the functioning of a United Nations force on Jordanian soil—a stand which we still maintain.

9. The other alternative which is being broached at present is the dispatch of a United Nations observer group similar to the one sent to Lebanon. My Government is convinced that such a group is not an answer to the present problem. This attitude on the part of my Government should not, however, create the impression of intent of non-co-operation on our part with the United Nations organs. In fact, we have a long record and a very satisfactory one of full co-operation with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. My Government also co-operated with the Secretary-General in every matter that was of concern to the United Nations Organization as well as to Jordan itself.

10. We will always be ready to encourage this co-operation and to welcome the presence of the United Nations in Jordan in a form which my Government finds fit to help overcome the present crisis.

11. Mr. TSIANG (China): In a debate in the Security Council on the complaint of Lebanon,⁴ I stated that the country most concerned was, of course, Lebanon, and that the Government best qualified to judge on the adequacy or inadequacy of the measures to be adopted by the United Nations in Lebanon was the Government of Lebanon. Today, since we are met here to consider the two questions, the two complaints of Lebanon and

⁴ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirteenth Year, 831st meeting.

Jordan, I would like to say that, in the judgement of my delegation, the countries most concerned in this debate are Lebanon and Jordan, and that the Governments whose views deserve the most careful consideration by all delegations are the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan. This is our basic approach to this debate. For this reason, I have chosen to state it at the very beginning of my intervention.

12. Lebanon and Jordan have so far taken two steps. One step was to bring their complaints to the Security Council. The other step was to ask for military assistance, in the one case, of the United States and, in the other, of the United Kingdom. I find nothing that could be criticized in their taking these two steps. Both these steps are in harmony with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and both have been taken with the sole objective of self-defence, indeed of self-preservation.

13. I find it unnecessary to argue at length on this point. Surely, nobody can accuse Lebanon or Jordan of expansionist, aggressive, or imperialistic designs against their neighbours. Whether in the Security Council or in this Assembly, I have not heard a single speaker accuse Lebanon or Jordan of expansionist designs. These two countries are, of course, peace-loving. They desire above everything else to be let alone. They are struggling only for the right of independent existence. This is the minimum right of any State. The motives of Lebanon and Jordan are above reproach.

14. The United States in responding to the appeal of Lebanon for military assistance and the United Kingdom in responding to a similar appeal from the Government of Jordan have behaved as good members of the international community. American and British forces have entered Lebanon and Jordan for the sole purpose of helping these States to preserve their independence and integrity. Responsible leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom have repeatedly assured the world that their forces will be withdrawn when the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan so request, or when the United Nations can afford to Lebanon and Jordan the necessary safeguards. All these assurances are on public record.

15. In an ideal world with an ideal United Nations, Lebanon and Jordan might have found their appeals to the Security Council sufficient without exercising their right of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. Likewise, under ideal conditions, the United States of America and the United Kingdom might have contented themselves with action in the Security Council, without sending military assistance to Lebanon and Jordan. Unfortunately, we must face the world as it is, and we must evaluate the United Nations as it actually is today. No nation at the present moment can rely solely and entirely on the United Nations for self-preservation, and no nation under present-day conditions can forgo the right of collective self-defence.

16. Therefore, the problem before this session of the General Assembly is not so much the withdrawal of the troops. The problem is that of safeguards which the United Nations can afford to Lebanon and Jordan. If, in addition to these safeguards, the General Assembly can work out plans to promote peace and prosperity in the whole region of the Middle East, my delegation would wholeheartedly support such plans. My delegation was deeply impressed by President Eisenhower's

speech on last Wednesday [733rd meeting]. However, I would like to make this point clear: it is the judgement of my delegation that we cannot secure the general peace and prosperity in the Middle East without, in the first instance, giving to Lebanon and Jordan the necessary safeguards for their political independence and territorial integrity.

17. In this session of the General Assembly, as well as previously, sometimes in a formal manner and sometimes informally, our attention has been called to the factor of Arab nationalism. In all the debates for the entire period of the United Nations history, in all the debates in which any Arab country has been involved, my delegation has not made a single anti-Arab speech or cast a single anti-Arab vote. We of China sympathize with and support the Arab countries in their struggle for freedom from foreign domination.

18. I recall my participation in the first debate in the Security Council on an Arab question.⁵ That was in the fall of 1947. Some Members of this Assembly may remember the occasion when the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Nokrashy Pasha, came to Lake Success to ask the Security Council⁶ to persuade the Government of the United Kingdom to reopen the negotiations on the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. On that occasion, I was among those members of the Council who supported the Egyptian request for the renewal of negotiations. From that day to the present, I have consistently favoured the nationalistic aspirations of the Arab peoples, and I would continue to do so.

19. Now we are told that there is an Arab nationalism in addition to the nationalistic aspirations of the individual Arab States. If I understand it correctly, I take this Arab nationalism to mean the desire for Arab unity. I would like to declare on behalf of my delegation that we are sympathetic to the movement for Arab unity. We are convinced that in the modern world larger political and economic units promote better the welfare of the peoples. Furthermore, we find among the Arab States in the Middle East strong cultural and racial affinities which furnish the basis for unity.

20. However, the problem of Arab unity should be solved only in harmony with the principle of the Charter. The process involved must be one of peaceful association, co-operation and integration among the Arab peoples, each of whom should have the right of self-determination. It seems to me that even a would-be Arab Bismarck of the present day should not and could not imitate the tactics of the German Bismarck of the nineteenth century. International life has progressed. Statecraft, even in the field of unification, has found better means to achieve that end. The method of blood and iron is today self-defeating. The United Nations, in the judgement of my delegation, may well sympathize with Arab nationalism in the sense of a movement for Arab unity, but the United Nations must uphold the principles of the Charter and must afford to every one of its Member States the inherent right of self-determination.

21. Mr. BUNACIU (Romania) (*translated from French*): My delegation shares the view of the delegations which have stressed the gravity of the tension which has been created in the Near and Middle East. We believe that the General Assembly at this session should concentrate its attention on the main cause of

⁵ *Ibid.*, Second Year, No. 80.

