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Prefatory Note

The papers published in this volume relate to field missions sent by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to report on conditions in various countries. In general the records of American participation in interallied missions are not printed here. The records of the American sections of two interallied missions, the Interallied Military Mission to Hungary and the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, are published in this volume. General H. H. Bandholtz was sent to Hungary as the American member of the Interallied Military Mission. However, as his reports sent directly to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace are so voluminous and so informative regarding conditions in Hungary over a period of several months, these reports are included here with those of the distinctly American observation missions. H. C. King and Charles R. Crane were technically the American representatives on the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, but only the American section was duly constituted and sent to the Near East. It became, therefore, in fact purely an American mission.

Omitted from this volume are documents concerning American field missions the reports of which have already been published in other volumes of *Foreign Relations*. The reports of the first Dresel Mission to Germany are printed in [volume II of this series, pages 130](#) ff., and those of the Coolidge Mission up to January 16, 1919, are printed [ibid., pages 218](#) ff. For information regarding the mission of William C. Bullitt to Russia, see [Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pages 74](#) ff., and for the reports of American observers in South Russia, see [ibid., pages 750](#) ff. For papers relating to the mission headed by Henry Morgenthau to report on relations between Jews and non-Jews in Poland, see [Foreign Relations, 1919, volume II, pages 772](#) ff. For papers regarding the American Military Mission to Armenia headed by General James G. Harbord, see *ibid.*, pages 824 ff.

List of Papers

FIELD MISSIONS OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

THE GHERARDI MISSION TO GERMANY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 30 (501)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Organization and personnel of the Gherardi Mission to Germany, sent for the purpose of investigating general situation.	1 [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1]
Feb. 2 (2)	<i>Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report that political situation is critical; active resistance by Spartacists to government troops in Bremen, Düsseldorf, and Eisenach.	2 [Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3]
Feb. 4 (6)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Colonel Williams, G-2, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz (tel.)</i> For Gherardi: Expression of appreciation for information conveyed in telegram No. 2 of February 2; suggested topics for investigation.	2 [Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3]
Feb. 4	<i>Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Analysis of present provisional government and instability of political situation; rumor that anti-government uprisings will occur on February 6.	3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4]
Feb. 6 (2)	<i>Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on Spartacist uprisings; agreement of volunteer troops to support government.	5 [Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5]

Feb. 8 (3)	<i>Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that political situation remains unsettled; Ebert's opening speech at the National Assembly (text printed) protesting severity of armistice conditions and advocating a strong socialist government.	7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6]
Feb. 11 (4)	<i>Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on change in political atmosphere; expectation that the government will assert, in dealing with the Peace Conference, that refusal of its claims will result in the Bolshevism of Germany.	12 [Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7]
Feb. 12 (H. H. F. No. 4)	<i>Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report of arrival in Munich and first impressions; animosity of general public toward Eisner, Social-Democratic Premier of Bavaria.	13 [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]
Feb. 15 (5)	<i>Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Opinion of the French Mission under General Dupont that the present government is growing more reactionary; indication that press considers Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech on German foreign policy (<i>infra</i>) to be very broad-minded.	14 [Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9]
Feb. 15	<i>Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Text of speech delivered by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, Foreign Minister, before the German National Assembly, Weimar, February 14.	15 [Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10]
Feb. 16 (157)	<i>The Minister to the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report that Brockdorff-Rantzau in framing future foreign policy considers it to be of first	26 [Pg. 26 includes portions of

	importance that he learn American opinion regarding his speech.	Doc. 10 and Doc. 11
Feb. 17	<i>The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Major Arnold Whitridge</i> List of instructions for the continuation of the work of the Gherardi Mission.	27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12]
Feb. 18 (6)	<i>Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Inability to supply military data requested by General Churchill's office; protestations of the press over the new armistice conditions.	28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13]
Feb. 21 (2)	<i>Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on efforts of Spartacists and Independent Socialists to control German industries; political character of the National Assembly.	29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14]
Feb. 22 (H. H. F. No. 9)	<i>Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on Bavarian political situation, including account of assassination of Bavarian Premier Eisner by a student and assault on Auer by left extremists.	31 [Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15]
Feb. 24	<i>Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Summary of the German political and economic situation as of the end of February 1919.	33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16]
Feb. 26 (24)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Colonel Williams, G-2, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz (tel.)</i> For Franklin Day for transmission to Dr. Field at Munich: Expression of appreciation for services rendered, and instructions for termination of Mission.	37 [Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18]
Feb. 26 (921)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	37 [Pg. 37 includes

	Information that a gradual withdrawal of the members of the Mission has been decided upon; reasons for withdrawal.	portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18]
Feb. 26 (H.H.F. No. 11)	<i>Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Loss of prestige of moderate government group following assassination of Eisner, and strengthening of leftist movement.	38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19]
Feb. 27	<i>Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that murder of Eisner has precipitated outbreak of radical movements in many parts of Germany; belief in Berlin that strike movement in industrial regions is prelude to a second revolution.	41 [Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20]
Feb. 28 (968)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Reports from several members of the Gherardi Mission indicating that country is in a state of constant political flux, that food and employment are necessary in Bremen and Hamburg to make present quiet condition permanent.	43 [Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]
Mar. 1	<i>Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on political situation; negotiations between government and strikers in Halle and Saxon industrial district; growth of radical tendencies among masses, who are convinced that democracy, as represented by the National Assembly, has failed and that signs of the second revolution are ominous.	44 [Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22]
Mar. 2	<i>Major Lindsay Blayney to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Résumé of impressions of conditions in western Germany based on visit to Cassel and	47 [Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23]

	Frankfort; opinion that authorities are doing all in their power to avert the hardship caused by unemployment and lack of food, fuel, and raw materials.	
Mar. 4	<i>Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on general strike in Berlin, voted on March 3 by Convention of Workmen's Councils of Greater Berlin.	48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24]
Mar. 6 (1034)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that withdrawal of members of the Gherardi Mission has been effected. Reports from Day in Berlin that government is losing ground within its own party and the masses are becoming more radical; his opinion that only remedy for situation is immediate dispatch of food and raw materials.	51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26]
Mar. 6	<i>Report on Economic and Political Conditions in Silesia, Prepared by Captain Robert L. Black, Lieutenant Albert H. Stonestreet, and Field Clerk A. L. Rosenthal</i> Text of report.	51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26]
Mar. 14 (H.H.F. No. 13)	<i>Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Synthesis of impressions gained during stay in Munich, revealing that Bavarian particularist sentiments are taking the form of distinct separatist demands.	66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 27]
Mar. 15 (H.H.F. No. 14)	<i>Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on Bolshevism in Bavaria; recommendation that food, raw materials, moral aid, and military occupation are means of combating the spread of Bolshevism.	68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28]
Mar. 17 (H.H.F.	<i>Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i>	72 [Pg. 72 includes

No. 16)	Report on attitude in Bavaria toward militarism and the disarmament of Germany.	portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29
Mar. 19	<i>Report by Lieutenant George Howe</i> Report on the confused political situation in Munich.	74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 30]
Mar. 19 (H.H.F. No. 17)	<i>Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on conversations with various Austrians and Bavarians regarding the movement for the union of German Austria with Germany.	77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31]
Mar. 20 (H.H.F. No. 18)	<i>Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Dietrich, in which he emphasized the paramount interests of Baden in saving the navigation of the upper Rhine.	79 [Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

THE SECOND DRESEL MISSION TO GERMANY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Apr. 11	<i>The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Colonel David H. Biddle, American Liaison Officer, Cologne</i> Notification of the organization of the Dresel Mission to Berlin, and instructions to make arrangements for the accommodations of Mr. Dresel and his party en route.	82 [Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]
Apr. 20	<i>Colonel Williams, Third Army, A. E. F., to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Dresel via General Harries: Interview with Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, who expressed his reluctance to accept the formal invitation to Versailles, because of inability to accept proposed peace terms.	82 [Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]
Apr. 26 (20)	<i>Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i>	84 [Pg. 84 includes

	From Dresel: Rumor that Mission is serving as an advance courier to mitigate shock of the peace terms; information that treatment at the Foreign Office and elsewhere has been courteous.	portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36
Apr. 28 (23)	<i>Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Colonel House and Grew from Dresel: Request for instructions as to advisability of continuing Mission on account of attitude outlined in telegram No. 20 of April 26; plans to leave Berlin May 3, unless instructions to the contrary are received. (Footnote: Commission's approval of proposed departure.)	84 [Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36]
Apr. 28 (24)	<i>Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Dresel: Stubborn attitude of the government in regard to question of signing peace terms; doubt that people, in present frame of mind, can be induced to carry out peace conditions even if accepted by the government.	85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 37]
Apr. 30 (30)	<i>Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Dresel: Interview with Walter Rathenau, during which he expressed a different point of view in regard to the peace terms from those prevalent in political circles.	86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38]
May 2 (35)	<i>Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Dresel: Interviews with an Independent Socialist and with a Foreign Office official of Independent views, who expressed belief that disposition of Danzig is an obstacle to peace.	87 [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39]
May 3	<i>Mr. E. L. Dresel to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Memorandum, dated May 2, on impressions of	88 [Pg. 88 includes portions of

	the general political situation in Germany gained from perusal of the German press and conversations in non-official bourgeois circles.	Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]
May 6 (3224)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Two memoranda, dated April 24 and April 30, by Mr. Lithgow Osborne on the situation in Germany (texts printed).	94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 41]
[May 10]	<i>Messrs. E. L. Dresel and Lithgow Osborne to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Report on the Dresel Mission to Germany covering the period from April 16 to May 5 (text printed).	103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]
May 10	<i>Mr. E. L. Dresel to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of report (text printed) on the political situation in Germany, and annexed memoranda of conversations with the secretary of Minister President Scheidemann on May 9, and with Dr. Oskar Cohn, Independent Socialist, May 8 (texts printed).	118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 43]
June 5	<i>Mr. E. L. Dresel to President Wilson</i> Belief that credit should be given to the German Government for its accomplishments in the face of tremendous odds; opinion that the admission of Germany to the League of Nations would induce the Government to sign the peace terms.	122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44]

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN GERMANY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 May 21	<i>Mr. C. A. Herter to President Wilson</i> Transmittal of six reports (texts printed) prepared by officers of the Military Intelligence	124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 45]

	Section on the political situation in Germany and on the substance of interviews with Mr. Erzberger and Count von Bernstorff.	

THE GREENE MISSION TO THE BALTIC PROVINCES

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Feb. 10	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Submission of a proposal for sending observers to the Baltic provinces, one observer to be in Esthonia, and one in Latvia.	136 [Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]
Mar. 8 (1086)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Receipt of request from Lithuanian Foreign Minister for aid against Bolshevists, and for permission to organize soldiers of Lithuanian origin in the U. S. Expeditionary Forces in France; intention to request Baltic mission to investigate possibility of an understanding between Poles and Lithuanians.	136 [Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]
Mar. 12	<i>The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Major Royall Tyler</i> Commissioners' approval of proposed Mission to Baltic provinces under Lt. Col. Warwick Greene; list of personnel.	137 [Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49]
Apr. 10	<i>Major Royall Tyler to Colonel S. D. Embick</i> Personnel and stations of the Baltic party.	137 [Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49]

Undated (1609)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Greene (via Copenhagen): Recommendation that the Baltic blockade, prohibiting supply by sea of the German forces operating against the Bolsheviks in Courland, be removed, subject to certain controls, insofar as will be necessary to maintain the German forces.	138 [Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50]
Apr. 13 (313)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Greene: Synopsis of the present situation in Latvia and recommendations for improving the critical conditions caused by the blockade.	139 [Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51]
Apr. 21 (324)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Greene: Report on conditions in Libau following the overthrow of the Provisional Government of Latvia by German Bait troops on April 16; attempt, on the part of Bait soldiers, to arrest certain members of Greene's party.	141 [Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]
Apr. 22 (325A)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Greene: Report on the critical military situation of Latvia; recommendation for the creation of a Latvian national army or occupation of Kurland by Entente forces, releasing German troops.	144 [Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]
Apr. 23	<i>Mr. R. H. Lord and Mr. S. E. Morison to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary</i> Recommendations for Allied action to deal with political, military, and economic situation in Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia.	147 [Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54]
Apr. 28	<i>Colonel O. N. Solbert, Acting for the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene), to General T. H. Bliss</i> Recommendation for Allied action to restore former Latvian ministry, but on more	150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55]

	representative basis; suggestions to meet military situation in Latvia.	
Apr. 30 (51)	<i>Colonel O. N. Solbert to the Minister in Denmark (Hapgood) (tel.)</i> For Greene: Notice of creation of an interallied Baltic commission to sit in Paris; favorable comment on work of Mission.	154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57]
May 3	<i>The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Transmittal of a report on Esthonia (excerpts printed) prepared by Lt. Comdr. John A. Gade, U. S. N., concerning questions of Allied recognition, food relief, spread of Bolshevism, relations with Germany and Russia.	154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57]
May 3	<i>The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Résumé of political developments in Latvia from establishment, and subsequent overthrow, of Ulmanis Provisional Government to the present; comment on position of General von der Goltz; transmittal of copy of a letter (text printed) from Lt. Col. Greene to Mr. Andreas Needra, Prime Minister of the Bait-controlled cabinet, advocating the re-establishment of the Provisional Government with Mr. Ulmanis as Prime Minister of a coalition cabinet.	172 [Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]
May 4 (354)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Greene: Recommendation, upon the basis of a report prepared by Lt. Comdr. Gade, for the recognition of Finland as an independent country and the necessity of immediate financial aid from the Allied Governments. (Footnote: Information that the United States had already decided to recognize Finland.)	183 [Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59]

May 15	<i>Report by Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley</i> Report on military situation in Lithuania, recommendations for Allied relief and definition of position of Germany and German troops in regard to Lithuania; Annex No. 9 (text printed) containing questionnaire and reply by Lithuanian Minister of War regarding Mission to the United States to secure volunteers; supplemental military report regarding relations with Poland, and General Pilsudski's proclamation to the Lithuanians, April 22, 1919 (texts printed).	184 [Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60]
May 20 (379)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Greene: Report on the stability of the Lithuanian Provisional Government and the necessity for Allied military and financial support; forced resignation of Needra as Prime Minister on May 12, and resumption of duties, May 16. Information for Hoover regarding food conditions in the Baltic countries.	196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61]
May 26	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in Denmark (Hapgood) (tel.)</i> For Greene: Decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers to send a military mission, with headquarters at Libau or Reval, to advise the governments of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on questions of organization, equipment, and training of troops. Information that Marshal Foch has received instructions that General von der Goltz be ordered, through the German Government, to facilitate the establishment of a coalition ministry in Latvia.	197 [Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62]
June 5	<i>The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to Major Royall Tyler</i> Interallied consultation to consider a joint recommendation to the Peace Conference regarding situation of the Baltic provinces;	198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of

	request for means of motor transportation and additional funds for continuing the work of the Mission.	Doc. 62 and Doc. 63]
June 6	<i>The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to Major Royall Tyler</i> Transmittal of memorandum (text printed) containing suggested draft declaration regarding military and financial aid for Baltic provinces to be made jointly by American, British, and French representatives in the Baltic provinces, to be presented at Paris by Colonel Greene. (Footnote: Information that Lt. Col. Greene and certain members of his staff reported in Paris June 18.)	200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64]
June 22	<i>Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Criticism of the course of action followed by the Allies in the solution of the Baltic problem; necessity for removing the German occupation forces; recommendation for the organization of an Allied Mission charged with directing military operations and guiding civil governments of the Baltic provinces.	202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65]
June 30	<i>Memorandum From the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Report on strategic importance of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and danger of their falling under Bolshevik or German control; joint Allied draft memorandum (text printed), recommending Interallied Military Mission and financial aid for these provinces, and further recommendations by American mission.	207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 66]
July 5	<i>The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i>	213 [Pg. 213 includes portions of

	Continuation of the preceding report on the Baltic situation with additional recommendations for solving the military problems of the Baltic provinces.	Doc. 66 and Doc. 67
July 9	<i>The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Proposed resolution for continuing the work of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces. (Footnote: Information that Colonel Dawley, who is in charge of the Mission during Greene's absence, is acting as Military Governor of Riga by request of General Gough.)	215 [Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68]
July 15	<i>The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene)</i> Explanation of powers and duties of American Commission and information that Commissioners' decisions regarding the proposed resolution will be sent later. Instructions for Colonel Dawley to surrender his position as Military Governor of Riga if report is true.	216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69]
July 19	<i>Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the critical Baltic situation, particularly at Riga and Libau; recommendations that supplies and equipment be sent to the Russian northern army, that financial aid be provided, and that consular agents be sent to Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia, to open the way for commercial relations with America.	217 [Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70]
July 28	<i>Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Letter signed by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments presented to the Esthonian Prime Minister (text printed) protesting against certain elements of the	222 [Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71]

	Esthonian agrarian project, and requesting that attitude of Allied and Associated Governments be obtained before any action is taken.	
July 29	<i>The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Comments in reply to certain paragraphs of the Secretary General's letter of July 15, regarding duties and powers of Baltic Mission, and observations as to responsibilities of Allied and Associated Governments in Baltic regions, based on article XII of the Armistice and on certain articles of the Peace Treaty. Information that Colonel Dawley did not assume the position of Military Governor of Riga.	223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]
Aug. 1 (Misc. 1155)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley (tel.)</i> Query as to Dawley's authority for signing letter to Esthonian Prime Minister, quoted in telegram of July 28.	227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74]
Aug. 4 (87)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) (tel.)</i> From Tyler: Recall of the Baltic Commission and instructions for Greene and personnel to report to American Commission in Paris.	227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74]

VISIT OF MR. HUGH GIBSON TO COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 [circa Feb. 1]	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of Embassy at Paris (Gibson) for the Secretary of State</i> Report on conditions in German Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Czechoslovak Republic based on trip January 1 to February 1	228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75]

	with a mission sent by the U. S. Food Administration to investigate food conditions in German Austria.	

THE COOLIDGE MISSION

GERMAN AUSTRIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 30 (53)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the possible future political associations of German Austria, including proposals for complete political and economic independence, membership in a Danubian Confederation, or union with Germany.	240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 76]
[Jan. 29]	<i>Captain Frederick Dellschaft to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Substance of a conversation with the Secretary of the Handels and Gewerbe Kammer regarding economic factors involved in a union of German Austria with Germany as opposed to a Danube Federation.	245 [Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 77]
Jan. 31	<i>Captain Frederick Dellschaft to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Conversation with Dr. Oskar Reichenauer of the Wirtschafts-Politisches Amt, who expressed views regarding the spread of Bolshevism and opinion that troops, coal, and food are the only means of combating the danger.	246 [Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78]
Feb. 4	<i>Captain Frederick Dellschaft to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on the general economic situation in German Austria.	247 [Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]

Feb. 10 (72)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the question of liquidation of the assets of former Austro-Hungarian Empire, including war and railway materials, public buildings, and art treasures.	254 [Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80]
Feb. 22 (102)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that the former Emperor Charles is living in seclusion near Vienna; transmittal, as of historical interest, of substance of an interview granted by the Emperor to Professor F. W. Forster of the University of Munich containing an authoritative declaration by the Emperor (text printed) of his adherence to the doctrine of self-determination and federalization of Austria-Hungary, with equal rights for all nationalities.	256 [Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81]
Feb. 22	<i>Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Interview with editor of the <i>Arbeiter-Zeitung</i>, who emphasized the necessity for the resumption of industrial life in German Austria to prevent serious trouble.	259 [Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 82]
Feb. 27	<i>Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on reciprocity arrangement between Hungary and German Austria regarding stamped bank notes.	260 [Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84]
Feb. 27	<i>Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Order by the Department of Finances of February 15, 1919 (text printed), regarding the temporary restrictions of money remittances, and reasons for order.	260 [Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84]
Feb. 27	<i>Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Interview with officers of the Wiener Bank	262 [Pg. 262 includes portions of

	Verein regarding German Austria's two greatest problems, the stamping of the bank notes and the proposed union with Germany.	Doc. 84 and Doc. 85
Mar. 3 (122)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of recommendation (text printed) by Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge regarding the final Hungarian-Austrian boundary; suggestion for the relief of the food crisis in Vienna.	264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86]
Mar. 10	<i>Memorandum by Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on problems involved in determining the frontiers of the new countries formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.	271 [Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87]
Mar. 17 (153)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that the proposed union of German Austria with Germany has met with a setback; growing perception in Austria that as a future part of Germany she may receive severe treatment at the hands of the Allies.	278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88]
Mar. 20 (163)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the situation in Vienna, indicating that the shortage of food and coal is politically dangerous.	279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89]
Mar. 31 (45)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) (tel.)</i> For Coolidge: Information that the Associated Governments intend to publish a notice authorizing the restoration of trade under certain conditions with German Austria.	281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91]
Apr. 3 (185)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a report (text printed) from Captain Nicholas Roosevelt describing an interview with Chancellor Renner; Renner's	281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 89 ,

	threat that if German Austria were dismembered, the Government would resign, turning the country over to Bolshevism.	Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91
Apr. 7 (192)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Opinion that the giving of the German South Tyrol to Italy would violate the principles of national self-determination, history, and nationality.	282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]
Apr. 4	<i>Mr. Walter E. Bundy to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Interview with editor of the <i>Neues Wiener Tagblatt</i> regarding the attitude of the Viennese public toward lifting of the blockade on German Austria and expectation of the fall of the Government because of the growing strength of the radical Socialist and Communist party.	284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]
Apr. 7 (198)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Interview with the Vienna chief of police regarding the growing indiscipline and arbitrariness of the Volkswehr; his recommendation that an increased supply of food, coal, and raw materials might help the situation, and suggestion that the presence of a guard of American soldiers with the food trains would have a reassuring effect on the population.	285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94]
Apr. 7 (199)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the unfavorable conditions in Vienna, emphasizing the disastrous economic and financial situation; growth of Bolshevism on the political front.	287 [Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95]
Apr. 8 (201)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Impression created in Vienna regarding the sending of General Smuts' mission to Budapest.	289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96]

Apr. 8 (205)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Desire that the Commission consider the suggestion of the chief of police regarding the presence of an American or English guard with the food trains; opinion that the guard would give an impression of strength and good will.	290 [Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]
Apr. 10	<i>Mr. Walter E. Bundy to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Interview with editor of the <i>Arbeiter-Zeitung</i> concerning the political situation in German Austria; opinion that relief in the form of food and raw materials can prevent a revolution.	290 [Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]
Apr. 15	<i>Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on the final result of the stamping of banknotes in German Austria.	292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99]
Apr. 17	<i>Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report of investigation of Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein to determine whether they are to be attached to Switzerland, or to Germany, or to remain in German Austria; annex regarding suggested boundaries.	293 [Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100]
Apr. 22 (238)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a report by Walter E. Bundy regarding the suspicious character of the Vienna Volkswehr; his opinion that the so-called neutrality of the Volkswehr can become dangerous to the present government and favorable to the Communist movement.	305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 101]
Apr. 28 (252)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that President Wilson's declaration regarding Italian frontiers is arousing anxiety among the Tyrolese.	307 [Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , and Doc. 103]

May 5 (260)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that the Tyrolese Landtag, with the exception of the Socialists, voted to set up an independent neutral republic in an attempt to preserve the integrity of the Tyrol; desire of the Socialists for annexation to Germany under any circumstances; opinion that if the Tyrol is annexed to Germany, Vorarlberg should annex itself to Switzerland.	307 [Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , and Doc. 103]
May 11 (271)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Interview with the Chancellor, Mr. Renner, before his departure for Paris; his opinion that the proposed peace terms were severe, and appreciation of the work done in Austria by the American Food Commission.	309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104]
May 11 (272)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Interview with Mr. Renner regarding the present situation of the Germans in West Hungary; opinion that this region is on the verge of civil war; Austrian desire for immediate mandatory powers and ultimately, for a plebiscite.	310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 105]
May 14 (278)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the further disintegration of the Austrian provinces; information that the inhabitants of Vorarlberg voted to enter into negotiations for union with Switzerland.	311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 27	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i>	312 [Pg. 312 includes

(44)	Transmittal of Professor R. J. Kerner's report (text printed) regarding the Czechoslovak-Polish boundary question; criticism of the historical and ethnographical arguments presented in Kerner's report.	portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107
Jan. 27 (46)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a report (text printed) by Lieutenant R. C. Foster concerning the occupation of the Duchy of Teschen by the Czechoslovak troops under cover of a so-called Allied Commission.	317 [Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]
Jan. 29 (50)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that the fighting between the Poles and the Czechs in Eastern Silesia is continuing; unexpected resistance on the part of Polish troops aided by volunteers from the mining population.	322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109]
Jan. 31 (54)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on a conversation with Mr. Tusar, the Czechoslovak Minister at Vienna; Tusar's intimation that the Entente tacitly approved the Czech action against the Poles.	323 [Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110]
Jan. 29 (24)	<i>Lieutenant Frederic R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Text of report by Mr. Van Svarc, American newspaper correspondent, regarding recent events in Teschen.	324 [Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]
Feb. 3 (14)	<i>Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Information regarding Bolshevist movement in Czechoslovakia; opinion that the attempted assassination of Dr. Kramar, the Premier, turned the people from Bolshevism.	326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 112]
Feb. 5 (61)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i>	327 [Pg. 327 includes

	Conversation with President Masaryk regarding the boundaries of Bohemia and the action of Hungary and Austria in claiming disproportionate share of assets of former Austro-Hungarian Empire; expression of hope that the United States would soon appoint a Minister to Bohemia.	portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113
Feb. 5 (62)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Opinion of President Masaryk and Mr. Stepanik, Director of Foreign Affairs, regarding the conflict between the Czechs and the Poles in Austrian Silesia; transmittal of the terms of the armistice with the Poles (text printed).	328 [Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]
Feb. 5 (66)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Impressions regarding the critical situation in Czechoslovakia as a result of inexperienced personnel holding offices, unemployment, and the rise of Bolshevism; opinion that the Czechs, in spite of their present difficulties, have confidence in their future.	330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 115]
Feb. 15	<i>Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Interview with Minister Tusar and Dr. Venicek, Finance Commissioner, representing Czechoslovakia at the Austro-Hungarian Bank, regarding reasons given by the Czechoslovaks for their stamping of the banknotes in Czechoslovakia.	331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116]
Feb. 17 (89)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a report (text printed) by Professor Robert J. Kerner on the subject of a German Bohemia with special reference to the Brůx-Teplitz coal region; critical comments on the report.	334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117]

Feb. 24	<i>Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Interview with Dr. Preiss, head director of the Zivnostenska Bank in Prague, regarding financial conditions in Czechoslovakia; Campagnoli's opinion that American financiers should invest reserves and surplus funds in the new republic.	342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 118]
Feb. 26 (50)	<i>Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Information regarding a bill passed by the National Assembly governing the stamping of banknotes and the declaration of property in the Czechoslovak Republic.	344 [Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119]
Mar. 1	<i>Professor R. J. Kerner to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on political conditions in Slovakia; analysis of various nationalities living there.	345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]
Mar. 2	<i>Professor R. J. Kerner to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Synopsis of the four reports regarding the results of an investigation made of conditions in Slovakia.	349 [Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121]
Mar. 2 (55)	<i>Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report that the Entente order for the Czechs to evacuate Teschen has met with a storm of protest; opinion that the Czechs continue to hope for a favorable decision of the boundary question.	351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 122]
Mar. 5	<i>Statement of Professor R. J. Kerner to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary</i> Report on Bolshevism in the states of Central Europe; recommendations for Allied action to curb Bolshevism on the one hand, and to prevent development of a German <i>revanche</i> on the other.	352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 123]

Mar. 20	<i>Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Criticism of Professor Kerner's memorandum of March 5; opinion that Germany's acceptance of the peace terms is an admission of her defeat.	355 [Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]
Mar. 10 (131)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a report (text printed) by Captain John Karmazin regarding Bolshevist propaganda in Slovakia.	356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 125]
Mar. 23 (77)	<i>Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Information that the expropriation of the large estates is causing friction among the various parties of the National Assembly; proposal of the Czech State Right Democrats for a program of land reform.	359 [Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126]
Mar. 23 (31)	<i>Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on modifications by the Committee of Finance of the Custom Tariff Bill of 1906 for the Czechoslovak Republic; recommendations of the Committee of Finance to the National Assembly.	360 [Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127]
Mar. 25 (33)	<i>Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on the Bolshevist movement in Bohemia and the Government's measures for suppression of Bolshevist propaganda.	363 [Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128]

POLAND

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 9	<i>Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Interview with Mr. I. J. Paderewski regarding	365 [Pg. 365 includes portions of

	his idea of the formation of a coalition Government; Paderewski's opinion that the present Government, under the leadership of Pilsud-ski, is inefficient and incompetent.	Doc. 128 and Doc. 129
Jan. 15	<i>Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Interview with General Pilsudski regarding the question of arranging an armistice between the Poles and the Ukrainians; desire of the Poles to hold Lemberg and Drohobycz; impression that Pilsudski is working for Poland, but that his officials are inefficient and unreliable.	368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 130]
Apr. 7	<i>Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on the difficulties surrounding the settlement of the Danzig question and on the general political situation in Poland.	369 [Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131]

HUNGARY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 16 (20)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that the Hungarians consider the occupation of large tracts by the Czechs, Serbs, Roumanians, and Ukrainians, a violation of the terms of the armistice; Hungarian arguments for preserving the unity of the state.	372 [Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132]
Jan. 19 (21)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on impressions received during a short stay in Budapest; opinion that the people are unanimous in their desire for a plebiscite to determine the future boundaries of Hungary; information that the Hungarians look to America and President Wilson for their salvation.	374 [Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133]

Jan. 19 (22)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that the Hungarians insist upon maintaining the essential unity of their country; presentation of their principal historical and national arguments.	375 [Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134]
Jan. 19 (23)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Admission by Hungarians of mistreatment of the non-Magyar nationalities in the past, but intention of the Liberals, who are now in control, to grant full autonomy to all the nationalities in Hungary.	377 [Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135]
Jan. 19 (25)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the geographic and economic unity of Hungary; rupture of economic life resulting from occupation of certain sections by the Czechoslovaks, Roumanians, and Serbians.	378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]
Jan. 19 (26)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the political situation in Budapest and the strength of the various parties; opinion that the coalition government of Count Karolyi is weak; confidence of the Socialists in their power to maintain order as long as food and fuel last.	380 [Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137]
Jan. 19 (27)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on the Czech seizure of northern Hungary and the Slovak question; assertion by the Hungarians that the Slovaks do not desire separation from the state, but that they do want autonomy and privileges for their language.	382 [Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138]
Jan. 20 (28)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a memorandum (text printed)	383 [Pg. 383 includes

	from Lieutenant Goodwin on the financial situation in Hungary; comment that memorandum has overlooked certain facts.	portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]
Jan. 26 (43)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Opinion of Baron Podmonincky, of the Hungarian Foreign Office, that the declaration of the Supreme War Council against the forcible occupation of disputed territories before the settlement of the peace terms will strengthen the Karolyi Government.	385 [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140]
Jan. 28 (48)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Inability of the Hungarian Government to call for an election of a popular assembly because of the occupation of large sections of Hungarian territory by other states.	386 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 141]
Jan. 29 (49)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Agitation of the German population in western Hungary for union with Austria, encouraged by Austria in accordance with principle of self-determination; Hungarian opposition to this movement.	387 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 142]
Feb. 2	<i>Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Belief that the election of the constitutional assembly is necessary; proposal by Count Apponyi, President of the Hungarian Independence Party, of a method for holding the elections without admitting the relinquishment of sovereignty over the occupied territory.	388 [Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]
Feb. 8 (60)	<i>Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Résumé of the activities of the political parties in Hungary and their respective platforms.	389 [Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 144]
Feb. 10 (72)	<i>Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on Bolshevism in Hungary under the	392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 145]

	leadership of Bela Kun; conclusion that there is little danger of a Bolshevist uprising at present.	
Feb. 17 (90)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Interview with three representatives of the German-speaking population of western Hungary regarding their desire to belong to Austria; their request for Allied occupation of this territory in order to secure protection against the Hungarian troops and to insure a fair plebiscite when the time comes to vote.	393 [Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]
Feb. 25	<i>Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Information from Baron Podmonincky regarding Hungary's desire to reach a <i>rapprochement</i> with the Serbs and the Yugoslavs, in accordance with view that Hungary's future access to the sea lies through Serbia and Salonica.	394 [Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]
Feb. 25	<i>Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Conversation with Count Karolyi regarding the Hungarian attitude should Hungary be deprived of her non-Magyar territory.	395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149]
Mar. 12	<i>Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on the Ciscarpathian Ruthenians, in relation to parts of the final frontiers of Ukrainia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and in relation to the Transylvanian problem; transmittal of a report (text printed) on the Ciscarpathian Ukrainians in relation to the question of the southeast border of Czechoslovakia.	395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149]
Mar. 13 (140)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a report (text printed) by Captain	404 [Pg. 404 includes

	Nicholas Roosevelt on the Transylvanian question, including a report (text printed) summarizing the respective Hungarian and Roumanian claims.	portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150]
Mar. 17 (156)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a memorandum (text printed) by Major Lawrence Martin, in support of the cause of the Hungarians; his desire that the Magyar Republic be permitted to send delegates and professional advisors to Paris; his offer to go as an American spokesman for the Magyars.	411 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 151]
Mar. 20 (123)	<i>Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on the presentation to President Karolyi of the Peace Conference decision regarding new demarcation line for Transylvania, and creation of a neutral zone to be occupied by Interallied troops.	413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152]
Mar. 26	<i>Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Summary of conditions in Hungary after revolution of March 21 establishing a Communist government; information that revolution was precipitated by presentation of Peace Conference decision regarding Transylvania, and recommendation for immediate and vigorous action by Allies.	416 [Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153]
Mar. 26 (1)	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Summary of political situation in Hungary under new regime; observation that mass of people are intensely nationalistic and have accepted socialism as alternative to complete dismemberment of Hungary; conclusion that a policy of conciliation by Allies might prevent the situation from becoming worse.	419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154]

Mar. 26 (2)	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Transmittal of documents furnished by Colonel Vix, head of Interallied Military Mission in Hungary, concerning affronts to French Mission, notification to new government regarding departure of Military Mission, and declaration to government regarding nature of new line of demarcation; comments regarding these subjects.	422 [Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155]
Mar. 27	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Transmittal of two messages (texts printed) from Professor Brown in Budapest regarding situation in Hungary, and advising of departure of Interallied Military Mission; his opinion that negotiations could be held with present government, which is conciliatory.	424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157]
Mar. 31 (183)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of report by Professor Brown in Budapest, March 30 (text printed), regarding political situation, based on a conversation with Mr. Kunfi, an official of the new Hungarian Soviet Republic; Brown's recommendation for friendly understanding with new government, and offer to serve as unofficial channel of communication between Entente and Hungarian government.	424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157]
Apr. 6 (22)	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on food situation; understanding that prohibition on shipment of fats ordered and paid for by Karolyi government has now been removed; considerations regarding policy of supplying food to Hungary under present government.	428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 158]
Apr. 9 (1543)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report by Professor Brown from Budapest (text printed), regarding treatment of foreigners under	429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of

	new government, release of French troops captured by Hungarians March 31, and growing strength of revolutionary government.	Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]
Apr. 10 (26)	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Transmittal of memorandum on the coal and iron industry furnished by Dr. V. Koller, an official of the new government; agreement with his conclusions as to necessity for supplying food and coal to revitalize the industrial life of the country.	430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160]
Apr. 10 (29)	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on political situation; policies and methods of present government; recent restrictive regulations concerning private property of foreigners. Observation that while new government has not won support of the workingmen, possibility of a counter-revolution appears unlikely.	432 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 161]
Apr. 11 (210)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Discussion of question of Ruthenian territory in northern Hungary in regard to establishment of future boundaries of Hungary; three possible solutions of problem, and recommendations for leaving Ruthenian territory to Hungary.	434 [Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]
Apr. 17 (31)	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Memorandum of a conversation with Bela Kun, April 15 (text printed), regarding the economic situation in Hungary, arrests of <i>bourgeoisie</i> , spreading of propaganda in foreign countries, and other topics.	437 [Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 163]
Apr. 25 (248)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of two memoranda (texts printed), one by Lieutenant Osborn concerning proposed conference in Switzerland between Bela Kun and	442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 163

	a mission from the Entente, for formation of a transitional government in Hungary along moderate socialist lines; the other, an oral report by the courier of Professor Brown's views regarding situation in Budapest, and willingness of Bela Kun to form a transitional government of a moderate socialist type.	and Doc. 164]
May 1 (253)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of a portion of letter from Professor Brown in Budapest, dated April 29 (text printed), regarding political situation and requesting support of proposed conference with Bela Kun in Switzerland; considerations against action recommended by Professor Brown.	447 [Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165]
May 2 (37)	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Information regarding recent regulations issued by Bela Kun for protection of foreigners and assurances regarding protection of foreign business enterprises.	452 [Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166]
May 2 (40)	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Transmittal of copy of appeal addressed to President Wilson by the Hungarian Soviet Government (text printed) requesting arrest of the advance of Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak troops, now actually fighting the Hungarian Red Guard.	453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 167]
May 8 (267)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Opinion that invitation to Hungarian Government to send representatives to Paris, if delivered, would strengthen position of Government; efforts of Professor Brown to contact Roumanian troops in attempt to avert massacre in Budapest. Report by Lieutenant Osborn, May 7 (text printed),	455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 168]

	regarding situation in Hungary. Report by Professor Brown, May 4 (text printed), of interview with fiela Kun on political situation and negotiations with the Italian Mission regarding proposal to turn government over to Czechs.	
May 12	<i>Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on mission through French lines to Szeged and Belgrade; opinion that Entente failure to adopt clear policy regarding Hungary, combined with Roumanian advance, is precipitating state of anarchy in Budapest and that only alternative now is military occupation of Hungary in conformity with the terms of the armistice; feeling that presence in Budapest is no longer desirable and would be more useful in Paris.	462 [Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

JUGOSLAVIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 16 (1)	<i>Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on general conditions in Slovenia; observation that while there are potential questions of politics and economics, they are in abeyance pending settlement of frontier question.	468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]
Feb. 27 (114)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that there are reasons to believe Italy is encouraging Croatian Separatist movement.	475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , and Doc. 172]
Mar. 2 (116)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Extracts from reports by Lt. L. R. King (texts printed) regarding (1) attitude of Yugoslav Government towards territorial claims of its	475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , and Doc. 172]

	component states, and (2) military situation and alleged efforts of Italians to hinder Yugoslav state.	
Mar. 15 (16)	<i>Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on Fiume situation; desire of the people for an autonomous form of government, based on economic considerations; summary of arguments of pro-Italians in Fiume, and Yugoslav counter-arguments.	479 [Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173]
Mar. 16 (146)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of reports by Lt. King (texts printed) regarding general situation in Yugoslavia and political parties; observation that although ill feeling between Serbs and Croats seems to be growing, the situation is quiet at present.	484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 174]
Mar. 19 (11)	<i>Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on general situation; relations between French and Yugoslavs; anti-Italian sentiment in Agram.	489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 175]
[Mar. 20 (?)]	<i>Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on trip of investigation to Pola; difficulties among Allies in interallied occupation zone at Fiume.	491 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 176]
Mar. 29 (19)	<i>Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Report on the question of the future nationality of the Dalmatian coast.	492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177]
May 10 (29)	<i>Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Extract from a report concerning effect in Yugoslavia of President Wilson's declaration	497 [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 178]

	regarding Fiume, and announcement of conditions of peace with Germany; Italian activity in Fiume.	

BOUNDARY IN CARINTHIA BETWEEN GERMAN AUSTRIA AND JUGOSLAVIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 20 (31)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report of action of Lt. Col. Miles and Lt. King in determining a temporary line in disputed region in Carinthia in order to avoid hostilities between Austrians and Slovenes; request for immediate telegraphic instructions as to whether decision reached should be given out.	498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179]
Jan. 29	<i>Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Suggestions regarding report by Professor Coolidge of attempted settlement of Carinthian boundary dispute.	499 [Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180]
Jan. 30 (67)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) (tel.)</i> For Coolidge: Instructions as to policy regarding attempted settlement of boundary disputes by American representatives and position of Commission regarding Carinthian boundary.	500 [Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182]
Feb. 10 (73)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information regarding reports made by Lt. Col. Miles and Lt. King, Maj. Martin and Professor Kerner, giving recommendations as to provisional boundaries between Austria and Jugoslavia in Carinthia, for purposes of avoiding bloodshed and	500 [Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182]

	not for final delimitation of frontiers; reports by Miles and King regarding methods and final decision, dated February 7 and 9 (texts printed).	
Feb. 12 (77)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Acceptance in general of conclusions of Miles, Martin, and King, with certain reservations, and nonacceptance of Professor Kerner's dissenting report; opinion that there is no need for haste in publishing a decision, and intention not to make a public statement at present.	511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 183]
Feb. 14 (80)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of report by Miles, Martin, and King, dated February 12 (text printed), with recommendations regarding future boundary between Austria and Yugoslavia in provinces of Carinthia and Styria.	513 [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184]
Feb. 24 (105)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Attempts of Yugoslavs to avoid carrying out their promises in case conclusions regarding boundary should be contrary to their desires, and to obtain postponement of announcement of decision in belief that it would be unfavorable to them.	520 [Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185]
Feb. 26 (923)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Information that on February 4 a telegram (text printed) was sent to Professor Coolidge, advising him of Commission's attitude regarding the fixing of a temporary boundary between Austria and Yugoslavia, and instructing him to inform the parties to the dispute, preferably orally, that matter has been taken up by the Supreme War Council in Paris, and is therefore outside the competence of any individual or of the American Commission.	521 [Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186]

Feb. 27 (112)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Acknowledgment of telegram of February 4; opinion that there is no necessity for making any statement at present, and intention not to do so unless necessary.	522 [Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187]
Apr. 25 (247)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information regarding disturbed situation on Austrian-Jugoslav frontier, and opinion that no improvement can be expected until final boundaries have been established.	523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 188]

TERMINATION OF THE COOLIDGE MISSION

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Apr. 27 (250)	<i>The Office of the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary</i> Consideration of suggestion by Professor Coolidge that his Mission be closed when the terms of peace with Austria have been decided upon; recommendation that Coolidge Mission be replaced as soon as possible by appropriate consular representatives, who should, however, not act as such until after the signing of peace.	524 [Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 189]
May 16 (83)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Instructions to make immediate arrangements to bring Mission to a close and to proceed to Paris as soon as possible; arrangements for turning over work of Mission to Consul General Halstead and Vice Consul Heingartner.	525 [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190]
May 21 (2197)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	526 [Pg. 526 includes

	Information that Coolidge will leave Vienna on May 22 after consulting with Consul Heingartner; temporary arrangements regarding clerical and other personnel, and opinion that with arrival of Consul General Halstead the question of finances and personnel should be taken over by the Department of State.	portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191
May 29	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Commission's expression of appreciation for valuable work accomplished in Austria and Hungary.	527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 192]

THE HALSTEAD MISSION

GERMAN AUSTRIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 June 13 (291)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report of conditions in Vienna; dissatisfaction and despair caused by peace terms.	528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 193]
June 14 (292)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of copy of an address by Dr. Bauer, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to the National Assembly on June 7 regarding the treaty of peace; interview with Dr. Bauer concerning the effect upon financial conditions in Austria of peace treaty provisions.	531 [Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]
June 17 (296)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report of unsuccessful attempt by Communist faction, on June 15, to overthrow Government and establish a Soviet regime, which was	532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195]

	checked by strong action of the Government and loyalty of the Volkswehr.	
June 29 (311)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Transmittal of letter from Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, June 28 (text printed), regarding food supplies for returning prisoners of war, for attention of the Food Administrator; information that copy of despatch and letter has been sent also to Captain Gregory, head of Food Administration in Austria.	534 [Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196]
July 2 (532)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> View that severe peace terms will drive Austria into union with Germany.	536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 197]
July 4 (544)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Reiteration of view that unless steps are taken for economic federation of Austria with new states formed from old empire, union with Germany is inevitable; hope that financial and industrial peace terms will give basis for rebuilding of industry and commerce.	537 [Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198]
July 6 (554)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Opinion as to necessity for Allied military action to overthrow the Hungarian Bolshevik government and to force the expulsion of Bolshevik agents in Austria in order to prevent the spread of Bolshevism throughout Europe.	538 [Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]
July 7 (560)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Opinion that conclusion of peace with Austria before overthrow of Bolshevik regime in Hungary would be great error and open the way for Bolshevik invasion of Austria, followed by union with Germany.	539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200]

July 11 (323)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Italian attitude in regard to boundary in Tyrol between Italy and Austria.	541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202]
July 16 (329)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Memorandum of a conversation with the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (text printed), who made an appeal to President Wilson, or the U. S. Government, for a rectification of the Tyrolean boundary.	541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202]
July 18 (620)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that Foreign Secretary has discussed with British and American representatives his intention to negotiate with Mr. Boehm, the new Minister from Hungary, with regard to the possible overthrow of Bela Kun and Hungarian extremists and establishment of a Social Democratic government in Hungary; belief that this move should be encouraged indirectly, but without promise of recognition.	544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 203]
July 18 (335)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Comment on future of Austria in regard to its relations with the new states formed from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire; political and economic problems facing the new states.	545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204]
July 18 (336)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Assurance by Foreign Secretary that there will be no disorder when planned demonstration and 24-hour general strike occur in a few days; information regarding proposed informal	548 [Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205]

	negotiations with Mr. Boehm when he returns as Minister from Hungary, in regard to establishment of a Social Democratic government in Hungary.	
July 19 (339)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report on coal situation and necessity for solution before the coming of winter.	550 [Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206]
July 27 (356)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Resignation of Dr. Bauer as Minister of Foreign Affairs, as result of letter from Dr. Renner, Austrian Chancellor, indicating that Bauer's attitude was hindering his work at the Peace Conference; probable effects on Austrian political situation.	551 [Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207]
Aug. 1 (15)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Reports in <i>Neue Freie Presse</i> of attitude of Allied Missions in favor of modification of peace terms; opinion that any expression of views differing from those of the Peace Commission should not be a matter of public discussion.	554 [Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 208]
Aug. 3 (17)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Comments in regard to the injustice of certain provisions of the Austrian peace treaty, and danger to the future of Austria.	555 [Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]
Aug. 8 (28)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Criticisms of reparation clauses of peace treaty, which would place Austria under the domination of other nations, particularly the new states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.	557 [Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]
Aug. 10 (35)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a conversation with Dr. Renner	559 [Pg. 559 includes

	(text printed), who referred to unjust clauses of peace treaty and appealed for U. S. assistance in Austria's problems following the signature of the peace treaty.	portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211]
Aug. 12 (36)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Austrian desire for an American as president of the Reparations Commission.	561 [Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213]
Aug. 14 (39)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Feeling in Vienna against restoration of the monarchy.	561 [Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213]
Aug. 28 (66)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of reports by Count Sigray, civil governor of Western Hungary; opinion that it would be desirable to have an investigation of conditions in West Hungary for a report to the Peace Conference.	562 [Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214]
Sept. 5 (75)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Review of political conditions in Austria; disproportionate influence of Workingmen's Council.	563 [Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]
Sept. 7 (77)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report regarding ratification of peace treaty by Austria.	565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]
Sept. 9 (82)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report that there are many valuable opportunities for investment in Austria which would be worth while for American financiers.	566 [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217]
Sept. 12 (2)	<i>Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State</i> Summary of events of past week; attitude of the people toward the signing of the peace treaty;	567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of

	probability that reorganization of present temporary government will be undertaken upon return of Dr. Renner to Vienna.	Doc. 217 and Doc. 218]
Sept. 12 (92)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report on Italian investments in Austria.	569 [Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219]
Sept. 15 (95)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of conversation with Dr. Renner, Austrian Chancellor and Foreign Minister (text printed), who expressed thanks to the United States and Great Britain for their attitude toward Austria during Peace Conference negotiations, and hope for improvement in Austria's relations with those countries; discussion of Austria's relations with France, Italy, and new states to the east.	570 [Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220]
Sept. 21 (7)	<i>Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State</i> Report on coal crisis in Austria and serious consequences liable to result from lack of fuel.	574 [Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 221]
Sept. 26 (108)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a conversation with Dr. Renner on September 25 (text printed), in which informal representations were made regarding reports that pogroms were being organized against the Jews; information that Foreign Minister made public announcement in newspapers (text printed) regarding visit of U. S. representative and assurances given him that all necessary steps would be taken to avoid brutalities.	576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 222]
Sept. 28 (114)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> <i>Neue Tag</i> article (excerpt printed) regarding publication of Austrian <i>Bed Book</i> and Dr. Bauer's action in arranging to clear Germany as	578 [Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 223

	far as possible from the charge of responsibility for the war.	and Doc. 224]
Oct. 10 (128)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report on necessity for immediate assistance to Austria in order to rebuild its industries, in the interest of all Central Europe, and importance of Reparation Commission's beginning to function at once.	578 [Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224]
Undated (11)	<i>Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum regarding acceptance of treaty on October 17 by National Assembly and resignation of old Cabinet; establishment of new coalition Cabinet headed by Dr. Renner; program of new administration.	580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225]
Nov. 7 (146)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report on present conditions in Vienna; lack of food and fuel, and arrangements for financing of public food kitchens.	584 [Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226]
Nov. 21 (159)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report of conditions in Austria and Vienna; discouragement of people and Government under hopeless conditions, and dissatisfaction with inaction of powers; political tendencies, sentiment for restoration of monarchy, growing independence of provinces.	587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227]
Nov. 26 (163)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report of interview with Dr. Renner in regard to the hopelessness of the Austrian situation; his belief that only hope of saving Austria is through a loan from the United States.	589 [Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228]
Nov. 27 (167)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Suggestions regarding possible intervention in Austria by neighboring states, particularly Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary.	592 [Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 228

		and Doc. 229]
Dec. 1 (36)	<i>Memorandum by Mr. A. W. DuBois</i> Report of trip through German West Hungary, made to learn the wishes of the population regarding annexation to Austria; conclusion that decision of the Peace Conference, giving area to Austria, should be abided by.	594 [Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230]
Dec. 3 (173)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report of conference of State Chancellor with heads of Missions of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and with Chief of Japanese Military Mission, in which he discussed difficulties confronting Austria, appealed for help from Allies and United States, and requested permission for Chancellor, Finance Minister, and other secretaries to go to Paris between December 10 and 15 to present Austria's case to the Supreme Council.	598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231]
Dec. 5 (41)	<i>Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State</i> Report of a conversation with the Minister for Hungary in Vienna regarding German West Hungary and the unfortunate effect on Austro-Hungarian relations if this area is given to Austria.	600 [Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232]
Dec. 12 (182)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Statement (text printed) submitted to Foreign Office with request that it be issued through Official Correspondence Bureau, expressing American Commissioner's regret at frequent publication in Vienna newspapers of unfounded reports of what the United States proposed to do for Austria; granting of the request by Acting Foreign Secretary after 24-hour delay.	601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233]
Dec. 12 (187)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report on increasingly serious situation in Austria; weakness of Government; separatist tendencies in provinces.	604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 234]

HUNGARY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 July 10	<i>Captain Bernath Weiss to Mr. Albert Halstead</i> Report on economic and political conditions in Hungary; opinion that Hungary could be occupied by Allied troops for purposes of restoring order.	606 [Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]
July 11 (321)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Observation that peace in Austria is dependent upon restoration of peace in Hungary and overthrow of the Bela Kun regime; opinion that declaration by the Peace Conference, backed by force, that there will be no peace negotiations with Hungary while Bela Kun regime exists is only method of overthrowing that regime.	609 [Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236]
July 16 (330)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Impressions of Count Holstein, a journalist, of the Bolshevik movement in Hungary and Bolshevik plans to dominate all Europe.	611 [Pg. 611 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237]
July 22 (137)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Mr. Albert Halstead (tel.)</i> From White and Bliss: Advice, in reference to telegram No. 620 of July 18 (page 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 203]), that American Commission does not desire to interfere in question of future form of government for Hungary, and recommendation for utmost caution in the matter.	613 [Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239]
July 24 (646)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Suggested solution of Hungarian problem agreed to unofficially by British, French, Italian, and American representatives, and approved in	613 [Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 ,

	principle by Boehm, new Hungarian representative in Austria.	and Doc. 239]
July 24 (647)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information in reply to telegram No. 137 of July 22 that unofficial negotiations regarding Hungary have been conducted through the British representative and that American Commission is not committed in any way.	614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241]
July 24 (654)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that Boehm will be ready to act in about a month provided Allies approve plan; inability to recommend approval of plan in view of Commission's attitude, expressed in telegram No. 137 of July 22.	614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241]
July 24 (350)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> History of discussions in regard to the Hungarian situation, indicating that there was no personal connection between Halstead and the Hungarian leader, Boehm.	615 [Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242]
July 26 (141)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Mr. Albert Halstead (tel.)</i> Instructions to have nothing to do with the negotiations regarding Hungarian situation, either directly or indirectly.	619 [Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]
July 27 (3351)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From White and Bliss: Issuance by the Council of Five of a declaration to the Hungarian people which it is thought would give the necessary assurances to provide the incentive for the overthrow of Bela Kun.	619 [Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]
July 27	<i>Captain Bernath Weiss to Mr. Albert Halstead</i> Report on conditions in Budapest and Hungary; organizing of Soviets among peasants; plans of Bolshevist leaders for reign of anarchy in	620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 245]

	Budapest if defeated by Roumanians; report of increasing disorganization of Red Guard.	
July 29 (361)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that British and Italian representatives were advised that declaration by Allied and Associated Governments regarding Hungary, issued July 28, had taken the matter out of the hands of the American representative and that he could proceed no further with the negotiations.	621 [Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246]
Aug. 1 (687)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report from Budapest of overthrow of Bela Kun and establishment of new Socialist government, which includes no Bolsheviks; personnel of new Cabinet.	622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248]
Aug. 2 (16)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Comments regarding change of government in Hungary, factors contributing to Bela Kun's downfall, and character of new government.	622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248]
Aug. 3 (19)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Further comments on conditions in Hungary; promise of Foreign Minister to call constitutional assembly, indicating intention to form representative government; information that there has been full accord among Allied Missions in attitude toward new Hungarian Government.	625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 249]
Aug. 5 (25)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Comments regarding effects of Peace Commission note of July 27, and unofficial negotiations in Vienna upon fall of Bela Kun government; emphasis upon necessity of	627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 250]

	requiring withdrawal of Roumanian troops from Budapest to line established in armistice terms; other recommendations for Allied action to assist Hungary.	
Aug. 19 (53)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Comments regarding situation in Hungary; urgent recommendation that Roumanians be compelled to obey orders of Peace Conference and cease looting of Hungary; impossibility of establishment of a truly representative government since return of Hapsburgs under Archduke Joseph as Regent.	629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 251]
Aug. 26 (61)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Telegram from Count Sigray, Government Commissioner for Western Hungary (text printed), protesting advance of Roumanian troops toward Western Hungary under pretext of restoring order, and requesting that protest be forwarded to Allied Missions; information that copies of telegram have been forwarded to British, French, Italian Missions, and to General Bandholtz.	630 [Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252]
Aug. 29 (65)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report on political situation; observation that prospect is favorable for the election of a national assembly which will support the restoration of a monarchy.	632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 253]
Aug. 29 (67)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Remarks regarding situation in West Hungary; assurances by Foreign Minister Ippen that Austria has not been responsible either directly or indirectly for any agitation in West Hungary, but that his information is that people are being influenced against union with Austria by propaganda from Budapest.	633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 254]
Sept. 7 (76)	<i>Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State</i> Report of situation in Hungary; attitude of Magyar minority in West Hungary hostile to	634 [Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 255]

	Peace Conference decision to join certain portions of three western counties to Austria; recruiting of men for White Army under Admiral Horthy.	

THE BANDHOLTZ MISSION TO HUNGARY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 July 25 (2636)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> President's approval of plan to detail army officer to represent United States on mission to Hungary.	635 [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]
Aug. 7 (3554)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Appointment of an Interallied Mission of Generals for Hungary; appointment of General Bandholtz as American representative and arrangements for his immediate departure for Budapest.	635 [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]
Aug. 11 (1)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of arrival in Budapest and tentative organization of Military Mission in cooperation with General Gorton, British representative.	636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260]
Aug. 11 (2)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Arrival of General Mombelli, Italian representative on Interallied Military Mission.	636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260]

Aug. 11	<i>The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Serbian Forces (tel.)</i> Request, if report is true that Serbian troops have crossed Hungarian boundary prescribed by the Armistice, for immediate withdrawal of invading forces.	636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 257, Doc. 258, Doc. 259, and Doc. 260]
Aug. 13 (1)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz (tel.)</i> From Polk: Message for Interallied Military Mission (text printed) containing instructions for dealing with <i>de facto</i> Hungarian government, and defining powers of the Mission.	637 [Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261]
Aug. 14 (4)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Arrival of General Graziani, French representative; conference with Roumanian representatives regarding their arrangements for alleviating food situation in Budapest; report of private interview with M. Diamandi, who advised that his Government was willing to accept as final Supreme Council's instructions to the Military Commission.	638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262]
Aug. 14 (5)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Memorandum submitted to Military Mission (text printed) recommending request for Roumanian action toward restoration of municipal and government functions to <i>de facto</i> Hungarian government, ceasing of requisitioning, and other steps toward restoration of peaceful conditions in Hungary.	639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263]
Aug. 15 (7)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Belief that Roumania is attempting to delay	640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of

	withdrawal in order to continue looting of Hungary.	Doc. 263 and Doc. 264]
Aug. 16 (8)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Presence of M. Diamandi and General Mardarescu with his Chief of Staff at session of Interallied Military Mission, at which they acknowledged for Roumania the validity of Supreme Council's instructions to the Mission, and were handed a communication (text printed) containing instructions along lines of memorandum referred to in telegram No. 5 of August 14.	641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265]
Aug. 17 (11)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Notification to Hungarian government as to immediate importance of appointing a qualified person as Food Minister, and of necessity of cooperating fully with Roumanians; preparation of notification to Roumanian Commander requesting submission of daily report of progress.	642 [Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266]
Aug. 18 (12)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Continued requisitioning by Roumanians, and intimation that Roumanian forces may suddenly be withdrawn; request, at insistence of American representative, that Roumanian Commander appear before Mission and explain what has been done toward complying with requests of Supreme Council; opinion that if Supreme Council does not intend to recognize the <i>de facto</i> government, the Archduke should be notified accordingly.	643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 267]
Aug. 19 (14)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Dissatisfaction with information given by General Holban, Roumanian Commander of	644 [Pg. 644 includes portions of

	Budapest, before Mission, and insistence upon attendance of Roumanian Commander in Chief at next meeting.	Doc. 268 and Doc. 269
Aug. 20 (16)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Appearance before Mission of General Mardarescu, Roumanian Commander in Chief, M. Diamandi, Roumanian High Commissioner, and General Rudeanu; questioning of General Mardarescu in regard to action taken in accordance with instructions of August 16.	644 [Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269]
Aug. 20 (20)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that a report on the Hungarian political situation, requested by the Supreme Council, will be submitted by the Mission and will be a composite of memoranda by the four representatives; memorandum by American representative (text printed).	646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 270]
Aug. 21 (18)	<i>The Interallied Military Mission to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Notification (text printed) read to Hungarian Archduke and Prime Minister requesting immediate revocation of proclamation by Hungarian Government of state of siege in Hungary, to which Archduke agreed; message (text printed) read to Archduke alone regarding attitude of Mission toward <i>de facto</i> Hungarian government.	647 [Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272]
Aug. 21 (18 A)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report regarding action of Mission in advising Archduke of lack of confidence in his government and in Hapsburg regime, and his reply that his retirement from the government would mean a return to Bolshevism.	647 [Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272]
Aug. 22 (19)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i>	648 [Pg. 648 includes

	Belief that Archduke does not intend to quit office unless given more emphatic instructions; failure of Roumanians to comply with instructions given them; suggested measures for carrying out Supreme Council's instructions to prevent Roumanians from exporting material from Hungary.	portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273]
Aug. 22 (21)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Interview with General Rudeanu to protest continued seizures by Roumanians and failure to return anything despite promises; General Rudeanu's promise to confer with his colleagues and report on the following day regarding the Roumanian Government's intentions in the matter.	650 [Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275]
Aug. 23 (22)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Assurances by Roumanian Commissioner Diamandi and General Rudeanu of the desire of their Government to cooperate with the Allies; belief that Roumanian policy is one of procrastination in order to drain Hungary before they can be stopped; indication that Roumanians are attempting to make a separate peace with Archduke's government before it dissolves.	650 [Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275]
Aug. 23 (24)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Resignation of Archduke and entire Ministry following receipt of message from Supreme Council, and information that ministry was advised that they must organize a government.	652 [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277]
Aug. 24 (25)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Opinion that action of Supreme Council in compelling resignation of Archduke has discouraged Roumanian hopes of forcing	652 [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277]

	Hungary into a separate peace; systematic looting of Hungary by Roumanians; report on situation west of Danube, and existence of a well-armed Hungarian peasant force, under Admiral Horthy in that territory.	
Aug. 24 (26)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information regarding Roumanian requisitions and seizures, which occurred subsequent to promise of Roumanians to comply with instructions of Interallied Military Mission.	654 [Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278]
Aug. 25	<i>The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Roumanian Forces</i> Information regarding actions of Roumanian forces in Hungary west of the Danube and request that Mission be informed as to the intentions of the Roumanian Government in that territory.	655 [Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280]
Aug. 25 (28)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that Roumanian attitude is unchanged, that they are believed to be planning to leave suddenly when they have finished their looting, and that meanwhile all their actions are directed toward turning Hungary over to Bolshevism and chaos; information that Archduke's successor has not yet been selected.	655 [Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280]
Aug. 26 (29)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Importance of preventing anarchy in Hungary in event of sudden Roumanian withdrawal by immediate arming of municipal police and other actions; information that no government has yet been formed.	656 [Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281]
Aug. 27 (30)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report on political situation, and actions of	657 [Pg. 657 includes portions of

	Prime Minister Friedrich, who is attempting to organize the Government.	Doc. 281 and Doc. 282]
Aug. 27 (31)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of further seizures by Roumanians, and comment that if Roumanians continue exporting material at present rate, they will soon leave Hungary a charge upon the Allies, unable to pay any indemnity.	658 [Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283]
Aug. 28 (33)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Opinion that Roumania is being backed by someone, presumably Italy, in effort to isolate Jugoslavs.	660 [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , and Doc. 285]
Aug. 29	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report that Friedrich intends to remain at head of new government and that he is organizing a ministry which is practically a continuation of the Archduke's Cabinet.	660 [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , and Doc. 285]
Aug. 29 (215)	<i>The Interallied Military Mission to the Supreme Council (tel.)</i> Opinion of Mission, in reply to inquiry by Supreme Council, that Hungarian army has been reduced below the effectives mentioned in the armistice of November 13.	663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286]
Aug. 29 (35A)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Reply given by Mission to Roumanian proposal to hold their present line west of the Danube, requesting immediate evacuation of the territory, except for a bridgehead at Budapest.	664 [Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289]
Aug. 30 (37)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i>	664 [Pg. 664 includes

	Report of declaration by Friedrich that he will make peace with Roumania on her own terms within 48 hours unless the Entente is successful in stopping the plundering of Hungary.	portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289]
Aug. 31	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Memorandum (text printed) for consideration of Interallied Military Mission regarding results accomplished by the Mission, setting forth requests made to Roumanian Government and action taken regarding them; decision to hold memorandum until notified of Roumanian reply to last ultimatum of Supreme Council, of August 25; information that Roumanians continue looting, with no intimation that their Government has received ultimatum.	664 [Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289]
Sept. 2 (46)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Attitude of Roumanian government officials toward Hungarian situation and their right to indemnification from Hungary before considering claims of other allies.	671 [Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291]
Sept. 3 (49)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report on material taken out of Hungary by Roumanians from August 25th to September 1.	671 [Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291]
Sept. 6	<i>The Prime Minister of the Hungarian Government (Friedrich) to the Interallied Military Mission</i> Appeal for recognition and aid of Allied and Associated Powers, particularly in achieving evacuation of Roumanian Army beyond demarcation line, and organization of an armed	672 [Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 292]

	force for maintenance of public order, so that the elections may be held; intention, otherwise, to turn country over to Allied and Associated Representatives.	
Sept. 7 (60)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Supreme Council (text printed) at request of M. Heinrich, transmitting information that he is resigning his mandate to constitute a Cabinet, in the belief that public opinion favors present Government under Friedrich.	674 [Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295]
Sept. 8 (27)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Officer in Charge in General Bandholtz' Absence (tel.)</i> From Polk: Message for General Bandholtz to avoid discussion of diplomatic questions with Roumanian officials, and to telegraph immediately object of trip.	674 [Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295]
Sept. 11 (62)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report on trip to Roumania, which was undertaken for purposes of explaining Mission's orders in hope of securing Roumanian cooperation, and of ascertaining reason for growing Roumanian hostility towards America.	674 [Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295]
Sept. 12 (4183)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of War from Polk: Request to have General Bandholtz continue in rank of Brigadier General until his work with Mission is completed.	676 [Pg. 676 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297]
Sept. 12 (65)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of Roumanian requisitions of rolling stock up to September 8; appointment of a commission to investigate material left by	676 [Pg. 676 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 ,

	General Mackensen; Roumanian claims of a Hungarian conspiracy against the Roumanian Army and Government in which Prime Minister Friedrich is seriously implicated.	and Doc. 297]
Sept. 13	<i>General Bandholtz to the Supreme Council (tel.)</i> Furnishing by Roumanian Command to the Mission of proofs that Friedrich Cabinet has encouraged the clandestine creation of a corps of troops in Budapest and suburbs, and request for Mission's consent for action against Ministry.	677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298]
Sept. 14 (67)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Impression that Roumanians are intending to leave suddenly; Hungarian opinion that they expect request to return on account of unsettled condition of country.	678 [Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299]
Sept. 15 (68)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that efforts to organize a police force to handle conditions in Hungary have accomplished nothing, owing to uncooperative Roumanian attitude.	679 [Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301]
Sept. 15 (69A [69])	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Transmittal of a telegram (text printed) to the President of the Supreme Council from Prime Minister Friedrich requesting that the Hungarian Government be placed under the protection of the Supreme Council because of danger threatening country from Roumania.	679 [Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301]
Sept. 15 (69 [70])	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of fall of Friedrich Cabinet and formation of new Cabinet approved by Roumania, and Roumanian attempts to force signature by Hungary of peace treaty under	680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 ,

	threat to evacuate and leave Hungary in a state of chaos; opinion that Hungary could handle situation in event of Roumanian withdrawal.	and Doc. 303]
Sept. 16 (72)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that Roumanians are beginning to evacuate part of Hungary, looting as they go; unconfirmed report that new government under Perenyi has approval of Roumania and Italy.	680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303]
Sept. 17 (75)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Decision of Mission to protest to Roumanian military commander against scheme for further impoverishing Hungary by demanding redemption of 200 million kronen of Communist-issued white money.	681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304]
Sept. 18 (77)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of additional Roumanian requisitions and departure of troops, despite nonadmission by Roumania of their departure; information that Mission has requested attendance of Roumanian Commander in Chief at session following day to advise as to whether he intends to permit organization of police, and as to definite date for promised evacuation of trans-Danubia.	682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305]
Sept. 19 (79)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information and assurances given by Roumanians at session of Mission in regard to promise to give notification of decision to evacuate Hungary, pledge of immediate evacuation of west bank of Danube, organization of Hungarian Army, and other questions.	683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 306]

Sept. 20 (47)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz (tel.)</i> Telegram for Interallied Military Mission from Supreme Council (text printed), regarding desire for speedy constitution of a <i>gendarmierie</i> force to maintain order after withdrawal of Roumanian army; instructions to so inform Hungarian and Roumanian authorities.	684 [Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]
Sept. 20 (1722) [M2]	<i>The Interallied Military Mission to the Supreme Council (tel.)</i> Importance of having a government in Hungary which is recognized by Entente; recommendation that Friedrich Cabinet be recognized, or that explicit instructions be given them as to what will be recognized; further report on Roumanian seizures and exportations.	684 [Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]
Sept. 22	<i>The President of the Day, Interallied Military Mission, to General Mardarescu of the Roumanian Army</i> Request that General Mardarescu either postpone intended departure until receipt of report upon Admiral Horthy's army, or arrange that officer in charge in his absence be invested with necessary authority to act upon the report.	685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309]
Sept. 23 (86)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report by Budapest chief of police that Roumanians have authorized Socialist meetings for alleged purpose of overthrowing Friedrich Cabinet and that unarmed police force may have difficulties in handling them; information that Mission is informing Roumanian authorities that they are responsible if anything happens; failure of Roumanians to supply promised guns for police force.	686 [Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311]
Sept. 23	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i>	686 [Pg. 686 includes

	Summary of Mission's negotiations with Roumanians regarding conditions in Hungary, and failure to carry out instructions of Supreme Council owing to obstructive attitude of the Roumanians; visit of Hungarian Foreign Minister, who advised that he believed that it was necessary to accede to Roumanian terms to save the country.	portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311
Sept. 24 (87)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's intention to confer with Ardeli with view to accepting Roumanian terms in order to save country; intention to advise American representative, in confidence, regarding terms.	693 [Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]
Sept. 25 (89)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Notification to Roumanian Commander of receipt of committee report containing unanimous declaration that Admiral Horthy's army does not threaten the Roumanian army, with which Mission concurs; request for reply by September 28 as to decision of Roumanian Commander, for transmission to Supreme Council.	694 [Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]
Sept. 27 (95)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report by U. S. Army officer after visit to headquarters of Hungarian army, concerning investigation of reported mistreatment of Jews; his opinion that authorities are doing their utmost to prevent injustice and disorder and that rumors of a White terror are unfounded.	695 [Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315]
Sept. 29 (102)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that Roumanians have agreed to evacuate trans-Danubia and that evacuation should begin in about 5 days.	695 [Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315]

Oct. 2 (112)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report on U. S. Army personnel on duty with Interallied Military Mission.	696 [Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317]
Oct. 3 (115)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk from Bandholtz: Action taken by Mission in respect to claims and complaints regarding Roumanian requisitions; opinion as to necessity of forcing Roumania to obey instructions of the Supreme Council.	696 [Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317]
Oct. 4 (118)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Recommendation that Roumanians be made to return immediately a portion of Hungarian rolling stock as directed by Interallied Military Mission to relieve food and fuel shortage.	697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320]
Oct. 5 (124)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report that first stage of Roumanian evacuation has passed off satisfactorily.	697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320]
Oct. 6 (125)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Recommendation that Hungarian peace delegates, to be approved by the Interallied Military Mission, be sent to Paris without delay.	697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320]
Oct. 6 (126)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i>	698 [Pg. 698 includes

	Efforts to prevent removal by Roumanians of articles from National Museum in Budapest which they claim belong to them.	portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321]
Oct. 6 (127)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Receipt by Mission of a letter from the Archbishop of Esztergom and Prince Primas of Hungary claiming ownership of the articles which the Roumanians desire to seize from the National Museum.	699 [Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , and Doc. 324]
Oct. 7 (128)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk from Bandholtz: Report that Roumanians have delivered 1,000 serviceable rifles for police, and that evacuation of Western Hungary should end this date.	699 [Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , and Doc. 324]
Oct. 8 (133)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Data regarding continued Roumanian requisitions despite Roumanian assurances on September 16 that they would cease; report of formation of an Austrian Red Army with intention of breaking into Hungary; completion of evacuation of Western Hungary without serious incident.	699 [Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , and Doc. 324]
Oct. 8 (561)	<i>The Interallied Military Commission to the Supreme Council (tel.)</i> Information that withdrawal of Roumanians and corresponding advance of Hungarians in trans-Danubia has been completed without incident; data regarding rolling stock evacuated by Roumanians through October 4.	700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325]
Oct. 11 (76)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz (tel.)</i> From Polk: Request to be informed whether promised delivery of rifles for police has been made by Roumanians.	701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 ,

		and Doc. 327]
Oct. 16 [13?] (145)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram to Supreme Council from Interallied Military Mission (text printed), containing text of memorandum sent to Roumanian Headquarters in protest against attempted arrest of Prime Minister Friedrich.	701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327]
Oct. 13 (147)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Report that Roumanians have delivered 4,000 rifles and promised 6,000 more.	702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329]
Oct. 15	<i>The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Royal Roumanian Forces</i> Request that, pending report of Interallied investigating committee on conflict between Roumanian and Hungarian troops beyond neutral zone in trans-Danubia resulting in death of Roumanian soldiers, Roumanian orders for payment of fine by Hungarian Government under threat of starvation of Budapest be suspended.	702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329]
Oct. 15	<i>The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Royal Roumanian Forces</i> Desire that Roumanians proceed with the evacuation of Hungary and of Budapest in accordance with instructions of the Supreme Council and request to be informed of date on which withdrawal will take place.	703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331]
Oct. 15 (151)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Report on obstructive actions of the Roumanians; information regarding letter sent	703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331]

	by Mission requesting immediate withdrawal of Roumanian forces.	
Oct. 15 (154)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Report that Roumanians have delivered 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns, which, however, lack accessories, bayonets, and cartridges.	704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333]
Oct. 17 (157)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of continued Roumanian requisitions in trans-Danubian territory; reply of General Mardarescu to Mission's letter of October 15 in regard to cutting off of food supply of Bucharest that he had been misunderstood; further information regarding Roumanian attempt to arrest Prime Minister Friedrich.	704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333]
Undated (167)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Roumanian reply (excerpt printed) to Mission's letter of October 15, maintaining liberty with respect to operative questions; reply by Mission that such action would imply nonrecognition of Mission's authority, and that Supreme Council will be notified accordingly; efforts of Roumanians to seize Friedrich, which were frustrated by action of Interallied Military Mission.	705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 334]
Oct. 23 (172)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Receipt of letter from Roumanian Commander in Chief disclaiming intention to arrest Friedrich; trouble in Baranya caused by Jugoslavs, who have been requested to withdraw south of demarcation line; arrival of Sir George Clerk in Budapest.	706 [Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335]
Oct. 27	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i>	707 [Pg. 707 includes

	Summary of lack of success of Mission in carrying out instructions of Supreme Council, owing to attitude of Roumanians; report on trip to Belgrade and attitude of Jugoslavs.	portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336]
Oct. 30 (181)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram for Supreme Council (text printed) regarding conditions in Roumanian prisoner of war camps.	713 [Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337]
Oct. 31 (182)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Decision of Mission to request Roumanians to take action to improve conditions in prisoner of war camps.	715 [Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , and Doc. 339]
Nov. 5 (5011)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Polk: Recommendation that an American diplomatic or consular representative be sent to Hungary as soon as possible.	715 [Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , and Doc. 339]
Nov. 5 (187)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram for Supreme Council (text printed) containing unanimous protest of Interallied Military Mission against proposal of Supreme Council for occupation of Hungary by Interallied, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav troops.	716 [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , and Doc. 341]
Nov. 6 (188)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Probability that Roumanians will begin evacuation on 9th; indication that they will evacuate only to line of Tisza and will try to hold territory in attempt to obtain territorial concessions from Supreme Council; willingness	716 [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , and Doc. 341]

	of Friedrich to resign when Roumanians have withdrawn to demarcation line.	
Nov. 9	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Interview with Prime Minister Friedrich, November 7, at his request, in which he was advised unofficially that as the representative of the Hapsburg dynasty he would never be recognized by the British and American Governments, and the immediate organization of a coalition Cabinet was suggested.	717 [Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342]
Nov. 10 (195)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Submission of Roumanian plans for evacuation from Danube to Theiss; request that Mission be informed as soon as possible of Roumanian schedule for withdrawal from Theiss to line of demarcation in compliance with Supreme Council's orders; formation of an Interallied committee to supervise transfer of Hungarian prisoners of war held by Roumanians.	719 [Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343]
Nov. 12 (199)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Report of Roumanian action in distributing large quantities of food as a philanthropic gesture, which they obtained by seizing Hungarian Government food depot.	720 [Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344]
Nov. 13	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Request for information as to probable date of liberation, or other information, regarding disposition of Hungarian prisoners of war in Siberia.	721 [Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347]
Nov. 15 (203)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Report of completion of evacuation of	721 [Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 345 ,

	Budapest by Roumanians and reoccupation by Hungarians without incident.	Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347]
Nov. 15 (204)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Information that evacuation is proceeding satisfactorily, but that Roumanians are determined to hold line of the Tisza River; intention to send one of Mission's officers to join Roumanians as liaison officer, since they left no one for that purpose.	721 [Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347]
Nov. 16 (205)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Arrival of Admiral Horthy's Hungarian National Army in Budapest; report of Sir George Clerk's concern over the arrest of several Social Democrats.	722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350]
Nov. 17 (105)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz (tel.)</i> From Polk: Agreement with attitude of Sir George Clerk regarding arrest of Social Democrats; observation that continuance of campaign against Socialists, will justify Roumanian claims that they are needed to keep peace in Budapest, and make impossible insistence on further Roumanian withdrawal.	722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350]
Nov. 17 (206)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram for the Supreme Council from the Interallied Military Mission (text printed) regarding conditions in Budapest since Hungarian reoccupation; information that Friedrich is about to publish election proclamation; indications that he will not form a coalition with the Socialists.	722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350]
Nov. 18 (207)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i>	723 [Pg. 723 includes

	For Polk: Advice that facts do not justify concern over reported arrests; indication that Friedrich will be replaced within next 24 hours, probably by Apponyi; adverse report on Roumanian evacuation, and information that Mission's liaison officer will arrive at Roumanian headquarters on November 19.	portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351
Nov. 19 (208)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Intention of Sir George Clerk to telegraph an explanation of his first reports; his concurrence in opinion that there should be no delay in complete Roumanian evacuation; information that a telegram has been sent to Supreme Council by Mission regarding question of Serbian occupation of Hungarian territory.	724 [Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 352]
Nov. 20 (110)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz (tel.)</i> Information that Ulysses Grant-Smith has been selected as Commissioner to Hungary and instructed to proceed there immediately.	725 [Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354]
Nov. 24 (212)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Information that Friedrich will resign on this date and new Prime Minister, Charles Huszar, and his Cabinet will come into power; report on conditions in Pecs coal mines, now occupied by Serbs.	725 [Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354]
Nov. 26	<i>The Interallied Military Mission to the Commanding General of the Roumanian Army of Transylvania</i> Protest against bombardment by Roumanian forces of defenseless town of Tokaj.	726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , and Doc. 356]
Nov. 26 (214)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram for Supreme Council from Interallied	726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of

	Military Mission (text printed) recommending action by Supreme Council regarding Serbian occupation of Hungarian territory.	Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , and Doc. 356]
Nov. 27 (119)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz (tel.)</i> From Polk: Request for views as to whether it is necessary for Interallied Military Mission to remain in Budapest, or whether it would be sufficient for General Bandholtz to remain as U. S. Special Commissioner until arrival of Grant-Smith.	727 [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357]
Nov. 27 (215)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Recommendation that an Interallied committee be sent to investigate reported Roumanian atrocities in Transylvania; importance of arrival of American representative on Reparations Committee without delay.	728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359]
Nov. 29	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Opinion that Interallied Military Mission could now be discontinued; report that Serbs are evacuating Baranya, plundering as they go, and that Mission has sent four officers there; information that Roumanians are still holding the line of the Tisza.	728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359]
Nov. 30 (219)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Report from liaison officer sent to Roumanian headquarters, regarding intention of General Mardarescu to hold Tisza line until signature of peace with Hungary; Roumanian attitude that liaison with Mission is unnecessary since all questions regarding occupied territory should now be taken up with Roumanian Government.	729 [Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361]

Undated	<i>Report to the Interallied Military Mission Made by the Subcommittee Sent to Pecs on November 28, Returning December 1, 1919</i> Text of report; information that subcommittee was unable to accomplish its mission because of attitude of Serbian Military Commander and Civil Governor at Pecs; impression of subcommittee that Serbs intend to evacuate Pecs eventually, but without notice to the Mission.	729 [Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361]
Dec. 5 (127)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz (tel.)</i> From Polk: Decision of Supreme Council to dissolve Council of Generals; instructions to remain in Budapest as United States representative; arrangements regarding staff.	731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362]
Dec. 6 (230)	<i>General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Indications that Roumanians do not intend to sign Hungarian peace treaty and will not retire from Theiss until forced to do so by economic or diplomatic pressure.	732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363]
Dec. 13	<i>General Bandholtz to the Interallied Military Mission</i> Notification of discontinuance of membership on Interallied Military Mission.	733 [Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365]
1920 Jan. 10	<i>General Bandholtz to Countess Karolyi</i> Information in regard to question of repatriation of Hungarian prisoners of war in Siberia.	733 [Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365]
Jan. 23	<i>General Bandholtz to the Hungarian Prime Minister</i> Appreciation of cooperation and assistance of Hungarian Government, and especially of Minister Councillor Zerkowitz, in the work of the Claims and Complaints Bureau established	734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366]

	by the Mission to consider claims and complaints of Hungarian subjects and others; notification that Bureau may be discontinued on February 15.	
Jan. 31	<i>The Commissioner in Hungary to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Recommendation that General Bandholtz be returned to the United States on State Department detail to report personally to the Secretary of State on conditions in Hungary.	735 [Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368]
Feb. 9	<i>The Commissioner in Hungary to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Departure of General Bandholtz and staff from Budapest for Paris.	735 [Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368]

MISSION OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL SHERMAN MILES TO MONTENEGRO

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Mar. 28	<i>Mr. A. J. Balfour to Colonel E. M. House</i> Suggestion for an Anglo-American Commission to proceed to Montenegro to ascertain the true wishes of the inhabitants, following withdrawal of the Allied troops now occupying the country; suggestion of Count Salis as British representative.	736 [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 369]
Apr. 3	<i>Colonel E. M. House to Mr. A. J. Balfour</i> Information that President Wilson has approved plan for Anglo-American Commission for Montenegro and appointed Lt. Colonel Sherman Miles as American representative.	737 [Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370]
Apr. 18	<i>The Secretary of State to Mr. A. J. Balfour</i> Information that a telegram (text printed) is being sent to Colonel Miles requesting that he consult with Count Salis and investigate reports	738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372]

	of massacres of Albanians in Montenegro by Serbian troops.	
May 19 (23)	<i>Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Summary of situation in Montenegro and suggested solution that Montenegro be included in Yugoslavia, under guarantees of autonomy and political rights; further recommendation for defining boundary between Montenegro and Albania on lines of nationality.	738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372]
May 21 (24)	<i>Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Report on investigation of Serbian massacres of Albanians in Montenegro.	740 [Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373]
May 30	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Submission of report of American representative on Anglo-American Mission of Investigation for Montenegro; observation that his conclusions confirm reports that best solution of Montenegrin question is the incorporation of this country into Yugoslavia, with guarantees of autonomy and political rights.	744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 374]

THE AMERICAN SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
MANDATES IN TURKEY (THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION)

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Mar. 25	<i>Instructions for Commissioners From the Peace Conference</i> Instructions for guidance of the American Commissioners in investigating social, racial, and economic conditions in certain portions of the Turkish Empire which are to be separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of	745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 375]

	Governments acting as Mandatories, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the five great powers on January 30, 1919, and with the Anglo-French Declaration of November 9, 1918 (texts printed).	
Apr. 2	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Request for authorization to sign letters to Mr. H. C. King and Mr. Charles R. Crane, designating them as American Commissioners.	747 [Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376]
Apr. 15	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Authorization to sign letters to Mr. King and Mr. Crane, even though other interested powers apparently have withdrawn from their agreement to send commissioners to Syria.	748 [Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378]
June 20	<i>Mr. C. R. Crane and Mr. H. C. King to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> For President Wilson: Hostile attitude of Moslem and Christian population toward extension of Jewish immigration or any attempt to establish Jewish sovereignty over them.	748 [Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378]
[July 10]	<i>Mr. C. R. Crane and Mr. H. C. King to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that Commission has covered principal strategic points in Palestine and Syria and has been favorably received everywhere; observations concerning desire of native population for political independence, and attitudes toward United States, Great Britain, and France as mandatory powers; conflict of interests between Great Britain and France in area; importance of encouraging and supporting Emir Feisal.	749 [Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 379]
Aug. 28	<i>Report of the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in</i>	751 [Pg. 751 is part of

	<i>Turkey</i> Text of report in three sections dealing respectively with Syria, Mesopotamia, and the non-Arabic-speaking portions of the former Ottoman Empire.	Doc. 380]
Undated	<i>Confidential Appendix to the Report Upon Syria</i> Supplementary discussions and material involving criticisms of Allied powers not included in the report of the Commission.	848 [Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381]

Field Missions of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace:

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(Documents 179-188)

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The Gherardi Mission to Germany

[1] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, January 30, 1919—2 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.012/20a: Telegram

[2] Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 2, 1919—1 p.m. [Received via Colonel Williams, G—2, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz, 11:20 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/2: Telegram

[3] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Colonel Williams, G—2, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz

Paris, February 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/2: Telegram

[4] Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 4, 1919. [Received February 7.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/6

[5] Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 6, 1919. [Received February 10.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/9

[6] Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 8, 1919. [Received February 11.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/18

[7] Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 11, 1919. [Received February 14.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/37

[8] Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Munich, February 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/3

[9] Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 15, 1919. [Received February 18.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/44

[10] Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 15, 1919. [Received February 18.]

Paris Peace Conference 184.01202/44^{1/2}

[11] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

The Hague, February 16, 1919—1 p.m. [Received February 17—2:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 862.00/172: Telegram

[12] The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Major Arnold Whitridge

Paris, February 17, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.012/37c

[13] Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 18, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/50

[14] Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, February 21, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/55¹/₂

[15] Dr. E. E. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Munich, February 22, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/8

[16] Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Brest, 24 February, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/59

[17] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Colonel Williams, G-2, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz

Paris, February 26, 1919—8 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.014/16b: Telegram

[18] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, February 26, 1919—9 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.012/42a: Telegram

[19] Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Munich, February 26, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/12

[20] Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[Berlin,] February 27, 1919. [Received March 3.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/69

[21] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, February 28, 1919—5 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/65a: Telegram

[22] Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[Berlin,] March 1, 1919. [Received March 4.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/75

[23] Major Lindsay Blayney to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Frankfurt a/M., March 2, 1919. [Received March 7.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/75¹/₂

[24] Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[Berlin,] March 4, 1919. [Received March 10.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/78

[25] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, March 6, 1919—12 midnight.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.012/47a: Telegram

[26] Report on Economic and Political Conditions in Silesia, Prepared by Captain Robert L. Black, Lieutenant Albert H. Stonestreet, and Field Clerk A. L. Rosenthal

March 6, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 862.00/236

[27] Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Zurich, March 14, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/15^{1/2}

[28] Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Zurich, March 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/16

[29] Dr. E. E. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Zurich, March 17, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/18

[30] Report by Lieutenant George Howe

Paris , March 19, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/19^{1/2}

[31] Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Zurich, March 19, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/19

[32] Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Zurich, March 20, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/20

Paris Peace Conf. 184.012/20a: Telegram

[Document 1]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, January 30, 1919—2 p.m.

501. By direction of Ammission a party headed by Captain Gherardi U. S. N. left for Germany January 26th for a probable stay of 2 months or more in order to investigate general situation especially political but with no authority to make representations on questions of policy. Communication with Mission has been arranged by cipher and will be in charge of a navy communication party of 10 members. Captain Gherardi and several other members of Mission will make headquarters at Berlin and he will send other members to places requiring especial attention. All officer members of party will wear uniform. Dr. H. H. Field will be stationed at Munich with Lt. Howe. Following is complete list of members of mission omitting communication party

- (1) Captain Gherardi, U. S. N.
- (2) Major Arnold Whitridge, G. S.
- (3) Major Lindsey Blayney
- (4) Capt. Robert Black
- (5) Capt. L. S. Chanler
- (6) Capt. Hayford Peirce
- (7) 2nd Lt. Albert H. Stonestreet
- (8) A. Louis Rosenthal, A. F. C.
- (9) W. H. Webb, A. F. C.
- (10) Dr. H. H. Field
- (11) 1st Lt. George Howe
- (12) Lt. E. T. Dewald
- (13) Franklin Day
- (14) Frederick Schumacher.

Of the foregoing Day has been assigned by the Minister at Berne to this temporary duty at the request of the Commission. Copies of all telegrams and reports from Gherardi will be forwarded to Department for its information.

Doctors Taylor and Kellogg are proceeding to Germany today to investigate food conditions. They will maintain touch with Gherardi party but will act independently and for Hoover.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/2: Telegram

[Document 2]

***Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

BERLIN, February 2, 1919—1 p.m.

[Received via Colonel Williams, G-2, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz,
11:20 p.m.]

2. Situation of Government critical because of active resistance in Bremen, Düsseldorf, and Eisenach where Spartacists are in control. Government volunteer troops of doubtful qualifications have been sent to Bremen where Bolshevik government has been instituted. The Government demand that the workmen give up their arms has been met by active preparations to resist loyal troops; negotiations which have taken place have so far been fruitless and fighting may take place as the Government appears determined to crush rebellion. In Eisenach Workmen's Council has threatened to prevent National Assembly. Berlin appears quiet, but considerable apprehension of new Spartacist uprising exists. Spartacists offer soldiers of "Red Soldiers League" 30 marks a day. The outcome of the present struggle will show whether the Government in cooperation with Brackecis Partys [sic] can restore orderly condition and preserve democracy. It is severely handicapped by apathetic mentality of people which has lost hope with break-down of old orderly regime. This has been much accentuated by underfeeding, high infant mortality, and by rapidly increased unemployment which is demoralizing even those of the masses who have been orderly until the present. The early lifting of the food blockade and that on certain essential raw material alone can enable the present government to hold the situation and to suppress the danger of further disorganization.

GHERARDI

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/2: Telegram

[Document 3]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Colonel Williams, G-2, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz

PARIS, February 4, 1919.

6. For Gherardi, Hotel Esplanade, Berlin. Your No. 2 2nd. Ammission highly appreciates information conveyed and is convinced that results of expedition will be of great value. Suggest that following topics may be advantageously investigated: 1st, the apparent paradox involved in the alleged collection on the one hand of a large volunteer army under Hindenburg in the east; on the other the reported revolts and opposition in Soldiers' Councils to Noske's plans of military organization; 2d, Is the military activity against the Poles of an aggressive character or are its aims merely defensive as has been claimed; 3d, what is the general trend of opinion regarding incorporation of German Austria into the new German state and by what parties is it favored.

Suggest that you endeavor to see Oscar Cohn and possibly other leading Independent Socialists as no opportunity offered to talk with them on last visit.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

***Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

BERLIN, February 4, 1919.
[Received February 7.]

Subject: Political situation.

1. A brief review of the government and its tendencies at the present time is necessary to understand the policies and actions which may develop in the near future.
2. The Ebert-Scheidemann Government¹ is a development of a self-appointed government supported by the Social-Democratic party. As shown by the election figures for the Constituent Convention to be held in Weimar, the Social Democrats have the greatest number of votes of any one party but are outnumbered by the combined votes of the various parties to the right which are parties representative of the Bourgeois as distinguished from the Socialists. It is therefore necessary, if the present government is to keep in power, that the Social-Democratic party look for supporters. This they are doing by seeking to unite with them the party immediately to the right, the German Democratic party (the party of Theodor Wolff, Dernburg, Fischneck, Gustave Hartman, Bernstorff). They also seek to bring into their support certain moderate portions of the party on their left (the Independent Socialists), but opinion appears to be that they are compromising themselves to secure the support from the right much more than from the left and in doing so they are bringing into political strength men and ideas whose liberalism is tinged with reactionary tendencies.
3. Ebert and Scheidemann are immersed in internal political matters. The Foreign Minister, Brockdorff-Rantzau is said to be constantly acquiring stronger influence over them. Members of the

Foreign Office now indicate that their authority is much extended over pre-war days. The old army influence with the government has correspondingly fallen away. Of Brockdorff-Rantzau and the Foreign Office, I was impressed that no change had occurred and no democratic spirit exists except as circumstances dictate for the moment. No realization as to the changed conditions in the world and in Germany's position in it are in evidence.

4. Bernstorff is handling American affairs and the Foreign Minister offered to have me consult with him, which offer I refused. In talking with Brockdorff-Rantzau over the permission to send members of the Mission to see for themselves how economic conditions actually were in various parts of Germany, he at first proposed that in order that misunderstandings should not occur, that reports should be shown him before being forwarded. I told him that the Foreign Office censorship could not be held over my reports but that I was ready to discuss matters with him at any time and assured him that the Mission had no intention of making trouble for his government and that the Mission was one for information only. He yielded the point but it remains to be seen what facilities will be given for observation.
5. I mention these matters as an indication of the spirit of the Foreign Office which has a relatively strong position in the new government.
6. In the handling of internal affairs the government has gone more than half-way in yielding to the Bremen Spartacist uprising. Threatened with the uprising of Hamburg in support of Bremen, the government compromised on the workingmen turning in their arms to the soldiers' council of the 9th Army Corps, which were the very ones who defied the government. This is a very decided weakening in the government's announced intention and is likely to lead to trouble elsewhere. The date of February 6th is spoken of as one on which there will be many anti-government uprisings. The forcible resistance which the government is getting is all from the left. Dynastic or monarchial support is to be found particularly amongst the clergymen and school teachers but their influence at the present time is small. The general disinclination of everybody except the Spartacists to fight renders the latter the serious problem against which the government must contend.

7. I consider the Ebert-Scheidemann government with its attendant influences not a great change from the old bureaucratic system, yet there stands between them and straight Bolshevism no class or party from which a government can be drawn which would have the confidence of even a small part of the people.
8. In order that the Ebert-Scheidemann or some compromise government along the same lines elected by the Weimar convention should control the country, it will be necessary that they show results which will bring confidence to the majority that will make them more active in its support. The situation at the present time is sufficiently unstable.
9. The German Colonial Society, the German Woman's Red Cross for the Colonies and other societies of distinctly Pan-German tendencies held a meeting on February second to protest against the "robbing" of the German colonies. The tone of this meeting is best indicated by a passage from Erzberger's speech in which he said: "Let there be no deception, the plans of Paris mean the death of world peace. We say this now so that we need not be accused of deception. German people, awake before it is too late. Your future is being decided." Dr. Dernburg, who criticised the former administration of the German colonies, was not allowed to finish his speech. The meeting was a manifestation of a mentality which has not learned to grasp the new facts of the political situation. Noske who had been scheduled to speak abstained probably to avoid compromising himself by joining a distinctly old German meeting.
10. The press is still largely unchanged and instead of treating of the pressing economic and political problems confronting Germany, indulges in bitter recrimination against the Entente and in tearful complaints of its brutality. The *Vorwaerts* alone has kept some dignity and devotes itself largely to domestic problems and to raising the economic morale of the laboring classes. Even the *Berliner Tage-blatt*, with the exception of Theodor Wolff's editorials, shows little difference from the general weakness of the bourgeois press. The violent *Rote Fahne*, the Spartacus organ, has reappeared but appears slightly more moderate, while the Independent Socialist *Freiheit* engages in a campaign of personal vituperation against the government.

¹ Friedrich Ebert, Chancellor of the Provisional German Government, elected President by the National Assembly, February 11, 1919; Philip Scheidemann, Minister of Finance and Colonies, appointed Chancellor by President Ebert.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/9

[Document 5]

***Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 2

BERLIN, February 6, 1919.
[Received February 10.]

Subject: Political situation.

1. The past few days have seen the outbreak of the Spartacist troubles which were expected as an attempt to disturb the National Assembly.
2. The Spartacist movement at present is strongest in Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel and Brunswick. These towns with the exception of the latter are of the greatest importance to the government as they control the routes by which food might enter Germany; Hamburg and Bremen representing the most feasible seaports and Dusseldorf controlling the big railways crossing the Rhine. For this reason these towns are also large industrial centers and suffer therefore from the consequences of unemployment and of the difficulties of food supply.
3. The first energetic action on the part of the government was taken against Bremen where it appeared on Saturday that the Spartacists would comply with the government's demands. They appeared willing to resign in favor of a city government composed of members of all parties in proportion to their voting strength but refused to surrender their arms except to Hamburg troops. As these, however, were as radical as the Bremen workmen, the government refused to concede this point and a volunteer division of loyal troops entered Bremen with some fighting. It succeeded in clearing the town of Spartacists but has not yet been able to disarm them as they have retreated to a point outside Bremen.
4. In Hamburg a Spartacist movement in sympathy with Bremen has begun; the Spartacists have threatened to burn the food supplies in

case of attack. The inefficiency of local guards has been shown by the ease with which Spartacists were able to disarm them.

5. Similar movements have occurred at Kiel and Hamborn. At Dusseldorf all tradesmen, doctors, lawyers, apothecaries and all officials have entered upon a protest strike against Spartacist rule.
6. The Government possesses volunteer troops which agree to support the Republic and to ensure untrammelled elections.
7. The National Assembly meets today. It is proposed that a cabinet of seven Socialdemocrats and seven members of the German Democratic Party and of the Centre will be formed. The cooperation of the Centre, however, is not yet assured, although its left wing would lend itself readily to such an alliance. An offer is said to have been made to the Independents by the Majority Socialists of a fusion. No success can be hoped for this and it represents a purely formal action on the part of the Majority to ensure it against any charges of refusal to join its former associates.
8. Dr. Taylor and Mr. Vernon Kellogg, of the Food Commission, are here and in consultation with the German food authorities. It is evident that the state of German finance will govern the amount of food which can be purchased for importation. It is probable that German credits which the Allies will permit her to use will not be large. The big industrial heads will seek to use as much as practicable for importing raw stuffs on which employment rests, and the German food control will want to bring in quantities of food. A compromise will result, but it is probable even with sufficient shipping granted there will not be more than a bare necessity of food and work for a long time. There are two hundred and fifty thousand unemployed in Berlin and little desire shown to accept work as a considerable daily sum is given to each unemployed.
9. Reports are circulated to the effect that a strong movement in the National Assembly has set in against Erzberger because of his consent to the taking of German merchant ships by the Entente. It appears that this opposition which reaches from the extreme right into Social-democratic circles, intends to remove Erzberger from his place as Chief of the German Armistice Commission, or at least to insist that the next armistice convention be ratified by the National Assembly.

W. R. GHERARDI

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/18

[Document 6]

Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 3

BERLIN, February 8, 1919.
[Received February 11.]

Subject: Political situation.

1. There are forwarded with today's translations Ebert's speech at the opening of the National Convention and some of the press comments thereon.² The interruptions by the various parties of the extreme right and of the left show their salient points of disagreement with the government.
2. Reports today show very heavy attacks upon Erzberger (Head of German Armistice Commission) for his action in surrendering the merchant shipping and on other questions. His resignation is foreshadowed by some papers.
3. Among the parties to the right there has in the past week been a growing agitation over questions affecting the retention of former provinces which may be split off from Germany. My observation is that the masses of the people are apathetic on these questions, but vitally interested in securing food and working conditions. The difficulties of the present government will be overwhelming if some practical method of relieving, at least in part, the present economic situation is not found.
4. The verbatim statement of the Independent Socialists refusing to cooperate with the Majority Socialists is forwarded amongst the translations.³ The Independent Socialists have thereby constituted the opposition. They are as yet a small minority as shown by the vote for the constituent assembly. They are likely to develop as time goes on and people dissatisfied with the results obtained by the government join their ranks.

5. The Independent Socialists are the active upholders of the proletariat against the *bourgeoisie*. There are some moderates in it who differ little from the Socialist party as it was before it assumed control of the government, but the radical wing goes as far as Spartacus and wants the overthrow of the government by any means in their power. I am sending Mr. Day to Weimar on Monday to talk to Haase, who is the present active leader of the moderate section of the Independent Socialists.
6. A description of the workings of the Soldiers' Councils and their political significance is in course of preparation and will be forwarded shortly; also an inquiry is being made as to the morale of the army on the eastern border who are acting against the Bolsheviki.

W. R. GHERARDI

[Enclosure]

Translation from the "Deutsche Tageszeitung," February 7, 1919

EBERT'S OPENING SPEECH AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Through me the government of the Empire greets the constitutional assembly of the German Nation. I extend an especially hearty greeting to the ladies, who appear for the first [time?] as equals in the parliament of the Empire. The provisional government owes its authority to the Revolution; it will give it back to the National Assembly. (Applause) The German people rose in the Revolution against an antiquated and collapsing despotism. (Hissing on the right). As soon as the right of the German to self government is assured, then normal legal measures will return. Only by the broad road of counsel and law-making can we progress with the imperative changes in the field of economics and social reform, without the empire and its economic situation. Therefore the government greets in this assembly the highest and only sovereign in Germany. (Applause)

The day of Kings and Princes by the Grace of God has passed for all time. (Lively applause on the left, hissing right, repeated vigorous applause on the left, and a cry from the right "Wait and see"). We do not forbid any sentimental recollections, but as certainly as this National Assembly has a large republican majority, so certainly have the old God given dependencies been laid aside for ever. The German people are free, will remain free and will govern themselves throughout the future. (Cry from the Ind. Soc. "With Noske") This freedom is the single consolation left to the German people, the only way, by which it can work itself out of the bloody swamp of war and defeat. We have lost the war. This fact is not a consequence of the Revolution. (Cry right "Oho!", left "No, never"). Ladies and gentlemen, it was the Imperial Government of Prince Max of Baden which brought on the armistice, that rendered us defenceless. (Cry: Ludendorff did it) After the collapse of our allies, and in the face of the military and economic situation, they could do nothing else. (Very true!) The Revolution refuses the responsibility for the misery into which the German people has been thrust by the perverse policies of the old authorities and by the arrogance of the militarists. (Very true, Applause from the Socialists, contradiction from the right) Nor is it responsible for our serious food situation. (Very true. Remonstrance and cry; Soldier's Councils). The fact that we have lost many hundreds of thousands of lives by the hunger blockade, that hundreds of thousands of men, women, children and the old people have been its victims, disproves the theory that without the Revolution our food supplies would have lasted. Defeat and lack of food supplies have delivered us into the hands of our enemies. But the war has also terribly exhausted our enemies as well. Out of their feeling of exhaustion arises their effort to exact an indemnity from the German people, if the thought of exploitation enters into the peace negotiations at all. These plans of revenge and oppression demand the sharpest protest, (lively and universal assent). The German people cannot be made the slaves of other countries for twenty, forty or sixty years. (Renewed applause). The frightful misfortune of the war for all Europe can only be made good by all the nations going hand-in-hand. (Applause). In view of the misery of the masses, the question of blame is comparatively of little importance. Nevertheless the German people is determined to call to account everyone who intentionally acted basely or is in any way guilty of

anything against the state. But those who were themselves victims, victims of the war, victims of our former bondage, should not be punished. (Very true, from the Soc.)

Wherefore, by their own testimony, have our enemies fought? To destroy Kaiserism. That has now passed forever; the very fact of this Assembly is proof of that. They fought to destroy "Militarism"; it has been overthrown and lies in pieces never to rise again. (Cry from the Ind. Soc. "They will raise it again"). According to their solemn proclamations our enemies have been fighting for justice, freedom and a lasting peace. Nevertheless the conditions of the armistice have been hard to a degree unheard of before, and have been rigorously executed. Alsace is treated as French without further ado. The elections for the National Assembly which we proposed, have been hindered, contrary to law. (Cries of "Fie"), the Germans have been driven out of the land, (Renewed cries of "Fie"), and their possessions are confiscated. The occupied left bank of the Rhine is cut off from the rest of Germany. (Cry from the Ind. Soc. "Weimar will also be"). The clause in the armistice conditions that no public property be allowed to lie idle, is the object of great effort to increase its scope to the general financial enslavement of the German people. Long after we have become unable to take up arms again, our 800,000 prisoners of war are still retained, and threatened with moral collapse and are forced to hard labor. (Cries from the extreme left "We are still keeping the Russians"). From this act of despotism no spirit of conciliation speaks. (Assent) The conditions of the armistice were made to be imposed on the old Hohenzollern regime. How can the fact be justified that they continue to augment them, when the new Republic is using all its powers to meet its obligations?

We warn our enemies not to drive us to the utmost. Like General Winterfeldt, any German government might be forced to renounce any further cooperation in the peace negotiations, and throw the whole weight of the responsibility for the reorganization of the world on its enemies. Do not place us before the choice between hunger and disgrace. Even a socialistic government, and especially just such a government must hold fast to this policy: rather the worst privation than disinheritance. (Lively applause). If there were added to the millions who have lost everything in the war and have nothing more

to lose, those who feel that Germany has nothing more to lose, the tactics of despair would irresistibly succeed.

Germany laid down her arms trusting in President Wilson's principles. Let them now give us the Wilson peace to which we lay claim (Applause). Our free and popular republic, the whole German people, asks only to be allowed to enter the League of Nations as an equal, and through industry and ability to earn a respected position. (General applause). Germany can still aid the world in many ways. It was a German who presented to the workmen of all nations a scientific socialism. We are again on the way to outstrip the world in socialism for we serve socialism which alone can endure, which extols the welfare and culture of the people, and the socialism we serve is becoming a reality. We turn to all the nations of the world with our urgent appeal to proceed with justice towards the German people, and not to destroy our people and our economy by oppression. The German people have gained by fighting the right of self-government within their land, and cannot prostitute themselves to the outside world.

Nor can we refuse to unite the whole German people in a single state. Our German-Austrian brothers have already declared themselves a part of the greater German republic at their National Assembly on November 12th of last year. The German-Austrian Assembly has reiterated its greetings with the great enthusiasm and expressed the hope that our respective National Assemblies will be able to renew the union severed in 1866. German-Austria must be united with the mother country for all time. (Applause). I am sure that I express the opinion of the whole Assembly in greeting this historic announcement directly and full of pleasure and reply to it in hearty brotherhood. Our comrades by race and fate may be assured that we bid them welcome into the new empire of the German Nation with open arms and hearts. (Applause). They belong to us, and we to them. (Applause). I dare also express the expectation that the National Assembly of our future government will very shortly give the authority to treat with the government of the German-Austrian free state in regard to the final coalition. (Applause). Then there will no longer be a boundary fence between us, then we shall really be a single nation of brothers. (Lively applause). Germany must not again

fall into a land of disintegration and narrow limits. History and the past prevent the formation of a rigorously centralized state, but the different stocks and dialects must cling together in one nation with one tongue. (Applause). The future of our people can be assured only by the possibility of a large, unified development of our economic life and by a Germany united in policy and capable of action. (Applause). The provisional government has stepped into a very bad inheritance. We were the liquidators of the old regime. (“Very true”, from the left; remonstrance on the right; increased applause on the left.) With the help and support of the Central Council of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils (Remonstrance and laughing on the right; Ebert repeated and emphasized the last words; lively applause from the left.) we have used all our strength to overcome the danger and misery of the period of transition. We have done everything to start our economic system functioning again. (Contradiction from right). These continued interruptions (turning to the right) make it clearly apparent that in the grave period of these last weeks and months you have learned exceedingly little. (Stormy applause from the left). If the success of our work did not attain to our wishes, just consideration must be given to the reasons. Many large producers, led astray by the large and sure profits which war industries gave them in the old monarchical, protectionist state have withheld the necessary initiative. We therefore address to these large manufacturers the urgent appeal to further the reawakening of production with all their powers. (Applause).

On the other hand, we call upon the working class to strain every effort in work, which alone can save us. (Applause). We understand the mental mood of those who are now seeking a rest from the strain of overwork during the war, we realize how difficult it must be for those who have been in the field for years to find their way back to peaceful pursuits. But it must be,—we must work and produce goods or we shall go to ruin. (Applause.)

According to our conception, socialism is possible only when the production contains a sufficiently high stage of work done. For us socialism is organization, order and solidarity, not arbitrariness, stubbornness and destruction. (“Quite right”, from the Socialists). The old state could not avoid further extending the state economy to

cover the enormous war debts. In the time of universal need, there can be no place for private monopoly and capitalistic profit without work. On that account we want to cut out profit systematically where economic development has made an industry ripe for forming combines. ("Bravo", from the left).

The future looks at us full of cares, but in spite of all we trust in the inexhaustible power of production of the German Nation. (Applause). The old German principles of might are broken forever. Prussian hegemony, the Hohenzollern army, and the policy of gleaming weapon have been made impossible for us. As November 9, 1918, is bound to March 18, 1848, we must complete here in Weimar the transformation from imperialism to idealism, from world power to spiritual greatness. (Applause).

Even as La Salle's [*Lassalle's?*] influence was but slight on the thinkers and poets of the classic age, so has the age of William with its emphasis on outward splendor passed over us. Now the spirit of Weimar, the spirit of great philosophers and poets, must again fill our lives, fill them with the spirit shown in the second part of "Faust" and in "Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre"; we must not get lost in theory, must not hesitate or vacillate, but take a firm grip on practical life with clear glance and a firm hand, for a man who hesitates at a doubtful moment increases the evil and leads it further and further. But he who clings to reason himself, fashions the world.

So we shall go to work, our great goal clear before our eyes: to guard the rights of the German people, to anchor in Germany a strong democracy and fill it with true social spirit and socialistic ways. (Applause). Thus we will make true that which Fichte gave the German Nation as its task. We will erect an empire of justice and of truth founded on the equality of every human being. (Lively applause from the majority).

² Ebert's speech is printed *infra*; the accompanying press comments are not printed.

³ Statement not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/37

[Document 7]

Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 4

BERLIN, February 11, 1919.
[Received February 14.]

Subject: Political situation.

1. Since the meeting of the convention at Weimar there has been a decided change in tone. The Social Democratic party, unable to have support from the Independent Socialists, has had to secure its majority from an understanding with the German Democratic Party. What this party stands for may be reckoned from the names which appear on its committee (v. Payer, Schiffer, Naumann, Dernburg, v. Richthofen, Neumann-Hofer).
2. It is reported that Dernburg has said Germany will never make peace without the return of the colonies. In the introductory speeches of both Ebert and David claims on a popular vote for the disposition of Alsace-Lorraine were made. Meetings of protest are being held over the retention of the prisoners of war where extravagant speeches are made. It is evident that the old politicians are more and more gaining an ascendancy and are using it to incite resistance to any acceptance of probable allied terms. Bernstorff has been at Weimar, ostensibly having left diplomatic to take up political life. I am told that he has been pressing "inspired interviews"; that is, prepared and typewritten answers to supposed questions by the United Press correspondent. He is said to have ascendancy over his cousin, Brockdorff-Rantzau, and that he is a figure to be reckoned with in present and future political circumstance. He is reported to claim to belong to the German Democratic Party.
3. The trump card which this government is expected to use in its dealing with the peace conference is that without having its claims

allowed the country will become Bolsheviki. This matter I have mentioned before, but Bolshevism has nothing to do with colonies or territorial claims about the border lands. What the proletariat will want is the ability to make a living. To stir up feeling amongst the masses over territorial questions on the part of their leaders and then claim that unless these demands are satisfied the country will go Bolsheviki is an unjustifiable and dangerous play. It savors of the pre-war and war time methods of Germany. Yesterday a wagon went through the streets scattering leaflets calling for the return of the German prisoners.

W. R. GHERARDI

Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

H. H. F. Report No. 4

MUNICH, February 12, 1919.

ARRIVAL IN MUNICH AND FIRST VISIT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Every facility was accorded to us at the frontier, nothing being submitted to censorship nor to customs examination. We were met on the platform in Munich by Dr. Engerer of the Foreign Office who greeted us as welcome to Munich in the name of the prime Minister. Rooms had been engaged and we were taken to the Hotel by Dr. Engerer who expected to wait upon us to know our wishes the next morning. I declined this offer and said we should shift for ourselves and turn to him when we required him. Some days later when we were installed, I made my first visit to the Foreign Office. With Dr. Engerer and Dr. Merkle, I arranged technical matters concerning our stay, our letters and despatches. Dr. Merkle profited by the occasion to expound eloquently and well the food situation. I was then taken to the highest official then in service, Geheimrat von Müller. Here I encountered the coldest reserve. It seems that the Bavarian Legation in Bern had seen fit to give a statement to the press to the effect that I had been sent to Bavaria by the American Government to obtain information for it and to enter into "Offiziöse" relations with' all circles. Von Müller seemed to fear on the one hand that this might be construed as unwished for spying or on the other hand that Berlin might take offence at the matter being run by the Bavarian Legation alone. I assured him that the German Legation was informed and approved.

Our first impressions in Munich are those of deep gloom in spite of all forced jollification, dancing etc.

The one topic on all lips is food. There is no exception. It is a complete obsession. Another universal trait is the hatred of Eisner.⁴ I have surely talked with 50 people of all walks of life, overheard conversations at the barbers and elsewhere and have yet to meet a person in favor of Eisner. Some consider him a sincere idealist, but most regard him as an intriguer. I am more inclined to the former view.

Coupled with this animosity against Eisner and his kind is a tremendous outbreak of antisemitism. The Jews are regarded as to blame for everything. It is the universal opinion that Eisner's government cannot last and that Auer is the coming man. There is particular bitterness just now because of an utterance of Eisner at the Bern congress to the effect that Germany did not wish the return of her prisoners. Eisner is to address a mass meeting tomorrow evening on the Bern congress. I intend to attend. It is believed that there will be great disorder.

HERBERT HAVILAND FIELD

⁴ Kurt Eisner, Social-Democratic Premier of Bavaria.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/44

[Document 9]

Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 5

BERLIN, February 15, 1919.
[Received February 18.]

Subject: Political situation.

1. There are forwarded with today's translations the program for the ministry laid before the National Assembly by Scheidemann,^{4a} and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech on Germany's foreign policy;⁵ also a report received yesterday from Dr. Field in Munich.^{5a}
2. In accordance with your telegraphic instructions received yesterday, I have got into touch with the French Mission under General Dupont. In their opinion the present government is growing more and more reactionary. They consider that the provisional constitution, of which a copy will be forwarded to you by the next courier, will give the head of the government powers almost as unlimited as those held by the Kaiser. They also state that there has been a considerable change in the temper of the government since their arrival in December. At that time it was actually suggested that it would be a good thing if the Allies would occupy Berlin and protect the city from Bolshevism. Since then, as General Dupont expressed it, "ils sont devenus beaucoup plus fiers." Captain Gherardi will be able to give the Peace Commission further information as to the opinions of the French Mission.
3. From a conversation yesterday with a Dr. Schotte, who came to see me at Bernstorff's instigation, it would appear that Germany claims northern Silesia on economic rather than racial grounds. He stated that the Poles would never develop the coal mines in northern Silesia with the same efficiency as the Germans and that in the interest of the world's coal production northern Silesia should be left under German jurisdiction.

4. The press comments on Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech indicate that it is thought to be very broadminded. Germany expects that her delegates will come to the Peace Conference, not as representatives of a defeated country, but as statesmen who expect to assist in the reconstruction of Europe. Wilson's 14 points are regarded as Germany's greatest safeguard.

A. WHITRIDGE

4a Not printed.

5 *Infra*.

5a Not printed.

Paris Peace Conference 184.01202/44^{1/2}

[Document 10]

Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BERLIN, February 15, 1919.
[Received February 18.]

1. There is inclosed herewith translation of speech delivered by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the foreign policy of Germany before the German National Assembly, Weimar, February 14, 1919.

A. WHITRIDGE

[Enclosure—Translation]

Full Text of Speech of Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau Before the German National Assembly, Weimar, February 14, 1919

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The new government has confirmed my appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This makes it my duty to render account to you concerning the fundamental lines upon which it is my intention to conduct the foreign affairs of the Empire within the bounds of the general policies of the present government. The inheritance left by the collapse of the old system to the new government is a bankrupt estate, and yet I realize that this estate cannot be liquidated according to individual judgment, but according to the wish of the creditors.

I may sum up the problems of German foreign policy in two categories: The clearing away of the situation due to the war and the bringing about of normal relations with the society of the nations. The clearing up of the war-situation is a crying need of the whole world. Germany is not responsible for the fact that it still exists.

When the former German government came to an agreement with the Entente and the United States upon the basis of the Wilsonian conditions of peace and accepted the armistice conditions upon this basis, no one would have believed that peace would be so long delayed. Unfortunately, Germany's disarmament of her free will did not render the enemies any milder, but rather put them in the position to obtain from us still further concessions by repeated threats of renewal of the offensive. Recently they have made the attempt by this means to settle matters which, unquestionably, belong among the subjects to be determined at the moment of the signing of peace and which they intended to decide one-sidedly to our disadvantage by armed pressure, while under the conditions of peace agreed upon they were to be decided upon the basis of justice. I have rejected this attempt and shall reject such attempts. Violence may be employed against us, but we cannot be forced to recognize violence as justice.

We have expected an early peace because armistice conditions only had reason of existence if made for a short duration of time. We are on the point of demobilizing our entire forces hitherto existing and replacing our old army of times of peace, that we could now make good use of in the east, by new republican troops. Nevertheless, the conditions of the armistice are made more stringent each month. If our enemies think it their duty to punish us, they are serving the idea of revenge instead of justice and are destroying the spirit upon which, according to their own declarations, peace should be made. Germany has accepted the results of her defeat and is determined to fulfill the conditions agreed upon with her opponents; these conditions mean a complete renunciation of the political aims of former Germany and the recognition of the truth spoken by one of the former great spirits of Weimar, "History is the Tribunal of the World". But we refuse our enemies as our judges because of the prejudices. We in our hearts cannot bow to the opinion of the victor but only to the judgment of impartial parties. Therefore, I shall not allow myself to be thrust aside from the articles of the Wilsonian peace program as it is recognized by both sides. Among these belongs first of all the submission of our differences with other states to an international court of arbitration and the renunciation of armed preparations which would permit of a neighbor's being attacked by

force of arms. We stand ready for both limitations of our sovereignty if our former enemies and our future neighbors submit to similar limitations. (Quite right!).

We admit that the position taken by Germany at the peace conferences at The Hague in regard to these two fundamental questions comprised an historic wrong (unfortunately!) for which our entire nation must now suffer. This confession does not include by any means the admission that, as the enemy insists, the German people alone are responsible for the world-war and that they conducted it with a barbarism that is exclusively peculiar to them. We have had reason to complain about war plans of years standing on the part of our enemies and about grave atrocities in their conduct of the war, and we stand ready to permit unprejudiced men who enjoy the confidence of both parties in the war to establish the guilt for the war and in the war. Therefore, we hold fast to the Wilsonian theory that no costs of the war are to be paid to the victor and that no territories of the vanquished are to be ceded. (Applause.) We are duty bound and willing to make good the damages incurred through our attack by the civil population in the regions occupied by us. If we rebuild in these regions what has been destroyed by us, we will do so by our unfettered labor. (Quite right!) We protest against our prisoners being utilized to do such work as slaves, and against the possible continuance of the state of war in order to have an excuse for this compulsory service under the law of nations (Lively applause). Our enemies owe the vastly greater part of their victory not to the military but to the economic conduct of the war (Quite correct!). Hence it follows that peace must be not only a political but inherently also an economic peace. Quite rightly President Wilson characterized the principle of economic liberty and equality of rights as a fundamental condition of a just and lasting peace. We may, therefore, suppose that the decisions of the Economic Conference of Paris of 1916 will be dropped. It is evident that any differential treatment of Germany, even for a time in the matter of trade and commerce would be unacceptable to us (Applause). One cannot treat a people like the German as a second-class nation (Quite right!). One cannot impose upon it a period of quarantine before its admission into the League of Nations, as one keeps a vessel from port on account of fear of the pest (Lively applause!). If we accept just

conditions of peace and give guarantees for their fulfillment that a reasonable opponent in a peace-treaty can demand, there is no ground for refusing us most-favored nation conditions.

To be sure we have much to relearn in the sphere of commercial politics. We have not always acted upon the principle that even in international relationships the truth holds—If thou wouldst receive, so must thou give (Very good!). That has come certainly in part from the one-sided bureaucratic complexion of our foreign service. (Quite right!) By bureaucratic means the economic relations of nations, which have been profoundly disorganized by the war, can never be re-established. (Quite right!) It is my intention, therefore, to appoint more than in the past experienced specialists in the foreign service. I have already made a beginning. I shall count upon it that the economic side of our foreign policy will in the future make use of the principle of commercial free trade that a just peace must give us in a manner that is as far from unstable, reckless business as it is from narrow minded, corner-grocer politics. In this way we shall be able the more readily to avoid the dislike of other nations to Germany's business methods, which had considerable to do with preparing the atmosphere of war.

Freedom of commerce presupposes, however, the freedom of the seas. (Quite right!) Therefore that article of the Wilsonian Doctrine that deals with the freedom of the seas is one of the most important for Germany.

For us in connection with this point the important thing is not so much the rules of sea-warfare,—we do not want to speak of new wars at this time—but rather the peaceful use of the ocean highways and of its coasts and ports. Regarding this important point of the future laws of nations, however, a clear understanding does not yet exist. The Entente last fall withheld their consent to this point; the conditions that they have imposed upon Germany in connection with the promise of delivery of food supplies and the prolongation of the armistice, leads to the fear that they wish to rob Germany of its entire commercial fleet. If it is desired that Germany be forced to enter the League of Nations without a commercial fleet, that would

mean a high-handed upsetting of its economic development. (Lively applause!)

Such a metamorphosis cannot take place without the accompaniment of fearful convulsions that would spell continual danger to universal peace.

Nor is it any more possible for Germany to enter the League of Nations without colonies than without a commercial fleet. (Renewed lively applause!) According to Wilson's program, colonial questions are to be subjected to a free, generous, absolutely unpartisan settlement. According to this program we expect the restitution of our colonial territories that have been taken from us, partly by threadbare excuses. (Quite right!) We stand ready to discuss the ceding of this or that colony, but as rightful owners. Future colonial policies shall above all guarantee the humane treatment of the native population. In this respect—we must admit it—mistakes have been made also by us.

Missionary activities in which Germany played a large part—though they have been greatly circumscribed by the war—must in the interest of the natives be assured. In connection with this we favor the idea of an international control over tropical colonies under the condition that all colonial powers submit thereto and that Germany receives a just share in the utilization and in the products of the colonies. (Quite right!) To be sure participation in colonial activities can only be of importance to us when the active firms, who are to be regarded as the sole supporters of practical colonial policies, are compensated for the damages they have received at the hands of the enemy.

On the other hand we must be prepared to lose valuable portions of the real territory of the Empire. This is above all true of Alsace-Lorraine, the regaining of which was the fruit of our victories and the symbol of German unity. You know that President Wilson has posed the demand that the wrong done by Germany in 1871 by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine shall be made good. From the standpoint of the new laws of international morality, according to which populations, in the game of the powers, should not be pushed

about like chessmen, it was unjust to decide the fate of the people of Alsace and Lorraine without their consent, and even without regard to language boundaries. (Lively applause!) I shall not refer here to past injustices done the German people. I accept Wilson's point of view because the rights of the present population of Alsace-Lorraine are at stake. Violence is being done these rights, when at this moment the French forces of occupation treat the land like a finally conquered one, and expel or imprison all persons whom they regard as obstructions to their imperialistic plans, and infringe on its language by making it French by violence. (Lively applause from all sides) The Peace Conference has not yet put its seal upon the fate of Alsace-Lorraine. Legally Alsace-Lorraine is still territory of the Empire. From this fact we derive our right to champion the cause of the population of Alsace-Lorraine that their voices be heard in the determination of their fate. (Applause.) Whether they wish to become French Departments or a German free state, whether they prefer autonomy or complete independence: Germany will never believe that the new Europe is founded upon justice until the solemn assent of the entire population of Alsace-Lorraine be given to that article of the treaty of peace that determines the future of their land.

The French plan of joining the Prussian Saar district or the Bavarian Palatinate with Alsace and Lorraine indicates an imperialistic oppression which must be criticised just as sharply as the intentions of former German Chauvinists in regard to the Longwy and Briey basins. (Quite right!) The French are acting in just the same way towards the coal treasures of the Saar as the German Imperialists did towards the mineral wealth of the Longwy and Briey basins. If such propositions are accepted by the Peace Commissioners, then that is the last of any hopes towards ennobling international relations. (Quite right! and applause). Naturally France has a political interest in any weakening of Germany as long as both great nations regard each other as mutual hereditary enemies and therefore are pitted against each other armed to the teeth. The Peace Conference will have the task of furnishing guarantees that will make such a state of affairs seem senseless, but let them beware of finding these guarantees in tearing loose parts of the German Empire which are among its most important members. (Quite right! and vigorous applause). You know what opinions are being spread abroad by

France and Belgium with suspicious zeal in Rhineland and Westphalia:—the establishment of an independent republic, which would soon fall under French leadership after the French and Belgian borders had been pushed further into German territory. With great ingenuity these plans make use of centrifugal forces which were let loose in the West by an excessive centralization of our whole economic life in the war offices of the capital of the empire, and recently by certain phenomena attendant upon the revolution in Berlin. (Quite right!) Thus true and honest supporters of the idea of the German Empire have been made the victims of a dangerous subordination, against which I must give most emphatic warning in the interests of German foreign policies. (Applause!)

I must direct the same warning to certain circles in the south of our Fatherland whose cry, “Los von Berlin”, (Free from Berlin) finds an echo which can be understood to a certain extent, but is none the less lamentable. Even if the restoration of the line of the Main might for the moment seem to promise advantages, which a certain subterranean policy of our enemies tried to make the population believe, even during the war, in the long run such a separation will surely lead to the ruin of the political and economic independence of the separated members. (Quite true! and applause). The German people is beyond all state boundaries, even beyond the boundaries of the old Empire, a living unity. One single state is its natural form of existence. (Very true! and applause). We have no intention of making either the Swiss or Dutch into Germans; the only parts of Scandinavia we have annexed are her old Sagas and her present writers. (Very good!)

But our Austrian brothers and we had the same history until the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. We sat with them in the Paulskirche, and the war which separated us, has, at the best, always been thought of as a civil war which realized the “little-German”, instead of the greater-German idea. Once we find ourselves together again, after all the non-German races in the old Hapsburg Monarchy have declared their independence, we know that we have only made a tardy correction of a mistake in the foundation of the Empire, to which the Peace Conference will certainly not refuse its sanction. (Applause!). The German National

Assembly may already protest and so may I as leader of German foreign policies, against the injustice done to German-Austria by former members of the Imperial Government. (Quite right!)

The new Czecho-Slovak State is only infringing on the law to which it owes its own creation, when it attempts by the force of arms to subject not only the Germans of Moravia and Bohemia to its rule, but also lays claim to districts towards the southeast inhabited by Germans. It even threatens to attack territory of the German Empire itself. Sharp protest must be made against any such attempts. (Lively applause!). The economic needs of the Czecho-Slovak State, which arise from the fact that it is cut off from the sea, can be discussed and settled quite calmly and quietly. The new Germany has just as much interest in the prosperity of its aspiring neighbor, as the latter has in Germany's economic soundness. (Quite right!)

Even as we are determined hereafter to make good the rights of nationality where they are in favor of German brothers, we will also recognize these rights even when they are employed against our power. This applies first of all to the Poles. We have declared ourselves as ready to allow those parts of our Empire settled indubitably by Poles, to join the Polish State. We will keep our promise. What districts fall under Article 13 of Wilson's principles is open to discussion. Some impartial power should decide that point. Until that is decided these territories belong to the Empire. (Applause!). The Prussian State and the Imperial Government are the only powers authorized to exercise sovereign prerogatives therein. The impassioned Polish national propaganda has not been willing to await the decisions of the Peace Conference, but has risen in force against German and Prussian authority, in order to enter into the peace negotiations with as favorable an array of possessions as possible. So they are bringing the horrors of war again to Eastern Germany, which is already threatened with the greater danger of Bolshevism. Thus they prevent us from protecting the Prussian East Provinces in an effective manner against the common enemy. These facts must be sufficient to make it clear to everyone understanding the political situation that it is our first duty to call the Prussian Poles to order—to keep them from violence until the decisions of the Peace Conference have been reached. They can no

longer claim that it is in self defence, for the new German government has lifted the oppressive special legislation and was ready to meet the Poles in the question of the selection of officials. Despite this, the Poles represented us as the aggressors and the Entente undertakes to forbid us using force against the Poles in our own country. The Empire has refused this unreasonable demand and has in turn demanded the withdrawal of all armed bodies of Poles from German territory. (Applause!). The German government will be in complete sympathy with any other form of procedure which the allied and associated powers wish to institute to produce quiet in Polish districts. We are obligated by the armistice conditions to allow the passage of delegations for this purpose from the Baltic Sea to the Polish State, and to assist them and the journey of the Commission in any possible way. It would be to our advantage that the atmosphere of hate that poisoned German-Polish relations even before the beginning of peace negotiations give place to the purer air of mutual understanding. Unfortunately we cannot foresee in Poland an agreeable neighboring state. (Quite true!) It must and will be our aim to find a *modus vivendi* which will carefully guard national interests and mutually protect national peculiarities and characteristics. In this connection must be recognized the right of the Poles to an assured communication with the Baltic. This problem can be solved by a regulation by treaty of navigation on the Vistula, and by railroad and harbor concessions, without having to encroach on the prerogatives of the Empire over inalienable West Prussian territory.

That which is just for the German Poles is fitting for the German Danes. The German government considers it its duty to grant to the Danes the same right to self-government that it demands for the Germans themselves. After the development which affairs have taken, I hope that on our northern boundary an example will be set showing how a national disagreement of years' standing may be harmoniously settled. (Applause!). The German people is united in the wish to live in peaceful relations with the Danes, relations not disturbed by any secret complaints. The majority of the Danish people will certainly not wish that Germany's defeat should be misused in order to make German land Danish. (Quite right!)

The coming peace negotiations will present a theme that is characteristic of them. Among all the peoples engaged in the war, millions of hearts are demanding the most serious attention for an international regulation of the social question. Even as after the Reformation, treaties of peace could not be signed without clauses regarding religious liberty, and after the upheaval of the French Revolution the question of political freedom concerned the Peace Congress, now after the world war of the masses, the question of the social freedom of the working classes must be internationally settled. (Applause!). This demand can be founded on the principle of economic equality of rights. This principle will open equal possibilities on the world market, to every member of the League of Nations. It would work to the disadvantage of socially conscientious and progressive nations, if the exploiters of human energy were free to take advantage of their low cost of production in cutting out their competitors. (Lively applause!). But here the aim sought is not only material but is of a more noble nature,—its basic thought being that the common task of all men is to make life richer and more complete, and not, in a period of high civilization to debase it to mere parts of the machine in the process of production. (Applause!). This thought is forcing its way with such elemental strength, that circles which have withstood it up to the present will finally have to bend before the momentum of social forces. I do not mean by that decisions by force; on the contrary I see in the policy of force now carried on by the Russian Bolsheviks rather the defeat than the victory of socialistic principles. (Quite right!) It is a question of peaceful reasoning about the way which social development shall follow. Germany is not running any danger of a ruinous transformation of its existing conditions. For decades Germany has been making considerable progress down the road which all must travel. The thought of social freedom is nowhere more at home than in Germany. That makes our duty all the more imperative,—not to conclude peace without trying to secure international assent to our social program. That the peaces concluded in the east were of a purely capitalistic nature was a disavowal of our social spirit. Such treaties are today a danger for any conqueror. The German government has decided to take essentially the ground held by the conferences at Leeds and Berne when it comes to clauses in the peace treaty about labor laws and protection and insurance of laborers.

We expect that the coming peace will create a strong organization of the world in the League of Nations proposed by Wilson, which alone will make possible such a common task. The idea of a League of Nations, which only a short time ago seemed a vision of idealistic dreamers, has now come into the clear light of actuality. Already a great number of burning questions concerning a League of Nations have been brushed aside in Paris, which could not be settled by an interchange of opinions among the Powers.

Germany is resolved to cooperate unhesitatingly in the establishment of the League, even though the others should regard us with the deepest suspicion and the League should have been planned to prevent Germany from inaugurating a warlike policy,—which, indeed, is far from our ideas. This suspicion we must overcome with a clean righteous love of peace. (Approval!). An immediate proof of this will lie in the determined renunciation of any policy of armament. Germany will soon be forced for economic and financial reasons to limit its armament greatly, retaining only what is necessary for the preservation of internal order and for the security of our outer boundaries. For a foreign policy that is founded on an overwhelming armament may be a comfortable, but it is mostly an evil and an unfruitful policy. (Very true, from the Left). In any case, you can expect from me a conduct of national affairs which will not be tapping its sword every moment in order to accomplish its designs, but which rather will persuade its opponents that it is to their own interest to fall in with our purposes. A material disarmament is not sufficient, a spiritual disarmament must go hand in hand with it. We must handle all differences of righteous nature that may arise between us and any other nation in a conciliatory spirit. If they cannot be avoided diplomatically, we must leave them to the decision of a court of arbitration, even though there be danger that sometimes a wrong might be done us. At the same time, we shall make it our business to build up an international arrangement for negotiation and settlement of all problems, which are difficult of purely disinterested decision. The propositions made by Bryan^{5b} were the forerunner for such a union.

The establishment of the principle of arbitration in the League of Nations will result in the allaying of differences of opinion between

its members, before they have taken on the harshness that demands the opinion of a court. I am persuaded that the positive problems that will eventually be placed before the League can be solved only by a strong and enduring organization. From that arises the need of officials chosen by common election and some Council of a League-Parliament such as is already prepared for by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Finally, the League of Nations must have strong means of enforcement in order to put its decrees into effect. The surrender of a considerable part of sovereignty that results therefrom can be demanded of a free people only when it can share in the executive power and furnishes on its part the means of enforcement.

We cannot enter into any League of Nations in which we shall be only a subject for executive action. (Right!) Particularly there will be many difficulties in establishing the participation of the nations in the committees of the League, as well as the jurisdiction of the committees and their methods of operation. But I do not give up hope that mankind, martyred by war, will attain to a new and better regulation of national relation as the fruit of its sacrifices and suffering. It will then be possible that hate will give way to consideration without which no human relations can exist. That must be not only for the enemy nations of the west with whose leaders we are now negotiating but also for our neighbors on the east with whom the war first broke out and with whom the first peace was made, but with whom we remain in fact in a state of war without conventions or diplomatic relations. The Russian Soviet republic has declared to the Entente a willingness to join in negotiations on the basic principles that it would stop the Bolshevistic propaganda among other peoples, on condition that it might control the domestic affairs of Russia without foreign intervention. As far as Germany is concerned, I see no reason for refusing to enter into an understanding with Russia on this principle. One would think that such a program must secure the assent of all the statesmen of the warring nations. There should be only one condition to it, that Russia also should accept the principle of Wilson referring to the self-determination of peoples. The League of Nations must remain only a rump if those nations which can be kept from war are not parties to it. It is not feasible to establish the permanent existence of a League

unless the neutral nations are heard. (Very true!) The warring nations will be all the less willing to shut them out since they owe gratitude to the neutral nations for the suffering and sacrifices that they have gone through for the benefit of the warring nations. I take this opportunity to acknowledge gladly in the name of the entire German people that part of the debt of thanks which is due from Germany, and I know that I have therein the concurrence of the German National Assembly. (Vigorous approval!). I am thinking especially of the conspicuous, unforgettable service which the peoples and governments of Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Spain and Switzerland rendered to interned Germans and prisoners, and of the friendly reception which many of our children and sick found among them. (Renewed vigorous approval!). May an international truly humanitarian sentiment spring from this seed which will be more enduring than the dragons teeth of the war. (Applause!).

Ladies and gentlemen, the government in whose name I am about to conduct our foreign policy is under the guidance of the German working class. But it is the government of a unified socialist and bourgeois democracy. On that memorable day which gave to the German nation its first self-chosen government, it was established that the leaders of democratic Germany could for the first time speak to other nations fully empowered in the name of the German people. That means for me, as long as I know myself to have the confidence of the leaders of the German people, a mighty support, which my predecessors did not have. The confidence that I beseech from you will not be lessened because of the name which I have inherited from my ancestors. I hope to show you that a man can be a Count and a convinced democrat. (Good!) Democracy does not mean government by the masses as such; only the ablest must lead and govern. A wholesome people wishes nothing else. The will of the people must try for that in its elections, but it has the means to correct its mistakes. (Very true!) I know that I can hold this place only so long as it approves the conduct of my office. You are assembled here to set up the new structure of the German nation, a structure that must serve not the ends of warlike might, but the works of peace and civilization. If I have taken so much of your time on questions of foreign policy, I demand it as a right because this National Assembly must also deliberate on the different means whereby Germany may

put an end to the war. The decision which you will offer to the new nation, will be the cornerstone on which the German representatives will establish their negotiations with the enemy. The spirit that may animate your debates will be conclusive on the question whether the conquerors of the German people shall recognize it as deserving of justice, or shall offer conditions which will force us rather to accept the utmost consequences than to bow to them. (Applause!). Certainly Germany will have heavy damages to pay both within and without, especially to Belgium, and on that we have no inclination to speak haughtily. (Very true! from Independent Socialists.) But we have immeasurably valuable possessions both within and without, and therefore a duty to look to our individuality and independence as against our opponents. (Vigorous applause!). We are conquered but not dishonored. (Bravo!) The greatest poet of German freedom says, “Unworthy is that nation which does not gladly place its all on its honor.” (Applause from the Right!). Contentment has gone from many of us, but will, unshakeable will, stands fast. (Applause from the Right!). A part of the dignity of the German people has been given into my hand, and I swear that I shall preserve it. (Vigorous applause and handclapping).

^{5b} [Treaties for the advancement of the general peace negotiated under the direction of William J. Bryan, Secretary of State, 1913–1915. For citations to treaty texts, see *Foreign Relations, General Index, 1900–1918*, p. 420 !\[\]\(1d3a1175dd4902218e694b9c098adb83_img.jpg\).](#)

Paris Peace Conf. 862.00/172: Telegram

[Document 11]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

THE HAGUE, February 16, 1919—1 p.m.
[Received February 17—2:30 a.m.]

157. Daily report. Baron von Maltzan, Counselor of German Legation at The Hague has sent word through intermediary that Count Brockdorff-Rantzau in framing future policy considers it to be of first importance that he learn American opinion regarding his speech summarized in my No. 155.^{[5c](#)}

GARRETT

^{[5c](#)} Not printed. Translation of speech printed *supra*.

***The Secretary General of the Commission to
Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Major Arnold Whitridge***

PARIS, February 17, 1919.

SIR: The American Commission to Negotiate Peace has given attentive consideration to questions connected with the Mission to Germany headed by Captain Gherardi, and desires that the Mission continue its functions on the following basis:

1. The central Secretariat will remain in Berlin for the present consisting of Mr. Franklin Day with Mr. Schumacher as clerk. A code will be furnished to Mr. Day by the coding party.
2. It is expected that additional civilian members of the Mission will, when available, be sent to Germany including, if practicable, a code clerk.
3. The Naval Communication Party is to return to Paris at once and is to report to Admiral Benson for further orders.
4. The Commission desires that Captain L. S. Chanler shall report in person at Paris with a view to informing the Commission of the conditions at Hamburg and Bremen as gathered from his observations in these cities.
5. By arrangement with the Foreign Office, a party consisting of Major Blayney, Captain Peirce, with W. H. Webb as Field Clerk, is to be sent to the cities of Cassel, Frankfort a/M and Mannheim to report on local conditions. Such party is not to exceed a period of two weeks for their observations and is then to report personally in Paris to the Commission.
6. Major Arnold Whitridge and Lieut. E. T. Dewald are to proceed to Munich, and are there to consult with the party headed by Dr. H. H. Field as to local conditions. In especial these officers are directed to discuss with Dr. Field the matter of certain statements alleged to have been given out to the German press by Dr. Field. At

the conclusion of this Mission to Munich, Major Whitridge is to return to Paris via Switzerland and is to report to the Commission in person, and Lieut. Dewald is to resume his post in Switzerland.

7. By arrangement with the German Foreign Office, a party consisting of Captain Robert Black, Lieut. A. H. Stonestreet, with A. L. Rosenthal as clerk, is to proceed to Breslau to investigate the political and economic conditions in that city and the surrounding country and is then to return to Paris and report personally to the Commission.
8. It is the wish of the Commission that the Secretariat shall coordinate its work with special commissions which may be arranged from time to time in order to investigate subjects of interest to the Commission, and that all possible assistance shall be rendered to such commissions by the Secretariat. A civilian head of the Mission, with more or less permanent residence in Berlin, is in contemplation.
9. Captain Black will retain the accounts of the Mission and furnish necessary funds for the various parties. Upon the completion of his work in Breslau, he is to bring the expense accounts of the Mission with him to Berlin from where the accounts will be administered thenceforth. Necessary funds for the maintenance of the Secretariat are to be left with Mr. Day.
10. The senior officer in each group referred to in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 will be directed to report his probable arrival in Paris at least forty-eight hours in advance.
11. You are authorized to modify these instructions in such details as may be necessary, reporting by telegraph all modifications which you may make.

I remain [etc.]

J. C. GREW

Major Arnold Whitridge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 6

BERLIN, February 18, 1919.

Subject: Political situation.

1. There are inclosed herewith a copy of the *Wahlkreis Karte Zur National Versammlung*,⁶ which gives a good idea of the political complexion of the country, and a report from two members of the Mission who have been examining political and economic conditions in Hamburg and Bremen;⁷ also a report on the unemployment situation in Germany.⁶
2. With reference to a telegram received from General Churchill's office requesting information on the present strength, organization, equipment, morale, discipline and intention of all enemy forces within the German empire, I consider that this Mission is not in a position to gather the information required. On our arrival in Berlin, Captain Gherardi impressed on the Foreign Office that this Mission was not a military one, and that its only purpose was to study the political and economic situation. In view of this statement, any attempt on our part to obtain complete data on the present German military organization would naturally be regarded with considerable surprise. I will, however, forward as soon as possible such information as I have been able to gather on the various "freiwillige korps", which appear to be the only troops on which the government can depend.
3. The angry protestations of the press over the new armistice conditions are only another proof that the German people as a whole do not realize that their army was defeated. The attitude seems to be that inasmuch as Germany laid down her arms voluntarily, the Allies are taking a very unfair advantage of her. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau has considerably strengthened his

position by offering to resign. It is very unlikely that his resignation will be accepted but should the conservative element get into power again his offer of resignation will stand him in good stead.

4. The strike in the Ruhr coal mines may possibly precipitate further disorder, as it is wholly Spartacist in origin and the government appears determined to suppress it.

A. WHITRIDGE

6 Not attached to file copy of this document.

7 Not printed.

6 Not attached to file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/55^{1/2}

[Document 14]

Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 2

BERLIN, February 21, 1919.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honour to present below a report on certain phases of the political situation in Germany.

Spartacist efforts to this day have been concentrated on controlling industrial centers vital to the welfare of Germany. The attempt to obtain power in Berlin, and thus to control the center of government failed, but failed narrowly. I have been informed by so reliable a person as Theodor Wolff that on the first day of the Spartacus rising the government was absolutely at the mercy of the Spartacists. By calling in a general strike of the organized workmen who were Majority Socialists and by keeping them on the street listening to speeches from members of the government, time was gained to organize the effective resistance which finally broke the Spartacist power in Berlin. Since then no further troubles have ensued and none are expected until the food supply becomes more restricted. Occasional riots which have their origin in the search for arms and in the clearing out of thieves' dens are not really Spartacist; criminal elements in these cases only take up the Spartacist slogan of "down with Ebert and Scheidemann" to lend a political complexion to their dark activities. It can, however, not be doubted that Spartacist propaganda is actively carried on; an aide of Noske's informed me that even in the Volunteer Corps (such as the Brigade Reinhardt) Spartacist agitators could be found.

Failing in Berlin, the Spartacists have concentrated their efforts on the large industrial centers. Hamburg and Bremen would have given them control of the ports through which food might arrive; Düsseldorf holds the key to much of the Rhenanian railway system

and possession of the Ruhr coal mines means large control of industrial production. The proletariat of these towns, moreover, furnishes fruitful material for Spartacus recruiting. With the exception of the Ruhr mines, the Spartacists have everywhere lost control of large cities and from late reports it appears that moderate Socialist elements are getting control. The situation, however, is made worse by the fact that a small armed minority can exercise a terror and can commit sabotage in a short time of such a nature as to make the taking up of work exceedingly difficult (cutting of wires, "drowning" of mines, etc.).

The Spartacists find a powerful ally in the Independent Socialists. This party pretends to be no more than a Socialist party which desires the immediate carrying out of the "Erfurt Programme". In a conversation with me, Haase, the leader of the more moderate wing of the Independent Socialist Party, told me that at present they would be content with the "Socialisation" of the coal and iron industries and of the electrical power works. The trust-like organization of these industries recommend them in their eyes for immediate socialisation. If their present economic program is not very much more radical their political tactics are distinctly revolutionary, not only in their general political activities but on the floor of the National Assembly.

This party has consistently flirted with Bolshevism, one of its chief spokesmen, Dr. Cohn, deputy for Anhalt, was an emissary to Russia to obtain Bolshevik funds and such of its leaders as Ledebour, now in prison, actually aided the Spartacists. Wherever Spartacists create disturbance they can count on the support of the Independents; wherever such support is not given the Independents at least by their neutrality obstruct the government's efforts to re-establish order. On the floor of the National Assembly the Independents vie with the Conservatives in disturbing the speeches of the Liberals and of the Majority Socialists.

Theodor Wolff informed me that the Independents were growing in numbers. They obtain political strength in part from the tendency of the Majority Socialists to become more and more conservative. Considerable dissatisfaction exists against the government because,

three months after the revolution, no measures have been taken to relieve economic distress. It is probably impossible to relieve this distress and to lower the prices of essentials, but it is difficult to persuade much of the proletariat of this impossibility. To this must be added the reluctance of the Ebert-Scheidemann government to change even certain externals such as the terms “Reichs verfassung”, which the Independents proposed should be “Verfassung der Republik”, and to acknowledge boldly the republican and socialist character of the state. Such externals give the Independents weapons which they do not fail to use; their accusation that the present government has too closely allied itself with the bourgeois parties is not without foundation and is having its effect on the radicalization of the masses.

The National Assembly in its transactions, as well as in its prominent personnel, differs but little from the Reichstag. The tone of the speeches by all members of the Assembly from the extreme right to the Majority Socialists has changed but little; they are not aware of Germany's defeat. Here both the Agrarian and the Democrat-Professor are still largely in evidence and although monarchical sentiment is confined to the extreme right, the Democracy of the Democratic Party is not so wholly different from the Liberalism which created the idea of “Mitteleuropa”. It is not easy, however, to evaluate the actual influence of these men, whose energy is spent in speeches generally untranslated into political action. The elections to the National Assembly “were elections dictated by the fear of Spartacus”. The influence of the Majority Socialists which represent a slightly better political idea than the ancient Liberals, is stronger than their representation shows; they lost much ground to the bourgeois parties at the election because of panic. Whatever the faults of the Majority Socialists may be it at least possesses the energy to govern practically which the German Democrats lack entirely. As long as it however does not have the absolute majority, the Ebert-Scheidemann group is forced to ally itself with the Democrats and to support a phrasey Nationalism out of keeping both with the internal and external situation. It is not impossible that this support of such a Nationalism is also due to a fear of Bolshevism and a hope that it may crystallize the forces of order.

I have [etc.]

FRANKLIN DAY

Dr. E. E. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

H. H. Field Report No. 9

MUNICH, February 22, 1919.

Subject: Political situation.

1. The most practical division of the parties in Bavaria is 1) a moderate governmental group, 2) opposition on the right, 3) opposition on the left. The ministerial group Auer–Timm, Rosshaupter and Frauendorfer forms at present the kernel of the moderates. These include the Majority Socialists, the Democrats, and the left section of the Bavarian Popular Party; they are supported without enthusiasm by many persons voting for the German Popular Party. The opposition on the right comprises the bulk of the German Popular Party and a large section of the Bavarian Popular Party (clericals). The opposition on the left comprises the Spartacists and, with the elimination of Eisner from the Government, the independents. Eisner has largely won the Peasant Party and it would probably follow him into the opposition.
2. The Central Council of Workmen and Soldiers was long in opposition to the meeting of the Landtag and held its sessions in the Landtag building. It consented to retire before opening of Landtag. Eisner wished to continue the Council as a political body, a government within the government; Auer was willing to keep the Council, but insisted on assigning to it a purely consultative role, similar at best to that of a Trades-Union.
3. Auer told me the day before the attack of his intentions. He was willing to retire before a bourgeois ministry and to support the same if it kept in liberal democratic channels or he was ready to join a majority socialist government and act on a program which would win liberal bourgeois support. He felt he was not sufficiently cultured to take the first post in the government and told his

colleague Timm not to consider him a candidate. He was carried, however, unanimously by party caucus.

4. The attack on Eisner was made by a 20 year old student of an old aristocratic Bavarian family. It formed no part of a Royalist corn-plot; but was the result of a personal conviction that Eisner must be removed to save the country. Particularly at the time when the murder was committed it was a folly and promises to be a curse to the land. Auer was assaulted by left extremists and today shares none of the sympathy of the masses which flows to martyred Eisner. On the contrary, there is fear lest Auer be dragged from the hospital and lynched.
5. The first consequences of the events lead to a strengthening of the Spartacists. The question is whether it will be possible to find a leader who will have energy enough to stem the tide. At present the energetic majority socialist minister of war Rosshaupter is under arrest. I can learn nothing of the Justice-Minister Timm who is also a supporter of Auer. For the moment almost any development may set in. The surgeons hope to save Auer. They have removed the bullet from the mediastinum, they do not dare let the favorable prognosis be known, lest the patient should be lynched. Auer insisted this morning that I be sent for. I went to the hospital; but the surgeon preferred to serve as go between. Auer has drawn up his political testament, which has so impressed Prof. Sauerbruch, who is known as a furious nationalist, that the latter declares to me he accepts him as the man to save the country.
6. I have very few practical results as yet, but am opening channels, which promise to yield valuable information later.

HERBERT HAVILAND FIELD

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/59

[Document 16]

***Captain W. R. Gherardi to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

BREST, 24 February, 1919.

Subject: Summary of German situation end of February 1919.

1. In addition to reports sent in from Berlin during the first part of February 1919, I submit the following summary of German conditions in general with certain deductions as to the future outlook:

2. The present Government holds the majority by a political combination of the Moderate Socialist and the German Democratic Parties. Had the Moderate Socialist Party been able to work out the destiny of the country alone it would have probably declared for a policy of internal reforms and socialization of certain industries looking to the re-establishment of a sound economic condition, if such a thing were possible. In order to have a working majority in the Constituent Assembly the Moderate Socialist had to form a voting combination with the German Democratic Party which, although it has announced a liberal party platform, is controlled by men of ambitious character who, before the revolution, stood for Pan-Germanism. Those most in evidence in this party at Weimar have been Naumann, (the Central Europe Doctrinaire), Bernstorff, Dernburg, Theodor Wolff, etc.

In general there is no change in the viewpoint that the war had been properly conducted by Germany. The systematic removal or destruction of industrial machinery from Belgium, France, and Poland is still referred to as a war necessity, while suggestion[s] for restitution and restoration are met with the assertion that if the allied nations bring industrial pressure on Germany it will drive her into Bolshevism.

The cry of Bolshevism is the propaganda of the present day. It is the card which the German Peace Delegation expect to use at the conference to get them advantageous treatment.

To Germans a “just peace” means restoration of pre-war conditions for Germany in commercial and territorial matters.

3. To the influences of the German Democratic Party may be attributed the sudden reawakening of policies, such as the demands for the return of the colonies, the return of the Province of Posen, the plebiscite for Alsace-Lorraine, all of which came greatly to the fore, both at Weimar and in the press shortly after the Constituent Assembly had met.

I attribute the demand for the vote in Alsace-Lorraine as a political manoeuvre to enable, at some future time, a claim to be raised that these provinces were never given the right of self-determination, but were torn from Germany by force of arms. All parties are in accord on one subject—that German-Austria must join Germany.

4. To preserve the policies of the Moderate socialists in the Government there had developed in Germany but few men of outstanding ability. Auer [*Eisner?*], who has just been assassinated at Munich; Noske, who has put down the Spartacist uprisings; and Ebert, appear to be the leaders of those who genuinely seek for higher political ideals for Germany. Scheidemann’s sincerity as a reformer is open to question. Brockdorff-Rantzau is of the old school of German diplomacy. He is closely allied with Bernstorff. As adviser to the Ebert-Scheidemann Government in their dealings with the allied nations and America he shows a failure to realize that times have changed from those when German influence was powerful in the world.

The Independent Socialist Party under Haase will not co-operate with the Government and attacks it bitterly on nearly all occasions. It is a growing party, but one whose influences are destructive.

To say that a new spirit has grown up in Germany as a result of the war would be going too far at present. There is profound depression

for the future outlook. There is also a spirit of complaint and whining which sits ill on a nation with such a record.

The Foreign Office, under Brockdorff-Rantzau, is a greater factor in the Government now than in the past, having acquired those powers formerly under control of the political section of the General Staff of the Army.

The people themselves show an undeveloped political sense. It may be too much to expect from the present generation that new ideals should have taken root, but the political instability of the people leaves Germany in a state of flux from which disorder is likely to develop.

There are no signs at present of a desire for a return of the Hohenzollerns, but there are many people who think Germany will be stable only as a limited monarchy. For the time being such a development need not be considered. The struggle is between democracy and Bolshevism.

5. The food conditions in Germany have been carefully gone over by Dr. Alonzo Taylor and Mr. Vernon Kellogg, of Mr. Hoover's Staff. A British Commission has also covered the same ground. They are in substantial agreement that the present food ration will have to be greatly reduced by the end of March, unless large importations of food are arranged at once. To give the people two thirds of the normal ration will be about the maximum that can be arranged for under any conditions. This year's crop cannot be reckoned as more than half the normal, and the probabilities of getting agriculture on its old basis for the next year is slight. This means large purchases of food abroad by a country whose finances are in a desperate condition.

Before the war Germany made in industrial pursuits great sums which went to support her population. The prospect for the revival of this is remote. The development in those lines of industry in America and England, which before the war formed Germany's chief sources of income, are such as largely to preclude Germany under her present condition from competing in the world's market. Her

financial resources, which must be curtailed for restoration of destroyed areas and for reparation for illegal acts, are not sufficient to finance great manufacturing ventures and to provide the raw stuffs to start them. The chance of her shipping being available to move overseas freight in the interests of her own producers is remote. That important asset of “good will” is lacking generally throughout the world, and the great Russian market for her goods is, for the present, unable to absorb manufactured articles if such could be produced.

At present unemployment in Berlin is reckoned at 325,000 and in other cities it has reached large numbers, and unemployment is on the increase everywhere. The Government is paying a high living allowance to the unemployed. The Government realizes that it is creating a financially impossible situation, but frankly states that they cannot at this time afford to withdraw or decrease these allowances as further rioting and bloodshed would lead to its overthrow.

6. No Government, however vigorous and long established, can stand against economic conditions such as these, unless there is conviction amongst the people that conditions will eventually be ameliorated. Considering the world’s decreased power to absorb goods, it is not easy to see how, with justice to the allied nations, Germany can employ and feed her industrial population. There are twenty-five or thirty million of excess population over what she can maintain from an agricultural standpoint.

7. The people of the cities show their underfeeding by their pallor and leanness. In general they are apathetic. There is no desire for further war. Those who are ready for disorder are found in the classes who have nothing to lose by plunging the country into the horrors of class warfare. In the Spartacist uprising of January the Government had at first no force at its disposal. At one time they were at the point of abandoning the Government offices to the Spartacists and seeking safety in flight.

8. The Gurstenberg and Reinhardt regiments, hastily raised by their leaders and highly paid by the Government, saved the situation.

Their personnel were recruited from citizens, officers out of employment—some of whom served in the ranks, and such others as would serve for the adventure or for patriotic reasons. General Von Luttwitz, who is trusted by the new Government in Berlin, has general supervision over these regiments, which have recently done good work in suppressing the disorders in Hamburg and Bremen, as well as keeping order in Berlin, but the number of troops available under this system and their prolonged loyalty under adverse conditions is a matter which only the future can tell.

9. The old army organization, now known as the “Corps Soldaten”, is stated by the Government to be about 200,000 men, with Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff in command. Discipline has gone down greatly. The Russian influence is at work on the soldiers on the Eastern frontier. From what I could gather this force would not prove a danger to troops disciplined and well supplied. If Germany should become a Bolshevist State they might form a nucleus for a force seeking to extend that creed to the West, but for the present they are not an effective fighting force.

10. The general apathy of those classes of the people who are usually the backbone of a nation is a danger to stability, which must be recognized. A general loosening of both morale and morals is clearly observable. Crime of all sorts is greatly on the increase.

11. A reasonable discussion of the situation of Germany from any point of view is rarely to be found in the press. There are many newspapers devoted to minor political manoeuvres, abuse of the Allied Governments for their demands, and of the German Armistice Commission for their acceptance of such demands. The press, as well as the people, appears to have no idea of the present position of Germany in the world. They fail to understand that even with the peace treaty signed Germans cannot take their old position and be received as if nothing had happened to make them unacceptable in both business and social relations. The old idea that Germans will one day control the world is not in evidence, but it still exists among the intellectuals. To this end the German Democratic Party seeks to hold the old boundaries and colonies and annex German-Austria. To deal with her justly with regard to the economic necessities of the

present, and to prevent a rebuilding of the policies of domination is the problem of the moment.

12. The question of the survival of the present German Government depends on the economic conditions which the immediate future will present. Those matters relating to colonies, boundary lines, return of prisoners-of-war, etc. have little relation to Bolshevism in Germany, although politicians and a large section of the press attempt to unite them with that issue.

13. With all the undesirable points of the present Government in Germany it appears to contain about all of the political ability that is available at the present time. A total collapse of the Ebert-Scheidemann Government would leave the country in a state of anarchy which would enable the Bolshevist movement to take possession, and Bolshevism is as possible for a disorganized Germany as it was for a disorganized Russia.

14. There was evidence in Berlin that Germany counted on differences between the Allies and the United States to bring advantages in the peace terms to herself.

W. R. GHERARDI

Paris Peace Conf. 184.014/16b: Telegram

[Document 17]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Colonel Williams, G-2, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz

PARIS, February 26, 1919—8 p.m.

24. For Franklin Day, Hotel Adlon, Berlin. Please send following message which has also been routed through Berne to Dr. Field at Munich by telegram or courier:

“Ammission thoroughly recognizes value of your services and appreciates your faithful work under difficult circumstances but considers it best to treat your mission as terminated and directs you to return to Switzerland at the earliest moment possible and report to Amlegation. Lieutenant Howe⁹ should also leave at same time and return to Paris to report via Switzerland or by other route if preferable.”

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁹ Lieutenant George Howe, U. S. A., accompanied Dr. Field on his mission to Munich.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.012/42a: Telegram

[Document 18]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, February 26, 1919—9 p.m.

921. Ammission's 501 January 30th 2 PM. Captain Gherardi returned to Paris February 17th and is now on his way home. After full consideration and consultation with him the gradual withdrawal of the members of the Mission has been decided upon and Major Whitridge and Captain Chanler as well as the Naval Communication party are already here. The reasons for this withdrawal are the following: (1) At the present time it seems unnecessary to keep a large permanent force in Germany for information purposes only and it is thought that the same purpose can be attained by sending in certain selected observers from time to time. (2) The military uniform worn by most members of Mission proved a handicap as it attracted attention and rendered the acquisition of confidential information difficult. (3) From a reliable source information was obtained of a projected attack at the hands of irresponsible agitators apparently including Russian and Bolshevik elements upon Captain Gherardi's life. This was treated by the Foreign Office as a serious matter and resulted in restrictions on the movements of the party, employment of detectives etcetera.

The following arrangements have been made: Franklin Day will remain at present in Berlin with Schumacher as clerk but will probably be withdrawn in a relatively short time. Major Blayne, Captain Peirce and W. H. Webb as field clerk have been sent to Cassel, Frankfort am Main and Mannheim for a period of 2 weeks to report on local conditions and similarly Lieutenant Stonestreet and A. L. Rosenthal as clerk have been dispatched to Breslau for a limited stay. It is also in contemplation soon to withdraw Dr. Field and Lieutenant Howe from Munich.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

H. H. Field No. 11

MUNICH, February 26, 1919.

Subject: Political situation.

- 1) The most important consequence of the assassination of Eisner is the loss of prestige of the moderate government group. The left extremists got to work at once to reap the utmost benefit from the events and succeeded in utterly discrediting Auer and his associates in the esteem of the masses. Eisner is the hero of the day and is exerting an influence, such as he never could have gained in life. His funeral brought probably over 100,000 people into line, whereas his polled vote was less than half of this number. It would be dangerous to utter a slighting remark regarding his conduct of affairs in the streets of Munich.
- 2) In order to meet the tempestuous shift towards the left of public opinion, the moderate elements at once tried to readjust the composition of the government in the same direction. Hoffmann, an independent and hitherto minister of education and of church affairs, was put forward as head of the government, this rather than turning to those most closely associated with Auer. Rosshaupter and Timm were indeed placed under arrest. Hoffmann has himself been in hiding.
- 3) The attitude of the party upon which the main reliance was placed for the maintenance of order, the majority socialists has been that of surprise and of panic. The leaders who seemed once to sway the masses have lost hold of the situation. Auer, whom all regarded as the coming man, seems utterly forgotten and though at death's door has not a martyr's crown. It seems to me the most remarkable phenomenon in the flight of events. His name is rarely mentioned and no expression of pity is felt. All turns about the name of

Eisner. For all that, the Majority Socialists are well aware that in their hands lies the only chance of stemming the tide and the leaders at once approached the Independent leaders with the proposition of a combination of efforts. Förster and Mühlön were sent for as well and Mühlön has come, whilst Förster replied that he felt unable to be of use.

- 4) The attitude of the Independent leaders was at first to respond to the call for union and a moderate program was agreed upon and a proclamation issued by the socialists for a united front. The agreement was to be submitted to a mass meeting of independents for confirmation; but the gathering was dispersed by Spartacists. Furthermore the independent leaders found that they had lost hold over the masses and seem to show no firmness in upholding the agreement which they had signed.
- 5) The attitude of the Councils of Soldiers, Workmen and Peasants is one of fury. In the meetings held in the Landtag, incendiary speeches are warmly applauded. No words of prudence seem of the slightest avail.
- 6) The Spartacists are doing all in their power to utilize the passions of the masses to further their designs. They proclaim that Lenin will arrive presently to direct the movement. I fear he would be received in extremist circles with open arms.
- 7) The bourgeois parties seem utterly overawed and incapable of taking any stand. They confine their activity to gnashing their teeth and making plans in view of their personal safety. The lot of army officers and of the aristocracy is a sad one. All those of prominence are either hiding or facing resignedly the prospect of arrest or finally are already taken as hostages. The largest group of the hostages are confined in a wing of this hotel. Any vigorous reaction would be condemned to failure; for the bourgeois are unarmed and are forbidden to secure arms; whilst the workmen and the unemployed are largely armed and are offered arms from the arsenals. Furthermore, the mob has the right to meet together and concert for united action and to utilize the press; whilst the bourgeois can hold no meetings and its press, after being long suppressed, now appears under censorship and can only publish matter pleasing to the revolutionary extremists. In consequence, no resistance is offered. The houses of the bourgeois, the banks, the clubs, the hotels have put out red flags draped with black, the

church bells are tolled by priests in inward revolt against the command issued. Submission is the parole of the day.

