

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

Official Records



**735th
PLENARY MEETING**

Thursday, 14 August 1958,
at 3 p.m.

THIRD EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

New York

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Agenda item 5: Questions considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958 (<i>continued</i>).....	23

President: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEM 5

**Questions considered by the Security Council at
its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958 (*con-
tinued*)**

1. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan): This emergency special session of the General Assembly came about as a result of deep concern regarding the situation in the Middle East, which situation followed a deterioration of conditions in the Arab countries. Aggression by subversion, organized and directed from without, broke out vigorously in the area and intended to complete its course in Jordan. This tide of indirect attacks and disguised armed activities against the Arab countries will no doubt continue to rise until it covers all parts of the Arabian peninsula and North Africa. The future international complications will then be far more serious than at present and will be beyond the skill of international diplomacy.
2. The latest events in the Arab lands are preliminaries to further plans of aggression designed by the same source to dominate that important and strategic part of the world. The discussion of these events at such an important meeting, and on such a high level, necessarily and essentially demands a general survey of their causes and aims. Such causes and aims are sometimes intentionally or unintentionally misinterpreted and misrepresented by certain politicians and political commentators. Therefore, in order to lead a constructive discussion and to find an effective remedy for the present crisis in the Arab East, my delegation will try to describe the real picture of conditions in that area.
3. There is no doubt that there is in the region a violent struggle. But what kind of struggle is it and what are the driving powers behind it? Those who are not very familiar with the inhabitants and the history of that region describe it as Arab nationalism. They give it such identification even when it is a struggle among the Arabs themselves, and within the same nation, or even when it does not serve any national aspirations, and even when it is degraded to the level of sin and crime.
4. As an Arab, with an Arab background, and coming from an Arab country, I wish to put forward to the General Assembly, on behalf of my delegation, our remarks on this important subject of Arab nationalism.

It has become more or less the duty of every true Arab to save Arab nationalism from the ambiguities and abuse into which it has fallen.

5. It does not, however, escape my delegation that this subject is a purely Arab affair. But because it has been considered as a factor in the present crisis of the area we feel that it should be presented in its proper perspective.

6. Arab nationalism is not a new movement in the Arab world. Nor could any present Arab leader claim that it is his production. Arab nationalism rose in the latter part of the nineteenth century when the call for Arab aspirations was first heard in Lebanon and then echoed and developed into more practical ideas in other parts of the Arab homeland.

7. It was as early as 1911 and 1913 that the Arab national movement developed from concepts and feelings into serious talk and real preparations.

8. In 1916 the great Arab revolt broke out in the Hejaz under the leadership of late Hussein ibn-Ali and enveloped Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, led by the four sons of old King Hussein. That great Arab revolt, whose anniversary is still celebrated in several Arab countries, had as its first and ultimate aim the freedom, independence and unity of all the Arab countries.

9. From 1916 onwards, the Arab countries passed through national, political and military developments, marked by a series of minor national revolutions, until each Arab country individually and separately achieved its independence and sovereignty, with the exception of Palestine, whose problem is well known to everybody.

10. Yet, in spite of the establishment of several Arab States, the idea and feeling of Arab unity continued to exist and grow and develop, and to follow in its application a natural evolutionary pattern. The League of Arab States was founded and then the Arab Collective Security Pact.¹ Other agreements and pacts were concluded among some Arab States with the purpose of strengthening the ties of pan-Arabism and Arab unity to the strongest possible degree. In most of the Constitutions of the Arab States the emphasis is laid in the very first articles on the fact that the Arab country concerned is a part of the great Arab homeland, that its people are a part of the Arab nation, and that its policy is to achieve a complete Arab unity.

11. But in the last eight or nine years a new movement of violent political events has been introduced into the Arab region, a movement which set back Arab progress into a state of inter-Arab differences and conflicts.

12. In 1949 the President of the Syrian Republic, Shukri al-Kuwatly, who was the foremost national leader of Syria and the man who spent most of his seventy years in a struggle for his country, was over-

¹ Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty between the States of the Arab League, signed 17 June 1950.

thrown by the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, Colonel Husni Za'im, who later proclaimed himself as the President of Syria with the general consent of the Syrians.

13. Colonel Za'im was in turn overthrown by two other colonels who ruled the country successively. Each of them claimed national leadership and that he had won the general support of the nation. Yet, each of them ended with failure.

14. The Syrians then turned again to their old former President, who was living in exile. He, who had been thrown out by his own people, was called back by the same people and was again elected President of Syria. This fact upset the scales of true nationalism, and proves that real nationalism should not be confused with political events.

15. A regrettable outcome of the unconstitutional changes which took place in Syria in recent years was the suppression of a large number of nationalistic Syrian leaders. They were men who contributed substantially to the independence of their country, and who personally took part in the battle of national liberation. They now wither as prisoners in Syria doing hard labour, or are in compulsory confinement, or in exile, sentenced to death.

16. In spite of the natural progress of every nation with the passage of time, the unconstitutional political events that occurred in Syria in the past few years did not strengthen the Syrian national Government, which was already strong there, but they only established the military régime.

17. However, another political event took place in Egypt, as a result of which the King was dethroned and Colonel Mohammed Naguib came to power. Developments there led to the coming of Colonel Nasser, who became the President first of Egypt and then of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria.

18. Similarly, outstanding Egyptian statesmen and political leaders who were highly reputed nationally and internationally were no more on the scene.

19. It was a big task for the Government of the United Arab Republic to keep the internal situation under control unless the change in the régime could be justified by offering the people real gains and new conquests. But as public opinion was barred from expressing itself in the two parts of the United Arab Republic, questions were raised in Arab public opinion elsewhere regarding the achievements and failures of the new Egyptian régime in matters which were of concern to all the Arabs, or which fell within collective Arab responsibility.

20. Yet, for the sake of preserving solidarity, none of the Arab rulers failed to support President Nasser in every issue to the very end.

21. King Hussein of Jordan sided with President Nasser all the way. He signed with him a mutual defence pact. He placed his army under the command of the Egyptian Chief of Staff. An Egyptian officer was appointed in Jordan as commander of the military operations of the Jordanian armed forces. The King accepted President Nasser's word that he would replace British financial aid by an Egyptian contribution. King Hussein was ready to go along with President Nasser even further than that during the military attack against Egypt in 1956. He followed that line *vis-à-vis* President Nasser, prompted by true Arab nationalism and national brotherhood.

22. It was exceedingly disappointing to King Hussein to have been rewarded by hostility and enmity on the part of the Egyptian President, who seemed to have had certain aims in Jordan itself. This fact is the source of conflict and one of two basic factors in the present trouble in the Arab countries. It represents one side of Jordan's case in the present deliberations.

23. As the expansionist aims of Cairo failed to succeed in Jordan, they unfortunately found their way in Lebanon.

24. In Lebanon, the agents of the United Arab Republic were able to create disturbances against the lawful Government and the peaceful inhabitants, taking advantage of certain internal issues. Evidence of such interference has already been made available.

25. While trouble and bloodshed in Lebanon were welcomed and cherished in Cairo, another tragedy occurred in the Arab world, which made Cairo claim another success. A military coup took the lives of all the members of the royal family in Iraq. Cairo claimed a victory and considered this tragedy a successful Arab national movement.

26. What was not a coincidence was the fact that Moscow hailed the events in Iraq as much as Cairo did. The representative of the Soviet Union in the Security Council said on 17 July 1958: "Those who cherish the feelings of any country which wishes to achieve independence cannot fail to welcome the events in Iraq".² I should like to ask: What is it, in the view of Cairo and Moscow, which would make such an internal event in Iraq an Arab national movement? What Arab national programme has it got to offer, so that we all could cherish it? But it seems that there is a common reason for both Moscow and Cairo to welcome such events and any other possible similar events in the Arab countries.

27. This brings me to the second basic factor in the present troubles in the Middle East. The Soviet Union for its part seeks opportunities for penetrating the Middle East.

28. In this region, the Middle East, there is bitter feeling on the part of the Arabs because of the creation of Israel and because of the Algerian problem. There are also one million desperate Arab refugees receptive to any ideas which might raise their hopes and strengthen their morale. In the Arab countries there is a substantial degree of poverty and under-development.

29. The Soviets found an easy entry to the United Arab Republic through various doors. They concluded with it many agreements, relating to military, economic, technical, and cultural affairs and transportation. The two Powers worked jointly within the Arab zone.