⁶ *Ibid.*

the tension and make a concerted effort to find a solution capable of removing it.

22. Everyone recognizes that the problems of this region are complex. It is equally true that the greater the efforts that are made to complicate them the harder they will be to solve; the more numerous the attempts to divert the General Assembly's attention from the crucial, fundamental and urgent issue before it, the harder it will be to find a way of breaking the present deadlock.

23. While we do not underestimate the importance of the area's political and economic problems, my delegation believes that the cause of the present tension and of the grave danger of war which has been created, with incalculable consequences for all mankind, is the armed intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom in Lebanon and Jordan, directed against the independence of the Arab peoples and their determination to be free, to assert their right to live and to follow a policy consistent with their own interests and aspirations. That is an inalienable right of the Arab peoples, a sacred right of every nation, a right inscribed in the Charter of the United Nations, with which none may interfere. The Arab peoples have the right to choose the political system best suited to their interests, the political leaders who represent those interests, the policy they believe to be the right one for them to follow in international relations, the friends on whom they believe they can rely to promote their national interests. The time is past when questions of this kind could be settled in the big western capitals and decisions could be imposed on the Arab peoples by force of arms and colonialist military intervention. In our days there is not and there cannot be any justification for action of a colonialist type such as that undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom in the Middle East. All the arguments advanced by the representatives of the two great Powers in an attempt to justify their military intervention belong to the last century, and it is astonishing that those at the head of affairs in those countries do not realize how strange their attempts to justify their action sound in this Assembly.

24. The main argument of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom is that they acted in response to an appeal by President Chamoun in the case of Lebanon and by King Hussein in the case of Jordan. I do not wish to dwell on the unconstitutional nature of the appeal, which has already been established here; but if there is one thing which the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom fear more than anything else it is the idea of leaving President Chamoun and King Hussein face to face with their people. The fact is that popular opposition to these two rulers is so strong that they cannot even count on the support of their own armed forces. This state of affairs is openly admitted even in political circles and the Press of the two western countries. In the circumstances the military action taken by these foreign Powers to keep such rulers in power cannot be described as anything other than armed aggression against the peoples of Lebanon and Jordan.

25. In any case, everyone remembers that the White House statement on the landing of American forces in Lebanon made it clear that the action had been taken because of events in Iraq, which leading figures in the United States and the United Kingdom misrepresented in the same way as they are now trying to misrepresent

events in the other Arab countries. But the United States and the United Kingdom subsequently recognized the Republic of Iraq and, thus, the internal and legitimate nature of the changes which had occurred in that country.

26. This being the case, what construction can be placed on the action of the United States and the United Kingdom in using armed force to prevent internal changes which they have been obliged in similar circumstances to recognize as legitimate in another country?

27. Obviously no question of principle is involved; the action was an arbitrary one, taken to suit their own interests, in a way which has been and unfortunately still is typical of the great colonial Powers in their relations with other countries.

28. The practice of deciding in Washington and London who is a good Arab and who is not, which political parties and which politicians are pro-Western and which are not, and of backing one side against the other, is out-of-date and condemned by the nations and the Charter of the United Nations.

29. It is high time that it was understood that it is for the Arab peoples themselves to decide these issues, and that they can dispense with the good offices of special envoys from Washington and London, backed by detachments of marines and paratroopers.

30. My delegation believes that all States great and small should make common cause in defence of the rights of the Arab peoples against the colonialist methods and military intervention of the great western Powers. In the modern world the cause of the independence of nations is as indivisible as the cause of peace. Today detachments of marines and paratroopers have invaded the countries of the Arab East; yesterday they appeared on the shores of Latin America; tomorrow they may make an appearance in Asia or in Africa. An end must be put, once and for all, to practices of this kind, which belong to a bygone age.

31. In this matter the small countries have an important part to play, side by side with the great Powers, whose greater obligations and primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security are recognized by the United Nations Charter.

32. Those who pay heed to the existence of the small countries only when they are anxious to find an excuse to prevent a meeting of the great Powers should always remember the role which they play and their interests in international life. The small countries are much less in need of flattering statements than of acts that give evidence of respect for them and show an awareness of their right to determine their policy in the light of their national interests.

33. Is it not a fact that the main reason for our meeting here is the policy of force pursued by two great Powers in their relations with the Arab countries?

34. How can one overlook the fact that in the course of carrying out the military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, the United States military forces violated the airspace of two neutral countries, Austria and Switzerland, both of which made legitimate protests.

35. As we see, the deeds are not only not in keeping with the words but are in fact utterly inconsistent with them.

36. My delegation must also note with regret that the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom

towards the United Nations in the case we are now considering is marked by a similar discrepancy between words and deeds.

37. On the one hand, they proclaim their unswerving loyalty to the principles of the United Nations Charter and their boundless desire to strengthen and uphold the role of the United Nations as an effective organ in the defence of peace and security, and, on the other, they act in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations; they undermine the action taken in conformity with the Charter by the United Nations in Lebanon, despite the fact that the delegations of both the United States of America and the United Kingdom voted in favour of it.

38. Whatever the alleged pretexts, the undeniable fact remains that the dispatch of American and British troops to the Middle East not only implies a disregard for the procedure laid down by the Security Council in its resolution of 11 June 1958,⁷ which provided for the dispatch of an observation group to Lebanon, but also deals a serious blow to the prestige of the United Nations.

39. The United Nations cannot be confronted with a *fait accompli*, nor can its role be reduced to that of receiving notification of the missions which one State or another has undertaken on its own initiative and without any mandate. No one would argue that the position of the United Nations observers in Lebanon after the American troops had landed was such as to increase the prestige of the United Nations. What can have been the effect on world public opinion of the fact that in justifying their military action the United States of America and the United Kingdom took their stand on findings which were diametrically opposed to those set out in the first two reports of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon⁸ and confirmed by the third report?⁹

40. The same approach was shown by the United States and the United Kingdom when they arbitrarily invoked Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 applies only if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, which is far from being the case in Lebanon and Jordan. However broad the construction placed on the term "armed attack", the known facts and the findings of the United Nations observers in Lebanon clearly prove that it is not applicable to the situation in Lebanon and Jordan.