- 8) The outlook is extremely dark. I expect to see a bolshevist reign installed in the near future. Many elements have already appeared (suppression of the freedom of the press, arming of the proletariat coupled with disarming of the upper and middle classes, terrorisation of the latter, seizure of hostages, plundering by armed bands). The number of unemployed is growing rapidly. The finances of the state are desperate. A railway strike is threatened. The food situation is said to be also much more worse than the masses know.
- 9) Concomitant with the appearance of this second revolution there is a strange outburst of particularism. The appearance of Prussian troops would be the signal for the flaring up of old hatred of the most extreme violence. I hear but one voice in this matter in all walks of life.
- 10) In bourgeois circles and in certain revisionist majority socialist circles, one can hear the view expressed that Entente occupation would be the best solution. Such an idea is at least no longer a bugbear to them. Their preferences are even openly expressed, in the following order: American, British, Italian, French. Italy would indeed rank higher, save for the mortification.
- 12) [*sic*] The persons working for the cause of order seem frequently to believe that their hands would be greatly strengthened, if it were only possible for them to point to certain pronouncements of policy on our part, such as the declaration that we never would consent to treat with a government installed on bolshevik principles. I have been repeatedly approached in the last few days in this regard and my visitors left me much disappointed over the reserve which I maintained even where no reasonable doubt could exist.
- 13) The present uprising can certainly not be called a food revolt. Nevertheless, many persons point out to me that the supply of food would go far to save the situation. Personally, I do not believe that any revulsion of feeling could be secured through the mere sending in of food. Furthermore the distribution under existing circumstances would be difficult. On the other hand, it is very likely that the want of food is prominent among the remoter causes of the present unrest, partly as a direct cause of discontent, partly

as a physiological factor in undermining the mental balance of the population. The common people are as dough; they can be moulded at will by those who have an interest in using them. Should a stable government come into power, it could doubtless acquire a permanent ascendancy, if it was aided to secure food and raw materials.

- 14) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has displayed considerable concern regarding our safety. It has decided to place a placard on our doors at the hotel declaring us to be under the protection of the Bavarian state and to have the same signed by the head of the government, by the head of the Soldiers' Councils and by the head of the Spartacus organisation. In the past the Ministry has shown itself over anxious.

HERBERT HAVILAND FIELD

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/69

[Document 20]

Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[BERLIN,] February 27, 1919.
[Received March 3.]

GENTLEMEN: I have the honour to transmit below a review of the political situation in Germany today.

The murder of Eisner in Munich has precipitated outbreaks of radical movements in many parts of Germany. The situation in Munich is not yet clear and no reports have reached Berlin of the action of the Bavarian congress of Soldiers and Workmens Councils. In consequence it can not be told yet whether a Soviet Republic will be proclaimed or whether a more democratic government will be formed. It is stated in the press today that the Independent Socialist Haase, who belongs to the less radical wing of his party as well as Barth, who leads the more radical elements, have counselled against the creation of a purely Soviet form of government and have advised energetically that the Independent Socialists come to an agreement with the Majority Socialists. At the same time reports, the authenticity of which can not be controlled, state that there is a great movement within both parties for a union of the Socialist parties, a union which is to be effected by a promise of more speedy socialization on the part of Majority Socialists, together with the recognition in some form of the Workmens councils as organs of the government, in return for which the Independent Socialists will support the government. Information which I have from a reliable source states that in the Cabinet Scheidemann is still opposed to any recognition of the workmens and Soldiers Councils but that the Majority Socialists in the Cabinet are quite ready to recognize these bodies. This recognition would probably take the form of the recognition of these bodies as a form of Workmens Councils who

would have the right of veto of any bill passed by the National Assembly which would then become subject to a referendum. This was contained in an amendment which the Independent Socialists proposed for the provisional constitution and which was defeated by a large majority in the National Assembly.

The situation of the government is such that it must come to an agreement with the radical elements. Spartacus is becoming dangerous again, not in Berlin, but in many other industrial regions. Duesseldorf, Plauen, parts of the Ruhr district and some smaller towns are under the control of the Spartacists and the danger of Spartacism in Munich is not over, besides a general strike has been called in Halle, Dresden, Leipzig and in fact in all of Saxony and Thuringia. These strikes are organized by the Independent Socialists and the demands of the workmen are for immediate Socialization of the mines and of all insurance, for the recognition of the Workmens and Soldiers Councils and for the legal recognition of those Workmens Councils which control each industrial plant and are elected from the workmen in each particular factory to supervise the production of that factory. The train to Weimar is not able to run because of fear of Spartacist attacks upon it and the government, with the exception of Ebert who is in Berlin, is isolated in Weimar. The railway employees have struck in all of Saxony and Thuringia and no trains are running. The complete control of this district by forces hostile to the government would cut Northern Germany entirely from communication with the other parts and would make it difficult to send troops to threatened points. The officials in a number of towns have struck in protest and in some smaller towns strikes of the professional men and the shopkeepers have also been called in answer to the threatening attitude of labour.

The government faces enormous difficulties at this time. The strike movement is well planned and is here generally believed to be the prelude to a second revolution. Besides these more or less pacific strikers the industrial districts however hold a number of armed and determined Spartacists who follow a plan of inciting revolts against the government in one city after another in order to worry the government and leave it no quiet. In this they often have the tacit support of the Independent Socialists who proclaim a neutrality

which is benevolent toward Spartacus and hostile toward the government. This is probably done because the Independents hope to accede to power by help of the Spartacists, hoping also that they will be able to rid themselves of them as soon as they are in power. This is a vain hope and would in the event of the arrival in power of the Independent Socialists lead to a real strengthening of Spartacus. The latter would then be better armed than now, as the Independents would not disarm them and the radicalization of the masses once begun could not easily be stopped. The Independent Socialists have too consistently availed themselves of the financial and moral aid of the Bolsheviks to be rid of their influence and would in the end be forced to adopt their ideas. The coming months which will no doubt increase the problems of lack of work and of the food supply will give radical labour agitation, which while not Bolshevik in its immediate aspects still has strong and growing tendencies toward accepting them, a fertile field. I venture to state that the opportunity to work and a betterment in food conditions alone can prevent what seems today to be an impending catastrophe.

I have [etc.]

FRANKLIN DAY

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/65a: Telegram

[Document 21]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, February 28, 1919—5 p.m.

968. Oral report from Captain Gherardi on his stay in Germany lays stress on genuine wish for democracy among German people. The country is in a state of constant flux. The shell is off and the whole body is rather soft. The present Government is still encountering great difficulties but through the capture of Radek and certain members of the Spartacist group has managed to keep the situation well in hand. Present Government far from ideal as it has had to compromise with the Democratic party among whose members reactionaries are to be found. It is evident that the Majority Socialist Government will only last as long as it maintains order but it should in Gherardi's view be given a fair chance both from without and within as if it fails no other party is in sight which is likely to insure stable conditions.

Among the members of the Democratic party is Count Bernstorff who is playing an extremely important part both in the Foreign Office and at Weimar apparently even overshadowing Rantzau who will undoubtedly head the German Peace Commission.

Field who has been directed to return to Switzerland states that attack on Eisner formed no part of a reactionary conspiracy but was the result of a personal conviction that to save the country Eisner must be removed. This was confirmed by Auer who after being wounded sent for Field to give him a message to that effect. Field states that the surgeons hope to save Auer but do not dare to let the favorable prognosis be known for fear that the patient should be lynched.

Report by Captain Chanler and Lieutenant Dewald of conditions in Bremen and Hamburg emphasizes fact that food and work are necessary to make present quiet condition in these cities permanent. Food will give out in April. Over 30 ships belonging to Hansa North German Lloyd and Hamburg America lines ready to sail at once. Cessation of fishing since Armistice additional hardship. No danger of interference with food ships or depots. Even Spartacists have always respected national food supply. Bolshevism will only reappear here as the result of unemployed being hungry. Unemployment would cease to be excessive in Hamburg when harbor becomes active, coal supply improves and work on farms begins. Bremen has no excessive unemployment.

Report by Major Blayney still in Germany on unemployment throughout Germany gives chief cause as the lack of raw materials due to the blockade and the break down of transportation. The latter results above all in lack of coal. Figures submitted by Government officials show 1,000,000 unemployed receiving state support of from 6 to 8 marks per day. Partially unemployed due to fluctuations in coal supply and weather conditions and those who are not registered are not included and would more than double this figure.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/75

[Document 22]

Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[BERLIN,] March 1, 1919.
[Received March 4.]

GENTLEMEN: I have the honour to submit the following report on the political situation in Germany.

Until today there has been no relief of the tension which I reported in my last despatch. The government is carrying on negotiations with the strikers in Halle and those of the Saxon industrial district. It has been stated that the strike broke out because of a misunderstanding on the part of the workmen. They believed that they would be forced by the government to give up the "Betriebsräte", workmens bodies elected in each factory and shop for the purpose of the control of such factories and shops. The government has stated that this was not its intention but that on the contrary it was desirous of giving these bodies a legal foundation. The negotiations at Weimar with the Saxon workmen will no doubt be conducted on the basis of the resumption of work in return for a more speedy socialisation and the full recognition of the "Betriebsräte". No information is available this morning regarding the situation, but the Saxon strikes, which also extend to all of Thuringia, have so far been pacific. In Leipzig the *bourgeoisie* and the administrations have entered on a counter strike. A similar movement is contemplated in Halle. In Magdeburg the strike has only been partial. It is however expected to affect all of that town also in the near future. The strikes though pacific have been complete and even the electric light and gas works have shut down. The railway service is much cut down and is only kept up by detours. Weimar has been completely cut from all other communication except by aeroplane.

Berlin has so far been quiet although a very active Spartacist propaganda is being carried on for the purpose of getting all workmen to join a general strike which is to break out on the fifth of the month. The movement seems to be strongest in Spandau but a general strike proclaimed five days before its outbreak does not appear to be more than a menace. A general strike affecting the electric and gas works would be a serious menace to public safety in a large town like Berlin. I have been assured that the military means to keep order at the disposal of the government in Berlin are sufficient to prevent any new Spartacism. It is to be noted however that the present general strike movement proceeds from the Independent Socialists and not from the Spartacists although the latter are using it to further their own ends. With the spreading of such a movement there is no guarantee that bloody disorders will not sooner or later occur.

There can be no question that the masses are becoming more radical. The Socialdemocratic party organ, the *Vorwaerts* is showing considerable nervousness and it seems certain that the government is losing ground within its own party. The National Assembly has disappointed even those among the great masses who were for democracy by its reactionary complexion. It has moreover fulfilled no promises of social reform or rather of social revolution and has delayed the socialisation of the great industries. Whatever may be said of the *bourgeoisie* and of some of the more cautious leaders of the Majority Socialists or rather the right wing of this party, the great masses of the people are opposed to the old regime and find that the National Assembly offers them only a diluted liberalism instead of a new and revolutionary doctrine of change. It is quite possible that any socialisation is impossible in the present crippled condition of this country, but the desire for this process has become so strong in the masses that no arguments will avail against it. It is to be admitted that the scheme for such socialisation which was proposed by the Socialists of the Ruhr district when they intended to take the matter in their own hands last months did not contemplate any radical increase in wages or any wild strikes but only wished the nationalisation of "public property". The government in interfering in this has taken upon itself much odium and has seemed to many of its supporters to have become bourgeois. Whatever the justice of this

charge and whether the government has done essentially rightly, it can not afford to ignore the desire of the people behind it and must take more radical steps than it has heretofore been willing to take or accept the evil name of being “counter revolutionary”. I have personally had opportunity to notice this growing radicalisation of the masses in conversations with common people and in overhearing conversations. The Independent Socialists are working feverishly to make the best of the dissatisfaction which exists everywhere and are using the murder of Eisner to some advantage. The Soldiers Councils are fearing for their existence and for the existence of the “revolutionary achievements” and have expressed in their Berlin meetings a desire for a pure Soviet Republic. Today they are all convinced that the democracy represented by the National Assembly has failed and the signs of the second revolution are ominous. The government will have to come to a compromise with the radical elements or make war on them. It will not be as strong in fighting the Independent Socialists as it was against the Spartacists because the former have not been as radical in their demands and state that they are only socialists instead of being, like the Majority Socialists, reformers. It appears certain that the next days will see some decided changes in the policy of the government.

Not a little of the dissatisfaction arises from the fear of the Volunteer Corps. These have become a sort of Praetorian Guard of the government and their interference has caused some bitterness. The Republican Guard of Berlin which contains some very dubious elements left over from the Richhorn regime has demanded the withdrawal of these Volunteer troops from Berlin. It is significant that the Offices of the government in the Chancellors Palace are guarded by a corps of noncommissioned officers. In the Volunteer Corps moreover there are no soldiers councils and the discipline and system of administration are much as in the old army with some minor relaxations. This does not tend to increase the confidence of the masses in them because of the fear that they will become the instruments of a bourgeois reaction. It appears that these Volunteer Troops have not always acted without brutality in the accomplishment of their work, which is probably unavoidable, but which embitters the great masses. If I have in this report emphasized the sentiments of the radical masses it has been because they

represent the revolution here and are the most important elements. The bourgeois classes generally are content with phrases, all action proceeds from the radical masses.

Germany on the whole is the picture of hopeless confusion. Late reports indicate that in Brunswick the compromise of the Independent Socialists and the Majority Socialists has not been accepted and that a Soviet Republic has been proclaimed. In Munich an obscure arrestation within the body of the Soldiers and Workmens Council Congress has taken place during which the Spartacist leaders were arrested by troops. Other troops are said to be on their side and the situation is obscure. I shall send another courier to Munich as soon as the situation has slightly cleared.

I have [etc.]

FRANKLIN DAY

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/75^{1/2}

[Document 23]

Major Lindsay Blayney to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

FRANKFURT A/M., March 2, 1919.
[Received March 7.]

SIR: The arrival of a courier with mail affords me the opportunity to send you in hurried and very short form our impressions formed after the first days of our trip to western Germany. While I had not expected to make a report until arrival in Paris, I feel that some of the facts set forth briefly below are of such a nature that they should reach your hands at the earliest possible moment.

During the past six days we have visited Cassel and Frankfurt, the two cities representing populations that have heretofore been quiet, the first a typical city of smaller size, the latter one of the largest industrial centers of Germany. I believe from the two that we have already gathered impressions that, even as such, will be of value to you without a detailed report which will be presented later.

The two cities present practically analogous conditions. In Cassel we interviewed some twenty of the leading representatives of industry and of labor of the city. In Frankfurt we have so far been in consultation with some forty citizens representing various branches and in both places visited the important factories and industries.

In a general way the situation may be summed up very briefly, without going into detail or giving statistics, under the following heads:

1. *Food.* The ration, most carefully supervised and regulated, already reduced to a point where it was not sufficient to sustain strength or health, has been still more reduced and will have to be reduced yet more in from four to six weeks.

2. *Health.* The death rate has been increasing. The unhealthy appearance of both cities is striking. The children are particularly unhealthy and frail in appearance. The authorities universally voiced grave apprehensions in this regard.
3. *Unemployed.* In spite of the reduction of working hours to six per day in order to compel employment of more persons in spite of great sacrifices made by employers to endeavor to continue to pay their employees, thousands are unemployed. Only a portion of these receive state assistance, which in a family of four, for example, only amounts to eight marks a day, which at present prices is not sufficient for even the barest necessities.
4. *Fuel.* Owing to transport difficulties, and in Frankfurt especially owing to the Rhine blockade and unwillingness of the French to allow fuel and raw materials to pass their bridgehead, a coal famine of serious nature is at hand. Factories which are running only from one-third to one-half of their boilers are unable to secure more than a supply of very inferior lignite sufficient for three or four days in advance.
5. *Raw Materials.* Raw materials for textile mills are entirely lacking, they now being engaged practically solely in the manufacture of substitute materials made of paper or paper mixture. The metal industries are entirely or in part idle on account of the Rhine blockade.
6. *Political Situation.* All the above considerations contribute to bring about a situation of great nervous tension and gives the authorities the greatest concern. Both authorities and workmen's representatives assure us that a serious outbreak cannot be averted unless, first of all, the food and fuel situation be relieved very shortly, and, secondly, raw materials be imported at the earliest possible moment afterward as second most important consideration.

How serious the situation is may be seen from the fact that, at the end of our meeting with some twenty of the leading representatives of industry and labor at the City Hall, the Mayor requested all present to refrain from giving to the public any of the serious sides of the situation as laid before us for fear of precipitating trouble.

I feel that these statements which, on account of the immediate departure of the courier, cannot be accompanied by the statistics and figures which will later be submitted to you, warrant your very earnest consideration. My impression is that the authorities are doing all in their power to avert the inevitable calamity. I also feel that the workmen are showing a most earnest spirit of cooperation in view of the very difficult position in which they find themselves. But I further feel that the best efforts on the part of both parties requires energetic steps on the part of the Allies.

We go from here to Darmstadt and thence to Mannheim, from which point we shall return the end of the week directly to Paris.

Respectfully yours,

LINDSAY BLAYNEY

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01202/78

[Document 24]

Mr. Franklin Day to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[BERLIN,] March 4, 1919.
[Received March 10.]

GENTLEMEN: I have the honour to transmit below a report on the political situation in Germany.

The growing discontent in the masses reported in my previous despatches forced the government to hasten the Socialisation of the mines. A project for such a Socialisation was introduced in the National Assembly by the Majority Socialists and posters announcing this decision were shown everywhere in Berlin. This action was taken to prevent the general strike which was threatened in Berlin and it was an effort to prove to its supporters that the Socialist government had not lost its Socialist character. At the same time the government issued an appeal to labour calling for effective help against anarchy. The government's efforts however came too late and on March third the Convention of the Workmens Councils of Greater Berlin voted by 400 votes against 120 (200 members not voting) to call a general strike to be effective immediately. This convention represents 1500 Workmens Councils each representing about 1000 workmen. It is however not true that the whole of the labour element represented favours either the strike or the policy of the Independent Socialists as many of the Workmens Councils represented are members of the Majority Socialist Party. They are however in the minority at present and the general movement of opinion is toward the Independent Socialists. The radical Independent Socialist element in the convention attempted to have the Communist (Spartacus) program accepted, it failed however by a two thirds vote against it. The demands of the convention are as follows:

Recognition of the Soldiers and Workmens Councils as economic bodies.

The Liberation of all political prisoners including Ledebour and Radek.

Abolition of all summary courts (which do not exist).

Reestablishment of economic and diplomatic relations with the Russian Soviet Republic.

Immediate dissolution of the Volunteer Corps.

The establishment of Popular Courts and the change of all existing courts to such courts.

A demand to bring the men who were chiefly guilty of beginning the war before a Revolutionary Tribunal was passed. A similar demand to call Ebert, Scheidemann and Noske before the same court failed. The meeting appears to have been stormy and much disturbed by the Spartacist representatives.

At the same time the Independent Socialist Party held its convention in which Haase spoke for the moderate wing. His demands were for immediate disarmament, for the creation of a popular army which would elect its own officers and soldiers councils for the supervision of the troops, the establishment of Workmens Councils on a constitutional basis, their cooperation in the government through the right of veto and of submitting laws to a referendum, their use in the Socialisation and in the supervision of production and the immediate Socialisation of all mines, electric works and the concentrated steel and Iron industry. His opponent Daeumisch proposed that the party adopt the idea of complete Soviet rule in its program, a motion regarding which no vote was taken at this meeting.

The general strike began by the cessation of all street car and subway traffic. The electric plants, the water supply, hospitals, the firemen, the food shops are all excluded from the general strike. So far the only disturbance has been the disarmament of a number of police reserves in their stations by crowds in the slum district of the

“Wedding”. The town is patrolled by government troops which have however not gone into action. An attack on North Station was defeated by men of the “Sicherheits Wehr” which however is not a certain factor. The State of Siege has been proclaimed and Noske is charged with the enforcement of its provisions. Three extraordinary Courts Martial have been established to deal with offenses under the State of Siege.

It is impossible to say what the outcome of the strike will be. The tension is such that a small riot could easily develop into a revolution. A counter strike of the Bourgeois elements will so far not take place but should the general strike extend to the light and water supply such a strike would still be possible. The railways as well as the post and telephone service are still functioning and the aspect of the town, with the exception of the crowds at corners is normal.

In other parts of the country quiet reigns. The entry into Duesseldorf of the government troops was effected without bloodshed. In Leipzig the general strike as well as the counter strike of the *Bourgeoisie* continue but there have been no disturbances. Zeitz is still in Spartacist hands and no light has been furnished the town for a week. Here the Spartacists have taken prominent men as hostages. There has been a minor shooting affair in Zeitz, but no great disorders have taken place so far.

Government troops have entered Koenigsberg and disarmed the “Volkswehr”, because the government was in possession of information that the Spartacists wanted to take Koenigsberg to use it as a base for communication with the Bolshevik army to facilitate its entry into Germany.

The entry of government troops into Halle was not effected without bloodshed, as usually criminal elements had been released from the jails by the Spartacists and the great shops had been totally pillaged. Many cases of arson have been reported.

An agreement has been reached between the strikers from the Wittenberg district and the government as the strikers had been wrongly informed of the intentions of the government. So far the

general strike movement in Dresden was supported by only 700 persons and appears to have been a total failure.

It is impossible to evaluate the events although the situation seems momentarily to be improved. The Berlin strike however may cause all other radical movements to flare up again and the situation of the government is still uncertain.

I have [etc.]

FRANKLIN DAY

Paris Peace Conf. 184.012/47a: Telegram

[Document 25]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, March 6, 1919—12 midnight.

1034. Ammission's 921 February 26th 9 PM. In view of critical situation in Germany and increasing difficulties of communication Ammission has directed Day to report at Paris and his clerk Schumacher to return to Berne. All other members of Mission have now returned or are on their way. Written reports from Day state that Government is losing ground within its own party and masses are becoming more radical. Independent Socialists are gaining in strength and are pressing for immediate socialization of industries. With a view to overturning the Government they are fostering strikes and even joining hands temporarily with the Spartacists though should the Independent Socialists succeed in forming a Government they expect to be able to reject Spartacist assistance. Situation in Munich is chaotic and obscure. In Day's opinion a catastrophe may be impending in Berlin and other places and from his observations he believes that only remedy is in immediate dispatch of food and raw materials to remedy Bolshevist tendencies and unemployment. Action of this nature is now being discussed by the Conference.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Report on Economic and Political Conditions in Silesia, Prepared by Captain Robert L. Black, Lieutenant Albert H. Stonestreet, and Field Clerk A. L. Rosenthal

MARCH 6, 1919.

GENERAL

Itinerary.

Pursuant to the order of Captain W. E. Gherardi, Chief of the Mission for Germany, Captain Robert L. Black, Lt. Albert H. Stone-street and Field Clerk A. L. Rosenthal, proceeded from Berlin to investigate and report on economic and political conditions in Silesia. Arriving in Breslau on February 22, the representatives of the Mission with the cooperation of the local authorities, took statements from 19 persons as to conditions in Breslau and the province. On February 23, the representatives were taken by motor to Waldenburg and there took statements from 15 persons as to conditions in Waldenburg and Glatz, and as to the Czech claims. During the morning of February 24, 3 additional statements were taken in Breslau, and the representatives proceeded to Upper Silesian industrial district in the afternoon. In the evening, at Kattowitz, statements were taken from 12 persons as to local conditions. During the morning of February 25, statements were taken from 4 persons as to labor conditions. A tour of the district was made by motor. In the evening, statements were taken at Gleiwitz from 15 persons as to the Polish claims, etc. The representatives returned to Berlin during the night. Attached hereto are copies of the statements and statistical data furnished to the representatives.^{[10](#)}

Comment.

Practically all of the statements on which this report is based were made by government officials or experts selected by them. The representatives of the Mission, being in uniform and accordingly conspicuous, were able to secure independent interviews from 5 persons only. This report, therefore, except where facts are specifically stated to be from independent sources or personal observation, must be taken with the understanding that it is a summary of the German contentions.

Outstanding Problems in Silesia.

- 1) Food. Conditions in the Waldenburg and Upper Silesian industrial districts are probably worse than elsewhere in Germany. The authorities insist on the need of immediate assistance from America.
- 2) Bolshevism. A complete demoralization within a few weeks is predicted unless food is supplied to the workers.
- 3) Czech claims to Glatz and Waldenburg. The Germans contend that the population is overwhelmingly German.
- 4) Polish claim to Upper Silesia. The Germans contend that a majority of the population is German or loyal to Germany, and that the industrial organization is wholly German.

I. Breslau

(Including general data as to Silesia)

ECONOMIC

Industry and Commerce.

The principal industries of Breslau are:

Manufacture of railroad rolling stock; the normal output is 200 locomotives and 7,000–8,000 trucks per year.

Textiles; converted in part during the war to the manufacture of paper fabrics.

Paper and leather products.

Clothing.

All industries are suffering from a lack of raw materials and transportation. A part of the depression, however, is caused by the necessary readjustment to peace conditions.

The commerce of Breslau is carried on principally with Eastern Europe. It is not cut off by the closing of the Polish border.

The agricultural products of Silesia are sugar, potatoes, and grain. Minimum crops are expected during the coming year because of the lack of seasonal labor from Poland and the loss of agricultural machinery abandoned in the East on the withdrawal of the German armies.

Transportation.

Railroad transportation has been greatly reduced by the loss of rolling stock and the bad condition of what remains. 1,000 locomotives and 150,000 trucks were abandoned in Poland on the withdrawal of the German armies. The deliveries under the Armistice conditions have aggravated the shortage. The total number of locomotives in Silesia has fallen as follows:

<i>1914</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1919</i>
2307	1744	1242

The hauling capacity of those now available is half of normal because of poor material. The roundabout route to East and West Prussia, imposed by the occupation of Posen, has greatly increased the burden; the facilities at Cüstrin, the junction point in West Prussia are insufficient. The reduction in the traffic in coal through Breslau is:

<i>January</i>	<i>January</i>	<i>January</i>
<i>1914</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1919</i>
311,751 tons	287,400 tons	91,631 tons

Hence the shortage of coal in all Germany east of the Elbe.

Freight traffic has been maintained only by eliminating passenger trains. An order reducing passenger traffic by an additional 50% is contemplated.

The Oder waterway connects Silesia with tide water at Stettin and with the Elbe and Vistula, and carries boats of 600 tons burden. There are available on the Oder 265 tow-boats and 1700 cargo boats, besides the equipment on other systems. Coal constitutes about 60% of the freight carried.

Labor.

The labor population of Breslau is 100,000–120,000.

No strikes have occurred recently,

15,000 unemployed, of whom 10,500 are men are registered at the City employment office. This number does not include 4/5 of the unemployed women, 20,000 soldiers retained in demobilization camps at the request of the city authorities, 2,600 clerks, etc. Nor does it take account of the fact that many employers have adopted a 30 hour per week schedule. It is estimated that only half of the actual working strength of the city is employed.

The number of registered unemployed has increased from 4,500 at the end of December. The daily increase in registration is about 100. The employers, even those who are strongest financially, will not be able to keep their shops open much longer.

The 2,000 unemployed can be given work for a month leveling the fortifications around Breslau. 4,000 have already applied.

Food, Clothing, etc.

The food issues and the supplies for the future are practically the same in Silesia as throughout Germany.

The following facts are more or less peculiar to Breslau.

Potatoes. The supply will fail in March. The Silesian crop is not available until July-August.

Fat. No fat has been issued for 2 months.

Milk. The supply has fallen in six months from 150,000 to 73,000 liters. None is issued except to children below 6 years.

Eggs. The entire issue last year was 20 eggs per head.

The death rate especially from tuberculosis has increased greatly because of starvation.

The central cooking plant in Breslau prepares and distributes one meal a day consisting of 1 liter of soup and 3/4 liter of "essen". The ingredients are cleaned bones without the marrow, barley, cabbage, carrots, etc. The "essen" is a flat sticky gruel, filling but not nourishing, and with an infinitesimal fat content.

Land Problem in Silesia.

A limited amount of information was furnished on this subject.

Graf Kaiserlingk-Kammerau stated: the average size of the hereditary estates (*Rittergut*) is 300 hectares. While the owners of 75,000 hectares have consented to subdivision, it is impracticable because of the high cost of land—4,000 marks per hectare—building and equipment; a 10 hectare farm complete would cost 80,000 marks. Finally, there is no popular demand for breaking up the large estates.

By way of comment, this statement does not seem wholly disingenuous. A popular demand certainly does exist elsewhere in Prussia. In Upper Silesia, the Poles promise, as part of their propaganda, a small landholding to each man.

From personal observation the great sugar beet plantations about Breslau, while admirably cultivated and served by narrow gauge railroads and local sugar refineries, are wholly lacking in housing accommodations for workers. A potato farm in the Upper Silesian industrial district gave much the same impression.

Poland has heretofore provided seasonal labor (*Sachsen-gaenger*) for the cultivation of the large estates. Great numbers, especially women, have been imported in the Spring and rigidly deported in the fall. The supply will fail this year, and such Russian prisoners as now remain will have been repatriated. An effort has been made to induce the unemployed of the cities to go on the land by promises of additional food and a small garden plot, but in so far as the inducements are not much greater than those offered to the Poles or the Russians, the efforts have not been successful.

POLITICAL

Domestic

Government.

The results of the elections to the National Assembly were (in seats):

	<i>Middle Silesia (Breslau, Waldenburg, Glatz)</i>	<i>Lower Silesia</i>
Majority Socialists	6	4
Democratic Party	2	2
Center Party	2	1
German Peoples Party	2	1

From personal observation: While some of the officials of the old regime have been replaced by their subordinates, the revolution has not worked fundamental changes in Breslau. The persons selected to make statements to the representatives of the Mission were obviously conservatives. Pictures of the Kaiser and Crown Prince remain hanging in the President's office in the *Regierungsgebäude*, and the words "Kaiserliche" and "Koenigliche" have not been generally erased from official signs, etc. Silesia has always been loyal to the Prussian cause, and Breslau as an industrial center has been closely involved with the imperial ambitions.

Army.

The Staff officers claim to be sure of the loyalty of the soldiers and their ability to check internal disorder.

From personal observation: There has been a breakdown of discipline among the troops, similar to that in Berlin.

People.

The population of Breslau has been exceptionally orderly and quiet since the revolution. In the middle of February, an uprising occurred after a meeting of the unemployed, and some 16 rioters were killed before the authorities regained control.

The workers are losing faith in the moderate socialist leaders, and are getting out of control. The clerks and the students at the University are forming radical groups.

The statement was repeatedly made that Russian Bolsheviks were coming over the border at the rate of about 100 a day, assisted by the Poles and well supplied with money. The secret police report that recently at a meeting of Spartacists in Breslau attended by 150 members and addressed by a Russian, an organization was effected and arrangements for a general strike made. It was predicted that, unless food is furnished to the people, complete anarchy will result within a few weeks or even days.

Opinions on this question from independent sources were: from an *Oberwachmeister* of the City Police, that though disorder must be expected, the authorities have sufficient force to maintain control; from a Jewish business man that the imminence of Bolshevism was much exaggerated; from a rabbi and a hotel manager, that the danger was immediate.

International

Polish claim.

The line between the German and the Poles, fixed by the Armistice conditions, runs along the northern and eastern boundary of Middle Silesia. Both sides maintain armed forces along the northern line.

Military situation.

The cadres of noncommissioned officers were not demobilized after the withdrawal of the German Army. It however is difficult to enlist soldiers to fill them out. The morale of the troops as against the Poles is excellent.

No information was given as to the strength of the opposing forces.

There are constant reports of clashes between patrols. The Germans contend that the Poles are wilfully breaking over the line. For instance, on February 17, a Polish force made an attack near Grebline (north of Militsch) $\frac{3}{4}$ km within the Silesian boundary.

II. WALDENBURG AND GLATZ

ECONOMIC

Industry and Commerce.

Coal mining is the principal industry of Waldenburg. The coal basin extends into the edge of Glatz, furnishes an excellent coking coal, and is estimated to last at the present rate of mining about 40 years. 5–6 million tons are mined yearly and 25,000–30,000 miners are employed.

The other industries are textiles, procelain, glass etc.

Mining is suffering from the crisis in transportation; the other industries from a lack of raw materials—especially kaolin from Bohemia—and from the stoppage of war orders.

There are a number of watering places in Glatz, which were much patronized before the war by Russians.

Transportation.

The conditions in Breslau apply to Waldenburg and Glatz.

The stringency is so great that coal is being hauled by road for considerable distances.

Labor.

Only two strikes occurred during the war. Both were quickly settled without disorder.

There are no unemployed in Waldenburg. Many of the factories are working on a 30-hour schedule. 200 unemployed are brought in daily by train from neighboring towns and given work in Waldenburg.

The factories will soon be forced to discharge their men and close down unless raw materials are provided.

Food, Clothing, etc.

The food situation in Waldenburg is worse than in Breslau. The surrounding country is mountainous and in forest so that there is no local supply of vegetables. The customary imports of food from Bohemia have been stopped by the closing of the frontier.

Fats are peculiarly necessary to the underground worker. As a result of under-nourishment the capacity of the miner has fallen from 0.727 tons per head, in times of peace, to 0.56 tons. They frequently collapse at their work.

From personal observation: The starved conditions of the workers was most pathetic. The children were emaciated and stunted in growth. It would appear as if Waldenburg, being an out of the way district, and normally good humored, had been neglected in the matter of food.

POLITICAL

Domestic

Government.

From personal observation: The officials of the old time regime seem to have combined with the leaders of the workers rather than to have been displaced by the revolution.

For results of the election to the National Assembly see Breslau.

People.

The people of Waldenburg, especially the workers have been exceptionally patient throughout the war and since the revolution. The moderate socialist newspaper has 30,000 readers. Not a single Independent-Socialist vote was cast in the recent election. Only 12 avowed Spartacists are known.

Grave fears are expressed for the future. The *Rote Fahne* has recently acquired 300–400 readers, a tendency toward radicalism has set in, and the moderate leaders are losing touch. A minor uprising had recently been narrowly averted.

A complete breakdown from hunger [is] inevitable within a short time.

The people of Glatz have not been so long suffering and there has been disorder within the last weeks.

International

The Czech claims.

The Czech claim Glatz and Waldenburg on the ground of the Czech population.

Czech population.

There are no Czechs in Waldenburg. There are a few German Bohemian miners, long resident and married to German wives.

In Glatz the Czechs number 3,000–5,000 (maximum figure for Middle Silesia—9,700) as against a German population of 175,000. They inhabit a small district in the mountains along the northwest boundary between Glatz and Bohemia, comprising the villages of Schlaney, Tscherbemy and Kakobowitz, Ober-Kudowa, Strasseney and Bukowine, and Nauseney. Their ancestors colonized the district under Frederick the Great to secure religious freedom; only one of the villages is Catholic. They are thoroughly Germanized. Czech is spoken in the homes only and is not taught in the schools or used in the churches. They fought loyally with the 38th Regiment in the war. The national movement is of very recent origin, and has secured a following only because of the extravagant promises made by the propagandists.

German arguments against annexation.

Glatz and Waldenburg have been colonized by Germans since the 14th Century, and have belonged to the Prussian crown since the time of Frederick the Great. Waldenburg is unanimously and intensely German. The industrial organization is wholly German.

Glatz is geographically part of Silesia; a high plateau cut off from Bohemia by a mountain with only three passes; all rivers and roads eact [sic]. The population is overwhelmingly German, and the industries are wholly German.

The Czechs make the claim because they covet the Waldenburg coal basin and the Glatz watering places.

Military situation.

The Czechs have mobilized 150,000–200,000 troops in positions to threaten Glatz and Upper Silesia. 30,000 are under arms along the western Silesian border although 10,000 would be ample for a border guard. So far no fighting has occurred, but reports of intended invasions keep the German population in a state of constant dread. It was rumored that an attack was to have been made on February 24.

The Germans feel sure of being able to hold the passes into Bohemia. The army and the population are intensely loyal. No information was given as to the strength of the German forces.

III. UPPER SILESIA

ECONOMIC

Industry and Commerce.

The Upper Silesian industrial district is similar to the Ruhrrever [sic], though second to it in importance. It has grown up in the last 60 years. It furnishes 32% of the coal production of Germany and 17.6% of the zinc production of the world. The coal basin within the German border($\frac{1}{3}$ of the whole) is estimated to last 1,000 years at the present rate of mining.

The principal industries are (figures for 1913):

	<i>Yearly production in marks.</i>	<i>Men employed.</i>
Coal mining	393,664,928	130,000
Rolling mills (Iron and Zinc)	179,409,079	30,000
Iron refining	94,242,816	13,000
Zinc,Lead and Silver Smelting	90,203,405	12,800
Iron Smelting	70,101,845	5,300
Coking	47,165,000	
Zinc and Lead Mining	36,440,168	12,000
Cast Iron and Steel	16,081,573	34,000
Briquetting	5,038,000	4,000
Iron Mining	699,934	1,300

Production in the iron mines has greatly decreased in the last few years and iron has been imported from Poland, Sweden, etc. for refining and fabricating.

All of these industries appear to be in full operation, although complaints are made of a lack of raw materials and transportation.

The rest of Upper Silesia is devoted to agriculture. There are however small mining districts in the southern part.

Transportation.

The supply of available locomotives has been reduced from 1,200 to 700–800; of these 40% are constantly in the repair shops as against 16% before the war.

Instead of a normal shipment of 8,000 ten-ton trucks daily, only 30,000–40,000 tons of coal are shipped. 2 million tons are awaiting transportation.

The milk supply for the district is hauled 400 km on local freights and is thereby delayed 3–4 days in delivery.

Gleiwitz is connected with the Oder at Cosel by canal. At high water 15,000 tons daily can be shipped from Cosel, but the water stages in the upper reaches of the Oder are unreliable.

Labor.

220,000 workers are now employed in the mining and metallurgical industries. Before the war there was a floating labor population of 40,000 Poles; this is now reduced to 11,000–12,000.

There are no unemployed in the district. Women are performing heavy labor.

Strikes. To meet the increased cost of living, emergency allowances (*Kriegsteuern*) first of 15% and finally of 40%, were paid to the workers during the war.

Ever since the revolution the miners and metallurgical workers have been in a continuous state of unrest. It is claimed that the strikes have been instigated by the Polish Communists known as the PPS—and the Polish Nationalists.

On November 19, the first strike was settled amicably by an increase of 15–25% in wages and the establishment of the 8-hour day. Another strike immediately followed with disorder and damage to company property. It was settled on November 29, by a further increase of 15%. The total increase in November was, therefore, 30–40%. In comparison with the present daily capacity of the worker the increase is actually 60–100%.

In December a third strike, fomented by the PPS and attended with personal violence to company officials was settled by an allowance of 30–150 marks to each worker for the purchase of clothing.

In January a fourth strike for an additional allowance of 800 marks was instigated by the Polish Nationalists and involved 80% of the workers. It was settled after two weeks by an adverse decision of arbitrators.

The unrest is again on the increase. The PPS is agitating for a 30-mark 6-hour day.

Food, Clothing etc.

Before the war, the principal food of the Upper Silesian worker was fat pork and potatoes; 3,600 hogs were allotted to Kattowitz for weekly slaughter. An abnormal ration of fat is essential to the nourishment of the miner and foundry worker.

Important imports of food have been stopped by the closing of the Polish border.

The following facts are more or less peculiar to the district:

Meat. The actual issue, including bones is: in Kattowitz, 150 grams per week; in Gleiwitz, 131 grams.

Fat. The actual issue in the month of December was 30 grams of margarine. There has been no fat issue since. The price of butter has risen 2,000–2,500% since the war.

Potatoes. The supply will fail in three weeks.

Milk. The milk supply has fallen from 15,000 liters in peace times to 1,800. $\frac{1}{4}$ liter is issued to children under 6, but the supply is frequently ruined by delays in transportation.

Surreptitious trade. Considerable food is smuggled from Poland, with the connivance of the Polish Nationalists. 800 smugglers are said to cross the bridge, between Myslowitz and Modrzejow every night.

As a result of undernourishment, the daily capacity of the miners has been reduced from 1.2 tons per head in time of peace to .45–.5 tons.

The sick benefit fund of the railroad employees has a deficit of 1,000,000 marks from unprecedented sickness.

A cheap suit of clothes cost 500–600 marks; an overcoat 800–1,000 marks; and shoes 100 marks per pair.

From personal observation: The conditions are worse than elsewhere in Germany. The faces of the workers are haggard. The women and children are pitiably emaciated. Although snow was lying on the ground in protected spots, 25% of the women and children were on the streets barefooted.

POLITICAL

Domestic

Government.

The results of the elections to the National Assembly in Upper Silesia were:

Majority-socialists	5
Democratic Party	1
Center	8
National Peoples Party	1

From personal observation: The officials of the old regime were ousted in the disorder following the revolution, and were replaced by Majority-socialists who had the confidence of the people. The Workmen's and Soldier's Councils are active. Nevertheless, the picture of the Kaiser still hangs conspicuously in the hotel dining-room at Kattowitz and a reference to the "unconquered German army" by a speaker at one of the meetings met with general approval.

People.

The moderate leaders have practically lost control of the people. The labor unrest was originally economic, but has been diverted to political purposes by the Polish agitators. It was predicted that unless the intolerable food conditions are remedied, the district will turn Bolshevik within 4 weeks.

From personal observation: The officials and leaders are in a state of strained suspense.

Army.

No information was forthcoming as to the attitude of the troops in respect to the maintenance of order.

From personal observation: Such troops as were met on the streets and roads appeared surly and undisciplined.

International

The National Polish movement.

Poland claims the whole of Upper Silesia and especially the industrial district on the ground that the majority of population is Polish, and desires annexation.

The Silesian Pole.

The Silesian Pole or "Water Pole" is the descendant of original Polish colonists. 92–95% are Catholics, the rest Protestant. They belong

practically exclusively to the laboring classes. The Silesian Pole has not created a single industry in Upper Silesia.

53% of the total population of Upper Silesia according to German figures (59% according to Polish figures) are Silesian Poles. They are distributed as follows (1910 census per thousand):

<i>District</i>	<i>Silesian Poles</i>	<i>Germans</i>
Tarnowitz	668.42	270.28
Beuthen (Country)	628.13	302.83
Beuthen (City)	330.80	606.50
Kattowitz (Country)	648.47	303.33
Kattowitz (City)	133.36	854.49
Koenigshuette	339.85	540.69
Hindenburg	510.40	339.69
Pless	860.43	133.97
Rybnik	778.17	188.95
Tost-Gleiwitz	763.94	203.79
Gleiwitz (City)	146.93	739.66

Water-Polish is a primitive tongue based on High Polish, but supplemented by German words with Polish terminations. It is a spoken language, without orthography or literature. The Silesian Pole can barely understand High Polish. It is claimed that only 5% can read High Polish. While Water-Polish is spoken in the home, the younger generation prefers to speak German. In Rossberg, where the population is 80% Silesian Pole only $\frac{1}{3}$ of the school children have elected to take Polish. 540,000 copies of German newspapers are printed daily in Upper Silesia as against 120,000 in Polish. (From personal observation: $\frac{4}{5}$ of the notices on a bulletin board in Myslowitz were printed in Polish.)

Present Strength of the Movement.

Only $\frac{3}{5}$ of the Silesian Poles are adherents of the National movement. During the elections to the National Assembly, the Posen Central Popular Council declared a boycott against voting; it is estimated that the total normal vote was reduced by 25–30%. This 25–30%

representing 625,000–750,000 constitutes the entire following of the National Movement. The remaining 2/5 of the Silesian Poles are bitterly opposed to separation from Poland.

History of the Movement.

During the period from the reign of Frederick the Great to 1848 Upper Silesia was colonized by Germans and the industrial exploitation of the district began. The Silesian Pole became thoroughly Germanized, and was wholly indifferent to political matters.

1848 to 1872. The restrictions were removed and the Polish was taught in the schools. The Silesian Pole considered himself insulted if called a “Polack”.

1872–1900. In 1872, Bismark renewed the policy of repression. The teaching and preaching of Polish was forbidden. Protestant Bureaucrats were sent down from Berlin to govern Upper Silesia. Meanwhile the industries had developed, and labor was viciously exploited. During this period the national movement began, and was carried on by leaders from Posen.

1900–1919. Under Korfanty’s leadership the movement took on a radical character. In 1907, the party had five seats in the Reichstag. Separate political administration, separate schools etc. were demanded for the Silesian Poles.

Since the revolution, economic and political chaos and disillusionment as to the future of Germany have added impetus to the movement. Adolph Hoffmann’s proposition to separate Church and state involving the suppression of religious instruction, has alienated the Catholics.

It is claimed that the movement is not autochthonous, but has been imported from Posen; it has grown through the political mistakes of the Prussian.

Polish Propaganda.

The National Poles appeal to the national consciousness; The PPS incites economic agitation.

The propaganda promises 5 morgen of land (1 morgen= $\frac{1}{4}$ hectare) and two cows to each man. The 6-hour day. Complete socialization of industry. Escape from taxes to pay war debts and indemnity. Supremacy of the Catholic religion. Food within a week after annexation.

Recently an aeroplane distributed anonymous fly-leaves over Laurahutte urging a general strike, desertion from the border guard and enlistment in the German-Polish army already 80,000 strong.

German arguments against annexation.

Upper Silesia has belonged to the Prussian crown since the reign of Frederick the Great.

The natural access is up the valley of the Oder.

40% of the population is pure German. Of the Silesian Poles only $\frac{3}{5}$ or 30% of the total population is disloyal from selfish motives. The remaining $\frac{2}{5}$ are intensely patriotic to Germany. General Hoefer stated that the Silesian Poles in his regiment were the best soldiers he had. The Protestants (7–8% of the population) and the Jews (20,000–20,000 [sic]) are unanimous against annexation.

The industrial organization is the product of many years of German capital, enterprise and genius. The Silesian Pole has had no part in it except as a common laborer.

The Pole is utterly incapable of creating or maintaining an industrial organization. The thousands of Poles who emigrated to the United States before the war were driven out by unendurable conditions at home. $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Upper Silesian coal basin lies in Poland, but the only exploitation has been done by Germans. The German east Provinces have 11.8 km of railroad and 34.6 of highway to the 100 sq. km. Poland has 2.7 and 6.9 respectively. The average value of small holdings in Silesia is 2185 marks, per hectare in Poland 405 marks.

In the phrase of one of the speakers: "Poland looks on Upper Silesia as a cow to be milked".

The Bolsheviks are gaining complete control of Poland. They now hold Lodz, Bendzin, Modrzejow etc. The Russian Bolshevik army is within 60 km of Warsaw. The lot of the middle classes, especially the Jews, would be intolerable in case of annexation.

Comment.

(Personal Opinion) While the German figures as to the proportion of Silesian Poles and the strength of the Polish movement are undoubtedly less than the truth, there is, at least, a strong minority if not a majority of pure Germans and loyal Silesian Poles implacably opposed to separation from Germany.

The industries of Upper Silesia are wholly German, and are an essential factor in the German economy.

The representative[s] of the Mission were taken to a hill (Dreikaiserecke) overlooking the junction of the boundaries of Germany, Poland and Austrian Galicia, and the contrast between the high *Kultur* of Germany and the barbarism of Poland was pointed out. On one side of the Przemsza River was the town of Myslowitz with its great coal mining plant, apartments for laborers, hospitals and entertainment halls; on the other side, a miserable Polish village of peasants, hovels surrounded by uncultivated fields and forest land. Even discounting the view as panoramic propaganda and admitting that the terrain and Russian domination may have hindered development, the contrast was startling.

Military Situation.

No information as to the strength of the Polish forces was given. A considerable body of Polish legionaries are holding the border along the Przemsza River. The Polish Red Guard is holding the town of Modrzejow 1 km. from the bridge of Myslowitz.

No information was given as to the strength of the German forces. The 117th Grenzenschutz is stationed in the district. General Hoefer

says that the troops are loyal and reliable and have resisted all efforts at corruption by Polish secret agents. The Germans are determined to resist invasion to the utmost.

The Germans accuse the Polish of provoking hostilities and breaking the armistice conditions. Minor engagements have been brought on by Polish incursions into Silesian territory at Kamin (East of Beuthen) and at Kattorski. On Feb. 24, there was firing across the bridge between Myslowitz and Modrzejow, and 1 German was killed.

Czech Claim to Upper Silesia.

The Czechs claim Ratibor and the surrounding country in the southern end of Upper Silesia on the ground that the population is Moravian. If, however, the Poles should gain possession of the industrial district, the Czechs would claim as against the Poles.

The Moravian population forms 4% of the total population of Upper Silesia—100,000. They are all Catholics. The principal territory inhabited by them is an agricultural district on the Galician border surrounding Hultschin. There is a coal mine in this district at Peterhoven.

The Moravians speak Moravian in the home and German generally. Until the revolution they were inclined to allow German to supplant their mother tongue.

The Czech movement is of recent origin, but has considerable following.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT L. BLACK
ALBERT H. STONESTREET

¹⁰ Not attached to file copy of this report.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/15^{1/2}

[Document 27]

***Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***¹¹

H. H. Field No. 13

ZURICH, March 14, 1919.

Subject: Separatist tendencies in Bavaria.

In synthesizing the impressions which I have gained during my stay in Munich, few features have been more prominent than the particularist sentiments shown almost without exception by those with whom I have had to do. Already in Bern, the German Minister, Adolf Müller, confined his talk to Bavarian matters and the Bavarian Legation urged that I should rely solely on the Bavarian authorities for passport visa and traveling facilities. In Munich all thoughts seem concentrated on Bavarian matters and one hears on all sides such expressions as: "Conditions in Bavaria" contrasted with those "in the Empire", as if Bavaria were no part of the Empire. As I look back over the political discussions I had in Munich, I realize that the topic was socialization in Bavaria, Feeding of Bavaria, raw materials for Bavaria, etc. Where the question of the relations of Bavaria to the Empire were discussed, there were always complaints. The particularism was of course of various grades but, especially in the last weeks it took the form of distinct separatist demands. Dandl (former prime-minister) and Pfeffer (secretary of the clerical party) expressed extreme discontent with the centralist course that was being steered in Weimar and declared that Bavaria's interests were gravely compromised thereby. Eisner (though himself no Bavarian) felt very bitter over this and he and his followers regard his pronouncements at the socialist congress in Bern as a first step towards initiating a Bavarian foreign policy. This point has been developed at length with obvious intention by various visitors. De Fiori (intimate friend of Auer and Adolf Müller) put it as a necessity that Bavaria should succeed in gaining influence on German policies

or else must go her own way. Auer hates everything Prussian and his whole ardent patriotism is Bavarian, rather than German. In my conversation with him extending over two hours, he kept reverting to the desirability of a Bavarian arrangement with the Allies to secure raw materials and food. Col. v. Sonnenburg (head censor for Bavaria during the war and now in charge of the press service) declares that the whole German system is as bad today as it was prior to the revolution, that we must not let ourselves be deceived by German duplicity, only in Bavaria has the military spirit been destroyed, only there can we find trustworthy men to deal with. During the crisis following Eisner's assassination, search was made for a foreign secretary. At this time I became conscious of a tendency on the part of those visitors who were in the midst of the party negotiations to sound me, as to my acquaintanceship with Prof. Forster, with Dr. Mühlön, with Prof. Bonn, with Mr. Eiffe. I was very reserved in expressing any opinion whatsoever and in my own mind I formed the conviction that these were candidates for the post and that the one who stood the best with the allies possessed in that fact the surest recommendation. This surmise was later fully confirmed, for four members of the majority socialists called on me confidentially and naïvely told me that this was the criterion that counted and that—well—a private personal opinion expressed to them would decide them and in consequence probably decide the choice. I of course had no opinion to offer, but did express surprise at such importance being given to the choice of a foreign secretary at a time when Weimar had decided that Bavaria was to be shorn of her privilege of maintaining diplomatic representatives abroad. My visitors declared that this matter surely had not yet been definitely settled; Bavarian public opinion had still its word to say. Baron Steglitz (the Saxon ex-Minister) and Djiembowski (Saxon Chargé d'Affaires) with whom I have talked concerning Bavarian particularism are equally convinced of its potency and feel concerned. Dr. Merkle (of the Foreign Office) and Fechenbach, who regard themselves par excellence as the successors to Eisner, have taken up Eisner's idea of the necessity for Bavaria to break through the ring drawn about Bavaria by Germany's foreign policy. Eisner's trip to Bern cleared the atmosphere, though it was an open act of rebellion against Berlin. Some coming Bavarian statesman must again have the courage to take the bit in his teeth. As for the communist leaders, they rave against Berlin. Landauer tells

me he means to get a “Rate”-republic in Bavaria whether Germany likes it or not. A strange episode occurred on my departure from Munich. Geh.-Rat v. Müller (interim head of the Foreign Office) appeared at the station. He said he learned I was going via Konstanz to see the Baden Minister Dietrich. Would I mind telling Dietrich that he would like to confer concerning joint action with Baden against the excessive centralist doings in Weimar. There must have been some purpose in asking me to be the message bearer. V. Müller is one of the old school of state functionaries.

The “Second Revolution” has of course greatly exaggerated the anti-Prussian feelings in Bavaria. The Bavarians are certainly incapable of being militarized today; but if Prussian troops were to come to restore order, there would be a chance to see just how far resistance would be possible. No fight could be more popular.

During my last days in Munich, Prof; Jaffe, Minister of Finance, came to me on strange errands. He wanted me to tell him how negotiations stood concerning the importations of foodstuffs. I assured him I had no knowledge of these and would not be able to say anything even if I were informed. I suggested that his natural source of information would be the German authorities. This led to a bitter complaint against the negotiations in Spa. The Bavarian government was not represented there. Erzberger was a schemer whom surely we did not trust. There was also a Bavarian general at Spa, who for a time sent reports to the Bavarian Government; but he belonged to the old school and merely sent such silly vituperations and colored accounts that the government had no use for them. “And so our interests are being offered at auction without our participation and we are being overpowered in the peace negotiations, as we were in the war by Berlin, which has learned nothing and has no conception of how to deal with other peoples. We must find a way out.” Jaffe is a man whose sincerity I distrust and whose capabilities I count very low. He can not long retain his place in the ministry, although he clings to it with all his might. Nevertheless, such utterances on the part of a member of the government are significant, especially if he has been put forward as an *enfant terrible*, to tell truths with the possibility of their being disavowed.

When visitors have talked on the separatist strain, I have asked them, whether they really believed Bavaria could stand alone from the economic point of view. The reply usually was that it would be difficult, but that commercial treaties might help. Besides Bavarian industries were largely doomed in any event and an agrarian Bavaria could get on very well by herself. The separatist movement is surely one of the headless extravagances of the day; but I think it should be known, when its manifestations become so evident.

In the foregoing account, I have spoken of Bavarian sentiment; I ought, however, to point out that my watchtower was Munich and that the echoes coming in from regions with a Frankian population seem to differ considerably. It was a point I intended to study on the spot, when I was recalled. On the other hand I am sure that the tendency is not a mere attempt to curry favor by casting all the blame on the “unspeakable Prussians”. I got a taste of this in Baden in the two days I was there. The two things are different.

HERBERT HAVILAND FIELD

¹¹ Transmitted to the Commission by the Minister in Switzerland under covering letter No. 251, March 15; received March 18.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/16

[Document 28]

***Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***^{[12](#)}

H. H. Field No. 14

ZURICH, March 15, 1919.

Subject: Bolshevism in Bavaria.

No observations made during my stay in Munich seem to me more instructive than those relating to the insidious proselytic character of the Bolshevistic propaganda. The first question one may consider in this connection is:

How far bolshevism already prevails. By bolshevism I mean minority rule to the advantage of the proletarian class. When I left Munich, power was vested in the Central Council of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers, comprising 7 persons, chosen by the Council Congress, itself a convention of deputies numbering some 400 from various parts of the country. No pretence is made that the deputies to the Council Congress are chosen according to any just electoral system or represent the entire electorate. It is class representation at best and does not even truthfully depict the views of the class. Furthermore, any vote taken is dependent upon the members, who chance to be in Munich. In view of the difficulty of securing lodging in the capital and the restrictions on travel, the convention is virtually a local body. Besides the Central Council, the Council Congress also nominates an Executive Committee of 21 persons, 7 workmen's representatives, 7 for the peasants and 7 for the soldiers. Since the soldiers are almost entirely demobilized, it is evident that they receive an exaggerated representation. Moreover, they comprise today largely fresh recruits under 21 years of age, who under most constitutions would not be regarded mature for suffrage. The Executive Committee of 21 forms the kernel of the Committee of Action comprising 33 members, the 12 additional seats being

assigned as follows: 3 to the Revolutionary Workmen's Council (the colleagues of Eisner, who made the revolution of Nov. 9 1918), and 3 each to the party caucuses of the Majority Socialists, the Independents and the League of Peasants. The bourgeois parties which in the recent elections secured the majority in the land are completely ruled out. The Central Council, the Executive Committee and the Committee of Action are in permanent session. The latter have various sub-committees and commissioners, who rule with dictatorial powers, the most important being the Commissioner of Lodgings, who can [and?] does requisition lodgings in houses inadequately utilized, the Press Censor and the (coming) food dictator. Eisner had a moderating influence over the "Councils" and on Feb. 19 they were to vacate the Landtag building, so as to permit the assembling of the legal legislature on Feb. 21. The assassination of Eisner swept away all these resolutions and the "Councils" acquired complete ascendancy. Fortunately the demand of the extremists to proclaim a "Councils" Republic, vesting officially all power in the Councils was voted down. On the other hand, a compromise reached in a conference of party leaders held in Nuremberg on Mar. 2 was rejected by the "Councils". Instead the Council formulated its terms which have been accepted as the only possible transaction and which provide for the recognition of the Councils as permanent institutions incorporated into the constitution and restrict the legal National Assembly both as to the period during which it is to be allowed to remain in session and as to the proceedings to be followed. It is impossible to disguise the fact that minority rule already prevails.

Pretorian guard. The Landtag prior to the death of Eisner was strongly guarded by soldiers pledged to defend the decisions of the Councils. Also Eisner and Unterleithner, whose presence in the government could not be justified by popular vote, maintained personal body guards. Since the assassination of Eisner, great military preparations for the defence of the Councils have been made; but it has been almost forgotten that this is revolutionary, in so far as it is directed against the duly elected legislature.

Disarming of the bourgeoisie. The carrying and possession of arms is forbidden to all members of the bourgeois class. Even officers are

supposed to give up their pistols. Certain persons have told me in Munich that they did not dare in view of the perquisitions expected and the severe penalties edicted to keep even valuable historic weapons or shot guns for hunting in their houses; others admitted that they had revolvers well hidden, for they could not risk being overpowered by marauders.

Arming of proletarians. By decree of Feb. 24 issued by the Arming Commission all workmen over 20 years of age who are familiar with the use of firearms and who are members of a trades union or of a socialistic party are to be given a rifle and 20 cartridges. Details concerning the distribution are given and all permits for carrying arms issued prior to Feb. 23 are declared invalid. All arms held by others must be given over to the Councils by Feb. 27, after which date any person found with arms or munition is to be arrested and brought to judgment. I had it on my program to endeavor to find out to what extent arms actually were distributed according to this decree. Estimates seem to differ greatly.

Dissolving of Landtag. Prior to the death of Eisner, the extremists insisted that the legal legislature must never be allowed to meet. They were overruled. The assassination of Eisner led, however, to the closing of the legislature by decree of the Councils. Its reconvening is regarded by the moderates as a very liberal concession, rather than as a natural event. The trammels placed on its action and the bitter opposition of the extremists render its supremacy illusory.

Freedom of speech. This does not exist for the bourgeois. It is quite impossible for the citizens of Munich to assemble in order to protest against revolutionary measures. On the other hand, in the Wagner Hall a mass meeting of extremists is in session all day long, in which incendiary speeches are held and from which deputations are despatched from time to time to the Council Congress or to the Committee of Action.

Freedom of press has also been completely suppressed. From Feb. 21 to Feb. 26 no bourgeois nor even socialist newspapers were allowed to appear at all. Instead there appeared a daily entitled *Nachrichtenblatt of the Central Council*. From Feb. 26 on, the papers were

allowed to appear, but were only allowed to publish matter which had been previously approved by the Council Censor. A further condition was that they should publish such articles as were submitted to them by the Council and so these papers appeared day by day with editorial articles condemning all that the papers had hitherto stood for and praising to the skies the new system. Catholic papers were compelled to publish anti-Catholic articles, pan-German papers to vie with each other in preaching socialism and in praising Eisner. All the papers published a declaration "To Prussia", warning the German central authorities against interfering with Bavarian affairs and terminating with an energetic "Hands off!".

Hostages. Immediately after the assassination of Eisner, numerous persons of high rank in society, government circles, church, etc. were arrested and held as hostages. The general statement was made that for every revolutionary leader harmed, 3 hostages would be sacrificed. The students had also to designate hostages to be held in rotation.

.....

Adaptability. The development the movement was taking under my eyes in Munich shows its extreme insidiousness and danger. The apostles of bolshevism can lead to their waterwheel all currents of discontent. They realize that different methods are necessary in Munich from in Moscow. The Munich leaders differ so greatly among themselves and differ so greatly in their successive manifestations that they can win all shades of opinion. The careful reasoning presentation of the case at the hands of Landauer can scarcely fail to carry conviction with unbalanced intellectuals. One parts with him with the thought uppermost: "What slanders have been said about this movement!" I am convinced that an adaptation to the western mentality could be devised, just as has been done for the German mentality.

Bolshevism as a German bugbear propaganda. There can be no question about the existence of a German parole, that we are to be frightened into concessions by the threat of bolshevism penetrating into our camp. Nevertheless it would be folly on our part were we to

systematically close our eyes to a real danger, because the Germans used it for propaganda purposes. In Munich I had the stereotype reply: "Bolshevism does not attack the victor" and pointed out that no folly committed by Germany during the war could equal that of desiring to see bolshevism raise its head to the west as well as to the east of her. For all that, my intimate contact with the birth of bolshevism in Munich has left an uneasy feeling in my mind. Discontent of any kind is a hotbed for such theories and it is not merely the unrest of defeat which can be infected.

Means of combating. I do not believe that the passive drawing of a line of demarcation along the Rhine is an all sufficient means of prevention. What action is decided upon for stamping out the centre of contagion in Russia is quite foreign to the scope of my observations. But I do believe that certain measures of prophylaxis are advisable right in Bavaria, provided of course higher reasons do not stand in the way. It is the policy of a helping hand. Help against starvation (food supply), help against unemployment (raw materials), moral help (pronouncements against minority dictatorship, etc.), help against disorder (in last instance military occupation). All this requires development, which I propose to give to it in a later report. I mention these conclusions not as a plea for any given policy. Of this I have not to judge. They merely seem to me to constitute the immediate deduction from my observations. I give them as such in all modesty.

HERBERT HAVILAND FIELD

¹² Transmitted to the Commission by the Minister in Switzerland under covering letter No. 273, March 24; received March 26.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/18

[Document 29]

***Dr. E. E. Field to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***¹³

H. H. Field No. 16

ZURICH, March 17, 1919.

Subject: Militarism and disarmament.

Militarism in Bavaria. There can be no doubting the fact that the military machine has been completely smashed in Bavaria. Bavarian soldiers can not be brought back to the discipline of former days and the soldiers themselves feel a deep antipathy even for such revolutionary armies as Noske has been able to form in the north. The only districts in regard to which I have been able to make comparisons, Saxony and Southern Baden, leave me with the conviction that the process of disintegration has gone further in Bavaria than elsewhere. As an example of a most orderly unit, I took the 39th Bavarian Reserve Division, which after the revolution kept at the head of its Soldiers' Council a liberal minded nobleman, Capt. v. Zwehl. Even this officer who proclaimed himself a socialist and voted for Auer, had to go and was replaced by a country carpenter Roesch, with whom I had a long conversation. High officers of course deplore this situation but for a moment try to conceal their utter hopelessness. A perfect passion for leaving the country and seeking foreign service has seized the officers' profession and I was overwhelmed with applications for service in the American army. The bearing of the troops in Munich is bad beyond belief. With all socialists and most liberals the situation is accepted without recrimination. In reactionary circles regret is expressed; but also here the military spirit is dead. Among other proofs of this the displays in the windows of book-sellers and the testimony of their proprietors tell the same tale. The public has no interest in military exploits and hates to be reminded of anything military. My conferences with statesmen of the most varied political standing

concurred in regarding a return to the old German military system quite impossible as a political program. Coming from Switzerland, I expected to hear the Swiss militia system propounded as a substitute; but the Swiss system yields too large an army for it to be favored even by such a man as ex-Prime-Minister Dandl, who is regarded as a reactionary by the Bavarian socialists. All agree that the present army must be completely disbanded. The Secretary of State for Demobilisation, Rothisberger, with whom I had many talks and who became by the fortune of the revolution for a week commander in chief of the Bavarian army, developed at length his plans for a future army with the attributes of a police force. Quite independent of any pressure from without, Bavarian statesmen are quite ready to abandon conscription and adopt the Anglo-American voluntary system.

Disarmament of Germany. This feature formed the topic of several interviews with Col. Falkner v. Sonnenburg. This gentleman, who has had supreme command of the Bavarian press service and censorship throughout the war, claims to know tendencies of public opinion better than anyone else in Bavaria. Today he is charged with following expressions of opinion throughout the Empire and had arranged to send me a daily report and offered to discuss his verdicts with me at frequent intervals. V. S. thoroughly distrusts the Prussian spirit prevailing in Berlin and Weimar and kept pointing out to me hidden manifestations of the same. Above all he warns us not to tolerate the reconstruction of a powerful army. Give the Prussians an army and they will at once set to work to introduce all the old abuses. It is a dangerous toy for such a people to possess. We do not need it and must not be allowed to have it. A simple police force raised on the voluntary system, as in America is quite sufficient. Col. v. S. consulted a group of Bavarian experts on the matter and secured from them the estimate that for Bavaria one solitary division would suffice for all practical requirement, 7–8 divisions would be the proper quota to allow for the German Empire.

HERBERT HAVILAND FIELD

¹³ Transmitted to the Commission by the Minister in Switzerland under covering letter No. 272, March 24; received March 26.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/19^{1/2}

[Document 30]

Report by Lieutenant George Howe

THE SITUATION IN MUNICH

The present report cannot pretend to give an up-to-date account of the political personalities and movements in Munich, as the writer left his post in that city on February 28th, and in the present uncertain state of affairs daily changes take place. It is, however, possible to give a general account of the feeling of the people, and the atmosphere surrounding the attempt to build up a more or less permanent form of government, from which forecasts as to future movements may be made.

In the first place it is necessary to keep in mind that utter political confusion reigns, owing chiefly to the fact that the aims of the various parties are vague and ill-formulated. As everything must be built up from the ground, the problem facing the political leaders is of such scope that it is almost impossible to bring into prominence any one detail on which to concentrate a call for support. For the same reason the parties within themselves, as well as the A. B. and S. Council, are divided into many conflicting elements, ranging in various degrees from right to left. To add to the difficulty of the situation the Spartacist elements of the Independent Socialists and A. B. and S. Council seem determined to destroy any organization of a constructive character which may be formed, in order to establish the "dictatorship of the proletariat", a term as vague in Munich as it has proved elsewhere.

At the time of the arrival of the American Mission in Munich on February 6th, the situation seemed comparatively calm and clear. Auer was the man of the day, as he had been for some time. Eisner, in spite of his popularity in certain sections, was losing ground politically. Even in his own ministry he had no supporters, as was amply testified by the confidential statements made to Dr. Field by

the undersecretaries. Auer, on the other hand, was gaining rapidly, not only in government circles, but also with the A. B. and S. Councils. On the day previous to the murder of Eisner and the attempted assassination of Auer, Dr. Field and the writer had lunch with the latter and Timm, Minister of Justice in the provisional government. Auer spoke at length on his scheme for the development of the government along Socialistic lines, with a bourgeois element, the disestablishment of the church on a moderate basis, the reduction of the A. B. and S. Councils to their proper functions as local governing and advisory bodies, etc. He stated he had brought the councils around to his point of view by explaining to them clearly the place he proposed to find for them in the body politic, that they had agreed to give the Landtag a free hand, and that he had pledges which assured his election as Prime Minister.

The meeting of the Landtag on February 21st, for which occasion disorders had long been predicted from the Spartacist elements, marked the end of all moderate hopes. The murder of Eisner, though there seems no reason to believe it to have been the result of a reactionary plot, stirred the more violent elements into open revolt. The attempted murder of Auer, which was at first believed to have been a consequence of Eisner's assassination, really appears to have had more significance. There is ample reason to believe his death was plotted beforehand by the Spartacist element of the A. B. and S. Council. A workman named Lindner, a member of the Council, was chosen to carry out the attack, as he did at the very time when Auer, speaking before the newly-convened Landtag, was deploring the death of Eisner. It is not, therefore, an exaggerated conclusion to draw that the Spartacists were attacking in the person of Auer the idea of an established order, which would have brought them back to a political state more or less resembling other liberal governments of today. It also seems probable that in the present state of mind similar attacks may be made whenever the efforts of the more conservative elements promise to bear fruit.

Whereas, however, Auer might well have been considered a martyr, and the attack on him have estranged many adherents of the Spartacist idea, the unfortunate circumstance of Eisner's assassination put quite a different face on the matter. Auer and his

like were considered, through their conciliatory attitude towards the *bourgeoisie* and the old regime, to have been in some measure responsible for Eisner's death. Auer would indeed have been lynched had it not been announced and believed that he was on the point of death. His influence appears to have been permanently lost, especially as he is not a strong leader in a crisis, but rather a pacifier and pourer of oil on troubled waters.

During the days immediately following the double tragedy, pandemonium reigned. The A. B. and S. Council, with its troops, took practical charge of everything. Timm, Rosshaupter, and other adherents of Auer were arrested. The bourgeois press was seized and suppressed for several days, and subsequently allowed to reappear only under radical supervision. All articles published were of an Independent Socialist tone. All meetings of any but Socialists were prohibited, all persons were obliged to remain within doors after seven p.m., parades of workmen and soldiers marched the streets shouting "death to the *bourgeoisie*" and bearing signs with such inscriptions as "Long live the New Revolution", several hotels were stormed with hand grenades, hostages belonging to the nobility were seized as guarantees and plundering was of nightly occurrence.

Strangely enough, however, a certain semblance of order was maintained. Even within the A. B. and S. Council there was a strong element of moderation. Patrols were sent out to do their best to stop the plundering, the ordinary life of the town continued in general unmolested, and the proposal to arm all workmen over twenty was brought to naught by the seizing of the arsenals by so-called "government" troops, which also occupied the principal public buildings. In all this it was impossible to distinguish who was in command, and yet in some way the work was done. The police were frankly powerless.

Almost immediately attempts were made to form a new provisional government. Eiffe, a business man of Hamburg, called in originally as technical adviser to the old provisional government, returned from Berne and telegraphed to Förster and Muehlton to join him and take the leadership, while the Majority and Independent Socialists met together and attempted to form a coalition government. In this

connection an incident occurred which shows the state of mind of the various elements, and the mistrust which exists amongst them. Eiffe came to visit the American Mission to expose his unofficial plans, proposing Muehlton as Minister of Foreign Affairs. While he was there a delegation of Majority Socialists came in, which was received in another room, and which stated Forster and Muehlton to be extremely unpopular in Bavaria as being not sufficiently Bavarian, an indication of the strength of the independent Bavarian feeling. The Majority Socialist candidate for Minister of Foreign Affairs, according to them, was Prof. Bonn, for whose candidacy Dr. Field's official approval was requested—a request which was of course refused. The following day Jaffe, Independent Socialist and Minister of Finance, came in, with a candidate of his own. He had never heard of Bonn's candidacy. From this incident it may be judged how little cooperation exists.

Meanwhile, at their joint meeting, the Majority and Independent Socialists had succeeded in selecting a common candidate for Prime Minister, in the person of Hoffmann, Minister of Education, belonging to the extreme left wing of the Majority Socialist Party. Not the least amusing incident of a generally tragic situation was the fact that Hoffmann could not be found for three days after his nomination. The provisional Government, under Hoffmann's leadership, was of course finally formed, but appeared to have little chance of ultimate success.

To summarize, the situation in Munich is one of complete confusion. No party knows exactly what its aims are, there are no leaders of strong personality, and whatever is built up stands under the constant threat of destruction by the Spartacist element. This element has the tremendous advantage of being entirely ruthless and having none of the laborious constructive work in its hands. It appears, however, to be comparatively small, and not to possess much sympathy among the serious working classes in general, though what it lacks in size and strength is compensated by the mistrust and confusion within the ranks of the constructive elements, and the fact that the *bourgeoisie* is allowed to have no public voice either in press or meeting. It is therefore not a difficult

task for them to tear down whatever is built up, and as long as the present spirit lasts, it seems not unlikely that they will do so.

Meanwhile the financial situation of the government is very precarious with no means of obtaining credits, and the tremendous burden of the daily allowance of eight marks per day made to every unemployed workman—they were about 40,000 when the writer left Munich, and the number was constantly increasing owing to coal shortage—draining the treasury.

The food situation, although it forms a large part of every conversation, appears only indirectly contributory to the dissatisfaction which exists, insofar as lack of nutrition depresses the morale of the people and breeds in it indignation against any regime which fails to fill its stomach. There is no doubt, however, that the hand of any government established on a firm basis would be greatly strengthened by the distribution of supplies.

To conclude, there appears to be a strong feeling of “Bavaria for the Bavarians” in all circles, and of indignation at the thought of outside interference from any other part of Germany. This feeling might well lead to complications in national affairs should matters not go to the liking of the Bavarians. How far this spirit is pervasive it is of course difficult to tell until it is put to the test.

PARIS , March 19, 1919.

[File copy not signed]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/19

[Document 31]

***Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***¹⁴

H. H. Field No. 17

ZURICH, March 19, 1919.

Subject: Union of German Austria with Germany.

Prior to being charged with my mission in Munich, it fell to my lot to confer with most of the political personages of prominence who came from Austria to Switzerland. Among these I did not encounter a single thorough going advocate of the union of Austria and Germany. Many were very stoutly opposed to such a union and among these were several official or semi-official personages, such as the Commercial Attaché of the Austrian Consulate in Zurich and the Secretary of Legation Prince Alfred zu Hohenlohe in Bern. The latter went so far as to declare it as his personal opinion that the whole movement in Vienna had been financed from Berlin. The German Embassy in Vienna would seem from the accounts of Hohenlohe to have outdone itself in propaganda. The only responsive chord in Austria was stated to have been the socialists and their interest in such a solution was a matter of party interest. I was therefore curious to see how the problem would appear on the other side of the frontier.

In Bavaria, the question is seldom treated and the general attitude in the masses is one of profound indifference. I used the occasion of a visit to the upper Inn valley (Rosenheim) near the Tyrolian frontier to sound the people as to their feelings for their southern neighbor. They were loud in proclaiming that a sharp line of demarcation existed. Bavaria ends before Kufstein and Tyrol begins with no gradation. I even found a remnant of resentment concerning the last phase of the war (invasion of Tyrol). In Munich two very different groups desire the union: the socialists and the militarists. With the

socialists it is a matter of party tactics and is far from universal. With the militarists it is a matter of power; to offset the losses in Alsace-Lorraine, Poland and Schleswig, the adjunction of a compact German population seems a godsend. In intellectual circles also, sentimental reasons for strengthening German culture prevail. But here too there are those who contend that it is German culture in its diversity that is important and the specific Austrian manifestation is endangered with being quite submerged. Political considerations in liberal circles seem opposed to the union, especially if carried out under the dominion of the centralist tendency which now seems to pervade Prussia-Germany. "Surely if we revolt at the violence being done to our federalistic ideas, the Austrians will never find it to their taste and if in a moment of disorientation, the ill considered step is taken, we shall lose the counterpoise of Vienna, which a federalistic solution might have afforded us." Just as is the case with Bavarian separatist tendencies, there is a dislike to publicly take position against the entry of Austria; but in frank private conversation the sentiments I have expressed will be shown. Ex-Prime-Minister Dandl told me his knowledge of the Austrians led him to doubt there being any really deep felt desire for union. "Surely they can not like what is being done in Weimar!" On the other hand, no step could foster the movement for union and particularly its expression in public assemblies more than a veto proclaimed in advance by the Entente. Both Bavaria and Austria can be led with ease; they may prove difficult to drive. Both look sincerely to the Allies; both have a common hatred of Prussianism; both are sick of militarism.

In some heads I encountered a vague feeling that some league between Austria and Bavaria might be possible; but such a conception does not seem to play any prominent part in practical Bavarian politics.

I regret that I am not in Bavaria to see how Bavarian opinion reacts to the idea of neutralizing Austria put forward by the French press. I can conceive the possibility, if not the probability, of its being taken up as a matter which might also interest Bavaria.

P. S. In the introductory paragraph of this report, I refer to conversations I had with Austrian statesmen regarding the union of

Germany and Austria. I neglected to mention the Austrian Minister Freiherr v. Haupt and the commercial advisor Baron Hennet. These two personages, representing as they do officially a government, which had already declared itself in favor of union, could not be expected to give vent to heterodox views. In matter of fact, they placed themselves on the platform of the union as inevitable. It was, however, interesting to see the arguments they used in favor of the decision. They explained that German Austria could not possibly stand alone and then proceeded to point out how all advances on Austria's part had found no hearing with the Tchèques, with the Yugoslavs, with the Poles or with the Hungarians. So they had to turn to Germany as the last possibility. It would not seem a very good omen for the marriage relations of Austria and Germany that the suitor confesses that he has been given the mitten by all other possible and impossible neighbors. At the time when I had these conversations, no one could have foreseen that it was intended to build up a unified state to take the place of the federal German empire. From what I learned in my intercourse with the Austrian Legation concerning the attitude of Dr. Bauer, I am inclined to give credence to the tale that his retirement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may not be entirely without relation to what he learned in Berlin and Weimar concerning the internal status of the new German Republic.

HERBERT HAVILAND FIELD

¹⁴ Transmitted to the Commission by the Minister in Switzerland under covering letter No. 272, March 24; received March 26.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/20

[Document 32]

***Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***¹⁵

H. H. Field No. 18

ZURICH, March 20, 1919.

Subject: Interview with Minister Dietrich—Baden—The Rhine.

My only point of comparison with Bavarian conditions during my stay in Germany was afforded by a visit to the Grand Duchy of Baden, where I went on invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dietrich on my return journey to Switzerland. It filled me with a feeling of contrast, rather than of similarity. Dietrich pointed out to me that Baden particularism was very different from that of Bavaria. Indeed he insisted that I should not take Bavaria as a whole, but should distinguish the Frankian and the Alemanic regions. In the case of Baden, the people felt themselves Southern Germans and had a certain antipathy for Prussian ways. They did not want to be submerged in the Prussian uniformity. But it did not take the form of separatist tendencies. History had its part in this; for Baden was an outlying province, which had again and again been overrun by the western enemy and could not stand upon its own feet, but had to have the protection of the Empire. In southern Baden also discipline had never relaxed as in Bavaria. Food conditions were also tolerable. However, Baden had certain preeminent needs which were special to it and which had perhaps not obtained full recognition as yet in Germany. So long as Alsace remained German and the Rhine was flanked on both sides by German states, a definite German policy for the upper Rhine was possible. Now that Alsace promised to become French, there was a Baden policy for the upper Rhine, which he would like to make known and which corresponded to the interests of the seafaring nations and contrasted somewhat with that which he could conceive to lie in the special interests of Alsace. He said that public opinion was greatly exercised in Baden over the intention of

France to extend her supremacy to the Baden shore of the Rhine, bringing the entire river under her control. Statistics would show that the loss of navigation on the Rhine would spell almost annihilation to Baden. But even were this blow to be avoided, the interests of Alsace in the navigation of the river above Strasbourg were non-existent or even negative, whilst for Baden they were paramount. Both states had interests in the water power; but Baden wanted a solution which would save navigation, allowing cargo boats up to 2000 tons to reach Basle and even eventually the Lake of Constance. This was also a vital interest of Switzerland and of England, Belgium, Holland and perhaps America. This was a feature where Baden felt she must raise her voice and where she was desirous [of?] pointing the matter out to well-disposed Entente personages.

But there was another aspect of the matter, which had not yet received due consideration. Baden had of course her worries over the coming indemnities. She also faced a grave crisis of unemployment. Now the problem of the utilisation of the upper Rhine opened possibilities in both regards. Baden could undertake at once the construction of the necessary waterworks, which would give employment to many hands. She could then contribute this outlay in part at least to the war indemnity by turning over to France a disproportionate amount of the electric energy acquired and by giving over to all users the waterways resulting from a rational disposition of the locks and canals.

Dietrich spoke bitterly of the break-down of the German rationing system, which had been due to an excess of reglementation, against which he had always warned. Today it was a mere farce.

In Baden I found a mentality distinctly different from what I saw in Bavaria. In Munich I soon acquired a sense of just what one could say without making a *faux pas*. In Baden, I found the need of a revision of this sentiment.

HERBERT HAVILAND FIELD

¹⁵ Transmitted to the Commission by the Minister in Switzerland under covering letter No. 282, March 27; received March 29.

The Second Dresel Mission to Germany^{[1](#)}

^{[1](#)} For reports by the first Dresel Mission to Germany, see [vol. II, pp. 130](#) [ff.](#)

[\[33\] The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace \(Grew\) to Colonel David H. Biddle, American Liaison Officer, Cologne](#)

Paris, April 11, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.0131/11b

[\[34\] Colonel Williams, Third Army, A. E. F., to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

[Coblenz,] April 20, 1919—9 p.m. [Received April 22—1:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/54: Telegram

[\[35\] Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Berlin, April 26, 1919—1 p.m. [Received April 27—1 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/20: Telegram

[36] Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, April 28, 1919—9 a.m. [Received 9:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.0131/27: Telegram

[37] Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, April 28, 1919—1 p.m. [Received via Colonel Williams, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz, April 29—3 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/24: Telegram

[38] Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, April 30, 1919—1 p.m. [Received 11:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/32: Telegram

[39] Brigadier General George H. Harries to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, May 2, 1919—2 p.m. [Received May 3—3:50 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/39: Telegram

[40] Mr. E. L. Dresel to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, May 3, 1919. [Received May 5.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/46

[41] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen, May 6, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/51

[42] Messrs. E. L. Dresel and Lithgow Osborne to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

[Paris, May 10, 1919.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/58

[43] Mr. E. L. Dresel to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, May 10, 1919. [Received May 12.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013202/4

[44] Mr. E. L. Dresel to President Wilson

Paris, June 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 862.01/8

Paris Peace Conf. 184.0131/11b

[Document 33]

***The Secretary General of the Commission to
Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Colonel David H. Biddle,
American Liaison Officer, Cologne***

PARIS, April 11, 1919.

SIR: The American Commission to Negotiate Peace has delegated Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel to head a mission to proceed to Berlin. Mr. Dresel, accompanied by Mr. Lithgow Osborne, Second Secretary of Embassy, and Messrs. Morris Medofsky, David L. Ullman and James Mannion, will leave Paris on Wednesday, April 16th, arriving at Cologne on April 17th. The Commission will be grateful to you if you can secure three compartments on the train to Berlin on the night of Thursday, April 17th, for the accommodation of Mr. Dresel and his party, and if you will inform the Commission telegraphically whether it is possible for you to do this.

The German Foreign Office will be advised through the American Legation at Berne of the prospective date of arrival in Germany of Mr. Dresel and his party, but it might also help avoid possible unnecessary delays if you could have the proper German authorities beyond the occupied territory informed with a view to obtaining their assistance in expediting Mr. Dresel's journey.

I am [etc.]

J. C. GREW

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/54: Telegram

[Document 34]

***Colonel Williams, Third Army, A. E. F., to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

[COBLENZ,] April 20, 1919—9 p.m.
[Received April 22—1:10 p.m.]

[From Dresel via General Harries²]

In talk with Rantzau³ Saturday evening, he began by stating that formal invitation to Versailles had astonished him, and that he should only go if he were specifically directed by the government to start. As far as he could see an ultimatum was intended as [*and?*] it was not clear why he should have to go to Paris to receive this. Passing to discussion of terms he said that conditions apparently proposed would reduce Germans to abject slavery. An eminent financier had just assured him that full possession of the Sarre district and Upper Silesia were absolutely indispensable to economic existence of nation. He would never sign any peace nor would the Ministry in his opinion agree to one which deprived Germany even temporarily of these two districts, and he was convinced that the German people would back this up. If another ministry chose to accept such conditions that was their lookout. Questioned as to how, in case of refusal of terms, German people could continue to exist, he made no definite answer and repudiated my suggestion that possibly an arrangement with Russia might be attempted.

Throughout the interview he insinuated a peace, such as apparently will be imposed, could not be in accordance with President's Fourteen Points.⁴ He stated that he made no specific [apparent omission] as to Alsace-Lorraine, specially Wiesbaden, or the size of the indemnity as announced, and I gather that the protests on these points will not be serious. The free port for Danzig will, as I infer, also not meet with much opposition.

His attitude was of great depression and he showed a remarkable irritation towards the French. He gave the impression of sincerity although I [am] not convinced he will not ultimately recede from his position. From the papers, a proclamation just issued by Ebert,⁵ and interviews with several well-informed persons, I have guarantees that the views of Rantzau meet with much support. A plebiscite on the question of acceptance of the terms is now being much discussed and appears entirely probable. As to this Rantzau would not commit himself. The Independent Socialists would undoubtedly favor acceptance of the terms as published but it is exceedingly doubtful whether their influence will be decisive.

I venture to suggest that whatever definite statement can be made indicating that at least a limited amount of discussion of terms will be permitted might have reassuring influence.

I emphasized throughout the talk the belief that German economic rehabilitation will be in the interests of the whole world and that on the conclusion of peace our attitude will be only cooperation to this end. I also pointed out the ruinous consequences of summary rejection of peace. I shall endeavor to impress this as strongly as possible in future conversations and shall be grateful for suggestions as to anything that can be said further along these lines. Dresel. Harries.

WILLIAMS

² Brig. Gen. George H. Harries, Chief, U. S. Military Mission, Berlin, Germany, December 3, 1918–September 30, 1919.

³ Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁴ For text of the Fourteen Points, see [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 15*](#) –[*16*](#) .

⁵ Friedrich Ebert, Chancellor of the Provisional German Government, elected President by the National Assembly, February 11, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/20: Telegram

[Document 35]

***Brigadier General George H. Harries to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

BERLIN, April 26, 1919—1 p.m.
[Received April 27—1 p.m.]

20. From Dresel. From various independent sources believed to be reliable I am told that presence of this Mission has given rise to much comment in governmental circles and was discussed in a Cabinet meeting. The theory was advanced that the peace terms will be so great that it was thought advisable to send an advance courier to mitigate the shock. Some resentment is stated to be felt on account of this alleged interference. Personally I have had no intimations of the kind given me and my treatment at the Foreign Office and elsewhere has been consistently courteous. [Dresel.]

HARRIES

Paris Peace Conf. 184.0131/27: Telegram

[Document 36]

***Brigadier General George H. Harries to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

BERLIN, April 28, 1919—9 a.m.
[Received 9:30 p.m.]

23. For Colonel House and Grew from Dresel. Shall greatly appreciate immediate instructions as to my continued stay here. After full consideration, I believe my remaining here solely for purpose of keeping Commission informed is not necessary and perhaps not advisable on account of attitude outlined in my No. 20, April 26, 1:00 p.m. I have always felt that present Mission should be more than a mere information bureau. If therefore, partly on account of unconciliatory attitude of government and partly by reason of difficulty, which I realize, of giving me definite instructions from time to time, close contact with government sources is rendered impracticable, it would seem that return of Mission is indicated. Press Bureau is now efficiently organized and can continue after my departure under Dyar, who can also transmit information received through other channels.

I shall therefore leave here next Saturday morning, May 3rd, unless I receive definite instructions to the contrary.⁶ In this last case I venture to request full instructions as to how much longer Commission wishes me to stay and especially as to the course it wishes me to follow in future conversations. Osborne leaves here, in any case, on Saturday morning, and should the Commission decide that my continued stay is necessary, please send Minot here at once in his place. [Dresel.]

HARRIES

⁶ The Commission replied in telegram No. 5 of April 30, 1919, “Your plans approved.”

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/24: Telegram

[Document 37]

***Brigadier General George H. Harries to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***[7](#)

BERLIN, April 28, 1919—1 p.m.

[Received via Colonel Williams, Third Army, A. E. F., Coblenz, April 29—3 p.m.]

24. From Dresel. At the time of departure of delegates for Paris the (?) seems liberal and (?) likely to consider a pilgrimage to Canossa. The stubborn and uncomprehending attitude of the government in reference to question peace terms as fostered by propaganda and referred to both in press and interviews seeks to eloquently increase responsibilities, it appears to be:

- 1st. To the desire to take a decided stand. In answer to criticisms the government has no fixed policy but is supervision and opportune I learn.
- 2nd. To a hope to some extent encouraged by the Italian incident and Japanese attitude that the opposition of a first article from these may advance yet more cause dissension among the Allies.
- 3rd. To a belief that the Entente is anxious for early peace in order to resume industrial and commercial activity.
- 4th. To the conviction that neither military nor blockade measures can be effectively employed as it is thought that the unwillingness of the Allied armies to fight further will prevent the former and the public opinion will not support enforcement of the latter.
- 5th. To the argument that an acceptance of unjust peace terms would mean a widespread of nationalistic and reactionary movement endangering the Republic. It seems therefore clear that elaborate protests are planned on all points involved including, as I have lately ascertained, an evasion of responsibility for the war. While many of the peace provisions would ultimately be conceded to ensure peace, all indications point to a categorical refusal of

French control of the Sarre Basin, annexation of the Silesian coal fields and Polish control of Danzig.

I venture to draw attention to the sensitiveness of the government and of the delegates as to their probable treatment at Versailles. They evidently fear that they were likely looked on as Pariahs. In view of their excited and almost abnormal frame of mind I am convinced that as conciliatory an attitude as can be adopted towards them in nonessential matters may have important bearing on final result. Even insignificant concessions and the form in which distasteful demands are phrased will mean much to some of delegates. I believe therefore that latitude in such matters as material comforts, the widest liberty that can properly be afforded the delegates, occasions for informal intercourse, and ample opportunity to prepare and state their case, cannot fail to have a favorable effect.

My personal opinion, gathered from a large series of interviews, is that the present government will refuse to sign peace if the conditions are such as are stated in the press.

As regards the reaction on other parties of attitude outlined above, it is evident that all conservative parties, which now are often grouped under the name of Nationalists, are at one with the government in its policy of resistance. On the other hand the Independent Socialists with few exceptions entirely approve signing of peace conditions, even if severe, believing that injustice will be rectified by international action of the proletariat if not otherwise. They take their exclusion from the Peace Congress philosophically believing their hour is at hand whatever the outcome at Paris. I have not, however, been able to convince myself that an overthrow of the government is imminent in spite of the undoubted increase in strength of the Independent[s]. As long as the government has at its disposal the only organized military forces in Germany it will continue to have the support of the *Bourgeoisie*, the conservatives and very great numbers of people who see nothing ahead but bolshevism as an alternative for the present government. Changes in the Cabinet are not unlikely in view of the growing unpopularity, especially of Scheidemann and Landsberg and Noske, but it does not

look as if the coalition still discussed between Majority and Minority Socialists has chance of (?) closest tie being.

The people at large are strangely apathetic on questions connecting with peace. A feverish desire to forget the trouble of the moment in amusements and dissipation is everywhere noticeable. Theatres, dance halls, gambling dens, and race tracks are crowded as never before. Cases of theft are of ever increasing occurrence. In view of a prominent attorney at law the greatest danger to the German people at the present moment is their cutting loose from authority and discipline. He considers this as more serious even than the bankruptcy state of German finances. It is difficult to see how a people in this frame of mind can be induced to make an honest and serious effort to carry out the peace conditions even if accepted by the government.

HARRIES

7 The first part of this telegram is badly garbled.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/32: Telegram

[Document 38]

***Brigadier General George H. Harries to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

BERLIN, April 30, 1919—1 p.m.
[Received 11:10 p.m.]

30. From Dresel. Interview with Rathenau⁸ gives different point of view from that prevalent in purely political circles. He believes that Danzig and left Rhine control can be accepted if no customs barriers are erected between occupied and non-occupied Germany, but not otherwise. He greatly fears the effect of French propagandism in these districts which as he thinks is directed towards permanent annexation. He believes that Danzig question is capable of solution and does not favor a protest on Alsace-Lorraine nor on annexation of Polish parts of Prussia. On the other hand he insists that delivery of the coal mines of the Silesia to Poland would complete the industrial ruin of Germany and be quite unacceptable, and he considers the taking over of German colonies unjustifiable in view of the Fourteen Points and claims that their loss will prevent Germany from obtaining on reasonable terms raw materials urgently needed. Finally he stated his opinion that an indemnity of 125,000,000,000 was preposterous in view of desperate industrial situation and financial bankruptcy. He has a plan by which a permanent Inter-Allied Commission in Berlin should, with cooperation of German authorities, collect trade and financial statistics and determine what sum can be paid as indemnity.

Rathenau still is understood to be closely in touch with Russian Government and no doubt is relying on laborers in Russia to accomplish the industrial regeneration of Germany. He believes that the two countries may well eventually have the same form of government, viz a modification of the Soviet system in the nature of an oligarchy and not Communistic. From other sources I gather the

arrangement which is stated already to have been concluded between Berlin and Moscow though now kept in the background, may be brought into the negotiations by German peace delegates if a good opportunity offers. [Dresel.]

HARRIES

⁸ Walter Rathenau, participating in Berlin in the preliminary preparations for the Peace Conference.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/39: Telegram

[Document 39]

***Brigadier General George H. Harries to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

BERLIN, May 2, 1919—2 p.m.
[Received May 3—3:50 p.m.]

35. From Dresel. Recent interviews with a member of Independent Socialists and a member of Foreign Office of the pacifist and Independent views indicate belief that disposition of [Danzig?] obstacle to peace. They all declare that to put Danzig under Polish control, even if no annexation, will result in placing a powerful weapon in the hands of Nationalists, and will result in a storm of protests and permanent ill feeling throughout Germany. If for Polish control an Inter-Allied supervision which will safeguard German sovereignty is substituted, my informant states that in their view German Government would not be able to justify a rejection of the other terms of peace. I consider these opinions of considerable significance as Independents are almost universally in favor of acceptance and as their attitude has been open and straightforward on peace questions.

First medium of communication here was absolutely true. As no papers appeared since Wednesday night, no press comment on trial of Kaiser is obtainable. General view obtained in conversation is that, without [*with?*] the contempt in Berlin he is now held and the obscurity into which he is relapsing, it is unfortunate that a martyr should be made of him and that the reactionary party should be strengthened by the action contemplated. [Dresel.]

HARRIES

[Document 40]

Mr. E. L. Dresel to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BERLIN, May 3, 1919.
[Received May 5.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum in triplicate on Impressions of the General Political Situation in Germany gained from Perusal of the German Press and Conversations in non-official Bourgeois Circles.

I have [etc.]

ELLIS LORING DRESEL

[Enclosure]

IMPRESSIONS OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN GERMANY GAINED FROM PERUSAL OF THE GERMAN PRESS AND CONVERSATIONS IN NON-OFFICIAL BOURGEOIS CIRCLES

1. From present surface indications the German Government will not sign the peace treaty if its terms are deemed in conflict with President Wilson's principles as interpreted by official Germany. If the utterances of German statesmen and many leading publicists are taken at their face value it is probable that Germany will not sign the peace treaty. The recent speech of the Prussian Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Heine, a Majority Socialist, would indicate that the cession of Alsace Lorraine without a plebiscite, the admission of Germany's responsibility for the war, the retention of the German prisoners on any pretext, a servitude of the Saar Basin and the cession of Danzig are considered unacceptable by the German Government. At the same time the present German Government

evinces no disposition to assume the responsibility for rejecting the peace treaty. The National Assembly will be consulted before the final decision is taken, and it has already formed a special committee to study the peace treaty. There does not seem to be much doubt that the National Assembly would reject the peace treaty if asked to do so by the Government. The Special Committee numbers among its members men like Traub, Stresemann and Trimborn who may be fully expected to make it very difficult for the Government to urge the signing of the treaty. On the other hand, a recent article in the *Vorwärts* indicates that the Government will sign peace, but hopes not to be forced to sign dishonest peace. In determining the attitude of the Government it is necessary to consider that it deems it expedient to defer to a certain extent to the feelings of the German "patriots". It therefore seems probable that the somewhat uncompromising utterances of government officials and publicists need not be taken too seriously, and that the Government will sign in the end, especially if it can save its "face" by being able to point to actual negotiation at Versailles.

The idea of submitting the issue to the German people by holding a plebiscite was first suggested by the Democratic leader Richthofen and Secretary Erzberger⁹ and now seems to be entertained by the Government. The opposition to a plebiscite is, however, very strong, especially from the quarter of the Conservatives and Radical Socialists, both of whom do not propose to permit the Government to evade its responsibility. This opposition has now extended to the ranks of the Democratic Party. One of the leading Democratic publicists, H. von Gerlach, points out that a plebiscite at this time would be preposterous on account of the ignorance of the masses of the people regarding the real issues, which is due principally to the misleading press campaign apparently inspired by the Government. Herr Haase, the Independent Socialist leader, expressed himself strongly in a recent speech against a plebiscite. If a plebiscite were actually held the chances are that the result would be in favor of rejecting the peace treaty. In any event it would give rise to most intensive agitation by the Nationalists and Independent Socialists and add new fuel to the fires of internal political controversy.

The agitation against signing the peace is believed by many to be insincere. In particular, the articles in the Majority Socialist press do not seem to reflect the true sentiment in the party. The provincial papers of the Majority Socialists follow the lead of the Berlin *Vorwaerts* in this respect. A plausible explanation of the press agitation against peace is that the Government conceived the measure in the beginning as a bluff which could be abandoned when found necessary, but committed itself too far and permitted the movement to get beyond its control. The extraordinary vicious campaign of the *Berliner Tageblatt* against signing peace is probably instigated by the Government. It is now being paralleled by the usual series of "impressive" protest meetings held in the large cities and towns. The practical arguments against refusing to sign peace are, however, so overwhelming that it is difficult to believe that the Government will in the end shut its eyes to them, unless it is convinced that its days are numbered, come what may, and that it is preferable to go down in a blaze of patriotic glory than to be compelled to abdicate in a humiliated Germany.

The population of the industrial districts of Germany is the only stratum of the German population of which it can safely be said that it favors acceptance of the peace terms. The Independent Socialist Party will favor the signing of the treaty, and the same holds true of the greater part of the Majority Socialists. The sentiment of the *bourgeoisie* is on the whole against signing, depending as it does in large measure on the dicta of its party leaders and press. Financial circles are divided but will probably in the end favor signing peace if no early tangible advantage from rejection is apparent. The volunteer army and the peasants will reject peace that does not come up to nationalist requirements.

It is possible that an attempt will be made to organize a great popular uprising in the event that the peace terms are considered impossible of acceptance. The whole attitude of the present Government and the *bourgeoisie* points to this, and the idea would be most welcome to the reactionary element. Any such attempt would be answered with a general strike with consequences which it is impossible to conjecture. The truculent enthusiasm artificially engendered by the nationalist agitators would be short lived. The futility of armed

resistance to the Allies is too apparent and an outburst of bellicose enthusiasm would soon give way to an attitude of sullen passive resistance.

The belief that the influence of labor and radical opinion in France and England would make impossible further military action against Germany is not shared by wide circles outside the reactionary group represented by Westarp and Reventlow. German radical opinion inclines strongly to the view that kindred opinion in Allied countries will eventually rectify any wrongs worked by the peace treaty.

The present Government rests on the support of the greater part of the Majority Socialist Party, the Democratic Party and the Center Party. The support of the last named is not unqualified. This coalition represents on paper the majority of the German people but the dissatisfaction with its administration is widespread, and even its parliamentary majority does not inspire great confidence. The Center Party can determine the fate of the present Government.

The strongest opposition to the present Government comes from the radical parties, the Independent Socialists and Communists, who have made great inroads on the Majority Socialist Party. The other element of opposition is the natural obstruction of "the Conservatives and National Liberals, whose numbers are far less imposing than those of the supporters of the Government.

The present Government might be replaced by a purely Socialistic government to the exclusion of the *bourgeoisie* and the Communists. Such a government has been repeatedly suggested even by bourgeois circles, but the wide division between the Majority and Independent Socialists is the great obstacle to its establishment. It does not seem possible for a union to be effected unless the present Majority Socialist leaders, Scheidemann, Landsberg, Noske and Heine resign. It is continually being pointed out by Independent Socialists like Breitscheid, and Democrats like von Gerlach, that the only salvation for Germany lies in the uniting of the working classes. Whether this will be recognized by the present Majority Socialist leaders is now the question.

The present Government is divided within itself, as shown by the recent resignation of the Democratic Secretary of State for Finance, Herr Schiffer, owing to differences with Scheidemann. The opposition to Scheidemann is very strong but is kept below the surface. The Majority Socialist members of the Government are subjected to continual criticism for concerning themselves principally with the interests of their political party, and not the welfare of the whole country. The friction between Erzberger and Brockdorff-Rantzau is an open secret. Erzberger is said to plan to make the Democrat Richthofen Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The strength of the present German military units is variously estimated at from 600,000 to 850,000 men. The cadres are considered reliable: the officers and sergeant majors are carefully picked men. The troops consist mostly of young men from 17 to 25, usually boys from the country who have been attracted by the high pay promised. The soldiers' councils have been reduced to practical insignificance among these troops, but no full reliance seems to be placed in the men by the officers, and it is certain that despite all precautions there is a considerable sprinkling of radical elements among the men of these new elite troops. The conspicuous advertisements for volunteers still appear in the papers and on the billboards.

It is generally admitted that the trend of the working classes is towards radicalism. The results of the recent municipal elections confirm this. The most noticeable effect of this movement is seen in the Majority Socialist Party, the left wing of which has gained increased influence recently. The Communists have gained some ground but it is believed that their prospects depend in a large measure on the outcome of the Munich uprising.

From all quarters come complaints of the utter demoralization of the German people, and there are abundant indications of this demoralization in the alarming frequency of robbery, theft and crime in general, the widespread callousness, the indifference to illicit traffic in commodities, the unheard of epidemic of gambling. There are two methods proposed to improve the morale of the people: that of the reactionaries who seek to arouse nationalistic feeling with a

view to gradual reversion to the ideals of old Germany, the primordial interests of the State, absolute loyalty and discipline under a stern authority; and that of the radical reformists who recognize the necessity of breaking once for all with old Germany and educating the people to believe in broader and purer ideals. It is fairly obvious that the reactionaries have an easier task than the reformists. The latter fully appreciate how gigantic the task is that they have set before them. First of all the people must be thoroughly enlightened, a great task in itself, and then they must be taught to shape their own new enlightened ideals. Many reformists despair of success unless aid is rendered by foreign countries; the necessary “spiritual depedication [sic]” of Germany must receive a stimulus from without. The tendency towards relapse is too strong in Germany today. The Government itself does nothing to enlighten the people; a crusade from abroad is indispensable. The desire to emigrate is very marked among younger military circles and it is certain that much German capital has been smuggled to neutral countries in contemplation of subsequent emigration.

A reactionary counter-revolution is greatly feared by the parties of the extreme Left who view with increasing apprehension the Government's apparent desire to cater to the bourgeois parties. The danger of a reactionary uprising actually seems much nearer today than the danger of a new Spartacus revolt, but the one would provoke the other. The militarists of the old regime are actively engaged in the endeavor to organize an efficient new Army as free as possible from the “taint” of social democracy. The present Government is practically leaving the militarists a free hand, trusting fully in their assurances of loyalty. The Independent Socialists and Communists are, however, extremely vigilant and may be depended upon at least to sense the coming of a royal uprising. In any event it seems that the militarists are willing to bide their time: they are confident that a favorable opportunity to regain the power will present itself sooner or later.

Of deeper and more sinister significance is the elaborate campaign of the reactionaries to win over the youth of Germany to the old militaristic ideals. The activity of the German National Juvenile League is very intensive and the German radical reformers state that

they have no adequate means of coping with it. The juvenile organisations of the Social Democratic Party are efficient as party organizations, but there is no concerted effort on the part of democratic Germany to meet the great danger of the poisoning of the youth of Germany. The German National Juvenile League is stated to have unlimited funds at its disposal, which are furnished by industrial circles, and is having great success with its program, which offers many attractions to the youth in the way of sports and entertainment. The counter movement of the German reformists has insignificant financial support and is forced to confine itself to an enlightenment campaign on a limited scale. The reformists are confident, however, that they can ultimately win over young Germany to democratic ideals, but at present the battle for the German youth is an unequal one.

The monarchical sentiment no longer predominates in Germany. It is confined to the Conservative, National Liberal and Center parties, on the whole, while finding some few supporters in the ranks of the Democratic Party. The feeling against the Hohenzollerns is very strong among the common people, who would never tolerate their return, but there seems to be a growing movement elsewhere to rehabilitate the Hohenzollerns in public esteem. One hears much praise nowadays of the great benefits which Germany enjoyed under the Hohenzollern rule, and the free circulation of pamphlets explaining the conduct of the Crown Prince indicates a sort of campaign to exonerate him. On the other hand the Berlin municipal government recently voted to remove all pictures of the Hohenzollerns from the public school buildings.

The food shipments which are now reaching Germany undoubtedly have a stabilizing tendency, but more because of the improvement of alimentation which they seem to promise than because of any appreciable effect which the shipments have had themselves. The continued supply of food at reasonable prices would in time reduce the present large proportions of illicit trade and smuggling and tend to improve the morale of the people.

The idea of constitutional establishment of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils meets with favor among the Independent

Socialists and Communists and in the left wing of the Majority Socialists. It even seems attractive to many Democrats, but it is a question whether it would receive the support of the majority of the German people. The Government seems desirous of postponing any decision on this issue as long as possible and the impression is gained that the idea of a *Räte* Chamber has lost some impetus during the past few weeks. It seems likely that a compromise on the basis adopted by the recent Soviet Congress will ultimately be reached.

MAY 2, 1919.

⁹ Matthias Erzberger, German Secretary of State without portfolio.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/51

[Document 41]

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State[10](#)

No. 3224

COPENHAGEN, May 6, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, copies of two reports on the Situation in Germany, dated the 24th and 30th ultimo respectively, prepared by Mr. Lithgow Osborne, formerly a Second Secretary of this Legation and now attached to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, at Paris, and forwarded by him to the Commission from Berlin.

I have [etc.]

U. GRANT-SMITH

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by Mr. Lithgow Osborne

BERLIN, April 24, 1919.

This is a rather complicated situation we've run into here. One thing is evident. It would have been well for Ellis Dresel to have known a little more exactly what the terms of peace are to be, before setting out. In a sense, everything depends on exactly what they are, perhaps even exactly how they are phrased,—how the dose is administered.

What I have to say relative to the situation is posited upon the peace terms containing the following settlements:

1. Saar Basin to be settled in accordance with the [illegible] Note, i. e. French administration for 15 years, plebiscite at the end of that time and, in case it results favorably to the Germans, opportunity for them to re-purchase the coal-fields by paying gold.
2. Danzig to be a free-port but largely under Polish control and the Poles to have a corridor to the sea with the administration of large German populations and the separation of East and West Prussia as a result.
3. Cession of practically all the East Silesian coal-fields together with the German populations in those districts to Poland.
4. Military occupation by the French of the Left bank of the Rhine for 15 years.

In what follows, when I say peace I mean a peace containing these four settlements, as they constitute the terms which will arouse the greatest opposition. The question of the colonies and of the referendum in Alsace-Lorraine are still raised by many people who represent the point of view of the government parties, but the government, if they tried to object on these points, would certainly not have the support of public opinion and they can be left out of consideration. The loss of Schleswig and the indisputably Polish parts of Prussia fall into the same class.

On the part of the government and the parties representing it there is a very stiff-necked opposition to the reported peace terms on the following grounds:

1. They are not in accordance with the 14 points on which Germany agreed to make peace with the Allies.
2. They could not be fulfilled even if signed.
3. Peace with the Allies on the basis of the 14 points and co-operation with the Western powers has been the basis of the policy of the present democratic government. If they fail to obtain such a peace, the failure of democratic idea in Germany is signed and sealed with their own signatures.
4. Peace on the basis of the reported terms would furnish the reactionaries and militarists with tremendous material for agitation (presence of the French troops in the Rhineland etc.) while Germany's hopeless economic and industrial condition,

resulting from the indemnities, and the loss of great coal-fields would create industrial confusion and accrue to the advantage of the Bolshevik agitators.

5. If Germany signs the peace terms indicated, a catastrophe is certain, and the government does not wish to assume responsibility for it. If there is a refusal to sign, they evidently count on radical and labor opinion in the Allied countries preventing further military action or the long continuance of a re-established blockade. In other words they profess to see one ray of hope, if they do not sign, and nothing but catastrophe, if they do.

So think the Government and their supporters. In the meantime their inward cogitations are accompanied by a vitriolic press campaign aimed particularly at the French, and which, though possibly understandable, is exceedingly foolish. They have undoubtedly succeeded in aligning some public opinion behind them.

Militating in favor of the acceptance of the peace terms by the present Government (with one or two possible changes of personnel) are the following factors:

1. The widespread popular demand, particularly among the industrial populations, for peace at any price.
2. The realization by the Government that the only possible alternative to themselves is an Independent Socialist Government or possibly a coalition of the two Socialist wings, with a strong leaning toward Bolshevism.
3. The fear of Bolshevism.

When it comes to the point of deciding to accept or refuse the peace, the Government, being lamentably weak as far as being able and willing to do anything positive, will be anxious to shift responsibility. They will undoubtedly place the decision in the hands of the National Assembly which in turn may submit the matter to a popular vote. It is my impression that the probability of this last is decreasing; it had apparently been first thought of about the time we came, and the Government would undoubtedly be glad to "pass the Buck" to the people. But in the meantime the objections to the scheme have

become evident—the chance for agitation against the Government and the political unrest it would cause, as well as the impossibility, under existing conditions, of getting a really representative vote on the question. The whole campaign, however short would only accrue to the advantage of the more violent elements, namely the Independents, Spartacans and the Nationalists.

Another factor, I believe, which is against the present Government signing the peace is the psychological. Human beings are naturally optimistic. The Germans have little left but Hope. But having only that I think they have clung to it—the Hope that the Americans would do something, the Hope that the final terms would not be so severe as the Armistice indicated, and so on. Sub-consciously I think the Germans have been more optimistic than they realized. Hence, when they see the terms in cold print, there will be intense bitterness, hate and desperation. Also, all the anger they have worked up recently has been directed first at one specific indicated settlement, then at another. In the peace document the whole lot will appear en masse with a cumulative effect that will be crushing. The result will be that the belief will be increased that Germany is ruined anyhow and that it is better to take a chance on the radical and socialistic forces in England and France forcing a different settlement or on the whole of Europe “going Bolshevik.”

But personally—and here is where I differ greatly from Ellis—I think all these considerations are beside the point. The key to the situation lies in—Oskar Cohn’s diabolically benevolent smile!! Cohn is an Independent Socialist who is at heart a Bolshevik; he admits that his idea of things is the same as Lenin’s. He favors an immediate understanding with Russia. He indicated plainly that he hopes for a revolution in France and England.

Now the Government seems at the moment pretty strong. It is supported by two factors.

1. The general political passiveness and apathy.
2. Noske’s excellent military organization.

But no one takes it seriously; it has no enthusiastic supporters; it has compromised itself with the left by its lack of socialism and the fact that it depends on old-time militarists and the financial help of the Big Business interests. The only thing that could make it really popular is a peace more favorable to Germany than any that there is the remotest chance of their obtaining.

In the meantime the industrial situation grows steadily worse and the food situation does not improve. The American food has made no particular impression and will only serve to keep the people on their present starvation rations until the next harvest. Faced with such problems and with no ability to take forceful decisions in time, there seems little chance of it getting more popular. It can only increase its hold in the country by increasing its military supremacy—which is a double-edged weapon.

The Independents say that they favor signing the peace, but it is certain that, if and when it is signed, the Independents will at once begin an agitation because the German masses have been made the “Economic slaves” of the Entente as a result of the stupidity of the Government.

As a matter of fact the Independents and Spartacans don't really care. They believe that they have the Government, going or coming, simply as a result of the pressure of events and regardless of whether peace is signed or not.

If the Government refuses to sign, the Independents will assume the Government and sign the peace with a tacit or expressed reservation that its terms are impossible for Germany to fulfill. They will also promptly hook up with Moscow without necessarily, in any way adopting a hostile attitude toward the western states. They will further carry on propaganda directed at the labor populations of England and France which will have all the effectiveness that the present Government's propaganda of whines lacks. They will, in fact, play Lenin's game at and after Brest-Litovsk only much more cleverly.

Everyone admits that the Independents and Spartacans are, politically, making great headway. The last meeting of the Soviets was controlled by the Majority-Socialists and Democrats but they saw themselves compelled to criticize the Government and to adopt a resolution concerning the constitutional status of the “Räte” which is shelved for the moment but which Scheidemann has stated is impossible.

There seems some possibility of a re-union between the Independents and the Majority Socialists minus the “Compromised” leaders (Scheidemann, Noske, Landsberg, etc.); if such a re-union is effected, the chances of it taking over the Government, when the “Peace crisis” comes seem very good. In such a combination it seems inevitable that the Independents will play the leading role (as the Majority Socialists have no leaders who aren’t compromised and the leadership would hence fall to the Independents) and what I have written about the policy which would be followed by a pure Independent Socialist Government is also true of a mixed Socialist Government. Such a government, moreover, would be only the precursor to a still more radical one, as they would dispense with Noske and strict military control and the lid would be off for violence on the part of the Spartacans, unemployed etc., etc.

It all comes down to this: Faced with the problems which exist in Germany no Government not of the Extreme Left can permanently maintain itself, without far-reaching assistance’ from outside—more far-reaching assistance, financial, economic, alimentary, etc., than the Entente and the U. S. are either willing or able to give.

The Independent Socialist[s] of the Left realize this,—realize that time and pressure of the economic situation, etc. are always working in their favor; hence Dr. Cohn’s smile.

In other words I feel certain that, whether peace is signed or not (and it will be signed, probably, either by this Government or some other) there will be some kind of a Socialist Government in Germany within one, two, or three months, which will be on the most friendly terms with Moscow and will be working, either openly or secretly, to bring about upsets in France and Italy. If the present Government signs

the peace, they may hang on for sometime longer; if they refuse their place will be taken by a Socialist Government (either purely Independent or Socialist coalition) which will sign with expressed or tacit reservations. On the whole I think the latter the most probable.

APRIL 25th.

After a talk with Haase and Breidscheid, I am more than ever convinced that there is an imminent possibility of a reunion between the two Socialist wings—including part of the “Communists”. Whether it will actually be consummated, I don’t know. If it is, the Government will fall at once. It seems more probable to me that there will be a reunion, but that many of the Maj. Soc. leaders and a good part of their following will be left out of the new party. Haase said among other things that the Ind. Socs. would not take over the Government unless there were Maj. Socs. with them.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by Mr. Lithgow Osborne

BERLIN, April 30, 1919.

It can hardly be said that the situation here is much clarified through longer acquaintance. German politics, so-called, used to be comparatively simple to follow. There were certain personalities and parties of whom it was rather easy to keep track; they represented, or pretended to represent, certain definite political ideas. And the very artificiality of the whole game helped to simplify it.

It is no longer a problem of personalities and parties; it is a problem of currents and drifts, whereon persons and parties float, trying to control the tides that bear them and to steer their own courses, but apparently quite powerless in the rush and flood of circumstances.

Even to an outsider, bent only on observation and who endeavors to get a simplified view of things, the picture is confusion. It almost seems to me that, were I a German, I should be an Independent

Socialist one day, a Conservative the next and a Spartacan on the third. There is so much to be said for all sides—and so little for any.

The party lines are no longer clear. Thus the most radical of the Democrats—like v. Gerlach, for instance—in some questions such as that of responsibility for the war and the maintenance of Noske's military forces go further than the Majority Socialists (who theoretically stand to the left of them) and believe that Germany's responsibility for the war should be admitted and that Noske's forces should be demobilized; but they do not believe in far-reaching socialization as do the Independents. Schiffer, on the other hand, also a Democrat, left the Ministry because he more or less agreed with the Independents about immediate socialization, whereas the Majority Socialists opposed, he would not agree with the Independents regarding the admission of Germany's guilt or the demobilization of Noske's army. Some of the Majority Socialists are ready for a coalition with the Right Wing of the Independents; some of the Independents want a coalition of Majority Socialists, Independents and the most sensible Communists. Other Independents would refuse any coalition with the Majoritarians but would be glad to join forces with the Communists. Some of the Communists favor violent attempts to gain control of things; others are for more subtle methods. The so-called "continental" economic policy is favored by persons of such diversified coloring as Georg Bernhard, Jingo-Democrat, and Cohen-Reuss, Majority Socialist of the left wing. Most of the Independent Socialists and many of the Nationalists (old regime) favor a *rapprochement* with Russia.

These are only a few of the most obvious contradictions in the present political chaos, and when it appears on a background of imminent bankruptcy, general public corruption, mal-nutrition, reckless frivolity and extravagance, fantastic prices, industrial chaos, and yet withal an utterly astounding normality in the everyday aspect of affairs (lovely yellow spring flowers are just being planted in the Pariser Platz), it is all a touch confusing.

Through this confusion I find two great political currents are growing daily more evident:

1. The Nationalist current.
2. The Bolshevik current.

(I use Bolshevik here in the sense in which the word is now generally employed, not as signifying a clear political conception but as a generic term for a radicalism which is anti-capitalistic, international, and, in general, dissatisfied with the methods and catchwords of democracy and the abuses to which they have led.)

Both these currents are gradually acquiring volume from the pseudo-democratic river on which, partly in order to please their enemies, the Germans tried to launch their ship of state. The conflict of these two currents forms cross-currents, eddies, and whirlpools creating the confusion I have described. To forsake metaphor, the forces behind the Government (who still pretend to represent the ideas of western democracy) are dividing to Right and Left and I am more than ever convinced that it will fall or that it will radically change its nature and become a nationalist government, leaning more and more on the support of the old militarist crowd, for whom Noske will become more and more of a stalking-horse.

As I see it, events are bound to take one of the following courses:

1. Rejection of the Peace Terms by the present Government without a plebiscite; accession to power of some sort of Socialist coalition which will sign any peace terms; *rapprochement* with Moscow, etc.
2. Resignation of the present Government (presumably after a plebiscite favorable to signing peace) without either rejection or acceptance of the peace terms; accession to power of a socialist government which will sign any peace terms; *rapprochement* with Moscow etc.
3. Rejection of peace terms by the present government as the result of a plebiscite; violent opposition by the Left, necessitating even greater and more evident dependence of the government on armed force and the nationalist elements, quite possibly resulting in a military dictatorship; eventual overthrow of the government from the Left as a result of the re-enforced blockade or military occupation.

4. Acceptance of the Peace Terms by the present Government without a plebiscite but with mental reservations that they are not to be kept; alliance of the Government with the nationalist elements on a policy of revenge, increasing opposition from the Left; eventual overthrow of the Government unless it is given assistance and support by the Entente.
5. Acceptance of the Peace Terms by the present Government after a plebiscite, sincerely and without mental reservations, nationalist agitation favoring a “revenge” policy; continued opposition from the Left on questions of internal policy; attempted *coup d'états* from both groups of extremists, resulting in eventual victory for the Left.

These are the possibilities. I regard 1. and 2. as much the most probable.

Notice one thing. No development in this country, according to present indications, leads towards democracy, on the contrary. I see no possible development which does not lead directly away from the democratic idea. For the moment, democracy, as we think of it, is finished here, whether the government signs or does not sign. I see no chance of anything but a practical dictatorship either of the Right or the Left, and the betting is about 100 to 1 on the Left.

Ellis is still inclined to believe in the staying powers of the present government under certain circumstances. The one chance I see of its staying in I have dealt with under (4) above. But even so, it will not remain unless it is supported by the Entente—loans, raw materials, food, moral support, etc. A Socialist government, by turning toward Russia and getting moral support from that quarter and the promise of more material assistance, might exist without active co-operation from our side. No non-Socialist Government can exist here without our support. That needs to be repeated. When I say support, I mean real support which includes a certain amount of real or expressed sympathy. If we do not care to give it, we must be prepared not to be upset when one of the alternatives to a non-Socialist government (some sort of Socialist government, tending always to the Left) becomes an actuality. Of course, I am not sure that even support

from the West can maintain the present pseudo-democratic Government. Perhaps it is best if it is not saved.

Personally, I am inclined to believe that, if it can be pulled off, a coalition Socialist government here is the best for all concerned. The present Government, under the circumstances, is a thoroughly dishonest one. (Ellis disagrees here, and I probably have over-stated the case. He agrees that the Government is weak, opportunistic, time-serving and employs idiotic measures. I suppose that there are sincere democrats in it, but no “feel” for democratic methods has been acquired, and couldn’t be made use of, if it had been.) It consists of tame pseudo-Socialists, still tamer Pseudo-Democrats and of persons who pretend to base their democracy on Catholicism. (Imagine politics based on revealed religion in this day and age). The government’s instruments are the old “Beamtentum”, and as regards democracy, no more need be said about them.

The government’s methods undoubtedly smack strangely of the old regime; it depends on military forces; there is still the attempt to “imponieren”. “Imponieren” is the basis of foreign policy—see Rantzau’s answer to the first “invitation” to Versailles. And that whole incident is regarded here as a “diplomatic victory” for Germany!!!!

Of course the case for the Government is: People can’t change their manners and methods in a night. If they have “imponiert” all their lives and striven for “Diplomatic victories” they can’t get out of the habit by labelling themselves “Democrats”. The Germans “went in” for democracy to please their enemies but found no sympathy and have been forced by their enemies’ intransigence to adopt the worn out methods they were used to. The Government must depend on the old machinery which is at present impossible to replace, etc., etc., etc.

Some or all of this may or may not be true. But the fact remains that the Government is a fake as far as democracy is concerned and, although it might in the course of time and by degrees develop into a democratic government, it is unsuited to the present crisis with which only a government, unified and determined to practice what

they preach, can deal. The present government is too much open to attack from both Right and Left and from outside of Germany. To a large extent it lacks the guts to take decisions.

Of course its apologizers say that if it had had moral support from abroad it would have been in a position to carry out decisions and to democratize itself, but the fact remains that it did not receive such support and is now in a thoroughly flabby condition, holding its seats largely through mere inertia. It is technically democratic and constitutional, I suppose, as it probably still has the ballots of a majority of Germans behind it. But that doesn't alter its complete incapacity to deal with the present situation.

Now the problem facing Germany is:

1. To secure outside assistance, including moral support, raw materials, food, etc.
2. To bring internal industrial peace.

The second depends largely on the first, but at the same time certainty that the Government is really anti-capitalistic (the Socialists now in power are quite evidently only *petite bourgeoisie*) would go far toward restoring the confidence of the proletariat, would take the wind out of the sails of the Spartacan agitators, and help to put an end to the industrial sabotage which is what these strikes really are. Then, if the outside help were forthcoming the machine might get going once more. I am not certain whether a Socialist government would enjoy any more sympathy or would be afforded any more help from the Western countries than the present government. It at least would not (in fact could not) get less, and at least it could gracefully come to an understanding with Moscow which, if it did nothing else, would help to restore confidence.

The alternatives, as I see them, to the present government (aside from the very remote possibility of a temporarily successful military dictatorship) are:

1. A Majority-Right Minority Coalition (minus the "compromised" Majority leaders, including some of the younger Democrats of the

Left Wing.)

2. A Minority Socialist Government, probably including some Communists.

The first would, of course, be preferable. Many people are working for such a combination, but there is some doubt whether Haase, Colin, etc. could swing their followers, (who in general have gone already too far to the Left) even if the opportunity offered. It may be too late to form such a coalition, but it is possible. The moment may come for it when the present Government rejects the peace terms, or possibly later.

The Entente still has, to a certain extent, the control over German internal affairs and, unless they desire to see complete chaos here, it would be well for them to consider what sort of a government they must want here—always remembering that no government can remain in power permanently which does not receive support from outside. I am doubtful if the present Government can be saved by anything except what the *Daily Mail* would call a “German peace.” If the present Government signs at Versailles, it may be possible to bolster it up by granting Germany loans, and giving her raw materials and food on credit. If the Entente and the United States are unwilling or unable to do this, there is a chance of a Socialist Coalition government, which will not be essentially Communistic, though it will be anti-capitalist, and (in the beginning at least) non-democratic. Such a government can perhaps keep this country from a complete collapse—which I presume is not desired by the Entente—but again only if assistance is given them. Possibly we have our plans laid for giving it. If we haven’t, we’d better get busy, if we’re not to be too late again, and this time it will be absolutely the last call.

¹⁰ Copy transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, received May 19, 1919.

[Document 42]

***Messrs. E. L. Dresel and Lithgow Osborne to the
Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate
Peace (Grew)***

[PARIS, May 10, 1919.]

SIR: We have the honor to submit the following report of a journey to Germany covering the period from April 16, 1919 to May 5, 1919.

I. ARRANGEMENTS AND DETAILS OF EXPEDITION

In accordance with instructions of the Commission, the Mission left Paris on Wednesday, April 16th, arriving at Berlin via Cologne on April 18th. As the purpose of the Mission was primarily to obtain political information, it seemed advisable to concentrate almost the whole work at Berlin, and, with the exception of a short trip to Leipzig taken by one member of the party with the especial view of visiting the Leipzig Fair, the Mission remained at Berlin until Saturday, May 3rd, when the party started on the return journey, reaching Paris on the morning of May 5th.

No difficulties of any kind during the actual journey or the stay in Berlin were encountered, and excellent hotel and train accommodations were secured in every case. Any newspaper publicity was entirely avoided, and the only adverse criticism which reached the Mission was that it was thought at the Foreign Office that the party had been sent in for the express purpose of preparing the Government and the people for the shock of an extremely severe peace. It was said that this alleged object was in some quarters resented. No further developments occurred in consequence of this attitude, and the treatment of the party was at all times courteous. The stay was about for the period originally planned, but in view of the fact that the reaction on the receipt of the peace terms could not

be observed for some time, it appeared in any case best to return in order to report.

Shortly after the arrival of the Mission at Berlin and in accordance with arrangements previously made, Mr. C. B. Dyar reached Berlin with a party of four assistants. Mr. Dyar's party was attached to the Paris Mission with the especial purpose of covering the press, and of preparing telegraphic and written summaries. Members of his party, as well as he himself, also furnished notes of conversations with persons whom they met. Mr. Dyar has been left in Berlin pending further orders, in order to continue the press and other work, and will send daily telegrams and occasional despatches by mail as opportunity warrants. Mr. D. Ullman was directed to remain behind with Mr. Dyar's party in order to assist in getting information by personal interviews.

The members of the party who started from Paris were Messrs. E. L. Dresel, Lithgow Osborne, M. Medofsky, J. Mannion and D. Ullman.

II. ATTITUDE TOWARDS PEACE CONDITIONS

It must be borne in mind that at the period during which the Mission was in Germany, no accurate information was obtainable as to the terms of peace, and newspaper reports, incorrect in many cases, formed the only basis for surmises. It is believed, as a whole, that the severity of the peace terms was not overestimated. This subject has already been shortly treated in a letter to the Commission on May 5, 1919,^{[11](#)} but for the sake of completeness, the conclusions are here repeated and enlarged upon.

1. *Government Circles.* At the date of the arrival of the party in Berlin, a very evident agitation against signing the peace terms was noticeable in the papers. Scarcely any doubt can exist but that this was encouraged by the Government for reasons which may be stated as follows:

(a) An inclination, in answer to criticism of the weak and vacillating policy of the Government, to take an energetic stand and thereby acquire support of the nationalist groups.

- (b) A reluctance, to some extent quite sincere, to promise conditions which, as is believed, cannot be fulfilled.
 - (c) The idea that dissensions among the Allies might still be brought about in the course of the negotiations.
 - (d) The belief that either radical and proletarian opinion in the Entente countries and armies might prevent further military occupation and the reinforcement of the blockade, or that such measures, if undertaken, might eventually lead to violent reactions favorable to Germany among the masses in the Entente countries.
 - (e) The argument that a severe peace would mean the revival of militarism endangering the Republic.
 - (f) The possibility that close political and commercial relations, especially with Russia but possibly eventually with Japan and other countries, might yet save the situation.
 - (g) The belief, sincerely held in some quarters and loudly voiced in others, that since Germany would certainly be ruined if she accepted the peace terms, European chaos, which would result from a rejection, would offer better chances for her.
2. *Nationalist and Reactionary Elements, Junkers, Land-owners, etc.* These are undoubtedly strongly against accepting a severe peace. The volunteer army may be classed among this group. Being composed of younger and naturally nationalistic elements who have little to lose and being also largely under control of officers of the old regime, they will form a nearly solid unit against signing.
 3. *Independent Socialists.* These are strongly in favor of accepting almost any conditions of peace, as with them boundaries are not so important as fraternization with the proletariat of the other countries. The only strong protest heard from them was in relation to the supposedly planned Polish control of Danzig, which, it was claimed, would be flagrantly unjust and certain to create endless and violent unrest.
 4. *"Bourgeoisie", Bankers, Captains of Industry, etc.* These will generally favor peace because only by this means will they be able to keep what they have acquired. Some evidence was obtained that a number of large employers of labor had approached the Government with a view to urging them to accept the peace conditions. The members of this class generally feel the commercial and industrial rehabilitation of Germany to be the all

important aim, and a peace which, in their opinion, will guarantee this will be approved by them, even at the cost of territorial concessions. As a rule, the great mass of the small merchants, petty officials, etc. will support peace because it will enable them to continue their occupations. No doubt some will oppose peace on nationalistic grounds, but they will presumably be in the minority.

5. *Peasants*. Few reliable data have been obtained in regard to the country population. It is believed, however, that the majority, not being land-owners, will be inclined to follow the Government if it opposes peace.

III. GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION

In a report of January 10, 1919,¹² the composition and aims of the different parties were analyzed. Since then numerous changes have taken place. Political opinion has been in constant state of flux. The Majority Socialists are weaker in numbers and influence, while the Minority have gained accordingly. The Communists and Spartacists have increased in strength. The Democratic party is an acknowledged failure and exerts no collective influence, and little is heard of the People's party.

For the purposes of a general survey, the political groups can be conveniently considered under three headings:

1. Nationalists.
2. Government supporters.
3. Independent Socialists and Extremists.

1. *Nationalists*. The term "nationalist" is now generally used to include all conservative and reactionary elements. Their numbers are not yet very great, but their activity is increasing. An important factor of the group is formed by the former officers who are now serving in the volunteer army. In Berlin these have regular headquarters at the Eden Hotel, which is a center of considerable political agitation. Among this coterie a curious split has lately taken place, which has given rise to much comment, in that some of the members have recently approached the Independent Socialists, and stated themselves to be in general accord with their principles. A

possible explanation is that these persons believe that the Government is about to fall, and that the Independent Socialist Party is the aptest instrument to hasten the *débâcle*.

No question exists but that the propaganda of the Nationalist party is thorough and extensive. It is largely directed towards influencing youth, and a German National Juvenile League has been formed, which is extremely active. In spite of these efforts, it is not believed that any immediate danger of a reaction exists. Whatever occurs in that direction is likely not to come until the pendulum has swung far to the Left.

As a whole, the party is bitterly opposed to the present Government but supports its military measures and is entirely in accord with the repressive policy of Noske. Even among them, however, the idea of continued military operations against the Entente appears to be nonexistent. For the future, a policy of revenge is doubtless in sight, but the Hohenzollern ideas are said to be dead even as far as they are concerned. The present leader of the Nationalists, so far as they have one, appears to be General von Lettow-Vorbeck, the Commander in the long continued defence of East Africa. His name is even mentioned as a possible dictator, but his capacity as a politician appears to be open to doubt.

2. The Government Supporters. The present Government is nominally a coalition of moderate parties, but the lines between these are not so sharply marked as some months ago, and the Democratic party has nearly disappeared as a political entity. No pretence is being made that the original principles of the Majority Socialists are to be carried out in the near future, though the Majority Socialists still form a majority in the Cabinet. Politically the present Government is weak and inert, but it has been able to maintain itself by the help of a strong military organization. Almost the only strong decisions which have been taken are those of a military nature, and in all others the effect of a temporizing and opportunist policy is seen. It has few enthusiastic supporters, its adherents being largely the great inert mass of *bourgeoisie*, petty office-holders, and others who are openly afraid of reaction further

to the Left which may deprive them of whatever possessions and emoluments they have.

As a practical governing body, the present Ministry is looked on from all sides as a failure. With the exception of the Foreign Office, which is still largely dominated by the same men and methods as during the war, the different members have had little or no experience. It is said that discussions are endless and that it appears to be a creed that the art of governing can be attained by mere talk.

Among other grounds, on account of which the Government is being attacked with some success, is their refusal to publish the documents relating to responsibility for the war. The report had been prepared by a committee, of which Kautsky is the head, and is fully ready for publication. The excuse given is that the question is to be tried in Germany by a regularly constituted tribunal, and that any prior publication would prejudice the decision and create complications.

The members of the Government who are most unpopular as being, in the view of their opponents, hopelessly compromised by their former and present political attitude are Scheidemann, Landsberg, Noske and Rantzau. Should the Government be able to maintain itself longer in power, it may be confidently expected that some or all of these Ministers will be ousted. The position of Rantzau is also weakened by the alleged enmity towards him of Erzberger, who is said either to wish to take his place or to supplant him by von Richthofen.

While on all hands it is conceded that the position of the Government is exceedingly precarious and that, if it refused to make peace, it must inevitably fall, it is believed to be by no means certain that it cannot maintain itself for a considerable period should it succeed in negotiating peace with the approval of the National Assembly and of the people generally. Should, as a consequence of peace, the food situation be immediately relieved, should far-reaching economic assistance be in sight, and should the present Minister of Finance succeed in improving the financial situation, it seems quite possible that a Government, which has accomplished even partially these extremely difficult tasks, will not be supplanted for some time to

come. It must also not be forgotten that whatever the shortcomings of the present Government, it is sincerely democratic. The constant press intimations that it is reactionary and merely a cloak for imperialism are unworthy of serious attention.

The ideas of a very small coterie which writes for the *Vossische Zeitung* may be noted in passing. These persons, of whom the leader is Georg Bernhard, editor of this paper, advocate what they call the "Continental Policy." They openly seek a *rapprochement* with France at the expense of England and America, and the tone of the newspaper in question is distinctly Francophile. Max Cohen, known as Cohen-Reuss, is affiliated to some extent with this group. Their policy is looked on generally as an eccentric vagary, and it is not believed that it will receive much attention.

3. Independent Socialists and Extremists. In spite of the failures in January and March to overthrow the Government by violence, the parties of the extreme left have been gaining steadily in numbers and influence. This is due to a number of reasons, among which the most evident are the desperate food and industrial situations, the great numbers of unemployed, the contagion of the Russian example, and the general demoralization, all of which foster a movement towards the Left. In the recent communal elections in Berlin, the Independents polled a larger vote than the Majority Socialists, and they have evidently gained many supporters at the expense of the latter. The methods by which they work are evidently aimed at gaining control of governing bodies through domination of workmen's councils in all big industries, in the different trades, and in towns and villages.

If the present Government suffers from a lack of experience, it is evident that a purely Independent Socialist Government will be still more handicapped. The party seems to be entirely lacking in leaders of the right stamp and in men of really constructive ideas. Further, it is a serious question whether a purely Socialist Government would be able to secure and hold the confidence of the proletariat sufficiently as to be able to dispense with military forces. Again the tendency to dissension between different groups and members of the

party, which is already apparent, will probably be a serious source of difficulty if the Independents come into power.

In this connection the attempts, which have so far proved abortive to bring about a coalition between the Independents and the Majority Socialists, should be noted. These attempts are opposed by the more radical members of the party but have the support of Haase, Breitscheid, Cohn and others of the Majority, as well as leaders like Bernstein and Kautsky, who no longer consider themselves as belonging to the Minority. A coalition of this kind does not seem probable. The rank and file of the Independents have become too radical and they look upon the Majority Socialists as traitors to the cause of socialism.

Still further to the Left, the strength and influence of the Communists and Spartacists are still unknown factors. It remains, however, a truism that Germany is not naturally a fertile soil for Bolshevism. Even if the view, often expressed, that the repeated violent repressions of the radical revolts have brought adherents to the ranks of the Extremists and weakened the hold of the Government, is correct, it is questionable whether the gradual elimination of the leaders will not make future uprisings more difficult. It is also noticeable that among the persons with whom political affairs were discussed, not nearly so much was heard about the dangers of Bolshevism as in January. A successful "red terror" must still be reckoned among the possibilities, but it is doubted whether it will arise in an acute form in the near future, or before the constitution of an Independent Socialist government which is not yet prepared to go to extremes.

Whether peace is accepted or refused, it seems altogether likely that economic and even territorial compensations will be sought in two directions, first, German Austria and secondly, Russia. As to the first of these, the active propaganda which has been directed by Dr. L. Hartmann, Austrian Minister to Germany, has undoubtedly not failed to have some effect, but the Germans are, however, slow to committing themselves until after peace has been signed. They claim, however, that in accordance with the President's principles the population of German Austria is fully entitled to vote on the question

of annexation to Germany. Dr. Hartmann states that 95% of the voters are in favor of the incorporation, but these figures are probably exaggerated. Germany undoubtedly looks upon German Austria as a country towards which future immigration can be directed. Evidently this is still more the case with Russia. It is beyond a question that German industrial leaders are already making detailed plans to enter into close commercial relations with Russia at the earliest moment practicable, to send in large numbers of the surplus population, and to obtain raw materials in exchange for such machinery and manufactured articles as Germany will be able to offer.

IV. SYSTEM OF WORKMEN'S COUNCIL ("RÄTESYSTEM")

Should the present Government survive the "peace crisis", it will at once be faced with an extremely difficult internal political question which may result in its overthrow, namely, the extent to which the Soviet system (*Rätesystem*) shall be introduced in Germany.

After the revolution of November 9th, Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils sprang up throughout the whole country. The Executive Council of the Greater Berlin Soviets was, for a time, the preponderating influence in the central government. Then came the first Pan-Soviet Congress. It was controlled by the Majority Socialists and declared in favor of the National Assembly. The Independents demanded parity with the Majoritarians on the Central Council elected by the Congress. The demand was refused and the Independents declined to accept any seats on the Council.

With the elections to the National Assembly and its meetings in Weimar, the importance of the Soviets waned. But the Independents and the Communists, growing in power, held the majority in the Soviets of Greater Berlin, and early in the year began an agitation in favor of the introduction of the complete Soviet system. The Government, late in February, in a semi-official note, took a decided stand against giving the Soviets a place in national political affairs. A few weeks later, however, they were forced to abandon this attitude in the face of the partial general strike, called by the Soviet of Greater Berlin. The Majority Socialist members of this Soviet, fearing that

their supporters were slipping entirely from their command, sent a delegation to Weimar; as a result of their representations, the Government issued a statement recognizing the Workmen's Councils in principle, and stating that a constitutional status would be given to them. On April 5th the Government issued another statement promising to bring in a special law on the subject. Up to the present this has not been done.

After repeated demands from the Berlin Workmen's Council, the Central Council of the Soviets of all Germany issued a call for a second Pan-Soviet Congress, which met in Berlin in April. The Majority Socialists were again in control, but the increased strength of the idea of the Soviet system was plainly evident. In order to maintain their control of the Assembly, the Majority Socialists, under the leadership of Cohen-Reuss and Kaliski, introduced a resolution demanding the formation of a second chamber, elected by the Soviets, and entrusted with the instruction [*introduction?*] of legislation dealing with labor, industrial questions, etc. The Independents introduced a resolution, which was defeated, demanding a Soviet Chamber having far-reaching powers in political questions as well as industrial questions. But the Cohen-Reuss Resolution, concerning which the decision has been postponed until after the settlement of peace, goes much further in its demands than the Government's promise, and will, it is believed, be unacceptable to the Government. If this proves true, it is quite probable that the Cohen-Reuss-Kaliski wing of the Majority Socialists will withdraw its support from the Government, and, as has been stated, the fall of the Government might be the result of the controversy.

The Government is willing to grant to the Soviets at most only advisory power on certain non-political questions while the democratic constitutional basis of the Government remains unchanged.

The Cohen-Reuss-Kaliski group of Majority Socialists are now on record as favoring the formation of a Soviet Chamber which shall have a determining influence in practically all questions relating to industrial matters, etc., and which would result in giving the Soviets a large measure of political influence.

The Independents insist that the Soviet system to its full extent shall be introduced and that the Soviets (national, provincial and communal) shall be given practically all political power. Their plans really mean, in point of fact, the introduction of an advanced form of socialism on the Soviet framework—a German adaptation of the Russian system.

V. FORECAST OF COURSE OF POLITICAL EVENTS

A forecast in the present endless maze of complications can only be offered with the utmost diffidence. Sudden changes may occur which put at an hour's notice an entirely different aspect on affairs. The following notes may, however, be helpful as suggestions.

It is believed to be altogether unlikely that the present German Government will accept the peace terms as they stand. The only possibility, which appears to be a somewhat remote one, is that the financial and economical advisers of the Government, working in concert with captains of industry and great financiers, may recommend acceptance on the ground that the conditions make an economic rehabilitation of Germany practicable and that this consideration should outweigh all others, including territorial losses. In that case, it is to be presumed that further assurances will be demanded by the Germans, by which the means for an industrial revival will be furnished and by which financial bankruptcy can be averted. No doubt a large section of far-seeing Germans at the present moment have abandoned all thoughts of military domination but are looking forward to the possibility of an intensive and renewed commercial and industrial activity, especially with the help of the Russian field.

From many interviews a further impression was gained that at least some slight concessions on territorial questions will be, in any case, necessary to enable the Government to save its face and claim that it has not accepted a peace of violence.

If a peace on this basis is concluded, it seems to be a possibility, even if remote, that the present Government may succeed in maintaining itself in view of the sincere desire of the German people for peace.

It is, however, believed that the peace terms are almost certain to be rejected by the present Government for the reasons which have been analyzed above, under II. (1). The delegates will report the peace terms at once to the Government, presumably with recommendations that they be not accepted. The Government will refer them to the National Assembly which will in turn give them for examination to its peace committee, consisting of twenty-six members. This committee will return them with their comments to the Ministry, will then instruct the delegates to prepare counter-proposals, and presumably, if these are refused, to decline to accept the terms. The plebiscite, which at first met with some approval even in government circles, appears now to be not likely to come about.

It may confidently be assumed that a refusal of the peace terms will in no case be followed by a military uprising. It is more likely that a series of strikes will be proclaimed followed by the formation of an Independent Socialist Government.

Undoubtedly the present Government realizes the effect of this course. It appreciates the great insecurity of its position and is not unwilling to go out in whatever blaze of enthusiasm may be started by its nationalistic attitude. As it is evident that Germany cannot resist military or economic pressure, the only alternative appears to be an Independent Socialist Government which would doubtless accept the terms of peace. It is not thought that such a government would be strong enough to hold together the rapidly disintegrating elements in the country. A condition of chaos is therefore to be expected, and it is feared that the result will be wastage and destruction on a large scale of the resources still existing. Excesses, even if not repressed by Allied military action, would bring their own punishment and if the pendulum swings far to the Left, a strong reaction may be expected. The dictatorship, of which mention is already being made, is then likely to become an accomplished fact, and this would undoubtedly be accompanied by a militarist revival. Such changes would render the payment of indemnities and the performance of the necessary restitutions and reparations exceedingly doubtful. The ultimate form of government which will be established in Germany is impossible to foresee. The Independents profess to believe that a modified form of the Soviet Government

with an oligarchy in control is the ultimate solution; others still believe in a federal government after the American pattern. Some of the nationalists think that a constitutional monarchy is likely, but no one seems seriously to question that a return of the Hohenzollern regime is not within the realms of possibility.

VI. MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The military situation evidently could not properly come within the scope of the Mission, and the following notes as to German military forces are offered with all reserves.

German military units appear to be constituted from three classes:

1. Soldiers of the old regime, either pensioners or such as have not yet been discharged.
2. Volunteers.
3. Temporary volunteers.

1. As to the soldiers of the former regime, information was obtained to the effect that one million of these were on the Government payrolls, but of these 400,000 were old men on the pension rolls or such as were used as museum guides, janitors in official buildings, etc., and also men who were still in hospitals to receive medical treatment. For fighting purposes, the troops of the old Government, who are still undemobilized, are apparently entirely untrustworthy. At Munich they were routed by an inferior number of Spartacists.

2. As to the regular volunteers, the following perhaps fairly trustworthy estimate was obtained. On the eastern fronts between seventy and eighty thousand men, in the neighborhood of Berlin 60,000, scattered about 40,000. As to reliability, the volunteer corps are undoubtedly improving. They are composed of students, sons of farmers and buyers, and also members of industrial classes who are unemployed. A patriotic attitude is by no means absent, but there is certainly a blending of duty and profit. They are paid ten marks per day except those on the Russian front who get four marks a day additional. They have comparatively speaking good food, free quarters, and certain privileges in matters of service pay, family

allowances, insurance, etc. They can leave the service at any time on fourteen days notice.

Their fighting value has not yet been tested thoroughly, and undoubtedly varies with different units. In uprisings which have hitherto taken place, they have always been in overwhelming numbers against a disorganized enemy. The men are now being picked with greater care, as the regiments have been in many instances filled up. Every recruit must have his application endorsed by an officer who knows him personally and can vouch for him.

3. The temporary volunteers, who are entirely trustworthy, are being recruited from the sons of members of the *bourgeoisie*. They correspond to a great degree to our National Guard. They are organized and armed but remain in their homes until summoned in times of emergency. Five thousand of this class are said to have been enrolled in Berlin.

VII. SOCIAL CONDITIONS

1. *General Aspect.* The most striking external feature of Germany at the present moment is the apparently almost complete normality of the life of the population. Aside from the crowds in the railway stations which rush for standing-room in the few trains still running, the old orderly and well-kept appearance of both the cities and country districts is noticeable. The Berlin streets are not as clean as in peace times but they appear no worse than in the second year of the war, and the general aspect of the city presents only one noticeable change, namely, the many placards and posters warning against the dangers of Bolshevism, calling upon the German people not to accept a dictated peace, and advertising the various volunteer brigades which form the present German army. These placards are omnipresent and disfigure public buildings, kiosks and palaces alike. The excellent performances at the opera and in the theatres continue as usual, together with many concerts, lectures, etc. The members of the aristocracy and the rich *bourgeoisie* who have not retired to their country estates or gone to neutral countries are giving dinners and bridge-parties in a quite unrevolutionary spirit. The flower beds in the Pariser Platz and the Tiergarten are being well tended and aside

from occasional barbed-wire barricades, placed across the Wilhelm Strasse or some other strategic point, but usually soon removed, or the passage of a dray through the central arch of the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin gives little external evidence of the changes which have taken place politically.

At the great fair ("Messe") held during the last week of April at Leipzig, the general tone was optimistic. The trading was chiefly in glass, porcelain, paper goods and patented machines for household use, such as patented appliances for potato peeling, washing, etc. Displays of fancy articles, jewelry, beaded bags, ornamental lamp shades and also of toys were seen in great numbers. These categories comprised over nine-tenths of the articles offered.

2. Food Conditions. No attempt was made to investigate food conditions. On several sides a very slight improvement was reported, but the general opinion is that the American supplies, which are now arriving regularly, will hardly do more than maintain the present rations until the new harvest, when a real improvement can be expected. During the second week the party was in Berlin, a quarter of a pound of American bacon was given to every man, woman and child in Germany, and it was stated that this, together with the small quantities of American lard, which were being distributed, was having a good effect. On the whole, it is probably too early to judge of the extent to which the American food supplies will act as a stabilizing factor on the political situation. The prices for food in general have increased rather than decreased. In the expensive restaurants everything can now be obtained at fantastic prices, as the illicit trade in food has been made easier by the general corruption in the public service since the revolution. The better classes depend almost entirely upon illegal methods for obtaining food. A small chicken, obtained in this way, costs eighty-four marks. A luncheon for two at a good restaurant (including butter, eggs and cheese) costs from 130 to 160 marks. There is no outward appearance of malnutrition in the classes of population seen in the better quarters of the city (except possibly among some of the children) and the poorer sections, where it is said that the effects of under-nourishment can be seen in the faces of the inhabitants, were not visited. Statements were heard on all sides that the poor are still

suffering in this respect. The situation as regards potatoes and meat is the most serious, and is causing a great deal of anxiety.

3. Clothing. Following the reports concerning the clothing shortage, the generally well-dressed appearance of persons of both sexes was surprising. This includes the item of foot-gear. Here again the poorer classes of the inhabitants, as with the question of food, are by far the most seriously affected and it was stated that many poor people were without underclothing.

4. Industrial Situation. Reports from all sides agreed that one of the most serious problems facing Germany is the general demoralization of the working classes, who have lost all respect for authority and all ambition to work. In their present mental, moral and physical condition the workers are easy prey for political agitators, and the tremendous number of unemployed (roughly estimated at one million) adds a complicating factor. The problems brought about through the necessity of paying such high wages that many great industries are operating at a financial loss and the lack of raw materials, are dealt with elsewhere in this report. There is general distrust of the Government among the masses and the seething social unrest, coupled with the demands for the socialization of the great industries and for the introduction of the Soviet system, preclude any possibility of initiative on the part of the capitalists, who fear that the drift toward Communism will eventually result in the loss of all that they have acquired or will achieve in the future.

5. Morals. Many reports were heard of the widespread corruption and immorality of all kinds, and there were sufficient superficial-signs to make the truth of these reports seem probable. Since the armistice, the night life of Berlin has assumed all the unpleasantness of pre-war times on a greatly increased scale. Cafes are doing a thriving business and gambling clubs and dance halls, in countless numbers, have sprung up everywhere. Police regulations are disregarded through the device of making these places "clubs" where only "members" are admitted. Roulette is played on the street corners and the sums won and lost in the most "exclusive" gambling joints run into the hundreds of thousands of marks for the individual person in the course of a night's play. There is no question that

extravagance, frivolity and immorality amount at present almost to a mania with most sections of society who have money to spend. The remark was heard that “nowadays the only pleasure of many people is to spend.”

6. *Health.* It was impossible to investigate this question, but we were authoritatively informed that all kinds of wasting diseases and diseases resulting from malnutrition have greatly increased in the last six months; furthermore, that over a million men with venereal diseases have returned from the army into family life.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

If the German Government rejects the peace terms, it is obvious that recommendations are out of place, as the only solution can be found in military and economic pressure.

If, however, the present Government shows any inclination to accept the terms, their hands should, in our opinion, be strengthened in every possible way. The present Government represents the only combination in sight which has elements of stability sufficient to guarantee the carrying out of peace terms. Should it decide to make peace, it will in any event have a hard struggle with the reactionary element on one side and the extreme radicals on the other.

One of the constant complaints which is heard from the Germans is that few if any opportunities for open conversations as to the situation have been given. Should the attitude of the German Government be favorable to making peace, it seems highly advisable that they should be accorded facilities in this direction, either here or in Germany.

In order to carry out the provisions of the Peace Treaty, it appears urgently necessary that the financial and economic conditions now obtaining in Germany should be thoroughly studied from the inside. Cooperation from the Entente, especially the United States, in the industrial rehabilitation of Germany and in an endeavor to remedy the exchange situation will be expected in return for the signing of the peace conditions. It is presumed that the United States will be

prepared to give assistance of this nature, as the rebuilding of the industrial life of Germany is unquestionably of vast importance to the world generally.

In accordance with these views, the following specific suggestions are made:

1. That should the outlook for peace be favorable, a small mission should be sent to Berlin at once with the special purpose of informal conversations and of giving such assurances as may be possible.
2. That should the outlook for peace be favorable, a commission of financial experts be sent in at the earliest moment possible in order to confer with leading German financiers and obtain an accurate knowledge of the financial situation on the spot.
3. That should the outlook for peace be favorable, an economic commission be constituted and sent in at the earliest moment possible in order to study the industrial conditions, with a special view to assistance in rehabilitating the German industries and in importing the necessary raw materials.
4. That such moral encouragement as is possible be given to the present Government, in recognition of the fact that it is in theory democratic and representative of the German people, and that a non-representative government, whether of the Right or Left, cannot count on either recognition or assistance.

As annexes, memoranda of interviews with the following persons are hereto attached:[13](#)

1. Professor L. Hartmann
2. Dr. Melchior
3. E. Bernstein
4. Dr. O. Cohn
5. Dr. K. Kautsky
6. Theodor Wolff
7. Count Bernstorff
8. Dr. Simons
9. Minister Erzberger
10. Director Gutman

11. Ernst Däumig
12. HugoHaase
13. Dr. R. Breitscheid
14. Max Cohen (Reuss)
15. Maximilian Harden
16. H. vonGerlach
17. HerrNoske
18. Dr. B. Dernburg.

We have the honor [etc.]

ELLIS LORING DRESEL
LITHGOW OSBORNE

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² [Vol. II, pp. 132](#) —[172](#) .

¹³ Annexes not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013202/4

[Document 43]

***Mr. E. L. Dresel to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***

BERLIN, May 10, 1919.
[Received May 12.]

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit, herewith, for the information of the Commission, a copy of the report on the general political situation in Germany, dated May 10, 1919.

I have [etc.]

For Mr. Dresel:
CHARLES B. DYAR

[Enclosure]

Report on the Political Situation in Germany

The publication of the peace terms has undoubtedly had a crushing effect in Germany. The press is practically unanimous in rejection of the terms; the Independent Socialist *Freiheit* is the only paper which now insists that peace be signed and it does not hesitate to state that it considers some of the terms impossible of execution. The Independent Socialists consider themselves the only political party entitled to protest against the peace terms and, while urging the signing of the treaty, they frankly place reliance in the international proletariat for the eventual revision of terms with which it can be demonstrated Germany can never comply. The language of the democratic press is exceedingly bitter, in many instances a cry of despair, but the idea of refusing to sign is not generally entertained. The hopelessness of armed resistance is recognized even by

reactionary papers, and the solution which they urge is to refuse to sign the impossible treaty and let the Allies take such action as they may see fit. This view is shared by part of the democratic press, but practically all papers insist that all means of negotiation must be exhausted before Germany's final answer is given. At the same time very little hope is expressed that objections on the part of Germany will have any effect and it is clear that no great illusions are indulged in regarding the prospects of substantial modifications of the terms. Democratic leaders like Haussmann, Haase, Theodor Wolff and Richthofen state very clearly that the treaty in its present form is entirely unacceptable, but Richthofen thinks that Germany will have to sign under protest in the end. The position of the Government seems fairly clear (Memorandum No. 1.). Very many of the stipulations are deemed utterly unacceptable; perhaps the cession of Upper Silesia and parts of West Prussia to Poland and the prolonged occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads are considered the worst stipulations of all. The Government will do its best to negotiate and will ask for more time to study the treaty. No final decision will be taken until all means of negotiation are exhausted. Meanwhile the support of the people will be secured by the organization of demonstrations, protest meetings, etc., throughout the country. The Foreign Office is beside itself. Many high officials are unable to talk rationally regarding the peace terms and very many threaten to resign if this peace is signed. It is stated with full assurance by Baron Langenwerth that Brockdorff-Rantzau will resign before he will ever consent to sign the treaty in its present form and that several, if not all, of the members of the peace delegation will follow his example.

There can be no question of the depth of the emotion of the German people today; the situation is very tense. The German people did not expect such peace terms; they have never been enlightened concerning the true feeling of the Allied countries towards Germany. The shock to them is all the more terrific because they were consistently encouraged in the notion that peace on the basis of President Wilson's principles would not establish Germany's guilt and the necessity of atonement and reparation; that the Fourteen Points would be construed in the way in which the German Government has preferred to construe them; that President Wilson would see to it that the peace terms would not greatly inconvenience

Germany. The entirely insincere belief that the armistice was only concluded on condition that President Wilson's peace program, as interpreted for the benefit of Germany, would be enforced, had become general. The people had been led to believe that Germany had been unluckily beaten after a fine and clean fight, owing to the ruinous effect of the blockade on the home morale and perhaps some too far reaching plans of her leaders, but that happily President Wilson could be appealed to, and would arrange a compromise peace satisfactory to Germany. The result is that President Wilson and the United States are now subject to most scathing attacks. The Allies have gone back on their solemnly pledged word, it is said, and President Wilson has proven himself the greatest hypocrite in all history, for did he not consistently maintain that the Allies did not wish to destroy the German people? But the peace terms will inevitably destroy the German people. Great manifestations are planned for Sunday and the coming week in Berlin and throughout the country. The proclamation of national mourning for one week stops all public amusements and sports. General Harries has ordered that no American officers or men in uniform shall show themselves on the streets in Berlin until further notice.

At the same time the full impact of the peace terms has already been felt and it is believed that the prevailing excitement will gradually subside. There are surprisingly few demands that Germany shall refuse to sign; the reactionary and part of the Democratic press, particularly the group represented by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, is practically alone in this demand. The "sober second thoughts" of the press reflect the general opinion that Germany must try to negotiate and must not commit herself hastily. The view that peace must be signed in the end has a very strong following. The Majority Socialist press seems to recognize that it would be suicide to refuse to sign and urges that every effort be made to make peace bearable. The Independent Socialist press is unstinting in its condemnation of some of the peace terms but nevertheless insists that peace must be signed. The somber views of the Independent Socialist leader, Oskar Cohn, are set forth in Memorandum No. 2. Haase is reported to consider that many stipulations of the treaty can never be complied with by Germany but he favors signing under protest. Breitscheid, on the other hand, seems to be less insistent on signing. It should not be

forgotten that the Independent Socialists are convinced that the treaty cannot be enforced in all its stipulations after it is signed.

There are many persistent rumors that the present government will resign and leave the decision in the hands of the people. The argument is that the Government would not last two weeks if it signed insupportable peace, and the Government does consider the peace terms in their present form insupportable. It is certain, however, that the Government will take no action before the Allies act on the German counter proposals, which, it is stated here, pronounce certain terms unacceptable and ask for negotiations on others. The present Government, it is argued, would be followed by a radical Socialist government which would never pay any indemnity to the "capitalistic" governments of the adversaries. It is significant that the bourgeois democratic press now inclines to the belief that whether peace is signed or not Germany will become a united Socialistic nation and form a constantly growing danger to the imperialistic governments of the victors. Germany must pin her faith to the ultimate victory of Socialism. The idea of war of revenge is entertained in reactionary and some bourgeois circles but they look far ahead. Majority Socialists suggest an alliance with Russia which would soon crush Poland.

[Subenclosure 1]

MAY 10, 1919.

MEMORANDUM No. [1]

*Conversation With the Secretary of Minister President
Scheidemann on May 9th*

The entire German Government is overwhelmed by the severity of the peace terms. They are absolutely unacceptable in their present form and the Government cannot sign them en bloc. No one can account for the entire failure to realize Wilson's principles. Occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads is quite unjustifiable even by military reasons, for the reduction of the German Army to a footing of 100,000 men is in itself ample military security for France. The awarding of German territory to Belgium without a plebiscite is incomprehensible. The Polish corridor to the Baltic will inevitably

breed a strong German irredenta. The loss of the Upper Silesian coal mines, in addition to the Saar Basin, will utterly cripple Germany in an economic sense; German industries will become dependent on foreign countries for coal. This stipulation makes it impossible for Germany to pay indemnities. The interception of Germany's commercial intercourse with the East is intolerable. The German industries cannot work if they must wait two years before the amount of indemnity is made known. The League of Nations in its present form is a parody. It is perfectly clear to the German Government that the proposals of the Allies can never form the basis of peace of any duration. The Government will do its best to secure modification of all terms conflicting with Wilson's program and will ask for oral negotiation. The Government will reserve its decision regarding the signing of the treaty until it has exhausted all means of securing amendment of the terms.

[Subenclosure 2]

MAY 9, 1919.

14

MEMORANDUM NO. [2]

Report of a Conversation With Dr. Oskar Cohn, Independent Socialist, May 8, 1919

The peace terms of the Allies have confirmed the worst fears of German statesmen and politicians of all parties. Germany must sign the peace notwithstanding, and trust to the future. The treaty affords no guarantee of peace. A German irredenta in Poland seems inevitable. In any event the future of Germany is very black. She simply cannot pay indemnities. Fifteen million Germans who in normal times depended on Germany's export trade will now be without means of subsistence. Raw materials and food cannot be imported in time to prevent a crisis. There will be no rest in Germany for a long time; half starved people without employment will be driven to desperation. Credits must be granted Germany for the purchase of food and raw materials but even the interest on those credits cannot be paid, at least for a long period.

The public health of Germany will steadily deteriorate; tuberculosis will in the course of a decade exact thousands of victims among the undernourished children now ten or twelve years of age; marriages will become an economic impossibility among wide circles of the people; free cohabitation will assume unheard of proportions resulting in a great increase of abortions and an appalling drop in the birth rate; venereal diseases will make great inroads on the population and the people as a whole will in their undernourished and weakened condition offer small resistance to other diseases. The first great crisis may certainly be expected in the fall of 1919.

The hopes of the German proletariat are centered in the working classes of the other countries.

MAY 8, 1919.

¹⁴ Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 184.013202/3.

Mr. E. L. Dresel to President Wilson

PARIS, June 5, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: May I venture to say one word in regard to the present German Government? Statements are constantly being made both in the press and outside to the effect that the existing government is merely a cloak for German militarism, that its members are arch-hypocrites, and that it deserves no more consideration than if it were in form imperialistic.

I cannot help thinking that these charges have no basis in fact and that they are highly prejudicial. No doubt the present government has many faults. It has been vacillating, opportunistic, at times arbitrary, and at times yielding. No doubt some of its members are not to be trusted. On the other hand, it is clearly democratic in form and in sentiment, and stands unquestionably for a republican form of government. Of its prominent members, Ebert was formerly a saddler, Scheidemann a printer, and Noske a carpenter. Ebert in especial gives the impression of entire directness and reliability, and his honesty is not doubted even by his enemies. It is altogether incredible that these men and many others that could be named are harboring ideas of military revenge, and the failure to insist in the German counter-reply on an army of more than one hundred thousand men is in itself indicative of a non-militaristic attitude, as is the proposal of the Germans to reduce their navy to a greater extent than is demanded by the Allied and Associated Governments.

As far as permanency goes, the very fact that the present ministry has been able to maintain itself, and even to strengthen its position, in the face of bitter opposition from all sides, is significant. A government which has been able to keep above water for seven months, in the convulsions through which Germany has passed, is not a negligible quantity, and surely shows as great elements of

stability as a government which has continued for seven years in quiet times.

Should peace not be concluded with the present government, no other combination is in sight which can afford the slightest prospects of stability and sincere effort to work out peace terms. A cabinet of pacifists, rejecting any military measures to keep order, would shortly find itself in an untenable position. An Independent Socialist government, directing all its energies to taking up relations with the proletariat of other countries, would give free reign to the forces of anarchy. A military dictatorship of a reactionary nature would plunge Germany into civil war and endless bloodshed.

A letter received from Mr. C. B. Dyar, in charge of German press summaries at Berlin, dated June 3, 1919, states that in his opinion admission to the League of Nations would induce the German Government to sign, on the ground that the League of Nations would eventually modify such stipulations as would in time appear impossible to fulfil.