30. The joint activities of these two Powers in the Arab homeland could better be described by the Jordan delegation in the light of the continued attempts of both forces against the present régime in Jordan. My delegation, therefore, wishes to submit to the Members of the General Assembly a documented report about the attempts at indirect aggression against my country. But to submit all the facts on all the attempts would consume a considerable part of the present debate. I shall therefore outline only the major incidents.

31. In April 1957, a state of chaos, inspired from outside, prevailed in Jordan. Students broke out of their schools and joined the mobs in revolutionary demon-

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirteenth Year*, 831st meeting.

strations, carrying red banners on one side and pictures of President Nasser on the other. For no apparent reason they were shouting slogans denouncing Western imperialism and hailing friendship with the Soviet Union. Pamphlets were scattered here and there against King Hussein and his régime. Explosions echoed everywhere. Certain government officials went around making fiery speeches to the crowds. Personal safety became uncertain. Shops and stores closed to avoid the mobs.

32. During that confusion a military *coup d'état* was plotted by the Chief of Staff against the King. The Chief of Staff ordered the encirclement of Amman, the capital, by one brigade. He ordered a number of officers at key posts to go out on manoeuvres. On the other hand, the disposition of the Syrian forces which were stationed in Jordan in accordance with the mutual defence pact with Syria was changed in such a way as to separate Amman from the northern district of Jordan, which borders Syria. Investigation later showed the existence of a big file of secret correspondence in the office of the Egyptian military commander at the headquarters of the Jordan Army in Amman. It contained information from him and instructions from Cairo about the progress of those events and "the weakening position of the Palace". Moreover, the Cairo broadcasting station and the Egyptian newspapers day and night kept calling upon the Jordanians to revolt. The situation deteriorated into actual fighting within the Jordanian armed forces between the loyalists and those misled by their officers. The King, therefore, asked his Prime Minister to resign, but the Prime Minister received a telegram from President Nasser of Egypt asking him not to do so.

33. King Hussein then took matters into his own hands, and by his personal courage restored order and re-established his authority. Details of the incident must surely be known to many of the representatives here.

34. The success of King Hussein on that occasion was the starting point for the launching of open hostility by Cairo against the King and his kingdom. Since then, the twenty-three-year old Hussein has become the target of Cairo and of Moscow. Since then, the Jordanians have been accused of lack of Arabism and nationalism.

35. We should like to take this opportunity to assure those in Cairo and those in Moscow that Arab nationalism is our cherished ideal. Its doctrines lie deep in the blood and spirit of every Jordanian. It derives from time immemorial throughout the long history of Arabism in Jordan. It shines from the first early conquests and victories of the Arabs in our homeland. It rises from the tombs of Arab martyrs buried in every spot in our native land. It is a necessity to our life and existence. It is the dream and hope of our future. Genuine Arab nationalism in Jordan is expressed in the tears and sighs of every Palestinian refugee whom we sheltered and with whom we share our loaf of bread. Arab nationalism is reflected in the high morale of our army that stands in defence of what is left of our dear Palestine. And Arab nationalism was proved in the real measures which our young and gallant King took to bring about unity among the sister Arab States, and in the first place with Egypt itself.

36. But because we refused to be subjects and because we wish to defend our independence and dignity, plots are continually being made against us and we are called traitors and imperialists.

37. The persistent attempts of the United Arab Republic to overthrow Jordan's constitutional régime continue in the form of propaganda, shameful Press at-

tacks, radio incitement, conspiracies and plots prepared in Cairo and Damascus or on the borders of the United Arab Republic with Jordan. Infiltration of terrorists and smuggling of large amounts of money and arms have gone on on a large scale. I am not going to describe in detail all the incidents of the smuggling of arms and money and the infiltration from the Syrian border into Jordan since the crisis of April 1957. Nor am I going to read extracts from what was written in the Egyptian and Syrian Press against King Hussein or what was said in the Cairo and Damascus broadcasting stations. That would cover a large number of pages and would consume considerable time. I will only refer to what has taken place very recently in giving examples of such activities.

38. A plot from within was discovered in Amman a few days before the Iraqi events. It involved a few army officers who are still under investigation.

39. Last week a wide network of espionage and saboteurs was discovered in Amman, a network which included government employees. They confessed that they had relations with the outside.

40. The following incidents happened from without during the last few weeks:

(1) On 10 July 1958 a Jordan army patrol detected near Wadi al Yitm a caravan approaching Jordan territory. Some of the infiltrators managed to escape when challenged, but the patrol managed to capture five of them and seized the five camels with their loads of twenty-six sacks containing 1,954 kilogrammes of high explosive (TNT), made in Egypt. Wadi al Yitm is situated to the south of the Dead Sea in the area of Ma'an in the Southern District.

(2) On 27 July 1958 a Jordan army patrol clashed with a band of eight infiltrators in Kafr Suhm on the Syrian border in the Northern District. Following an exchange of fire, the patrol wounded one of the infiltrators and captured the rest. The Jordan army patrol also seized all the arms, ammunition and explosives which the band was carrying. Investigation revealed clear intervention by Syrian army authorities and some wanted Jordanians now residing in Syria, whose sole purpose was fomenting trouble and disturbance in Jordan and causing instability there.

(3) On 29 July 1958 the Jordan Security Forces seized an arms cache on the Syrian-Jordanian border which served the infiltrators as an arsenal. Large quantities of these hidden arms, ammunition and explosives were confiscated.

(4) On the night of 30 July 1958, a Jordan army patrol observed an armed band of infiltrators with five horses crossing the Syrian border into Jordan, north-east of Ar Ramtha and proceeding towards the village of At Turrah. An exchange of fire with the band resulted in the killing of two horses and the capture of one member of this band whose name was Hassan Fahed whom investigation showed to be from Dar's and a member of a Kurdish clan. The rest of the band managed to escape into Syria, leaving behind all the arms, ammunition and explosives which they were carrying.

(5) Following is a list of quantities and type of arms which were captured by security forces in the second, third and fourth incidents mentioned above: 99 rifles (British manufacture) 2 anti-tank guns (Blenside); 18 cartridges for anti-tank guns (Blenside); 3 gun barrels; 32 Sten gun magazines of fifty rounds each; 2 Beretta gun magazines; 5,275 rounds of rifle am-

munition (British manufacture); 104 sticks of LOH explosive; 40 feet of safety cord; 27 detonators; 5 Bren guns; 107 Bren gun magazines; 22 Sten guns; 28 Sten gun magazines; 7,410 rounds of Sten gun ammunition; 81 bags of TNT; 40 feet of fuse; 10 timing detonators; 2,220 rounds of rifle ammunition (Czech manufacture). Photographers took several still, movie and television pictures of this arsenal.

(6) On 29 July 1958 an explosion took place in the British Consulate in Amman, while another explosion occurred on 2 August 1958 on the premises of the Jordanian Development Board. Earlier, a number of explosions had taken place in various places in the capital. The security forces succeeded in discovering the band that had carried out these activities and in capturing its members, who have clearly confessed in tape recordings and in written statements that they had direct connexions with the Syrian Deuxième Bureau [Intelligence Department] and that they were working under the guidance and directives of this office in order to disturb public security in Jordan.

41. Another kind of indirect aggression against Jordan is incitement by broadcasts. In addition to the radio network "Voice of the Arabs", the Cairo broadcasting network, and the Damascus radio station, there was heard recently a new station calling itself "the Jordanian People's Radio". The last one operates somewhere within Syrian territory near the Jordanian border. It was first heard at 2100 hours, Jordan local time, on 4 July. Its first address was to the students and young men in Jordan, calling on them to "attack the enemy of the people, Hussein and his Prime Minister, the imperialist".

42. I am not going to dwell on this part. All that I would say is that this station, with the three other stations in Cairo and Damascus, keeps playing these tunes day and night to the Jordanians.

43. Of late, the danger to Jordan has increased very considerably, and the threat to our independence became imminent. The Iraqi régime fell suddenly. The new rulers of Iraq immediately broke their union with Jordan. The Iraqi armed forces which were stationed in Jordan returned home.

44. My Government at that crucial moment received reliable information regarding a large-scale attack against Jordan planned to start from the United Arab Republic borders on 17 July 1958. We realized that all around our frontiers we were surrounded by hostility. We felt that the burden on our shoulders of maintaining public order and watching the very long frontiers all around the country had become too heavy. We therefore had no choice. We had to ask for help. We requested urgent help from certain democratic Powers. We asked the United Kingdom and the United States of America for such help. We appreciated their prompt response.

45. The Jordanian request was not made by the decision of the King alone or by Jordan's Council of Ministers alone. It was decided unanimously by the Jordanian National Assembly and approved by the Government and the King. The arrival of British forces in Jordan was received by the Jordanians with satisfaction and calm.

