

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

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RECUEIL

DES ARRÊTS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

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CONDITIONS DE L'ADMISSION D'UN ÉTAT  
COMME MEMBRE DES NATIONS UNIES  
(ARTICLE 4 DE LA CHARTE)

**AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 28 MAI 1948**

**1948**

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

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REPORTS

OF

JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

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CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION OF A STATE  
TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS  
(ARTICLE 4 OF THE CHARTER)

**ADVISORY OPINION OF MAY 28th, 1948**

Le présent avis doit être cité comme suit :

« *Admission d'un État aux Nations unies (Charte, art. 4),  
avis consultatif : C. I. J. Recueil 1948, p. 57.* »

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This Opinion should be cited as follows :

“*Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4),  
Advisory Opinion : I.C.J. Reports 1948, p. 57.*”

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## INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

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General List :  
No. 3.

CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION OF A STATE  
TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS  
(ARTICLE 4 OF THE CHARTER)

*Request for advisory opinion in virtue of Resolution of General Assembly of United Nations of November 17th, 1947.—Request does not refer to actual vote but to statements made by a Member concerning the vote.—Request limited to the question whether the conditions in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter are exhaustive.—Legal or political character of the question.—Competence of the Court to deal with questions in abstract terms.—Competence of the Court to interpret Article 4 of the Charter.—Legal character of the rules in Article 4.—Interpretation based on the natural meaning of terms.—Considerations extraneous to the conditions of Article 4. Considerations capable of being connected with these conditions.—Procedural character of paragraph 2 of Article 4.—Subordination of political organs to treaty provisions which govern them. Article 24 of the Charter.—Demand on the part of a Member making its consent to the admission of an applicant dependent on the admission of other applicants.—Individual consideration of every application for admission on its own merits.*

## ADVISORY OPINION.

*Present : President GUERRERO ; Vice-President BASDEVANT ;  
Judges ALVAREZ, FABELA, HACKWORTH, WINIARSKI,  
ZORIĆIĆ, DE VISSCHER, Sir Arnold McNAIR, KLAESTAD,  
BADAWI PASHA, KRYLOV, READ, HSU MO, AZEVEDO.*

THE COURT,

composed as above,

gives the following advisory opinion :

On November 17th, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the following Resolution :

*“The General Assembly,*

*Considering* Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Considering* the exchange of views which has taken place in the Security Council at its Two hundred and fourth, Two hundred and fifth and Two hundred and sixth Meetings, relating to the admission of certain States to membership in the United Nations,

*Considering* Article 96 of the Charter,

*Requests* the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following question :

Is a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article? In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State?

*Instructs* the Secretary-General to place at the disposal of the Court the records of the above-mentioned meetings of the Security Council.”

By a note dated November 24th, 1947, and filed in the Registry on November 29th, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Registrar a copy of the Resolution of the General Assembly. In a telegram sent on December 10th, the Secretary-General informed the Registrar that the note of November 24th was to be regarded as the official notification and that certified true copies of the Resolution had been despatched. These copies reached the Registry on December 12th, and the question was then entered in the General List under No. 3.

The same day, the Registrar gave notice of the request for an opinion to all States entitled to appear before the Court, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 66 of the Statute. Furthermore,

as the question put mentioned Article 4 of the Charter, the Registrar informed the Governments of Members of the United Nations, by means of a special and direct communication as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 66, that the Court was prepared to receive from them written statements on the question before February 9th, 1948, the date fixed by an Order made on December 12th, 1947, by the President, as the Court was not sitting.

By the date thus fixed, written statements were received from the following States: China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Canada, United States of America, Greece, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Iraq, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Australia. These statements were communicated to all Members of the United Nations, who were informed that the President had fixed April 15th, 1948, as the opening date of the oral proceedings. A statement from the Government of Siam, dated January 30th, 1948, which was received in the Registry on February 14th, i.e., after the expiration of the time-limit, was accepted by decision of the President and was also transmitted to the other Members of the United Nations.