If the present government does not sign, a state of chaos and anarchy seems sure to follow. Cannot these consequences be avoided by giving the present German Government credit for what it has accomplished in the face of tremendous odds? By admitting Germany to the League of Nations without further delay, the parties of order and true democracy in Germany would at once be immensely strengthened, and it is not evident what if any danger would be incurred. In the present critical situation, can we not afford to take the German people at their word, and give them an opportunity to work out their destiny on lines which will be of benefit to the whole world?

I remain [etc.]

ELLIS LORING DRESEL

Military Intelligence Reports on Political Conditions in Germany

[\[45\] Mr. C. A. Herter to President Wilson](#)

Paris, 21 May, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 862.00/344

Paris Peace Conf. 862.00/344

[Document 45]

Mr. C. A. Herter to President Wilson

PARIS, 21 May, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I beg to enclose herewith, for your information, copies of several reports prepared by two officers of the Military Intelligence Section of our Army respecting their observations as to the political situation in Germany at the present moment, and reporting the substance of interviews with Mr. Erzberger¹ and Count von Bernstorff.² These officers travelled to Berlin at the urgent request of Mr. Erzberger. My colleagues on the Commission and I believe that these reports are extremely valuable as indicating the present sentiment in Germany in regard to the proposed Peace Treaty.

I beg to call your attention particularly to the report by Major Henrotin on the second interview which he had with Mr. Erzberger in which the latter made certain definite suggestions in regard to amending various Articles of the proposed Treaty.

Faithfully yours,

[C. A. HERTER]

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by Colonel A. L. Conger

TREVES, May 20, 1919.

Memorandum for A. C. of S. G-2:

Subject: Report of trip to Berlin.

1. Upon the urgent request of Herr Erzberger, I left for Berlin, Friday afternoon, and arrived there Saturday evening at 10 o'clock. An appointment was made for me to confer with Herr Erzberger at 10.45 the next morning, and following that for Major Henrotin (who accompanied me to Berlin) and myself, to see, jointly, Herr Erzberger and Count Bernstorff. In the preliminary interview with Herr Erzberger I explained to him that I had not been sent by anyone in authority, but had come of my own volition, having, as a General Staff Officer, authority to travel wherever my duties took me, and that in consequence I was not speaking officially for any military or diplomatic authority; that what I should say represented my own views and certain facts which it had seemed to me important for the future peace of the world should be understood, and which were not now understood, at least by the German people.

At this point Count Bernstorff and Major Henrotin were introduced and I repeated in English, for the benefit of the Count what I had already stated separately to Herr Erzberger in regard to my having come entirely upon my own responsibility. I went on to say that I had done this in the hope that I might clear up some misconceptions, which I was informed were held by the German Government, and which were interfering with the settlement of peace.

The first of these misconceptions was that the President was not himself in sympathy with the terms of the Peace Treaty. I stated that I had it on excellent authority that the President was in thorough agreement with, and prepared to back up, all the terms of the Treaty of Peace as regards Germany.

Second, it was reported that the American Army had mainly gone home, and that this was interpreted to mean that President Wilson would not make further use of American troops in Europe. Further, that even if it was the President's desire to make such use, that the temper of the American people would not stand it. I gave a most emphatic denial on these points. Count Bernstorff attempted to parry the statement that American public opinion, represented by the press, was supporting the Peace Treaty. I replied that such a

misconception was a further example of the German misinterpretation of foreign public opinion, as a result of grasping at a few stray opinions favorable to the German side, and supposing that those represented the body of public opinion. I stated further that it was well appreciated by our own Government, and equally well appreciated by every Allied Government, each of whom took great pains to keep informed of the state of the American public mind.

Third, that the German Government was misinformed over the attitude of the French Government in supposing that the French Government was prepared to compromise on the Peace. I stated that it was commonly believed in Paris that the French Government was quite indifferent as to whether Germany did or did not sign the Peace Treaty, as it expected to get a great deal more out of Germany if the Peace were not signed than it would if Peace were signed.

Fourth, that the French people were supposed by the Germans to be against the renewal of the war, and would view with anxiety a failure to make Peace. I replied to this that the answer to this question was to be found in the participation in subsequent events of the American Army,—that the French people trusted its Government not to do anything without the participation of America, and that they were prepared to go hand in hand anywhere in any project to settle the Peace of Europe through that co-operation.

Fifth, in the matter of the interpretation of the Treaty, that it was commonly agreed in Paris that the Treaty was interpreted too literally by the Germans, that after signature, and as it became apparent that Germany was doing her utmost to live up in good faith to the terms of the Treaty, that it would receive more and more a liberal interpretation favorable to Germany.

Sixth, that as regards to the Government of the Occupied Territory, measures already taken in the establishment of the new board on economic control, which I described in brief, indicated that the Government of this territory would not be such as would be found, either binding upon the people in the sense of a purely military

government, or one which would isolate the people economically from the rest of Germany.

During the elucidation of the above points, Count Bernstorff maintained a running fire of comment and of protest making such statements as that under no circumstances would Germany sign the present Treaty, and that the Allies could do what they pleased. He appeared much agitated and several times on the point of having lost his temper. Mr. Erzberger on the contrary appeared calm and unmoved, glad to have the information, and seemingly glad to enjoy Count Bernstorff's discomfiture.

The next morning, by appointment, Major Henrotin and myself a second time met Herr Erzberger alone. He began the conversation with the statement that it was perfectly patent to everyone that Germany must have Peace, and the German Government cordially and even anxiously desired Peace. But the German Government could not accept the present proposed terms, and therefore desired to meet the Allies and inform them of the difficulties in the German Government in meeting the demands of their people, in the hope that a compromise could be made which Germany could accept.

Herr Erzberger's attitude during this statement seemed to indicate that he was making this proposal *con gusto*, and that he had had his way about it in making it in the Cabinet meeting which we were informed was held the preceding evening. The proposals he made were taken down in writing by Major Henrotin and are transmitted herewith.^{[3](#)}

In addition to the above Herr Erzberger stated that he had sent a message to Lloyd George by a British Officer who had called on him two days ago. He also made reference to numerous conversations which he had had with French Officers, who were constantly protesting the friendliness of the French Government to Germany, which was said with an expressive shrug of the shoulders, indicating lack of credence on his part.

In this second conversation, which was held on Monday morning, I made no reply of any kind to the proposals, and no statements, but

announced my intention of returning to Trèves at once, and that what he said would be duly reported to the proper authority.

Sunday afternoon I went, at his request, to call on Professor Hans Delbrück, who was leaving that evening for Versailles to act in an advisory capacity to the German Peace Delegation. He expressed great chagrin over the Peace terms. I stated that his views were of great interest to the American authorities, and asked him if he cared to be quoted on the subject. He replied, "Yes, you may say that I shall advise the German Government not to sign the Peace terms as they now stand, as being dishonorable for Germany. If Germany is to die politically, it is better for her to perish honorably than by agreeing to a dishonorable Peace. I shall therefore recommend that the Government say to the Allies: 'We will not fight you; do what you please. Come in if you wish and take over the German Government, and we will give orders to all our subordinate officials to obey your orders implicitly and explicitly.'"

I did not see President Ebert or any other member of the Government except those named, but I was told by an agent who related to President Ebert what had transpired in the afternoon conference, with Bernstorff and Erzberger, that when Ebert was informed of the repeated assurances which had been given by Bernstorff and Erzberger that under no circumstances would Germany offer any active resistance to an Allied advance: "I am not so sure about that; I am not so sure that we won't fight when the time comes." This remark appeared not to have been given with the intention of being repeated to Major Henrotin and myself. The significance of it to me was brought out by the thousands and thousands of Officers and soldiers seen on the streets in Berlin and throughout the parts of Germany visited as far west as Cassel. Officers were everywhere in new gray uniforms with shining shoulder straps. Nowhere was the officer's insignia, blue band on the arms, adopted only a few months ago, in evidence. The new uniforms of the officers and of the majority of the soldiers were in striking contrast to the war-worn, threadbare uniforms seen on the occasion of a former visit to Berlin in March. Officers, and many of the soldiers, wore sidearms, and nearly all of the soldiers seen were wearing at least belts, which was not the case two months ago. In

Berlin many military bands were seen marching about the streets followed by small crowds. This indicates to my mind that the sentiment being spread and stirred up in Berlin over the Peace Treaty is being inspired by the Government, which is striving to unite the people. In Brandenburg a regiment of Lancers was seen by us on Monday afternoon parading through the streets, newly equipped, for field service, escorted by a throng of men, women, and children, who filled the entire street so that our automobile had to get into a side street to get out of the way.

The temper of the people of Berlin, civilian as well as military, has changed entirely since two months ago. The people seem livelier, energetic, well fed, differing in opinions, as Germans always do, but united in a common patriotic purpose.

I am prepared from what I have seen to state positively that there are some people in Germany that are getting together an army ready to fight. The Government may be in it or not. Of those I think the Minister of War, Noske, must be in it. The General Staff may be in it, or not. Personally I do not think that Gen. Groener, or Hindenburg or the other leaders of the General Staff are in it. It may be that the military clique, reported to have been organized by Gen. Ludendorff, is running it. There are no evidences of this in the zone passed through by us west of Cassel. Whether other parts of Germany, besides Prussia, Hannover, etc., are the same or not, I cannot say, but after what I have seen I would not be surprised at the reappearance of the Kaiser in Germany, and his calling of the German Army into the field which would result in a wave of loyalty toward the Kaiser, such as has not been seen in Germany since 1914, of loyalty to Germany's former leaders and enthusiasm for a war of self-defense. This enthusiasm, it must be stated in all frankness, is based on the German Government's propaganda, or other propaganda, to the effect that Germany has been tricked in the armistice proceedings, that the Peace Treaty now offered is not in accordance with the terms of the armistice or with the 14 points of President Wilson.

A. L. CONGER

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by Major Frederick Henrotin

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
TRIER, 20 May, 1919.

IMPRESSIONS IN GERMANY

I. Political:

The impression was clearly given that the leading spirits in Germany are now completely split into two parties: those for signing the peace if certain amendments can be obtained, and those who are opposed to signing at all. The latter party has, of course, the backing of the old military and autocratic regime, whose influence has increased very considerably during the last month. The various government officials, are, of course, backing the old party.

Evidently an organized propaganda has been at work for sometime past to stir up the people against signing the peace treaty and this was started even before the conditions were published. In Berlin itself numerous manifestations may be met against the signing of the peace treaty. One party of agitators was headed by a brass band in military uniform.

It is noticeable that the activities of the military caste are directed against the signing of the peace terms, and it is apparent that their men are being used for the same purpose.

With regard to the two parties, for and against signing the peace, from attached interviews it is clearly seen that Erzberger is on one side and Von Bernstorff on the other.

As to President Ebert: his opinion is likely to be swayed by whichever party wins the day. When asked regarding the peace terms, however, he made the following verbatim statement:

“That America should not expect that Germany, in view of the eventual consequences of peace as now constituted, will accept, that it must be evident to America that it will not only have to occupy but also govern Germany.”

II. Morale of the civilian population:

A distinct change is noticed in the attitude of the population of Berlin. Where before they were apathetic, they now appear brisker and more alert, and are evidently regaining their spirit, which the old party is endeavoring to foster as a weapon to use against the signing of the peace treaty.

III. Military:

A very distinct change is seen in the attitude of the military. The men are clad in new uniforms, have a soldierly appearance, and evidently take a pride in their duties. They have gotten back considerable of their military bearing. The officers are wearing their shoulder straps openly, and a very large number are seen in the streets of Berlin in uniform.

When passing through Brandenburg the writer had occasion to meet a regiment of the Brandenburg hussars, marching through the town with a mounted band at the head of the column. The men were all clad in new uniforms, the saddle equipment was all new, and the column presented a very business-like appearance. The men had their harness and equipment decked with flowers, and large crowds were gathered in the streets to witness the procession.

A reliable opinion from Berlin states that if Peace is signed the military will arrange an uprising in about six weeks' time. If it is not signed, the present Government will resign, the Independents take over the Government, and sign the Treaty without any thought of executing it, and then in about two weeks' time the whole country will be in an uproar, when it is probable that the military will again take possession of the people.

Minister Noske seems to have thrown his lot in with the Military party. It appears certain that in the case of the non-signing of Peace, all the troops which are now being thrown towards the Polish frontier will be immediately used to attack the Poles; that the notion has been carefully fostered in the eastern provinces that the German civil population has been armed, and that very strong anti-Polish propaganda has been let loose, not only amongst the civil population, but also amongst the troops.

F[REDERICK] HENROTIN

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by Colonel A. L. Conger

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
TRIER, 20 May, 1919.

In conversation with Major Kroeger, of the German General Staff, purporting to be spokesman for General Gruner, Chief of the German General Staff at Kolberg, he stated that he had been instructed to speak only on the question of military terms, in connection with which he stated that the immediate demobilization of the German forces, and, incidentally handing over all material, could constitute a very serious financial loss to the German government, running into billions of marks; moreover, that 100,000 men would not be sufficient during the present emergency to cope with the interior political situation. He thought, however, that if the Allies would agree to the gradual demobilization of the German Army, the figures given later could be reduced. He stated that in a recent count made between the German General Staff, the War Minister Rheinhardt, and the Reichsminister Noske and other members interested, the figures varied between 200,-000 fighting troops, outside of non-combatant units, and 300,000 troops of all descriptions. They acknowledge that if the peril in the East disappeared part of these forces could certainly be demobilized.

To enforce his statements, Major Kroeger added that 40,000 troops were required to restore order in Munich and 60,000 to preserve order in Berlin alone. With regard to the present situation he frankly admitted that resistance in the West was impossible; that on the eastern front the figures were unchanged; that troops were moving from the Baltic front to the Polish front, but that this move would take two months; that the troops were being moved to the Polish front on account of the trouble with the civilian population; moreover, General Gruner had sent special orders to Upper Silesia to avoid any hostile act against the Poles, but that he was unable to guarantee the troops or the militia. He stated, in conclusion, that the opinion of the German General Staff was that Germany, as long as she remained a nation, should have an army sufficient to defend her frontiers; that 100,000 men would only be sufficient as a *gendarmerie*.

Major Kroeger was unwilling to discuss the peace terms, but stated, as a matter of principle, in which General Gruner was agreed, that the German government and German people were unwilling to sign a treaty of peace which they would not be able to fulfill.

A. L. CONGER

[Enclosure 4]

Memorandum by Major Frederick Henrotin

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
TRIER, 20 May, 1919.

INTERVIEW WITH HERR ERZBERGER

At ten o'clock on the morning of the 19th instant a second interview was had with Herr Erzberger. He stated that he wished to lay down all his cards on the table; and that it was necessary for Germany that the Peace be signed; and that he believed a conversation would clear

up matters. In the meantime, he begged that the following proposals be sent through:

Firstly, the League of Nations: Erzberger insisted upon the entry of Germany into the League of Nations immediately upon the signature of the Peace Treaty, and upon her admission on a basis of equality with the other Powers. The Statutes of the League of Nations would be accepted as proposed, with the exception of some of the clauses bearing on economic inequality.

Secondly, military questions: Following the signature of the Treaty of Peace, disarmament will take place and conscription will be abolished, but he stated that the number of 100,000 men was insufficient to preserve order in Germany under present circumstances, and that they should need a force of 350,000 men under arms for the first year, and 200,000 the second year, and then the army could be reduced. Some changes would have to be made in the tables of organization to fit in with their normal tables. Mr. Erzberger stated that Germany would be willing to give up all her battleships. He stated that the military terms would not constitute an obstacle to signing the Treaty.

Thirdly, The Merchant Ships: Germany would need to retain a portion of her merchant fleet, in order to resume the economic life of Germany, and to meet her economic obligations. He suggested that a World Pool of shipping might be organized under the League of Nations, and also that negotiations be opened for turning over shares in the Hamburg-America and the North Deutscher Lloyd to British and American capital (which was formerly impossible under German law).

Fourth, Territorial Questions: Erzberger would require a plebiscite to be taken in all territory proposed for surrendering to the Allies, with the exception of Rupen and Malmedy, and that the Plebiscite should be taken by a secret vote under the control of a neutral committee, Dutch, Swedes, etc. This is to include territory already in the hands of the Poles. All troops should be withdrawn from the disputed sections and the boundaries would then be fixed by the League of Nations, as nearly as possible in conformity with the results of the vote taken.

As a counter proposal to the Saar settlement, Erzberger suggests an arrangement whereby France would be assured of 20,000,000 tons of coal per annum, and France would be offered a partnership in all German mines, so that they could be certain of obtaining its delivery. Every possible international guaranty would be given them.

Occupied Territory: Erzberger states that the nation wishes the occupation of German territory to be abandoned within the next six months. Mr. Erzberger frankly stated that he fears that the occupation of this territory will interfere with the economic life of the districts. He pointed out that the money necessary for the disbursement of the expenses of maintaining the allied armies was so much money lost that could otherwise be paid to the Allies, and that occupation was not necessary in order to hold Germany down, for that could be effectually done through the industrial and economic means at the disposal of the Allies, such as control of imports, etc. Germany could offer other guaranties, such as receipts of railroads, public forests, and lands, customs' duties, internal revenues, etc., and that moreover, on the strength of these guaranties, the League of Nations should issue a loan to Germany. From a military point of view, he stated that no military forces would be maintained within a distance of 50 kilometers of the East Bank of the Rhine. All fortifications would be razed, so that the Allies would have sufficient guaranties. He mentioned, in this connection, that it would be necessary for Germany to maintain her *gendarmarie* forces in order to preserve order in this territory.

Colonies: Minister Erzberger wishes that Germany be made mandatory for her colonies, or part of same, in order to satisfy public opinion in Germany, so that her people would think that she was a nation possessing colonies.

Finance: Erzberger stated with regard to indemnities, that he was agreed to Article 244, part 1, of the Armistice agreement [*draft treaty of peace?*], with the exception of paragraph 4 relating to pensions, and paragraph 5, cost of prisoners, as he stated that this should be mutual, paragraph 6, the payment of allocations to soldiers' wives, and paragraph 7, indemnities resulting from ill-treatment of prisoners. Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 9 and 10 will be paid.

Germany, however, Mr. Erzberger stated, could not pay the debts of other European nations, such as Bulgaria, Turkey, etc. He stated that all property handed over, according to the terms of the treaty, such as public buildings, colonies, railroads, manufactured products, etc., should be included in the indemnities.

In regard to the judgment of the Kaiser, and the fixing of responsibility for the war, or for acts of cruelty in its prosecution, Erzberger stated that from a constitutional point of view, Germany could not extradite a German subject. It would be a "gemeinheit" on the part of the German Government to give up the Kaiser. He stated that he was agreed that all responsible parties should be punished, and that he understood that the Allies could not accept that they should come before German courts. He suggested that a neutral tribunal should be instituted at the Hague, or elsewhere, and that the accused should appear before this court with the allies acting as plaintiffs. He stated that the German people could not conceive of justice being done in the case where the accused would be tried before a court where the Allies were both plaintiffs and judges, and that fairness could not be looked for under these circumstances.

Speaking of Reparations, he stated that Germany was in a position to rebuild France and Belgium, and that two months after the peace treaty was signed, 100,000 workingmen could be sent for that purpose and that six months later, 500,000 men could be devoted to this work, and that in two and a half years all would be restored. The work would be modern and sanitary. Germany, he stated, had plenty of building material. The plans could be drawn up by the French and the work controlled by them. He stated further that this would be of assistance to Germany, as it would enable her to put all men out of work to this employment. He stated further that for the practical working of the scheme a permanent commission should be set up, parallel to the Allied Commission, and along the lines of the present Armistice Commission. Any disagreement arising could be submitted to the League of Nations for settlement; and in dealing with a permanent commission the Allies would obviate the difficulties of dealing with the German Government.

Mr. Erzberger stated that Germany wishes freedom within the interior of the country, and therefore desires that there be no commission working in Germany.

In regard to the turning over of manufactured articles, he stated that in such cases as dyestuffs, ammonia, etc., there would be no difficulty arising, and in spite of the outcry raised in the German press against the demand for the milch cows, this could be done, as Germany could take oils, oilcakes, etc., in exchange, and that in this way the production of milk in Germany would increase far beyond the loss of 160,000 cows.

Mr. Erzberger stated that they would sign the Treaty, and that he wished it to be signed, and to be observed sincerely. However, he could not sign a Treaty which departed too far from the 14 points of President Wilson. He stated further that he could have the Treaty accepted in Germany, although he let it be understood that it would require a certain amount of camouflage to put it over, but promised he could do it.

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure 5]

Memorandum by Major Frederick Henrotin

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
TRIER, 20 May, 1919.

On May 18th, 1919, at 1:00 P.M., an interview was had with Herr Erzberger and Count von Bernstorff. The latter spoke the whole time, Mr. Erzberger only listening and not interfering with the conversation, which was carried on in English, it being noticed that the Count omitted to translate his remarks or any replies made to his questions, to Mr. Erzberger. He was evidently determined to make the interview a personal one and to ignore Mr. Erzberger. The Count stated flatly that the Germans would not sign the peace treaty; that it

was their intention to refuse to sign, and to invite the Allies to come in and take over the government of Germany.

When informed what the consequences would be of not signing, he stated there was no reason for the American troops to return to Europe as Germany would offer no resistance. He was given plainly to understand, however, that the troops would return, and that the consequences would be exceedingly serious for Germany, and probably result in the destruction of the nation.

Count von Bernstorff would not raise any specific objections to any points in the Treaty, with the exception of requesting that a plebiscite should be held in West Prussia, Upper Silesia, and the Saar district, and that Germany should be given admission to the League.

Apparently, from his attitude, he disapproved of the Treaty on general principles, and formed part of those who were determined not to sign. His attitude is perhaps explicable by the fact that since his re-entry in political activities his main object in life has been to persuade the German people and the German government that President Wilson would give them a treaty which would be in accord with their dearest wishes. It is also not to be forgotten that he is a member of the old regime, and in this connection will probably take the same attitude towards the peace terms as the other members of his party.

FREDERICK HENROTIN

[Enclosure 6]

Memorandum by Major Frederick Henrotin

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
TRIER, May 20, 1919.

IMPRESSIONS OF INTERVIEWS WITH HERR ERZBERGER

A very distinct change was noted in the attitude of Herr Erzberger as between the first and second interviews. In the first he appeared to be imbued with the spirit of most of the officials in Berlin, that “the peace terms were impossible; Germany could not sign, and the Allies could come in and take over the country.” Apparently the German Government does not realize the consequences of not signing the Treaty, more especially in so far as America is concerned, their apparent impression being that the Allies would merely occupy Germany in a peaceful, unassuming manner, as they have done with the Rhinelands, and assume the obligations of feeding the civilian population. This impression was evidently dissipated to a great extent by the straight-forward statement made by us, so that in the second interview, which was preceded by a meeting of the Government, a far more conciliatory attitude was adopted, and the definite statement was made by Herr Erzberger that it was necessary for Germany to sign Peace, and some concessions must be made by the Allies to mitigate the severity of the Terms, and to camouflage them in the eyes of the German people. It is probable that the tone of the German press during the next few days will show their new spirit—in fact, already on Monday morning the *Welt am Montag* published a conciliatory article by Von Gerlach, embodying the statement made by Herr Erzberger concerning the milk cows.

FREDERICK HENROTIN

¹ Matthias Erzberger, German Secretary of State without portfolio.

² Former German Ambassador in the United States.

³ Enclosure 4, p. 131 [*Pg. 131 is part of [Doc. 45](#)*].

The Greene Mission to the Baltic Provinces¹

¹ Additional information regarding conditions in the Baltic Provinces, including some reports from the Greene Mission not here printed, may be found in [Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 666](#)  ff. and *The Baltic Provinces: Report of the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the Situation in the Baltic Provinces*, by Robert Hale (Senate Document No. 105, 66th Cong., 1st sess.).

[46] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Paris, February 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/1

[47] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, March 8, 1919—11 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 861L.00/47: Telegram

[48] The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Major Royall Tyler

March 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/7

[49] Major Royall Tyler to Colonel S. D. Embick

Paris, 10 April 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/35

[50] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, undated. [Received April 15, 1919—3:62 a.m. (sic)]

861.00/4298: Telegram

[51] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen, April 13, 1919. [Received 9:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/4: Telegram

[52] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen, April 21, 1919—4 p.m. [Received April 22—2:20 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/9: Telegram

[53] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen, April 22, 1919. [Received 6 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/91: Telegram

[54] Mr. R. H. Lord and Mr. S. E. Morison to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary

[Paris,] April 23, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1722/6

[55] Colonel O. N. Solbert, Acting for the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene), to General T. H. Bliss

Paris, April 28, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1722/7¹/₂

[56] Colonel O. N. Solbert to the Minister in Denmark (Hapgood)

Paris, April 30, 1919—11 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/42a: Telegram

[57] The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Libau, May 3, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/20

[58] The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Libau, May 3, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/22

[59] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen, May 4, 1919. [Received May 5—9:50 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/22¹/₂: Telegram

[60] Report by Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley

Kovno, May 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/29

[61] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen, May 20, 1919. [Received May 21—9:40 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/32: Telegram

[62] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in Denmark (Hapgood)

Paris, May 26, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 861C.00/85a: Telegram

**[63] The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to Major Royall Tyler**

Libau, June 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf.184.01502/42

**[64] The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to Major Royall Tyler**

Libau, June 6, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/43

**[65] Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Secretary
General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)**

Reval, June 22, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/62

**[66] Memorandum From the Chief of the Mission to the
Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)**

Paris, June 30, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf.184.01502/60

[67] The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew).

Paris, July 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/69

[68] The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew).

Paris, July 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/74

[69] The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene).

Paris, July 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/74

[70] Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Reval, July 19, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/80

[71] Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Reval, July 28, 1919. [Received July 30—10:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/83: Telegram

[72] The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew).

Paris, July 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/85

[73] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley.

Paris, August 1, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf.184.01502/83: Telegram

[74] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene).

Paris, August 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf.184.015/104a: Telegram

Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/1

[Document 46]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

PARIS, February 10, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Dr. R. H. Lord, one of the American representatives on the Inter-Allied Commission to Poland, has presented a memorandum² in which he states that in view of the importance of Russian affairs, it appears advisable to have observers sent to the Baltic provinces and Lithuania,—sections of Russia from which little valuable information is at present being received. Dr. Lord points out that in Esthonia, Lettonia, and Lithuania new national governments are in the process of formation and are seeking American assistance and recognition. These governments are struggling against Bolshevism and, according to some reports, against German intrigue.

The specific proposal which has been presented provides for one observer in Esthonia, and one in Lithuania.

Personally I am in accord with the proposal of Dr. Lord, which I submit to you for a decision. In case your answer is affirmative, an appropriation of fifteen thousand dollars from your fund would probably be necessary.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

² Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 861L.00/47: Telegram

[Document 47]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, March 8, 1919—11 p.m.

1086. [From Lansing.] Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs has transmitted through Legation Berne note dated February 12th² to me as Secretary of State requesting aid to Lithuanians against Bolsheviks and particularly permission from Allied Supreme Command to organize soldiers Lithuanian origin in Expeditionary Forces of the United States in France. I question whether in any event such project is practicable and I feel before such measure could be considered assurances must be received that they would not operate against Poles in disputed district near Vilna. I am requesting mission of investigation which leaves shortly for Baltic countries to examine this question to see whether such an understanding between Poles and Lithuanians is possible but of course with no power to negotiate.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

² Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/7

[Document 48]

***The Secretary General of the Commission to
Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Major Royall Tyler³***

1. The Commissioners on March 12th⁴ approved the sending of a mission to Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Warwick Greene, and including the following personnel:

Major Alvin Devereux, 305th F. A.
Lt. [Commander John A.] Gade, U. S. N., Naval Attaché at
Copenhagen.
Lt. Ludlow B. Alexander.
Lt. Ivan W. Wahren.
2nd Lt. A. H. Stonestreet.
Army Field Clerk Louis Rosenthal.
Army Field Clerk J. Holbrook [Chapman].

MARCH 12, 1919.

³ Member of the Political and Economic Intelligence Section of the American Commission.

⁴ See minutes of the meeting of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, March 12, 1919, [vol. XI, p. 114](#).⁴

Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/35

[Document 49]

Major Royall Tyler to Colonel S. D. Embick[5](#)

PARIS, 10 April 1919.

Subject: Personnel of Baltic party.

1. Lt. Col. Warwick Greene left Paris on March 23, at the head of a Mission to the Baltic Provinces.
2. The following is a list of the Baltic Party:
 - Lt. Col. Warwick Greene
 - Lt. Col. E. J. Dawley
 - Maj. Alvin Devereux
 - Lt. [Commander John A.] Gade, U. S. N., Naval Attaché at Copenhagen
 - Lt. Ludlow B. Alexander
 - 2nd Lt. A. H. Stonestreet
 - 2nd Lt. Robert Hale, Inf.
 - Army Field Clerk Louis Rosenthal
 - Army Field Clerk J. Holbrook Chapman
 - Corp. Joseph B. Saliunas
3. The party is now stationed as follows:—Libau, via AmLegation, Copenhagen:
 - Lt. Col. Warwick Greene
 - Lt. Col. E. J. Dawley
 - Maj. Alvin Devereux
 - 2nd Lt. A. H. Stonestreet
 - 2nd Lt. Robert Hale
 - Army Field Clerk Louis Rosenthal
 - Corporal Joseph B. Saliunasvia AmLegation, Stockholm:
 - Lieut. Commander John A. Gade
 - Lieut. Ludlow B. Alexander
 - Lieut. Sollinger

Official telegrams should be sent to Libau, via AmLegation, Copenhagen.

R. TYLER

NOTE: A report from Lt. Col. Greene shows that a Lieut. Sollinger has joined the party, presumably at Copenhagen.

5 Adviser on military questions, American Commission.

861.00/4298: Telegram

[Document 50]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, undated.

[Received April 15, 1919—3:62 a.m. (sic)]

1609. Following for information of Department. “412, [Copenhagen,] 12. Following from Greene.

‘6, [Libau,] April 11. [1.] Reference Baltic blockade which prohibits supply by sea of German force operating against Bolsheviks Courland, following submitted after careful consideration situation with Lettish provisional government, British Mission Libau, Admiral Cowan, Commander British Baltic naval forces, and German command in Courland.

2. Sixth German (Army?) Corps consisting First Guard and Iron Division under General von der Goltz strength 73,000 occupying Courland and with 3500 German Baits and 3500 Lettish troops all under supreme (?) (?) (?) German command (?) front (?) * German force is here with tacit Entente consent in accordance with article 12 of Armistice and its departure before arrival of other adequate forces will deliver automatically entire Courland to Bolsheviks.

4. [sic] Since establishment of blockade March 6 the sole means of supply is by rail from base at Konigsberg with impaired rolling stock about 400 kilometers.

5. German force consists three-months volunteers. For many their time is now up requiring return to Germany and consequent transportation of replacements from Germany.

6. German command states prior to blockade 5 ships aggregating 7500 tons sufficient for supply. Further, that at present 5,000 tons

operating from Stettin, Dantzig and Königsberg will be adequate for Nels [sic].

7. As long as Germany maintains a field force against Bolsheviks, as in this case, conforming to terms of Armistice, the essential element is that she be accorded adequate facility for supply said forces, which facility does not exist by land.

8. In view of above I recommend that subject to complete control and inspection of shipping of cargoes to and from Courland, same to vest in commander of British Baltic naval forces, the restriction against supply of German forces in Courland be removed insofar as will be necessary to allow said forces to supply themselves by sea with food, clothing, munitions [of] war, supplies and replacements as are necessary to maintain their forces now operating against Bolsheviks.

9. In regard the above urgent and pressing. Greene.' Grant-Smith."

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

*
_ Part of message, about eight cipher groups, totally undecipherable; repetition has been requested. Telegraph Room. [Footnote in the original.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/4: Telegram

[Document 51]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

COPENHAGEN, April 13, 1919.
[Received 9:10 p.m.]

313. Following from [Greene, Libau.] "Greene 7, April 12. I came first to Libau and have remained here because present situation in Latvia is more critical than in other territories we are to cover owing (1) to important section of country including Riga being held by Bolsheviks, (2) the presence of a dominant German military force on which security of country must depend until other arrangements are made, (3) intensity of local intrigue in which Germans, Baits, Bolsheviks, Lettish, *bourgeoisie*, Jews and Lettish Socialists all have a hand.

- (1) My 67 recommended relaxation blockade and supply of German forces. This very important. Lieutenant Colonel Dawley making careful study military situation which will be cabled you after his return from front.
- (2) British have naval situation at Libau and Windau well in hand. Strength varies but I have seen one light cruiser and six destroyers at same time in Libau. Admiral Cowan most helpful in every way to our Mission.
- (3) A British Mission with Major Keenan as chief, one captain and some civilians established at Libau. Grant Watson, unofficial political representative of British Foreign Office, was here on our arrival but left for Lithuania.
- (4) Foodstuffs are scarce with high prices and diminishing stocks. There is still some flour at Libau but is reported that at Windau, Tukum and Mitau supplies exhausted. Fats everywhere exceedingly scarce. Probably considerable food secreted but will come out now that American food is entering. Arrival *Lake Wimico*

with 1,200 tons flour for immediate needs together with officers American Food Administration has immensely helped situation and is first material aid from Entente or America. Can we count on allotment foodstuffs for Baltic States as per bulletin number 3 AFA page 23? This very important as sections freed from Bolsheviks must be provided with adequate food ration. Otherwise we are nourishing bolshevism behind fighting front. From reliable source I understand that current feeling among unemployed and landless is that if they must starve they prefer to do so under Bolshevik regime where they can rob the *bourgeoisie* and rich.

(5) Germans dominate situation as they are here in force and Lettish Army is insignificant as military factor. Germans now state they are here under article 12 of the armistice,⁸ although they at first claimed to us they were an army of occupation. General von der Goltz commands all forces operating in Courland, and is Governor of Libau. In addition he controls police and telegraph and German Military Intelligence Service Bureau of railroad. Without Germans country would be quickly submerged by Bolsheviks. This naturally creates most difficult and anomalous situation, as Lettish people historically are anti-German, and this feeling has been reinforced by their experience of German Military Intelligence Service operation during war. Von der Goltz informs us that Germans here under article 12 armistice, and also for the international fight against Bolsheviks which threatens western civilization and western culture. We shall telegraph you much more fully regarding all above after Dawley and I return from interior and front.

(6) The present *de facto* government of Latvia is extremely weak, and represents no mandate from the people of Latvia. It would be overthrown immediately if there were popular election. It is self-constituted government by party leaders and men who took things into own hands at Riga and were later driven from that city by Bolsheviks advance. It was recognized by Germans December. Both Baits and Socialists are hostile too and *bourgeoisie* give only grudging support. At same time it is only organization we have dealings with and should be supported as *de facto* national government or organization of Latvia, but should not be recognized for present. It should be treated with, however, on all questions concerning food import, blockade, finances, etc. Ulmanis, Prime Minister, and Walters, Minister of Home Affairs,

only capable men they have in Cabinet. Ulmanis makes good appearance and seems to have considerable energy and shrewdness.

(8^{*}) My present recommendations are: (1) Is [*Lifting*] of blockade by sea for German Military forces operating in Courland. To be controlled by British Admiral. (2) Steady importations of foodstuffs in accordance with A. R. A.⁹ program and relief for unemployed and children in Libau and Windau. (3) Provisional relaxation of blockade of Libau under proper control, in order that raw materials may be imported and industrial life recommenced and unemployment be reduced. We have list of raw material immediately needed. Million dollars to the *de facto* government of Latvia to be secured by timber in national forests in Latvia which was formerly Russian crown or state property. Finance expert should be sent immediately in order study this matter. Greene.”

GRANT-SMITH

⁷ See telegram *supra*.

⁸ Vol. II, pp. 1[☞], 4[☞].

^{*} Number of Par. came as "8". [Footnote in the original.]

⁹ American Relief Administration.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/9: Telegram

[Document 52]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***^{[10](#)}

COPENHAGEN, April 21, 1919—4 p.m.
[Received April 22—2:20 p.m.]

324. Following from Greene, Libau. “Greene 9, April 20. 1. On my return Libau on April 16 after 6-day trip to front, Bait Landeswehr troops attempted to arrest at railroad station General Missin, Lettish Chief of Staff, and four officers and orderlies who had accompanied and conducted our trip. Attempt was made while they were with us, getting out of our special car. I refused to allow arrest, asking German officers by what authority action was being taken. Shortly afterwards, Rittmeister Armitstead, a Bait officer in Russian Army formerly, presented himself stating he represented Committee of Safety of local front troops; that fearing ministry of provisional government would turn Bolshevik they had taken steps to secure safety of front by removing these ministers; that negotiations were being conducted respecting establishment of provisional cabinet in the interest of all classes of population without any exceptions; that the Committee desired to inform the American Mission of the events which had occurred.^{[11](#)} I declined to enter into political discussion with Bait officer while armed Bait soldiers without credentials were interfering with our party in presence of German troops and officers representing the supreme police military power of General Von der Goltz, and if the government had been overturned and there was disorder, then the exclusive police power at this station. I also refused to submit to further interference or arrests of members of our joint party unless by authority of General Von der Goltz. I took General Missin to our house where he now is. I am informing General Von der Goltz of occurrence at station and that General Missin is a guest at our house.

2. In Libau I found that Bait Landeswehr troops from the front, apparently mostly of Baron Manteuffel's battalion known as Attacking Battalion which was in neighborhood of Mitau when we first went to front, had come to Libau by train and on afternoon April 16 had deposed ministry by force. Prime Minister Ulmanis and Minister of Finance were with British Mission and three ministers were in asylum on British destroyer and Minister of Home Affairs Walters and Minister of Supplies were prisoners. Sahlitz, Minister of Defense, who accompanied us on trip to front, had left our party at Preklum. He is now at large in interior.

3. Libau was heavily patrolled both by German and Landeswehr troops. I personally witnessed one scene of violence in streets by Bait soldiers who were brutally arresting an apparently unarmed civilian. But in general there was little apparent violence though atmosphere very tense. So far as we know one Lett was killed at government printing establishment, one at navy yard and several Letts and Baites reported killed in fighting at Durben.

4. It was reported that at navy yard German Westphalian troops of Captain Pfeiffer's command insolently marched to headquarters Lettish troops with band playing, disarmed and ejected all officers and soldiers, killed one orderly and plundered and ransacked place. Letts have withdrawn to woods close to navy yard and are instructed not to fire on Germans. Dawley has visited navy yard and confirms looting and wrecking property, killing of orderly, etc., but we have not as yet positive evidence what troops committed outrage or antecedent evidence.

5. General Von der Goltz' attitude: He does not wish to interfere with interior politics of Latvia; as supreme police power he bears responsibility for order in Fortress Libau which order he is in position to maintain.

6. Facts are that front troops operating under his supreme command came to Fortress Libau by military railroad and by force of arms deposed ministry of provisional government, interfering decisively in interior policies of Libau, and with bloodshed and violence.

7. We knew Bait plot was brewing but had not expected it to break so soon. Various events related in our written reports precipitated matters. I believe *coup d'état* was executed with connivance and assistance older Baits and the Germans by young Baits who had fought excellently against bolshevism at front. If *coup* fails, rashness of gallant young hotheads will be deplored by the Baits and Germans. If it succeeds the profit will largely accrue to Germans and Bait barons. Young Baits say *coup* was necessary to save country from interior bolshevism; that national government of Latvia continues and will be reconstituted in the interests of all parties. With a few this is genuine but the dominant motives of Germans and older and abler Baits are to embarrass Allies and return to power the old Bait baron regime, somewhat modified to suit new conditions but fundamentally the same.

8. Deposed provisional government was inherently very weak. It failed to include Bait and Jewish representation and so had their intense hostility. This failure was mistake. It was self-constituted, and so its title as a popular government was defective. It failed to secure help from the Entente and so could not gain popular confidence. It asserted itself too much against German domination and so was allowed to be extinguished. But it was a *de facto* government and the best foundation on which to have built a stable and representative government with the necessary help from outside which was essential. Its violent overturn by young soldiers is a serious reflection on General Von der Goltz' responsibility under article 12 of armistice, is an affront to Allies and crime for which there should be a reckoning.

9. In eyes of common people of Latvia the old tyranny in all its rigor backed by armed might of Germany has returned in defiance of Allies and America. Lettish soldiers have been instructed not to resist and so far have shown admirable fortitude and forbearance under intense provocation and almost intolerable circumstances. For moment people are quiet. They look westward for help from the democracies or eastward from bolshevism. But their patience will not last indefinitely. They will not tolerate baron dominance and will eventually resist the new regime with bloodshed. In proportion as their hope of help from West dies they will turn Red.

10. We are sending full written reports covering military and political situation to Paris by Colonel Solbert, military attaché at Copenhagen, whom I have asked to come to Libau on British destroyer, or by Colonel Dawley. A British destroyer will take one of these two officers to Danzig. Our 10, April 20,¹² covers military situation with definite recommendations covering both military and political matters and will, we believe, furnish sufficient information on local situation to enable you to take action you deem advisable.

11. Naval forces at Libau have been increased by arrival two French destroyers. It is important that American destroyer or tender be sent.

12. Under present circumstances I advise against sending of further food supplies until a definite policy to meet the grave situation here has been adopted. Greene.”

GRANT-SMITH

¹⁰ This telegram was badly garbled in transmission; it has been corrected on the basis of copy enclosed with report of Lieutenant Colonel Greene to the Commission, April 23; received April 28 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/10).

¹¹ The overthrow of the Provisional Government of Latvia on April 16 was reported by Lieutenant Colonel Greene in telegram No. 8, April 16, forwarded by the Chargé in Denmark in telegram No. 319, April 17, [*Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 675*](#) .

¹² *Infra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/91: Telegram

[Document 53]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***¹³

COPENHAGEN, April 22, 1919.
[Received 6 p.m.]

325A. From Greene, Libau. "Greene 10, April 20. 1. Following report on military situation based on personal inspection of front troops and situation, careful investigation information from now deposed Latvian ministry and German command. Military situation of Latvia is critical. Front held against Bolsheviks across Kurland is in general Aa river held as follows: Gulf of Riga to Mitau exclusive by 200 German Baits, 1,000 Letts, 300 Russians all effectives; Mitau to Bausk, both inclusive, by 7,000 German effectives of 6th German Reserve Corps consisting Iron and First Guard Reserve Divisions.

2. Critical points of line are Schlock, Kalenzem, Mitau, and Bausk. Garrisons maintained at these points with small outposts and cavalry patrols between. At Kalenzem, Mitau and Bausk bridgeheads are held to depth of about 5 kilometers. Dispositions generally very suitable. Aa River now free from ice and natural line of defense. Terrain characterized generally flat, Mitau to sea wooded and swampy. Roads few and poor except metalled road Riga, Mitau, Shavli, Tilsit. Standard gauge railroad Libau to Mitau parallels front Tuckum, Mitau, Sanischki, Szawle with narrow gauge to front from Sessau and Sanischki in south of sector. Standard gauge Tuckum to Schlock intact but not yet in operation. Right flank Guard Division in air and critical. Intelligence shows concentration of Bolsheviks opposite Schlock, Mitau, Bausk and exposed right flank. Stated by Germans only poor condition roads prevents serious offensive from this flank in order completely roll up force. Contact maintained with Lithuanian forces but not cooperating between them. But for

defection local troops and Germans, doubt possibility Bolshevik offensive that cannot be met and held by present forces.

3. Bolshevik forces on this front, including defenses of Riga, estimated variously 30,000 to 50,000 all arms. They have some artillery and appear well supplied with munition. Believe their morale, discipline and organization worse than poor though some Red regiments appear well supplied and officered. Their numbers in nowise indicate their fighting efficiency. Information indicates their forces on this front have been and are being augmented by detachment of regiments from other fronts, notably Estonian.

4. Total organized forces in Kurland, including interior garrisons, troops in training, supply services, etc., are 3,800 Baltic Landeswehr, 3,500 Letts and 300 Russians, 20,000 6th German Reserve Corps, grand total 27,600 of all arms with 65 guns light and medium calibre, 500 light and heavy machine guns and 27 airplanes.

5. German Baltic troops are officered mostly by Germans, Letts and Russians by ex-Russian officers. Morale and discipline good. All are of good physique and soldier material. Lett troops are the least well-trained, officered and equipped. Morale and discipline of German troops as such not good though command professes to have situation in hand. All forces including Germans are volunteers.

6. April 16, headquarters building of Lettish training battalion navy yard Libau looted, sacked and guards disarmed and officers' quarters looted circumstantially by German troops and Latvian Cabinet expelled by so-called Committee of Safety representative of German Baits. No explanation from German command to date or information as to effect of this on troops or situation at front.

7. Entire front and zone of operations from Gulf of Riga to Bauska is tactically and strategically under German General Von der Goltz, who is also military governor of Libau and at present the only authority with power in Latvia.

8. There seems to have been no distinct agreement between Lettish Government and German command as to extent of zone of

operations or administration of territory not included therein.

9. Question of supply of and blockade against German troops covered by my 7 [6], April 11.¹⁴ Attention invited to revision of strength therein. Baltic Landeswehr and Russians are maintained as to supply equipment, arms, munitions, clothing entirely by Germany to account of Latvian Government. Letts are maintained partly by Germany and part by Latvian Government. Some machine guns, rifles, and ammunition have been supplied by British and further limited supply available here from same source.

10. Germans employ requisition jointly with Latvian Government under pseudo agreement with latter and under nominal control by joint German-Latvian requisition commission.

11. Lettish provisional government had proclaimed general mobilization which was refused by German command on ground that general arming of Letts dangerous to Germans and to security of entire country against Bolsheviks. I did not entirely concur in this, but did and do believe a promiscuous arming of people dangerous. This situation more complicated now in view of paragraph 6 *supra*.

12. German command states it contemplates no operations aside from possible improvement of communications.

13. German forces are *de facto* preserving order in Kurland by holding Bolsheviks back under color article 12 of armistice. The deeper reasons for or advantages to Germany from maintenance armed force outside Germany not here considered. Immediate departure of German forces will deliver country to bolshevism unless replaced by other forces. No provisional government will be able to finance, arm, clothe, or equip force adequate to hold Bolsheviks. Their available strength by general mobilization all factions Letts and Baits in Kurland estimated at 8,000 in addition those now in service but to accomplish this will require complete direction, instruction, finance, equipment, clothing, and war supplies of every nature by Entente.

14. Opportunity seems favorable to progressive mobilization of manpower of liberated Lettland at available bases Libau and Windau under protection naval forces; Baltic units to be organized at one base and Lettish units at other.

15. This course will require from Entente rigid definition of Germany's position here, the attitude she is to assume toward creating such force and help to be afforded by her to this end and explicitly her part in maintaining line against Bolshevists until arrival of newly created Latvian force to relieve said German force of responsibility to Entente for preservation order and checking advance bolshevism.

16. I therefore recommend to consideration Peace Commission project of creation Latvian national army by progressive mobilization from all of Lettland, capable maintenance government and order against bolshevism, Entente to guarantee direction, instruction, finance, supply, equipment and war supplies of every sort under adequate organization mission from one nation either Great Britain or United States, this for entirely non-political considerations.

17. Alternative to this is occupation of Kurland by Entente force which will at once release German troops now here and rid this country of Teutonic forceful influence. Greene."

GRANT-SMITH

¹³ This telegram was badly garbled in transmission; it has been corrected on the basis of copy enclosed with report of Lieutenant Colonel Greene to the Commission, April 23; received April 28 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/10).

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 138 [Pg. 138 includes portions of [Doc. 49](#) and [Doc. 50](#)].

Paris Peace Conf.185.1722/6

[Document 54]

***Mr. R. H. Lord and Mr. S. E. Morison to the
Commissioners Plenipotentiary***

[PARIS,] APRIL 23, 1919.

Subject: Recommendations for dealing with the situation in Latvia,
and in Esthonia and Lithuania.^{[15](#)}

Statement:

Lieut.-Col. Warwick Greene, U. S. A., head of the American Mission to Baltic Countries, has confirmed previous reports on the situation in Latvia.

On April 16, the Provisional Government of Latvia was deposed by a military *coup d'état* at Libau, effected by German Bait troops. Lettish troops were disarmed and interned, government offices seized, and the leading members of the Provisional Government either imprisoned or driven to take refuge with officers of the Associated Governments. A Balt "Committee of Safety" was set up. The whole affair took place with the connivance and support of General von der Goltz, commander of the German Army ostensibly defending Latvia under Art. XII of the November Armistice.

Acquiescence in these acts of violence would expose the Entente to the charge of supporting the German Baits. Immediate action is necessary both to defend the people against further violence, uphold the prestige of the Entente, and prevent the Letts from embracing Bolshevism as the sole alternative to Germanism. As the Associated Powers are unwilling to send troops to Latvia, the following action is recommended:

Recommendation:

(1.) That the Supreme Council transmit through representatives of the Associated Governments now at Libau, to (the “Committee of Safety”, or) whatever *de facto* authority exists at Libau, and to General von der Goltz, a demand that the imprisoned members of the Provisional Government of Latvia, and all officials and troops formerly acting under its authority, be immediately released; that all arms and other seized property be returned; and that this Provisional Government be restored at once to its previous functions and be respected as the *de facto* government of Latvia.

That General von der Goltz be ordered to refrain from any interference in the internal administration of Latvia, under pain of having his communications with Germany severed.

Statement (2):

The events in Latvia are the direct result of the Entente’s policy of using German troops to defend a strongly anti-German country against the Bolsheviks. The same policy has been followed in Lithuania. Art. XII of the November Armistice, providing for the eventual evacuation of the Baltic region by the Germans, will expire automatically with the signature of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace. Unless an article on this subject is inserted in said treaty, the Germans will be able to claim that they have an indefinite license to remain. Both the Letts and the Lithuanians wish to get rid of their German “protectors” as soon as possible, and claim that they can defend themselves against the Bolsheviks if given material aid.

Esthonia is included in the stipulations suggested below, since the Germans may invade that country before the ratification of the Preliminary Treaty. Evacuation must be supervised by Allied representatives in order to prevent a recurrence of the illegal acts of last November and December.

Recommendation (2):

That, in accordance with the suggestion made by Mr. Lansing at a session of the Council of Five on April 19th,¹⁶ it be stipulated in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace that the German troops now in the Baltic

Provinces and Lithuania evacuate those countries; that this evacuation begin immediately and be completed within a period of weeks; that it be carried out under the supervision of Allied representatives; that until the completion of the evacuation there shall be no interference with the civil administration of these countries, or with such measures for material defense as may be adopted by the Provisional Government of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Statement (3):

Collective recognition by the Associated Governments of the Provisional Governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia should no longer be delayed. If the German troops are to be ordered out, and these countries left to defend themselves, we must necessarily lend all the moral support that we can to their governments.

Esthonia has already elected, by universal suffrage, a constituent assembly that will meet within a few days. Conditions are not sufficiently settled in the other countries to make elections possible.

Some reservation to protect Russia's rights and interests in these countries must be included in their recognition; but it should be made clear that no disposition will be made of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania without the consent of their peoples. The Conference; Politique Russe at Paris has already expressed itself virtually in favor of such a recognition as is here suggested.

Recommendation (3):

That the Supreme Council recognize the Provisional Government of Latvia, as it existed before the *coup d'état* of April 16th, as an independent *de facto* government; and that a similar recognition be extended to the Provisional Governments of Esthonia and Lithuania. Any declaration or recognition made to the governments in question should contain the provision that the final status of these three countries is to be settled only in accordance with the wishes of the population as expressed through properly elected constituent assemblies; and that, as soon as a recognized Russian government

exists, the Allied and Associated Powers will use their good offices to facilitate an amicable settlement of the relations of these countries with Russia.

Statement (4):

The three countries under consideration are in a desperate economic and financial situation. They have little equipment or munitions for their armies. In order to permit them to organize forces sufficient for their defense, before the German evacuation takes place, they must be given arms and equipment. Questions regarding supplies and credits for these countries could be referred to Baltic Commission of the Peace Conference which, it is hoped, will shortly be appointed.

Recommendation (4):

That, in order to assure the defense of these three countries against the Bolsheviks, in view of the impending evacuation by the German troops, the Allied and Associated Governments should undertake to supply Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the necessary military equipment, food, and credit.

Statement (5):

The Paris delegates of Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania have requested the Peace Conference to require Germany in the Preliminary i Treaty to indemnify them for German depredations in violation of international law and of Article XIV of the November Armistice. As we have neither the time nor the facilities to investigate these quesitions immediately, they could best be referred by the Treaty to a mixed commission.

Recommendation (5):

That an article be inserted in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, ensuring that the question of the reparations due from Germany to Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, be referred to a mixed commission or other appropriate body for decision.

NOTE: These recommendations are submitted at this moment without waiting for the appointment of the Inter-Allied Baltic Commission recently agreed upon by the Council of Four;¹⁷ because:

- (a) The situation created by the German *coup d'état* at Libau demands immediate action;
- (b) Articles relating to the German evacuation and the question of reparations ought to be inserted in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace.
- (c) The provisional recognition of the three governments in question and the granting of material assistance to them are measures which can no longer be delayed if the Germans are to be compelled to evacuate these territories.

Practically identical recommendations are being made to the British delegation by Sir Esme Howard.

¹⁵ This memorandum was called to the attention of the Commissioners at their meeting of April 24, 1919, [vol. XI, pp. 162](#) , [164](#) .

¹⁶ See FM-6, minute 5, [vol. IV, p. 589](#) .

¹⁷ No minutes of the meeting of April 16, at which this resolution was passed, have been found in the files of the Department.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1722/7^{1/2}

[Document 55]

Colonel O. N. Solbert, Acting for the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene), to General T. H. Bliss

PARIS, April 28, 1919.

Subject: Information and recommendations concerning Latvia.

It is requested to present in condensed form certain information, and especially recommendations, and reasons for same, concerning the present crisis in Latvia. The following is such a presentation based upon the appended detailed reports¹⁸ of the Mission under Lt-Col. Greene, my verbal discussion of the situation with the Mission, and Mr. Ulmanis, Prime Minister of the Lettish cabinet, and Gen. V. D. Goltz during my visit in Libau.

General Statement. The German military forces enjoy their legal status in Latvia under Art. 12 of the November armistice. The front and zone of operation against the Bolshevist forces are under the command of Gen. Von der Goltz, who is also military governor of Libau. His is the only authority in the land that is coupled with executive power. There seems to be no distinct agreement between the Lettish government and the German command as to the extent of the zone of operation or of the administration of the territory not included therein.

Theoretically, at least, the supreme political authority in Latvia inheres in the *de facto* Provisional government appointed by the Latvian National Council at Riga, Nov. 18, 1918. It consists of twelve members, all Letts; the Baits, Jews and Russians not being represented. The government enjoys no mandate from the people and is entitled to consideration as nothing more than a *de facto* governing body. The German high command has, however, expressly

recognized by treaty the Latvian government as the theoretical sovereign.

Overthrow of the Lettish Government. At Libau on April 16th the Lettish ministry was forcibly deposed and its offices occupied by a battalion of Baits just returned from the front. Two members of the ministry were arrested, the rest mainly took refuge under allied protection. German troops also disarmed Lettish officers and soldiers and looted their quarters.

According to statement "the office of Gen. V. d. Goltz was not informed of these events. However he finally gave orders to remove the pickets of Bait troops from the streets, although not wishing to interfere with the interior politics of Latvia, at the same time, being in supreme police power, he had to bear the responsibility for order in the fortress of Libau."

The reasons given by the Baits for their action was that the cabinet was not representative (being composed only of Letts), that it had failed to undertake the establishing agreement between the various groups of the population (Letts, Baits, Jews and Russians), that it had levied unreasonable requisitions, passed objectionable land reforms, instituted a senseless financial policy, and that it was not seriously combatting Bolshevism.

If the German command did not directly connive in this military *coup* with the Baits, it at least, by certain omissions to uphold order when Bait and German troops acted with violence against the Lettish troops and ministry, did look upon it with favor. It may have taken the latter course to be free to disown complicity should subsequent allied action deem such course desirable.

Several days after the *coup* the Baits proposed a military *directoire* of two men to form a cabinet. The two officers at the front (a Balt and a Lett) offered this refused to act in such capacity as the allied missions would have nothing to do with this whole affair.

Food distribution was temporarily held up as the government which had contracted for its payment had ceased to exist. This had the

effect of discrediting to a great extent the action of the Baits, and giving the people hope of an allied opinion on the *coup* so as to clear the atmosphere regarding their relations both with the Germans and the Baits.

The present situation is that the Letts (who form about 70% of the population) are waiting for allied action. If allied governments countenance the forcible usurpation of the government by the Baits (who form about 7% of the population), the Letts will probably take matters into their own hands and rise up throughout the country and exterminate the long hated, power- and land-privileged Baits. Such an uprising of the Letts would be looked upon by the Germans as a Bolshevik revolution which they in turn would take as a pretext to put the Letts down with the sword. The present is a critical period.

Recommendation. That the allied powers notify the German command and the Lettish government (through their prime minister) that they wish the reestablishment of the former ministry, but that this request be couched in such terms that the reinstated cabinet will include members of the different races of Latvia to make it representative. This to be done for humanitarian reasons in order to prevent revolution and bloodshed. The fact that the former cabinet was not representative was a weakness—it was taxation without representation. Such allied action would also clearly demonstrate to the German government that the allies will not countenance their exploitation of smaller races, and would be a guarantee against future repetition of such a *coup*.

The Military Situation. The Military Situation is paramount. About one-third of the territory claimed by Latvia is cleared of Bolsheviks. The line along the Aa River, from the Gulf of Riga to Lithuania, is held against them by German, Bait and Lett troops (20,000 German, 3,800 Bait, 3,000 Lett, and 300 Russian troops). The deciding elements in this fight are the German troops and the German command. The withdrawal of the German force, unless replaced by one of equal strength, will deliver the country to Bolshevism. The advantages accruing to Germany by maintaining her military force here are:

1. Protection of Germany from Bolshevism.
2. Maintenance of an army in being, under service conditions outside of Germany, and ready for an emergency.
3. Holding their “bridges to the East”, or retaining German influence in the Baltic littoral as a commercial “jumping off” ground for Russia. Germany now faces economically to the East due to forced circumstances and threatened allied boycott. Germany’s logical road to Russia since the erection of the buffer states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., lies therefore through Latvia. Besides keeping her own road open by controlling German influence in Latvia and Russia’s only ice-free harbor, Libau, she also blocks the only gate of entrance for Allied commerce to Russia.

Recommendations.

1. To send Allied troops to replace German troops. This being out of the question;
2. The formation of a Lettish National Army. Although the Lettish Government has proclaimed a general mobilization, the German command has refused to allow this to be carried out as dangerous to the Germans and to the security of the country against Bolshevism. The Letts hate the Germans, and the Germans maintain that a great portion of the Lettish population has Bolshevist tendencies. It is estimated that 8,000 troops, besides the 7,500 now in service, between the ages of 18–35 could be mobilized. Progressive mobilization as Latvian territory is regained shows expectation of an increase to 20,000. To accomplish this would require complete direction, instruction, financing, equipment of food, clothing and war supplies of every nature by the Allied governments. Such a course would also require from the entente a rigid definition of Germany’s position here, the attitude she is to assume toward creating such a force, and the help to be afforded by her to this end, and explicitly her part in maintaining aggression against the Bolsheviks until such time as the newly [mobilized?] Latvian force can relieve the said German force of its responsibility to the Allies for the preservation of order.

If this recommendation is not considered favorably;

3. To definitely assign to Germany the task of keeping Bolshevism out of Latvia and its coast from where it could better reach other countries. Along with such responsibilities must go the authority of German independent action, the privilege of supply by sea, the acknowledged moral support of the Allies, and a recognition of the advantages accruing to Germany as a result of success.

Whatever course is taken, there should be a co-ordination of efforts in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Future Military Operations. The German command states that it contemplates no further operations than improving communications. The spirit and desire of the Baits, Letts and Russians at the front is to advance and relieve Riga. The situation in Riga is desperate. Reports indicate atrocities beyond belief, starvation universal and disease rampant. Coincident with relief must go food for the population. It is the opinion that the forces on the front, if the Germans are willing, could advance and take Riga, especially with naval assistance.

O. N. SOLBERT

¹⁸ Not attached to file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/42a: Telegram

[Document 56]

***Colonel O. N. Solbert to the Minister in Denmark
(Hapgood)***

PARIS, April 30, 1919—11 p.m.

51. Inform Greene. An interallied Baltic Commission was created today to sit in Paris, so that this end of his work will be better taken care of. Uncertain as to fate of proposition for Lettish National Army. Information and recommendations have received considerable attention from Commissioners. I came here at the right moment. Work of Mission has received favorable comment. I leave for London tomorrow.

SOLBERT

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/20

[Document 57]

***The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to the Secretary General of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

LIBAU, May 3, 1919.

Subject: Report on Esthonia number 1.

1. There is attached hereto the first report of this Mission on Esthonia. This report has been prepared by Lieutenant Commander John A. Gade, U.S.N. whom I sent to Finland and Esthonia in charge of part of our mission. I have been over this report very carefully with Commander Gade, and consider it to be very comprehensive, and well worked out. I am forwarding it as our official report, and take all responsibility for the statements and recommendations contained therein.

WARWICK GREENE

[Enclosure—Extracts]

Question A1—Do you recommend that Esthonia (a) be recognized?

Recognition would for the present be an unwise step. Esthonia's case is entirely different from Finland's. Finland has a well organized, capable Government, used to manage its own affairs, plenty of trained and experienced forces to draw from, a strong leader, national consciousness, in fact, has a people thoroughly capable of taking its place among the Nations of the World. The reverse may in many respects be said to be the truth of Esthonia. The Nation has had little or no experience in self government, and there is little to base one's belief upon that it will succeed. The men framing the

Constitution and forming the National Council have had little training and many of them are lacking in education. The educated classes belong unfortunately principally to the German element, now all but excluded from Legislation. The Paets Ministry has unquestionably succeeded not alone in holding the Country together but, by the assistance of Finnish, Russian and Scandinavian troops, of practically cleaning the Country of Bolsheviki. It has leaned upon a coalition of burger and rather conservative elements. The new elections have gone against it. Steadily increasing radical tendencies are evident. The Social-Democrats have unexpectedly elected the largest number of representatives and everything indicates that they do not intend to govern with the strong policy of the Paets Ministry, but rather to pursue methods and pass legislation of a most radical character.

The recognition of Esthonia as an independent country, separated from Russia, complicates naturally the Russian situation considerably, in spite of any commercial or economic agreements which may be entered into by an Esthonian Republic. Russia can not exist without some Baltic Ports, ice-free ones included among them. With Finland gone, the recognition of Esthonian independence becomes doubly perilous from the point of view of future Russian peace.

It is further very doubtful whether Esthonia has within her borders sufficient resources or possibilities to enable her to finance her government. Some of her own bankers say not. For some years to come it seems out of the question. Agriculture and such industries to which she principally looks for her national income will for some time be so disorganized that the profits to be derived will be considerably below the normal. Abuses of long standing will still be felt. The great landowners who now are the capitalists and whose capital does not merely lie in the land, but in their other and various resources, will all disappear as national assets as soon as they are deprived of their land. The large estates proving less remunerative, the country will lack its present ability for payment. On the other hand the flax resources are valuable, as also the timber lands, sufficient for decades of export, and the Russian Government is said to have derived some 40–50 millions of roubles of yearly income

from Esthonia. Mineral resources are valuable, and new finds are still being made.

The country is unquestionably worthy of assistance in various forms. It has fought its own hard fight against Bolshevism with courage and persistency. It feels it has fought it for the rest of the World as for itself. It can not and will not continue unless the Allies help with money, food, and war materials. It has earned the right to manage its own affairs. It is hindering Bolshevism from spreading through its harbors to Scandinavia. Unless help comes at once it will come too late. The people and army should officially be informed of such assistance as will be rendered, in order to allay and counteract any growth of disaffection at the Front. The Government, as well as the people, should clearly understand under what conditions and for what purposes help is rendered, as well as also that any recognition of Esthonian independence is impossible until Russia is peaceful and the problem considered jointly.

It is very evident that the Government has as yet but very imperfect control of forces active and powerful below the surface. The wildest and most communistic promises were made during the recent electioneering in order to gain Socialist and Social-Revolutionary votes, and the inability to keep them may result in considerable political shipwreck. Not only was all the free land promised to all who voted the Socialist ticket, but the voters were assured they could select the land anywhere they wished.

The problem of Esthonian independence would be more facile if the Country could gain in size and resources by making common cause with its southern neighbors, Latvia and Lithuania. The railroad system, as also a number of other government undertakings, were planned and carried out by the Russian Empire as common and unified systems for the entire Baltic provincial district (Finland excepted). Owing to racial hatred, any intimate future political union between Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is unthinkable.

Esthonia has always been under foreign dominion. Dane, German, Swede, Pole and Russian have each in turn ruled the country. The people have never dreamt of self-rule, the Baltic Baron element alone

doing about as it liked. As a result, the intoxicating effect of the new found independence may lead to abuse and intemperance in government.

The demand for independence is now universal, while a protectorate by the League of Nations would be very acceptable. Fear of what has taken place in Russia makes the Esthonians turn from any Russian federation, while a German protectorate is unthinkable.

The Baltic Barons propose a new government based upon the Baltic States temporarily being protected by the League of Nations, and when order is reestablished in Russia, becoming a member of a new Russian Federation. Greater Russia's diplomatic representatives should also represent the Baltic States, but the latter should have their own foreign commercial and financial agents. They should have their own diet which will decide their form of government. The Baltic States should be represented in the Russian Capital by a Legation. There should likewise be a Russian Minister accredited to the Baltic States, with the right to veto any law infringing the Constitution of the Baltic States. They should have complete autonomy as to domestic administration, their own economic system and coinage. All present public Russian property in the Baltic States, such as railroads, public buildings, etc., should be turned over without remuneration to the Government of the Baltic States. The Baltic States would in turn pay a proportion, to be agreed upon, of the Russian public debt, contracted prior to the Bolshevik revolution, as well as its portion of foreign diplomatic representation. The Baltic States should receive damages for all they have suffered from Russian troops and Bolshevik invasions during the years 1918–19. The Baltic States should have complete financial and economic autonomy. In case of war the Baltic States and the Gulf of Riga should be considered as neutral territory.

Esthonia should not be recognized until some guarantee be given that the owners of the large estates be permitted to retain their homes with some parcel of ground however small, as [*and?*] also receive compensation for such land as is appropriated.

Do you recommend that Esthonia (b) be given food without payment?

Esthonia seems worthy of receiving food without payment. It is even more true of Esthonia than of Germany, that the best way to stop the spread of Bolshevism is to provide the people with food. Lack of food and lack of land on which to produce it, are mainly responsible for the recent disorders, and only to a very slight extent infection from the East. Unless the soldiers are guaranteed food, from a source believed responsible, then they must leave the fighting lines and return for the spring farming.

The four uninterrupted months of constant fighting against the Bolsheviks, broken scarcely by any leave, have naturally undermined the power of resistance of the Army, especially when rations have been insufficient and of scarcely any variety. Added to this the Esthonians have, during the four years of war, not only been obliged to feed 100,000 men in the field, out of a total population of 1,200,000, but have been forced to give up large quantities of the stores needed at home, including much flour and meat. The requisitioning of Bolsheviks and Germans have made bad, worse, and all in spite of the vigorous protests of the helpless population.

Esthonia can, owing to her financial condition, only purchase the minimum amount of food to keep her from starvation. If she receives a little more, owing to her being given it without payment, and such food be stipulated for, and controlled so as to go to the soldiers, this would unquestionably improve their physical and mental condition and resulting fighting qualities. Careful inquiry shows that most of the soldiers are suffering from malnutrition, owing to insufficiency as well as sameness of food stuffs. Hundreds of Bolsheviks offer to come across the lines and join the Esthonian and Allied Russian soldiers if they only be given regular meals. Most of them have to be refused owing to the fact that the Esthonians have not sufficient for their own men, leave alone hungry, willing deserters. The free distribution of food among the Esthonian Army might thus considerably weaken the Bolshevik resistance and morale.

Esthonia has never been able to feed herself, but has been dependent upon Russia, Germany and other countries. During the past year she has been unable to import any food stuffs whatever, added to which the Germans confiscated the harvest of 1918, the Army of Occupation either consuming it or sending it to Germany. The following Bolshevik occupation devastated the country and made impossible the retilling of the ground.

Government requisitions have finally exhausted any remaining or hidden stores, and the prolonged war against Bolshevism has ruined all foreign credit.

The conditions among the poorer classes in outlying districts, as in Narva and Hungerburg, are appalling. The malnutrition among the children exceeds that of Belgium in its dark hours. The writer speaks in both cases from personal observations and inquiries.

Physically and politically the country is temporarily in crying need of food, while it at the same time, with the best of intentions, is utterly unable to pay.

Do you recommend that Esthonia (c) be relieved by removal of blockade?

Such recommendation was forwarded, after consultation, by the Chargé d’Affaires of the American Legation at Stockholm, and the blockade was lifted about April 2nd. Owing to lack of coal and tonnage the first beneficial effects are as yet unnoticeable.

Question A2—What means if any has the Esthonian Government of paying for food?

The Esthonian Government has no money with which to pay and nothing to offer outside her natural resources. ...

.....

Question A4—Can the Esthonian Government carry on defensive warfare against the Russian Bolsheviks if supported financially and materially, but not with troops?

The Commander-in-Chief, as well as others equally well informed are all of the opinion that the Esthonian Government can unquestionably carry on defensive warfare against the Russian Bolsheviks, and hinder them from crossing the Esthonian Borders, if supported financially and materially, but not with troops. Much depends if the help is sent immediately and in the proper sequence. It is equally badly needed for political propaganda, for actual war requirements, and for the sake of the morale of the troops. The Esthonian troops stand now practically along the old Eastern territorial boundary and southern ethnographical frontier. Slight advances will have to be made in places in order to gain the most tenable military strategic lines, which do not naturally always correspond with the true frontiers. Future advances will be mainly undertaken along the Southern Frontier, in conjunction with the Letts, in order to force the Bolsheviks out of Northern Latvia.

A detachment of troops has recently deserted from the Esthonian Army and gone over to the Bolsheviks. Another has been suspected of disaffection and been moved. The Ministry is fearful of the situation and consequently is more and more willing to think of peace. Strong and immediate Allied support can alone save the situation. Without some assurance, peace will be declared. The Esthonian Government has been officially informed by the Hungarian Government (April 28th) that it is willing at once to act as intermediary in negotiating peace between the Soviet and Esthonian Government. Such offer must be accepted by the Esthonians unless the Allies act quickly, form a policy, and inform the Esthonian Government of same.

Question A5—Tour opinion regarding the capacity and representative character of the Esthonian Government.

The delegates to the new Constituent Assembly represent the voice of the people. Many of them are peasants and have had little experience, others have taken part in county and communal governments ever since Kerensky's time. When a Cabinet crisis was imminent, during the last National Council, all parties finally united in a vote of confidence so as not to jeopardize the success of the Anti-

Bolshevik war. The effect upon the Allies, of stability of government, was also a deterrent.

The large new Socialist vote was due to a certain extent, to present difficulties, and also to the natural reaction after the present conservative house. The Army voting more than one third Socialist may have an unfavorable effect upon future legislation.

The Constituent Assembly met on April 23. The mode of procedure and candidates all having been agreed upon previously. Rei (Socialist) was elected President by a second vote of 100 to 14. His reputation is not of the best. He was previously a member of the Paets Ministry but was forced to resign owing to Finland's remonstrance when Rei characterized the Finnish troops who were assisting the Whites in driving out the Bolsheviks as "Bloodhounds." He is a young man, who having failed as a lawyer, became a journalist on the Socialists' Organ, the *Sozialdemokrat*, and later became a member of the extreme left wing of the Socialist group in the 'National Assembly.

In his opening speech Rei emphasized the necessity of immediate legislation for the purpose of giving the Country a Constitution, bringing about the nationalization of land, breaking up all the large estates, and granting amnesty to all except those guilty of treason. He made no direct proposal as to conclusion of peace with the Bolsheviks but emphasized the desirability of such being effected. This may have been brought about by Finland's having brought pressure to bear by stating that Finland would be closed to Esthonia should the Esthonian Government declare peace, or immediately commence with all nationalization of land. Ollesh (Labor Party) was elected 1st Vice-President, and Birk (Peoples' Party) was elected 2nd Vice-President. A halfhearted vote of confidence was given to the present Ministry, which will continue in office¹⁹ until a provisional Constitution has been passed and the main issues of contention such as the agrarian question, amnesty, etc., have been decided in draft form. Such business having been attended to it is proposed that the Assembly dissolve and work upon the new permanent constitution will be commenced by various committees. Their work completed, the Constituent Assembly will again be convoked for the purpose of

passing a permanent constitution, as well as laws regarding the Agrarian and other vital questions. This done, the Constituent Assembly will permanently dissolve and new elections take place.

The leaders of the Labor, Peoples', Agrarian and Christian Workmen's Parties (68 votes)^{[20](#)} are endeavoring to form a block and put through a Coalition Ministry. Without some understanding with the Socialists as to such main issues as the land question, the block will fail, and as an alternative, the Socialists may succeed in forming a more radical Ministry with the Labor Party (71 votes).^{[20](#)}

As soon as the Constituent Assembly has finished its work it will disband and a new election will be held on the basis of the new constitution.

The greatest danger is that the new Ministry, if formed out of Socialists, may insist upon too radical measures, and attempt to accomplish everything at once, as well as permit itself to be swayed by the communistic demands of an important body of soldiers and peasants demanding nationalization of almost all resources and institutions. Such a Ministry would likewise show dangerous laxity in putting down revolutionary tendencies. Nothing but a firm policy can hold the Country together during the next three months.

The recent elections were honestly conducted and the voting was satisfactorily watched and controlled. The large Socialist vote was due to several causes, principally to the well organized and efficient electioneering of the Socialists and the partial apathy on the part of the more conservative groups, who seemed to have been utterly unsuspecting of the results. They believed the Paets Ministry would upon its record unquestionably be supported. Universal suffrage having been introduced, the Socialist men not only themselves were in full forces but were careful also to see that every woman was brought to the polls, while the farmers and more conservative groups were represented by very few female voters.

The best educated men, forming the "right" parties, were the first to be drafted, and their women folk left behind, did not cast their first vote, partly owing to the absence and encouragement of their

husbands. Many of the more conservative elements further voted with the left wing, owing to their dissatisfaction with the half-heartedness of the present Ministry, arguing faultily that a change could not bring about worse conditions. Much Socialistic propaganda proved valuable and at the polls themselves the ignorant peasants were in larger numbers brought and induced to vote the Socialist ticket by persuasion of the Socialist agents. The peasants were informed that only by voting the Socialist ticket would they receive all the land they wanted, while the present Ministry of Lands would only give it to them very grudgingly. About 65 percent of the total vote (including voters who have fled from country) was cast.

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Question B2—Political conditions in general.

Long suffering and years of suppression have led the Esthonians to believe they are surrounded by enemies. They hate Germany, first because of their taskmasters' German relations and sympathies. They hate the Letts out of racial differences. They fear Bolshevism from experience, and they now mistrust any Russian coalition or dependency whatever, partly owing to the policy Imperial Russia followed during the last decades, and partly because of the uncertainty as to future Russian social conditions, and the behavior of the Russian troops in 1917.

The Government now going out, and with it the Landtag or Mapaa, which started governing after the retreat of the Germans in 1918, and which was not elected on the basis of universal suffrage, has on the whole done remarkably well. The newly elected Constitutional Assembly is far more radical, and the political future can not be viewed with optimism.

Paets, the head of the Ministry, who remains in office until about May first, has enjoyed the confidence of all parties. Despite his lack of certain moral strength, he is probably the best and strongest man to head the Government. His departure from office will be a calamity. His Ministry has from time to time had to give way to revolutionary pressure, partly because Allied assistance, both

financial and material, could never definitely be reckoned upon, and the Ministry had no reply to the assertion of the Socialists and more radical elements “that the nation’s power of resistance when standing alone was limited.” The Socialist element counted further upon the support of partisans in France and England, and by virtue of such support being able to overrule any opposition that might urge the danger of alienating Allied Sympathy by too Socialistic legislation.

The political situation has at present become critical. Disaffection in the Army as well as the financial and agricultural conditions require either ultra-Socialistic legislation, including peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks, or Allied political, financial and military interference.

Paets is willing to form a new Government if backed up by the Allies. He has sent one of his Ministers to “inform the writer of this, and believes that such backing will be sufficiently strong to meet all opposition and to obtain a majority in the National Assembly.” He counts even upon considerable Socialist backing, believing many of the Socialist representatives are swayed by the Bolshevik contingent among their ranks.

Paets suggests for the time being an Allied Governor General, preferably American (owing to American disinterestedness) with powers somewhat similar to the British Governor General of Egypt. He should be supported by some 5,000 Allied troops, or a couple of men-of-war.^{[21](#)} Should such a direct and visible supervision and control prove impossible, a diplomatic representative of the Allies is suggested, and one who is clearly understood to have full powers to act and insist.^{[22](#)}

Up to the time being, the Socialists have been willing to vote the Army budgets and the army has as a consequence backed up the Ministry. But the parting of the ways has been reached. General Leidoner, the Commander-in-Chief, has informed Mr. Paets that he will shortly be forced to hand in his resignation, in case the Ministry does not support him and his military measures.

In the meanwhile, the Government's authority is weakening throughout the Country. Local commissioners and communes are more and more frequently disobeying orders and acting upon their own initiative.

Prime Minister Paets states that without Allied support he will retire about May 1st, being unwilling any longer to be the scapegoat of the Socialists, receive all criticism, have no authority and no help.

The problem of Esthonia's future and Esthonian politics taken as a whole has three interested parties—Esthonia, Russia and Europe and America.²³ Such Esthonians as possess any political foresight realize the hopelessness of settling Esthonia's fate except simultaneously with that of Russia. They realize that the Baltic Provinces do not in themselves form as difficult a problem as Poland or Ireland, but also that any Baltic settlement taken regardless of future Russia, may cause as great, if not a greater stumbling block to the future peace of the World, as a false step in regard to Poland.

Russia's aim has for centuries been to obtain a firm footing in the Baltic. This aim may be said to lie deep down in the very nation's political sub-consciousness, as a requisite for successful national existence. In the present world wide reconstruction of national boundaries, this constant policy and historical striving of centuries can not be ignored. From their geographical position the Baltic Provinces should most naturally lean towards Russia. Their peoples are not antagonistic to Russia itself, but were so to the despotism of Russian Imperialistic Rule. Russia's fundamental vice was her system of centralized government over widely differing and widely spread peoples. This can never return. Esthonia and Latvia must practically manage their own affairs and in all vital matters be autonomous.²⁴ If they felt absolutely certain that this would prove the case, the more reasonable and sane elements would probably see the economic and political necessity of some form of union with a new, healthy Russian State. In Esthonia, Russia sinned previously in fanning the flame of hatred between the German Baits and the Esthonian people itself. This hatred might in turn better be overcome by future Russian suzerainty, than by an attempt to overcome it left to their own devices. Russia's further sin in Esthonia was the

absolute lack of system in governing. By a practically independent Esthonian Government, a recurrence of this on the part of Russia at least, falls away. Directly interested parties are at the helm.

Some of the calmer heads among Esthonian politicians realize that the question of the self-determination of nations can not always be practically applied and that the economic requirements necessary for a nation to exist may outbalance nationalistic arguments. They feel that from a point of view of political philosophy the little state can not exist as yet, at least not until it has had a trial at demonstrating that it can economically stand alone. They further realize it will always be economically dependent upon its neighbors, that the money for its development has come from Russia, and that its requisites will in the future, as in the past, also very largely come from the same direction. They feel that the economic arguments and resources as presented by the Esthonian Government of today are unsound.

All Esthonian political parties have practically the same point of view in regard to the Russian situation. None of them desires any alliance with Russia. Russia with her system of oppression, desire for Russification and centralization of power has definitely lost all the sympathies of the Esthonian people. Bolshevik rule and method of procedure has only increased Esthonian antipathy. Until recently there have been parties, such as the Esthonian Social-Democratic and Labor-Party, which had no objection to a union with Russia. But now even these are for a definite breach. Only the Social-Revolutionary Party desires a reunion. This party, constructed along the lines of the corresponding Russian Revolutionary Socialists, is gradually disappearing.

The influential parties wish to create an independent Esthonian State and to establish the political organization, on democratic basis. At the present time Switzerland with her organization of central power and the right of referendum, has been considered as a model. Just how much of such a political organization could successfully be applied in Esthonia is questioned by many, as the Swiss system centralizes its power in Bundesversammlung (*Assemblée fédérale*) and is not counterbalanced by another equivalent institution, and the

right of referendum does not counterbalance the Bundesversammlung. It is feared, that during the transitional period, when the political opinion of the people is strongly influenced by internal and external conditions, such a government would not be sufficiently flexible to conform to the practical demands of the moment.

The majority of the Constituent Assembly, the Social-Democrats, Revolutionary Socialists, and Labor Party are for the moment radical. Prior to the elections the following promises were given by them: The Social Democrats promised to appropriate all the estates without any recompense to the owners and to turn them over to the farmers having no land; the Labor Party, to confiscate all landed property and to apportion it to the landless on terms of perpetual rights; the Revolutionary Socialists promised confiscation of property and division on terms of Bolshevistic communism. The people are now waiting for these promises to be fulfilled. The promises are categorical and do not permit of compromise with the Conservative Party. It is probable that the radical majority of the Constituent Assembly, together with the Government chosen from them, will shortly put through legislation bringing about the promised reforms.

The sudden and radical change in agricultural conditions and the division of the estates into small farms will undoubtedly at first decrease the annual production. While Esthonia is compelled to purchase grain from abroad during the present year, it will be necessary to buy in greater quantities the following year.

The radical agrarian reforms require without doubt, a large appropriation from the treasury, of about one hundred million marks for the first year.

Esthonia can not be financed during the next year without assistance from abroad. Waging of war, the great internal reforms, the support of the non-employed, purchasing food for the next two years, repair of railroads, purchase of rolling stock and engines, liquidation of the war, all call for large sums of money in addition to which the country is in urgent need of the following requirements usually imported

from outside: agricultural implements, manure, cloth, dye-stuffs, coal, petroleum, cotton, sugar and other goods.

All this the radical parties promise to accomplish in a satisfactory manner during a short time. Up to the present no scheme has been offered showing how the money is to be procured. The proposed taxes can only cover a small part of the expenses involved. There are practically no exports to be depended upon. The question of possible future transit trade with a regenerated Russia is entirely enigmatical. The only possible way of realizing the proposed reforms, is a foreign loan. The amount of the loan must depend upon the time in which these radical reforms are to be realized as well as their scope.

The most pressing question is the prolongation of the war or an immediate possible peace. Many people voted for the radical parties because they were promised peace as soon as the Constituent Assembly met. The radical majority is now in power and proposals from the Russian bolshevists have been made through the present Hungarian Government.

The people are tired of war and see no end to it. They see, however, no prospects of allied intervention. They understand that peace could be made at once, but question whether it would be lasting, and whether the Bolsheviks would not use this means to stir up the country by agitation and propaganda in order to accomplish their object of making Esthonia a part of the Soviet Republic.

All these questions will be shortly decided by the Constituent Assembly. Their decision will depend upon the attitude of the Allies. If it is left to the Esthonian people alone there is no doubt but that the radical majority will accept the proposed peace with the Bolsheviks.

If the country is left without material and moral support from the outside, left to carry on the war with her own resources, to rear her own political structure and to attempt her social reforms, it is feared that instead of real reform the country will merely pass a large number of decrees the realization of which will be impossible, the peace which is concluded will turn into a civil war and the end will be

a Bolshevik or semi-Bolshevik structure instead of democratic government. If the Allied Powers now, in the last hour, give their moral and material support, there can probably be formed a strong Ministry, capable of carrying through the desired reforms and establishing a stable democratic government.

The Estonian political parties are still young, and have had no experience under Russian regime. Added to the sin of youth is also intolerance and a belief by each one in the infallibility of the party. Parties have sprung up rather as a result of accident than mature differences in political conviction. A consolidation of certain parties will probably take place, even during the life of the First National Assembly. The radical parties will probably form a single Social-Democratic Group. The Labor Party, which considers itself socialistic, will form the center of the Constituent Assembly and gradually affiliate itself with the conservative wing. The right wing will form a moderate liberal party, which will retain two wings, one with more radical inclinations than the other. It is still impossible to say where will be the center of gravity. If the Estonian State is left without support from the outside, party demands will become more and more radical.

The German element (Baits) is decidedly conservative. Up to the present time the government has been entirely in its hands, despite its small numbers. Such part as the German Baits may play in the future depends upon their willingness to submit to the necessary reforms, and upon their willingness to facilitate them. Distrust and the spirit of enmity will not disappear at once, but should gradually die out if the Baits abandon their efforts to recover their former position of authority and are able to read the signs of the times. The relations between the Estonian people and the German Bait element were better during the early years of the war than at present. The Baits have themselves caused this estrangement by their policy during the occupation of the German Army.

The German occupation was welcomed by the landowners of German origin. It helped them recover their property confiscated by the Russian Bolsheviks. The German element was not satisfied to recover its property, but grasped the opportunity during the time of

occupation to annex the Baltic Provinces of the Imperial German Empire. With the aid of the German occupying authorities the German landowners liquidated all institutions created by the Esthonian people during the time of the revolution, forbade the use of the Esthonian language in the administration of the country, in schools, in courts, etc. The educated Esthonian classes were compelled to suffer much injustice, and were accused of having been bought by English money. Instead of giving the land to the Esthonians the German authorities proposed colonizing the country with some hundred thousand Germans and many educated Germans actually immigrated. All their pan-Germanic aspirations found a welcome reception from the German Baltic Barons. It seemed as if Esthonia would ultimately become a German Confederated State.

The disappearance of mutual prejudices and the creation of new relations can not be effected in a year. The new generation of German Baits must receive an entirely different education, and disabuse themselves of their old political privileges.

.....

Question B5—Is Bolshevistic propaganda being circulated? Is it having any effect?

The freedom from Bolshevism is partly due to the fact that such a large portion of the population consists of small landowners. Added to this, the people are temperamentally careful and sceptical, and not prone to accept new ideas, similar to those spread by the Bolsheviks, and finally, many of the original Bolsheviks fled to Russia during the German occupation.

Unquestionably a useful lesson was learned by all from the happenings of the recent Bolshevik regime, nevertheless it seems rather difficult to draw the lines between much that is happening and actual Bolshevik procedure. Thus, despite the fact that the laws as to confiscation of property have not as yet been passed by the Legislature, over fifty of the large properties have already been “taken over” by the Ministry of Agriculture, the old and experienced managers summarily dismissed, and supplanted by Government

agents. The Kultusministerium has served notice that wherever it deems it wise, owing to the uncertainty of law and order being upheld, it will take charge of works of art. Private houses are being entered and family portraits, as well as other works of art are being removed, despite the remonstrances of their owners. Horses worth 4000 marks are taken by Government order from the estates that still have any left, and in return is given a Government promissory note for 300 marks. In many instances the peasants are now taking matters into their own hands, driving away the old owners and managers of the estates, and entering into possession, feeling the leaders are too long at making good their promises. If the present Government could remain in power, the future would probably be lighter. They have repeatedly had to suppress with a firm hand, dangerous disorders. With the more radical elements in power, the question becomes more dubious.

The Social-Revolutionary Party, which did not exist at the previous elections, procured 26,536 votes at the last one, and will be represented by seven members in the National Council. There is no difference between them and the Bolsheviks. In the Capital, Reval, there are at present some 350 Bolsheviks. There are few in other cities. Their sympathizers are, however, many, and their number has considerably increased during the last two months, especially in the factories. If one takes the managers of factories aside and gets at the truth, they all reply the workmen and mechanics are getting out of hand. This is especially the case in the large car works and Naval Yard of Reval.

The present Government is doing much to check the spread. Propaganda is strictly forbidden and very little of it penetrates, especially through the Northern Front. Such as has come through, as well as agents themselves, have come by the Verro-Haynash, or Southwestern Sector. During the elections certain laxity was shown, but ever since the authorities have done their best, and the Government Intelligence Service has by degrees become more efficient. Bolshevik nests have been smoked out, organizations broken up, and meetings forbidden. The work which now is going on must thus be done with care and circumspection. The poorest among the population, and especially those residing where Bolshevik

occupation lasted longest, will have nothing to do with it. Those that are most easily converted live where the Bolsheviks practically never passed, and as a consequence have no bitter experiences as a counterweight to their golden promises.

The spirit of the troops is Anti-Bolshevik, but they are nationally [*naturally?*] tired of fighting, fear starvation unless they return for the requisite spring farming, and see little change ahead in the present military conditions. It is not improbable that the coming ministry may, during the spring, propose the conclusion of peace with the Bolsheviks. Pressure is being brought to bear from various influential quarters to bring this about.

Though the Bolsheviks are mainly to be found among the factory workmen, the movement among them is still carried on secretly, while in the country districts, the peasants, impatient to get the land into their own hands, repeatedly commence operations by murdering the proprietor or his steward.

Considerable work is being done underhand in order to wean away members of the Socialist party to more radical ideas. The two principal Bolsheviks now at large in Esthonia are Kingisep, supposed to be at large in Reval, and Anwelt, who originally organized the late Bolshevik revolt against the Government. In the Army, Bolshevik propaganda is spread principally by the Esthonians fighting in the opposite ranks.

The *Sozialdemokrat* of April 17, 1919, stated:

“Bolshevism will disappear if the Constituent Assembly passes the land reform bill. The red-guards (Esthonians fighting with the Bolsheviks) will then be anxious to return so as to participate in the allotment. They will be ready to lay down their arms if promised amnesty. At least three-quarters of them should receive it. They must naturally be influenced by energetic propaganda. A great number of the Esthonian Bolsheviks could without doubt return without harming in the least Esthonia ...^{[25](#)}

“The war would thus be over. The desertion of the Esthonian Bolsheviks would induce the Russians fighting upon our Fronts to disband ...²⁵ A discussion of peace terms would ensue.”

Four million roubles have been put aside by the Bolsheviks for the purpose of propaganda and bribery among the Esthonian troops. Large amounts of the money are coming across the southern frontier and seriously corrupting the penniless Esthonian troops, heartily tired of fighting. Unfortunately Russian roubles may still be used as currency, so the Bolshevik counterfeit Czar and Douma roubles are as good in Esthonia as the Country's own paper currency.

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Question B7—What proportion of the Bait or German element is still left in Esthonia? What is their attitude toward the Esthonian Government?

The Baltic Barons

With very few exceptions, they are completely pro-German in their feelings. They speak German, they think German, and they hope German. They are strangers to their own country. Together with the best educated among the middle classes, the smaller landowners, doctors, lawyers, clergymen, school teachers, and a certain number of the most successful business men, they form a separate caste, in general intellectually superior to the rest of the population, and in consequence looking down upon it.

German sympathies are kept alive by close German business connections, by the professional men receiving their higher education at German institutions, and the young ladies being sent to German “pensions” for their final education. A smaller group of the younger generation, who have received their military education in Russian officers' schools, are pro-Russian.

They are in turn thoroughly despised and their long tenure of land, fortunes, and privileges is at an end. They are now to pay for the

centuries in which they have ground down the peasants. Their position is very similar to that of the nobility in France, after the full meaning of the revolution had broken upon them. They are to be deprived of all, if the present revolutionary tendencies continue. German Imperialism is a broken reed on which they realize they can no longer lean, so they try to hide their former attachment to it. The nobles themselves number about 600. Of these some 450 still remain, and most of their young men are fighting in their special battalion. They feel such strangers to the people among whom some of them have lived for 500 years, that they quickly resent being called Esthonians, stating, "we are Russians," to an Allied sympathizer, to a German, "we are German Baits,"—never, "we are Esthonians."

They are as conservative and reactionary as the Russian Grand Dukes, some of them still cherishing the delusion that by some miracle or possibly disagreement among the various Socialistic factions, they may still from the "Dom" citadel above Reval rule the country in medieval manner. They believe the present government utterly unable to govern and smile at its naive hallucinations in this respect. Many of them state that their estates were burned and pillaged by the Esthonians themselves when they were chasing the Bolsheviks out of the Country.

The Baltic Barons' deadly sin, which can not be forgiven, was the treacherous manner in which, after Bolshevism came into power in Russia, they sold their country to the German invader and welcomed him when he came. Welcomed the enemy whom the Esthonians had been fighting for four years.

A certain amount of the landowners' money is for safety's sake being forwarded to Germany. The German Barons and wealthy landowners pay in their savings to the Brennereiverein Bank (a development of the institution which finances their alcohol factories) which forwards the money to Germany in the form of ost roubles, which are purchased and which are taken for deposit by the Posen Ostbank. The depositors can not draw against deposits until three months after deposits have been made. It is becoming increasingly difficult to purchase Ost roubles owing to their scarcity. The German Chargé d'Affaires, Vogel, forwards the money in his pouches.

Apart from the abuses continued by the Baltic Barons, which have infuriated the masses (now conscious of holding the whip handle), the Russian Government has done much harm in encouraging the hatred between German Baits and Esthonians, believing that by applying the principle of "Divide et impera" the demands of the people for greater independence and progress might thus partially be broken by encouraging national disputes between the various races.

The differences between the German Baltic element and the Esthonians are not nearly so great in the country as in the cities.

When the Germans left a great many of the German Baits went with them to Germany, others fled to Finland, and others to the Scandinavian countries. Their city houses are closed and their Estates merely occupied, in most cases by the head of the family, endeavoring under the present very difficult conditions to make both ends meet. Almost all the families of the nobles are at least temporarily impoverished. The various events of the last four years have devastated some 30,000 hectares of cultivated land, rendering it non-productive. The revolution of 1905 laid waste some 80 of the manor houses.

The Baltic Barons' attitude towards Russia has been a curious one. Most of them have contended that they were loyal to the Czar and his throne, but were foreigners to the country. This perverted point of view naturally added to their unpopularity in Russia. They have always and genuinely looked upon the Esthonian people as their feudal property and as an inferior race. They have only mixed in the rarest instances. The Esthonian people, from its side, returned the feelings with rage, heartily detesting their powerful masters. The farmers were as a rule treated kindly and paternally, and apart from their wishing land, and suspecting the injustice of the subdivision of it, regarded their landlords with kindly eyes.

The substantial merchants, the bankers, city magistrates, and leaders among the burgers in the large cities such as Reval, Dorpat, and Pernau, are almost all German Baits, and among this class one finds confidence and common work with the Esthonians, though lack of

culture and education very frequently makes the inferiority of the latter evident.

A memorandum is affixed²⁶ giving the new form of government as proposed by the Baltic Barons.

Question B8—How has the land problem been dealt with up to date? What is the government program in the future?

The Government supports its case against the landowners and non-productivity of the land by presenting the following figures. Only

18 percent of the entire land has been cultivated
30 percent represents badly kept prairies
22 percent forest land
30 percent inhabited and *en friche*

The Nobles, consisting of some 650 families, own 1100 large estates or about 55 percent of the entire land. Some 75 percent of the urban population, working on the land, do not possess any. The country's future depending principally upon prosperous agricultural conditions, the Land Question became the principal point of contention in the recent elections. All parties, including the large proprietors, agreed that the landless must be given some portion of the land belonging to the great estates. The difference of opinion lay in how much each was to be given, how much, if at all, the proprietors were to be compensated, and whether the nobles were to be deprived of all land, including forests, etc. The exact stand of each Party in the matter is given in the section relating to "Political Conditions in General."²⁷

The landowners propose that one third of their own and State lands at once be distributed among the peasants, or about 1,650,000 acres in all, some 40 percent of which would fall upon the landowners. This they claim would be all that now could be absorbed, as well as also financed by the State. The landowners are willing to sell at 1914 prices. Forest land is not included.

Until definite legislation has been enacted, the Ministry of Agriculture has temporarily issued a provision which gives it the right to administer all estates which in its opinion are mismanaged. The peasants have in certain instances themselves acted as judges in the matter, and driven out landlord and manager. In other places they are sullenly watching their employers and waiting for the opportune moment. The Government knowing how near the boiling point the entire matter lies, is anxious to legislate as quickly as possible and as radically as it dares. A further decree has been issued to the effect that the Ministry of Agriculture will lease the mismanaged estates, either in whole or in part, for from 1 to 6 years. Special officials representing the Ministry of Agriculture are travelling throughout the country to pass judgement on the estates. The owners are given slight or no opportunity to speak their cause, but the new government manager is immediately installed, the land being distributed and the timber cut. Some 210 properties have to date been appropriated in this manner. ...

.....

¹⁹ Marginal notation in the original: “May 2. Commander Gade says this no longer holds true, Premier’s own statement. Warwick Greene.”

²⁰ Marginal notation in the original: “May 2. Commander Gade’s figures. W. Greene.”

²⁰ Marginal notation in the original: “May 2. Commander Gade’s figures. W. Greene.”

²¹ Marginal notation in the original: “Troops—no! Naval forces—yes! W. Greene.”

²² Marginal notation in the original: “Yes! W. Greene.”

²³ The words “and America” have been added in the original in the handwriting of Lieutenant Colonel Greene.

²⁴ Marginal notation in the original: “Important. W. Greene.”

²⁵ Omission indicated in the original report.

²⁵ Omission indicated in the original report.

²⁶ Not printed.

27 Question B–3, “Party platforms in coming elections to the Constituent Assembly”, has been omitted from the report as here printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/22

[Document 58]

***The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to the Secretary General of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

LIBAU, May 3, 1919.

Subject: Second report concerning affairs in Latvia.

1. On November 18, 1918, one week after Germany's signature of the Armistice, thirty-nine delegates chosen at caucuses of their respective political parties in the territory of Lettland met at Riga, styling themselves the Latvian National Council. The only parties not represented at this meeting were the extreme Socialists and the conservative Baits, who as the landholding nobility have always been the Extreme Right of local politics. At this meeting the delegates declared their country a free and independent republic under the name of Latvia. They voted the adoption of a skeleton constitution and appointed a cabinet to be known as the Provisional Government of Latvia to carry on the government of the country until elections could be held and a legislature or national assembly could be convened. The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government was K. Ulmanis. The Provisional Government remained in Riga until January when it was driven out by the Bolshevist invasion. For a time the ministers felt obliged by the desperateness of the situation to leave the country in search of money and aid, but about March 1 they returned and set up their capital in Libau. The National Assembly provided for in the constitution has never been elected, and no elections can be held until the Bolshevists have been driven out of the country. Of the entire territory of the Latvian State which comprises the Russian provinces of Courland, Livonia, and part of Vitebsk, the Bolshevists now hold all but the western portion of Courland.

2. Upon establishing themselves in Libau the Provisional Government set themselves to the task of rehabilitating the country and driving out the Bolsheviks. They projected land reforms, made requisitions, and commenced the mission of a twenty-five million ruble issue of currency. The actual amount of their accomplishment was small. The government had no real mandate from the people. It could not possibly have been upheld at a popular election, and it lacked the support of large elements of the community. The only Bait in the cabinet was Baron Rosenberg who represented only the liberal Baits and had never participated in the work of the government as he was absent from the country during its whole course of existence. The result was that the Baits who are said to own more than half of the land in Latvia and who for hundreds of years, although numerically in the minority, have held the dominant political position in the country felt that their power had been entirely usurped, and that they were without a voice in the national affairs. The Jews also were without any representative in the Provisional Government which had treated them in several instances with marked want of tact. And finally the Radical Socialists, a strong party in the cities, being unrepresented in the cabinet were inclined to consider the Government reactionary.

3. The forces fighting Bolshevism in the country are practically all volunteers under the supreme command of the German General Count von der Goltz. More than two-thirds of his troops are Germans. The rest are Letts and Baits who are trained and equipped by the Germans. The Provisional Government gave some pay to their Lettish troops. The Baits were paid entirely by the Germans, and the Letts were paid in part by the Germans. All equipment for both Bait and Lett troops was furnished by Germany, except some arms supplied the Letts by the British. The German authorities appear to consider that the Provisional Government is indebted to Germany for the support of both Bait and Lett troops, but we understand that the Provisional Government never undertook to maintain the Bait troops.

4. On April 16, 1919 after the Provisional Government had been established in Libau for about six weeks a battalion of Baltic Landeswehr under Baron Hans Manteuffel came back from the front,

overturned the Provisional Government, arrested some of its ministers, and drove the rest into asylum in the Allied Missions in Libau, and on Allied ships in the harbor. At the same time German troops in the naval harbor at Libau attacked the Lettish troops at their quarters, killed two, wounded several others, and plundered and sacked the buildings which the latter occupied. There were disorders and some bloodshed in other parts of the country. General von der Goltz states that the incidents occurred without his knowledge or authority, and that his policy is one of strict nonintervention in the internal affairs of Latvia which Germany recognized as an independent state in December 1918. He has admitted, however, that the troops which participated in this *coup d'état* were under his command, and that their acts constitute a breach of military discipline. The actual overthrow of the ministry was accomplished in the name of a self-constituted "Committee of Security", only a few of whose members have ever made themselves known. They purported to act in the interest of the suppression of Bolshevism, and the maintenance of the front in security against the invaders. Their act was carried out, however, without any semblance of a popular mandate. It was an act of violence which is utterly unjustifiable. The only attempt at justification made by the "Committee of Security" was contained in a proclamation posted in Libau on the morning of April 17, copy of which is annexed. (Exhibit 1.)^{[28](#)}

5. After the *coup d'état* sentries detailed from the Baltic Landeswehr were posted to guard the offices of the ministry and the houses occupied by the British and American Missions in Libau which were giving asylum to members of the Provisional Government and the Chief of Staff of the Lettish Army. By this overt threat of arrest these men were kept in confinement for nearly a fortnight, April 16–29.

6. The "Committee of Security" at first announced its intention of forming a military directorate under Colonel Ballod, commander of Lettish troops at the front, and Prince Lieven, commander of the Russian detachment. A copy of the announcement to this effect is attached hereto (Exhibit 2). Colonel Ballod is a soldier who enjoys the respect of his men, and appears to have no political ambitions. Prince Lieven is a pro-Russian Bait, but a man of the most liberal

tendencies who stands above the political strife of Lett and Bait. His own statement regarding his political convictions is annexed hereto (Exhibit 3).

7. Colonel Ballod never left the front, but sent three Lettish officers to Libau to confer with the British and American missions. Major Keenan, chief of the British Mission who has throughout exercised a great influence and restraining powers over Lettish officers and men received from these officers a written statement from Colonel Ballod on April 24th as follows:

- a. Colonel Ballod declines to accept a position in the proposed Directorate, and will not allow any of his officers to accept any such position.
- b. The Lettish Army does not interest itself in Politics and has only one thought, viz. the fight against Bolshevism. The Lettish Army is dependent on the Lettish Provisional Government and the People's Council.
- c. The active Lettish Army wishes to express its greatest contempt for the occurrences in Libau on the 16th instant.

8. Prince Lieven expressed himself unwilling to enter into the task of a directorate, except on two conditions: one, the consent of the Allies, and two, the consent of Colonel Ballod and the Lettish troops. As Colonel Ballod had taken the position already described, and as the British Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, and the Chief of the British Mission, Major Keenan, both advised against his leaving his command at the front, he declined to accept the position offered him. The "Committee of Public Security" thereupon set up a Bait named Borkowsky as sort of temporary dictator. He made a public announcement of his accession to office, a copy of which is annexed (Exhibit 4).

9. On April 20 the Chief of the American Mission wrote to General von der Goltz as military governor of Libau asking for full information from his office concerning the events and disorders which had occurred. A copy of this letter is annexed (Exhibit 5). On the following day he also wrote General von der Goltz regarding the attempted arrest of persons in his party at the Libau railroad station

(Exhibit 6). In response to these letters on April 22 General von der Goltz transmitted the annexed statements to the American Mission (Exhibits 7 & 8). On the same day a conference was held between General von der Goltz and the Chief of the American Mission in which General von der Goltz enlarged on the subject matter of the above written statements, admitting fully that the events were serious breach of military order, but dwelling on the great difficulties of maintaining military discipline under present conditions in Latvia. He said that on his shoulders rested the responsibility of maintaining the front against strong Bolshevist forces, that he was menaced by Bolshevism in the rear, that his German troops were volunteers demoralized by recent events in Germany, and that the intense hostility between Letts and Baitis made civil war imminent at any time. Furthermore, military authority was weakened by the Soldatenrat. Also, his exact authority over Bait and Lett troops was often in dispute. Under all the above conditions the maintenance of firm military discipline was most difficult. He concluded by asking for suggestions or recommendations from us.

10. Immediately after this interview a conference was held at the American Mission at which participated the Senior British Naval Officer, Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, the Senior French Naval Officer, Capitaine de Vaisseau Brisson, the representative of the British Foreign Office, Mr. Grant Watson, the Chief of the British Mission, Major Keenan, the Chief of the American Mission, Lt. Col. Warwick Greene, and Lt. Col. Ernest J. Dawley, also of the American Mission. In response to the suggestion made by General von der Goltz, this conference agreed to send a letter to General von der Goltz stating the views of the Allied and the American Representatives as to the action that should be taken. The text of this letter was as follows:

“To General Count von der Goltz

In continuation of a conversation between General von der Goltz and Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene of today's date, the Chief of the American Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, & Lithuania in concurrence with the Senior British Naval Officer, the Senior French Naval Officer, the representative of the British Foreign Office, and the Chief of

the British Mission at Libau considers that the following action is necessary.

The commanders of the offending units (stated to be Baron Manteuffel's unit, and Captain Pfeiffer's unit) should be relieved of their commands, and the Lettish units at the Naval Harbor should be reestablished.

The offending units should immediately be sent away from Libau. If and when this action has been taken, the Allied and Associated representatives, in the interest of a vigorous prosecution of the war against Bolshevism, would recommend their governments only to support a governing body for Latvia which includes a fair representation of all national elements in their proper proportion.

Warwick Greene, Lt. Col. U. S. A.
Chief of Mission"

11. To this letter General von der Goltz on April 23 replied as follows:

"To Lt. Col. Greene
Chief of the American Mission to Latvia.

Brig. General Count von der Goltz confirms the receipt of the letter of April 22, 1919.

He agrees with the Allied and Associated representatives that the events which happened without his knowledge and led to the overthrow of the Lettish government were a breach of military order.

Brig. General Count von der Goltz has already ordered the removal of the troops concerned from Libau in the interest of the restoration of peace. This removal will take place according to a program based on the capacity of the railroads.

The dismissal of Baron Von Manteuffel from his post as commander of the Baltic Assault Troop is not within the rights of the German High Command. The decision of this question

lies with the Baltic National Committee to whom the wish of the Allied and Associated representatives is submitted.

The dismissal of Captain von Pfeiffer from the command of the Westphalian Freikorps, which was not concerned in the overthrow of the Government, involves the most serious considerations, since the Freikorps was recruited by Captain von Pfeiffer in person, and the troop could not be used at the front without this commander. At present the Freikorps can only be exchanged for a similar formation at the front.

The Lettish formations are again in possession of their arms, and freedom of movement by command of the Military Governor.

The Commanding General agrees that the absolutely essential condition for seriously fighting Bolshevism is peace behind the front, this is to be brought about by the creation of a government representing all national elements.

Count von der Goltz”

On April 25 General von der Goltz announced that the Baltic National Committee had informed him that Baron Manteuffel had retired from his command (Exhibits 9 & 10).

12. On April 26 the dictator pro-tem, Borkowsky styling himself acting Prime Minister published a proclamation asserting the necessity of a firm government and announcing the creation of a new cabinet under the leadership of Mr. Andreas Needra a well-known Lett (Exhibit 11). This announcement came on the same day as the arrival from Berlin of Noske, the German Minister of War who was stated to have visited Latvia as part of an inspection trip along the entire eastern front. It is rumored that the Needra cabinet was hurriedly put down on paper at the instigation of General von der Goltz in order that something might be shown to Herr Noske on his arrival. However that may be, it is certain that Needra and perhaps some of the other ministers were included in the cabinet without having been approached on the subject. Mr. Needra who called on

the American Mission and made full and candid statements on April 29 said he had not given his consent to the use of his name as Prime Minister, and had not accepted the position.

13. The "Needra cabinet" contains four Baits and six Letts. The Letts are all what are called here Moderates, and may be considered the Conservatives in the present political situation of Latvia. Mr. Needra is a Lutheran Pastor who was driven from his home in Livonia by the Bolsheviks. He is an honest and patriotic man who has long been prominent among the Letts as a writer and an intellectual leader. He is a fervid anti-Bolshevist, has three sons at the front, and has himself performed very dangerous missions for his country, as he has been in and out of Riga in order to help the anti-Bolshevist propaganda in that city. He has had little administrative or political experience. Personally I believe him an upright patriot to whom Bolshevism is the supreme peril and who to combat it will cooperate much further with the Germans and Baits than most Letts. At the present time his principal desire seems to be to act as a mediator between the various groups and factions. Of the other members Arrajs, the State Controller (whose real name is Alberts, but his family being in Riga under the Bolshevik, he does not wish his name to appear), and Burkewitz, the Minister of Traffic and Labor have both expressed their unwillingness to serve. So far as we can judge the new cabinet has failed largely because it could not win the support, moral or material, of the Allies and America. I believe the cabinet was a dummy one, created for bargaining purposes (Exhibit 12).

14. Since the overturn of the Provisional Government the Lettish troops have held themselves in restraint, anticipating help or some pronouncement of policy from the Allies and America. They have tolerated a situation which to patriotic soldiers is almost intolerable. They have suffered the suppression of the Lettish paper which was the organ of the former government, and the publication in its stead of a new Lettish paper with pro-Bait and pro-German sympathies. They have not interfered with the picketing of the Bait troops, or with the formation of a "new cabinet". Generally speaking, they have submitted to disarmament by the Germans without armed resistance. Much credit for their forbearance is due to Major Keenan,

Chief of the British Mission, who has a great influence over them, and who has counselled them to remain patient until the Allies have had time to consider carefully the situation. Major Keenan's work with these troops has been admirable, but his influence on the political situation has been less beneficial. He lacks the coolness, maturity, and political experience necessary in this situation. He also lacks constructive ideas, and as a young British officer is too much of a "Hun-baiter" for the delicate situation in Latvia where German troops are maintaining the front against Bolshevism with the tacit or expressed consent of the Allies, and where on the one hand one must protect the Letts against the German forceful influence, and on the other must not undermine the military authority of the German command.

15. Civil war threatens unless a temporary compromise government can be established supported by both Lett and Balt. Civil war would either be put down with an iron hand and considerable bloodshed by General von der Goltz, in which case the hereditary bitterness between Lett and Balt would be still further intensified, or it will let down the front, and thereby deliver the entire country to the Bolsheviks. That is, the establishment and maintenance in power of a Balt government will deliver the country either to Germany or to Bolshevism. American influence is now strong because all parties look to America for food and raw materials, and the mass of the Letts look to America for moral support in their efforts at national self-expression and self-determination. On America's attitude the immediate future of the country depends. If food and raw materials are furnished to a government founded on violence and established in favor of a hated and powerful minority as is the present government, it would be considered a condonation on America's part of an unlawful and intolerable act of violence by the reactionary groups of the country, which also constitutes a fatal breach of discipline in the forces on which we are relying to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in Europe. Such condonation would encourage other factions in the country whose passions are at least as strong to have recourse to similar acts in the belief that such conduct would never be seriously reprobated. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that continuation of factional strife in Latvia will inevitably deliver the country to Bolshevism, or to complete German domination. Both

Bolshevist and German are only too willing to fish in troubled Latvian waters.

16. General von der Goltz's position throughout has been that he does not interfere in the internal politics of Latvia. (See his communiqué of April 17, Exhibit 13). As he wields the police power of the country it is obvious, however, that he does exercise a most powerful influence over its domestic affairs. He can, if he desires, entirely stifle national life and national aspirations. Even his negative influence on the situation is all powerful. With the country in the grip of his German army he has merely to abstain from active interference to allow a small unit of Bait troops to overthrow the government in favor of reactionary Bait elements which are favorable to Germany.

17. Further light on General von der Goltz's position is shown by Exhibits 14, 15, 16 & 17.

18. All groups in Latvia seek the approval of the Allies for whatever government is to be formed. All realize that life in the country would soon become insupportable unless the blockade is relaxed, and all realize the great moral importance of Allied support. The majority of the Letts are intensely anti-German and fervently wish Allied help. The Balt minority largely favor Germany but in their hearts know that the economic life of the country is impossible without Allied recognition. Mr. Ulmanis, the deposed Prime Minister, and Mr. Needra, Borkowsky's nominee for leader in the "new Cabinet" have all directly solicited the aid of the Allies and America. Mr. Ulmanis realizes that changes should be made in his own cabinet. He wishes, however, to return to office with the old cabinet complete, and then make the necessary changes in a few days time. In this attitude he has been encouraged by Major Keenan and to some extent by Mr. Grant Watson, the representative of the British Foreign Office.

19. The attitude of the Chief of the American Mission has been as follows: A wrong has been committed against the Lettish people which must be righted if there is to be internal peace and a united stand against Bolshevism. At the same time the deposed Provisional Government was at fault in not being more representative. In view of the prominent part the Baits have taken in carrying on the war

against Bolshevism, some Balts should have been included in the Ministry. The best solution, therefore, is a political truce, a united stand to win the war, and the reestablishment of the Provisional Government with Mr. Ulmanis as Prime Minister, and a cabinet in which the majority will consist of members of Mr. Ulmanis' old ministry, and a minority of Moderate or Conservative Letts, Baits, Jews, etc. In this way a Lettish majority will have control of the government, but a minority which has been very active in the war will also have a voice in the direction of the affairs of the country. These views have been expressed in a letter to Mr. Needra, (Exhibit 18).^{[29](#)}

20. If the Baits will not agree to a government wherein the Ulmanis cabinet has a majority, and the conservative Letts and the Baits have a minority, then it will be necessary for the Allies and America to exercise strong and concerted pressure on the situation directing the German government to force General von der Goltz to allow the restoration of the old government. This action has already been demanded by the British representatives at Spa. Unfortunately, the demand included the right for general mobilization for the Letts. Probably this was based on Major Keenan's recommendation. In my opinion general mobilization of the Letts is a military matter which at present should not be tied up with the political situation, as this provides General von der Goltz with the opportunity of defending himself on military grounds in which he will have a considerable show of right. The general mobilization and promiscuous arming of Letts is highly inadvisable until a British or American Military Mission can come here to take charge of the Lettish troops in an area apart from contact with the Germans. This area can be found at Windau, or at the Naval Harbor north of Libau where there are already adequate administrative buildings, barracks, grounds, etc. The hereditary hatred between Lett and German is now so intensified that a general arming of undisciplined Lettish levies is out of the question, if serious bloodshed is to be avoided. A Lettish army can be created, but only under adequate safeguards. As has already been pointed out, the sending of a British or American military mission with full power to form a Lettish army is the only solution.

21. It is to be noted that the attitude of the Baits has been considerably liberalized by pressure from the Allied Missions. The *coup d'état* in its inception seems to have sprung from the arrogant ambition of Baron Manteuffel and his kin who are believed to have aspired to a sort of a Grand Ducal position in a restored nobility. When the Manteuffels, father and son, found that they had no personal following, and that even the reactionary Baits were aware that times had changed the next project was a military dictatorship or directorate under a liberal Bait and a Lett, both commanding units at the front. This in turn gave way to the plan of a Cabinet in which the Letts would have a majority, but the Baits behind the scenes would pull the strings. The continued firm positions of the missions with regard to the blockade has made the Baits abandon even this position, and they are now quite willing to compromise with the old cabinet on the basis of a new cabinet containing four members of the Ulmanis cabinet, four from the "Needra" cabinet, and four Baits. They are prepared to make still further concessions, but are still holding out for a majority of Conservative Letts and Baits in the new cabinet, in other words for a Bait dominated cabinet. They may persist in this attitude and make strong action on the part of the Allies necessary, as a peaceful future of the country is impossible in a government founded on the violence of Landeswehr troops and dominated by the Bait minority of the country. Both Baits and Moderate Letts claim that the Ulmanis Government is not supported by a majority of the anti-Bolshevist Letts, and that Needra and the other Letts have a strong following among the Letts, particularly as you go East towards the front. They argue that a compromise cabinet with Ulmanis as Prime Minister and a majority of Letts divided between followers of Ulmanis and followers of Needra is the fairest representative government that can be established under the present circumstances. Mr. Ulmanis, on his side, says that unless his government can have a majority in a new cabinet it will not have the country back of it; indeed he thinks that a compromise cabinet is a great concession, and that it will be difficult to induce the true Letts to support it. So the situation is still in a deadlock, although considerable concessions have been made by both sides. It is likely to remain in a deadlock unless either the Allies and America, or General von der Goltz take affirmative action. Repeated requests have been made to the Chief of the American Mission to call representatives of

all groups together and act as chairman of a meeting which will agree on a compromise government. This we are not empowered to do, and so have refused.

22. Commander Gade arrived in Libau May 1. I have taken him to see both Mr. Ulmanis and General von der Goltz, and on May 2 sent for the principal representatives of the Baltic National Committee, so that he has heard all sides. General von der Goltz is very emphatic in his statement that the restoration of the old government would cause the Landeswehr to defect, and that then he could no longer maintain his front. It has been intimated to us from his office that unless a government is soon established he would take a direct hand in events himself in order to protect his army. It is of course difficult to estimate these statements at their true value. They are the statements of a German and a soldier. Commander Gade and I believe that, in general, he speaks as a soldier and not as a politician, and that he believes what he says. But we feel that he looks at the situation from a thoroughly German point of view. It will be hard to teach new tricks to an old Prussian dog.

WARWICK GREENE

P. S. A short statement concerning certain military disorders is also appended herewith (Exhibit 19). Further information will be sent in our next report after we have had more time to sift the evidence and endeavor to give an impartial estimate of these occurrences and the steps that should be taken by the Allies and America to prevent them in the future. I feel, however, that these disorders will cease if and when a British or American military mission comes with power to take charge of the training of the Lettish forces in an area apart from contact with the Germans.

[Enclosure—Exhibit 18]

Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene to Mr. Andreas Needra

LIBAU, May 1, 1919.

DEAR MR. NEEDRA: With reference to our meeting of this morning, to which you came as mediator between Letts and Baits, I wish to make the following informal statement:

1. America does not wish to interfere or intervene in the internal politics of Latvia, except as they affect the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice.
2. American sympathies are with the people of Latvia in their efforts towards self-determination and in their struggle against the destructive force of Bolshevism.
3. At the present moment our concern is to see the establishment of a temporary, *de facto* Government, organized only for the present military emergency, to which all anti-Bolshevist elements will pledge their sincere support and which will be sufficiently stable to
 - a. Prevent civil war.
 - b. Provide the necessary administrative machinery for American food distribution.
 - c. Permit provisional relaxation of the blockade so that commerce and industry may revive.
 - d. Make possible the creation of a Latvian Army under proper supervision, with adequate safeguards, and with assurance of the necessary money and equipment.
 - e. Perform the other functions of civil government until normal political Government is possible.
4. It is my personal opinion that such a provisional Government might be reestablished by the following steps:
 - a. Public disavowal and condemnation by the Baltic National Committee of the acts of violence of the Landeswehr of April 16.
 - b. Removal of guards from Government buildings and return of Ulmanis ministry to their offices.
 - c. Immediate resignation of all members of Ulmanis cabinet.
 - d. Prompt reconstitution of the Government by formation of a new coalition cabinet under Mr. Ulmanis as Prime Minister, in which members of the old Ulmanis Cabinet would have a majority, for example, seven or eight out of twelve places, and the minority groups (Baits, Moderate Letts, Jews, etc.) four to five places.
 - e. General amnesty in regard to past political events.
 - f. A political and social truce, similar to those in France, Germany, and other countries during the Great War, to enable a vigorous

prosecution of the war against Bolshevism.

5. In my opinion the Ulmanis Ministry should have a majority representation in any proposed coalition Government, as this measure would be supported by a majority of the anti-Bolshevist population of Latvia. On the other hand, the minority groups—especially those which have taken a prominent part in the field operations against Bolshevism—should have a strong minority representation in a coalition Government organized for a vigorous prosecution of the War.
6. The above personal views are expressed owing to the gravity of the present situation, and in the hope that it is still not too late, if the leaders of the national elements will adopt a policy of moderation, goodwill, and conciliation, to prevent the people of Latvia from shedding one another's blood, in the face of the supreme peril from Bolshevist Russia.

I am [etc.]

WARWICK GREENE

²⁸ None of the exhibits accompanying this document are printed except exhibit 18, p. 182 [*Pg. 182 is part of [Doc. 58](#)*].

²⁹ *Infra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/22¹/₂: Telegram

[Document 59]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

COPENHAGEN, May 4, 1919.
[Received May 5—9:50 a.m.]

354. Following from Libau: “Greene 19, May 3. Have carefully reviewed situation in Finland with Gade who has prepared very able and exhaustive report on present conditions Finland. We urge prompt recognition of Finland as an independent country and financial aid from Allies and America. Finland deserves recognition for her part in stopping westward destructive flow of bolshevism and she has demonstrated her capacity for self-government under difficult circumstances. Recognition and a loan now essential to maintain her position. Her future should be determined quite apart from problem of Baltic provinces. Greene.”³⁰

GRANT-SMITH

³⁰ The United States Government had already decided to recognize Finland; see telegram No. 1992, May 5, 1919, 8 p.m., from the Commission to the Acting Secretary of State, [*Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. II, p. 214*](#).⁶⁷

Report by Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley

KOVNO, May 15, 1919.

MILITARY SITUATION IN LITHUANIA

1. The following is a report on the military situation in Lithuania. It is based upon information obtained from the Lithuanian Government, personal inspection of points of the front and of troops and, to a certain extent, information given by the German command. A questionnaire, copy of which is attached hereto,³¹ was submitted to the representative in Lithuania of the German Ost Army on May 5th. This representative in Lithuania replied stating he had transmitted the questionnaire to the General Commando at Bartenstein. On May 14th he advised that Bartenstein had telegraphed him to the effect that they were preparing the information desired and that the same would be forwarded when complete. When this information is received it will be forwarded to be attached to this report.
2. On November 11th the general line held by the Germans in Western Russia was the Düna River, Riga to Dwinsk exclusive, thence almost due south. Early in January a general withdrawal was executed by the Germans, the reasons being given as defection among the troops and their inability to hold the advanced line against the Bolsheviks. On January 20th the line of defense of the Bolsheviks was generally Windau River–Telze–Szawle–Szalow–Hjiedny–Janow–Koszedary—exclusive Wilna–Olita–Grodno exclusive—Walkowyak. Early in February a general reorganization was made of the German forces and in connection with partisan bands in Lithuania, there being at that time no organized Lithuanian Government force, a general offensive was started with the result that by March 30th the line held today in Northern Lithuania was reached, except for the advance in the direction of

Wilkomierz made May 3rd. In the southern part of Lithuania the Poles, who held the line from Grodno south, advanced until a drive north and east, coincident with a general uprising of the Polish elements in Wilna, enabled them to drive the Bolsheviks out of Wilna on April 19th. On May 3rd Polish outposts met Lithuanian outposts in Schirwinty, 30 kilometers southeast of Wilkomierz. Polish troops now hold the front from Schirwinty east to Poddrozic on the railroad Wilna–Dwinsk, and thence generally south, neither Lithuanian nor German troops being in contact with the Bolsheviks south of Schirwinty.

3. The present front is shown on Annex No. 1. There has not been and there is no unity of command of the forces in Northern Lithuania operating against the Bolsheviks; German and Lithuanian troops are interspersed. At present the Lithuanians have but few troops south of an east and west line through Kovno. Grodno is occupied by the Poles. A White Russian regiment, nominally counted as part of the Lithuanian army, is stationed in Grodno. Two battalions of infantry with a small detachment of cavalry and one 4–gun battery are located on the road Kovno–Wilna about half-way between the latter points, and are maintained there as a guard for Kovno against an offensive in that direction by the Polish troops. Polish and Lithuanian outposts jointly occupy the town of Jewie, 35 kilometers west of Wilna.
4. The Bolshevik organization on this front is shown on map, Annex No. 1. The Bolshevik forces are not important nor do they at present constitute a real menace. They lack organization, initiative, energy and equipment. However, the withdrawal of German forces from this country before an adequate Lithuanian force is built up would invite disaster in the form of an organized Bolshevik offensive if this were in any way possible. In the northeastern part of Lithuania the Bolsheviks at present hold some of the most valuable and fertile land in the country. The Bolshevik scheme of defense consists of maintaining large forces at the important centers of resistance. These centers are from north to south; the railroad east and west through Ponewiez, the highway northeast through Wilkomierz, the railroad northeast from Wilna and east and south from Wilna. No information is at present available on the Bolshevik forces further to the south on the Polish front.

5. The organization of the Lithuanian forces is shown in Annex No. 3. The organization of the German forces in Lithuania as dictated by the best available information is shown in Annex No. 4. The total German forces in Lithuania are estimated at about 40,000. All of these troops are volunteers. Their discipline and morale are not good. Their appearance is not good. There are but few troops actually on the front, the majority being stationed in the interior. A great deal of military training is being done by the German troops in spite of the lack of discipline and morale. Their equipment is complete. So far as known, since March 30th the Germans, with the exception of a little help accorded the Lithuanians in the capture of Wilkomierz on May 3rd, have made no active aggression against Bolshevism. On May 9th the Lithuanian General Staff was officially informed by a member of the German General Staff that no further operations against Bolsheviks would be undertaken by the Germans in view of the fact that negotiations were under way looking to the conclusion of an armistice with the Soviet Government. The reason given was the severity of the peace terms imposed on Germany by the Allies. The attitude of the German forces is completely domineering. In the city of Kovno all of the best buildings and houses are occupied by Germans. The Lithuanian authorities receive daily multitudinous complaints from the civil population of robbery, thievery and plundering by the Germans. The Lithuanians make a real effort to get along and to quiet their people, hoping for action from the outside which will bridle or curb the activities of the Germans. I believe that the majority of German officers realize it is to their interest and the interest of all concerned to maintain order among the people, but I also believe that they are under the present circumstances powerless and unable to hold their men. Nor can they forget the Prussian characteristics and the domination they had over this country for four years. The Soldatenrat are powerful and are a constant annoyance to the Lithuanian government officials. The latter claim they have positive evidence of trafficking between the Soldatenrat and the Bolsheviks in which the former supply the Bolsheviks with arms, ammunition, food and even field pieces. The Lithuanian government officials openly admit that at present practically their entire source of supply of gasoline, auto tires, spare parts, etc., is by purchase from civilians who have in turn

bought the stolen property either from the Soldatenrat or individual German soldiers.

6. The railway communications in operation in Lithuania are shown in Annex No. 4–A. Attached thereto is also a statement of the amount of railway material required for the operation of these roads in the event of a withdrawal of the Germans. All other railroads are maintained, operated and completely controlled by the Germans and it is difficult for the Lithuanians to get transportation even for their officials and people travelling on public business. The Germans admit of no boundary control with the result that they are taking out of the country large amounts of foodstuffs, timber, narrow gauge railway material and military installations of all kinds. The Lithuanian government of itself owns absolutely no rolling stock or railway material of any kind. That which was here before the war was of Russian gauge and has been disposed of by the Germans so that nothing remains. One of the conditions for the withdrawal of the German forces must, therefore, be that they leave intact and maintain in operation such rolling stock and railway material as may be necessary for the maintenance of communication and supply of the country of Lithuania.
7. The Lithuanian Government is being financed by a loan obtained from Germany in December last. Its army is being equipped by a German firm. Rifles, field pieces, and ammunition are furnished directly by the German Government. Copies of the contract for the loan and contract with the German firm for the equipment are attached hereto as Annex No. 5 and 6. A price list of articles purchased in this manner from Germany and the German firm will be sent later to be attached to this annex. By written correspondence between the Lithuanian Government and the German Government the former are obligated to pay four marks per day for all ranks for the German forces in Lithuania up to 20,000. A copy of this contract will be sent to be attached to the above annex or to the political report.
8. The political questions of the boundary of Lithuania, including the present occupation of Wilna by the Poles while of the utmost military importance will be dealt with in a separate report. The relations between Poles and Lithuanians are extremely strained. A solution of this problem must be made from the outside. At

present at one point the Lithuanian and Polish forces face each other, but both have orders from their military commanders under no circumstances to be embroiled in a fight. In the event of an aggression by the Poles the Lithuanians are powerless lacking as they do organization and equipment for their available man power. It is evidently to the interest of Germany to foster and maintain this spirit of rivalry and ill feeling between the Lithuanians and Poles and while no definite information is at hand, rumors are rife concerning the German attempts to get Lithuania united with them in the event that they, the Germans, shall again go against Poland. The representative of the German Ost Army in Lithuania stated to the chief of Mission and myself that in the event of the cession of the east provinces of Germany in consequence of the peace terms, the German forces now outside of Germany would have to be withdrawn for the protection of these German provinces. A Lithuanian commission composed of two ex-Ministers has been in Warsaw for the past month with instructions and power to arrange with Polish representatives a nominal settlement of the boundary question between the two countries and to arrange an agreement regarding their future combined action against Bolshevism. To date nothing has been accomplished by this mission.

9. The total organized Lithuanian forces number about 11,000. These include Kommandantur detachments which are stationed all over the northern part of liberated Lithuania. They have nothing in the way of arms and equipment except that furnished by the German Government and the German firm referred to before. As shown in Annex No. 3 there are less than 8000 rifles now in the hands of the Lithuanians. It is impossible to organize the recruit detachments at many of the Kommandanturs owing to the lack of equipment, shoes, clothing, arms and ammunition. The deliveries of these supplies from Germany have not been regular nor in the quantity desired. Of the present forces now organized, 67% are volunteers and 33% are conscripts. Of the 31 districts in Lithuania, but 21 are liberated and available to the Lithuanian Government. So far, in but 13 of these districts are figures accessible on available mobilization. From these 13 districts by taking the men born in 1897 and 1898 an additional force of 12,000 could be formed. Based on these figures it is estimated that if the age limit were

extended to 35 a force of 7,000 additional could be mobilized. These figures I do not regard as extremely reliable, but I am convinced that there is enough available man power in Lithuania to maintain the country against Bolshevism without the aid of German or Polish troops. The Lithuanian soldier as such I regard as very good soldier material. What they require is organization, direction, training and equipment, and it is believed that if the arms, clothing and ammunition were available that a sufficient and suitable force to maintain the government and the country against Bolshevism could be raised in one month, enabling all German troops to be withdrawn. To organize this force will require the loan or sale to Lithuania against her natural resources of equipment for her forces, complete in every detail. There are no industries in Lithuania producing war materials or equipment of any kind. The Lithuanian Government can handle the food supply of this army with what help has already been given in the way of flour by the American Relief Administration.

10. While the Lithuanian soldier material is good there is a lamentable lack of competent officers. General Zaukauskas, an ex-Russian division commander, arrived the latter part of April and has been made Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief of the field of the Lithuanian army. He is a man of considerable force of character, energy and apparent talent and ability for command, and he has associated with him a number of ex-Russian officers of long experience, force and ability. Junior commanders and officers are, however, lacking. The organization of the Lithuanian General Staff which went into effect on May 15th is shown as Annex No. 7. An ex-Russian General Staff Officer was largely responsible for this organization and is now in charge of instruction of the General Staff. Among the Lithuanians themselves there are but few officers who were allowed under the Russian government to attend their staff school; this for the reason that Lithuanians are Catholics. There is in operation in Kovno a school for junior officers and candidates for commission. Detailed information of this school with course of study is attached as Annex No. 8.
11. An effort is being made by the Lithuanians to recruit a force of 6,000 to 7,000 Lithuanians in America for service in the Lithuanian army. To this end a commission has left Lithuania for the United States. Aid for this mission in its project was ardently

sought but no encouragement was offered in any way. In order to have more definite information on the method of procedure and the full project, a questionnaire on this subject was submitted to the Ministry of War. This questionnaire and the answers are attached as Annex No. 9³² and is submitted without comment.

12. While from one standpoint the German forces are necessary in this country to protect it from Bolshevism, it presents itself on the other hand a constant menace in the form of Bolshevism. Positive and definite proofs are lacking and yet I am convinced that there is and does exist a definite agreement between the German command in Lithuania and the Bolsheviks. It is appreciated that what follows is not conclusive proof of this and it is given only for what it may show of the danger that exists to this country by the retention here of the Germans. It is reported to me that an Inter-Allied Commission for the repatriation of Russian prisoners was put in telephonic communication from the German command in Kovno with the Bolsheviks. A United Press correspondent, Mr. Frank J. Taylor, with credentials to the Soviet Government in Moscow passed through Kovno on May 5th. Mr. Taylor went to the German command for information as to how he could best get in touch with the Bolsheviks to assure his passage through the line. He stated to me that the German representative for the Ost Army in Lithuania told him that he could not put him in telephonic communication at once with the Bolsheviks due to the fact that the Bolsheviks had been retreating so fast that they had not kept up their communication. A Bolshevik Jewish agent with German credentials was captured by the Lithuanians on May 14th. He had with him a large sum of money in German Reichsbank notes. The German command immediately demanded the release of this agent to them, which, of course, was done. As stated above, these are not submitted as conclusive proofs of accord between the Germans and Bolsheviks but they are a few instances related to indicate the mass of intrigue that is being carried out by Germans here.
13. *Future operations:* An operation is contemplated by the Lithuanian forces for the capture of Ponewiez in the next few days. This operation was scheduled for May 14th but had to be postponed on account of the German refusal to assist. An effort

will now be made without them by flanking from the north and south. It is believed it will succeed.

14. The reason of the German occupation of this country is on the surface in consequence of Article XII of the armistice. The more subtle reasons are:

1. The maintenance of an armed force outside of Germany.
2. The maintenance of German influence outside of Germany.
3. A scheme for colonization and a pretext for domination and control of a country which is furnishing vast amounts of food and timber supplies for Germany.

At present Lithuania is as completely dominated by Germans as if it were part and parcel of Germany. The Lithuanian Government is such in name only. The German forces cannot be withdrawn without danger of complete domination by Bolsheviks. German occupation is but the lesser of two evils. If this country is to be saved from ultimate domination by Germany, the German forces must be withdrawn and must be kept out. Until that time a Lithuanian national army must be organized, equipped and trained. This requires complete supervision, direction, finance and equipment from the Entente. It will require personal equipment for the soldier, arms, ammunition, transportation of all kinds and war supplies of every nature. No attempt is made to delineate the separate items that are needed. If equipment and aid are to be furnished, they should be furnished according to accepted tables of organization and equipment, the reservation being made that the Lithuanian soldier does not need, and that this kind of war does not demand the high standard of maintenance of this equipment that our American soldiers require. It is believed that a great deal of this equipment could be furnished from salvaged and captured stock of any equipment of any of the three great powers in the Entente. The natural resources of this country, which could be used for the security of the loan and sale of arms and equipment, are limited entirely to agricultural and forestry products. There is little or no industry of any kind in the country. Formerly leather manufactory was important. It is stated that the Germans have taken out of the country 200,000 horses and 300,000 head of cattle, as well as large numbers of sheep, swine, etc., with the result that there remain but few of these animals in the country and it will require intensive breeding and propagation before the

needs of the country in that respect can be restored and the leather industry ever again become important. In spite of the shortage of horses and cattle, the spring agricultural work has progressed remarkably well. It is estimated that two-thirds of the tillable land in Lithuania is at present under cultivation and with a good harvest Lithuania should be able to export food stuffs in some quantity within the year.

15. Coincident with help in the formation of a National Lithuanian Army must come from the Entente an absolute and rigid definition of Germany's position in this country and it must be explicitly stated as to:

- a. Her relations with the Lithuanian civil government.
- b. Her attitude toward and help she is to afford in the formation of a national army.
- c. The aggression she is to maintain against Bolshevism until such time as the newly created national force will be able to relieve the German forces from their responsibility to the Entente for the preservation of the country against Bolshevism.

There must also be an agreement or arrangement effected by the Entente between the Lithuanians and Poles in regard to their boundary dispute, guarantees being exacted from both that their military operations will be limited solely to the aggression against Bolshevism. While the race question is acute, it is believed that both Poles and Lithuanians will readily submit to the mandates in regard to their boundaries from the Entente. It is believed that assistance in the formation of a national army for the protection of the country against Bolshevism can only be accomplished by a directorate who shall practically administer civil and military affairs of the country. This directorate must have an adequate military mission, financial and legal experts. It is also held that this can best be accomplished by one nation, reporting to one government rather than by an Inter-Allied directorate or commission, and although it is not desired to see America involved to that extent, it is believed that American men and American brains can solve this problem more readily and more rapidly than can any other of the Allies. In this connection attention is invited to the fact that there is at present in Kovno a French military mission which is doing valuable work for the Lithuanians in the matter of assistance in organization and training. However, a

larger and more important work in this regard is being accomplished by three Swedish officers who are here solely as volunteers to aid the Lithuanians in their struggle against Bolshevism.

16. *Recommendations:* In view of the above it is recommended that the Entente consider the immediate relief of Lithuania by:
1. Guaranteeing to the country against her natural resources, which are agricultural and forestry products:
 - a. Finances;
 - b. Equipment and supplies of every kind for her army; and,
 - c. Complete direction, supervision and organization of her army.
 2. Defining rigidly the position of Germany and German troops in this country as to:
 - a. Germany's attitude toward the Lithuanian Government and the creation of a Lithuanian National army;
 - b. Her *modus operandi* in this country; and
 - c. Explicitly her part in the maintenance of an aggression against Bolshevism.
 3. Creating a control of German import and export to and from this country and stipulating what German property such as railway rolling stock materials and military installations may be withdrawn.
 4. Demanding from the Lithuanian and Polish Governments a military coalition against Bolshevism with full agreement that racial problems and boundary questions shall be reserved to a later date for adjudication.

E. J. DAWLEY

[Enclosure 1]

Annex No. 9

STATEMENT IN REGARD TO LITHUANIAN MISSION TO THE U. S. FOR
PURPOSE OF GETTING VOLUNTEERS FOR LITHUANIA

QUESTIONNAIRE PROPOSED TO LITHUANIAN MINISTER OF WAR

1. Names and present occupation and status of members.
2. Proposed method of procedure.
3. Number of troops or men it is believed possible to obtain from America.
4. Brief outline of work already accomplished in this matter.
5. How were men in U. S. enrolled.
6. By whom is the expense of transportation, equipment, etc., to be borne.
7. What assurances have already been obtained that the U. S. Government will approve the project.
8. When is it expected to get these troops here.
9. Have any arrangements been made to get similar volunteers from other countries.
10. To what use is it proposed to put these troops.
11. Is the Lithuanian Government in a position financially to assure payment and maintenance of these troops while here.
12. What assurance is contracted to these volunteers to:
 1. Return them to the U. S.
 2. Indemnify them or relatives for loss of life or property.
 3. Definitely define their status and rights here—Lithuania and afterwards as citizens of the U. S.

E. J. DAWLEY

MEMORANDUM

1. Col. Galvidis-Bykauskas, chief of the Military school, and 2nd Lieut. Natkevicius, adjutant of the artillery regiment.

2. By permission of the government of the country, by the Lithuanian societies of the countries and by advertisements in the regions inhabited by Lithuanian colonies.

3. We hope to obtain from America 10,000 men.

4. Up to the present time we have enrolled in the Lithuanian army about 7,000 volunteers who are expecting to be sent to Lithuania.

5. They were enrolled by the societies of the country and by advertisements in the Lithuanian colonies.

6. The expense of transportation and equipment is to be borne by the Lithuanian government.

7. Up until now no assurance has been obtained that the U. S. Government will approve of the project.

8. It is desirable to get these troops from America to Lithuania as soon as possible.

9. Arrangements have been made to get volunteers from Sweden.

10. The troops obtained from America will be used only on the front to defend Lithuanian frontier.

11. The Lithuanian Government is in a position financially to assure the payment and maintenance of these troops while they are in Lithuania.

12. (1) With regard to the U. S.—These men will be given full liberty and help.

(2) For loss of life or property, they or their relatives will be indemnified as Lithuanian soldiers.

(3) American volunteers will have the same rights as Lithuanian soldiers.

MERKIS
Minister of War

[Enclosure 2]

Supplement to Military Report on Lithuania

WARSAW, May 20, 1919.

1. The information contained in the following sub-paragraphs was gotten by me in Vilna while *en route* to Warsaw. Inasmuch as I am not accredited to Poland, no attempt has been made to verify or pursue the matters further. A copy of this Supplementary Report has been left with the American Minister in Poland for his information.
 - (a) Referring to the statement in the Military Report that there exists an agreement or accord between the German and Soviet Governments and that the two are in constant communication, the Chief of Staff of the Polish garrison in Vilna informed me that the wireless station at Vilna intercepts a great many messages in cipher and in clear between Kovno and Dünaburg and Moscow; the messages in the clear being invariably on the subject of the exchange of prisoners.
 - (b) On Saturday, May 17th, a Mrs. Harrison, American newspaper correspondent of the *Baltimore Sun*, attended a meeting in Vilna of Jewish representatives. Mrs. Harrison informs me that resolutions were passed extremely socialistic in nature and in reality Bolshevistic; the Jews contending that the administration in Vilna by the Bolsheviks was far preferable or acceptable to them than the administration by the Poles. I have not a copy of the resolutions but I have every reason to believe the statements made to me. In this connection, the attitude of the Jewish element in Wilkomierz which was taken on May 3rd by the Lithuanians and Germans, toward Bolsheviks and toward the newly occupying force is identical with that of the Jews in Vilna. Attention is invited to the capital which is being made by the Lithuanians of the excesses committed on the Jews in Vilna. While I have no positive evidence, I believe excesses to a lesser

degree were committed by the Lithuanians themselves in territory occupied by their own troops. This evidence is only given as indicative of the feeling which exists between Lithuania and Poland and of the necessity for some strong action by outside power as regards these two people, their present racial, political, and boundary disputes.

(c) The Chief of Staff of the Polish garrison in Vilna informed me that about May 13th or 14th approximately three hundred Russian prisoners of war from Germany walked into the Polish lines west of Vilna and were being kept by the Poles. He could not state the exact disposition made of these prisoners by the Poles but he was positive that they had not been sent into Russia.

2. I have been in conference with the Lithuanian Delegation, headed by Dr. Shaulis, here at Warsaw. This Lithuanian mission was sent to Warsaw to enter into negotiations looking to the solution of the present political and boundary disputes between Poland and Lithuania. They report that there has been no progress made as yet and that they are leaving this day, May 21st, for Kovno, at which place a conference is taking place between Polish and Lithuanian representatives. Before leaving Kovno, I was informed that the Ministry of War had attempted to effect an agreement with the Polish military authorities. The basis of the agreement desired was the evacuation of Vilna by the Poles in favor of the Lithuanians, on the ground that Vilna was necessary as a base for the Lithuanians in their future operations against the Bolshevists. The Poles refused the evacuation of Vilna. However, Gen. Szeptycki, commanding the Polish army in the north, expressed on May 15th his willingness to start negotiations with the Lithuanian command. The Lithuanians in turn asked that a Polish delegation be sent to Kovno or Vilna.
3. From what information I can get from the Lithuanian delegation now here in Warsaw, the bone of contention is positively Vilna. I have been furnished by our American Minister to Poland with a copy of a proclamation issued by General Pilsudski on April 22nd.³³ I am also informed that this proclamation caused considerable political unrest and alarm in Polish circles; that, however, Prime Minister Paderewski insisted that the proclamation should stand—at the same time stating that this was

exactly his attitude and commending General Pilsudski for his breadth of view in the matter. The proclamation, however, has had little or no effect on the Lithuanians, as they regard it as merely camouflage. Withal, I believe that an agreement can be reached by the intervention of the Entente in the matter of the present disputes between Lithuania and Poland.

4. I have asked the Lithuanian delegation here in Warsaw for statements in writing, setting forth their instructions, the propositions they have put to the Poles, the counter propositions, if any, made by the Poles, and in general the answer of the Polish Government to the propositions of the Lithuanians. If possible, a copy of these will be forwarded with this report.³⁴
5. I am suggesting to the American Minister that an investigation and study be made for the benefit of the Peace Commission of the measures and agreements and general methods employed by the Poles and Germans relative to the disposition of railway material, communication systems of all kinds, at the time of the evacuation of Poland by the German forces. I believe that this information will be valuable as an index of a solution of the similar questions which will arise when the Germans are required to evacuate Lithuania and Latvia.

E. J. DAWLEY

[Subenclosure—Translation]

General Pilsudski's Proclamation to Lithuanians

APRIL 22, 1919.

Your country has been deprived of liberty for nearly a century and a half. The Russian, German and Bolsheviks tyranny have oppressed you one after another imposing on the whole population forms of existence that were strange to you, which denied you all liberty of action and which often oppressed even the very principle of life.

This state of permanent slavery, which is only too well known to me as a son of this unhappy country, must now be abolished. Liberty and

the right to express openly and without restriction the wishes of the people must now prevail in these regions which seem to be forgotten by God Himself.

The Polish troops which I have led here in order to drive out tyranny and expel the authorities governing the country against its will bring you liberty for all.

I desire to offer the means of solving all internal, national and religious questions according to your own inclinations without oppression of any sort from Poland.

This is why—although the cannon still roar in your country and blood flows in rivers—I establish a government, not military, but civil; and to this government I summon the inhabitants of the country.

The duty of this government will be—

1. To help the population to express its desires freely thru representatives elected by universal suffrage.
2. To help the poor in the provision of food, protection of labor, of order and tranquillity and to protect all the inhabitants regardless of their religion or nationality.

³¹ None of the annexes to this document are printed except annex 9, p. 192 [*Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 60](#)*], and the supplement, p. 193 [*Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 60](#)*].

³² Enclosure 1, *infra*.

³³ *Infra*.

³⁴ Not attached to file copy of report.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/32: Telegram

[Document 61]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

COPENHAGEN, May 20, 1919.
[Received May 21—9:40 a.m.]

379. Following from Greene, Libau: “38. Transmit following Paris: ‘Greene, 24, May 19. Have just returned from Lithuania. Military situation covered by separate telegrams and reports. Present provisional Lithuanian Government is organized, reasonably stable, deserve[s] military and financial support Associated Governments if latter will prevent threatened clash between Poles and Lithuanians. I sent Dawley and Hale to Warsaw for conference with our Legation regarding Polish-Lithuanian controversy. If Associated Governments will arbitrate matters, peaceful solution possible. In that case, immediate provision should be made for progressive arming and equipping present and increasing Lithuanian forces, now being 11,000 men of whom 8,000 have rifles but ammunition is failing and Germans refuse supply. If Germans forced withdraw they claim right remove all rolling stock, which will ruin country. Are Associated Governments in position supply rolling stock for Latvia and Lithuania, or require Germans leave sufficient? All railroads altered by Germans from former Russian broad gauge local standard gauge to standard gauge. All rolling stock is German, but we do not know how much is captured Russian rolling stock altered for gauge.

2. Needra captured by Lettish officers on 12th of May and made to sign abdication as Prime Minister which was published. Escaped on May 16th and again assumes to act as Prime Minister.
3. For Hoover. After considerable travel in interior Lithuania and Latvia I find food conditions in country districts usually fair to good but poor in cities and close to front. Ploughing and planting have made good progress and country should be able to feed itself

after next harvest unless again overrun by Bolsheviks. But larger acreage could be planted if more work animals and seed available. Therefore seeds are important but time is fast slipping by when they can be planted for this year's harvest as the summer is short. As barley and oats are used for work animals their increased production or importation allows larger acreage to be ploughed and consequently believe Finland, Esthonia and Lithuania should receive seed provided immediate deliveries can be made. In Latvia it will be difficult until a government is formed. Above my personal opinions only. You have excellent men on ground in Brookings and Hollister. Wire me probable date Colonel Groome's arrival Libau as important I see him before leaving here.

4. For Tyler. Corporal Saliunas wishes to stay with our mission. Has seen his family in Lithuania and is now with Dawley in Warsaw. Urge he be allowed remain with us which is his wish. Private Boefer arrived May 11. Send mail all members our mission overland to Libau via Berlin, not to Copenhagen. Greene.' Greene."

GRANT-SMITH

Paris Peace Conf. 861C.00/85a: Telegram

[Document 62]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in Denmark (Hapgood)

PARIS, May 26, 1919.

[For Greene.] Your cables on Lithuania and report on Military Situation received. Major Keenan personally reported on situation in Latvia before Baltic Commission. On advice of this Commission, Council of Foreign Ministers on May 23 decided to send a Military Mission³⁵ under a British Lieutenant or Major General with headquarters at Libau or Reval, for the purpose of advising the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania on questions of organization, equipment and training of local forces and volunteers who may be raised from external sources. Hoover directed to continue *ravitaillement* to all nonbolshevist areas in the Baltic region without respect to political control. Marshal Foch directed to require the German Government that it order Von der Goltz to facilitate the establishment of a coalition ministry in Latvia proportionate to the strength of the respective parties, that he rearm the disarmed Letts, that he permit mobilization and training of local forces, and hamper in no way the new Lettish government in the exercise of its functions. Conditions of Peace repeat provisions of Armistice regarding withdrawal of German troops from Baltic with stipulation that German authorities are not to interfere with measures of national defense adopted by provisional Governments of Latvia, Esthonia and Lithuania. Full text of these decisions follows.³⁶ In view of probable tergiversations of German Government on Marshal Foch's demands, and in view of fact that Baltic Commission now sitting and able to get action on its recommendations have you any further action to suggest from this end to obtain coalition government or otherwise ameliorate conditions in regions under your observations. Keep Ammission informed of developments in Latvia and Esthonia and especially situation at Riga. Send officer of

observation if possible to report on campaign along southern shore Gulf Finland in direction Petrograd.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

³⁵ See FM–19, minute 4, [vol. IV, p. 752](#), and appendix C, [ibid., p. 762](#).

³⁶ Telegram not found in Department files.

***The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to Major Royall Tyler***

LIBAU, June 5, 1919.

DEAR MAJOR TYLER: The courier has just arrived bringing your letter of May 27th,³⁷ which found me in conference with Lieut. Col. Tallents, Chief of the British Economic Mission to Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, who has just arrived. We have spent the morning in going over the entire situation and are considering wiring General Gough, now on the Petrograd front, to know if we can come up by destroyer for consultation with him with a view to preparing a joint Allied and American recommendation on the situation which I will take to Paris on a flying trip.

This follows an inter-Allied meeting held at my mission day before yesterday at which there were present Commodore Duff of the British Navy, Senior British Naval Officer, Captain Brisson of the French Navy, Senior French Naval Officer, Colonel Groome of the A. R. A., Major Keenan of the British Mission, Mr. Grant Watson of the British Foreign Office, and myself. This was followed yesterday by a further discussion on board Commodore Duff's flagship. We are all of us intensively apprehensive over the results of the present policy of drift which is inevitably leading these countries under complete German control. Yet without the presence of the German forces there would be complete anarchy and Bolshevism. We are working on the plan of framing a joint definite recommendation representing the views of the British, American and French representatives, and sending one, two, or possibly three, representatives to Paris to urge its adoption.

I do not believe that Paris realizes the gravity of this situation. We have left these border countries either to Bolshevism or Germanism,

whichever proves strongest. At present Germany is consolidating her position here and looks to Russia to recoup from this war.

At the same time the handling of the local situation, as long as it is necessary to retain the German forces in these countries, must not be under the control of "Hun-baiters" whose policy gets us continually into unnecessary difficulties with the Germans from which it is difficult to extricate ourselves without loss of prestige.

It is absolutely necessary that my Mission have motor transport. Colonel Groome has arrived with five automobiles, and more coming, Colonel Tallents has four. My Mission, which has done all the pioneer work under the most difficult circumstances, has none. We have been greatly handicapped in the past for lack of automobiles, and I cannot continue the work unless we are to be supplied. Colonel Groome has a Cadillac limousine, and four Dodges, so that all the subordinate members of his mission have transportation. I have to walk, yet my mission, covering military and political matters, has a greater need of transportation than any other mission here. I consider our minimum requirements two automobiles, and one light two-and-a-half-ton truck, either Fiat or White, the latter to carry spare gasoline, stores, baggage, etc. It is requested that motor transport be sent immediately, together with an adequate supply of tires and gasoline.

The original appropriation, for this mission is nearly exhausted, consequently I am sending Mr. Rosenthal to Paris with our financial statements and a request for additional funds if the work of the Mission is to continue.

Colonel Dawley is now on the Petrograd front. He is the best informed man in Europe on this Bolshevist front, as he is the only man in any army who has visited the Lithuanian, Latvian, Esthonian and Finnish fronts; moreover, he has stayed on each front long enough to make a careful study of military operations and local conditions. Furthermore, he has visited Warsaw, so he has come into touch with the Polish military situation. I am confident there is no man in a better position to advise the Allied and American

governments at Paris on the military situation from Finland to Poland.

I visited Riga shortly after it was taken, and remained there six days. I found conditions very bad, and am glad to report that the A. R. A. has taken prompt action as American flour was already at Mitau in anticipation of the taking of Riga and an American Food ship has arrived at Riga in spite of the difficulties and dangers of getting through the mine fields.

Sincerely yours,

WARWICK GREENE

[37](#) Not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/43

[Document 64]

***The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to Major Royall Tyler***

LIBAU, June 6, 1919.

DEAR MAJOR TYLER: The attached proposed memorandum from the Associated Governments' Representatives in these countries has just been drafted in this office in time to go to Paris with Mr. Rosenthal. It has been agreed on between Colonel Tallents, Chief of the British Economic Mission, and myself. Tomorrow morning we go out on board the British Commodore's flagship to have an inter-Allied meeting to adopt it as a memorandum representing the views and the urgent recommendation of all of us. At this meeting there will be present the British Senior Naval Officer, the French Senior Naval Officer, the Chief of the American Mission, the Chief of the British Mission, and the Chief of the French Mission. We are all agreed that the situation here is so intolerable and the need of action so great that we should prepare a joint note and that I should take it to Paris in person the moment we have all signed it. It is possible that the attached draft may be somewhat modified in detail at tomorrow's meeting, but I do not think that it will be changed in principle. Our proposal is that I take it to Paris on a flying trip in the hope that favorable action can be secured and that I can return to Libau and then proceed to Riga with the other Allied Representatives where we will present this announcement to the proper authorities.

We find the present situation intolerable. We are forced to stand by and watch the country pass first under the Red Terror and then under the White, without any power to help matters. We consider that a continuation of the present inactivity on our part will lead the country either to Bolshevism or Germanism. The immediate peril has been Bolshevism, but we believe in the long run Germany is stronger, that she is consolidating her position in these provinces,

thereby preserving her “bridges to the east” and that she looks to Russia to recoup from this war.

As soon as this proposed amendment is adopted and signed by the various representatives it will be cabled to Paris with a statement that I have been selected as a delegate to take it to Paris³⁸ and present it to the Peace Conference, returning here as soon as possible thereafter with the decision of our respective governments in regard to the matter.

Sincerely yours,

WARWICK GREENE

[Enclosure]

Draft Memorandum

LIBAU, June 6, 1919.

It is a matter of the greatest urgency that a declaration should be made locally of the immediate proposals of the Associated Governments in regard to the three Baltic Provinces. Fighting is to be expected at any moment about Riga among the forces hitherto opposed to the Bolsheviki, and apart from this, the situation in Latvia and Lithuania will inevitably continue on its present downward course unless a firm statement of Allied intentions is made locally. It is requested that the Political Representatives of America, France and Great Britain in the Baltic Provinces may be authorized to make a united statement immediately. It is suggested that the statement should as nearly as possible take the following form:—

“An Interallied Military Mission, under command of a British General, will reach the Baltic Provinces immediately. Arms, equipment, instructors, and (a proportion of their) pay will be provided for local forces, and for volunteers, who may be

raised from external sources, in so far as this may be determined by the head of the Military Mission to be necessary for the protection of the provinces against Bolshevism or for other purposes of defence. The provision of such supplies will depend upon the loyal acceptance by the forces named of the general direction of the head of the Interallied Military Mission in their fight against Bolshevism, their methods of recruiting, and their relations between each other and with the German and Polish forces.

“A loan will be granted immediately to Lithuania and Esthonia, respectively, for civil purposes, on condition that the Provisional Governments concerned will undertake to lay before the Political Representatives of the Associated Governments, in their countries, their proposals for the use of the money thus raised, and that no such Proposal is carried out without their approval. A similar loan will be granted to Latvia as soon as a provisional Coalition Government has been formed, which, in the opinion of the Political Representatives of the Associated Governments in Latvia, is truly representative of the inhabitants of the country.”

³⁸ An American Commission personnel memorandum of June 18, 1919, states that Lieutenant Colonel Greene, with certain other members of his staff, had reported in Paris from the Baltic Mission (Paris Peace Conf. 184.015/50).

***Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Secretary
General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
(Grew)***

REVAL, June 22, 1919.

Subject: Report.

1. As temporary head of the Mission sent by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, I desire to express my dissent from the course of action that is being followed by the Allies in the solution of the problem of the Baltic States. I believe myself as well informed on the present military situation in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania as any representative of the Allied Powers. The military situation I believe to be of paramount importance. The political and economic factors are so closely related to the military that they are inseparable from it. I believe that the policy followed this far has had for the most part a negative effect and that unless some positive constructive action is taken, Allied prestige and influence in these important states will be seriously diminished if not entirely lost. The foregoing criticism and the comments which follow do not apply to Finland, with which I am less familiar, and which appears to be in a situation totally different from that of the other Baltic States.
2. The Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian peoples were formerly subject races in the Russian Empire. They are ancient races, long held in subjection, poor for the most part in material goods, of small educational or cultural attainments, with no experience in self government. On the other hand, all three races are ambitious for independence and are eagerly seeking recognition in the world at large and more particularly from the Allies. They want friendship and support from us. Amongst themselves they are suspicious, and crudely, violently, often short sightedly resentful of

any people or group of people which they may imagine stands in their way. In Latvia and Esthonia the land-holding aristocracy for seven centuries has been a German nobility superior in culture and educational attainments to the peasant races by which they are surrounded. These Baltic Germans, or Baits as they are generally called, have for all this period been the dominating political and administrative element in these communities. They ruled or misruled the country in mediseval times, they ruled or misruled it under the Czars, and this notwithstanding the fact that numerically they composed no more than 15 or 20 per cent of the population. For centuries the Esthonians, and Latvians submitted with varying degrees of good or ill grace to this domination. They are now determined to put an end to it and to take all power into their own hands. In the execution of this plan they are willing to resort if necessary to violence. In Lithuania there are virtually no Baits but there is a land-holding nobility of Polish origin, regarded by the Lithuanians as the Baits are regarded by the Esthonians and the Letts.

3. To the east of these Baltic countries lies Bolshevik Russia, for whom many of the people in all three countries, but particularly in Latvia and Esthonia, have considerable more or less concealed sympathy. To the south and west lies Germany, a nation defeated but still ambitious, still possessed of some power, with a practical certainty of increasing power in the future. Germany's ambitions in Russia and the Baltic countries are boundless. She realizes that in these countries are great markets, great sources of raw material, even perhaps reservoirs of military power on which her greatness and conceivably her future existence as a nation may depend. She recognizes the usefulness for her own purposes of the Baltic element in Esthonia and Latvia. She recognizes the values of a Lithuanian state as a counter to Poland. She recognizes that her power of organization and her industrial output are necessary and almost indispensable to the Great Russia that now lies under the paralyzing rule of the Soviet Republic.
4. The Allies and the great bulk of opinion of the civilized world are hostile to Bolshevism. The Allies have never committed themselves to the extermination of Bolshevism but they are committed as it would seem to keep a sanitary cordon drawn and to prevent the release of Bolshevism into Europe and the Western world. For the

maintenance of this sanitary cordon we have consented to the presence in Latvia and Lithuania of some 60,000 German troops, 20,000 in Latvia and 40,000 in Lithuania. They have been in these countries under Article 12 of the Armistice, which explicitly recognizes the fact that the presence here of German troops may be necessary to maintain order in the country. There can be no doubt whatever that their presence has in the past been necessary to keep Bolshevism out. This fact is recognized by the Letts and Lithuanians themselves.

5. Bearing in mind these facts the problem of the Baltic States as I see it is as follows:
 - (1) To maintain in these territories the sanitary cordon against Bolshevism.
 - (2) To secure justice for all the indigenous races in these provinces alike, the Esthonians, Letts, Baits, Lithuanians, and Lithuanian-born Poles.
 - (3) To prevent Germany from ruthlessly exploiting these countries and from making of them and of Russia in the future, a vast territory servile to her every scheme of expansion and aggrandisement.
 - (4) To stand ready at such time as a stable government, not repugnant to our principles of freedom and order, exists in Russia, to define the relations to Russia of these small frontier communities, determining whether these states shall be absolutely independent, shall preserve autonomy under the Russian rule, or shall lapse back to complete vassaldom under the Russia State as they were in the days of the Czar.
6. The problem is monumental and calls for the highest statesmanship, the most determined adherence to a fair, generous and just policy carried out by agents who shall be above suspicion and vile intrigues. Any petty policy, any playing of race against race, party against party, class against class, is playing the game as the Germans are playing it, and we are bound to lose. On the other hand, to bait and harass the Germans or the German armies now in occupation in these provinces, with the implied assent of the Allies is simply to stimulate their antagonism and make them all the more eager to push their influence and consolidate their following in these countries. It is also to weaken the defense of these countries from the Bolsheviks without and from the

Bolsheviks within. If we sympathize with the Baits against the Esthonians and Letts we are sympathizing with a small reactionary land-holding minority against national and democratic movements. If, on the other hand, we encourage the Letts and Esthonians to exterminate the Baits, or the Lithuanians to exterminate the land-holding Poles, or countenance an arbitrary confiscation of the lands of Baits or Poles, we encourage the tyranny of a majority and the destruction of the most intelligent, experienced, and capable classes in the respective countries.

7. Unfortunately there is not a single one of these vital factors and principles which has not been already at one time or another overlooked. In Latvia, for example, there existed the Ulmanis Government, which was overthrown by the *coup d'état* of the Baltic Landeswehr of April 16. By patient efforts on the part of the Allied representatives the Baits were induced to disavow their act and to accept the principle of minority representation in a coalition government to be formed for the prosecution of a war against Bolshevism. Up to May 8 Mr. Ulmanis had an opportunity to form such a Government which should be truly representative of all the elements in Latvia and which should contain a majority of his former cabinet. Mr. Ulmanis obstinately refused to do this, preferring to seek to shelter himself behind the Allies and to adopt an attitude which committed him to no constructive effort but simply to an expression of Hun hate and Bait hate. In his attempt to obtain Allied sympathy he has been more successful than he deserved, but in the long run nothing has been gained either by Mr. Ulmanis or by those of the Allies who strove to restore him to power. At present, he, with a large number of his followers, sits impotent and apparently terrified on a boat in the harbor of Libau. Meantime, Mr. Needra, the Lettish pastor, with the support of the Baits, the moderate Letts, and some of the smaller peasant land-holders, formed a provisional government which has been functioning since about May 10. Mr. Needra was not in the beginning pro-German. He sought, in fact, begged the support of the Allies but failing to receive it, he turned to the Germans, where he found a warm welcome. His Government is not strong but it has to its credit the achievement, with German assistance, of having taken Riga and practically cleared a large part of Latvia of the Red

Army. After waiting all these months, the Allies have still some positive action to take in the domestic situation in Latvia.