41. If they truly respected the United Nations Charter, the organizers of the intervention would have remembered Article 2, paragraph 4, which requires Members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force.

42. The organizers of the intervention have gone even further and have attempted to associate the United Nations with their illegal action. To this end the United States and United Kingdom delegations in the Security Council argued that the action of the American troops would strengthen that of the United Nations observers.¹⁰ But that argument was not accepted either by the Security Council or by the United Nations observers. The latter's view was clearly expressed from the beginning:

"The United Nations Observation Group represents the only action taken by the Security Council. There is, therefore, no basis for establishing any contact or working relationship, formal or informal, between the United Nations Observation Group and any non-Lebanese forces in Lebanon . . ."¹¹

43. The General Assembly must now take appropriate measures to restore the prestige of the United Nations, which has been gravely impaired by the arbitrary actions of the United States and the United Kingdom, and to fulfill the hopes pinned on it.

44. Fine phrases and the declaration of high principles cannot serve as a screen for actions which are by their very nature contrary to morality and international law. This duplicity brings to mind the words of Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of the century: "Speak softly and carry a big stick".

45. It is no accident that it is those who wield the stick who urge the Assembly to speak softly to them. There would be no difficulty in speaking softly if the interventionists would withdraw their thousands of heavily-armed soldiers from Lebanon and Jordan.

46. It is impossible not to agree with the stand taken by authoritative representatives of Arab public opinion, who have stated that as long as the presence of British and American troops in Lebanon threatens the peace and security of the Near and Middle East it will be difficult to discuss economic development programmes, disease control, the water problem and the other needs of the Arab world.

47. From our own experience I can state categorically that it is because they have freed themselves from imperialist domination that the Romanian people have been able to concentrate their efforts on the country's economic development, on the exploitation of national resources, on education and on culture.

48. The Romanian Government and people view with sympathy the Arab peoples' struggle for national freedom, independence and the right to utilize their countries' resources to promote their economic and cultural development.

49. The General Assembly has heard attempts to minimize the dangers inherent in the American-British intervention in the Middle East. It has even been argued that the reaction was merely the result of an effort to create war hysteria. In other words, it is alleged that world public opinion has been alarmed by tendentious and baseless propaganda and not by the dispatch of thousands of soldiers by air to Lebanon and Jordan, the violation of the airspace of two neutral countries by United States military aircraft, the alerting of military bases in Cyprus, Libya, Italy and elsewhere, the United States Defense Secretary's statement that the forces landed were equipped with atomic weapons, or the inflammatory declarations against the Republic of Iraq.

50. The truth is that the scale of the military measures taken by the United States and the United Kingdom and the threatening statements made by persons in high positions in those countries have made the whole world realize that there is a danger that the notorious "brink of war" policy proclaimed by the American leaders may be put into practice.

51. The danger will persist so long as American and British troops are stationed in the Middle East. The

⁷ *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1958, document S/4023.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1958, documents S/4040 and Add.1, and S/4069, respectively.

⁹ *Ibid.*, document S/4085.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Year, 827th meeting.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1958, document S/4085, para. 4.

Romanian delegation believes that the first and most urgent step that must be taken to ensure peace and security in the Middle East is the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan.

52. My delegation is convinced that the resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation [*A/3870 and Corr.1*] fully meets that requirement. The withdrawal of American and British troops from the Middle East is absolutely essential if we are to tackle and solve the other major political and economic problems of the area.

53. The Romanian delegation reaffirms its determination to make its full contribution to the General Assembly's efforts to strengthen peace and security in the Near and Middle East.

54. Mr. BARROS HURTADO (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): The efforts made to promote agreement at other levels having failed, we have been called together to seek a solution to the difficult problems of the Middle East, exercising the supreme responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

55. It must be recognized, however, that these events are not an isolated or accidental development. For many years the world has been living in a state of unrest and alarm which is not conducive to constructive work or creative effort. Only a few years have gone by since the signing of the Atlantic Charter, which laid the foundations for a better world, the Dumbarton Oaks agreements, under which world peace was to be secured through procedures agreed between the four great Powers, and the San Francisco Conference, which approved the establishment of this world security Organization. Yet how far removed in fact we are from the hopes embodied in the inspiring message which the three Heads of State addressed to mankind at Yalta. "Victory in this war and the establishment of the proposed international organization", they said, "will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create, in the years to come, the essential conditions of such peace."

56. As we meet here, with these words to guide us, to consider the specific situation in the Middle East where sister nations are living under the shadow of tragic events, we cannot shirk our duty to consider the world situation, because we have a responsibility towards our history which has given us human dignity and our concept of international life and friendly relations between nations.

57. In settling the problem of the Middle East, we shall not, despite our boundless good will, solve the troubling and ever-present problem of peace. New developments will occur, and we shall have to adopt new emergency resolutions. The peoples will continue to live in alarm and suspense until perhaps some event beyond human control brings disaster upon mankind.

58. It may well be asked whether what has come to be called the "cold war" is peace. Is this the guiding principle which presided at the establishment of this Organization? Do these developments, which have become continuous and permanent, and the main objective of which is apparently the limited goal of survival, reflect the supreme aspiration of the peoples? That is certainly not the case. This is not peace; this is a crime against peace.

59. We must recognize that on occasion war has been avoided mainly through the miraculous intervention

of this international organization, which has served as a brake on the passions and disputes of men. But peace should not be a miracle; peace is, above all, a natural condition, capable of ethical and moral evaluation, like order in a State based on law. The state of peace should therefore be the natural and permanent outcome of all the activities of mankind and of human societies.

60. For some time the peoples have stood helplessly by while a natural climate of international calm was transformed by policies, polemics, incidents, advances and retreats, provocations, actions and omissions into an artificial climate of international unrest. But for that transformation, war would be impossible. A war-like climate is being created before our eyes by actions that disrupt peaceful coexistence. At times we are the passive spectators of actions foreshadowing a world conflagration.