By its Resolution the General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General to place at the disposal of the Court the records of certain meetings of the Security Council. In accordance with these instructions and with paragraph 2 of Article 65 of the Statute, where it is laid down that every question submitted for an opinion shall be accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon it, the Secretary-General sent to the Registry the documents which are enumerated in Section I of the list annexed to the present opinion<sup>1</sup>. A part of these documents reached the Registry on February 10th, 1948, and the remainder on March 20th. The Secretary-General also announced by a letter of February 12th, 1948, that he had designated a representative, authorized to present any written and oral statements which might facilitate the Court's task.

Furthermore, the Governments of the French Republic, of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, of the Kingdom of Belgium, of the Czechoslovak Republic, and of the Republic of Poland announced that they had designated representatives to present oral statements before the Court.

By decision of the Court, the opening of the oral proceedings was postponed from April 15th to April 22nd, 1948. In the course of public sittings held on April 22nd, 23rd and 24th, the Court heard the oral statements presented

—on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, by its representative, Mr. Ivan Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Legal Department ;

<sup>1</sup> See page 116.

—on behalf of the Government of the French Republic, by its representative, M. Georges Scelle, Professor at the Faculty of Law of Paris ;

—on behalf of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, by its representative, Mr. Milan Bartoš, Minister Plenipotentiary ;

—on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, by its representative, M. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, D.C.L., Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Division for Peace Conferences and International Organization at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ;

—on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, by its representative, Mr. Vladimír Vochoč, Professor of International Law in Charles University at Prague ;

—on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Poland, by its representative, Mr. Manfred Lachs, *Professeur agrégé* of International Law at the University of Warsaw.

In the course of the hearings, new documents were filed by the representatives accredited to the Court. These documents are enumerated in Section II of the list annexed to the present opinion <sup>1</sup>.

\* \* \*

Before examining the request for an opinion, the Court considers it necessary to make the following preliminary remarks :

The question put to the Court is divided into two parts, of which the second begins with the words "In particular", and is presented as an application of a more general idea implicit in the first.

The request for an opinion does not refer to the actual vote. Although the Members are bound to conform to the requirements of Article 4 in giving their votes, the General Assembly can hardly be supposed to have intended to ask the Court's opinion as to the reasons which, in the mind of a Member, may prompt its vote. Such reasons, which enter into a mental process, are obviously subject to no control. Nor does the request concern a Member's freedom of expressing its opinion. Since it concerns a condition or conditions on which a Member "makes its consent dependent", the question can only relate to the statements made by a Member concerning the vote it proposes to give.

It is clear from the General Assembly's Resolution of November 17th, 1947, that the Court is not called upon either to define the meaning and scope of the conditions on which admission is made dependent, or to specify the elements which may serve in a concrete case to verify the existence of the requisite conditions.

<sup>1</sup> See page 119.

The clause of the General Assembly's Resolution, referring to "the exchange of views which has taken place...", is not understood as an invitation to the Court to say whether the views thus referred to are well founded or otherwise. The abstract form in which the question is stated precludes such an interpretation.

The question put is in effect confined to the following point only: are the conditions stated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 exhaustive in character in the sense that an affirmative reply would lead to the conclusion that a Member is not legally entitled to make admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided for in that Article, while a negative reply would, on the contrary, authorize a Member to make admission dependent also on other conditions.

\* \* \*

Understood in this light, the question, in its two parts, is and can only be a purely legal one. To determine the meaning of a treaty provision—to determine, as in this case, the character (exhaustive or otherwise) of the conditions for admission stated therein—is a problem of interpretation and consequently a legal question.