8. The real purpose of Germany in maintaining an armed force in these countries is:

- (1) To fight Bolshevism, as vigorously or as laxly as the needs of the moment seem to dictate.
- (2) To keep an army in being ready outside the territorial limits of Germany for an emergency.
- (3) To assure the import of large amounts of food stuffs and raw materials to Germany.
- (4) To extend and maintain German influence outside of Germany.
- (5) To protect her bridges in the East.

The Allies have stooped to harassing the German occupying forces and have never attempted to define their position in a straightforward and constructive manner. They have neither treated with the German as an ally, fought him as an enemy, or considered him as their agent or servant, which in fact he was. On the contrary, they have been prone simply to insult him as an interloper and let things go at that. The Bolshevik menace now appears to have lessened and in my opinion three-fourths of the German troops in Lithuania, and half the German troops in Latvia should be now withdrawn. However, our action in the past has been so dilatory, and our treatment of Germany so impolitic, that the Baltic Landeswehr of Latvia under the command of a German officer, and with furtive support from the Germans, has had time to march north and attack the Esthonians in their rear, thus creating a civil war in Latvia, weakening the front against the Bolsheviks, and providing Germany with an excuse for a prolonged military domination of the country, coupled quite possibly with the colonization and political control. The Provisional Government of Latvia six months ago entered into an agreement with Germany by which troops who fought for Latvia for thirty days might acquire Latvian citizenship. Under this agreement some 20,000 pure German subjects have a right to regard themselves as citizens of Latvia and to fight the Esthonians under the guise of being Letts. When they are sick of being Letts they can throw off the lamb's skin and give the roar of the Prussian lion.

9. I believe that these great problems can be solved only by an Allied Mission with a complete organization, charged with the duty of

directing the Military operations of these countries, of organizing, equipping and training their national forces, and guiding their civil government in the application of political principles of justice and fair play to all parties. The outline of such an organization is attached hereto as Exhibit I.³⁹ It is a large organization but the issues at stake are large issues. Negligence or procrastination now we may pay for dearly in the future.

10. The situation is such that as already observed, a large proportion of German troops could be withdrawn without imperiling the safety of the countries in question. I recently recommended the complete recall of all German troops and elements from Courland, but this was to follow the immediate extension of material and moral aid to Latvia. The latter implied the formation of a national coalition government, with a consequent nationalization of the Landeswehr and Lettish detachments. Since then the situation is so much more critical due to the lack of an attempt at a constructive solution that I now advise the withdrawal of only 50 percent of the Germans in Latvia. In this connection attention is invited:

(1) To the disposition of German troops in Lithuania, i. e., the great majority being concentrated in the southern part of Lithuania near the Polish and German frontiers.

(2) German troops have taken no decisive part in offensive operations against the Bolsheviks since March; the advance of the Letts and the Landeswehr on Riga being merely followed by the German forces in the nature of a flank protection. The same is true of the Lithuanian offensive in the direction of Ponewiecz and Dwinsk.

(3) The railroads and communications in Latvia and Lithuania are completely operated and controlled by Germany. The situation demands the complete control of the evacuation of the German troops by the Allies and further that the railroads and communications, together with rolling stock and operating personnel be left *in situ*.

11. There are attached hereto the following documents:

(1) Organization and outline of procedure for Inter-Allied Mission to the Baltic States.

(2) Report on the Esthonian-Landeswehr situation to date.

- (3) Report on the relation of Ingermanland to the Russian Northern Corps.
- (4) Report on the Russian Northern Corps.

These questions are treated in separate reports so that each may be considered by itself, but they are not isolated matters and the relation of all these events and the political and military factors which underlie them should be considered in relation to the whole situation which I have attempted to state in the foregoing.

E. J. DAWLEY

39 None of the enclosures to this document are printed.

Memorandum From the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)[40](#)

PARIS, June 30, 1919.

INTRODUCTION

The following memorandum covers the situation in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The case of Finland has already been considered in the report of Commander John A. Gade of this mission, which recommended the recognition of Finland's independence.[41](#) This has been done. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider Finland in the present memorandum.

Further details regarding military, political, and other matters in the Baltic Provinces will be found in the appendices[42](#) to this memorandum and in the reports already submitted by this mission.

1. GENERAL

The present situation in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania merits the most careful consideration from the Allied and Associated Governments as the continuation of an inactive policy on their part will inevitably deliver these countries to Bolshevism or Germanism—whichever proves strongest.

If Bolshevism completely overruns this territory it will register its greatest westward advance and will bring the Red Menace close to Western Europe; if on the other hand, Germany seizes the land of the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians (which she is now in the process of doing) she will possess the entire eastern littoral of the Baltic and will shut the western gate of Russia, thereby securing the

opportunity for a preponderate influence in the future of the former Russian Empire, with all this implies in the way of natural resources and man power.

It is, therefore, vital to us that this western doorway to Russia be kept free both from Bolshevism and from Teutonic forceful influence.

2. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BALTICUM

In considering this problem it must be borne in mind that the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania have an importance out of all proportion to their size and population. This is due to their geographical situation which makes them:

- (1) The most critical barrier states against Bolshevism;
- (2) Buffer states between Russia and Germany. (This is their present position. Their geographical situation, however, links their fate to that of Russia.)
- (3) The military and commercial key to the hinterland of Russia;*
- (4) The probable direction of Germany's future expansion, military, political and economic.

For these reasons the Baltic States and Lithuania are the Strategic ground:

- (1) To check the westward flow of Bolshevism;
- (2) To inaugurate an active and aggressive campaign for the defeat of Bolshevism and the reconstruction of Russia;
- (3) To prevent Germany from acquiring military domination over Russia.

3. BOLSHEVIST DANGER

Early in 1918 Bolshevism overran the former Russian provinces of Livonia and Esthonia, as well as the Grand Duchy of Finland. Soviet Republics were established and the usual Red regime inaugurated.

From these regions the Bolsheviks were ejected by the advance of the German army north which took place during the summer of 1918.

The Soviet Governments were overthrown and Esthonia, Livonia and Finland brought under German military control.

After the armistice in November, 1918, the German army began to disintegrate and to withdraw from these countries. Its retreat was followed by a fresh Bolshevik aggression which overran Esthonia, Livonia and Courland as far as the River Windau.

Early in 1919 a counter-movement against Bolshevism started, carried out by the Esthonians, assisted by the Finns and Russian volunteers in the north, and by the German troops under Gen. Von der Goltz in the south, assisted by Baits and Letts. By the 13th of June the Baltic Provinces were once more free from Bolshevism except the eastern part of Latvia known as Lattgalia.

At the present time Bolshevism still menaces these regions. Internal disorder, civil war between Baits and Letts or Baits, and Esths, or the precipitate withdrawal of the German troops might invite a fresh Bolshevik aggression from Russia, particularly if the setback to Kolchak should release troops which Moscow could send against the Baltic front.

A concentration of Bolshevik forces is reported at Riejitsa and they are attacking in the direction of Kreutzburg. This may or may not develop into a serious offensive.

4. GERMAN DANGER

In the summer of 1915 the German armies conquered Lithuania and Courland and established a military occupation which lasted until the armistice. They changed the gauge of all the railroads from Russian to standard and issued a special currency in rubles and marks for these regions known as the Ost currency, which is still the prevailing legal tender.

After the weakening of Russia due to the revolution, followed by Bolshevism, the German forces pushed north, capturing Riga during the summer of 1918 and continuing northward until they had

occupied Livonia, Esthonia and Finland in addition to Courland and Lithuania.

The armistice in November, 1918, was followed by the revolution in Germany, which extended to the army of the East and caused its disintegration. This army, after a revolt against its officers practically dissolved, abandoning or selling large quantities of war material to the Bolshevik forces following its retreat. It is also not improbable that connivance on the part of German authorities with the Bolshevik Government permitted the regions evacuated by the Germans immediately to be taken over by Bolshevik.

By February, 1919, the Bolsheviks occupied all of Livonia, a part of Lithuania and Courland as far as the River Windau.

In February a counter-offensive against the Bolsheviks was inaugurated by Gen. Von Der Goltz who landed in Libau with a considerable force of German volunteers. Assisted by the Baltic territorial defense troops (Baltic Landeswehr) and later by Lettish troops, the country was eventually cleared of the Bolshevik forces. To-day the Germans completely dominate Lithuania, Latvia and Southern Livonia, including the city of Riga. In this area they maintain a German army of 50,000 to 60,000 men; they support and control the local governments which they overthrow if hostile to them (as in the case of the Ulmanis Government in Latvia); they equip, pay, supply and command the local and Russian forces, as well as their own; they operate all railroads and telegraphs and control or administer all the police functions. In Lithuania there is a German force of 30,000 to 40,000 under Gen. Von Eberhardt; in Courland a German force of nearly 20,000 under Gen. Von der Goltz; in Riga and Southern Livonia, Major Fletcher, a German officer, commands all the local troops, Baits, Letts and Russians, as well as German troops loaned by Gen. Von der Goltz.

Ostensibly the Germans are in this territory under Article XII of the armistice, although there is some claim on their part of being an occupying force on the ground that the armistice cancelled the treaty of Brest-Litovsk^{[43](#)} and thereby revived a state of war, or at least of non-peace, with Russia. Their motives for being in this region are:

- (1) To fight Bolshevism—a sincere motive on the part of many of the officers and men in spite of the fact that the German Government is in negotiation with the Soviet Government and that many of the Prussian officers declare their willingness to use Bolshevism as a weapon if Germany is driven too hard by the Allied and Associated Governments;
- (2) To maintain their “bridges to the east”, including German colonization and commercial penetration in the Baltic States. By their “bridges to the east” they mean a secure hold on the non-Russian border states of Russia as the first step towards a controlling influence in Russian affairs;
- (3) To keep an army in being in order to “protect” East and West Prussia against Polish and other “aggression”, to give employment to the old officer class and for use in case of monarchical and reactionary tendencies in Germany.

I doubt if the present government in Berlin has a definite policy regarding the East. I consider the German control in these provinces more the result of an “economic push” from Germany coupled with the foresight of great financial interests who look to Russia as the field from which to recoup Germany’s losses. This colonizing and commercial movement falls in line with the ambition of Prussian officers to continue their military careers and to form a nucleus for conservatist and monarchist influences.

Germany must be reckoned with in the future of Russia. She cannot be excluded from participation in the reconstitution of Russia, nor is it desirable to do so. Germany should have a share in the commercial opportunity offered by Russia, but not a monopoly. Furthermore, it will be highly perilous to allow her to continue indefinitely to occupy the western gateway to Russia by military force.

At the same time her forces should not be precipitately withdrawn. Before their evacuation from Balticum takes place the Allied and Associated Governments must undertake the support of the local forces and local governments, operation of railroads, etc.

German and Bait forces advancing north and east from Riga have come into collision with Esths and Letts advancing south and east

and active fighting is in progress between the two. A temporary armistice was arranged by British, French and American representatives on June 10th but has since been denounced. This warfare has been brought about by mutual ill will and suspicion, the Germans and Baits fearing a flank attack on Riga from the Esthonians and Northern Letts, and the latter anticipating a German and Bait advance on Esthonia.

5. RECOMMENDATION OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES

The situation seemed so serious to the British, French and American representatives in Latvia that on June 7th the following joint memorandum was drawn up on board the flagship of Commodore Duff, R. N. This memorandum was the result of several days of negotiation and was subscribed to by Commodore Duff, R. N., the Senior British Naval Officer; Commodore Brisson, the Senior French Naval Officer; Lt. Col. Warwick Greene, Chief of the American Mission; and Lt. Col. Tallents, Chief of the British Mission. It was also considered with Colonel John C. Groome of the American Relief Administration. The memorandum is as follows:

Libau, Latvia, June 7, 1919.

In view of the extremely critical position in the Baltic Provinces, the British and American Political Representatives with the British and French Commodores here, have to-day agreed on the following statements:—

“No question is more vital than the arrest of the movement of Prussia towards the North and East. At the same time the Bolshevik danger must not be underestimated. The greatest immediate danger lies in a clash north of Riga between troops, especially Letts, moving south from Esthonia, and Germans and Baits moving north from Riga. Provided that the Associated Governments are in a position to enforce their demands, the Germans should be required, under penalty of which the execution should immediately follow upon noncompliance to refrain absolutely from advancing further northwards in the district north of Riga, in the absence of the

Allied Military Mission we feel otherwise unable to recommend the exact measures by which the advance of Prussian forces in the Baltic Provinces should be checked and their withdrawal secured.

“The first need of the situation is the arrival of the Allied Military Mission. It is, however, requested that the Political Representatives of America, France, and Great Britain in the Baltic Provinces may be authorized to make a united statement immediately. It is suggested that the statement should as nearly as possible take the following form:—

“An Inter-Allied Military Mission, under command of a British General, will reach the Baltic Provinces, immediately. Arms, equipment, instructors, and pay will be provided for local forces, and for volunteers who may be raised from external sources, in so far as this may be determined by the head of the Military Mission to be necessary for the protection of the provinces against Bolshevism or for other purposes of defence. The local distribution of such supplies will depend upon the loyal acceptance by the forces named of the general direction of the head of the Inter-Allied Military Mission in their fight against Bolshevism, their methods of recruitment, and their relations between each other and with the German and Polish forces.

“A loan will be granted immediately to Lithuania and Esthonia respectively, for civil purposes, on condition that the provisional Governments concerned will undertake to lay before the Political Representatives of the Associated Governments in their countries, their proposals for the use of the money thus raised, and that no such proposal is carried out without their approval. On such an arrangement being concluded the blockade of Lithuania would be raised. It is intended that this loan should in particular be used for the provision of the materials required for the restoration of industry and agriculture and the reduction of unemployment. A

loan on similar terms will be granted to Latvia as soon as a provisional Coalition Government has been formed which, in the opinion of the Political Representatives of the Associated Governments in Latvia, is truly representative of the inhabitants of the country. On such an arrangement being concluded the blockade of Latvia would also be raised.”

6. RECOMMENDATION OF THE AMERICAN MISSION

In view of the above situation, the chief of the American Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania recommends;

- (1) That Great Britain and the United States accept mandatories for the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania;
- (2) That a definite policy of hostility to Bolshevism be adopted, to be made effective by undertaking the support and direction of the Anti-Bolshevist forces operating in the Baltic Provinces, in Lithuania and on the Petrograd front, both those in being and those to be organized. Support to include pay, adequate supplies of every nature and complete military equipment;[†]₋
- (3) That in Esthonia and on the Petrograd front the military duties and responsibilities created by this policy be assumed by a British Military Mission;
- (4) That in Latvia and Lithuania the same duties and responsibilities be assumed by an American Military Mission;
- (5) That moderate loans be granted the local Governments;
- (6) That food be furnished the population as required.

If the above is not acceptable, then it is recommended;

- (1) That a definite policy of hostility to Bolshevism be adopted, to be made effective by undertaking the support and direction of the anti-Bolshevist forces operating in the Baltic Provinces, in Lithuania and on the Petrograd front, both those in being and those to be organized. Support to include pay, adequate supplies of every nature and complete military equipment;[†]₋
- (2) That a British Military Mission undertake the training and direction of the anti-Bolshevist forces in the Baltic Provinces, in

- Lithuania and on the Petrograd front;
- (3) That the United States cooperate with Great Britain in furnishing supplies and military equipment of every nature to these anti-Bolshevist forces;
 - (4) That the present mission from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace be continued; in military matters to be an observing mission except in so far as it may assume active duties in agreement with the Chief of the British Military Mission, it being contemplated that an American officer will be designated to undertake the direction of the Lithuanian army and that American officers may be detailed for special duties in Riga and Petrograd, if and when the latter city is captured from the Bolsheviks;
 - (5) That food be furnished the population as required;
 - (6) That moderate loans be granted the local Governments.

WARWICK GREENE

⁴⁰ Transmitted to the Secretary General under covering memorandum dated June 28, 1919, [*Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 682*](#) .

⁴¹ Not printed; see telegram No. 354, May 4, 1919, from the Chargé in Denmark, p. 183 [*Pg. 183 includes portions of [Doc. 58](#) and [Doc. 59](#)*].

⁴² None printed.

* The Baltic States comprise Russia's entire Baltic sea front; they contain all her western ports except Petrograd which they dominate; the mouths of her great western rivers and the termini of many important railroads. In addition, they lie on the flank of other important railroads. [Footnote in the original.]

⁴³ [*Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442*](#) .

[†] Arms, munitions and other military equipment in abundance can be furnished from the stores in France which have already been paid for, which are being held in quantities beyond any probable requirements and which are using valuable storage space and absorbing labor for their preservation. [Footnote in the original.]

[†] Arms, munitions and other military equipment in abundance can be furnished from the stores in France which have already been paid

for, which are being held in quantities beyond any probable requirements and which are using valuable storage space and absorbing labor for their preservation. [Footnote in the original.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/69

[Document 67]

***The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to the Secretary General of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

PARIS, July 5, 1919.

On June 28th my memorandum on the Baltic States^{[44](#)} was submitted to you and later discussed with the Peace Commissioners, and particularly with General Bliss.

I should now like to add the following to this memorandum:

BOLSHEVIST OFFENSIVE AGAINST RUSSIAN NORTHERN CORPS

The military situation in the Baltic regions continues critical. The Bolshevik garrison in Petrograd appears to have been reinforced. A Bolshevik offensive is also now in progress against the Russian Northern Corps. This corps has been driven back and according to a telegram from Lieutenant Hale of our Mission is short of munitions and its position is precarious. (See attached telegram from Lieutenant Hale.)^{[45](#)}

FIGHTING BETWEEN ESTHONIANS AND BALTS

The temporary armistice between the Esthonians and Northern Letts on the one hand and the Balts on the other, which was arranged at Wenden by British, French and American representatives on June 10th, came to an end. Serious fighting has been in progress between these forces with heavy casualties. At the present time the Esthonians have advanced to the outskirts of Riga which they are bombarding. (The last telegram from Lieutenant Stonestreet of our Mission is attached.)^{[46](#)}

Nothing could be more unfortunate than this fighting which is consuming men and material of the anti-Bolshevist forces which should be united in the fight against Bolshevism. In place of an offensive against Petrograd we have it against Riga—which had already been recovered from Bolshevism—during the course of which the best anti-Bolshevist troops are decimating one another. Leaving aside the question of the original blame for this fighting, it is now clear that the Esthonians in advancing on Riga in Latvia are aggressors and that all American food and help for them should cease until this internal fighting has come to an end.

GERMAN EVACUATION

Personally, I have been opposed to the precipitate withdrawal of the German forces from Lithuania and Latvia which was recently ordered. In my memorandum of June 28th I have done full justice to the danger of German domination. At the same time I am not forgetting the Bolshevist peril and I do not favor the evacuation of the German troops until steps have been taken for the control and support of the local forces and the Russian volunteers.

Furthermore, when the time for the evacuation of the German forces comes it should be arranged in an orderly and businesslike way by an Evacuation Committee on the ground authorized to treat direct with the German command.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Meanwhile the summer is slipping by and with it the chance for finally clearing the Baltic Provinces of Bolshevism, capturing Petrograd and organizing an aggressive movement against Bolshevism. To do this peace behind the Bolshevist front must be restored and maintained; credits, supplies and munitions for the local forces and Russian volunteers furnished; and an effective degree of control for these local forces established.

I propose:

- (1) That vigorous steps be taken immediately to strengthen the Northern Russian Corps under General Rodzianko and the Russian volunteer forces under Prince Lieven. This can be done by advancing war materials to these forces by the Liquidation Board against the credit of Russia represented by Admiral Kolchak, the latter agreeing to recognize General Rodzianko and Prince Lieven as the respective leaders of these two forces.
- (2) To expedite the negotiations between Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the one hand and the representatives of Admiral Kolchak on the other with a view to a definite understanding whereby the military support of the territorial troops of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania can at once be undertaken as part of the agreement of the Allied and Associated Governments with Admiral Kolchak, the representatives of the latter guaranteeing the autonomy of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
- (3) Adoption of a policy whereby all support, including food, will be immediately withdrawn from nationalities which like the Esthonians divert their energies into internal warfare instead of the campaign against Bolshevism.

WARWICK GREENE

⁴⁴ See memorandum dated June 30, *supra*.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

⁴⁶ Not attached to file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/74

[Document 68]

***The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to the Secretary General of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

PARIS, July 9, 1919.

SIR: The Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania has now completed over 3½ months inquiry into political, military and economic conditions in these countries.

The results of these investigations have been embodied in various telegrams, statements and reports submitted from time to time. My memorandum dated June 28th⁴⁷ gives briefly my conclusions and recommendations on the situation, and is supplemented by Lieut. Col. Dawley's report of June 22nd⁴⁸ recently received.*

The further status of this Mission should now be determined. Its future size, importance and responsibilities depend on the general Russian policy adopted by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace and the degree to which the Commission, in the interest of restoring peace in Europe, may desire to exert its influence towards lessening the bloodshed, misery and disorder which now prevail in Western Russia.

In my opinion the critical situation in the Baltic States and the neighboring regions justifies the United States in maintaining a Mission on the ground until a return to more normal conditions will permit the re-establishment of regular diplomatic and consular agencies and representatives. Accordingly I submit the following proposed resolution for consideration:

Resolved, that the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania be continued on the following basis:

1. In the future it will be known as the Mission to Western Russia and Finland.
2. Its jurisdiction will be Finland, Petrograd, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and other non-Bolshevist areas in Western Russia.
3. This Mission is empowered and it will be its duty:
 - (a) To investigate and report on political, economic and military conditions;
 - (b) To carry out policies authorized by the Peace Commission;
 - (c) To assume such additional duties as may be agreed on between the British General commanding the British Military Mission and the Chief of this Mission.
4. An allotment of \$20,000 is hereby made available for the expenses of the Mission to be expended in the discretion of the Chief of the Mission.

I am [etc.]

WARWICK GREENE

⁴⁷ See memorandum dated June 30, p. 207 [*Pg. 207 is part of [Doc. 66](#)*].

⁴⁸ *Ante*, p. 202 [*Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 65](#)*].

* During my absence Colonel Dawley is in charge of the Mission and at the present moment, I understand, is acting as military governor of Riga by request of General Gough. [Footnote in the original.]

The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene)

PARIS, July 15, 1919.

SIR: Replying to your letter of July 9⁴⁹ in which you submit a proposed resolution for consideration by the Commissioners with a view to defining the duties and functions of the present mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania I have to inform you that the Commissioners have given careful consideration to your proposals and have come to the following decisions:

1. The designation "Mission" is disapproved on the ground that it is competent neither for the State Department nor this Delegation to send a Mission, but only a "Commission."
2. The commission should be for the Baltic States, including Lithuania, and excluding Finland.
3. The only duties which can be assigned to the Commission by this Delegation are "to investigate and report on political, economic, and military conditions;" this Delegation may assign such duties because information on these subjects may assist it in solving problems which may come before it in its official capacity as the American Peace Delegation; additional functions can be assigned to it only by the government in Washington.
4. The American Delegation is empowered solely to take part in the negotiation of a Treaty of Peace with the Central Powers with which it has been at war; the Delegation can have no other policy than to accomplish this task as soon as it can properly be done; it cannot, therefore, authorize any policy to be carried out by anyone other than itself.

In paragraph 3 (c) of your letter there is noted a reference to the “British Military Mission.” It is believed that association with this British Military Mission has given the natural, but wrong, impression as to the character of the American Commission in the Baltic Provinces. The British Military Mission was sent out by the British Government, and not by the British Peace Delegation in Paris. It is a governmental agency and may exercise such powers and perform such functions as its Government may assign to it. The case is entirely different with the American Commission.

The natural misunderstanding as to the powers and duties of the members of the American Commission must be the explanation of the statement in the foot note at the bottom of page 1 of your letter of July 9 which is to the effect that Colonel Dawley, as you understand, is acting as Military Governor of Riga. If your understanding is correct the American Peace Delegation is now placed in the embarrassing position of having an officer who was sent at its request to collect certain information acting as Military Governor of a foreign city, belonging to a country with which we have never been at war and acting under the orders of a foreign general. In his capacity as Military Governor he may at any moment be obliged to resort to measures resulting in the loss of many lives.

Under these circumstances I am instructed by the Commissioners to direct you immediately to communicate with Colonel Dawley and should he actually be performing the functions of Military Governor of Riga to order him immediately to surrender this position and return to his proper functions.

Please inform me in due course, in order that I may report to the Commissioners, the result of any action taken by you in accordance with the foregoing instructions.

I may add that a subsequent communication will be sent you with regard to the views of the Commissioners as to the future size and personnel of your Commission.

I am [etc.]

⁴⁹ Considered by the Commissioners on July 11; see [vol. XI, pp. 293](#),
[294](#).

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/80

[Document 70]

Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

REVAL, July 19, 1919.

Subject: Report.

1. In continuation of my report dated July 11–12, from Riga,⁵⁰ the following is a report on (a) Situation Lithuania (b) Situation at Riga (c) Situation at Libau (d) Situation Esthonian Army (e) General Situation Esthonia (f) Situation Northern Russian Army (g) General Recommendations.

Situation Lithuania.

Professor Shimkus, Minister of Trade and Industry of the Lithuanian Government arrived at Libau about July 10 from Kovno. I did not have an opportunity to talk with him personally but later had a conference with an officer of the Lithuanian Staff who had come with Mr. Shimkus. As indicated in my previous telegrams, the situation in Lithuania is critical in that the Poles, notwithstanding the military solution as regards their military zones of operation was prescribed by the Entente by way of defining the line between the two armies, have advanced westward across this line attacking the Lithuanians. Professor Shimkus maintained that the objective of the Poles was Kovno and that it was necessary for the Lithuanians to withdraw their forces which were operating in the direction of Dvinsk against the Bolsheviks for the protection of their capital. I believe exactly as stated in my report of May 15 from Lithuania,⁵¹ that it is part of a German policy to keep the Baltic Countries in a state of internal unrest if not actual war. It was clearly foreshadowed both by Prof. Shimkus and the Staff officer that an alliance of Lithuania with Germany against Poland was extremely probable as they could not

countenance the advance of the Poles across Lithuania. I need not call attention to the extreme danger this proceeding involves to this entire country by making possible the advance of the Bolsheviks westward from Dvinsk, the danger being not only to Lithuania, but to Latvia and finally to Esthonia and to the North Russian Army. It was earnestly requested that I go to Kovno but in view of the fact that the Mission is already sadly depleted in numbers, and that I would be entirely alone, I did not feel I could accomplish anything toward averting a Polish-Lithuanian War.

In this connection I was also influenced by the fact that there is at Warsaw a large French Mission and a large British Mission, and an American Minister with his military attaches, etc. During the latter part of May I furnished our American Minister at Warsaw with a complete copy of my report on Lithuania of May 15, and went over the situation very carefully with him, leaving in his possession all the notes that I had. If it is impossible for these Missions at Warsaw to avert this internal warfare, I do not see how it is possible for a single officer to affect the situation from the Lithuanian side.

I call attention again to the fact that Lithuania has been entirely dependent upon Germany for finance and for the entire maintenance of her small armed forces. Any break with Germany takes away the only source of supply, aside from American foodstuffs, that Lithuania has, and this fact alone renders an alliance with Germany more probable.

Situation at Riga.

I left Riga by British destroyer on July 14. As indicated in my report of the 11th and 12th, there had been no decisive measures taken as regarding an agreement with Germany supplementary to the armistice agreement signed on the 3rd of July. I felt such an agreement or virtually peace terms to be absolutely essential for the following reasons. The Germans still occupy a large part of Courland and are in almost complete possession of all the railways in Latvia. They have at least all the rolling stock. There is no rail communication between Riga and Libau, nor any telegraphic or telephonic communication in the country except that maintained by

the Germans. I need not call attention to the fact that if a new Government is to operate in Latvia, it must have access to these ways of communication. They are also essential to the life of the country and to the operation of the American Relief Administration and food distribution. Still another factor is the fact that the military forces in Latvia, including the Lettish Detachments, the Landeswehr, and Prince Lieven's Detachment, have been completely armed, equipped, maintained, paid and otherwise supplied by Germany. On July 4, following the armistice, Germany naturally severed all such supply for the Lettish Detachments, and it is logical to presume that with the severing of all relations with Germany by the Landeswehr, Germany will also sever relations. Prince Lieven's Detachment still remains as far as I am informed, under German support and control. General Yudenitch, Commander in Chief of all the Western Russian Armies, has ordered Prince Lieven to move his detachment by water from Libau or Riga to Narva. I need not call attention to the difficult position in which Prince Lieven is placed in this regard, as all his equipment is German. I believe General Yudenitch extremely ill-informed on the general situation and that he is influenced by the equally ill-informed British Mission. I do not regard the severance of any of these troops from German supply as logical or as well advised until the facilities are known to be present to replace said German supply. The British have requested supplies, finance, etc., but they have no assurance that it will be granted, and the supplies promised to the Russian Northern Army are already a month overdue, and their arrival is not foreseen.

Bearing in mind the above, I drafted a peace protocol covering some of the above points which I deemed absolutely necessary. This draft was completely and unconditionally rejected by the British Mission. I believe also that a similar agreement is necessary to be made as between Prince Lieven and the Germans, supervised by the Interallied Mission, but I have not undertaken any draft of this. In connection with the shipment of a portion of Prince Lieven's Detachment from Libau to Narva, I call attention to the fact that there are some 26 members of Russian officers' families left at Libau absolutely destitute, their men having gone to Narva unable to make any provision for their dependents left behind there, as to assistance or possibility of joining them in Russia.

Situation at Libau.

The British at Libau are quite optimistic at the situation and state that the recruits under their hands are doing remarkably good work. I do not know from personal inspection but I am not nearly as optimistic as to the results obtained. I do know that they are being fed by American flour and they are without arms, equipment or clothing. There is practically no work of any kind going on at Libau, even the printers being on a strike. Both the employers and the strikers have requested an American for mediator. To my mind it is simply an outbreak of Bolshevism. They both have categorically refused to allow a British officer to mediate. Libau is still out of touch with the rest of Latvia except by boat. There are numerous rumors to the effect that the Germans do not intend to evacuate Latvia. Still other rumors to the effect that the Germans are increasing their forces in Latvia. I do not regard these rumors as founded. But as stated before I do not believe the Germans will evacuate until they have concluded an elaborate agreement with the Latvian Government exacting agreements for their safe withdrawal, etc. If the rumors as regards the reinforcement of German troops are correct, it merely means that Germany is defying the Entente with no intention of carrying into effect the peace of Versailles.

Situation Esthonian Army.

With the exception of one regiment left in the vicinity of Ramotzki, 50 kilometers east of Riga, all Esthonian forces have been withdrawn, part being sent to Narva and part to Pskoff. Esthonian forces still hold the line against the Bolsheviks from about Luban See to Pskoff. The reason for the reinforcement at Pskoff and at Narva is to be ready to stop the Bolsheviks should they break through the Russian Northern Army, which is not improbable. The Esthonians realize that it is very dangerous for them to allow Pskoff to be retaken by the Bolsheviks and are prepared for the emergency.

General Situation in Esthonia.

The general political situation in Esthonia is one of unrest and disquietude and distrust. As indicated before, while the Esthonian

Government is a fair government, it is not strong in that it is unable to entirely enforce its policies, especially as regards the radical elements. These radical elements are of course bent on independence. When they see independence far away, they become more radical and at present are demanding a peace with the Bolsheviks. There is also considerable evidence of distrust of members of this Government, notably of one Minister who is accused of harboring at the present time a Bolshevik Commissary and representative. For the particulars of this and other occurrences I invite attention to the enclosed newspaper editorials.^{[52](#)}

I am led to believe that the British are pressing for the independence of Esthonia. This recommendation, if they are making it, is not based on full information or impartial or complete investigation of the conditions. I do not admit that they realize in any true proportion the political situation in Esthonia and if they are making this recommendation for independence, it is merely because they feel indebted to the Esthonians for helping them out in the crisis brought about by their unfulfilled promises of ammunition for the Russian Northern Army.

There was recently a serious mutiny of Esthonian troops at Dorpat, as a result of which 21 men have been tried by court martial and executed. I am satisfied that the Esthonian Government and Command handled this matter in a very satisfactory manner but the case has not yet been completed, and has an extremely grave political complexion. I am also satisfied that the real reason of this outbreak was the lack of shoes for the troops. I can not believe that the situation of these countries is appreciated. There is no industry. There is no work for the workers except those who have land, in other words the peasants. The Esthonian method of solving this, namely the confiscation of land from the land holders and giving it to the landless, is not working out, in that the landless when offered the land refuse to accept it.

The fatal error the Bolsheviks have made is that they would not and could not and can not reorganize industry in Bolshevik Russia. To my mind this is one way to combat Bolshevism and to do so it is necessary to put money in this country and start industry. It is true

that the country is largely agricultural but there are at the same time industries of various kinds, shipping, paper, timber products, etc., that can and must be revived if the country is to be saved from Bolshevism eventually. To do this, one thing is necessary, material and moral support from the Allies. In the event this is not forthcoming, it will come from Germany, who realize very clearly the entire problem and the needs of the situation. It is not necessary to recognize the independence of Esthonia to ameliorate conditions, but it is necessary to extend material and moral aid in something more than the form of advisory and investigating missions.

Situation of Northern Russian Army.

The reports which Lieut. Hale drafted on this subject are complete. There are no new developments since the date of his writing except the Northern Army have been compelled to effect the evacuation of a few more villages. I entirely agree with Lieut. Hale that the Northern Army is wasteful of ammunition but I must also ask you to consider that they have not the superior direction and command which we were accustomed to see and operate under in France, and I might also add that other armies, notably the British, French and American have been accused of waste of ammunition. As will be seen in one of the editorials ascribed to a Mr. Ivanoff, a Russian, the Russians must have aid. Germany is at present offering this aid, naturally on her own terms. If the Entente will not grant it, Germany will, and now that the peace is signed, there is no possible way of stopping her short of another war.

General Recommendations.

1. I recommend that the equipment and supplies which I recommended on June 20,⁵³ be immediately made available for Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia, and that the Mission organization be inaugurated.
2. That the loans therein recommended be immediately placed to the credit of these three countries.
3. That the best consular agents obtainable be sent to these countries to open the way for commercial relations with America.

4. That the complete equipment authorized for two American divisions, tables of organization for a war of movement, excepting heavy artillery, trench mortars, etc., with proportional supply of small arms and ammunition, be made available for the Russian Northern Army.
5. That the advance part of these supplies consisting of complete individual equipment for 20,000 men, including clothing, arms, etc., to be loaded and dispatched immediately to Reval, together with 24 field pieces, 75 mm., 4000 rounds of ammunition, 50 percent shrapnel and 50 percent high explosive, per gun; 300 machine guns, light, Browning or Lewis; 3,000,000 rounds small arm ammunition for same; 3,000,000 rounds small arm rifle ammunition; 50 2–3 ton trucks; 10 Ford cars; 15 light Ford trucks; and 15 Ford ambulances.
6. That a Division Headquarters and Staff, American, be sent immediately to assume direction and supervision of the Russian Northern Army, as outlined in my report of June 22.

E. J. DAWLEY

⁵⁰ No copy of this report has been found in the Department files.

⁵¹ *Ante*, p. 184 [*Pg. 184 includes portions of [Doc. 59](#) and [Doc. 60](#)*].

⁵² Not reprinted.

⁵³ Document not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/83: Telegram

[Document 71]

Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

REVAL, July 28, 1919.
[Received July 30—10:30 a.m.]

The following letter was presented today to Esthonian Prime Minister:

“Representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments view with apprehension and concern the Esthonian agrarian project as submitted by the Constituent Assembly committee, and particularly those elements which:

- (1) Offer no security or protection to foreign owned property or realty;
- (2) Provide for confiscation of privately owned property and realty;
- (3) Appropriate any property without full and just compensation in conformity with the recognized principle and practice of Allied democratic Governments whose aid and support the Esthonians are seeking.;

The representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments therefore suggest before action on any such momentous problem as the agrarian project is consummating [sic] the attitude of the Allied and Associated Governments be obtained thereon. (Signed) Gough, Boset, Dawley.”

Please acknowledge.

DAWLEY

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/85

[Document 72]

***The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces
(Greene) to the Secretary General of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

PARIS, July 29, 1919.

SIR: An answer to your letter of July 15th has been delayed pending telegraphic information from Lieut. Col. E. J. Dawley in regard to the newspaper report that he was acting Military Governor of Riga. His reply having been received I desire to submit the following answer to the various points raised in your letter:

Referring to sub-paragraph 1: The word "Mission" was used because our party was officially sent out as the "Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania". The term "Commission" would have been preferable but we have never had authority to employ it.

Referring to sub-paragraph 2: Finland was included in our original credentials. So far as I know it had never been withdrawn officially from the jurisdiction of our investigations.

Referring to sub-paragraph 3 and main paragraph 2: I am well aware that our Mission was sent out to investigate and report; not to act or negotiate. There has never been any misunderstanding in regard to the scope of our duties. In all interviews and conferences, as well as in every public statement, we have announced that our powers were limited in this manner. Repeated requests were made to us to act as arbitrators in disputes and difficulties and to take an active hand in events for the purpose of furthering the interests of law and order and the re-establishment of stable conditions. We refused though an active role on our part would have promoted peace and a better understanding between hostile groups and might have lessened the bloodshed and disorder which prevail in the Baltic regions. We have,

however, used our moral influence—which is very great in the case of American representatives—to urge conciliation between factions and to point out the steps which seemed to us to lead to peace and stable government. Along these lines we made suggestions and recommendations whenever it seemed opportune. Furthermore, when the occasion justified it we did not hesitate to express ourselves vigorously—to Esth, Lett, Lithuanian, Balt or German alike. We have lodged protests against courses of action which were flagrantly unjust or inhumane. An example is given in the attached letter in regard to the executions at Riga.⁵⁴ Partly as a result of this letter and partly as a result of other representations made by the Allied representatives, a great improvement took place in prison conditions at Riga. Furthermore, the trial courts were reconstituted, there was a perceptible diminution in the number of executions and the executions themselves were much more humanely carried out.

I may also add that the stand taken by the Allied representatives, including our Mission, at Libau in April prevented, after the overthrow of the Ulmanis Government, the formation of a purely reactionary Bait Government. This would promptly and inevitably have led to civil war.

I wish to make it clear, however, that in the face of the terrors and disorder which prevail in these regions we have chafed greatly at our inactive role, knowing how much we could have accomplished with a little more authority, but we have refrained from action. This has been particularly difficult as all elements in these countries look to the Allied and Associated Governments to take the necessary measures to re-establish law and order in the Baltic regions. This was based generally on the feeling that these governments had won the war and were the arbiters of Europe, and specifically on Article XII of the Armistice and on the following articles of the Peace Treaty:

Article 116 which provides:

“Germany acknowledges and agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire on August 1, 1914.

“In accordance with the provisions of Article 259 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) and Article 292 of Part X (Economic Clauses) Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaties and of all other treaties, conventions and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist Government in Russia.

“The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the present Treaty.”

Article 117 which provides:

“Germany undertakes to recognize the full force of all treaties or agreements which may be entered into by the Allied and Associated Powers with States now existing or coming into existence in future in the whole or part of the former Empire of Russia as it existed on August 1, 1914, and to recognize the frontiers of any such States as determined therein.”

And Article 433 which provides:

“As a guarantee for the execution of the provisions of the present Treaty, by which Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and of all treaties, conventions and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist Government in Russia, and in order to ensure the restoration of peace and good government in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, all German troops at present in the said territories shall return to within the frontiers of Germany as soon as the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories. These troops shall abstain from all requisitions and seizures and from any other coercive measures, with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany, and shall in no way interfere with such measures for national defence as may be adopted by the Provisional Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

“No other German troops shall, pending the evacuation or after the evacuation is complete, be admitted to the said territories.”

In view of these articles there is a very definite impression, whether right or wrong, on the part of the Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians and Baits that the Allied and Associated Governments have certain responsibilities in the Baltic. They inevitably look to the representatives of these governments to carry out such responsibilities.

My statement about Lieut. Col. Dawley was based on newspaper reports. Immediately upon receipt of your letter I telegraphed him to come to Paris, both for the purpose of clearing up this matter and in order to furnish fresh information regarding the military and political situation.

This telegram being disapproved, the following was sent:[55](#)

“General Bliss wishes to know if newspaper report true that you are performing functions of military governor of Riga. If so he directs me that you surrender this position and return to proper functions of mission which are limited to observing and reporting on political, economic and military situation. I assume all responsibility for whatever actions you may have taken at Riga and have as always complete confidence in your ability, judgment and discretion.”

To which the following answer was received:[56](#)

“Newspaper reports are not true. Tallents in advisory capacity only, declines aid of military governor and commander of Landeswehr. Report follows by mail.”

This would seem to end the matter.

Had Colonel Dawley assumed an active role at Riga in response to a request from General Gough, commanding the Inter-Allied Military

Mission, I should have ventured to offer the following comment in regard to this sentence in the third paragraph of your letter:

“If your understanding is correct the American Peace Delegation is now placed in the embarrassing position of having an officer who was sent at its request to collect certain information acting as Military Governor of a foreign city, belonging to a country with which we have never been at war and acting under the orders of a foreign general.”

It is true that Riga is a foreign city belonging to a country with which we have never been at war, but it is also a city in a region in which the Allied and Associated Governments seem to have assumed certain responsibilities in regard to internal order and internal conditions under the sections of the Peace Treaty already quoted. It is also true that he would have been under the orders of a foreign general, but this has been repeatedly the case with American officers during the war and, indeed, the entire American Army was under the command of a supreme commander, Marshal Foch. General Gough is chief of the Inter-Allied Military Mission to the Baltic States and as such, it seems to me, has the right to call on American or French military officers in the Baltic to assist him, especially in the great emergency that existed at Riga after the attack on the city by the Estonian Army and the proposed evacuation of the German and Baltic troops. Without vigorous action on the part of the Allied representatives there might have been a massacre. Had General Gough as chief of the Inter-Allied Military Mission asked Colonel Dawley temporarily to perform the duties of acting Military Governor of Riga I should have considered the latter justified in accepting. In that case General Gough would have become temporarily his chief and responsible for his actions. I believe that in the emergency conditions existing in the Baltic General Gough is entitled to use his own best discretion and that Allied officers on the ground are justified in assisting him if he asks them to do so, especially when they are officers of the experience and ability of Colonel Dawley. This, however, is only a personal opinion submitted for what it is worth.

But the case is a hypothetical one as Colonel Dawley did not assume the duties of acting Military Governor of Riga.

In returning to the Baltic I will bear carefully in mind the instructions contained in your letter of July 15th and under no circumstances will I assume any active duties, no matter what the emergency, even if called on to do so by the chief of the Inter-Allied Military Mission.

I am [etc.]

WARWICK GREENE

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ On July 19.

⁵⁶ No. 22, July 22, from Reval.

Paris Peace Conf.184.01502/83: Telegram

[Document 73]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley

PARIS, August 1, 1919.

Misc. 1155. Your telegram of July 28th, quoting letter signed by Gough, Boset, and Dawley acknowledged. Your participation in this letter not understood by American Commission, in view of fact that the sole function of American Baltic Commission is to observe and report on economic, political and military situations. Your undated personal telegram to General Bliss, Supreme War Council,^{[57](#)} acknowledged.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{[57](#)} Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf.184.015/104a: Telegram

[Document 74]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Chief of
the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene)***

PARIS, August 4, 1919.

87. From Tyler: Baltic Commission recalled Colonel Greene and personnel to proceed to Paris to report to Ammission, after winding up affairs of Commission.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Visit of Mr. Hugh Gibson to Countries of the Former Austro-Hungarian Empire

[75] Memorandum by the Secretary of Embassy at Paris
(Gibson), for the Secretary of State

[Paris, circa February 1, 1919.]

Paris Peace Conf. 863.48/3

Paris Peace Conf. 863.48/3

[Document 75]

***Memorandum by the Secretary of Embassy at Paris
(Gibson), for the Secretary of State***

[PARIS, circa February 1, 1919.]

CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN
EMPIRE

The observations in this memorandum are based on a trip through the countries of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire lasting from January 1st to February 1st, with a Mission despatched by the United States Food Administrator to investigate food conditions in German Austria.

The Mission visited Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Trieste, Fiume, Agram, Belgrade, Kladno, Teplitz, Ostrau and Karwin. It talked with government officials, business men, railroad employees, miners, and workmen—in fact, with all classes.

GERMAN AUSTRIA

There seems to be no one in the government at Vienna with any particular force and no well-qualified potential leaders are in evidence. The men with whom we talked seemed to be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task before them and the disaster that has overtaken their country. They seem, however, to have succeeded in wiping out of their minds any misgivings as to Austrian responsibility or liability to suffer for what has been done and turn confidently to the Allies for help. Their whole attitude was very much like that of people who had suffered from some great natural calamity, such as a flood or famine. Their attitude and their arguments were much like those of a delegation seeking help for the famine sufferers of India, and there was a complete assumption that

we were free from resentment and filled with a sympathetic desire to put them on their feet.

A large part of the functionaries of the old regime have been retained and seem to be responsible for much of the friction with neighboring countries. It has been their habit for years to harass the Czechs and other subject races, and they seem unable to overcome the impulse, even under changed conditions, to keep up their old policy of pinpricks. This, of course, results in reprisals from people who are no longer obliged to submit and makes for disagreement and friction. The complement of this state of mind is found in the other countries, as for instance in Bohemia, where some of the functionaries of the new government are men who served under the old imperial regime, suffered all sorts of indignities, and are now only too anxious to get even. When tangles arise and it is pointed out to them that they are no longer fighting the old imperial regime, they retort with a certain amount of justice that, although the Emperor is no longer there, the same nagging tactics are displayed and that, in fact, they are fighting the same people they have always fought. The people at the top in German Austria and the other countries seem to realize the stupidity of these tactics, but they do not always know what is going on underneath and are unable to keep things running smoothly.

The morale of the entire country is very low. The German Austrians do not share the feeling of the Germans that they are unbeaten. They are appalled at the completeness of their collapse and seem to have no hope for the future. They point out that Vienna was the capital of a vast and rich empire which was tributary to it, that the prosperity and brilliancy of the capital was artificially created, and not only Vienna, but German Austria carried along on the wealth and labor of the subject portions of the country. Now they are reduced to a territory no larger than that of Belgium with very little natural wealth or industry. The newly liberated countries will shun relations with Vienna and German Austria and they expect to see their city drop to a relatively unimportant place. Most of them say it will retain some importance as the capital of an independent German Austria, but if they should join Germany, it will fall to the place of Stuttgart or Baden. The low morale of the country is due, not only to the political

situation, but also in large measure to unemployment and suffering from hunger and cold.

Owing to the great shortage of coal, the industries are generally shut down or working on a very small scale. There is practically no coal for domestic use and there are great restrictions for its use in public places. There are no express trains in the whole of the former Empire. On many of the smaller lines, no trains are running. On the principal lines, there is not more than one train a day in each direction. This takes from three to five times the usual time to make its journey and is quite inadequate to handle necessary traffic. The trains are usually packed to suffocation, the platforms and steps crowded, people hanging on to the sides of the cars and sitting huddled on the roofs. Needless to say there is no travel for pleasure but the volume of really necessary travel is abnormally large because of the numbers of demobilized soldiers returning to their homes, refugees returning from exile, and those who travel from foodless districts to more fortunate districts where they can find something to eat.

In Vienna the theatres are allowed to open only once a week. The restaurants must close at 9 p.m. and the shops at 4 p.m. There are in Vienna alone about 125,000 unemployed—some of them drawing unemployment allowances and some utterly destitute. Many thousands are daily fed in the soup kitchens which we investigated carefully. These are established in school-houses and other suitable buildings and feed from 3000 to 10,000 each. They give one meal a day consisting one day of a villainous soup containing some chopped turnips, carrots and beets with a little meal of some sort worked in. Another day they get a small dish of chopped turnips, carrots and beets. Both of these dishes at a cost of 30 heller. Once a week there is a meal of meat, consisting of chopped turnips, carrots and beets with the addition of a small slice of horse or mule. This costs one crown and a half. This ration is, of course, utterly inadequate to maintain any sort of life and the suffering of these people is only too evident even to the untrained eye.

There is a rather extensive illicit trade (*Schleichhandel*) in meat, butter, sugar, flour, and other commodities, which have been kept

hidden or which are smuggled into the country in small quantities. The prices on these things are so exorbitant that only the very rich can afford them and the poor get none of its benefits.

Not only in German Austria, but in all the other countries we visited, there is an astonishing amount of ignorance in regard to conditions in neighboring countries. Communications are utterly demoralized, railroad travel is of course reduced to the limits of absolute necessity, and the newspapers seem to delight in the spread of trouble-making reports.

In discussing the coal situation in Vienna, we soon discovered that there was a crisis that must be met. The coal experts told us that there were vast surplus stores of coal in Bohemia, but that the Czechs were holding it back in the desire to ruin German Austria. One official told us apparently in good faith that the surplus coal in Bohemia was piled up in such quantities that it was in danger of internal combustion. After a careful first-hand investigation in Bohemia it was found that, not only was there no surplus supply, but that the Bohemian railroads and trams were running a greatly reduced service on less than two days' reserve, that there was practically no coal for domestic use, that there were severe restrictions in regard to the use of electric light, and that the industries which were not shut down were working at only a small percentage of their capacity. The misinformation of the Czechs in regard to the coal situation was equally noticeable. One official told us that, while they wanted to make enough shipments to maintain order in German Austria, it was an aggravating thing to have to deprive themselves when the Viennese were wasting coal in the most criminal manner, running factories for articles of luxury, keeping their restaurants and cabarets going all night, and having no restrictions on the domestic use of coal. When we succeeded in convincing him of the true situation, he was frankly surprised. The foregoing is merely an instance of the sort of ignorance on conditions which adds to the misunderstanding and friction among the countries of the former Empire.

The one matter of interest in German Austria is, of course, the question as to whether they shall join Germany or shall set up an

independent republic with some standing in the proposed Danubian Federation. So far as we could observe, the desire to join Germany exists chiefly among the Socialists who feel that the step would strengthen their party. Many, even among the Socialists, feel that the disadvantages of this union to the country outweigh the advantages to the Socialist Party and express themselves as opposed to any union with Germany. All people of other classes to whom I talked expressed themselves as strongly opposed to any union with Germany. The old feeling of dislike for that country has been greatly intensified during the war and it is generally believed in Vienna that, if the elections are at all fair, they will result in a decision to keep out of the German union. There may be people outside the Socialist Party who are in favor of the union but I was unable to discover any of them although I made careful inquiry.

It is generally said that the existing government knows that the movement to join Germany is unpopular and would not carry if fair elections were held; that for this reason the elections have been deferred from time to time, and all sorts of doubtful methods have been used to increase the vote for the union. For instance, there are in Vienna about 40,000 officers of the old Austrian army which has been demobilized. Although there is no work for them to do, they are receiving full salaries because the government does not wish to provoke them to open opposition. Some further evidence of the government's attitude comes from members of the various liquidation committees who are settling the affairs between the countries of the former Empire. The Czecho-Slovak Minister at Vienna told me that the German-Austrian government was disposed to accept any and all demands, however unreasonable, made upon it by functionaries or the laboring classes so as to gain their support for the elections and that, when it was manifestly necessary to refuse any of their demands, the German Austrians begged the Czechs and Hungarians to assume responsibility for the refusal. One instance that he gave was that the functionaries of the Imperial War Office had asked a definite undertaking that the work of liquidating the Ministry should be prolonged for the period of one year so that their salaries might be paid for that period. The other countries objected to this but the German Austrian government was afraid to take any

action and said that, if the request was to be refused, it must be done on the sole responsibility of the Czechs and Hungarians.

Unemployment allowances are being paid and there are many stories of political jobbery to increase the strength of the Socialists for the coming elections.

There seems to be much apprehension of disorders after the election on January 16th, no matter what the result. Even allowing for the morbid pessimism of nearly everybody in Austria at the present time, there seems to be some justification for the fear that there may be trouble. The present government is certainly in no position to cope with any organized outbreak. The police force is being well cared for by the Socialists but they apparently do not put much trust in it. The Volkswehr (often spoken of as the Red Guard) is not to be depended on by the government for support.

HUNGARY

The Mission made two visits to Budapest at about two weeks' interval and had a number of interviews with Karolyi. I also had an opportunity of talking to Count Apponyi, Count Festetiks, Baron Ambrózy, and a number of others of different shades of opinion.

The food situation in Hungary is not so bad as in German Austria although it is rapidly becoming worse and will doubtless be productive of trouble. Under normal conditions Hungary could not only take care of herself but would have a large surplus available for export. The great bulk of her food supply comes, however, from the southern provinces which have been occupied under the armistice, leaving the unoccupied part in a bad situation as regards food.

The coal situation is much more critical and has an important bearing on the political situation as the stopping of the wheels of industry has turned loose in the country, in addition to the demobilized armies, a large mass of unemployed.

President Karolyi talks very frankly of his problems. He says that when the breakup came, the French Commander-in-Chief appealed

to Hungarians to rally around Karolyi as the man best qualified to secure favorable terms for them. He was accordingly chosen and went to Belgrade where he concluded the Armistice in the belief that he would secure consideration for his people. He says that since that time he has addressed a large number of communications to the French Commander-in-Chief but he has not received a single reply. He says his position would be better if he had occasionally received even a refusal but he has been totally ignored. He complains bitterly that while Hungary has loyally observed the conditions of the Armistice, the Serbs and Roumanians have frequently violated them and occupied large portions of Hungarian territory not included in the limits set by the Armistice. Further, that the Czechs have occupied the whole Slovak country peopled by more than three million souls and that his protest was met with the bare statement that this territory was not mentioned in the Armistice and that the action of the Czechs had been taken with the approval of the Entente. President Karolyi and others with whom I talked are particularly bitter against the actions of the Roumanians whom they consider an inferior race and who have acted in a very arbitrary and brutal way according to their reports. They are careful to say however, that the behavior of the Serbian troops has been invariably good, and I found no one who was not willing to give them credit for having behaved well, particularly after what they themselves have suffered. Colonel Vix, Chief of the French Armistice Commission at Budapest expressed himself as very unhappy over the entire situation. He had been sent to Budapest to see that the Hungarians carried out their undertakings. The Hungarians had come to him frequently, protesting against the unwarranted actions of the Allies; actions which he had been unable to explain or excuse. He had been put in the position of having merely to refuse to receive the protests. He had on his own responsibility protested to the French Commander-in-Chief against some of the actions of the Allied forces, and considered his own position so undignified that he had asked to be relieved.

The first time we were in Budapest there was a strong Bolshevik movement in progress. On the day of our departure we were with President Karolyi when a member of the Cabinet came in to say that a meeting of many thousand people was in progress and that it had

been decided to take Karolyi out and hang him. There were machine guns in the streets and great excitement. Every one was advised to stay in after dark unless obliged to go out. Karolyi had taken no steps against the Bolshevik agitators and had not even arrested them on the rather quaint theory that while they were agitating he knew what they were doing, but that if he put them out of the country, he would not know. One blunt-minded member of our party suggested that, if he put them in jail, he would know what they were doing and he seems to have acted on that or some other similar suggestion. Two weeks later the entire aspect of the place had changed. We were surprised to be told by every one that there was no longer any fear of the Bolsheviks. Karolyi himself, while he had more serious troubles than ever, said that Bolshevism was a thing of the past; that he had rounded up all that were to be found, was allowing no one to bring in large sums of money from abroad, that he had imprisoned one party of twenty-seven Bolsheviks coming from Vienna and had presented the entire collection to Colonel Vix who had, as he said, "put them in a safe place". The drastic measures taken by the Hungarian authorities seem to have discouraged the other adherents of the movement and the Bolshevik danger seems to be non-existent for the present. On the other hand, there is a very dangerous state of feeling because of the encroachments of the Allied Armies, particularly of the Roumanians, who seem to have inflamed public feeling to a very dangerous degree. Of course, it is impossible to estimate the accuracy of the stories we were told, but whether they are accurate or not, they have had a highly exciting influence on Hungarian public opinion, and while Karolyi has exerted his whole strength for the maintenance of order, he fears that there will be a national uprising against the Roumanians. He is, of course, intelligent enough to know that this would only result in the complete occupation of his country by the Allied forces and much more severe conditions at the Peace Conference, but he says that however true this may be there is no use to reason with the people when they are inflamed with feeling against the Roumanians and rise up in desperation to strike out against them.

Karolyi has of course, carried on an active and open propaganda for several years for a peace on the terms proposed by President Wilson, and has persevered in this course at great personal risk to himself.

The Hungarian nobility naturally look upon him as a renegade and traitor, and some sections of the lower classes are inclined to mistrust him. He seems, however, to be a man of the greatest sincerity, though quixotic and without much balance. He has, however, succeeded to a remarkable degree in holding the people together with one line of propaganda, to the effect that there is just one hope for Hungary and that is that she would get justice from a peace on the lines laid down by President Wilson. Papers which he influences are filled from day to day with articles preaching calm and patience, and saying that when the time comes for the President to make his influence felt, they may be sure the Hungarians will get justice. The walls of Budapest are covered with great posters put up by Karolyi bearing the President's portrait and the inscription "A Wilson Peace is the only Peace for Hungary". In one of his recent speeches he said "The future hope of Hungary can be stated in just three words—Wilson, Wilson, and again, Wilson". In another speech to a large crowd he said—"Our only hope lies in God and Wilson". His insistent propaganda has had a remarkable influence, not only on the lower classes but on the old reactionaries who have come to see that if there is any hope at all for Hungary, it will be in the way that Karolyi points out. They are not any of them so foolish as to believe that they can escape scot-free, but they look to President Wilson and to him alone for justice at the peace table.

The last time we were in Budapest about January 20th President Karolyi said that his position was desperate, and that he feared he would not be able to keep on holding things together from day to day. We asked him what in his opinion was the proper solution for his troubles. He answered without hesitation that he would be immeasurably strengthened in his endeavor to maintain public order if President Wilson would make or cause to be issued a statement to the effect that the occupation of Hungarian soil by foreign armies was not to be considered definitive, that such occupation was not considered as vesting title in the occupant and that title would be determined by the Peace Conference. We had already left Budapest when we heard that a statement along these lines had been issued.¹ We were further told by Hungarians in Vienna and other places that this statement had greatly strengthened Karolyi's hold on the

situation and had calmed public opinion to an almost incredible extent.

JUGO-SLAVIA

The Mission made a journey of inspection to Jugo-Slavia in an endeavor to ascertain whether there were any considerable stocks of foodstuffs available for export.

We first visited at Trieste and Fiume, then went to Agram where we had very satisfactory talks with the authorities. The Jugo-Slav National Council had already moved to Belgrade but had left an intelligent group of men for the administration of Croatia and Slavonia. From there we went to Belgrade which seemed to be the best place to learn of conditions in the Banat and other southern districts of Hungary. From what we saw first hand and from what we were able to learn, it is evident that there are very large stocks of cattle, swine, and corn in Croatia, Slavonia, and the occupied districts of Hungary. Owing to the present shortage of coal which is very desperate, these stocks cannot be moved. People are actually dying of starvation in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, and will continue to do so until these stocks are put in movement. In old Serbia the destruction wrought by the enemy was so complete and ruthless that it has been impossible to even make a start at reconstruction, and there will undoubtedly be a great deal of suffering before the railroads and bridges can be re-built and normal life begun afresh.

Our journey through this country was very rapid and devoted almost entirely to investigation of food and coal matters so that I did not gather any noteworthy impressions in regard to political matters.

CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC

The Mission made two visits to Prague and visited other parts of the country including the Ostrau, Karwin, Kladno and Teplitz coal fields. We had several talks with President Masaryk, the Prime Minister, Dr. Kramarcz, Mr. Štanek, Minister of Public Works, various mine operators, workmen, and representatives of all classes.

Of all the people whom we saw in the course of our journey, the Czechs seemed to have the most ability and common sense, the best organization, and the best leaders. They seem, however, to have been seized lately with a strong attack of imperialism, and a desire to dominate central Europe. This was evident in frank conversations with President Masaryk, the Prime Minister, Dr. Kramarcz, and many others. Among the officials of the new Republic are many who had served under the old imperial regime, and the wrongs of the past still leave a bitter sting. They are filled with a desire to strike back at German-Austria, but do not seem to realize that the imperial regime which they hate is no longer there. They have, it seems, learned too well, the methods of the old empire, and in some instances are adopting them in their own country; for instance, in dealing with the Germans of Bohemia, where there has been discrimination in the distribution of food to such an extent that the deaths from malnutrition are really frightful. The figures which we got from the Government at Prague are quite convincing enough but I paid a visit to Teplitz and saw at first hand enough to convince me if I had not heard anything else. Malnutrition in this district seems to take chiefly the form of dropsy and the only treatment for it being adequate nourishment, an extra ration is doled out to those who are certified by official doctors as suffering from dropsy caused by malnutrition. In the castle of an old friend of mine, Prince Clary, I found over eighty of these people gathered to receive their weekly ration of one pound of flour which was all that could be scraped together for them. They were most of them, monstrosities with swollen feet and legs, and very few of them have any hope of recovery.

The Czecho-Slovak troops have maintained order in the German districts of Bohemia, but there have been many petty persecutions, and the general attitude toward the Germans of Bohemia cannot be considered a sensible propaganda if they wish to reconcile the people to becoming subjects of the new state. A number of the manufacturers and exporters are quite ready to be included in the Czechoslovak state as they feel their goods will be better received as coming from Bohemia than if they have a German taint. There are other classes however, which feel that they belong to German Austria in race and speech and are very much alarmed at the antagonistic

attitude adopted toward them by the government at Prague. Some of them told me that they would not have any particular feeling as to whether they belonged to Bohemia or German Austria if they felt that they were sure of equally good terms, but that if the Czechs are going to be antagonistic, they propose to agitate for union with German Austria.

As previously mentioned, we visited the coal fields at Teplitz, Kladno, Karwin and Ostrau, and talked with the operators and miners. I was particularly interested in the question of Bolshevism but got at the question by indirection. We usually asked the miners what they thought was necessary to increase the production from the mines. Their answers were practically always the same; food to build up the strength of the miners so that they could do the heavy work; certain essential supplies and equipment, and finally troops to maintain order. They stated that they had no use for Bolshevism; they had seen its effect in other places; that it was wanted only by a negligible number of men who inveigled a certain number of the foolish and intimidated some of the timid to follow them; that a small force of troops, particularly if they were Americans, British or French would maintain complete order, materially increasing the output. There is something radically different in the Czech mentality from the mentality of the other Slavs, and they do not seem to lend themselves in any degree to the preachings of the Bolshevik agitators.

As a result of visits to the coal fields, the Mission formulated certain views as to how the output of coal could be increased and local consumption reduced so as to increase the export supply to German Austria and Hungary. At the conclusion of our investigation at Karwin, we were planning to return to Paris to report, but at the last minute decided to go first to Prague and ascertain the views of the Czech government.

We had a long talk with Minister Štanek and Dr. Oberthor, an official of the old imperial regime in charge of coal distribution. We elaborated our ideas at some length and Minister Štanek, although very conciliatory and friendly, gave us no hope that anything could be done for German Austria and Hungary even if the output were increased. He said that he quite realized that an increase in coal

supply to those countries was essential if public order was to be preserved, but that he could not see how Bohemia could increase her contributions. She was already suffering from coal shortage, large numbers of people going without work and the government had been compelled, in order to avert suffering, to resort to the demoralizing practice of paying unemployment allowances. He said that this had assumed considerable proportions, and that in the Skoda Munition Works alone these allowances amounted to six million crowns a month. He said that the Czech government was very much concerned over this matter as under such a system people soon became disinclined to work; that the industry of the Czechs was their greatest asset; and that if they were to become lazy and shiftless, they would lose one of their strongest hopes for the future. He said further that, although he and his colleagues in the Ministry recognized the need of keeping the neighboring countries supplied with coal, the people did not understand or approve it, and that a vigorous campaign was being waged against the government for shipping coal to the former Austro-Hungarian oppressors while the Czechs were suffering. Certain shipments have been held up at Budweis and other points and threats made to the government that future shipments would be seized and distributed by the local authorities. Nothing of the sort has happened thus far but the Minister felt that his position was very shaky and he was quite receptive of sympathy.

The Minister added that the situation in the Slovak countries was very bad and that he had been obliged to go there himself to investigate and take emergency measures. This country was cut off by the Czech occupation from its ordinary Hungarian supply of coal. The sugar refineries were shut down although this was the usual time for operation, the beets were rotting in the ground, and all work had come to a standstill. Angry farmers and mill operators had been rioting and the Slovaks were going to the government and saying, as he put it: "We thank you for nothing. You say you have rescued us from the political oppression of the Hungarians which was in fact pretty bad but now we are under martial law, we have no work, little food, we suffer from cold and our future is black. Now that we have a taste of both, we do not know but that we prefer the evils we endured before to what we have now. We thank you for nothing".

After a long conversation we finally got down to the real reason for the Minister's discouraging attitude. After he had exhausted all other arguments, he finally said he would tell us something in strict confidence which he had no right to say—that the situation of the country was so bad that desperate measures had to be taken; that a secret meeting of the Cabinet had been held on the previous day (January 27th) and that it had been unanimously decided—not only that coal shipments should not be increased—but that an absolute embargo should be placed upon all future shipments and that the entire output should be devoted to the needs of the Czecho-Slovak country.

We were shocked by the possibilities of such a step and pointed them out in no uncertain terms. He was able to see, when it was pointed out to him, that, when the people of Vienna and Budapest woke up on the morning of January 29th and learned that they had received their last shipment of coal, that railroad and tram service would stop within 24 hours, that lighting and heating would cease, that there could be no importations of food from the outside world, and that all industry must come to a standstill, there would be an immediate explosion and that the ensuing anarchy would not be long in making itself felt in Bohemia.

We left the Minister in a bad state of depression, but after a call upon President Masaryk, we found at our hotel a messenger from Minister Štanek to say that, after our visit he consulted his colleagues, and that another meeting of the Cabinet had been summoned for that evening to revoke the embargo decision.

While this action has insured the continuance of the present situation, the supply of coal for German Austria and Hungary must be materially increased unless those countries are to drift into anarchy. The Karwin district, recently seized by the Czechs from the Poles, has been producing 8,000 tons per day and it is believed that, with careful management, the maintenance of order and a moderate supply of new cables and explosives, this can be materially increased. Under an equitable plan of distribution, some of this coal at least will probably be sent south but relative small amounts are involved. It is

highly desirable that further supplies be made available. There are two ways in which this can be done.

1. Occupation of the Prussian Silesian fields or some pressure brought to bear on Germany to work the fields which are now producing very little and to ship as much as possible of the coal to German Austria and Hungary. From these fields in normal times 20,000 tons per day are shipped thither. Anything approaching that amount would save the situation.
2. A part at least of the needs can be met from the large coal deposits at Pola which were seized by the Italian authorities. They are said to contain from 140,000 to 200,000 tons. It might be worth considering whether an arrangement could be made for using this as an emergency fund to be replaced by shipments from England and from surplus coal in the United States.

HUGH GIBSON

¹ [Vol. III p. 715](#) .

The Coolidge Mission:^{[1](#)}

^{[1](#)} For previous correspondence concerning the Coolidge Mission, see [vol. II, pp. 218](#) [↗](#) ff.

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[85] Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, February 27, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf.184.01102/160

[86] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, March 3, 1919. [Received March 5.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/173

[87] Memorandum by Professor A. C. Coolidge

March 10 [1919].

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[88] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, March 17, 1919. [Received March 19.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/225

[89] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, March 20, 1919. [Received March 22.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/245

[90] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)

Paris, March 31, 1919—2 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/144c: Telegram

[91] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 3, 1919. [Received April 7.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/300

[92] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 7, 1919. [Received April 10.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/318

[93] Mr. Walter E. Bundy to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, April 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/322

[94] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 7, 1919. [Received April 10.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/324

[95] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 7, 1919. [Received April 10.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/325

[96] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 8, 1919. [Received April 10.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/327

[97] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 8, 1919. [Received April 10.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/333

[98] Mr. Walter E. Bundy to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, April 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/341

[99] Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, April 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/353

[100] Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, April 17, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/371

[101] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 22, 1919. [Received April 25.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/388

[102] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 28, 1919. [Received April 30.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/415

[103] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, May 5, 1919. [Received May 7.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/447

[104] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, May 11, 1919. [Received May 14.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/468

[105] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, May 11, 1919. [Received May 14.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/469

[106] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, May 14, 1919. [Received May 17.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/478

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[Document 76]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 53

VIENNA, January 30, 1919.
[Received February 6.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that one of the vital problems that interests everyone here is what should be the future political connections of German Austria. Three solutions have been proposed, namely, complete political and economic independence, membership in some sort of a Danubian confederation, and union with Germany.

In Vienna, at least, few people, I believe, favor the first of these solutions, though it is probably more popular in the country districts, where there is also talk of smaller republics formed from the ancient provinces, perhaps with some sort of tie with one another. It is also pointed out that an independent Austrian state would be larger than Switzerland and would have as many natural resources. Why should it not exist just as well? There is even a suggestion it might be neutralized, but the prevalent belief is that a small, weak Austria with barren soil and scant mineral wealth would be incapable of a prosperous life and, in particular, could never support a great city like Vienna, which would be doomed.

The people who favor a Danubian confederation include, in the first place, most of those who cling to the past, especially the aristocracy and the former officials and officers who are numbered by the tens of thousands, for be it remembered German Austria furnished an undue share of these in the former dual empire, and is now suffering from a plethora of men who do not know how to be anything else. They regard a confederation of this kind as being a sort of reconstruction of the dual empire in a form which will give freedom

to each nationality but will weld them all into some sort of a federal state to the economic as well as the political advantage of each part.

Secondly, we must take into account the aversion of many Catholics to belonging to a German state where the majority is Protestant, as well as the fear of the propertied classes and conservatives generally of belonging to one where the Socialists make up such a great proportion of the population. Then there are the old dislike of the Austrian for the North German and especially the Prussian, a dislike the war has tended to heighten, at least for the moment; and an unwillingness to see Austria, which so long was the leading state of Germany, henceforth nothing but a minor member even if her unity is preserved under the new regime, which is not certain. There is, too, a strong feeling on the part of the Viennese against seeing their ancient famous imperial capital reduced to the position of a German provincial town. In a Danubian confederation Vienna would still hope to be the capital of the whole, the seat if not of empire at least of common interest, common culture and common trade of many nations as in the past. In the Germany of today they say there can be no great future for Vienna. This last consideration affects the many financial and manufacturing interests centered here. At the present moment they are suffering terribly from the breakup of the dual empire, for their field extended to every part and they have been dismembered with the dismemberment of the territory they covered. Different legislation and hostile tariffs in the new formations into which this territory has been broken up will bring to them the greatest injury, if not ruin, but a Danubian confederation, with free trade between its members, will not only save them but will enlarge the field for their activity. In this field they will have, at least at first, no rivals of equal strength to themselves, whereas if Austria is to be a part of Germany they will have to compete with German skill and enterprise, and the superior organization of the great German industries.

There is some uncertainty as to just what countries should be included in this confederation; for example, Poland, Rumania, the Balkan States; but this is a matter of detail that can be settled later. The United States is often pointed out as a model that might well be imitated. A Danubian confederation, from its loose nature and varied

nationalities can never be an aggressive power that will menace others, but it will have sufficient resources to make it strong enough for defence. Such a confederation may be regarded as a political necessity for the peace of the world, for without it the various small states of Eastern Europe will inevitably be filled with mutual jealousy and rival aspirations. We shall have the story of the Balkan Peninsula over again.

A final argument frequently heard is the fear that the victorious allied powers may be so opposed to a union between Germany and Austria that they will take measures to prevent it; or that Austria if she persists in her desire will receive more severe treatment than she otherwise would in the terms of peace. Indeed by joining with Germany, whom the Allies intend to punish severely, she may come in for a share of the punishment which she may escape if she remains alone.

The partisans of a union of Austria with Germany include not only those who prefer this solution in itself, but also many who in theory might prefer a Danubian confederation but believe there is no chance of its realization. The first of these have been represented by the German Nationalist Party, who have always felt that Austria was, and for many centuries had been, an integral part of Germany and that the historical and racial connection had been only temporarily severed by the rivalry between the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns that had led to the expulsion of Austria after the war of 1866. Now that the dual empire has gone to pieces and that Italians, Serbs, Rumanians and Poles are being united to their brethren outside, and the Czechs have formed a new state, what could be more natural than for the Germans of Austria to unite to the rest of their German brethren. This is the day of national states and it is better to be part of a great one than to vegetate as a detached fragment. The reunion of Austria to Germany will restore in favor of the south the preponderance which has been exercised by northern Germany owing to the too great power of Prussia.

The Social Democratic Party, the strongest in the present coalition government, has taken the same ground, but it has been perhaps more influenced—as it is charged with being—by an additional

reason. As the present Austria is not an industrial state the Socialists are only a minority in it and bid fair to remain so. If Vienna is going to decline they are likely to shrink rather than to gain in numbers. But if Austria is incorporated with Germany, the Austrian Socialists will be members of a powerful and perhaps some day the dominant party in a great society.

Even the capitalists and manufacturers are not all opposed to union. There are some that believe that in the end, if not immediately, better conditions of credit and better and safer markets can be found for them in a united Germany than in a detached Austria, however confederated. There is much they can sell in Germany itself and they will profit by the gains of German enterprise throughout the world. There is room, too, for Vienna in the south as well as for Berlin in the north, and it is Vienna that has the greater natural advantages. Why despair of her future?

As for a Danube confederation, whether desirable or not, there are many reasons for doubting if it is in any way possible. We may talk of the United States, but the difficulties that had to be overcome before the American constitution was laboriously evolved were child's play compared with those that would face the creators of the United Danubian States. These states are inhabited by many different nationalities; hardly any two of them are on good terms, and many of them regard each other with a bitter hatred, born of centuries of friction, rendered intense by the events of the last five years and still further exasperated by the sudden reversal of their relations to one another and by their fierce conflicting claims which, however settled, will leave ill feeling behind them. Verily a common parliament representing these elements would be a wonderful spectacle.

But even a looser union with only a common tariff and financial system and a common foreign policy would meet with many of the same difficulties, and looks quite beyond the bounds of probability for a generation.

The Ausgleich of 1867 which created dualism between Austria and Hungary never worked well at any stage of its existence. As soon as each decennial renewal was voted, thanks to the pressure of the

dynasty of the army and of the foreign office, both sides began to prepare for the next nasty wrangle that must occur when the matter came up again. Each renewal was obtained with increasing effort and led to increased ill feeling.

Tariff negotiations are proverbially thorny, and to bring about a commercial union between four, five or more equal states is hardly in the range of practical politics. Even if it were brought about, every time any modification was suggested, there would be fresh trouble. Nothing but universal free trade could obviate this; but if it existed, the chief reason for a confederation would disappear. And, who wants it? Hungary? Yes. Fallen from her high estate, if she is to lose her non-Magyar territories and be reduced to an agricultural inland community she must look for some support, and there is little else she can hope for. But there is little indication that others of the proposed members really desire it. Most of them are full of self-confidence in their new found greatness and believe they are quite able to stand alone, and even absorb land belonging to their neighbors. It is true the new Czecho-Slovak state, which, if it gains all the territory it is now claiming, would be the leading member of the confederation, might like an arrangement that would secure a large field of enterprise to its powerful industries and assure it of economical as well as political hegemony. But this hegemony would be particularly distasteful, not to say disastrous, to both Austria and Hungary, whose feelings towards Czecho-Slovakia would be like those existing between Germany and France.

But supposing the dream to be realized, what reason is there for thinking that Vienna would retain her ancient glory? Budapest, which has had an independent life since 1866, has gained much on her; and Prague will now do her utmost to supplant her in every way possible.

Such are some of the chief arguments put forth here by the partisans of a Danube confederation and those of a union with Germany. It is hard to gauge the strength of the forces on the two sides. A prominent official said to me recently that if everyone in Austria were to vote out loud the great majority would favor the union; but if they were to vote secretly everyone would vote against it. I note,

however, that Dr. Bauer, the chief of the Social Democrats, does not avoid the issue but insists upon it in his electoral speeches, and newspaper discussion of it is increasing as the date of the election draws near. My own opinion is that public opinion is still in rather a fluid state and may be turned one way or the other by the course of events. Union with Germany was proclaimed at a meeting of the National Council of German Austria on November 12, 1918, but nothing was said as to the form in which it was to take place, and it is not too late to draw back or to insist on impossible conditions. All sorts of elements will enter into the final decision.

The form of constitution adopted by the new German state will have its influence; especially the question whether the unity of Prussia is to be preserved, for there is a pretty general dislike of Prussia here and if Prussia continues to exist as a whole or is not seriously diminished in the Germany of tomorrow, Austria is less likely to join in. The size of the new Austria will also make a difference, for there seem to be many Austrians who think that their country is capable of independent existence if it includes German Bohemia, but not if it is deprived of it, in which case it must adhere to Germany.

The leaders of all three parties that have formed the present coalition government have committed themselves in favor of union. The German Nationalists and the Social Democrats may be expected to remain true to this policy, but the German Nationalists are only one of the group of Bourgeois parties; and the Christian Socialists who it is generally expected will be the most important party of all after the next elections may see fit to change their attitude. They are strong in the country districts. Their support lies in the peasants, the aristocracy and the clergy; that is to say, in the conservative elements generally, who dislike modern Germany and abhor Socialism. It is to be noted that so far the Austrian Church does not appear to have taken a decisive stand. The influence of the hierarchy and that of Rome are still great. One would naturally think of them as being thrown on the side of the conservatives and against the Socialists, and the idea of a union with a Protestant state; but other considerations, such as a desire to strengthen the Catholic element in Germany may lead to a different conclusion. If this influence is really exerted it may be decisive.

The above impressions hastily formed without time or opportunity for serious investigation are nevertheless submitted in the hope that they may be of some utility.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/52

[Document 77]

***Captain Frederick Dellschaft to Professor A. C.
Coolidge²***

[VIENNA, January 29, 1919.]

ECONOMIC NOTES

The following points, illuminating the question of a union of German Austria with Germany as opposed to a Danube Federation, were brought out in a conversation with Hofrat Dr. von Tayenthal, Secretary of the Handels and Gewerbe Kammer, Vienna, January 29, 1919:

Union with Germany.

The history of textile industry in Bohemia affords an illustration of the interests at stake in the readjustment of economic conditions in the territory of the old empire. Originally the small trader had employed the cottage weavers for making the stuff he required. From this relation subsequently sprang the local industries. As these increased, the owner of the factory had to borrow from the Jew, who gradually became owner; the latter is now being replaced by the banks who have to a large extent assumed control over the industry. The banks again through a chain of local agents and dealers control the sale of the product of the factories to the peasants. It should be remembered also that the factories are not specialized to the extent that they are in the U. S. A., England or Germany. Consequently, the banking element is anxious about the future of its trade in case the former protective tariff is removed and is therefore inclined to oppose a union with Germany. This anxiety is hardly justified insofar as the use of the banks as a mechanism of commerce is concerned. The trade with the peasants, through the small dealer, is of so special a nature, that the special knowledge of conditions and credits

possessed by the banks and the large dealers is absolutely essential for success.

In the iron industry, the mill owners are somewhat inclined to fear German competition as they have heavy freight charges to pay on ore and coal.

The mass of the people, however, needs the stimulus of enterprise to meet modern conditions. The natural character of the German-Austrian is rather inclined to take life easy, although, among the intellectuals, many engineers, chemists, economists, etc. have gained distinction and found employment in Germany and elsewhere.

Water-Power.

It is estimated that only about 5% of the available water-power in Austria has been developed. Foreign capital would find a lucrative field for investment in this direction, although at present the sovereignty of the state in the matter of water-power, and the extent to which it will control the distribution, is not clear.

The railways were prevented from electrification by the policy of the War Office. This policy now being no longer effective, it is intended to proceed with electrification as rapidly as conditions permit. About 200,000 H. P. will be required.

Demobilization of Material.

The question of liberating army supplies and material for public use is proceeding very slowly. Of the stocks available in German Austria, one-fifth each has been apportioned to that State and Czechoslovakia. The other three-fifths are being held for later distribution (involving somewhat over one billion kronen in value) pending settlement with the Yugo-Slavs and Hungary, who on account of their geographical position were able to seize very considerable quantities left at the time the armistice was declared. Up to the present, neither the Yugo-Slavs nor the Hungarians have raised the question of a distribution of war material.

² Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 55, January 31.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/52

[Document 78]

Captain Frederick Dellschaft to Professor A. C. Coolidge³

VIENNA, January 31, 1919.

Subject: Austrian economic situation and bolshevism.

As preface to a personal exposé of the economic situation, Dr. Oskar Reichenauer of the Wirtschafts-Politisches Amt submitted the memorandum of which a translation is attached.⁴ Dr. Reichenauer called this morning and entered more fully into his views as they relate to bolshevism.

Bolshevism, said Dr. Reichenauer, is not merely a state of mind induced by the conditions due to the war. It is a social movement begun 15 years ago and furthered with an almost religious fanaticism. The Slav peoples who are naturally disposed to vague ideals were most easily its victims; the Latin peoples would be the next to fall, and then the turn of the Germanic nations would inevitably come if drastic measures are not taken at once. The next two months are the most critical, and even the German Austrian who is easygoing and little inclined, as past events have shown, toward violent and subversive measures, would not be able to resist the waves of bolshevism coming through Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. German-Austria is, so to speak, the bridge-head of western civilization to the Orient; when the bridge-head falls, Italy, Spain and France will be at the mercy of bolshevism almost instantaneously. The culmination of the danger is not a question of months but of weeks. The means to combat the danger utilizable now, that will be useless within a short while, are troops, coal and food. The two latter items would furnish the physical strength to the working classes, the first item, the moral strength to resist. Trustworthy troops to the number of about 30,000 would furnish backbone to the good

elements that could be collected in this country. They are needed in the industrial regions such as Vienna, Wiener Neustadt, Muerzzuschlag, Kapfenberg, Bruck, Donawitz, Leoben, Graz, Koeflach, St. Poelten. The main weapon should be a large number of machine-guns and the men should always appear in force. A measure such as this is absolutely necessary to check the tide of bolshevism.

Dr. Reichenauer closed with his ideas on the “Anschluss” as opposed to the Danube Federation. Without its industry German-Austria would not exist, and German-Austria needed the Orient as the Orient needed German-Austria. The latter would always be the cultural leader among the other states into which the Monarchy has been broken up and its influence was needed to prevent the Balkan question from extending westward.

F. DELLSCHAFT

³ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 55, January 31.

⁴ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/67

[Document 79]

***Captain Frederick Dellschaft to Professor A. C.
Coolidge***⁵

VIENNA, February 4, 1919.

Subject: General economic situation in German Austria.

In response to your request for a statement on the general economic situation in German Austria, I beg to submit the following remarks, with the suggestion that they be considered subject to the circumstances under which they are prepared. The extensive nature of the subject demands for its proper treatment not only a thorough knowledge of economic conditions before and during the war but also training in the systematic and theoretic study of economic subjects. This knowledge and training is to a great extent foreign to me. The subject is further obscured by the unsatisfactory political relations between the several states sprung from the old empire and the uncertainty as to the future, so that statistics to illustrate the matter properly are not only unavailable but also difficult to approximate.

The economic situation of German Austria is discussed below under the following headings:

- (a) Industry and Labor
- (b) Agriculture and Forestry
- (c) Commerce
- (d) Means of Communication and Transportation
- (e) City of Vienna
- (f) Political and Economic Outlook.

It should be mentioned that the supply of food and coal does not come within the scope of these remarks, as I understand it is being

dealt with by a separate mission.

Population.

According to the 1910 census, the population of Austria comprised:

Male	13,787,029
Female	14,537,912
Together	28,324,941

Of this number only 34.30 or 9,715,017 were German, distributed as follows:

German Austria (<i>Alpenländer</i>)	6,505,398
Bohemia, Moravia & Silesia	3,209,619

This distribution is made on the territorial basis outlined in the German-Austrian Act of November 22, 1918 and proclamations of November 22, 1918 and January 3, 1919.

No figures are procurable of the actual number of workers available. It is possible that an estimate may be procurable in the next weeks. The war has caused such great migrations of working-people from one section of the former empire to another and between trades and employments, that it is impossible at present to form a trustworthy estimate. Vienna, the only city with a population of over 100,000 in undisputed German Austria, has over 2 million people and, for this reason, will be discussed in a separate paragraph. Available statistics have been based almost entirely on a classification separating German and Non-German districts without respect to provincial boundaries, and as a large part of the former are now claimed by the Czechs, Slovaks and others, considerable analysis is necessary before absolute figures can be obtained.

Industry and Labor.

The main industries left to German-Austria are textiles, paper, mining and sugar, which at present, are almost inactive on account of the lack of coal and raw material. The labor that is being employed

is largely for maintenance of plants and salvage. The enormous overhead expense is rapidly reducing what financial surplus existed.

Textiles—

The latest figures of the number of workmen employed in the various branches of the textile industry are as follows:

	<i>No. of Workpeople</i>	
Cotton:		
Spinners	9,820	1,167,920 spindles
Weavers	7,963	13,486 looms
Printers	1,690	47 presses
Other branches	13,955	
Together	33,428	
Wool:		
Spinners	749	
Weavers	1,480	
Together	2,229	
Linen:		
Spinners	632	
Weavers (Machine)	334	
do. (Hand)	80	
Together	1,046	
Hemp & Jute:		
Spinners (Jute)	1,299	
do. (Hemp)	1,088	
Weavers	285	
Ropemakers	208	
Together	2,880	
Silk:		

Weavers, etc.	2,398 1,652 looms
Other factories	1,650
Together	4,048
Total workpeople in Textile industry	43,631

This figure is probably much below the actual number and only serves as an index to the importance of the industry.

The German districts in the Sudeten Lands employ about 150,000 hands and these would be lost to German Austrian industry if the Czecho-Slovaks are allowed control over Bohemia to the extent of her conventional frontiers.

It should be pointed out that the textile factories in Austria are not specialized as in the United States and England, so that the cost of production is high and the industry is not in a condition to take up competitive export trade with success.

During the war many new textile processes, principally in the use of paper and rags, were introduced. Paper, particularly in combination with cotton, is used for the manufacture of material of remarkable durability. Bags are shredded and rewoven as often as eight times to supply the needs of the population. It is not certain that either paper or rags will continue in the manufacture of textiles as it is doubtful whether their use will pay. There are, however, no cotton stocks at present, nor is there any coal.

Paper—

The average monthly production of the paper industry during the year 1913 was the following:

Paper	7,830 tons
Pasteboard	2,520 do.
Cellulose	4,850 do.
Wood-pulp	1,275 do.
	16,475 do. per month

or 197,700 do. annually.

This industry is capable of great development on account of the great resources of German Austria in timber and water-power. Its production per workman employed is less than German, and still more behind the American, which is over three times as great, on account of better machinery.

Mining—

Iron ore is the most valuable mineral product of German Austria but the necessary coal for reduction and foundry work must be imported. As a result, iron-works are at a standstill. In 1913, over 2 million tons of iron ore were mined.

The lignite and coal production is normally between 2½ to 3 million tons. The mines are still working to some extent but the general agitation and lack of desire for work has affected the Austrian miners also, as they keep in close touch with the Silesian workers.

Sugar—

German Austria produced only 67, 900 tons of raw sugar as compared with a total production of 1,677,000 tons for all Austria in 1912/13. It should be pointed out, however, that the German districts of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia produced 425,000 tons in the same period. The production season ends in January. Very little has so far come into the market and the consumption is under careful control.

Power—

The main source of power in the past has been coal. German Austria in peace times required about 14 million tons, of which only about 3 million were produced within inner Austrian territory, leaving a deficit of about 11 million tons. In order to make this deficit good it is proposed, in addition to making the necessary importations, to develop the large resources in water power. The latter measure, however, cannot supply immediate needs nor even approach them for at least 5 to 10 years, as the works to be constructed are extensive.

It is estimated, on the basis of government surveys which have been very thorough, that German Austria has about 1.4 million H. P. water power capable of development, of which not more than about 7% is in use. This resource constitutes one of the country's most valuable assets and it is hoped, in certain financial circles, to interest foreign capital in its further development. In the meanwhile, coal must be imported, and it is urgent that an arrangement be arrived at with the Czecho-Slovaks not only for the supply of coal from Bohemian mines but also for the transit of coal from the Silesian fields.

Labor—

As previously stated, a clear statement of the number of unemployed in German-Austria is not available. In Vienna alone, it is estimated at over 100,000 men; for the entire country it is variously estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000. This figure does not, however, convey a correct idea of the labor situation. The German Austrian is generally admitted to be an orderly citizen, easy to govern and not readily convertible to bolshevism. It cannot be ignored, however, that after making allowance for the natural reaction to the cessation of hostilities, a point will come when the population will demand food and work with considerably greater insistence than it has done so far. This point will be reached in several weeks or months, depending on what outside influences are active.

Agriculture and Forestry.

The 1913 crops of the 4 principal cereals in German Austria were the following:

	<i>Acres</i>	<i>Bushels</i>	<i>Bu. per Acre</i>
Wheat	487,900	10,783,900	22.1
Rye	1,012,300	24,604,300	24.3
Barley	328,400	8,418,800	25.6
Oats	848,600	32,389,800	38.1

It is evident, therefore, that in cereals German Austria with a population of only 6½ million is fairly well supplied. The production of potatoes and sugar-beet in 1913 were as follows:

	<i>Acres</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tons per Acre</i>
Potatoes	453,100	1,716,000	3.79
Sugar-beet	44,300	403,600	9.11

These agricultural crops all require fertilizer, for which the cheapest source will probably be Germany, until it is successfully manufactured at home by modern methods.

In meat stuffs German Austria is comparatively poorer than in cereals, etc., but this branch of farm produce as well as dairy products are capable of considerable development on account of the large areas of meadow-land and pasture in the state.

Forest land is the largest single item in the classification of German-Austria's cultivated area and amounts to about 8 million acres. Its value from an industrial point of view cannot be overestimated.

From these agricultural statistics it is evident that while in some branches not quite self-supporting, German Austria could be made practically so when normal conditions return, provided that a capable food administration is established. It will also have considerable values in paper and dairy produce available for export.

Commerce.

Commerce is reduced to little more than trade in the daily requirements of the population.

Future conditions depend on the delimitation of frontiers and other matters in the hands of the Paris Conference. In the meantime, the lack of transportation and the difficulty if not total impossibility of producing manufactured goods, put commerce almost at a standstill.

Means of Communication and Transportation.

German-Austria is well-provided with railroads but is unable to use them satisfactorily owing to lack of coal. Passenger traffic is, therefore, crowded into a small number of trains, which are unlighted at night, unheated and in many cases, without glass in the

windows. What little freight traffic there is, is unsatisfactory and thefts are very frequent.

Traffic on the Danube is closed on account of the winter-season.

City of Vienna.

The situation of Vienna as the capital of a state is extraordinary on account of the fact that its inhabitants comprise roughly speaking about one-third of the entire population of German-Austria. The civil official and higher military classes, as a result of the dismemberment of the empire, are numerically out of all proportion to the productive and commercial classes. The question of employment and pensions, which affect the older officials and officers most seriously, has not yet been solved as the burden is one that should not fall exclusively on the German Austrian state, nor is it one that can be disregarded in justice to the individuals concerned. These individuals are, furthermore, valuable at the present critical time as they represent a conservative and intellectual element as a counter-weight to the unemployed classes.

Of the unemployed working classes, over 100,000 are in receipt of supporting allowances from the government. These men are a dangerous element, and industry will not be able to get use out of them for some time to come. The government's method of paying them to avoid trouble is spoiling the people as economic producers. In case of serious trouble arising, it is doubtful whether the militia (*Volkswehr*) would be a useful aid in maintaining order, in fact, it is not unlikely that they might turn against the government. After all, the only means for assuring quiet in town and country are coal and food, the restoration of normal traffic conditions and a well-organized, even if comparatively small, military force.

Vienna and its immediate surroundings have considerable resources in industries for the production of building material, agricultural machinery, automobiles, freight cars, electrical equipment, furniture, leather goods, clothing, chemicals, tobacco, etc. A large part of the product of these industries involves a comparatively large proportion

of labor, so that freight on raw material should not be a great detriment to the reconstitution of local industry.

As regards river transportation, the Danube at Vienna is not an easy waterway. The volume of navigable water is liable to great fluctuations, the flow is extremely rapid, and at certain points the river-bed requires constant dredging. It is for this reason that Pressburg (Pozsony) is so vital to German Austria, as it is not until Pressburg is reached that the Danube becomes a steady, unhazardous stream, the drop being only 120 metres to sea-level, in a distance of slightly over 2,000 kilometers.

Political and Economic Outlook.

In the matter of the adjustment of the affairs of German Austria to the new conditions, three questions have arisen, the solution of which, when the terms of peace are known, will tend considerably to putting German Austria in an economically stable position. These questions are:

1. Internationalization of Railway and Steamship Lines.
2. Union with Germany (*Anschluss*).
3. Danube Confederation.

With regard to the first of these, little discussion has been heard; negotiation between the several new states has not yet taken place as their relative positions are not settled. The two latter questions are also not by any means clear. The bankers and industrials appear not to favor the union, while they do not see how German Austria can stand alone. The only other alternative, the Danube Confederation hardly seems feasible in view of the fact that Hungary, Roumania and Yugo-Slavia are agricultural states with products that for some time to come will find a ready market everywhere and who will certainly not find advantage in assuming a protective tariff merely for the benefit of German Austria or Czecho-Slovak industry.

The population of German Austria, insofar as it is not agrarian, will demand, when it finally recovers from its present partly enforced, partly natural period of indolence, a larger market for its labor. This

probably will re-act, as the industrials foresee, to the detriment of German Austrian industry but it is doubtful whether it will be a governing factor in deciding German Austria's political and economic future. The fears are expressed that Vienna may lose its position as the intellectual and artistic center of the countries formerly constituting the old empire; the union with Germany would tend more than a Danube Confederation to prevent these fears from being realized.

FREDERICK DELLSCHAFT

5 Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 65, February 5; received February 12.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/79

[Document 80]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 72

VIENNA, February 10, 1919.
[Received February 17.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that among the questions that threaten future trouble in this part of the world is one that has as yet attracted but little public attention, but has already been taken up seriously by the various governments of the former parts of the Austrian Empire, that is the question of "liquidation". When the war ended there were naturally concentrated in Austria, and to a secondary extent in Hungary—and especially in the vicinity of the two capitals Vienna and Budapest—vast amounts of materials and stores of many kinds, not only military munitions but railway and other supplies. The new states into which the Empire has split up have naturally claimed that all these supplies are not the property of the governments of German Austria or of Hungary, in whose hands they happen to be located at the present moment, but that they should be divided up in fair proportion between the former parts of the Empire. This claim has been admitted in theory by the German Austrians and the Hungarians, and there is at the present day sitting here a Liquidation Committee which tries to deal with this subject. The task is a very large and complicated one. To begin with, no agreement has, as far as I am aware yet been reached as to what the respective share of each of the governments should be. It cannot be based merely on the number of population for no one knows what that is—or can know until the final boundaries are fixed. Besides, a people like the Czechs with their great manufacturies feel that they have contributed far more in the making of the materials accumulated than have, let us say, the Poles in Galicia or the Rumanians in Eastern Hungary. The Czechs would never accept as just a per capita division. On the contrary they are inclined to claim a

percentage far in excess of what their numbers alone would entitle them to. In my recent visit to Bohemia I was impressed with the importance that the President and others attach to this question of liquidation and their bitterness towards the Austrians for the way it had been carried out, or not carried out so far. One can understand that the Austrians, especially in view of their present relations with the Czechs, should not be enthusiastic or helpful about carrying out such an arrangement, even though they had theoretically agreed to it. They are accused of selling as much of the material as they can, without informing the others. The result seems to be continual bickerings and much ill feeling.

An even more serious side to the situation is the question how far the principle of liquidation is to be applied. In theory, if not in practice, it may be simple enough if we confine it to such things as war and railway material, but it is being pushed a great deal further. For instance, it has been claimed that all public buildings of the old government that were used for general and not merely for local purposes belong to all the successors of that government. This includes the various ministries here in Vienna, and even the splendid building of the former Austrian Parliament. It can also be applied to governmental and historical archives, as well as the scientific and artistic museums for which Vienna is famous, and to arsenals, training camps, scientific and experimental laboratories and the like. Here too, the principle seems to have been accepted, at least to a certain extent, by the government of German Austria. Representatives of some of the other States are making themselves at home in what were formerly Imperial property. For instance, I believe the headquarters of the Rumanian propaganda are located in part of the former Imperial Ministry of War.

But this is not all. It is claimed that the contents of the scientific and artistic museums for which Vienna is famous do not belong to modern Austria (nor do those in Budapest belong to Hungary) but that they are the property of the component parts of the former Dual Empire and should now be divided in just proportions between them. Then, too, there is the question of how the contents of these museums were acquired. In the course of centuries many articles of value have been transferred from the provinces to Vienna by the

closing of monasteries and for many other reasons. It is true the reverse has taken place, for instance the central government has made gifts to local museums, but to a much smaller extent. If the origin of the acquisition of every picture in the art galleries and of every specimen in the zoological museum is to be inquired into, we have the prospect of endless dispute and of a most unedifying scramble. This is no mere imaginary danger. I recently heard one of the most important of the Czech ministers, Dr. Kasin, talk of getting back for Bohemia the things she had been deprived of after the battle of the White Hill in the early part of the 17th century. I gathered from him the impression that, feeling it was impossible for the Czecho-Slovak State to avoid accepting a large share of the Austrian war debt and of the vast issues of paper money which had been brought into existence for purposes to which the Czechs had been violently opposed, he intended to get even with Austria for this and other injuries in every way that he could. He is not alone in that sentiment. The hatred felt for Vienna notably in Bohemia is strong, and the idea of plundering her for the future profit and glory of Prague and other places presents many attractions. Even Italy, apart from compensation she may demand for losses suffered during the war, shows signs of raising claim to certain works of art here that were formerly in Northern Italy at the time of Austrian rule there. It is needless to point out that if this process of liquidation is carried out to the extent that some are now planning, Vienna will come out from it in the condition of a city that has been sacked, and its position as a center of art will be gone forever.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/133

[Document 81]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 102

VIENNA, February 22, 1919.
[Received February 26.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that in response to your telegram No. 11 [76?] dated February 5th⁶ I have been investigating the position of the former emperor Charles. As far as I can make out he is living in seclusion at Eckartsau, about twenty miles from Vienna, and is absolutely unmolested. His health has been bad, and I cannot find that anyone suspects him of being engaged in political intrigue.

I am told there is no truth in the report that any investigation is to be made about him, except for the fact that a committee has been appointed to investigate the conduct of the higher officers in the earlier part of the war. But this would hardly touch him. General Auffenberg referred to in your Telegram No. 11 is on this committee, but Mr. Katz is unknown.

Colonel Cunningham of the British Mission here has just been to call upon the ex-Emperor, as I learn from an extract from the *Neue Freie Presse* of yesterday which I enclose herewith with translations.⁷

I have been called upon by Baron Polzer, who was and still is one of the intimates of the former Emperor. He told me that in July 1917 the Emperor was anxious to come out with a pronouncement to the world in which he should express his adherence to the doctrine of self-determination for peoples, and to the consequent federalization of Austria-Hungary, granting equal rights to all nationalities. Accordingly, he gave an interview to Professor F. W. Forster of the University of Munich, and what the Emperor said at the interview was prepared for publication. At the last moment Count Czernin⁸

interfered and brought such violent pressure to bear from several sides that the Emperor was forced to consent to the suppression of the manuscript. Baron Polzer now came and confided it to me, it being explicitly understood that I was to make any use of it that I saw fit. He even intimated that he would be glad to see it published. The document seems to me to be of considerable historical interest even if of no particular immediate value. I inclose it herewith.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Professor F. W. Forster of the University of Munich informs us: "I recently had the honor of a conversation with the Emperor Charles about the relation between the Decree of Amnesty and the present world situation. I am authorized to make public the following declarations of the Emperor:

"My Decree of Amnesty has provoked a great deal of uneasiness and contradiction in many circles. It has, however, long been my firm conviction that the thoroughly muddled situation of the Austrian peoples has demanded a radical change. The tradition of narrow Handedness and short sightedness is so deep rooted in us that only an entirely new way of looking at things can save us. An example must be set. It can only proceed from the dynasty which for centuries has been the symbol of unity for the Austrian peoples and whose spiritual authority over its peoples is based wholly on the dignity of its super-national mission. I know that thousands in all of my peoples long ago desired a fresh start of this kind. Abroad, however, we are not understood at all. There is no inkling of why we in this southeastern corner of Europe are united by Providence. Austria is once and for all neither a German nor a Slavic state. The Germans, it is true, were the founders of the Danube Monarchy, but today they are in the minority, surrounded by and permeated with peoples who are

in active evolution. They can remain the leaders of the newer civilization only if they themselves set an example of the highest civilization and greet the newly awakened peoples with affection, regard and generosity. There have been faults on all sides. Where there was wrong it must be made good again. Therefore, draw a line through the past.

As to the self-determination of peoples, unless from being too abstract it leaves Austrian realities out of account I am not in the least afraid of it. If we magnanimously concede to each separate group the greatest conceivable scope for their individuality, for the exercise of their own cultural power of development, for the enjoyment of their own speech, in short for their whole national effort to make good, they will then in new forms be united with the whole far more intimately than before, and by so doing will have rid themselves of exaggerations that could not live. In Austria much less than anywhere else can the form of political unity be forced on the populations from without. It must proceed from the moral unification of the peoples. The very youth should be influenced in this sense. In place of the inflammatory text books on both sides other text books ought to be written in which the great talents and virtues of the Slavic Race should be brought home to the German youth, and in the same way the Slavic youths ought to be fairly told what Germanism has contributed to the culture of the world, and especially to the young peoples of the Slavic southeast.

What we have to do here on a small scale is also the task on a great scale. With my whole heart I am for a league of peace for the nations after the war. There is no other salvation. I am also ready for any internationally regulated disarmament. War agitators are either people without heart or people who do not know what war is. I have experienced war. Men were cut to pieces beside me ...⁹ One cannot remain stuck in one's old ideas.

The most urgent and immediate international disarmament consists, however, in at last and for good stopping mutual

insults and accusations. In this war all are guilty. From now on all must feel themselves responsible for the peace of the world, and, to begin with, so regulate everything in their internal relations that no state through perturbed or clouded internal conditions shall give occasion for a new world conflagration. Now, let us begin to straighten out our internal questions in this new spirit of European responsibility—it will create a European confidence in us, and may serve as an example for a great league of peace of the nations.’

The Emperor spoke all these sentences with great emotion, with strong emphasis and visibly affected by the greatness of the present historical moment, and by the urgent duty of those highest in responsibility to become in this hour guides and leaders to the highest saving truths of national life.”

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to April 15, 1918.

⁹ Omission indicated in the original.

Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to Professor A. C. Coolidge^{[10](#)}

VIENNA, February 22, 1919.

Subject: Interview with editor of *Arbeiter-Zeitung*.

1. I called last night on Frederick Austerlitz, editor of the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*. The last time I spoke with him was about a month ago and he then expressed his conviction that Bolshevism was no real danger for German-Austria. He added that if food and raw materials could be obtained the situation would rapidly clear up inasmuch as the feelings of the mass of the working classes in German-Austria were not radically inclined, and that the program of social reforms proposed by the Social Democrat party satisfied the ideas of all except the inconsiderable communist fraction.
2. Yesterday he took a much more disconsolate view of the situation. In spite of the victory of the Social Democrat party, which he recognized was largely a victory for reform, as opposed to the reactionary forces represented by the old monarchy, the old industrial class, and the militarists, he said that the living conditions had become so much worse in the last few weeks that he feared greatly that it would be impossible to avoid hunger riots. He added that it was still his opinion that Bolshevism, as developed in Russia, was not a danger here, but he said that the increasing number of unemployed, which he now estimated at 120,000, together with the increasing shortage of food and increasing prices, for what little could be obtained, would almost inevitably lead to serious trouble. He said that the one most vital thing for German-Austria at the present moment was the resumption of its industrial life. He claimed that the greater portion of the unemployed were more than willing to work, but that for many of them it was impossible to find any occupation. In

consequence he begged that something be done to provide the wherewithal to resume the industrial life of the country. Raw materials, facilitation of transportation and food were indispensable and if these could be obtained things would continue to proceed in orderly fashion. He was afraid that the Italian demand for locomotives would bring about the collapse, as there were already sufficient difficulties in the matter of transportation, and as the government did not have the rolling stock of the whole former Austrian state to draw from, but only of the small portion remaining in the hands of the German-Austrians.

3. I have followed Austerlitz's articles in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* during the last five weeks and it strikes me that the man is a sincere believer in the anti-capitalist radical social ideas which he has proclaimed. In talking with him he gives the impression of being well informed and of having a quick grasp of conditions. The change, therefore, from his previous position of polite incredulity that serious trouble was to be anticipated here, to the point of view always insisted upon by the more conservative elements, is significant. While ultra-radical the man is not a revolutionist and the great emphasis that he lays on the imperative need of the immediate resumption of the industrial life in German-Austria is worthy of serious attention.

NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT

¹⁰ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 104, February 24; received February 26.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/160

[Document 83]

Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge^{[11](#)}

VIENNA, February 27, 1919.

Subject: Arrangement on reciprocity between Hungary and German-Austria as to stamped bank notes.

The Hungarian Secretary of Finances came to Vienna to negotiate with competent parties over the question of an arrangement of reciprocity in regard to the stamped bank notes of German-Austria and Hungary. So far as is possible an agreement will be made whereby the notes stamped in German-Austria and Hungary shall keep their full pay value in both countries respectively, and there shall be no limitation in traffic caused by the dividing of the currency.

HUGO G. CAMPAGNOLI

^{[11](#)} Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 114, February 27; received March 3.

Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge^{[11](#)}

VIENNA, February 27, 1919.

Subject: Order by the Department of Finances of February 15, 1919, regarding the temporary restrictions of money remittances.

The text of the prohibitive decree is as follows:

On the basis of the decree of June 24, 1917, the Department of Finances orders the following:

- A. 1. The import of bank notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank and the remittance of amounts to German-Austria in crowns, as well as the execution of such remittances, are until further notice prohibited. The Department of Finances can, under special conditions, permit the remittance of amounts in crowns from abroad to German-Austria.
2. Persons crossing the border will be permitted to import bank notes up to the amount of 500 crowns.
- B. Persons and firms who have their domicile and permanent residence in one of the national states of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, may dispose of their existing or subsequent credits in crowns in German-Austria without limitation, whereas payments to other foreign countries and within German-Austria, until further notice, shall not be effected without the permission of the Department of Finance.
- C. The existing or subsequent credits and claims in German-Austria of persons or firms who have their domicile or permanent residence in one of the national states of the

former empire, are to be made distinguishable as such and are to be kept separate.

- D. The transfer of coupons and dividend-warrants from the national states to German-Austria is only permitted with the sanction of the Department of Finance.
- E. The sale of securities, stocks, etc., to persons and firms who have their domicile or permanent residence outside of German-Austria within the territories of another national state, is only permitted with the sanction of the Department of Finance.
- F. The traffic in bank notes between the Austro-Hungarian Bank and the national states of the former empire, as well as with the other foreign countries is permitted, but disposition of such credit in crowns within German-Austria is only permitted with the sanction of the Department of Finance.
- G. Such territories of German-Austria as are occupied by the armed force of another state, and are under foreign administration, are to be treated in the same way as the territories of the respective state in regard to this order during the time of occupation.
- H. 1. Exceptions to the regulations of this decree may be granted by the Department of Finance.
2. Applications for permits in accordance with paragraphs B to E are to be addressed to the Department of Finance and are to be transmitted through the "Devisenzentrale" (Central-Office for Foreign Currency) in Vienna.
- I. Violations of this decree will be punished in accordance with paragraph 13 of the ministerial order of June 18, 1918. Further, the confiscation of the articles to which the crime refers may be ordered.
- J. This decree goes into effect on the day of proclamation.

Reasons for the prohibitive order. Official report.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes has stamped the bank notes circulating in the territory of their state; a similar step is planned by the Czecho-Slovak Republic, by which bank notes thus marked are given exclusive paying value and those of the Austro-

Hungarian Bank are not considered valid. Thus these states not only infringe upon the privilege of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, but also put the German-Austrian state into an embarrassing position. The German-Austrian government, therefore, finds itself compelled to seek means of defence and to close its borders until further notice so as to prevent the further import of bank notes. The German-Austrian Government has resolved to take this measure of defence only because of the overwhelming pressure created by the contravention of the other national states, and hopes that no fair-minded person will misinterpret its action. The government cannot afford to take the risk of being the sole state in possession of the Austro-Hungarian bank notes and thus be looked upon as the successor of the old monarchy, for whose public debt and circulation of bank notes not only German-Austria, but all the other national states, are responsible. The bank notes held by foreign countries did not get there on behalf of supplies, etc. for the present German-Austrian state, but for the mutual war purpose of states forming the former empire. The government of German-Austria does not wish to resist the recognition of the bank notes held by foreign countries, and does not intend to withdraw from any of its financial liabilities. However, it takes the stand that the other national states of the former empire also meet their liabilities. The German-Austrian Government is of the opinion that the share of each of the other national states in the liabilities of the old monarchy should be ascertained as soon as possible. To prove the perfect willingness and good will of the German-Austrian government it declares itself in readiness to yield to the decision of an international court of arbitration which should fix the liability of the various national states with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Bank and owners of the notes as well as the creditors of the state. In expectation of such a court's decision the German-Austrian Government declares all actions caused by the decrees of the Jugo-Slav and Czecho-Slovak states as temporary, and is ready to drop all distinction between the notes stamped by the various states and those not stamped, as soon as this is also done by the other national states.

HUGO G. CAMPAGNOLI

¹¹ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 114, February 27; received March 3.

Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge¹³

VIENNA, February 27, 1919.

Subject: Interview with Bernhard von Popper, head director of the Wiener Bank Verein, and Alfred HERNSEIMER, director of the Wiener Bank Verein.

Financial Reports.

The two greatest problems at present in German Austria are the stamping of the bank notes and the proposed union with Germany.

German-Austria is forced against its will to stamp the bank notes of the Austrian-Hungarian Bank. It has to do this to protect itself from being swamped with the millions of bank notes held by countries outside of the old dual monarchy. German-Austria is perfectly willing to do its share and exchange the bank notes in these countries, namely it is willing to accept 30% of the whole amount. However, if German-Austria did not stamp the notes it would be forced to take the entire 100% as it would then be the only state of the former empire which did not stamp its bank notes.

In the course of my interview with the above mentioned directors they stated that they were at a loss to understand why Bohemia had to stamp its bank notes, and they do not agree with the Czechs that in time their rate of exchange will be better than that of German-Austria. They state that it was not at all necessary to stamp the bank notes and that it shows the character of the men in authority. They added that everyone knows that the Czechs themselves could never have made Bohemia what she is today and that it was Vienna and the financiers of Vienna who interested themselves in building up both

the commerce and industry of the new republic. Herr von Popper believes that Bohemia in the end will prefer to do business through Vienna, the door to the near East and the Balkans.

There are now about seven billion kronens of Austrian-Hungarian Bank notes circulating in German-Austria besides there are approximately four billions of Kassenscheine notes, so that altogether there is a currency of over eleven billions. Considering the immense amount of bank notes circulating and the inert condition of commerce and industry, German-Austria is in a very bad financial situation, and will continue to be so until some help comes from the outside. German-Austria is hoping for an early peace so that it can demand and obtain foreign credits. The foreign country she is hoping to interest is the United States.

Union with Germany.

The second problem is also very important and in some respects disagreeable. It has not been decided whether German-Austria is to combine with Germany politically only, or both politically and financially. It would be to the detriment of German-Austria if the second case was put into effect. The industrial and financial men are not greatly interested in a union with Germany as they see in it a great mistake and loss for the country's business. The only party interested in a full union with Germany is the Social Democratic party. Germany is now a socialist country, and if German-Austria is taken into the union it will strengthen the socialists in German-Austria. It is the belief of these two directors that it would be to the best interest of the country if German-Austria would be left as a neutral state like Switzerland.

HUGO G. CAMPAGNOLI

¹³ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 114, February 27; received March 3.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/173

[Document 86]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 122

VIENNA, March 3, 1919.
[Received March 5.]

SIRS: I have the honor to inclose herewith further material on the subject of the movement for the annexation to Austria of the German speaking territory of Western Hungary. I have already discussed this subject in my report No. 90¹⁴ to which I respectfully refer. I asked Major Martin, who is an expert professional geographer, to make an investigation of the question from a geographical point of view. I enclose his results without necessarily accepting all his recommendations. The question of Pressburg is a distinct one from that of the territory to the south of it. Major Martin's suggestion as to immediate relief in the food crisis here hardly appears to me practicable under the existing circumstances.

It should be remembered in connection with the question of the Germans in Western Hungary that this is perhaps the sole case in this part of the world where both parties are bound by their declarations in favor of the principle of self-determination. In theory it could be easily applied were it not that neither of the two contestants can be trusted to control its operation.

Yesterday a meeting on this subject was held in Vienna. A hall whose capacity is said to be two thousand was filled and there was an overflow of about a thousand people outside. The meeting was enthusiastic. The speeches were principally on the nationality side of the question and were greeted with much applause. They urged again and again that if the principle of self-determination was to be generally applied it could not be refused in this instance. They touched but lightly on economic points. I enclose certain pamphlets

that were distributed and some newspaper articles bearing on the subject.¹⁵

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, February 28, 1919.

Subject: Tentative recommendation regarding final Hungarian-Austrian boundary, with a suggestion of immediate relief for the food-crisis in Vienna.

1. In accordance with your direction, I submit the following discussion of the geographical, economic, and ethnic factors affecting Heizenland, or German West Hungary, and the boundary between the Hungarian Republic and the Republic of Deutschösterreich. It affects 22,000 square miles, populated by 389,400 persons, and involves a boundary 256 kilometers long.
2. This recommendation is based upon a study of maps and documents, but has not been preceded by a visit to the area affected. I append a number of maps and exhibits,¹⁶ and refer to several others which I know to be available in the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, in Paris.
3. This tentative recommendation I take to be chiefly for your information and that of our commissioners in Paris; I do not need to say that our experience in drawing the Line of Demarcation in Carinthia, where we found many Slovenes who wished to be governed by the Austrians rather than the Yugoslavs, affects my judgment to such an extent that I should feel a great mistake were being made if the wishes of the Deutsch-Westungarn people were not carefully

canvassed by a neutral commission before a final boundary is determined. The Heinzisch language is not pure German but somewhat dialectic (see Exhibit B, accompanying). I do not feel sure to what extent they have been Magyarized.

4. The economic factor is likewise a tremendously important one, as it appears to involve the victualling of the city of Vienna to a notable extent.

5. This memorandum brings up the Slav Corridor scheme between the Republica Československa and the S. H. S.¹⁷ Kingdom, as the area includes the Sprachenarchipelago of Serbo-Croats upon which the Bohemians and Jugoslavs place so much stress.

6. Heinzenland, the district in western Hungary here discussed, is shown upon the two small maps on this page. [Here follow two maps which have not been reproduced.] One of these (Map 1) indicates the physical features and shows in red the tentative Hungarian-Austrian boundary which I recommend. The other map (Map 2) roughly indicates the German-Magyar ethnic distribution, but willfully omits the Sprachenarchipelago of Serbo-Croats. The latter, however, are shown upon other maps of Austrian compilation herewith (Maps 8 and 10) and the Hungarian Map 9, as well as on the 4 sheets of the 200,000 scale map appended, upon which the boundary recommended is shown in detail (Map 11).

7. The region involved is divided between two larger geographical districts: (a) the Alpine foothills, including (1) Leitha Gebirge, a narrow ridge connecting the Alps at Semmering Pass with the Carpathians north of Pressburg, and (2) the eastern extension of the Grazhügel; (b) the western extension of the plain of Hungary—KL Ungarisehe Tiefebene—lying between the Bokony Wald and the Alpine foothills. Part of this is the Hansag, a swampy plain. The Little Hungarian Plain has an altitude of 130 to 150 meters, while the Alpine foothills rise to 476–883 meters above sea-level, or 800 to 2300 feet above the plain.

8. The mineral resources of the district involved include three basins of lignite or brown coal, two pyrite mines, and one antimony deposit.

9. The main occupation of the district is agricultural, and 60% to 70% of the land is arable; the soil is good; and the climate favorable (July temperature 20°-21°, January temperature 2°-1°; rainfall 500-700 mm.) This is a very productive part of the former Austro-Hungarian empire. It has an average population of 40 to 80 persons to the square kilometer, rising above 120 per square kilometer near Odenburg (Sopron). The foodstuffs produced in the northern half of the district are largely consumed in Vienna under normal conditions. Professor Bruckner of the University of Vienna asserts that statistics support the estimate that 35 to 42 percent of the necessary food import of Niederösterreich, including Vienna, was brought from the German-inhabited strip of West-Hungary before the war.

10. Manufacturing is not an important industry in any part of the area. Transportation relationships are shown upon the appended maps and will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

11. This district includes parts of four Hungarian Komitats, but I shall disregard their boundaries, as only the western portion of each one is involved, and discuss the tentative boundary recommended under four geographical divisions, (a) from Hill 404 (see recommendation of Permanent Boundary in Carinthia and Styria, Feb. 12, 1919) to the valley of the River Raab near Szentgotthard (St. Gotthard); (b) from St. Gotthard to Ferto Tava (Neusiedler See); from Neu-siedler See to Pozsony (Pressburg); (d) north of Pressburg.

12. The southern area, which is very small, may be dismissed with the statement that I am not familiar with the terrain and its population and resources, from personal observation, but I feel that the permanent boundary should be drawn in relation to ethnic distribution and minor divides, somewhat as shown in red on Szombathely sheet, 1:200,000, appended (Map 11), after an impartial field investigation has determined the wishes of the German, Croatian, and Magyar peoples in this hilly region. Szentgotthard I give to the Hungarians, as it is overwhelmingly Magyar. Its north and west hinterland will be German; its southwest hinterland Slovene; but what else could one do with a city close to the Yugoslav-Hungarian-Deutschösterreich frontier corner?

13. For the district from the River Raab at St. Gotthard to Neusiedler See there appears to be a simple situation. The ethnic boundary is generally parallel to the base of the foothills at the edge of the upland forest (see accompanying Wien and Szombathely sheets, 1:200,000, Map 11); if the Germans west of this line really wish to belong to Austria rather than Hungary, I think a permanent boundary could be drawn along some such line as I have indicated on the detailed map, without any complications or hardships, other than those involved in relation to railways and town markets at the base of the upland. The railway line between Kormend, Szombathely (Steinamanger) and Zinkenfeld (southeast of Odenburg) would lie wholly within Hungarian territory, so that part of the products from the rolling country inhabited by the Germans might have to be shipped to market through territory controlled by the Hungarians. I see no way to avoid this. This does not involve any hardship for trunk-line railway transportation between Vienna and Agram, or Vienna and Belgrade. Of the foothill cities, Kozseg (Guns) is most perplexing. Its population is mixed, but with 2 Magyars for 1 German, besides a handful of Slovenes and Serbo-Croats. It lies in a valley under the forested ridge of Trött Kö and Karlshöhe, the best bit of military strategic frontier in western Hungary. I believe we shall have to give the city to the Hungarians, unless field investigation shows that its minority of Germans are the merchants and that they, as well as the Croat farmers on the north and German farmers on the west prefer that it belong to Deutschösterreich; this, however, would involve hardship for the Magyar farmers to the east where there is more level land and less forest. Szombathely (Steinamanger) and Kormend are overwhelmingly Magyar and must be Hungarian, though this may temporarily inconvenience the German and Croat farmers on the upland to the west.

14. In this district we face squarely the relationship of the Serbo-Croat Sprachenarchipelago to the Corridor scheme (see Yugoslav map, #5, herewith). No one of the ethnic-linguistic maps attached to this memorandum appears to me to represent the distribution of the small number of scattered Serbo-Croats adequately. The number of islands of these people isolated in the midst of the German population is best seen upon sheets 9, 10, 19, and 20 of the Carte Ethnographique de la Hongrie, scale 1:200,000, prepared under the

direction of Count Paul Teleki, and transmitted by me in package No. 15, January 20, 1919. Count Teleki's 1:1,000,000-scale map, appended, indicates the density of population as well as actual distribution; but, as it omits the factor of topography in relation to the transportation line which the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs propose to build, if they obtain their Corridor, I have roughly indicated the distribution of the centers of Serbo-Croat settlement, (in blue spots and circles, without boundaries), on the four sheets (Wien, Pressburg, Szombathely, and Papa; General-karte von Mitteleuropa, K. K. Militargeographisches Institut, 1:200,000) on which I have drawn the boundary which I recommend, and which accompanies this memorandum as Map 11.

Realizing that I make the statement without adequate discussion, I cannot resist stating that the distribution of the scattered islands of this Serbo-Croat Sprachenarchipelago, on a highland with transverse railway lines but no possibility of longitudinal railway construction, because of deep valleys, strengthens my opposition to the Corridor scheme, even if there were not strategic, economic, and other objectionable features.

I do not feel that the presence of these detached areas of Serbo-Croats raises an objection to the drawing of a new frontier which shall unite the Germans of West Hungary with those of Austria. I do not believe that the Serbo-Croats in the area under consideration should be united with the Hungarians rather than with the Germans; either is an antagonistic race; a Viennese book-dealer characterized the Croats and Magyars to me today as "Feuer und Wasser". The Croats near the proposed Hungarian border should not, in my mind, form Alien-halbinseln projecting from the Hungarian state into the new Austrian republic; these Slavs, even in the areas north of Guns (Koszeg) and west of Steinamanger (Szombathely), are so situated that their market-relationships can be equally as good with the Germans of the surrounding upland as with the Hungarians of the plain to the east. For the Serbo-Croats north of Koszeg this point is debatable.

One feature of the pamphlet by Dr. Richard von Pfaundler, *Die Zukwift der Deutschen in Westungarn* (appended as Exhibit A), is a

discussion of what shall be done with these Serbo-Croats. He says, in effect, that the percentage of Croatian population will not exceed 1/7 of the total, no matter which way these Slavs are handled. As 306 of the communities have a majority of Germans, and 297 communities constitute an undivided language-district it appears to him that the Serbo-Croats would be equally as happy and comfortable under a German as under an Hungarian administration. Dr. Pfaundler states that a large proportion of these people speak one language beside their own and that they are friendly to the Germans.

If a field investigation should demonstrate that these Serbo-Croats speak German as their second language, which seems natural in view of their market-relationships, I should have no question of the wisdom of giving them to Deutschösterreich, provided, of course, the Corridor scheme is, as I hope, to be laid on the table.

With regard to the isolated areas of Hungarians living within German West-Hungary there appears to be no way of attaching them to the Republic of Hungary, and they can doubtless continue their business relations equally well with the Germans of the surrounding country if German West-Hungary becomes part of Austria.

The new boundary recommended in the district between the Raab River and the Neusiedler See (Fertő Tava) is not as satisfactory a geographical-strategic line of demarcation in some respects as the old one, since it is nearer the foothills than the old Hungarian-Austrian frontier on the upland (blue-shaded line on appended 1:200,000-scale maps). Nevertheless, as the ethno-linguistic boundary coincides fairly well with the base of the foothills, lying everywhere in the foothill slope, I have drawn my suggested line as fully as possible in relation to the minor topography and forests. I regard this proposed new international boundary as satisfactory in its combination of an ethnic-linguistic frontier, a geographical line of demarcation, a good military frontier, and a line which does not transgress any great laws in relation to economic factors.

15. The proposed boundary from Neusiedler See (Fertő Tava) to Pressburg goes through the swampy plain of the Hansag north of the Rabnitz River, and then turns northward to the Kleiner Donau. It

avoids complication with the Rinser Canal, leading from Neusiedler See to the Danube. It terminates on the Danube just west of Pressburg at the mouth of the River March (Morva), forming as good an international boundary as one can possibly make along a series of rivers and uninhabited swamps. The proposed new frontier would be vastly inferior to the old ridge-frontier of the Leitha Gebirge-Pressburg Carpathians, overlooking the plains on either side, from a military point of view if we still used bows, arrows, and catapults, instead of modern artillery and airplanes. Nevertheless the Final Frontier here proposed is excellent, for it traverses an almost uninhabited area, the Hansag (see white area, Count Teleki's 1:1,000,000-scale map, Map 9, appended), for many miles, and then follows a small stream, partly-canalized, to the Danube.

The district thus set off, although a plain, is much less populous than the rolling country southwest of Neusiedler See, having a maximum of only 40 to 50 persons to the square kilometer, while the upland has 70 to 80 to the square kilometer. This is because the region is swampy, but possibly sand, malaria, and other factors are involved. The large estate of Archduke Friedrich is here also. It is a district of mixed population, however, containing a minority of Hungarians and a few Serbo-Croatians in the midst of a German population. The extent to which its products go to Pressburg rather than Vienna as a market is not clear without further investigation.

I have attached to this memorandum Exhibit D, prepared by the Magistrate of Vienna to show the food relationship of this region and of the Odenburg district west of Neusiedler See to the city of Vienna. He says several hundred dealers in 50 small places in the Hungarian Comitats regularly supplied the daily and weekly markets in Vienna. In 1913 the Vienna Great Market-Hall and the Central Cattle Market St. Marx received 139,000 cattle, 635,000 pigs, 118,000 calves, lambs, and young slaughter animals, etc., etc. (see Exhibit D). Obviously much of this came from parts of Hungary farther east than Heinzenland, as did the flour from Hungarian corn; but the daily milk supply, amounting to 100,000 to 150,000 liters, sold in Vienna, and imported from Hungary, did come from German West Hungary or Heinzenland. This also applies to green vegetables, 327,000 q.

(*meter zentner* or 100 kilos) in the year 1913, and to fruits, 107,000 q., and some of the 28,464,000 eggs.

The great complication that immediately arises, however, is involved with the trebly complex question as to who is to control the city of Pressburg (Pozsony). (a) It is at present in the hands of the Czechoslovaks; (b) the Hungarian census gives it a majority of Germans; (c) the Hungarians are likewise anxious to retain it for themselves. As it lies on the north side of the Danube, however, its trade-relationships are more with the Hungarians on the east and the Czechoslovaks on the north than with the mixed German-Croatian-Hungarian population in the area under discussion on the south. I know of no plot of land in Central Europe, however, whose future more urgently demands an impartial field study than this particular district. The study of this district will bear upon the final disposition of Pressburg. I very much hope that the wishes of the local population may be freely consulted by Americans or other neutrals before a determination is made. At the time of writing this memorandum, however, one thing is clear: Since Pressburg is in the hands of the Czechoslovaks, and since Vienna needs food-products from the upland between Neusiedler See and the Danube more urgently than any Hungarian city does, especially as the suffering among the poor of Vienna is intense, I recommend without reservation that the whole district between Neusiedler See and the Danube, as indicated on my map appended, be considered as more likely to go to Austria than to remain a part of Hungary. The present trade of Pressburg with the region to the southwest will naturally be diverted either to Vienna or to a new German river-port opposite Pressburg, but it would never go to a Hungarian city.

16. The area north of the city of Pressburg where Germans live is ridiculously small, compared with what is shown upon the two Austrian ethnic maps accompanying this memorandum. The Atlas of Hungary alluded to before (1:200,000) shows this distribution more fairly than any other map I know. I do not feel that it is within my province to discuss the future of Pressburg. I can only state that although, according to the Hungarian census, which was independent of Austrian control or direction, it has a majority of Germans, I can see many economic reasons for giving the

Czechoslovaks this river-port; I feel that if the Germans in Pressburg do not desire to continue to live there, in case the Peace Conference gives Pressburg to the Czechoslovaks, it would be very easy to build a rival German town directly across the Danube at Engerau, and that this would take care of the marketing facilities of the German population in the plain (Haid-boden) and on the hills (Leitha Gebirge).

17. I earnestly recommend for consideration, as an immediate measure of relief for the Viennese, the establishment of a tentative boundary along the line indicated on the four attached sheets of Map 11, scale 1:200,000, giving the Germans of West Hungary to the Austrian Republic for temporary administration, pending the establishment of a final boundary by the Peace Conference. If it be true that anywhere near a third or a half of the food of Lower Austria normally comes from German West Hungary, we have a weighty argument in favor of this emergency measure. At least I am convinced of the truth of the Austrian claim that the district in Hungary southeast of Vienna, inhabited by Germans, is an important part of the hinterland of Vienna for the supply of local food. None of this now gets to Vienna except by *Sehleiehhandel*. If we could reduce the number of sick in the Viennese hospitals who are dying daily of starvation, and the number of poor in Vienna who are suffering acutely from malnutrition, if we can bring to babies in Vienna a few thousand liters of milk, out of the 150,000 liters of milk that came daily to Vienna from the southeast before the war, by immediately shifting the Hungarian-Austrian frontier from the ante-bellum boundary to the one here recommended, we should be performing a service for humanity. I am not inclined to think that neither the poor in Pressburg nor the poor in Raab or Budapest would suffer if this emergency measure were investigated immediately and then put at once into effect. This appears to be a case where a tentative demarcation line is almost certain to coincide with the permanent boundary determined after the principle of *Selbstbestimmung* has been applied to the local population.

LAWRENCE MARTIN

¹⁴ *Post*, p. 393 [*Pg. 393 includes portions of [Doc. 145](#) and [Doc. 146](#)*].

¹⁵ None printed.

¹⁶ None printed.

¹⁷ Serb-Croat-Slovene.

Memorandum by Professor A. C. Coolidge

MARCH 10 [1919].

THE NEW FRONTIERS IN FORMER AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In the difficult and complicated series of questions involved in the problem of determining the frontiers of the new countries formed out of what was once Austria-Hungary, I believe that the guiding principle to be observed is that of self determination or the wish of the people immediately concerned. Usually though not always, this depends upon the nationality to which they belong. The principle, it is true, is not everywhere applicable. There are communities too small and too unfavorably situated to claim its advantages except by such laws as may be made for the protection of minorities. Its application also may involve disproportionate injury to others and concessions must be made to geographical, economic, and historical considerations, even if so-called strategic ones do not deserve much regard. I admit too that recent events must be taken into account. For instance, the Germans and the Magyars have not at the present moment the same claims as the Czechs to the benevolence of the Allies and of the United States. Likewise it seems hardly fair to overlook a long record of ill-treatment on one side and of suffering on the other. Nevertheless the nearer we can come to forgetting the past and to applying equal treatment to all, the better it will be and the firmer the foundation for the future.

Even the idea of compensation need not always be rejected. The fact that Bohemia and Jugoslavia will include unwilling Germans, and Rumania unwilling Hungarians is not in itself a reason for handing over unwilling Czechs and Slovenes to Austrian and Rumanians to Magyar domination. Nevertheless the fact that such regions as Briinn

and Iglau will come under the Czechs, Gottleuba and Cilli under the Slovenes, and the Székler region under the Rumanians makes it less unfair if in the fixing of certain disputed boundaries a number of Slavs and Rumanians are left under Austrian and Hungarian rule.

It is well known that the official statistics of population at our disposition are partisan and not to be trusted implicitly, nor are the estimates made by the rival nationalities worthy of confidence any more than are their readings of history. It must be remembered too that certain elements in a region, such as day laborers, may be only transient. Others under changed circumstances will disappear quickly. The German and Magyar colonies of officials, teachers, etc., and their families scattered throughout Slav and Rumanian districts have no longer any reason for existence. All these things have to be taken into account, but they are seldom important enough to modify materially the main decisions.

The opinions which I shall now venture to submit represent in many cases ideas of long standing confirmed or modified by unusual opportunities of observation in the last few months. I shall merely state my conclusions with but a few words of explanation, as it would take far too long to attempt anything like adequate treatment of the various questions.

I. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The clearest cases of conflict between the rights of nationality and those of history and geography come up in connection with the boundaries demanded by the Czechoslovaks who in inconsistent but human fashion base their claims to the two halves of their territory on opposite principles. In Bohemia they demand their "historic frontiers" regardless of the protests of the large number of Germans who do not wish to be taken over in this way. In Slovakia they insist on the rights of nationality and pay no heed to the ancient and well marked "historic frontiers" of Hungary. I believe that here the national claim is the stronger, though we cannot push it to an extreme, that is to say, I think that a large part of German Bohemia should not be incorporated into the Czechoslovak state even if the historical and geographical unity of Bohemia (including Moravia and

Austrian Silesia) will suffer from the amputation, while Slovakia should be taken away from Hungary even though Hungary will thereby suffer still more. As a wrong must be done in both instances to legitimate claims, the decision in details should tend to favor the side being injured, that is the Czechs in Bohemia and the Magyars in Hungary.

To grant to the Czechoslovaks all the territory they demand would be not only an injustice to millions of people unwilling to come under Czech rule, but it would also be dangerous and perhaps fatal to the future of the new state. In Bohemia the relations between the Czechs and the Germans have been growing steadily worse during the last three months. The hostility between them is now intense and there is no reason to expect that it will soon disappear. The blood shed on March 3d when Czech soldiers in several towns fired on German crowds, though but a drop compared with the human sacrifices the world has been witnessing, was shed in a manner that is not easily forgiven. Whatever German sentiment there may have been last November favorable to the maintenance of political union with the Czechs for economic reasons is reaching the vanishing point.

For the Bohemia of the future to contain within its limits great numbers of deeply discontented inhabitants who will have behind them across the border tens of millions of sympathizers of their own race will be a perilous experiment and one which can hardly promise success in the long run. If the minority continues, as it is likely to, both large and profoundly disloyal, one cannot imagine that a League of Nations will force it to remain indefinitely under a hated alien rule. Such a league is not intended to perpetuate the existence of Alsace-Lorraines. Many Germans will have to be citizens of the new Bohemia in any event, but the number should be cut down wherever this can be done without subtracting a considerable number of Czechs from the population. Some weight may be attached to economic considerations, but the argument one hears so often these days that a state "cannot exist without" this that or the other bit of territory that it covets should be acceptable only after the closest scrutiny. Even if the "historic frontiers of Bohemia" have been promised to the Czechs by the Allies, modifications can and should be made in the details.

Taking up the frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia one after another, I believe that

- a) in the south, Lower and Upper Austria should be extended as nearly as possible to the existing ethnic line, as studied out by our experts in Paris. There are no serious geographic objections to this.
- b) The Eger District which is not part of the original Bohemia should be allowed to go to Bavaria if it wants to.
- c) The question is much more difficult in the case of the large rich territory of Northern Bohemia. It is separated from Saxony by natural obstacles, it is of great economic value and its loss would be a very serious blow to the Czechoslovaks. At the same time if it demands, as to all appearances it does, by an overwhelming majority to be separated from Bohemia, it will be hard to deny the justice of its claims. If they are admitted, the Czechs should be given the preference in doubtful districts. If they are not admitted, the territory of Eger should be extended and wherever it is feasible, other modifications should be made.
- d) The so-called Sudetenland can be easily cut off from Bohemia and Moravia. Unfortunately it has no connection with either Austria or the rest of German Bohemia. It might exist as a small state in the new German republic or be united to Prussian Silesia.
- e) Austrian Silesia has recently been the subject of special investigation on the spot by an international commission.¹⁸ Its attribution or division may be safely left to their judgment, corrected, if need be, by the knowledge of our own people who have studied the question. The only suggestion I have to make is that the Czechs and the Poles are not the only people to be considered, but that the Germans have some rights, and that much of this territory forms a natural portion of the Sudetenland mentioned above.

In the small districts in the Carpathians of Spiz (Zips) and Orava, the population is largely German. The Slavs are mountaineers who are more or less half way between Poles and Czechs. If there were any way of consulting their preferences, these might be decisive. If not, I should favor the Poles, who have historical claims to Spiz.

Slovakia, in accordance with the principle of nationalities but doing great violence to those of history and geography, should be given to the Czechs and taken away from the Magyars. Such a decision will, I think, be in accordance with the desires of the majority of the population, although the Hungarians vehemently deny this and I should be surer of the fact if President Masaryk had not for lame reasons refused to hold a plebiscite there. The Czechs, indeed, do not seem sure of their ground, as is shown by such measures as putting the region under martial law. The boundary between Slovakia and Hungary should be made to correspond with the best ascertainable ethnic line, but as the loss to Hungary will in any case be as great as the loss of Northern Bohemia would be to the Czechs, doubtful points should as a rule be decided in her favor. The loss of Pressburg, a city famous throughout Hungarian history, the place of coronation of the Hungarian kings, will be deeply felt by the Magyars, even if they are but a small element in the population, which is chiefly German. But though there are few Slovaks in the place itself, there are many in the vicinity, and the possession of the town giving the Czechoslovaks access to the Danube will be of much commercial value to them. On the other hand, I see no reason or justice in allowing them to extend their dominion as they do at present for a considerable distance along the northern edge of the Danube in predominantly Hungarian country. As I have said above, the smaller the number of discontented people that they have in their new state, the easier it will be to govern and the greater the chances of its permanence. Hungary will suffer terribly in any case and should be left as many as possible of her former sources of wealth.

The Ruthenian districts of Northern Hungary should not be taken away from her. The geographical reasons are particularly strong against it, for the region is almost entirely mountainous and in the valleys the lines of life and of communication run not east and west but north and south to the Hungarian plains below. The Czechs maintain that the Ruthenians desire to be united to them by at least a confederation. I doubt whether the desire on their part is either spontaneous, widespread or deep-seated. The autonomy granted them by a recent Hungarian law respects their individuality and will be much more profitable economically. The wish of the Czechs to extend their own frontier until they are in touch with Rumania and

the Ukraine and to cut off direct communication between Poland and Hungary, although not unnatural, is a bit of imperialism of no particular moral value. It is not, however, as immoral as the suggested corridor through German and Magyar lands to connect Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia.

II. GALICIA

I have made no close study of this question. In general I should favor as a boundary between Poland and Ukrainia something like the line of the Bug and the Stryi or the temporary demarcation fixed by the international commission recently in Lemberg and rejected by the Ukrainians.

III. BUKOWINA

The greater part, including Czernowitz, should be given to Rumania, cutting off the western portion for the benefit of the Ukrainians who should also receive the northern tip of Bessarabia.

IV. TRANSYLVANIA

Transylvania should be allotted to Rumania, but unusual care should be taken to guarantee the rights of the Székler population, indeed it would be desirable if in any way possible geographically that their union with Hungary should be maintained. I have not studied this question sufficiently to have a fixed opinion about it, but looking at it superficially the plan hardly appears feasible. In any event the western frontier of Rumania should be drawn to the eastward of the territory occupied by the Rumanian forces. Some sort of a dividing line should be sought that shall be tolerable economically and that shall correspond as well as may be with the ethnic situation. Here again in view of the great loss to the Magyars and great gains to the Rumanians, doubtful cases should usually be decided in favor of Hungary.

[V. THE BANAT]

The Banat should be divided. The arguments in favor of its unity are weak. The Rumanians should be given the eastern portion, the Serbs

a block in the south, and the rest be left to the Hungarians. A boundary established on these principles will satisfy nobody, but will represent an approximation to justice. In such a settlement, the scattered German population can hardly be taken into account, except insofar as its preferences are thrown in on one side or the other. These preferences are difficult to ascertain. Meetings of the so-called representatives of such populations at the present time usually represent little more than political moves of some outside agency. My belief is that in spite of the natural tendency to side with the winning parties, the Germans in this part of the world would prefer to belong to a Magyar rather than to a Slav or a Rumanian state, although there are doubtless exceptions among them, particularly among the Saxons of Southern Transylvania. The Backa Region should go to Jugoslavia.

VI. WEST HUNGARY SOUTH OF THE DANUBE

This territory seems to belong with Austria rather than with Hungary, though it would be a particularly good case to have the matter settled by a popular vote, if it were possible to have a fair one, which I greatly doubt. Neither the Austrians nor the Hungarians, although both have expressed their willingness to abide by the results of such a test, could be trusted to carry it out fairly, if they were in control and a mixed regime would probably lead to endless friction and ill feeling with charges and countercharges difficult to prove or to disprove. I should favor annexation to Austria with the boundaries as fixed by Major Lawrence Martin in his report to me, accompanying my dispatch No. 122, March 3, 1919.^{[19](#)}

VII. JUGOSLAVIA

The boundary between Austria and Jugoslavia should be drawn along the mountains according to the lines laid down by Lieutenant-Colonel Sherman Miles, Lieutenant LeRoy King and Major Lawrence Martin in their report to me accompanying my dispatch No. 80, February 14, 1919.^{[20](#)} We have here the advantage of possessing competent and impartial studies by our own men.

VIII. SOUTH TYROL

The German speaking South Tyrol should be given to Austria, not to Italy. All the arguments except perhaps those arising from the political necessities of the present international situation demand that these Tyrolese should remain united with their brethren in the north and not be put under a hated alien rule. History, economic interest and the feelings of the inhabitants are on the same side in this instance. I have been surprised by how widespread and deep is the feeling throughout Austria and I believe throughout Germany in regard to this small section of land with a scanty population and of no great economic value. The feeling is chiefly sentimental, but it is strong, and the loss of this beautiful and poetic territory would never be forgiven. The Ladin portion of the Tyrol, although I think that for commercial reasons it would prefer its present affiliation, might be handed over to Italy with less injustice.

IX. VORARLBERG

This little district resembles one of the Swiss mountain cantons. Economically it is more closely united with Switzerland than with Austria. If it be true, as I have recently heard from an Austrian source, that in a private vote of the population, 65% expressed themselves in favor of union with the Swiss republic, we may feel sure that a considerably larger number would have done so if the vote could have been public and the voters had had no fear of unpleasant consequences. If Switzerland is willing to accept the union, which is doubtful, it should be made. In this case Liechtenstein would probably go with Vorarlberg.

In conclusion let me add that I am aware that political and other considerations at the present time may make it impossible for our commission to support all of the solutions I have advocated. Nevertheless, I am presenting them as those which seem to me best in themselves.

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

¹⁸ Interallied Teschen Commission.

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 264 [*Pg. 264 is part of [Doc. 86](#)*].

²⁰ *Post*, p. 513 [*Pg. 513 includes portions of [Doc. 183](#) and [Doc. 184](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/225

[Document 88]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 153

VIENNA, March 17, 1919.
[Received March 19.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that interesting things have been happening here in regard to the question of the union of German Austria with Germany. During the last few weeks there has been a perceptible cooling down of the sentiment in its favor. Recent events in Berlin and Munich have increased the alarm of the conservative and propertied classes, and the perception has been growing, rather late in the day, that Austria as a future part of Germany might suffer more severe treatment at the hands of the Conference in Paris in questions of boundary and finance than if she were to remain a weak, independent state. The threats of the French have I believe had not a little to do with this sentiment.

The chief setback, however, has come from a quite unexpected quarter. It had been taken for granted, both by enemies and friends of the proposed union, that the attitude of Germany would be entirely favorable. Reports from German public men and the German newspapers seemed to confirm this point of view. Stories of Dr. Bauer's reception in Weimar and Berlin also were favorable. Soon after his return, however, rumors began to circulate that he had come back greatly disappointed and depressed. These rumors soon spread; and when, to the surprise of the public, it was announced that Dr. Bauer did not wish to remain as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs but preferred to devote his whole attention to a new secretaryship of socialisation, people gave but one explanation. They said and say that Dr. Bauer had committed himself so deeply, not only to the whole principle of union with Germany but also to that of going ahead frankly and directly without paying attention to further

objections from within or without, that in view of the cold reception his overtures had met with from Berlin his position had become untenable. Secretary Bauer has denied this explanation in a long interview in the *Neue Freie Presse* of March 16th, but his explanation is hardly likely to be generally accepted. The fact that he has consented to remain temporarily in charge of Foreign Affairs is taken to mean only that there is great difficulty in finding a suitable successor for him at this moment.

The situation is confused. On the one hand the Government is still officially committed to union with Germany, and the Chancellor, Dr. Renner, has once more avowed his adherence to the idea. An alternative is as difficult as ever to find. Relations with both the Czechoslovaks and the Jugo-Slavs render the thought of confederation with either of them, not only unpalatable but practically impossible to most Austrians. Specially in the case of Czecho-Slovakia if she obtains a large number of German Austrians by the treaty of peace, friendly relations of any kind between her and Austria can hardly be expected for a long time to come. For Hungary many Austrians feel both dislike and distrust, feelings which they might be willing to forget if necessary but they regard the plight of Hungary as even worse than that of their own country—and an association with someone even more bankrupt than themselves arouses little enthusiasm. Still less enthusiasm is aroused by the idea—though people are beginning to turn to it—of an independent, weak state of small resources and great needs, which would have little to do but chew the cud of its past glories.

On the other hand, the plan of union with Germany has undoubtedly met with a setback. A few days ago I was called upon by Dr. Schumpeter, who was soon to be appointed Secretary of State for Finances in the new government. He began by telling me that he could talk in a confidential way that would be impossible for him a few hours later. He then went on to ask whether I thought the idea of a Danube confederation was still possible. After a little fencing I managed to get out of him that what he really wanted to know was whether Austria by remaining independent could obtain better terms from the Allies than if she were to become a part of Germany. When I

put this baldly to him he admitted that such was his object. He left saying that he wished to see me again very soon.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/245

[Document 89]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 163

VIENNA, March 20, 1919.
[Received March 22.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a report from Mr. Walter E. Bundy on the subject of Bolshevism in Vienna and a translation of the recent speech of Dr. Julius Deutsch, Secretary of War (Socialist) to a meeting of the Soldiers Councils of the Volkswehr.^{[21](#)}

It is difficult to judge accurately of the internal situation here. To all outward appearances the city is quiet and orderly. Every Sunday there are meetings of one sort or another and the attendance at them is said to be increasing. The language used is often violent, but so far there has been no disorder of any kind. On the other hand the *bourgeoisie* and upper classes, who it must be remembered are disproportionately numerous owing to the thousands of former officers and officials from all over Austria now gathered here, paint the situation in dark colors. Conditions of life are difficult for them. Until now they have managed to live from the so-called “*schleichhandel*”, the smuggling of provisions into the city which has taken place on a large scale and which the government has winked at as meaning an increase in the amount of food here however illegal its importation. Of late, owing to the closing of the borders and also to greater strictness on the part of the authorities, the *schleichhandel* has much diminished; and the situation of all those who have lived by other means than going into the bread line has become worse. Several of the best known hotel and other restaurants have closed, and others are expected to follow suit at any time. The Volkswehr have recently visited a certain number of restaurants, a well-known club and a few private houses in order to see if the laws against hoarding were observed. This has been done without legal warrant,

and though there have been really but a few cases thus far it has alarmed all the restaurant keepers and the upper classes in general, who look on it as being merely the beginning of a period of plunder. The Volkswehr, by the way, for the most part appear as weak and emaciated a body of so-called troops as one can well imagine. The city police on the other hand are large, fine-looking men. The contrast is striking.

The strength of Bolshevism in Vienna is a thing that one hears very variously estimated. The word is used in the vaguest possible manner to cover everything from a red anarchist to people of mild theoretical Socialistic opinions. So far the extremists do not seem to be numerous enough to present any serious danger. The people as a whole bear their misfortunes and hardships with extraordinary patience; one might almost say sweetness. There can be little doubt that an aggravation of the food situation would promptly give much greater strength to the revolutionary elements. The lack of coal too, which is one of the reasons—and perhaps the chief one—for the great number of unemployed, is also politically dangerous. Perhaps the most dangerous of all is the lack of a trust-worthy armed force at the disposal of the Government. People will tell you that a few thousand determined men could easily terrorize and control this whole great city. There is nobody besides the police to oppose them, for the Volkswehr would be on the side of the mob.

In these statements there is doubtless exaggeration, but some truth; and now that under the new ministry the Socialists are going to control the Department of the Interior—and presently the administration of the city—the character of the police may well be changed. It is certain that what society has to trust to here is the peacefulness of the population, not the power of the authorities to repress disorder.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

²¹ Neither printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/144c: Telegram

[Document 90]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister
in Switzerland (Stovall)***

PARIS, March 31, 1919—2 a.m.

45. For Coolidge, Vienna. On April 2nd the Associated Governments intend to publish a notice authorizing the restoration of trade with German Austria outlining the conditions of this restoration. This notice contemplates:

- (1) The establishment of an Interallied Trade Commission at Vienna.
- (2) The importation into German-Austria of all products, save a short list of articles mostly of a military character.
- (3) The prohibition of all reexportation, save under special authorization of the Inter Allied Commission, from German-Austria to countries with which commercial relations are not now authorized, namely Germany, Hungary and Bolshevik Russia.

It is desired that you communicate the above promptly and informally to the German-Austrian authorities and also to the French and British representatives in Vienna.

In case the Austrian Government should have fallen before this reaches you, it is left to your discretion whether above action should be taken or not.

It had been contemplated to restore trade relations with Hungary at the same time as with German-Austria, but in view of Bolshevik conditions there resumption of trade with Hungary will be considered later.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/300

[Document 91]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 185

VIENNA, April 3, 1919.
[Received April 7.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith an interesting report from Captain Koosevelt describing an interview he had with Chancellor Renner. It will be noted that the Chancellor's remarks differ from other reports one gets from the conservative classes. What he said at the end may have been intended as a direct threat. There are rumors abroad of dissension between Messrs. Bauer and Renner. I have not been back long enough to have any opinion on the subject.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Captain Nichols Roosevelt to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, April 2, 1919.

Subject: Interview with Chancellor Renner.

1. In an interview which I had with the Chancellor Dr. Renner on April 1st, he stated that the situation was well in hand, and complete quiet was to be expected unless some unexpected incident should turn up. The Railroad strike had been satisfactorily settled, but had almost recommenced when news was spread at Wiener Neustadt that Allied troops of occupation were to

be brought in. He stated that the sentiment against military occupation was great, and that the people in particular felt a fear lest Austria should be used as a base of operation against Hungary, and might, as he put it “become another Belgium.” Military occupation would probably only drive the feeling of the working classes more in favor of Hungary, and would produce a grave crisis.

2. In speaking of Karolyi’s abdication he expressed the opinion that the revolution in Hungary had come as a surprise and despite Karolyi’s efforts to withstand it. It had in no way been premeditated. But he added that as regards German Austria, it had already been decided that if the country was dismembered—especially referring to German Bohemia and German Tyrol—the German Austrian Government would resign, just as had done the Hungarian Government, and would turn the Government over to whoever would take it. He added that this would mean inevitably Bolshevism.

NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/318

[Document 92]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 192

VIENNA, April 7, 1919.
[Received April 10.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I beg to call attention to certain aspects of the question of the future of the German-speaking region of the Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass now held by the Italians and claimed by them.

In no question of boundary at present under discussion have we more clearly the principles of history, nationality and self-determination on the one side and strategic and imperialistic considerations on the other. For this reason although the size of the territory itself and the number of people concerned are relatively small, the case might be regarded as a test one under the Fourteen Points.

It may be conceded that geographically German South Tyrol is a part of Italy, as is the Swiss canton of the Ticino, but, whereas the Ticino represents the result of a comparatively recent foreign conquest, is inhabited by an Italian-speaking population, and is separated by no good natural frontiers from the kingdom of Italy, German South Tyrol has a perfectly satisfactory southern frontier, and it is and has been inhabited for many centuries by a German-speaking population, which has come in by a process of peaceful colonization and by a gradual absorption of the earlier Ladin elements. In no question now before the Conference does the linguistic frontier coincide more exactly and satisfactorily with an excellent geographical one, and its application means hardship to smaller minorities. The proper solution for the small Ladin districts is more

open to doubt although the sympathies of the inhabitants are for the most part on the side of Austria.

The Italians have maintained that for the protection of Italy against future attack they need to hold the territory up to the Brenner Pass which forms a good first line of defense. This argument of an advanced first line of defense is a strategic one that can be pushed to great lengths. It is no truer of the Brenner Pass than it is of the Lower Rhine as between France and Germany, and it belongs to an order of ideas which we trust will soon begin to be obsolete. We may hope that after the constitution of the League of Nations purely strategic considerations may be accorded less weight than they have been in the past, particularly when they sacrifice the happiness of peoples. With the acquisition of the Italian-speaking region of the Trentino Italy will have a much better and more defensible frontier than she has had up till now, but even the old one she was able to hold against all the offensive efforts of the Austrians during the present war. It was not there that the Italian armies gave way.

Historically, the district of German South Tyrol has been inhabited by people of German speech, race, sympathies and characteristics for many hundred years. During much the greater part of that time they have been connected politically with Germany, and the apparent barrier of the Alps has not interfered with Tyrolese unity except during one of the ephemeral arrangements made by the great Napoleon. The people of the whole Tyrol, both north and south of the Alps, in order to maintain their cherished unity are willing to make almost any sacrifice—to set themselves up as an independent republic or do whatever else is demanded of them.

Economically too, it should be remembered that German South Tyrol profits by its connection with the north. Its fruits have a great advantage in their easy access to the Austrian and German markets, where they are likely to have tariff protection. On the other hand, once within the Italian customs line, they will have to face the competition of similar products grown on more fertile soil and at less cost.

A last point worth taking into consideration is the extremely strong feeling on the part not only of German-Austrians but of all German peoples for this territory, small in area, population, and economic value but endeared to them by its beauty and its romance, the one bit of Germany in a southern clime, a land of legend and of history, the home of the Minnesingers in the Middle Ages, and of Andreas Hofer, who led the heroic struggle for independence against the French. Every year it is visited by hundreds of thousands, and its loss would produce far deeper resentment than would the cutting off of an equal number of people from some other part of Germany.

But the strongest argument of all is the one first mentioned, that to give the German South Tyrol to Italy would be as frank a departure from the principle of national self-determination as it is easy to conceive, and would be judged accordingly.

I have [ete.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Mr. Walter E. Bundy to Professor A. C. Coolidge²²

VIENNA, April 4, 1919.

Subject: Interview with Ernst Neuborn, editor of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*.

1. The Lifting of Blockade on German-Austria is taken here as a joke because the people know generally that they have no means of taking up international trade due to the cheapness of German-Austrian money. At the present rate of exchange it is impossible for them to buy. The only hope of help by the lifting of the blockade is that German-Austrian firms who before the war had credit abroad may be permitted to buy on terms of long credit, or until the time when German-Austrian exchange improves. Even with the possibility of means of purchase abroad the large concerns are reluctant to import as long as the political situation in Vienna is so uncertain and might take the course resorted to in Budapest.
2. The Vienna public fears and seems to expect the fall of the present government because of the growing strength of the radical Social and Communist party. The number of factories and other concerns joining the communist method of organizing a labor council in each factory or concern is very rapidly increasing. Many of the factories and concerns do this because they fear a political change such as came in Hungary, and if this change comes their establishments will not be seized because they have already organized their labor into labor-councils. The communistic movement in German-Austria is much better organized than it was in Hungary. In Vienna each establishment whose labor is organized into a labor-council chooses its representative to sit in the city labor-council (*Stadtarbeiterrat*). The same organization is effected in Graz and Linz. The rural districts also form similar

organizations. Then the city labor-councils and the rural peasant-councils choose their representatives to sit in the national labor-council (*Reichsarbeiterrat*). This entire organization is being executed by Friedrich Adler (extreme left-wing Socialist) who is opposed to the present compromise-government only in method. Adler advocates change by revolution, but has assured the present government in Vienna, which advocates a gradual and slower change, that he will not step in its way. Adler is considered stronger than the present government because of the organization of labor-councils behind him and because the armed force of Vienna is chiefly in his hands.

3. It is to be noted that the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* advocates the occupation of Vienna by Entente troops in order to prevent a repetition of the Budapest revolution. The communists are spreading the propaganda that the Entente is afraid to send troops to Vienna lest they too be infested with Bolshevism.

WALTER E. BUNDY

²² Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 196, April 7; received April 10.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/324

[Document 94]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 198

VIENNA, April 7, 1919.
[Received April 10.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report with reference to my telegram No. 252²³ that I have just had an interesting and confidential conversation with Mr. Schober, the chief of police here. Mr. Schober has long been regarded as one of the strongest men in Vienna and no small part of the credit for the excellent order that has prevailed in this city until now has been ascribed to him. From all I can make out this credit is thoroughly deserved.

I found him, like almost everyone else I have seen, in a depressed state of mind. He told me that the greatest menace to public security here was the growing indiscipline and arbitrariness of the Volkswehr who number about 17,000 in Vienna and some 30,000 more in the rest of German Austria. Some of them are honest, well-meaning socialists or labourers unable to find work, but a considerable proportion are men who do not want to work and a number of them have actually criminal records. They are continually guilty of excessive and illegal acts, such as freeing arrested people from the police, entering private houses to search for food and taking it when they find it there, and other things of the sort. This is true throughout the country. For instance a couple of days ago they issued a proclamation threatened with punishment anyone who criticised the Volkswehr or spread evil report of them, and the local authorities were powerless to take action in the matter. They have become a pretorian guard, responsible to no one, undisciplined, idle and increasingly disorderly and oppressive.

The government while disapproving their action and secretly desirous of getting rid of them is too weak to control them efficiently and can only keep them in line by persuasion. Mr. Schober declares that a month ago he would have undertaken to disarm the 17,000 Volkswehr in this city with his 5,000 police and gendarmes. Now he doubts whether he could do it and a month hence he may be powerless. Even his own men in whom he has until recently been able to have complete trust are showing signs of demoralization. They are beginning to fear that the power in the end will be on the side of the Volkswehr and that they had better not antagonize them.

I questioned Mr. Schober as to what he thought could be done to help the situation. He said that anything like a threat on the part of the Allies that unless the Volkswehr were dissolved food supplies might be cut off from the country would be dangerous and likely to provoke an outbreak. He thought, however, that official Allied advice that they should be dissolved might possibly strengthen the hands of the government. Like so many other people here he would be glad of some sort of foreign intervention though in as disguised a form as possible. I asked him what he could suggest short of that to help the situation. He replied, and this he repeated several times during the conversation, an increased supply of food, also of coal and raw materials so that industry might get going again. If Austria could have these, perhaps somehow or other things might be tided along until the summertime when the situation might improve of itself. Mr. Schober said also that the presence of a considerable guard with the food trains, especially of American soldiers, if they could be somewhat in evidence, would have a reassuring effect on the population. He said that the mere marching through the streets of an English company which in January escorted the first food train brought here had had for a time an extraordinarily tranquilizing influence on people.

I may add that my personal opinion is that Mr. Schober is entirely right in his recommendations.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

23 Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/325

[Document 95]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 199

VIENNA, April 7, 1919.
[Received April 10.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that my impressions since my return to Vienna of the situation here are depressing. It is not so much that anything has got seriously worse but there are almost no signs of improvement anywhere, and several of increasing disintegration.

To begin with, there is a shortage of almost everything. The recent arrivals of food trains have not been sufficient to make conditions in the city appreciably better—people are on their fourth meatless week—but merely to prevent them from becoming more critical.

The same is true of coal, so urgently needed for the revival of industry.

Prices are soaring ever higher.

The number of unemployed is great, and those that are employed are constantly demanding an increase of wages, which the employers find it increasingly difficult to pay.

The economic and financial situation is disastrous, and the prospect of immediate improvement is slight. The dissolution of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire into a number of separate territories has naturally dealt a particularly heavy blow to the capital, which was the center of finance and control for the whole. This blow is rendered far worse by the almost complete closing of so many frontiers, which makes normal relations impossible. The last stroke has been the Hungarian revolution which, among other things, threatens the great Austrian interests in Hungary.

The condition of the currency looks desperate. The Krone has been going steadily down and one sees no end to the process. The restamping of money in Czecho-Slovakia could not but harm the Austrian currency, and now the Hungarian revolution, which is likely to mean an unlimited issue of fresh notes similar to the old ones, threatens further disaster to finances here. Under these circumstances, the rate of exchange makes the importation of anything except the most immediate necessities impossible, and the lifting of the blockade is regarded as a platonic measure.

The political situation is no more cheerful than the economic. The government, though honestly struggling with the difficulties that beset it, is weak and not too well united. It has to lead or follow its supporters but cannot control them. It is helpless against the excesses of its own unreliable military force, the Volkswehr, for it has nothing else to fall back on in case of disorder. One cannot well see what could prevent it from falling tomorrow if the Volkswehr, supported by a section of the laboring class, should order it out. Already the illegal and arbitrary measures of the Volkswehr are beginning to terrorize the property-holding classes, who are also looking forward to a process of taxation and socialization which may amount to wholesale confiscation in the end.

A further sign of the weakness of the government and of the general disintegration, is the increasing independence of the provinces, which show a disposition to pay little attention to orders from Vienna. At the present moment not only are the peasants keeping their food supplies in a great measure for themselves, but there is a movement on foot to shut out all strangers this summer; that is to say, that people in this city are to be left to their plight here and not allowed to go into the country where conditions are better. The government has declared such resolutions on the part of the provinces to be illegal, but whether it will be strong enough to prevail in the end is uncertain. Its own small authority may soon have a rival in the system of Councils of Workmen who are to be called into existence by election next week.

Finally, there is an undoubted growth of Bolshevism. Its progress has been slow indeed—rather surprisingly so—and I do not believe it is

yet either very deeprooted or widespread. But for months conditions have been such as to promote its increase, and now the example of Hungary has undoubtedly given a stimulus to those who favor a similar movement here. Relations between Austria and Hungary are still close, and what happens in Budapest inevitably affects Vienna, and vice versa. Some 800 or 900 of the Volkswehr have joined the Hungarians and this will react here; and from Hungary several prominent agitators are said already to have come to Vienna to begin work. If Bavaria goes Bolshevist, the situation will be blacker still.

When we add to all the above causes the strain of 4½ years of war, the depression of defeat, the long lack of sufficient food, the uncertainty as to the political future of many German-speaking regions, and finally the strain produced by months of waiting for the final conclusion of peace, we can see why pessimism here is so widespread.