46. Jordan's request was based on its inherent right of self-defence in a state of emergency, a right recognized by the United Nations Charter. This request was made for defensive purposes and through constitutional and

democratic methods. The presence of the British troops in Jordan could not by any means, and in view of the present circumstances, be interpreted as intended for aggressive purposes.

47. Those who call for the withdrawal of these forces from Jordan under the existing circumstances mean, in fact, to give a free hand to indirect aggression against Jordan in particular and against the area in general. It is quite unreasonable to ask for withdrawal of these forces in the present hostile atmosphere prevailing all over the region. How could withdrawal be called for while attempts against the existence of Jordan continue daily, almost without interruption?

48. Having outlined the facts of our case, my delegation feels that we should now come to the constructive stage of dealing with this situation. It seems to us that there are various current ideas on how to bring about a settlement. I therefore wish to clarify the position of my Government.

49. The presence of British forces in Jordan is a temporary measure necessitated by the special circumstances in which Jordan was subjected to the threat of aggression and to conspiracies plotted from without. As soon as the Government of Jordan is convinced that the measures and arrangements taken by the United Nations will in fact ensure Jordan's integrity, safety and independence, the stationing of British forces in Jordan will no longer be required. Jordan will then ask for their withdrawal.

50. It becomes the responsibility of the United Nations, therefore, to decide on the adoption of practical arrangements to secure effective international guarantees which will prevent aggression, as well as direct and indirect interference, in the internal affairs of Jordan.

51. Such measures and arrangements must not envisage by any means the dispatch of United Nations forces or United Nations observers to be stationed on Jordan territory or to guard the Jordanian frontiers. My Government will oppose such decisions.

52. Jordan will continue to depend on its own army and its security forces in maintaining law and order within the State and in combating outside infiltration, smuggling of arms, and other means of destruction and sabotage.

53. What Jordan needs and asks for in this respect is effective material assistance which will provide the necessary funds and arms to reinforce and strengthen its army and security forces, so that they will always be on a satisfactory level of efficiency to accomplish their duties.

54. However, it is imperative that a stop should be put to hostile and provocative propaganda, both in broadcasting and in the Press. On this point my Government will not object to the establishment of a United Nations committee or a special international organ to monitor broadcasts and Press reports used for incitement and interference in other countries' internal affairs.

55. Having expressed our views, I feel I have to end my statement with the following expression of the sentiment of my delegation. How sad it is for the Jordan delegation to expose this real but unpleasant picture of the situation in the Arab countries. And how sad it is for an Arab to submit his complaint against his Arab brother. But we are compelled to do so. We are leading a battle imposed on us. What is at stake is our honour and our integrity. We therefore call upon every Arab,

whoever and wherever he may be, to appreciate the present dangerous situation in his homeland and its future consequences. We also appeal to the family of nations, meeting today in this great Organization, to take adequate steps to protect peace in our region and eventually in the whole world.

56. Mr. WALKER (Australia): Before addressing myself to the grave questions we are assembled to discuss, may I take this opportunity, Sir, to express the satisfaction of my delegation that the General Assembly in this emergency special session will continue to work under your capable and impartial presidency.

57. We are here to discuss the present serious situation in the Middle East. This situation results from the sustained attempts at intervention in the affairs of Lebanon and Jordan by a sister member of the League of Arab States. These interventionist activities became so serious and fraught with such grave dangers to the territorial integrity and political independence of those countries that they were impelled to complain to the United Nations. In the case of Lebanon the United Nations Observation Group was established, which has rendered useful service, but has encountered some difficulties in developing its activities. In Jordan no United Nations action has yet been taken. As the external pressure developed and the threat to the security of Lebanon and Jordan grew, their Governments made specific and urgent appeals to the United States and the United Kingdom for aid. The aid which they requested was the stationing of armed forces to assist them in defending themselves against the threat of armed aggression.

58. At this point, I think we should clear our minds on the origin and purpose of this debate. It was evident from Mr. Gromyko's remarks yesterday [733rd meeting] that the Soviet Union wishes to present as the primary objective of this present session of the Assembly the securing of the withdrawal of American and British forces from Lebanon and Jordan. This reflects a certain confusion in the mind of the Soviet Union delegation and that same confusion runs through the wording of the draft resolution it submitted [A/3870]. This emergency special session was convened because the Security Council, finding itself frustrated, unanimously adopted a resolution [A/3866] under the procedure set forth in the "Uniting-for-peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly [resolution 377 (V)]. I repeat, "unanimously"; even the Soviet Union representative voted for the resolution convening the Assembly. In what way was the Security Council frustrated? It was frustrated in that it had failed to reach any agreement on how to deal with the complaints made to it by Lebanon and Jordan. The preamble of the resolution calling this session, which the Council adopted on 7 August 1958, says this in black and white. It begins as follows:

"Having considered items 2 and 3 of document S/Agenda/838 . . ."

What were these two agenda items? If we refer to the document we find that they were as follows:

"2. Letter dated 22 May 1958 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council concerning: 'Complaint by Lebanon in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'.

"3. Letter dated 17 July 1958 from the representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council concerning: 'Complaint by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of interference in its domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic.'"

59. The immediate and most urgent task of the present session of the Assembly is to act on these complaints by Lebanon and Jordan where the Security Council has failed to act. The Assembly is called upon to take speedy and effective action to assist the Governments of the Lebanon and Jordan to protect their integrity and independence against the pressures that have been applied to them.

60. The Assembly has not been convened primarily for the purpose of considering and terminating the presence in Lebanon and Jordan of United States and United Kingdom forces that have entered those countries at the express request of their legally constituted Governments to assist their defence against threatened aggression, but we can be sure that, if the Assembly fully discharges its responsibility in relation to the Lebanese and Jordanian complaints, the withdrawal of the United States and United Kingdom forces will promptly follow. We all know that the action of the United States and the United Kingdom in responding to the requests of the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan for this assistance has been attacked by the State whose activities have been the subject of complaint by Lebanon and Jordan, namely, the United Arab Republic, and also by the Soviet Union. But there is no ground whatever for describing as intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon and Jordan the lending of the assistance which those States have officially requested.

61. It is the height of absurdity to suggest, as the Soviet Union delegation appears to suggest, that the Charter of the United Nations does not permit a country which considers itself threatened, and which has appealed to the United Nations for assistance that is not yet forthcoming, to request and to receive assistance from friendly countries. There is nothing in our Charter or in international law that forbids a nation from providing such assistance pending effective action by the United Nations to preserve the security of the country that is threatened. It would be a calamitous situation full of the most disquieting prospects for many small nations if the doctrine were accepted that it is illegal to lend military assistance when it is requested by a country facing the menace of aggression.

62. The Australian Government therefore fully endorses the action taken by the United States and the United Kingdom to assist Lebanon and Jordan in response to their request and commends the United States and the United Kingdom for the promptness with which they responded to these calls for help. Their action was a courageous one, taken as it was in an atmosphere of world tension in which both those Governments recognized the risks inherent in the situation. Their overriding consideration was the obligation of Members under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security. We have no doubt that their action has contributed to the preservation of the peace and has prevented a rapid deterioration of the security situation in the Middle East.

63. The Australian Government welcomes the declaration by the President of the United States before this Assembly that the United States reserves, within the spirit of the Charter, the right to answer the legitimate

appeal of any nation, particularly small nations [733rd meeting]. This, indeed, is the right of every Member State. On the other hand, we, too, would doubt whether any free Government in all the world would willingly forgo the right to ask for help if its sovereignty were imperilled.

64. The United States has given the United Nations the solemn assurance that its troops will be totally withdrawn whenever this is requested by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon or whenever, through action by the United Nations or otherwise, Lebanon is no longer exposed to the original danger. The United Kingdom has given the same assurance with regard to its forces in Jordan. We all hope that the withdrawal of these forces can take place in the very near future. The essential thing for the Assembly to do at this emergency special session is to take the action that will remove the danger of aggression from Lebanon and Jordan, and thereby permit the rapid termination of the military assistance that those Governments are at present receiving at their own request.

65. It is the earnest hope of the Australian Government that, as the General Assembly takes up this task, it will put aside the mutual recriminations that have characterized so much of the discussion of Middle East problems and will seize the opportunity, now presented, to lay the foundations for a constructive programme of peaceful development and progress throughout the region.