It has nevertheless been contended that the question put must be regarded as a political one and that, for this reason, it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court cannot attribute a political character to a request which, framed in abstract terms, invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty provision. It is not concerned with the motives which may have inspired this request, nor with the considerations which, in the concrete cases submitted for examination to the Security Council, formed the subject of the exchange of views which took place in that body. It is the duty of the Court to envisage the question submitted to it only in the abstract form which has been given to it; nothing which is said in the present opinion refers, either directly or indirectly, to concrete cases or to particular circumstances.

It has also been contended that the Court should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms. That is a mere affirmation devoid of any justification. According to Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute, the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise.

Lastly, it has also been maintained that the Court cannot reply to the question put because it involves an interpretation of the Charter. Nowhere is any provision to be found forbidding the Court, "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations", to exercise in regard to Article 4 of the Charter, a multilateral treaty, an interpretative function which falls within the normal exercise of its judicial powers.

Accordingly, the Court holds that it is competent, on the basis of Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute, and

considers that there are no reasons why it should decline to answer the question put to it.

In framing this answer, it is necessary first to recall the "conditions" required, under paragraph 1 of Article 4, of an applicant for admission. This provision reads as follows :

"Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."

The requisite conditions are five in number: to be admitted to membership in the United Nations, an applicant must (1) be a State; (2) be peace-loving; (3) accept the obligations of the Charter; (4) be able to carry out these obligations; and (5) be willing to do so.

All these conditions are subject to the judgment of the Organization. The judgment of the Organization means the judgment of the two organs mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 4, and, in the last analysis, that of its Members. The question put is concerned with the individual attitude of each Member called upon to pronounce itself on the question of admission.

Having been asked to determine the character, exhaustive or otherwise, of the conditions stated in Article 4, the Court must in the first place consider the text of that Article. The English and French texts of paragraph 1 of Article 4 have the same meaning, and it is impossible to find any conflict between them. The text of this paragraph, by the enumeration which it contains and the choice of its terms, clearly demonstrates the intention of its authors to establish a legal rule which, while it fixes the conditions of admission, determines also the reasons for which admission may be refused; for the text does not differentiate between these two cases and any attempt to restrict it to one of them would be purely arbitrary.

The terms "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States which...." and "*Peuvent devenir Membres des Nations unies tous autres États pacifiques*", indicate that States which fulfil the conditions stated have the qualifications requisite for admission. The natural meaning of the words used leads to the conclusion that these conditions constitute an exhaustive enumeration and are not merely stated by way of guidance or example. The provision would lose its significance and weight, if other conditions, unconnected with those laid down, could be demanded. The conditions stated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 must therefore be regarded not merely as the necessary conditions, but also as the conditions which suffice.

Nor can it be argued that the conditions enumerated represent only an indispensable minimum, in the sense that political considerations could be superimposed upon them, and prevent the admission of an applicant which fulfils them. Such an interpreta-



tion would be inconsistent with the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 4, which provide for the admission of "*tout Etat remplissant ces conditions*"—"any *such* State". It would lead to conferring upon Members an indefinite and practically unlimited power of discretion in the imposition of new conditions. Such a power would be inconsistent with the very character of paragraph 1 of Article 4 which, by reason of the close connexion which it establishes between membership and the observance of the principles and obligations of the Charter, clearly constitutes a legal regulation of the question of the admission of new States. To warrant an interpretation other than that which ensues from the natural meaning of the words, a decisive reason would be required which has not been established.

Moreover, the spirit as well as the terms of the paragraph preclude the idea that considerations extraneous to these principles and obligations can prevent the admission of a State which complies with them. If the authors of the Charter had meant to leave Members free to import into the application of this provision considerations extraneous to the conditions laid down therein, they would undoubtedly have adopted a different wording.

The Court considers that the text is sufficiently clear; consequently, it does not feel that it should deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself.

The Court furthermore observes that Rule 60 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council is based on this interpretation. The first paragraph of this Rule reads as follows:

"The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and accordingly whether to recommend the applicant State for membership."