On the other side of the ledger we can find little to note except the extraordinarily quiet, docile, and orderly, not to say apathetic, character of the population. Their patience and resignation have been admirable, and one can only hope that it will continue to be so. Then, too, the approach of summer not only makes the suffering from lack of light and fuel less severe, but may open a way to the revival of industry in one form or another, although here as elsewhere it is hard to get the city laborer to work in the country, however much his presence may be needed. It may be hoped also, that peace when it does come will have a tranquilizing and encouraging, and perhaps stimulating, effect upon people here; for there is still to be found plenty of intelligence and good will, though perhaps not much enterprise.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/327

[Document 96]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 201

VIENNA, April 8, 1919.
[Received April 10.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that the mission of General Smuts in Budapest has naturally interested people in Vienna and excited much comment. Certain things are worth noting. To begin with, the sending of the mission and the propositions made by the General are regarded as rather a triumph for the Hungarians. The fact that the evacuation of less territory is demanded than before, and that Allied and not Roumanian troops will occupy it, is looked upon as a substantial concession. Some people draw the conclusion that the policy followed by both Austria and Hungary up till now has been too yielding, and that it is only by making trouble that anything can be obtained. Another rather interesting fact is the consternation among the conservative elements in Vienna that the Allies have been willing to make concessions to the revolutionists at all. This is regarded as a direct encouragement to the extremists here. It is also pointed out, as I reported in my telegram No. 253 of April 7th,²⁴ that if the Allies are going to furnish food to a Hungarian Soviet republic, one of the chief arguments which have been used to keep partisans of a revolution here from taking action disappears of itself. In general, people are waiting for further results.

Professor Brown writes to me from Budapest that General Smuts made a great impression on people there, and he adds his own opinion that the General was just the man to deal with a situation of the kind.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

24 Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/333

[Document 97]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 205

VIENNA, April 8, 1919.
[Received April 10.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I wish to urge very seriously to the consideration of the Commission the suggestion recently made to me by the Chief of Police that the presence of considerable guard of American (or English) soldiers with the food trains coming here would have an excellent effect on public opinion. This presence could not be regarded as objectionable, but would seem most natural under the difficult circumstances now existing. In any case no one could look this gift-horse in the mouth. I believe that a little not too ostentatious marching of these escorts through the streets—in the way that the English detachment of one or two hundred men marched here in January—would run small risk of provoking trouble, and that it would hearten many people here who today see no soldiers except the Volkswehr and some stray Italians. It would give an impression of strength, as well as of good will, and might even have a steadying effect on the government, as well as help to cool the elements that are making for disorder.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Mr. Walter E. Bundy to Professor A. C. Coolidge²⁵

VIENNA, April 10, 1919.

Subject: Interview with Dr. Friedrich Austerlitz, editor of the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, concerning the present political situation in German-Austria.

1. Dr. Austerlitz is the most optimistic man with whom I have spoken concerning the present political situation. He is further a man in closest connections with the industrial laborers of German-Austria.
2. He regards the present state of affairs as very serious; yet by no means hopeless, and that a change as came in Budapest is to be avoided by an immediate doubling of the bread and flour ration. Since July 28, 1914, the state of affairs in German-Austria has grown continually worse and, if very soon the people could have the present bread and flour ration doubled, they would become hopeful for it would be the first time since the outbreak of the war that their outlook has in the least improved. The first shipments of food should be sent to the greater industrial centers where there is greatest need and where there is the strongest inclination towards a revolutionary program.
3. The coal question is also serious, but in this matter the Entente cannot help as materially as in the bread question, for shortage of coal in Vienna is chiefly due to the lines of military occupation that have been set since the armistice. But a conclusion of a just peace would relieve this situation and give the greatest hope to the people.
4. Unemployment is extensive, but not now on the increase and the falling out of the habit of labor is not peculiar to German-Austria but common to all the nations engaged in the war, and a condition that has followed every extended military conflict in the past.

5. The “Volkswehr” (military guard of public safety), Dr. Austerlitz regards as out of the hands of the present government, but not at all dangerous. Its members are chiefly Vienna citizens interested in the maintenance of the public order and in the good wages and living which the members enjoy as compared with other occupations. Their discipline is by no means strict in the Prussian sense and they are banded together by common consent and with the feeling that they are rendering a public service in the execution of their public guard duty.
6. The change to a councils-republic in Bavaria Dr. Austerlitz does not regard as permanent and therefore of little consequence in bringing about any political change of a like character in German-Austria.
7. That if it comes to Bolshevism in German-Austria it will not be because the masses of the laborers are politically in sympathy with Bolshevism, but because they try it as a new experiment and method, because the other forms of social-democratic, Christian-socialistic, and concessionistic government have failed to improve the situation.
8. Dr. Austerlitz looks upon German-Austria as an outpost of greatest importance in the fight against Bolshevism in its westward campaign. German-Austria must be held and the Entente should do everything possible to help her stand and ward off a revolution.
9. The great sentiment of the laborers is that of hope and trust in the Entente, and that they are anxious to show the other nations that it pays better to trust to the fairness and good offices of the Entente than it does to make trouble. Any relief that may come now in the form of food or materials necessary to the resumption of labor will greatly strengthen this sentiment, and a revolution can certainly be avoided.

WALTER E. BUNDY

²⁵ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 209, April 11; received April 14.

Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge²⁶

VIENNA, April 15, 1919.

Subject: Final result of stamping of bank-notes in German-Austria.

The period fixed for stamping of banknotes expired March 29th last. Owing to railway strike towards the end of that period transmission of notes to the various towns was lengthened, so that final exchange was only effected in early April. There are now available statistics up to April 3d, and these figures are final ones, because further exchange is not made except in special cases only. The result of stamping in German-Austria is as follows:

For exchange there were issued in German-Austria stamped notes amounting to	4,804,000,000 crowns
The total amount of banknotes in circulation throughout the old Dual Monarchy on March 23, 1919, was	37,709,000,000 "
The amount of notes stamped in German-Austria amounts to	12.8 percent, of the entire amount in circulation.

This proportion is particularly interesting because it practically exactly equals the proportion in population. German-Austria without German-Bohemian territory, which could not be considered in connection with the stamping of notes—numbers 6,500,000 inhabitants. The whole former Monarchy, to which the circulation of 37,700,000,000 crowns applies, numbered 50,000,000 inhabitants. The population of German-Austria represents 13 percent, of the whole population of the old Monarchy. Although Vienna as the center for money traffic naturally has great demand in notes, the

circulation of notes is proportionally not larger than the proportion in population. So far it was ascertained that the Czech-Slovak State had a circulation of 8,000,000,000 crowns, the Jugo-Slav State of 7,000,000,000 crowns for stamping. Adding circulation in German-Austria this would amount to 20,000,000,000 crowns. Thus there remain 17,000,000,000 crowns of which the larger part should be in Hungary, Galicia and abroad, chiefly in districts occupied by foreign powers. The rest must be taken to be "stored away"; chiefly in the Czecho-Slovak State where considerable sums are reported not to have been registered by country people, because they do not want to suffer confiscation of half the notes.

The circulation of 4,800,000,000 crowns does not represent the entire circulation of German-Austria. There must be added the notes for one and two crowns. According to reports of the Austro-Hungarian Bank the circulation of such notes at the end of 1918 was about 800,000,000 crowns. At the proportion of 12.8 percent. German-Austria's share in these small notes would be about 100,000,000 crowns. The entire circulation in German-Austria does not reach the amount of 5,000,000,000 crowns previously estimated. When the German-Austrian crown is specially rated in foreign places, this comparatively not excessive circulation must be taken into consideration.

During the stamping small notes of 100 and 20 crowns were chiefly demanded by the public. Of the 100 crown notes 1, 155,000,000 crowns, of 20 crown notes 534,000,000 crowns were issued for stamping. According to number of notes these two kinds were chiefly brought into circulation, whereas in regard to total value large notes of 1,000 crowns of course counted most. The Austro-Hungarian Bank had made great preparations for the stamping and issued in all 5,400,000,000 crowns for this purpose. The quantities consigned to individual branches of the bank were not used up fully and therefore were partly returned to the head-office. Such notes will be stored away by the head-office and will be brought into circulation later on to substitute worn German-Austrian notes.

H. G. CAMPAGNOLI

²⁶ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 218, April 15; received April 17.

***Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C.
Coolidge²⁷***

VIENNA, April 17, 1919.

Subject: Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein.

1. In accordance with your direction, I have made a geographical field investigation of Vorarlberg in Deutschösterreich; of the independent Principality of Liechtenstein; and of the Swiss Canton of St. Gallen, immediately adjoining. The object of this investigation was to determine the features of geography, language, religion, resources, commerce, and the wishes of the people in relation to the problem as to whether Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein (Map I)²⁸ should be attached to Switzerland, or to Germany, or allowed (forced) to remain in Deutschösterreich.

2. The field work was carried on with the knowledge and full cooperation of the several governments; responsible individuals in the important cities were interviewed, all of whom furnished important information embodied in this memorandum or attached to it in the form of maps and exhibits. Unfortunately I was not permitted to go into Bavaria or to Lindau and Munich.

I first visited Berne and had a frank talk with Mr. Paraviccini, the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs. After telling me the attitude of the Swiss government, as explained below, he stated in response to my direct question, that the Swiss government had no objection whatever to my carrying on such investigation as I thought wise in the Canton of St. Gallen. Dr. Fritz Nussbaum, geographer in Berne, advised me on certain matters.

I then proceeded to St. Gallen, stopping to obtain essential data in Lucerne, Zug, and Zurich, and getting important information from the American Consul in St. Gallen; Mr. J. W. Sutcliffe, Special Commissioner, the United States Treasury; Mr. Otto Alder, president of the local Chamber of Commerce; Dr. Peter H. Schmidt, professor of economic geography in the commercial high-school; Mr. Hardwyn H. Gastrell, British Consul; and a number of manufacturers whose business is largely with Vorarlberg.

I went on to Bregenz, Vorarlberg, where the Landeshauptmann, Dr. Ender, and the “revolutionary” government, Dr. Kinz, mayor, and others cooperated with me in every way.

I continued my investigation in Feldkirch, where the bürgermeister, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, several manufacturers, and a representative of the railway employees contributed materially to the information here given. A number of priests in the Jesuit College at Feldkirch helped me. I visited Vaduz, Liechtenstein, where Prince Carl Liechtenstein, the Landesverweser, assisted my investigation. Finally I discussed the matter in Vienna with Herr v. Pflügl, the Austrian Under-secretary of State for Vorarlberg and Tyrol, and with Herr Finck, Vice-chancellor of Deutschösterreich, a resident of the Bregenzer Wald in Vorarlberg, and a representative in the Austrian Parliament for many years. In every community where I carried on investigations I asked to speak with persons who were opposed to detaching Vorarlberg from German-Austria, as well as to the larger number who favor it.

3. The problem is a grave one, although it involves only 145,000 persons in Vorarlberg, and 10,000 in Liechtenstein. Nearly three-fourths of these people have expressed a preference for being attached to Switzerland. Switzerland presents the rare and gratifying spectacle, in all greedy Europe, of having no strong appetite for this morsel of new territory, and in really desiring to know whether the annexation is best for her own people and for the people of the territories involved. It is clear that Vorarlberg desires to be detached from the Vienna government (Exhibit G). Some of the inhabitants favor joining Bavaria or Schwabenland. The greater number desire to join Switzerland. If Switzerland took them she would acquire a

German increment, and Switzerland is already 69% German; she would have a new Catholic canton and Switzerland is now 56% Protestant; she would add a conservative mountain district, and this might meet opposition in the radical lowland of Switzerland; she would increase the area that is economically poor and therefore would have to import still more foodstuffs. Vorarlberg produces in a year only enough food for a month. On the other hand, she would gain a district which is directly related to Switzerland, since it lies between a mountain divide and the Rhine, and Switzerland would thus have a strategic mountain frontier rather than a frontier on a navigable river. Moreover, the Swiss would possess and regulate a district whose industrial relations are already bound in every way to those of Switzerland.

4. Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein are situated on the northern border of the Alps southeast of Boden See (Lake Constance). The Rhine forms their western boundary. The mountain range on the south is the Rhatikon and Silvretta Gruppe, 2967 to 3312 meters; on the east between Vorarlberg and Tyrol are the Fervall Gruppe and Lech Alpen, known usually as The Arlberg, and crossed by the Arlberg Pass, 1802 meters; on the north, between Vorarlberg and Bavaria are the Algauer Alpen and the Bregenzer Wald, 1021 to 2232 meters. Thus the region is an upland unit, (Maps 4–15) definitely separated from German-Austria and from Bavaria by mountains; its northern and eastern frontiers are crossed only by one railway line which goes through a tunnel at an elevation of 1210 meters. Its western frontier (Swiss) on the Rhine is crossed by two railway bridges, near Buchs and St. Margrethen, respectively.

The mountain slopes of Vorarlberg are largely without habitation and the population lies in three valleys, the Rhine, the Ill, and the Bregenzer Ach. The density of population of the Rhein Tal is 90 to 150 to the square kilometer; Liechtenstein has 67 to the square kilometer; and the smaller valleys 20 to 30 to the square kilometer.

5. Of the 145,408 inhabitants of Vorarlberg, 126,000 are German, 5,857 are Italians, not true Ladins (see *Spezialortsreportorium* for Vorarlberg (Exhibit ZD)); 143,000 of these people are Catholic, 2,044 are Augsburger and Helvetischen Evangelical, and 126 are Jews. Of

the 10,716 inhabitants of Liechtenstein practically all are German and Catholic; there is one American Jew, a barber; for some unexplainable reason, he is not the present president of a local Räterepublik nor even actively engaged in politics. The cities of Vorarlberg are: Dornbirn, 16,199 inhabitants; Feldkirch and Bludenz, each with slightly more than 5,000 inhabitants; and Bregenz, the capital, with 8,529.

6. On November 3, 1918, Vorarlberg declared itself an independent country in the frame of German-Austria. It is governed by a Landeshauptmann and local assembly. It has well-organized Soldaten-, Arbeiter-, and Bauer-Räte; but seems to me to be absolutely free from undesirable bolshevism. The new elections are to take place on April 27th.

7. Liechtenstein presents the remarkable spectacle of being governed today by its ante-bellum Landtag, consisting of 15 members. It experienced a mild sort of revolution, and the active administrators of the present government are the aristocratic Prince of Liechtenstein, and two elected supervisors, one a clever doctor from one of the small villages, the other a simple bauer, the three strangest bedfellows in all Europe. Official orders are still promulgated and signed by Der fürstliche Landesverweser (see newspaper file, Exhibit ZQe).

8. On March 15, 1919, the Vorarlberg Assembly had a long discussion of the annexation question (see stenographic report appended as Exhibit A). The result of this discussion was the adoption of five resolutions leading to the appointment of a Committee of Five, which was to visit the governments in Switzerland, Bavaria, and Deutschösterreich to search into the economic results of possible annexation, for the whole people and for single professional groups. Previously, an informal vote had been taken in nearly all the villages and communities of Vorarlberg, resulting in a vote in favor of annexation to Switzerland, including 50% of those who voted in the political Bezirk Bregenz, 82% in the political Bezirk Bludenz, 80% in the political Bezirk Feldkirch; or 70.82% for the whole of Vorarlberg (see Exhibit B).

9. The Committee of Five attempted to visit Berne to confer with the Swiss government about annexation. The Swiss government evaded a consultation for the present time and the Federal Council is reported to have telegraphed the government at Bregenz on March 29th (Exhibit C): “We regret infinitely to have to say that the Federal Council cannot receive the Delegation of Five at Berne”. The attitude of the Swiss, as stated to me by Mr. Paravicini of the Foreign Office is that:

- a) The question of annexation is not really up yet;
- b) Switzerland would take Vorarlberg if the Great Powers think she should assume this responsibility;
- c) If Vorarlberg is annexed to Switzerland, Liechtenstein should be annexed also;
- d) If it is not annexed to Switzerland, the Swiss would rather see Vorarlberg remain in Deutschösterreich than go to Germany.

The Vorarlberg Committee of Five has taken no further steps to visit either Munich or Vienna.

On March 7th the Swiss Bundesrat was sent a report from certain manufacturers (Verband der Industriellen Vorarlbergs; see report appended as Exhibit F) opposing the annexation, for certain, possibly selfish, reasons of which I speak later. They sent this without the consent of the Landesrat and Vorarlberg government (see Exhibit A, pp. 26–27), and I understood the report was refused. It alluded to Germany as the “real home” of Vorarlberg.

The Vorarlberg villages of the Rhine delta in Boden See had previously applied for admission into Switzerland (see Exhibit I, and Paragraph 21 of this memorandum). Between 95% and 98% of the enfranchised citizens signed the petitions.

10. The only real opposition on the part of the Swiss seems to be based upon a fear that if the question of additional territory is under discussion someone may also bring up the question of changing other boundaries of Switzerland, particularly on the Italian side (Exhibit T).

The author of the article just alluded to is a French Swiss, and it is clear that he has no strong objection to adding to the number of German-speaking inhabitants of Switzerland. When I was in Berne I indicated my willingness to discuss the matter with the President of the Federal Council, a French Swiss, but he did not express the desire to do so.

11. Dr. Fritz Nussbaum, Privat Dozent in Geography, University of Berne, has summarized the reasons why he believes Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein should be annexed to Switzerland (Exhibit H). His views are based upon geographical and economic considerations, and seem to me to be sound in all respects.

12. There appears to have been a union between Appenzell in eastern Switzerland and the people of Vorarlberg a little more than 500 years ago (Exhibit L).

13. The only formal expression of the Germans in Bavaria regarding a possible annexation of Vorarlberg to southern Germany is contained in the statement of Herr Dirr (Exhibit D), who demanded on April 2d that the Bavarian Foreign Office take immediate measures to unite Vorarlberg to the German Empire, incorporating it within the borders of Bavarian Schwaben in connection with a commercial league of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden.

The press of these three German states is said to have raised the question as to why their governments appear to be so indifferent to the opportunity of securing Vorarlberg.

14. The German-Austrian government in Vienna desires to retain Vorarlberg. They have presented no strong arguments to meet those advanced by persons who desire to detach this land from German-Austria, and I gathered from my conferences that they hoped to defer action until the general question of the boundaries of Deutschösterreich were settled. It is my own view, however, that the Vorarlberg question should be settled at once, and not deferred.

15. The government and people of the Principality of Liechtenstein infinitely prefer to remain independent. The Prince of Liechtenstein

told me that his whole point of view and that of the present government is summarized in the five questions (Exhibit E), which the representative of Liechtenstein was to present at the Peace Congress if he had been received there. I merely comment on this list of questions by calling attention to the one which brings up the membership of Liechtenstein in the League of Nations and the one which asks an explanation as to why Liechtenstein has heretofore been represented by Austria and, particularly during the war, by the powers representing the latter state. These questions and the others raised lead me to think that the present government of Liechtenstein has no clear appreciation of the fact that so small an independent country cannot exist in the new order of things.

16. It is my view that the problem of the future of Liechtenstein and Vorarlberg ought to be settled chiefly in relation to the economic and commercial factors.

The ethnic factor may be dismissed with the statement that everyone agrees that these people (whether called Alemanni or Schwabians) are directly related to the Swiss and to the Bavarians, and are decidedly different from the Tyrolese. I do not believe that any injustice would be done to the French-speaking Swiss if the number of German-speaking Swiss were slightly increased.

The religious factor may likewise be dismissed with the statement that since there are already Catholic cantons in Switzerland (Appenzell is 93% Catholic, St. Gallen 60%, —see *Tafel 7*, Exhibit T), the addition of one Catholic canton would not upset conditions in any respect. There is, however, one religious feature which needs attention. There are Jesuits in Vorarlberg, and the Swiss law forbids Jesuits in Switzerland. If Vorarlberg should be incorporated in Switzerland, steps should be taken to see that the Jesuits obtain fair treatment. Many people believe that the Swiss will repeal their law against the Jesuits, just as the Germans have done. Unless this is done, Vorarlberg should not be united with Switzerland without a provision that the Jesuits be given a period of 5 or 10 years to make plans for removal and to dispose of their property. They have, in Feldkirch, Stella Matutina College, an excellent institution of learning which draws 450 students from countries in every part of

the world (Exhibit ZL), including the United States. The faculty of this Jesuit college includes such men as Father W. M. Peitz, a historian, and Father Joseph Fischer, a geographer of international reputation, who republished the first map upon which the name America was printed. This Jesuit college would be a credit to Switzerland, and if Vorarlberg is attached to that country rather than to Germany or Austria, I very much hope the Swiss would allow this Jesuit institution to remain.

The political factor does not appeal to me as tremendously important or likely to upset any conditions now existing in Switzerland; although Vorarlberg is conservative, while St. Gallen is liberal, the former is a mountain district with such a large proportion of industrial population that its voters would be easily converted to desirable radical innovations by the industrial population of the Swiss lowland. There remains then only the economic factor, and this I regard as the most important of all.

17. So far as food-supply is concerned, Vorarlberg is necessarily dependent. It can produce in a year only enough to support its population for 35 days. The food situation in Vorarlberg at the present time is critical. I refer to the investigations there by the American and British representatives in St. Gallen (Exhibits M and N). The Swiss are supplying the people of Vorarlberg with potatoes (Exhibit O) and relieving the immediate situation. It appears, however, that before the war Vorarlberg received flour from Hungary exclusively, potatoes from Bohemia (a few from Germany), meat from Styria and from Hungary. Vorarlberg exported milk and cattle-for-breeding to Bohemia and Lower Austria. Cheese from the Bregenzer Wald was shipped to Vienna. Half the product was sent to the Front during the war. In 1918 900,000 kilos of cheese were produced and 514,000 kilos of butter. These products are not needed in Switzerland, of course, but are of famous quality and easily marketed in Germany and Vienna. As Bohemia and Hungary are now independent countries, I see no argument in favor of leaving Vorarlberg as a part of Deutschösterreich because it was formerly fed by Austria-Hungary, and I see many reasons why it would be better to have Vorarlberg victualled through Switzerland in the future.

18. The people of Vorarlberg include 64,058 persons engaged in manufacturing; 16,907 engaged in commerce and trade; and 46,018 engaged in farming; 56% of the population is industrial and only 32% agricultural (Exhibit P). Nevertheless the Hausarbeiters are also farmers; the population is not really so dominantly industrial as the figures suggest.

The manufacturing industries may be divided into two larger groups: the embroidery industry (*stickerei*), and the cotton spinning and weaving. The tambour embroidery work, nearly all house-industry, depends to an unusual degree upon that of the Canton of St. Gallen, Switzerland. Mr. Otto Alder, President of the Chamber of Commerce in St. Gallen, told me on April 1st that he had made a report to the Swiss Bundesrat about the annexation of Vorarlberg to Switzerland from the industrial point of view, and that he had recommended that Vorarlberg be accepted by Switzerland because so much of the manufacturing industry of St. Gallen depends upon that of Vorarlberg. St. Gallen supplies Vorarlberg with material upon which the coarser work is done in Vorarlberg (see Exhibit Q where it appears that Vorarlberg has 3609 crochet machines and Switzerland 854) after which the crocheted embroidery for curtains is finished in St. Gallen. All the Rhine villages of Vorarlberg, except two, work for St. Gallen. The product turned out by Vorarlberg (crochet embroidery alone) in 1913 was valued at 54 million francs (Exhibit Q). If Vorarlberg should be attached to Germany the *stickerei* manufacturers of Plauen, Saxony, could do serious damage to the *stickerei* industry of St. Gallen, as 215 million francs worth of *stickerei* were exported in 1913 and 90% of the curtains finished in St. Gallen and shipped from Switzerland are crocheted in Vorarlberg. The coarser work being done in Vorarlberg, the finer in St. Gallen, the two industries complement each other, but are not competitive. There is also a part of the *stickerei* industry which markets its embroidery in Austria.

19. Herr Fritz Bosch, President of the Chamber of Commerce in Feldkirch, leans a little more to the view that Vorarlberg should remain in German-Austria, but he, as a *stickerei*-manufacturer, would infinitely prefer to have it attached to Switzerland rather than to Germany, while the cotton manufacturers prefer Germany if they

cannot remain in Austria. Bosch and a group of his associates made it clear to me that the cotton spinning and weaving (Exhibit R and some woollen manufacturing is entirely independent of Switzerland, having always shipped its products to Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. The proprietors of the cotton mills are many of them Swiss who moved over into Vorarlberg in order to have a customs frontier between themselves and their Swiss competitors. Some of them, however, still own factories in Switzerland. The weaver-proprietors' desire to remain in German-Austria seems to me to be a selfish one, and I am uncertain about the prosperity of the employees, because Deutschösterreich will not have the simple customhouse-relationships which Austria-Hungary had. Moreover, a majority of the spinners and weavers in these cotton factories desire a union with Switzerland.

The commercial factor may, therefore, be summarized by saying that there are certain great advantages in attaching Vorarlberg to Switzerland; that there are fewer advantages and many disadvantages in attaching it to Germany; and that those who desire to have it remain a part of German-Austria seem to me to be actuated by a desire to retain trade advantages which they have no right to impose upon the workmen in their factories.

20. A few minor factors in the problem are the following. The representative of the Austrian state railway employees in Feldkirch indicated opposition to union with Switzerland because of uncertainty about wages and pensions.

The question of the share Vorarlberg should bear in the war debt of German-Austria is being carefully considered by the Swiss and by the Vorarlbergers.

The cost of correcting the channel of the Rhine (16½ million francs) was borne by the Swiss and Austrian governments jointly, and the correction of the Rhine along the western border of Liechtenstein was largely paid personally by the Prince of Liechtenstein. The great expense in connection with this work, which began in 1893, is already met, but all cost of future maintenance of a navigable channel would have to be borne by Switzerland if Vorarlberg and

Liechtenstein were attached to that country. Inasmuch as the navigable mouth of the river has been shifted from the old channel near the village of Altenrhein to the new channel near the village of Hard since 1900, and the larger part of the dredging which cuts off the ox-bow near the village of Diepoldsau has now been paid for, there appears to be no reason for apprehension about oppressive costs of maintenance.

The question of taking over the Austrian money in Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein will have to be handled carefully since the Swiss *valuta* is so high compared with that of Austria.

The supply of raw material for Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein is much easier if this territory be attached to Switzerland since the Swiss will supply raw material and the manufacturing populations east of the Rhine will resume work sooner than if they remained in German-Austria.

The hydro-electric power of Vorarlberg is more likely to be developed by Switzerland, which has no coal, than by Deutschösterreich which has some. Two obvious innovations, greatly to the advantage of the people of Vorarlberg are (a) the electrification of the Arlberg Railway and tunnel, (b) the use of more hydro-electric power in cotton factories of Bludenz, Bregenz, and the Rhine Tal.

21. Whether Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein are annexed to Switzerland or to Germany, or remain in Austria, there are slight modifications of existing frontiers which ought surely to be made. These are discussed in Annex A (appended).^{[29](#)}

22. In conclusion, upon the basis of all the factors involved, and in view of (a) the expressed preference of 70% of the people of Vorarlberg to be attached to Switzerland, and (b) the statement by the Swiss Foreign Office that they would feel obliged to take the responsibility of Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein if the Great Powers desired them to do so, I recommend that:

a) the American Commission to Negotiate Peace shall use its influence to bring about action by the Great Powers for the

- incorporation of Vorarlberg as a separate canton of Switzerland, special provision being made for the Jesuits;
- b) Liechtenstein, ceasing to exist as an independent principality, be incorporated in the Vorarlberg canton. This will, I believe, terminate the comic-opera war between Liechtenstein and Germany, which has lasted since 1866;
 - c) the frontier between Switzerland, Deutschösterreich, and Bavaria be established as shown in red on Maps 2, 25, and 29, departing from the Vorarlberg frontier at several points (see Annex A);
 - d) the Swiss government be informed that it is the wish of the Great Powers that they should assume responsibility for the incorporation of Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein within their frontiers and that they take immediate steps to relieve the food stringency there and to supply seed and raw materials so that farming and manufacturing may be resumed as soon as possible upon a normal basis.

LAWRENCE MARTIN

ANNEX A. SUGGESTED BOUNDARIES

I. The present boundary between Vorarlberg and Switzerland follows the channel of the Rhine. A correction should be made in any event so that the boundary (international or cantonal) shall follow the corrected channel of the Rhine. Thus it would depart at two points from the existing boundary (see Map 25). If no change were made in the boundary it would be decidedly inconvenient to administer the Swiss village Diepoldsau after the Diepoldsauer Durchstich is completed. It would be much better to have Switzerland turn over this village and the surrounding area, $1\frac{3}{4} \times 3$ kilometers square, to Deutschösterreich or to have the Swiss canton of St. Gallen turn it over to the Swiss canton of Vorarlberg.

II. At the mouth of the Rhine the villages Höchst, Rheinegg, Brugg, and Fussach are situated on the delta between the old mouth of the Rhine and the Fussacher Durchstich. It is said that during the war the strategic boundary has been removed to the new Rhine for natural reasons (Exhibit I). Moreover, the officials from these villages petitioned the governmental council of the canton of St.

Gallen on December 18th that the Swiss boundary of the valley of the Rhine be removed to the new Rhine and the Rhine delta admitted into the Swiss Confederation.

I recommend that the Rhine boundary be modified at the two points indicated, as shown in red on Map 25.

III. If Vorarlberg is separated from German-Austria and attached to Switzerland the eastern boundary should not follow the present frontier, but it should depart from it, slightly, at several points, as shown in red on Map 29. The reasons for these modifications are explained below. The boundary between Tyrol and Vorarlberg beginning on the south at Dreiländerspitz (3212 meters) in the Silvretta Gruppe follows the divide between the tributaries of the Rhine and the Inn through Bieltalspitz, Hohes Rad (2912 meters), Bieler Höhe (2046 meters), Vallüla (2815 meters), Zeinis Joch (1852 meters), Fluhs Spitze (2826 meters), Albonakopf (2487 meters), Silbertaler Winter jochl, and Kalte Berg to Arlberg Pass (1802 meters). From Arlberg Pass northward the boundary departs from mountain crests and mountain passes at a number of points. I recommend that at one point where it departs from the divide the boundary continue as before but that at several other points it be rectified as shown in red on Map 29.

IV. I recommend that the head of Lech Tal, now a part of Vorarlberg, although draining into the River Danube, and being related hydrographically to Bavaria, continue to be administered with Vorarlberg. My reasons are as follows:

I am informed that the inhabitants of the Lech Tal market their goods by going southward through Flexen Pass (1784 meters) to the Klostertal (see Map 4) instead of going eastward down the valley of the Lech into the Tyrol. I am told that the Austrian government built the highway which follows this valley from Lech to Steeg, but that the peasants do not use it and that the local government has refused to keep it in repair. This seems to me, therefore, like the Saminabach Valley, with headwaters in Liechtenstein and mouth in Vorarlberg at Feldkirch, to be a case where trade preferably crosses a pass instead of going downstream through a narrow gorge. Moreover, a change in

the frontier to follow the water-parting would not give as good a strategic boundary as the present one, since such a frontier would be only a few kilometers from the Arlberg railway in Klostertal.

V. The cases where I suggest that the boundary be changed are as follows:

The present frontier, between Krabachspitze (2522 meters) and Mittagspitze (2475 meters) follows a valley, giving Vorarlberg an uninhabited mountain slope which is of no use to that country. I recommend that the boundary be shifted westward approximately two kilometers, passing through Wösterspitze (2559 meters) and following the crest of the mountains between Krabachspitze and Mittagspitze.

VI. Where the boundary reaches the River Lech northeast of Mittagspitze, I recommend that instead of turning westward and following the stream as it continue northward on some minor divide to Bieberkopf (2602 meters). From that point it should continue westward with the present Bavarian-Tyrolese boundary through Schrofen-Pass to the point where this boundary intersects the Vorarlberg-Tyrolese boundary northwest of the village of Gehren.

VII. From this point the present boundary between Bavaria and Vorarlberg goes northward along the Schafalpenköpfe, crossing the Kl. Walsertal near Walser-schanze. This place is the populous upper 15 miles of Kl. Walsertal in Vorarlberg, although the valley is cut off from Vorarlberg by high mountain passes and everyone tells me that its trade is entirely with Bavaria. There is no road leading from Kl. Walsertal to Vorarlberg. There are foot-paths across only four cols (1871 to 1975 meters, or 5500 to 6000 feet above sea level). The best indication that the Walsertal should belong to Bavaria rather than to Vorarlberg is that the *zollgrenze* has been for many years on the mountain divide at the head of Kl. Walsertal rather than on the political frontier near Walser-schanze. Because of this consideration I recommend that the boundary follow the red line (Map 29) from the point where the present Bavarian, Vorarlberg, and Tyrolese boundaries meet, westward along the mountain crests and through the minor passes to Widderstein (2536 meters), Heiterberg (2153

meters), Ochs-enhofer Sp. (2042 meters), and Hoch-Gerach Pass joining the present frontier at Hoher Ifer (2232 meters).

VIII. From Hoher Ifer northwestward to the shore of Boden See between Bregenz and Lindau the present frontier departs from mountain crests at many points. Between Hoher Ifer and Hoher Häderich I recommend that the present frontier be abandoned and a new boundary be drawn, passing along the mountain crests and through the passes, including: Gottesackerwände; Hornle Pass; Schonebach-Starzelach Pass (but leaving the village of Rohrmoos in Bavaria); Riedberghorn; Siplinger Kopf; Hochgrat; joining the old frontier north of Lecknersee (see red line, Map 29), and continuing westward to Hoher Haderich (1568 meters). This involves give-and-take in a relatively uninhabited region, compensating Vorarlberg for giving Bavaria the Kl. Walsertal.

IX. I see possible reasons for a frontier adjustment between Vorarlberg and Bavaria in Weissach and Rotach valleys, but I hesitate to make any recommendation without having been on the ground and learned something of the market relationships of the several villages involved. If the heads of any of these valleys have such relations as that of the Kl. Walsertal, I have no doubt that frontier modifications might be advantageously made.

X. The ridiculous tiny projection north of Aach in Weissach Valley (Map 4) should certainly be given to Bavaria.

XI. I recommend that the present frontier between Vorarlberg and Bavaria on Lake Constance and along Laibacher Bach (Map 27) be retained, as this stream makes a better strategic frontier than the mountain overlooking Bregenz.

²⁷ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 231, April 18; received April 21.

²⁸ None of the maps or exhibits mentioned in this report are printed except annex A, p. 302 [*Pg. 302 is part of [Doc. 100](#)*].

²⁹ *Infra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/388

[Document 101]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 238

VIENNA, April 22, 1919.
[Received April 25.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith two reports^{[29a](#)} by Mr. Walter E. Bundy which contain interesting information on the present situation. Personally I am inclined to take a less pessimistic view of the immediate situation than does Mr. Bundy. As long as the Volkswehr are ready to support the government I believe order may be maintained, and that danger from the Volkswehr itself lies rather in the future than at the present moment. There is no doubt that the Hungarians are pushing their propaganda here desperately, all the more so on account of the insecurity of their own position. One hears disquieting rumors from Prague. Thus it looks on every side as if the last half of this week is likely to be marked by critical events.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Mr. Walter E. Bundy to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, April 19, 1919.

Subject: The suspicious character of the Vienna "Volkswehr".

That the character of the Vienna "Volkswehr" is very suspicious in the present crisis in Vienna is indicated by the following

considerations.

1. The “Volkswehr” was organized last fall just before the demobilization of the German-Austrian Army by the present Secretary of War Deutsch. Deutsch is radically socialistic in his views but opposed to the ends of socialism being gained by revolution, especially opposed to Communistic and Bolshevik methods. He has educated the “Volkswehr” in the radical socialistic direction, and now it is feared by many that the majority of the “Volkswehr” have become, under Communistic influence, not only radical in their ideas but in their methods, and that the “Volkswehr” had gone farther to the left than Deutsch planned and are not so surely under his control as formerly.
2. The “Volkswehr” is composed of soldiers from the rank and file of the former Austrian Army, very few non-commissioned officers and practically no commissioned officers. The members of the “Volkswehr” are of the class most susceptible to Communistic ideas.
3. The political coloring of the “Volkswehr” is threefold:
 - (a) Many, some say the majority, are reliable in the interest of maintaining order.
 - (b) Some are neutral and liable to support in either direction.
 - (c) Many are most radically Communistic, as was seen in the first firing affair of the 17th, when hundreds of the “Volkswehr” unarmed took part in the demonstration and one-half of the most radical speakers and agitators were members of the “Volkswehr”. In the move to present the demands of the unemployed at the Parliament Building it was not the unemployed who formed the delegation to present the demands but the Communistic leaders and “Volkswehr” members.
4. The first fight took place between the crowd and the hated Imperial police. The fight began about 4:45 on the afternoon of the 17th and lasted until about 9:00 o’clock at night; the losses, dead and died of wounds 4 police, and about 40 wounded, chiefly police. Then the “Volkswehr” came, and took the rifles of the police stationed in the Parliament Building and dispersed the crowd.
5. The intervention of the “Volkswehr” was that of an act of a “neutral” force. But this “neutrality” can become dangerous to the present government and favorable to the Communistic movement.

The “Volkswehr” would certainly fire on any demonstration that attacked it, but it is practically certain that the Communists will not attack it and the Communists seem to feel sure that the “Volkswehr” would not fire on them and is really with them. That many of the Volkswehr are with the Communists was clearly evident on the afternoon of the 17th.

6. After taking over the Parliament Building members of the “Volkswehr” Battalion, about 1,000 men with 50–60 machine guns, broke open the safe stealing some thousands of kronen belonging to the officials, stole the civil clothing of the employees from the lockers, broke open the safe of the archives, and took souvenirs available from the halls of the Parliament Building. This fact does not speak well for the conduct of a body supposed to maintain order.
7. The Vienna foreign office is by no means certain and confident of the support of the “Volkswehr”.
8. The “Volkswehr” holds the arsenal and is, so far as I can learn, the only military force in Vienna that has a real supply of machine guns. If the issue of the present crisis is to be decided by arms it will come in favor of the party with the machine guns. The neutrality of the “Volkswehr” is dangerous because of the large Communistic following of the “Volkswehr” and the conduct of the “Volkswehr” in the Parliament Building. The fact that the Communists have plenty of money, once the “Volkswehr” as a supposed “neutral” force has taken over the Vienna government buildings, may lead to the “Volkswehr” being bought off by the Communists and the easy expulsion of the present government. More such incidents as occurred Friday are expected, and now before the State Chancellory Building and the Foreign Office. It is possible that the “neutral” intervention of the “Volkswehr” is a definite part of the Communistic plan to take over the Government buildings. Once the “Volkswehr” has taken over these buildings there is no Vienna military force to expel them and if the “Volkswehr” chooses it can tell the present government to go and the government can do nothing else.

WALTER E. BUNDY

29a Second report, dated April 22, not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/415

[Document 102]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 252

VIENNA, April 28, 1919.
[Received April 30.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that since the declaration of the President in regard to the frontiers of Italy^{[30](#)} there has been deep depression among all the people here who are interested in the fate of the German-speaking region of South Tyrol. It is feared that the President's declaration can only be interpreted to mean that this district is to be given to Italy. In the Tyrol itself I am told the anxiety, or rather the despair, is great. I have just been visited by a Tyrolese representative who has handed in to me the enclosed document,^{[31](#)} of which I believe copies have already been forwarded to Paris. In the course of conversation he emphasized the fact that if the southern part of the Tyrol should thus be taken away from the northern, the northern portion would have no choice except union with Bavaria. Further existence in connection with Austria would be impossible, as it would be nothing but a thin strip of mountainous territory with foreign boundaries on three sides of it.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

^{[30](#)} The text of President Wilson's manifesto of April 23, 1919, is given in Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Garden City, N. Y., 1922), [vol. III, p. 287](#) .

^{[31](#)} Not attached to file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/447

[Document 103]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 260

VIENNA, May 5, 1919.
[Received May 7.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum I have received from the Austrian Government³² containing a *mémoire* on the future of the Tyrol. I also enclose a translation of the formal resolutions passed by the government on this subject,³² and in my telegram No. 329 of yesterday³² I reported that the Tyrolese Landtag had voted unanimously, except for the Socialists, that if it were necessary to save its integrity the Tyrol should set itself up as an independent neutral republic; but that if the Tyrol were doomed to lose its southern portion, the remainder should annex itself to Germany. The Socialists, who opposed the motion, declared themselves in favor of annexation under any circumstances. In either case, this looks like a severance of the connection between the Tyrol and the rest of German-Austria, which is thus being reduced to ever smaller dimensions but which seems prepared to accept without demur the action of the Tyrolese.

As I have more than once pointed out in my reports there is nothing surprising in the stand now taken by the people of the Tyrol. From the first they have been prepared to employ every means in their power and make every sacrifice in order to retain the ancient German-speaking territory of Bozen and Meran, and in this they can count on the strongest sympathy on the part of all, not only German Austrians but German speaking people everywhere. The cutting off of the German speaking population south of the Brenner and their forcible Italization, which may be expected, will inevitably provoke deep and long lasting indignation. All this has doubtless been taken into due consideration, so that I need add no comment. It is also

highly natural that North Tyrol if left to itself, a thin strip of mountains with little body and long frontiers, should feel itself constrained to enter into political union with the territory to the north. This territory is inhabited by people who are kin to the Tyrolese in every way, and nothing but historical accident has kept the two apart.

In the event that Northern Tyrol is annexed to Bavaria I trust that the Vorarlberg may be encouraged to join itself to Switzerland. I have reported on this matter several times, and particularly in a memorandum handed in to me by Major Lawrence Martin enclosed with my Dispatch 231,³³ in which the subject is treated at some length. I am aware that the Swiss are not enthusiastic over such a union, and recognize that it may mean certain dangers for them. If Austria were to continue as an independent state, Vorarlberg might remain part of it as it has in the past. But if the frontier of Germany is to be brought down to the Brenner Pass it is desirable that this boundary should not extend to the northern edge of the Canton of the Grisons and that the eastern frontier of Switzerland should be strengthened. So far I have no information as to how the people of the Vorarlberg feel about the latest vote of the Tyrolese Diet; but even supposing their non-Socialist members supported it, as they seem to have done, this does not prove that they and those they represent do not favor the annexation of their own particular district to Switzerland—which so far as our evidence goes is desired by the considerable majority of the population. It is not yet certain that the Swiss will remain opposed to it.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

³² Not printed.

³² Not printed.

³² Not printed.

³³ Text of memorandum is printed on p. 293 [*Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100*]; despatch No. 231 not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/468

[Document 104]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 271

VIENNA, May 11, 1919.
[Received May 14.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that the Chancellor, Mr. Renner, asked me to call on him this morning so that he might see me before his departure for St. Germain. The main subject of which he wished to speak to me was the question of West Hungary, which I shall take up in a separate report. The Chancellor said that he was going to Paris quite unexpectedly, and was not properly prepared for the mission, as he had been devoting his time almost exclusively to internal affairs, but he added that he had good technical advisers. He declared that the terms of peace proposed to Germany had produced a very painful impression here. I asked him if there was anything unexpected in these terms. He answered they were more severe than people had looked forward to; especially the provisions concerning the mixed districts of the eastern frontier surpassed expectations, and that the financial conditions were very hard.

Speaking of Hungary he said that he did not believe that the present Bolshevik government would fall of itself for a long time; but that if there were an advance of foreign troops he thought that things would be settled within a fortnight; that he feared that there might be serious street fighting in Budapest. He pointed out that in Munich the resistance had lasted five days and had been as obstinate the last day as it had the first.

The Chancellor referred two or three times to the work that had been done by the American Food Commission here, and said that Austria owed a great deal to them; that he did not believe men of any other nationality, not even the English, could have put through matters as

they had. He added “if it had been left in the hands of the Italians we should have starved”. He spoke of the question of employment, not only at the present moment but for the future, and said “we have thousands more officials than we need and at least two hundred thousand workmen. It is a fearful question to know what to do with them.”

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/469

[Document 105]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 272

VIENNA, May 11, 1919.
[Received May 14.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that the Chancellor, Mr. Renner, told me today that he would be greatly obliged to me if I would forward to the members of the American Mission certain facts in connection with the present situation of the Germans in West Hungary and ask for their immediate consideration. I have already taken up this question in my reports No. 49 of January 29th, No. 90 of February 17th, No. 122 of March 3d, No. 151 of March 16th and No. 168 of March 20th.³⁴ At the present moment the region is on the verge of civil war. Many of the Hungarian troops supposed to be posted there have simply scattered and are living off the people. The peasantry are not likely to stand this much longer, and may rise in revolt at anytime—in which case Austria will have to intervene.

As has already been pointed out in my previous reports this region is inhabited by a German population who in spite of the political boundary line have always been more closely connected to Vienna than to Budapest, and it is a territory on which Vienna is particularly dependent for food. Chancellor Renner says that the Austrians cannot now sit by and abandon it to the horrors of civil war, but that they have consistently followed in the last few months the policy of not interfering anywhere beyond the boundaries they at present hold. In this instance they are very desirous of acting, not on their own account but with a mandate from the Allied Powers. The question is immediate, for an outbreak may occur any day, and for this reason the Chancellor asked me to prepare the way for him in the hope that he may be able to take up the matter in some way soon after his arrival at St. Germain instead of waiting until in the official

order of things the question of West Hungary should happen to come up of itself. He declared that what Austria desired ultimately was a plebiscite, under Allied supervision if necessary, which should enable the inhabitants to express freely their desires. He pointed out that the important manufacturing city of Wiener-Neustadt is on the very frontier, and that if Red troops came flowing in a retreat from Budapest it will be hard to hold them back unless the Austrians can advance a certain distance from the city to protect it. He had previously asked me if I were familiar with the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, and by this last remark he unquestionably meant to indicate that there were a good many Communists in Wiener-Neustadt who would be likely to take the side of the Red Guard.

The impression left upon me by the above conversation is that under certain circumstances the Austrians intend to advance into the immediate territory of West Hungary with the hope of retaining it permanently. It would naturally be a great advantage to them to do this as mandatories of the Powers instead of appearing to attack an unoffending neighbor. This fact, however, does not affect the advisability of listening to the Austrian request. If it is desirable, as I believe it is, that this German speaking strip should belong in future to Austria rather than to Hungary, there is something to be said in favor of giving Austria mandatory powers at once.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

³⁴ No. 49, p. 387 [*Pg. 387 is part of [Doc. 142](#)*]; No. 90, p. 393 [*Pg. 393 includes portions of [Doc. 145](#) and [Doc. 146](#)*]; No. 122, p. 264 [*Pg. 264 is part of [Doc. 86](#)*]; No. 151 and No. 168 not printed.

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 278

VIENNA, May 14, 1919.
[Received May 17.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that the increasing disintegration of the Austrian provinces to which I have adverted several times is one of the important phenomena in political life here today. The most striking example of this is the election that has just taken place in the district of Vorarlberg. The question before the people was whether they wished the province to remain a part of Austria, with which it has been connected for many centuries, or whether they preferred to enter into negotiations for union with Switzerland or with Germany. According to the accounts so far received, four-fifths of the inhabitants voted to enter into negotiations with Switzerland. Most of the other fifth, many of whom were Socialists, preferred Germany. There seems to have been almost no desire at all for maintenance of the former connection. This is a striking fact and a symptom of the times. Although Vorarlberg is geographically more closely connected with either Switzerland or Germany than with Austria, its historical union has lasted for centuries. The inhabitants have had no particular grievance to complain of, and have never shown especial disaffection. They are influenced by several motives at the present time: the general break-up of Austria; the desire to escape having to pay a share in any, either Austrian or German, war indemnity; the recent movement to set up an independent Tyrolese republic, to which they do not care to belong; their close geographical and commercial connection with Switzerland, and the feeling that Switzerland is a good country to tie to. We may soon expect the beginning of negotiations.

The loss of Vorarlberg would mean little for Austria. That of the Tyrol might well be followed by Salzburg, and even the movement for a Carinthian republic is once more on foot. It is hard to say where all this will end and how permanent is its character, but it unquestionably presents one of the many extremely difficult questions with which the government of Vienna will have to deal and which the Allied Powers should take into account in their policy towards Austria.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Czechoslovakia

[\[107\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, January 27, 1919. [Received February 3.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/41

[\[108\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, January 27, 1919. [Received February 3.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/43

[\[109\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, January 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/46

[\[110\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, January 31, 1919. [Received February 6.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/51

[111] Lieutenant Frederic R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Prague, January 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/61

[112] Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Prague, February 3, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/61

[113] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, February 5, 1919. [Received February 12.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/62

[114] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, February 5, 1919. [Received February 12.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/63

[115] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, February 5, 1919. [Received February 12.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/68

[116] Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge

[Vienna,] February 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/99

[117] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, February 17, 1919. [Received February 24.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/110

[118] Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, February 24, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/146

[119] Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Prague, February 26, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/177

[120] Professor R. J. Kerner to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, March 1, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/162

[121] Professor R. J. Kerner to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, March 2, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/162

[122] Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Prague, March 2, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/177

**[123] Statement of Professor R. J. Kerner to the
Commissioners Plenipotentiary**

[Paris,] March 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/175¹/₂

**[124] Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel to the Secretary General of
the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)**

Paris, March 20, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/175¹/₂

**[125] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace**

Vienna, March 10, 1919. [Received March 12.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/193

[126] Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Prague, March 23, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[127] Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Prague, March 23, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[128] Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Prague, March 25, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/41

[Document 107]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 44

VIENNA, January 27, 1919.
[Received February 3.]

SIRS: I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of report of Professor R. J. Kerner who has recently been travelling in the coal region of Austrian Silesia and has collected valuable material on the subject. My criticisms of the report are as follows.

I do not think the historical question is fairly stated. No mention is made of the fact that Silesia was one of the main divisions of Poland before the year 1000. Its connection with Poland thus not only antedated but lasted longer than its connection with Bohemia. Its population may be regarded as wholly Polish until the period of German colonization. That Frederick the Great, in order to make his title more clear, required the sanction of the Bohemian Diet to the cession to him does not seem to me a serious argument.

Professor Kerner's ethnographical argument also does not appear to me to be sound. A generation ago, before the Polish population of German Silesia had wakened up to a sense of their nationality, Germans often declared that they were not to be regarded as Poles but only as Silesians, or "Wasserpölacken" as they contemptuously termed them. Since that time they have in great part awakened, and no one today seriously attempts to deny that they are Poles. The Poles of Austrian Silesia seem to be less awakened, but they are merely a detached fragment of the others. I grant, however, that the closeness of the Polish and the Czech languages, especially the dialects of the border districts, makes it likely that the Silesian Poles could be absorbed by the Czechs without very great difficulty. On the other hand, Professor Kerner states further on that the employers

intend to use Slovak labor in place of Polish, which indicates an intention to displace rather than to assimilate. If the German Austrians get Northern Bohemia they may intend to replace the Czech mining population there by Germans, but this does not strengthen their claim to the district. It may be noted too that, though it is not unlikely that the Germans in Silesia would prefer Czech to Polish rule, this sort of statement is not easy to control and, as far as my observation goes, is put forward by both sides regarding any third element in every nationality dispute.

I shall not try to enter into the economic argument. This is a complicated question and can be dealt with by specialists much better than by myself. They will know how much weight should be attached to such considerations as the political union of a given mineral region. If the Czechs offer the prospect of a more orderly and efficient administration than do the Poles, it is natural that they should have the support of the capitalists and the employers of labor.

The geographical considerations may also be referred to specialists on the subject.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Professor R. J. Kerner to Professor A. C. Coolidge

JANUARY 24, 1919.

Subject: Report on the Czecho-Slovak-Polish boundary question
(Mährisch Ostrau-Teschen)

The report presented here is the result of a trip of observation taken by Captain John Karmazin and the writer to the Mährisch-Ostrau-Karwin coal region, i. e., the area under dispute between the Czechs and the Poles and commonly known as the "fight for Teschen". The

places visited by the writer were Mährisch Ostrau, Witkowitz and Teschen. Captain Karmazin will report later in special reference to the economic features of the question and their relation to Bolshevism. He will also make a more extended trip of observation.

The essential features of the question discussed here may be most conveniently summed up under five headings:

- a. Historical.
- b. Ethnographical.
- c. Economic.
- d. Geographical.
- e. Cultural.

a) Historical:

This argument is wholly on the side of the Czechs. In the 14th century Silesia became a “Crown Land of Bohemia” and remained so until today. When Frederick II seized Silesia he required not only Maria Theresia’s signature of cession but likewise a special act of the Diet of Bohemia (1743) which his lawyers clearly recognized possessed the sovereign rights to dispose of a crown land. Hence today, so far as legal theory is concerned, the parliament which possesses the sovereign rights of the Bohemian crown has the legal jurisdiction over this province.

b) Ethnographical:

If the official census be taken as the basis of ethnic delimitation, the ethnographical argument would be decidedly in favor of the Poles. This includes the Silesians (*Slazaky*) as Poles. They speak a dialect “after their own” and make up the bulk of the population east of the political district of Friedek. The observer asked hundreds of these inhabitants whether they were Poles. They answered invariably “No! We are Silesians.” The official census which is based on the *Umgangssprache*^{*} is most favorable to the Germans. By including the “Silesians” as Poles it gives that doubtful linguistic area to them. As a matter of fact the region east of Friedek and to Bielitz is a miniature Macedonia, in which over half of the mass of population

consists of an undeveloped Slavic dialect group. The rest of the common people is undoubtedly Polish. The upper classes are Czech, German and Polish, the latter being by far the weaker in the hotly contested district of Teschen.

Thus, by official statistics, (see Appendix: *Special Ortsrepertorium für Schlesien* 1917)³⁵ the Political District of Teschen shows a total population of 102,552 (1910), of which by the *Umgangssprache* basis, 77,147 are Poles, 17,045 Germans, 6,204 Czechs. It is asserted by the Czechs, many Germans (who prefer the Czechs to the Poles), and by many “Silesians” that if a neutral commission took a plebiscite it would result favorably to inclusion in the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

If the official census is taken as the basis of the ethnic line, then the boundary usually designated and which corresponds in general to the eastern boundary of the Political District of Friedek would be used—of course, this is looking at it wholly from the ethnic point of view and takes the official statistics as a basis, calling the “Silesians” Poles against their will. If some regard is shown for the “Silesians” of this district a line running north and south from Bielitz would perhaps delimit the Czecho-“Silesian” area (See Appendix I Map of Moravia and Silesia).

It may therefore be concluded that should this area or that part of it east of the Oderberg–Kaschau Railroad be given to the Czechoslovak Republic no crying injustice would be done to the Poles. The bulk of the population is “Silesian” and not Polish, and has no definite antipathy toward such a solution. But it should be noticed that the arguments for this solution are not as strong ethnographically as they are on historical and economic grounds.

c) Economic:

The Friedek-Teschen Political Districts form one economic unit. They form the rich coal region known as the Ostrau-Karwin Coal-Area. The center of this manufacturing and mining district is Mährisch Ostrau (in Moravia, at the very boundary line of Silesia). The cities of Bohumin, Oderberg, Teschen, Karwin, Friedek, and

Freistadt all drain economically into Mährisch Ostrau. Under the Austrian administration the office of the inspector of mines for the whole district was located at Mährisch Ostrau and this city was not only economically but administratively (through no pressure on the part of the Czechs) the head and heart of the coal area. It is connected with the mines and factories by a complicated network of railways which center there. The whole region from Teschen to Bielitz therefore is likewise turned economically to the west and not to the east.

The coal area has been divided provisionally by the local national councils (Czech and Polish). This may be traced by reference to the local treaty and supplements thereto included in the appendix to this report (See Appendix No. 9). It was, however, the understanding of the Czechs that like conditions (wages, hours, etc.) should exist in all parts of the area. It was impossible to investigate the truth or falsity of these statements or whether the treaty has been lived up to by both sides. It is nevertheless a fact that since historically, economically, and administratively the region has been a unit the backing which that argument can secure is overwhelming. So far as it is known, only one of the mine owners is opposed to his property becoming a part of Czecho-Slovakia—i. e., Count Larisch, whose concessions lie at the extreme end of the Karwin coal region. Business men and capitalists are in favor of keeping the region as one unit because the division into two will mean dual state ownership and their concessions would thus be scattered in the two states, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Please see the letter by Gunther (Appendix No. 7) in which he advocates this. Sonnenschein who directs the steel works and mines in Witkowitz is of the same opinion. Their argument is a capitalist argument—they do not want two legislations, different wages, and varied conditions to obtain in the same coal region. They point to Bolshevism and declare that the only way to stop it is the inclusion of the coal area, now being exploited, in the Czecho-Slovak republic. They make much of the fact that the Poles have a vast field north of the Oderberg-Kaschau railroad which is still undeveloped and that there they will have plenty of coal in a state which is, without Silesia, one of the richest in coal resources in Europe.

The Poles point out that not only ethnically but economically they need the region. The Oderberg–Kaschau railroad is not only the connecting link between Moravia and Slovakland, but between Polish Upper Prussian Silesia and Galicia. In general, they admit the weight of the remaining economic arguments, but wish a precise ethnic delimitation nevertheless.

Dr. Michejda of Teschen, long a member of the Austrian Parliament and a member of the Polish National Council of Teschen, advocated the internationalization of the Oderberg–Kaschau railroad and the granting of the territory west of the railroad to the Czechs, east of it to the Poles. On the whole this appears to be a reasonable division. But the bulk of the Polish intellectuals who have been imported into Silesia in the last generation are not with him in this.

The report which Captain Karmazin will make on the economic aspects of this question in relation to Bolshevism should be read in connection with this section. The best maps of the whole coal area are to be found in the appendix (Appendices Nos. 2–4. No. 2 was especially corrected up to date for the American Peace Commission by the Chief Mining Inspector).

It appears to the observer that the solution which would treat the whole area as one unit would have the greater weight. The already Czech part of the coal region could not justly be taken from the Czechs in view of their lack of coal and their absolute domination of the region through Mährisch Ostrau. Hence that part of the field west of the Oderberg–Kaschau railroad should undoubtedly be given to the Czechs. Teschen is German, not Polish. If the railroad is not neutralized, it should be given to the Czechs.

d) Geographical:

In general this part of Silesia is geographically a part of Upper Prussian Silesia and is inclined geographically more to the north and west than the east. The boundary line between the Czecho-Slovak state might from geographical grounds be drawn along the Vistula or along the Olsa rivers or the divide east of Teschen. There appears to be no good geographical boundary west of Teschen. The Oderberg-

Kaschau railroad, while forming a good boundary from ethnic, economic and strategic reasons is hardly to be recommended on grounds of geography.

e) Cultural:

At present the part of Silesia east of a line north and south of Teschen is undoubtedly under the influence of Polish culture. Down to the eighteenth century it was under the influence of Czech culture and would become a Czech region in a generation, as the Czechs and German employers of labor intend to use Slovak labor in place of the Poles.

Conclusion:

The best solution would appear to be one of a strict ethnic division. In this case the problem is not only complicated by economic, geographical, and administrative obstacles, but by the ethnic character of the district between Friedek and Bielitz. The observer is of the opinion that the inclusion of all the territory west of the railroad (Oderberg–Kaschau) in Czecho-Slovakia and all east of it to Poland and the neutralization of the railroad would be a just decision. It is a compromise between the historic rights of the Czechs and the ethnic rights of the Poles (counting the Silesians as Poles). It is likely that a plebiscite would be in favor of the Czechs in the district of Teschen.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J. KEENER

^{*} For a criticism of this as a basis on which to judge ethnic boundaries see Kerner: *Czech Minorities in Bohemia*. [Footnote in the original; memorandum not found in Department files.]

³⁵ None of the appendices mentioned accompany file copy of this report.

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 46

VIENNA, January 27, 1919.
[Received February 3.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a report by Lieutenant Reginald Foster and a letter from Captain John Karmazin³⁶ concerning the recent occurrences in Austrian Silesia. Lieutenant Foster gave me the first account from Prague by telephone whereupon I told him to come here and he arrived at noon today. The events that he describes are certainly serious and render his position in Poland a most embarrassing one. Lieutenant Frederic King in a private letter to me from Prague makes the interesting remark,

“Both the French and British Ministers think much right is on the side of the Czechs in the affair (as regards the necessity for occupation) but regret the way in which it was done—highhanded and with an unjustified Allied cover.”

The accounts of conditions in the mines under Polish control are as usual conflicting. Accusations have been freely bandied about by both parties. Whatever the reason, the situation was unsatisfactory. The statement in Annex F.³⁷ that the Czech action was taken with the “consent” (I do not feel sure that this is a correct translation of the Czech word used) is puzzling in view of the surprise and wrath of General Pilsudski, Mr. Paderewski and others seen by Lieutenant Foster. Possibly there may be some reference to intrigues with some Polish party leaders. It has been suggested that it was by no mere accident that the sudden armed advance on the part of the Czechs after a wait of about three weeks has occurred just before the Polish

elections of January 26. This may be mere surmise and the connection is not clear, but I thought it worth mentioning.

I do not think that the arrest of Captain Karmazin, although he was in American uniform, need be taken too seriously in view of the fact that there already was an American officer with the Czech forces and that the Poles believed that these foreign officers were really disguised Czechs. It should be remembered that Captain Karmazin is himself of Czech birth and education.

I shall try to follow further developments in the situation with the closest attention.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, January 27, 1919.

Subject: Occupation of the Duchy of Teschen by the Czecho-Slovak troops.

On learning from the Polish Government, on the morning of January 23, that there were difficulties between the Czechs and the Poles in the Duchy of Teschen, it was decided that Lieut. Commander Eawlings, of the British Mission to Poland, and myself should go to that district in order to investigate conditions. On leaving Warsaw that night for Cracow we first heard the reports that there had already been fighting around Oderberg. On January 24th we arrived at Cracow in the morning, and were met by a delegation of the Polish Liquidation Committee, who in conference gave us the first reports of the arrival of a so-called Allied Commission at Teschen and the ultimatum issued by them to the Poles. We immediately got in touch with General Barthelmy, head of the French Military Mission to

Poland, who at that time was in Lemberg, and learned from him that he knew nothing of this "Allied Commission" or authority from the Entente for the occupation of East Silesia by the Czecho-Slovak troops. A copy of a telegram from Col. Wade, Chief of the British Mission to Poland, asking the English member of this so-called Allied Commission at Teschen on what authority he was acting proved that Col. Wade was also not informed in the matter.

We therefore determined to leave at once for Teschen, in order to go further into the question and find out from the "Allied Commission" itself on what authority it was acting. We left Cracow by automobile at 2 P.M. and arrived at Teschen at 6 o'clock, going at once to the office of the National Council of Teschen, where we interviewed the president of this council and Col. Latinik, commanding the Polish troops in this region. A copy of the statement made by Col. Latinik at that time is attached hereto as Appendix A.³⁸ From these gentlemen we learned that the headquarters of this "Allied Commission" was at Mährisch-Ostrau and that telephonic communication with them was still possible. Commander Rawlings therefore immediately telephoned to Major Crossfield, the English representative on this "Allied Commission" and stated to him that we were anxious to confer with his commission at once, and suggested that pending this conference hostilities should be suspended from 10 o'clock that evening until 10 o'clock the next evening. To this the Colonel of the Polish troops agreed, but the Colonel commanding the Czech troops refused to suspend hostilities for this period, stating that he would agree to such an armistice only from 10 P.M. to 10 A.M. the following morning, and in further conversation he shortened this period to 4 A.M. He also stated that he could not guarantee safe passage through the lines that night. The question of an armistice was therefore given up, but it was arranged that we be given safe passage across the lines between 9:30 and 10 o'clock the next morning.

On Saturday, January 25th, we left Teschen by automobile for Mährisch-Ostrau, arriving at 10:30 A.M., where we met Major Crossfield of the "Allied Commission", who collected the other members of the "Allied Commission" for a conference at the Hotel National. The following gentlemen were present at this conference:

Lieut. Col. Gillain, (French), Commanding the Czecho-Slovak troops in that region;
Lieut. Col. Snyderak, (French, of Czech extraction), Military Inspector of the District;
Major Nosedá, (Italian);
Lieut. Voska, (American);
Major Crossfield, (English);
Capt. Karmazin, (American Peace Commission);
Commander Rawlings, (of the British Mission to Poland); and
Lieut. Foster, (of the American Peace Commission).

In view of the action taken by this so-called Allied Commission as outlined to us by Col. Latinik, Commander Rawlings and myself pointed out the difficulty of the representatives of the Entente in Poland, and asked on what authority this group of officers had acted in the name of the Entente. The question was put separately to each member, and the following answers were given:

Lieut. Col. Gillain—under orders of Col. Phillipe, French Colonel commanding the division of Czecho-Slovak Legionaire[s];
Lieut. Col. Snyderak—the Czecho-Slovak Government;
Major Nosedá—the Czecho-Slovak Government;
Lieut. Voska—orders from Capt. Voska, and on direct question who Capt. Voska represented, he stated “The American Peace Commission.”
Major Crossfield—the Czecho-Slovak Government.

They were then asked if in their knowledge this action on the part of the Czecho-Slovak Government had been ordered or authorized by the Entente governments. This question was again put individually and the answer by all of the officers was that they did not know. We then brought up the extraordinary position in which the name of the Entente powers had been placed, and asked what steps could be taken to bring about an immediate cessation of the fighting between the Czecho-Slovak troops and the Polish troops. It was stated that such action could only be taken by higher authorities at Prague. Commander Rawlings and myself therefore decided to leave at the earliest possible moment for Prague, and a special train was placed at our disposal.

On Sunday morning, January 26, we arrived in Prague and got in touch at once with Col. Phillipe, who stated he had received his orders from the Czecho-Slovak Government and advised that we see President Masaryk, of the Czecho-Slovak Government, at once. He asked also that we talk with the French Minister. A resume of our conversation with the French Minister is attached hereto, (Appendix B); and of our conversation with President Masaryk, (Appendix C). It having been learned from these gentlemen that the officers signing themselves as the Entente Commission were acting without authority from the Entente, after discussing the matter with the English Minister it was decided that Commander Rawlings should send an open telegram to Col. Wade, chief of the British Mission to Poland, at Warsaw, stating that President Masaryk disclaimed all authority for their action, and that they were acting only as officers attached to Czecho-Slovak troops. This telegram we hoped would assist Col. Wade in clearing up the situation of the Entente representatives stationed in Poland. A copy of this telegram is attached hereto (Appendix D). As a result of these conferences the following may be stated as the steps taken in this occupation of Eastern Silesia by the Czecho-Slovak troops. The Czecho-Slovak Government had determined that this step was necessary, and after discussion with the French Minister word was sent to the French Government asking the permission of the Entente. This request was sent approximately three weeks ago but the Czechs had become very restless on receiving no answer from the French Government, and had ordered troops to proceed to Mährisch-Ostrau on Saturday, January 18, when the French Minister received word from his government that in their opinion it was advisable that this district of East Silesia be held by French troops and a detachment was consequently being sent at once. This information he transmitted at once to the Czecho-Slovak Government and on the same day Mr. Stepanik, of their Foreign Office, returned from Paris bearing the same dispatch. In view of this message the French Minister and Mr. Stepanik both counselled patience on the part of the Czecho-Slovak Government and the troops were not dispatched until the following Wednesday, when evidently the Government made up their mind to wait no longer. On Thursday, January 23, with troops concentrated at Mährisch-Ostrau and plans fully made for the occupation of the mining districts of East Silesia, the "Entente officers" mentioned above were asked by

the Czecho-Slovak Government to go to the Polish authorities at Teschen (posing as an Entente Commission) to request the immediate evacuation of this territory. The various members of this commission stated that they took this action in the hopes that bloodshed might be avoided and the matter settled peaceably by negotiation. However, it may be stated that there could have been very little idea of negotiation when troops were already massed on the Polish frontier and plans laid for occupation at 2 o'clock that afternoon, and when this "Allied Commission" stated that unless the Polish authorities accepted their proposition by that time the country would be occupied by force. Professor Kerner, of the American Peace Commission, was in conference with the Polish authorities when the "Commission" arrived, and he states that Major Crossfield said to him "We are going to order them out". Professor Kerner and Capt. Karmazin, on receipt of this information, immediately left, with the approval of Major Crossfield. It was very clear that this "Allied Commission" had hoped to force the Poles to accept the evacuation of this territory by the appearance of acting in the name of the Entente. Posters signed by them, which must have been previously printed, (Appendix E) were placed in districts occupied by their troops, and announcements in the paper (Appendix F) show that every effort was made to bring out the fact that the manoeuvre was favored by the Entente powers. It has been learned that on leaving Teschen after delivering their ultimatum, the French Colonel sent a telegram to Mährisch-Ostrau ordering the troops to advance within an hour, the statement being made by Lieut. Voska to us that this telegram was sent *en clair* in the hopes of scaring the Poles into accepting their conditions. From the various reports we have not been able to ascertain the exact hour in which the Czecho-Slovak troops crossed the frontier, but it is sufficiently certain to state that they crossed the Polish frontier into Eastern Silesia before the time stated in the ultimatum of the "Allied Commission" to the Polish authorities. On leaving Teschen Lieut. Voska joined the Czecho-Slovak troops and took part in the command of them in the occupation of Oderberg and other villages up as far and including Freistadt, and showed to us two empty cartridges that he had fired against the Polish troops. Figures as to the casualties on both sides have not been accurately determined. The Poles also reported that at 9 o'clock on Thursday morning the telephone and telegraph

communications through Oderberg had been stopped by the Czecho-Slovaks, which would indicate that preparatory steps were being taken even before the appearance of the "Allied Commission" at Teschen. The impression given to the Polish authorities by this commission is clearly shown by the fact that they telegraphed to Warsaw that an ultimatum for the evacuation of Eastern Silesia had been presented to them by Czech officers dressed in Allied uniforms; and the answer from Warsaw was that "these would-be Allied officers" should be sent at once to Warsaw, and to answer all violence with violence.

Capt. Karmazin, of the American Peace Commission, who happened to be in Teschen at the time, was also put under arrest immediately following the departure of the "Allied Commission", but on showing his papers to the Colonel of the Polish troops it was quickly proved that he had no connection with these officers, and he was released with apologies, and taken through the streets in an automobile in company with the Polish Colonel.

This whole incident has placed the representatives of the Entente in Poland in a very embarrassing position, and it has been absolutely proved by statements of President Masaryk, the English Minister and the French Minister in Prague, that no authorization of the step by the Entente powers had been given, and President Masaryk emphatically stated that the step had been decided upon by the Czecho-Slovak Government, who acted with his entire accord and approval.

R. C. FOSTER

³⁶ Letter from Captain Karmazin not attached to file copy of this document.

³⁷ Not attached to file copy of this document.

³⁸ None of the appendices mentioned are attached to file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/46

[Document 109]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 50

VIENNA, January 29, 1919.

SIRS: I have the honor to report that since writing my Dispatch No. 46³⁹ I have seen Major Schelling, who had come down from Warsaw, and Mr. Hugh Gibson who has come here from Prague (both of them attached to the Food Commission). Neither had much to add on the subject of the fighting between the Poles and Czechs in Eastern Silesia. At last accounts this fighting was still going on. The Polish troops have been aided by a considerable number of volunteers from the mining population, but they are still being driven back. There seems little doubt that the stiffness of the resistance put up by them was not expected. Indeed Colonel Gillain told Mr. Gibson that the foreign officers had thought that the Poles would leave when ordered out. In view of the fact that this matter had been hanging fire about three weeks, as stated by the French Minister, it is easy to understand why the Czechs have been unwilling to permit the importation of arms and munitions from both Austria and Hungary into Poland for use against the Bolshevists. The fact of this refusal has been confirmed to me from several sources.

I inclose herewith a number of annexes.⁴⁰ Number 1 is of course incorrect in several particulars, but I put it in as showing how the news was given to the public in the best known Vienna newspaper. I think the English Commission referred to in it was really some Americans under the orders of Mr. Creel.⁴¹

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

³⁹ *Ante*, p. 317 [*Pg. 317 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)*].

⁴⁰ None printed.

⁴¹ Chairman of the Committee on Public Information.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/51

[Document 110]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 54

VIENNA, January 31, 1919.
[Received February 6.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that since my Dispatch No. 46,⁴² I have not received any additional information on the subject of the recent fighting in Austrian Silesia, which I trust may have now come to an end. I inclose herewith a note sent to Warsaw⁴³ just before the Czech troops were set in motion. The Polish Government was not left sufficient time to yield even if it had desired to do so. The assertion has been made that the chief reason for this precipitation was the desire to occupy the district before it could elect members to the new Polish National Assembly, thereby testifying to its Polish nationality.

In a conversation I had yesterday with Mr. Tusar, the Czech-Slovak Minister here, he intimated that the fact that the Czechs were going to take action was known and approved in Paris by the Entente, but said that formal permission could not be given because Poland was an Allied nation. Some days ago, officials of the Western Galician Republic told me that in their efforts to get representatives to Paris they had been aided by Mr. Tusar, who had enabled them to send one man to Switzerland and two to Italy. None of these men, however, have been able to get further. This story, if known, would doubtless be regarded as another proof of Czech hostility to the Poles. It is no secret I believe that the Government at Prague refused to permit the shipping of arms and ammunition from Austria to Poland; or prevented it by delay, which is not surprising in view of what was in the wind. I inclose copies of a memorandum⁴⁴ that has come into my possession in regard to similar dealings with Hungary.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

⁴² *Ante*, p. 317 [*Pg. 317 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)*].

⁴³ Not printed.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/61

[Document 111]

Lieutenant Frederic R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge[45](#)

No. 24

PRAGUE, January 29, 1919.

Subject: Report of Mr. Van Svarc regarding Teschen. (American newspaper correspondent.)

Mr. Svarc who arrived this morning in Prague from Teschen gave us the following account of events which took place in Teschen from Sunday morning to Tuesday afternoon. He said in substance as follows:

“On Sunday morning the Poles had made all arrangements to get out of the town entirely and then they began a systematic hunt of all Czechs of any prominence in order that they might ship them away from Teschen as hostages. I was informed that about twenty of them were gathered together at Teschen and about forty more from the neighboring towns and villages and all these with the exception of two who managed to escape in the confusion on the way to the railroad station were put aboard the train and sent eastward, the report being that they were being sent to Cracow.

Sunday night rumors spread that the Czecho-Slovaks would be in Teschen by midnight, but they did not come, however, until Monday, when at 12.15 in the afternoon the first automobile, bearing their officers and guard, arrived in the square. I happened to be near the railroad station when they arrived and heard the rousing cheers with which the people received them. In half an hour later the first Czechoslovak troops entered the town proceeding to the public square, and from that time on until 8 o'clock in the evening they kept

arriving. They were not molested in any manner whatsoever and all kept marching toward the public square where they concentrated. About two o'clock Monday afternoon the Czecho-Slovaks placed their flag on the tower of the city hall while the troops sang the Czech national hymn. When this ceremony was over rousing cheers were given by the populace that had gathered there.

On Tuesday morning I heard rumors that the Poles had retired from Teschen in order to organize a counter-attack, but from inquiries which I made and information which I was able to gather, I am convinced that they have no such motive in view. I also heard rumors that the Poles intended to come back in force within two months, but I do not place any credence in that story because the Czecho-Slovaks once in Teschen would be able to hold the town from a military point of view as they have the necessary troops to garrison it, and have the guns, artillery and ammunition as well.

From the information I could gather regarding the Polish troops I firmly believe that they have no intention to offer any resistance to the Czecho-Slovak Army, as their morale is of a very low order and the troops made up of men whose only reason for being in the Polish Army is the fact that they have practically nothing to do and receive three meals a day. I was told that the only resistance offered to the Czecho-Slovak troops at Karvin and Dombrova was on the part of civilians who had been surreptitiously armed by agitators, but there was no active resistance offered by the Polish troops who immediately fled upon the coming of the Czechs. I tried to learn the motive for the arming of these irresponsible civilians, who were principally miners, and was told from several sources that this arming was probably done by the manager of the Count Larisch estate. The Count Larisch Estate has large holdings in coal mines and property at Karvin and they were afraid that the Czecho-Slovak Republic would condemn their property for the benefit of the state.

The rumors regarding the number killed run as high as 300 on the Polish side (British and French soldiers confirm this report). There were two Czecho-Slovak officers and a French captain killed, and also 18 Czecho-Slovak soldiers.

In this connection I think it would be well to explain the underlying causes of the so-called resistance at Karvin. Both Reger and Rev. Lonzdin, who are members of the Polish National Council at Teschen, for weeks have been carrying on propaganda among the miners in that place and the workmen throughout the district generally. This propaganda led to Bolshevik outbreaks. These men were promising the workmen what they knew could not be fulfilled, namely; a six hour working day for miners, at high wages. Also that they would receive food-stuffs at nominal prices, flour for instance, at 3 K. per kilo. They also told them that the woods on the large estates in the neighborhood would be the property of the people if the Polish representatives should be in power there. These statements and the constant baiting of the Czecho-Slovaks on the part of the Polish agitators led the workmen to believe that their interests lay in opposing the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This opposition on the part of the so-called Polish workmen at Karvin was not merely nationalistic but socialistic or bolshevistic as well.

I was told that for weeks constant burning of the forests had been going on, that the forest keepers had been driven off and refused to return because they claimed that their life was in danger, and at the same time the Polish Government did not interfere with these depredations and anarchy which was fast increasing, because to do so would have weakened their position and they would have had to retract their course with regard to the broad promises they had been making. It was this spirit of anarchy that was fast gaining ascendancy that was endangering life and property in this neighborhood and causing in the minds of the merchants of Teschen a fear of the future.

This same spirit had brought down the coal production to probably 50% of what it had been before the Polish National Council had begun to interfere.”

FREDERIC R. KING

⁴⁵ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 60, February 5; received February 12.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/61

[Document 112]

***Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C.
Coolidge***[46](#)

No. 14

PRAGUE, February 3, 1919.

Subject: Bolshevism in Bohemia.

About two months ago there returned from Russia to Bohemia many of the most dangerous Bolsheviks who came directly from Moscow and who were equipped for propaganda purposes with large sums of money. Under the auspices of Russian Bolsheviks, headquarters for furthering this movement were established at Cracow, Budapest, Vienna and Prague. The Bolshevik movement in the Czecho-Slovak Republic is lead by Muna who has a notorious reputation in Russia where he informed on the Czecho-Slovak troops and opposed them in every way possible, together with his assistants, Konichek, Knoflicek, Hulan and Hais. They are all former Austrian prisoners of war in Russia, of Bohemian nationality, and are fully experienced in methods of Bolshevik propaganda. The principal places of their activity have been in the coal mining districts of northern Bohemia, Kladno and Mäh-risch-Ostrau (especially in the Karvin coal district of northern Moravia). The social democratic daily newspaper, *Pravo Lidu* (People's Rights) defended them against criticism and attack and aided in their propaganda until the attempt was made to assassinate Dr. Kramar, the Premier, when public opinion forced this newspaper to change its attitude. This attempted assassination seems also to have turned the people from Bolshevism and had a sobering effect upon the radicals generally as it came to be realized that this propaganda was leading them into chaos and destruction. On the occurrence of this mad act many social democrats destroyed their membership cards vowing openly that they could never again belong to a party whose official organ (*The Pravo Lidu*) espoused a cause which led to such eventualities. A strong counter-propaganda

was undertaken in which Major Spacek of the Czecho-Slovak Army in Russia and Captain Voska, U.S.A., did effective work.

Another dangerous element that leans toward Bolshevism is composed of the demoralized soldiers of the old Austrian Army, which includes deserters, common thieves and escaped prisoners. They are too lazy to work and the government simply keeps them in barracks under close surveillance to prevent them from doing any mischief.

In a conversation which I had with President Masaryk, he informed me that the government cannot take any severe repressive measures until food and raw materials are received from the United States.

Some of the Bolshevik propagandists are under arrest, but Muna is still free though among the working men generally he is discredited.

JOHN KARMAZIN

⁴⁶ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 60, February 5; received February 12.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/62

[Document 113]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 61

VIENNA, February 5, 1919.
[Received February 12.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I have just returned from Prague where I spent nearly three days. During that time I saw President Masaryk twice, on the second occasion I lunched with him and had a conversation afterwards. In general he seemed to me rather tired and nervous and he spoke of not being able to sleep at the time of the recent fighting about Teschen. This question, which I shall report on separately, has evidently been much on his mind. He dwelt on the breaking of the agreement made by Messrs. Paderewski and Dmowski with him, indeed he repeated the story two or three times. He also talked of the necessity for the Czechs to get the mines at Karvin, not only to procure the coal that the Allies were demanding of Bohemia, but also to check the Bolshevism that was rampant at Karvin and that was infecting the workmen in the Czech mines. Somehow I gathered the impression that in the affair he had been led rather than he had taken the lead himself, and he was evidently unhappy about the whole matter.

President Masaryk also took up the question of the historic boundaries of Bohemia and declared that the Czechs must have them, indeed that they are prepared to fight for them even if the decision of the Entente is unfavorable to their claims. When I questioned him a little he admitted that certain districts might be conceded without serious loss. He said he believes in the principle of self-determination, but that in the German Bohemian districts there are many Czechs whose interests must be considered and whom the Germans could not be trusted to treat fairly. He admitted that many of these Czechs were recent immigrants to the mines, but said that in

these democratic days the miners had as good a right to be protected as the land owners or anyone else.

In speaking of Slovakia the President admitted that the Czechs were at present occupying certain territories which were almost purely Hungarian, but he rather intimated that the final boundaries there were still unsettled.

He spoke with some bitterness of what he called the dishonesty of the Hungarians, instancing that the Hungarian Government had recently appealed to the Austro-Hungarian Bank for a sum of 2,000,000,000 kronen, which had been allotted to Hungary from the last general loan, but had not yet been handed over to them. They are now asking for the whole of this sum regardless of the fact that their country is now much reduced in territory and has, therefore, no right to more than its share in proportion to its size. He added that the bank had prepared to hand over the whole sum of the money if the Czecho-Slovak Government had not protested. The President also referred to the way in which Austria had stripped Bohemia during the course of the war and spoke of her unwillingness to liquidate and give back many things to which the Czechs were entitled.

Finally President Masaryk more than once expressed his hope that the United States would soon appoint a regular minister to Bohemia.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/63

[Document 114]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 62

VIENNA, February 5, 1919.
[Received February 12.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that on my recent visit to Prague I have had the opportunity to hear the opinions of President Masaryk, Mr. Stepanik, Director of Foreign Affairs, and several other people on the question of the recent conflict between the Czechs and Poles in Austrian-Silesia. The Czechs dwelt particularly on the historic rights, on the violation by the Poles of their agreement, on the necessity for heightened production, on the danger of Bolshevism and other arguments well known to the Commission. On the other hand they said little of the reasons that prompted them to take action at the time they did, except to make the general remark that they could stand the situation no longer. It is pretty clear that they hoped, to put it colloquially, to bluff the Poles out of the contested region without fighting, and were surprised as well as troubled by the Polish resistance. While carefully avoiding any official statement which could be construed as a claim that they were acting with the consent of the powers of the Entente, the Czech Government made use of legionaries, that is to say, soldiers who have actually fought in the Entente armies, who wear the French uniform and are often popularly called Entente soldiers. President Masaryk admitted to me that these men were sent in the hope that the Poles would not oppose them. It was also with the same idea, I feel sure, that a group of foreign officers, including one from our own army, were allowed and probably encouraged, though they may not have been authorized, to summon the Poles to retire; and also post, over their own signatures, proclamations exhorting the population not to resist. When contrary to expectations the Poles did resist, though the fighting itself was trifling, and when there followed great excitement in Poland and stir

elsewhere the Czechoslovak Government seems to have become alarmed. A little over a week ago President Masaryk told Lieut. Foster that the Czechs were determined to push matters to the end and indeed not to stop until they reached the frontier of Galacia [*Silesia?*]. They have now by the terms of the armistice accepted and contented themselves with their first gains, and their attitude is that they had not intended to go any farther. President Masaryk went so far as to say that though Eastern Silesia historically belonged to Bohemia it was not of much importance nor did the Czechs lay great insistence on its possession. I believe that Mr. Stepanik, Director of Foreign Affairs, was opposed to the action taken by his government, but he did not betray this in the conversation I had with him.

I inclose herewith a copy, taken from the *Narodni Listy* of February 4, of the military conventions signed for cessation of hostilities. President Masaryk's secretary assures me the terms given in the paper are correct.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

PRAGUE, February 4, 1919.

PRESS

FROM THE "NARODNI LISTY", FEBRUARY 4, 1919

Terms of Armistice With Poles

1. Armistice to last seven days, beginning Feb. 4, 1919 at midnight, and will be automatically prolonged by 7 days.
2. The opposing forces to remain in the positions held by them on January 30, 1919.
3. Diplomatic representatives of both nations are allowed free passage through Silesia, including territory occupied by the

armies. Polish diplomats must pass through Mährisch-Ostrau, and Czech diplomats through Trebine.

4. All prisoners of war and all interned civilians will be well treated and well fed.
5. Communication between Bohumin and Dziedzice is to be reopened with control at Pruchne. The road Teschen, Skocov, Istebra, Jablunkov cannot be used except by permission of the commander at Teschen.

Made at Teschen and Skocov, February 3, 1919.

LATINIK
Brig. Gen. Polish Army
SNEJDAREK
Col. Czech Army

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/68

[Document 115]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 66

VIENNA, February 5, 1919.
[Received February 12.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that during my recent stay in Prague I gathered certain general impressions from the people whom I talked with, most of them being officials. In the time at my disposal it seemed not worth while to go outside.

The new Czecho-Slovak Government are struggling with difficulties of many sorts and they are much hampered by the fact that they have had, at short notice, to create a new organization from whatever material they had at hand. Many of the people are, therefore, quite without previous experience in the tasks which they now have to perform, and the whole machine is an imperfect one. Nevertheless they are full of determination, courage and believe in the success and prosperity of the Czecho-Slovak state when once they have got over their present crisis. They complain of the lack of food and are quick to protest against the belief that Bohemia has more to eat and is better off than Austria, and even seem to parade their difficulties.

They dwell with bitterness on the way in which Bohemia had been stripped of everything during the war and on the centralization of materials in Vienna. I have no idea how much of this stripping and centralization were due to the inevitable necessities of the struggle and how much to special harsh treatment of Bohemia, which no doubt took place.

Generally I was struck with the bitterness, even hate, with which the people talked of Vienna as being a parasite which had long lived from the toil of foreign nations and well deserved the trouble that had now come to it.

One result of the war which in Bohemia and elsewhere is exciting much apprehension is the unwillingness of many of the returned soldiers and others to do their former amount, indeed even a small amount of work. There are many unemployed and there is work especially in the country for which it is impossible to find labor.

Bolshevism has undoubtedly obtained a certain foothold among the Czech workmen, estimates as to its strength varies and the truth is hard enough to ascertain, especially as the term "Bolshevism" is very loosely used. The government, I believe, are confident that they can keep it down and hold their own if only they can have enough food and can tide over the present critical situation and also if Bolshevism does not sweep away the countries round about.

The Czechs seem to regard the question of the boundaries of Bohemia and Slovakia as being practically settled to their satisfaction even though they have not yet been formally ratified by the conference. They are confident in their ability to control, placate and in due time absorb the foreign elements in their new population. In general in spite of the difficulties that beset them they are still aglow with their triumph and confidence in their future. I have not seen any traces of any particular desire for a Danube confederation although theoretically the Czecho-Slovaks would not be opposed to it on their own terms.

I have taken up certain other questions in separate reports.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/99

[Document 116]

Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge[47](#)

[VIENNA,] February 15, 1919.

Subject: Reasons given by the Czecho-Slovaks for their stamping of the bank-notes in Czecho-Slovakia.

Interview with Minister Tusar and Dr. Venicek, Finance Commissioner, representing Czecho-Slovakia at the Austro-Hungarian Bank.

The principal reasons for the stamping of the banknotes by the Czecho-Slovakia Government are, first, to eliminate the new country from the combined bankruptcy of the other states of the former Dual Monarchy; and, second, to protect the industrial and financial system of Czecho-Slovakia. The Dual Monarchy had on October 31, 1918, a debt of 130,000,000,000 kronen. Of this amount 101,000,000,000 were incurred during the war. Therefore, prior to this the country had a debt of about 29,000,000,000 kronen. From statistics we find that over one-half of the wealth of the Dual Monarchy is in debt.

Valuta Frage:

At the beginning of the war there were 2,500,000,000 kronen in circulation, but the circulation has increased tremendously during the four and one half years of the war so that at the beginning of 1918 it amounted to 36,000,000,000. During the last year alone 18,000,000,000 were printed. There are at the present time ten or twelve billion kronen banknotes in Czecho-Slovakia, about 1,200,000,000 in Ukrainia, and about 800,000,000 in Serbia. Poland has a great amount of banknotes, while the foreign countries

are supposed to hold approximately 500,000,000 in Austrian banknotes. All of these lump sums were exported to other countries so as to increase the value of the krone. The Czechs opposed greatly the increase of the paper currency, but had no power to stop it although they held one-third of the shares of the stock of the Austro-Hungarian Bank in their hands. They had no representative in the directory of the Austro-Hungarian Bank before and during the war. On October 31, 1918, the Austrian Government had very little money, and the expenses of the demobilization began. Dr. Redlich, then Finance Minister, through the Austro-Hungarian Bank had 2,000,000,000 notes printed, and was supported by the country in general. This amount, however, lasted only until the middle of December, and then again the Government was obliged to look for more funds. They took the measure of selling the army supplies, and other measures of the same type to pay partly the coupons of the other loan and the pensions due. On January 1st, only 100,000,000 kronen were left of that amount, which was supposed to last until the end of January. In December the Austro-Hungarian Bank asked for permission to print further 2,000,000,000 kronen, and to the protests of the Czecho-Slovak Government they gave the reason that the old Parliament had authorized the Austro-Hungarian Bank to print 12,000,000,000 kronen. Redlich had used 10,000,000,000, so that they asked to have the other 2,000,000,000 printed. The Czechs, who since the revolution were represented by a commissioner, gave their veto to increasing further the banknotes. However, this was of no avail, as during the month of December 1,200,000,000 kronen notes were printed, and up to the present time since October 31, 3,000,000,000 new notes were put in circulation. The Magyars as their part of the authorized 12,000,000,000 issue, claimed 34 percent, of it, and were not opposed because of favorable agricultural conditions, and the Ausgleich etc. Austria itself took 66 percent. Hungary, however, left her part largely untouched. Soon after the revolution they demanded their share. The Czecho-Slovaks, the Jugo-Slavs, and the Rumanians put in a veto for their share of these notes because they hold occupied sections and maintained that the present government is not the same as the old. To this the Magyars objected and declared that their government assumes the responsibilities of the old and is entitled to these notes. This means that the present Magyar

Government assumes responsibility not only for the debts but for the indemnity which Austria-Hungary is expected to pay. These are some of the reasons which cause the Czechs to fear the financial government, and saw in it positive future bankruptcy. Again, the Government, through the Austro-Hungarian Bank, issued Kassenchaine, which were substituted in part for the banknotes, and were to be used mostly by the commercial companies. One quarter billion of these Kassenchaine were printed immediately and then increased so that by the 15th of March 1919, combining them with the regular Austro-Hungarian banknotes and the banknotes issued by the private banks, the sum of paper money printed in the old Dual Monarchy would approach the sum of 50,000,000,000 kronen.

War Bonds:

The bank lombarded the war bonds up to 75 percent, of their real value. The Czechs from the beginning did not want to buy war bonds, in fact they did not trust in them but, against their own will, they were forced to purchase them. Austrian speculators soon began to go to Bohemia and bought their war bonds at the price of from 62 to 66 kronen and returned to Vienna, where they were able to get 75 kronen on a 100 kronen bond as loan, thus making a good profit. In other words, the war bonds were greatly speculated in during the war. The main reason why the Czechs sold the war bonds was, as said above, that they did not trust them and preferred the banknotes, although of very little value. Secondly, the Czechs saw that there was great danger in remaining any longer in a financial combination with German Austria, Hungary, Poland and Ukrainia, and therefore they preferred to withdraw before the general bankruptcy came, which was only a matter of time.

New Valuta:

The Czechs are now ready to export goods, namely sugar, china, etc., and are anxious to have their own currency and as soon as possible be able to balance it to a better value. They see at this time an opportune moment to withdraw from the financial combination and stamp the kronen held by the people in Czecho-Slovakia. The exportation to Switzerland, Italy, etc., would of course raise the value

of the krone, and if stamped in time the difference in the exchange would only be to the profit of the Prague Government and not in Vienna or Budapest. The krone value in Zurich at present is around 26 francs, and as we know very well it will go down further, mainly on account of the continued printing of the kronen. But this will only happen in the case of the countries where no stamping has as yet been done. Therefore, to protect their own industrial and financial system, the Czecho-Slovaks intend to stamp their own money. It is expected that the difference between the Jugo-Slavs' and the Czechs' stamping will be great. That is, the Czechs appear to be thinking over the matter in a more intelligent and practical manner. The Finance Minister of the Czechs collected the extra floating banknotes, about two billion, as a loan and prepared that amount ready to stamp for circulation. The probable method will be to exchange all the small notes at once, while great amounts will only be paid in half. This is only for the present moment. The people have not paid any taxes for a number of years, quite contrary to the English system where some of the war industries were taxed about 80 percent. The government therefore expects to tax the war made rich when they come to have their notes stamped. By changing the notes the Finance Minister will be able to determine who holds the money of the land and tax accordingly. Of course, many wealthy people will escape their full quota of taxes because during the war they bought jewels and real property to a large extent and believed that it would not be taxable. The present circulation of banknotes is, as I have already said, from ten to twelve billions, but it is predicted that circulation will be made smaller. However, this will have to be done in a careful manner, as there may be an unhealthy shrinkage which may cause a crisis. The best way out would be to issue *rentes* or government bonds for the remainder not paid out. Dr. Preiss, in Paris, dealt with the Dutch, the Americans and the French and is reported to have obtained a gold loan, so that Dr. Rasin when informed of it went ahead and had the arrangements made for the stamping of the notes. It is believed that probably at a later date the exchange of the Czech currency will rise to the equivalent of the French franc and that the new franc value will replace the old stamped kronen.

H. G. CAMPAGNOLI

⁴⁷ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 88, February 17; received February 24.

Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 89

VIENNA, February 17, 1919.
[Received February 24.]

SIRS: I have the honor to inclose herewith a report (with annexes) of Professor Robert J. Kerner on the subject of "Deutsch-Böhmen with especial reference to the Brüx-Teplitz Coal Region". I am making some comment on this report, and I should like to refer back for another point of view to my own Dispatch No. 10 of January 12th⁴⁸ on the feelings of the Austrians on the subject of German Bohemia.

My first criticism of Professor Kerner's report is his title and the way that he tends to confound two separate things. That is to say "German Bohemia", a queer mis-shapen geographic entity which as he says has no basis in history or in law, and "German Bohemia" in the sense of the parts of Bohemia inhabited by the Germans, which has very distinct and in some ways well founded claims. While the Austrian Empire was a single state with a centralized administration and no internal customs barriers, it is comprehensible that the German population of Bohemia, especially of late years has demanded with increasing insistence a division of the country into separate Czech and German "circles" (*Kreiseinteilung*) and, violently as the Czechs opposed this plan for national reasons, it was economically and administratively feasible, not to say defensible. Today it is easy to point out that German Bohemia by itself looks contrary to all laws of geography and economics and that even joined as a unit to Austria it would form a distorted appendage, but these are not the only alternatives. Many, if not most, German Bohemians care little about maintaining a difficult and artificial unity between the separate portions of their territory provided only they can be parts of the same general whole, and even if it is impossible,

provided they can be united with brethren of their own nationality. All this Professor Kerner barely suggests.

From a geographical point of view there are no difficulties to a union of the German speaking regions of Southern Bohemia and Moravia to the adjacent territories of Upper and Lower Austria with which they have always been closely connected and where the present boundaries are for the most part the result of historical accident. In the northwest, the Eger Territory, which was not part of the original Bohemian State, could go without difficulty to Bavaria. The Sudetenland in the east would fit in well with Prussian Silesia, and its loss would not seriously impair the natural geographic frontiers of Bohemia. By far the most difficult and important question is that of Northern Bohemia. Here is where the largest and most important block of German speaking territory is to be found. It might conceivably be annexed to Saxony or made a separate state in the new German Republic, but, owing to its barrier of mountains, it would seem to belong by clear geographic law to Bohemia and not to Saxony. Without it Bohemia would lose her obvious natural frontiers as much as Hungary would without Slovakia—a parallel, by the way, which the Czechs do not like to admit but which is continually being thrown in their faces. Northern Bohemia is also the seat of the recent great development of industry. It is economically the most valuable part of the country. We can understand the Czech determination not to let go of it under any circumstances. I should like, in this connection, to call particular attention to Annex No. 23⁴⁹ to Professor Kerner's report.

It is in this region of Northern Bohemia that for economic reasons there has been in recent years the greatest increase of the Czech population, especially in the Brůx-Teplitz district to which Professor Kerner makes special reference in his report, thereby, it seems to me, tending slightly to confuse still further the general issue. No one questions the right of the Czechs to go there in as large numbers as they want, but to call the coming of the Germans “a later infiltration” and that of the Czechs “re-immigration” is an unjustified play on words. We might just as well term the coming of the Germans in the 13th century a “re-immigration” because, as Professor Kerner himself states, there were Germans in Bohemia seven hundred years

earlier. In point of fact, the much disputed question as to the antiquity of various Germanic or Slavic settlements in the country is not a matter that need be taken seriously except by the conscientious historian. Both peoples have been there centuries enough to have well established claims, and their opposing claims must be decided on other grounds. Professor Kerner points out, as do other writers on the Czech side, the interdependence of the different parts of Bohemia, and he uses the familiar and obvious arguments in that connection. Among the replies made to those arguments are that they fail to take into account changed political conditions and the larger factors of the world situation. It is by no means certain that in future the industries of Northern Bohemia, if included in Germany, could not compete with those of other parts, though doubtless some of the manufacturers will suffer in the process. Nor is it sure that German laborers could not be found to take the place of Czechs. The real answer to that should be "What are the desires of the people themselves?" What do they think best, and not what do others think best for them; and here Professor Kerner frankly admits that they would vote for separation. There are strong arguments for the thesis that the possession of German Northern Bohemia is "vitally necessary" for the prosperity of the future Czecho-Slovakia. It only weakens the case to insist that it would be for the good of the Germans themselves. Such arguments have been used against every discontented people.

Finally, it may be admitted that the Austrian statistics of nationality for 1910 are neither fair nor exact, and I think we may expect quite different results when the Czechs have made, as they are doing in some cases, a census of their own. All those who are unfairly counted by prejudiced or dishonest authorities, those who were afraid to confess their true nationality, and those who did not care were formerly reckoned as Germans. They will now appear as Czechs. But whether the census will be more impartially conducted than before and will give a fairer idea of the proportion of the two nationalities, is perhaps open to question. All we can say is that the errors will be on the other side. Even Professor Kerner's statement about the extraordinary increase of Czech children in the schools, his statement I have heard confirmed by President Masaryk himself, loses some of its force in view of the rumors one hears of the closing

or transfer of German schools, as well as other measures of Czechisation which are now going on.

The above remarks are not meant as a wholesale condemnation of Professor Kerner's point of view. Especially on the question of the treatment of minorities he is most liberal, but I have been asked to criticize his reports with particular care and in consequence I am doing so.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Professor R. J. Kerner to Professor A. C. Coolidge

[Undated.]

Subject: Deutsch-Böhmen with especial reference to the Brüx-Teplitz coal region.

Explanatory Note.

Within the space usually allotted to reports such as this it is possible only to outline general ideas and to support them here and there by references to special detail included in the appendix.⁵⁰ To discuss the problem in detail or to exhaust the material in the appendix would require several reports like the one which follows.

In this report the writer hopes to convey the impressions which he has received as a result of the study of the problem in the field and through its contemporary literature, as well as through conferences with various German and Czech political and business leaders.

I Historical Basis.

Deutsch-Böhmen, as a separate political entity, has no basis in history or in law.

It was demanded by some German leaders in 1848, but it was opposed by others who belonged to the Pan-German party. The idea was not taken up again until the late eighties and nineties of the last century when it became certain that the Germans could no longer obtain a majority of the Bohemian Diet.

Until the present war, it remained a movement which aspired to divide Bohemia into a German and a Czech Bohemia purely for administrative matters. In other words, it was not a movement to divide Bohemia politically into two crown lands. This movement was opposed by two powerful forces: first, the natural geographic and economic unity of Bohemia; and second, the determined resistance of some Germans and most of the Czechs who stood on the basis of historic boundaries and refused to allow Bohemia to be divided even administratively.

Pacher incorrectly maintains that the electoral law of 1907 (for the Austrian Parliament) laid the legal basis for Deutsch-Böhmen. This law was never intended for such a purpose, and it is not so considered by the acknowledged leaders of the movement, Lodgman and Seliger.

In short, Deutsch-Böhmen, taken as a whole, has no historic rights, nor can it assert them against the acknowledged historic rights of the Bohemian crown i. e. Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. The former duchy of Eger alone may lay some claim to recognition in this way.

II *Ethnographic Basis.*

If Deutsch-Böhmen has no historic rights, it may be truthfully asserted that it has ethnic rights. It includes, with perhaps one exception (the Brück-Teplitz region), the territory which the official Austrian census recognizes as preponderantly German. The Czechs contest the basis of the statistics i. e. language of intercourse (*Umgangssprache*) and point out that this basis does not properly record the Czech minorities in Deutsch-Böhmen. In the case of the coal

region of Brüx-Teplitz the Czechs claim about 50%, the Germans, who live there, and the official census give them about 25%.

In regard to the very fundamental difference of opinion about the census, the reader is referred to a memorandum which the writer prepared for the Inquiry. It will suffice to state here that both the official census and the private census as well as the census about to be taken should be carefully compared. The German leaders in the Brüx-Teplitz region admit that the official figures of the number of Czechs should be raised—some say “4 to 5%”, others say “somewhat”. It was the impression of the writer, who visited the region, that there were many more Czechs in the Brüx-Teplitz region than could be found in the census. Since the revolution (October, 1918), the pupils in the Czech schools have increased from 10 to 30 even 40% above their average for the year 1918. These were children of people who for the most part were economically dependent upon the Germans for a livelihood and who under pressure (explained in memorandum already referred to) allowed themselves to be recorded as Germans. In other words, the conclusion which the writer reached in the mentioned memorandum has been substantiated by field work and the admission of German leaders themselves.

The real question at issue is, how large is the percentage of error which the *Umgangssprache* basis causes? This can only be determined by a new census which would aim to investigate nationality, and not the language of intercourse (*Umgangssprache*). In the opinion of the writer such a census would reveal a larger number of Czechs—perhaps not as high as the Czechs themselves claim—, but still high enough to threaten the German majority in the Brüx-Teplitz region. In other words, the Brüx-Teplitz region is a debatable territory. And should this region prove to have Czechs to the number of 50% it would cleave Deutsch-Böhmen in two.

There are other regions which have strong Czech minorities as for instance the Reichenberg region and the Hohenelbe District. But these are clearly minorities and do not assume the proportion of possible majorities as does that in the Brüx-Teplitz region.

The present German population of Deutsch-Böhmen is for the most part, undoubtedly a later infiltration. Down to the sixth century German and Celtic tribes occupied Bohemia. From the sixth to the twelfth Bohemia was completely Czech. Such Germans as remained were insignificant in numbers. The present German population in some cases goes back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but for the most part to the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century and represents pretty much the different kinds of Germans who live around the border of Bohemia from the Prussians on the east to the Bavarians on the west.

On the other hand a great proportion of the Czech minorities in Deutsch-Böhmen represent a recent “reimmigration” on the part of the Czechs who were drawn there by the industrialization of Deutsch-Böhmen, which occurred before that of the rest of Bohemia.

Summing up then, it may be said that the present German population in Deutsch-Böhmen represents in general a later infiltration, but that the Czech minorities there are for the most part a recent Czech “reimmigration”; that Deutsch-Böhmen is threatened with a partition by the very strong Czech minority (or even Czech majority according to their claims) in the Brüx-Teplitz coal area; and that Deutsch-Böhmen, as viewed from ethnographic conditions, is a reality which must be reckoned with even if it can be proved that the Brüx-Teplitz region has a Czech majority or a powerful minority of, let us say, 40%. In the latter case it is certain that the Czechs would not give up the region should the Peace Conference decide to lop off parts of German Bohemia.

III Economic Basis.

It is the opinion of some German and Jewish capitalists, as well as of the Czechs, that Deutsch-Böhmen cannot exist independent economically and that it cannot compete with the industry in the German empire. We leave aside the question of Deutsch-Böhmen forming a part of Deutsch-Österreich. This is a political impossibility. On the other hand, German politicians maintain that they can find a way to exist in the German empire, or, if need be, even as an independent state.

It can be proved statistically that Deutsch-Böhmen cannot feed itself. It can also be shown that Deutsch-Böhmen is largely dependent (except in one or two cases) on exporting its industrial products to the south and southeast and that it cannot compete (except in a few cases) with the powerful industry of the German empire. German leaders have admitted to the writer that they expect to be independent, or to be a part of Germany, or even to be a part of Deutsch-Österreich and yet maintain their free Czecho-Slovak market! It goes without saying that should they be excluded from the Czechoslovak republic that the latter state will have to resort to a fairly high protective tariff. They will likewise be unable to secure Czech labor without which they cannot run their factories.

Viewed from the other angle, the Czecho-Slovak Republic would be crippled economically although helped politically, by the exclusion of all or part of Deutsch-Böhmen. Not only does this part of Bohemia represent great wealth and hence income, but it contains mineral resources vitally necessary to the Czechs in their steadily growing industry. Under no circumstances would they give up the Brück-Teplitz region which would not only retain for them a large Czech population, but likewise the richest part of the Northwestern coal area.

The truth is that from an economic point of view Bohemia cannot be divided without serious damage to both parts. This is the point of view of certain German and Jewish capitalists, of newspapers like the *Prager Tagblatt*, and virtually all Czech bankers and business men. The *Prager Tagblatt* very ably points out now, as it did when the question of dividing Bohemia came up before, that even if this division were carried through, two German taxpayers of Pilsen (which would be Czech) would pay more than three purely German districts of Deutsch-Böhmen and that the Germans of Prague would be delivering to the Czech government one-half as much as the total tax payment in Deutsch-Böhmen. Such men see the inclusion of Deutsch-Böhmen in the Czecho-Slovak Republic as necessary, not only from the economic point of view, but likewise from the national point of view. If there are three millions of Germans in the republic, it will not necessarily mean that they will be assimilated. Otherwise,

the Germans of Prague, as well as the German islands elsewhere in the republic, will soon be assimilated.

Deutsch-Böhmen cannot exist as an independent economic unit nor can it obtain the favorable economic conditions on which it now subsists if it is either independent or becomes a part of Germany. In order to get the same favorable conditions which caused the industry to spring up and which gave it its physical supply (Czech labor), it must be a part of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Should Deutsch-Böhmen be given to Germany the Czechs will undoubtedly demand the Brüx-Teplitz region and certain areas including Reichenberg and Hohenelbe. The best condition which the Germans of Bohemia might obtain is autonomy in the Czech republic. But the Czechs will insist on giving full protection to German minorities on some such basis as the Moravian Nation-Register system.

In other words, the Germans cannot have national independence and economic prosperity at one and the same time, nor can the Czechs have a purely national state and economic prosperity at the same time. Each must concede to the other, if they wish to continue the wonderful economic evolution of the lands of the Bohemian crown. The Germans will have to give up their claims to national independence or exclusion from Bohemia. The Czechs will have to make concessions on that basis either in the form of autonomy or a liberal Moravian National-Register system and Anglo-Saxon local government. Otherwise both will suffer.

IV The Political Solution.

The political solution of the problem of Deutsch-Böhmen naturally depends upon the fundamental principles which the Peace Conference will adopt.

If ethnic rights are to be given the predominant place in the calculations then the problem of Deutsch-Böhmen resolves itself into the calling of a plebiscite. This would favor, without a doubt, annexation or “connection” (*Anschluss*) with Germany, because the course of events in Deutsch-Österreich points very strongly in that direction. If the Czechs succeeded in getting the Brüx-Teplitz region,

Deutsch-Böhmen would go in two sections, otherwise as one, although it is to be doubted whether it would remain one province or state in the empire very long. There is very little geographic, economic, or even ethnic cohesion in Deutsch-Böhmen. For that reason it would perhaps be partitioned between the various states which border Bohemia and to which ethnically and dialectically the different kinds of Germans in Bohemia belong. For Deutsch-Böhmen to remain a part of Deutsch-Österreich and then enter the German empire does not seem likely (except in legal fiction) because the thin strip with [*which?*] joins both through the mountains west of Klattau will in all likelihood be given to the Czecho-Slovak republic. This strip (the Judicial Districts of Taus and Neugedein) according to official statistics contained in 1910 a German population of 17.5% and a Czech population of 82.3%. The strip to the south and east of this might go to Deutsch-Österreich.

If historic rights and geographical, strategic, and economic conditions be given the predominant place in the solution of the problem, then Deutsch-Böhmen will be included in the Czecho-Slovak republic. The remaining problem will concern itself with the manner of its inclusion. The Germans will insist on autonomy, using the right of self-determination to bargain for it; the Czechs will be willing to give the Germans what the latter had given the Czechs in Moravia on the basis of the National-Register law of 1905, as well as equal civil and political rights and full protection to minorities. It is to be hoped that an international law for the protection of minorities will be one of the results of the Peace Conference.

⁴⁸ [Vol. II, p. 233](#) .

⁴⁹ Not attached to file copy of this document.

⁵⁰ Not printed; footnote references in this report to material contained in the appendix have been omitted.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/146

[Document 118]

Lieutenant Hugo G. Campagnoli to Professor A. C. Coolidge[53](#)

VIENNA, February 24, 1919.

Subject: Financial notes. (Interview with Dr. Preiss, head director of the Zivnostenska Bank, Prague, Czecho-Slovakia)

The following information was secured in an interview with Dr. Preiss, Head Director of the Zivnostenska Bank, Prague:

The present circulation of bank notes within the old dual monarchy is about 37,500,000,000 kronen. Practically from ten to twelve billions are in the hands of the people living within the borders of the new Czecho-Slovak Republic. In other words, Bohemia holds approximately one-third of the whole amount. The only specie securities are 282,000,000 kronen of gold. If we add to the bank notes in circulation the war loans, bank notes issued by different banking institutions and other small issues circulated by the government, the debt of the old dual monarchy would add up to practically 150,000,000,000 kronen. Before the war the state debt was 21,500,000,000 kronen so that it has tremendously increased during the last four and one-half years. Before 1914, although there were two and one-half billion kronen notes circulating in the dual monarchy, really only 1,600,000,000 were used and were found enough to answer the needs of industry, finance, commerce and the public in general. At present on account of the difference in prices 10,000,000,000 kronen should be used, but no more.

Dr. Preiss continued by saying that the main questions confronting the new state at the present time are, first, to regulate the circulation of the currency; second, the taxing of incomes in every way possible so that the government may be able to obtain figures as to the

general financial condition of the country. Taxing money, taxing bills of exchange and lombard bills, taxing real and personal property. The first question is the most important and it seems that it cannot be solved by the financial men of the different states coming together to discuss it.

Jugo-Slavia began by taking matters in its own hands by stamping the old Austria-Hungarian bank notes, and making them valueless within their borders unless stamped. Czecho-Slovakia is placed in a much too delicate position, both financially and economically, to watch this change in Jugo-Slavia and not try to protect the currency circulating within its borders. Therefore, it was found advisable to stamp the bank notes in Bohemia so as to protect the country from an overflow of bank notes either from German-Austria, Germany, Poland, Ukraine or neutral countries.

Dr. Preiss added that they have enough currency, in fact too much, and it will be found advisable to cut down by about one-half or perhaps more. He continued by saying that another great reason why they are taking the step is that the Czecho-Slovak Republic is now ready to export about one and one-half billion kronen's worth of goods, and one can readily see that if the stamping was not done the country would lose immense amounts of money on the exchange. To prove this he mentioned that already in Zurich there is a difference between the Vienna kronen and the Prague kronen.

Further Dr. Preiss remarked: "Czecho-Slovakia had debts of its own, and we wish to pay off these debts to our allies as soon as possible. As you know we had regiments formed in France, United States and Italy. Our debt with the United States is approximately 20,000,000 dollars, with Italy it will reach 100,000,000 liras and with France 100,000,000 francs. Therefore, if we should not protect ourselves and try to raise the exchange of the kronen in our country, it would be more than a three-fold loss to us in paying these debts at today's rate of exchange.

"I maintain that the United States is the only government that can really help Czecho-Slovakia financially, as both France and England are not at present in a position to do so. France must take care of her

devastated districts and has lost considerable in her investments in Russia and South America. England's problems are in the near future with her colonies, so that the United States is the only remaining country that can assist us in credits and raw material. I wish to give an example of how the United States can help us in building up the economic situation of Czecho-Slovakia. Every year before the war the dual monarchy imported from the United States 800,000 bales of cotton of which 640,000 were used in Bohemia. This country will soon be ready for the import of cotton. However, as the industrial conditions at present are not up to standard, 50% will do for the first year or so, say 300,000 bales, which can be imported into this country at the rate of 25,000 bales per month. The credits that the United States should extend to us would be for a period of six months. The extent of our markets is large, as we are able to sell not only to Bohemia, but also to the other states of the old dual monarchy, Russia, Turkey, Roumania, and Asia Minor. We are well acquainted with conditions in the above mentioned countries and have made a thorough study of them so that we are in a position to handle as intermediaries the American business with these countries."

At my suggestion Dr. Preiss will shortly send me a résumé of the economic and financial conditions of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

I believe that Dr. Preiss is the best authority on finance and economic matters in the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and the fact that his advice is frequently asked by the Ministry of Finance shows that he is considered one of the men who can be instrumental in forming the economic and financial policy of the new state.

He leans strongly toward help from the United States and, I believe it would not be to the loss of American financiers and industrialists to interest themselves, after a thorough study in Czecho-Slovakia, in investing reserves and surplus funds in the new republic, which, in my estimation, has a great future.

HUGO G. CAMPAGNOLI

53 Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 109, February 24; received February 26.

Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge[54](#)

No. 50

PRAGUE, February 26, 1919.

Subject: Stamping of bank notes in the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

The National Assembly on February 25 passed a bill governing:

- (1) The Stamping of Banknotes, and
- (2) The Declaration of property. (This latter with a view to the proposed tax on capital).

(1) Stamping of Banknotes.

All notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank in circulation in the Czechoslovak Republic, with the exception of one and two crown notes, will bear a stamp of the value of 1% of the respective note. The stamping will take place between the 3rd and 9th of March inclusive; merchants and tradesmen, however, will only be allowed to present their notes to be stamped on March 9th. Fifty per cent of the notes will be with-drawn from circulation and will be held as a Government loan bearing interest of 1% from March 15th. After March 9th only stamped banknotes will be valid in the Czechoslovak Republic. (A provision of the law requires wages of workmen (paid weekly) to be paid in stamped banknotes which are in this case exempt from the stamp tax and states that monthly payments (e. g. salaries of officials) will be made as follows: $\frac{1}{4}$ on March 1st and balance on March 10th). The purpose of this bill may be said to be:

- (a). To ascertain the amount of money in circulation,
- (b). To reduce this amount by half, and
- (c). To nationalise the crown.

(2) Declaration of Property.

All war loan bonds, Austrian or Hungarian, will be recorded and stamped. All bank deposits, shares in stock companies, bonds etc. must be declared in the name of the real owner and failure to comply with this provision within three months will give the state the right to confiscate all property not declared. An inventory of certificates, of gold and silver, in coin or specie, and of foreign banknotes etc. and a list of live stock, agricultural implements, raw materials and stocks etc. must be submitted. Any sums spent between August 1, 1914 and February 28, 1919 for the purchase of precious stones, pearls, jewels, antique rugs, *objets d'art* etc. must also be accounted for. Finally a list of insurance policies on life, capital or income, will be made and submitted to the Government.

All persons having lived in the Czecho Slovak territory for a year or more must declare all their possessions including those in foreign countries. Others need only declare their property within the territorial limits of the State.

The frontiers of the Republic will be closed between February 26 and March 9th to all passengers and freight traffic, couriers and doctors excepted. Between March 1st and 9th no money orders will be issued nor will deposits (cash or cheques) in Saving banks be accepted.

FREDERIC R. KING

⁵⁴ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 123, March 5; received March 8.

Professor R. J. Kerner to Professor A. C. Coolidge[55](#)

VIENNA, March 1, 1919.

Subject: Political conditions in Slovakia. Report II.

It is the purpose of the writer here to describe political conditions as he saw them during his recent trip through Slovakia. Each of the nations living there is analyzed so far as possible.

I. General Considerations.

The writer found no movement for the complete independence of Slovakia, either among the Slovaks or the Magyars. The Eastern Slovakia movement which had been headed by Dwortsak with its center at Kassa and which had been supported by the Magyar government collapsed because it had found no support among the Slovaks. Here the "American" Slovaks, i. e. Slovaks who had returned from America resolutely defied and wrecked the movement.

II. The Slovaks.

(a) The Clericals.

There is a certain fear among those Slovaks who were either almost Magyarized or were known as Magyarones (Magyarophils) that Slovakia will be "Czechicized". And this has led to the coalescing of a party among such Slovaks for the preservation of a considerable amount of autonomy for the Slovaks in the Czecho-Slovak state, but not in the Magyar state. Strange to say this party consists for the most part of those who most strenuously desired to be Magyars and who most disregarded the Slovak language and cause before and during the war.

This party is coming to be known as the Clerical Party, for the leadership of which Fathers Hlinka and Juriga are rivals. The membership of this party, as it is now forming, seems to include the Magyarone priests, ultra-Catholics, and Catholic Slovak landowners and officials. Their main concern besides that of the groundless “Czechicization” fear is that the church and state will be separated to the great detriment of the former. They fear these things in spite of the fact that the Czechs have turned over the entire administration to the Slovaks (there being not one Czech in the whole political administration) and in spite of the fact that the law on the separation of the church and state does not apply to Slovakia.

(b) The Social Democrats.

The Social Democratic Party among the Slovaks is rapidly forming among the Slovak industrial and agrarian workmen. This is staunch in its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak state and stands only for a few moderate planks on “semi-autonomy”. It is, however, very small in numbers because of the undeveloped character of Slovak industry. It is significant that Bolshevism has not taken root among them and their desire to work, while the Magyar and German workmen, who were permeated with Bolshevism, called a series of strikes against the new government, is a significant comment on their point of view.

(c) The Agrarians.

The Slovaks are also slowly forming an Agrarian party which will include the free-thinking and protestant landed class and intellectuals. These stand on the basis of compact national solidarity with the Czecho-Slovaks and will tend to state centralization as against the autonomist clericals. This party bids fair to be strong in Western Slovakia, while the Clericals may easily count on being stronger in Eastern Slovakia.

(d) Conclusion.

It may therefore be concluded that there is no organized political movement among the Slovaks either for independence or for autonomy under the Magyars for all of Slovakia or a part of it. There

are individuals whose economic interests will be injured by severance from the Magyar state, but these are few and far between. Some fear to express themselves openly for the Czecho-Slovak state because they fear the future terror should the Magyars come back. In some cases a few communes were forced to sign declarations of loyalty to the Magyar state by the retreating Magyar forces. But taken as a whole the one impression which the Slovak people now make upon the observer is that they are happy in their new freedom. They do not as a whole fear the Czechs and are delighted to know that such exemplary soldiers as the Legionaries are really their brothers and “actually speak their own language”. In a recent tour which Czecho-Slovak officials made of Slovakia the uneducated Slovaks were spoken to first by a Slovak and then by a Czech. The Czech got the greater applause because to their great astonishment they understood perfectly and could hardly believe their ears after the propaganda which the Magyars had scattered broad-cast to the effect that the Czechs spoke another language. The writer can vouch for the fact that Czech and Slovak are two dialects of the same language and the difference is too slight to notice. With Czech one can travel to Ungvar as though he were always in the environs of Prague.

III. *The Magyars.*

It is natural that the Magyars should resist will [*with*] all means possible the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak state. But even they are divided into:

- a) Pure Magyars, who make up the bulk of the official class (especially in public offices and transportation) and the lowest classes of workmen.
- b) Jews who have enjoyed the exclusive privilege of liquor licenses, special concessions in business, credit, etc.
- c) Magyarized Slovaks and Germans who through political or economic advancement have almost lost their previous national identity.

The Pure Magyars are divided into two political schools: those who favor the present administration at Budapest and those who wish to overthrow it. Some of the latter, the higher capitalists among them,

have even made advances to the Czecho-Slovaks, but it may be said with certainty that the Magyars as a mass will not compromise with the Czecho-Slovaks as long as there is a chance of their getting back into Hungary. Those who favor the present Magyar administration are doing their best to scatter Bolshevism and to call political and railroad strikes to paralyze the Czecho-Slovaks. Aeroplanes without national designation even scatter over Pressburg and other places masses of Bolshevist and Magyar propaganda. See the appended copies of such literature.⁵⁶ The Italian officers in command have refused to fire on such aeroplanes on grounds that they do not know their nationality. In the appendix⁵⁷ will also be found a letter every third word of which tells the story of Bolshevist preparations to wreck the Czecho-Slovak government in Slovakia. This propaganda is supported partly by the Magyar government at Budapest (especially by payment of salaries to strikers) and partly by Bolshevists in Budapest whose connection with the government there and with Vienna and Moscow has not yet been explained.

The Jews stand most to lose in Slovakia. In the Czecho-Slovak state they cannot long maintain their liquor and concession privileges and their financial control of the peasantry. In the long run—after the final boundaries are fixed—the Jews will become Slovaks or Czechs as the case may be or move out. Most of them speak Slovak perfectly. They are not insignificant in numbers and range from 10 to 20 even to 30% of the total number of Magyars, among whom they are reckoned by official statistics.

The Magyarized Slovaks are in a peculiar position. When finally the fear of the return of the Magyars will be gone, the situation will clear itself, and they will in large percentage become Slovaks among whom they still have relatives who do not speak a word of Magyar.

It is in this way that large portions of those who are now recorded as Magyars will disappear to form a part of the future consolidated nation of the Czecho-Slovaks.

IV. The Germans.

The Germans of Slovakia are the least national of the three nations. As simple farmers who live to themselves isolated from the rest of the German world or as business men in Pressburg or Kassa they realize that they cannot carry on a national policy. This they have concretely expressed by refusal of the Pressburg Germans to come into Deutsch-Österreich. They prefer the Czecho-Slovaks to the Magyars who oppressed them almost as badly as they did the Slovaks. Above all they look forward to business relations in the rich Czechoslovak state. If they had their way they should like to govern themselves as in the middle ages as free towns, but they realize that this might have bad economic results especially at Pressburg.*_

V. The Ruthenes.

Undeveloped nationally as they are, they prefer the Czecho-Slovaks to the Magyars. In fact it is difficult to distinguish them from the Slovaks because the languages blend gradually into each other on the northeast.

VI. Conclusions.

To sum up then we may say

1. That the Slovaks as a whole and as organized parties are for the Czecho-Slovak state.
2. That there are some elements, especially the clericals who favor autonomy under the Czecho-Slovaks.
3. That the Magyars naturally favor the re-establishment of the old Hungary but are divided among themselves, some wishing to wreck the present Magyar administration, others to spread its Bolshevism and disorder in Slovakia by means of political strikes and propaganda literature.
4. That the Germans prefer the Czecho-Slovaks from economic and political motives.
5. That the Ruthenes are as a whole in favor of inclusion with the Slovaks.

⁵⁵ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 115, March 2.

⁵⁶ None printed.

⁵⁷ Not printed.

* See the Report on Pressburg by R. J. Kerner. [Footnote in the original. This report (No. IV) is not printed.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/162

[Document 121]

Professor R. J. Kerner to Professor A. C. Coolidge[58](#)

VIENNA, March 2, 1919.

Subject: Slovakia, Report I.

The four reports[59](#) which accompany this one were written as the result of a trip which the-writer took to Slovakia. It is proposed here merely to enumerate the results of the investigation leaving the reader the option of consulting each report where fuller details and proof may be found.

The Czecho-Slovak government has established itself thoroughly in the region north and east of the demarcation line. It enjoys the enthusiastic support of the vast mass of the Slovak people, both as individuals and as rapidly forming political parties. All separatist movements engineered by the Magyar government have collapsed, especially the Eastern Slovak movement of Dwortsak because the population refused to support them. There are left only the disgruntled individuals and they act only as individuals and as propaganda agents. The Slovaks are rapidly forming into three political groups, the Clericals whom both Hlinka and Juriga aspire to lead, the Social Democrats, and the Agrarians. There is no party which wishes Slovak independence. Only the Clericals desire a form of autonomy which will guarantee them against Czechicization and the separation of Church and State. In answer to this the Czechs have handed over the entire administration of Slovakia to the Slovaks and excluded Slovakia from the Church and State legislation. See Report II Political Conditions in Slovakia

The Germans prefer the Czecho-Slovaks to the Magyars, but they themselves do not feel nationally. The Ruthenes likewise prefer the Czecho-Slovaks but with a certain degree of warmth and enthusiasm.

The Magyars are resolutely opposed to the Czechs because if they are pure Magyars they will in all probability lose their political and official positions, of which they hold the bulk. Many of these officials and some of the lower-class Magyars are cooperating with the Government at Budapest to wreck the Czecho-Slovak Government by means of railroad strikes and the spread of Bolshevism.

To accept the Magyar official census as a correct and just basis on which to run the final boundary line would in the opinion of the writer be unscientific and unjust. According to the hand-book of "Official Instructions" to Census-takers the Statistics and mother-tongue can be stretched to include any Slovak who can speak Magyar or is learning it. Thus the Slovaks actually registered as Slovaks are for the most part those who never attended the schools which it is well known have all been Magyarized. Until and unless a new census is taken the official Magyar statistics should be taken with a good deal of reserve. See Report III Magyar Census Statistics and Census Talking With Especial Reference to Slovakia

Pressburg is a cosmopolitan city in which the non-national German element predominates but in which neither the Germans, nor the Magyars (who are largely the officials) nor the Slovaks predominate. To include it in the Czecho-Slovak state will not outrage any considerable permanent national population and will answer to the economic needs of the city. To exclude it from the Czecho-Slovak state as a free city (i. e. internationalized) will cause the Czechs to build up Diven at the junction of the Danube and Morava. In such a position Pressburg would be ruined. On the other hand, it would not be just to deprive a hinterland of over a million people (not including the population of Bohemia and Moravia), who are officially recorded as 70% Slovak, of its natural port so that 30,000 Magyars of whom 10,000 are political and railroad officials, and 31,000 Germans who do not feel nationally, might have a free city which could not exist economically. Report IV Pressburg

Kassa is a city whose population (44,000) is 75% Magyar but whose immediate environs and hinterland (420,000) is 75% Slovak. It should be included in the Czecho-Slovak state because it cannot exist without its hinterland. The whole region of Eastern Slovakia should

be included in the new Czechoslovak state because the utter collapse of the Eastern Slovakia movement shows how little support it received from the population. To exclude Kassa from the Czechoslovak state without its hinterland would be to ruin the city. Report V Kassa

⁵⁸ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 115, March 2.

⁵⁹ Report II, dated March 1, printed *supra*; reports III, IV, and V not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/177

[Document 122]

Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge[60](#)

No. 55

PRAGUE, March 2, 1919.

Subject: Teschen.

The order from the Entente to the Czechs to evacuate Teschen has been met with a storm of protest in the Press and received with deep resentment on the part of the public throughout the country. The Poles are bitterly attacked for bad faith and their general behaviour during the war and much reference is made to their influence and connexions in Paris. The National Assembly has voted a million Crowns for the relief of the refugees from Teschen where there is undoubtedly great consternation among the portion of the population which displayed enthusiasm upon the arrival of the Czechs.

In an interview last night with Dr. Stepanek of the foreign office and Lieutenant Colonel Sneydarek (the Commander of the Czech troops in Silesia) I learned that the present frontier line to which the Czechs object so much was drawn by General Niessel (of the Warsaw Commission) in such a way as to leave the passenger station at Bohumin in Czech hands while the freight station is in Polish possession. The line also runs within 500 metres of the Karvin mine pits which are held by the Czechs. The miners being mostly Poles return to Polish territory at night and are encouraged by the Poles to agitate against the Czechs. A general strike was declared yesterday at Karvin and all production has ceased. Moreover under existing conditions it is impossible for the Czechs to keep the frontiers closed and to prevent banknotes from being brought in from Galicia, to be stamped. Dr. Stepanek referred to the recent Paris agreement, (which Beneš, he said, had signed under strong protest) whereby the commission of control was to sit at Teschen, and said that the delay

on the part of the Czechs in evacuating the town of Teschen was due to the fact that they were awaiting orders from this commission. In spite of all Stepanek said in protest against the present condition of affairs as decreed by the Entente, I rather got the impression, already received from governmental circles, that the Czechs have strong hopes that the whole question will eventually be decided in their favour.

FREDERIC R. KING

⁶⁰ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 123, March 5; received March 8.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/175^{1/2}

[Document 123]

***Statement of Professor R. J. Kerner to the
Commissioners Plenipotentiary***

[PARIS,] March 5, 1919.

BOLSHEVISM AND THE STATES OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The writer, having just returned from Central Europe where he was a member of Professor Coolidge's commission for two months, presents the following memorandum.

The conclusions reached are:

- (1) To curb Bolshevism on the one side and to prevent a German *revanche* from developing on the other, the western allies should
 - (a) proclaim publicly their adherence to a policy of economic and social amelioration;
 - (b) give immediate and effective economic assistance (and actually deliver it) in food, raw materials and capital to the newly founded states, i. e., to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to Jugo-Slavia, Poland, Finland and the Ukraine (?) and make it possible for these states to engage in commerce with the allies.
 - (c) send political advisers to the same to assist in guiding these states so that they can be organized on a sound basis.
- (2) The Allies should outline a public policy toward Germany, German Austria, and Magyaria, which would offer them economic assistance in return for their adoption of a policy which will frankly admit their defeat, which will publicly disavow the idea of a *revanche*, and which will disavow and discontinue their participation in Bolshevik propaganda whose purpose it is to wreck the new states.

Explanation of conclusions:

Bolshevism is a political party with an economic and social platform. It can flourish permanently only where the educated classes (i. e., the intellectuals and entrepreneurs) are separated from the working classes by great economic and social differences and where the former can be isolated and destroyed by a determined minority which has obtained control of the technical equipment of war. The spread of Bolshevism cannot be checked by force, except by a tremendous undertaking in men and materials. It can best be attacked by a programme of radical economic and social amelioration initiated in a people as yet sound. Its cure, or rather, its defeat in the countries where it has already manifested itself on a sufficiently large scale is a gradual one, depending upon the amount of economic assistance which such countries or peoples absolutely need from without, and upon the number of educated people left behind among them or which can be developed among them for purposes of arousing a progressive leadership. In such countries a leadership which is founded on monarchic reaction is doomed to failure.

Germany is a republic without republicans, just as Russia, or German Austria or Magyaria. In each of these, excepting in Russia, the old bureaucracy still remains. There men who are not really socialists are trying to socialize the state. Meanwhile the feeling of the radical leaders (i. e. those inclined to Bolshevism) is that another and more thorough revolution must come before the old foundations are uprooted.

The Germans, as a whole, do not consider themselves to have been defeated in this war. Neither do the German Austrians nor the Magyars. They argue they were merely misled by their monarchs, and that in face of the fact that the war was greeted in 1914 with a tremendous enthusiasm by the people of the Central Powers. Now they are indignant that they should suffer at the Congress of Versailles at the hands of the Allies for the sake of their kings.

Two definite currents of solution for their difficulties are moving among the German people. One is that of preparation for a *revanche* of all the Germans. It is the aristocratic solution of reaction. The other is Bolshevism, i. e. to Bolshevize Central Europe and then

overwhelm the rest. Neither is acceptable to the Entente. The intellectual leaders of the middle and aristocratic classes in German life do not see their possible role of a middle stand between the Entente and Bolshevism, and since an immediate policy of *revanche* is impossible, the Bolsheviks are seeking to marshal the common indignation of the German people—their secret desire for a *revanche*—along with the cry that the Peace of Versailles will be unacceptable. They will lay down their arms as did the Russian Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk but declare a war of revolution, public or secret—a revolution which is to sweep away every vestige of middle class government in Central and Western Europe, and which it is hoped will overwhelm the rest of the world in due time. In this is seen the tactical advantage which the German Bolsheviks will have over the middle and aristocratic class *revanche* which must work its way on a foundation of reaction and which can not offer the people an economic and social paradise but merely another great war, albeit it be a national one pure and simple this time. Thus Bolshevism has the better chance in Germany in the immediate future.

The bourgeois west must meet the problem in a direct manner. It was the refusal of the absolutist and centralistic central and eastern Europe after 1815 under the guidance of Metternich and Nicholas I which created the fruitful basis for present day Bolshevism. They met the spread of liberalism in the west with the application of force and terror and the prevention of free political education in the east. The result has been the wide gulf between their thinking and their laboring classes.

The present Bolshevik wave cannot be held back by reaction, but it may be gradually tempered by an intelligent and progressive policy of economic and social reform in those countries as yet sound. It is necessary for those who determine the policies of these states to distinguish between three types of shibboleths which have become and will be a part of the catechism of every statesman, namely: (1) a radical and progressive democracy in which all elements may still work out their existence on lines of moderate economic and social self-interest; (2) socialism, which is a state of society in which a smaller number of class elements can find room in which to exist; and (3) Bolshevism, which has already been defined as a political

party ruled by a small aristocratic cast of leaders (most of them bourgeois in origin) and the proletariat in which the latter are supposedly the gainers, but in both of which in reality a small minority (largely Jewish) really rules and which makes organized social and political life an impossibility.

The west can meet this onrushing current by two methods, first, by putting its own house in order, i. e. adopting the shibboleths of the radical and progressive democracy and advocating a series of gradual but fundamental economic reforms, and second by giving immediate and effective economic and political assistance to those states or nations which are as yet sound or which are in a measure sound. It will be found that this will answer the highest dictates of sound and upright policy for the Allies. Thus the Entente should give immediate and effective economic and political assistance to the Czecho-Slovak republic, which bids fair to remain, if assisted, a bastion of sound democratic ideas in Europe and where the nation is as yet untainted with Bolshevism. From the point of view of Bolshevism next in order of soundness is Jugo-Slavia, then Poland, then Finland and finally the Ukraine. By economic assistance is meant the immediate moving, over all obstacles of transportation, etc., of large quantities of food, raw materials and money and the immediate opening of these states to trade so that they may begin to function as soon as possible. By political assistance is meant the sending of political advisers to guide the young states to a sound point of view, to give confidence to the new statesmen, to counteract Bolshevik, German national and Magyar national propaganda, and to introduce now and then small detachments of soldiers, often only a hundred or more men, to be stationed at strategic places, but to be used largely to overawe the aforementioned propaganda.

For the west to ignore the need of setting itself sternly to the realization of some such plan of internal house-cleaning and of immediate and effective economic and political assistance to the new states will be to court quick and permanent disaster to themselves and the new states and to lose the victory which they had at last won.

As regards Germany, the German Austrians, and the Magyars, a strict policy of justice (not of military terror or of starvation) should

be followed in which the offer will be made that they will be taken back into the family of states or nations only when the groups which rule these countries recognize the defeat of the Germans and Magyars in the war, when they frankly give up their not too secret policy of a future *revanche* and when they openly join hands for the extirpation of Bolshevism. They must also be required to give up supporting Bolshevik movements in neighboring states.

P. S. This memorandum can be amplified [*amplified?*], if desired.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/175^{1/2}

[Document 124]

***Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel to the Secretary General of
the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

PARIS, March 20, 1919.

Subject: Memorandum of Mr. R. J. Kerner.

1. Mr. R. J. Kerner's memorandum is returned herewith. His discussion of Bolshevism appears to me of considerable interest and value. On the other hand, his conclusions as to the necessity of Germany acknowledging her defeat and giving up her alleged policy of "revanche" rest on a very shadowy basis, and show to my mind that the writer has not lately been in Germany.
2. In an article by A. G. Anderson of the International News Service, who has lately been in Berlin, he says: "The Berliners admit two things. First, that the war has taught them a lesson they will not forget; secondly, that Germany is defeated. The curious type of German who believes otherwise has been reduced to an infinitesimal faction." This is my view; and I always thought that no specific declaration of defeat or guilt or verbal abandonment of a policy of revenge is of much use, as such statements might be entirely insincere and in any case would not be binding.
3. As to Kerner's specific recommendations, I agree with 1 (a) and (b). As to 1 (c), political advisers would clearly be out of place as soon as Legations are founded in the countries as recognized.
4. I do not agree with (2) as above indicated. No better admission of defeat can be devised than the acceptance of the peace terms, and nothing else really counts.

ELLIS LORING DRESEL

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/193

[Document 125]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 131

VIENNA, March 10, 1919.
[Received March 12.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a report on Bolshevism, by Captain John Karmazin. Some of the facts contained in it are interesting, though the tone is not judicial.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

No. 25

PRAGUE, February 27, 1919.

Subject: Bolshevik propaganda in Slovakia.

General

The present Magyar government at Budapest is assiduously engaged in creating such conditions in Slovakia as are bound to be in favor of Bolshevism and is carrying on in Slovakia through shrewd agents who have an unlimited amount of money in their possession a Bolshevik propaganda in order to keep the country in turmoil and to discredit the government of the Czecho-Slovak republic.

Slovakia under Magyar rule was administrated by an official class composed of Magyars and Magyarones, the latter being renegade Slovaks who for the sake of material gain, and official favor betrayed their own kin. Consequently loyal Slovak workers were not to be found on the railroads, in post offices, telegraph and telephone service. These officials when requested by the Czecho-Slovak government to take the oath of allegiance, refused to do so. Upon the advice from leading Magyar agents at Budapest these traitorous employees were advised to take the oath and then to forget its solemnity and work against the interests of the Czecho-Slovak government.

This activity led to the fomenting of strikes under the guise of economic demands, but which were in fact called only for political purposes to engender social unrest, disrupt the organization for provisioning, and to reduce in every way possible efficient government under the new Czecho-Slovak republic. The Magyar agents go among the Slovak people and try to show them what a mistake it would be to live under these inefficient, helpless Czechs who are seeking to enslave them.

The favored classes under the old Magyar government are all working openly and secretly against the new government of the Czecho-Slovak republic. These classes are composed of landed proprietors, who as a class are Magyars, Jewish merchants, who formerly had a monopoly of the liquor dispensing trade, teachers whose appointment was made to serve the ends of Magyarization, government officials and all workers in every branch of the late government service.

The Bolshevist Propaganda:

The Bolshevist propaganda is spread by means of pamphlets, circulars and newspapers published by the "Communitic Society" at Budapest, this literature being printed (as was reported to us) at the government printing office at Budapest. This propaganda is printed in three languages, Slovak, Czech and Magyar and seeks to appeal to the workingman and farm laborers. Another variety of propaganda makes an appeal to the Czecho-Slovak soldiers calling upon them not

to fight their “brothers” and promising them high wages and food. In order to tempt them, the Magyar government pays its own soldiers 30 crowns a day, 10 days in advance. It also pays unemployed workingmen the same rate of wages.

Professor B. J. Kerner and I visited the former DuPont Powder Works at Pressburg. The manager who is a German, informed us that in war time they employed 5000 workingmen. The present number is about 1000. There has been a political strike here, but in spite of it 700 workingmen principally Slovak have remained loyally at work. They receive 16 crowns per day. Every day, however, they are tempted by Magyar agents with offers of 30 crowns per day if they will quit work and join the “communists” (Bolshevist) society.

Magyar aeroplanes appear frequently especially over Pressburg, from which Bolshevist pamphlets and circulars are scattered. Dr. Srobar, minister of the Czecho-Slovak republic, for Slovak affairs resident at Pressburg showed us copies of circulars, pamphlets and secret code letters, through which they discovered thousands of copies of Bolshevist circulars and all kinds of fire-arms stored at city of Nitra. Professor R. J. Kerner will submit originals with his report.^{[61](#)}

Land Question.

About 75% of the land in Slovakia belongs to large landed estates and 25% to small peasant holders. Of this 25% about % is so heavily mortgaged that we can say that only about 10% actually belongs to the peasant class. The best class among the peasantry are those who have lived for several years in the United States and have returned here. This class is now carrying out the democratization of the people and exerting a strong influence toward maintaining law and order and keeping up the patient struggle for a better day.

Schools.

All school teachers under the former Magyar regime were unacquainted with the Slovak language and after the liberation of Slovakia when the people demanded the teaching of their own mother tongue, the schools were suddenly without teachers. The new

government of the Czecho-Slovak republic called upon volunteer Czech teachers for the higher institutions. They also called on those Slovaks who formerly resided in the U.S.A. to teach and give talks about democracy in the U. S. as about one-half of the male population of Slovakia had been in the U.S. at one time or other. This system is producing a fine result considering the short time it has been in effect and the imperfections that naturally are a part of it.

The Food Situation.

The food situation is generally bad. The only food to be seen among the peasants is poor grade black bread and potatoes [*potatoes?*]. Several countries are even without bread. In passing through cities and villages one sees, underfed women and children, poorly clothed in many cases entirely barefoot walking in the snow and slush. As a result of this condition many people to whom the Bolshevik promises from Budapest are extended, get restless and threatening.

Army.

The present Czecho-Slovak troops in Slovakia are legionaries from Italy and France as well as newly organized units of former soldiers of the late Austrian army. The legionaries from France are usually Americans of Slovak or Czech origin who render excellent service, maintaining strict discipline among themselves, law and order in the communities and keeping down the effects of Bolshevik propaganda. The legionaries complain against the Italian commanders who have been placed at the head of the army of occupation, accusing these officers of a pro-Magyar tendency. They accuse them of mingling with the Magyars' high society in the large cities where there are few Slovaks who can offer them social entertainments.

Government.

The government of Slovakia is now in the hands of loyal, patriotic Slovaks with headquarters at Pressburg. These officials are lawyers, doctors, engineers, priests and ministers, and a few farmers, who though they are not experienced are energetic, conscientious men. The Czechs are only taking part in the organization of the railroads,

replacing the Magyar officials who were disorganizing wilfully the transportation system of Slovakia. These men who are now heading the government of Slovakia are intensely nationalistic free of all Utopian dreams, being highly practical and tireless workers. Bolshevist appeals and schemes find no sympathy among them.

Conclusion.

The mass of the Slovak workingmen and peasants are not inclined to Bolshevism. They are extremely nationalistic and patriotic to the core. A great many left the U.S.A. where conditions would have meant to them greater prosperity than in Slovakia, and are doing all in their power to help their less enlightened kinsmen to appreciate their new found freedom and opportunity. But it would be foolish to underestimate the effect of the Bolshevik propaganda which is being carried on at present by the Magyars through wholesale bribery. The offer of enormous wages and large quantities of food cannot fail to appeal to the ignorant classes who are in great poverty and want. It is, however, to be hoped that the new currency reform in the Czechoslovak state (the nationalization of the crown by stamping) will prevent the Magyars to some extent from further bribery and corruption.

Food is the first necessity and clothing is next. The gravity of existing conditions cannot be exaggerated. Raw materials, wool, cotton and leather are badly needed and should be sent as soon as possible in order that the people can find employment in the making of their own clothing and shoes. The Budapest government should be stopped at once in its desperate effort to poison the Slovak people with Bolshevist propaganda.

JOHN KARMAZIN

⁶¹ See report No. II, p. 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of [Doc. 119](#) and [Doc. 120](#)].

Lieutenant F. R. King to Professor A. C. Coolidge⁶²

No. 77

PRAGUE, March 23, 1919.

Subject: Expropriation of the great estates.

An agreement is apparently being reached by the various parties of the National Assembly in regard to the above subject which has been causing a considerable amount of friction between the extreme Socialists and the conservative elements in the parliament. The presidents of the Political Clubs held a meeting on March 20, 1919 and discussed the different proposals made by the various parties and especially the proposal introduced by the agrarian party dealing with the principle that all great estates be proclaimed property of the Republic. An agreement was reached as follows: A committee counting 32 members will be appointed for the purpose of studying the question of the expropriation of the great estates and a subcommittee consisting of three members will be required to submit a report within 8 days on a proposal regarding land reform. Modracek will be one of the members of the general committee. The programme of reform as suggested by the Czech State Right Democrats is as follows:

1. The great estates (i. e. over 250 ha) are to be expropriated.
2. All estates of the late Emperor family Habsburg-Lorraine or of any member of this family, or of any member of any German Imperial family, will be confiscated for the benefit of the Republic without compensation.
3. All estates will be expropriated without compensation which became the property of the ancestors of the present owners for political or religious reasons during the 30 years war.
4. A special law will be passed regarding the compensation of other great estates.

5. All private forests will become state property.
6. A Colony office consisting of 15 members of the administrative commission will decide all questions regarding the distribution of the confiscated and expropriated estates.
7. Public Credit Institutions will be entrusted with all credit operations connected with the expropriation and colonisation of the estates.
8. The government is entitled to take any measures necessary for an economic development of the estates as mentioned in this law.
9. All legal dispositions (expropriations, confiscations, mortgage of the estates) made after October 28, 1918 can be cancelled by the Colony Office.
10. The ministries will be charged with the execution of this law. The agricultural committee will report on this programme. The Social Democrats who represent the extreme socialist view wish the Republic to rent out the estates expropriated on long term leases to those of the poor who are not able to purchase land. They wish to prevent all speculation and resale of land allotted. It is to be expected that a compromise satisfactory to all parties will be reached in a few weeks.

FREDERIC R. KING

⁶² Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 178, March 24; received March 26.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[Document 127]

***Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C.
Coolidge***⁶³

No. 31

PRAGUE, March 23, 1919.

Subject: Custom Tariff Bill for the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

As the whole system of laws of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy were taken over and made effective (for the Czecho-Slovak Republic) the customs tariff of 1835 applies to their entire domain. All commercial treaties existing between the Entente powers and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were abrogated during the war and hence the autonomous customs tariff of 1906 became effective. On the other hand all commercial treaties with neutral states and with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance remained effective. The Czecho-Slovak State became an ally of the Entente and therefore cannot give any greater advantages in customs duties to the neutral countries of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy than to the allied countries of the Entente. Upon its very origin and union with the Entente the Czecho-Slovak State abrogated its treaty relations with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. But even towards neutral countries it is impossible to preserve as effective the treaties of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy if thereby there are not obtaining such advantages as accrue to the countries of the Entente. Because the Czechoslovak State as a new juridical entity cannot merely on its own part renew agreement[s] formerly negotiated between Austria-Hungary and the countries of the Entente, which were abrogated by the war, as pertains to all foreign countries subject to customs duties there remains but one position to be assumed namely, to place on the basis of the autonomous customs tariff of 1906 until such time when new commercial treaties can be negotiated with individual states. Because there might be a dispute as to what rates apply to various countries, the Committee on

Finance has deemed it necessary to incorporate in the law a description of the frontiers of the state.

If the autonomous customs tariff of 1906 is to be effective as the basis for assessing duties at the frontiers it must be elastic. It is a requisite of the present moment that the government be in a position to apply this customs tariff for various economic and political purposes. In the first place in order that it can either reduce the amount of the duty or rebate it entirely on essential goods where the duty would increase the price to the common detriment. The economic interest must in such cases take precedence over the fiscal law. This principle enunciated in Section (3) of the bill was given precedence by the Committee on Finance over the regulations in Section (2) as being of greater general importance.

Section second (2) of the bill gives the government authority to use the customs duties for purposes of *valuta*. Through the payment of the duty the government desires to obtain foreign *valuta*, either here or abroad, and at the official rate in francs. By section (2nd) of the bill it is empowered that the tariff rates on certain classes of goods especially luxuries, stated in crowns, shall be deemed to have been fixed at a like amount of franc standard.

After the formal motion by Dr. Englis who had charge of the bill, the Committee on Finance modified it in the following respects.

1. The bill in general speaks of the franc standard. This might be taken to refer to the standard of the Latin Union in so far as its unit of value is called a franc in the individual states therefore in Switzerland and France. As long as there was in peace times in the various states of the Latin Union a gold standard, there was no difference between the French and the Swiss standards. But today it is otherwise. They have no common Franc standard, but only a French and a Swiss one, between which there is a considerable difference on exchange. Therefore it cannot be simply stated that the duty in a given case shall be paid in the franc standard, but it must be stated in which. For economic and political reasons it was decided to specify the French franc for this purpose.

2. The bill stipulates that the payer can pay either in gold or paper francs. The stipulation that it is elective to pay in gold francs is illusory so long as the gold franc will be at a premium over the silver franc.
3. The bill requires that for certain classes, of goods the duty shall be paid exclusively in francs and excludes the possibility of making payment in Czecho-Slovak stamped notes according to the current value of the franc on exchange. The Czecho-Slovak government has no interest in obtaining a greater income through the aforesaid customs duty but it is interested through this means in securing foreign circulating medium. They believe that this effort, however, might lead to an increased demand for francs, and of all foreign exchange at the present time francs are circulating in the Czecho-Slovak Republic in the smallest amount in comparison to other media. They further believe that the result of this would be the further increase in the price of the francs and the corresponding decrease in the value of the crown, which would increase the cost of the imported goods. However they believe that this effect would certainly be an unwelcome one when they consider that the purpose of Section (2) is solely intended for securing *valuta*. The Committee of Finance is therefore choosing a middle course. Though they have permitted the payment of franc duties in stamped crowns, such payment however will be at the current rate of exchange as fixed by the Minister of Finance, but who has the authority to fix this rate somewhat higher than that which rules in the open market. In this way they believe there will be an incentive to make payments in francs rather than in crowns and yet there is a means to limit the rise in value of the francs in the open market due to the demand for paying customs duties.
4. The Czecho-Slovak government bill takes measures only for the obtaining of francs. But the government may have an interest in securing other foreign media, and sometimes a much greater interest. Recognizing this contingency the Committee on Finance has permitted the payment of duties not only in Czecho-Slovak stamped crowns but in the media of other foreign states as well subject to a special order of the Minister of Finance and according to the official rate of exchange as established by him. This rate of exchange will regulate the inflow of the media of the various countries.

The Third paragraph of Section (2) has been restated by the Finance Committee in other words but its effect has not been altered. The title of the law has been changed and an enabling paragraph added.

In connection with the consideration of this law the Committee on Finance calls attention to the fact that today the real body charged with its enforcement is the Commission for export and import which not only regulates its application, but collects as a fee for entry permits for imports an ad valorem duty of $\frac{1}{2}\%$ based on the value of the imported goods. And beside this a duty will be collected on the border in accordance with the autonomous custom tariff then in reality a double duty will be charged. Because the ad-valorem charge made for the entry permit is sufficient large, and it was recommended that rulings of the Export and Import Commission be brought into harmony with the enactments of this law. This request has been formulated in a special resolution designed [*designated*] by (J).

The attention of the Committee on Finance has been directed to the following. If the necessity should arise to reduce or to rebate the duty in cases involving the import of essential goods, that the analogy, the same course should apply to the collection of the fee collected by the Commission as this fee also increases the price of such goods, and this especially in reference to such goods needed for daily use by the masses, particularly food stuffs. This request has been formulated in a resolution designated by (II).

The Committee on Finance recommends:

- A. That the National Assembly pass this bill in the form adopted by the Committee on Finance and [give?] it its constitutional sanction.
- B. That the National Assembly adopt the following resolutions:
 - I. The government is requested to bring the administrative policy of the Commission on Export and Import into harmony with the enactments of this law.
 - II. The government is requested to reduce the ad-valorem fee for import permits in cases involving the importation of goods

essential for the daily use of the masses of the population,
especially food-stuffs.

JOHN KARMAZIN

⁶³ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under
covering letter No. 178, March 24; received March 26.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[Document 128]

***Captain John Karmazin to Professor A. C.
Coolidge***⁶⁴

No. 33

PRAGUE, March 25, 1919.

Subject: The Bolshevist movement in Bohemia.

The principal participants are agitators who have come from Russia as exponents of the "Soviet" form of government, the leading ones being, Muna, Hais, Knoflicek, Friedrich, etc. They joined forces with the centralists, that is, with the social democrats who stand on the platform of the Vienna social-democracy and are opposed to the Czech-Autonomists who during the late Austrian regime took a stand for complete independence from Vienna. The centralists under the complete domination of Vienna, were passive during the war, they did not stand for the Czech demands, they did not want an independent Czech State. They were subsidized and abetted by the Austrian government. They could have passports to Switzerland for the asking, and at Stockholm when they spoke it was in advocacy of the program of Viennese Government social-democrats.

Furthermore, those elements turned favorably toward the Communists returned from Russia, who had been personally disappointed or forced aside after the revolution, because prior to it they had stood with Vienna against the aspiration of the Czech nation. These are principally Smeral and Stivin, and because Smeral has under his control the funds and enterprises of his party, (Social-Democrats) therefore he wields an influence over many secretaries, and over people generally who gain a livelihood through the party. These three groups, the people from Russia who by the way, are Russian subjects, the centralists who just recently have been amalgamated with the Social-democratic party and thus have strengthened the left wing, and the Smeral group, all three groups are in direct touch with Vienna, with the Spartacists and the Russian

Bolsheviks. They exploit the financial and economic difficulties in which the nation finds itself as the result of the war, they foment dissatisfaction with the republic, and very cleverly utilize the awkwardness of their opponents in the democratic press, which is really liberal, in order that they may exaggerate the dissatisfaction and exploit it. Dr. Smeral is the leading spirit. They have the advantage that they are members of the social democratic party and although they do not support its program, they enjoy its hospitality and especially its protection. Consequently the government is prevented from using drastic measures against them or even to appear to use them, for these Bolsheviks as they call themselves would incite the masses against the government and disorder and revolt. Their agitation will meet with favor only as long as want and lack of employment exist. Work and facility in obtaining food-stuffs would soon force this movement into the narrow limits of the common anarchistic movement as it existed before the war. Then their own party which have strength and will enough to do it, would easily bring them to account and get rid of them. Today that is not possible, for the people to follow him who has dissatisfaction inscribed on his banner, and who promises that through violence and revolt he will bring the people into plenty. In its heart the mass of the people do not really follow these leaders into revolt, but the desperate economic situation drives them that way.

It has been discovered that these Bolsheviks are in a direct and very active touch with the Bolsheviks of Vienna, Budapest and Russia. They get money from them, so that they have large amounts on hand, and are also able to maintain several newspapers at large expense. These are published at Brno, Kladno, Pilsen, Trebich, Marisch-Ostrau and Zizkov suburb of Prague. They carry on a personal agitation going from house to house, and are more active than the agitators of the other political parties, because they have the financial means. The Government has undertaken energetic measures against this, of course quietly, in order to keep the socialistic ministers from being discredited. In cities where this movement might be dangerous, systematically lectures are given by people who have returned from Russia, and who flay the Bolsheviks unmercifully. These government agitators are constantly on the heels of the Bolsheviks and impress the people favorably. The government

supports the press of the other socialistic groups against the Bolshevik press, and also publishes pamphlets similar to those published in the U.S.A. and France. Separate articles which describe conditions that are similar in Bohemia, are translated from the American and French pamphlets, and are printed in the newspapers. In other ways also the government carries on an effective and systematic propaganda against Bolshevik ideas.

JOHN KARMAZIN

⁶⁴ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 178, March 24; received March 26.

Poland

[129] Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Warsaw, January 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/25

[130] Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Warsaw , January 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/25

[131] Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Warsaw, April 7, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/365

Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge⁶⁵

WARSAW, January 9, 1919.

Subject: Conference with Mr. I. J. Paderewski.

1. Paderewski stated that his stand had been a non-party one and that his coming to Poland was with the desire to assist in the forming of a Government that would embody the national wishes of the people. Before leaving the Allied countries he had received the support of his mission by high officials, especially in England. The uniting of all the parties was his aim.
 2. He stated that during his journey to Warsaw he had passed through Posen where he found the people well organized and in full accord with his Mission. In Cracow the same condition prevailed and it was only on his arrival in Warsaw that he found disorganization and unwillingness to support his idea of the formation of a coalition Government.
 3. These opinions were formed only after having received and conversed with delegations of a majority of the parties and representing thousands of the population.
 4. Several days after his arrival in Warsaw he called upon Pilsudski and discussed his mission. Pilsudski then suggested to him that he form a cabinet, but this Paderewski refused to do for the following reasons.
- Pilsudski had been put in at the head of the Government by the Regency. This Regency had been put in power by the Germans and had played the game of the Germans to the end that they had in no way the confidence of the people, in fact were opposed by them. Pilsudski therefore represented through the appointment by the Regency the German influence and if he in turn turned over to Paderewski the formation of a cabinet, Paderewski would not be

working thro wish of the people but under the auspices of the old German influence.

5. Paderewski stated that Pilsudski was supported only by the socialist party and by the army. He believed the socialist element to be but a small one as the majority of the population being of the peasant and farmer class were naturally conservative. The farmer also would not support any socialistic or communism whereby his little plot of land would be taken out of his hands and control. The army supported Pilsudski only on account of his former military heroism but this popularity had dwindled appreciably during the last few weeks as the present government has failed to pay the army.
6. From Warsaw Paderewski went to Cracow where at a large conference the idea was conceived of calling together a large National Council which would form the basis of a National appeal for the election of a coalition cabinet. The election of a man to perform this task would take place at this meeting. There would be 25 delegates from Posen and the same number from Galicia and 50 members from Warsaw of which only half could be socialists.
7. It was during the night of this conference that the farcical *Coup d'État* took place in Warsaw and Pilsudski sent General Szepticki to Cracow to ask Paderewski to return to Warsaw and form a new cabinet. The station before arriving at Warsaw it was learned, however, that the cabinet members had been released and were still in power.
8. Paderewski therefore approached Pilsudski with the idea of the National Council and received the reply that he personally was willing that such a meeting should take place but that the prime minister Moraczewski would have to be consulted. Moraczewski stated that he would be willing to act in a coalition cabinet but in a general conference with the socialist leaders in [which?] a Mr. Perl, the editor of the most prominent Socialist paper, took the leading part, the socialists refused to take part in any such National council.
9. It is interesting that the socialists did not suggest the representation of the Jews in this council and it was only through the suggestion of Paderewski that they were included.
10. The party of socialist peasants who form a body separate from the Pilsudski socialists due to their fear of radical social communist

ideas, have not decided as yet whether they will take part in the conference.

11. Posen and Galicia warmly support the idea, and the conference will be held on January 16th in Warsaw the socialists not being represented.
12. Paderewski states that this conference will represent fully 98% of the Polish population.
13. Regarding the present government Paderewski states that it is almost universally considered as being inefficient and incompetent and points out the weakness that was shown through its unwillingness to compromise. He states that the public funds amounting to some 200,000,000 marks at the beginning of the Pilsudski regime have now been exhausted and have been expended by the government for political socialistic propaganda. The army has not been paid for three weeks, is not clothed, no industries have been restarted and no public charitable works undertaken.
14. The Milice can be regarded as a Red Guard organization as the old Polish Milice has been replaced by the Minister of the Interior, Thugut, with strong socialists. This Milice depends on the Minister of the Interior whereas the Army depends on the Ministry of War. The Army is, however, a loyal national body and many cases of conflicts between members of the Army and the Milice can be cited.
15. Paderewski stated that there are as many as 500 Bolshevik delegates in the city that are working with the knowledge of the Socialist party as shown by the fact that when these men are caught carrying arms they are simply disarmed and let go again. He considers Perl as the leader of the socialists, the power and schemer behind Pilsudski's throne, and an out and out Bolshevik.
16. On the military situation Paderewski was very much depressed. He stated that the army consisted of about 60,000 men and that there was only enough ammunition to last through a two days battle. They lacked clothes and equipment also. In the case of troops being sent to Poland it would be necessary to provide food also and in this connection he stated that there was only about one months food supply in Warsaw.

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R. C. FOSTER

⁶⁵ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 30, January 20; received January 28.

Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge⁶⁶

Subject: Conference with General Pilsudski.

1. At the invitation of Col. Wade⁶⁷ I went with him to a conference with General Pilsudski on the question of arranging an armistice between the Poles and the Ukrainians.
2. Col. Wade had already talked over this matter with General Szeptycki Chief of Staff of the Army in a previous conference and had offered his services as middleman for negotiations. To this General Szeptycki agreed and consequently Capt. Johnson, assistant to Col. Wade had been sent to Lemberg on January 12th from Warsaw.
3. The basis of these negotiations was to arrange a neutral zone between the two armies, suspend all hostilities and leave the question of the settling of boundaries to the Peace Commission at Paris.
4. Capt. Johnson reported by letter to Col. Wade this morning that the Polish General Rozwadowski had refused to undertake negotiations on the basis that the "bandits" should not be treated with but be exterminated and stated that he would only move on direct orders from General Pilsudski whose authority he only recognized. (It is interesting to note that word had already been sent to him by General Szeptycki which evidently he did not want to recognize saying that the telegrams had been garbled in transmission.) He further stated that were he forced to negotiate he would resign.
5. General Pilsudski informed Col. Wade that a letter had been dispatched to General Rozwadowski yesterday instructing him that negotiations would be carried on by General Leswiewski. Pilsudski said that this General was chosen as he was of the Russian school and would therefore be considered as more impartial whereas

General Rozwadowski was a large land owner in Ukrainia and therefore strongly biased in his feelings.

6. General Pilsudski was very firm in stating that Lemberg should be freed within a radius of twenty kilometers and the three lines Tuning to Warsaw, Cracow and Przemysl left absolutely at his disposal. He spoke most strongly of Lemberg as a Polish town stating that it was the very centre of the life of Galicia and to lose that would have a tremendous effect on the Polish people throughout Poland. From his own personal point of view it was vital for him to insist on this on account of the delicate position that he was in politically as the Poles attached so much importance to holding this town. All armistice terms should therefore consider the holding of Lemberg by the Poles as a necessity.
7. The second point that he brought up was that Drohobycz should belong to Poland and no terms should be made that would endanger the assurance of this. He stated that although the industries in this town were owned by outside capital nine-tenths of the workmen were Poles and the town therefor considered by Poles as being Polish. Public opinion in Poland was very strong on this point and it was the opinion of the public that must be watched in any terms that were made.
8. He felt sure that even if the Peace Conference decided against the holding of these two towns and this district of Poland, the population would not abide by it, their feeling was so strong that troubles would result.
9. Regarding negotiations with the Ukrainians, Pilsudski stated that he felt it was easier to negotiate with Petlura at Kieff than try to bring anything about in the Lemberg district as conditions at Kieff were more settled, there was order and that the "Bandit Atmosphere" was not felt there and had not taken possession of the Government as it had the troops in the vicinity of Lemberg.
10. My whole impression of Pilsudski was that he was working for Poland and he spoke with a certain force and conviction that I had not expected to find as a result of the impressions given me by other people. His greatest difficulty is no doubt the crowd that support him in power and form a circle about him that is inefficient and not to be trusted. It is reported that he and Paderewski are now in conference working out the details of a new cabinet and I will make that the subject matter of another report.

11. Col. Wade leaves for Lemberg tonight.

R. C. FOSTER

WARSAW , January 15, 1919.

⁶⁶ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 30, January 20; received January 28.

⁶⁷ Head of British mission to Poland.

Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge⁶⁸

WARSAW, April 7, 1919.

Subject: General report on Dantzig question and situation thruout Poland.

The prevailing feeling is one of uncertainty regarding the fate of Dantzig. The newspapers are full of it, people of all classes talk of it daily and hourly with the result that the question has assumed extraordinary proportions and the attitude of Lloyd George is severely criticized, he being generally considered as working against the interests of Poland.