66. The Australian Government, like other Governments that share the world's anxiety over the dangers inherent in the Middle East situation, has been giving consideration to the sort of programme that might be acceptable to the United Nations, including, we would hope, the countries of the Middle East. Following this consideration by the Australian Government, the Australian Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Casey, in a statement before the Australian Parliament on 6 August 1958, indicated several proposals that the Government considered to be worth advancing at this stage. These proposals have already come to the attention of many delegations and I should like to refer to them briefly.

67. It may be too much to hope that the deep-seated antipathies, rivalries and imperialist ambitions underlying past crises in the Middle East can be eliminated at one stroke. But it seems to us that the first step is to endeavour to create an environment in which individual Middle East Governments can work out their policies free from external pressures.

68. It is indeed the inalienable right of all States small and large to work out their own destinies in their own way, and the United Nations must protect this right in the Middle East as elsewhere.

69. With a view to providing an assurance to the countries of the Middle East that their independence will not be jeopardized through threats and pressures from outside sources, the Australian Government would favour, first, the creation of a United Nations commission composed of representatives appointed by Governments and located in the Middle East. This commission would be charged by the General Assembly with the task of investigating, verifying and publicly reporting to the United Nations all external acts or threats of interference and subversion, whether direct or indirect, against countries in the Middle East. The commission should remain in force until the Middle East showed signs of enduring stability.

70. Secondly, the investigations of the commission, Mr. Casey suggested, would need to be supplemented by a United Nations police force which could be called upon at need to control threatened borders. Vigilance on the part of the commission, backed by action as required from the United Nations police force, could reduce tension and clear the way for the establishment of normal political relationships between the Governments of the countries concerned. It could also help to establish a calmer and more favourable atmosphere for the examination of the immediate and long-term problems of the area. The cost would be small in comparison with the recurring dangers to peace in the Middle East, with which we have been faced.

71. Thirdly, the aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East for economic advancement must be recognized. Economic development for the benefit of the peoples of the Middle East should be a matter of world interest founded on the concept of interdependence. This interdependence exists and cannot be denied. The Australian Government favours the creation of an international organization to assist countries of the Middle East to develop their resources and to develop mutually beneficial trade with the rest of the world. Progress in this direction, we believe, would facilitate the resettlement of nearly one million Palestinian Arab refugees, with Israel making its due contribution.

72. These suggestions were put forward by the Australian Government in the hope that they might contribute to the constructive consideration of a programme that would bring both peace and progress to the Middle East. Along such paths as these, we hope that Arab nationalism can find the fulfilment of its aspirations in harmony with the interests of the rest of the world and to the mutual advantage of all.

73. There have of course been other proposals from various sources that are worthy of consideration by this Assembly. The statement made by our respected Secretary-General at the first meeting of the present emergency session on 8 August 1958 [732nd meeting] contained a number of lines of possible action by the United Nations, which we know are receiving the careful consideration of Governments in the region and of other Members of the United Nations. Yesterday, the President of the United States placed before the General Assembly [733rd meeting] the elements of a generous and constructive programme which cannot fail to command the closest and most favourable consideration of this Assembly.

74. The Australian delegation is glad to find, in the Secretary-General's statement and in the programme expounded by President Eisenhower, and again in Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's statement this morning [734th meeting], a number of points in common with our own thoughts about this problem.

75. We welcome, for example, the great emphasis that is being laid on the need for co-operation among the countries of the Middle East and between the region and the rest of the world in the field of economic development. In the Middle East the disparity of wealth among States and the absence of continued economic development have made the area especially susceptible to political ferment, which itself has retarded development. I have had opportunity to refer to this matter on previous occasions. More than two years ago in a statement³ before the Security Council about the Middle

³ *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Year*, 723rd meeting, para. 98.

East I expressed my doubt whether there is any part of the world where there is a greater need for a more determined attack upon the evils of poverty, or greater opportunities for economic progress if the necessary resources could be provided to improve the productivity of the region. I was glad to hear the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, this morning, offer to give such help as may be within the power of the United Kingdom and acceptable to the countries concerned.

76. We welcome also the stress laid by President Eisenhower in his statement on the need for an expansion and intensification of international assistance to the countries of the Middle East in their campaigns against the appalling health problems of the region.

77. We see no reason why steps should not be taken in the course of the present emergency special session to initiate a great co-operative effort for social and economic progress in the Middle East, an effort to which many countries throughout the world will be ready to make their contribution—unless we fail to provide the framework of security without which it is impossible to make any effective attack on economic problems.

78. From what I have already said regarding the suggestions advanced by the Australian Government, it will be clear that we support the proposal of the United States that this Assembly should take action, looking toward the creation of a stand-by United Nations police force. We agree whole-heartedly with President Eisenhower's statement that the need for such a force in being is clearly demonstrated by recent events involving imminent danger to the integrity of two of our Members.

79. We also welcome the growing recognition of the need for the continued presence of the United Nations in the Middle East until such time as the danger of war between the countries of the region has receded. Moreover, this is part of the immediate practical problem that confronts the Assembly of affording Lebanon and Jordan protection against existing threats to their integrity and independence, and removing the need for the continued presence of United States and United Kingdom forces. The best method of organizing this continuing presence of the United Nations in the area clearly requires very careful consideration in consultation with countries of the area. Our suggestion for the establishment of a United Nations commission for the Middle East is advanced for consideration in this connexion. I may add that, when this matter was debated in the Australian Parliament a few days ago, the idea of a commission was supported by all parties.

80. We are ready to support, as a further practical measure, President Eisenhower's important proposal that the Assembly consider means for monitoring broadcasts directed across national frontiers in the Middle East [733rd meeting], a proposal which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has also commended to the Assembly. As we see it, the examination of complaints from nations that consider their security jeopardized by external propaganda might well be among the functions of the proposed United Nations commission.

81. These comments and suggestions are intended as a contribution to the constructive discussion by this Assembly of the problems before us and as indicating the sort of proposals that Australia will gladly support. We look forward to hearing the views and suggestions of other delegations and we realize the importance of acting swiftly to meet the most pressing dangers of the

present situation. This situation calls for a great effort of good will and a determination to carry out the principles of the Charter. We hope that all Members of the Assembly will approach this task in the spirit of the Charter.

82. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland): There is, I think, as this debate has already shown, very wide agreement in this Assembly on two things.

83. The first is that the situation in the Middle East represents a grave and continuing threat to world peace. That threat, over more than a decade, has been at times acute, at times apparently quiescent, but it has never been dissipated. We become indeed, after each crisis, more conscious of its gravity. Each nation represented here, no matter how remote geographically from the area, becomes increasingly aware that its own future and the future of the world may depend on what happens there, because world peace now hangs to such a disquieting extent on the choices that must be made in and concerning that strategic hub of the world, with its vital oil resources and communications facilities.

84. The second aspect on which, I believe, there would be fairly widespread agreement, is that the threat to the peace in the Middle East does not come exclusively from any one quarter. A threat to the peace existed before the United States and United Kingdom landings in Lebanon and Jordan: that threat was neither created by those landings, nor removed by them. If all those troops were withdrawn tomorrow one critical phase would be over, but the general threat would remain. It is bound to continue, we think, unless the nations represented here can take advantage of this crisis—and of the sense of urgency we all must feel in the presence of growing danger—in order to build a just and stable peace throughout the region as a whole. The Irish delegation believes that this peace, which is in all our interests, must be based on a comprehensive agreement covering all the major problems which cause tension and strife between the States of the area itself and between the great Powers.

85. The main responsibility for peace in the Middle East lies with the great Powers and with the Middle Eastern States themselves. But the other Member nations also have a responsibility, the obligation which a voice and a vote in this Assembly imply: to make the best contribution we can to an examination of all the outstanding problems of the area, evading none of them, and to suggest practical solutions according to the best of our judgement.

86. Events in Lebanon and Jordan were the immediate cause of the convoking of this emergency special session. Most of us would, I suppose, agree that the immediate problem is to enable the peoples of these States to determine their own futures freely, with no outside pressure of any kind. This Assembly will, no doubt, discuss a draft resolution aimed at that object, with a clause dealing with the withdrawal of the United States and United Kingdom troops. My delegation would certainly vote for any soundly-conceived draft resolution in that sense which might find support in this Assembly. But we must ask ourselves the question: is it realistic to suppose that such withdrawal in itself could end the threat of war ever present in this region?