It does not, however, follow from the exhaustive character of paragraph 1 of Article 4 that an appreciation is precluded of such circumstances of fact as would enable the existence of the requisite conditions to be verified.

Article 4 does not forbid the taking into account of any factor which it is possible reasonably and in good faith to connect with the conditions laid down in that Article. The taking into account of such factors is implied in the very wide and very elastic nature of the prescribed conditions; no relevant political factor—that is to say, none connected with the conditions of admission—is excluded.

It has been sought to deduce either from the second paragraph of Article 4, or from the political character of the organ recommending or deciding upon admission, arguments in favour of an interpretation of paragraph 1 of Article 4, to the effect that the fulfilment of the conditions provided for in that Article is necessary before the admission of a State can be recommended or decided upon, but that it does not preclude the Members of the Organization from advancing considerations of political expediency, extraneous to the conditions of Article 4.

But paragraph 2 is concerned only with the procedure for admission, while the preceding paragraph lays down the substantive law. This procedural character is clearly indicated by the words "will be effected", which, by linking admission to the decision, point clearly to the fact that the paragraph is solely concerned with the manner in which admission is effected, and not with the subject of the judgment of the Organization, nor with the nature of the appreciation involved in that judgment, these two questions being dealt with in the preceding paragraph. Moreover, this paragraph, in referring to the "recommendation" of the Security Council and the "decision" of the General Assembly, is designed only to determine the respective functions of these two organs which consist in pronouncing upon the question whether or not the applicant State shall be admitted to membership after having established whether or not the prescribed conditions are fulfilled.

The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment. To ascertain whether an organ has freedom of choice for its decisions, reference must be made to the terms of its constitution. In this case, the limits of this freedom are fixed by Article 4 and allow for a wide liberty of appreciation. There is therefore no conflict between the functions of the political organs, on the one hand, and the exhaustive character of the prescribed conditions, on the other.

It has been sought to base on the political responsibilities assumed by the Security Council, in virtue of Article 24 of the Charter, an argument justifying the necessity for according to the Security Council as well as to the General Assembly complete freedom of appreciation in connexion with the admission of new Members. But Article 24, owing to the very general nature of its terms, cannot, in the absence of any provision, affect the special rules for admission which emerge from Article 4.

The foregoing considerations establish the exhaustive character of the conditions prescribed in Article 4.

\* \* \*

The second part of the question concerns a demand on the part of a Member making its consent to the admission of an applicant dependent on the admission of other applicants.

Judged on the basis of the rule which the Court adopts in its interpretation of Article 4, such a demand clearly constitutes a new condition, since it is entirely unconnected with those prescribed in Article 4. It is also in an entirely different category from those conditions, since it makes admission dependent, not on the conditions required of applicants, qualifications which are supposed to be fulfilled, but on an extraneous consideration concerning States other than the applicant State.

The provisions of Article 4 necessarily imply that every application for admission should be examined and voted on separately and on its own merits; otherwise it would be impossible to determine whether a particular applicant fulfils the necessary conditions. To subject an affirmative vote for the admission of an applicant State to the condition that other States be admitted with that State would prevent Members from exercising their judgment in each case with complete liberty, within the scope of the prescribed conditions. Such a demand is incompatible with the letter and spirit of Article 4 of the Charter.

FOR THESE REASONS,

THE COURT,

by nine votes to six,

is of opinion that a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, is not juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article;

and that, in particular, a Member of the Organization cannot, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State.

The present opinion has been drawn up in French and in English, the French text being authoritative.

Done at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-eighth day of May, one thousand nine hundred and forty-eight, in two copies, one of which shall be placed in the archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

*(Signed)* J. G. GUERRERO,  
President.

*(Signed)* E. HAMBRO,  
Registrar.

Judges ALVAREZ and AZEVEDO, whilst concurring in the opinion of the Court, have availed themselves of the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the opinion a statement of their individual opinion.