Naturally the Bolshevik elements are not letting the opportunity slip to work upon public opinion already excited and to belittle the efforts of the Entente for Poland. The negotiations for the landing of Haller's troops at Dantzig, after the objection of the Germans, gave the opportunity of saying that the Entente had been frightened by the German threats of Bolshevik uprising and that the Entente would not therefore take the strong action in this and other matters that was so necessary in dealing with the Germans.

It was shown in the papers how England, having obtained the German naval and merchandise fleet and the German Colonies, had obtained what she wanted and was anxious as soon as possible to start up commercial trade again, the sea being in her hands. She was therefore ready to make concessions in order to establish peace. America, on account of the Germans in America, did not want to adopt such stringent measures that might embitter the Germans and also she was anxious to finish up her part in Europe and go back home. Italy, though theoretically one of the large powers, was not an

important factor and only mixed in such things as were of general interest or to her special interest. France, however, was fighting for all that could be gotten out of the Germans and it is felt that only France is backing the Poles against the Germans. It was further stated in the Press that official assurances had been received that France would defend the Polish interests as her own. It is believed also that the Four Great Powers are fighting among themselves.

There is no question but that the settlement of the Dantzic problem will have a tremendous political effect on this country. The great protection against the spread of Bolshevism has been the extraordinary patriotism of these people. In order to realise finally the creation of an Independent Poland almost unbelievable hardships, suffering and difficulties have been put up with, everyone living in the future when Poland, reconstructed, would take her part as one of the big powers, her industries and trade in touch with the rest of the world through Dantzic—her outlet to the sea. Suddenly they see the possibility of not getting Dantzic and, their confidence in the future rudely shaken, the acuteness of the present becomes more sharply defined and their patriotism is shaken to the foundation. Without this future why should they continue to resist Bolshevism? They had confidence in the relieving of their hardships by the Entente but the Entente is apparently ceding to the Germans, the great enemy of the Poles. That is the train that thought is taking and in view of this and the lack of food, clothing and employment, the loss of Dantzic would undoubtedly bring disastrous results and be difficult to explain.

The Minister of Finance—Englis—has resigned and Mr. Stanislaw Karpinski has taken his place. Mr. Karpinski was formerly director of the Polska Kassa Pozyezkowa which under the Regency and German occupation was the official Government bank and by which the present Polish marks were issued. His appointment is considered favorably in banking circles even though his anti-semitic sentiments have rendered him disliked by the Jewish banking element.

A movement of political interest is that of Mr. Daszynski towards the Right. He was always considered as one of the leaders of the P. P. S.⁶⁹ and one of the strongest socialist advisors of Pilsudski during the

Socialist regime. He has supported the more conservative elements of the Diet so openly in the last week that the P. P. S. have finally come out in a frank attack against him. He is considered a clever man, a skillful politician and to have considerable personal ambitions—this last fact may account for his change of tactics. It has even been suggested that he might be placed to good advantage in the Ministry and that his Socialism is really only skin deep.

The peasant parties have consistently supported the Government voting the Alliance with the Entente, the conscription bill, martial law and the stamping of the money. They are anxious, however, that the Agrarian Reform Laws come before the Diet as soon as possible and are restive at the delays.

One hears some talk of speculation in the sale of American Foodstuffs and its distribution but the American Food Mission is in close touch with the situation and does not feel that it is serious. Gossip has it also that there is corruption among a large part of the Government officials but there have been no public instances of this and the answer is generally given that a perfect Government cannot be created in a day.

It is proposed to prohibit the sale of cakes within a few days (April 12th) it being stated in the Diet that the American Food Mission said that it was not importing food stuffs for the manufacture of cakes etc. Such a move, even though throwing many people out of work (the main objection in the Diet), would have an excellent effect and a prominent Jew in answer to my questions regarding further food control and requisition stated that the Jewish element would cause no disturbance providing measures were thoroughly and impartially carried out.

There seems to be more of a tendency towards strong Government action as shown by the above and the report that the Peoples Militia, organized by the former socialist Minister of the Interior Thugut as his “Bed Guard”, was to be disbanded. Threatened strikes have been handled in an arbitrary manner and those that have been in progress in the district of Lublin have been settled.

It was extraordinary how the Bolshevik move in Hungary created nothing more than sceptical comment in Poland and it is generally believed that the uprisings and threatened disturbances in Germany are false and purposely created to influence the Entente. The Poles believe that the Entente is unduly alarmed and that strong action is all that is necessary. If the Germans were sincere in their desire to establish order they would call in their troops of the Army of the Ober-Ost, some 200,000. This army they believe, however, from all indications is being organised and held for a political Imperial *coup d'état*.

The reorganization of the Polish army in East Galicia and the sending of troops to this front from Posen has resulted in the situation around Lemberg being materially improved. The railroad line has been entirely freed from the North and the campaign favoring the Poles. It was a very close call for the city, however, as the last food rations had been given out and they figured that they could hold out a bare 48 hours longer when the Polish forces broke through and freed the railroad line. Thirty-three of the first cars entering the city with food stuffs were filled with supplies of the American Food Mission.

On the Eastern front the military continue to make satisfactory progress but the districts uncovered by the advance are in an unbelievable condition of starvation, sickness and general want, and the military not only faced with this situation are also compelled to contend with the numerous agents and organizations left behind by the Bolsheviks. These regions are largely populated by Jews. The American Red Cross and Food Mission are doing everything possible to assist this population.

R. C. FOSTER

⁶⁸ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 225, April 17; received April 21.

⁶⁹ Polish Socialist Party.

Hungary

[\[132\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, January 16, 1919. [Received January 24.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/15

[\[133\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, January 19, 1919. [Received January 28.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/18

[\[134\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

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[\[135\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, January 19, 1919. [Received January 28.]

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[136] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

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[137] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, January 19, 1919. [Received January 28.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/22^{1/2}

[138] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

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Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/23

[139] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, January 20, 1919. [Received January 29.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/24

[140] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, January 26, 1919. [Received February 3.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/41^{1/2}

[141] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, January 28, 1919. [Received February 5.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/44^{1/2}

[142] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, January 29, 1919. [Received February 5.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/45^{1/2}

[143] Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, February 2, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/64

[144] Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, February 8, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/117

[145] Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, February 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/92

[146] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, February 17, 1919. [Received February 24.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/110¹/₂

[147] Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, February 25, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/146¹/₂

[148] Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, February 25, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/146¹/₂

[149] Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, March 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/207

[150] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, March 13, 1919. [Received March 15.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/208

[151] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, March 17, 1919. [Received March 19.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/229

[152] Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, March 20, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/254

[153] Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, March 26, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/254

[154] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, 26 March, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[155] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, 26 March, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[156] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Paris, March 27, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/274

[157] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, March 31, 1919. [Received April 2.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/294

[158] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, April 6, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/326

[159] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, April 9, 1919—11 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/328a: Telegram

[160] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, April 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/343

[161] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, April 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/343

[162] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 11, 1919. [Received April 14.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/342

[163] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, April 17, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/375

[164] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, April 25, 1919. [Received April 28.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/411

[165] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, May 1, 1919. [Received May 3.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/424

[166] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, 2 May, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/450

[167] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Budapest, 2 May, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/450

[168] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, May 8, 1919. [Received May 10.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/460

[169] Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Vienna, 12 May, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/474

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/15

[Document 132]

Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 20

BUDAPEST, January 16, 1919.
[Received January 24.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that our party reached here yesterday morning and we were almost at once taken to the President who talked with us for the greater part of an hour. I inclose a report of his conversation by Lieutenant Goodwin.⁷⁰ Ever since I have been through a series of interviews only interrupted by intervals for food and sleep. I have already seen most of the ministers and several other important men and with difficulty have secured time for this short despatch before the pouch closes. All I can do is to try to recapitulate here the chief points which have been taken up by my various interlocutors.

I. The Hungarians feel that they have a great and legitimate grievance. They accepted an armistice on certain definite terms a copy of which armistice is inclosed herewith.⁷¹ These terms they claim have been violated in several respects. Under the armistice a certain territory in the southern part of the country was to be occupied by the Allies, but no acts of sovereignty were to be performed in it until its legitimate fate had been decided by the Peace Conference. Since the conclusion of the Armistice and after the dissolution of the Hungarian army other large tracts have been occupied by the Czechs, the Serbs and the Rumanians and Ukrainians, and the Hungarians were formally notified by the French Commanding General that they were not to oppose these advances. Also in all the above territories the invaders have deposed officials, changed the language of signs and in other ways acted as if they had every intention of remaining there and of forcing the inhabitants to adopt their nationality. There have been numerous tales of outrages,

particularly on the part of the Rumanians, but the conduct of the Serbs is praised. There has also been received a notification from Lt. Col. Vix⁷² saying that the Allied Powers and the United States have authorized the Czechs to act in full sovereignty in the territories occupied by them. I enclose a copy of the notification.⁷³

The Hungarians say that all this is in violation of the terms of the armistice, and that even if the notification from Lt. Col. Vix is in accordance with instructions from the Allied Powers and the United States, and of this they have had no confirmation, it does not apply to the regions occupied by the Serbs and the Rumanians and is in violation of the armistice terms. I am to see people on this subject this afternoon and shall enclose any documents they give me, but shall probably not have time to report further owing to the departure of the courier.

II. All the territory thus occupied is immediately cut off from Hungary. This has meant a dislocation of the economic life of the whole country. On the one hand it is impossible for the government to send money for pensions to the invalids, orphans, etc. in the occupied regions. On the other hand what is left of Hungary has suddenly been deprived of many of its most valuable resources, for instance, four fifths of the Hungarian coal mines have been seized and the country is suffering most acutely from the lack of coal. If this shortage continues unabated, the laming of all industries with the consequent lack of employment of the working classes means a great danger of Bolshevist revolution against a government which has no armed forces with which to meet it.

III. The one great political question in the minds of all apart from the maintenance of order and the economic situation is the danger that menaces the unity of the state. Some men even yet can hardly realize their territory which a thousand years ago had much the same limits as at the present time is now seriously threatened with dismemberment. Others do so with a feeling of despair at what seems to them an enormity. Croatian Slavonia they abandon without too much regret, but for the rest they plead passionately. Their chief arguments are:

1. The geographical and economic unity which is confirmed by the long historical one.
2. The impossibility of a division which shall not leave great masses of people under alien rule and the certainty of fresh troubles in the future.
3. Their willingness to give equal rights to all nationalities and to institute some sort of a government like that of Switzerland with cantonal independence.
4. Their readiness to put the question to the vote of the populations interested if only this can be done under fair conditions. They declare they have confidence in the result of such a vote and are willing to abide by it. When pressed they admit there are certain regions they are less confident than in others, for instance they do not feel confident of the Rumanians, but declare that they do of the Slovaks.

Finally they rest their whole appeal on the Fourteen Points of President Wilson and say that their only hope is in the sense of justice of the United States and its leader.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE
By **WALTER GOODWIN DAVIS**
Captain of Infantry, U. S. Army

⁷⁰ Not printed.

⁷¹ For text of the military convention between the Allies and Hungary, November 13, 1918, see [vol. II, p. 183](#) .

⁷² Allied Military Representative in Hungary.

⁷³ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/18

[Document 133]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 21

BUDAPEST, January 19, 1919.
[Received January 28.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that my stay of nearly five days here has now come to an end. My later impressions have confirmed those given in my dispatch of January 16th, and have strengthened them. I have seen many people, most of them highly competent on their subjects, and representing nearly every grade of political opinion from an archduke to a politician openly charged with Bolshevism. On foreign questions opinions are practically unanimous. There were very different views as to the past, the origin of the war, and the advisability of the policy followed by the Hungarian Government. But, on the one burning question of the day, the integrity of Hungary, there are almost no differences, except a greater or less insistence on the principle of a fair plebiscite and a willingness to abide by its result. I believe I have succeeded in eliciting information without expressing views of my own. I have continually insisted on the fact that there was nothing diplomatic in my mission, and that all official things must go through the regular channels. Nevertheless, I have not been able to prevent what seems to be a general feeling that this is the first chance that Hungarians have had of putting their views before the Allied powers and especially before America. As they look primarily to America for their salvation, I have been overwhelmed with visits, appeals, memoranda and attentions. These last have become embarrassing. For instance I have been obliged to appear on the balcony of the hotel and say a few colorless words to cheering crowds in the streets below. The position of both statesmen and people here is pathetic enough, and they are ready to clutch eagerly at every straw. Their faith in America, and particularly in President Wilson, is touching; and their expressions are I believe for

the most part genuine. Count Karolyi told me that in a speech on January 1st he had declared his foreign policy could be summed up in three words: “Wilson, Wilson, Wilson”. There are many placards in the streets with President Wilson’s picture and the statement “We are for a Wilson peace only”. Today one of the ministers said to me “Our only hope is in God and President Wilson”. I shall report separately on several topics connected with my stay and leave others to Mr. Storey,⁷⁴ who is to remain here after I depart and who will be able to take up the subjects with more deliberation.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

⁷⁴ Charles M. Storey, member of the mission.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/19

[Document 134]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 22

BUDAPEST, January 19, 1919.
[Received January 28.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that the point that all Hungarians dwell upon with passionate insistence is the essential unity of their country, despite the various nationalities that inhabit it. I shall present here some of their chief historical and national arguments.

No country in Europe has been more genuinely and historically united for the last thousand years than has Hungary. Her boundaries have been so well marked out by nature that except for the period when the greater part of her territory had been conquered by the Turks her frontiers have changed but little since the days when the Magyars first entered into this land. The only considerable accretion has been Croatia and Slavonia, whose union has never been complete and whose separation is now accepted.

The Hungarian State has had a long, and in many respects a glorious, history, with the usual variations of prosperity and decay, but always with a lively sense of its national existence. In the age when most of Hungary was in the hands of the Turks, Hungarian national life took refuge in portions of their land under Hapsburg rule or under that of the semi-independent Hungarian princes of Transylvania. It is to be noted that precisely these territories in the west, north and east, dear to Hungarian traditions, are the ones where the non-Magyar nationalities predominate in numbers. There is much dispute as to whether the Rumanians are the older or the late comers in Transylvania. The Germans mostly settled at various times in the middle ages. The mixed populations, Germans, Serbs, Rumanians, etc. in the Banat of Temesvar were welcomed in the 18th Century by

the Hapsburg sovereigns as immigrants into a region which had formerly been Magyar and most of whose population had disappeared under Turkish rule. Just as the fact that there are Alsatians, Bretons, Basques and other elements who do not speak French does not impair the recognized unity of France, so the Hungarians feel that their unity of a thousand years is not affected by the existence within their borders of people who do not in ordinary life make use of the national language. That the land should now be partitioned after the fashion of Poland seems so incredible to them that many even now cannot realize it is possible. They declare that, however unable to resist at the present moment, the Hungarians will never submit to being permanently divided up among neighboring states, leaving them but a helpless fragment of territory, one incapable of economic existence. If the boundaries of Hungary in the future should correspond to the present lines of foreign occupation which are continually being changed to her disadvantage, she would be left with 31 percent, of her previous extent and less than 40 percent, of her previous population. 34 percent, of the Magyars of today, or more than three and three quarters millions of people, would be subjected to foreign rule. I inclose an estimate with these figures which has been given to me.⁷⁵ This population, a proud, determined and enduring one, thus subjected to nationalities whom it has for centuries regarded as inferior to itself would constitute a number of Irredentas which could not be absorbed in any time that it is now possible to foresee. One Hungarian statesman and former prime minister put it to me thus: "It looks as if the policy of the Allies was to create at the same time an Ulster (the Szeckler region in Transylvania) and an Alsace-Lorraine (the Magyar speaking regions now occupied by the Czechs) in this part of the world." To compel what has been since a thousand years a unified country to accept such an arrangement as permanent would only condemn it to a future of hatred and strife with every probability of violent outbreak before many years have elapsed.

In other dispatches I shall take up the questions of the geographical unity of Hungary and of the separate disputes as to nationality.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

75 Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/20

[Document 135]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 23

BUDAPEST, January 19, 1919.
[Received January 28.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that most Hungarians recognize that the treatment of the non-Magyar nationalities in the last half century has not been satisfactory or creditable. Although this is denied by some conservatives and many others who are ignorant about such questions, the better informed say that the law of nationalities, passed in 1868, was a good and fair one in itself, but admit that it has not been properly observed. Some people declare that this was not owing to any intention of ill treating the nationalities as such, but because the administration was generally bad and oppressive, and they say that the Magyar peasants suffered from this as much as the others, as is shown by the fact that it was from the Magyar regions of the country that the deputies of the opposition were generally elected, while those of the majority were more apt to come from the Slovak and Rumanian regions. This explanation is not convincing. The Liberals who are now in control express themselves as being entirely ready to grant very full autonomy to all the nationalities in Hungary, rearranging the country in administrative divisions in a way that would make this most feasible and giving every guaranty to minorities. They admit that the task is difficult but they say it can be done and some sort of a Hungarian Switzerland be created. As a beginning, a law has just been promulgated for the benefit of the Ruthenians of Northern Hungary. I have seen some of the chief Ruthenian officials, who declare themselves perfectly satisfied. Other laws of the same sort are in preparation. The Hungarians are convinced that if arrangements of this sort can be made, the great majority of the non-Magyar peoples who have until now been in the Hungarian state will prefer to remain in it rather than be absorbed

by their neighbors; and they claim in the name of justice and particularly in the name of the 14 points and the principles enunciated by President Wilson that these peoples should be given a fair chance to express their wishes. Such a fair chance cannot be given as long as the territories where the food is to be taken are in the hands of Czech, Rumanian and Serb soldiers.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/22

[Document 136]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 25

BUDAPEST, January 19, 1919.
[Received January 28.]

Geographic and economic unity of Hungary.

SIRS: I have the honor to report that in support of their statements that the kingdom of Hungary forms a natural geographic and economic unity to a greater extent than any other state in Europe except Great Britain the Hungarians point to the following facts. The Hungarian state is made up of the basin of the middle Danube and its tributaries and of the surrounding hills and mountains. On the north, east and much of the south the frontiers of the wild Carpathians and of the Transylvanian Alps are about as good as could be desired. In the south until the loss of Croatia and Slavonia it has also been excellent. On the west, too, it is satisfactory. Hungary consists of flat, fertile plains and of the highlands about them. All the rivers (with some slight exceptions in Transylvania) ultimately flow into the Danube, which is thus the central artery reached by many tributaries. This great common river system now more than ever needs treatment as a whole. For instance, the Danube and its tributaries are subject to sudden rise and fall. What is needed is an elaborate storage system by which water should be preserved some times in one part, some times in another, and then used later in such measure as circumstances may require; but for such a system central management is necessary.

The Hungarian plains are rich, flat lands, which in former times were a natural resort of nomad or pastoral peoples like the Magyars, and the Huns and Avars before them. Today they are chiefly devoted to agriculture and produce fine crops, although these often suffer

severely from drought. The Piedmont or region of the lower hills seems to integrate rather than to separate the plains from the mountains, and it is here that many of the more important cities are to be found, cities which from their very position usually have a population belonging to several nationalities. In the more mountainous regions we find all the forests, all the mineral wealth and all the future considerable possibilities of the development of water-power, of which the war has here as elsewhere shown the need. As the Magyars have been men of the plains in the mountains we find predominating in numbers Slovaks, Ruthenians and Rumanians (except in the Szeckler portion of Transylvania). The Germans have been numerous in the cities and are to be found scattered about in various places, but throughout the whole country the chief landowners have been Magyars, and they claim to have lived on good terms with the peasantry.

Thanks to this diversity in the character of its different regions, Hungary has been from the earliest times a singularly self-sufficing state. The plains have furnished the food, the hills have furnished the wood and the mineral wealth, the Danube and its tributaries have brought the people together. The different parts of the country have been attached to one another by the countless ties that come from having formed parts of the same unity through long ages. With the development of modern industry and communication the unity of the kingdom has been still further strengthened. In recent years mining has been carried on on a much larger scale, and many new manufactories have arisen and thrived. These establishments are to be found in the hill regions, that is, the borderlands, but they have been financed and managed from Budapest, which has grown in the last half century from a comparatively small town into one of the capitals of the world, with a population of nearly a million people before the war. Here is the center for the railroads, the seat of government, the winter home of people from every part of the country, the great focus of national life. Even distant Transylvania is and always has been economically found more closely connected with the central plain into which most of its waters flow than it has with Rumania on the other side of the mountains.

As a final argument the Hungarians point to the historic unity of their state, and say that it could never have been preserved through all the ups and downs of its history of a thousand years, despite the variety of nationalities that have lived in it, if its continuity had not been in the nature of things in obedience to geographic law.

We can understand then what a violent rupture in the economic life of the country has been produced by the occupation, whether temporary or not, of almost the whole Hungarian peripheral by the Czecho-Slovaks, the Rumanians and the Serbians, and in their severing of all relations between the lands they have occupied and the heart of the country. We can appreciate, too, the anguish of people here when they face the possibility of a Hungary reduced to the dimensions of the present unoccupied territory, without wood, without iron, without coal, without manufactories, nothing but an agricultural region and a great city condemned to certain ruin.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/22¹/₂

[Document 137]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 26

BUDAPEST, January 19, 1919.
[Received January 28.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that in the various conversations I have held in the last few days I have been able to gather certain impressions as to the general situation here, the position of the government and the strength of the various parties. I give these impressions, such as they are, leaving it to Mr. Storey to confirm or correct them when he has been there longer and has had time to study these matters more thoroughly.

The government of Count Karolyi is weak, its greatest asset being his own popularity and the difficulty of finding anyone to replace him. The aristocracy is bitterly critical of Count Karolyi. It accuses him of culpable weakness and declares he is leading the country to ruin and Bolshevism. They point out the small number of official adherents to the Socialist Party and say that Budapest is not Hungary or even a fair representative of it, that the present government is dominated by fear of the city mob and is steadily moving further and further toward the left. The military weakness of the government, as of the state, is only too evident. The troops returning in confusion from Italy and Serbia were sent to their homes by the War Minister without having to surrender their rifles and ammunition. This has had a demoralizing effect throughout the country. Later it was found necessary to have an army and after some hesitation five classes were called back to the colors. This produced dissatisfaction and the soldiers thus called proved unruly. Two classes were sent back, the other three having no wish to be as they were receiving good pay, had little to do and were under weak discipline. The councils of the soldiers (in which the officers take part) are already a power. Many

people will tell one that against any revolutionary attack there is practically no military force whatsoever. What the conservatives ask for, as is usual in such cases, is firmness, and they believe that they can rely on the support of the peasants. Many of the conservatives seem to [be?] reactionaries and would like to see the monarchy, though hardly the recent emperor, restored. In general they appear to me not to realize how profoundly the situation has changed in the last three months and to lack constructive ideas.

The Social Democrats, among whom the Jewish element is strong, are well organized, in fact they have practically the only good organization that now exists in this country. Their leaders appear to be men of ability. They are planning all kinds of reforms in taxes, distribution of property and many other matters. There may be truth in the charge brought against them that they live in the domain of theory and not of fact. They are patriotic enough and dread the partition of their country as much as do the conservatives, though they admit errors in the past and appeal to the doctrine of self-determination rather than to history. They are suspicious and inclined to look on all conservatives as reactionaries plotting to restore the monarchy.

It is to be noted that one of the great weaknesses of Hungary is the absence of a strong middle class which might hold the balance between the main parties. Finance and industry are largely in the hands of the Jews and at present there is a strong Semitic feeling among the conservatives.

The government is conscious of its weakness and is trying to steer a middle course. It is based on a coalition and its members do not appear to get on harmoniously together. After a crisis which has lasted about ten days a new cabinet was announced this morning. Some members of the last one were retained, others left. I asked Count Karolyi if his new cabinet meant a step further to the left, he answered "a little, not much". There are now three socialists in it instead of two as before, but he pointed out that he had put in as a member a genuine peasant (whom I have met) to help counter-balance the power of the city democracy. Count Karolyi came in as the man who had opposed the war and who it was hoped might get

better terms from the Entente. Since he has been in office he has not been able to get into communication with the Allies at all and he has seen a great part of his country overrun in a way not at all indicated by the armistice. The fact that this has happened and that the Magyars have attempted no resistance has tended to discredit and weaken the government and strengthen the power of its critics. Count Karolyi has an attractive personality, well educated, experienced, broad-minded. He realizes the difficulties of the situation and the futility of many of the plans proposed. He is doing his utmost under trying circumstances with no too great a confidence in the future. One feels attracted to him and sorry for him. He seems a very good fellow but nervous and permanently worried, which is perhaps not surprising.

The financial situation by all accounts is very bad. The expenses are enormous, a great number of pensioners and idle people are receiving what looks like high pay though it is not enough to keep them comfortably. Taxes do not come in. The economic life of the country has been disrupted by the occupation of the industrial portions by invading armies and I suspect that government finance is kept going chiefly with the aid of the printing press. The present reduced Hungary is being held responsible for the obligations imposed on the old larger one. Everybody says that any attempt to put on her an unfair share in the burden of the debt or an indemnity will result in prompt and complete bankruptcy. Many people think this will come anyway.

As throwing light on the situation I shall mention an incident which I witnessed yesterday. A band of students and others from the so called Szeckler portion of Transylvania who had gathered to protest against the incorporation of their country by the Roumanians, after proceeding to the hotel where I lived and cheering and singing the national hymn until I had to appear on the balcony, went on to the residence of the President where one of them made a speech and where I happened to be making my farewell call. The meeting, however, assumed an anti-socialist character and it was rumored that a demonstration would be made against the new Socialist Minister of War. When I left the palace and crossed the open place a Socialist guard (though I think that they were regular troops) was

drawn in front of the residence with machine guns and others were coming to support them. I have been told that bloodshed was narrowly averted. In the evening there had been firing (without casualties) in one of the main streets through which I passed on my way to the station.

Still on the whole public order has so far been preserved and the Socialist leaders expressed themselves as being able to maintain it as long as the people have enough to eat and keep decently warm. The food question is not as bad here as it is in Austria, but the scarcity of coal is equally great and there is greater lack of material for clothes. If the absolute necessities of life give out no one can answer for anything. Mr. Boehm, the newly appointed Socialist Minister of War said to me “what we fear is not Bolshevism but anarchy.[”]

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/23

[Document 138]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 27

BUDAPEST, January 19, 1919.
[Received January 28.]

Slovak questions.

SIRS: I have the honor to report that people here are getting exercised over the Czech seizure of northern Hungary, a seizure which has been extended continually until now it includes pretty much the whole region north of the bend in the Danube and is so near Budapest that there have been rumors that the city itself would soon be occupied. It should be remembered as soon as any territory passes into Czech hands it is immediately cut off from communication with the rest of Hungary and, if accounts may be trusted, measures are immediately taken to denationalize it. The Hungarians are very bitter against the Czechs and their proceedings. They maintain that the whole Slovak movement is artificial, that the great majority of the Slovaks have lived on excellent terms with the Magyars and had no desire to be separated from the Hungarian state. They assert too that Slovak is not a dialect of Czech but a separate language akin not only to Czech but the other Slovak tongues and that the Slovaks do not like the Czechs or wish to be joined to them. They are more afraid of losing their own language under the rule of a kindred one than under that of a totally different one such as Magyar. It is asserted that already one thousand Czech school teachers have been sent into the Slovak region.

The Hungarians admit that the Slovaks desire autonomy and privileges for their language which they have not enjoyed in the past. These the Hungarians say (or at least the Liberals) they are now willing to grant and continually declare that they are ready to abide

by the decisions of the Slovak people, if the question is fairly put in the form of autonomy with Hungary or union with Bohemia. The Hungarians point triumphantly to President Masaryk's recent declaration that the Slovak people were not ready for a plebiscite. They say that this shows that he knows perfectly well that the Slovaks do not desire union with Bohemia. They also point out the inconsistent nature of the Czech demands based on the historical and geographical rights in Bohemia, ethnographical ones in the Slovak territory in complete disregard of geography and history (the reference to the Moravian kingdom of 1000 years ago looks almost like a joke) and economical ones in their seizure of purely Hungarian lands north of the Danube. They say that the whole thing is nothing but imperialism in its most naked form and that they cannot believe the allies and especially America can countenance such a violation of the principles of justice and self-determination.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/24

[Document 139]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 28

VIENNA, January 20, 1919.
[Received January 29.]

SIRS: I have the honor to inclose herewith memorandum from Lieutenant Goodwin on the financial situation in Hungary. His summary seems to me to overlook certain facts. The Government, and especially the Socialist members of it, are anxious to tax as heavily as possible war profits, which have undobutedly been considerable. It must be remembered that the Government is desperately hard up for money, and anxious to get it from any available source. Personally, I do not believe that any of the serious leaders "are purposely attempting to ruin the capitalistic industry in order that it may fail and be taken over by the Government". It should be remembered too that, though the payment of 10 or 15 crowns a day to the unemployed seems unwise enough in itself, owing to the scarcity and very high prices that prevail it does not mean luxurious living. It also may be regarded as a desperate temporary measure in order to tide over a crisis.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Memorandum for Mr. A. C. Coolidge

January 19, 1919.

Subject: Summary of the financial situation in Hungary, middle of January 1919.

The State budget of Hungary amounted to about 2 billion Crowns a year in peace times. From Nov. 1st, 1918, the beginning of the new Government, till the present time, the revolutionary government has spent over 2 billion Crowns in less than two months. During the war Hungary spent 35 billions in 50 months; the present rate of expense is somewhat higher than in wartime and is steadily increasing.

Hungary's yearly savings amount to about 500 million Crowns, now worth about 150 million Crowns at the present rate of exchange. Taxes have practically ceased to be paid and from the occupied regions they do not reach the Hungarian Government at all. At the present moment the Government is making all payments through the Austro-Hungarian Bank, practically its only cash supply. Funds are received from the bank in the following manner: A War-Loan was placed with the State Austro-Hungarian Bank; of this Austria received 70%, Hungary 30%. Hungary's share amounted to about 5 billion Crowns, of which about 3 billion were unused before the revolution. This is now being spent.

At the present rate of expenditure of nearly 1½ billion a month, this sum will not last much more than two months, and on account of the daily increasing government salaries throughout the country and payments to the unemployed, it is likely to be exhausted before the end of two months.

Besides Hungary's national debt she owes Allied countries a sum of nearly 3 billion Crowns, of which France is the largest holder, amounting to over ½ billion; the country also owes Germany a war debt of 1½ billion Crowns, to be paid in monthly installments. This debt is due at the conclusion of peace.

The threat of the Jugo-Slavs and Czech Governments to stamp the Imperial money in those countries is another menace to the financial situation.

.....

Summary

From the appearance of the socialistic policy in Hungary it would seem that they are purposely attempting to ruin capitalistic industry in order that it may fail and be taken over by the Government. At the same time by the payment of 10 Crowns per day to women and 15 Crowns to men who have no employment, they are winning a large number of persons to their side. Unless the country is provided with some raw material and coal at once so that it may produce as well as spend, a serious crisis will occur within a month or two. The conservative elements recommend besides the sending of coal and allowing raw material to enter the country, that an Allied force of 15,000 men should be sent to maintain order and allow the constructive elements of the Government to put through measures for saving the national credit.

Respectfully yours,

PHILIP L. GOODWIN

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/41^{1/2}

[Document 140]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 43

VIENNA, January 26, 1919.
[Received February 3.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I was called upon this afternoon by Baron Podmonincky of the Hungarian Foreign Office of whom I recently saw much in Budapest. In the course of the conversation he spoke of the declaration of the Supreme War Council against the forcible occupation of disputed territories before the terms of peace are settled.⁷⁶ He declared that the Hungarian people were greatly pleased with it. I asked him if he thought it would strengthen the government of Count Karolyi. He answered emphatically that it would very much. He said that Count Karolyi had been all along preaching and practicing the doctrine of non-resistance to the recent invasions of Hungarian territory, maintaining that occupation of this sort would not prejudice the final decision arrived at by the Peace Conference in Paris. He had been much criticised for this, but now the announcement of the Supreme War Council would greatly strengthen his position.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

⁷⁶ [Vol. III, p. 715](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/44^{1/2}

[Document 141]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 48

VIENNA, January 28, 1919.
[Received February 5.]

SIRS: I have the honor to inclose herewith a number of reports sent by Mr. C. M. Storey from Budapest.⁷⁷ I can confirm from my own experience his statement of the way in which posters of President Wilson are to be found all over the city. The memorandum of Mr. Pogany on educational program⁷⁸ is interesting though it throws no light on the disputed question of Mr. Pogany's attitude towards Bolshevism. In general the impression I get of Hungarian affairs is disquieting. The coal situation continues bad, there is a menace of shortness of food fats, and there has been a division, I do not know how serious, in the ranks of the parties that support the Government.

The government of Count Karolyi is faced among other difficulties with the one, insuperable for the present, that it does not see how it can call for the election of any popular assembly. The states that are now holding large parts of what was formerly Hungarian territory will not allow any election to take place there for an assembly in Budapest. In view of the fact that they hope to keep these occupied lands, at least in great part, this attitude is natural. On the other hand, the Hungarians are unwilling to hold an election in only the restricted area which is now under their control. They feel that to do so would be a sort of recognition of what they regard as an utterly illegal occupation. They are thus unable to hold any election at all and are correspondingly weakened and unable to test the feeling of the country. The Austrians have to face the same difficulty, especially as regards German Bohemia. They get out of it by treating the former representatives of that district as still being such. This method could hardly be applied in Hungary, at least with the consent of the

Socialists, for it was in the now occupied districts and not in the purely Magyar portions of the country that the most extreme partisans of the old regime were elected in the greatest numbers, thanks to the way in which the elections were conducted.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD GARY COOLIDGE

77 None printed.

78 Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/45^{1/2}

[Document 142]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 49

VIENNA, January 29, 1919.
[Received February 5.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that among the various movements of nationality in this part of the world that of the Germans in western Hungary has attracted little attention. It does not affect any great section of territory and so far has not produced excitement, but it may seriously affect the future relations of Austria and Hungary to one another.

The western strip of Hungary, southwest of Vienna, although it has for ages formed part of the Hungarian kingdom, is inhabited by a predominantly German population mixed with a few Magyars and Croatians. As far as I am aware, it has been in the main contented and manifested no desire to change its political connections. Since the breakup of the dual empire, however, there has been agitation in the region and the expression of a wish for union with Austria. The Austrians regard this wish as not only natural but legitimate in view of the principle of self-determination. They also are anxious to get this territory for economic reasons. It is from here that Vienna has been accustomed to obtain many of her vegetables and other produce and has come to rely much on it for her food. The disturbance in the former existing relations is given here as one of the reasons for the scarcity of food in this city at the present time. The annexation of the territory to Austria thus appears entirely natural and is in accordance with the new political principle.

The Hungarians, on the other hand, although they recognize the existence of a pro-Austrian movement in their border territory put it down to the temporary excitement of the present moment and to the

fact of the disturbance of the former relations with the Viennese market, but say that matters will soon readjust themselves. They declare that the Germans of Western Hungary are in the main loyal citizens of the new Hungarian Republic, and prefer to remain a part of it, especially if their right of maintaining their nationality is recognized. In recognition of this right and in order to allay discontentment the government of Budapest has just made a law (a copy of which I enclose⁷⁹) on this subject. It is on similar lines to the one recently enacted for the Ruthenians of Northern Hungary, and is part of a general plan to conciliate the non-Magyar nationalities and keep them loyal to the Hungarian state. It will be interesting to watch the effect of these laws. In this western German region at the present time the Austrians declare that the people are kept from uniting themselves to Austria only by the presence of Hungarian troops. This the Hungarians deny. As both sides loudly proclaim their willingness to abide by the principle of self-determination this would seem a chance to put that principle into practice, though the usual difficulty would arise of conducting the election under impartial control, the more so as such control has not been among the former habits of Hungary.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

⁷⁹ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/64

[Document 143]

Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge80

BUDAPEST, February 2, 1919.

Subject: Elections in Hungary.

Some of the more intelligent political factors in Hungary are beginning to think that even in the present situation the election of the constituent assembly is becoming increasingly necessary. My information comes from several sources.

However, the only method of cutting the Gordian knot, caused by the occupation of Hungarian territory, has been suggested by Count Apponyi⁸¹ and is as follows: That elections be had in unoccupied territory, that at the same time a formal declaration be issued by the Government, protesting against the occupation and stating that the failure to hold elections in occupied territory is not to be considered in any way as admission of a relinquishment of sovereignty; and that delegates from occupied territory be chosen temporarily to represent the inhabitants thereof.

We have asked several persons their opinion as to the complexion of Parliament if elected and the answers have been more or less uniform and to the effect that unless pressure is exerted by the Government, the more conservative element will predominate. Count Apponyi further stated to me that he couldn't remain much longer in retirement if things continued as at present and that he might shortly enter the political ring as an advocate of National Assembly. He told me that Capt. Pommerol when questioned had stated that to him a National Assembly seemed necessary and that he believed that the Entente would welcome it.

Respectfully yours,

CHARLES M. STOREY

⁸⁰ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 63, February 5; received February 12.

⁸¹ Count Albert Apponyi, President of the Hungarian Independence Party.

Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge⁸²

No. 60

BUDAPEST, February 8, 1919.

Subject: Political parties of the present day in Hungary.

Before attempting to catalogue, describe and estimate the political parties in Hungary today it is well to begin with a few introductory remarks.

In the first place I am told on every hand that the Parliament lately dissolved, had through longevity long ceased to be representative of the political complexion of the Hungarian Kingdom. For instance the leading party was held together by the personality of the late Count Tisza. After his resignation as Prime-Minister the party fell apart and Wekerle who was the Prime-Minister up to a few days before the Revolution was compelled to maintain a majority by a coalition difficult to bring under control.

Therefore when peace and the Revolution came coupled with the dissolution of Parliament the old parties instantly crumbled and disappeared.

There were left only two, the party of Karolyi, called the Independent Party or more accurately the Party for Hungarian Independence, which had perhaps 40 members in Parliament, and the Social-Democratic party, which had no representation at all. This latter party was made up of the different Trade-Unions and though small was compact and vigorous.

In the new Cabinet of Karolyi were one or two really independent persons, and one or two of the radical party, but the great majority were drawn from the Independent party and the Social-Democratic party. Karolyi himself said to me, that any Cabinet which attempted

to carry on the Government without the aid of the Social-Democrats today in Hungary would be foredoomed to failure. He is to my mind quite correct.

In the two months between the Revolution and the beginning of the year the Trade Unions all went in for expansion to a tremendous degree, some of them adding at least 50% to their membership. As membership in a Trades Union carries with it automatically membership in the social-democratic party, the growth of this party was very rapid. Furthermore it was a time of groping and of apathy, and while the Social-Democratic party was organizing, the other parties were stationary and the great majority of the people unaffiliated.

Recently, however, there has been a decided shift in the political complexion. Owing to the growth of the social-democratic party Karolyi felt that he had to give them greater representation in his Cabinet, so at the expense of the Independents a reorganization was put through about January 20th and Jaszy, a Radical, and Count Festetics, an Independent, were displaced in favor of Social-Democrats. Not long after, and probably induced by this act, the Independent party under the leadership of one of Karolyi's lieutenants, one Lovaszy, broke with the Government and with the exception of a small minority who were office holders and preferred to stay in the Cabinet, went frankly into opposition.

It is possible to assign many causes for this defection, but I think that the real basis was an ill-defined feeling—though strong throughout the party—that the Government was getting entirely too far to the left and was becoming dangerous. On the other hand it might not be wrong to ascribe the clash to the personal ambition of Lovaszy. If one comes to study the platform of Lovaszy and compare it with that of the Cabinet, I think that differences of purpose would be difficult to find, and that the main distinction would be only differences in degree of radicalism and in methods for carrying out common purposes. At about the time of the Cabinet-reorganization other parties to the right of the Government began to make head. The Christian Socialists re-appeared somewhat divided amongst themselves, being a Catholic and Protestant party, somewhat

monarchistic in instinct, opposed to all land reform except in the abstract, quite conservative in everything else. Though not altered in personnel this party is considerably liberalized and chastened by misfortune and the course things have taken.

Allied to it is the party of the small farmers led by some of the large landowners, and bitterly opposed to the land-reform proposed by Karolyi. It is still a small party, and though it professes to be a complement to the citizens party next to be described, is in reality quite in sympathy with all but the most conservative branch of the Christian Socialists. I do not anticipate any future for this party and foresee its absorption before long. It is noteworthy in neither numbers nor organisation and is not led by men either vigorous or particularly intelligent.

The Citizens party is distinctly a bourgeois party. In it are many of the more intelligent professional men, intermixed with a fair sprinkling of literary men and professors. To it will rally many of the leading Jewish business and banking interests.

Mr. Alpar, the leading architect of Budapest, who has built all the great public buildings within the last twenty years, has taken great interest in this *Burgerpartei*. He is a tremendous man, physically speaking, with a hearty and popular way of speaking. In a conversation with him, he expressed great confidence in the future of this party, and said that they were very well supplied with money, that their propaganda was increasing from week to week, and that they hoped to make an organized propaganda in the country districts also. This has already been started with considerable success. The daily papers announce the district meetings of this party in Budapest every day or so, and until the present moment it has had no opposition from the Social Democrats to be compared with the opposition toward the Clerical and Agrarian parties.

In discussing the possibility of a coalition between the Citizens' party and Lovaszy and his adherents, Mr. Alpar, one of the leaders of the former, told me it would be impossible on account of Lovaszy himself. Lovaszy expressed sympathy for the Entente in 1917 in the middle of the war, and this he felt was treason to the country.

Personal reasons, however, seem to have more real weight in keeping Lovaszy and other bourgeois elements apart.

The above form the only large political groups. There remain the Radicals and the two extremes—Communists and Capitalists. The Radicals represent a group next to the Social Democrats, and chiefly differing from them in that they believe in the right of property. They have no representative in the Cabinet, but are neither well organized nor very numerous.

The Communists form a small group expelled from the Social Democrats on February 9th. They have no money for a campaign, and their members are not increasing much at present.

The Capitalist Group are not a party, but an element composed of Jewish bankers and aristocrats with great estates. These people have money and are only waiting their chance to turn the course of the Government towards the old established order of things, as much as it is possible to do after so much change in people's ideas. They are not organized, but they are working indirectly against the Government.

Respectfully yours,

C. M. STOREY
Per **PHILIP L. GOODWIN**
1st Lt., U. S. [A.]

P. S. The formation of a new party, called the National Party, has just been communicated to me by Count Teleki and Betteleu. This party is to represent the Hungarian integrity idea, and will naturally find its chief support in the country. However, it is hoped not to limit it to any class or type, and to unite as many people as possible with the old Independence idea of 1848 adapted to the ideas of 1919.

⁸² Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 91, February 19; received February 22.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/92

[Document 145]

Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge83

No. 72

BUDAPEST, February 10, 1919.

Subject: Bolshevism in Hungary.

This report has been considerably delayed owing to the fact that Bolshevism is such a bugbear to the Hungarians that it has been very difficult to ascertain the true proportion of the movement. We have suffered from numerous exaggerated and false rumors. However, we are beginning to be convinced that at present there is little or no danger of a Bolshevik uprising.

The situation is somewhat as follows: There has been in Budapest for some time one of Lenine's emissaries, a former secretary of Lenine himself named Bela Kuhn. He has been engaged in spreading Bolshevik propaganda of the original Russian type. He established a newspaper called *Vörös Ujsag (Red Paper)*. About 12 numbers were issued, but owing to the action of the Government, described below, publication has ceased. It was said that the funds were low, but about two weeks ago I received word from the Government that a large sum, something like 30 million Crowns had been received from Russia. The truth of this rumor has never been definitely established.

Lack of paper as well as lack of money also interfered with Kuhn's activities. As previously reported the distribution of print paper which is very scarce and expensive is controlled by the Government and they have refused naturally to distribute paper to the Bolsheviks. Therefore supplies of paper have been obtained clandestinely and in small quantities.

Furthermore unemployment does not seem to be so widespread in Budapest, as at first believed, more reliable estimates though varying

in number running between 40 and 60,000. It is among the unemployed, of course, that Kuhn is able to work most effectively and his activities have been counterbalanced by two important factors: the first being the extraordinary action of the Government in supporting the unemployed out of the public purse, described in other reports,^{[84](#)} and the second being the fact that all but about 2000 of the unemployed are members of Trade-Unions and therefore members of the Social-Democratic party. Inasmuch as the Social-Democratic party is bitterly opposed to Bolshevism, every effort is being made by the Trade-Unions to keep its members in line.

An interesting statement made to me by Count Karolyi shows, if true, the extent of Kuhn's success. He said that they had received word secretly that Lenine had become dissatisfied with Kuhn's progress and had decided to recall him. Finally, last Monday morning, February 3rd, a raid was made upon the offices of the *Vörös Ujsag* by the police, an account of which is transmitted herewith, as are examples of documents collected.^{[85](#)}

It is our opinion that this action will put an end to effective Bolshevik activity for the present. It must, however, be remembered that due to the lack of coal, clothing, the high price of necessities and the possible shortage of food before the spring, a situation exists in which Bolshevism may rapidly spread and unless by the end of March some alleviation is forthcoming, is likely to achieve some tangible result.

Furthermore another complicating factor, the importance of which it is difficult to estimate, is presented by the Hungarian Communists, referred to in a contemporaneous report. It is not impossible that an addition of some of these Communists to Kuhn's forces may serve to strengthen his waning fortune.

Respectfully yours,

CHARLES M. STOREY

83 Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 81, February 14; received February 20.

84 Not printed.

85 Enclosures not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/110¹/₂

[Document 146]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 90

VIENNA, February 17, 1919.
[Received February 24.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I was visited today by three representatives of the German-speaking population of western Hungary, who came to express the desires of the people of their section to belong in the future to Austria and not to Hungary.

They repeated the arguments which I have already set forth in my report No. 49 of January 29th, and to which I beg leave to refer. They declared that this territory had been inhabited by Germans before the Magyars came into Hungary at all and that it had always been united by close ties with the German-Austrian territory to the west of it. Especially in recent years it has furnished much food to the city of Vienna, and Vienna in the poverty stricken condition of the new Austrian state, which has but little fertile land, is more than ever dependent upon it. My interlocutors said that the west Hungarian-Germans had always been in much closer touch culturally as well as commercially with Vienna than with Pest, and that there were about 140,000 of them in this city today. When the break-up came there had been a movement in favor of inclusion with Austria but this had been checked by the presence of Hungarian troops.

Of late there have been determined efforts on the part of the government at Pest to Magyarize the region and these efforts have met with some success, as is shown by the maps I enclose herewith.⁸⁶ Many of the townspeople are Magyar in their sympathies but the mass of the peasantry, I was assured, are anxious for union with Austria.

I inquired how people felt about the new special law for the benefit of the Germans in Hungary, of which I sent a copy in my report. The answer was that it did not go far enough and that people did not trust the Magyar government. The famous law of nationalities of 1868 had been liberal in principle but had never been observed.

The present conditions in the region are deplorable. It is held by Hungarian troops, who use their arms on very slight provocation. I asked if it was not the headquarters of smuggling operations on a large scale. The reply was that this was inevitable under the present circumstances, and that it could only be stopped by an arrangement between the two governments which, however, the Hungarians had so far refused to conclude.

Finally came the familiar request for an occupation by a small number of Allied troops, in order to secure life and liberty at the present time, and to insure a free plebiscite when the time comes for the inhabitants to decide to what country they wish to belong; especially as, in view of the well-known Magyar methods of conducting elections, no honest vote could be taken under Hungarian rule.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

86 Not attached to file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/146^{1/2}

[Document 147]

Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge⁸⁷

VIENNA, February 25, 1919.

Subject: Hungarian attitude towards Serbia.

1. Baron Podmaninczy informed me that he was being sent to Trieste by President Karolyi for the ostensible purpose of securing fats for Hungary but in reality to attempt to make arrangements with the Serbs and Jugo-Slavs looking towards some *rapprochement*.
2. He further stated that the Hungarian Government hoped to be able to make a private arrangement with Serbia for the distribution of the Banat and the country lying west of the Tisza, which would control irrespective of the decision of the Peace Conference.
3. It is his opinion, and I think he represents the Government, that Hungary's future access to the sea lies through Serbia and Salonica rather than down through Croatia to Fiume, and it is with the purpose of securing such access that endeavors are now being made to form an alliance with Serbia.
4. Incidentally, he stated that he is in receipt of information to the effect that the Italians are doing their utmost to separate the Croats and the Serbs. In this connection, Lieutenant Goodwin told me that the Italians have been asking for the translation into Italian of a good deal of Hungarian Integrity literature.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES M. STOREY

⁸⁷ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 110, February 26; received March 3.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/146^{1/2}

[Document 148]

Mr. C. M. Storey to Professor A. C. Coolidge^{[88](#)}

VIENNA, February 25, 1919.

Subject: Hungarian attitude after division of territory.

1. In conversation with Count Karolyi yesterday I was informed that it was his intention, should the Peace Conference deprive Hungary of her non-Magyar territory, to use all his influence to throw Hungary into the arms of German-Austria or Germany, with a view to obtaining strength thereby to control Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary's other enemies.
2. I think that by now it has begun to percolate into the minds of the Hungarian Government that many of the claims of Hungary's integrity will be disallowed by the Peace Conference.

Respectfully,

CHARLES M. STOREY

^{[88](#)} Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 110, February 26; received March 3.

Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge^{[89](#)}

VIENNA, March 12, 1919.

Subject: The Ciscarpathian Ruthenians, in relation to parts of the final frontiers of Ukrainia, of Stat Československa, and of Hungary, and in relation to the Transylvania problem.

1. In accordance with your direction, I submit a second memorandum (see Goodwin's and Martin's memorandum dated Budapest, March 9, 1919^{[90](#)}) regarding the Ruthenian population southwest of the main crest of the Carpathian Mountains in Ruszka-Krajna, adjacent to the new states of the former kingdom of Hungary. Tentative final frontiers are shown on Map 1, this page, and Map 12, accompanying, in red.^{[91](#)}

2. One of the principal needs here [is] to more carefully determine the wishes of the Ruthenian people, since the Carpathian barrier, (Maps 1, 2, 12), which separates them from the Ukrainians of southeastern Galicia is so high and crossed by so few passes that these Russians must market their products in one or the other of the states on the south and west. The determination of the desires of these people then becomes of paramount importance in connection with the maintenance of permanent peace in Europe. There are 464,000 Ruthenians, and many Hungarians, Slovaks, Roumanians and Jews in the area involved. The Ruthenian increase in population just equals loss by emigration (see Wallis, Exhibit C). I saw the Ruthenians during five days of geographical field work just completed.

3. Geographically, this district is a simple mountain unit. The population here consists of Ruthenian settlements in valleys in the

midst of high mountains. At the eastern borders of the district the peaks reach altitudes of 1405 to 2058 meters, or 4000 to 6000 feet. The Uzsok Pass lies at an elevation of 889 meters, or about 2700 feet, the Beskid Pass at 1014 meters or 3000 feet, and the Woronienka or Tar-taren Pass is equally high. The valleys inhabited by the Ruthenians lie at elevations varying from 121 meters, or 350 feet, above sea-level, at Ungvar to 274 meters, or 820 feet, at Maramaros-Sziget. Thus, the local relief is 3600 to 5100 feet. The roughness of the topography is indicated in general on Maps 1 and 2 and is shown in detail upon the ten sheets of the 1:200,000 staff maps appended as Map 12.

4. The region has heavy rainfall and is densely forested (see last map listed). Its agricultural and grazing industries are limited by the steepness of slopes, so that lumber and other forest products and mineral resources, including salt and petroleum, form an important output. There is no manufacturing to speak of except in connection with the forest products. Eighty-nine per cent of the Ruthenians are farmers; all the miners are Magyars. The sparse population of the region with no inhabitants except in the valleys (Map 4) is not self supporting, but is dependent upon the markets to the southwest in Hungary. Ungvar, Munkacs, and Maramaros-Sziget are the chief towns.

5. Transportation depends upon the railways from Lemberg through three chief passes (Maps 11a, 11b) to Budapest. The main line between Lemberg and Budapest, however, is a fourth railway which crosses Lupkow Pass in territory to the northwest, also inhabited by Ruthenians who occupy the heads of mountain valleys in whose mouths live Slovaks.

6. With these geographical, economic, and ethnic factors must be combined a religious factor which I reported to you from Prague on February 22nd on the basis of a conversation with President Masaryk. I append a copy of my letter (Exhibit M).

7. As this letter also states the view President Masaryk presented to me as to the future of the Ciscarpathian Ruthenians I shall not repeat his view of the wishes of the Ruthenians upon which I present some

evidence myself and his desire for physical connection between his republic and the Roumanians of Transylvania.

8. The matters just discussed are best stated specifically by saying how we would draw a boundary for (a) the west border of Ukrainia adjacent to the northeast side of the Republic of Hungary; (b) the east side of the Stat Československa; and (c) the north border of Transylvania, assuming that it might possibly become a part of Roumania rather than be erected as an independent state or be retained as a part of Hungary. Accordingly, although I have not had an opportunity to carry on complete geographical field studies in the region, to ascertain the wishes of its people with soldiers absent, or to study its resources as fully as I should like, I shall try in this memorandum to summarize my present view regarding the Ciscarpathian Ruthenians by drawing tentative boundaries on the series of Austrian staff maps, scale 1:200,000, hereto appended (Map 12), discussing them under the headings listed above.

9. *The Western Frontier of the Ukraine.* I recommend that unless a more complete field investigation regarding the wishes of the Ruthenians in Hungary indicated a different feeling from that which I encountered the first week in March, 1919, the western frontier of the Ukraine be considered as best drawn along the crest of the Carpathians, following the old boundary between Hungary and Galicia, except near Prislop Pass (Stiol P.) where a change is extremely desirable (Map 12). This line is shown in red on the appended Austrian staff maps, scale 1:200,000 (Ungvar, Turka, Stanislau, Maramaros-Sziget, Sniatyn sheets). I make this recommendation because: (a) the overwhelming majority of the educated Ruthenians in Hungary prefer to be ruled by the new Magyar republic rather than by Ukrainia and fear the Russians (see Exhibit D); (b) a surprisingly large proportion of the uneducated Ruthenians have the same preference; (c) the remainder, although conscious of a blood-preference for the Ukraine, have no clear appreciation of the economic disadvantage of being separated from Hungary, since the market relationships, both exports and imports, of Ruszka-Krajna are and always must be with Hungary rather than Galicia and the Russian plain; (d) the crest of the Carpathians is an excellent strategic frontier and there is a decided military advantage

in holding the Slavs east of the mountain crest instead of giving them a bridgehead at the very border of the Alföld (Plain of Hungary). In 1914, when they were our Allies, the Russians came through Uzsok and several other passes, and penetrated nearly to the border of the plain before they were driven back. If the military frontier had been at the southern foothills of the Carpathians they would have easily overrun the Plain of Hungary.

Another important factor influencing my recommendation is the direct relationship between this section of the Carpathians and the Alföld. The Hungarians need the salt, the petroleum, and the water-power of these mountains. They need the forest products; they need to restrict deforestation in order to control the rivers which water the agricultural lands of Hungary. The forest products include not only lumber, but also important by-products, like acetone, used in the manufacture of munitions. During the war, for example, there were large gunpowder factories between Ungvar and the Uzsok Pass, and in the Maramaros-Sziget valley. I should prefer that these be in the hands of the Magyars rather than the Russians. But this small forest area is merely one of many upon which the prosperity of the plain of Hungary depends. If Hungary is to be dismembered, and particularly if she is to lose the forested mountains inhabited by the Slovaks, the retention of the mountains populated by Ruthenians, is even more important. I take it that we are not trying to crush Hungary absolutely and are interested in the existence of an economically prosperous rather than a maimed state.

10. *The Eastern Frontier of the Stat Československa.* I recommend that the tentative boundary indicated in red on the Austrian staff map, scale 1:200,000 (Ungvar sheet), be adopted unless further field study among the Ruthenians and Slovaks adjacent to Ungvar, leads to a different conclusion. I have drawn this tentative boundary upon the basis of (a) Sheet 7 of Count Paul Teleki's ethnic map of Hungary, scale 1:200,000; (b) the ridges, valleys, and forests of the region involved; (c) the market relationships of the Slovaks and Ruthenians in the adjacent valleys; (d) the trunk lines of railway crossing the Carpathians at the Lupkow and Uzsok Passes.

Although the Ruthenians of the Ungvar valley told me on March 6 and 7 that they desired to belong to the Stat Československa rather than to the Ukraine or Hungary, I am not convinced that this represents their real sentiment or best good. I explained in my memorandum of March 9 the military conditions under which this sentiment was expressed to me. I also described in that memorandum the greed of the Slovak governor who desired to cross the line of demarcation and occupy Ruthenian territory now held by the Hungarians. He could easily have done so, as he had 3000 troops, the Hungarians having only 175. Moreover, he tried to mislead me about bolshevism (see Goodwin and Martin's Memo, of March 9).

The permanent boundary ought not to be on the Ung River. The unwise choice of the river as the present Line of Demarcation is best indicated by the facts (*a*) that the Line of Demarcation in the city of Ungvar has been shifted southward from the river by mutual consent because the city was divided by the Line of Demarcation; the railway station was in Hungarian hands while the main part of the city was held by the Czecho-Slovaks; (*b*) the railway line from Ungvar over Uzsok Pass to Lemberg crosses the river at several points near the pass, so that there was friction and danger of bloodshed until the Hungarians allowed the Czecho-Slovaks to run their trains through, regardless of the Line of Demarcation.

However, I am convinced that the permanent boundary should be west of the Ung River rather than on some watershed east of it, because I believe that this particular Ruthenian population will be more prosperous and contented under Hungarian rather than Czechoslovak rule, and because I am not willing to consider subjecting Poland's and Russia's transportation to Czecho-Slovak regulation and military control. It is bad enough to have the double-track railway by Lupkow Pass going for a short distance through Slovak territory without considering that this second railway line should do the same thing, giving the Slovaks an unnecessary economic and military control over Hungarian-Ukrainian transportation.

I fear there is no legitimate basis for the Slovak ambition to retain the city of Ungvar (Uzhorod). Its economic relations are largely with the Hungarians on the south and the Ruthenians on the north and east. The Slovaks have no more right in Ungvar, as administrators, than the Americans would have to claim a wedge of land including the city of Montreal and thus control Canadian commerce. Ungvar is at a geographically and commercially strategic point.

All this applies equally well either to an international frontier in the position shown by the red line on the Ungvar sheet or to a state boundary within Hungary, in case the Peace Conference finds that the Slovaks do not desire to be ruled by the Czechs, or that the economic relations of the Slovak mountains and the Hungarian Plain are such that a boundary between the Ruszka-Krajna and Slovenska-Krajna is established.

President Masaryk gave me an impression, when I talked with him in Prague, that the religious factor was a gravely important one, because the Ruthenian (Greek Catholic) priests, although belonging to the Roman Catholic church and acknowledging the Pope in Rome rather than the [omission] in Kief, may marry, and conduct religious services in the vernacular rather than in Latin. After talking to Greek Catholic and to Roman Catholic priests I saw no reason to believe that the religious welfare of the Ruthenians will be safer under Slovak than under the new Hungarian government. But if the Ukrainians were to obtain the southern slope of the Carpathians permanently I see danger of a religious upset.

So far as the educational outlook is concerned the new Hungarian government seems to have made more generous provisions than the Slovaks. I append as Exhibit A the proclamation in Russian, Slovak, and Hungarian by Governor Moys of Ungvar providing that the official language in Slovak territory shall be Slovak, and in Ruthenian territory Ruthenian. I append as Exhibit B a translation of the Hungarian law of December 21, 1918, providing for such generous autonomy for the Ruthenians that their state legislature will be able to provide education under almost any terms they desire. Certainly, with the information now on hand, the Ruthenians may look forward to a happier future under Hungarian than under Slovak rule, and this

is one of the several reasons why I favor drawing the frontier west of the city of Ungvar and of the valley of Ung River.

11. *The Southern Frontier of Ruszka-Krajna.* The frontier is described in relation to Ruszka-Krajna, or the Hungarian territory inhabited by Ruthenians, rather than is the northern frontier of Roumania, because the Transylvania problem is such a grave one that I do not wish to presuppose that it is settled, or that we may look upon Transylvania as definitely given to the Roumanians rather than as a possible Hungarian province.

I recommend that this frontier be considered as best located on the line indicated in red on the Austrian staff maps, scale 1:200,000 (Szatmar-Nemeti and Maramaros-Sziget sheets). I have drawn the frontier which I recommend upon the basis of Count Teleki's ethnic map, scale 1:200,000, sheets 16 and 17, but in relation to mountain ridges, to forests and to the resources and transportation lines of this part of the Carpathians. It will be observed that the boundary recommended does not correspond to the distribution of Ruthenians, Roumanians, and Magyars, but leaves a small number of Roumanians in the Magyar-Ruthene territory.

At Prislop Pass, an important and necessary change is made (Sniatyn sheet), as the old boundary did not follow the main crest of the Carpathians.

The problem has many factors, but assumes an economic form at once because of the nature of the terrain. The *comitat* of Maramaros is essentially the valley of the Tisza (Theiss) River within the Carpathians. South of this river is the Avavs-Köhat-Lapos-Rodnaer-Borgo Gebirge (Siebenburg Karpathen) a great, forested ridge rising to an elevation of 900 to 2300 meters, or 2700 to 7000 feet. The city of Maramaros-Sziget has an elevation of 274 meters or a little over 800 feet so that the local relief is approximately 1900 to 6100 feet. It has an easy water grade outlet northwestward down the Tisza. One may go northeastward from Maramaros-Sziget over the Woronienka or Tartar Pass and on to Czernowitz, a city in the distinctly Ruthenian portion of Bukowina. One may go southeastward from Maramaros-Sziget over the Prislop Pass, but this

is not a line of railway transportation. A military railway (*deecauville*) was built here during the war. Finally, one may go southward across the Lapos Hegyseg, at an elevation of 1039 meters or more than 3000 feet, or over another pass, at an elevation of 917 meters or more than 2700 feet. Neither of these two will ever be a line of railway transportation. The Roumanian Lieut. Colonel at Maramaros-Sziget told me that his difficult present line-of-communication was over the western of these two passes. It appears, therefore, that the economic future of the valley of the Tisza and the city of Maramaros-Sziget is necessarily controlled by the natural outlet northwestward through Huszt and the Hungarian Plain.

The city of Maramaros-Sziget appears in the Hungarian statistics as overwhelmingly Hungarian with a few Roumanians and a smaller number of Ruthenians and Germans. It has been claimed that a large number of persons classified as Hungarians are Jews and that a large number of Hungarians in this and several other cities are officials who would not remain there if the city passed from the hands of the Magyars. There may be a slight basis for the latter statement, but the former certainly is exaggerated. ... I am convinced that a large proportion of the Jews classify themselves as Germans rather than as Magyars. Whatever correction should be made, it still appears evident that the great majority of the inhabitants of Maramaros-Sziget are Magyars. The majority of the country population of the valley in which the city lies is Ruthenian, the Roumanians on the south slope being a smaller number. I am convinced that all the nationalities involved will be more contented and prosperous if this city and its outlet are controlled by the Hungarians.

We were told that the Ruthenian population in three villages near Maramaros-Sziget were in favor of Roumanian administration (see memorandum by Goodwin and Martin, paragraph 20, March 9). I place no more value upon this statement than I do upon what the Ruthenians in the valley of the Ung told me about their preference for Slovak administration. At Maramaros-Sziget the Ruthenian population is said to be now for union with Roumania. The Ukrainian troops occupied the city not long ago, and I have no doubt that the Ruthenians were then for union with the Ukraine. If Hungarian troops garrisoned the town the population, being Magyar,

would express preference for Hungary. If all troops were removed, and (a) if the advantages of union with their blood-brothers the Ruthenians in Ukraina and the disadvantages of the Carpathian barrier were explained to the Ruthenians, followed by (b) an impartial discussion of what would result if the Roumanians here were joined to Roumania even though there is a very strong mountain barrier on the south, and (c) if both races were told that union with Hungary would involve being ruled by Magyars, who may or may not, be regenerate, but that under these conditions they would have greater economic prosperity, I have a strong impression that a great majority of the Ruthenians and Roumanians would prefer to remain a part of the Hungarian Republic.

An important resource of the Maramaros-Sziget valley is the salt, the mines there supplying a great deal of salt which has been shipped to Serbia and the Balkan States as well as to Hungary. The workmen employed in the salt mines are Hungarians not Ruthenians. It appears that possibly the anxiety on the part of President Masaryk that the whole area of Ruthenian population be united with his republic may have some relation to mineral resources, particularly as Bohemia, Moravia, and the Slovak region of northern Hungary, although rich in all sorts of other minerals, are absolutely deficient in salt, and the Maramaros-Sziget valley has great salt mines.

I talked in Budapest with Mr. Ferencz Bolgar, a former governor of Maramaros-Sziget, and with Count Perenyi, who was his predecessor as governor there. Both these gentlemen assured me that the petroleum resource of this region was such an important one that a large amount of British capital was about to be invested just as the war broke out. It appears to me that a region which may turn out to be an important producer of petroleum ought to be given to Hungary, which is likely to be deficient in fuel, rather than to Roumania, or the Ukraine, both of which have petroleum, because, as suggested before, a maimed Hungarian state cannot be as peaceable and prosperous as one that has adequate resources.

Maramaros-Sziget can develop 388,000 horse power by use of the Tisza (see Exhibit G and Map 10). Neither the Roumanians nor

Ukrainians would have the same interest as the Hungarians in developing this.

12. Taking all the factors into account, it appears to me as if some such boundaries as I have described are eminently desirable, because the Ruthenians of Ruszka-Krajna and the adjacent Magyars of Hungary can be more prosperous and will be more inclined to keep the peace if this slope of the Carpathians is retained by Hungary. I do not see the slightest danger of creating a serious Irredenta, because it is clear that the Ruthenians have no great preference for the Ukraine. The Roumanians and Slovaks have not, to my mind, a just claim for expansion within this area. Righty-nine percent of the half-million Ruthenians are farmers. We have an opportunity to see to it that they be united with the farmers of Hungary. Under the new Hungarian regime I believe that the forests and mines will be developed and I am sure that the Hungarians need the forests and mineral resources of these mountains more than the other three nations. The waterpower is not of the least value to any one of the other three and is almost essential to the Hungarians. The regulation of the streams is also essential to the Hungarian farmers and would be of no interest to either one of the other three nations if the frontier were at the western base of the Carpathians rather than on the crest. Finally, the military strategic situation is not improved by creating a Slav-Latin buffer ("corridor") between the Magyars of the Hungarian Plain and the Slavs of the Russian Plain. On the other hand, the strategic situation is decidedly better if the military frontier coincides with the old frontier on the crest of the Carpathians as it was before the war, except at Prislop Pass.

LAWRENCE MARTIN

[Enclosure—Exhibit M]

Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

PRAGUE, 22 February, 1919.

Subject: The Ciscarpathian Ukrainians.

1. In conversation yesterday with President Masaryk we discussed the question of the south-east border of the Czecho-Slovak republic particularly in relation to the Ruthenian population between the Uszok Pass and the city of Unghvar.
2. I regard this territory as important in connection with the question as to whether ethnic boundaries or economic relations shall determine the permanent frontiers. This particular area you well know is so placed that it might belong either to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, the Hungarian Republic or to the Ukrainians. It belongs to the latter ethnically although the population is rather mixed but the Carpathian passes here are so high and few that the trade of these people must continue to be with one of the countries to the south-west. Accordingly I suspected that it would be stated eventually that the Ruthenian population would desire to be either Hungarians or to belong to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. If this should be the case I knew we should want detailed information regarding economic resources and hence I brought up the matter with the President.
3. His Excellency stated that the Czecho-Slovak Republic did not desire this territory but that the Ruthenian people there asked that they be united to the Republic.
4. He said also that there was an important religious question as follows:—People here are Greek Catholic under the jurisdiction of Rome. The priests are not celibate, however, and the vernacular is used in the church services, and he was of the opinion that they had great apprehensions about the future of the church if it came under the jurisdiction of the Greek Catholics east of the Carpathians.
5. It appears to me that this latter point opens up a field that absolutely necessitates a field investigation by some neutral commission before a final boundary is determined. The population is sparse, the mineral resources are not well developed and nevertheless the economical factor is also a large one. To my mind the religious factor, the economic factor and the real situation as to the wish of the people should be carefully studied.
6. President Masaryk stated that he felt that this area east of Unghvar would be an economical incubus upon the Czecho-Slovak Republic

but that nevertheless he was willing to consider attaching this territory to the Slovak tip of the Czecho-Slovak Republic if the Peace Conference in Paris so decided and if the Ruthenians of the region really desired it. He stated several times that he thought there would be an advantage in having the south-eastern frontier of the Czechoslovak Republic immediately attached to the Roumanians of Transylvania so that there would be a barrier of Poles, Czechs, Roumanians, Serbians, and Greeks, extending across this part of Europe between the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean.

LAWRENCE MARTIN

⁸⁹ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 139, March 13; received March 15.

⁹⁰ Not found in Department files.

⁹¹ Map 1 has not been reproduced; the other maps referred to do not accompany file copy of this report. None of the enclosures referred to are printed except exhibit M, p. 403 [*Pg. 403 is part of [Doc. 149](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/208

[Document 150]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 140

VIENNA, March 13, 1919.
[Received March 15.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a series of reports by Captain Nicholas Roosevelt,⁹² who has recently made a visit to Bucharest to complete certain studies in connection with Transylvania and the relations between the Hungarians and Roumanians. While not endorsing all of Captain Roosevelt's opinions, some of which seem to me too sweeping, I beg to call attention to them and to the information contained in the report.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, March 12, 1919.

Subject: Transylvania.

1. In compliance with your instructions I proceeded to Budapest and thence to Bucharest to complete the investigations of the Transylvanian question undertaken by Mr. Storey and Lieut. Goodwin.
2. While at Budapest I talked with the president, the prime minister, the former minister of nationalities Jaszy, Count Apponyi, Count

Teleki, and a number of others. A summary of the Hungarian view as presented by these gentlemen is included in the general report (enclosure No. 1)⁹³ herewith. By way of comment I wish to remark that Count Apponyi in particular, and to a much lesser degree Count Karolyi, held out the threat that if Hungary was dismembered she would never cease to make herself a thorn of irritation to her neighbors, and that in consequence the peace of Europe would be constantly endangered. It is my personal opinion that this attitude is fostered primarily by Apponyi and the band of stiff-necked conservatives surrounding him. I consider it a pernicious attitude, to be classed with the worst imperialistic point of view of the Pan-Germans. If this band decides upon a policy of sowing discord between the different nationalities in the territories of the former kingdom, as it appears they are already attempting to do (see the report on this subject, Enclosure No. 2),⁹⁴ it will be impossible to prevent outbreaks of hostilities. But such meddling is only comparable to the attempts of the imperial German government to rouse anti-American feelings among the Germans of America. The only apparent solution is the complete democratization of Hungary and the putting out of power once and for all of the Pan-Hungarians.

3. At Bucharest the American Minister and the Military Attaché⁹⁵ put me in relations with the leading Rumanians familiar with the situation. Among others I saw the acting prime minister Constantinescu, the minister of war Vaitoianu, the chief of staff General Prezan, his chief of staff Colonel Antonescu, Professor Jorga, and the Transylvanian commissioners Popp and Popovici. I also saw General Berthelot and several officers of the French Mission. The general impression which I got of the Rumanian attitude was that it was extravagant. They were more anxious to talk about atrocities committed by the Hungarians than to give reasons for their claims. And their claims were not modest. Perhaps the most significant hint as to the true state of affairs can be found in their universal disapproval of Storey's interest in the Hungarians in Transylvania, and their complaints that he ought to have seen more of the Rumanians and Saxons. When I pointed out that no one seemed to question the attitude of the Rumanians and Saxons, whereas the point of view of the Hungarians was much

more dubious, and when I asked why therefore he should see so much of the Rumanians and of the Saxons, the objectors ceased talking.

4. Perhaps the most significant thing brought out by the French was the fact that of all the complaints they had received there were none from the Szeklers, though many from the Hungarians nearer Hungary. They confirmed the impression of Storey that the Saxons were willing to take a chance on the Rumanian regime. But General Berthelot said he considered a neutral zone indispensable, anyway for a while.
5. Mr. Vopicka and Colonel Yates both considered that it was Rumania's due to receive Transylvania, on account of ethnic grounds and because it had been promised her by the Allies. They, as well as the French and Rumanians, were of the opinion that once the line was decided the Hungarians would cease to agitate.
6. It is my personal opinion that whatever the final decision may be it must include a clause guaranteeing the redistricting of the region in such a manner as to create as few local minorities as possible; to grant local autonomy in these districts guaranteeing full liberty of education, press and religion, although obliging the study of the government language along with that of the race. It might even be highly advantageous to create, besides, an autonomous state of Transylvania under the general supervision of Rumania. It seems essential that a sort of international police system be established along the border, and it is possible that both in this connection and in connection with the guarantee of autonomy a league of nations might find constructive service.
7. As far as the drawing of a boundary line is concerned, if the ethnic basis is to be accepted it would seem best to have an American ethnologist construct an ideal line based on the various available sources, and to have later on a commission of experts completely under American control proceed on the ground to check up and to lay down the accepted line, making whatever minor modifications might be necessary or advisable after a study of local geographical and economic features.

NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT

[Subenclosure]

Subject: Report on Transylvania.

1. Reduced to the fewest possible words, the question of Transylvania centers about the proposition that if it belongs to Hungary there will be a Rumania irredenta, and if it belongs to Rumania there will be a Hungary irredenta.

2. The Rumanian and Hungarian claims may be summarized as follows:

RUMANIA

- 1) Majority of population.
- 2) Majority of area.
- 3) Misgovernment of former Hungarian Kingdom.
- 4) Revindication of historical tradition.
- 5) Promise of the Allies.

HUNGARY

- 1) Superiority of Hungarian over Rumanian "Kultur".
- 2) Economic affiliations with Hungary.
- 3) Inefficiency of present Rumanian government.
- 4) Dismemberment of a historical unit.
- 5) Probable disruption of peace of Europe.

3. The Rumanians claim the majority of the population in Transylvania. The Hungarian statistics for the Transylvanian Banat region, as given in Hungarian publications, are as follows:

Rumanians	43.%
Hungarians	35.5%
Germans	10.8%
Others	9.7%

The Rumanians in a publication just issued by the Rumanian General Staff, comment on the validity of the Hungarian statistics as follows:

"In order to increase the number of Hungarians to the prejudice of the Rumanians, the Hungarians have employed

the following means: (a) They count as Hungarians all persons speaking the language. Now it is well known that the Rumanians were obliged to learn Hungarian because otherwise they had no access to the authorities. (b) Furthermore they have counted as Hungarians all those who have Hungarian Christian names. It is equally well known that the authorities forced the population to give Hungarian names to children.”

This same publication adds that out of the 1,085,679 Magyars residing in the total territory claimed by the Rumanians 195,000 are Jews and 240,000 are Hungarian officials who will return to Hungary once peace is signed. The Rumanians give as the true proportion of Rumanians in Transylvania 57.6% and of Hungarians 29.2%.

4. The Rumanians add that the block of territory claimed by them is a solid mass inhabited almost exclusively by Rumanians with the exception of the Szekler Region and of the towns. To contravert this claim the Hungarians have published a skillfully made map by Count Teleki, which spreads large uninhabited regions throughout the Rumanian block. In as much as many of the Rumanians here lead a pastoral life, the validity of the claims of Count Teleki would bear thorough examination by an expert on ethnic and geographic questions.

5. It is generally acceded even by the Hungarians themselves, including such men as the former Minister of Nationalities, Jaszy, that the regime of the old Hungarian authorities left much to be desired, and that there was a tendency to oppress persons of non-Magyar origin. The Rumanians therefore claim that it is their duty to liberate their fellow nationalists in Transylvania from the yoke of the Hungarians.

6. Transylvania, according to history as presented by Rumanians, is the home of the Rumanian race. Whatever claims the Magyars may put forth to dispute this it appears to be a well established fact that it has been one of the principal centers of development of the Rumanian people in the last six or eight centuries; and it is probable

that owing to their isolation the people are of purer Rumanian stock than the people of Rumania proper. These facts are advanced by the Rumanians as the historical bases for their claims.

7. Having been promised Transylvania as well as the Banat by the Allies in 1916, the Rumanians assume that the Allies will make good this promise, and this has lent a moral support to the Rumanian claims for national unity.

8. The Hungarians, on the other hand, bring forward two main arguments in favor of their keeping Transylvania. The first is that the Hungarians as a people have reached a higher stage of civilization than the Rumanians, and that their government is more capable of handling the problem to the best general interest of all nationalities concerned. They lay special emphasis on the fact that the new form of Government is very liberal and that complete autonomy has been granted within the last few months to other nationalities within the territory of the former Hungarian Kingdom.

9. The second of their main arguments is that the region is economically and geographically bound to Hungary and that to sever the two regions will result disastrously to both. They claim that Transylvania furnishes the rest of Hungary with timber and mineral products which are essential to the economic existence of the country, and that Transylvania in turn receives many things from Hungary which she cannot do without. They add that the control of the rivers of the Hungarian plains is essential for the prosperity of the country and that inasmuch as this control has to be exercised to a great extent in the regions near the sources, it will be disastrous to the agricultural life of the Hungarian plains if these territories fall into the hands of other nations.

10. The Hungarians say that the present form of Rumanian Government is inefficient and add that they consider there is little likelihood of the government improving to a great extent in the near future. This point of view was shared by the Americans and French with whom I spoke in Bucharest.

11. The Hungarians say, furthermore, that to break up a historical unity such as was the former Hungarian Kingdom can only entail disastrous consequences.

12. They claim finally that if Hungary is dismembered they will never cease to agitate and to be a source of irritation for their neighbors. This point of view is most vehemently expressed by members of the old regime, such as Count Apponyi, but is also encouraged by people of more liberal views, Karolyi himself having intimated the same thing.

13. I made a special point to try to get precise information on the form of autonomy which the Rumanian Government proposed to give the Hungarians and Germans in Transylvania. No one could specify anything further than the expression "complete autonomy". Cross-questioning elicited nothing more precise, and I was informed that the question has not yet been settled. In the meantime the Transylvania Rumanians have set up a semi-independent government under the direction of Dr. Maniu, and have a commission of three members in Bucharest who keep in touch with the Bucharest government. I talked at length with two of these men, who likewise could give me no specific information, and were more interested in telling me about atrocities which they said the Hungarians were committing against the Rumanians. The general impression that I gathered from talking with these two men was that the idea of the Bucharest government was to make a complete unit of Greater Rumania, whereas many of the Transylvanians favor some form of government by which they would have a greater hand in the directing of their own affairs. It was, of course, impossible to get from these men, or for that matter from anyone else in Bucharest, a reliable estimate as to the real feelings of the different persons in Transylvania. Nearly everyone with whom I spoke, however, agreed that the opinion there could be summed up roughly as follows: That the Rumanians and Saxons were not averse to a union with Rumania, and that the Hungarians were divided into three groups, the first group composed principally of officials and large landowners being strongly against separation from Hungary; the second group favoring an independent Transylvania; and the third group willing to try the experiment of Rumanian rule. Owing to the

strongly prejudiced views of the Rumanians it would probably be impossible to ascertain accurately the sentiments of the Transylvanians except by a commission having as interpreters real Americans speaking Rumanian and Hungarian, and operating with complete freedom of action so as to allow neither the Rumanians nor the Hungarians a chance to influence temporarily the opinions of the inhabitants.

14. The map⁹⁶ attached to this report was given to me by the Rumanian Chief of Staff, General Prezan. Its ethnic claims are pretentious. On it he has drawn four lines: The green line represents the area promised to Rumania by the Allies in 1916. The red and blue line represents the line of occupation agreed to in the armistice between Franchet d'Esperey and Karolyi. The blue line represents the region occupied by Rumanian troops under orders from the French (so General Prezan stated) until the first week in March. The red line from Arad to Oradea Mare and Satmar represents the line to which the Rumanian troops of occupation are advancing in accordance with instructions which General Prezan told me he had received from Paris. The second red line from Seghedin to Vasaros Nemeni is the line to which the Hungarian troops have been obliged to withdraw. General Prezan said that French troops would occupy Arad, Oradea Mare and any other important points on the new frontier. He as well as the Minister of War, General Vaitoianu said that they took this as an indication that the Allies were going to grant them their full claims.

15. The Rumanians were much disturbed about propaganda which they claimed the Hungarians had been spreading throughout Transylvania. Much of this propaganda they said was of a Bolshevik nature, and its object was to create hard feeling between the different nationalities. Judging from Mr. Storey's reports this is a fact, and even though he recognized some of the literature as coming from Bela Kuhn it is not at all unlikely, in view of the attitude of the Hungarians and especially of the ultra-conservative set, that they would use this or any other means which might in any way assist their efforts to retain Transylvania. The Rumanians claimed that in the Banat the Hungarians were working hand in hand with the Serbians to oppress the Rumanians, and considered that this was

merely another manifestation of the same desire on the part of the Hungarians to set one race against the other.

16. As long as any one race encourages hostility towards other races occupying the same territory, such as in Transylvania and in the Banat, it will be extremely difficult to maintain peace.

NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT

⁹² Member of the mission.

⁹³ *Infra*.

⁹⁴ Not printed.

⁹⁵ Charles J. Vopicka and Lieutenant Colonel Halsey E. Yates, respectively.

⁹⁶ Not reproduced.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/229

[Document 151]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 156

VIENNA, March 17, 1919.
[Received March 19.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith two personal memoranda which I have received from Major Lawrence Martin. In regard to the first one, [97](#) which concerns myself, I will only say that as at present advised I do not share its conclusions. It is not for me to judge of the second.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Major Lawrence Martin to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, March 16, 1919.

Subject: I challenge our good faith.

1. It may be accepted as agreed:

- (a) The Czecho-Slovak, Roumanian, and Yugoslav governments are represented at Paris, but not the Magyars of Hungary; we are treating the latter exactly as we are treating the Germans.
- (b) We are not considering the partitioning of linguistically-particolored states like Belgium and Switzerland.
- (c) No one has seriously proposed that the Yugoslavs, or the Greeks in Macedonia, turn over unquestionably Bulgarian-populated

- territory in western Serbia and near Saloniki to the Bulgarians.
- (d) It appears likely that many international boundaries will be drawn partly or entirely in relation to economic and strategic factors rather than along purely ethnic lines.
 - (e) The present stage of work in Paris, with boundaries more or less settled upon in a tentative way, is a time to consider most carefully all relationships involved; it can never be too late to reconsider until the final treaty is signed.
2. It seems apparent also that:
- (a) The Alfold or Plain of Hungary, is a rich agricultural region, densely populated (91,500 square kilometers with 7,000,000 people); antebellum Hungary had 283,000 square kilometers with 18,000,000 people.
 - (b) It is similar to, though smaller than, the Middle West of the United States.
 - (c) Our states from Ohio to Iowa and Illinois depend upon the mineral resources of Michigan–Minnesota–Wisconsin (iron), and of Pennsylvania–West Virginia, etc. (coal), upon the forests there, upon the Appalachian and Lake Superior water power and stream regulation, and these thinly-populated and economically-poor mountains depend equally upon the agricultural Middle Western prairies.
 - (d) One might consider the Lake Superior highland as equivalent to the Slovak mountains and the Appalachians as equivalent to Transylvania.
 - (e) If Canada (Stat Česko Slovenska) wanted Wisconsin–Minnesota–Michigan, and if Massachusetts–New Jersey–Virginia and the Atlantic seaboard (Roumania) wanted the Appalachians, *tout entiere*, not merely to the mountain crest, I, as an American Middle Westerner, would ask for an adequate hearing on the relative demands of Canada and the Atlantic seaboard for my mountains, in relation to mineral resources, water power, forests, and transportation. I should ask that the people of the American highland areas be heard, Canadian and Atlantic seaboard troops being absent.
3. As an American officer, I came into this war primarily to fight the Germans and German imperialism. I confess to a lurking admiration for the Hungarian soldier, even though he threw leaden missiles at me in Italy during the latter days of the war. I

was glad to see the Czecho-Slovak Legionnaires in Italy, though they were deserters from the Austro-Hungarian Army. I trusted them then, and I do today, sympathizing with their desire to escape from the Hapsburg rule, but I admire the Hungarian soldier more. He cannot be accused of being a traitor to a cause he honestly espoused, he was a frank foe; he says so now. He never claims that he was merely a victim of German military oppression. But I believe his new republic's cause is now exactly on a par with those of the Czecho-Slovak, Yugoslav, and Roumanian governments.

4. As evidence of our good faith I urge that the Magyar Republic be permitted to send peace delegates and professional advisors to Paris at once, to hear there the appropriate portion of the proposals of the Czechs, Roumanians, Ukrainians, and Yugoslavs, regarding the partitioning of Hungary, and to present recommendations for consideration of boundary committees. In addition, and for the best interests of all the peoples of the former Kingdom of Hungary, I suggest that an American spokesman for Hungary, who has seen the country since the armistice, be called to Paris to confer with the American Commissioners and their advisors.
5. Unless some better-qualified American is available, I volunteer and ask that I be detailed to go to Paris, for a week or two, as an American spokesman for the Magyars, believing that as a geographer, familiar with Hungarian resources to some extent, through previous education and teaching in America, and through observation in Austria-Hungary since January of this year, I can be of service,—first to America, desirous of a just peace; secondly to Hungary, desirous of prosperity for her farmers in the Alfold and the population in Transylvania and the Slovak and Ruthenian mountains. I believe also that at this time my advice, being disinterested, may be of greater value to the British, French, American, and other professional advisors now drawing up recommendations for final frontiers, than that of a Magyar politician or even a geographer, economist, or historian from Hungary.

LAWRENCE MARTIN

⁹⁷ Not printed; it proposed that Professor Coolidge be called to Paris to report in person.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/254

[Document 152]

***Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to Professor A. C.
Coolidge⁹⁸***

No. 123

BUDAPEST, March 20, 1919.

Subject: Presentation to President Karolyi of Peace Conference
decision regarding evacuation of Transylvania.

1. At Colonel Vix's request, I called on him this morning at a quarter before nine, to attend a meeting of the Allied representatives in Budapest. I arrived there early purposely so as to explain to him again that I was not empowered to take any action of a diplomatic or military nature. He stated that the question for consideration was the presentation to President Karolyi of a decision taken by the Peace Conference in Paris about the new demarcation line for Transylvania, and the creation of a neutral zone to be occupied by allied troops.⁹⁹ He said that he realized that I had no military or diplomatic standing here, but that inasmuch as this was merely the presentation of a decision already taken by the Peace Conference, and inasmuch as I was connected with the Peace Conference, he could see no reason why it would in any way prejudice the position of the actions of the American Mission if I accompanied the other missions in presenting this note to the president. He said that all he wished was the support of the Allied Missions in a decision already taken by their superiors in the Peace Conference at Paris, and that he wished particularly that the Hungarian government might have the ocular proof in the persons of the representatives of the French, British, Italian and American governments; that this decision had been taken by the Allied Powers in Paris. I at once tried to get into telephone communication with you to get your approval on this matter, but could not get Vienna before it was time for us to go to the president. Inasmuch as Colonel Baker, the British representative, and Major Pentamalli, the Italian

representative, both expressed their views that it would not look well for the United States not to be represented if the English and Italians were there, and inasmuch as it struck me that this point of view was correct, I went with them and we were received by the President a few minutes after ten o'clock.

2. The memorandum, a copy of which I hope to be able to send you, stated in brief what I had already been informed in Roumania, namely; that the Peace Conference had decided upon a new line of demarcation, running roughly speaking, from Arad to Nagy-Varad and Szatmar, following pretty closely the ethnic line as set down in the German map of Justus Perthes. The Hungarians are to withdraw to a line almost coincident with the original demarcation line promised Roumania by the Allies in 1916. This runs in a general way from Szegedin to Debreczen, and thence onwards towards the Ruthenian country. I enclose herewith a map¹ drawn from memory, showing these lines. The intermediary zone is to be neutral and policed by interallied troops, consisting mainly of officers. The memorandum explains that the method to be followed will be first the evacuation of the Hungarian troops and withdrawal to the new line from Debreczen to Szegedin; second, the occupation of the neutral zone by interallied troops; lastly, the advance of the Roumanian troops to their new line of demarcation.
3. Colonel Vix opened the meeting at which at first President Karolyi alone was present, by stating briefly that he had come to present to him a decision of the Peace Conference in Paris. He handed Karolyi a copy of the paper, and the president sat down and read it about half through. He then got up and said that before going any further, he must send for the Minister of War, Böhm. Vix suggested the Prime Minister also, so the President left the room for a minute and gave directions that they be summoned at once. When he returned he finished the reading of the paper. In the meantime, Colonel Vix had laid on his desk a map showing the proposed neutral zone. Minister Berinkey then came in, and the president handed him the note. As Berinkey was reading it, Böhm came in. The president first said he would have to protest, but nothing further, and then he turned to Böhm and had a brief conversation in Hungarian with him, during which Böhm, who had been examining the map, sat back and shook his head continuously. The president then turned to Colonel Vix and told

him that it was impossible, that in the first place he could not see why no line of demarcation had been drawn to the north (in the Ruthenian country) and that this clearly showed that Hungary was to be dismembered. It could only mean that the Peace Conference had decided to allow Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania to share the Ruthenian country, and to have a common boundary. Otherwise it was impossible to imagine that such a neutral zone and such a line of demarcation will be drawn. One did not draw a demarcation line just simply in space. It had to run from some fixed point to some other fixed point. Berinkey then put in the remark that this open space was left so that the Roumanians might attack the Hungarians. Vix added that this was ridiculous; that it was no question of such an action, and that furthermore the Allies were prepared to guarantee that there should be no such attempt. Berinkey shrugged his shoulders and said that Hungary had already had experience with Roumania in the Belgrade treaty. Karolyi interposed that the country and the people would never tolerate such an action. Vix said that as far as public opinion was concerned, and whether or not the people would tolerate such an action, this could easily be regulated by the government; that it depended upon the newspapers, and that if the people were shown the thing in the proper light through the papers, there would be no trouble; whereas, if on the other hand, the papers made a sensation about it, public opinion could be strongly aroused against it. He added that it was not a question of politics, that it was merely a question of acting upon a decision already taken in Paris. The president replied that it was a matter of politics, inasmuch as it not only deprived Hungary of a large portion of territory, but it practically gave Roumania the whole territory which she claimed, and to this extent it was a matter of the gravest internal political importance to Hungary. Böhm, who in the meantime had continued to shake his head, made a remark to the president in Hungarian, which the president translated to the effect that if this was done, the Communist Party would jump in a day from a few thousand to 200,000 or more. Whereupon Colonel Vix leaned forward and said in German to Böhm: "Das ist mir ganz egal". Böhm shrugged his shoulders and said: "Mir auch". Vix came back again to the fact that it was not a question of politics, and that even so, it was not our business to discuss them with him,

and said that he must ask for an answer before six o'clock tomorrow on the question as to whether the government would guarantee that the interallied troops of occupation in the neutral zone would be unmolested by the Hungarians. At this point, Berinkey asked if there was any provision to prevent the Hungarians advancing through this neutral zone against the Roumanians. At first I thought he had mistaken a grammatical phrase in French, but he later came back to the same proposition, and wished to know what opposition would be made by the Allied troops if the Hungarians decided to enter this neutral zone, and to advance on the Roumanians. Karolyi then asked how many troops the Allies expected to put in the zone, and Vix said that he could not say, but that they would be chiefly officers. The president kept insisting that the question of the neutral zone was minor from his point of view—that the whole thing hung on the fact that the Roumanians are to advance 100 kilometers into Hungarian territory, and the Hungarians are to withdraw 200 kilometers. Berinkey here remarked that the government had already had experience with an armistice, and they knew how far they could rely on the promise that the Roumanians would not advance beyond a specific line. Karolyi seized this opportunity to cast reflections on the way in which the Belgrade armistice had been carried out, and Vix answered that it was true that there had been unfortunate violations on both sides, but that it was not now a question of the Belgrade armistice, but of a decision by the Peace Conference in Paris, and he repeated what he had previously said that the Allies could guarantee that Roumania would not overstep the line. Karolyi then said that the political consequences of this could only be revolution. Any government that signed such an agreement would not last a day, and even if the present government fell (Karolyi here said in a low tone of voice “As far as I am concerned, I should be glad to be rid of it”) he did not think that any other government could be found which would consent to sign such an agreement. Under the circumstances it would be just as well to occupy all of Hungary—“To make it a French colony, or a Roumanian colony, or a Czecho-Slovak colony” (These were the words he used in English turning to Colonel Baker, the British representative) Colonel Vix replied that he felt certain that after they had considered the matter in a dispassionate manner, that

they would see that the wisest thing to do was to acquiesce in this decision of the Peace Conference in Paris. He said that he hoped the president would think somewhat also of the future and not of the present alone. Karolyi asked Vix what he would do if the Hungarians refused to acquiesce in this agreement. Vix shrugged his shoulders and said that in the same way he had come, he was prepared to leave. He then said that he judged it best to leave the president to discuss the question with his ministers, and that he must insist upon an answer not later than 6 P.M., tomorrow, March 21.

NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT

⁹⁸ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 169, March 23; received March 26.

⁹⁹ See BC-40, minute 3, [vol. IV, p. 145](#)  and Annexure A, [p. 157](#) .

¹ Not attached to file copy of this document.

Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to the Commission to Negotiate Peace²

PARIS, MARCH 26, 1919.

The following summary of conditions in Hungary is presented by Captain Roosevelt who left Budapest about 8 P.M., March 22nd, thirty-six hours after the outbreak of the revolution. The information published in the papers since then throws no new significant light on the subject.

1. The revolution in Hungary was primarily nationalistic in character. The Hungarians who are united in their conviction that Hungary must not be dismembered, have made use of Bolshevism as a last desperate resort to preserve the integrity of their country, and have openly defied the Allies, and set a precedent for Germany to follow.
2. The revolution was precipitated by the presentation to the Hungarian government on the morning of March 20 of a decision of the Peace Conference concerning the demarcation line in Transylvania and the temporary creation of a neutral zone to be occupied by Interallied troops. This note was presented by Colonel Vix of the French Mission at the direction of General de Lobit, the French commander at Belgrade.³ The new line of demarcation follows closely the ethnic boundary between the Roumanians and Hungarians in Transylvania and was therefore taken by the Hungarian government to be the indication of the intention of the Peace Conference to give the whole of Transylvania to Roumania. Furthermore, the withdrawal of Hungarian troops to the westward of the neutral zone provided for in this decision meant that the Hungarians would have to abandon virtually half their territory to enemy occupation.

3. The revolution was accomplished with comparative quiet. During the night of the 21st there was a good deal of shooting in Budapest but only a few casualties and only a small amount of plundering. On the 22nd the government issued orders punishing with death any persons carrying arms, offering armed resistance to the new government, robbing, or plundering, and punishing with a 50,000 kronen fine the sale of alcoholic liquor. The effect of these measures was good. As far as the political aspect is concerned, the revolution was brought about apparently through a common understanding between the old government and the various elements which have constituted the new government. Baron Podmanicky, who presented to Colonel Vix the answer of President Karolyi, informed me that it had first been decided to maintain Karolyi as President, but with an ultra radical cabinet and with an understanding with the Russian Soviet government. The members of the Communist party including Bela Kuhn favored this, but the members of the Laborers' party insisted on a complete change and on the establishment of the rule of the proletariat. This was done. Karolyi accepted the resignation of his government and himself resigned, turning the government over to the proletariat, and appealing to the proletariat of the world to come to the rescue of Hungary. The new government, which is based on the Russian Soviet model, is a combination of the Communists and the left wing of the Socialists and includes Bela Kuhn and others who were previously arrested as Bolshevik agitators. In a manifesto the new government proclaimed its adherence to the Russian Soviet government.
4. There were also rumors which I was unable to substantiate but which it is my belief are true;—to the effect that there is some sort of an understanding with the Germans. Major Pentamalli, the Chief of the Italian Mission, informed me that he had been in close touch with Kunfi,⁴ one of the strongest men of the new cabinet, and that Kunfi while at the Berne Socialist Conference had come to an understanding with the Russians and Germans about this very matter. It is interesting to note that in my last interview with Karolyi on March 18 he showed keen interest in the question of the rate of return of American troops in France and asked what the attitude of the United States would be towards having American troops police Europe.

5. In this connection it is important to note that Major Pentamalli told me he had tried “to soften the blow” for Karolyi, and when I saw Prince Borghese, the rejected Italian Minister to Servia, who is in Budapest, (tho he states it is in no official capacity) Prince Borghese volunteered the opinion that the Allies would make a great mistake if they failed to give the new government a chance to make good, and he added that in his opinion it was advantageous that a “neutral person” should remain if the Allied Mission left, and keep in touch with the situation. He suggested that he might be such a “neutral person” and said if he remained he would of course keep his government informed of conditions. It is my opinion, tho here again I can adduce no definite proof, that the Italians were not altogether ignorant of this revolutionary movement. It appears from what Major Pentamalli said that the Italians would be willing to consider occupying Hungary. The only reason I can see for this is their policy of gaining power over a strengthened Hungary at the expense of Yugo Slavia.
6. The general opinion in Hungary as far as I was able to ascertain from newspapers, and from talking with persons of various classes, as well as from the reports of the Hungarian-American Lieutenant who was with me, is one of welcome for this revolutionary move. All classes seem to consider it as a step in the right direction, and as a probable successful method of preserving the integrity of their country. It is therefore essentially nationalistic, making use of Bolshevism for national ends—in this particular case against the Czechs and the Roumanians who have occupied parts of Hungary and for whom there is a bitter hatred. When it comes to a question of Hungarian integrity all parties are in accord.
7. The grave significance of this revolution is that this, the first important decision of the Peace Conference made known to one of the Central Powers, has been met by open defiance. Hungary has refused to comply, and is holding the club of Bolshevism over the Allies and asking “What are you going to do about it?” The precedent set by this action will offer an encouragement to the Germans which may be disastrous.
8. The immediate results to be expected are military activities against the Czechs and the Roumanians. The hatred is perhaps more bitter against the Czechs because they are stronger from a military point of view, but the bulk of the best troops are concentrated in the

Transylvanian section. The American Military Attaché in Bucharest informed me on March 12th that according to his information the Hungarians were in a position to put about ten divisions into Transylvania at short notice. The greatest handicap to any military operations by the Hungarians is the lack of coal, which has crippled their transportation.

9. The following alternatives have been suggested as possible measures of relief:
 - (1) Ordering the Czechs and Roumanians to advance and occupy Hungary. Owing to the intenseness of hatred against these people such an action would only result in the worst kind of bloody war. Furthermore it is questionable whether the military organizations of these two countries are in a position to carry out such operations.
 - (2) Occupation by Allied troops. This was advocated by the Italian and British missions in Budapest, the last word of the Chief of the British Mission to me being that 10,000 troops would be sufficient. This number is probably too small and might suffice for Budapest alone. If, however, the feeling of the country continues to be of as strong a nationalistic character as it is at present, occupation by any troops will surely be met with resistance.
 - (3) If the Peace Conference desires to enforce its decision regarding the Transylvanian armistice line, a blockade is a practical weapon, but it would not prove really effective for about two months, when the food situation will become desperate, without imports.
10. The conclusion of the matter is that unless immediate and vigorous action is taken the Allies will be met with a disastrous state of affairs in Central Europe which it may take years to straighten out. Hungary has defied the Peace Conference and allied herself with the Bolsheviki. It is Germany's turn next.

2 Substance of this report transmitted to President Wilson by Secretary Lansing under covering note dated March 27.

3 Provisional commander of the Allied armies in Hungary.

4 People's Commissioner for Education.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[Document 154]

***Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge***⁵

No. 1

BUDAPEST, 26 March, 1919.

Subject: Political situation.

SIR: The political situation at this moment may be summarized as follows.

1. The new regime styles itself as "The Hungarian Council-Republic" which means of course Soviet Republic along the model of the Russian government.
2. The responsible governing body of this Republic is the "Revolutionary Government Council" which is composed of an indefinite number of officials called either "People's Commissioners" or "People's Representatives". At present the number is about fifteen. This Council has all powers and assumes all responsibility. It is now occupied principally with the drafting of Socialistic legislation covering every field of social interest.
3. The new regime has not declared war on any single nation or group of nations. In fact it claims to be international in character. It has made an appeal to the proletariat of the world, and an especial appeal to the proletariat of Roumania, Tchecko-Slovakia, and Serbia not to lend themselves to nationalistic aims at aggrandizement, etc., etc. It has made a particular appeal to the Russian Soviet Government in the nature of what they choose to call a "brotherly greeting" and call for help. I think that the extreme communistic members of this regime have had hopes of the active support of the Russian Bolshevist army, but now are discouraged because they believe the Russians are too far away to be of much assistance.

4. While the radical socialists are certainly in the ascendancy at this moment, I do not believe that the mass of the people are either extreme or even socialistic. They are intensely nationalistic and have accepted socialism as the only alternative to what they consider the complete dismemberment of Hungary. Nationalism and Socialism have formed an unnatural partnership under the pressure of events. They are making use of each other, though the Socialists quite realize the utter inconsistency of their position. They of course will utilize any means to accomplish their end, namely the reign of socialism throughout the world without regard for nationalistic aims.
5. As to the attitude of the new regime towards the Entente, I do not think it has had time to formulate definitely its policy. Certainly they have not declared war, and they are most conciliatory. In fact I believe they are willing to go a long way in acquiescing in necessary rectifications of the frontiers of Hungary. A high functionary of the Government intimated as much to me this morning. Colonel Vix has just told me that he has been unofficially informed that the Government would accept the new line of demarcation whose notification precipitated the downfall of the Carolyi Government. Vix stated that they would confirm this in writing but he had not received any statement up to the time indicated for his departure.
6. As to the attitude of the Entente towards this new regime, I venture to state that I believe it possible to prevent Hungary from becoming completely Bolshevik by prudent action. A firm but liberal attitude could accomplish much. A clear assurance that the Entente has no intention of mutilating Hungary or of breaking it up without due regard for the wishes of all the peoples concerned and for the principle of autonomy would go far towards tranquilizing these people. It would moreover, hold back the Hungarians from becoming completely Bolshevik. I am confident that the new regime would consent to a considerable rectification of the frontiers on the side of Transylvania and Slovakia if the wishes of the peoples concerned were consulted. It is important that the people of Hungary should now receive some assurance that they will be consulted before any final decision is taken concerning the rearrangement of their boundaries. Rightly or wrongly, they felt driven in desperation to accept this new regime.

The new regime may succeed in getting complete control of the Hungarians and in turning them over to Bolshevism unless the Entente takes immediate action. This action may either be conciliatory or by active military intervention. I do not attempt to say which, though I cannot avoid the conclusion that a policy of conciliation might yet prevent the situation from getting much worse. Military intervention by British and American troops combined with conciliatory assurances might be the wisest course to pursue. I am certain it would be folly to send French, Roumanian, or Tcheco-Slovaques. I doubt the wisdom of sending Italian troops. Serbian troops would be preferable to the latter, according to reliable information. British troops or American troops however would probably be welcomed.

7. As to the trend of events here, while there has been no shooting as yet and no general disorder, the situation is distinctly disquieting. For the moment the moderate radicals have been able to restrain the extreme communists. The latter are bound however to secure the ascendancy if they have time enough to work out their plans. The "Red Guard" is very much in evidence and beginning to feel its power. Many Russian Bolsheviks among the prisoners are coming into town and are being enrolled in the Red Guard. Counsels are necessarily divided and there is no one person to whom one can turn with confidence to keep a firm hand on the situation. I do not question the good intentions of the present powers that be. I merely record the fact that events are taking place they cannot control, and that the extremists may some day be the masters.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP BROWN

5 Presumably transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter not found in the Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[Document 155]

Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge⁶

No. 2

BUDAPEST, 26 March, 1919.

Subject: The Inter-allied Military Mission.

SIR: 1. I enclose herewith documents⁷ furnished me by Colonel Vix the head of the Inter-allied Military Mission namely (I.) a memorandum showing various affronts inflicted on the French Mission; (II.) a copy of the collective note addressed to the Soviet Republic in the form of a *Protocole* on the subject of the departure of the various Military Missions grouped as one Inter-allied Mission; and (III.) a copy of the declaration furnished the Government regarding the nature of the new line of demarcation.

2. Regarding the affronts to the French Mission, I would state that feeling here against the French has been running very high. This has been due to several causes. First it is evident that the French have not been exactly *suaviter in modo*. Secondly, the Hungarians greatly resented the sending of the Spahis; and thirdly the French unfortunately had to bear the brunt of a policy that the Hungarians bitterly resented. Colonel Vix and his staff were submitted to a most humiliating treatment. I saw irresponsible members of the Red Guard exercising a control in his own anteroom. I think Colonel Vix has shown an extraordinary self-control and *sangfroid* under excessively exasperating circumstances.

3. In regard to the departure of the Mission, the Government has been most disinclined to have the foreign Military officers leave. Although Colonel Vix expressed a desire to leave last Friday the 21st, the question of affording proper facilities has dragged on till the present moment. It was first agreed that the Inter-allied Mission

should leave last night at 8 o'clock. At the last moment it was announced that the train could not be gotten ready, and that time must be allowed to get ready the necessary passports, etc., reasons which were only pretexts to conceal other ends. This morning the Mission was notified to be ready to leave at noon. I went to see them off at the train, and learned that they had been informed at the last moment they could not leave until 8 o'clock tonight "pour des raisons techniques".

4. I cannot but feel that this procedure on the part of the new Government is not only unpardonable but most disquieting. It is possible that in the present state of disorganization and demoralization the Government does not quite know what to do in order to carry out its program. Furthermore, they do not yet feel sure as to their fate at the hands of the Entente. I have been told that they are afraid that the departure of the Military Mission will entirely discredit them in the eyes of the Entente. They claim that they wish to maintain diplomatic relations with the Entente. It may be that they have sinister ends in view. I cannot yet determine. I only know that there is little personal security for the Military Mission, and that they could not possibly tolerate this situation.

5. The British of course are very indignant over the seizure of two small submarine chasers and the forcible removal of the crews. The crews were at once sent back on board and the chasers came back to the moorings in front of this hotel. Apologies were offered for the incident, but it is naturally one that cannot easily be overlooked. These two boats have dropped down stream today at great risk of being fired on from the shore as happened the other day to two good sized British monitors when an officer was seriously wounded. The monitors withdrew immediately, and I hear they are safely within Entente jurisdiction. I have been informed that three lines of mines have been placed across the Danube below this city.

6. I would add that I could not allow any impression to exist that there was any lack of solidarity of aims and sentiments between the members of the Entente, and so without participating formally in the *démarches* of the Inter-allied Mission, I found ways of letting the Government know that personally I found the situation intolerable

from the point of view of the members of this Mission. There has been a decided tendency here to make it appear that the French did not have the support of the Entente in the measures adopted here, particularly in the matter of the new line of demarcation. I have made it clear that we have nothing to do with Military Missions or political matters, but I could not allow anyone to imply in any way that there was any divergence of views between the Allies as to the decisions of the Conference at Paris. This would have been particularly reprehensible at this critical time if I permitted anyone to think that we Americans and the British and Italians as well were to be treated on a more favorable footing than the French whose lives have been actually in danger.

7. In regard to enclosure number III, I would state merely that this announcement published in yesterday's papers to the effect that the new line of demarcation was not intended as a political frontier, has had an excellent effect on the public. It is a great pity that this statement was not originally included in the official notification.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP BROWN

⁶ Presumably transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter not found in the Department files.

⁷ None printed.

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

PARIS, March 27, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I beg to quote herewith two telegrams which have been received from Vienna transmitting telephone messages from Professor Philip Marshall Brown, a member of the Coolidge Mission, who is still in Budapest:

“Vienna, March 25, 10:50 P.M.

“Telephone communication with Budapest opened for American Mission. Brown reports tonight, Hungarian Government not extremely radical, more national protest Entente attitude. Government conciliatory, but may become more radical. Brown regards negotiations with present government possible. Americans well cared for. Italian, English, French Military missions leave Budapest tomorrow, Wednesday. Slight feeling against French. Food situation extremely bad, Brown advocating immediate supplies of food, as aid in keeping order. Reference American Mission message # 40,⁸ Brown prefers to remain. Have sent courier Budapest tonight. Will have two telephone talks daily with Brown.”

“Vienna, March 26, 4:00 P.M.

“Allied military mission leaving Budapest March 26th, 8: P.M. Brown fails to understand manner in which they are leaving. Emphasizes Government is conciliatory and moderate and desires understanding with Entente. Feeling that if right of self determination given to Hungary, country can still be saved and advise caution. Courier leaving for Vienna tonight.”

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

8 Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/294

[Document 157]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 183

VIENNA, March 31, 1919.
[Received April 2.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith Report No. 11 from Professor Brown in Budapest, which he has just sent to Vienna by special courier. This report seems to me to be of a most urgent nature, and by far the most important news that has come from Budapest since the new government has been in power there.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE
By **NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT**
Captain, Infantry, U. S. Army

[Enclosure]

Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

No. 11

BUDAPEST, 30 March, 1919.

Subject: Political situation. Important talk with Kunfi.

SIR: 1. I have had a personal call from Mr. Kunfi the Commissary for Public Instruction in the new Soviet Republic in Hungary who is a leading personality in this Government as well [as] a member of the last Carolyi Government. I was much impressed by Kunfi and by what he said. I feel that it is of sufficient importance to warrant my sending this report by special *courrier* to Vienna to be forwarded to

Paris at the first opportunity. I shall also prepare a telegram giving the gist of this report to be sent in cipher from Vienna.

2. Kunfi began by stating that the new Government had not declared war against anyone, that it desired to live on peaceful relations with all. I then asked him about the recent incident of the capture of several hundred French troops, whether that was to be considered as an act of war. He stated that it had been reported to him as act of the people of the locality and that the troops seemed only too willing to surrender. I spoke of the seriousness of such an incident from the point of view of the Entente, and he stated that he would immediately take up the matter with his colleagues. I asked Kunfi if his Government was prepared to accept the new advanced line of demarcation laid down in the ultimatum of March twentieth. He said they could not formally accept but would not resist military occupation of the zone in question. He remarked that boundaries had but little significance to Socialists so long as there was freedom of trade and communication. "Hungary must not be strangled economically".

3. Speaking of the mobilization of the "Red Army", Kunfi stated that it had absolutely no aggressive purpose but was for the purpose of maintaining the new regime in power. (I understand, as a matter of fact, that they have had great difficulty in securing volunteers even at the inducement of 450 kronen a month with food, clothing, equipment, and special allowances for their wives and children).

4. Mr. Kunfi emphasized the importance of sending in food and coal as the most effective means of keeping the people quiet and avoiding excesses. I informed him that Captain Gregory had notified me of the despatching of food trains from Zagreb and Trieste. (I now understand that serious trouble is expected in Zagreb between the Serbs and Jugo-Slavs which may render it impossible to get this food through into Hungary.) Kunfi said that with food and coal the people could get to work and much trouble might be avoided. I stated that Captain Gregory also had informed me that he was endeavoring to arrange for shipments of coal. I fully concur with Kunfi in his argument in this connection. I am sure more good than harm could

be done by sending in both food and coal. The Entente has more to gain by appearing as friends of the Hungarians than as enemies.

5. I questioned Mr. Kunfi as to the relations of the new Government with the Russian Bolsheviks. He said that they were “affinities” having the same cause, but differing as to methods. He informed me confidentially that Lenin had expressed to the Hungarian Socialist Government his hope that they would avoid the mistakes of the Russian Bolsheviks.

6. I asked Kunfi as to the distinction between Socialists and Communists, the latter term being now generally employed with regard to the new regime. He said it was only a question of “tempo”: that the Communists insisted on accelerating the process of Socialization, and that they frankly had the ascendancy in the new Government. He assured me however that the Government would in no way approve of terrorization and bloodshed. The *bourgeoisie* would have to accommodate itself to the new order or there would be excesses. He felt confident that the Government had the situation well in hand. I can fully confirm this as far as one can judge by public order and security. It is quite admirable at present.

7. I asked Kunfi whether the new measures for Socialization such as the sequestration of bank deposits would apply to foreigners. He replied “certainly not” and stated that if any American was molested he would have only to apply to the competent authorities to receive immediate redress. He suggested that I should personally recommend any Americans who might have complaints to present, but I made clear that such matters were within the purview of the Spanish Consul and that I had nothing whatever to do with the same. His assurances on this subject, however, may be of considerable value and significance.

8. Mr. Kunfi most earnestly stated in behalf of his colleagues that they desired that Kun Bela, the Commissary for Foreign Affairs, should be the intermediary between the Entente and Lenin for the sake of reaching a friendly understanding. Kunfi also added that this was greatly desired by the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine. I agreed to transmit this important communication to Paris.

9. I can only repeat that I was deeply impressed by Kunfi and by his exposition of the situation which I find substantially confirmed by other sources here as well as by the events themselves. Whatever their first *élan* and their expressions of solidarity with the Russian Bolsheviks, I am strongly inclined to believe that the Hungarian Government is not a Bolshevik Government. They are extreme Socialists who desire to accelerate the process of Socialization in Hungary. I do not believe they have any ulterior ends in view, certainly not of a political character. It goes without saying, of course, that they are in sympathy with all Socialists and are working together for the triumph of Socialism in every country. Their point of view is not national, or even international. Their fight is a fight against capitalism. They recognize only class struggles.

10. The situation seems to me to be reduced to the following: we are confronted by a *fait accompli* here in the establishment of a real Socialist Government which is the radical heir of the late Carolyi Government. It is possible that this Socialist Government may not have the approval of the Hungarian people as a whole. This remains to be seen. In the meantime the "Council-Republic" has the situation apparently well in hand here in this capital, and probably in the country. Of the latter I cannot judge clearly as yet.

11. The question before us is whether it is desirable that this regime should be overthrown or recognized. Intervention probably would be easy from the military point of view if handled skillfully; but would military intervention result in the permanent elimination of the Socialistic Government? It seems to me at least doubtful. I doubt if the Entente would care to appear as the enemy of Socialism, though perhaps sworn to hostility against Bolshevism.

12. On the other hand, a friendly understanding might easily be reached with the present Hungarian Government that would doubtless ease the international situation considerably. It might be based on the idea of self-determination and autonomy as applied first of all to the nationalistic problems of Hungary, and secondly, as applied to the right of the Hungarians themselves to choose the kind of government they may prefer, without interference either from Russia or elsewhere.

13. I have carefully explained that I am here in no diplomatic or political capacity, and I have entered into no official or direct relations with the present Government. I have made clear that I serve merely as a means of transmitting information. If it should be desired, however, that I should serve as a “conduit” between the Entente and this Government, the way of communication is quite open without any embarrassing implications.

14. It is true that my report on the Political Situation dated yesterday⁹ pointed to military intervention as the best way of meeting this extraordinary emergency. This opinion, however, was based on the supposition that the alternative of a friendly understanding with this Government was out of the question. I now feel that in the light of the *démarche* of Kunfi and the actual trend of events, such an understanding might possibly be considered as desirable. The present report, therefore, must be considered, not as superseding, but as supplementing my preceding report number 10 of yesterday’s date on the subject of the Political Situation.

PHILIP BROWN

⁹ Not printed.

***Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge¹⁰***

No. 22

BUDAPEST, April 6, 1919.

Subject: Food situation.

1. I desire to report concerning the food situation, as in the absence of a regular food representative here, I have considered it my duty to be of any service I could to Captain Gregory and Colonel Causey,¹¹ with whom I have been in telephonic communication several times during the last week. They have been most active, as you know, in trying to remove all obstacles in the way of the delivery of the supplies of fat ordered and paid for [by] the Karolyi government. The first trainload, as you know, has been held up at Zagreb, at the instance of the French authorities at Belgrade, on account of the change of government here. I now understand that owing to the energetic action of these gentlemen and of Mr. Hoover and the personal interest of President Wilson, the prohibition on the shipment of these fats has been removed.
2. I desire to state that although I have favored the sending of this supply of food on the ground of humanity, honor and sound policy, I have never intended to create the impression that the population of Budapest was actually starving, or even in desperate straits. The fact simply is that the population, normally well supplied with fats, has been deprived of this important nutritive element for some time, and is, accordingly, now feeling the deprivation keenly.
3. On the matter of flour, I can say on good authority, that there is plenty of flour in the country districts, which however is jealously hoarded by the peasants, and is not available except through the agency of a vigorous military government, which does not of course exist at present. Budapest is said to have supplies of flour for four or five weeks longer. There are one or two mining districts

where flour is said to be lacking. This will be looked into and reported on later.

4. I am told that the peasants are failing to attend to their spring sowing, owing to questions regarding the division of land and political agitation. This, of course, would have most lamentable results for next winter.
5. In regard to the policy of sending in food at this time, there are those of course who argue that it would be to strengthen the hands of the present revolutionary government, and enhance their prestige. Personally, I give little weight to this argument, as I am convinced that if done in the right way, the sending of this food will be interpreted by the Hungarian people as a welcome indication that the Entente is not animated by any feelings of malice or lack of consideration. The sending of food at this time, followed by a clear indication of the considerate, fair-minded attitude of the Entente to the people of Hungary, can not fail, in my opinion, to render the solution of this difficult political problem much easier. It must be remembered that the people of Hungary are simply dejected and despairing. They need to be encouraged and given faith in the future of their own beloved country.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP BROWN

¹⁰ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 200, April 7; received April 10.

¹¹ American members of the Interallied Commission on Relief of German Austria.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/328a: Telegram

[Document 159]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, April 9, 1919—11 p.m.

1543. For your information Brown reports following from Budapest

“New Government has decreed that all foreigners shall retain the privileges and rights accorded under former governments with immunity of diplomatic consular and other official representatives. Transfer by inheritance to foreigners forbidden. Kunfi states that government will not apply to foreigners all provisions of social legislation. Consular corps endeavoring to obtain written assurances this matter. Government is facilitating departure of foreigners if provided with passports and visas.

French troops captured by Hungarians within new zone of occupation were released March 31st on urgent demand of British representative Major Freeman. Attempt made by new government to win them over to Bolshevism but without success.

Revolutionary government apparently gaining in strength. Excellent order being outwardly maintained but abuses frequent in execution new laws. There is much discontent among servants of hotels and shops who have saved money but are now on same footing with others who have made no effort. Ordinary workmen however are apparently supporting new regime with more enthusiasm. Reports regarding attitude of peasants and farmers most conflicting. Government will probably make distinction between large and small estates in socialization of land, but will only take up this matter after socialization of industry and commerce. New government is

not a government of majority of people but literally a dictatorship of minority and the elections may produce interesting results. Most well-informed people apparently think Hungary would welcome intervention of almost any sort except by French, who have made themselves unpopular.

Revolutionary government is in intimate relations with Russian Bolsheviks and Lenine is said to be exerting guiding control in Hungary, and apparently desires that Hungary avoid mistakes and excesses of Russian revolution. There are constant rumors that Russian Bolshevik army is approaching but no confirmation of such reports. Strong conviction exists in Budapest that Bolshevism will soon triumph in Roumania, Bulgaria and Bohemia.

Intervention would require great skill in order to effect most good and least harm. No one connected with Hungarian problem since armistice should be prominently identified therewith because of Hungarian resentment over manner in which they have been treated. It is essential that friendly attitude of Entente towards Hungarians be shown. Food and coal should be sent and possibly blockade lifted in order to help restore economic life. To refuse food would only make Hungarians the more bitter and resentful. A clear declaration by Entente that Hungary will not be dismembered without respecting wishes of all peoples concerned or without conceding right of local autonomy is still more necessary. Such a declaration would prepare way for an easy intervention or strengthen those disapproving of present regime. If Hungarians convinced they will have right of self-determination problem would be vastly simplified.

Recruiting for Red Guard has not met with success and this force does not yet exceed 20,000 men. New government does not possess any serious military strength.

Bela Kuhn is treating American Mission very well. He and most other Hungarians convinced Americans honestly desire

fair play and therefore differentiate greatly in treatment of them.”

With reference to last paragraph Brown states that he is not allowing the Hungarians to receive impression that America is disassociating itself from the policy of the Allies as regards Hungary.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

***Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge¹²***

No. 26

BUDAPEST, April 10, 1919.

Subject: The coal and iron situation in Hungary.

1. I enclose herewith copy of a special memorandum¹³ concerning the coal and iron situation in Hungary, furnished me by Dr. V. Koller, Mining Engineer, and now an official connected with the Department of Socialization under the new government.
2. This memorandum, of course, is only the expression of an opinion, and is to be read with some reservations, as being a naturally ex parte statement. I have, however, submitted it for perusal to an American engaged in a big industrial enterprise here, who assures me that the memorandum is in all essential respects correct.
3. I would call attention first of all to Dr. Koller's remarks concerning the wrongs and hardships endured by the miners and iron workers. Not only were they not permitted officially to organize unions, but after the outbreak of the war they were compelled to labor in the mines and factories—not on the footing of workmen, but of soldiers, receiving a daily wage of 16 hellers. Later on, special allowances were made for their families, but their condition, from all accounts, was miserable. On the other hand, while the workmen were being treated as vassals, the owners of these factories and mines were making colossal fortunes.
4. The statistics concerning coal are only approximate, of course, but are fairly reliable. I would draw special attention to Dr. Roller's plea for the importation of coke in order to enable the iron industry to carry on, and provide labor for a large number of employees. This coke can only be secured in Silesia, by way of Oderberg, Czaza, etc., — not a long haul to the main industrial centers.

5. Dr. Roller takes up the question of food, showing the great need of the miners for fats, their diet consisting mainly of bread and butter. I consider this of very great importance, because underfed workmen are not exactly a sound basis for the reconstruction of social order, and of the establishment of sound political conditions.
6. As I have previously reported, the iron workers, numbering about 150,000 organized laborers, probably hold the key to the political situation. As long as they support the government, the tendency will be against terrorism of any sort. Their whole influence has been conservative, so much so that it has been seriously questioned whether they would continue to support the present government, even with its marked tendency to free itself from the extremists. It is, of course, significant that the organizer of the iron workers, William Böhm, is now virtually Commissioner for War under the nominal direction of Kun Bela, the controlling personality in the new government. I understand that Böhm is organizing these iron workers in the neighborhood of Budapest into guards, nominally for their respective factories, but really for the purpose of exercising an effective check on the terrorists.
7. My own conclusion is that under such circumstances it is of immense importance that the industrial life of this country must be permitted to get under way again at the earliest possible moment in order to prevent the increase of discontent and disorder among men who are by nature really solid citizens, and disinclined to approve or abet Bolshevistic methods. I therefore agree with Doctor Roller in his conclusion that the two things most needed in the country to effect this purpose are food and coal, coke in particular. I will treat of the food situation in a separate report.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP BROWN

¹² Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 211, April 11; received April 14.

¹³ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/343

[Document 161]

***Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge¹⁴***

No. 29

BUDAPEST, April 10, 1919.

Subject: Political situation.

1. I desire to report further regarding the political situation here, which still remains outwardly unruffled, with Kun Bela very much in the ascendancy.
2. I had a call the other night from Kun Bela, with whom I discussed the situation somewhat fully, and was greatly impressed by his immense vitality and his shrewdness. Not impressive in personality, he is nevertheless a force to be reckoned with. He knows what he is after, is a sincere Socialist, and evidently most resourceful. His whole policy seems now to avoid, if possible, the regrettable excesses of the Russian Socialists, which have given to the name Bolshevist so sinister a significance. Personally devoted to Lenin, he at this present moment is evidently guided in most of his decisions directly by the great Russian leader; not for any political reasons, but because of the affinity that binds all Socialists in common devotion to a fundamental ideal.
3. As an indication of the policy of the present government, I enclose herewith (enclosure No. 1)¹⁵ translation of a speech made recently by Garbai, the President of the Revolutionary Government. In a few words, he has summarized his whole program; namely, the abolition of private property on a big scale, the socialization, and in some cases the communization of many industries and enterprises, the repudiation of war loans and indemnities, and the creation of a new social order, which shall provide for the poorest man a "secured living, a nice home, sufficient food, culture, accommodations and facilities for education." So much for the

program. As to the methods for carrying it out, there is much to be criticised.

4. As an indication of the methods of the present government, I enclose herewith a translation of recent orders on the subject of the housing of the poor, which has been recently placed in the hands of two zealots named Szamuely and Vago, who are known to be among the most extreme members of the Revolutionary Government. The provisions of these rules and regulations give a more vivid idea of the socialistic methods of this government than any comments can do. The inflammatory language employed by these two commissioners in calling the attention of the public to the measures adopted for the purpose of providing homes for the proletariat, is most suggestive. (See Enclosure No. 2).¹⁶
5. It is true that housing conditions in Budapest have been notorious, and the poor ordinary workmen have been denied decent, hygienic surroundings. This condition of things during the last few months has become particularly reprehensible, owing to the enormous influx of refugees from occupied territory. Already, under the Karolyi government, measures were taken to house many of these unfortunate people. More undoubtedly remains to be done, but the present measures are not calculated to inspire confidence. For example, one of the provisions states: "We decide that in general the *bourgeoisie* shall live together. We are not inclined to expose the proletariat by living together with the *bourgeoisie* to their poisoning influence. The *bourgeoisie* who have larger homes shall share them with their friends and relatives. The houses freed in this manner will be used for housing proletarians. The general principle to be followed is that each fairly large family shall occupy not more than three rooms." This may appear to afford some relief to people of gentility. On the other hand, in times of public disturbance, when class hatred may run at a fierce pace, the segregation of the *Bourgeoisie* might prove to be a most unfortunate arrangement.
6. I have already favorably reported on the subject of the attitude of this government towards foreigners and their property. The assurances already given, seemed to me to be most liberal and calculated to avoid difficulties for the new regime. I regret, however, to note by the regulations published today, as translated

in Enclosure No. 3,¹⁶ that the government is evidently inclined to render the situation of foreigners more difficult, by refusing to permit them to take out all their personal property, and by practically taking over the administration of their private property. This is especially regrettable, in view of the definite promises made by Kun Bela in his note to General Smuts, dated the 5th; assurances which Kun Bela repeated to me personally the other day. I am informed by Major Freeman, the British Military representative here, that Kun Bela practically repudiates this note on the ground that it was contingent on the negotiations with General Smuts, an interpretation which seems to be entirely unwarranted.

7. Another regrettable indication is to be found in the number of arrests of prominent people, who were identified with the old regime, for no other reason that I can find, except a spirit of vindictiveness, unless it should appear that they were actually implicated in some counter-revolutionary conspiracy, which I in no way think possible. Once this government starts on this declivity of arresting members of the *bourgeoisie*, class hatred is quite certain to be aroused, and everything that savors of resistance or counter revolution will serve as a pretext for dreadful excesses. The Revolutionary Tribunals, with their provisions for a crude, swift and pitiless "justice" are ready at hand for sinister uses.
8. In regard to counter revolutions, I must admit that such movements are always possible, and might come most unexpectedly, though I see no evidence of anything formidable being prepared. There have been a few incidents in the country, where some of the peasants have apparently resisted the authority of the Red Guard, with the result that several have been shot, and others summarily executed. I do not think that the country at large is really aroused as yet. It still is in a more or less benumbed state of mind, owing to the hardships of recent years, the stagnation of economic life, and the destruction of their hopes for a great national future for Hungary. I doubt, however, if the average Hungarian is really in favor of Socialism, and I am quite certain that he is violently opposed to Bolshevism. The possibilities, therefore, of a general resentment towards the Revolutionary Government and of factional warfare, are undoubtedly great.

9. I do not find that the new government has made itself in any way popular with the workingmen, and I question its ability to carry on indefinitely without their active approval. If they are not properly fed, and if the economic life of the country is not soon revived, I can see every prospect of serious disorder and discontent. Some sort of a general peace and resumption of economic life in Europe is an immediate and overwhelming necessity.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP BROWN

¹⁴ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 211, April 11; received April 14.

¹⁵ Not printed.

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁶ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/342

[Document 162]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 210

VIENNA, April 11, 1919.
[Received April 14.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that in connection with the establishment of future boundaries for Hungary, I wish to take up again one particular question which I have previously treated, namely that of the Ruthenian territory in northern Hungary. The question is discussed at some length and in its various aspects in memoranda by Major Martin and Lieutenant Goodwin enclosed in my Reports 139, 145 and 158 and their report No. 112¹⁸ of March 9th sent direct to Paris, to which I respectfully refer.

It seems to be well established that the Ruthenians of northern Hungary are for the most part a backward, ignorant people who have not been liberally governed in the past and have not developed any strong feeling of nationality or desired independence or separation from Hungary. During the last few months they have been living in a state of disorderly confusion, solicited from various sides and uncertain as to what they wanted, perhaps even incapable of knowing.

There are three obvious possible solutions to the problem of the future of their territory. I reject union with Rumania for which there is no reason. It might be left to Hungary with provision for the national language and autonomy such as have been offered by the new Hungarian law. It might be annexed to or constitute an autonomous state connected with Czecho-Slovakia or it might be part of a new Ukrainian republic.

The third solution conforms best with the ordinary theory of nationality. The Ruthenians of North Hungary are an offshoot of the people across the mountains. On the other hand it must be remembered that the barrier of the Carpathians is a considerable one, much more considerable for instance than that between Northern Bohemia and Saxony, which is regarded as a good reason for keeping them under different jurisdictions, and the economic interests of the people on the two sides of it have little in common. There is a certain feeling between them of belonging to the same nationality, but it has only recently been awakened and has penetrated but little. In religion they differ, the Ruthenians south of the range belonging to the Roman-Catholic Church, those north to the so-called United-Greeks, who are in community with the Roman-Catholics but have a different rite.

The second solution, a union of the Hungarian Slovaks with Czechoslovakia is supposed to conform to their desires as expressed by their members in the United States and by delegates to Prague, which in its turn adopts the attitude of gracious consent rather than ardent longing. These desires, however, have not been expressed in such a way as to prove them to be general or profound. In the present state of chaos people can be found in northern Hungary and delegations can be sent from there to express a wish for any imaginable solution, incorporation into Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, Ukrainia and even restored Russia, as well as for complete independence or the continuance of the former political relations. The real truth I believe is that most of the people are not in a position to know what they do want except peace, order and a certain respect for their individuality.

The Czecho-Slovaks on their side, besides being moved by a feeling of kinship and a dislike of the Hungarians, would like a boundary in the northeast that shall be coterminous with that of Rumania. This is not unreasonable from the point of view of their political interests and ambitions, but it is no more so than the wish of the Poles to be the direct neighbors of the Rumanians, or of a similar wish on the part of the Poles and the Hungarians, or of the Ukrainians and the Hungarians. Such considerations are natural in themselves, but do not affect the real merits of the question. At bottom the desire of the

Czecho-Slovaks to obtain the Hungarian Ruthenian territory is based not so much on racial relationship as on imperialism, and we may doubt whether in the long run its satisfaction would not add to the dangers to which the new Czecho-Slovak state is exposed.

There are several strong reasons which may be urged in favor of leaving the Ruthenian territory to Hungary. In the first place, the mere fact that there is no other solution that is obviously more advantageous is a strong argument against breaking up a political connection that has lasted for a thousand years, and this by no mere accident but because it has been in the nature of things. Secondly, there is no shadow of doubt that geographically the region belongs with the territory south of it, not with that to the north-east or west. On the north it ends in a lofty natural barrier. It is itself a region of mountains and valleys, all its communications tending to be with the plain below and not with the hilly country on the two sides of it. Economically the connection is every bit as obvious as is that of Northern with Central Bohemia. Union with Czecho-Slovakia would add to the wealth of the Czech State, for Hungarian Ruthenia is not without valuable resources, but for the Ruthenians themselves political connection with the plains below is, as it always has been, the obvious and natural thing. Finally, at this time when, albeit for good reasons, the Hungarian State is doomed to partition and seems likely to be left weak, exposed and deprived of much the greater part of its former wealth and resources as well as territory, it seems to me that in a case where the reason is by no means evident and the chances of a crying injustice very considerable, the Hungarians have every claim to be given the benefit of the doubt. These and other arguments on the same side are capable of much further development, but here I wish to indicate them only to express my strong personal opinion that they should be taken into most serious consideration.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

¹⁸ Reports No. 139, No. 145, and No. 158 by Professor Coolidge not printed; memorandum by Major Martin, March 12, which was transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge by report No. 139, is printed on p. 395 [*Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 147](#), [Doc. 148](#), and [Doc. 149](#)*]. Report No. 112 by Major Martin and Lieutenant Goodwin not found in Department files.

***Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge¹⁹***

No. 31

BUDAPEST, April 17, 1919.

Subject: Conversation with Bela Kun.

1. I enclose herewith a rough abstract of a conversation which I had with Bela Kun on Tuesday, April 15, here in this hotel; Professor Marszalli of the university here, being present as a friend of Bela Kun's, and Lieutenant Weiss assisting as an interpreter.
2. As will be seen, the subjects treated in this conversation were of considerable importance, and the views expressed by Bela Kun are naturally to be given considerable weight. It is obvious, of course, that his answers are not at all to be accepted as entirely in accordance with the facts, as for example in the matter of propaganda. His statement that the government did not approve of propaganda in foreign countries, and that it maintained connections merely with the proletariat of other lands, is not to be taken seriously. The distinction between conveying messages and carrying on propaganda is a distinction without a difference. As a matter of fact, I am perfectly well aware that every effort is being put forth here to stimulate the proletariat in other countries to rise in revolt. This morning's paper, for example, alludes to the sending of propaganda literature over the Roumanian lines in occupied territory in Hungary by airplane.
3. I desire to say a few words in regard to the personality of Bela Kun, as I have been able to observe him in this and in a former interview. Though not endowed with what we are accustomed to denote as "presence", and at first glance rather unimpressive, and even repellent, Bela Kun ends by making a decided impression of immense vitality, resourcefulness and a certain self-mastery and poise that is quite extraordinary when one thinks of his utter lack

of preparation for the position of dictator of a nation. It is only a few short weeks ago that he was imprisoned, and, as a matter of fact, after the frightful beating he received at the hands of the police, he was released from the hospital to assume the virtual direction of this revolutionary government. His head still shows the wounds he received.

4. I was greatly impressed, first of all, by the clearness as well as the readiness with which he answered my questions. It is evident that he has a perfectly clear sense of direction and has laid down a line of policy which he is determined to carry out,—not at all costs,—but by the most effective means available. Though I believe him to be a sincere socialist, he is not a fanatic nor an impractical dreamer, but is shrewd and practical, and ready to seize any and every opportunity to accomplish his aims. In other words, he is a good deal of a strategist, an opportunist who, like a good general, keeps his main end in view without faltering.
5. It seems to be quite clear that Bela Kun's policy is one of moderation, and that he earnestly desires to establish socialism. To accomplish this end, he must steer carefully between the extremists among the Socialists, and naturally the so-called *Bourgeoisie*, on the other hand. If he should succeed in establishing a fairly conservative socialistic regime, it is possible that he may succeed in not provoking the *Bourgeoisie* to open conflict, provided of course that at the same time he shows himself a good nationalist. On the other hand, it will require consummate skill for him to suppress the extremists and yet maintain power. Thus far he has shown immense ability in the measures he has taken to eliminate the extremists and mitigate the rigors of the new regime. So long as he maintains his ascendancy, I think we may confidently expect that Hungary will not witness the terrorism and the excesses of Russian Bolshevism.
6. In conclusion I desire to emphasize this point: That if wisely dealt with and properly cultivated, Bela Kun might even prove to be, in these troublesome times, a means of effecting a fairly satisfactory adjustment of the problems not only of Hungary, but of this part of the world. If encouraged in his policy of conservatism, the Entente might find him a check against Russian Bolshevism. If antagonized, however, and handled in a crude, rough way, Bela Kun might easily prove a dangerous enemy.

PHILIP BROWN

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of a Conversation With Kun Bela, Tuesday, April 15

Kun Bela referred to the question of the resumption of the economic life of Hungary, and stated that he would welcome any move in this direction, alluding to a conversation I had with Professor Marszalli on the subject. I stated that I had discussed the whole matter with certain Americans in Vienna, but that of course our discussions were not in any way formal or official, and that I was not authorized to make any propositions whatever. The question interested me very much, and I desired to inform myself as to the attitude of Kun Bela's government. It seemed to me of the utmost importance that, without regard to the solution of the political questions here, steps should be taken at once to try to restore the circulation of a country whose forces are at a very low ebb. I referred to the great quantities of Roumanian oil awaiting shipment; to the need of Silesian coke in Hungary, and to the general industrial and trade relations of this part of the world. I remarked that I had noticed several hundred freight cars lying idle in the neighborhood of Biske, including many oil tank cars. It seemed to me most regrettable that all this rolling stock should be idle and deteriorating.

Kun Bela stated that his government would be glad to cooperate in any measures for the purpose of stimulating the economic life of these countries, and that these freight cars would, of course, be available for use under some general agreement.

I stated that I presumed that if anything of this sort were attempted, there would have to be some central control or management, and that under the present strained relations a control of this character could only be exercised by disinterested officials, such as the American Food Representatives.

I asked Kun Bela a hypothetical question as to whether in case anything was done in this matter his government would be prepared

to allow American representatives to take charge of the transportation and distribution of food and raw materials.

Kun Bela stated that this would be acceptable so long as there were no soldiers in uniform.

I then pointed to Dr. Weiss, as he was in uniform, and Kun Bela said that he had no objection if the Food Representatives preferred to wear a uniform. I then said that of course he must understand that it was far from my own thoughts to suggest anything of the nature of intervention, disguised or otherwise. He said he quite realized that.

Kun Bela stated that they were negotiating with the Czecho-Slovaks in regard to the idle cars and were planning to turn some cars over to them, and to get oil and coal in their place. He is also expecting Roumanian delegates to take up the question of oil, etc. Kun Bela also stated that an American Economic Study Commission would be welcome in Hungary.

Financial.

I raised the question of finances, and the probable attitude of a Socialistic government in regard to international finance. Kun Bela admitted that the time might come when there would be some other form of currency, referring I assume, to the Marxian idea of a medium of exchange based on actual labor.

Kun Bela said that in the meantime they had gold and foreign securities with which to meet obligations; furthermore, they would have grain to export. He stated that 85% of the available land has been sown, which is one-third more than during the war.

He stated they would have wine, beer and liquor to export, in view of the fact that Hungary had gone dry under a Bolshevik regime, and that they would have horses to export also. He added they would have to effect a small loan from abroad, and expected to offer good securities. I did not attempt to ascertain the nature of these securities.

Arrests.

I stated to Kun Bela that I was constantly hearing rumors of an alarming sort, and that in order not to be misled, I would ask the privilege of putting some direct questions to him. I said that I had heard that there had been a large number of arrests recently of members of the *Bourgeoisie*, prominent under the old regime, and if this were true, I desired to know on what grounds these arrests were made.

Kun Bela replied that it was true, that there had been a number of arrests, although naturally he could not give me the exact names and numbers at the moment, but that there had been forty-three arrests the night before. He stated that these arrests for the most part were due to a widespread counter-revolutionary plot, organized in Vienna and Switzerland, and that it was necessary to take measures to prevent any of these gentlemen from giving trouble. He said that most of the cases were really under detention, rather than in strict confinement. He also stated that this was a sort of prophylactic measure, taken in order to prevent the mob from taking matters into their own hands, and committing excesses against the *bourgeoisie*.

Kun Bela went on to state that he was absolutely against any baiting of the *bourgeoisie*, that if they behave themselves and accepted the new order of things they would have as much chance to live as anyone else, that it was merely a question of each man living by his own labor. He said that he had no intention of going either to' the left or to the right,—that he was trying to steer a course straight ahead, avoiding extreme measures on the one hand, and reaction on the other.

Propaganda.

I stated that I had been informed that very active propaganda was going on from here, directed against foreign countries. I desired information on this point. Kun Bela replied that it was quite false. He was opposed to this sort of thing, and that there would be no propaganda. I stated that I had noticed that there had been appeals made to the proletariat of other countries.

He replied that these appeals were merely to their comrades in other countries not to take up arms against each other. He said they had organized a propaganda for the education of the people of Hungary.

I stated that when I was in Prague, I had heard that Hungarian airplanes were dropping propaganda over the city. Kun Bela laughed and said that this propaganda was literature of a nationalistic sort, published in the Karolyi regime. They are in touch with the proletariat of foreign countries in order to transmit messages, but they will refrain from carrying on propaganda provided foreign countries will not interfere here.

Russia.

I referred to the proposition made by Kun Bela several weeks ago that this mission should act as an intermediary between Lenin and the Entente, and asked him to define exactly what he had in mind.

He stated that although Lenin had a strong army, he would be glad to come to an understanding with the Entente, based on the simple proposition of leaving Russia alone, letting them import food and raw products, and they would meet Russian financial obligations properly. Kun Bela laid great emphasis on this matter, and asked me if I would be good enough to take it up again.

I asked him if this proposition of Lenin included Ukrainia. He said no: that Ukrainia was independent. When asked about General Petlura, he replied that Petlura was operating in a portion of Ukrainia and that the movement in the Ukraine was really a counterrevolution by Ukrainian Bolsheviks who desired a separate Ukraine. Ukrainia is independent of Russia and Paderewski's troops are fighting Ukrainian Bolsheviks and not Russian Bolsheviks. Kun Bela disclosed the interesting fact that he was attempting to mediate between the Polish troops and the Ukrainian troops fighting in Galicia.

Conference.

Kun Bela referred to the proposal made to General Smuts for a conference between the former portions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and also with Roumania. He stated that he thought this conference was of the utmost importance to determine the economic relations of these countries, and would have nothing to do with politics.

I replied that the reasons why this proposal was received with little enthusiasm was due probably to memories of Brest-Litovsk, where Trotsky, instead of talking business, preached Bolshevism to the delegates. Kun Bela replied that he would confine himself strictly to business.

Smuts' Mission.

Referring to many rumours that have been freely circulated recently, I asked Kun Bela as to the status of the negotiations since the departure of General Smuts. He said there had been no change, although delegates had been sent down to Arad by airplane to discuss the question of the demarcation line. He said that the airplane was fired on, and that when it landed the delegates were treated so roughly by the French representatives that they were glad to get away and return to Budapest, and that he was not at all anxious to send down any more delegates. I did not gather from what he said that this government had received anything of the nature of an ultimatum.

Telegraph and Telephone for Food Mission.

While we were conversing, a telephone message came from Vienna from the Food Mission, stating that they had difficulty in arranging through communication to Bucharest via Budapest and Belgrade, owing to interruption at Presbourg.

I raised the matter in a casual way, and Kun Bela said of course that there would be no objection whatever to through communication across Hungary, but that naturally the government could not undertake anything at Presbourg, which was actually in the hands of the Czecho-Slovaks. As far as Hungary is concerned, Dr. Weiss might

take the matter up in detail with Landler, the Commissioner of the Interior.

In closing the interview, Kun Bela said that he would give me complete data on the subject of arrests and would also like to take up again with me the matter of economic relations. I made clear to Kun Bela I had no representative capacity whatever, and was not authorized to undertake anything of the nature of negotiations, and that the purpose of all my inquiries and conferences was to obtain information to transmit to Paris. I was always grateful for any information that he or his government would feel inclined to furnish.

I also took occasion to express my concern lest the talk of class hatred here might lead to extremely regrettable events, and endeavored to suggest the necessity of moderation. I stated that long ago I had formed views more or less sympathetic to Socialism in its economic aspect, but that I had always been alarmed by the spirit of hatred that animated the socialistic leaders. I could not see that any good ever came into the world through hatred, and that in the necessary adjustments between human beings, who honestly differed with each other, the only spirit that accomplished anything was a spirit of consideration and charity. It would be quite impossible for us to understand each other always, but it was never impossible for us to have respect and consideration. Kun Bela assured me that although he and his followers received no consideration in the past, he would endeavor to carry out his policy without this spirit of hatred. He said that when he was being beaten over the head by the police he merely remarked that they did not know what they were doing, and that he hoped that when they were getting blows on their heads that they would take them as philosophically as he took his.

¹⁹ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 232, April 18; received April 21.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/411

[Document 164]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 248

VIENNA, April 25, 1919.
[Received April 28.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a report from Professor Brown, as made out by Capt. C. A. Scully and Lieut. W. H. Osborn, who arrived here this morning from Budapest; and also another report by Lieut. Osborn representing Professor Brown's views.

Owing to the precarious nature of the general situation, it has seemed better that not even the courier should carry with him written material that must not fall into the hands of the authorities in Budapest. Instead, he is given full oral instructions, which he then prepares in the form of a memorandum after he has seen me in Vienna. Professor Brown's reports thus made are full of interest. He is evidently doing work of much value. I have no doubt that his presence exercises a restraining influence on the bolshevik government, and that it has prevented excesses that might otherwise have taken place.

He deserves the highest credit for what he is accomplishing even though I must admit I should feel more confident of the extent of the government's good behavior if it did not rest so far chiefly on their own testimony.

I wish also that I felt quite sure that the movement of public opinion in Hungary is at present towards the right. This may be the case, but Secretary Bauer, who is really intelligent and is in a position to be well informed, told me yesterday that although he believed the communistic government of Hungary might fall in six months owing to the economic impossibility of its system, for the present it could maintain itself unless attacked from outside. He said that there were

no materials there just now on which a reaction could be based; that he had recently talked with Minister Böhm, an old friend of his, who declared to him that the masses were more radical than their leaders, and would have made the revolution without them if necessary. Secretary Bauer added that he thought if there was any change it would be to the left rather than to the right.

It is evident that the bolshevist leaders at Budapest are thoroughly frightened at the prospect of an Allied advance upon the city, and feel that they have no means of resisting it. In order to avert their downfall they are willing to make great concessions. How much their promises are to be trusted, especially in the matter of refraining from propaganda, it is difficult to say. The best, or, one might say, the worst of them are such complete fanatics that it is hard to believe that they will refrain from spreading their faith no matter what assurances they may give.

Bela Kun, who is superior to most of his associates, may be able to control the situation and to institute a stable and relatively moderate government, especially if it is necessary to do so in order to escape foreign intervention. If no such intervention is contemplated, he is the man that must be dealt with. An intervention will mean bloodshed and perhaps massacre. If, on the other hand, the only way to check definitely the spread of bolshevism in this part of the world is to crush it out in Hungary at once, action to this effect should be immediately taken.

A promise of food and supplies to the city provided no excesses take place before the arrival of the Allied troops, might insure the maintenance of order in Budapest, and perhaps even the peaceful surrender of the government. The situation is, in any case, big with responsibilities. Until the Roumanian advance I had felt that it was better not to attempt intervention in Hungary. Since that advance I have believed that prompt, decisive action would be the best course. In another week I may see cause to modify my opinion again—for events move quickly.

The suggestion that Bela Kun be invited to Switzerland to meet a representative from the Allies, raises not merely a Hungarian but far

reaching general questions about which I do not feel called upon to comment.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure 1]

Lieutenant William H. Osborn to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, April 25, 1919.

Subject: Proposal for conference with Bela Kun in Switzerland.

1. Professor Brown sent me to Vienna with the courier especially to urge the proposal for a conference to be held in Switzerland between Bela Kun and a mission from the Entente in Paris. The ground in Budapest is well prepared for the formation of a transitional government along moderate socialist lines, but it is felt that no such government would succeed the present one without considerable bloodshed unless Bela Kun were a member of it. At the present time he is extremely popular with the radical elements in the city, but is also exerting all his influence to keep down their excesses. In any change he would be the only man who could satisfy these elements, and prevent their causing trouble.

2. In order to permit the new transitional government to get on its feet and at the same time keep in check the wilder elements Bela Kun accompanied by one or two men of known moderate socialist views could be sent by the new government to Switzerland, in order to meet the Entente representatives. Such a move would immediately give the extremists confidence in the new government, while getting Kun out of the city and giving the new regime a chance to become installed without his presence.

Mr. Brown was assured last night by Agoston, a Minister for Foreign Affairs and one of the most substantial and moderate men in the

present government, that not only was an immediate change in the government being contemplated, but that the sending of Kun to Switzerland accompanied by Kunfi and some representative of the workmen, or perhaps Agoston himself, would be the surest means of effecting the change.

4. Furthermore, it is Kun's ambition to act as an intermediary between the Entente and Lenin, and Mr. Brown feels that possibly some important steps could be taken along that line by the proposed conference.

5. This proposal is made by Professor Brown as a direct result of his conferences with more moderate members of the government who wish to bring about a change, but find their hands tied by the attitude of the extremists. On account of Bela Kun's position and popularity, he seems to be the only factor that will make possible a transitional government without resort to violent measures. Mr. Brown considers it impossible to make a change that will throw out Bela Kun entirely, without giving him or the people who believe in him any recognition of his position, and that only by sending him on such a mission can Kun and his followers be satisfied and permit the new government to obtain power.

W. H. OSBORN

[Enclosure 2]

Professor Philip M. Brown (by oral report of Courier) to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, April 25, 1919.

Subject: Memorandum of situation in Budapest April 24, 1919.

1. Unconfirmed reports are to the effect that the Roumanian advance is continuing. The infantry advance is preceded by cavalry patrols. The general in command of the French forces in the south issued a proclamation stating that the French would begin an advance on April 23d. There is no information as to whether or not the advance has actually begun. The announcement was made that the

advancing forces had with them the elements of a new government to take control of Budapest, the individuals named being Vagy, Minister of the Interior under Karolyi, and Ugron, a member of the Wecherle Cabinet. The information as to these two individuals being with the advancing forces has been substantiated by more than one source. The advancing troops are said to be organizing the counter-revolutionary element as they proceed, so as to increase the local military forces which would add security to the establishment of the new government.

2. There have been indications for some time past that there is a revulsion of feeling on the part of the working men of Budapest against the Bolshevist Government, notably among the iron workers. It is believed that they would welcome the intervention of any foreign troops who would assure the prevention of bloodshed and pillage in the city, the idea being that with a change in the regime subsequent measures could be taken to have foreign troops withdrawn when the stability of the new government had been assured.
3. At the present time Bela Kuhn is unquestionably in control of the city and is showing a disposition to introduce moderate elements into the government. A number of the more moderate individuals have been forced to join the Red Guard. It is unquestionable that his personal popularity is such that he cannot be disregarded and entirely cast aside in any contemplated change in the regime. It is he alone who holds the radical revolutionary elements in the city in check. It is quite evident that he is willing to form a transition government of the moderate socialist type, and has even stated that the elimination of the Bolshevist element in the present cabinet is being considered. He is willing to come to an understanding with Garamy.
4. If a change in the regime is effected and a transitional government formed, it is desirable that Kuhn Bela remain temporarily as an official of the new government, in order to keep the revolutionary elements in control and to avoid bloodshed. Professor Brown feels very strongly that it is desirable to have Kuhn Bela meet a representative of the Entente in Switzerland, not only to discuss the situation in Budapest and in Hungary but also to act as the intermediary of Lenin. Professor Brown desires that this be made in the form of a definite proposition to Paris, and that a definite

and immediate answer be requested. The real reason back of such a meeting would be to afford a plausible reason for Kuhn Bela to leave the city and to facilitate the formation of a transition government during his absence.

5. Among the names suggested as possible members of a transition government are Garamy, Böhm and Agoston. The last named is a minister of foreign affairs in the present government, is apparently a man of considerable responsibility and judgment and is believed to hold views of somewhat moderate nature. The name of Buchinger has also been suggested. This man is not a member of the present government, is a former Socialist political boss, but little is known of him. At the present time it is out of the question to consider the introduction of any bourgeois element into the new transition government. Popular feeling is such that an attempt of this character would cause a lack of confidence in the new administration.
6. If a change is to be effected it is desirable that the Roumanian advance be withheld, in order to allow the new government to effect a substantial organization and to gain the confidence of the people. If the change is effected and the Roumanian advance is continued, the new administration would in all probability have to cope with outbreaks of a violent nature in the city. If the change is effected, it is also desirable that a strong Inter-Allied Commission be sent to Budapest under the heading of a British or American representative. This mission could add an element of responsibility and recognition to the new government, and its personnel could be increased from time to time, so that in the event of any subsequent attempts at disorder there would be additional military force to aid in the suppression of violence.
7. A representative of Kuhn Bela was authorized by him to make the following representation with regard to the present situation:
 - (1) The reports of a number of arrests in the city are greatly exaggerated. Men over sixty years of age and invalids are released. A number of others whose arrest was found to have been made without sufficient justification were set at liberty today. Those still in confinement are well cared for, they are not in an ordinary prison and their welfare is supervised by one of Kuhn Bela's secretaries. (It may be stated that the release of certain individuals and the attitude of the authorities toward the

prisoners is the direct result of the representations of Professor Brown to Kuhn Bela).

- (2) All foreign propaganda has been ordered to cease.
 - (3) Kuhn Bela has made up his mind to put an end to “la tactique Bolsheviste”.
 - (4) In view of the above steps already taken and to be taken, Kuhn Bela expects some measures to be adopted that will stop the Roumanian advance. He is willing that the subject matter above given be embodied in the form of a written agreement. This, however, would require the authorization of some individual by the Entente, and at the present time there is no one in Budapest who has such authority.
- 8. The proposition of a meeting between Kuhn Bela and others with a representative of the Entente in Switzerland received the favorable consideration of Kuhn Bela. Kuhn Bela would be accompanied by Kunfi and a third person, who would be the representative of the working men, possibly Agoston.
 - 9. Professor Brown has intimated to Kuhn Bela that if a transition government acceptable to the Entente is organized, economic relief in the form of food stuffs for the people of Hungary would probably be afforded by the Entente.
 - 10. A late report is to the effect that in a local engagement of minor nature the Bed Guard had succeeded in pushing back the Roumanian forces.

C. A. SCULLY
W. H. OSBORN

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/424

[Document 165]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 253

VIENNA, May 1, 1919.
[Received May 3.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the official part of a letter which I have just received from Professor Philip M. Brown at Budapest. The letter seems to me of much interest and offers a picture from a point of view which we should otherwise lack. Professor Brown is evidently doing most important work under trying circumstances. I have reason to think that his presence at his post at this moment exercises a most valuable restraining influence on the government and has been beneficial to many unfortunate people. I believe he handles the difficult situation admirably.

On the other hand, while admitting the truth of his statements, I cannot concur with all of his conclusions. Granting that Bela Kun and those close to him deserve the credit which Professor Brown ascribes to them and granting that if they were to be overthrown there might be pillage and massacre, even this is not enough to settle the question of what would be the wisest policy for the Allied and Associated Powers to follow at the present juncture. Professor Brown's evidence is almost entirely from one, interested side, and the fact that Bela Kun is wise enough, not only to maintain law and order but also to wish to establish decently civilized conditions, does not prove that he and his partisans are really moving to the right as far as their fundamental principles are concerned. I must admit too, that the idea of a "transitional" government groping towards something better appears to me a little nebulous. But even disregarding all such doubts, there are other considerations to be taken into account, and to be given even more weight than those mentioned by Professor Brown.

The question as to how the Allies should treat the government of Bela Kun is of importance not only to Hungary. It also will affect Austria, Bohemia, Germany, Poland, and indirectly at least the whole world. To give public recognition and encouragement to the man whose name stands next to that of Lenin and Trotsky as the apostle of international Bolshevism and class warfare is a grave matter. To invite him to come on a special mission to treat as an equal with representatives of the Allied Powers, and perhaps to serve as an intermediary between them and Lenin would vastly enhance his present importance as well as tend to stabilize his government and what it stands for in Hungary. This would be going a great deal further than General Smuts' propositions, which were that Hungary should merely appear as one of several interested states in a general meeting, and there is no doubt that the mission of General Smuts did much to strengthen the hands and enhance the prestige of Bela Kun. At the same time it weakened the position of the government here, which had been telling its people that a Bolshevik revolution would mean the end of the Allied food supply which alone saved Vienna from starvation. Since then, in spite of the Smuts' Mission, the statement has been repeated and it has been explicitly and officially confirmed by the English and French representatives here, whose utterances on the subject have never been repudiated. The belief in its truth has unquestionably been an influence for the maintenance of order. Conversely, every encouragement given to the present Hungarian regime weakens the hold of the Austrian government on its own more radical supporters.

In the eyes of the Hungarian Bolsheviks few things at this moment could be more desirable than a revolution here, which would establish in Vienna a system similar to that of Budapest. It would be one more great step in the progress of international revolution, a conquest in itself and one full of menace to the security of Bohemia, of Poland, of Germany and beyond. On the other hand, the collapse or overthrow of the government of Bela Kun, whatever his merits as a statesman, would, provided it were succeeded by a moderate regime, depress revolutionists and strengthen the forces of law and order the world over. It is thus evident that the advisability of recognizing him does not depend solely on the likelihood of massacres in Budapest, however terrible. Large considerations have

to be taken into account, and these considerations, whatever may be true tomorrow, are I believe decisive today against such action as recommended by Professor Brown. Let me add that my difference of opinion from him in this regard does not detract from my appreciation of the splendid work he is doing.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

BUDAPEST, 29 April, 1919.

DEAR COOLIDGE: I am taking advantage of a special train leaving for Vienna this afternoon to send Captain Scully back with this personal *compte rendu*. He can also obtain fresh supplies of provisions for our immediate needs.

The political situation is as follows: The Roumanian advance has profoundly discouraged this Government and inflamed the extremists. The Government for a long while has shown a disposition to move decidedly to the Right, as I had occasion to report in detail previously. One single indication of this policy was the suppression two weeks ago of the Soldiers' Councils—an institution of an obvious Bolshevik character. The extremists were fast losing ground prior to the Roumanian advance.

Even now, in spite of the frenzied appeals of the extremists, the Government has thus far succeeded in quietly getting them out of Budapest and sending them to the front. I have been assured confidentially that the most extreme leaders will not be allowed to return as members of the Government.

There was undoubtedly a serious counter-revolutionary plot involving a very large number of people, including some of the old

police force. It was most unskillfully managed with the result that there have been many arrests, some just and many unjust. I believe that only two of the leaders have been shot.

Many of those placed under arrest are prominent persons suspected of being in sympathy with counter-revolutionary movements. Certainly many have been most indiscreet in openly showing their sentiments, and particularly in spreading rumors calculated to discredit this regime.

Unfortunately, some of the government officials were so ill-advised as to speak of these *detenus* as “hostages”. I immediately let them know that such an idea was utterly abhorrent, and was at once assured that the Government had no thought of resorting to such barbarous measures as might be implied by the use of such an expression. Moreover, they assured me that many of these suspects would be immediately released, and that they would endeavor to make use of surveillance rather than of detention in dealing with political enemies. I hear this morning that thirty were released in one bunch and that more will follow.

Allowance, of course, must be made in such times for so-called “preventive measures”; and it also must be recognized that when feeling runs so high, the Government is compelled to satisfy the extremists that the counter-revolutionists are being held effectively in check. It is a great satisfaction to Freeman and myself to be able to exert a moderating influence in behalf of these people.

Public order and security is being maintained most admirably, and I have yet to hear of any real excesses. Some abuses are committed, of course, in the carrying out of so radical a program involving private property rights, but even there, as I have had occasion to find out by personal investigation of several cases of American women married to Hungarians, much of the criticism is grossly exaggerated. Moreover, whenever the attention of the Government has been drawn to any such complaints, it has been quick to rectify such abuses. There have been many severe orders published in order to guard against same.

It is true that irresponsible zealots among the subordinate officials are hard to control, but Kun Bela has repeatedly given good evidence of his own determination to prevent excesses and abuses. I agree with Freeman that it is a fortunate thing that Kun Bela is in control of the situation at this time. We see no other strong man in sight to guarantee any sort of order and security. And this is why we must lay such strong emphasis on the impossibility of bringing about a transitional political transformation without the aid of Kun Bela. If we are to have a moderate Socialist regime which ultimately may be replaced by something still more moderate, the help of Kun Bela is absolutely required in the first transitional Government if we wish to avoid bloodshed.

In order to carry through such a program, it is entirely necessary to provide for some such conference between representatives of the Entente and representatives of Hungary as was suggested by General Smuts. (I believe he favored Paris, but I think Switzerland more desirable.) I do not need to reemphasize the great importance of having K. B. go as a member of the Hungarian delegation. It is perhaps the key to the whole problem.

In the absence of any agreement among the Entente as to the policy to be followed here, and in the absence of any authorized representative of the Entente with full powers to deal with so extraordinary a situation, there seems to have been no other course open to Freeman and myself except quietly to use our influence, when consulted, in this direction. We are encouraging this Government to purge itself of all Bolshevist taints and to endeavor to inspire some confidence in the outside world. K. B. and his associates have given me every evidence of their anxiety to carry out this program, and are working against great odds in this sense. Doctor Bolgar has informed me that his collaboration has been requested. He seems to Freeman and myself to be well intentioned, though perhaps lacking in force. I told him that perhaps the fact that he had represented this regime in Vienna at a time when they were resorting to questionable methods of propaganda might militate against him in the eyes of the outside world.

The situation is extraordinarily delicate and dangerous, but I am confident that we can weather some trying days with proper cooperation from without. I am convinced that in the present state of mind of the extremists, military intervention by the Entente would have bad results here in Budapest. It is not required so long as K. B. and his associates are induced to effect the transformation they have in mind. The advance of the Roumanians as an act not authorized by the Entente may have good results here in hastening the political changes desired, but if those changes are satisfactory, it might be desirable to exert strong influence to persuade the Roumanians to cease their invasion.

In the meantime, I earnestly hope that you and Gregory will do all in your power to back us up in this policy which was agreed on when I returned, and also, if you can do so without violence to your own judgment, to obtain from Paris an answer on this proposition for a conference in Switzerland along the lines already suggested by Smuts and myself. I consider this vital and urgent, and hope you will by telegraph get an answer at an early moment. It can do little harm; it may accomplish a great deal of good, particularly the one definite thing we had most in mind. As long as K. B. is essential to maintain order and avoid acts of terrorism, his help in the formation of a transitional government is indispensable. After that, we need have little concern, it seems to me.

PHILIP BROWN

***Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge²⁰***

No. 37

BUDAPEST, 2 May, 1919.

Subject: Protection of foreigners.

1. I enclose herewith translations of recent regulations issued by Bela Kun, Commissary for Foreign Affairs, concerning the protection of foreigners.²¹
2. It will be observed that the Revolutionary Government evidently desires to avoid all possible cause for complaint from foreigners residing here. Furthermore, in actual practice, I understand that with the exception of certain inevitable abuses on the part of subordinate officials, great care has been taken not to molest foreigners. They have been furnished with special placards to be placed on their houses and apartments, indicating that they are entitled to special consideration.
3. With respect to the special assurances furnished by Bela Kun to Mr. Balfour, published in the papers here on April 23d, concerning particularly the protection of foreign business enterprises,²² I would state that I have been given to understand that foreign establishments that were "socialized" at the beginning of this regime have not yet been restored to their original status. This may be due, not so much to an unwillingness on the part of the government to rectify their errors, as to a certain obvious difficulty in accomplishing the "unscrambling of the egg." Industries once socialized and placed under control of the employees cannot readily be restored to their original organization.
4. As an instance of the solicitude of the government with regard to foreigners, an apology was made and reparation promised for an alleged attack on the captain of a Greek tugboat lying alongside the quay here in front of this hotel a few days ago. It afterwards

appeared on a careful investigation that these charges were not substantiated, and that in all likelihood the Greek captain had grossly imposed on everybody. I am informed by Lieutenant-Commander Freeman, who had the matter particularly in charge, that he could find no cause for complaint, and that it was desirable to let the matter drop.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP BROWN

²⁰ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 263, May 5; received May 7.