87. We all know that the events which have taken place in Jordan and Lebanon are not an isolated phenomenon: that they are immediately related to what happened in Iraq a month ago; closely related to the consequences of events in Egypt two years ago; and

profoundly affected by decisions regarding Palestine more than ten years ago, and by the artificial fragmentation of the whole region thirty years ago. I understand the attitude of mind of those who say: "Let us not widen the debate. Have we not our hands full with the immediate problem?" "We cannot," they argue, "expect to reach agreement on the wider aspects of this complex, entangled and embittered situation." "Let us try therefore," they say, "to achieve, piecemeal, the best solution we can for each local crisis, in turn, as it comes up." That is a tempting attitude, and appears to be the practical approach. But, as we all know, the results to date of this one-at-a-time approach have not eliminated the basic problems which lead to the intensification of these recurring local crises.

88. The persistent threat of war in this region has, in the opinion of our delegation, been due to a failure to work for a general regional solution. Although the problems of the area are so closely interrelated that they can hardly be solved in isolation, there has been a tendency to treat them as a series of separate problems concerning individual States. They have been considered in terms of the foreign policy alignments and the vital resources of these States. In practice this approach has led to intensive diplomatic competition between the great Powers, a situation where Governments, favored by one or more of these Powers, are confronted by Oppositions, often revolutionary Oppositions, favoured by another Power. There follow accusations between the Powers: accusations of unfair competition, of imperialism, and of indirect aggression. In recent years every change or overthrow of a Government in the area, every shift of alliance, one might say every important political development of any kind, leads automatically to a sharp increase in international tension. Each such increase brings us near—perhaps a little nearer each time—to the ultimate calamity, the outbreak of general war.

89. This session of the Assembly will prove to have been a historic one if it can check that fatal drift which has brought three major crises in two years and if it can establish the outline of a general settlement in the Middle East region.

90. It is obvious that that is no easy task. Some of the key problems involved, without a solution of which no general settlement is possible, have been on the agenda of this Organization for years without any perceptible progress being made. Is it too much to hope that, as the terrible dangers inherent in the situation have come so sharply into focus in recent weeks, a greater will to find practical solutions may make itself felt? If that is so, our delegation will be happy to support, to co-sponsor or to help in framing any constructive, general draft resolution which proposes comprehensive and adequate solutions, capable of establishing good-neighbourly relations between the States of the region and of freeing them from their present dangerous involvement in the rivalry of the great Powers.

91. The exact form which such a draft resolution would take would have, of course, to be the subject of very careful discussion among a number of delegations. It may, however, be not altogether amiss, even at this stage, for the delegation of a country like Ireland, which is in a detached geographical position and has no military or economic commitments in the area, and no share in the fateful decisions taken regarding it in the past, to state what, in its view, might represent the outline of a comprehensive settlement.

92. The area for which the special attention of the Assembly and special measures are required consists principally of the Arab States of the Middle East and Israel—that is to say, the region comprising Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab Republic and Israel.

93. Our delegation believes that a just and stable settlement in this region ought to include the following.

94. First, a recognition that the right of self-determination, enshrined in the Charter, includes the right of all States in this region either to maintain their separate existence or to unite or federate with one another. This implies that if the Arab States of the region demand political unity, they shall not be impeded by outsiders in the achievement of this goal, nor shall outside interests determine what form that unity should take, or what its leadership should be. It has been gratifying to note that in recent weeks this principle has been gaining more and more widespread acceptance. Its formal endorsement by this Assembly should not, I imagine, give rise to any insuperable difficulties.

95. The second point for a settlement would be a declaration by this Assembly that the neutrality of the whole region, guaranteed by the United Nations and recognized by the great Powers, would be in the interest of world peace. In addition, Members should be asked to undertake not to supply atomic weapons or long-range bombers or missiles to the region, or maintain such weapons or equipment there; and that Member States in the region itself should be asked to undertake not to acquire or manufacture such weapons or equipment. The endorsement of this principle by the United Nations could, I believe, be an important contribution not only to peace in the area, but towards the creation of a psychological atmosphere favourable to negotiation for peace in other critical areas.

96. Neutrality would be obviously in the interests of the people of the region itself, for if this vital strategic area does not become neutral, it cannot hope to escape immediate devastation in time of war, involving the destruction of its cities, communications and productive centres, and the radio-active poisoning of its scanty agricultural and water resources.

97. Again, the neutrality of the region is in accord with the natural interest of each of the great Power groups as the neutrality of Austria has proved to be. This would ensure that, if they cannot use the region themselves, it will not be organized and equipped as a base of attack against them. This non-use by a potential enemy of the region as a developed modern war-base is, so far as we can judge, the best that either group can now hope to achieve short of a successful war. The principle of regional neutrality, if it is accepted, should imply also the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States of the area, and, if necessary, its enforcement by the United Nations. The cessation of violent propaganda and incitement would logically follow such an agreement. I may add that even at the present stage a propaganda truce would make it very much easier to reach such an agreement.

98. The third point, and in many ways the most difficult, concerns Israel. I know that, because of the great difficulties of this problem and the tremendous emotional forces involved, many delegations are tempted to set it aside and to restrict their attention to more approachable and less forbidding aspects of the Middle Eastern question. Unfortunately, experience suggests that this aspect cannot be ignored. Unless better relations be-

tween Israel and its Arab neighbours are made possible there can be no lasting peace in the Middle East. To attempt to find a solution for the domestic problem in Jordan, for example, without taking into account the terrible Arab-Israel antagonism is, in essence, to treat a symptom without examining the root causes of the disease. The United Nations should now, we believe, make a supreme effort to reduce that antagonism. Here, our delegation would like to make a concrete proposal.

99. Most people agree that the greatest embittering factor between Israel and its Arab neighbours is the position of the Arab refugees. As we know, the refugees demand for each individual the choice between repatriation and compensation. Israel, however, refuses to re-admit any significant number of refugees. The compensation which the refugees demand is not only for the property they have lost, but also for the damage suffered by them because of their expulsion from what is now Israel. Israel, I understand, does not refuse compensation, but limits it to property lost and stipulates that it should form part of a general agreement, including recognition of Israel by the Arab States—a recognition which the Arab States refuse.

100. That deadlock is perhaps the greatest single obstacle to the establishment of peace in the Middle East region at present. It represents, therefore, a serious threat not only to local peace, but to world peace. In that situation should not the United Nations be prepared to undertake a really extraordinary effort to break the deadlock? If so, we think that it is in guaranteeing full compensation to the refugees—compensation by the United Nations—that the greatest hope of a solution lies. And we should remember that, even if the most generous terms were given to every refugee, the total cost would be much less than the damage that might be caused by a single hydrogen bomb.

101. The refugees are seeking not merely material help and rehabilitation. They are seeking either rehabilitation or compensation with all that that word implies—an acknowledgement that they have been injured, that they are the victims of a wrong. The Irish delegation thinks that that acknowledgement is owed to the refugees; they have been wronged; they have the right not merely to generosity, but to justice. But we repudiate the idea that their injury is the result of Israel's actions alone or that Israel alone ought to be required to carry the full burden of compensation.

102. There is no need here to recapitulate the tragic series of promises, decisions and conflicts which have led to the present desperate enmity between Jew and Arab—these two great Semitic peoples who have contributed such wonderful pages to the history of mankind, both of whom endured persecution, oppression and betrayal over the centuries. It would be worse than useless, however, now to attempt to apportion blame for the events of which this enmity is the bitter fruit. But while we should not waste time in recrimination, in considering what can now be done we must recall that there is hardly a major Power free from a share in that responsibility and that, finally, some of the key decisions have been taken here in this Assembly.

103. In these circumstances, would it not be fitting and fruitful for peace if this Assembly were to acknowledge that the refugees are entitled to compensation for the property they have lost and the damage they have suffered by reason of their expulsion and exclusion from their homes, and to assume responsibility—this

Assembly to assume responsibility—for that compensation? If the Assembly is willing to assume that responsibility, this long-drawn-out and terrible human and political problem might at last be within sight of a solution. The Secretary-General could inform the refugees that in all cases where repatriation was not practicable at present the United Nations was prepared to assume responsibility for full compensation. Israel would be invited to state in these circumstances how many refugees it was prepared to receive back and how much it would contribute to the compensation scheme. The Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, would arrange for the repatriation of the maximum number of refugees and for full compensation—not merely resettlement—for the remainder. As far as the refugees are concerned, although in some cases individuals might be denied the repatriation they desire, they would collectively benefit more from the operation of such a scheme, both morally and materially, than from either the continuance of the *status quo* or any other probable outcome. As far as the United Nations is concerned, this solution would be costly, but it would be less costly—even if every member of every family were given \$1,000—than the alternative: the maintenance of the refugees in the camps indefinitely. Certainly it would lift a heavy political and psychological mortgage from the area as a whole, and not least from Israel itself, and from one of the States—Jordan—whose situation this emergency special session has been summoned to consider.