61. War has thus become the normal and usual means of solving the problems of peace.

62. The most serious aspect is that each nation taking part in the drama regards itself as the victim, not the originator of the circumstances that give rise to it. In the circumstances, we do not regard ourselves as qualified to assign the guilt to anyone, or, perhaps we consider that we are all equally guilty because we have not defended the peaceful cause of the peoples more effectively.

63. Be that as it may, we must continue to work for the defence of peace. We must constitute ourselves the advance guard of a new order of law, which, originating in this Organization, would be rooted in the spirit and would determine the action of each of its Members, until it became a positive force outlawing war.

64. Thus, we cannot allow peace to be used for anyone's benefit to create an artificial climate of insecurity and violence.

65. To ensure peace and to prevent offences against the peace by punishing offenders is essentially a legal problem and requires the intervention of legal organs. On the other hand, the examination of the international problems affecting peace is essentially a political task pertinent to the purposes of this Assembly. We must therefore distinguish between political and legal issues.

66. Our contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security consists above all in the ideas which we add to those of the many others who have fought for similar ideals and for identical ends. To make these ideas effective, we must, at a different level, provide this Organization with the means necessary for the preservation of peace just as we have made provision for the maintenance of domestic order in our respective States.

67. The codification of crimes against peace, which could be undertaken on the basis of ten years' experience of international organization, and the appointment of permanent international judges and international courts to enforce the law, would, even if it did not prevent wars, reduce the possibility of their being provoked and, in any event, serve as a deterrent to wrongdoing. The political responsibility for ensuring compliance with decisions will rest with this Assembly.

68. In the domestic order of our countries such wrongdoing is punished by law, and, regrettable though it may be, we must recognize that it is fear of the law,

not respect for it, which restrains men. In international relations that fear is wholly non-existent. No law defines offences or provides for the prevention and punishment of wrongdoing. No international court has been specifically created by this Organization to enforce a non-existent law. Crimes against peace are in fact based on impunity.

69. Force is the negation of law. Force is ethical only when it is used to safeguard the law. We should create a new international law out of this peculiar state of affairs, originating in corruptive practices, which are reflected in these twilight periods of "cold war" or "wars of nerves", and, before we have recourse to international force, we should establish the courts and appoint the prosecutors and judges to administer and enforce this new law. This may well be the supreme instrument of our mission of peace in the service of reason and for the preservation of peace through the consolidation of law.

70. The Argentine Government is pledged to contribute to the maintenance of world peace by all the means in its power through this Organization, in order to ensure the peaceful coexistence of peoples and to secure to man the right to life, liberty and happiness, the foundation of the ideal of the sovereignty of man. It is pledged to act to this end whatever the cost, convinced that only in a climate of peace and mutual respect will nations find the resources necessary for their full development and the achievement of their high destiny.

71. In accordance with its traditions, my country has submitted, and will continue to submit, its disputes with other States to the peaceful rules of the law of nations, and when a settlement cannot be obtained by direct means, it will submit its disputes to the proper regional or world organs of peace, thus demonstrating its profound respect for the sovereignty of States and its attachment to the principles of law.

72. But our devotion to the cause of freedom is no less than our devotion to the cause of peace, and any sacrifices we may make are limited by our respect for the rights of the human person and the self-determination of peoples. This is said without prejudice to the economic co-operation of the developed countries in furnishing the under-developed countries with the means necessary to advance the well-being of the individual and the community.

73. We therefore declare that we will be on the side of those peoples who recognize, practise, and fight for the defence of these principles which are so dear to mankind.

74. In the Argentine Government's opinion, this is a premise of fundamental importance for a satisfactory settlement in the Near East. My Government considers that no settlement is possible without respect for the right of all peoples to achieve full nationhood through the elimination of all forms of colonialism and political, economic and military dependence.

75. As President Frondizi said in May 1958 in his inaugural message to the Argentine Congress:

"In asserting the right of peoples to shape their own destinies, Argentina is aware of its position in the cultural world of the West. For us this involves no contradiction. On the contrary, we feel that we are the heirs to a spiritual heritage based on the recognition of the sacred principle of the creative capacity of every human being.

"It is for this reason, because we are sons of the West, that we feel ourselves to be members of the world community of peoples and that we feel that every battle for freedom and progress in every corner of the globe is our own."

76. The right of nations to shape their own destiny, free from foreign intervention, direct or indirect, is the cornerstone on which international law and peace are founded.

77. My Government, through the United Nations, sends to those peoples a message of friendship and sympathy and urges the great Powers to exhaust all peaceful means to settle their differences. We trust that it may be possible on another occasion to examine the ideas we have advanced, if they are considered useful for the constructive purposes of peace.

78. Lastly, my Government expresses its earnest desire continuously to strengthen, by thought and by deed, the great edifice of peace built by the men of San Francisco, so that later generations may enjoy a climate of peace, work and happiness, free from the appalling scourge of war.

79. Mr. PALAMAS (Greece): One of the main characteristics of the Middle East crisis, in its present phase, is a feeling of deep distrust animating the various political factors existing in that area. This feeling of distrust is generating most of the differences and conflicts with which we are faced.

80. There is always a lack of confidence in the background of every troubled situation or international tension. But the amount of suspicion and distrust in the present predicament in the Middle East is by far greater than the existence of really conflicting interests.

81. If the General Assembly at its present session succeeds in dispelling, even to a certain extent, this distrust and in clearing the air of suspicion, then we do believe that the way will be open to a satisfactory settlement of the present dispute, as well as to the prevention of new ones in the future. This is the reason why my delegation considers it a good omen that in the course of this debate a significant restraint has been shown by all concerned in the presentation of their views and suggestions.

82. In our efforts to restore confidence we must, I think, face the facts as they are. The Arab peoples of the Middle East are suspicious of the West. There is the background of foreign domination, which lasted for centuries and cannot be ignored. Its residual effects, following the abolishment of colonial rule, have been reinforced in the hearts of the Arab peoples by some unfortunate reactions of Western policies towards the awakening of Arab nationalism. The Suez crisis—to mention only one of these reactions—was not destined to improve the situation.