²¹ None printed.

²² Identic, presumably, with the regulations mentioned in paragraph 1.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/450

[Document 167]

***Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge²³***

No. 40

BUDAPEST, 2 May, 1919.

Subject: Appeal addressed to President Wilson.

1. I enclose herewith a copy of an appeal addressed to President Wilson by the Hungarian Soviet Government on the 28th or 29th of April, urging that he should arrest the advance of the Roumanians and Czecho-Slovak troops now actually fighting with the Hungarian Red Guard.
2. I have been informed that this appeal was transmitted by wireless to Paris, and that its receipt was acknowledged. I presume that this merely means that the appeal was published to the world and in that manner was brought to the personal attention of President Wilson. It would appear to be an appeal of desperation, in view of the rapid approach of the Roumanian forces.
3. I merely transmit it for your information and for any use you may think desirable.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP BROWN

[Enclosure]

Appeal of the Hungarian Soviet Government Addressed to President Wilson

[APRIL 28 or 29, 1919.]

SIR: Blood and smoke, the blood of a proletariat all but exterminated, and the smoke and ruins of the villages ravaged by war, mark the path pursued by your allies in the name of that higher civilization and love of peace which you proclaim. We do not believe that this proceeding is in conformity with the principles proclaimed by you, the essence of which is that every country must be allowed to determine its own fate as it deems best from the point of view of its future development or its present interests. The very dead in their silence, and the maimed by their groans, protest against the action of your allies against the Hungarian Soviet Republic, they protest against the mere notion of this action being undertaken in your name or with your approval.

We, the Revolutionary Governing Council of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, who wish to establish a commonwealth based on organised work in place of capitalistic anarchy, we who have assumed power to prevent indiscriminate bloodshed, civil war, and complete anarchy from ensuing in this country, we appeal to you to arrest this fresh bloodshed ere the working people of a whole country be buried under the ruins of their own nation and drowned in their own blood.

When we assumed power, we had no armed force to back us. But neither was our succession to power followed by sanguinary conflicts of any kind. Within a very brief space of time we have taken thoroughgoing and far-reaching measures of social reconstruction, both in the political and in the economic sphere, without encountering any resistance. This was done without occasioning any convulsions, in a manner unprecedented in the history of mankind. We owed these achievements to the fact that proletarian democracy, which is the desire of every working man and woman and thus of the overwhelming majority of the population of the country, offered the one possibility to ensure the continuance of production and the livelihood of the people after the utter breakdown of capitalism. No doubt those who acquired millions of money at the cost of the blood spilt in the war will not willingly acquiesce in the new order of things. They, and they alone, are the people that try in every way to restore the old hated order, and drum their lamentation in the ears of those whom they vilified in the most infamous manner. They appeal for protection now whose joy knew no bounds every time a ship was

sunk, in callous disregard of the fact that hundreds of innocent women and children perished in those ships. In the same inhuman way they are now careless of the fact that such assistance to a tiny majority, which at best could only be temporary, would entail the sacrifice of many thousands of lives.

We appeal to you to take steps to arrest immediately all warlike action against us, the more so as we believe that the settlement of our own internal affairs could be left to ourselves in accordance with the principles proclaimed by you, without the international situation being thereby affected in any way. The Governing Council declares that it has no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of any other country. Therefore it feels it is entitled to ask you to stay the armed forces turned against the lives of our citizens and aimed at the overthrow of our internal order. We are ready to face all contingencies. We are ready to face the danger of our being exterminated to the last man.

The Revolutionary Governing Council of the Hungarian Soviet
Republic
GARBAI
President
KUN
People's Commissary

²³ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 263, May 5; received May 7.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/460

[Document 168]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 267

VIENNA, May 8, 1919.
[Received May 10.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that on Saturday morning I was informed by Colonel Cunningham, British Attaché here, that he had been told by M. Allizé, the French Chargé, that he had received instructions from Paris to invite the Hungarian Government to send representatives to Versailles. M. Allizé, whom I saw that evening, confirmed the information, but, having no means of his own for direct communication, the message to Bela Kun was to be conveyed by an English officer who left for Budapest that night. At the time of sending my reports on Monday I supposed that the message had been delivered. Yesterday morning I learned from Colonel Cunningham that the invitation had been held up while fresh instructions were requested from Paris and that these cancelling the previous order arrived half an hour before it was to go into effect. Meanwhile, news that Hungary was to be invited appeared in the newspapers here and in Budapest in the form of a Reuter and one or two other telegrams. In Vienna they attracted but little attention, doubtless because they were not believed. In Budapest they were immediately heralded and produced a temporary elation.

Although I have been in frequent telephonic communication with Professor Brown and have also been in touch with him by courier, I have not attempted to direct his movements, believing that he was the best judge of the situation. Feeling strongly that everything must be done to prevent massacre and that too hasty an advance of the Roumanian troops might precipitate this, he determined to try to learn their intentions and to explain the situation to those in command. He first attempted to get in touch with them at Szolnok

but failing there he went with Lieutenant Weiss to Szegedin and entered the French lines. From there he proceeded to Belgrade, sending back word through Lieutenant Weiss that Lieutenant Osborn and the yeoman with him should come to Vienna. I judge that he regarded the situation in Budapest as so critical that he wished to reduce the number of Americans there. I do not know whether he expects to return directly to Budapest or is coming here. I enclose an interesting report which Lieutenant Osborn has made out for me, and also a copy of the stiff terms which the Roumanians delivered to the Hungarians²⁴ as an answer to the request for the cessation of hostilities.

The situation is most confused and hard to judge accurately, and I am the more uncertain about it as some time has elapsed since I have had any considerable confidential communication from Professor Brown. As far as I can make out the government of Bela Kun is in a position where it could oppose little resistance to an armed advance upon Budapest. It is said that his intention is if need be to evacuate the city and withdraw towards the southwest. It is impossible to say whether his retirement and foreign occupation would or would not be followed by a massacre of some kind. The massacre is certainly possible and general disorder is at least likely, but in such situations an accident may turn the scale one way or the other and confident predictions are futile.

If foreign troops do not advance on Budapest the government which at this moment is very shaky may be able to hold its own. I believe that the invitation to send representatives to Paris if delivered would have greatly helped its prestige and strengthened its position. As it is it is still losing ground, though there is no telling what may succeed it. It is impossible to determine just how much truth and how much exaggeration there are in the current stories as to the reign of terror that now exists in Hungary, especially in regard to the treatment of the prisoners or hostages. Every sort of wild rumor is current among the refugees here, often with no foundation. I have believed so far that the situation was much less bad than most of the accounts one heard would indicate, but it is bad enough and the strain of uncertainty great upon all parties. An attempt on the part of a body of refugees to cross the border and start an insurrection has just

failed rather ignominiously. There are reports of uprisings in various parts of Hungary but they are hard to verify. The one thing that would quickly clear the situation would be an advance of foreign troops on Budapest. Without it we may expect to wait some time longer before reaching a solution.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure 1]

Lieutenant W. H. Osborn to Professor A. C. Coolidge

VIENNA, May 7, 1919.

Subject: General report on situation in Hungary.

1. I shall report first on the general condition in Budapest. The government is still exercising complete control in the city, where perfect calm and order prevails. Strict measures are being taken to prevent either counter-revolution or extreme action on the part of the terrorists. All cafes are to be closed at 8:00 P.M., all people off the streets at nine, no groups of more than three people are allowed to walk or meet together, either on the streets or in private houses. The arresting of political prisoners has been continuing. The government's promise to release all men over sixty or all sick prisoners has apparently been carried out in some cases but not in all. The prisoners are not being cared for with any great tenderness, but except in a very few instances there seems to have been no systematic brutality shown towards them. The policy of keeping watch over suspected *bourgeoisie* by means of detectives is also being largely used. An order has been issued disbanding all terror troops, known as "Lenin Boys". There is, however, a great deal of difficulty in carrying through this order. Apparently some of the terror troops in the provinces have already committed murders, and a certain amount of killing of hostages—especially in the village of Kishkurfelgyhasi where Dr. Navay was killed. As a result of some of

these unauthorized executions an order was published by Böhm, forbidding the execution of any people without proper trial, and condemning any executions that had so occurred. In the last two days the mobilization for the army has been greatly speeded up. Almost all the workmen have been called to arms except those who are working in munitions factories or those factories providing army supplies. A number of factories which were actually in operation have been closed down in the last few days and the workmen sent to the front. Especially stringent orders have been issued for former officers to report for mobilization. It seems, however, that a large number of these officers, instead of being given commands and sent to the front, have been confined to quarters in their barracks as semi-prisoners. The members of the Soviet fit for service have been mobilized. There is a possible significance in this, as it was these men who voted that the government should fight to the end last Friday and some people feel that the government wishes to get these gentlemen out of the city in order to give it freer action. There has been a general requisitioning of blankets and any other available army supplies in the city. The general attitude of the workmen mobilized is certainly not enthusiastic, although they are being shipped out of the city to the front in great numbers and without any disturbances.

The food situation in Budapest is very bad. It is almost impossible for anybody but active soldiers and certain classes of workmen to obtain meat cards, and the queues of people at the meat markets are very long. Flour is very coarse, only a small ration of fat is issued, and there is very serious shortage of milk. The peasants are refusing to send food into the city and the general feeling is that the government has overestimated the amount of food supplies that it has on hand. The chief difficulty in the situation lies in the complete uncertainty which the enemy advance has caused. It is the announced policy of the government that they accept all the nationalistic claims of the Czechs and the Roumanians, and that all they wish to do is to hold a small piece of territory which they may use to work out their communistic schemes and as a base for further propaganda. At the same time the government is using every possible armed opposition to prevent the further advance of the Roumanians, and by so doing has made strong appeal to the nationalistic sentiments of the people.

To add to this the Roumanian answer to the Hungarian request for an armistice, instead of simply stating as had been expected that they would refuse to deal with the Soviet Government showed them perfectly willing to deal with the Soviet Government, but asked for terms which were absolutely unacceptable either to Bolsheviks or to patriotic Hungarians. The result is that the state of mind of the average Hungarian seems to be about as follows: "Shall I oppose the government when Hungary is being overrun, and so weaken it further in the face of a hopeless situation, or shall I help the government hold what territory it can and, if finally the Entente declares a definite policy and reasonable boundaries for Hungary, then work for the overthrow of the Communistic regime?". This seems to be the very general dilemma among a great many conservative people with whom we have talked. Dr. Weiss reports a conversation with the stationmaster of the town of Kishkurfellgyhasi, who said that he was the captain of a large band of White Guards in that town but that as long as the situation remained as hopeless as it was he had no intention of opposing the Bolsheviks and would use his White Guard only to maintain order in the town in case the government was overthrown, but that of course if Hungarian boundaries were restored he would do what he could to overthrow the Communist government. The peasants are outspokenly opposed to the present regime. So are the majority of the more stable classes of workmen, and of course all the former bourgeois elements. But all these elements are at a loss as to what they should turn to, and the result is that there seems to be a general passive acquiescence in the action of the Bolshevik government. In the meantime the Bolshevik government is the only factor which is holding down the extremists. I think there is no doubt that Bela Kun, Kunfi and the majority of the government leaders are at heart Communists who want to carry out their system but if possible without bloodshed. But at the same time it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to hold the extremists in check.

The attitude of Professor Brown in this situation is as follows: As long as the Entente has not given out any definite policy, either of intervention or of defining the boundaries, he feels that the only possible way to avoid bloodshed in the city is to encourage as far as possible the moderate tendencies of the present government until

some decision is reached. For this reason he undertook to go to Szolnok with a verbal message from Bela Kun to the Roumanians, redefining his attitude. At the same time Professor Brown hoped to be able to carry out some form of mediation whereby if the Roumanians were going to continue their advance they could give guarantees which would enable Bela Kun to keep order in the city until they arrived. At the same time that Professor Brown went to Szolnok Bela Kun asked Prince Borghese to carry a written message to the Czechs similar to the one sent President Masaryk a few days earlier. Prince Borghese, however, declined to do this, stating that he did not feel that the message of Bela Kun represented the sentiments of Hungary and as such he felt no right to take it to the Czechs. Professor Brown being unable to cross the lines at Szolnok returned to Budapest, and the next day went to Szegedin in order to get in touch with the French, show to them the situation in Budapest and attempt to find some means of handling the situation. From Szegedin he was referred to the French Supreme Command in Belgrade, and I have not yet heard the results of his mission.

The Italian Mission has been increased by the arrival of a lieutenant-colonel, a major, two captains and a considerable staff of secretaries and orderlies. They have taken over the whole second floor of the Ritz Hotel and have at their disposal several automobiles. On Saturday the Italian colonel held a conference with Bela Kun, at which he proposed that the Czechs should enter the city of Budapest and Bela Kun should turn over the government. Bela Kun turned down this proposition, but at the same time did not entirely close negotiations with the Italians. The Italians have apparently not tried to work together with the British and American missions in Budapest but are pursuing their own policy. It looks as if they were attempting to fish in troubled waters and were taking advantage of the Entente's lack of policy in regard to Hungary in order to strengthen their own position there.

To sum up, it seems that energetic intervention in the city by either Czechs, Roumanians, or preferably French or British troops could be effective without much difficulty. With the situation as it is, however, there seems very little hope of obtaining any suitable form of government as long as the greater part of the territory inhabited

purely by Hungarians is held either by the Roumanians or Czechs. It is hard to tell whether, if the boundaries of Hungary were defined on approximately the present lines, the Bolshevik Government would submit to the situation without fighting; or whether they would attempt to drive back the Roumanians and Czechs. The morale of the people is very low, and there seems a general feeling of hopelessness on the part of the Hungarians as to how they should unscramble the egg until they have definite assurance as to where they stand.

W. H. OSBORN

[Enclosure 2]

Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge

BUDAPEST, May 4, 1919.

Subject: Interview with Bela Kun.

The question came up of my going to Szeged in order to go through the lines into territory occupied by the French. I said that I was quite ready to go, but I desired to inform myself first of all as to the actual situation here. Kun informed me that he was going up to Komoron tomorrow in order to meet the Czecho-Slovak Minister of War, an old acquaintance of his, who has always been a Socialist. He was going to talk over the situation with him.

I then asked him concerning the object of the Italian Mission to Budapest, because I hardly felt in a position to question them on the subject. He stated that they had come from General Segre with the proposition that his government should resign, and hand the town over to Czecho-Slovak troops under the command of Italian officers. I asked him on what ground they based the proposition. He said that he was a good deal in the dark, but that he had the impression that they were acting on their own initiative, and not as representing the Allies. He said that the question seemed to be involved with Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia, with Hungary as the football. I then asked him whether they mentioned the armistice as a basis for

intervention, because they might of course, allege the right to occupy the country under the terms of the armistice; and he said they did not. He expressed considerable mystification over the whole proposition. He said that he had informed them that no government could possibly exist here for a moment if it invited intervention of that sort.

I then asked him whether the door was closed on further negotiations. His reply was somewhat evasive, to the effect that he would refer the matter back to his colleagues (which he probably had already done); and that the Italians were quite free on their part to talk with anybody they wanted to here on the subject; that as matters stood now, he had no intention of carrying on further discussions. Later on, however, in our conversation, he alluded to a possibility of some conversations tomorrow with the Italians.

He stated that he had the intention of resisting by force of arms as long as possible any attempt to occupy the city. He gave me, however, the impression that the door was not absolutely closed on further negotiations with the Italians.

Kun asked me if I had heard what had happened to their ambassador in Vienna, and went on to state that Dr. Bolgar had been arrested by counter-revolutionists in the embassy, then imprisoned in the cell of a Franciscan monastery, where he lay for two days on the floor. "This gives you an idea of conditions in Vienna," he said; "we ought to be thankful that Dr. Bauer is not a Bolshevik." I asked whether Dr. Bolgar had been released, and he said yes, after considerable negotiations that he was back in the Embassy. I then asked him if the rumour was true that they had found a considerable quantity of money in the Embassy, and he said, with some embarrassment, that as a matter of fact a Commission from this government happened to be in Vienna for the purpose of purchasing rice and potatoes and other provisions from the Italians; and that they had with them for this purpose the money that was found in the Embassy. The money was to be used in purchasing Italian liras. I asked him whether the money had been returned, and he replied that he understood that it had not been returned, and that it had been handed over to Colonel Cunningham, that a British correspondent by the name of Bartlett

had been instrumental in taking this money from the Embassy. I remarked that the whole proceeding was very extraordinary.

Reverting to the question of my going to Szeged, I stated that I would be ready to go tomorrow morning, and Bela Kun suggested that I should be accompanied by a Hungarian. I replied that of course if it were agreeable to the French to have a Hungarian go through with me, I would have no objection, particularly if it were someone such as Mr. Zerkowitz. Kun hesitated and said finally he would probably need Mr. Zerkowitz tomorrow as an interpreter with the Italians. I then said that unless there was some particular reason for insisting on it, perhaps on the whole, it would be better for me to go unaccompanied rather than to give my mission the character of a Hungarian mission. Kun said that all that would be desired was that someone should accompany me up to the line of demarcation, and he indicated someone named Braun from the library. I then stated that of course it must be clearly understood that I went in no official capacity, and merely for purposes of information, and I desired especially to avoid any appearance of being what some had intimated as an emissary of this Government; but if I were to be of any service at all at this time, I must not be considered as a partisan of either side. Kun replied that he hoped that I would give information as well as take. I said certainly, that I would acquaint them with the situation here as well as ascertain what the situation was on the other side.

The conversation then turned to the subject of the general political situation here, how uncertain it was. He commented on the fact that he could not fathom the purpose of the Entente and said that if things went badly here, that the responsibility would all be on the Entente and not on him, that he had done everything in his power to avoid bloodshed and acts of terrorism. I then observed that as Bela Kun was not to be considered as an egotist, he would hardly care to put himself in the position of placing all the blame on the Entente, and not admitting the possibility of having made mistakes himself. He did not make any definite reply to this observation. Alluding to the proposed plan to resist to the end, I stated that whatever might happen at this present moment, we must judge things not by the day but by generations; that what was true in Socialism would ultimately

triumph, that we must not be too impatient. He agreed to this and said that we must try to look at things from a high plane.

After discussing some details about arrangements for the train, our interview came to an end.

²⁴ Latter not printed.

***Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C.
Coolidge²⁵***

VIENNA, 12 May, 1919.

Subject: Report concerning my mission through the French lines to Szeged and Belgrade.

1. I desire to report in detail concerning my mission through the French lines to Szeged and Belgrade, after I had failed to get through the Roumanian lines, owing to active hostilities in the neighborhood of Szolnok.
2. When the news reached Budapest on May 2d that the Roumanians were rapidly advancing, there was great excitement in government circles, and apparently a majority of the Government was in favor of resigning, in order to leave the task of maintaining order in Budapest to a kind of provisional directorium, pending the arrival of Roumanian troops. Kun Bela, however, for reasons of his own, was not ready to make such a decision, owing as I believe, to the menacing attitude of the extreme communists, and he therefore left the decision to the Council of Workmen. They, in turn, were from all accounts opposed to a policy of resistance to the end, but owing to the vehemence and noise of the extremists, finally agreed to such a policy.
3. One of the moderate members of the Government thereupon sent me a representative to state that if such a policy were followed, the gravest results would ensue. He feared a reign of terror, and made an appeal that something should be done to avert this possibility.
4. Lieutenant-Commander Freeman and I, after canvassing the situation, came to the conclusion that it would be most desirable to get in touch with the Roumanians or the French, in order to give time to make some arrangement, if possible, with the Government, that would avert a reign of terror; this in the belief that a delay of a

day or two would permit an opportunity for calmer reason to assert itself. The temperament of the Hungarian is such that he cannot sustain a tense attitude for any length of time.

Furthermore, it was quite clear that the conservative elements amongst the workmen were entirely opposed to a policy of resisting to the bitter end.

5. It also seemed urgent to Lieut.-Comdr. Freeman and myself that an attempt should be made to obtain assurances from the Roumanians or the French that in case of the occupation of the city there would be no attempt at reprisals; and that no-one would be punished for mere political acts. Assurances of this kind would be quite likely to facilitate the conservative element in their efforts to persuade the extremists and others not to resort to the last ditch policy of desperation, prompted very largely by the fear of personal vengeance.
6. I had a conference with Kun Bela on the night of Friday, the second of May, and offered my services as an intermediary. He promptly accepted, and though in a very tense state of mind, seemed to desire that I should work something along the lines indicated. He proposed that I should leave the following morning.
7. In this same interview, Kun Bela requested very insistently that Colonel Cunningham should come to Budapest—for what purpose I could not ascertain—but I was under the impression that Kun Bela desired to make Cunningham the medium of some very important communication to the Entente. Freeman and I agreed that this would be desirable, and I telephoned, as you will remember, that same night, asking that Cunningham come down at once. We had an idea that his presence at that moment of extreme tension might have a calming, reassuring effect, and enable the conservative element to revise the decision already taken to fight to the end. I greatly regret that it was impossible for him to come.
8. A special train was held waiting for me on Saturday, the third, and I proceeded with Captain Scully as my aide, to the town of Szolnok on the Theiss, that afternoon, arriving only an hour or two after the town had been evacuated by the White Guard, which had occupied the place with Roumanian assistance. Wilhelm Böhm, the Commissioner for War, accompanied me on this train, and afforded me every facility. Confidentially, I would state that he

indicated in his conversations with me that he was in no way in favor of a policy of desperation, and seemed to be in sympathy with my point of view. This was also true of his Chief of Staff, who accompanied me later to the French lines.

9. As fighting was actually going on in and around Szolnok when I arrived, it was obviously impossible to think of attempting to go through the lines. I returned to Szeged (Szolnok) to await further attempts to get in touch with the Roumanians. The next morning I was informed that these attempts had failed, and that two of the men sent out under the white flag to arrange for my passage through the lines had been fired upon and killed. I thereupon decided to return to Budapest before proceeding to the French lines, in order to inform myself directly concerning the situation, which I was informed by telephone had become complicated during my absence by the arrival of an Italian Mission.
10. I found that a Commission of four Italian officers had arrived from Vienna, with a proposition to Kun Bela on the part of General Segre that the Revolutionary Government should resign, and request the occupation of the city by Czech troops under the command of Italian officers. Kun Bela then told me that the Italian Mission did not definitely state that this proposition was authorized by the Entente. It certainly was of a character, however, to confuse the situation, and seemed to render my mission through the French lines all the more imperative.
11. I left the following morning, Monday May 5th, on a special train provided by the Government, passed through the French lines in an auto belonging to the Government, with my own chauffeur, Private Wilherd, and Lieutenant Weiss, and immediately had a conference with General Charpy, the French officer in command of that district. I made it perfectly clear to him, as I had made it clear to Kun Bela the night before, that I had not come through the lines as an emissary of the Revolutionary Government, but merely as an intermediary for "purposes of information." I endeavored to let him know the exact situation in Hungary, and particularly emphasized the fact that the delay of the Entente in defining its policy coupled with the unfortunate Roumanian advance, was fast driving Hungary into anarchy, and giving the extremists a pretext and an opportunity to adopt a policy of terrorism. General Charpy took note of all I said, stated that he would transmit it to Belgrade,

and expressed a desire that I should myself go to Belgrade. Owing to the uncertainty of the situation in Budapest, I hesitated to be absent any longer than possible, and stated to General Charpy that I felt it was unnecessary in view of the fact that he had all the information I could give.

12. On the following morning, however, Tuesday, May 6th, I received a message from General Franchet d'Esperey,²⁶ urgently requesting that I should proceed to Belgrade in order to confer with General de Lobit. I might add, by way of parenthesis, that this request was presented in a rather peremptory and discourteous fashion.
13. I thereupon sent Lieutenant Weiss back to Budapest, and proceeded with my car and Private Wilherd as chauffeur to Belgrade, accompanied by Major Ehret, of General de Lobit's staff, who was extremely courteous and of the greatest service to me en route. We were unable to cross the Danube that night, but reached Belgrade the following morning about ten o'clock, after an extremely rough, and I might add, a somewhat dangerous crossing.
14. I was taken immediately to see General de Lobit, who questioned me in detail regarding the situation. He was greatly surprised to discover that the news of Kun Bela's overthrow which had been communicated by radio from Paris, was entirely false. He was also visibly upset by the news of the Italian intrigue for the occupation of Budapest. I also repeated to him, of course, what I had already stated to General Charpy.
15. A telegram was then drafted, with my approval, for transmission to Paris and Bucharest, giving the substance of my report. General de Lobit requested that I should delay my return as long as possible, in the hope that he would have some reply from Paris which it would be desirable I should have before returning to Budapest.
16. During that day I conferred successively with Mr. Dodge, our Chargé d'Affaires; with Major Colby, the Military Attaché; with General Plunkett, the British liaison officer with the French; and with Admiral Troubridge, who has been associated with the Serbs during the war, and was placed in charge of the navigation of the Danube; giving to them all the first hand information, which they clearly lacked, concerning the exact situation in Hungary.
17. As I stated that my mission was for "purposes of information", I was able to inform myself pretty accurately as to the exact

situation as regarded the French and Roumanians; though, as a matter of fact, I learned little that I had not already inferred myself before coming through the lines.

18. It was quite evident that the French had never been authorized to favor any sort of military action against the Kun Bela Government; and furthermore, that the Roumanian advance was undertaken by the Roumanians on their own initiative without French approval. I discovered that, on the contrary, the French were greatly annoyed over the Roumanian advance, and the prospect of the occupation of Budapest by any other troops than French troops. I also discovered that the French were skeptical concerning the ability of the Roumanians to act effectively, owing to the internal situation in Roumania being far from satisfactory. I gathered also that the Serbs were in no way interested in any military movement that would compel them [*them?*] to divert forces that might be needed at this time to protect Jugo-Slavia from the Italians.
19. Responding to an urgent request of General de Lobit, I decided to delay my departure another twenty-four hours, in order to await a reply from Paris. It seemed to me desirable that I should show likewise [*myself?*] as complaisant as possible to the French in this respect, though I was very anxious to be back in Budapest. The following day, Wednesday the 7th, I had an interesting conversation with the Roumanian liaison officer in Belgrade, and endeavored to impress him with the fact that if the Roumanians had any intention of occupying Budapest, they should declare clearly their policy, and especially make it known that they would not permit any political reprisals. This officer told me that the Roumanians had no intention originally of crossing the Theiss, but that the repeated counter attacks of the Red Guard had compelled them to go on to Budapest in order to get rid of what they considered a bad neighbor.
20. No answer having come from Paris, I decided to leave that afternoon for Szeged, thus giving still further time required by my actual journey until Saturday morning for a reply to reach me at Szeged, before returning through the lines.
21. On my arrival at Szeged on Friday afternoon, May 9th, I saw General Charpy, and arranged with him that in case no word had arrived by 8:30 the following morning, that I would in all events,

proceed through the lines; as I did not feel justified in remaining longer away from Budapest.

22. The following morning, therefore, I made arrangements through the French to go through the lines; though I must confess that their procedure in this respect would not seem to me quite in good form. It was very much criticized by Major Colby, who had accompanied me from Belgrade. He was kind enough to accompany me with a friend, Captain Dardall, of the French Army, to the lines, where I found representatives of the Kun Bela Government awaiting me with a special train to convey me back to Budapest.
23. I did not find any material change in the situation in Budapest, except to learn that the Roumanians had proposed an impossible armistice, which Kun Bela had promptly rejected, and thereby somewhat increased his own prestige; that of his Government; and at the same time greatly stimulated the fiery extremists. It was quite evident to all that the Roumanians had started something that they were unable to finish; and that they did not have sufficient troops at their disposal for the task of capturing and occupying Budapest and the rest of the country. I found also on my arrival the Italians were still there and carrying on negotiations on a variety of subjects; such as the sale of provisions, and the protection of people from Fiume, etc. I was informed that they had not dropped their proposition for the occupation of Budapest although they did not seem to be pressing it with any insistence.
24. I had a long conference with Kun Bela on Saturday night, the 10th of May, and limited my report on my mission merely to stating that I had nothing definite whatever to bring back to him. He was most courteous, expressing great appreciation of all I had done, and added significantly that whatever might happen, he would always feel doubly grateful for what he termed my fair-minded attitude.
25. During the course of this conversation, my previous impression was confirmed that as a matter of fact Kun Bela was not really in favor of a policy of resistance to the bitter end, but that his relations with the extremists quite rendered it impossible for him to appear for one moment as in favor of foreign intervention. He seemed to be doing all in his power to keep the extremists under

control, pending a decision by the Entente as to its policy in Hungary.

26. I wish to emphasize most strongly this point, because I still believe that a definite, firm policy by the Entente, exercised in a proper manner, would compel the existing government in Budapest to accept the inevitable, and give no real pretext or an opportunity for the terrorists to carry out their policy.
27. I cannot, however, conceal my grave concern over the situation, because it has become quite apparent to me that with the best of intentions, it is quite impossible for Kun Bela to restrain the more vicious members of the Red Guard. Instance after instance has come to my attention of grave excesses, horrible summary executions; done I am sure without either the approval or cognizance of Kun Bela; which, however, he was unable to prevent. He spoke of his difficulties, of his ceaseless efforts to punish the guilty. The fact remains nevertheless that a progressive demoralization is rapidly going on, and many innocent people are suffering and are in grave danger. I must again repeat that the failure of the Entente to define clearly its policy is precipitating a state of anarchy.
28. There was a strong possibility, and I might add, even a probability that the Kun Bela Government might have been transformed into a moderate Socialistic regime had it not been for the Roumanians' advance. If the Entente had only been able to act on the suggestion originally made by General Smuts, and urged most earnestly by me, that the Kun Bela Government be permitted to send representatives to meet representatives of the Entente, I am quite certain that this would have afforded the one dignified and acceptable manner of exit for Kun Bela himself personally; who in this manner would have been able to help transform the government and to retire eventually from the government. It is a matter of most profound regret and disappointment to me that this could not have been accomplished, and in all probability the present deplorable situation have been avoided.
29. The only possible alternative now, it appears to me, is the military occupation of Hungary in conformity with the terms of the armistice, and for the purpose of providing the people of Hungary a chance to express themselves without further fear of a dictatorship of any sort. I am sure you will recognize that no one

could have gone further than I did in giving Kun Bela and his associates many of whom are moderate and life-long socialists, all benefits of the doubt, and to encourage them in every possible way in their evident policy of eliminating the extremists and converting the government into a more or less moderate Socialistic regime. I have not attempted to palliate in any way the abuses and excesses committed under this regime. My own personal policy, as I think you realize, in the absence of any decision by the Entente, either to intervene or to take any action whatever, was merely to try and help tide over a very dangerous situation, in order to avoid the excesses and the reign of terror which I now feel is actually developing most rapidly.

30. Having done all that I could in this respect, without success, and having in the process placed myself in a more or less embarrassing situation; it seemed to me most undesirable that I should remain in Budapest any longer. This conclusion was particularly imposed by the fact that as a mere mission of observation, it is impossible, under present conditions in Budapest, to remain as the silent spectators of dreadful events, without authority to act, or power to continue to exercise a really effective restraining influence.
31. Finally, it seemed to me that I now could be of most service, if after my trip through the French lines, I should proceed to confer with you in Vienna, and then, with your approval, to go directly to Paris to report in person at the earliest possible moment. The necessity of some decision by the Entente, is at this very moment so imperative that it is possible that I might be of some special service in Paris, rather than continue to remain here. I now hold myself, therefore, ready to leave at the earliest possible moment, if you think it desirable.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP BROWN

²⁵ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 277, May 12; received May 22.

²⁶ Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the East.

Jugoslavia

[\[170\] Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge](#)

Laibach, 16 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/32

[\[171\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, February 27, 1919. [Received 10:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/157: Telegram

[\[172\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, March 2, 1919. [Received March 5.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/166

[\[173\] Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge](#)

Fiume, 15 March, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/216

[174] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, March 16, 1919. [Received March 19.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/218

[175] Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Agram, March 19, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[176] Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge

[Spalato, March 20 (?), 1919.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/256

[177] Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Spalato, 29 March, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/295

[178] Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Agram, May 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/499

***Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A.
C. Coolidge²⁷***

Report No. 1

LAIBACH, 16 January, 1919.

Report on conditions in Slovenia (Yugo-Slavia).

General situation.

1. The outstanding interest of the government and people of Slovenia is in the question of the new frontiers, especially the Italian-Jugoslav frontier. This was impressed on me by the Slovenian Provisional President when I was presented to him at a meeting of the government authorities (Jan. 13th), and has been the leading topic of everyone I have met since then.
2. The cardinal point in the frontier question, in their minds, is Trieste. They want Trieste, and do not mean to give it up if urgent representation of their case, and propaganda, can save it.
3. I can discover here no rift in the Yugo-Slav unity. The Slovenes seem to take it as a matter of course that the union will be consolidated and preserved. What political opposition exists to the principles of the Declaration of Corfu seems to take the form of preferring a republican to a monarchical form of government, but not the form of opposing in any way the close union of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. External conditions now existing constrain all parties to lean on the strength of the Serbian Government. Questions of "States Rights", of proportional representation between the different peoples, and their mutual jealousies are not so far in evidence. To what extent this is brought about by the external pressure of the Italian occupation of part of their territory, and by the grasping aspiration of all their neighbors, it is impossible to say;

but it is certain that at this moment the Slovenes are looking out and not in—and looking especially at the Italians.

4. For the rest, the general situation presents no very salient points. The Serbs are in occupation of the region with about 2,000 of their own men and about 6,000 Slovene troops. The people are quiet. In Laibach and the surrounding country there is sufficient food, although I am told that there is little in reserve. Excellent meals are served in the hotels at an average price of 25 kronen a plate. Eggs, bread, sugar, cakes, spirits and meats are to be had at the hotels. Ration cards are supposed to be issued, but the system has broken down, and I have seen none in use. There is very little begging on the streets. There is no proportionally large number of unemployed, and no apparent discontent.

Frontier Question.

.....

6. The crux of the Slovene aspiration is Trieste or rather Trieste and the railroad junction of Villach (110 kilometers to the north). They base their claim to Trieste on several grounds, historical, national, economic, geographic, etc. The essence of their claim, and by far their strongest point, is that the entire hinterland, beginning even with the outlying districts of the city, is Slovene. Trieste is, they say, merely a small Italian commercial foothold in a Slovene land. They admit that the majority of the population of the city is Italian, but claim that the latter have to a large extent been artificially introduced, and they contest the population proportion given in the Austrian census of 1910 as having been established by Austrian officials of Italian birth or tendencies. On the economic and geographical side, they point out that Italy does not need Trieste, having many good ports of her own. Fiume, on the other hand, will not do for the Jugo-Slavs as a substitute for Trieste, because it is an open roadstead, very difficult to make into a good harbor, as the shore shelves off into deep water close to the beach; and also because the entire coast line of the Gulf of Fiume is swept by “bora” at certain seasons of the year. Trieste, on the contrary, is an improved and excellent harbor.

7. The question of the railroad junction of Villach seems to resolve itself into this—Villach is a junction of 5 single line railroads, the two northern ones running to Bavaria and German-Austria. The Jugo-Slavs claim that if the Italians hold Villach they can cut off the Slovene port of Trieste from the Bavarian and Austrian trade routes. This argument is sound for the Bavarian trade route, but hardly so for the Austrian. What they do not say, but what is obvious, is that, with both Trieste and Villach in Jugo-Slav hands, Italian competition for through Austrian trade would labor under great disadvantage. The relationship of Villach to Trieste can, I think, be expressed in this way—

- (1) If Trieste is Slovene,
 - (a) and Villach is Slovene: Italian through trade with Austria is put under heavy disadvantage.
 - (b) and Villach is Italian: Slovene through trade with Bavaria is penalized, and possibly killed.
- (2) If Trieste is Italian,
 - (a) and Villach is Italian: Slovene through trade with Bavaria is killed, and Slovene through trade with Austria is penalized.
 - (b) and Villach is Slovene: Trieste would be so shut in that it could not live as a port.

8. While emphasizing the economic side of the Villach Question, the Slovenes also insist that the Villach region is racially Slovene, as shown by the Austrian census of 1910, and that there are no Italians near there.

9. As to Villach going to the Austrians, the Slovene contention is that the same situation would arise as if it were Italian. This contention is based on the strong Slovene conviction that the Germans (including the Austrians) and Italians are coming together after the war, at least economically and commercially. This conviction colors a great deal of their ideas about the frontier question, and leads them to regard the Italians and Germans as a potentially united enemy. They claim, as an example, that the bands of Austro-Germans now operating in Carinthia are armed by the Italians.

10. As to the peninsula of Istria, they say little, since the Slavs there are mostly Croats and not Slovenes; but the general contention is that the Italians live only in the coast towns, and that the peninsula is almost entirely Jugo-Slav.

11. The northern Slovene border, running through the provinces of Carinthia and Styria, is drawn by the Slovenes largely on the racial basis, though in some places, notably north of Villach and Radkersburg, they push the boundary somewhat to the north, on economic grounds, claiming that they must include territory economically dependent on the Slovene valleys to the immediate south.

12. It is significant that in the many talks I have had with Slovene authorities they have never mentioned the "corridor" running up to Czecho-Slovakia, in spite of the fact that this corridor is supposed to connect their country with the latter. When I asked them about the project, they showed little real interest in it, and their unspoken attitude seems to be that it is a matter which concerns the people without a sea-coast (the Czecho-Slovaks), and they propose to let the latter do the worrying.

13. The last point to be noted about the proposed Slovene frontier is their claim to a corner of old Italy (Italy of 1914), north and east of the town of Cividale. This claim is based on racial grounds. The Slovenes admit that the land claimed is economically dependent on the Italian centers in the lower valleys, and the claim is probably advanced for bargaining purposes only.

14. Of the two frontiers, Austrian and Italian, the Slovenes emphasize the latter, not only because it touches on land more important to them, but also because they are more incensed by the Italian attitude towards them than by the Austrian. The present difficulties with Austria, in Carinthia, they regard as a matter of minor warfare, carried on by more or less irresponsible bands of ex-Austrian soldiers and Bolsheviks. Though they think these bands are being recruited from Vienna, they are more disturbed by the report (which they believe) that they are being armed by the Italians. Against the Italian occupation of Istria and western Slovenia they have

numerous complaints. They object in principle to the Italian occupation of the line of demarcation of the Treaty of London (1915)²⁸ on the grounds that they (the Slovenes) were then a subject people of the Hapsburgs, and had no voice in the matter. They state that the Italians have issued a proclamation requiring all ex-Austrian soldiers (including, of course, the Slovenes) now in Italy or in the territory occupied by Italian troops, to enter the Italian Army. They complain of all sorts of Italian subterfuges, repressions and requisitions in the occupied territory, and sum it up by saying that the Italian attitude towards the Slovenes is that of an active enemy.

Government.

15. Under the Austrian regime, the Slovene, Croatian and Dalmatian deputies to the Viennese Reichsrat were elected by a liberal suffrage of the people. These deputies formed a Jugo-Slav club in Vienna. When the Austrian debacle came this club united itself to the Croatian Parliament in Agram, and formed the Jugo-Slav Provisional Government. The latter appointed the Provisional Slovene Government, consisting [of] a president (Mr. Josef Pogacnik) and 12 “commissioners”. The large majority of this government are men who have been deputies in the Viennese Reichsrat or the local assemblies, and it is therefore very representative.

16. According to a very recent agreement made in Belgrade, the Slovene Provisional Government will be reduced to 7 Commissioners—the President and two representatives from each of the three political parties (see below). This reorganization will take place shortly.

17. There are in Slovenia three political parties—(1) the People’s, or Clerical, Party, which is conservative, and which is so far much the strongest as it consists largely of the agricultural population; (2) The Liberal Party, which so far has had but one deputy in Vienna; and (3) the Social-Democrat Party, which has not yet attained any considerable power.

18. The only point to be noted about party politics in Slovenia is that the matter is now completely in abeyance. Political interest is

centered in the establishment of the frontier, and the Provisional Government seems to satisfy the political needs of the moment.

19. The local mayors and magistrates are continuing to function, and the police power is exercised through the military.

Military Situation.

20. The military force of Slovenia consists of about 2,000 Serbian troops and about 6,000 hastily raised Slovene troops. The whole force is under a Serbian general, Smiljanic, and is officered by Serbian officers or Slovene (ex-Austrian) officers in Serbian uniforms. The government states that they have only about 4,000 rifles and some 24 cannon in all, and very little ammunition. They have fallen heir to some Austrian equipment (at least one aeroplane), but claim that the Italians got most of it by their occupation.

21. Roughly speaking, the 8,000 men are divided as follows—2,000 on the Styrian front, 4,000 on the Carinthian and 2,000 on the Italian. But these figures include all men garrisoning the country, policing the towns and otherwise in the rear.

22. The whole military organization is very hasty and irregular.

23. The fighting which has been going on in Carinthia, up to the truce of January 14th, was apparently very irregular sort of work conducted by small bands.

Internal and Economic Conditions.

24. There are no internal questions in Slovenia in any way in the foreground at the present time. This is the salient point—that there are potential questions of politics and economics, but that they are in abeyance pending the frontier settlement, and nothing but a food shortage is likely to bring them to the front.

25. The country is largely agricultural. From what one can judge by driving through a small part of it in a motor, by the food one gets in the country and in this town, and by the general look of both villages and towns, there is no shortage of food at present, and the people are

as contented as could be expected under actual conditions. Their mental attitude seems to be one of rejoicing over new-found liberty, and the one rift in their cloud of happiness is the compression on the Italian and Austrian frontiers.

26. Prices have, of course, gone up. Flour which sold before the war at 40 hellers a Kilo now brings from 15 to 20 kronen. But the Slovene government sets aside 800,000 kronen a month to purchase flour so that it may be re-sold at moderate prices to the poor. The fact that a large number of excellent shops keep open in Laibach is an indication that there is considerable money in circulation.

27. The Commissioner for Social Welfare states that there are about 10,000 unemployed laborers in the country (a fraction of one per cent of the population). Beginning January 1st, these men have been paid by the state at the rate of two and a half kronen a day, plus one kronen a day for a wife or child. This, it is estimated, will cost the state about 300,000 kronen a month.

28. There are also about 7,000 refugees (including 580 orphan children) from the Italian and Austrian occupations.

29. Bolshevism might be a serious problem in Slovenia in case of a famine, but hardly under any other circumstances at the present time. The doctrine is being introduced into the country (though not to any large extent) by returned prisoners from Russia and by sailors. There is no discernible propaganda coming in from the Bolshevik government in Russia. The agricultural population and the strong hold of the Catholic Church in Slovenia are conservative barriers against Bolshevism. Not only is the Church strong through the religious nature of the people, but the priesthood is said to be very good and the Archbishop of Laibach an exceptional man.

30. The economic situation is rendered difficult by the Italian occupation and the Austrian pressure. Both the Italian and the Austrian frontiers are practically closed to the Slovenes. The most earnest complaint is made against the Italians' occupation as a blockade cutting off the country. What manufactories exist here lack lubricating oils, special kinds of coal and raw materials.

31. Still, the basic fact is that the country is agricultural, and has, for the present at least, sufficient seed, labor and live stock. Damaging and unjust as may be the Italian and Austrian blockades, they do not appear to influence seriously the economic situation at present.

Monetary Situation.

32. The situation is this—There are three forms of paper currency in circulation in Jugo-Slavia at present,—the Austrian kronen, the Roumanian lei and the Serbian dinar. The Jugo-Slav government naturally wants to establish a national monetary system, based on one unit, as soon as possible. They do not consider it advisable to accomplish this immediately, but they do consider it necessary to take the first steps at once. These are the determination of the amount of paper kronen and lei now in circulation in the country, and the prevention of any further flooding of Jugo-Slavia by this currency.

33. Since the Austrian kronen (and I presume the Roumanian lei) are very much inflated beyond what their gold reserve should support; since the Jugo-slav government cannot well avoid eventual assumption of so much of this paper as is now in the hands of their own people; and since, finally, the foreign exchange of Jugo-slavian currency will be directly affected by the amount of inflated paper it carries, the present move of the government to determine that amount and to prevent its being increased appears sound.

34. The means employed by the government to determine the amount has been the monetary decree referred to in my telegram of January 13th.* The stamping of the kronen and lei is being done by banks and commissions.

35. As the stamps used for this purpose can be easily counterfeited, they will probably issue Jugo-slav currency in exchange for the stamped paper as soon as the total amount of the latter now in the country has been determined. The stamped paper will simultaneously be called in and eliminated. The provisional currency will be used in the country until it is converted into Serbian dinars at

the rate of exchange established at the time of conversion. Thus the dinar will eventually be the monetary unit for all of Jugo-Slavia.

36. The Provisional President of the Slovenian Government told me (January 13th) that he did not believe any further steps were contemplated before the peace settlement. Later information (contained in the foregoing paragraph) indicates, however, that this statement was not intended to mean that the stamped kronen and lei are to be used as currency for any length of time (for reasons given above).

37. The general impression here is that they must go slowly in this matter, and only take the steps which are immediately necessary at this time. But of course the final decision on all these points rests with the Central Government in Belgrade, and no one here is in a position to make a binding statement.

Calendar.

38. The adoption of the Gregorian calendar by the Serbians is expected soon. It will probably not be made until after St. Siva's day (January 14th), for religious reasons.

Attitude towards the United States.

39. In every way, both by word and deed, the government and the people emphasize their almost pathetic confidence in the United States as their champion at Paris. They constantly refer to President Wilson and his doctrines, and believe that their national claims and their national security, like those of other small states, can only be gained if these doctrines are accepted and carried out as the basis of the peace settlement.

SHERMAN MILES

²⁷ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 37, January 22.

²⁸ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915*; a translation from the *Izvestia* which was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Russia on December 5, 1917, is printed in [Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 497](#).²⁹

^{*} See “Annex E”, attached, an English translation of this decree. [Footnote in the original; annex E and telegram of January 13 not found in Department files.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/157: Telegram

[Document 171]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

VIENNA, February 27, 1919.
[Received 10:10 p.m.]

114. Reason for thinking Italy is encouraging Croatian Separatist movement. See annex 4th, report 110.^{[29](#)} Doubt the rumor of Hungarian encouragement. Hungary at this time eager to get into touch with Serbia and come to an understanding presumably against Roumanians. Hungarian food agent in Trieste will try to do this or attempt may be made here. Am investigating subject and sending men to Agram.

COOLIDGE

^{[29](#)} Annex 4, a report by C. M. Storey, is printed on p. 394 [*Pg. 394 includes portions of [Doc. 146](#) and [Doc. 147](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/166

[Document 172]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 116

VIENNA, March 2, 1919.
[Received March 5.]

Sirs: I have the honor to inclose herewith a number of extracts from reports sent me by Lieutenant Leroy King who is at present in Agram.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure 1—Extract]

Extracts From Reports of Lieutenant L. R. King

REPORT NO. 2, FEBRUARY 22D.

The Jugo-Slav Government has to consider:

1. The unity of Jugo-Slavia.
2. The effect on Jugo-Slavia as a whole (with relation to the Entente) of any unreasonable or extreme territorial claims by any one of its component states.

These two considerations are being constantly balanced, the tendency is to consider the effect on the Entente as of the first importance. Also, the Serbs and Croats do not care a bit about the special claims and wishes of the Slovenes. They care much more about Jugo-Slavia, and most about their own particular claims. I think, however, that the Serbs are much more reasonable and wise

about the Banat than are the Slovenes about Carinthia. The Serbs are a disciplined people, and are not inflamed by wild optimism.

The Jugo-Slav State is still so unformed and new that the Slovenes and Croatians go ahead and do what they like, and then refer back to Belgrade for support if they need it, and become furious if they don't get it. Conversely, (Johnson, a British Secretary of Legation here whom I used to know in Paris, tells me) the Slovenes and Croats will not obey orders sent out from Belgrade unless they feel like it. The Jugo-Slav Government needs recognition by the Entente (not merely the U. S. A.) in order to have the prestige and power to control the Croats and Slovenes.

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[Enclosure 2]

Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 6

BELGRADE, February 24, 1919.

Military situation.

1. Colonel Kafalatovitch, Chief of Operations of the Siberian Army, has given me the following information which I have supplemented from other sources to a small extent.
2. The Serbian Army is now the instrument of the Jugo-Slav Provisional Government, as the Serbian Government proper has been merged with the Jugo-Slav Government. The Jugo-Slav Government is still unrecognized by the Entente and has been in existence for such a short time that it is not yet a strong organization, while the Serbian Army is victorious and has much prestige. So the Serbian Staff run the army in all details. They do not even know whether they ought yet to call it the Jugo-Slav Army, but they use the army as the Provisional Government directs.
3. About two weeks ago the Serbian Staff took actual command of all the different Jugo-Slav forces, and it is now gradually and by

degrees exercising this control. Up to two weeks ago the Slovenes and Croatian forces were under the command of a staff at Agram, composed mostly of officers of Jugo-Slav blood and loyalty who had been in the Austrian Army during the war. It was this staff that appointed General Maester, who was not under the control of the Serbian Staff at the time of the shooting affray in Marburg.

4. The Serbian General at Laibach was sent there in the first instance as a “délégué” and advisor; and took command of the various Slovene contingents only two weeks ago. He now commands all the forces in that country. There have been two battalions and three batteries of Serbian troops under his command in Slovenia for some time; but these, Kafalatovitch affirms, have been always kept “in reserve”.
5. The Slovene troops, under officers appointed from Agram (like Maester) have been acting independently of the Serbs. Now that all troops in Slovenia and Croatia are under Serbian military command, backed by the Provisional Jugo-Slav Government, Kafalatovich says they will be controlled to a greater and greater extent as time goes on, though he admits that the problem is difficult owing to the rather vague power of the Provisional Government. The prestige of the Serbian officers will counterbalance the tendency on the part of the Slovene and Croatian officers and soldiers to pay little attention to a government which up to now is more of an idea than an actual power. Serbian officers are being constantly sent out to the various units.
6. There are about 10,000 troops in Slovenia, of which 800 men (2 battalions) and 1 field and 2 mountain batteries are Serbian. The rest are purely Slovene with the exception of a “régiment” (numbers probably small) created by the Slovenes out of returned Serbian prisoners of war, who were sent to Slovenia (or went there themselves) from Austria after the armistice. A larger proportion of these 10,000 troops are along the Italian line of occupation than on the Austrian frontier; and many are guarding lines of communication, or doing police work.
7. Kafalatovitch issued an order yesterday to the Serbian command in Slovenia to take the greatest care not to make reprisals against the Austrians, nor to make any hostile preparations. (This was the result of Dodge’s³⁰ action on your telegram). He denies absolutely

that any offensive is contemplated; and further says that all shooting across the line has been done by the Austrians. He may have been misinformed by the Slovenes commanders who still are acting more or less independently, but he certainly is speaking the truth as far as he knows it. He is well aware of the necessity for keeping the armistice. The Serbian Staff will do all they can to stop offensive action of any kind; but they are under difficulties as they have not yet got complete control.

8. I learn from Kafalatovitch that the Bulgars are making preparations on the Macedonian front by organizing bands of from 100 to 200 men, whom they are expected to send across the provisional frontier in the spring, for the purpose of sowing discord among the Macedonian population and turning it against the Serbs. They are stated to be in close understanding with the Italians who have a general and troops at Sofia, and who are everywhere trying to hamper the Jugo-Slav State. The Italians allow Bulgarian soldiers to be transported in Italian motor-trucks back along their lines of communication into Albania. The Italians are doing all they can to inflame the Albanians against the Serbs, and trouble is expected in that quarter. Information is very meagre, but General Plunkett, the English officer attached to the Serbian General Staff, with whom I have consulted, thinks there is much truth in the above statements with regard both to Bulgaria and Albania. He says Italy is striving to wreck Jugo-Slavia in every direction, and that she ought to be "sat on".
9. The Italians, so Dodge tells me, have just sent 30 officers to Laibach, each officer having 10 "orderlies". They give no particular reason for their presence and the Slovenes are excited and suspicious. They say that under the armistice they have a right to go anywhere in "Austria-Hungary" which also annoys the Slovenes. I also hear that Italians have appeared in Marburg, giving the same reason for their presence there.
10. General Plunkett informs me that the Italians recently proposed (at Fiume) that an Allied Commission of officers composed of British, French, Serbian, etc., but headed by an Italian should open and operate the railway from Fiume to Agram and Budapest. This means the Italians would control it and could bring up some of their troops on the slightest pretext. I believe the proposal has been rejected.

11. The Italians are choking Croatia by their occupation of Fiume, and are doing everything to cause discontent and trouble, both there and in Slovenia. They are determined to break up Jugo-Slavia if they can.
12. This is the view of the general situation I get here. Communications are very bad and the unorganized condition of Jugo-Slavia so acute that it is difficult to separate important incidents from small ones; but from a combination of what I hear I am sure I have given in general an accurate impression.

L. R. KING

FEB. 25.

13. It is stated that the Bulgars have at present 90,000 men who are equipped and ready for action at short notice. It is also said that the Italians are fostering and helping this force. I think the number must be greatly exaggerated.
14. The telegraphic communication is cut between Belgrade and Trieste, presumably stopped by the Italians.

³⁰ H. Percival Dodge, special agent of the Department of State in Serbia since June 28, 1917.

Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 16

FIUME, 15 March, 1919.

Sent, by direction, straight to Paris, because of direct courier service.^{[31](#)} One copy sent to Professor Coolidge, Vienna.

Subject: Fiume (supplementing my report No. 15, of March 9th^{[32](#)}).

1. Since writing report No. 15, I have spent another week in Fiume and Pola, and have been able to get more extensively the views of the "Independence Party" in Fiume and of ex-officers of the Austrian Navy, as well as of the two extreme parties (Italians and Jugo-Slavs).
2. The salient feature in the Fiume situation is the desire of the people for a more or less autonomous form of government. The degree of autonomy proposed varies from the complete independence under international guarantee, which is the desire of many Fiumans, to the limited form of a "free port" under the mandatory of either Italy or Jugoslavia. The point is that apparently no one, except the national propagandists who have no local interests, desires the absolute incorporation of Fiume into either the Italian or the Jugo-Slav state. So far as I can determine, this desire for local autonomy is founded, not so much on the traditions of the past (though Fiume has always been more or less independent), but on economic considerations. The fear in the mind of everyone interested is that the port will be starved if given over entirely to one state or the other. The local desire of the people concerned therefore accords with the economic factor in the problem of Fiume, for the prosperity of the port will be the measure of its economic usefulness to the hinterland which it serves.

3. It is significant that the “Independent Party” (the Fiumans who want complete local autonomy) prefer the Yugoslav to the Italian flag. Their stand is—complete independence if possible, but anything rather than Italian government. They are convinced that, under Italy, even under mandatory as a “free port”, the trade would greatly diminish—which is the same thing as saying that Fiume could not long be the port of Yugoslavia and Hungary.
4. There is in Fiume a Scotchman, a director in a large shipping firm, who has lived here 36 years and is thoroughly informed on all economic questions both of Fiume and of the Dalmatian coast. This gentleman keeps out of politics altogether. I went to see him, and asked him if he would discuss the commercial situation with me. This he agreed to do, in confidence. His views are that there can be no commercial future for Fiume under the Italian flag, even if guaranteed as a “free port”. Under the Yugoslav flag, he thinks that politics would continue to disturb the commercial situation, but that the port of Fiume could continue to serve Yugoslavia and the lands beyond. He dwells on the fact that it is Yugoslavia and Hungary that Fiume serves, and not Italy (except as a port of export for lumber going to Italy). If Fiume became Italian, Italy would have neither the means nor the desire to foster its trade, while Yugoslavia would have the strongest reasons for building up Spalato as quickly as possible and for shifting the trade there. He says that before the war Spalato was already taking some of the trade from Fiume, and that it is capable of taking much more when developed and connected by railroads with the interior. But this development will take some time; and while it is being done Fiume is necessary for Yugoslavia if that state is to thrive commercially. After Spalato is developed, Fiume will still thrive, he thinks, on through trade and on trade built up deliberately with the view of discounting the Spalato competition. Like all Fiumans outside of the nationalistic cliques, his real desire is to see Fiume completely independent of both Italy and Yugoslavia, under international guarantee.
5. The contentions of the leading pro-Italians in Fiume are interesting. They may be summarized (with the Yugoslav counter-arguments) as follows:
 - a) The pro-Italians minimize the importance of the Hungarian trade. They say that Fiume was independent of this trade, and

can so remain. They say that the Hungarian export trade fell off very considerably in the years before the war. This the Jugoslavs deny. The pro-Italians say that the imports into Hungary before the war were considerable, but they cannot see any hope of reviving this trade in the near future because of the poverty of Hungary. Since these same people also minimize the importance of the Croatian trade, their contention would seem to amount to a denial of the commercial future of Fiume, in which the pro-Jugoslavs agree with them if the port is to be under the Italian flag.

- b) The pro-Italians emphasize the point that Venice, Trieste and Fiume complete each other. Ships going to one port complete their deliveries or their cargoes at the others. Fiume without Trieste, they contend, would have a very hard time. Hence the importance of having all three ports under the same flag. To this the pro-Jugoslavs reply that large ships usually have to call at several ports anyway, and that the argument is really on their side, since only by separating Fiume from Trieste administratively can competition be stimulated.
- c) While the pro-Italians wish Fiume to go to Italy, they insist that it should be a “free port”, since only in this way, they think, can it serve the trade of the hinterland. In this the pro-Jugoslavs agree with them, except that they say that it can never be free under Italy, but only under Yugoslavia. Both sides dwell on the intolerance of the other—and personally I am inclined to agree with both. Certainly the present Italian policy, all along the Istrian and Dalmatian coast is not only intolerant but almost openly hostile towards the Jugoslavs, and not much more can be said for the liberality of the other side.
- d) The pro-Italians admit that much of the property in Fiume is owned by the Croats, but contend that this is because the latter have made money during the war and have been able to buy up property. The pro-Jugoslavs say that the Croats have always owned a large part of the property, and that they have not, proportionately, made more money during the war than have the Italian traders. Both sides cite incidences of men on the other side who have made a great deal of money out of the war. The truth seems to be that the Italians here are mostly the small traders and shop-keepers. Most of the banking and shipping

property is in the hands of the Hungarian banks, but the Croats own much more of it than do the Italians.

e) The pro-Italians say that the Hungarians are now selling out their interests in Fiume to the Italians. The pro-Jugoslavs fear that negotiations to this effect are now on, but contend that this has nothing to do with the case. The Hungarian banks, largely in the hands of Jews, are anxious to sell their Fiume property because they fear that it is going to Italy and will be lost commercially.

6. As I pointed out in report No. 15, the officers of the former Austrian Navy are probably the best judges as to the question of a Yugoslav port lower down the coast to replace Fiume. These men are relatively impartial and they have an intimate knowledge of the coast. When the question is raised, all of them I have so far met strike first on the hard facts of the case—that Fiume, while a small harbor, is nevertheless a prepared port, with loading facilities, railroad connections, repair shops and even a plant capable of building the largest ships, and that there is no other harbor on the Dalmatian coast having anything like these advantages, nor the possibility of having them in the near future. The opinion seems to be unanimous that Spalato, or more properly speaking the large body of water called “Canale Castelli” west of Spalato, is the only place at which a Yugoslav port to replace Fiume could be built. The harbor of Spalato itself is too small for any great commerce; but I have found some ex-Austrian naval officers who are strong believers in the future possibilities of Canale Castelli. They say that the “bora” is not so strong there, and it can be controlled by breakwaters built at relatively moderate expense, and that the extent of the harbor and depth of the water are ideal for a great commercial port. It also has a certain amount of coal (medium grade) in the vicinity. Against these advantages must be set the great difficulties of railroad construction into the interior, across the Dinaric Alps. Fiume has comparatively easy rail access to the upper valley of the Save, and through that valley it can serve most of Yugoslavia and Hungary. This is of course the outstanding feature of the economic situation so far as Yugoslavia is concerned — that Fiume is prepared to serve as a port and that there is no other in sight for many years to come, and then only after great expense has been incurred. The Italians are always inconsistent in

their contention that Yugoslavia is financially incapable of running Fiume and at the same time proposing that the Yugoslavs go to the enormous expense of building a new port at Spalato.

7. I append hereto (Annex “A”³³ —1 copy only) arguments presented by several of the leading pro-Yugoslav merchants of the town. The point brought out by them that nationality in Fiume is poorly defined is certainly true. I have run into numerous cases in which families were divided. In fact the leading men of the opposing sides are father and son. I also think that the writers of this paper are correct in saying that the Hungarian authorities favored the Italians over the Yugoslavs and, to a certain extent, artificially Italianized the town. They are certainly right in saying that the commercial interests of the port by far outweigh the question of self-determination of the town. Their point that the hinterland which the port serves is Slav and Magyar, and not Italian, is of course an established fact. Their interferences [*sic*] that the port should therefore go with its hinterland, and that Italy wishes only to starve it for the benefit of Trieste, appear to be difficult contentions for the Italians to answer. The estimate of the writers that it would take 30 years to develop Spalato to the point of being able to replace Fiume as the port of Yugoslavia, is, of course, merely an estimate, based on unknown financial conditions of the future. It is undoubtedly true, however, that much money and time would be necessary for the development of Spalato; and I believe that it is also true that the Ogulin-Knin railroad has more of a strategic than commercial importance. Their last point, that 70% of the capital invested in local enterprises, especially in shipping, is Yugoslav, is probably an exaggeration; but it is certainly true that there is much more Croatian capital invested, and much more Croatian management involved, than Italian.

.....

Geographic and Strategic Considerations as to Frontier.

11. If Fiume is made a free port under Yugoslav mandatory (which I believe is by far the best solution, short of complete internationalization), the Yugoslav-Italian frontier should certainly be run at least as far west as the Tschitschen Boden, (or Mt. della

Vena), those sharply defined and barren hills which cut across the northeastern corner of Istria. Any frontier nearer to Fiume than these hills would give the port no “breathing space”, and would cut off one of its two railroad lines into the interior. If strategy must be considered as a factor in the frontier question, the Tschitschen Boden is even less than the minimum necessary for the protection of Fiume. From this point of view the line should be drawn somewhat below (southwest of) the crest of the Tschitschen Boden, since an Italian foothold on the crest would mean direct observation over the Gulf of Fiume and consequent ability to bombard the port; while Jugoslavian possession of the crest, at least as far northwestward as the Brest–Danne–Vodice road, would not by any means give the Jugoslavs corresponding advantages over Trieste or Pola. The Tschitschen Boden is, in other words, the last defence of Fiume, and the capture of almost any point on its crest along the elbow west of Fiume might well make the port untenable (a situation very similar to 203 Meter Hill at Port Arthur). On the other hand, the Tschitschen Boden is not necessary to the defence of Trieste or Pola. (Save in the sense that it does control a portion of the Trieste–Pola railroad).

12. From the geographical point of view the frontier line I should suggest would begin on the south at that point of land on the Canale di Farasina, about 3 kms, southeast of the village of Fianona, thence north along the watershed through Mt. Maggiore (1396 meters), thence north along the watershed of the Tschitschen Boden to some point near the village of Matteria, thence northward over watersheds (so far as possible) between the Gulf of Trieste and the Laibach–Fiume railroad; as shown on accompanying map of Istria.^{[34](#)}
13. If strategical considerations must be taken into account, I believe that the above line should be modified by pushing that part of it that runs along the Mt. Maggiore spur and the Tschitschen Boden, an average of about 4 kms to the southwest of the watershed, as shown on accompanying map of Istria.

SHERMAN MILES

³¹ Received on March 21.

³² Not printed.

³³ Not printed.

³⁴ Map not reproduced.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/218

[Document 174]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 146

VIENNA, March 16, 1919.
[Received March 19.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith some reports and annexes sent me from Agram by Lieutenant Leroy King.^{[35](#)}

I beg leave to call attention to the fact that according to Lieutenant King, although ill feeling between Serbians and Croats in Agram seems to be growing, the place at the time when he wrote seemed to be perfectly quiet", contrary to what we have seen in a number of newspaper reports.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure 1]

Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 1

AGRAM, March 6, 1919.

General situation.

1. Agram is full to overflowing, many people having come here to escape from the Italian occupation in Croatia, Dalmatia and even Slovenia. There is order everywhere; the cafes and streets are full; the food good and plentiful; and much cheaper than in Belgrade or

Vienna. The difference between the civilized atmosphere of Agram and Belgrade (which is like a dilapidated caserne) is very striking.

2. Cardinal Bourne arrives here in a day or two, coming from the East via Belgrade; and after a short stay is to proceed to Ljubljana and eventually to Rome. Major Temperley (who tells me he knows you and has lectured at Harvard) the British officer who has been in Jugo-Slavia for six or seven weeks, tells me that the Cardinal's journey through Jugo-Slavia is rather a mystery. He thinks that it has some bearing on church politics here; and that it is not merely a benevolent tour of inspection as announced. He also thinks that the fact that he has been suddenly called to Belgrade today may mean that the British authorities do not wish him to be here when the Cardinal arrives. As you know Temperley you will be able to judge the value of his remarks. I have seen him three or four times and he is most friendly and confidential and has shown me several of his despatches. ...

3. Temperley tells me that he is certain that the French are now working with the Italians and have been in *rapprochement* with respect to policy in Jugo-Slavia with them for about a month. He wrote thus to London on February 22d. I noticed that, while the French Minister at Belgrade was rather extreme in his criticisms and hints against the Italians, all the French officers I have talked with have been very moderate, have had a tendency to avoid comments on the Italian extravagances and have even explained some of them away. This was particularly true of French officers I talked with on the journey from Belgrade to Agram, and I have never heard a direct criticism of the Italians by any French officers. This change of policy Temperley says is caused by the French fear of Germany, and of the possibility of an Italian understanding with that country. The French seem to be balancing the value of a united and satisfied Jugo-Slavia against the value of a satisfied Italy. They want both, of course, but will have a hard job to get them. I may mention here that the French are not sending their requisitioned ships to the Dalmatian Islands, as are England and the United States. The French forces are also not getting on particularly well with the Serbs in the Banat and near Ragusa.

4. The French are quite *intrigués* about the Carinthian question. I fancy that the Italians, and I know that the Slovenes, have been talking to them about it. A Slovene, Dr. André Druskovic, who is an ardent Jugo-Slav (and a fortiori an extra-ardent Slovene), who has been in Belgrade, talked to me at length tonight and said that Colonel Dosse in Belgrade had said to him that the French would only be too glad to draw a line in Carinthia as they had done in Styria; but that they did not want to interfere with Colonel Miles. The line they would draw (if they drew one at all) would of course be one of “purely military demarcation for the purposes of the armistice”. The Slovenes, of course, are wild to have them do it as they hope that such a line would include practically the last Slovenes as was done in Styria. Druskovic spoke of the “Germanization” of the Slovenes that was now going on north of the Drau and said that, if a line was not drawn so as to protect them, they would be quite Germanized by the time the Peace Conference could decide on the final frontier. He also asserted that the Italians were backing the Austrians in Carinthia. I “eased” through the conversation successfully, and was later invited to come to Ljubljana as soon as possible to hear more arguments!

Major Temperley says the Slovenes told him that Miles had decided on the line of the Drau but that you had reversed his decision. Temperley laughed and said that he knew this was not true as you would never have let such a thing get out, even if it were true. It is all very entertaining to me who know the Slovene arguments and suspicions backwards and forwards.

5. The French here have not mentioned the Carinthian matter to me. A French officer, Captain Cottier, has gone to Ljubljana to investigate transport conditions, but I know also that he is *officier de renseignements* for Colonel Dosse and is looking the ground over. I have heard nothing more of the French taking control of the frontiers between Austria and Slovenia.

I hear that the Italian officers in Ljubljana tried to make an incident out of the fact that the Italian flag was “insulted” in the station at that place. An Allied commission came up from Trieste and found there was nothing in it. (This from a Slovene source).

Two or three weeks ago two or three Italian officers were requested to leave a cafe here in Agram, and likewise tried to make an incident out of it.

I have seen no Italian officers or soldiers here.

6. The French inform me that a British commission is in Graz. They used the expression “Qu’est-ce qu’ils fichent lá?”

L. R. KING

[Enclosure 2]

Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 2

AGRAM, 7 March, 1919.

Political

1. The parties here are:

a) The Serbo-Croat Coalition (Greatly in majority with a large number of delegates in Belgrade.)

It supports the existing provisional government of Jugo-Slavia, and its leader is the Minister of the Interior—a Serbo-Croat.

b) The Starkevitch or Autonomist Party, led by Palovic.

This originally wished for the autonomy of Croatia, under the leadership of the Serbian Royal House. It has now joined in supporting the existing provisional government, and did so at the opening of parliament, but contains many germs of dissatisfaction, and is rapidly turning into the party of “Constitutional opposition”. It is thought here that a great mistake was made in not making its leader Palovic a minister. Temperley thinks that this party, though comparatively small, may cause trouble.

c) The Reactionaries and Discontented.

Mostly ex-officers of Austrian Army (Jugos by blood) who have been retired because of their political leanings to the old regime; and ex-functionaries of the Austro-Hungarian Government. These have no representation in Parliament of course. But they may cause trouble in connection with other elements later.

d) The Peasants Party. Republican.

This party, led by Radic a brilliant erratic man, has come out frankly for a Republican Jugo-Slavia (not a separate republic of Croatia). I am told that Radic himself has recalled from Belgrade the few deputies of his party who were sent to the Assembly. Radic has stirred up many peasants in Croatia who now follow his republican standard. He tells them that under a republic they will have to pay no taxes, and otherwise excites them. He also makes capital out of any mistakes of the existing government. The peasants have frequently applied what they think are republican principles and have pillaged their richer neighbors to some extent. At present, however, the Peasants Party has had somewhat of a set back owing to the new Agrarian law introduced by the Coalition Party which provides for the redistribution of land, and for the dividing up of the great estates in Croatia. Under it no land holder can own more than 750 acres, consequently many "republican" peasants are today leaning toward the coalition as the latter has definitely promised them something. This is probably temporary.

e) The Socialist and Clerical Parties are unimportant in Croatia.

2. The Croatians are not led by the R. C. Priests as are the Slovenes. There is no real clerical party, and little trouble is likely to come between them and the Serbs because of religion. *Par contre*, of the 22 members of the "Clerical Club" formed at Belgrade by Korvshetz three days ago, 19 are Slovenes.

3. Sources of Existing and Future Trouble in Croatia.

a) The ex-Austrian officers and functionaries who are passive now; but who spread pessimism and are ready to urge on discontent.

b) Certain Jewish and other traders in Agram who are cut off from their former lucrative intercourse with Austria and Hungary.

c) The reported presence of agents of Italy, Austria, and Hungary who work among all classes and try to stir up revolt, disunion and pessimism. (I have so far verified no specific case of this evil; though I am assured it exists. It is a sort of “covering clause” which appeals to the suspicious Jugo.)

d) Unpopularity of the Serbian Army.

This really exists and is increasing, particularly in the country districts.

While the Government officials all take pains to protest (“too well”) that the Serbs and Croats are one people, it is absurd to say so. The social “Climate” is quite different. The Serbs are soldier-peasants; the Croats are passive intellectuals in tendency. The Public Prosecutor, from whom one would expect a certain robustness of mind, told me frankly that the Croats had given up struggling against their Magyar oppressors long ago, and had devoted themselves to the arts. This applies, I suppose, to the upper classes. The peasant proprietors are mostly comfortably established and live off their rich soil. I fancy that many of the Serbs who live in Croatia have become somewhat like the Croats.

The Serbian Army is now scattered throughout Croatia; and there have been acts of “militarism” which the peasants do not like. Here in Agram one hears many expressions of dislike for the methods of Serbian military administration. These come from real Croats. I can imagine what the ex-Austrian officers, who glare at one in the cafes, must say about the Serbs. This growing unpopularity of the Serbian Army will easily be transformed into dislike of the Serbian people and influence. It is a dislike which already exists to some extent; and Major Temperley agrees with me in thinking it a real danger.

There is a sort of “mot d’ordre” going about to praise everything Serbian; but the required praise is not given with conviction. “Jugo-

Slavia” provokes enthusiasm; but Serbia lurks beneath the phrase in many minds.

4. The Croats care nothing about Serbian or Slovenian territorial claims as far as I can see. They are the vaguest thinkers and the least politically practical of the Jugos I have yet talked with. I am of course giving a first impression; but I don’t think the average educated Croat knows so much about the proposed or claimed frontiers of Jugo-Slavia as does the average Slovene. They are rather distressed about Italy’s acts than bitter about them. I have spoken with no Dalmatians yet. Americans are very popular, but one feels this popularity is rather theoretical.

Of course most of the political leaders are in Belgrade now.

5. To sum up. There are no visible signs of trouble in Agram. Crowds of people swarm in the streets until late at night without the slightest disturbance. Crowds of students wander peaceably about and mix with soldiers. On “Mardi Gras” the night of the carnival, everybody was throwing confetti about in a very normal gay way; singing and walking to and fro with hardly any policemen or guards to be seen. There may be something brewing, but there was no sign of it.

A Serbian general is here with some troops, but the French run the railroad and the people seem to be glad to let them do it. I am told the French are not particularly popular, but this may be because of the numerous Annamite soldiers who do pretty much as they please.

Bolshevism does not exist as far as I know at present.

L. R. KING

35 Reports No. 1 and No. 2 are the only enclosures printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/266

[Document 175]

***Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C.
Coolidge***³⁶

Report No. 11

AGRAM, March 19, 1919.

Subject: General situation.

1. I had a very satisfactory talk with Col. Miles in Fiume. It was of great value to me as I can now visualize the situation there and know about what is going on. I shall not write anything about Fiume, as I know Col. Miles is keeping you fully informed.

2. Relations between the French and Yougoslavs at Agram.

The French here are becoming very unpopular; the combination of their occupation of the country and the fact that they are believed to have a *rapprochement* in policy with Italy is causing this. Also rumors from Paris that things are going badly there for Yougoslavia makes the people here think that the French are not proving themselves to be the friends the Yougoslavs expected. The French *officier de renseignements* here tells me that while he personally dislikes the Italians, he knows that France must hold with Italy as against Germany, that France cannot look to England or America in the future for protection against Germany. He says that his position here and that of the French in general is increasingly difficult, that the Serbians are trying to secure all power in Yougoslavia, and that they are very jealous of the French occupation of the country. He even said that the Serbs in Agram were deliberately stirring up public opinion against the French.

3. French commerce in Yougoslavia.

There are indications that the French are working to establish a commercial foothold in Yougoslavia. This is natural, considering the great opportunity they have owing to their present occupation, which, although co-equal with and parallel to that of the Serbian Army, gives them great power here, as they control the railroads. I hear the French are making inquiries about the future commercial needs of the country, what manufactured articles are now, and will be in demand etc. A large number of educated Croatians speak French already, and German is very much out of fashion, although nearly everyone knows it. The French publishing house, Hachette et Cie. has established an agency at Fiume.

4. Anti Italian feeling in Agram.

On Saturday evening a report was published here that the Italians had declared that they were about to annex Fiume and would take it over in a few days. Though this report was unofficial and has since been declared so by the Government at Belgrade, it caused great excitement in Agram, which excitement is still continuing to a less extent, although the Government is doing everything possible to calm the people and has succeeded very well. When the report was first published the theatres and cafes were all closed as a sign of mourning (although I believe this may have been partly a precautionary measure by city officials), and crowds, chiefly students, paraded about the streets, demonstrating against Italy. There were some cries of “a bas la France” and “The Entente is a swindle”. The whole manifestation was without disorder and from what I learned from witnesses, such as Major Temperley (I was not in Agram myself that night) visible signs of the excitement soon disappeared. There is still, however, a strong undercurrent excitement; people are very depressed, fear the worst, not only for Fiume, but for Dalmatia and Istria and would probably make another demonstration if more bad news or even rumors came. There is some talk going about with reference to mobilising the Yougoslav forces against Italy, but I am convinced it is only the hotheads who even consider this. The more balanced people think that a clash with Italy is inevitable in the future if Italy obtained Dalmatia and Fiume. Another rumor to the effect that Fiume is to be internationalized seems to cause as much bitterness as the report

that Italy is to have it. I cannot insist too strongly on the temperamental nature of the Croatians, how they become elated one day and depressed the next at very slight things, but the fact is clear that at the time of writing they are very discouraged. They now look upon America as their last hope and trust that Mr. Wilson's arrival in Paris will help their cause, but they are very impatient, particularly in view of what they think is Italy's unrestricted grabbing. While the report mentioned above concerning Italy's being about to take Fiume has been declared unofficial, it has not yet been denied (March 19). A report in the paper on March 19 that Mr. Wilson is going to take up personally the frontier questions between Italy and Yugoslavia had a good effect, and the excitement on this point is very much less. Contradictory reports of all kinds are published in the newspapers and it is difficult to trace their origin. The communications between Zagreb and Western Europe seem to be very bad.

5. I think that the report that the Italians were about to take Fiume was probably sent out by them, as a "ballon d'essai".

Respectfully yours,

LE ROY KING

³⁶ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 186, April 3; received April 7.

Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge[37](#)

[SPALATO, March 20 (?), 1919.]

I went down to Pola and back again by automobile, going and coming by different routes. I spent a day there. I made this trip in order to see certain geographic features of the Istrian Peninsula, but principally because I had letters to some Austrian Naval officers and wanted to get their information on the Dalmatian coast. I got all I wanted and also found an American Destroyer in port and picked up some information from the officers. I have wired you twice that the Navy is not reporting to Paris and I think this is a great mistake. Perhaps it is too late to remedy it now, but I would suggest that you wire to Paris and tell them that they can get a lot of local information on the Istrian and Dalmatian questions if they put the Navy on the job.

I had thought of writing a short report on Pola, but I hardly think it worth while. Pola and lower Istria will go with Trieste; and I take it that Trieste will certainly be given to Italy. Of course, the outstanding facts are well known—that the interior is Slav (though not thickly populated) and that Pola has no commercial importance, but is purely a military port. Pola must in any case lose greatly in importance, but will probably be better off under the Italians than under the Jugos.

I have not tried to write any reports on the local difficulties between the Allies. The fact of the matter is that the Italians are running things with a high hand and are clashing with the French and to a lesser degree with the British. As is well known in Paris, Fiume is in a narrow zone east of the Pact of London line (Armistice Line). This narrow strip is nominally under inter-allied occupation, but as a

matter of fact the Italian troops very greatly outnumber the British and French, and an Italian General is Governor of Fiume. The whole question is complicated by the fact that the French have taken Fiume as the base-port of their "Army of Hungary" (Franchet d'Esperey). The French control all the railroads from a point five miles to the east of Fiume. This makes the Italians furious, and the frontier is practically closed. The money question, and the fluctuating value of the kronen would of itself make shipments from Fiume into the interior at present almost impossible. The Italians are trying to break the French hold over the railroads in the interior by refusing anything but purely Italian control on the Fiume end of the line. This Italian control is exercised by the so-called National Council, who are really the self-appointed Italian leaders in Fiume, backed by the Italian military governor. There are also some strong indications of a very bad feeling between the Italians and French. This is because the French have had the good sense to play the game the Italians should have played in the Balkan Peninsula. The Italian determination to antagonise the Jugo-Slavs is a most amazing piece of stupidity, when one thinks of the opportunity Italy might have seized in the Balkans. The British are very much annoyed at every turn by the Italians, but of course are not so much involved as the French.

I hear rumors that the Italians are buying up the Hungarian interests in Fiume. I cannot imagine where this money is coming from, unless it is out of our pockets. This is the only indication of an Italian-Hungarian *rapprochement* I have found.

I found in Pola that the Italians have been on the whole pretty considerate of the Austrian Naval officers there and of their property. I don't suppose this means much one way or the other, except that the Italian Admiral in command, Cannay, is said to be one of the greatest imperialists. The Jugo-Slavs here think that France is working against them, favoring Italy for the Italian support regarding Alsace-Lorraine.

³⁷ Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 171, March 23; received March 26.

Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 19

SPALATO, 29 March, 1919.

(Sent direct to Paris, by authority of Professor Coolidge, because of direct courier service. One copy sent to Professor Coolidge, Vienna.)

Subject: The Dalmatian Coast—question of future nationality (supplementing my report No. 17, of March 21st³⁸).

1. Since writing report No. 17, I have been in Zara and Sebenico, and have motored about the country in the Zara-Benkovac–Knin–Sebenico region. Although I was the guest of the Italian authorities, I had plenty of opportunity to talk to the representative men on both sides and to go to their clubs and societies.
2. The issue in Dalmatia is very plain. The province is Yugoslav by blood and sentiment. Although the Italians here are essentially traders, a large part of even the property is in the hands of the Yugoslavs. In Zara, for instance, there are 4 Yugoslav banks against 3 Italian. Commercially Dalmatia and its Yugoslav hinterland are inter-dependent to a far greater degree than are Dalmatia and Italy. The Italian claim rests primarily on the Pact of London and secondarily on the historical traditions of Rome and Venice—traditions of doubtful value at best, and based on regimes the last of which is now more than a century dead.
3. My statement in report No. 17 that Sebenico is a Yugoslav town and that it is by no means sure that a free vote in Zara would be for Italy is, I am convinced, true. The same conclusion is reached by examination of the question from different points of view—a balance of the claims of the two sides, the pre-war census, the attitude of the people during this difficult period of uncertainty,

the general appearance of the towns, the types met in the streets, restaurants, meetings, etc. I was not, however, prepared to be told by the Italians themselves in Zara that not only the Hinterland but also all of the islands were practically pure Slav. The pre-war representation in the Diet of Zara (37 Yugoslavs against 6 Italians) is a well known fact, as is the overwhelming preponderance of Slavs in the province as a whole, as shown by the pre-war censuses.

4. The Italians claim that during the forty years preceding the war the Austrian authorities favored the Slavs and did what they could to eradicate, slowly, the Italian colonies. In general, this is true; but it was always a matter of local issue, varying with time and circumstances, and a part and parcel of the old Austrian policy of playing off one people against another. Against it must be set the period of Venetian control, ending only in 1797—a period of three and a half centuries in which the Italians had every possible advantage and yet never gained even a numerical equality with the Slavs.
5. The Italians also claim that the Croats are incapable of governing the province, and continually bear charges against them on the general ground that they are “barbarians”. From what I have been able to discover, there is not an iota of choice between the intolerance of the two peoples. The blackest and most serious side of the whole question is the bitterness with which the quarrel is waged. Either way the decision goes, a large part of the losing party will be forced, economically at least, to leave the country. But as to the capacity for self-government, while I believe the Italians are right in saying that theirs is the higher culture, I am impressed by what I have been able to see of the ability of the Croat leaders and representative people. Certainly they bear comparison to the native Italians of the Province. It is of course well known that the literacy of the Croats is comparatively high, and even the Italians who have most to say about the squalor and ignorance of the lower Croat peasants admit their intelligence.
6. I mentioned in my last report the autocratic manner in which the Italians are now governing that part of Dalmatia assigned to them by the Pact of London. I found that their authorities in Sebenico and Zara openly admit the deportation of Yugoslav leaders, simply on the ground that they are leaders, and without charging them

with flagrant violation of the public order. These deportations are notably wrong in that the men, in many cases, have been sent away at night, on a few hours notice, and without trial. All of them have been sent to Italy where they are confined without communication (save by censored letters) with their own people. The last deportations in Sebenico occurred ten days ago. In this case nine men were arrested in their houses in the middle of the night and left in an Italian destroyer at 5 o'clock that morning for an unknown destination in Italy. In Zara I found that the Yugoslav club, one of the best and most conspicuous buildings in the town, had been taken by the authorities on the excuse that they wanted it for a military headquarters, and an old inn facing a stable yard had been assigned to the Yugoslavs in lieu of it. (Clubs here are not for men alone, but are social centers of the communities.) I mention these things only as showing that the charge of incapacity for government can well be made by both sides.

7. I find the Italians much inclined to harp on the racial difference between Dalmatia and the rest of the Balkan Peninsula. On this phase of the question they usually go farther than the line of the Pact of London, and place the division between Western Europe and the Balkans on the Narento River, in Herzegovina. As a matter of fact, there is no such clear cut division. I know the Balkans pretty well, and to all appearances Dalmatia is very Balkan. Recently I struck a religious fete-day in motoring near Zara. I never saw a better or more varied display of native Balkan costumes—Croat, Albanian and Serb. There are even said to be a few Cutzo-Valachs in the neighborhood of Knin. The larger villages I passed through have Orthodox churches, and many of them Serbian signs in the Cyrillic alphabet— this is in the zone of Italian occupation.
8. But the larger aspect of the Dalmatian question is the economic. With the exception of a few fairly fertile valleys, Dalmatia is a very poor strip of barren rocks lying between a rich hinterland and the sea. Its small production is largely confined to wine and olive oil. Its principal industry is fishing. In wine, oil and fish it has to compete at great disadvantage with Italy, where all three are obtained at less cost and with greater ease. This is the chief local argument against the incorporation of any part of Dalmatia into the Kingdom of Italy. The native Croats say that if the province

becomes Yugoslav they can send their produce across the mountains by their caravans and narrow-gauge railroads; but that if they have to cross a frontier and if they are flooded by the cheaper Italian produce of the same kind, they will starve. It appears that about 15 years ago Italy obtained a commercial concession whereby she was permitted to sell her wine and oil in Dalmatia under a very small import tax. This Italian competition nearly ruined the local producers. The strength of the local economic argument is shown, in a measure, by the difference between the native Italian and Croat ideas as to the future of Zara. The Croats there think that under Yugoslavia the town could continue to live as the center of the coastal produce being shipped into the interior and of the produce of the interior coming out. The Italians of Zara, on the other hand, told me that they saw no future for the town, even under Italy—that it would die commercially and remain only the administrative center of a local government and possibly a bathing resort of some small importance.

9. The manufactories in Dalmatia are few and relatively unimportant. There are some cement works near Spalato, and a calcium-carbide factory at Sebenico. The latter was built with Italian money, but had been bought up by Austrian capital before the war began. There are some mines producing a rather poor grade of coal on the Promina Mountain, northeast of Sebenico. The potential water power of the falls of the Kerka River is considerable. There are three of these falls, the largest being about 4 kms. west of Scardona (see Kistanje und Drnis sheet of the 1:75,000 map, herewith, marked “Annex B”³⁹). The Kerka broadens out into a long, narrow lake and drops into the gorge of Scardona over cascades some 130 feet in height. This water power is now used only to light the town of Sebenico. Both the above mentioned coal mines and water power are in the zone of Italian occupation. There are other waterfalls capable of development notably near Almissa and along the Croatian coast.
10. The commercial importance to Yugoslavia of the Dalmatian and Croatian coasts (including Fiume) far outweighs the commercial interests of Dalmatia. Bosnia alone is very rich in lumber and minerals, both largely undeveloped. I recently met the son-in-law of Herr Steinbeiss, the Austrian who owns large forest tracts in Bosnia and who constructed the narrow gauge railroad across the

mountains to Knin, in order to get his export to the sea. I was told by this gentleman that the Germans had developed during the war Bosnian mines yielding 50% iron, and that the timber lands of Bosnia would furnish export for many decades to come. In addition to Bosnia, there is the whole of the upper valley of the Save, including Croatia and Slovenia, in need of an outlet to the sea. While the Steinbeiss narrow gauge road from Bosnia down to Knin is well constructed and capable of considerable hauling capacity, the fact remains that the only standard gauge line capable of serving the present needs of the hinterland is the Agram-Fiume line. Standard gauge communication via Knin is a possibility of the future—the mountain pass is about 3,000 feet high, and the cost of construction would be great. It is therefore evident that Fiume is in every sense necessary for the prosperity of Jugo-slavia for many years to come. Losing Fiume but retaining Dalmatia, Jugoslavia would have two cramped outlets to the sea in the two narrow gauge, funicular roads running through Knin and Mostar. But if she loses Dalmatia (by the Pact of London) as well as Fiume, she is reduced to the single loophole of Mostar, with its inadequate harbors of Metkovac and Gravosa.

11. I attach hereto a map (marked “Annex A”—“Dalmazia”)⁴⁰ on which I have drawn the line of Italian occupation, which is approximately that of the Pact of London. I have also indicated on this map the coal mines and water power near Sebenico, as well as the two narrow gauge railroads into the interior, through Knin and Mostar. I have also drawn in what I believe to be the reasonable and natural frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia. This is the line I suggested in my reports Nos. 15 and 16,⁴¹ and which further study of the Adriatic question convinces me is the nearest possible approach to absolute justice.
12. Judged by the standards of today, the Italian claims on Fiume and upper Dalmatia are pitifully weak when compared with those of Jugoslavia. It is a case of a bargain made under the morals of the old diplomacy as against national rights. Italy may have paid, in the blood of her men, her full share of the bargain which brought her into the war: but the Pact of London remains a blood-bargain—the bartering away of a people who have every right to their independence. The map above referred to shows clearly how

imperialistic is the Italian land-grab. They have not only cut off from the hinterland the only outlet to the sea at present effective (Fiume), but they have also so cleverly sliced into the Dalmatian coast as to cut squarely across one of the two remaining outlets (such as it is), and have assured to themselves the splendid little harbor of Sebenico, with its potential water power and the only coal mines in the country. Not only that, but the eastern-most curves of their line, north of Spalato and around the islands to the south-east, are so drawn as to allow them to effectually strangle, both by land and by sea, any future Yugoslav development of Spalato or the bay of Castelli. It is a blood-bargain which goes so cynically against the essential rights of a virile people that I cannot believe that it would lead to anything but more blood in the future. If the bargain must be recognized in the coming Treaty of Peace, it is to be hoped that, so far as the United States is concerned, it will be made clear that our recognition is based on no principle for which we have fought.

SHERMAN MILES

³⁸ Not printed.

³⁹ Map not reproduced.

⁴⁰ Map not reproduced.

⁴¹ Report No. 15 not printed; report No. 16 printed on p. 479 [*Pg. 479 includes portions of [Doc. 172](#) and [Doc. 173](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/499

[Document 178]

***Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C.
Coolidge***[42](#)

[Extract]

No. 29

AGRAM, May 10, 1919.

Subject: General situation.

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The Italian Situation and the Peace Conference:

President Wilson's declaration concerning Fiume has greatly gratified and consoled this volatile people. They are very pleased and seem calmly to await the final decision. The armed occupation of Fiume by the Italians does not disturb them much, as they are convinced that the former must give way, and that France and England will now support America in this question. They think that Orlando acted childishly in rushing away from the Conference, and that his country is somewhat isolated by the reported alliance between America, England and France.

The announcement of the conditions of peace with Germany has had a salutary effect in this country. The Croats are sobered by what they call the severity of the terms, and feel the prestige of Paris very deeply; particularly as they had been inclined to forget it owing to the length of time which has elapsed since the armistice. Nearly everyone with whom I have talked thinks that the conditions are too hard, although one can always convince him by argument that they are just. Doubts are expressed as to whether Germany will sign, until mention is made of the power and resources of the Allies.

Italian Activity at Fiume:

The Italians have occupied Fiume in force and are fortifying their lines. They are digging trenches and putting up barbed wire. I learn from the French that they have advanced nearly up to Bakar, and are close to Sersak. With respect to the latter place Colonel Dehove was not fully informed, and could not tell me much as he is not reporting on the Fiume situation. There is no fighting: the Italians are merely digging themselves in. Col. Dehove informs me that General Grazioli announced that the Italians would not evacuate Fiume under any circumstances and would fight for its possession if necessary. The slight affray between the French and Italians at Sersak, which was reported in the Viennese papers about 1st of May, appears to have been negligible. The French, of course, will say nothing about it; but the Croats here who ought to know, and who would be glad to recount such an affair, treat it as of little importance.

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LE ROY KING

⁴² Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 284, May 22; received May 24.

Boundary in Carinthia between German Austria and Jugoslavia

[\[179\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, January 20, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/26

[\[180\] Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel to the Secretary General of
the Commission to Negotiate Peace \(Grew\)](#)

January 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/51c

[\[181\] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in
Switzerland \(Stovall\)](#)

Paris, January 30, 1919—10 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/51c: Telegram

[\[182\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, February 10, 1919. [Received February 17.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/80

[183] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, February 12, 1919. [Received February 19.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/89

[184] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, February 14, 1919. [Received February 20.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/91

[185] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, February 24, 1919. [Received February 26.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/143

[186] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, February 26, 1919—9 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/91a: Telegram

**[187] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace**

Vienna, February 27, 1919. [Received February 28—6 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/155: Telegram

**[188] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace**

Vienna, April 25, 1919. [Received April 28.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/405

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/26

[Document 179]

Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 31

VIENNA, January 20, 1919.

SIRS: I have the honor to report that a week ago I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Sherman Miles and Lieutenant L. R. King down to Laibach to investigate Jugo-Slav questions. There has been some fighting lately between the Austrians and the Slovenes in Carinthia, and it was agreed that representatives of the two parties should meet at Gratz in Styria, in order to put an end to this useless bloodshed. Lieutenant-Colonel Miles and Lieutenant King went to Gratz and attended the meetings as listeners. At one time the two parties seemed on the point of agreeing, but at the last moment failed to come to terms. In order to prevent a fresh outbreak of hostilities, Lieutenant-Colonel Miles then proposed, subject to my approval, that he and Lieutenant King should visit the regions in dispute and should draw a line which should be accepted temporarily by both parties. This suggestion was enthusiastically accepted, and a paper was drawn up and signed of which I send you the official French text and an English translation.⁴³ Lieutenant King then came here, arriving this afternoon and reported to me.

This outcome has put me in an embarrassing situation. My instructions, both oral and written, in no way authorize me to deal with matters of this kind. I can see too the dangers and disadvantages from the point of view of the United States in having its agents act as unauthorized arbiters in such delicate international matters. On the other hand, like Colonel Miles, I feel the urgency of what I am told may mean the saving of the lives of hundreds of people, and believe that one should be willing to risk incurring grave responsibilities in a case of this kind. I am therefore authorizing him in a letter of which I inclose a copy⁴⁴ to go on with the undertaking,

on condition that his decision is to be given out subject to my approval and control. I am also sending down Major Lawrence Martin to take part in the investigations as a geographical expert. The whole thing will take well over a week, and I respectfully request that I may have telegraphic instructions as soon as possible as to whether the decision we have reached is to be given out. In the meanwhile, there will at least be no further hostilities.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

43 Neither printed.

44 Not printed.

Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

1. In reference to Prof. Coolidge's dispatches No. 31 of January 20 and No. 33 of January 22,⁴⁵ while a formal disavowal of action taken might lead to further bloodshed and should therefore be avoided, it is submitted that a ratification would be equally undesirable.
2. I venture to suggest that Prof. Coolidge should be advised that in future attempts to settle boundary disputes by American representatives should be avoided as they are clearly outside of the scope of the powers intended to be granted.
3. In my opinion the precedent should not be followed, if only for the reason that such matters can only be properly determined by joint action by Interallied representatives. In Austria-Hungary as well as in other enemy countries, the tendency is markedly on the increase to appeal to American representatives to act as arbiters between the warring nationalities or factions, and for this very reason especial care should be exercised that our representatives should not commit themselves to decisions which may afterwards prove embarrassing. The real and ultimate remedy is obviously to send in Interallied Commissions where local investigations are necessary to stop fighting or to harmonize serious differences. Such commissions could probably perform police duty which obviously should not be entrusted to one power alone.
4. As the matter in question has already received publicity through the Viennese papers, it is further recommended that the associated governments be advised of the circumstances and informed that a maintenance of the present status seems advisable without formal ratification or disavowal.
5. A draft of suggested telegram is hereto appended.⁴⁶

JANUARY 29, 1919.

45 Latter not printed.

46 Draft not attached to file copy; for telegram as sent, see *infra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/51c: Telegram

[Document 181]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister
in Switzerland (Stovall)***

PARIS, January 30, 1919—10 p.m.

67. For Coolidge. “Your dispatches No. 31 January 20th and 33 January 22d.^{[47](#)} Attempts to settle boundary disputes by American representatives should in future be avoided as outside of scope your mission. Such action even if temporary can only properly be taken by Interallied representatives and an assumption by United States of office of sole arbiter may well prove embarrassing. In this case Commission neither ratifies nor disavows action taken but will not unless occasion requires interfere with *statu quo*.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{[47](#)} Latter not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/80

[Document 182]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 73

VIENNA, February 10, 1919.
[Received February 17.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith the reports made by Lt. Col. Miles and Lt. LeRoy King, by Prof. Martin and by Prof. Kerner^{[48](#)} which give their recommendations as to the provisional boundaries that should be drawn between the Austrians and the Yugoslavs in Carinthia. The four gentlemen have spent two weeks in working on this question, besides previous study. They have consulted many and contradictory maps and documents, they have heard able as well as enthusiastic advocates of opposing views. From all that I can judge they have conducted their work in an admirable spirit of impartiality and desire to find the most just as well as the most practicable solution, recognizing, however, that their task was merely that of providing a temporary arrangement which should avoid bloodshed and not a final delimitation of frontiers. They have done everything in their power to be as fair as possible. They have talked with many of the native population and they have repeatedly threshed out their results in discussion with one another.

It should be remembered that Lt. Col. Miles is an officer with much experience in dealing with the Slav peoples in the Balkans, having been with both the Serbians and the Bulgarians in the Balkan Wars. Professor Martin is a professional geographer of wide experience. Professor Kerner is of Slav origin and able to converse freely with the Slovenian peasants. The party was accompanied by two representatives one Austrian and one Yugoslav, both of them, I am told, men of intelligence and fairmindedness, though each was anxious to score every point for the cause he represented. I venture

to think that these reports are worthy of the serious consideration of the Commission.

It will be noticed that the opinion of Professor Kerner differs very seriously from that of the other three gentlemen. This difference has not been unexpected by me. As I have only just read the reports and the pouch will soon close and as I wish the Commission to be in possession of these important documents as soon as possible, I am forwarding them without comment on my part. I shall discuss them in my next report when I have had time to think them over and to examine some of the documents that accompany them which I have retained for this purpose.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[Enclosure 1]

Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles and Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 8

7 FEBRUARY, 1919.

Subject: Provisional line of demarcation in Carinthia—methods of investigation, and decision.

1. In accordance with the protocol signed at Graz⁴⁹ there were two points to be considered of which the first (*a*) is specified as the controlling factor in deciding on a line of demarcation:—

a. The clear and unmistakable features of the terrain.

b. The national desires of the people on general lines.

In addition we had to consider the expressed purpose and the spirit of the protocol as a whole, which was essentially intended to prevent the renewal of hostilities. Our methods of study, and the form of our inquiries, were based solely on the above considerations.

2. The geographical features of the country were carefully studied on the spot and by the aid of maps and relief maps. The study of the desires of the population, and of the effect of the proposed line of demarcation on the keeping of the peace, was carried on in the field as outlined below.
3. The protocol specified that we were to be accompanied by one officially appointed representative of both the Carinthians and the Laibach Governments. In addition we made the following verbal stipulations to insure absolute neutrality and fairness:
 - a. We were to use automobiles provided by the two contending governments and would make equal use of Carinthian and Yugo-Slav cars if so requested by either side.
 - b. We were to receive no hospitality whatever during our stay in Carinthia.
 - c. The automobiles were to carry neither the Carinthian nor Yugo-Slav flag.
 - d. We reserved the right to keep our itinerary secret, and to visit any place or district on any day, or at any hour, we might elect.
4. We chose Klagenfurt as our base of operations in Carinthia because this town is in the center of lower Carinthia, and within easy reach by automobile of any part of the disputed territory. Klagenfurt is in Austrian hands. In the course of our study we had occasion to spend one night at Unter Drauberg, and two nights at Völkermarkt, both of which towns are at present occupied by Yugo-Slav troops.
5. Our investigation occupied eight full days in the field. We started out early on the morning of each day and rarely got back until well after dark. The routes traversed are shown on the annexed map (annex A).⁵⁰ Many routes were traversed more than once.
6. We used two automobiles. Colonel Miles and Lieutenant King, together with the two representatives, rode in the leading car, while Major Martin and Professor Kerner, our two official advisors, followed in the second car. We arranged our itinerary so as to prevent as far as possible any preparation for our visit in any particular town or district, and were very successful in this in most instances. When we found organized demonstrations, or other evidence of preparation in any locality, we made a point of returning unexpectedly until we were quite satisfied that we were receiving a fair and normal impression. Our advisors had as

complete and full an opportunity for investigation and study as we. Not only were they almost always present when we made our inquiries and asked our questions in the towns, but they had also complete freedom in making their own investigation and asking their own questions. If either or both happened not to be present when significant information was obtained, we would either ask our informant to repeat his statement for their benefit, or turn him over to them to be questioned as they saw fit. Both representatives were constantly present (except that on one day Dr. Ehrlich, the Yugo-Slav representative, was absent at his own request) and were continually asked to make requests and suggestions as to the methods of questioning and study employed. These requests and suggestions were always agreed to and followed out when possible.

7. In dealing with the difficulty of finding out the national desires of people of pure Slovene blood, most of whom spoke both Slovene and German and who lived in country villages and farms, we adopted the only practical method of stopping individuals on the roads and asking them what their feelings and wishes were. In the course of our work we questioned many hundreds of people in the various districts, often stopping nearly everybody we met on the road. In the villages we walked about ourselves and sought people out. In order to give all confidence possible to the Slovene peasants, Lieutenant King, who did most of the questioning for us in the presence and with the consent of the two representatives, would ask the first three or four questions in the Slovene language and then continue in German. The questions almost invariably asked were; first, whether the man or woman was Slovene born, where he or she lived and how long he or she had lived there. Then they would be told that we were Americans and questions would be put as to their preference for permanent Yugo-Slav or Austrian rule, their feelings with regard to the administration which happened to be in control of their town or district at the time etc. Regard was always had to the intelligence of the individual and the particular local subject of investigation.
8. The two representatives also did a certain amount of questioning, and were at full liberty to bring out any point favorable to their respective sides if they could do so. The Yugo-Slav representative, who was a priest in clerical dress and as such was stamped at once as a Yugo-Slav political leader in a country where agitators for the

Yugo-Slav cause are nearly all priests, was in most advantageous position to elicit Yugo-Slav sentiments from the Slovene population. The Austrian representative was in civilian dress at all times and rarely announced his official capacity. The Yugo-Slav representative did far more questioning than he, and talked almost entirely in the Slovene language. Both the Austrian and Yugo-Slav representatives were men of justice and fine character.

9. We found that by stopping people on the roads, particularly on market days when they were coming to the towns to sell their produce, and then by asking them where they lived, we could obtain an impression of the desires of a whole district. Our market day investigations were very instructive. On one occasion Colonel Miles checked up impressions by keeping an accurate account of votes and found that both Major Martin and Lieutenant King, neither of whom had made any attempt to count had received impressions that were very accurate.
10. In the towns where there was a predominant Austrian population and sentiment, we always asked to hear the views and desires of the minority, and announced in the hearing of all that we expected and required of the authorities that no man should be oppressed or persecuted for having expressed a minority opinion.
11. In addition to actual field work we studied the documentary evidence presented by both sides. This evidence is attached hereto in two bundles one marked "Yugo-Slav evidence" (annex B) and one "Austrian evidence" (annex C).⁵¹
12. After the field work was over we spent a whole day in Klagenfurt in going over in detail all the data accumulated. We asked our advisors, Major Martin and Professor Kerner, to give their opinions first in each case. The final decision reached was that the line of demarcation should be in general the line of the Karawanken Mountains. We are in perfect accord in this decision on all points, and Major Martin's recommendation supports our decision in every respect.

**SHERMAN MILES
LE ROY KING**

[Enclosure 2]

Report No. 9

VIENNA, February 9, 1919.

Subject: Detailed reasons for the decision regarding the line of demarcation in Carinthia.

1. Supplementing our report to you (No. 8),⁵² in which our methods of investigation in Carinthia were described and our final decision stated, we submit the following detailed reasons which led to our decision.
2. Following the procedure of our discussion in Klagenfurt at which the decision was reached, we will present first our reasons for the adaptation [*sic*] of the line of the Karawankens Mountains as a whole, and then our reasons for giving to the Austrians each of the several disputed geographical districts north of the Karawankens. Both in the general and in the detailed discussions, we will adhere to the line of reasoning imposed by the Protocol (a copy of which is filed with your Dispatch No. 31)⁵³—that is to say, we shall reason from the three factors of (1), a clear and unmistakable geographical line of demarcation, (2) national desires of the people, and (3) how our decision would affect the chances for peaceful administration of the country between the date of your approval and the final decision in Paris.
3. On the map attached hereto⁵⁴ the line of the Karawankens is drawn in red. This chain of mountains, through most of its length, is a strikingly abrupt and sharp barrier. From the point of view of a clear and unmistakable geographical line it is unquestionably superior to the line of the Drau River (marked in blue), although the latter in every sense fulfills the definition of the protocol. Along the same line of reasoning, the Karawankens are still more superior to any possible line north of the Drau.
4. From the point of view of national desires, our investigation convinced us that the majority of the people between the Drau and the Karawankens (the blue and the red lines) preferred Austrian rule. The outstanding fact is the large number of Slovenes who avowedly prefer Austrian rule, or whose political creed is an undivided Carinthia. Since only the southeastern corner of

Carinthia is in dispute, and since all the rest of Carinthia is admittedly Austrian, undivided Carinthia means Austrian Carinthia. The Slovene who does not want to be a Jugo-Slav is a curiosity we should never have believed in had we not seen him, and in large numbers. North of the Drau (the blue line) the Austrian preferences of the people are still more marked.

5. From the point of view of the effect on peaceful administration, we prefer to give the disputed strip of territory between the Drau and the Karawankens (blue and red lines) to the Austrians for the following reasons:

(a) We are strongly impressed by the fact (which our investigations brought out) that the Jugo-Slav occupation of even Slovene territory is in the nature of a strong-handed military control, with unmistakable touches of Prussianism; while, on the contrary, the Austrian administration of the territory occupied by them rests on a much less military basis. Jugo-Slav forces are much more in evidence throughout the territory occupied by them than are the Austrian forces in the Austrian occupied territory. This statement includes not only numbers of men, but also potential strength in artillery. The Austrians are apparently holding their territory largely on the strength of the good-will of the inhabitants.

(b) Not only do the Jugo-Slavs base their administration on military force, but they also use that force as a constant threat against the people. The Jugo-Slav Colonel commanding in Völkermarkt told us that he proposed to answer random rifle fire from the Austrian side with field guns. Since the Austrian forces consist of almost ridiculously weak and dispersed detachments, the fire of the Jugo-Slav cannon is in effect a threat, not against them, but against the civilian inhabitants of the country. The same commander went still further by telling us that, if the random rifle fire from the Austrian side did not cease, he would reply by "punitive expeditions". Needless to say, such a measure would punish, not the Austrian troops, but the civilian population. We may say in passing that random rifle fire from the irregular troops on both sides is unavoidable, and will probably continue until the country settles down into final conditions of peace; but the opening of artillery or the advance

of “punitive expeditions” is quite another matter, and is something we heard of only from the Jugo-Slav side.

(c) The outstanding geographic features of lower Carinthia are the broad, flat valley of the Drau and the rugged and difficult chain of the Karawankens. These features establish the geographical, and hence the economic unity of lower Carinthia. The Jugo-Slav occupation of a part of the valley of the Drau is an economic handicap to the people of the occupied region, and hence a constant factor tending towards a disturbance of the peace. The story of the capture of the Rosenthal by the Austrians on January 6th and 7th, given below, indicates to our minds how strongly the people feel about an economic cutting off of a district by military occupation, and how easily the feeling may be fanned into open hostilities.

6. We will now discuss, in the same manner as above, the four districts marked I, II, III, and IV on the accompanying map.
7. District I, called for convenience “The Island”, can be dismissed with the statement that Major Martin and Professor Kerner agree with us that it should remain in the hands of the Austrians.
8. District II, is called the Rosenthal, and requires a detailed discussion because Professor Kerner dissents to our opinion that it should remain in the hands of the Austrians.
9. From the geographical point of view, we believe that the southern (red), and not northern (blue) limit of the Rosenthal should be adopted as the line of demarcation. While admitting that the Drau (blue line) fulfills the geographical definition of the protocol, we are convinced that the Karawankens (red line) is a much more clear and unmistakable geographical demarcation. Along this particular part of the frontier the Karawankens are especially rugged and difficult to pass—in fact, they are practicable for passage only at the Karawanken tunnel, the Loibl Pass (about 4,000 feet) and the Wurzen Pass (about 3,000 feet).
10. From the point of view of national desires of the people, we base our opinion that they are pro-Austrian on two lines of reasoning brought out by our investigation, as follows:
 - (a) Direct questioning of all classes of people, both in the towns and on the roadside, convinced us that the majority sentiment was distinctly pro-Austrian.

(b) The indicative results of the events of January 6th and 7th.

These events we found to be as follows: About November 2d the Jugo-Slav forces appeared in the Rosenthal, and soon afterwards occupied the whole of it. In addition to their troops, they organized from the pro-Jugo Slovenes of the district an armed "national guard". A large and long-established gun factory at Ferlach (Rosenthal) enabled them to supplement the equipment of their regular and irregular forces, at least by sporting arms, which should have been very effective in any irregular warfare. Two months after the Jugo-Slav occupation, on January 6th and 7th, hastily raised Austrian forces took the whole of the Rosenthal in 36 hours without serious resistance on the part of the Jugo-Slavs, and without any casualties worth considering on either side. The most extraordinary feature of this affair, and one that we would not believe until it had been repeatedly confirmed by pro-Jugo-Slavs, was that the fighting started at Arnoldstein by the attack of a group of armed men (part, at least, of whom were Slovenes) from the valley of the Gail. In other words, the fight was started by Slovenes who were not from the Rosenthal but who fought to free the Rosenthal from Jugo-Slav occupation in order to clear their own communication with their markets at Villach. The attack was then pushed on with the aid of Slovenes from the Rosenthal and the mass of the Slovene population there offered no resistance. We desire to point out that this affair, while beneath consideration from a military point of view, is extremely indicative of the real feeling of the people of the Rosenthal and the neighboring Slovene district of the Gail. It is true that part of the Austrian forces which took the Rosenthal were ex-Marines from the Austrian Navy, who had returned to their homes in Carinthia. Nevertheless, the whole affair is a typical example of irregular warfare, without artillery on either side. In irregular warfare, much more than in organized warfare, the factor of the hostility or the friendliness of the population is very strong, and often decisive. Here is a case in which the Jugo-Slavs had two months in which to organize and arm a predominantly Slovene population. They even had a gun factory on the spot. They actually did organize and arm the population, presumably as far as it was possible for them to do so. And yet in 36 hours the

whole district was taken from them. Careful investigation on our part failed to bring out a single instance of any armed pro-Jugo-Slav firing on the scattered Austrian detachments as they advanced beyond the immediate vicinity of the river. Even the fighting at the crossings of the river amounted to almost nothing. Men who were avowedly pro-Jugo-Slav, and even some who stated that they had been in the Jugo-Slav “national guard”, confirmed the amazing statement that many Slovenes from the Rosenthal joined the Austrians north of the Drau, before the attack, and came back with the Austrian forces to drive the Jugo-Slavs out of the district, and the equally extraordinary statement that there were Slovenes from the valley of the Gail in the group of men who began the fighting at Arnoldstein. (The Austrians claim that all the men who fought with them at Arnoldstein were Slovenes, but the point is that both sides agree that Slovenes were present.) In short, aside from slight resistance at the river crossings, the irregular Austrian forces simply walked through the Rosenthal and took possession of that Slovene district. No “embattled farmers” here, fighting for their country and their nationality.

11. From the point of view of the effect on peace and order, we are convinced that the Rosenthal should not be given back to the Jugo-Slavs, even for temporary occupation. Were such a step taken, we cannot see that the solemn promise of the Carinthian Government to maintain the armistice on our line of demarcation could possibly guarantee the prevention of such another affair as that of January 6th and 7th, described above. In passing, we would say that we were impressed by the tolerance of the present Austrian occupation of the Rosenthal. We found there pro-Jugo-Slavs who did not hesitate to say openly that they had borne arms in the Jugo-Slav “national guard” less than three weeks before—and these men are now at liberty. We found no hesitancy among the pro-Jugo-Slavs in avowing their political faith before the Austrians, and even in the presence of Austrian troops, nor any indications that they were under constraint by the Austrian occupation.
12. District III, called by us the “Völkermarkt Salient”, can be dismissed with the statement that Professor Kerner and Major Martin concur in our opinion that it should be entirely in the

hands of the Austrians, though Professor Kerner states that he would “personally prefer to give it to the Jugo-Slavs”.

13. District IV, the Jaunthal, requires a detailed discussion, since Professor Kerner dissents from our opinion that the line of demarcation should be the southern boundary, and that therefore the Jugo-Slavs must withdraw from it until a decision is given in Paris.
14. From a geographical point of view, we believe the Karawankens (red line) to be better than the Drau (blue line) for the same reasons as stated above in the discussion of the Rosenthal district. We are aware of the fact that in the Jaunthal the red line does not run along such an abrupt or impassable mountain chain as in the Rosenthal district. Nevertheless, we still consider it a better line of demarcation than the Drau. A detail may be mentioned in passing—the line of demarcation should follow the actual watershed across the Seeburg Pass, and not the old boundary of Carinthia (as the red line shows). This is a matter of only a few square miles, which even the Austrian authorities concede without discussion to the Jugo-Slavs.
15. From the point of view of national desires, our investigation convinced us that the sentiment of the majority of the people is slightly on the side of the Austrians. There are only four towns in the district of any size (say between 1000 and 2000 inhabitants each). These towns are strongly pro-Austrian in feeling. We were more interested in getting at the desires of the country people, and therefore limited our investigations almost entirely to people we met on the roadside. On one day we stopped every man on the highroad going to market (it happened to be a market day). In this way we should have found whatever Jugo-Slav sentiment existed, since the richer and more urban German population might have been expected to have been absent. And, as a matter of fact, most of the people we questioned were Slovenes by birth. In spite of this fact, and in spite of the fact that the district was under strong Jugo-Slav military occupation, and the additional fact that the Jugo-Slav authorities invited us to go into the district and knew that we were there, the result of our investigation was a slightly pro-Austrian feeling. We even found the extreme case of Slovenes who spoke no German, who lived in a Slovene town, and yet who said they preferred the Austrians to the Jugo-Slavs. We also got

the distinct impression that the pro-Austrian Slovenes were a better class of people than the pro-Jugo Slovenes.

By “better class” we do not mean more prosperous, but better in the sense of making a better general impression as men.

16. The effect of the withdrawal of the Jugo-Slav occupation to the south of the Karawanken mountains may or may not be beneficial. From the point of view of peace, the question is admittedly problematical, and we can only say that we believe peace and order are more apt to be maintained in the Jaunthal if the Jugo-Slavs withdraw than if they do not. The two cases may be summed up as follows:

(a) If the Jugo-Slav occupation remains in the Jaunthal, it will be under the sting of a Jugo-Slav withdrawal from the town of Völkermarkt. We are convinced from what we heard, both at Laibach and Graz, and from what we saw on the spot, that the possession of Völkermarkt to the Jugo-Slavs is a much treasured touch of chauvinism, if not of imperialism. They clung to Völkermarkt in the Graz conference, and actually broke up the conference on it. We believe that they greatly desire to retain Völkermarkt, not only because of its Slovene hinterland, but also as a spearhead across the Drau between the Austrian districts of the Lavant valley and the Klagenfurt basin. We are convinced, and our advisers agree with us, that they must get out of Völkermarkt. If they get out of Völkermarkt, but still retain the Jaunthal, we think the chances are that they would retaliate on the pro-Austrian population by increased military suppression, if not by actual reprisal. It would lie in their power to shell the German town of Völkermarkt from the heights south of the Drau. They could do this on some such flimsy excuse as that given us by the Jugo-Slav commander in Völkermarkt for artillery reprisal to rifle fire (See above, paragraph 5–b). Should they do this, they would probably claim that the Austrians fired cannon first, and no unbiased authority could prove the contrary. Nor could the Austrians make artillery reprisals in kind (even if they wanted to), for there are no Jugo-Slav towns of any importance in range. In this connection we may say that we were also impressed by finding Jugo-Slav artillery near Galizien, which could serve them only to cover an offensive movement into Austrian territory or to shell habitations on the

northern bank by way of punishment. Another point to be considered, under the above hypothesis, is that the economic life of the Jaunthal would be seriously crippled. Although both sides say they want to establish commercial intercourse over the new lines of demarcation, we doubt if this will be done, particularly at Völkermarkt. The shutting off of Völkermarkt from its economically dependent territory to the south would be an obvious reprisal on the part of the Jugo-Slavs for having to give up the town. The condition of the roads in the Jaunthal even now indicate economic strangulation as a result of being cut off from Klagenfurt. And we observed, in crossing the lines of occupation in several places, that it was always on the Jugo-Slav side that the roads were barricaded to stop traffic. Lastly, we refer to the general discussion above (Paragraph 5-*a* and *b*) to the effect that Jugo-Slav occupation, as we found it, is distinctly more military, in the Prussian sense, than is the Austrian, and hence more apt to lead to trouble. As an example of this, in the Jaunthal, the Jugo-Slav colonel in command at Bleiburg admitted to us that he had named certain German inhabitants of the town as hostages, and that he would execute them in the market place if any of his men were killed in fighting or in riots at Bleiburg.

(*b*) If the Jugo-Slav occupation is withdrawn from the Jaunthal, a certain amount of looting and pillaging may be expected during this withdrawal. The additional sting of the evacuation of the Jaunthal may be expected to make the Jugo-Slavs more hostile after they establish themselves on the new line of demarcation. But, as against these two unfavorable factors, we believe that disturbances during a short period of Jugo-Slav withdrawal are less apt to lead to serious trouble than is the continuous strain of Jugo-Slav occupation, and that later the mountains themselves will prevent, or at least greatly hinder any Jugo-Slav hostility taking the form of artillery reprisals or “punitive expeditions”. In short, we believe that the complete withdrawal of the Jugo-Slavs to the south of the Karawankens would tend more towards the avoidance of hostilities than would a prolonged Jugo-Slav military occupation of the Jaunthal.

17. To sum up our decision, we believe that the line of provisional demarcation, as defined and agreed to in the Protocol, should be

the watershed of the Karawankens (technical description of this line to be given in Report No. 10).⁵⁵ We base our conviction on each and all of the three factors of decision of the Protocol (geographical, national desires, and effect on peace), and our conviction holds in each and all of the four districts enumerated above.

18. In reaching the above decision, we confined ourselves strictly to the letter, as well as to the spirit of the Protocol. We refused to consider the effect which a provisional line of demarcation established by us might have on the final frontier as determined in Paris. Having reached our decision without regard to this consideration, we feel at liberty to say that, should the line of demarcation be used by the Austrians as an argument for the final frontier (in spite of the protocol), the burden of proof which we have unavoidably thrown on the Jugo-Slavs would not rest heavily upon them. Theirs is the side which will have the best, if not the only direct representation at Paris; theirs is the side least prejudiced in the eyes of the Entente Powers; and theirs is the side which has the ethnological argument of the Slovene blood (though we believe not Jugo-Slav feeling) in the districts our line gives to the Austrians.

**SHERMAN MILES
LE ROY KING**

⁴⁸ Reports of Professor Martin and Professor Kerner not printed.

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Map not reproduced.

⁵¹ Annexes not attached to file copy of this document.

⁵² *Supra*.

⁵³ Protocol not printed; despatch No. 31 printed on p. 498 [*Pg. 498 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)*].

⁵⁴ Map not reproduced.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/89

[Document 183]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 77

VIENNA, February 12, 1919.
[Received February 19.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that since sending in my Dispatch No. 73⁵⁶ containing the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles and Lieutenant King, of Major Martin and of Professor Kerner, I have reread the reports, consulted the annexes which I had kept back (and forward herewith),⁵⁷ and I have carefully considered the whole matter. My own conclusion is that, with certain reservations, I am now ready to accept the conclusions of the first two reports and do not accept those of Professor Kerner for the following reasons.

I believe that the region in dispute has a clearly marked geographical and economic unity and that any arrangement, even if only temporary, which disturbs that unity will do harm to all parties. This unity which is based on natural features has been still further strengthened by the development of modern means of communication, especially by the building of railways. It will be still further strengthened in the future when the rich resources in water power of the Drau River are developed. The fact that so many of the Slovenian inhabitants of the valley wish to belong to Austria rather than to Jugo-Slavia, and that they seem to have got along better with the German speaking population than in some other regions is eloquent testimony to the strength of the economic ties that bind the people together.

I was familiar beforehand with the Austrian assertion that most of the Slovenes in this region wish to remain under Austrian rule, but, though I knew that language and national desires do not always coincide—as for instance in the case of Alsace—I have felt skeptical

about the statement in this case and have believed that at least it required to be proved. It now seems to me that the visiting Americans have brought back convincing proof of the truth of the Austrian assertion, though all were incredulous at the start and, if anything, were prejudiced in favor of the Jugo-Slavs. Three of them have returned converted, and even the fourth does not deny the existence of a pro-Austrian sentiment among the Slovenes, although he tends to minimize its extent. I do not believe the majority reports have put their side too strongly; indeed I think they might have made more of the fact that at the present moment, after the defeat and the prostration of Austria and the creation of a new, ardent and aspiring Jugo-Slav State, all the sentimental and moral advantages appear on the side of the latter and would tend to exercise a stronger influence now than may be the case in the future. I therefore regard the pro-Austrian sympathies of at least a considerable portion, and perhaps a majority of the Slovenes of Carinthia, as being proved. In their case the principle of self-determination and language do not coincide, and it is the principle of self-determination which should be observed.

The Slovenes will undoubtedly claim that, even if the above facts are true, the Austrian leanings of their brethren in Carinthia are due to government pressure, schools, propaganda and other methods of Germanization, and that in a few years under the rule of their own people the Carinthian Slovenes would become as loyal to their nationality as the rest of their brethren. This may be so but it is not certain. The economic and other forces may be too strong the other way. It is, too, precisely the argument used by the Germans in regard to the French sentiment of Alsace in the year 1871, and history has shown the falsity of that argument. We are dealing with the way people feel now, not with the way they may be going to feel some day.

Professor Kerner's dissenting report, though judicious, does not convince me. His division of the inhabitants of Southern Carinthia into six categories tends to confuse the issue. There are always among partisans of any cause some who are more or less zealous and who would accept a solution they disliked rather than another which they disliked still more. The questions put by the party to the people interrogated seem to have been clear cut and the answers capable of being put on one side or the other. Some of Professor Kerner's other

arguments also seem to me rather in the nature of special pleading, though his intention to be scrupulously fair is evident.

But, while accepting in general the conclusion of Messrs. Miles, Martin and King, I have some serious reservations to make. These reservations are based on the grounds, not of justice but of expediency. I admit that I do not feel quite as convinced about Region No. 4, the so-called Jaun Thal, as I do about the other three on which they have reported. But even granting that they are right, as I believe they are, I am not sure that the evacuation of this territory by the Jugo-Slav forces will tend to promote the peace of the region. However just and well-founded the decision of the majority of the examining party has been, there is no avoiding the fact that it grants everything that the Austrians demand, and more than most of them hoped for, and confirms the worst fears of the Jugo-Slavs. This may well be due to the present temper and situation of the two parties—the one of them so stricken that it hardly expects the smallest favors and the other so flushed with success as to have lost sight of moderation. Nevertheless such a decision is not without danger. If a permanent line were being drawn one might take into account only principles of justice, but, in a mere temporary arrangement intended to keep the peace, other things have to be considered. The easiest way in such cases is usually the maintenance of the *status quo* as nearly as possible, for movement means friction. But, granting that in this case the *status quo* may not be desirable, the less it is changed the less opportunity there will be for untoward incidents where it is hard to fix the blame and which lead to recrimination and ill feeling; and which may lead again to open warfare. If each party had to yield to about an equal extent, there might be much grumbling but acquiescence ought not be difficult. In a decision where all yielding must be done by one side, and that the more excited one, the risk run may be serious.

At the present moment there seems no necessity for haste in publishing any decision. Both the Austrians and the Jugo-Slavs wish to bring in further testimony. The Jugo-Slavs show signs of alarm lest the conclusions reached may be unfavorable to them, in which case they would prefer that the matter drag along. In the meanwhile,

both sides are on their good behavior for fear of prejudicing their chances.

The suspense is trying for the unfortunate people on the two sides of what was the firing line, but it must continue whatever temporary arrangement is now made until their final destinies are settled at Paris. I am therefore not purposing to make any public statement for the time being, but shall watch the course of events.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

⁵⁶ *Ante*, p. 500 [*Pg. 500 includes portions of [Doc. 181](#) and [Doc. 182](#)*].

⁵⁷ Annexes not attached to file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/91

[Document 184]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 80

VIENNA, February 14, 1919.
[Received February 20.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith a report by Lt. Col. Sherman Miles, Major Lawrence Martin, and Lt. LeRoy King, one by Major Martin alone, and one by Prof. R. J. Kerner⁵⁸ with recommendations concerning the future boundary between German Austria and Yugoslavia. I have asked these gentlemen to make such recommendations because owing to their recent investigations in Southern Carinthia and study of the problems there, they are peculiarly qualified for the task. They have not done work of the sort for Styria, but the problems are so much the same that it is not difficult for them to argue, though with less certainty, by analogy. Whatever may be the incompleteness of their evidence, I believe that they are in a better position to make unbiased and competent recommendations to the Commission than anyone else. I doubt if any of the Allied powers will have testimony of equal value.

As in the reports on a temporary boundary for Carinthia, (Enclosed with my Despatch No. 73),⁵⁹ the opinion of Prof. Kerner disagrees with that of the other three gentlemen. Here again my own opinion coincides with that of the majority. When all is said and done, the differences between the two recommendations come down to simple principles. The recommendation of Prof. Kerner, the frontier line of the Drave River, is based on the principle of nationality as expressed by language and is justified from that point of view. The recommendations of the other three investigators are in accordance with what they believe, and it seems to me with good reason, to be the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants, that is to say the principle of self-determination. We have thus a clear-cut issue. Of

course the Yugoslavs and their partisans will deny that there is a pro-Austrian feeling among the Slovenes south of the Drave and will make an outcry if a contrary view prevails, but that does not affect the rights and wrongs of the case, if the evidence is sufficiently conclusive.

In this as in other connections, the geographic and economic unity of the Drave Valley, especially dwelt upon by Major Martin, a competent professional geographer, should be taken into consideration. His arguments appear to me irrefutable and a reference to the small maps, "Distribution of Cultures in the Austrian Alps" and "Density of Population in the Austrian Alps", appended by him, Annexes 3 and 4,⁶⁰ serves to strengthen the impression. The testimony of the people on the spot corresponds with this. Even in these excited times, when national sentiment is at white heat, evidently many of the inhabitants of the Drave Valley of both nationalities wish above all things to remain under one government, whatever that may be, rather than to be separated in a way that they realize would be ruinous to them. Their preference for Austrian rule may therefore be regarded as being primarily due to a legitimate sense of their own interests and not to national propaganda.

If the objects of the Commission are not to reverse the results of the colonization, peaceful or otherwise, of centuries, but to establish the future frontiers on the lines most satisfactory in themselves and most in accordance with the wishes of the people immediately concerned, I venture to think that the recommendations of Lt. Col. Miles, Major Martin and Lt. LeRoy King should be accepted as correct.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CART COOLIDGE

[Enclosure]

*Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles, Major Lawrence Martin and Lieutenant Le Roy King to
Professor A. C. Coolidge*

Subject: Study of the final frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia in the provinces of Carinthia and Styria.

1. By your direction we submit the following report on the above question, based on our recent ten days investigation in Carinthia, and on two days of study and observation in Styria, made in connection with the provisional line of demarcation in Carinthia. Our field work in Carinthia consisted largely in the attempt to arrive at the real desires of the people in the disputed districts of that province, and secondarily in a study of the geography, both physical and economic. We believe that this field work has given us a fairly good insight into the questions which should affect the final frontier in Carinthia. Our work in Styria, on the other hand, was so general in nature and so short in duration that our conclusions on the question of the final frontier of that province can only be made by analogy from our work in Carinthia.

The general problem.

2. The following basic facts of the problem impressed themselves upon us more and more strongly as our work continued.

(a) The northern fringe of the Slovene population has been so thoroughly Germanized that it does not wish to be separated from Austria. This of course, is a general statement, and refers only to the majority sentiment. The Yugoslavs contend that this Germanization is artificial and has been effected almost entirely by political and social oppression. The Germans, on the other hand, contend that it is the natural result of the benefits which German economics and education have given the Slovenes. This raises the question of what "self-determination" means when applied to a people who do not want to join the nation of their blood-brothers, or else are absolutely indifferent to all national questions, however these effects may have been produced. Personally, we feel that the factor of economics enters so largely into the present and future happiness of these people that it should be given the greatest consideration. It does not seem to us that a people now enjoying

the benefits of the more highly developed Austrian commercial life, and consciously or unconsciously clinging to that life when expressing their desire to remain Austrian, should be forcibly joined to the Yugoslav state.

- (b) The contention of the Yugoslavs that self-determination is obscured in the Slovene population by terrorism, we found to be utterly unfounded. We examined case after case of alleged terrorism on the part of the Austrians, because we wished to determine whether or not the Slovenes were being bullied into saying what they did not think. We found only the most ridiculously tame foundation for their “atrocities stories”, and a great deal of direct proof that the Slovenes had no fear in declaring for Yugoslavia when they really thought that way.
- (c) The respective nationalistic claims of the two sides, Austrian and Yugoslav, are made from such totally different points of view that they cannot be considered to be on the same plane. The Austrian claim is both more intelligent and more conservative. It is that of a beaten people who see clearly that they must give up a great deal, and that the burden of proof in all cases rests heavily upon them. The Yugoslav authorities, on the other hand, are men who have had much less experience in government and whose reason has been warped by long and very bitter political oppression. They now suddenly find themselves in an infinitely better political position than their Austrian antagonists, and do not hesitate to make the most of it. Their maximum claim, therefore, includes almost the last Slav in Austrian territory. When confronted by the fact that these last Slavs say they want to remain Austrian, the Yugoslav replies that this is the effect either of terrorism or of forceful Germanization, and therefore should not be considered. From our study of the two contending claims, both on the spot and from the official documents of the authorities, we are led to the conclusion that there is, in general, more reason in the maximum claims of the Austrians than in the minimum claims of the Yugoslavs.

3. No conclusion as to the final frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia can, we believe, be just unless it is based on these three basic facts, i. e., that there are many Slovenes along the border who really want to remain with Austria, that Slovene self-determination is

not obscured by Austrian terrorism, and that the Austrian and Yugoslav nationalistic claims are not on the same plane of reasoning.

4. The remaining considerations which affect the question of final frontier, in addition to self-determination, are, we believe, geographic and economic.

Self determination.

5. We append a map hereto (marked "A")⁶¹ compiled from the Austrian census of 1910, showing the racial distribution in Carinthia on the basis of the *umgangssprache* (language of intercourse). We used this map in Carinthia as a basis of study, but keeping always in mind first, that it in no way shows the density of population, and, second, that the *umgangssprache* (as we found out for ourselves) is not a good indication of the desires of the people.

6. It is apparent from the map that, should the final frontier run along the northern fringe of the Slovene population, the basin of Klagenfurt, which is the heart of Carinthia, would be cut, and the economic life of all Carinthians would suffer in consequence. As a matter of fact, our investigations in Carinthia convinced us beyond question that all of the people, Slovenes as well as Germans, in the economic basin of Klagenfurt and its two sub-markets, Villach and Völkermarkt, have the strongest desire to remain together, and preferably under Austrian rule. That part of Carinthia which lies south of the Gail and the Drau is to a lesser extent economically dependent on Klagenfurt and its subsidiary markets. The Slovene blood is here more predominant (as shown on the map), and the desire of the people is not so strongly pro-Carinthian or pro-Austrian as it is north of the rivers. Nevertheless, we found by actual field investigation (and very much to our astonishment) that the majority sentiment of the people south of the rivers and north of the Karawanken was for Austrian, rather than Yugoslav nationality. We consider that we have very strong proof of this fact (developed at length in our report No. 9,⁶² forwarded to Paris by your despatch No. 73), and were much impressed by finding the same sentiment in the territory occupied by the Yugoslav forces as in that occupied by the Austrians.

7. Therefore, from the point of view of self-determination, and taking self-determination in its literal meaning, we would recommend that the final frontier in southeastern Carinthia follow the watershed of the Karawanken. (A technical description of the above line is to be found in our report No. 10,⁶³ forwarded to Paris under your despatch No. 73).

8. To the west of a north and south line through Tarvis (now occupied by the Italians), there is a Slovene population in the valley of the Gail, as shown on the accompanying map "A". Although our investigations did not take us up this valley, we obtained clear indications that these Slovenes, economically dependent on the German town Villach, have no strong pro-Yugoslav feelings, but, on the contrary, have a strong desire to remain under the same political administration as that controlling their Austrian market. Hence we believe that the Slovenes of the Gail valley should be considered, from the point of view of self-determination, as Austrians. Without desiring to go into any of the details of the complicated Italo-Austrian frontier question, we would point out that the Karawanken watershed, recommended above as the final frontier, has a natural extension to the west in the watershed of the Karnische Alps.

9. By analogy between Styria and Carinthia, on the question of the difference between the blood and the desires of the people, we would strongly recommend that the frontier in Styria be not drawn along the northern fringe of Slovene blood, but that it follow some such natural line as that of the Bacher Mountains and thence across to the Mur southeast of Radkersburg, thus making due allowance not only for the German towns of Marburg, Mureck and Radkersburg, but also for the Slovene population around those centers, whom we believe really desire to remain Austrian.

Geographic consideration.

10. The best geographic frontier being that which runs along the least inhabited and accessible regions, there is no question in our minds but that, in the case of southeastern Carinthia, the rugged and forbidding Karawanken Mountains would make the best frontier. The line of the Gail and the Drau is, of course, a possible line, as are

several other conceivable ones further to the north. But the Gail and Drau have the disadvantage of all rivers, from the point of view of a frontier, that intercourse flows down to and crosses them from both sides. From the town of Unterdrauburg to the small city of Marburg this disadvantage of the Drau is less marked, since the river flows through a deep valley with fairly precipitous and wooded slopes. Nevertheless, even in this region the Drau is by no means an ideal frontier, especially since it becomes involved in the difficult question of waterpower. As the larger tributaries of the Drau and the Gail all flow down into them from the north, no really good frontier, from the geographical point of view, could be fixed north of these rivers without going deeply into a population which is German by blood as well as Austrian by sentiment.

11. The geographic consideration therefore leads us to the same conclusion as that reached in considering self-determination—i. e., that the watershed of the Karawanken forms the ideal boundary of southeastern Carinthia. And, by analogy, the west and east extensions of the Karawanken, the Karnische Alps and the Bacher Mountains, we believe to be the best frontier.

Economic considerations.

12. The economic unity of Carinthia is indisputable, especially after a study of the question on the spot. Economically, the whole province centers in the Klagenfurt Basin, marked out by the German towns of Villach, Klagenfurt, Völkermarkt, Bleiburg and Lavamünd. This unity is, of course, brought about by the geographical configuration of the province. A more detailed discussion of the economic conditions as they should affect the final frontier, will be found in the report on this subject of Major Lawrence Martin, Chief, Geographical Section, Military Intelligence, General Staff. As the above mentioned report is written by a student of economic geography, it is not thought necessary to go into great detail on this line of reasoning in the present report. We may sum up our study by the recommendation that, from the point of view of economics, it is highly undesirable that the province of Carinthia be divided by a political frontier. If the political unity of Carinthia is respected, the evidence we obtained from the Slovenes themselves shows that self-

determination will unquestionably give it to Austria rather than to Yugoslavia or to Italy.

13. Extending our recommendation as to the final frontier eastward through the province of Styria, by analogy from our studies in Carinthia, we recommend that the frontier, from the point of view of economics, run along the Bacher Gebirge, across the Drau south and east of Marburg and thence across the Windisch Bühlen to some point on the Mur River southeast of Radkersburg (as shown on attached maps).⁶⁴ It will undoubtedly be objected that this proposed frontier would cut straight across the Pettau Feld (Basin of Pettau). This might operate to the detriment of the city of Marburg. But on the other hand, Marburg (as we have seen) is so essentially Austrian, and the Pettau Basin (we believe) so essentially Slovene, that no economic injustice would be done either side. Marburg would still be what it is now, the Austrian center of a winegrowing district largely owned by Austrians. Its being cut off from the Pettau Basin would probably not greatly affect either it or the basin, since the natural effect of the frontier would simply be to build up the town of Pettau as the basin center, while Marburg would still continue to feed to the north and to the west.

Summary.

14. Reasoning in the light of the three facts which our studies have convinced us are true and essential—that there are many Slovenes who do not wish to join Yugoslavia, that this self-determination is not the result of Austrian terrorism, and that the Yugoslav and Austrian territorial claims are not made on the same plane of logic or expediency—we strongly recommend that the final frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia in the province of Carinthia be drawn along the watershed of the Karawanken Mountains. By analogy, we further recommend that this frontier be extended to the west and to the east by lines described above and drawn in ink on the maps attached hereto.

15. It is only fair to say that we began the study of this frontier with very different impressions, and that facts alone have changed them and have led us to believe that the line described above is the best

from each of the three points of view of self-determination, geography, and economics.

16. The Germans in 1871 took Alsace-Lorraine on the grounds that most of the people spoke German, were economically dependent on Germany, and would in a few years become thorough Germans. It seems to us that the Jugoslavs are now making an analogous claim in regard to the Slovenes in Carinthia and Styria, but with less basis of fact, both ethnically and economically, and consequently with even less chance of ultimate success. The difference between the potential powers of national absorption of the Germany of '71 and the Jugoslavia of today are, of course, obvious.

Note.

In this report we have not attempted to describe in detail our methods of investigation, nor the resultant information obtained in the various geographical districts into which, for convenience, we divided southeastern Carinthia. These details will be found in our reports forwarded to Paris by your despatch No. 73 on February 10th.

**SHERMAN MILES
LAWRENCE MARTIN
LE ROY KING**

⁵⁸ Reports of Major Martin and Professor Kerner not printed.

⁵⁹ *Ante*, p. 500 [Pg. 500 includes portions of [Doc. 181](#) and [Doc. 182](#)].

⁶⁰ Maps not reproduced.

⁶¹ Map not reproduced.

⁶² *Ante*, p. 504 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 182](#)].

⁶³ Not printed.

⁶⁴ Maps not reproduced.

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 105

VIENNA, February 24, 1919.
[Received February 26.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Sherman Miles was mistaken in one of his statements to the Commission concerning the temporary settlement of the Carinthian Boundary. He declared that "both sides are awaiting the decision somewhat impatiently". This is not and has not been true of the Jugo-Slavs. From the first they have striven to evade the carrying out of their promises in case the conclusion arrived at should be contrary to their desires. On February 8th I was called upon by a secretary of the Czech Legation here who told me that he had been asked by telephone from Laibach to request me to receive a delegation from there, and also to postpone my announcement of the decision reached by Messrs. Miles and King. I pointed out that this request was strange, in view of the binding nature of the agreement that had been entered into. The Secretary answered that the Slovenes were a new people inexperienced in such matters and allowances should be made for them. On the following day the delegation called upon me. They recognized the obligation they had accepted but wanted time to bring in further evidence and they also requested a more or less indefinite postponement if the decision were going to be unfavorable to them. I told them I had not yet seen the decision myself, that I would accept their evidence and would let them know before I issued my statement. On February 15th I was called upon by Mr. Pogacnik, former head of the government at Laibach and now the newly appointed Serbian Minister to Austria. Going on the supposition that he and his countrymen practically knew what the decision was going to be (in which he was mistaken) he made a request in more formal fashion that I postpone announcing it. To this I made no reply.

It is evident now that, while the authorities at Laibach were asking me, almost humbly, as a favor to them not to announce just yet the decision by which they had promised to be bound, they were at the same time taking measures at Belgrade to have a formal protest made against it by the Serbian Government. I hear from Mr. Dodge⁶⁵ that the Prime Minister made the request to him at the instigation of the Vice-President, a Slovene. Mr. Dodge sent the protest on February 12th. It was doubtless hoped that it would arrive in season to have me receive orders from Paris not to give out the decision. This may not affect the rights and wrongs of the dispute but is rather characteristic of the methods that the Jugo-Slavs have pursued throughout it.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

⁶⁵ H. Percival Dodge, special agent of the Department of State in Serbia since June 28, 1917.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/91a: Telegram

[Document 186]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, February 26, 1919—9 p.m.

923. Professor Coolidge some weeks ago informed the Commission that at the urgent request of both the Slovenes and the German Austrians he had consented to investigate the frontier dispute between these two peoples in Carinthia with a view to helping put an end to the unnecessary bloodshed which was taking place in this region. Lt. Colonel Sherman T. Miles of the United States Army, a member of the Coolidge party, after a personal examination of frontier conditions in Carinthia, has reported to the Commission in Paris and has recommended that a certain line be indicated as that which should serve temporarily to separate the two races, both parties having previously agreed in writing to abide by his decision in the matter.

The Commission has sent the following telegram to Professor Coolidge which indicates its attitude in the matter:⁶⁶

“Colonel Miles has reported to the Commission the details of the Carinthian boundary question. You must realize that the Commission can under no circumstances act independently in such a matter and therefore you should not give publicity to any, even a temporary, boundary line as being that determined by American officials. The Commission has already received a protest from the Serbian government in regard to the supposed line of demarcation decided upon by Miles.

At yesterday’s session of the Council of Ten a resolution was introduced and accepted referring the determination of a

temporary line in Carinthia to the Technical Committee which has been appointed to deal with such questions.⁶⁷ It is hoped that a neutral zone that will put an end to hostilities in that region will be determined upon in the near future. You may inform the parties to the dispute, preferably orally, that you understand that the matter of fixing a temporary boundary between the German Austrians and the Slovenes has been taken up in the Supreme War Council in Paris and that therefore the matter is entirely outside the competence of any single person or of the American Commission alone.”

It appears that both Professor Coolidge and Colonel Miles have become more deeply involved in this boundary dispute than they should have allowed themselves to be. The Commission however realizes the difficulty of Professor Coolidge’s position and has therefore endeavored to relieve him of personal embarrassment by referring the boundary dispute to the Supreme War Council.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁶⁶ Sent as telegram No. 4, February 24, 10 p.m.

⁶⁷ See BC–37, minute 4, [vol. IV, p. 98](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/155: Telegram

[Document 187]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

VIENNA, February 27, 1919.
[Received February 28—6 p.m.]

112. Telegram No. 4^{[68](#)} received and instructions respectfully noted. Do not see necessity of making any statement at all as at present advised and do not propose to do so without necessity. Austria has accordingly ceased to press for one since news of presence of Miles in Paris. Jugoslavs have wanted postponement from the first. Error in statement of Miles in this respect pointed out in report number 105.^{[69](#)} Situation along frontier troubled. Miscellaneous firing and charges of intended attack on the Partaga sidings. Rosenbach tunnel through the mountain recently reopened for the benefit of food trains. According to latest reports Jugoslavs have torn up track again.

COOLIDGE

^{[68](#)} See telegram No. 923, *supra*.

^{[69](#)} *Ante*, p. 520 [Pg. 520 includes portions of [Doc. 184](#) and [Doc. 185](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/405

[Document 188]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 247

VIENNA, April 25, 1919.
[Received April 28.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose herewith some material of various sorts concerning the situation on the Austrian-Jugoslav frontier.⁷⁰

Conditions there are undoubtedly deplorable. The long uncertainty as to the ultimate future of the region has more than got on the nerves of the population, and made the task of the authorities, who have to keep the peace, extremely difficult. I am not only in frequent receipt of written complaints of the sort of these I am now enclosing but I am also continually appealed to personally with fresh stories of the misbehavior of the Slovene authorities in the occupied districts, of violations of the armistices, wanton acts of aggression, and other things of the sort. I believe that these stories are in the main true but that such outrages as there are, are due rather to the nature of the situation itself and to the exasperation produced by what seems to the people intolerable delays, than to any special evil intention.

I have no doubt that the Slovenes on their part have a tale of grievances which they are repeating to the government of Belgrade and which are transmitted to Paris, or at least to the ears of sympathetic Allied correspondents.

Meanwhile the unfortunate population of the disputed regions is suffering severely. Owing to the cutting off of communications, often contrary to agreement, the daily life of thousands of people is constantly affected. In many places there is a shortage of necessities, and no one is sure of the morrow. No permanent amelioration of the

situation can be hoped for until the final boundaries have been established.

Expression of opinion, and especially plebiscites, are worth very little in any disputed territories when they are in favor of the side that actually occupies the region. Anything like a fair expression of opinion in such votes as have been taken here is inconceivable under the present circumstances. The only demonstrations that are worth while are those directed against the powers that be, and plebiscites of this sort, for obvious reasons, are few and far between.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

70 None of the enclosures printed.

Termination of the Coolidge Mission

[\[189\] The Office of the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary](#)

[Paris,] April 27, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/160

[\[190\] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Professor A. C. Coolidge](#)

Paris, May 16, 1919—8 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/172: Telegram

[\[191\] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State](#)

Paris, May 21, 1919—9 p.m. [Received May 22—2:33 a.m.]

763.72119/5058: Telegram

[\[192\] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Professor A. C. Coolidge](#)

Paris, May 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/183a

***The Office of the Secretary General of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace to the
Commissioners Plenipotentiary***

No. 250

[PARIS,] April 27, 1919.

Subject: Status of Coolidge mission.

Statement:

Mr. Grew has received a letter from Professor Coolidge in Vienna in which he suggests that his Mission be brought to a close when the terms of peace with Austria have definitely been decided upon. His reasons are:

- (a) The mission was sent out to do certain work in connection with the making of the treaty of peace; and that work is now about done;
- (b) Ministers have been appointed to Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, leaving Professor Coolidge without jurisdiction in those territories. He is having his last man leave Prague, and Lieutenant Foster can no longer work in Poland under Professor Coolidge;
- (c) No need for observers in Jugo-Slavia after question of boundaries is definitely decided;
- (d) The situation has changed, and food and economic questions are coming more to the front,—while the Coolidge Mission still has no direct political and diplomatic relations;
- (e) A well equipped French Mission has just arrived in Vienna, and is giving not only advice but warning to the Foreign Secretary. Professor Coolidge's Mission is one of diminishing importance and dignity;
- (f) Very few members of the Coolidge Mission have not, at one time or another, expressed a desire to leave;

(g) Professor Coolidge makes it clear that he does not mean to leave so long as his presence in Vienna may be regarded as really necessary or even highly useful to the Commission and the Government; but does not wish to stay indefinitely after his work has ceased until the Government sends a regular official to fill his place.

Captain Roosevelt also writes from Vienna strongly expressing his view that the work of the Coolidge Mission is over. He states that the time has come for the Mission to “play on the safe side” and leave; and bases his reason for this mainly on the fact that the people persist in thinking (although it is frequently denied) that the Mission is more than one merely to get information. He states that the people have great faith in the Mission, but “greater will be their disillusion when they discover that the Mission has stayed long, listened sympathetically, studied much and done nothing.”

Mr. Dulles does not see how it would at present be possible to get along without a Mission in Vienna, which he feels is essential until the Austrian and Hungarian representatives actually come to Paris. He feels that the State Department should endeavor to replace the temporary Missions sent out by the Commission by Consular officers prepared to stay permanently and to take out their exequaturs as soon as peace is signed. Although this is not entirely according to diplomatic precedent, he states that the French and British (generally more “hide-bound” than we) have taken the lead,—the French by sending such a man as Allizé to Vienna and the British by sending one of their former Consular representatives.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that steps be taken to replace the Coolidge Mission as soon as possible by appropriate Consular representatives who should, of course, not act as such until after the signing of peace.

APPROVAL, DISAPPROVAL, OR COMMENT

28 APRIL, 1919.

At the meeting of the Commissioners this morning the above memorandum was read regarding the possible withdrawal of the Coolidge Mission from Vienna. The Commissioners do not see how it would be possible to withdraw the Mission at the present moment, nor until the representatives of Austria and Hungary had been summoned to meet the Allies. The possibility of taking steps to replace the Coolidge Mission by Consular representatives was carefully considered, and Mr. Lansing approved the suggestion that a telegram be sent to the Department of State pointing out the desirability of relieving Prof. Coolidge at the earliest possible moment and inquiring whether it would be possible to send a Consular officer to Vienna to act unofficially until the signature of Peace would make it possible for him to take out his exequatur. Mr. Lansing further approved the suggestion that the name of Mr. Coffin, former Consul General at Budapest should be suggested to the Department as a man who might be qualified to take the place of Prof. Coolidge.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/172: Telegram

[Document 190]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Professor A. C. Coolidge

PARIS, May 16, 1919—8 p.m.

83. The Commission desires you to make immediate arrangements to bring your mission to a close and to proceed to Paris as soon as possible. Halstead, former Consul General at Vienna, now at Stockholm, has been instructed by the Department to proceed immediately to Vienna to take over the work which you will be leaving. Vice Consul Heingartner will leave Paris for Vienna Tuesday, May 20th and is to remain there with Halstead. You may turn over to him such of your records and material as you consider should be of value to Mr. Halstead. In case any member of your party, including clerks, are willing to remain in Vienna to assist Mr. Halstead temporarily the Commission would be glad to have them stay pending definite arrangements which Mr. Halstead will make upon his arrival. Heingartner will receive instructions from the Commission in regard to the nature of his work.

As the Commission desires that you should be in Paris as soon as possible after the presentation of the terms to the Austrian delegates, which will probably take place between the 23rd and 27th instant, you may use your own judgment as to whether it is necessary for you to await in Vienna to close all the details of your mission personally. It is suggested that Lt. King be instructed to proceed directly to Paris possibly via Fiume and Trieste in case you are able to communicate such a message to him.

Acknowledge receipt of this message and inform the Commission of your plans.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

763.72119/5058: Telegram

[Document 191]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, May 21, 1919—9 p.m.
[Received May 22—2:33 a.m.]

2197. Robert Heingartner reported in Paris on May 20 and left the same evening for Vienna with instructions from the Commission to continue the press and political information, telegrams and despatches which have previously been sent by the Coolidge Mission. These telegrams will be repeated to the Department. Coolidge leaves Vienna the evening of the 22d after having consulted with Heingartner. Captain Roosevelt, Vice Consul Bundy and the other members of his mission will also shortly return to Paris. Pending the arrival in Vienna of Consul General Halstead, the Commission is requesting Coolidge to leave such clerical and coding personnel in Vienna as may be feasible and the Commission will endeavor to arrange temporarily for this personnel to be financed from any residue of the fund which has been set aside for Coolidge's mission. With the arrival of Consul General Halstead, it seems necessary that the Department of State should take over exclusively the question of finance and personnel. Coolidge has been reporting by telegraph in Navy Code. For the sake of convenience for both the Commission and the Department it seems desirable that Halstead should be supplied with the necessary Departmental codes.

AMERICAN MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/183a

[Document 192]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Professor A.
C. Coolidge***

PARIS, May 29, 1919.

MY DEAR PROFESSOR COOLIDGE: On behalf of the American Commissioners I take pleasure in extending to you the sincere thanks of the Commission for the efficient and responsible work which you have accomplished in Austria and Hungary. The Commissioners desire me to add that your reports have been of valuable assistance in judging of the situation in the countries on which you have been reporting.

Please extend the Commission's thanks to the members of your party who so efficiently cooperated with you in your work.

Yours very sincerely,

ROBERT LANSING

The Halstead Mission:

Contents

German Austria

[\[193\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, June 13, 1919. [Received June 16.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/14

[\[194\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, June 14, 1919. [Received June 16.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/15

[\[195\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, June 17, 1919. [Received June 19.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/30

[\[196\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, June 29, 1919. [Received July 1.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/72

[\[197\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, July 2, 1919—5:30 p.m. [Received July 3—10:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/88: Telegram

[\[198\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, July 4, 1919—5 p.m. [Received July 5—2 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/98: Telegram

[\[199\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, July 6, 1919—11:50 a.m. [Received July 7—10 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/109: Telegram

[\[200\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, July 7, 1919—3:20 p.m. [Received July 7—6:50 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/112: Telegram

[\[201\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, July 11, 1919. [Received July 15.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/131

[202] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 16, 1919. [Received July 21.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/154

[203] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 18, 1919—4 p.m. [Received July 19—4:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/163: Telegram

[204] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 18, 1919. [Received July 21.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/168

[205] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 18, 1919. [Received July 21.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/169

[206] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 19, 1919. [Received July 22.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/174

[207] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 27, 1919. [Received July 29.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/220

[208] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 1, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/249

[209] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 3, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/260

[210] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 8, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/291

[211] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/301

[212] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/310

[213] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 14, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/318

[214] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 28, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/377

[215] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/410

[216] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 7, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/421

[217] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/431

[218] Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/443^{1/2}

[219] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/444

[220] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/453

[221] Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 21, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/480¹/₂

[222] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 26, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/498

[223] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 28, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/505

[224] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, October 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/539

[225] Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State

undated

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/560¹/₂

[226] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, November 7, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/607

[227] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, November 21, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/640

[228] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, November 26, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/661

[229] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, November 27, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/663

[230] Memorandum by Mr. A. W. DuBois

Vienna, December 1, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/682

[231] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, December 3, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/671

[232] Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State

Vienna, December 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/687

[233] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, December 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/696

[234] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, December 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/693

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/14

[Document 193]

***Mr. Albert Halstead¹ to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 291

VIENNA, June 13, 1919.
[Received June 16.]

SIRS: I have the honor to remind the Commission to Negotiate Peace of telegrams sent since my arrival here regarding conditions in Vienna,² and the general dissatisfaction and despair occasioned by the Peace terms. It seems desirable to explain the situation more fully:

On Monday there was a manifest feeling of unrest and anxiety with rumors as to a possible attempt of the Communistic element to take advantage of the proposed *Volkswehr* demonstration against reduction in its numbers, which had been demanded by the Italian Military Mission, to overthrow the existing government and to replace it with a Soviet. It was known that large sums of Hungarian money were being distributed amongst workmen. Then the feeling that the peace terms leave absolutely no future for German Austria had bred a partial indifference to impending events.

On Wednesday this feeling had increased and a number of definite statements as to the probable attempt at a *coup d'état* were made. These were emphasized by more detailed information as to the anxiety of the police authorities which was available that night.

Yesterday Doctor Pistor, secretary of the Handels and Gewerbekammer, and director of the Deutschösterreichisches Warenverkehrsbüro, called at the office of the mission and in a very earnest manner outlined the difficulties of the situation, described the feeling of impotency that prevailed among all thoughtful German Austrians and indicated much resentment because the terms of the

peace treaty seem to them to give every consideration to the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, all of whom, they insist, had participated in the war, fighting, with the exception of a small proportion of the Czechoslovaks, with complete loyalty to the old regime but who had, when the collapse of the old empire was apparent become allies of its enemies.

Dr. Pistor explained in detail the plans of the Communistic faction to overthrow the government, speaking specifically of the Hungarian money that had been poured out. He declared that the *Volkswehr* with its 26,000 men was presumed to be at least one-third Communist and that a second third was uncertain. He told of the plan to attack the jail and release the criminal element so as to secure its support, and asserted that the men who are most in touch with the situation were afraid that the government would be unable, with the forces at its disposal to overcome the expected attack, and indicated that some members of the government, including Doctor Bauer, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Secretary of War Deutsch, were regarded as sympathetic with Communistic ideals, in fact that they were rabid Bolsheviki. He stated that the personnel of the new government had already been arranged, including Tomann, a radical workman and known Bolshevik, Dr. Fritz Adler who assassinated Minister President Sturgkt in 1916 and who, regarded as a second William Tell, was to give moral support. Dr. Pistor said he hesitated to mention the name that rumor had selected for the third member of the Soviet Council, but finally gave that of President Seitz of the National Assembly.

To prevent the success of this menacing plan he said that the only forces available were the six thousand reliable police, the *gendarmerie* numbering around two thousand men and a battalion of the old Imperial Guard of about four hundred men. Both sides are said to be well armed and to have machine guns as well as armored motor cars. Dr. Pistor expressed the opinion that if the tactics of the Communistic element were skillful the chances for success were greater than those for the defeat of the uprising, much depending on the police being able to divide the forces of the opposition.

At the time Dr. Pistor made this statement he emphatically declared that he preferred the success of the movement to the acceptance of the peace terms as at present drafted. Later he invited Vice-Consul Heingartner and myself to an informal dinner that night where there would be present Lieutenant-Colonel Causey, U. S. A.

Communication, Dr. Taylor and Mr. Simpson of the Food Mission and Mr. Upson of the War Trade Board. Mr. Heingartner and I accepted and I made the point that I would attend informally to listen to what would be said but not for discussion of any kind, which would have been out of my province.

Just before leaving the office Thursday evening a newspaper was brought in which announced that the government would not reduce the *Volkswehr*—it was evident that this announcement would not be made unless the Allies had consented to their refusal—and I did not send the telegram containing the report as to the plans for the coup because it seemed as if the concession to the *Volkswehr* would weaken the Communistic movement. The dinner last night was more representative than I had anticipated, and in addition to the Americans mentioned the following German Austrians were present: City Secretary Zerdik, Assistant City Secretary Dr. Ellenbogen, Section Chief Riedl, Section Chief Muhlvenzl, Vice Mayor Emmerling, Hofrat Dr. Tayenthal, Dr. Pistor, Regierungsrat Dr. Drucker, Sektionsrat Dr. Langer, Grossindustrieller Fross Bussing, Generaldirektor Prinzhorn, Direktor Koppstein, Direktor Kreisky, Direktorstellvertreter Steyrer, Direktorstellvertreter Plentl and Dr. Widimsky.

Generaldirektor Prinzhorn, President of the Warenverkehrsbüro presided. He discussed with me the existing situation in detail, and at the same table were the Secretary for Commerce and Public Works and Dr. Pistor. In the conversations which the Americans present had with these gentlemen and with every other German Austrian there, the unanimous opinion, expressed in all earnestness and with no apparent intention to impress the hearer, was that German Austria could not exist under the peace terms with the various restrictions on her activities and financial loans; that the only future lay in the union with Germany, which most of those present had in the past opposed, and that they would rather risk a Communistic

rule which might last only for a year or two rather than bind themselves to the terms of the peace treaty which they declare is a death sentence to what remains of old Austria. Various statements were made as to the paralysis to industry, the inability to secure coal and to the injurious effect of the closing of the Danube. It was emphasized that without free intercourse with Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Jugo-Slavia industry could not exist even on a reduced basis. It was further remarked that the city of Vienna which had been the financial center for the monarchy and had originally financed most of the enterprises in the new states now carved out of the monarchy must become depopulated and die unless unrestricted and unhampered commercial intercourse, such as existed in the past, were possible.

I have not forgotten that these statements were all made under the stress of great feeling and have only attempted to give the view of leading German Austrian industrialists and officials without expressing an opinion. Further, the apparent tendency to resist the peace terms is increased by the belief that the Peace Conference is not agreed, each of the four great powers have an entirely different point of view from the others, by the feeling that the failure to compel Hungary and Jugo-Slavia to comply with the orders of the Conference show a weakness that would make refusal on the part of German Austria less dangerous.

From many German Austrians, and from Entente sources as well, specific reports are received that the Italians have armed and assisted the Hungarian Soviet, that they have brought money for them from Hungary for use in Austria, and have intrigued here to bring about a Soviet government, the idea being, through the unrest in German Austria and Hungary to weaken the position of the Jugo-Slavs, whose attitude on the Fiume question and in regard to the eastern littoral of the Adriatic is offensive to Italian ambition. French activities in Czecho-Slovakia and Poland are subjects of much comment and it is reported that the Jugo Slavs have felt that they could manage their own affairs and have not welcomed French military officers there.

There is comment and criticism upon the various Entente missions here, the French being said to intrigue against each other, the Italians to have no strong control over themselves, and the English to talk and do nothing. Regarding the Americans here it is stated that the authority is so divided as to prevent the best results, a duplication of effort being very frequent because there is no real coordination.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

¹ Representative of the Commission in Vienna as observer to replace Professor A. C. Coolidge and his mission.

² None printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/15

[Document 194]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 292

VIENNA, June 14, 1919.
[Received June 16.]

SIRS: I have the honor to forward herewith a copy in French of an address³ delivered on the seventh of June to the National Assembly of Austria upon the treaty of peace which was made by Dr. Bauer, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This speech was handed to me by Dr. Bauer with whom I had an agreeable interview in which he spoke of the peace treaty and its effect upon Austria and manifested a real appreciation of the efforts of the United States to be just, but he stated the belief that the real situation could not have been understood at the Peace Conference. The treaty involved not only the bankruptcy of the state but that of the banks, the insurance companies and of the middle classes. In the speech herewith forwarded he discusses the financial conditions. As an illustration he said to me that under the terms of the treaty if an Austrian desired to pay a debt of one hundred thousand crowns in Czecho-Slovakia he would have to pay two hundred thousand because he was compelled to buy Swiss francs at a very high rate and change them into Czech money which at the break-up of the empire was the same as Austrian money. He stated that to buy money at this rate would actually double the debt. He admitted the right of the Allied Powers and United States to take German-Austrian property, but indicated that the terms imposed upon Austria as regards Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and the Jugo-Slav State were in a different category and that utter ruin of this country would be their result. For instance, he declared that most of the interests in Czechoslovakia were financed from Vienna, that here were the offices, there the factories and that the treaty permitted the seizure of these Czecho-Slovakian factories.

It may be of interest to say that I have succeeded in establishing relations with Dr. Bauer which will, I believe, be very useful in obtaining information for the Commission.

It seems proper to say further that Dr. Bauer spoke very highly of Professor Coolidge and the attitude he maintained while here, stating that Professor Coolidge was a friend of German-Austria.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

3 Not attached to file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/30

[Document 195]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 296

VIENNA, June 17, 1919.
[Received June 19.]

SIRS: I have the honor to remind the Commission that the telegrams from this office⁴ indicated the danger of an attempt to overthrow the existing government on Sunday, June 15th and to refer to my telegraphic report of yesterday giving details of the rioting with serious loss of life and great injury to many. This attempt failed because of the loyalty of the police and because the authorities had sufficient courage and wisdom to arrest about one hundred and forty of the leaders on Saturday so as to prevent them from directing the communistic activities.