104. If this problem is put on the way to settlement, it would greatly facilitate the attainment of satisfactory solutions for the remaining problems which must be faced if a general settlement is to be attained. The improvement in Arab-Israel relations which ought to be ushered in by progress on the refugee problem should, in particular, help to bring about a just solution of the problem of the Holy Places, under an international régime which would be responsible for their preservation and accessibility. This problem also, in the inflamed atmosphere of the past years, has made no progress toward solution. Surely, however, if the general atmosphere can be improved this Organization can achieve what, throughout the world, Christians, Jews and Moslems so profoundly desire: the effective protection of the Holy Places in Palestine.

105. Improvement in Arab-Israel relations should also make possible a general convention under United Nations auspices for the protection of civil, religious, educational and cultural rights, both for native minorities and other residents. Such a convention should provide for legitimate commercial access to the resources and communications of the region on the same basis as is expected of a neutral State.

106. The many countries, both in the East and West, which regard access to the oil and to the air, sea, canal and pipe-line communications of the area as almost a necessity, would find in such a freely negotiated convention a better and more enduring safeguard of their interests than political or military intervention has ever been able to provide. The convention would be of no less benefit to the States and peoples of the region itself. Matters which have in the past offered occasion for endless disputes, boycotts, tensions and difficulties for the individual States of the region, and which have led other countries to develop super-ships and new oil resources, would henceforth be the subject of

orderly proceedings within an international organization of which the Middle East States were influential members.

107. It is clear that an integral part of any general plan for stabilizing the area should be a Middle East development organization, set up by the Middle Eastern States themselves, as suggested yesterday by the President of the United States [733rd meeting]. There is a similar organization already in Europe, of which my country is a member, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. This organization has proved to be one of the most successful examples of peaceful international co-operation that the world has ever seen. Through a similar organization for the Middle East, to which the United Nations should give every support and assistance, all outside State grants and loans to that region, or to any part of it, should be channelled, as President Eisenhower has emphasized, and should be used co-operatively to raise the standard of life of the peoples instead of increasing their war potential. Both the oil-rich States in the area and the oil companies operating there should be invited to invest, through the organization, in the development of the region as a whole.

108. Although our delegation fully realizes the difficulties of securing a just and stable peace in this entangled and inflamed area, we are convinced that a general declaration by the United Nations on some such lines as these, improved and strengthened by the collective wisdom of this Assembly and backed by its authority, should be made at this session.

109. Finally, may I say that all our interests, whether they are based on considerations of ordinary humanity, of special sympathy with Israel or the Arabs, of economic needs or of concern for our common fate under the impelling threat of general war, impose upon us the duty and the necessity to find a way of ending this sinister deadlock.

110. If, by dint of quiet negotiations, assisted by the devoted exertions of our Secretary-General, a convention can be reached along the lines of the suggestions I have made, we believe it would not only secure a drawing back of foreign forces from Lebanon and Jordan, but would be the opening of a new and happier chapter for all the peoples in the Middle East. Not only that, but by abolishing the causes of war in the most critical strategic areas in the world, by laying a broad carpet of peace between the great Powers, by assisting the development of resources and communications which are the lifeblood of modern civilization, this Assembly would be building a model for similar settlements in other troubled parts of the world. Thus we would transform, with God's help, these sorely tormented lands which were once the cradle of civilization into the prototype of the world we want.

111. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): Let me first of all, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, greet the representatives of States Members of the United Nations who have gathered here and express the hope that the results of this emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly will justify the hopes of world public opinion and contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the Near and Middle East and throughout the world.

112. This session has met to discuss the grave threat to peace and security in the Near and Middle East which has arisen as a result of United States armed interven-

tion in Lebanon and United Kingdom armed intervention in Jordan. The United States, seeking to suppress the nationalist movement in Lebanon and to increase that country's dependence on the United States, took as pretexts for its intervention the entirely unfounded complaint of the Lebanese Government that the United Arab Republic is allegedly organizing subversive activities against Lebanon, and the made-to-order request for United States military aid made by the then President, Mr. Chamoun, which violated the Lebanese Constitution. As far as Jordan is concerned, the United Kingdom, under an agreement with the United States, intervened for the purpose of keeping a régime which is contrary to the national interest in power in that country.

113. The present situation in the Near and Middle East is particularly dangerous in view of the fact that United States and United Kingdom intervention has not been halted despite the many vigorous protests made by the Governments of the peaceful countries of the world and by world public opinion; on the contrary, the United States and the United Kingdom are continuing to land further interventionist forces in both countries. The stratagem of the United States, which first landed many thousands of interventionist troops in Lebanon and now, on the eve of this session, has announced the withdrawal of one battalion of its forces, in fact alters nothing.

114. The emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly was convened after the talks in the Security Council failed to bring about the desired results, owing to the negative attitude of the Governments of the Western Powers.

115. Notwithstanding the fact that open intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East had taken place and that the threat of military conflict hung over the world, the United States and the United Kingdom, that is, the interventionists themselves, through the exercise of pressure prevented the Security Council, on which the United Nations Charter confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, from taking effective measures to bring about the immediate cessation of intervention and the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom forces from Lebanon and Jordan. This was made easier by the fact that the majority of members of the Security Council are States which are members of aggressive military groups and that the seat in the Security Council of the legitimate representative of the People's Republic of China is still unlawfully occupied by an agent of the Chiang Kai-shek clique.

116. Thus, the United States and the United Kingdom, by stipulating one new condition after another and delaying negotiations by obstructionist tactics, frustrated the attempt of the Government of the USSR to secure the convening of a summit meeting with the participation of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

117. The proposal of the Soviet Government was that this conference should take urgent measures to terminate the military venture which has been initiated in the Near and Middle East. There can be no question that the holding of such a conference would have greatly contributed to the settlement of the dangerous situation in the Near and Middle East and would have been a major contribution to the strengthening of peace and of the security of nations.

118. As a result of the continuation of the colonialists' armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan the danger of a military conflict still weighs heavily on the Near and Middle East. This is profoundly disturbing to the peaceful peoples of the world, who want to put an end once and for all to imperialist intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab countries and to strengthen peace in the Near and Middle East.

119. The Czechoslovak Government, through its official statements, has made known its position with regard to the United States-United Kingdom intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. Those statements express the great indignation which the arbitrary acts of the imperialists have aroused among the Czechoslovak people, which is demanding that the intervention should be halted immediately. The Czechoslovak people at the same time expresses its sincere sympathy with the just struggle of the Arabs for the freedom and independence of their countries and is convinced that no matter how hard that struggle may have been, no matter how hard it may yet be, it is bound to end in complete victory for the Arab people.

120. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic was one of the first Governments to recognize the young Republic of Iraq. I take this opportunity to greet the people of the Republic of Iraq on behalf of the Czechoslovak people and to congratulate it on its liberation and attainment of true independence.

121. The sequence of events in the Near and Middle East cannot be considered separately from the course of events in the world at large. They form an essential part of the world-wide movement towards national liberation against which the imperialists are today waging a struggle that is foredoomed to failure. After the considerable weakening of the positions of the colonial Powers as a result of the Second World War, the gradual disintegration of colonial imperialism throughout the world is being hastened by the steady growth of the national liberation movement among the peoples of Asia and Africa, who made their voices heard so strongly at Bandung.

122. Nor can the countries of the Near and Middle East stand aside from this great historical process. From time immemorial, this area has been the object of the selfish commercial designs of the imperialist Powers. Apart from their endeavours to retain strategic positions and control in the Near and Middle East, where three continents meet, the imperialists are also trying to preserve and strengthen the weakening hold of their oil monopolies. However deceptive the perfume they spray over their actions, the smell which assails the nostrils is still that of oil.

123. The successes of the Arab peoples in their struggle for national liberation, as reflected particularly in the creation of the United Arab Republic, in the overthrow of the hated monarchical régime in Iraq and in the growth of popular resistance in Lebanon to a government which is the servant of foreign interests, aroused the profound hostility of the imperialist Powers and led eventually to their armed action against Lebanon and Jordan.

124. The armed intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom in Lebanon and Jordan is the outcome of the systematic colonialist policy which the two Powers have been pursuing in their relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East. The use of armed force to preserve imperialist interests is the

inevitable result of the nature of the foreign policy the United States and the United Kingdom have been following in the Near and Middle East with the help of the aggressive Baghdad Pact and the notorious Eisenhower doctrine.