83. On the other hand, the West, too, was suspicious of the dynamics of Arab nationalism. Following the termination of colonial rule, some Western Governments were anxious to see their interests in the Middle East recognized and thoroughly guaranteed. Some of these interests, oil supplies in particular, were of great importance to the economies of those countries. One can now see that the approach of the West to this problem, influenced as it may have been by some surviving colonialist devices, was not the proper one; for the recognition of the new reality in the Middle East implied the necessity of co-operation with the Arab peoples on

equal terms. Such would have been the normal course. But because of the element of distrust the West considered that effective safeguards for its interests should be based mostly on political co-operation and concurrence. It was thus only natural that such an explosive accumulation of misunderstandings and distrust should result in more than one vicious crisis.

84. It is on this point that my delegation is offering, in all humility, its contribution to the necessary liquidation of this mutual distrust. Greece has always stood very close to the Arab nations. The Greek people have a great experience in contacts and mutual understanding with the Arab peoples—to say nothing of the spiritual bonds established in ancient times between Hellenism and Arabism. Our nationals have had the opportunity to share in the life of the Arabs, in the life not only of the privileged classes, but of the masses, too, which now constitute the surging force of Arab nationalism. Tens of thousands of our people are still living in Arab lands enjoying Arab hospitality and honoured in their way of life and in their traditions. Our experience of Arab nationalism is that it is a new creative force which should be thoroughly evaluated and trusted, because in Arab nationalism one finds pride, self-respect and independence, as one also finds wisdom and tolerance.

85. In the defence of its own interests and of what the West is bound to stand for, the Western nations must show trust and comprehension. They should trust Arab nationalism and deal with the new forces expressing the will of the peoples of the Middle East on an equal footing, putting aside all political prejudices reminiscent of the past.

86. The Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Fawzi, in defining a few days ago from this rostrum the position of his Government in the present crisis, informed the Assembly [733rd meeting] of the conclusion of a final agreement on compensation between the United Arab Republic and the stockholders of the former Suez Canal Company.

87. This is a gratifying event and a very significant fact. It indicates to all those who are sincerely looking for the protection of their interests the best way to follow, the only way conducive to satisfactory results. The day that the Arab peoples will be asked to respond as free peoples to proposals made on terms of equality and common interests, then all the problems of the Middle East will find the way to a reasonable solution and to necessary readjustments.

88. May I stress that the psychological and political factors are of paramount importance in dealing with the Arab peoples. Personal and national pride and dignity come first; bread after. I can understand this because the same is true of the Greek people. It so happens that the peoples value less the material than the moral aspect of life.

89. That is to say that the problem we are facing now is in its essentials both a political and a psychological problem. Its economic implications, though of the greatest importance, are still supplementary in character.

90. Now, as far as our Arab friends are concerned, I wish to say that, in our view, they are fully justified whenever they react against the remnants of colonialist policies. However, they must not lose sight of the many bonds linking them to the Western world.

91. The movement of national emancipation, which is now in full swing in Asia and Africa, was experienced, I would say, in a premonitory way by the peoples of

Europe in the nineteenth century. This movement, may I add, is not over yet. Still, in Cyprus, one of the cradles of our common civilization, a people is desperately striving to liberate itself from colonial bondage.

92. The Arabs and all the nations in Asia and Africa which have emerged from political subjection possess a considerable asset of sympathy and partnership in freedom among the peoples of the Western world. It is not a matter of detail that the people of the United States is one of them, and that the American nation has never been a colonial power. The Suez crisis marked a turning point in the development of Arab nationalism and independence; and it would be just to recall that it was not easy for the United States to take the stand it took in that crisis—a stand which proved to be decisive.

93. Now we come to the crisis in Lebanon. I do not wish to deal at length with the situation in that country, a country and a people very close to our hearts. Our approach to this problem, as well as to all other similar problems, the case of Jordan included, is a democratic approach—the only one we know and value in Greece—which permits the free expression, without any foreign interference, of the will of the people and respect for and compliance with this will from all sides, from inside and from outside.

94. We think that any other approach is unrealistic. This is why we consider that the United Nations action in Lebanon was wise, and we were happy to see that the United Arab Republic associated itself with this action. The Lebanese people should be assured of being able to settle its own affairs through the concept and rule of a freely elected majority.

95. In the face of such a general approach, what is our estimation of the landing of American troops in Lebanon on 15 July of this year? We do not intend to comment on the political aspect of this initiative. Even so, I have to say that we were fully aware of the serious complications such an operation could generate. Furthermore, and speaking generally, we think that the dispatch of troops to a foreign country, even if it has to be undertaken, is always a painful process and constitutes a political liability particularly in the case of a prolonged stationing of those troops in that country. We do understand very well why the United States has reluctantly engaged in such an operation.

96. What we cannot, however, accept is that the landing of American troops in Lebanon constitutes a sort of act of aggression in terms of the United Nations Charter. Such a contention proceeds from a shortsighted and perilous interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter. On this point my delegation—and I suppose many other delegations—is particularly sensitive. Article 51 recognizes the right of self-defence, individual and collective. This right, on which rests the independence of small nations, should remain unimpaired. This is a matter concerning not only the Middle East but every nation which may in the future have to face a situation necessitating, in the judgement of its own Government alone, prompt military, individual, and collective action.

97. It is true that Article 51 provides for the right of self-defence to be exercised in the case of an "armed attack". However, this situation extensively covers also the case of an imminent danger of armed attack. Particularly in view of the production in recent years of more highly perfected destructive weapons, a country should

have the right to react in self-defence in time and before it is too late. After an "armed attack" it may be too late. For the application of the rule provided in Article 51, we see only one substantial prerequisite: that the Government asking for help be the legally and freely elected government of that country, expressing in this vitally important matter the democratic consensus of its people.

98. The day the United Nations will have at its disposal a permanent force—my country has always favoured the creation of such a force—it will be possible to consider the application of Article 51 in a more restrictive manner. In the meantime, reasons of security make us feel very strongly on this point.