Judges BASDEVANT, WINIARSKI, MCNAIR, READ, ZORIČIĆ and KRYLOV, declaring that they are unable to concur in the opinion of the Court, have availed themselves of the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the opinion a statement of their dissenting opinion.

*(Initialled)* J. G. G.

*(Initialled)* E. H.

## ANNEX.

## LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT.

I.—DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED IN THE COURSE OF THE  
WRITTEN PROCEEDINGS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

1. Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (S/96/Rev. 3. January 27th, 1948) <sup>1</sup>.
2. Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly (A/520. December 12th, 1947) <sup>1</sup>.
3. Rules governing the admission of new Members (Report of the Committee of the General Assembly) (A/384, p. 4, September 12th, 1947) <sup>1</sup>.
4. Report by the Executive Committee to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (PC/EX/113/Rev. 1. November 12th, 1945) <sup>1</sup>.
5. Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (PC/20. December 23rd, 1945) <sup>1</sup>.
6. Records of the Security Council Committee of Experts Meetings concerning the Rules on the Admission of new Members <sup>1</sup>:

1946.	S/Procedure 91.
	"    91, Corr. I.
	"    92.
	"    93.
	"    93, Corr. I.
	"    94.
	"    99.
	"    99, Corr. I.

1947.	S/C.I/SR.96.
	"    96, Corr. I.
	"    101.
	"    102.
	"    103.
	"    104.

7. Records of the meetings of the Joint Committees appointed by the General Assembly and the Security Council on Rules governing the admission of new Members <sup>2</sup>:

<sup>1</sup> These documents arrived at the Registry on February 10th, 1948.

<sup>2</sup> These documents arrived at the Registry, partly on February 10th, partly on March 20th, 1948.

- A/AC.II/SR.I.  
 „ SR.I, Corr. I.  
 „ SR.2.  
 „ SR.2, Rev. I.  
 „ SR.3.  
 „ SR.3, Rev. I.  
 „ SR.4.  
 „ SR.5.  
 „ SR.6.  
 „ SR.7.  
 „ SR.8.  
 „ SR.8, Corr.  
 „ SR.9.  
 „ SR.10.  
 „ SR.11.

8. Report of the Security Council Committee on the admission of new Members, 1946 (*Security Council Official Records*, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 4, p. 53)<sup>1</sup>.  
 9. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly on the admission of new Members, 1946 (A/108, October 15th, 1946)<sup>1</sup>.  
 10. Records of the Security Council Meetings concerning the admission of new Members, 1946.  
*Security Council Official Records*, First Year, Second Series<sup>2</sup>:

- No. 1.  
 „ 2.  
 „ 3.  
 „ 4.  
 „ 5.  
 „ 18.  
 „ 23.  
 „ 24.  
 „ 25.

*Security Council Journal*, First year, No. 35.

11. Records of the First Committee Meetings of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly concerning the admission of new Members, 1946<sup>2</sup>:

- Journal 22, Suppl. No. 1—A/C.I/22.  
 „ 24, „ „ 1—A/C.I/31.  
 „ 25, „ „ 1—A/C.I/37.  
 „ 26, „ „ 3—A/C.3/43.  
 „ 27, „ „ 1—A/C.I/39.  
 „ 28, „ „ 1—A/C.I/41.  
 „ 29, „ „ A—A/P.V.47.  
 „ 31, „ „ 1—A/C.I/45.  
 „ 32, „ „ —A/C.I/47.  
 „ 37, „ „ A—A/P.V.48.  
 „ 38, „ „ A—A/P.V.49.

<sup>1</sup> These documents arrived at the Registry on February 10th, 1948.

<sup>2</sup> These documents arrived at the Registry, partly on February 10th, partly on March 20th, 1948.