125. The present serious situation in the Near and Middle East is due to the application of this doctrine and the responsibility for the situation therefore rests entirely with the ruling circles of the United States. The aggressive policy the United States has recently been pursuing in the Near and Middle East has finally torn from the faces of United States leaders the mask of "friends of independence" for the Arab countries, and has shown them to be in the forefront of the colonial Powers who are striving to stifle the national liberation movement in the countries of the Arab East and to restore colonial domination over them.

126. The Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower doctrine constitute a grave danger to the independence of the Arab countries, aiming a blow at their sovereignty and endangering their security. Is it not convincing evidence of the aggressive character of this doctrine that Lebanon, whose Government accepted the Eisenhower doctrine a year ago, is today the victim of United States armed intervention? That is why the Arab countries have firmly repudiated and continue to repudiate both the Eisenhower doctrine and the Baghdad Pact. Events in the United Arab Republic and the young Republic of Iraq show that the liberated Arab people are resolved to go their own way and will never allow a return to the old colonial order.

127. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, in their endeavour to mislead public opinion and give their actions an appearance of legality, have even invoked the United Nations Charter and in particular Article 51. This article recognizes the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.

128. But can it be used to justify the armed intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon and Jordan? There has been no armed attack either against Lebanon or against Jordan. Allegations about the interference of the United Arab Republic in the domestic affairs of Lebanon have also been refuted by the Observation Group sent to Lebanon by the Security Council, which, accordingly, confirmed the internal political character of the events in Lebanon. The only armed attack which has taken place was, precisely, the armed intervention of the United States in Lebanon and of the United Kingdom in Jordan. It is evident, therefore, that the invoking of Article 51 of the Charter by the United States and the United Kingdom was intended by both Governments to serve as a screen for the real purposes of their intervention.

129. Lebanon and Jordan are independent and sovereign States. No one has given the United States and the United Kingdom the right to settle their domestic affairs. The task of solving all the problems of Lebanon and Jordan, including their present internal political crises, is one for these countries alone. Thus the invoking of Article 51 of the Charter cannot in any way alter the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom, by their armed intervention in the Near and Middle East, have blatantly violated the provisions of the United Nations Charter and have presented the United Nations with a *fait accompli*.

130. The armed intervention in Lebanon has finally demolished the legend that the United States is the

champion of the liberty of small peoples. This is just another example of its gross interference in the affairs of small countries which are struggling for their independence and for freedom from United States influence. The history of United States imperialism provides many other such examples from Latin America and other parts of the world.

131. The ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom are also trying to cloak their military intervention in the Near and Middle East and to exchange the role of accused for that of accuser by talking about "indirect aggression". The United States, in particular, is again brazenly indulging in its well-known practice of accusing other countries of what it is itself doing on a large scale. It is the United States which is guilty of interference and subversive activity in these countries. We shall be buying the lesson dearly, it seems to us, if we learn it from those who have practised indirect aggression themselves.

132. Under its Mutual Security Act the United States makes an annual appropriation of no less than \$100 million to finance subversive activity against the socialist countries: inflammatory broadcasts are made from Radio Free Europe; military units are formed from refugees; spies and diversionists are sent into socialist countries; balloons have systematically been released over them, a policy of economic discrimination adopted against them, and so on. United States leaders are again proclaiming the doctrine of the so-called "liberation" of the East European peoples. From a whole series of these provocative statements we may, for instance, cite the one made by Secretary of State Dulles in August 1952 in which, describing United States policy regarding the "liberation" of the East European countries, he said that the policy of liberating the "enslaved" peoples from the Communists would be carried out as follows:

"The Voice of America and other agencies would begin to stir up the resistance spirit behind the Iron Curtain, letting Poles, Czechs and others know they had the backing of the United States Government; . . . the resistance movement would spring up amongst patriots who could be supplied and integrated via airdrops and other communications."

The object of all these subversive campaigns is to overthrow the lawful Governments of these countries, with the majority of which the United States maintains normal diplomatic relations.

133. The United States and the United Kingdom are carrying on similar intrigues and hostile activities against countries in other parts of the world too, including the countries in the Near and Middle East.

134. The direct military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan was preceded by a reactionary coup in Jordan, pressure on Syria, and the planning of a number of conspiracies against the United Arab Republic. The United States and the United Kingdom have been conducting indirect aggression, in various forms, against the Arab countries for many years; their manoeuvring with the threat of some sort of indirect aggression allegedly imperilling the countries of the Near and Middle East cannot, therefore, deceive anyone.

135. In this connexion the Czechoslovak delegation feels compelled to voice the most vigorous protest and to refute the statements of United States leaders who claim that the great victory of the Czechoslovak people over reaction in February 1948 is an example of in-

direct aggression. Everyone today knows quite well that the events of February 1948 took a perfectly constitutional and parliamentary form and were the expression of the will of the Czechoslovak people. If there was any intervention in that instance, then it was committed by the United States itself which, in February 1948, supported attempts at a reactionary *putsch* by the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, which was seeking to restore the capitalist régime in the Czechoslovak Republic.

136. Czechoslovakia thus has plenty of experience of United States intervention in its domestic affairs. Another aspect of this intervention is the further attempt of the United States to bring up the so-called question of the East European countries for discussion in this international forum. The Czechoslovak people wholeheartedly condemn these attempts as inadmissible intervention in the domestic affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, and as contrary to the United Nations Charter and the generally accepted principles of international law. The Czechoslovak people chose its destiny freely and will never allow anyone to divert it from the road to socialism. Mr. Antonín Novotný, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, when talking with journalists in March this year, strongly condemned the attempts of the United States Government to discuss the situation in the East European countries in this international body. In the course of this interview he said, among other things, that the position taken by the United States was in sharp contradiction with reality, since the countries of Eastern Europe were sovereign and independent States with the majority of which—including the Czechoslovak Republic—the Government of the United States maintained diplomatic relations.

137. Whatever pretext the United States and the United Kingdom use to justify their open armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab countries—whether they refer to their concern for the integrity and independence of Lebanon or to their desire to help the Jordanian Government defend itself against indirect aggression—it is clear to everyone that the real motive behind the present United States and United Kingdom armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan is to maintain or recover their former colonial positions in the Near and Middle East and to establish a strategic base for action against the USSR and other socialist countries.

138. The Czechoslovak people have never had any illusions about the policy of the United States and the other imperialist countries. The current military venture of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Near and Middle East proves once more to the whole world that, when it is to safeguard their own selfish interests, the colonizers have no scruples—despite all their claims of being humanitarian and peace-loving—about using their armed forces and confronting the world with an immediate danger of military conflict.

139. The United States and the United Kingdom embarked on their military intervention in the Near and Middle East at the very time when the Soviet Union, anxious to reduce international tension and to strengthen world peace, had unilaterally called a halt to nuclear weapons tests, at the very time when it was making great efforts to bring about a summit meeting to consider, in addition to other urgent and pressing aspects of international relations, the danger arising from the situation in the Near and Middle East.

140. The socialist countries have taken other steps to try to restore trust between peoples, and have suggested to the Western Powers various measures which would have contributed greatly to the easing of international tension.

141. I may mention, for instance, in this connexion, the further unilateral reduction of 419,000 in the strength of the armed forces of the countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty, Czechoslovakia's share being 20,000 men; the Polish Government's proposal for the setting up in Europe of a zone free from atomic weapons and missiles; the proposal that a non-aggression pact should be concluded between the States participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and those participating in the Warsaw Treaty; the proposal for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and co-operation between European States, and so on.

142. International peace and security have been prejudiced by the fact that, as a result of the negative attitude taken by the Governments of the Western Powers, these valuable proposals by the Governments of the USSR and the other socialist countries have so far remained without effect.

143. The danger of the outbreak of a new war has not been averted, and the course of international events demands that all countries should make the utmost effort to ensure that controversial issues are settled by peaceful means alone, and that there should be a wider application of the principles of the peaceful coexistence of States with differing political, economic and social systems.

144. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, seeking to ease international tension and increase peaceful co-operation among peoples, has therefore proposed that an item entitled "Measures aimed at implementation and promotion of principles of peaceful coexistence among States" should be included in the agenda of the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

145. Cessation of imperialist interference in the domestic affairs of countries and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination are a means of strengthening security and easing international tension in the Near and Middle East and throughout the world.