99. It would be unrealistic not to recognize that the Soviet Union is already playing an important role in the balance of the big Powers covering this very important region. This being so, it becomes evident that the concurring interests of the West, of the Soviet Union and mainly of the Arab peoples, are to keep the Middle East out of the game of power politics. Some think of this necessity in terms of neutralizing the whole area. We have listened with particular attention to the remarkable statement of Mr. Aiken, the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland [735th meeting]. In a comprehensive analysis of the situation in the Middle East, he elaborated on the point of the neutralization of the whole area, producing many arguments in favour.

100. Yet, we still have some doubts whether this formula is practicable now. But what we would understand is the policy of non-interference by the big Powers and the policy of independence by the Arab nations. "Freezing" the Middle East out of the competitions and the evils of the cold war would benefit all the peoples living in that area, as it would benefit the peace and security of the world.

101. In the course of the present debate, many constructive suggestions have been made which express the general desire to stabilize peace and security in the Middle East and to promote the welfare of the peoples in that area.

102. Most of the points in the statement by the Secretary-General [732nd meeting] as well as in the significant address by Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States [733rd meeting], drew our particular attention. Many delegates offered in their statements valuable contributions on the best ways and means to face the situation effectively. The Soviet draft resolution [A/3870 and Corr.1] also contains useful elements.

103. We earnestly hope that the General Assembly will be able to vote soon on a draft resolution covering in a constructive manner all the important points and, in particular, the early withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in the Middle East.

104. The Greek delegation is eager to offer its contribution, however small and modest, to the establishment in the Middle East of conditions of stability and peace.

105. Mr. LALL (India): At this very important and crucial juncture in the development of their affairs, I wish to express to all the Arab representatives in this room and to their Governments and peoples the friendly greetings of the Government and peoples of India, and our sympathetic understanding of the international aspects of their problems. I have, of course, deliberately used the phrase "the international aspects of their prob-

lems", for, as far as their internal affairs are concerned, we can only express our views and sympathies as and when we might be asked to do so by the Arab countries themselves and on no other occasion.

106. It is not opportune to reminisce at any length today on our extensive and friendly contacts with the Arab world, stretching over many centuries and, indeed, millennia. In the great period of the Arab renaissance there were friendly and often very lively discussions and even disputations between their scientists and ours and their men of letters and ours, and in the many-faceted secular India of today there is a warm welcome and a secure home for those Arab communities that have settled within our borders.

107. Though I do not wish to dwell on these matters, it is not possible for me, as an Indian of this generation, ever to forget or to refrain on this occasion from mentioning the outstanding assistance rendered to the cause of Indian nationalism and the resurgence of India by a distinguished son of Arabia whose death our whole nation mourned about a year ago, no one more deeply than the Prime Minister of India himself. I am speaking of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the great Indian national leader, who came to us from Arabia. He was born in Mecca and then he came to us and did so much to develop and inspire our own national movement. It was he who was President of the Indian National Congress in those crucial and momentous days for India when we regained our independence.

108. Fittingly, then, I can pass now to Arab nationalism, that powerful and dynamic force in the Middle East. If I may be permitted to say so, we understand that nationalism. We understand it as a natural expression, and the rightful expression, of the upsurge of the Arab peoples. It is the same force that we have found among ourselves, a force which is still at work in our own country and in other parts of the world, particularly in Asia and in Africa, where, for some time and for various reasons which I will not now go into, it had lain dormant.

109. On Arab nationalism, specifically, Prime Minister Nehru recently said:

"Arab nationalism must be recognized by other countries. It is an obvious, patent and clear fact which cannot but be recognized. There have been many failures in the past for lack of understanding of this force."

110. It is, I submit, entirely incorrect to think of Arab nationalism as some kind of imperialism. Nationalism, as such, and imperialism are, *ex-hypothesi*, incompatible one with the other. It is not imperialism for people to express their nationalistic aspirations which, indeed, are the basis of the modern nation States of the Western world. If I may say so, it is one of the extraordinary ironies of the present situation that a great deal of criticism of nationalism in the Arab world comes from just those parts of the world where the life of the people is squarely based on a vigorous, flourishing established nationalism. Surely this is something on which we should all reflect, because unless we look on Arab nationalism in the perspective of history and of our times we will continue to misunderstand it, and, perhaps, continue to take action unfortunately—though we hope very much that this will not be the case—thereby threatening the peace and the security of the area and of our entire world. Should not those who criticize Arab nationalism examine their own foundations? And should they not

remember how often those very foundations, of which they are proud now, perhaps regrettably had to be soiled with violence and bloodshed?

111. But on the whole, whatever the nature of their own origins, those nations which have firmly established their nationalism will be able to discern in the march of their own countries the growth and the development of the human personality, and a steady decrease of internal violence. Perhaps many of them would say that at one stage violence inevitably had to be used in order to give the peoples an opportunity to develop themselves, in order to rescue the peoples from the stranglehold of a narrowly based feudalistic or colonial or class-ridden concept of life. Let us, then, apply these very canons to Arab nationalism today. Let us not criticize those who are searching for and taking the path which we ourselves, many of us in the manner compatible with our own history and traditions, have trod.

112. When news came to New York of that brief and relatively orderly revolution which occurred in Iraq on 14 July last there were cries of outrage in this very building from responsible spokesmen at the horror and the violence which was being perpetrated. It is not anyone's desire—and I am sure that it is, not the desire of the Iraqi people or its Government—to praise violence, but the salient point here will emerge only if those who have deplored violence in Iraq will just look at the process of the development of nationalism and its effects nearer their own homes. Besides, have those who raised their voices against violence forgotten the violence and unfortunate brutality of the period in Iraq immediately before the revolution? Would they not agree that the new Government of Iraq is conducting itself in a manner which is far more humane than that of its predecessor? And this is very understandable because the uprising in Iraq was the uprising of a people which had suffered too much oppression, too much concentration of power in the hands of a few, too little respect for the people, too little attention to its needs and aspirations.