12. Records of the Plenary Meetings of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly concerning the admission of new Members, 1946<sup>1</sup>. (Journal No. 66, Supplement A—A/P.V. 67.)
13. Report of the Security Council Committee on the admission of new Members, 1947. *Security Council Official Records*, Second Year, Special Supplement No. 3, Lake Success, New York, 1947<sup>1</sup>.
14. Reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly on the admission of new Members, 1947 (A/406. October 9th, 1947.—A/515. November 22nd, 1947)<sup>1</sup>.
15. Records of the Security Council Meetings concerning the admission of new Members, 1947.

*Security Council Official Records*, Second Year, No. 38<sup>2</sup>:

S/P.V.136.	S/P.V.186.
S/P.V.137.	S/P.V.190.
S/P.V.151.	S/P.V.197.
S/P.V.152.	S/P.V.204.
S/P.V.154.	S/P.V.205.
S/P.V.161.	S/P.V.206.
S/P.V.168.	S/P.V.221.
S/P.V.178.	S/P.V.222.

16. Records of the First Committee Meetings of the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly concerning the admission of new Members, 1947<sup>2</sup>:

A/C.1/SR. 59.
„ 59, Corr. 1.
„ 59, Corr. 2.
„ 97.
„ 98.
„ 99.
„ 100.
„ 101.
„ 102.
„ 102, Corr. 1.
„ 102, Corr. 2.
„ 103.

17. Records of the meetings of the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly concerning the admission of new Members, 1947<sup>1</sup>:

A/P.V.83.	A/P.V.89.
„ 84.	„ 90.
„ 85.	„ 92.
„ 86.	„ 96.
„ 87.	„ 117.
„ 88.	„ 118.

<sup>1</sup> These documents arrived at the Registry on February 10th, 1948.

<sup>2</sup> These documents arrived at the Registry, partly on February 10th, partly on March 20th, 1948.

## II.—DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO DURING THE ORAL PROCEEDINGS.

A.—*List of annexes mentioned in the statement by Mr. Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations :*

*Annex 1.* First Committee. Verbatim record of the 98th Meeting (Nov. 7th, 1947). Statement by the representative of Belgium (pp. 72-81).

*Annex 2. Ibidem.* 99th Meeting (Nov. 7th, 1947). Statement by the representative of Poland (pp. 41, 42).

*Annex 3. Ibidem.* Remarks by the representative of Australia (pp. 74, 93).

*Annex 4. Ibidem.* Remarks by the representative of the U.S.S.R. (pp. 242-250, 251).

*Annex 5. Ibidem.* 100th Meeting (Nov. 8th, 1947). Remarks by the representative of India (pp. 52-53).

*Annex 6. Ibidem.* Remarks by the representative of Argentina (p. 161).

*Annex 7. Ibidem.* Remarks by the representative of China (pp. 14-20).

*Annex 8. Ibidem.* 101st Meeting (Nov. 8th, 1947). Remarks by the representative of the United Kingdom (pp. 103, 104-110).

*Annex 9. Ibidem.* 102nd Meeting (Nov. 10th, 1947). Remarks by the representative of Greece (p. 6).

*Annex 10. Ibidem.* 103rd Meeting (Nov. 10th, 1947). Remarks by the representative of El Salvador (p. 41).

*Annex 11.* Facts relating to the admission of new Members provided by documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (U.N.C.I.O.).

*Annex 12.* Admission of new Members.

B.—*List of annexes mentioned in the statement by M. Kaeckenbeeck, representative of the Belgian Government :*

Extract from the book by Dr. Dietrich Schindler, *Die Schiedsgerichtbarkeit seit 1914 (Entwicklung und heutiger Stand)*.

Extract from the book by H. Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law in the International Community*.

United Nations. General Assembly. Doc. A/474 (Nov. 13th, 1947).

*Idem.* Doc. A/P.V.113 (Nov. 14th, 1947).

*Idem.* Doc. A/459 (Nov. 11th, 1947).

*Idem.* Doc. A/459, Corr. 1 (Nov. 13th, 1947).