146. As far back as 11 February 1957, the Government of the Soviet Union proposed to the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments that a general declaration should be drawn up in which the basic principles for ensuring peace and security in the Near and Middle East, particularly the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States, would be confirmed and adopted by the Powers. Under this proposal, the participating countries would pledge themselves, in their relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East, to maintain the peace and settle controversial issues through negotiation, not to interfere in those countries' domestic affairs, to respect their sovereignty and independence, and not to draw them into military blocs. The proposal further envisaged the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from these countries, the cessation of arms shipments to the area, and economic assistance to these countries with no political, military or other conditions of any kind incompatible with their sovereignty and independence.

147. The Soviet Government's unshakable desire to ensure the peaceful development of the Near and Middle

East found renewed expression in its proposals of January 1958, published by the TASS News Agency, that the Near and Middle East should become a peace zone in which no nuclear weapons and missiles would be produced or installed, a zone of good-neighbourly relations and friendly co-operation among States.

148. The Czechoslovak Government, carrying out the will of the Czechoslovak people, pursues toward the countries of the Arab East a policy of peaceful coexistence and close co-operation which promotes, in particular, the economic development of the Arab countries. The desire to prevent interference by the imperialist Powers and to ensure the peaceful development of the Arab countries is obvious in all its actions.

149. In 1956, Czechoslovakia hailed the nationalization of the Suez Canal and strongly opposed the aggression of the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt, demanding that the aggressors should bear full responsibility for their actions. In 1957, the Czechoslovak Government vigorously condemned the preparations for aggression against Syria. Our country's desire to ensure peace and security in the Near and Middle East also found expression in the Czechoslovak Government's statement of 15 February 1957 supporting the Soviet proposal that the Great Powers should adopt a general declaration on the Near and Middle East, and our Government, for its part, showed its willingness to adhere to such a declaration.

150. I could cite a whole series of official documents in which the Czechoslovak Government warned against the dangerous designs of the imperialist Powers, which threatened the peace of the Near and Middle East. At the present time, too, Czechoslovakia, together with other peace-loving States, stands firmly on the side of the Arab people, which is fighting for freedom and independence.

151. The imperialist intervention of the United States in Lebanon on 15 July 1958 and that of the United Kingdom in Jordan on 17 July 1958 have been severely censured by the Czechoslovak people. They have evoked a wave of protests throughout Czechoslovakia, demanding an end to imperialist interference and recognition of the Arab peoples' right to independence.

152. The Czechoslovak Government, in its statements of 17 and 19 July and 6 August 1958, categorically condemned this aggression.

153. As this session convenes, the situation in the Near and Middle East remains grave. The number of United States interventionist troops in Lebanon is already considerably greater than the total strength of the Lebanese Army. Similarly, the number of United Kingdom troops in Jordan continues to increase. The United States and the United Kingdom have concentrated in those countries substantial armed forces, which have become a constant threat to the peace and security of the region.

154. On 12 August 1958, the USSR delegation submitted a draft resolution [*A/3870 and Corr.1*] which offered a practical method for putting an end to this situation that threatens peace and security in the Near and Middle East.

155. The Czechoslovak delegation fully supports this proposal and demands the immediate withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan. In order to observe the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon might be

strengthened and a similar observation group might be sent to Jordan.

156. The Czechoslovak delegation, for its part, will do all that it can to see that the effective steps are taken to restore peace and security in the Near and Middle East and, above all, that the interventionist troops are withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan without delay. We are certain that, given good will, an appropriate and effective solution will be found so that the primary purpose of the present session will be achieved.

157. The Czechoslovak Republic, which maintains broad relations with the Arab countries and which is extending to them economic and technical assistance, is prepared to take an active part in discussing the various proposals concerning the economic development of the Near and Middle East countries.

158. However, discussion of these proposals at the present time when no decision has been reached on the immediate withdrawal of the interventionist troops, whose presence in the Near and Middle East constitutes a serious threat to peace, would have the effect of diverting attention from the primary purpose of the present emergency special session of the General Assembly.

159. The Czechoslovak delegation is convinced that at the present session of this most representative of all United Nations bodies, in which the small and large nations alike are represented, steps can be taken, if there is good will and understanding, that will help to remove the danger of a military conflict created by the armed intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom, and, consequently, will help to ensure peace and security in the Near and Middle East.

160. It is also indisputable that, if it successfully performs this task, the third emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly will bring much closer to reality a summit conference of Western and Eastern statesmen to consider the possibility of solving the most vital problems on the contemporary international scene, the urgent need for such discussion having just been underlined by the events now occurring in the Near and Middle East.

161. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (*translated from French*): I did not intend to speak today but the accusations levelled against us by the representative of Jordan force me to make a few comments. I do not intend to reply in detail today to all that has been said; I reserve the right to do so at the proper time. I shall not linger now on the historical considerations in Mr. Rifa'i's speech; I shall merely confine myself to replying to some of his accusations.

162. The representative of Jordan referred, *inter alia*, to the infiltration of arms. To support his case, he mentioned cases where arms are alleged to have been found and introduced by infiltrators. I have already replied in the Security Council to accusations of the same kind from Jordan. These accusations are very vague. They concern isolated cases, which have not been proved and which cannot, in any case, be laid at the door of any particular Government. It is unnecessary to repeat that during revolutions, in times of tension, the conflicting parties can always manage to obtain arms, particularly light arms.

163. Mr. Rifa'i also mentioned radio broadcasts. All I need to do in reply is to refer you to Amman Radio and the clandestine stations which are continually attacking the United Arab Republic. I could quote some

broadcasts, both clandestine and official, from Jordan. I have the text here; but, out of regard for the prestige of this Assembly, I am reluctant to do so. However, if any of my colleagues wish to read these broadcasts, I am ready to show the text to them at any time.

164. Furthermore, the Chief of State of Jordan has unfortunately directly attacked the Chief of the United Arab Republic on many recent occasions and this has been reported in the Press everywhere.

165. Today, Mr. Rifa'i spoke of events which occurred more than a year ago. Why has he waited until today to bring these questions to the fore once more? The answer is very simple. These events have been revived to justify what has just happened in Jordan, I mean, the landing of British troops. My conclusion is very clear. This is nothing but malicious propaganda to justify the appeal of the Chief of State of Jordan for British troops to be sent back to this part of the world and remain there.

166. I cannot but note, furthermore, that the recent attitude of the present Government of Jordan is unlikely to relax the tension in this part of the world. The Government of Jordan has, for instance, broken off diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic on the pretext that the latter recognized the new Government of Iraq.

167. Moreover, the Chief of State of Jordan has stated on several occasions that he intends to liberate Iraq, asking the help of the Iraqi people in overturning the new Government, merely because the sovereign of Jordan wished, contrary to the wishes of the Iraqi people, to be king of the former Arab Union, a union which the new Government of Iraq immediately repudiated.

168. Thus, these accusations are intended only to justify the presence of British troops. No one is threatening Jordan. It is Jordan which is making belligerent statements and if there is a disturbed situation in that country, that is due to internal reasons of which you are all aware.

169. The Jordanian Government does not seem to enjoy the confidence of the Jordanian people. I could prove what I am saying and read you the comments of the international Press, which has devoted a great deal of space to this question recently. The question has been discussed even in the British Parliament, in the House of Commons, but, notwithstanding all that has been said by the representative of Jordan, I do not wish to discuss the internal situation in Jordan here at the United Nations. I shall therefore not dwell on this point.

170. However, in his statement today, the representative of Jordan emphasized the fact that his Government did not wish to have the United Nations in Jordan. Every Government is free to adopt whatever attitude it sees fit but I have a question to ask. Does the Government of Jordan—and this is what is serious—prefer British forces to continue to occupy its country? If so, it must take responsibility for this before history and before the Arab States and peoples.

171. As the head of my delegation stated yesterday [733rd meeting], we shall feel injured and threatened as long as British troops remain. World peace also is injured and threatened as long as British forces are not withdrawn from Jordan because the presence of foreign troops in this part of the world cannot but be a threat to the maintenance of peace and security. One of the

greatest problems stems from the fact that the present Government of Jordan does not have the support of the Jordanian people and calls in foreign troops. This was very well stated by Lord Attlee, the former British Prime Minister, in the House of Lords on 18 July 1958 when he said that:

“Where a Government had no control over its own people and called in foreign assistance, there was reason to doubt whether the British Government should accept the invitation.”

I do not think that I need comment on this statement by an eminent British statesman.

172. I regret that I have been obliged to make this short statement. We have not come here to make recriminations and accuse each other. We have come here to find satisfactory and constructive solutions to these problems in the interest of the Arab peoples, in accordance with the Charter and in co-operation with the members of this august Assembly.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.