113. Thus we can now see in Iraq the logical process unfolding itself, a process of liberation from many bonds. And this is a process which in itself will greatly enhance stability and peace in the area of the Middle East. So, if we examine these matters closely, it will have to be admitted that just that revolution which the representatives of certain countries made even the basis, or partly the basis, of their military action in Lebanon and Jordan, and so completely deplored here as being a sign of instability in the area, is actually and in fact, when objectively considered, a great step forward in the achievement of stability and peace in the Middle East.

114. Those who have read their history correctly cannot but see in the recent events in Iraq a development which, in spite of the element of violence which was involved, is very much to be welcomed. May I say how happy we are to see in our midst the Foreign Minister of the new Government of Iraq, and our colleague, Ambassador Hashim Jawad, for whom many of us have long cherished admiration and the most friendly feelings.

115. And what of Lebanon and Jordan? For them too, the Government and the peoples of India have the most friendly feelings. We feel for them in their struggles and in their hardships. We consider it axiomatic that they too must decide for themselves their own future; we consider, furthermore, that they are entitled to do

this without interference from any quarter, no matter what the motives.

116. I have probably said enough, and, I hope, said enough that is widely acceptable to this Assembly to indicate the basic reasons why the Government of India viewed with grave concern the landings of foreign troops in Lebanon and Jordan. We have given the most careful attention to the various reasons which were adduced for these actions. Sometimes it was difficult for us to follow those reasons, for they seemed to shift from one stand to another. But whether they were reasons based on Article 51 of the Charter, a stand which we regard as totally unacceptable and inapplicable to these cases, or whether they were reasons based on the right to protect foreign nationals or on the alleged right to assist a régime or Government, we were, may I say, not impressed. On the other hand, we could not but see very grave dangers inherent in the situation created by the entry of relatively large numbers of foreign forces, armed and equipped in a manner which could let loose such a carnage of destruction as has never been seen in the long history of the Middle East. And moreover, these forces by their very presence—the presence of massive striking potential—cannot but interfere in the normal political and other forms of expression of the life of the people. I do not have to dilate upon this. It is expecting too much of human beings, even of the brave Arab people, to think that they can develop in freedom and in the manner which they would choose for themselves when they stand in the shadow cast by the massive presence of the armed strangers within their gates. And there is another important reason, another important aspect of this matter which must engage our attention. As the Prime Minister of India has said:

“Even if outside forces intervene with sincere and honest designs, they would have to side with one group or another in the country with consequences fraught with grave danger.”

117. In our view, the whole situation will continue to be full of danger and will continue to be explosive so long as foreign forces remain on the soil of Lebanon and Jordan. There can be no settlement, and indeed no talk of an acceptable, workable and dignified settlement, and no return to normalcy until this element of foreign troops has been removed.

118. It is not our intention in this debate to raise our voices in bitterness or in invective. That is very far from our purpose. We do not think that sort of debate would conduce to a settlement. But before we suggest some of the ideas for a settlement which might be helpful, if accepted by the countries immediately concerned—for it is they who must first tell us what is acceptable to them—we feel that an appeal to certain countries would not be amiss. We have not been able to accept the reasons for foreign forces being taken to the Middle East, and this, as I have said, has not been for lack of trying to understand these actions. To us it almost seems as if those who have thus acted had taken out a directive paper from the drawer of some misplaced archive of the eighteenth or the nineteenth century. Somehow time has lunged backwards into the past and produced actions which are totally out of date and out of step with the present. We earnestly hope that these ancient archives and these wrong drawers of history will not be opened again. We do appeal to all countries to remember that whatever wise step may be taken in the future—and we hope that wise steps are

about to be taken both in this Assembly and by national Governments unilaterally—it will unfortunately be a long time before the natural resentment, the natural feeling of violation and insecurity caused by even a temporary stay of foreign forces, can be undone in that area in which they are now stationed. We will, I hope, in the next few days find a method—find the mechanism which will lead to a very speedy withdrawal of foreign forces. But we will not, I fear, in these few days be able to undo the human harm and to calm the stirring of human passions which will have resulted from this form of foreign presence in the Middle East. That result will require the protracted operations of the healing hand of time and the continued wisdom of all those concerned.

119. But in spite of the scar which will remain, and indeed so that the scar should not be too large and too painful, we cannot but act as quickly as possible. Nor can we overlook the fact, the very dangerous fact, that the presence of these troops creates the hazard that at any moment there may be set alight some incident from which could flare up such a bloody conflict as might well destroy the peace of the world. So from all points of view we must act quickly, and as wisely as we can.

120. Now if there is anything that emerges as a pointer from these brief remarks of mine, it is that we would be compounding folly and dealing a grave blow to the development of those very forces in the Arab world which should be encouraged if we were to replace the present type of foreign presence by a similar type of United Nations presence—that is, by armed forces. There could be no greater folly than this. Thus there would seem to be no question whatsoever of sending United Nations or other forces to the Middle East. And there can be no question whatsoever of the United Nations devising means to arrest the development of Arab nationalism in each State in the area. Nor can there be any question of there being any other form of United Nations activity which might interfere in the internal affairs of an Arab State. It would certainly be ironical if the United Nations itself, in spite of the provisions of the Charter, were to launch some kind of interference in the affairs of an Arab State, and of course it would be interference totally incompatible with the Charter if the United Nations should seek to bolster up a particular régime or a particular Government.

121. Of course, it would be an interference if the United Nations should seek to exercise any form of police powers within the jurisdiction of a State. We must be quite clear about these matters; otherwise we shall merely be sowing such seeds of discontent in the area as will, biding their time, surely spring up in a harvest which will render ridiculous such devices as I am trying to suggest should be now totally ruled out.

122. There has been much talk also of indirect aggression. In fact, at one time we got the impression that this Assembly was meeting to consider indirect aggression, even though for ten years the United Nations has been unable to define aggression itself.

123. Charges of indirect aggression, Prime Minister Nehru has said, are “inherently and essentially and inevitably a part of the cold-war technique”, and he added that such talk “really ignores the basic issues there”.

124. The point really is: Are we going to miss the wood for the trees? Are we going to concentrate our

attention on the cheering from the sidelines, even the booing, even the caterwauling, even perhaps a certain amount of egging on, and not look at what is actually happening in the arena itself? If we do this, we shall put ourselves into a totally false, unrealistic and also somewhat ridiculous position.

125. To cut this matter short, let us beware of stifling Arab nationalism—and, as I have said, nationalism and imperialism are incompatible with one another. Let us beware of stifling, even attempting to stifle, Arab nationalism, for the simple reason that if we were to do this we would be trying to deny to others what we have made the basis of our own statehood. We would be denying our own national heritages, we would be suppressing the development of creative processes in human communities, and we would forfeit any claim to have acted wisely. Of course, it is absolutely essential that all States respect one another's independence, territorial integrity and full sovereignty, and there must be no interference whatsoever in one another's affairs. But, having said this, do not let us bring under interdict those vital, robust stirrings in the Arab countries of today which have their springs within the countries concerned themselves. And, if these robust stirrings yearn for a certain degree of co-operation among the countries of the Arab world, that is the affair of the Arab peoples, and it is not for us on the sidelines to talk to them about indirect aggression. We have no doubt that the Arab States will make wise adjustments with one another. Whether a State retains in full its own separate identity or whether it enters into a particular form of relationship with its neighbours is a matter for decision in each case by the States concerned and not for us.

126. So, in searching for a solution, let us not get lost in talk about indirect aggression. If the cheering or booing, and so on, on the sidelines is regarded as too vociferous, there are friendly ways, as there are in private life, with a smile, of counselling or calling attention to neighbourliness. We all must remember these virtues, for we all need to practise them, and I want to make it absolutely clear that I am not addressing these remarks specifically to the Arab countries. We all, perhaps without exception, need to remind ourselves of these things.

127. The immediate, the foremost, the crying need is to remove the grave and present danger in the area; that is to say, we must turn our attention to the question of foreign forces in the Middle East. In doing so, I would once again repeat that we must remember the very grave dangers that are inherent in the presence of these forces; the grave dangers to international peace which concern every single country in this Assembly. We would, therefore, express the hope that United States forces will in the immediate future, and United Kingdom forces likewise in the immediate future, leave Lebanon and Jordan. We want to assure the United States and the United Kingdom again that we are not taking part in this debate for any reason but to attempt to contribute to a peaceful and speedy settlement in regard to the situation which confronts us. We have no desire to engage in invective or even in criticism. But we appeal to them to respond to the wishes of those in our part of the world who have some experience in these matters, and, may I say, to heed this appeal particularly when it comes from a very friendly country, from a country which has been able, in co-operation with the United Kingdom, to overcome some of the worst features of the past 200 years of our history, from a coun-

try which is not speaking from any personal motives, and from a country which therefore may be able to speak, we hope, not too unacceptably. We request the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw from an action which will not, we feel we can assure them, conduce to any purpose which they themselves might have in view. We do not at this point wish to go into the economic interrelations between the Western world and the Arab Middle East. We are convinced, however, that those interrelations are a matter for discussion, as and when necessary and as agreed upon, around conference tables in a civilized and peaceful way, and that any show of force, as background moves or as direct thrusts into the economic arena, is doomed to failure and will only make relations between the West and the Arab Middle East worse in all fields, including the economic. Therefore, as a country which has had long connexions with the West and which is a neighbour of the Arab world, and as a country which, if I may venture to say so, represents no small proportion of those peoples of the world whose experiences have in some respects been similar to those of the Arab peoples, we again ask the United States and the United Kingdom to consider and to heed our request and to accept our assurance that it is made in friendliness and in the conviction that it is in the best interests of all concerned.

128. Now, I have already said that we must not commit the folly of substituting one armed presence for another armed presence. May I say here briefly that much has been said in this debate about acting in accordance with the Charter or acting in accordance with the spirit of the Charter. We welcome the motives of such statements. However, we find nothing in the Charter which would even remotely sanction the sending of armed forces into the area in the circumstances and in the situation which exists. So far as we can see, apart from the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, the whole spirit of the wording of the Charter is that there should be no use of force whatsoever and no threats of force and no display of force. We do not, therefore, see any basis for statements invoking the Charter or the spirit of the Charter in defence of using armed force or of making a display of force in the present situation. As I have already pointed out, we exclude Article 51 of the Charter because none of the circumstances of which it speaks is applicable to the situation which confronts us. However, if either of the countries in which foreign forces have entered should ask for any strengthening of

United Nations observation, then we think that it should be possible to take steps to meet its wishes.

129. Here it might be opportune, in view of other statements which have been made, to make some observations on the suggestion that if only the United Nations had had a police force at the present juncture, it could have quickly thrown it into action in Lebanon and Jordan. I wonder whether we could devise a formula which would create a kind of chameleon-like force capable of changing its colour or character so as to act, if required, as an operation of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, of the United Nations Emergency Force, or of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. I submit that we could not do so. These operations are so different, one from another, that no single force could answer to all these widely differing requirements. To rush a standard type of force into delicate situations which cannot possibly be standardized is to court added trouble and disaster. In any event this is a matter which we should not resolve on now. If there is to be any consideration at all given to a matter like this, it must come up in the normal way and be looked at from all points of view. To slip it in, as it were, by a side door at this emergency session where we are considering a specific problem in a certain area of the world would in our view be unwise and totally unwarranted.

130. Let us then focus our attention on the matter which concerns us at this moment. Let us remove the cause of resentment in the Arab world. Let us remove the grave potential danger to world peace. Let us enjoin on all of ourselves brotherliness, non-interference, and respect for each other's sovereignty. Let us take these actions urgently lest the potential dangers should split wide open with a crash that would involve us all. Let us remember this when we talk of long-term measures: that they can be taken only in freedom and by the countries mainly concerned. Let it be those countries that will, in due time, if they wish and when they see fit, ask us to join with them in the evolving of such measures.

131. The delegation of India will welcome any constructive steps in line with the foregoing views, and, if necessary and desirable, will assist in their formulation and presentation to this Assembly. In that connexion, we might find it necessary, Mr. President, once again to seek your indulgence to come to this rostrum.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.