It would appear that a careful plan was formed, with the assistance of Hungarian money and Hungarian advice, to use the proposed reduction in the *Volkswehr* as an excuse for a protest which was to be turned into an effort to establish a Soviet Government. The withdrawal of the proposal to reduce the *Volkswehr* temporarily changed the outlook but the leaders were still determined to proceed with the demonstration and to carry out their plans for a *coup d'état*. The arrest of the leaders changed the character of the demonstration into an attempt to storm the jail. The resistance to the effort to break through the police and the firing on the mob after they had first shot destroyed the plan temporarily. The city has naturally been shocked by the sacrifices entailed and as it must be admitted that the strong action of the government was to many a surprise.

The situation is improved but the loyalty on the part of the *Volkswehr*, which had been reported to have been permeated with communism and to be in large part unreliable, has caused a greater

feeling of confidence. The situation, it must be admitted, is still uncertain and the fact that the government has not as yet shown the disposition to be less firm is very satisfactory. The attitude of the Workmens' Party has throughout been in every sense correct and its disapproval of communism has been a source of strength of the greatest value.

It is the habit of those who, while apparently supporting the government are at heart opposed to Socialistic doctrine to charge that such leaders as Doctor Bauer and Secretary Deutsch of the War Department are really communists. These statements are manifestly, to a very considerable degree, based upon unfriendly views of Dr. Bauer's idealism but the fact that he while in Russia as a prisoner, knew Lenin and Trotsky furnishes some ground for the lack of confidence in this official. As far as I have been able to judge Dr. Bauer has, in all his expressions of opinion shown his disagreement with communism and in the talks that I had with him there was no sign of even a theoretical sympathy with communism. There had been indications, however, that he might have indirect relations with communism which would be advantageous to him in the event of the communists coming into power. It seems that, for the present at least, he should be accepted for his apparent face value.

Though the situation appears improved and though the communists have been defeated it does not follow that the danger of another attempt has disappeared. Some of those who are accustomed to study situations are of the opinion that the present is regarded as an unfavorable moment to renew the attempt at the overthrow of the government and that those who are not extreme communists but who are sympathetic with communism see that the movement had better be delayed until all the food supplies that are available have been obtained from the entente and until the harvest is in.

Only one newspaper, *Der Abend*, has shown any criticism of the Government's attitude and that paper in its issue yesterday declared that it was those who ordered the arrest of the leaders [who] were responsible for the outbreak. The bright weather, and improved food conditions which are, however, far from ideal have their natural influence in favor of good order but the critical industrial conditions

of the country and the real apprehension that the peace terms as dictated by the Paris Conference are destructive to the future of German Austria are seriously interfering with any certainty of continued order. The proposed demand of the railway employees for higher wages to be followed by a similar demand from the small public officials are discouraging incidents. I am told by a person who should be well advised but who is not in the least sympathetic with the Socialistic policy of the government though he is associated with the government, that State Socialism is impossible and that despite the certainty that there will be a levy on wealth on a graduated scale the proof that socialization of industry cannot be carried through is apt to weaken the existing government.

If the Germans do not sign the peace treaty it seems probable that the demand for a union with Germany will be strengthened, a union which, if carried out will seriously menace the security of Czecho Slovakia and increase the probability of a future war. In conclusion it may be said that the outlook is better, that the permanency of good order is not assured and that the future must depend upon the fate of the Hungarian Soviet Government and the real moral strength of the present government of German Austria.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁴ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/72

[Document 196]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 311

VIENNA, June 29, 1919.
[Received July 1.]

Subject: Food for home-coming prisoners of war.

SIRS: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 506 of June 28th⁵ with regard to prisoners of war who it is understood are about to be released by Italy, and to enclose a copy of a letter with translation from Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs von Pflügl. Mr. Pflügl when lunching with me the other day told me that he had been informed from Tyrol that about 400,000 prisoners of war would very shortly be released by the Italians and that the first 80,000 would come through Tyrol within the next fortnight. Of the 400,000 he stated perhaps 200,000 were German-Austrians, and spoke of the refusal of the Czechs to assist and stated that the other countries had not answered. His letter to me being written officially is more cautiously worded and gives no total number of prisoners but only mentions the first 80,000. He does not emphasize, as he did to me personally, the danger to be expected from these returning prisoners of war, but that is so self-evident as to require no italics.

Perhaps I should have referred the matter to Captain Gregory the head of the Food Administration here, but I have had no instructions as to cooperation with his work, so I take the obvious course of forwarding it to the Commission to Negotiate Peace with the respectful suggestion that the matter should be brought to the attention of the Food Administration.⁶ I shall, however, forward a copy of this dispatch and a copy of the letter to Captain Gregory for his information.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

[Enclosure—Translation]

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The Austrian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Pflügl) to Mr. Albert Halstead

No. 664

VIENNA, June 28, 1919.

Food supplies for returning prisoners of war.

With reference to our conversation of yesterday, I have the honor to inform you that within the next few weeks the first group of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, to the number of about 80,000, held in Italy will be freed and sent home by way of Tyrol. These men are principally German-Austrians, but there will be among them men belonging to the other national states formed out of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The provisioning of such a large number of men will be all the more difficult owing to the fact that Tyrol is hardly able to support its own population. In view of this the other national states were asked for assistance, but only the Hungarian government agreed to take part in caring for these men.

The situation as it is, therefore, is not only dangerous to Tyrol but to all German-Austria. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the prisoners should be fed. If this cannot be done there is danger that these men, who are embittered by their long imprisonment, privations and sufferings, could not be kept under control. This would make it easier for the Bolshevik agitators to win these men over and thus strengthen their ranks.

At the request of the Tyrolean Relief Committee for prisoners of war in Italy, as representative for Tyrol in the Vienna government, I have the honor to request that you intervene to the end that these men be

provisioned so that the danger described above may be averted. The food supplies necessary are four carloads of flour, 5,000 kilos of sugar, 1½ carloads of fat, 500 kilos of cocoa and chocolate, and 50 kilos of tea, and it is suggested that these articles be supplied by the United States or the Entente states as a whole.

I would, be greatly obliged if you would inform me of the result of your action in this matter.

PFLÜGL

5 Not printed.

6 Notation on file copy indicates that a copy was sent to Mr. Hoover on July 3.

7 File translation revised.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/88: Telegram

[Document 197]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, July 2, 1919—5:30 p.m.
[Received July 3—10:30 a.m.]

532. Minister of Finance indicates that there is no intention to retaliate against American Companies and promises release funds American Companies which bank declined permit company to draw. See my telegram 529.⁸

I am reliably informed Italians are purchasing Vienna owned shares Galicia Oil Companies which in one instance gives control. Italians alert and active. British, French rather slow and Americans asleep. Opportunities to invest American money to secure profitable opportunities which would help stabilize conditions should not be neglected. Comparatively small capital considering rate of exchange necessary. At Konigsberg [*least?*] investigations opportunities should be made without delay. Repeat this paragraph Department of State.

Finance Secretary states German influence already working for union with Germany to prevail [*prevent?*] Danube Confederation. Bauer and his party favor union Germany as support their Socialistic policies. Finance Secretary declares harsh treaty will force that union but first leaning toward Bolsheviki through despair and that he and Bauer agreed better lay [*lean?*] to Bolsheviki when it becomes inevitable and prevented reaching criminally [*to?*] depth of Hungarian Communism. That Finance Secretary would be liable join such movement doubtful but he at least would have some sympathy therewith if peace treaty absolutely crush this country. Am compelled to emphasize my views formed after careful study conditions and not overinfluenced by conversations intended to convert me to that view that very severe terms to German-Austria make her union with

Germany certain. Plan already begun to have German-Austria adopt immediately after peace generally speaking [*German?*] civil and commercial laws and perhaps money so as to bring them closer together. In all circumstances natural state conditions is toward Germany which only close commercial intercourse with new states can prevent. Such union Danube states would naturally strengthen position Czechoslovakia whose future would be impossible with hostile Germanic people.

Many conservatives believe Government Socialists are driven to Communism because Provinces will not permit successes their socialization schemes. With Communism they would expect coerce peasants to their interests. Because Government must be in approved connection with workmen it is difficult for it to combat Communism by force. Workmen council postponed consideration proposition that it be recognized in constitution. Delay of this decision while tending difficulties at Königsberg [*to at least?*] delay Bolsheviki and once [*is?*] encouraging it paralyzes business and manufacturing by postponing resumption usual activities though [*through?*] uncertainty future.

HALSTEAD

⁸ Dated Vienna, July 2, 1919, 4:20 p.m.; received July 3, 10:30 a.m.: “Banks have refused several American citizens right draw on account retaliation as reported for seizure of German-Austrian property abroad. Indication that with one American company policy may be changed. Will report further. ...” (Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/86).

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/98: Telegram

[Document 198]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, July 4, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received July 5—2 p.m.]

544. Exchange greetings between Foreign Secretary Müller and Bauer in which latter spoke reunion Germanic people is significant confirmation my telegram as to steady drift to Germany. It cannot be stated too strongly that unless steps are taken for economic federation of this country with new state[s] formerly part of old Empire, such Germanic union inevitable. Many prominent persons oppose but will be driven support it unless German-Austria is left financially and industrially so as to self support and to have free commerce along trade routes created during Empire. It may be too late even now to prevent strengthening Germany through German-Austria which will mean certainly future destruction Bohemia, especially with Hungary reconstituted.

Increased hope manifest that financial and industrial peace terms may give basis for rebuilding industry and commerce and prevent bankruptcy, but alarming extravagance of government, which shows no knowledge of economical administration, is grave danger.

Political outlook temporarily at least brighter but government continues weak and Bauer's sympathetic leaning towards Soviet Government cause of anxiety. Exposure of Hungarian plot in today's *Neue Tag*, which I reported in [telegraphic] news,⁹ created sensation. The facts as discovered by police (apparent omission) Bauer's possession for some days, yet Hungarian Ambassador remains here. His presence continual threat national security. All reports from Hungary indicate conviction on part of all peace loving Hungarians that only by outside intervention can communists be

overthrown, the situation being repetition of Russian experience on smaller scale. It is certain that even if communism be checked for considerable period, Hungary cannot agree upon stable government. Foreign assistance will be necessary while construction government policy and orderly rule are formulated.

Desire early announcement peace terms so German Austria can begin reconstruction work more earnestly. Her future depends [on?] early and sane rebuilding.

HALSTEAD

9 Telegram No. 543, July 4, 3:40 p.m., not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/109: Telegram

[Document 199]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, July 6, 1919—11:50 a.m.
[Received July 7—10 a.m.]

554. The Government of German-Austria as first step toward overthrowing the Bela Kun Government and restoring order in Hungary should be compelled to send the Hungarian so-called Ambassador and his agents and other co-plotters from Vienna. The Government should be required to refuse to receive any representative of the Bela Kun Government.

The telegraphic news of this mission on Friday¹⁰ furnished an abstract of an official report of the police head of Vienna showing step by step the activity of the Hungarian Government. This document published in *Neue Tag* was admitted by Elderich [?], Minister of the Interior, to be genuine. He said he could not take action and has been criticized by lovers of order for his policies. In justice one must note that Elderich did yield to the police appeal and arrest 150 Communist leaders on June 14th so as to prevent the success of their coup. The rioting on June 15th followed and order was preserved. The Government of German-Austria despite the indisputable evidence that the Communists here are active and receive full support Bela Kun through his Ambassador here was too spineless to do anything. Some of its members were theoretical Communists without courage of conviction and one, Deutsch, Minister of War, willing to admit the Hungarian armies into Austria. In such circumstances and without support it would be too much to expect Erdlich [?] to have acted though conclusive proofs of Hungarian Bolshevik plotting were at hand. Today the *Neue Tag*, which though sensational is doing really patriotic work, publishes the Hungarian plan for seizing Vienna, gives details as to forces and

artillery available and map showing where artillery is to be stationed in proving that preparations have been made to take the city. The *News Telegraph* today will give some abstract of this view.

The Hungarian Ambassador remains untouched. Hesitation, lack of moral courage and sympathy with Bolshevism combine to make the Cabinet shirk its real duty. The delay in action paralyzes business, breeds hopelessness and strengthens communism. The flow of communistic money continues from Hungary and without [*unless?*] steps are taken with firmness and with speed Vienna will be the scene of bloodshed and possibly the prize of the Bolsheviks.

Having so frequently expressed my opinion of the danger threatening German-Austria and from here certainly spreading to neighboring countries and inevitably infecting all Europe that I fear I may be regarded as an alarmist, but never in my life have I viewed a situation with greater calmness and I have sought to use year's experience as an observer both as journalist and consular officer to get the truth. Russia has been permitted to work her own salvation and the rude and brutal dictatorship that destroys all the intelligent is not weakened. Hungary has for about 3 months been permitted to defy the Entente powers and her army is stronger than ever. Further delay cannot be permitted if Europe is not [to] become entirely Bolshevik. The men throughout Europe now supporting civilization are losing courage because they lack support from the Allies and their associates who they believe dare not use force because their own people are sympathetic with the new theories. Without military action most of the benefits of the war will have been lost, the only remedy is to overthrow Hungarian Bolshevism by force and force the expulsion of the Bolshevik agents in German-Austria. Without such action the future of the old empire can only be disorder and rioting. There is no alternative. But military measures must be accompanied by sympathetic control until Hungary can unite her opposing elements. The peace treaty affecting her must afford her opportunity to rebuild herself. She with German-Austria need help that guides and does not unduly punish, that encourages and does not inculcate despair.

HALSTEAD

¹⁰ Telegram No. 543, July 4, 3:40 p.m., not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/112: Telegram

[Document 200]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, July 7, 1919—3:20 p.m.
[Received July 7—6:50 p.m.]

560. Ammission to conclude peace with German-Austria before the overthrow of the Bela Kun Bolshevik regime in Hungary would be greatest tactical error. The problems of German-Austria and Hungary are inseparable. There would be no peace for this country with Bolshevism still ruling in Hungary. The German-Austrian frontiers would be open to easier Hungarian attacks. Not only has German-Austria no armed force sufficiently strong or reliable to withstand an attack, but the Bolshevik element here would aid in such invasion. With the failure of the Entente to act decisively against Hungarian Bolshevism those members of the Government of German-Austria who are really in sympathy with Bolshevik doctrines could afford to come out into the open. Failure to crush Hungarian Bolshevism would invite its spread. The efforts of Russian and Hungarian Bolshevism to infect other countries have had considerable success, as is witnessed by its appearance as an accompaniment of industrial unrest in all countries. The danger to the rest of Europe must not be minimized. The countries surrounding Hungary will be most endangered, but Italy's position is menaced and next come France and Great Britain, while the Scandinavian countries, Norway especially, have felt seriously the effects of Bolsheviks propaganda from Russia.

I do not give these views as my own alone. They are by no means original and have been strengthened by conversations and conferences with members of our Allied Missions. Captain Gregory of the ARA¹¹ has expressed to me identical views. The memorandum of yesterday's conference sent to the Food Administration in Paris, a

copy of which was forwarded for me to the Mission,¹² is a considered judgment, reached with full sense of the responsibility assumed. It is earnestly hoped that the views of those on the spot who should understand the situation best will receive noted consideration. The proposed action will not be regarded in Hungary as foreign meddling, but will be welcomed there as the only solution.

The so-called Government at Arad has no force and engages in trivialities and considers personal ambition of would-be rulers as of first importance. It comprises Monarchists, Reactionaries and Socialists and has not even the germ of practical political wisdom. Ineffective and impotent, it does not represent a majority of the Hungarian people. It is practically little more than a pious exclamation. For the present time there is no party sufficiently strong to undertake government. The majority of the people, at least 90 percent are in agreement against Bolshevism, but when Bolshevism disappears each faction would at first seek to enforce its own theories. Thence the necessity of sympathetic Allied control until a suitable government can be erected. The very desire to govern themselves would hasten compromise of theories, so the period of the Allied control need not be long.

With no action against Hungarian Bolshevism, and a treaty that deals with German-Austria as with a hardened criminal, Bolshevism is certain to have German-Austria as its next victim. Following that would come union with Germany. The necessity of an early peace with German-Austria so that the work of rebuilding may begin needs no emphasis. This very need of an early settlement makes immediate action in the case of Hungary imperative.

HALSTEAD

¹¹ American Relief Administration.

¹² Not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/131

[Document 201]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 323

VIENNA, July 11, 1919.
[Received July 15.]

Subject: An Italian expression regarding the Tyrolean border.

SIRS: I have the honor to inform the Commission that Sir Thomas Cunningham told me today that Prince Borghese, the Italian Minister, who is acting as Commissioner here, informs him that Italy could not consent to any other boundary in Tyrol between Italy and German-Austria than the Brenner one because an alteration would precipitate a crisis. He added in a hopeful way that later something could be done. This is of interest in connection with Prince Borghese's statement to the Foreign Minister Dr. Bauer, several days ago, which I have reported, that Italy could not negotiate with German-Austria over the Tyrolean border.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/154

[Document 202]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 329

VIENNA, July 16, 1919.
[Received July 21.]

Subject: Conversation with Under State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in regard Tyrolean frontier.

SIRS: I have the honor to inform the Commission that the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs von Pflügl called on me this morning in regard to the boundary between Tyrol and Italy. Herr von Pflügl is a Tyrolean, and was requested by the Landesregierung of Tyrol to make a final appeal to "President Wilson or the Government of the United States" for a bettering of the boundary between Italy and Tyrol. I informed Secretary von Pflügl that I would take pleasure in communicating this appeal, which was a verbal one, to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. This appeal is based on the belief which is so prevalent in German-Austria that the United States is endeavoring to promote a just peace. This belief in the disinterestedness of the United States and the hope that this belief has engendered is one of the striking features of the situation in German-Austria.

I am attaching hereto a memorandum of the conversation with Herr von Pflügl, and in that connection would say that amongst other things he said that the boundary which they understood had been fixed between Tyrol and Italy gave Italy more Tyrolean territory than was provided for in the secret Treaty of London between Italy, Great Britain and France.¹³ In the circumstances I asked him to furnish me a map showing wherein the Treaty of London was exceeded. The enclosed map and memorandum¹⁴ show Herr von Pflügl's views as to

the difference, but as he has not seen the Treaty of London there may be some errors.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

P. S. JULY 17, 1919.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Cunningham, the British representative here, informs me today that Secretary Bauer through one of the Under Secretaries has made a last appeal to him for a rectification of the Tyrolean border and that he wrote a dispatch to his government stating the contents of that appeal.

A[LBERT] H[ALSTEAD]

[Enclosure]

Memorandum

VIENNA, July 16, 1919.

The following is a memorandum of a conversation between Herr von Pflügl, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of German Austria, and myself, which took place in my office on the morning of July 16th, and which, while referring directly to the question of the boundary between Tyrol and Italy entered into other features of the political situation:

Herr von Pflügl stated to me in German, there being no one else present, that he had been requested by the Landesregierung (Government of the Province of Tyrol) to make a final appeal to President Wilson or the government of the United States for a rectification of the proposed boundary between Italy and Tyrol which took away from Tyrol not only territory which was of Italian nationality but a large section of other territory which was inhabited wholly by people of the German race and which formed a most

valuable part of the Tyrol. He expressed the hope that at the last moment the United States might be able to secure for Tyrol what the Tyrolese regarded as more [*mere?*] justice and prevent a separation of their brothers and of a most important section of territory from the Province of Tyrol. I naturally gave no expression of opinion on the subject.

Herr von Pflügl called my attention to the character of the Tyroleans, to their love of their land and of their race, and declared that incorporation of a large population of German speaking people in Italy would form an “irredenta” of a most dangerous kind. He said that the Italians told him, and as a citizen of Tyrol he had discussed the subject with them frequently, that for the moment it would be impossible for them to do anything; but that after the treaty was signed Italy and German-Austria could negotiate together and reach some understanding that would be in the interests of both. Herr von Pflügl declared that promises to change an accomplished fact were not convincing and expressed the belief that when Italy once had the separated part of Tyrol in her possession she would keep it in her pocket just as an ordinary individual would keep money which he had procured even though promising to consider some arrangement in regard to it. The cutting off of this large territory from Tyrol, Herr von Pflügl said, would leave only a corridor and would increase the tendency of the Tyrolese to look to Germany as the only country to which they could unite. This remark was made with full understanding of the provisions of Section LXXX of the Versailles Treaty,¹⁵ providing for the independence of German-Austria and indicated Herr von Pflügl’s belief in the irresistibility of a natural development.

Herr von Pflügl sought to impress me with the great importance of preventing the acquisition of German speaking villages and sections of Tyrol by the Italians. He declared that the Italians could not be thinking of the future in assuming their present attitude and could not realise that their well-being depended upon close and friendly relations with German-Austria, particularly as “today or tomorrow (*heute oder morgen*)” war would come between Italy and Jugo-Slavia. In such an event friendly relations with German-Austria, and particularly with the Tyrol, were most important. His own idea, he

declared, was a block consisting of Italy, German-Austria and Germany, with the United States as a friendly looker-on. Pointing to the map he showed that Tyrol was the “bridge (*Brücke*)” between Italy and Germany and pointed out that with Tyrol to the north unfriendly and the Jugo-Slavs joined to the rest of German-Austria, the position of Italy in a military sense was very much in danger. He emphasised the future possibilities of Jugo-Slavia with its present population of twelve to fourteen millions and its capacity for maintaining a population of thirty millions.

ALBERT HALSTEAD

¹³ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915*. A translation from the *Izvestia* which was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Russia on December 5, 1917, is printed in [Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 497](#) .

¹⁴ Map not reproduced.

¹⁵ [Vol. XIII, p. 198](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/163: Telegram

[Document 203]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, July 18, 1919—4 p.m.
[Received July 19—4:30 p.m.]

620. Foreign Secretary Bauer believes strike on 21st will be peaceful. It was agreed by Bauer and Adler to secure peace during demonstration on 20th, it being feared that otherwise trouble police would occur on 20th. All other sections Vienna expect no trouble, the solution pacifying the communism at least temporarily. Colonel Cunningham, English representative, saw Bauer today after consultation with me. Bauer informed him that Boehm's section [sic] acceptance as minister here¹⁶ is really in interests of Hungarian Social Democracy. Boehm is not Bolshevik and Bauer will discuss with him possible throwing out of Bela Kun and Bolshevik extremists. Bauer desired to know whether he should negotiate or whether Cunningham and I desired to do it. He was informed he should talk with Boehm and submit (omission) [proposals?]. Asked what conditions would be imposed, Cunningham declared himself unable to make them but that certain the Bolsheviks would have to go, that terror must end and connection with Russian Bolsheviks and before Entente would consider anything. Bauer asked about Soviet Government and Cunningham answered cautiously so as not to destroy possibilities and indicated importance of peasants and of final participation of all people discussed only to ascertain possibilities. Borghese, Italian representative, will be informed but French so unpopular in Hungary and with Italians who have great influence in Hungary that until something more develops they will not be consulted.

Opportunity offered to someone to settle Hungarian difficulties. Therefore my attitude. Of course I shall promise nothing but do

request that I be informed what changes in Hungarian Government United States of America demands so I can be guided in (?) [my?] action.

Regard changes to Social Democracy as most important and think peasant and other influences would shortly make government real representative and possible. I believe we should indirectly encourage this move. It can be done without promise to recognize but by indicating sympathy with any change from Bolshevism which necessarily would be for improvement.

Accessions of Red Guard officers and soldiers to White Guards at Szeged reported as well as gradual disintegration Red Army. While consider reports somewhat exaggerated believe discipline is lessening; also learn that offensive by Szeged Government probable in conjunction Roumania. This seems improbable because Whites lack arms and hate Roumania. Bauer declared today German-Austria is not trying to unite with Germans, that the conference at Weimar was only in regards to similarity of legislature [*legislation?*] in connection with proposed assessment on fortunes. No treaty of alliance was considered.

HALSTEAD

¹⁶ See despatch No. 336, July 18, p. 548 [*Pg. 548 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/168

[Document 204]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 335

VIENNA, July 18, 1919.
[Received July 21.]

Subject: The problem of the new states.

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I feel it my duty to discuss the future of German-Austria with regard to her relations with the states cut out of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire even if by so doing, I cover old ground.

The study of the situation of German-Austria, Jugo-Slavia, and Hungary, which I have sought solely from the point of view of the best and the real interests of all nations concerned, has convinced me that the future peace of this portion of Europe depends wholly upon cordial and close relations between all these states. A settlement of problems without such cordial relations, but with jealousies, excessive ambitions, and old bitterness permitted full sway can give no peace of permanent character. German-Austria and Hungary will find the greatest difficulty, even under the most favorable circumstances, to readjust their lives to the new order. Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Poland will be fully occupied in proving their capacity for self-government. Each of the two former states will have difficulties in consolidating its different races into a compact state, while Poland, though of one race, will be confronted with the problem of adjusting the varying views of its three sections which formerly were parts of Austria, Germany and Russia. Roumania will have her problem of digesting the large population that has been lately added.

Again each of the five states must adapt itself to the new economic order and must solve the problems which the war and Bolshevism

have made so acute. Each must find some means to compromise the striking differences that exist between the extreme radicals and the ultra conservatives.

This work alone is more than sufficient to test the political wisdom of their statesmen, and it is more difficult in that practically every one of the new states will have had no experience in actual self-government. In these circumstances rivalry and bitterness and the cultivation of extreme ambitions must check interior development and embarrass good government. As regards their outer politics each state's foremost interest is that of friendly and sympathetic relations with its neighbors.

At the present moment bitterness, ambition and hatred as well as disappointment appear to be the moving forces in each one of the countries. It is too early for German-Austria and Hungary to accept calmly the loss of territory and too early for the other states to have lost that feeling of triumph which blinds them to their real interests.

Unless the peace treaty, now being drafted, provides some means to impose some check upon distinctly selfish ambitions it will be impossible thereafter to overcome the hostility that threatens to become permanent.

The League of Nations will require considerable period for organization during which time bitterness and hostility in the attitude of one nation for another is apt to become so firmly planted as to make the work of the League in adjusting differences and producing harmony much more difficult. In the meantime the League must gain greater influence and authority. It must be noted that in this section of the world the Peace Conference has lost most of its prestige chiefly because the Hungarian situation has not been solved. It has been remarked that if the conference of great powers with all their military forces has not enforced its will in Hungary and elsewhere it would seem as if the League of Nations would be confronted by a similar or greater difficulty. It is suggested that some time may be required to overcome this feeling.

I trust that I may be permitted to again point out the grave danger that confronts the peace of this section of the world and threatens the stability of some of the new nations. With Jugo-Slavia one finds the menace of Italy. The hostile feelings that are known to exist between the Italians on the one hand and the Jugo-Slavs on the other are such as to justify at least the apprehension that these two nations will clash. Jugo-Slavia is confronted with racial problems because there is no real feeling of interest between the races. Then some of the races fought the Serb during the war and the Serbians are reported to desire to exert an overwhelming influence in the state. Therefore, the internal difficulties of Jugo-Slavia should not be minimized.

The other great danger lies in German-Austria and amongst the German-Bohemians, each feeling that friendliness to Germany, which is due to the similarity of language and the call of race. German-Austria alone knows she is impotent and the German-Bohemians are unwilling members of the Czecho-Slovak state. Both are apprehensive as to the treatment from the more numerous Czechs and Slovaks. The union of the Czechs and Slovaks because of the difference in race is not a natural combination. With this lack of cohesiveness it would appear to be more important that the German-Bohemians should be accorded considerate treatment and equality of opportunity and be at the same time protected from hostile legislation at the hands of the majority. The interests of the Czecho-Slovaks and the German-Bohemians are in most respects identical. Joined together historically, both manufacturing sections with commercial ties they could be fused into one united state by statesmenlike policies and real interests, if concessions were made on each side. Without such concessions it will be only natural if the German-Bohemians, embittered through a union with a race that they regard inferior should from this sense of unfair treatment lean toward Germany and plot in the interest of that nation.

The trend toward Germany of the German-Austrians will be the greater if Czecho-Slovakia pursues her present ambitions and seeks to take from Vienna the former commercial supremacy of that city, if she furnishes coal and sugar only grudgingly, insists upon preferential treatment and in general blocks the way toward the rehabilitation of this nation. The influence of pride must not be

overlooked. With the best peace possible a small country disappointed from its fall from power must be sensitive and dissatisfied.

There are indications of German plans to bring about closer relations with German-Austria. The farewell remarks of Baron Wedel, the former ambassador were calculated to indicate that German-Austria could lean on Germany, particularly wherein he indicated that it would be his task to have Germany make sacrifices so that Austria could secure the things she needs. The Social Democrats who remember that the provinces are not strong for Social Democracy, desire a union or closer relations with Germany to strengthen their party. Tyrol feels that she has lost so much to Italy that she is practically destroyed. Vorarlberg looks to Switzerland. These weak states naturally look to the Germans with their high birth rate and pride still undestroyed, with old ambitions fostered and with a possibility of rapid rehabilitation. Despite prohibition of such a union the desire will grow if not counter-acted by making it apparent that the interests of the German-Bohemians are with Czecho-Slovakia and making it possible for German-Austria to continue commercial relations with Czecho-Slovakia and for Jugo-Slavia to continue to be a market for the manufacturers of this country. Political alliances may change. Italy's ambitions might make an understanding with Germany easy. This with other developments may bring the League of Nations to favor a union of the German peoples. That would mean a great menace to Czecho-Slovakia and a threat to the other new states.

Vienna is the nerve centre of the old empire. It is the historical center. It has the geographic position, it is the seat of music, medicine, art, education and other cultures. It is not regarded as really German by the provinces, and has many other elements in its makeup. The commercial lines were established under the old empire, and these were then satisfactory notwithstanding hatred of the so-called Austrian rule in those parts of the empire which have now been separated. Without these commercial lines, without financial connections with the states of the old empire, without raw material and food from the other states no peace can come to German-Austria.

The political situation in German-Austria looks brighter despite the continued activity of the communists and the general strike to occur on the 21st, and prospects of good order increase. Dr. Bauer, the strongest person in the government, has been charged with communistic leanings. The ultra conservatives insist that he is a communist whereas in fact he appears to be theoretically so radical as to approach nearer to communism [*bolshevism?*]. However, he seems to see that the existing order cannot be overthrown and improved through force and that no civilization can be built on the foundation of destruction. He, therefore, works for reform in an orderly way. The workmen's council still stands in German-Austria as a great power, but the councils of the peasants are increasing in influence and the citizens' council may grow into usefulness. The Bolshevik danger is not so great notwithstanding the continued spread of Bolshevik propaganda. The amendments in the peace treaty are considered encouraging. There are indications of a greater confidence and of an impetus toward reconstruction. Inquiries for food and raw material are more numerous. All this is hopeful, but the outlook for the winter, especially the desperate want of coal, is discouraging.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/169

[Document 205]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 336

VIENNA, July 18, 1919.
[Received July 21.]

Subject: The government, communism, and Hungary.

SIRS: I have the honor to inform the Commission that, after consulting with me, Colonel Sir Thomas Cunningham, the British representative here, called on Dr. Bauer this afternoon with regard to the general situation. Dr. Bauer assured him that there was no probability of disorder on Sunday or Monday when the demonstrations and twenty-four [hour?] general strike occur. This agrees with information I have received from several sources. It appears that rather than have the police clash with the communists, and to prevent the latter and Social Democrats from coming into conflict on Sunday, it seemed best to agree to the general strike, especially as the Communists promised to be good. I am inclined to think that the decision of the government is wise inasmuch as it would be unfortunate if there were another outbreak especially as conditions have been looking more promising.

I telegraphed a few days ago¹⁷ that Boehm, former commander of the red army in Hungary, was to go to Budapest to see if the government of Bela Kun could be succeeded by a Social Democratic Government. Boehm will be back on Sunday, Monday or Tuesday as the Minister from Hungary. Dr. Bauer told Colonel Cunningham that he really came as a representative of the Social Democrats. This would be necessarily opposed to Bela Kun.

Dr. Bauer asked Colonel Cunningham today if he would be permitted to negotiate with Boehm with a view to throwing Bela Kun and the

radical leaders out of the government and making it a Social Democratic Government. He asked Colonel Cunningham, who had talked with me before the visit, as to what would satisfy the Entente. Colonel Cunningham said he was not in a position to pledge the Entente, but declared that the terror would have to stop, that the policy of connection with Lenine, and the Russian Bolsheviks would have to end together with interference with affairs in Austria, before there could be any consideration given to the new government. Dr. Bauer asked as to the Soviet Government, and it was suggested by Colonel Cunningham that there would have to be some promise of a participation of all people in the government when the time for that participation is opportune. It was distinctly understood that no obligation was imposed upon Colonel Cunningham and myself, but it seemed advisable for Dr. Bauer to negotiate informally with a view to ascertaining if something could be done to improve conditions by eliminating extreme radicalism. It is expected that shortly direct proposals will be made which I shall be able to forward to the Commission.

The Italian representative, Prince Borghese, will be informed by Colonel Cunningham of this conversation, because it seems desirable in view of the great interest Italy has taken in Hungary and the efforts she has made to better conditions there, for her to be kept fully informed. For the present the French representative will not be consulted, because of the intense bitterness that exists in Hungary toward France at the moment. When, however, any tangible proposal is made the French representative will be informed so that should there be any joint recommendations he may have the opportunity to participate in them.

It should be stated that in the meantime efforts are being made to organize the peasants of Hungary and to stiffen them to the attitude of the peasants of German-Austria, so that they may be ready to assert their influence to secure a real government of the people. It is, of course, possible, perhaps probable, that nothing may result from this attempt, but it seemed that informally and without any obligation, tentative inquiries should be made.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

¹⁷ Telegram No. 612, July 17, 12:20 p.m., not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/174

[Document 206]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 339

VIENNA, July 19, 1919.
[Received July 22.]

Subject: Coal situation.

SIRS: I have the honor to again bring the grave danger that threatens German-Austria for the want of coal to the attention of the Commission. I realise that Professor Coolidge has in the past pointed out this danger, but the matter has become so acute that I feel constrained to refer to it again.

The greatest apprehension exists for the winter. At the present moment there is not sufficient coal for present needs. As a result the railway service and the street car service are curtailed, and factories that might be employing workers are idle. This absence of work for want of fuel adds to the unrest that naturally prevails after such a shock as came with the overthrow of the old Empire. Raw materials are naturally required, but certain industries can be employed without those raw materials.

If in warm weather, when no coal is needed for heating purposes and the quantity of fuel required for lighting is reduced because of longer days, there is a scarcity of coal, the situation that will exist during the bitter and long winter can readily be imagined.

German-Austria is able to mine about ten percent, of her needs of coal. In the past the coal supply has come from Czecho-Slovakia and Poland as well as from Ruhr and Upper Silesian parts of Germany. The Czecho-Slovaks do not encourage the export of coal to German-Austria and the German coal is very short in quantity, and Upper Silesia, because of the uncertainty as to its final status, is not a sure

source of supply. German-Austria had contracted for 7,500 metric tons of coal per day with the German Government, but by reason of the disorganization of labor but forty-five percent, of this amount has been received.

The Czecho-Slovak Government is providing only coal for household use as well as for electric and gas works, but the quantity delivered for these purposes by no means reaches the amount required. There is some hope of securing about 50,000 tons of coal from Poland, but this comes slowly. The suggestion has been made that by reason of the long voyage from America to Triest and the costly haul from Triest to Vienna, which would be complicated as well by the Italian and Jugo-Slav regulations, American coal might be exported to Hamburg or Bremen and German coal in equal quantities, in addition to that already contracted for, shipped to German-Austria. Practical difficulties might arise in this connection, but the suggestion is worthy of consideration.

In closing I would emphasise the real necessity of the earliest possible solution of the coal problem. In normal times there would be daily arrivals of coal throughout the summer for winter purposes. At this late date, even if shipments in large quantities were to come regularly, the winter would still be particularly trying.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/220

[Document 207]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 356

VIENNA, July 27, 1919.
[Received July 29.]

Subject: Resignation of Bauer and its effects.

SIRS: I have the honor to forward herewith a translation of Dr. Bauer's letter¹⁸ resigning his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The letter shows distinctly that Dr. Bauer, though he denied several days ago that he had endeavored to make an arrangement with Italy that would bind Italy to Germany and to German-Austria—this naturally included consideration for the Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and in Jugo-Slavia—did make that effort. The idea, apparently was that Austria should be the bridge between Italy and Germany, with Tyrol a most important span of that bridge.

It was my first impression that Dr. Bauer's resignation did not actually lessen his influence but meant simply his retirement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while he continued to be a member of the Cabinet. In that position he would by his compelling personality continue his very great influence over the government. It seemed therefore as if the resignation were more a stage play to influence the action of the Peace Conference than an actual lessening of his political power.

It would now appear as if this first impression was perhaps incorrect. Conversations with a number of people would indicate that the change is a real one and that Bauer's influence may be greatly reduced, he having suffered a political check. It had been long known that several members of the Cabinet were in no sense in agreement with Dr. Bauer and regarded his coquetting with the Communists as

decidedly injurious to German-Austria's interests. In fact, Dr. Schumpeter the Minister of Finance did not hesitate in private conversation to express his entire abhorrence of the Bauer policy and indicated that several other members of the Cabinet agreed with him. It appeared at the time, however, as if Schumpeter, a most pronounced conservative, was unable to face new facts and exaggerated Bauer's attitude. It is now evident, however, that Dr. Renner in his work at St. Germain was decidedly handicapped by Bauer's attitude and that, when he learned of the report of Police President Schober on the activities of the Hungarian Legation and emissaries in promoting Communism and disorder he, Dr. Renner, had written to Bauer stating how much his work to assist German-Austria was impaired. It is believed also that Dr. Renner's views were indicated to the Austrian Correspondence Bureau, for what they are now understood to be was at the time published in the press of Vienna.

Upon receiving Dr. Renner's letter Dr. Bauer at once tendered his resignation. Without accepting or declining it Dr. Renner replied to the Bauer letter, which was dated July 13th, stating that he would discuss the matter with him at Feldkirch when he came there after the peace treaty was completed. It should be remembered that at the meeting of the Workmen's Council of German-Austria several weeks ago Dr. Bauer's speeches, in which he indicated a theoretical belief in a world revolution but that it was at present impossible because the city of Vienna would be starved, had seriously annoyed the workmen from the provinces. In that meeting various speeches were made criticising Bauer's position and expressing wonderment and inability to understand it. This, as is now known, was the beginning of Bauer's fall. The Schober report weakened his position much more.

It is stated, though not authoritatively, that Dr. Renner received intimations in Paris that the French, M. Clemenceau especially, were very distrustful of Bauer and his politics, and that this was indicated to Dr. Renner with the implication that German-Austria's chances would be improved if Dr. Bauer retired. Editorials in M. Clemenceau's paper were said to have shown this.

It is very likely that Bauer's resignation will stiffen the moderate men in the Cabinet and give them moral courage to stand for more conservative action, while Bauer himself, whose tactics were not sufficiently radical to satisfy the extremists weakened him with the Social Democrats who were opposed to Communism and felt that his playing with both sides embarrassed their own policies. There is an intimation that Dr. Bauer will not long continue in the Cabinet and that in order to let him down gently his cabinet rank is continued. Deutsch the Minister of War and consequently in control of the *Volkswehr* is regarded as the next possible retirement. A careful reading of that portion of the Treaty of St. Germain which limits the German Austrian Army is interpreted by keen minds as practically making it necessary for the *Volkswehr* to be disbanded, the details touching the new German-Austrian Army not covering such a force as the *Volkswehr*. The question naturally arises in this connection as to who in German-Austria is strong enough to disband the *Volkswehr*, it being remembered that the proposal to reduce its numbers gave the impetus or suggested the opportunity to the Communists to make their attempted *coup d'état* which failed so miserably on the 15th of June. It is this same lack of power that causes people to wonder how German-Austria will be able to take possession of that part of West Hungary which is assigned to her in the Peace Treaty.

Dr. Schumpeter, the Minister of Finance, it is rumored, is also likely to retire. How soon cannot be told, but there is a feeling that he has not grasped the financial situation, has been more of a theorist than a practical financier and that in German-Austria's critical situation an expert financier must replace him.

Whatever be the final terms of the peace treaty—and this doubt as to whether it is now in its final shape is generally prevalent—it is felt that it cannot by any possibility be an instrument which will be acceptable to this country. Therefore in order that the responsibility for signing the treaty may be distributed amongst all parties, it is suggested, in fact proposed, that the Ministry be reorganized and that not only Social Democrats and Christian Socialists (conservatives) but the German Peoples Party, which has some members in the National Assembly, be represented in the new

cabinet. As yet there is no indication as to who will be the permanent Foreign Minister, it being believed that Dr. Renner has accepted the portfolio only until a suitable man can be selected.

There is no confirmation, of the reported intention of Dr. Fritz Adler to resign from the Workmen's Council, but he and Dr. Bauer have worked together and one of the results of Bauer's retirement may be the weakening of the influence of that Workmen's Council and the increased power of the Peasants' Council, together with steps to make the Citizens' Council, at present a very hesitating body, more of a force.

In reference to the above discussion of the political situation of German-Austria I think I should add that I have endeavored to give what is the opinion most prevalent and that it seems a little too early to accept this view as wholly accurate. It should be remembered that Dr. Bauer has a lust for power, is a strong personality in the present Cabinet, and that he has exceptional resourcefulness and eloquence. It may be possible that his present check will drive him more to the left or inspire him to other steps to recover his influence.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

¹⁸ Not printed; filed separately under Paris Peace Conf.
184.011102/229.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/249

[Document 208]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State¹⁹

No. 15

VIENNA, August 1, 1919.

Subject: Reported modification of peace terms.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that the *Neue Freie Presse* today prints a statement that all the Allied Missions are in favor of modification of the peace terms and expresses the view that this unanimity of opinion will offset the efforts of the new states created out of the old Austrian Empire to secure the most favorable terms possible for themselves.

I think I should say as a matter of record that the publication of this statement is in no sense due to any comments that have been made by anyone connected with this Mission. Inquiries lead to the probability that someone in the French Mission is responsible for the story. It does happen to represent the views of the various Missions, but it would seem to me that it was wholly improper at this time to encourage such publication, for any differences of view from those of the Peace Commission should certainly not be a matter of public discussion.

In the *Neue Freie Presse* of yesterday it was announced apparently on the same authority that the peace terms would be modified to the benefit of German Austria. In this connection I trust I may be permitted to say that a nation of 6,500,000 people left with insufficient manufacturing capacity to pay for its raw materials and for the food which it must import to cover consumption for 8 months of the year cannot possibly bear the burden which it is proposed to impose on them. It should be remembered that a deficit for the fiscal year of June 30, last, was over 4,000,000,000 crowns. This in itself is a debt that imposes an immense burden. Such a debt is naturally a

manifestation of the gross incapacity of the Administration, but during the time that most of this deficit was incurred Austria Hungary was in a state of transition and it has had to support about 200,000 workless in Vienna alone, as well as the *Volkswehr* of 30,000 costing more than 400,000,000 crowns a year, a sum greater than the cost of the entire Austro-Hungarian army before the war.

In these circumstances terms which involve bankruptcy, which would seriously interfere with the securing of raw materials and would stifle industry must inevitably be followed by public disorders and probably a worse type of Bolshevism than that which now paralyzes and destroys what is left of Hungary.

The per capita obligation would be enormous. I am hoping to go into greater detail regarding this in a despatch which will go forward on Sunday.^{[20](#)}

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

^{[19](#)} Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead; received August 4.

^{[20](#)} Despatch No. 17, *infra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/260

[Document 209]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State²¹

No. 17

VIENNA, August 3, 1919.

Subject: The peace treaty.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that the overthrow of the Bela Kun rule in Hungary has given more real encouragement to Vienna than any event since the delivery of the first draft of the Peace Treaty. The report which was published here just before the handing over of the revised Treaty that Austrian owned property in the new states would not be confiscated, created a very favorable impression, but this was soon counteracted because the revised Treaty imposed upon Austria a debt so heavy as to appear insupportable.

The terrorists in Hungary and the communists in Vienna who cooperated, had ever since June 15th menaced the peace and caused an atmosphere of much apprehension throughout Vienna. Now that a government in Hungary has been formed and starts very well the apprehension has disappeared. No matter what the extreme radicals may endeavor to do, Austria will not become bolshevistic unless the peace terms, through enforced bankruptcy make bolshevism inevitable. It should be pointed out that a very large number of persons who had heretofore regarded themselves as Austrians, directly or indirectly supported the old government, contributed to policies financially and by personal efforts, served in the army, navy or official life, with their securities (largely issued by the Austrian Government) will now be enabled under the terms of the Peace Treaty to secure at least a constructive citizenship in one of the new states. Of my own acquaintances a considerable number are now citizens of the new states, people who in the past were Austrian in every sense. These the treaty does not reach and their burden rests

upon those who will not, or who have not been able to, change their nationality.

The third paragraph of Article 201, Page 93 of the Draft of the Peace Treaty provides that the new states except Austria are to be freed from obligation with respect to the war debt of the Austrian Government, no matter where that debt may be held. It provides, however, that none of the states, Austria included, shall be liable for war debt bonds held within their respective territory by themselves or by their nationals. This does not release German Austria from liability for war debt bonds owned by nationals of the new states which for one reason or another had been deposited in Vienna banks. As the principal city of the old empire, Vienna was the natural place of deposit for securities as New York is for many Americans who do not live in that city. By being deposited here better interest rates could be obtained and under the peculiar banking practices participation in new issues was facilitated by such deposits. For all these war securities thus deposited here the Austrian Government is liable and encouragement is given to persons who might otherwise remain Austrian to change their nationality. This the new states have not discouraged. It should be remembered that in addition to the war securities that were normally here and belong to nationals of the new states many others were sent to Vienna to avoid the possibility of capital taxes in the new states. It is impossible to state the amount of war securities for which the New Austria is thus made responsible, but it appears to impose a very heavy burden on this country.

The second paragraph of the same article makes Austria responsible for all war debts of the old government held by foreigners abroad, which appears to relieve nationals of the new states, despite their participation in the war, from heavy financial responsibility and to further encourage changes in nationality. The sixth paragraph of Article 201 which begins at the bottom of Page 93 of the Treaty makes the Austrian Government solely responsible for all liabilities of the former government incurred during the war other than those evidenced by bonds, bills, and currency notes which are otherwise provided for.

I would especially call attention to the fact that the old Austrian Government owed about three and a half billion crowns to Germany for supplies and raw materials and perhaps half a billion more to neutral states. Of the debt for this raw material some of it was for food which was consumed throughout the old empire and a considerable part for supplies which were manufactured into clothing and other articles which were for war purposes. Much of this manufacturing was done in factories now in Czecho Slovakia which profited by the manufacture. Not a little of this clothing consisting of uniforms is now used with changed insignia by the armies of the new states. For this no compensation is apparently to be paid to German Austria.

I trust that the Department will appreciate that I simply seek to indicate in the statement above wherein the Treaty seems to be unjust and to threaten the future of German Austria. I naturally do not regard myself as counsel for its defense and I hope it will not appear that I assume an attitude of criticism. The effort is solely to state the facts as they appear in the hope that if my conclusions are right they may have some weight. I fully appreciate that writing from Vienna I must to a degree be influenced by my situation and that from this single angle it is absolutely impossible to view the grave problems presented to the Peace Commission as broadly as it is viewed by those upon whom the responsibility rests in Washington and Paris.

That the provisions creating the Reparation Commission and granting it wide authority are so phrased as to afford opportunity in the future for adjusting the debt due from Austria according to her ability to pay is fully recognized, but in this connection I would respectfully call attention to the danger from the despair that is apt to follow when the final draft of the treaty is presented for signature—that is when all opportunity for further negotiation is ended. To a people whose morale has been so shattered by the result of the war,—who feel themselves friendless, who feel that the influence of the new states is directed against their interests,—the moral effect of a treaty which appears to them wholly destructive deserves consideration. With the best terms that could possibly be imposed the energy of a people notably lacking in that quality must be further lessened.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

²¹ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 370, August 3; received August 5.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/291

[Document 210]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State²²

No. 28

VIENNA, August 8, 1919.

Subject: Further comment on the peace treaty.

SIR: I have the honor to further discuss certain features of the revised draft of the Peace Treaty with German-Austria and to present further Austrian views on the subject, with especial reference to provisions which it is feared in Austria are wholly destructive.

The Commission, I feel certain, is now appreciative of my own belief that the treaty means bankruptcy and with bankruptcy will come disorder and probably bolshevism; that Austria bitterly resentful of what she would regard as the triumph of the states carved from the old empire would in the future be a menace to the peace; and that bankruptcy here will also threaten social order in the new states. However, in the views that follow the effort is made only to give the opinion of an Austrian publicist, not connected with the government nor in sympathy with it, which are those of every thinking German Austrian. I take it that such views are desired because it is manifest that the United States desires to conclude a just treaty.

It is held that Part VIII of the Treaty entitled "Reparation" practically mortgages all property, national, commercial, or personal for the payments which the treaty imposes on Austria, that it grants unlimited rights regarding the levying on property and as to the means which shall be used to enforce the Treaty. It makes German Austria absolutely dependent upon the Commission in all respects. The budgets must have the approval of the Commission and under Annex 12, Subsection B which follows Article 183, it may even require heavier taxes so as to demand that "the Austrian scheme of taxation is fully as heavy proportionally as any of the powers

represented on the Commission.” It can practically dictate the laws. This is a Commission in which German Austria has no voice and no weight. It is further stated that the Treaty is worse than that of Versailles, because of the rights granted to the states, except German Austria, that succeeded to the territory of the old Austrian Empire. Though the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy form the controlling force in the Reparation Commission, the other states may be represented by one delegate. Therefore, in questions involving the vital rights of German Austria, while she may have no voice, the Czecho Slovaks for instance who are regarded as the most threatening enemies of German Austria, have a voice and at least part of a vote. Inasmuch as Section XIII of Annex 2 above referred to, in Sub-Paragraph A provides for the unanimous vote of the Reparation Commission on any questions involving the cancellation of the whole or any part of the debt of German Austria, the Czecho-Slovaks’ interest or that of any of the three remaining new states would be able to veto a proposition to lessen the burden on Austria. They could do that either because it meant financial loss to themselves or because they desire to bring pressure to secure Austrian agreement to some other proposition. It is declared that while Germany must pay all that is possible under the Treaty of Versailles, the decision as to what she is able to pay rests with the United States, France, England and Italy who would not be benefited by and would suffer commercially if the payments demanded of Germany were in excess of her ability to pay, but in the case of German-Austria under the Treaty of St. Germain, the more she pays the more the Czechs gain, but if German Austria pays less—certain payments from the Czechs may have to be greater.

Further, under Paragraph 18 of the Second Annex to the Reparation Clauses the Allied and Associated Powers in case of voluntary default by Austria “may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals” which are not to be regarded as acts of war, as may be necessary. This permits the Allies to forbid exports and imports and to do all that they care to do to enforce their will. To all practical purposes and intentions this leaves Austria governed by the Reparation Committee. Her people would be subject during the years of its continuance to any command it imposes. This is a dictatorship—it takes away absolutely the right of self-government.

In the above connection it is said that Austria does not fear the Reparation Committee but it does fear its relations with the other nations formerly of the Empire. It would prefer to negotiate with the Conference Powers only. The danger is, and it is very great, that the Czechs, Jugo-Slavs and Poles will charge German-Austria with the major part of the debt—billions and billions—dispensed for their benefit.

In conclusion I would myself say that the criticisms to the reparation clauses are based on the natural objection of a former great nation to be under the practical domination of other nations; but this objection is the greater because the new states which they have reason to believe are not only unfriendly but are seeking their own interests, have a voice in the government of the country through the Reparation Commission. If the financial clauses with the exceedingly heavy obligations they impose upon German-Austria are to remain unchanged or only to be amended in slight details, the provisions creating the Reparation Commission are imperative. If, however, the voice of Austria is made equal to that of the new states a decided improvement will result.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

²² Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 382, August 8; received August 11.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/301

[Document 211]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State²³

No. 35

VIENNA, August 10, 1919.

Subject: An interview with Dr. Renner.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of a conversation I had yesterday with the German-Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Renner.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conference With Chancellor Dr. Renner

VIENNA, August 10, 1919.

Dr. Renner requested me to call on him today. As I came to the Foreign Office the head of the French Mission Monsieur Allizé was leaving and I was delayed a few minutes in the Foreign Office before seeing Dr. Renner because the Italian representative Prince Borghese was there. Dr. Renner speaking in German stated that German-Austria would require the help of the United States after the signature of the Peace Treaty. Of all the nations the United States was the only one which had no selfish end to promote and no obligation other than the desire to do right. He then expressed his thanks for all that America had done here and specified the food furnished, the help with coal and other necessities and the spirit of its representatives. He said he knew also that in the peace

conferences it was America which had often stood for fairer treatment of Austria.

After the signing of the Peace Treaty, he declared unselfish assistance and support would be required in the League of Nations and on the Reparation Committee and for that Austria could alone depend on the United States as well as upon the United Kingdom. He said German-Austria was left a small country with many mountains, few resources, with land that could not feed her population and a great city. From America she would need all kinds of help. America could come over to assist in her industries, to assist in her problems and she would be welcome.

Dr. Renner spoke of the difficulties which had been encountered here. The government could be strengthened only step by step and that until peace had come everything that was necessary could not be done. The Treaty, such as it was, they would have to sign, because they could do nothing else, but it was not a righteous treaty—and it placed burdens upon them that should be apportioned among the states created out of the old empire. It was proper for the countries who had been at war with Austria to charge her with debts incurred before the war at the old rate of exchange, but the countries created out of the old empire had never been at war with German-Austria, but had participated in the war and yet they had received fairer treatment in being paid at the old rate of exchange.

America he knew had done her best but she was confronted with the Treaty of London which had lost German-Austria South Tyrol and with the French Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia which lost them German-Bohemia. The economic and financial clauses meant an absolute catastrophe. He appeared to speak with absolute frankness and to be sincere in his remarks about what America had done and of the spirit with which her representatives on the Peace Conference and her representatives here had been inspired. He seemed discouraged but unbeaten.

²³ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 387, August 10; received August 13.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/310

[Document 212]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State^{[24](#)}

No. 36

VIENNA, August 12, 1919.

Subject: Desire of the German-Austrians for American as president of Reparations Commission.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that it has been represented to me by persons of influence in Austria that the interests of this small republic would be regarded as better safeguarded if an American citizen were to be elected as President of the Reparations Commission for which the proposed treaty of St. Germain makes provision. In the period since the war in which I have served in Vienna the belief in the sincerity and unselfishness of the American people has been on many occasions strikingly emphasized. The tendency has been to look toward the United States as the only nation without selfish interests or schemes who could possibly assist a stricken people in the hour of their need.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

^{[24](#)} Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 388, August 12; received August 14.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/318

[Document 213]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State²⁵

No. 39

VIENNA, August 14, 1919.

Subject: Protest against the restoration of the monarchy.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following comment: The demonstration yesterday in which several thousand of the *Volkswehr*, *gendarmérie*, police, and citizens took part was symptomatic of the feeling Vienna against any attempt to restore the monarchy. The demonstration was due to the fear that the return of the Habsburg Archduke Joseph to a position of power in Hungary might be the first step toward an effort to seat the former Habsburg Karl or some other member of the former royal house on the throne of Austria. There have been so many rumors, since the government of Archduke Joseph succeeded the social-democrats who had overthrown Bela Kun, that Karl was to become King of Hungary and that this would be followed by his becoming King of Austria that the protest meeting was regarded as necessary to show the real public feeling.

That the former Emperor does not despair of returning to Austria and Hungary as king of each country is quite believable. The Clerical Party and many of the old aristocrats together with some of the middle class who believe that they prospered better under the Monarchy, would welcome his return. Among the peasants, who as a rule are more conservative, a monarchy would find some supporters. The workmen and most of the citizens of Austria, would however, regard the return of a Habsburg to the throne, no matter how liberal a constitution might be provided, as a dangerous reaction. They know that such a return would be followed by the incoming of archdukes and aristocrats who have simply fed on the country and never done anything for its advancement. They are convinced that

the Habsburgs and old ruling classes are wholly responsible for their present plight.

Representations have been made to me indirectly that it is hoped that the United States in conjunction with its associates in the war will take steps to make the restoration of the monarchy impossible. While I realize that the policy of the American Government is not to interfere with the form of government of a foreign nation, I feel I should indicate the strong opposition to any reaction in the direction of monarchical institutions. This does not mean that a representative government, one in which all classes could take part and which would probably be more conservative than the present government, would be generally regarded as reactionary.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

²⁵ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 390, August 14; received August 18.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/377

[Document 214]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State^{[26](#)}

No. 66

VIENNA, August 28, 1919.

Subject: The West Hungarian situation.

SIR: I have the honor to forward copies of two letters received from Count Sigray,^{[27](#)} the civil governor of the four western counties in Hungary. In a previous despatch^{[28](#)} I have indicated my belief that Count Sigray would not tell a deliberate falsehood. I am still of that belief. Nevertheless he is a patriotic Hungarian and his views cannot be unprejudiced. It is quite probable that the majority of the people of that part of West Hungary which has been assigned by the Peace Treaty to Austria would rejoice to be Austrians because they are a Germanic people. However, it seems likely that reports of disorders in Hungary have been very considerably exaggerated and that while there has been some propaganda on the part of Hungarians against the loss of this territory, there has also been Austrian propaganda in favor of its union with Austria.

Editor Roth of the *Der Neue Tag* has been to West Hungary and reports that there is no disorder but that the reports of the oppression are the results of the falsehood factory of Fürstenfeld on the border.

It is unfortunate that General Bandholtz has no person available to make an investigation of conditions in West Hungary so as to report to the Peace Conference. I would have gone to West Hungary myself to investigate conditions, had I not feared that my going there might be misunderstood and would probably have been regarded as meddling in affairs properly coming under General Bandholtz's observation.^{[29](#)}

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

²⁶ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 416, August 29; received September 1.

²⁷ Neither printed.

²⁸ Despatch No. 47, August 17, not printed.

²⁹ For correspondence concerning the Bandholtz mission in Hungary, see pp. 635 [*Pg. 635 includes portions of [Doc. 256](#) and [Doc. 257](#)*] ff.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/410

[Document 215]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State30

No. 75

VIENNA, September 5, 1919.

Subject: Review of conditions in Austria.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a review of conditions in Austria:

The political situation in Austria is uncertain. The Peace Treaty is generally regarded as more severe on Austria than had been anticipated. The disappointment is therefore very great. Discouragement is general. There is a tendency, however, upon the part of the business community to face conditions. During the absence of Dr. Renner the Workingmen's Council has become far stronger. Renner is the one man of real force in the government. The Workingmen's Council though of no legal standing is at the present moment practically the dictator. This is despite the fact that the peasants, and the citizens of Vienna actually form a majority. The peasants are organized but not being in the capitol city their strength does not assert itself easily. The citizens, that is those who are not workmen, lack the initiative and courage characteristic of the Council. Both they and the peasants lack the training and organized discipline of the laborers. They also are wanting in self-assertion and experience. Consequently the Workingmen's Council exercises a disproportionate influence.

Another most important factor in the power of the workingmen is the *Folkswehr*. In Vienna alone there are perhaps 12,000 of these so-called citizen-soldiers. They are presumed to obey the orders of the government but in reality are independent except for the will of the workingmen. There is a pretense of patrolling parts of the city but as a matter of fact the men of this force have one small drill daily and

spend the rest of their time in their barracks talking politics and telling stories. For this essential service each is paid 16 crowns a day and his food.

The one really efficient organization for the protection of the city is the police force which is under state control. There are 5,000 police. The police are paid 15 crowns a day as a beginning wage and advanced to about 20 crowns. They have heavy responsibility and long hours. Their head, Police President Schober is a man of unusual force and ability. Despite the fact that the policeman's life would be a happier one in that it would be less arduous if he became a member of the *Folkswehr*, the policemen have remained loyal, but their efficiency is believed to decrease steadily because the example of the comfortable *Folkswehr*, doing no work, is most harmful. The *Folkswehr* is never trusted with any serious responsibility. For example the police must guard the city prisons and even those prisons where military offenders are confined.

So long as the *Folkswehr* remains, the Workingmen's Council must control the state. Except for the Police President and Dr. Renner no one has yet had courage enough to stand against the *Folkswehr* or the Workingmen's Council. If the Workingmen are not to continue to receive large payments from the public funds for their sustenance when out of work, a practice which does not encourage them to seek labor and which must gradually make real work distasteful, the *Folkswehr* must be disbanded. It is a menace to good order and a heavy expense. It has been suggested that their disbandment could be effected by the refusal to pay them further salaries and by the enrollment of a mercenary army, small in size, which would be responsible for order throughout the city. This may be attempted but whether it can be done without some disorder is a question.

On August 10th the Communists planned another attempt to overthrow the government. This naturally came to the attention of the police who are watchful of developments. It happened that Dr. Renner was here at that time to discuss the situation at St. Germain with the Chief Committee of the National Assembly. The situation was presented to him and he approved of the plan to place 4 machine guns before the barracks of the *Folkswehr*, Battalion 41, which was

composed wholly of Communists, and to station with the guns 200 police fully armed. When the communist battalion of 300 strong was ready to march forth with arms and ammunition it discovered that the exit from the barracks was commanded by a hostile force and the planned disorder fell through.

It is reported that Dr. Bauer contemplates becoming more active politically but his activity will be less potent with the State Chancellor Dr. Renner back in Vienna. Renner commands the respect of all parties, but the radical socialists regard him as becoming too moderate. He will have presented to him the problem of reducing expenditures, of securing coal and raw materials and of bringing workmen back to the factories so that they can be employed remuneratively and at the same time become profitably productive. It is probable there will be some changes in the cabinet and among other changes will be a new Finance Minister,—a position of great difficulty and in every sense thankless.

There is every probability that the Peace Treaty will be signed as there is no other course possible, but all parties are criticizing it with the greatest severity.

The situation in West Hungary still presents many embarrassments. The Hungarian authorities are far from inclined to accept gracefully the transfer of parts of the three western counties to Austria. The West Hungarian Germans themselves have been persuaded to believe, so it is reported that with the heavy financial burdens which Austria must bear their position will not be so satisfactory as it would be even if they reunited with Hungary under Magyar domination. With no efficient military force to proceed to West Hungary and occupy it and with the possibility of Hungarian resistance, the solution is not easy. Some Austrians feel that the transfer of West Hungary to this country is certain to breed ill-feeling between Austria and Hungary which will be so harmful in the future as to offset the advantages that may come from this additional territory.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

³⁰ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 425, September 5; received September 9.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/421

[Document 216]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State³¹

No. 77

VIENNA, September 7, 1919.

Subject: Austria ratifies.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a translation of the formal protest³² made by the Austrian National Assembly against the terms of the Treaty of Peace. The feeling against the Treaty has been very pronounced. The Pan-Germanistic party has been especially vociferous. There was a possibility of more bitter speeches than those that were made, and the speeches were most acrimonious. Dr. Renner, however, urged the leaders of the various parties to be more restrained in their utterances and to rely greatly on the Reparation Commission to adjust conditions which are regarded as unbearable.

The Assembly itself was attended by practically all members. Dr. Renner made a lengthy report on the negotiations and the three presidents, Seitz, Hauser, and Dinghofer all expressed their views on the situation. Representative members from all parties participated in the debate. The vote granting authority for the signing of the Treaty was ninety-seven against twenty-three. Forty-six members refrained. The Pan-Germanistics voted against acceptance. The Treaty is, therefore, as far as Austria is concerned, settled.

The problem before the country is to reorganize an economic and financial life and to strengthen the government so as to reduce expenditures and to reduce the payment of relief to those out of work which consumes the resources and pauperises the recipients. The *Volkswehr* remains a danger and must be disbanded or re-organized into a really effective force which is not an instrument of the workingmen's council.

Dr. Renner desired to have Dr. Bauer return as Foreign Minister but the cabinet would not accept this proposition. It is suggested that Dr. Bauer be made a member of the Vienna Reparation Commission where his real force will be utilized and he will be kept so occupied so as to have little time to engage in promoting radical politics.

I shall report on the Austrian situation as it develops.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

³¹ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 428, September 7; received September 11.

³² Enclosure not printed; see Nina Almond and Ralph H. Lutz, *The Treaty of St. Germain* (Stanford, 1935), pp. 76–79.

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State33

No. 82

VIENNA, September 9, 1919.

Subject: Opportunities for investment in Austria.

SIR: I have the honor to state that while the reduction of Austria to a small state of less than 7,000,000 people and the pronounced ambition of the Czecho-Slovaks to make Prague the financial and commercial center of that part of Central Europe which was formerly the Austrian Empire will seriously jeopardize the future of Vienna, it is not improbable that this would have but a temporary effect. Vienna's geographical position makes it a natural center for commerce from all parts of Europe.

The present outlook is almost desperate, but even though political union between the nations that formed the Austrian Empire was unsuccessful, the commercial ties were so developed, and that development was so natural, that it must be expected that even though at present severed, they will later become almost as important again.

With the Austrian crown worth about a cent and seven-tenths, opportunities have recently been afforded, and many continue, for investments here that in the future should increase many times in value. Even though the city should lose half a million people and become but four-fifths as large, business property in its center would still be a bargain at the price in American money at which it could now be purchased. The British have recognized this—they have purchased the new printing office of the Austrian Government; the Italians have recognized this—they have purchased shares in the iron-ore company called the Alpine-Montan Gesellschaft; the French are reported to have made investments. The British have purchased

large interests in the Danube Steamship Company with its capital of a little over 50,000,000 crowns and valuable coal deposits in Hungary and with its fleet of river steamers including those for the carrying of oil.

The Danube traffic would be under the supervision of an American and through shipments would be possible. American capital can still purchase heavily in this company with prospectively large returns. Though there be depreciation and the greatest distress in the near future the skill of the Vienna workmen will not be lessened and sooner or later at least a partial return to the prosperity that existed before the war is certain.

In all the circumstances, with the feeling of sympathy and the confidence in the United States, it seems regrettable that American financiers have been so apparently indifferent: that American exporters have been to such a great degree unwilling to take property or mortgages on the same as security for the sales to this country, all of which would have tended to create commercial ties which when the better times set in would be very remunerative and which at the same time would assist in the re-establishing credit in a sorely tried nation. It is suggested that though many valuable opportunities have been snapped up by the British, Italian and French, others still offer which would seem to make it worth while for financiers to investigate in person.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

³³ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 434, September 9; received September 11.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/443^{1/2}

[Document 218]

Mr. A. W. DuBois³⁴ to the Secretary of State³⁵

No. 2

VIENNA, September 12, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to make a report summarizing the more important events which have transpired during the past week.

The signing of the peace treaty was accepted by the people without demonstration.³⁶ This passiveness is accounted for by the time consumed in drawing up the terms which prepared the people so gradually that they became fairly calloused to the severity of the terms. The loss of German South Tyrol for the Austrians is the most painful clause. But as that is a *fait accompli* the people and press are at present more interested in the financial clauses, their immediate depressing effect, the resulting low rate of exchange—the dollar today brings from 60 to 66 Crowns—, and to the scarcity of food and coal.

Due to the shortage of coal only a minimum number of trains are in operation. Practically all of the larger and most of the smaller out-of-town hotels plan to close for the winter, which will result in forcing many more people into the already overcrowded and underfed capital.

The food shortage, lack of housing facilities, and unemployment have caused the government for Lower Austria to issue on September 9th an inoffensively worded proclamation giving notice to all persons who were not residents in Lower Austria prior to 1914 or who had not become citizens to vacate the country by September 20th. Exceptions are to be made in case of persons whose occupation is helpful to Austria or who are too infirm to leave. This decree, if carried out, will cause the ejection of great numbers of Hungarians, Yugoslavs, and Czechs, and may be opposed by the governments of

those countries, which would but add to the existing friction between Austria and her neighbors.

The political situation has not greatly changed in the past two weeks. The soldiers and workmens councils with the actual power in their hands, are dominating the situation, and the government is impotent to set up an efficient administration or properly organized institutions. The business men and employees—*Bürger und Stände*—on September 10th organized themselves into councils to defend their interests, but declared themselves in principle against class war and councils, stating that they were forced to organize in order to protect themselves.

It is anticipated that the reorganization of the present form of government, which is merely a temporary structure set up to carry on the work of government until a definite peace had been signed and which had really precluded a union with Germany, will be begun as soon as Dr. Renner returns to Vienna. The reorganization may cause a realignment of the present political parties and some people even foresee a split and the formation of new parties. However all comment on this topic seems as yet to be in a haze and it is a question whether anyone has a clear idea as the possibilities in the political future. The only thing that is clear is that the next few months will be of great importance for the future politics and policies of the Republic of Austria.

Reports of threatened disturbances on the part of the Yugoslavs at Radkersburg and mistreatment of people in German West Hungary is cause for much comment by press and people, who desire intervention by the Allies and cannot understand why it is withheld.

I have [etc.]

A. W. DuBois

³⁴ Member of the Halstead Mission.

³⁵ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. DuBois; received September 17.

³⁶ For text of the treaty signed at St. Germain, September 10, see *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910–1923, vol. III, p. 3149.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/444

[Document 219]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[37](#)

No. 92

VIENNA, September 12, 1919.

Subject: Italian investments in Austria.

SIR: I have the honor to report that of the four powers—United States, United Kingdom, France, and Italy—Italy is the only power that has made large investments in Austria. The Italians have purchased large interests in the Austrian Lloyd, Adria, Austro-American and several smaller steamship companies, and the Alpine Montan Iron Ore Company which controls practically all the iron ore out put of Austria. The Italians have also purchased the Urainische Stahlweike in Trieste. Other investments have been made, so it is reported but information is not available at the moment, as what are the companies in which Italy has purchased interests. The British have purchased the old Government printing office and are reported to have invested heavily in the Danube Steamship Company but the latter report does not appear to be correct for otherwise share quotation would have advanced much more rapidly.

The Italians have exported largely of textiles and other products to Austria paying for them in lire which they have bought up at good rates in coffee houses in Vienna.

The Italians have shown a pronounced desire to do as much business as possible and according to reports reaching me from a source which seems fully reliable, many of the Italian officers have not hesitated to use their positions for business purposes. For example:—Textiles that come to Austria from Italy enter Austria at Laibach which is occupied by Italian troops. There it is stated that large quantities of textiles are escorted across the frontier by Italian officers in uniform for sale in Austria. Some of the goods are stored

here and sold to the nations that had formerly been parts of the old Austrian Empire. The town of Laibach is reported to be filled with Galicians who participate in this trade. I have also been informed, and by a leading banker, that the Italians connected with the Mission have used information they have officially obtained in business transactions which have netted them large sums.

No other Mission here is known to have followed this policy. The American Mission certainly has not and the British have been equally particular in their conduct while there is every reason to believe the French have been beyond criticism in their conduct.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

[37](#) Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 442, September 12; received September 17.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/453

[Document 220]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[38](#)

Confidential
No. 95

VIENNA, September 15, 1919.

Subject: Transmitting memorandum of a conversation with Dr. Renner.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a memorandum of a conversation I had today with Dr. Renner, the State Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was the second time I had seen Dr. Renner who talked with even greater freedom than before, which conversation I reported in a despatch to the Department.[39](#) Dr. Renner's frankness about the attitude of the Italians and the French was really surprising and was called forth by an inquiry I made as to what he meant by his phrase "looking toward the west" when he spoke publicly about Austria's policy. The story of Italy's effort to make a separate treaty was wholly new.

Dr. Renner's statement of the French attitude agrees in principle with the view of Lt. Col. Sir Thomas Cunningham, Chief of the British Military Mission, and myself. The Department will remember that I reported that Prince Borghese, the Italian Minister who is chief of the Mission, had said in the presence of Colonel Cunningham, Captain Gregory and myself, that M. Allizé, the French Minister in charge of the French Mission had said to him that France desired to "Strangle German-Austria" and was willing for the Bolsheviks to continue in Hungary that Hungary might be weakened.

I have marked this report "confidential" because of the embarrassment that any publicity would necessarily cause.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of a Conversation With Dr. Renner, September 15, 1919

Dr. Renner expressed himself as most thankful for the support given to Austria during the negotiations of the Peace Treaty by the United States and the United Kingdom. He expressed the hope that I would state this specifically to the President and to all the American Members of the Peace Conference. The Italians had desired to make a separate Treaty with Austria regarding works of art and other things and had proposed this treaty fourteen days before the handing over of the Peace Treaty. They had promised that if this Treaty were signed they would support Austria in Paris. Inasmuch as Austria did not sign the treaty and despite the fact that the United States and England opposed the retention by Italy of the works of art she had seized, the Italians are displeased with Austria.

Asked what were the Italian plans with regard to Austria, Dr. Renner stated they wanted close commercial relations, and now that they had secured what they desired—reference was made to the south Tyrol—they were not particularly interested politically. The conversation turned to commercial relations between Italy and Austria and Dr. Renner confirmed the report which I have already made to the Department that Italian textiles had been taken across the frontier by the Italian officers and without payment of tariff duties against which practice Austria could do nothing. There was another, and perhaps more important, practice of the Italians and that was to deal with people who sought to get out of Austria artistic objects and jewelry which might be seized in connection with the work of the Reparation Commission. The persons who desired to send from Austria their precious jewels, and other objects paid ten per cent to the Italian officers to get them across the frontier. This has caused the illegal exportations of works of art and jewelry worth millions of crowns. To stop these things Dr. Renner declared Austria could do nothing.

I asked Dr. Renner exactly what he meant in his interview in an evening paper regarding the present policy being one of looking toward the west. He said that in the days of the old Empire Austria's policy had always looked toward the east. Austria could not, however, now make overtures to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Magyars, the Poles and the Jugo-Slavs whose attitudes were not friendly. They would suspect her of trying indirectly to restore the old relations that existed prior to the dissolution of the Empire. These people are suspicious of Austria as they had been before breaking up of the old Empire. Austria could, therefore, make no overtures but she could receive them if they were originated by the other peoples.

Austria looked to the United States and England for help, her only desire is for peace. Thanks to the United States and to England, though the Treaty is very hard, it is better than that which was presented to her. The unfriendly attitude of France made a better treaty impossible—Austria desires and proposes to live up to that Treaty. Austria hopes that England and America will propose and work for the formation of a Danube Federation and Austria would gladly support such a federation. Such a federation would be for peace because the United States and the United Kingdom desire peace. They have no warlike ideas. A Danube federation under French auspices, however, could not be considered. The French are so full of spirit so visionary—they think of war—that such a federation would look to French interests as opposed to those of the Germanic peoples. Such a federation could never make for peace and Austria must, and will have, peace for the future. The French are not Austria's friends and they showed that at St. Germain. Austria can not have confidence in France. She has no reason to trust the French. The French Minister professes to be very friendly but—and Dr. Renner shrugged his shoulders—meaning that M. Allizé did not justify his professions by his actions.

Dr. Renner again returned to the position of the United States and England had taken and he expressed his thanks for friendly attitude of the two countries. He said "Please say that we will gladly do all that America and England wish".

Reconciliation of the Anglo-Saxons and the Germanic peoples.

Dr. Renner in answer to an inquiry stated that he would remain as Foreign Minister but would devote himself entirely to foreign affairs and have nothing to do with the administration of the office. His policy was that of peace and the establishment of particularly close relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. He desires to endeavor to reconcile the Anglo-Saxon and the Germanic peoples. This did not mean any steps towards the union of the Germanic peoples. That is now impossible. He meant that the relations between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germanic people could be made better. Reference was made to the old Prussian ideas which he said could no longer prevail. Germany had become less important and her development must be continental and not maritime. The nations must work together for peace and the League of Nations must be made a reality. He hoped that in the future the people of England and the United States who desired to study German literature and art would come to Vienna for they would not now go to Berlin. The Vienna people are a friendly people and they would welcome the Americans and the English and gladly give them of their knowledge.

Austria's inner politics.

Dr. Renner spoke confidently of the Austrian situation. Austria has not as yet a really good Government but that the Government is steadily improving and would grow stronger. At my request he discussed relations between parties. He admitted there were differences in opinion between the two wings of the social democrats—the workingmens party—but these differences were not sufficient to make a break. His wing, the right wing, is the stronger and not so radical. The workingmen generally support him rather than the left. The left wing is too radical. It contains the Jewish intellectuals and they are dreamers and impractical who do not think clearly. As he said this he made a gesture toward his forehead to indicate that they were just a little mad. It was necessary that there should be cooperation with the so-called Christian social party. The latter also has two elements, the town element, and the peasant element, the former opposed to Dr. Renner and his party because after years of control of the city of Vienna, the town Christian socialists had lost the city government where they had not managed well and had done many improper things. The town Christian Socialists resent that and

consequently spread tales of disaffection among the social democrats to the embarrassment of the latter. With these town Christian Socialists the clerical people cooperate indirectly. The peasants are Christians but not clerical. They realize the necessity of a good government and of cooperation to secure the same. The two parties will work together despite these difficulties.

Dr. Renner intimated that there would be cabinet changes but not very many. It is necessary at the present moment to secure a capable man for the position of financial Minister which is a most unpopular position. He had in view the President of the Boden Credit Anstalt but that was not settled. The position is thankless and it would mean a sacrifice of at least eighty percent of his salary if this man were to accept the position.

Asked as to what would be Dr. Bauer's position he said that Dr. Bauer preferred to be the leader of the social democrats in the National Assembly and without cabinet rank and that he has no desire to return as Foreign Minister. In the National Assembly Dr. Bauer will support the cabinet and use his great ability to promote the interests of Austria.

Dr. Renner stated that there were bad elements and good elements in the *Volkswehr*—the peoples guard—which would not be abolished but would be reformed so as to become a really useful and dependable force. All possible steps would be taken to strengthen Austria's position and to get the people back to work but the problems are very difficult.

The impression was gained that Dr. Renner was very earnest, and despite the difficult problems, was confident of their solution on practical lines.

ALBERT HALSTEAD

³⁸ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 445, September 15; received September 18.

³⁹ No. 35, p. 559 [*Pg. 559 includes portions of [Doc. 210](#) and [Doc. 211](#)*].

Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State40

No. 7

VIENNA, September 21, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to report on the coal situation in Austria which has been the leading subject of press and conversation during the past four days,—since the government pronounced a coal crisis and the need of stoppage of tram and other service beginning with today.

There can be no question of the seriousness of the local situation due to lack of fuel, and if this crisis cannot be met by additional shipments of coal from Czecho-Slovakia, Upper Silesia, or Poland, practically all industries will be forced to shut down, hundreds of thousands of workmen will be thrown out of employment, and in spite of their easy-going character and good nature serious consequences can be expected.

An endeavor is being made by the various Allied and other missions to mitigate the present situation and probably it will meet with some success. From my experience on the Interallied Mission of Control for Teschen, which for several months was seriously engaged in dealing with the coal questions between Poles and Czechs, and was interested in the matters of production, distribution, and so forth, I am firmly convinced that the present manner of procedure will not put a stop to these constantly recurring crises (fuel crises) which Vienna is exposed to, and which very probably will lead to a collapse of government and economic structure. The dangers to which middle Europe would be exposed should this happen, from the probable repercussion in neighboring countries, and the breaking down of Austria's finances and industry which would make it impossible for her to meet the conditions of the peace treaty, are obvious results of a coal famine.

I fully appreciate the great shortage of coal throughout Europe and the difficulties in way of distribution, however the coal that is produced should be so distributed as to take care of the minimum needs of the important centers and to insure a safeguarding against such crises as now threaten this city. For instance, there can be no question that certain curtailments could be made in the consumption of coal in Czecho-Slovakia, which although to a degree injurious to her interests, would relieve coal for shipment to Vienna in sufficient quantities to do away with the ever recurring fear of a crisis and the grave dangers connected therewith.

Considering the character of the peoples with whom one must deal and the hatreds existing between them there is no use attempting to get results by prescribing a mild remedy. The present coal commission with its advisory character lacks the necessary power with which to carry out its decisions.

In a letter to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace written last May and handed to Commissioner White⁴¹ I pointed out the advantage of the Entente and Associated Powers retaining control over the disposition and distribution of the coal from the disputed areas of Teschen and Upper Silesia. The control over the coal produced in these regions would be a lever by which the Peace Conference and later the League of Nations could control the coal distribution of all central Europe, since all central Europe is dependent upon Teschen for its gas and better coking coal and upon Upper Silesia for quantity production. Further, as these areas are now under dispute the Peace Conference could easily reserve the necessary rights of control, especially in view of the fact that commissions of control are to take over the management of these areas for the next eighteen to twenty-four months, during the plebiscite period. The next year is the critical time for central Europe and the control and guaranteed equitable distribution of coal during this period would be the greatest assurance that these countries will survive this trying time. I therefore recommend that the proper provisions be made for the control of the distribution of coal from the Teschen and Upper Silesian fields during the period of the plebiscites. If this suggestion cannot be carried out for reasons unknown to me I suggest that the present coal commission be so

reconstituted and granted with the power to actually control and prescribe the distribution of the coal from the above mentioned districts. This control can be made real by the Conference or the League in turn through their control over products and other things vital to the central European states.

I am taking the liberty of making these recommendations because, from my practical experience in dealing with these peoples, I am convinced that advisory commissions are powerless to carry out their ideas, because instead of with action they will be fed with vain promises. If the Conference has an interest, as I [am] convinced it has, in the future and stability of the Republic of Austria, drastic action must be taken to forestall disaster.

I have [etc.]

A. W. DuBois

⁴⁰ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. DuBois; received October 27.

⁴¹ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/498

[Document 222]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State^{[42](#)}

No. 108

VIENNA, September 26, 1919.

Subject: Memorandum of conversation with Dr. Renner regarding pogroms in Vienna.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a memorandum of a conversation with Dr. Renner, the State Chancellor and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on yesterday afternoon. The newspapers had published reports that pogroms against the jews were being organized by reason of the large number of jews from Hungary and Galicia in town. The fact that many of them engaged in speculations that did not tend to lessen the cost of living created considerable antagonism towards the jews. The feeling was increased by the fact that eighty per cent of the Bolshevik leaders in Hungary were jews and also by the number of the same race in Bolshevik Russia.

In view of the emphasis that the Austrian Authorities had placed on the good will of the United States in the settlement of their problems, it occurred to me that it would be in the interest of humanity, and in line with the traditional policy of the United States if I should indicate to the State Chancellor that any mistreatment of the jews in Vienna would have an unfortunate effect on public opinion in the United States.

Immediately upon my return to the Mission I telegraphed to the Department and to the Commission in Paris of the representation I had informally made.^{[43](#)} The Foreign Minister saw fit to make an official announcement of my visit and the following statement appeared in all the newspapers this morning:

“Yesterday the representative of the United States, Mr. Halstead, called on Dr. Renner to ask whether rumours that a pogrom would appear to be true and declared he would regret if pogroms would occur, as it would exert a bad influence to public feeling of the United States towards Austria. Dr. Renner assured the American representative that all necessary steps would be taken to avoid brutalities”.

Dr. Armand Kaminka, Secretary of the Jewish Allegiance, called today to express the thanks of his people for the attitude shown. From other sources the information comes that attacks on the jews have been prevented by my visit to the State Chancellor.

I trust the Department will not disapprove my action.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation With Dr. Renner, State Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, on September 25, 1919

Doctor Renner was asked whether the reports that attacks upon the Jews were planned were correct, and it was stated that disorder and attacks upon the Jewish population would create a most unfavorable impression in the United States. Doctor Renner replied that every possible arrangement had been made to protect the Jews and that for the present they were in no danger. The agitation, he continued, was really not against the Jews but was an effort on the part of the Pan-Germanic Party to recover lost prestige. It was felt that agitation against the Jews, particularly in view of the large number of members of this race still remaining in Vienna who came during the war, would best achieve this result. It was desired as well to embarrass the government by compelling it to take strong measures to protect the Jewish population.

The State Chancellor said that there had never been any very pronounced anti-semitic feeling in Vienna, but that there had been a great deal of talk of that kind, but the Viennese people were never unkind to strangers and pogroms would not be a natural Viennese occupation. Doctor Renner was unable, however, to state that in the future, when the 450,000 war prisoners now in Italy and Siberia had returned, and when they found little food, no homes and no coal, it would be possible to prevent attacks upon the Jews who had come here during the war. It should be remembered that many of them had engaged in speculations in exchange and in food products which were not popular and others bought food at high prices which the population believed would have gone to them otherwise. The problem of the refugees is a most difficult one and one which the government is seeking to solve without causing sufferings. It was not proposed to send away the Galician Jews who came during the war and who had found work but the Jews who had money and no productive occupation would be sent home so soon as the trains which Poland was to furnish were available. This would not be until late in October. No Jews would be sent home, such as those from the Ukraine who would suffer for political acts and the government would endeavor to protect all political refugees. This refers also to the thousands who had come from Hungary. There are perhaps some 20,000 Hungarian refugees who would be expelled as soon as possible, but these do not naturally include the four to five thousand who were driven from West Hungary by Magyar efforts, to prevent them from expressing their approval of the annexation of parts of that district to Austria.

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁴² Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 455, September 26; received October 1.

⁴³ Telegram No. 905, September 25, 5 p.m., to the Commission, repeated to the Department as Mr. Halstead's No. 10, not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/505

[Document 223]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[44](#)

No. 114

VIENNA, September 28, 1919.

Subject: Dr. Bauer and the Austrian Red-Book.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 110[45](#) with regard to the Austrian Red-Book[46](#) and to quote the following article from the *Neue Tag* of today. This article is particularly interesting in that it tends to confirm rumors that had not been credible, i. e. that Dr. Bauer had deliberately intended when the publication of the Red Book was arranged to clear Germany as far as possible from the charge of responsibility from the great war. The *Neue Tag* article explains Dr. Bauer's attitude was due to his confident belief that Austria would be permitted to join Germany.

The *Neue Tag* article follows:

“At the time of the peace negotiations between the Entente and Germany Dr. Gooss by order of the Secretary Dr. Bauer went to Versailles to hand the head of the German delegation, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the legal documents which were published in the Red Book. These documents showed that responsibility for the war rested with Austria and not with Germany. They were handed to Rantzau that Germany might secure better terms. Count Rantzau made no use of the documents.

The information is actually true. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau as a good diplomat knew very well that to use the documents would make a bad impression on the Entente. But we are surprised to hear that Dr. Bauer, German Austrian Secretary of State, did such a thing as might have resulted in good terms

for Germany but in worse for Austria. It is surely not possible that Dr. Bauer could have done that on purpose. It seems that he was convinced of annexation to Germany and that the Entente would permit it. But we must say that our policy never was lead in such a dilettante way as under Dr. Bauer's control of foreign affairs".

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁴⁴ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 460, September 28; received October 1.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

⁴⁶ Republik Österreich Staatsamt für Äusseres, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, 1914. (Wien, 1919).

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/539

[Document 224]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[47](#)

No. 128

VIENNA, October 10, 1919.

Subject: The pressing need of Austria.

SIR: I have the honor to remind the Department that for the past four months this Mission has pointed out existing conditions in Austria and has outlined the probable course of events. These have proved there has been no exaggeration. Austria stands on the verge of utter destruction, and unless practical steps are taken, and at once, to assist it to rebuild itself the people will freeze and die from hunger in the streets this winter and every man's hand will be against his neighbor in the effort to save himself. When that situation arises civilized nations will be eager to put their hands in their pockets to tide over the difficulty, but that will be prolonging the agony. While they are feeding the starving and half-broken population, each dole will make it less capable of self-support. The problem is not one of charity. It would be better for the people to die than to perpetuate the growing tendency amongst them to let someone else solve their problems. The situation has passed far beyond any of the feelings of bitterness that the war caused. The condition of Austria is that of a convict sentenced to a lingering death.

The reparation commission, which as yet has given no evidence of functioning for Austria, is, it would appear, charged with liquidating the assets of this portion of the old empire. It was determined, however, that certain of the assets should be used for the purchase of food, coal, and raw materials, though no proportion was fixed. A careful reading of the Treaty of Peace might lead to the assumption that it was intended for the reparation commission, if possible, to squeeze as much indemnity out of Austria as could be obtained and leave the six and one-half million people remaining with just enough

to make a slow recovery possible. Even that is not being done, for the reparation commission has not begun to function. It is hoped that the language used will not be regarded as extreme, but intended to state the plain facts. The fact is, however, that the fate of Central Europe is at this moment at stake. Reports from Poland, and the Department is doubtless informed of conditions there, are not in the least encouraging. In Czecho-Slovakia the spirit of Bolshevism has certainly not decreased and the feeling of unrest which prevails is a real menace. The Slovaks are dissatisfied and the Bolshevik propaganda has penetrated deeply into the thoughts of those simple minded people. The Spartacists in Germany are more active and stronger than at any time since their overthrow in Berlin, Munich, and Hamburg. Hungary after being robbed by the Roumanians is disturbed, dissatisfied and discouraged. It is not so certain to them that the rule of the Bela Kun was much worse than that of the Friedrich regime. The outlook in Italy is particularly grave. With such unrest surrounding Austria, if the latter country is driven to disorder and to rioting in the desperation of hunger, the unrest is certain to spread over the borders as if it were a germ disease.

In the interest of Central Europe, therefore, without regard to any sentiments of justice or feelings of brotherly responsibility the people of Austria should be enabled to rebuild themselves. The Austrians naturally are a self-respecting, self-supporting people brought into distress by those who ruled them in the past. Their workmen are not excelled in skill or in artistic craftsmanship. Their mechanics are as well educated in technical matters as any in the world. Now they are without work. It is inevitable that thousands of them must migrate. Where? To the nearest industrial country with real capacity for industrial reconstruction—Germany. Austria is not allowed to join Germany for fear the addition might make Germany politically stronger but her workmen are going to be driven there to earn their livelihood to the benefit of Germany.

With raw materials, with coal, and food Austria can gradually rebuild, but she must be given time.

Raw materials, or money advanced, should be regarded as an investment upon which later returns could be obtained, the interest

being paid in the form of further investment until confidence has been returned, the number of workless has been reduced, the productive capacity of the country has been increased, the money has thus become of greater value and interest can be paid abroad with less sacrifices. There are many valuable factories and many business opportunities offered in Austria which will ultimately yield more than double the original investment. It is most desirable that American investors should send representatives here with power to act but before investments can be made, or anything practicable can be done the reparation commission must begin to function, and that should be at once.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

[⁴⁷](#) Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 468, October 10; received October 15.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/560^{1/2}

[Document 225]

Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State48

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No. 11

MEMORANDUM ON RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS IN AUSTRIA

The peace treaty of Saint Germain was accepted on October 17th by the National Assembly after a short report by Dr. Weiskirchner, chairman of the committee for peace negotiations, without debate. The treaty goes to Dr. Seitz, president of the National Assembly, for ratification. The Social Democrats and Christian socialists voted for the treaty, while the All-German party withheld their vote.

The treaty having been accepted, the old cabinet under the leadership of Dr. Renner, handed in its resignation. Dr. Renner stated that the work of the cabinet, namely that of treaty making, had been concluded and since new problems were to be undertaken a new government would have to be formed. The leaders of the Social Democratic and the Christian Socialist parties have been in negotiation for some time for the formation of a coalition cabinet and government and on October 16th had agreed upon a program which was carried out on October 17th without a hitch.

Dr. Renner was asked to present a cabinet list which was accepted. The new coalition cabinet is as follows:

State Chancellor, Dr. Karl Renner
Vice Chancellor, Jodok Fink
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Karl Renner
Minister for Interior, Matthias Eldersch
Minister for Justice, Dr. Rudolf Ranek
Minister for War, Dr. Julius Deutsch

Minister of Finance, Dr. Richard Reisch
Minister for Agriculture, Joseph Stöckier
Minister for Commerce, Johann Zerdik
Minister for Ways of Communication, Ludwig Paul
Minister for Social Government, Ferdinand Hanusch
Minister for Food, Dr. Johann Loewenfeld-Russ
Minister for the Preparation of a Constitution and Government
Reform, Dr. Michael Mayr
Undersecretary for Education, Otto Glöcke
Undersecretary for Worship, Wilhelm Miklas
Undersecretary for Justice, Dr. Arnold Eisler
Undersecretary for War, Dr. Erwin Weiss
Undersecretary for Commerce, Dr. Wilhelm Ellenbogen
Undersecretary for Social Administration, Joseph Resch
Undersecretary for Health, Dr. Julius Tandler

The new cabinet has thirteen ministers—secretaries of state—and seven undersecretaries, of whom eight are social democrats, eight christian socialists, and four professional men but conservative and probably also christian socialists. This majority or apparent majority of the conservative party has brought forth a cry of opposition from the radical elements who claim that they have been sold out to the middle class. However the social democrat leaders defend their position by claiming for themselves the six important political posts in the cabinet, namely the state chancellorship, the ministry for war, the ministry for foreign affairs, the ministry for interior, the ministry for instruction, the ministry for social administration, and further through the control of the socialization commission.

Equally as interesting as the attempt to coalesce the two political parties, is the attempt to bring about a better understanding between Vienna and the counties by placing in the cabinet the representatives of the latter, namely, minister for justice, a social democrat from Salzburg, the undersecretary of justice, a social democrat from Graz, and the minister for constitutional and administrative reform, a christian socialist leader from the Tirol.

In general it can be said that the new cabinet has been formed along common sense lines and the selection of the individuals on the whole

has been a good one. The character of the chancellor and minister for foreign affairs is well known. Dr. Deutsch retains his post as minister for war. His policy has been described in a former report (No. 5, Sept. 17th).⁴⁹ Dr. Reisch, the new minister for finance and who has one of the most difficult positions conceivable, is leading director of the Boden Credit Anstalt (Bank), is a leading financier and expert on taxation. He has served as counsellor to the ministry for finance and bureau chief for tax and finance reform and is well versed in governmental finance problems. He is considered a great improvement over Schumpeter, his predecessor. The elimination of Otto Bauer rids the cabinet of an extreme radical, an intelligent but dangerous man. Kautz, Bauer's secretary, who held a position in the foreign office, has resigned thus further purging that office of extremists and allowing the more reasonable elements to breathe more freely. Zerdik has been retained in the cabinet, on account of his knowledge of the coal industry but has been changed from interior to industry. The new government has four Jews in the cabinet.

Program of the new administration.

The *Reichspost*, the christian socialist paper, and the *Arbeiterzeitung*, the social democrat paper, published yesterday signed statements of the coalition government's program, a copy of which is attached to this memorandum.⁵⁰ Both parties are to be equally responsible in the new government and neither is to make political material of labor or wage questions.

The first question of importance is that of finance reform for which the following program has been set forth. Immediate contribution of wealth, to take place but once (*einmalige Vermögensabgabe*); a large part of the proceeds to be used for securing of foreign currency, to reduce the war debt, to cover current deficits, and to secure government aid for important undertakings. Demand for deliverance of gold and foreign securities, for payment of foodstuffs, against complete reimbursement. The creation of a steady currency. The tax system to be based on a graduated income tax. Division of tax between State and counties. Regulation of payments of state

employees. The adaptation of selling prices of foodstuffs to production costs.

The task next in importance is the drafting of the new constitution, in the carrying out of which the administration will consult both parties and also the counties. The new draft will constitute German Austria as a federated state; German West Hungary will be considered as a separate county a part of the new federation. The powers of the federation will be specified. The federal government is to have exclusive control over foreign affairs, law making (civil and criminal), the army, the higher schools, labor laws and insurance. The federal government will have the power to impose taxes. All powers not specifically granted to the federal government fall to the counties. Relation of state to church is to be regulated, all creeds to be respected. The lawmaking power is to be vested in the national assembly and a federal council, the latter to be modelled after the German Parliament. It will introduce the initiative and referendum. It will do away with the bureaucratic form of government.

The program acknowledges the faults of organization of councils (soldiers and workmens) and the misuse of their powers, but promises freedom to the individual, clubs, meetings, and so forth.

The new military is to be a democratic, republican army. All members are to swear to defend the democratic republic and not to take part in political movements directed against the republic. It is to be the army of the republic and not that of a party. However the individual members will have all the rights of citizens and outside of their duties can as individuals take part in politics. Men will be selected from the officers of the old Austro-Hungarian army for commissions and for non-commissioned rank. But also men who have become officers since the overthrow and who are qualified may become officers. All former officers may apply for entrance into the ranks of the new army on the same basis as other citizens. For those officers of the old army who do not enter the new some means will be found for their care. They will be especially selected for the work of carry[ing] out the deliverance of wealth, collection of gold and jewelry, agricultural operations, and census taking. The new army is to be subordinate to the federal authorities. Delegates of the rank

and file (soldiers councils) will represent the economical interests and stipulated rights of the men, but they will not be allowed to prejudice the powers of the commanders. Soldiers will serve in their own counties. Only when the volunteers from any county do not suffice will soldiers who are citizens of other counties be stationed therein.

The new program states in regard to its foreign policy that the government must show the best will to carry out the peace terms, and that German Austria must not attempt to carry out its national aims of union with Germany and reunion with the German elements lost to it through intrigue or force but only with the consent of the League of Nations. As far as possible good relations are to be established with the neighboring countries, but there shall be no meddling with their internal affairs. Alliances will not be sought with the neighboring states. The first aim must be to conclude commercial treaties and to do away with the system of compensation treaties. Representation of Austrian interests in foreign countries is solely confined to the federal government. Diplomatic missions will be established in the succession states and in England, Italy, and the United States as soon as possible. (France is not mentioned probably through typographical error)

The program further covers the food problem, but in a rather indefinite manner, and in the same way handles the socialization work, labor, insurance and other matters.

Dr. Renner yesterday was unusually cheerful and seemed well satisfied with the present political situation and line-up. The people as a whole however are apathetic to appointments of new government officers and publishing of programs. They want results and have very little faith in seeing them attained no matter what government is in charge. They consider their position hopeless and are greatly depressed with the prospect of a winter full of misery. There is some faith in the proposition of establishing a *Notenbank* to raise credits and stabilize the currency but more in the Reparations Commission which is to commence its work this week.

The serious condition of the country has brought about a coalition of hostile political elements that nothing else could possibly have accomplished. The bright spot in the situation is that this coalition may go far to soften the hatred between classes, at least between the classes as represented by the two large political parties. The real monarchists and the communists, also the All Germans, are left out but they have no program to offer which might alleviate the present situation, and everything considered the present political and administrative arrangement is the [best?] that could be brought about and therefore the best for coping with the situation, hopeless as it may be.

⁴⁸ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. DuBois under covering letter No. 11, October 18; received October 23. Mr. DuBois was in charge of the Mission to Austria during the absence of Mr. Halstead in Paris.

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/607

[Document 226]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[51](#)

No. 146

VIENNA, November 7, 1919.

Subject: Present conditions in Vienna.

SIR: I have the honor to furnish the following information regarding the present situation in Vienna, that the latest phases may be understood:

The gravest anxiety prevails into Vienna's immediate future.

Without coal, with reduced food rations, and therefore hungering and cold, and knowing that some people are well fed and warm, it is apprehended that the population in desperation may proceed to plunder and rob those who have something left. The police themselves are apprehensive though they hope their well disciplined force which still remains loyal, may be able to control the difficulty. But when newly-born children have died in the hospitals from pneumonia from want of heat, when the stomach is empty and the body is cold, when clothing is short and no hopes appear, it is but natural to fear that people who have been amazingly long suffering and patient may seek to solve the problem by seizing the means of existence from those who they think have more than they deserve.

Despite the strenuous efforts that had been made to procure sufficient coal for Vienna, the coal outlook to-day is not better and is even worse than in the recent past. It has been necessary to deliver to the electric light works coal originally assigned to the gas works. Private houses are absolutely unable to obtain coal except in an underhand way. In the poor quarters it is reported that the furniture is being burned for heating purposes. The woods in the vicinity of Vienna have been invaded by thousands of people and without police

interference have been devastated. Throughout the summer and autumn much of the timber in the Wienerwald, the forest surrounding the city, was cut for fuel and it is expected that every accessible group of trees will be cut down by people who fear to freeze to death. If a heavy snow storm should come it is almost inevitable that it will be necessary to close both the gas and the electrical generating works. This would not only necessitate the closing of many of the kitchens that furnish meals to children, but it would also make the city absolutely dark with all the dangers that such darkness would involve.

It has become necessary to cut the bread ration in two. The bread is nutritious but not appetizing, potatoes are scarce and almost impossible in price. As a meat ration the public is supposed to obtain a few ounces every fortnight and this is not a good meat. Neither real coffee nor real tea is obtainable, except by illegal methods and then at prices which are impossible for nine tenths of the population. There is absolutely no fresh milk. Up to the present fresh vegetables have been plentiful but costly. Yesterday, however, none was available because the peasants were asking too high prices. Butter can only be purchased indirectly and costs 202 Kronen a kilo. Even making some allowances for the reduced value of the crown in Vienna itself, this makes the butter thus obtained twenty five an ounce. There is practically no fat. Some fruit is still to be had.

With these conditions it can be seen how serious will be the reduction of the bread ration upon people who have had their vital energies seriously impaired by short rations and many of whom are really half starved. The *Volkswehr* and members of the workmen council and those who have connections with them are better off than others. The middle classes that were before the war comfortable and envied are the ones who perhaps suffer most. Many persons formerly prosperous are now living on the proceeds of the sale of jewelry and family treasures. The majority of the poor are in a desperate state.

In this situation there are strikingly interesting contrasts. In the large hotels at high prices one may obtain plenty of meat, vegetables, potatoes, in fact excellent food. The hotels are filled with people who

made money during the war or who are living on their jewelry, or come from abroad and who can pay the prices because of the advantage they gain through the rate of exchange. The rooms are not heated and are dark because only one burner may be used. In many private houses the table is not bad. The hotels and these houses obtain their food by what is called “*Schleichhandel*”—clandestine trading. It is said that this food would not reach the city were it not for the high profits obtainable. This is the reason given for not preventing this traffic. It is argued that by permitting such *Schleichhandel* the available food is not drawn upon. It is reported that in the country, peasants are feeding their pigs and cattle with food that otherwise could come to town because they do not regard the money as worth having.

There is fortunately a better side. The preliminary report of the temporary reparations sub committee—a document by the way, with the conclusions of which I fully concur and which is remarkably complete—suggests a method of solving the problems, temporarily at least. In my judgment it is the only method.

Again there is a probability that the city kitchens will shortly be able to feed a million people at prices within the reach of most, and then to furnish some meals to those who are pennyless. There were established during the war so-called “*Kriegsküchen*” (war-kitchens). These expensively handed [*sic*] had been continued up to the present, but they have not fed sufficient people nor have they been practically efficient. Accordingly the government, some weeks ago, asked Dr. Geist who has been in charge of the Child Feeding for Vienna, to take over this work. At first it was popularly assumed that this work would be supported by American funds, but Dr. Geist has succeeded in disabusing the people of that opinion. The question arose as to the financing of these kitchens, that is of providing capital for the purchase of food. It was calculated that eighty million Kronen was the minimum sum needed. To arrange for this money a meeting was held yesterday under the presidency of the Finance Minister, Dr. Reisch, at which were present the Vice-Burgomaster Emmerling, Dr. Geist and members of his staff and representatives of the leading banks. The banks came prepared to furnish the eighty millions. The finance minister finally offered ten million crowns from the state

funds if Vienna would furnish a like amount. The vice-burgomaster declared it impossible but finally agreed to furnish the ten millions crowns if the bankers would furnish 100 millions. Agreement was finally reached on this basis and a limited company is to be formed the finances of which will be under the control of the bankers. Both the finance minister and the vice-burgomaster insisted that their burocrats [*sic*] should have nothing to do with the management. Dr. Geist will be the director without financial responsibility. Professor Pirquet of the *Kinderklinik* will arrange a ration that is the most nutritious possible and on Monday the first kitchens will be taken over. It is hoped gradually to extend this work until a million people may be fed daily.

The money is sufficient, it is believed, to buy food on the best terms possible and it is hoped that the charges for the meals will ensure a sufficient profit to prevent loss and meet all the emergencies. It is further hoped that by encouraging people to go to the kitchens for the meals which they can carry home, the consumption of gas and coal for cooking in the houses will be markedly reduced, thus helping in a measure to solve the coal problem.

Fortunately to-day the weather has moderated, for the first time in a fortnight.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁵¹ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 481, November 7; received November 10.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/640

[Document 227]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[52](#)

No. 159

VIENNA, November 21, 1919.

Subject: Conditions in Austria and Vienna.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report on existing conditions in Austria and in Vienna particularly.

The general situation appears still to be going from bad to worse. The crown which was worth about 3 cents six months ago is worth just a little less than four-fifths of a cent today. Prices have advanced almost proportionately except on articles produced before the tremendous fall, but practically almost all of these have been purchased by foreigners who realized how cheap they were. There seems to be no end to the steady depreciation of the money. The fall is not surprising, however, when the expenditures of the Government are practically three times its revenue and when the printing presses are worked overtime to pay for running expenses.

Six months ago the people were depressed and apprehensive of an outbreak of bolshevism, but they were buoyed up by the feeling, which would appear to have been wholly illogical that the four great powers who were preparing the Treaty of Peace would see to it that they did not go under. When the Treaty of Peace was presented and the question of its signature came before the government, Doctor Renner insisted strongly upon its signature. He believed this was the only course possible. A few there were who feared that the treaty would not permit Austria under the most favorable circumstances to meet the obligations it imposed and to gradually rebuild. These argued that the Peace Treaty should not be signed and that Austria should stand back and say to the powers "what are you going to do about it." If a popular vote were now taken upon the question of

signing the Peace Treaty the chances would be against a vote to ratify. Developments in Hungary have accentuated this feeling as the increasing hopelessness of the situation became manifest. They see that the Rumanians remained in Hungary contrary to the wishes of the Peace Conference for several months and that they successfully looted the country and that even now the opposition of the powers to a monarchy has not decreased the sentiment for that form of government to any appreciable degree. They fear that even though the will may be there the powers have so far found it practically impossible to really improve the outlook. "Why" then is the question, "should we struggle on and why did we not force the powers to solve the problem that we cannot solve, for then theirs would have been the responsibility."

For the last few days there has been the gravest danger that there will be no bread and as it is the ration is reduced more than half. The most strenuous efforts are being made to obtain more bread but the city continues to live literally from hand to mouth. The harvest has been over for some months and the provinces have only given Vienna about 32% of the normal supply. From every neighboring country difficulties arise with regard to the supply for Austria, the chief one being the question of finance. The supply of clothing is insufficient and the price almost prohibitive—though in the shops that cater to the well-to-do, to the thousands who are here in one form or another for foreign missions, for liquidating the assets of the Empire, and for other purposes, and those catering also to the war-profiters clothing of a luxurious kind and all other luxuries are readily obtainable. The apartments of practically all of those except the foreigners who have an official or semi-official status are cold. A little wood is purchasable but at exceedingly high prices and the poor in many cases are unable to obtain fuel to cook their meals.

There was a danger yesterday that the electric light service could not be used because there was no coal and the bins were being swept to secure something to burn to keep the boilers warm, but a small supply of peat was finally secured which burned better than had been expected. This may improve the situation somewhat. The same difficulty of hauling occurs with this as with coal. Many trains have been reported on their way to Vienna, laden with coal, but have been

delayed for one reason or another, chiefly because of the breaking down of the railroad stock.

I have visited the poorer quarters and in one 9 x 5 room found a family without furniture, with children and parents in rags, and am told that this is not in the least an unusual case. In these circumstances the patience of the people is astonishing. This is both due to their nature and to the fact that their condition makes resistance and resentment most difficult.

One hears daily rumors of expected popular demonstrations, of public rioting and of the likely overthrow of the government. With everybody depressed, discouraged and hopeless such rumors naturally grow. The government is anxious and it has been stated that the socialists finding they can do nothing are not unlikely to turn the responsibility over to the Christian Socialists, who are a mixture of conservatives and clericals. There is much talk and there have been plans for an attempt to restore the monarchy. The tradesmen, the old officials, the aristocrats and those who are dependent upon a gay city and a majority of the *bourgeoisie* would favor a monarchy. To the peasants of at least Tyrol, Salzburg and Vorarlberg a restoration of the monarchy would be welcome. Even in Styria there is a strong feeling for the restoration of the monarchy.

The situation in Vienna is complicated by the hostility of the provinces which are seeking more and more to force the government to regard them as independent as the Swiss cantons. In several cases the government has been wholly defied and there is a case pending against the provincial council of Styria because it has acted unconstitutionally. The provincial council of Upper Austria insists upon a right to decide for itself what should be shipped from there, and who should be permitted to enter that territory. A comparatively little respect for law anywhere is apparent and the condition is actually one of peaceful anarchy. The one strong force for real order is the police of Vienna and that under existing conditions it should remain so loyal is the highest tribute to its discipline and efficiency. It appears to be almost the only body that has any real patriotism but that patriotism is largely due to the habits of obedience and discipline.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁵² Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 488, November 21; received November 24.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/661

[Document 228]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[53](#)

No. 163

VIENNA, November 26, 1919.

Subject: Interview with State Chancellor Renner on the hopelessness of Austrian situation.

SIR: I have the honor to state that in view of reports that had reached me from sources that have previously been reliable that other countries were interested in Austria's downfall for their own benefit, and because of the desperate conditions existing in Vienna, I called on Dr. Renner to-day to obtain his view of the situation. I did not intend, of course, to refer directly to those reports, but rather to tactfully draw from the State Chancellor his opinion of the situation and of the future. It was, however, wholly unnecessary to ask Dr. Renner any questions, for as soon as I entered his office he began in a jerky, nervous, overwrought manner, which had never been characteristic even at times when the outlook was most critical, to appeal to me for direct help from the United States. The following is a brief memorandum of the conversation, in which it was unnecessary for me to do anything except listen:

Dr. Renner declared that he and his colleagues in the government were at their wits' ends, hopeless and sleepless, because they could see no way out of the difficulties that confronted the Austrian Republic, and he asserted that the machinery of the Government would break down from utter exhaustion if relief did not come within the next week. The strain was shown upon his face, and he repeated himself frequently. That was not usual. He declared that the "Entente exist no longer", that the four Powers had intricate organizations including Supreme Councils, sub-divisions thereof, commissions in each country and commissions of enquiry, ministers and diplomatic and military missions, and other functionaries including committees

and sub-committees, which met, argued, consulted and accomplished nothing. All questions were confused with conflicting political policies, constitutional disabilities, financial insecurities, domestic politics and general inefficiency. The problem was simple: It was to furnish Austria with “a little piece of money” with which she could buy “a little piece of bread” to carry her through.

He said that the United Kingdom was in a bad condition financially, that France was far worse off, and that Italy was still more embarrassed by financial matters, and that a loan by the four Powers was apparently not possible; the United States with its hundred million people and its wealth alone being in position to help. He realized that the situation of the United States would not permit its Government to help directly, but it could, as it had in the past, advance money which the other three Powers would loan to Austria provided they could agree to do so. But governmental assistance was not necessary. Austria could pledge herself, her waterpower, her woods, her State property, and an American financial group, which by advancing say 200 million of dollars, could save seven million people, and be in a position of practical control of the future of this country at an immense profit. It was simply a matter of having one business man with power to act come to Austria and make the arrangements. Immediately thereafter he spoke of a Mr. Meyer, representing the New York bankers, who [was?] here and of a representative of the International Corporation who was to meet a representative of Austria in Rotterdam for the purpose of considering financial advances, but this took too long; that the help must be immediate; that without help, the people would within a few days be wholly without bread; that they must contract within a week for food after the 8th of January. But in the meantime he apprehended that about Christmastime that the whole country would fall to pieces, and with 100,000 men starving they could be expected to break into warehouses, private homes and Government buildings, seize what they could lay their hands on. This might keep the population for three days thereafter, but when those three days were ended, what was to happen? It seemed to him that it meant the utter destruction of Austria, which would mean disorder and confusion throughout all Central Europe, for say what one might Austria was the center, and upon the good order and contentment of the

population of Vienna depended the future welfare of the country surrounding. The states of Central Southern Europe were all irretrievably bound together.

Asked about food from Jugo-Slavia, he said that the food that was on the border had been received; Jugo-Slavia was not unfriendly; that in fact the Jugo-Slavian Minister and he were friends for years and addressed each other as "thou". The fact was that Jugo-Slavia had one main railroad which runs from Belgrade to Laibach, a single track in bad condition; that the Austrian railroads, bad as they are, compared to those of Jugo-Slavia were ideal; that the Jugo-Slavs had said "send us engines and cars and we will use them to take food to Laibach and then to Austria;" in Belgrade and vicinity there was an abundance, but at Laibach there was a want, simply for lack of rolling stock and railways that could carry the traffic. Austria could not provide the engines. The Czechs could not furnish coal because they hadn't the rolling stock; here is the same problem; where is it to come from? One goes constantly in a vicious circle.

Dr. Renner then referred to the Reparation Sub-Commission, which he said was composed of men of the highest purpose, who had labored unceasingly, but they could get no results from the various commissions and sub-divisions of commissions both in Paris and in their own countries to which their recommendations had to be referred.

To bring the State Chancellor back to the immediate subject, he was asked what would follow the breakdown in Vienna. With a jerk of his shoulders he said "probably the entrance of the Czechs into Vienna", and he added "troops from other countries, perhaps from Italy, possibly from Hungary and possibly Germany, and general chaos". What was to be done? He answered his own question by saying: "American bankers must give us financial help, and at once. Please telegraph your Government to this effect. They cannot understand the immediate, the present, the heartbreaking needs of Austria".

With reference to the food question, I asked Dr. Renner as to the report that the Germans were making sacrifices in order to furnish twelve million kilograms of flour to Austria. He drew a diagram of

the Rhine and Danube, on the Rhine marking Rotterdam and Mannheim, and on the Danube, Passau. He stated that a ship-load of grain was on the way from Rotterdam to Mannheim, and that from other sources in the vicinity of Passau in order to save time the Germans would furnish grain, taking over the Austrian owned grain when it reached Mannheim.

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The papers repeat the report to-day that the Germans will reduce their food allowance in order that they may give Austria two million kilograms of flour per month. This does not agree with what Dr. Renner said yesterday, and looks as if it were an attempt on the Germans' part to cultivate the good-will of Austria by an appearance of generosity while Austrian officials in the present condition of this republic could not deny the statement.

I have [etc.]

[**ALBERT HALSTEAD**]

[53](#) Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 491, November 28; received December 1.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/663

[Document 229]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[54](#)

No. 167

VIENNA, November 27, 1919.

Subject: Possible intervention in Austria.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my Despatch No. 163 of November 26, 1919, which was a memorandum of a conference with the State Chancellor, Dr. Renner, on that date. At the same time I would refer to my telegram of the same date[55](#) which briefly reported the conversation with the State Chancellor, and toward the end mentioned the impression that prevailed in circles that should be well-informed and for the most part have been reliable in the past, that the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs, the one from an unfriendly and selfish purpose and the other through an understanding with the Italians, were prepared to go to the extent of wholly breaking up Austria. The attitude of the Czecho-Slovaks on the coal question, their ambition to make Prague the successor of Vienna as the great city of Southern Central Europe, and the failure of the Jugo-Slavs to furnish the food which Austria had expected naturally led those who were in direct touch with the destructive effect of the absence of coal and food upon Austria, to seek for reasons for these attitudes. It was remembered that in Czecho-Slovakia the French for the moment exercise the greatest influence, and that the French policy since the war's close has been based upon the belief that the safety of France in the future is dependent wholly upon the weakening of her former opponents. It was also remembered that the Czechs themselves have been particularly bitter toward Austria, and have apparently felt that the more difficult the revival of Austria was made, the better would be the Czechish opportunity to obtain a predominant influence in Southern Central Europe. The very policies pursued at the Peace Conference by the Czechs, and the difficulties since the completion of the Peace Treaty made by Czecho-Slovakia in the matter of the

delivery of coal, coincide with the practice of keeping Austria weak. Again, with disorder in Austria, the excuse to intervene would be obtained. Intervention would mean predominance, and in the future permit a greater or lesser degree of control of the destinies of that country. A weakened Austria might also appear to those who pursue a shortsighted policy, to secure Czecho-Slovakia from danger from the South, a danger which to the West and North she must continually face at the hands of Germany. Therefore, if the lower part of this nut-cracker were to lose its temper the danger of being crushed by the Germanic race would be materially lessened, and the influence which Austria by reason of being Germanic must exercise to keep the Germans in Czecho-Slovakia unsettled, would be materially decreased.

Much curiosity has been aroused in Vienna by the acquiescent attitude of Jugo-Slavia during the last few weeks when D'Annunzio has been so energetically and vociferously occupying Fiume and Dalmatia, in view of the fact that only a few months ago the Jugo-Slovaks were almost at grips with the Italians over this very question. It is exceedingly strange that Jugo-Slavia has not taken steps to counteract the activities of D'Annunzio which it is apparent are tacitly supported by State unless internal troubles in Jugo-Slavia keep her inactive.

It is not forgotten that the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs have desired some direct connection one with the other through, for example, a corridor between Austria and Hungary. It has been suggested that Italy may have promised Jugo-Slavia compensation in Carinthia and in Styria particularly near Marbourg as well as the town of Gratz.

Recent developments in Hungary have made it apparent that the peasants are in favor of a monarchy probably of a limited character. Having been under Michael Karolyi and Bela Kuhn, and with the view thus created as to what constitutes a republican government, their preference for a monarchy is not surprising. The Hungarians have been bitter at the loss of the three Western counties of Hungary that the Peace Conference transferred to Austria, and they have done all that is possible to counteract the desire of the West-Hungarians to

become Austrians. A republican Austria, particularly a government that is supposed to be very radical, is not agreeable to the monarchists in Hungary. Again there is a very strong monarchistic sentiment among the peasants of Austria, the *bourgeoisie* of Vienna, and the artistic and musical circles which have not been happy under the republic. These, together with the ex-officers of the Austrian army, would rejoice in a monarchy for Austria. This situation might very well encourage the Hungarians with their well-organized army under Admiral Horthy, to seek the first excuse to come to Vienna with the pretext of preserving order. A fortnight or so ago reports in detail reached this Mission of Hungary's plans to enter Vienna with the pretense of establishing order but really to overthrow the present government, of all of which the Department was informed by telegraph.⁵⁶ It can thus be seen that if the city of Vienna progresses from a condition of insufficient food and of cold and cheerless homes to one of actual starvation and freezing, with a consequent plundering of shops, warehouses and homes by thousands of people, which even the well-organized police could not control, the excuse would be presented to the Czechs who have a strong force only an hour and a half away in Pressburg, and to the Hungarians whose border is only 40 kilometers away and there might be a race for Vienna, which, though greatly impoverished, is still a prize.

The above is not based on absolutely authentic information, but suggests possibilities that may approach the probable.

I have [etc.]

[ALBERT HALSTEAD]

⁵⁴ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 493, November 28; received December 1.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/682

[Document 230]

Memorandum by Mr. A. W. DuBois[57](#)

No. 36

VIENNA, December 1, 1919.

SENTIMENT IN GERMAN WEST HUNGARY IN REGARD TO ANNEXATION
TO AUSTRIA

This report sets forth the results of a trip through German West Hungary, which was made for the purpose of sounding the wishes of the population in regard to annexation to Austria, and to learn what foundation there exists for the Hungarian agitation which disclaims a desire on the part of the population of West Hungary to join Austria.

The trip was made on November 28th, 29th, and 30th. The itinerary included Wiener Neustadt, Pötsching, Krensdorf, Zemendorf, Oedenburg, Breitenbrunn, Parndorf, and Kittsee. Farmers, notaries, mayors, and workmen were interviewed. The Austrian Foreign Office was especially desirous that the sentiment of the people in southern German West Hungary and that portion lying east of Neusiedler Lake (Fertos Tava) be sounded. This was not done, but if an assumption were to be made it would be that the people in those sections are as friendly to Austria as those in the sections visited.

It might be well to review briefly the ethnographical character of German West Hungary, which covers an area of 437,063 hectares or about 1,100,000 acres. According to the Hungarian official census of 1910 there were, of a total population of 345,082, 245,714 Germans, 44,215 Magyars, 49,386 Croatians, and 5,767 others.

The southern portion of the country is hilly with a poor soil given over largely to cattle raising, woodland, viticulture, and some general farming, whereas the northern portion is flat or rolling with a rich

soil used for general farming—grain and sugar beets—only the steeper slopes being used for viticulture. There are three beet sugar factories and some minor industries. Many thousands of persons find employment in the industrial region on the Austrian side of the frontier.

Although German West Hungary has belonged to Hungary for nearly three centuries without interruption the population according to the last census is 70% German. The so-called Magyarization or oppression by the Magyars apparently was not as severe as generally stated since the German population after three centuries of Hungarian rule has remained essentially German, speaking the German language. Some inhabitants claim oppression but others do not. Hungarian as the official language was used in the courts, in official communications, and, under the Hungarian system most officers being appointive, they were largely Magyars. All this caused inconvenience, annoyance, and probably in some cases hardship and injustice, but in very few cases actual and direct oppression. The dissatisfaction among the German elements is due more to the general lack of educational facilities and progress, from which all nationalities suffered, than to direct oppressive measures.

Before attempting to generalize or to express an opinion I wish to set down a few statements made by persons selected haphazardly which are indicative of the sentiment of the persons interviewed.

1. An apparently well-to-do German farmer and four peasant women, who were driving with farm produce toward Wiener Neustadt. Favored remaining with Hungary, prospects of a better and conservative government. Fear socialistic-Bolshevist tendencies in Austria. Claim they will always be able to market their produce in Austria as heretofore. Well treated by Hungary.
2. Innkeeper and farmers in Krensdorf. Favor Austria; they being Germans felt oppressed under Hungarian rule, which always used Hungarian officially; German language and schooling neglected, children growing up half educated; dependent on Austria for all manufactured products; want frontier opened.
3. Burgomaster and family at Zemendorf. Favor Austria; stated that protocol sent from Budapest to be signed by all favoring remaining

with Hungary received but three signatures in his village. No Communists, possibly three socialists in village. Villagers all farmers, all favored Austria account language, market, and sentiment.

4. Vice-Mayor of Oedenburg. Although native of German village favors Hungary. Claims new frontier will ruin Oedenburg now dependent on large radius of territory as distributing center. German West Hungary imports grain and other products from Hungary. Oedenburg redistributes to surrounding country and to Austria. Claims that all Croats and many Germans desire to remain with Hungary.
5. Mr. Stesgal leading citizen, member of German West Hungarian Government, Oedenburg. Conditions under Hungary unsatisfactory but not oppressive. Too much Magyar influence. Believes autonomy for German West Hungary a good solution, but doubts whether Hungarian Government would ever carry out promises of autonomy.
6. First group of peasants at Breitenbrunn. Occupied mostly with viticulture. Dependent upon Austria for market for their wines and for the manufactured products which they use, but entirely dependent upon Hungary for flour, young live stock, and other agricultural products which they themselves do not raise. Not oppressed by Hungarians. They send their children (exchange) to Hungarian villages so that they may learn the Hungarian language, indicating no language oppression. Difficult to know what majority of people wished—divided opinion. Best solution would be a plebiscite. The one all important need is the opening of Austrian-Hungarian frontier to free commerce. (The latter seemed to be the all important thing with most persons interviewed.) When asked what effect a frontier to the east would have they did not know.
7. Second group of eight persons in Breitenbrunn, including innkeeper, hunter, and farmers. All favored Austria, but some wanted plebiscite, thinking that autonomy under Hungary would be satisfactory, but most doubted possibility of real autonomy under Hungarian rule; claim that it never was possible, that promised reforms never executed. Fear Austrian demand for converting vineyards into grainfields, in which case population could not subsist.

Summary.

The population of German West Hungary, which is largely agrarian has no real definite opinion in regard to the annexation problem. It for the most part apparently lacks any patriotic affection for either Austria or Hungary, but on the one hand is swayed by ties of family relationship and language and on the other by custom and precedent. False reports about Bolshevism in Vienna and *coup d'état* in Budapest influence the population first against the one and then against the other country. The population is religious and conservative and not friendly to the present political institutions in Austria. Economically they are dependent upon an open border to the westward and do not know how a customs frontier to the east would affect them. Some fear a cutting off of flour and grain from Hungary and a draining of the area by Vienna should the country be attached to Austria. The population for the most part is in a frame of mind where agitation would have its influence, even though the agitators base their arguments on things of a purely temporary nature.

General.

I wish to preface any opinion which may be expressed in this report with the remark that it is obviously impossible to determine the wishes of a people by a cursory investigation, yet I feel satisfied that my information warrants an expression of opinion.

The majority of the population of German West Hungary is essentially German. Due to their proximity to the Austrian border and former free intercourse between Austria and Hungary the people have not become Magyarized. They would probably fit better within the confines of a German state than within one having a predominant population of another nationality. Possibly the majority of the population desire direct annexation with Austria; certainly they would prefer autonomy under Hungary to complete incorporation with that state, but there is a general lack of faith in Hungary respecting such autonomy. It is claimed that Budapest already decries the liberty given to the German nationalities and that

the government is absolutely opposed to making separate *comitates* (counties) of the purely German areas.

The majority of the population has no definite opinion and is easily swayed by temporary conditions or agitation and propaganda. For the most part the people look first to their prosperity and they do not know how they would be affected by a frontier between them and Hungary, but they are one in their opposition to a customs barrier between them and Austria.

The officials and clericals are for the most part in favor of remaining with Hungary.

Conclusions.

The present (old) frontier between Austria and Hungary from a strategical standpoint is very unsatisfactory to the former, whose capital and industrial centers are exposed to Hungary, whereas the proposed frontier is of very slight strategical disadvantage to Hungary.

The majority of the population in German West Hungary is German and other things being equal would naturally prefer to throw in their lot with a German state, whereas remaining under foreign domination will probably always be a source of friction.

Economically they should be just as well off under Austria as under Hungary once conditions become settled and foodstuffs again become plentiful. They may suffer at first from Hungarian restrictions due to retaliation and from uncertain economic and political conditions in Austria, but these should wear off and improve with time.

For these reasons I am of the opinion that the decision of the Peace Conference, giving this area to Austria, should be abided by, but that if for other reasons the question be reopened, the decision should rest upon a plebiscite, which however should only be taken after the people have been made thoroughly acquainted with the situation, especially as it may affect their local administration and the

economical position. A one-sided propaganda would create a prejudiced and false sentiment which would result in a decision that would ever create dissatisfaction and unrest.

DuBois

[57](#) Probably forwarded to the Secretary of State by Mr. Halstead; a copy to the Commission was received on December 19.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/671

[Document 231]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[58](#)

No. 173

VIENNA, December 3, 1919.

Subject: State Chancellor's conference with the four missions.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the State Chancellor of Austria, Dr. Renner, several days ago requested the heads of the Missions of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Chief of the Japanese Military Mission to meet him at the State Chancery. The representatives attended. The State Chancellor was represented by the Food Controller, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Commerce and Public Works and the Secretary of Railways. The discussion opened with a frank statement by the State Chancellor of the difficulties that confronted the State of Austria, and that without help a catastrophe could not be avoided.

There are inclosed statements read by the various cabinet officers present[59](#) for such consideration as the Department sees fit to give them.

As the statements, copies of which are enclosed, were read, various points were discussed, all of which served to confirm my view, which I also understand is that held by my colleagues, that the Austrian situation is very precarious. The French representative, Mr. Allizé, announced however, after the Minister for Railways had indicated how pressing was the need of coal cars and the difficulties which were met in securing the return of cars from other States formerly part of Austria, as well as the delivery of coal in cars after it had once been started for Austria, that an arrangement had been made by the Supreme Council for the control of the transit of coal between the various countries that furnished and obtained coal so that wagons would be returned and coal billed for any definite place reach there.

The Department will remember that this plan was initiated by the Vienna Sub-Commission of the Organizing Committee of the Reparation Commission, which insisted that coal trains should come unbroken from the mines, and should be ticketed with a label indicating that they were under the control of this Commission, and that such trains should remain as originally consigned until officially released. I had not thought it wise to make this announcement inasmuch as it had never been officially communicated, but had come to me through the co-operation which characterizes the relations of this Mission with the American part of the Sub-Commission. The State Chancellor and the other Austrian officials present were very much encouraged at the announcement of this arrangement, which, by the way, is not as yet effective.

It was pointed out that the Police President of Vienna could not guarantee the safety of the city if the undernourishment of the population continued, and if the homes, as is at present the case, procure insufficient coal for kitchen purposes.

There is practically nothing new in the situation as outlined. The population continues underfed as it has been for weeks. The supply of food is never sufficient for any length of time. The prices paid are necessarily excessive because long contracts cannot be made, and the resources of the country are through this method of purchase, generally inefficient, rapidly being dissipated.

The peculiar point in the conference that should be emphasized is that the real head of the Austrian Republic should think it necessary to appeal to the heads of the Missions as a body in the form that he had so often appealed to each individual commissioner; that the Government is nervous and overwrought has been apparent, and the apprehension for the future is at this moment graver than at any time before. An additional point is the request for an immediate credit by the Allies and the United States in foreign banks, the sum not mentioned, to enable Austria to procure food, coal and raw materials up to June, which credit is to be based upon such assets as the personal and real property of the former dynasty including art treasures, State railways, concessions for water power, etc. It was

emphasized that this credit ought to be granted before the exact list of securities was indicated.

Before the closing of the conference, the State Chancellor declared that there was another danger (*Gefahr*) that confronted the Austrian Republic, and that was the activity of the Swiss Federal Council in favor of the union of the Austrian province of Vorarlberg with Switzerland, which, if it were to be consummated, would mean that Tyrol, Salzburg and other provinces would separate themselves from Austria. This would mean of necessity that Austria could not carry out the engagements she made in the Treaty of St. Germain, which, with suitable credits, she thought she would be able to carry out.

In order that the matter might be presented personally to the Supreme Council, it was requested that permission be granted for the State Chancellor, the Finance Minister and other secretaries of State, to go to Paris between the 10th and 15th of December, and there present the case of Austria.

I have [etc.]

[**ALBERT HALSTEAD**]

⁵⁸ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 495, December 3.

⁵⁹ None printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/687

[Document 232]

Mr. A. W. DuBois to the Secretary of State^{[60](#)}

No. 41

VIENNA, December 5, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to report a conversation which took place today with the Minister for Hungary in Vienna, M. Gratz, during which he expressed himself on the German West Hungarian matter.

Mr. Gratz showed himself to be in favor of a customs union of the Danube states and of bringing about close ties between Austria and Hungary. He however declared that a loss of German West Hungary would mean an embitterment of feelings between his country and Austria which would be impossible to overcome, and that as a consequence thereof Austria would receive no aid from Hungary, and that Hungary would be reluctant to send her products to Austria. He believes that these two countries are dependent upon one another and should do all to establish friendly relations but the loss of German West Hungary would make this impossible and Austria thereby would lose far more than she would gain. He stated that he thought Hungary would be willing to abide by the result of a plebiscite even though it went against her.

The Austrian Government on the other hand is opposed to a plebiscite at this time when, as they claim, there is an unnatural prejudice against them and a vote would not be taken on a sound foundation.

I have explained the situation more fully in my report Nos. 35^{[61](#)} and 36.^{[62](#)}

I have [etc.]

DuBois

⁶⁰ Probably forwarded to the Secretary of State by Mr. Halstead; copy transmitted to the Commission was received on December 26.

⁶¹ Not found in Department files.

⁶² *Ante*, p. 594 [*Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 229](#) and [Doc. 230](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/696

[Document 233]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State⁶³

No. 182

VIENNA, December 12, 1919.

Subject: Austria and America, the unfavorable position in which the United States has been placed.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that for a considerable time the Viennese newspapers have been almost daily printing reports about what the United States would do for the salvation of Austria. It was first assumed that the American Government would grant a credit to the Republic of Austria. Some time ago when I saw Dr. Renner I told him just why a credit from the American Government was practically impossible, stating that tax-payers' money could not be extended without the consent of Congress, and that the granting of money to a country with which the United States had lately been at war and with which she was still in a legal state of war, would be establishing a new precedent and therefore the more difficult. After this conversation with the State Chancellor, in which the remark about American credits was only incidental, reports of what the American bankers were certain to do began to appear in the papers, and a few days later there was a statement that the American Government itself could do nothing. The speech of some days ago by Mr. Lloyd George in which the financing of Austria was put up to America, was published in the newspapers, and one or two days after it was reported that the Americans were going to buy one or another great industry, for example, a company with \$100,000,000 had been formed to exploit Austria, take over all its public services, and in general manage affairs. Again there came the report, said to be from official sources, of a gift of 30,000 bales of cotton, and to-day it appears that American capital has suddenly discovered value in the most inefficient telephone service in the world.

Rumors fly around Vienna, particularly in financial circles, as to what is to be expected from America. There is no idea so impossible as not to be immediately believed. The whole atmosphere has been fraught with menace to friendliness for the United States, and has placed the American people in a false and absurd position. Cross currents of feeling have been created; the one, that the United States, as a great capitalist was about to buy everything worth while and fetter Austria with a load of debt which would make the people practically slaves to American capitalists. The harmfulness of this report is the more evident when it is remembered that the United States alone of the four great powers has not been purchasing Austrian industries and banks at prices far below their value at the time when each of these other powers was represented as too poor to assume any financial responsibility in connection with assisting Austria. It was the more unfortunate also because the Americans, unlike the Italians and the French, had not assisted in the exporting of Austrian securities and other values to the benefit of the exporters. The other cross current was that America alone could save the Austrian people from death through freezing and starvation and from utter anarchy, and that it was the duty of America to be that lifesaver. Again when the Austrian Government took an American connected with the Child Feeding as an adviser in the matter of the soup kitchens which the Vienna municipality and the Austrian Government had financed, it was immediately called an "American" undertaking.

It will be seen from the above that the United States has been put in the position of being expected to do the impossible, and when it had become realized that none of the things anticipated could be done it would have meant that the United States would be charged with having been guilty of "another bluff", and would have been placed in a most unlovely position. Even as it is, one notices a growing unfriendliness.

In conversations with business men and with other persons including officials, when the remark has been made as to what "America would do", I have lately distinctly indicated how unwarranted reports had been and how difficult it would be to accomplish anything because practically all Austria's assets had been

offered a number of times to every nation that had a possibility of raising money, and I have at the same time politely protested against the general disposition to load upon the back of America all the unbearable burdens resulting from the struggle. For some days it has seemed as if a statement should be made, and I yesterday forwarded the following to the Foreign Office with the request that it be issued through the Official Correspondence Bureau:

“The American Commissioner, Mr. Halstead, expressed regret today at the frequent publications in Vienna newspapers of unfounded reports of what the United States proposes to do for Austria. Such reports place the United States in a false position. At the same time they also make an unfavorable impression in America.

“The sympathy of the United States for Austria and for all of Europe has been sufficiently evidenced by what has already been done. The continuance of the Child Feeding and the recent gift of 12 cars of Red Cross supplies to the Vienna hospitals, are sufficient indications of that sympathy. It is to be hoped that there will be an end to publications which are described as coming from official sources for which there is no basis in fact.

“The American Commissioner further stated that the American Mission, notwithstanding reports to the contrary, is to remain at Vienna until the resumption of regular diplomatic relations between the United States and Austria.”

In the afternoon I asked Mr. Heingartner to telephone the Acting Foreign Secretary, Minister Ippen, and ask if my note had been received. Mr. Ippen was quite worried by the proposed publication and said that it would create great consternation. He also said that he proposed to modify my statement, and Mr. Heingartner switched him over to my telephone. I told Mr. Ippen that my notice could not be amended without my approval and that I would go over to the Foreign Office to see him. I went, accompanied by Mr. Heingartner, and the whole situation was very carefully discussed. Mr. Ippen was unfortunately overwrought by his heavy responsibilities. He said

Austria had hoped very much from America, and I told him that that was to be regretted. I mentioned what America had done and stated that those things had apparently been forgotten. I spoke of the heavy financial burdens that the American people were bearing and the fact that they were not responsible for the conditions in Austria or for any of the acts that had brought on the war. He said "But we relied on President Wilson's fourteen points". I told him that those fourteen points were an ideal and not a promise, but regardless of them the result would have been the same; that the military and domestic positions of Austria were impossible, and I remarked that I need not remind him of what Dr. Renner had said as to the friendly attitude of the American Commissioners to negotiate peace during the consideration of the Austrian treaty. The whole discussion was very friendly, but our impression was that the name of America had been used with at least the tacit assent of the Government in the hope of lessening the nervousness throughout the country. I also felt that the other Missions had indicated that America was the only possible source of help for Austria. I agreed to a delay of the publication for 24 hours.

Before preparing the statement all phases had been considered and I had consulted with Colonel C. B. Smith of the Sub-Committee of the Reparation Commission, who agreed that it was imperative that these reports should be denied and in such a way as not to have it appear that nothing would be done, but rather to show the unwisdom of publications for which there was no real ground. Accordingly, I to-day requested the publication of the statement, which Mr. Ippen agreed to do with the remark that he had already indicated the consternation that it would cause.

I have [etc.]

[ALBERT HALSTEAD]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/693

[Document 234]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State⁶⁴

No. 187

VIENNA, December 12, 1919.

Subject: The Austrian outlook.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to previous despatches especially my numbers 174 and 178 of December 4th and 5th,⁶⁵ with regard to the situation in Austria. The outlook has not improved but has become more serious. The situation is tense. The population is more discouraged. The return of cold weather has increased the strain. Some of the foodstuffs expected have not arrived. The *bourgeoisie* and financial people are full of criticism of the government. Two of the Cabinet Members Messrs. Ellenbogen and Zerdik have talked of socialization as still being a probability and the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* seeks to prove that socialization will not interfere with industry, while Dr. Bauer preaches radicalism whenever possible.

With the country crying for help from foreign capital, such sentiments cause anxiety amongst those who are seeking a practical way to solve the Austrian problem. Dr. Renner appeals to financiers on one day and demands help from the four great powers the next, offering the same alleged assets to each, regardless of the conflict in possible interests. His conduct is explicable because he is harassed and apprehensive, and not being a practical business man, he has no idea of anything but that Austria has assets and they should be offered on all hands in the hope of getting results.

Those of the moderates who supported the social-democrats in the election because Dr. Renner and his associates seemed to be the only persons who could possibly govern the country, have now, so it is reliably reported, turned to the christian-socialists. The result is to

drive Dr. Renner more toward the radicals in his party and to make their influence greater therein.

There is a demand in many quarters for a stronger government, but the christian-socialists are not ready to take over the government. They fear the problem is one that cannot be solved and they know they have not men of sufficient ability to replace the present cabinet. No man who is not infected with the Habsburg virus is available for the State Chancellor and the people though discouraged cannot see how the return of the Habsburg will help them, especially as they fear a Habsburg or Habsburg influence would make their case worse with the powers. The Austrian Christian socialists would, it appears, prefer to wait until Spring when the hardships of winter over—should the country survive as an entity—their chances of forming a stable government would be greater.

Dr. Renner is manifestly the strongest and best fitted man to lead Austria—but he lacks in courage and as an opportunist fears to face his radicals and to warn them to withhold their radical expressions until a more auspicious time. He apparently dares not take a strong stand against these separatist tendencies in the provinces, but discusses and bargains with them. Thus the separatist trend grows.

Meantime the pan-germanists have again become vociferous, point out the beauties of a union with Germany, and lay all the troubles of Austria to the prohibition of that union. They even think that a little later it may be possible.

Vorarlberg, as has been reported, is eager to join Switzerland, Tyrol is demanding that she be permitted to carve out her own destiny. The Tyrolese insist that they be permitted to join Germany. Reference is made to the attached newspaper account.⁶⁶ In Tyrol recently there have been bread disturbances and considerable disorder during several days. The Italians are said to have encouraged these manifestations while German propaganda is reported in the provinces as well. In Salzburg the movement is growing and a demand for political and economic independence is expected in a few days. German propaganda is active here too.

Months ago I reported to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, copy going to the Department, on Tyrol as a bridge between Germany and Italy.⁶⁷ In this direction there are reports of a probable secret treaty between Italy and Germany with at least part of Austria participating. When it is remembered that Italy tried to make a secret treaty with Austria, so she could retain the seized art treasures and was angry and had threatened to get even when Dr. Renner declined to negotiate—I reported on this subject at the time⁶⁸—the possibility of a secret treaty with Germany is not so remote as it might seem.

In Carinthia there are manifestations of a separatist movement, so Vienna is steadily more and more in danger of being isolated and doomed to death.

The papers yesterday reported that Czecho-Slovakia has allotted 7,000,000 of Czechish crowns for a Naval base at Pressburg—40 miles from Vienna. With gunboats Vienna would be commanded. At Pressburg is also a heavy detachment of troops. There are rumors of French and Italian intrigues here, but these have been constant and for the moment need not be discussed.

Uneasiness prevails as to Vienna developments in Christmas week. The people are really hopeless, and Christmas, the time of joy in Vienna will be a day of despair. Hungry, unhappy, cold and discouraged anything may happen if at that time the moment comes when further bearing of the burdens of to-day is impossible. With the present effort to make the United States responsible for all the misery, notwithstanding its real attitude, demonstrations against Americans are not impossible.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁶⁴ Copy transmitted to the Embassy at Paris by Mr. Halstead; received December 15.

⁶⁵ Neither printed.

⁶⁶ Not printed.

⁶⁷ Despatches No. 329 and No. 356, pp. 541 [*Pg. 541 includes portions of [Doc. 200](#), [Doc. 201](#), and [Doc. 202](#)*] and 551 [*Pg. 551 includes portions of [Doc. 206](#) and [Doc. 207](#)*].

⁶⁸ Despatch No. 95, p. 570 [*Pg. 570 includes portions of [Doc. 219](#) and [Doc. 220](#)*].

Hungary

[\[235\] Captain Bernath Weiss to Mr. Albert Halstead](#)

Vienna, July 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/132

[\[236\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, July 11, 1919. [Received July 15.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/129

[\[237\] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Vienna, July 16, 1919. [Received July 21.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/155

[\[238\] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Mr. Albert Halstead](#)

Paris, July 22, 1919—12 m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/163: Telegram

[239] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 24, 1919—7 a.m. [Received July 25—2 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/197: Telegram

[240] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 24, 1919—10:30 a.m. [Received July 25—2 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/198: Telegram

[241] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 24, 1919—5:50 p.m. [Received July 25—6:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/203: Telegram

[242] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 24, 1919. [Received July 28.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/204

[243] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Mr. Albert Halstead

Paris, July 26, 1919—6 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/203: Telegram

[244] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State

Paris, July 27, 1919—12 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/217a: Telegram

[245] Captain Bernath Weiss to Mr. Albert Halstead

Vienna, July 27, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/218

[246] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, July 29, 1919. [Received July 31.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/230

[247] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna, August 1, 1919—11 p.m. [Received August 2—3:15 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/243: Telegram

[248] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 2, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/258

[249] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 3, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/261

[250] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/274

[251] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 19, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/339^{1/2}

[252] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 26, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/368

[253] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/376

[254] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, August 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/378

[255] Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State

Vienna, September 7, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/420

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/132

[Document 235]

Captain Bernath Weiss⁶⁹ to Mr. Albert Halstead⁷⁰

VIENNA, July 10, 1919.

Subject: Conditions in Hungary.

Interview with Bela Kun.

In this interview Bela Kun showed that he is as confident as ever of retaining the present form of government, even though he admits that a large part of the farmers, who own their land, are positively against the present form of government, as well as all of the *bourgeoisie*, but he insists that the farm hands, especially of the cooperative farms, and also the Socialists are in favor and support the present government. According to his statement about six to seven million acres of land are being tilled by these farm hands, who do their best to produce large crops. He stated that he hoped in this way to get his supplies for Budapest and other cities so he could be independent of the small farmers. When asked how he would take care of the sick and protect the health of the children this coming winter in view of the coal shortage, he answered that the Entente may change its policy and lift the blockade thus allowing Hungary to get the necessary supplies. I then asked him "if the allies do not raise the blockade, what then?" His answer was that under any circumstances they would be able to survive for at least a year or year and one-half in spite of all blockades. He hopes that in a few months time Germany and Czecho-Slovakia will turn Bolshevik, when Russia, Germany, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia will form an Entente of their own, and exist as such until the rest of Europe joins them. In other words, he is just as confident today, in spite of all the revolutionary movements, as he ever was.

Upon asking him concerning conditions in Russia, he answered that naturally conditions are far better and consolidated than in Hungary, since they had started so much earlier. He further stated that by the time Hungary becomes consolidated, America will be in the same condition as Hungary is today.

Conditions in Hungary.

As one passes through the country districts he sees the crops ripening, but not being cut, and there is great danger that even after being cut it cannot be threshed due to the shortage of coal. The country seems to be fairly well supplied with food, in fact there is a surplus, but the peasants refuse to give up any food for Budapest. This is due to the fact that they do not sympathize with the present form of government, and refuse to accept the white or Bolshevik money, which is not accepted in any other country. It also seems that the farmers have plenty of money on hand, but cannot buy anything for it as there is no commerce at all, which displeases them.

In different parts of the country there are sporadic out-breaks of counter-revolutions, one suppressed and the other commences. On these occasions terror troops are sent to suppress the counter-revolution and after suppressed a number of the leaders are hanged, the town stripped of all cattle which are sent to Budapest, by which means the city is being nourished. In addition to this the town is assessed for sums from five to ten million kronen, which is to be paid in blue money within twenty-four to forty-eight hours, in case of failure the life of a number of citizens is forfeited. These cases are so numerous that it makes it unnecessary to mention the time and places. Eleven of the leaders of the last counter-revolution were sentenced to be shot, but so far this sentence has not been carried out.

The Red Army.

In order to accomplish the desired end in the last offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, the soldiers were allowed to carry the tri-color, and in this way the soldiers' national spirit was aroused, and they put up a good fight and succeeded. No sooner than the fight was over and

the army had to withdraw by orders of the Entente, the tri-color was replaced by the red flag. This caused much dissatisfaction among the troops, and one of their political leaders named Landler made repeated requests to Commander Boehm for the replacement of the red flag by the red, white and green. This, however, was not done. The soldiers being disappointed, partly by this act, and partly by the fact that they received letters from their families, saying that they are hungry and suffering at home, and to a great extent to the influence of propaganda employed by the white guard. Many units returned from the front of their own free will. The government being afraid to have these troops armed, they placed machine guns on either side of the railroad tracks in the vicinity of Budapest which were manned by Bolshevik troops, and in this manner disarmed the returning troops. The discipline is declining from day to day, and the army is falling to pieces. According to some reports in order to keep the army intact a new offensive was planned. It is true that an offensive was planned for the 15th of June against the Roumanians, due to the fact that they did not evacuate the territory indicated by the Entente. It is also rumored that there might be a similar attack against the Czecho-Slovaks on the pretext that the Entente did not live up to their promise in making the Roumanians evacuate the occupied territory.

The fighting troops are estimated at about fifty or sixty thousand; cannon about 350; small arms munitions about 40,000,000 rounds and well supplied with machine guns. A number of the army aviators crossed the border with their machines to the white guard in the vicinity of Szegedin and did not return, so that at present they do not allow officers to fly, but instead the communistic enlisted men are doing it.

Life in Budapest.

Life in Budapest is very depressing the people being in a nervous state of mind, practically all stores are closed, commerce has ceased entirely, shortage of food is very marked. The workmen are getting about three ounces of meat daily, but the *bourgeoisie* has to subsist on vegetables and very little of that. Fat is absolutely unknown, and the government does not make any effort to remedy the condition of the *bourgeoisie*, all they want and care for is the proletariat and of

those the communists come first. The city is in a continuous state of alarm, the wildest rumors being circulated so that practically every day the government has a number of red guard in readiness to suppress a possible counter-revolution. Many of the original labor battalions have been disarmed due to lack of confidence, and in their stead many young and old men, who are supposed to be communists, were armed and in this way they tried to make up for the military losses. A Socialist leader has informed me that the number of true communists is very small, and that the only reason for being able to keep up the present system is due to the following reasons:

1. True communists numbering about two or three thousand in Budapest.
2. Number of laborers who gained high positions through this system, who wish to stay in power.
3. Fact that many Socialists fear the return of the old system of government, consequently they remain passive or assist the present government.
4. Number of intelligent class who could not make a living under previous government and at present hold leading positions.

According to information received from a number of Socialists they desire military intervention by the Allies, at the same time making the following proclamations to the people:

1. Allies intention not to remain in country, but to occupy it in order to restore order.
2. Allies willing to support Social Democratic Government formed by Garami (Minister of Commerce in Karolyi Cabinet and well liked by all classes, now in Switzerland).
3. Immediate lifting of blockade with shipment of food supplies at the earliest possible moment so as to show the beneficial influence of changing governments.
4. Amnesty granted to all taking part in the present government and prevention of white guard terror.

If the above were done the general belief is that the Allied troops, preferably British and if possible some Americans, could march into Budapest without any fighting whatsoever.

It is reported that Michael Karolyi and family has left Hungary and are supposed to have gone to Italy.

BERNATH WEISS

⁶⁹ Member of the Halstead Mission.

⁷⁰ Transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 320, July 11; received July 15.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/129

[Document 236]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 321

VIENNA, July 11, 1919.
[Received July 15.]

Subject: The situation in German Austria and Hungary.

SIRS: I have the honor to call the attention of the Mission to that part of my coded telegram to-day, number 591,⁷¹ which refers to the proposed meeting on Monday of the peasant organization to express its condolence with the peasants of Hungary who are suffering from the Bolsheviks and to demonstrate against the acts of violence against the peasants in Hungary. In this connection I would refer to the telegram, number 574,⁷¹ in which I stated that there were two peasant organizations already formed, one with 84,000 members in Lower Austria and another with 100,000 members in Steirmark, while other organizations in Salzburg and Tirol are being created and one is about to be formed in Upper Austria.

The government has been weakened because of the strength of the radical elements among the Social Democrats. This has been most vociferous and had the strongest influence. The Workmen's Council is very radical though against communism by force. The peasants have in the past not expressed their attitude sufficiently or in such a form as to be particularly impressive, while the citizens have stood by, wringing their hands and done nothing.

The time has come, however, when if the government is to be a real government, in the sense of a government of all German Austria and not one of a single class, pressure from a source other than that of the workmen is necessary. It is for this reason that the peasants have been organized and that it has been suggested that the citizens

should also be organized. A meeting on Monday will inaugurate, it is hoped, pressure to offset that from the workmen.

The Workmen's council some time ago indicated very strongly its desire to be recognized by the government. This recognition would have made them into an equivalent of a second house which would in its natural course have developed executive control and probably far overshadowed the National Assembly itself.

Now, with a strong peasant organization, and with a citizens' organization, if they are handled practically, the influence of the workers should be reduced and these organizations would then be put on a consultative function. It should be remembered that these efforts to strengthen the government are only in their beginning and have not as yet had any actual effect.

The action of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Bauer, in dismissing the Hungarian Minister and in refusing to answer Bela Kun's demand for satisfaction has had an encouraging effect. The reported action of the Peace Conference in Paris in declining to admit German Austria as a foundation member of the League of Nations, but in promising that, when it appeared that German Austria had established a permanent government and was willing and able to meet her obligations, her admittance might be possible was a promise that combined a warning which, it is believed, will have most beneficial results.

I should emphasize the fact that there can be no real peace in Austria, no permanency of government, so long as across the border Bela Kun's murderous regime is permitted to exist. Every evidence goes to prove that the situation in Hungary cannot be corrected until Bela Kun is overthrown. Every person who is acquainted with Hungary, who has any interests in that nation, and every individual who has returned recently from Hungary reports that those who oppose Bolshevism, and they constitute not less than 90% of the people, are unanimous in the judgement that a declaration on the part of the conference that no peace will be made with Hungary and there will be no negotiations looking forward to a settlement while the Kun regime lasts, is the only method by which the existing anarchy can be overthrown. This must necessarily be accompanied

by preparations and movements to carry the will of the conference into effect. Bela Kun laughs at representations that give no evidence of being backed by force. Reports from several authentic sources show that he intends to begin an offensive against the Roumanians on the 15th and that he regards the Peace Conference as either unwilling or unable, on account of the social conditions in each members own country, to take aggressive action. The Allies and Associates have absolutely no moral influence in Hungary.

Military opinion is that while a force that can actually overthrow the Bela Kun Government is desirable, lest there be some miscalculation, it will be unnecessary to actually use that force when the people of Hungary, including Bela Kun and his adherents realize that words will be followed by deeds. I am not competent to judge the amount of force necessary but the military opinion seems to be that with the French troops on the Hungarian boundaries with these of the Czecho Slovaks, Roumanians and Jugo Slavs the work can be done but that British troops from Cologne and Italian troops should be started for Hungary so as to prove that the movement is in earnest.

I have referred in another dispatch to the report of Captain Weiss.⁷³ The British military representative here, Colonel Sir Thomas Cunningham whom I informed of the report that reached me informs me that it confirms the reports which he himself has already received.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁷¹ Not printed.

⁷¹ Not printed.

⁷³ *Supra*.

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 330

VIENNA, July 16, 1919.
[Received July 21.]

Subject: A journalist's view of Bolshevism and its plans.

SIRS: I have the honor to inform the Commission that Count Christian Holstein, representative of the very well known Copenhagen journal *Politiken* who has spent six weeks in Budapest, where his investigations have not converted him to Bolshevism, has been good enough to tell me of his impressions of the Bolshevik movement there and its future plans. Count Holstein was also in Russia during the early stages of the Lenine regime. From talks with Bela Kun, Samuelli and other of the Bolshevik leaders he is convinced of the unity of purpose of the Russian and Hungarian movements. According to his judgment Lenine and Bela Kun are endeavoring to work out a very carefully prepared plan with a view to making the Bolshevik theory a real success, which success it has so far failed to attain. Both in Russia and in Hungary the greatest need is for raw materials, the absence of which makes impossible a full test of the new doctrine which Lenine and Bela Kun seek to secure. Accordingly their purpose is to conquer countries from which raw materials can be obtained, Germany—that is conquer it by propaganda and force. It is claimed that the Russian troops which are being utilized against Koltchak, Denikine and Finland are not the real Bolshevik Army, but that the flower of the army, comprising one million well armed men, is to be found in the vicinity of Kiev. Despite the anxiety of Trotsky and other aggressive Bolsheviks, and notwithstanding the eagerness of similar leaders in Hungary, the plan of Lenine, whose best disciple Bela Kun is, is to wait until the armies of England, France and Italy are demobilized. When that is done and it is impossible for the

troops of these countries to be utilized against Bolshevism without their being called into service and reorganized, it is proposed to move this Bolshevik army westward. They have no belief in the efficiency of the armies of either Poland or Roumania. The Polish Army they believe is not sufficiently strong, while the Roumanians they regard as certain to run if strongly attacked.

During this period of waiting, efforts have been directed towards spreading Bolshevism, not only in Germany but in German-Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. Bela Kun declared a couple of weeks before the attempt to overthrow the government in Vienna on June 15th that the overthrow of the German-Austrian government was certain. Count Holstein says, however, that they miscalculated the strength of the Government here, which really meant the courage and efficiency of the Police President of Vienna. At that time Bela Kun was satisfied with the progress being made in Prague, and since then in both cities, so he admitted, the Communist propaganda was continuing. With Roumania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and German-Austria in the Bolsheviks' hands they believe that Germany would easily be turned to Bolshevism, and then the Bolshevik movement would for the time being halt at the Rhine. For the army of France they have the greatest respect, but they believe that from Germany propaganda in Italy, France and England would rapidly bring the time when Bolshevism would succeed there. They plan to secure from Germany coal and other raw materials which are absolutely essential for them to put into practical effect their doctrine of government manufacturing. Without coal and other raw materials they are able to tell their supporters that the lack of raw materials makes the success of the new industrialism impossible.

Bela Kun is the real leader in Hungary, but under him is a mob of bureaucrats consisting almost exclusively of Jews who lack administrative capacity and who in a state of great excitement accomplish nothing, days being lost through the necessity of complying with bureaucratic forms. The administration of public affairs and of the factories which are busy with war work is inefficient. The army is, however, well disciplined, though Bela Kun's insistence upon withdrawing his troops in reply to the Clemenceau note⁷⁴ weakened the discipline temporarily. Every effort is made to

appeal to the national spirit of Hungary and to hold in the army those who are not Bolsheviks at heart on the plea that their presence there is imperative in order that Hungary may be protected from the surrounding states who are her enemies. Count Holstein expresses the belief that given raw materials Bolshevism would soon prove itself incapable of administration and would fall by reason of its own failure to make good, but admits that the following of such a plan would naturally involve some dangers.

I think I should add that the opinions expressed above are those of Count Holstein and are forwarded without comment save that the reports of the taking of Kiev by the Ukrainian troops would seem to indicate an exaggerated idea on the part of the Bolsheviks of the strength of their army which was reported in that vicinity.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁷⁴ Appendix I to CF-52, [vol. VI, p. 246](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/163: Telegram

[Document 238]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Mr. Albert Halstead

PARIS, July 22, 1919—12 m.

137. [From White and Bliss.] Your 620 July 8 [18] 9 [4] PM⁷⁵ with reference to your inquiry regarding attitude toward Hungarian Government we wish to inform you that the question of the future form of Government for Hungary is a concern in which the American Commission does not wish to meddle. The utmost reserve and caution should be maintained in regard to this matter. Your telegram has been repeated in full to the Department of State together with the Commission's reply. White, Bliss.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁷⁵ *Ante*, p. 544 [Pg. 544 is part of [Doc. 203](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/197: Telegram

[Document 239]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, July 24, 1919—7 a.m.
[Received July 25—2 p.m.]

646. Referring to my telegram No. 637.⁷⁶ Following is suggested solution Hungarian problem agreed to unofficially by British, French, Italian representatives, Gregory and myself, and in principle approved by Boehm, a Social Democrat, new Hungarian representative here, and commander and powerful factor in the present Hungarian army:

1. Assumption of dictatorship in which complete powers of government are vested. Names to be discussed: Haubrich, Agoston, Garamy.
2. Dismissal of Communist Kun government, repudiation Bolsheviki and complete cessation of Bolsheviki propaganda.
3. Dictatorship to bridge over period until formation of government representative of all classes. Immediate cessation of all terrorizing acts, confiscation, and seizures.
4. Immediate calling of Entente advisory body.
5. Raising of blockade and immediate steps should be taken by Entente to supply food, coal, and assistance in opening Danube.
6. No political prosecution.
7. Ultimate determination respecting socialization to be left to permanent government.

Repeat to Department.

HALSTEAD

76 Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/198: Telegram

[Document 240]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, July 24, 1919—10:30 a.m.
[Received July 25—2 p.m.]

647. Your 137^{[79](#)} not received when telegram number (apparent omission) [646, July 24, 7 a.m.?] was written. Will inform commission later in day extent to which wholly unofficial negotiations proposed. I have not seen Boehm nor Bauer on the subject but have acted through Cunningham and Commission is in no sense committed.

HALSTEAD

^{[79](#)} *Ante*, p. 613 [*Pg. 613 includes portions of [Doc. 237](#), [Doc. 238](#), and [Doc. 239](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/203: Telegram

[Document 241]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, July 24, 1919—5:50 p.m.
[Received July 25—6:10 p.m.]

654. Referring to my telegram No. 646.⁷⁹ Colonel Cunningham saw Boehm today. Said he was consulting his friends and would be ready to act in about a month and that it would require 48 hours to overthrow Kun regime, but he could not proceed until assured that Allies would approve plan outlined in my telegram 646. In view of your telegram number 137⁷⁹ I cannot recommend approval of plan which was entirely subject to approval of governments concerned but can only report facts. Respectfully inquire whether raising of blockade and furnishing food and raw materials as means of improving conditions and destroying Bolsheviki terror, but I fear their presence would be considered partial recognition and strengthen Bela Kun. The other Allied representatives agree with this view.

HALSTEAD

⁷⁹ Ante, p. 613 [Pg. 613 includes portions of [Doc. 237](#), [Doc. 238](#), and [Doc. 239](#)].

⁷⁹ Ante, p. 613 [Pg. 613 includes portions of [Doc. 237](#), [Doc. 238](#), and [Doc. 239](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/204

[Document 242]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 350

VIENNA, July 24, 1919.
[Received July 28.]

Subject: The Hungarian problem and the United States.

SIRS: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of telegram No. 137 of July 22d, 12:00 P.M., signed by the Honorable Henry White and General Tasker H. Bliss. I had realised the delicacy of the Hungarian situation and had sought to be particularly careful to avoid anything that would have approached committing the Commission or the United States in any way. The idea had been that if it were possible to present a concrete proposition to the Commission that body could pass upon it. It appeared to me that if anything could be done through the Hungarians themselves to change the disastrous condition of affairs in Hungary that change would necessarily be a betterment.

My telegrams and dispatches have indicated the confirmed belief that the real solution was to be reached by intervention on the part of troops of the Allies alone. That policy, recommended also by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Italy and France, and by Captain Gregory of the American Relief Administration was presented to the Commission. For reasons, which though not officially stated to me and for which I have the greatest respect that policy has not been approved.

Therefore when another method was suggested I felt I should ascertain how far it was practicable, so that the matter could be presented in completed form to the Commission. However, in order that the Commission might be informed of what was under

consideration, I telegraphed it in my 620 of July 18th^{[80](#)} and my 637 of July 22d.^{[81](#)}

That the Commission may be fully aware of exactly what has been done, I relate the history of the discussions up to the receipt of telegram 137 of July 22d, 12 P.M. It was Dr. Bauer who first suggested to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Cunningham, British military representative here, that Mr. William Boehm could solve the problem. Mr. Boehm is a Social Democrat who was formerly commandant of the Hungarian Army, and appears to have had and to have the most influence with that organization. Dr. Bauer desired to know whether he should negotiate or whether Colonel Cunningham and I would undertake it. This was before I had any knowledge of the plan. Colonel Cunningham stated that he thought it was better for Dr. Bauer to talk with Boehm. When he was asked what conditions would be imposed, Colonel Cunningham declared that he was unable to make conditions but that certainly the Bolsheviks should leave the government, cease all association with the Russian Bolsheviks and end the propaganda and terror before the Allies and Associates would be able to consider anything. Colonel Cunningham made it clear that he was acting wholly unofficially. Dr. Bauer asked if the Soviet Government could continue, and with great caution he was informed so as to make no promise, and yet not destroy any possibilities, that the importance of the peasants and the ultimate participation of all the people in the government would have to be considered.

Colonel Cunningham immediately told me of this conversation. I thought he had handled the matter with the greatest delicacy, and told him that, and that I personally agreed with his ideas. I indicated my interest in any effort to solve the Hungarian problem but said at the same time that I had no instructions and could not indirectly or directly commit the government of the United States. He and I agreed that Prince Borghese, an Italian minister who is assigned as chief of the Italian political mission here, should be informed. In view of the unpopularity of the French with the Hungarians, it was feared that at first their participation might prevent any results. The Italians on the contrary are not unpopular and Prince Borghese, a very straightforward man, knows the Hungarian situation. It was

also realised that the Italians and French were not exactly on the most amicable terms.

On the 22d, Mr. Boehm called upon Colonel Cunningham and they discussed the overthrow or elimination of the Bela Kun regime. Mr. Boehm seemed to regard any restoration of private ownership as a difficulty, both for political and technical reasons. He felt that the people of Hungary could not be immediately informed of the probable return to private ownership, but it was suggested that a technical commission might settle the matter. This suggestion made it possible for the discussion to be continued, as it built a bridge by which the two could come together. Mr. Boehm in the first sparring avoided indicating any serious difference of opinion with Bela Kun, but he finally seemed to agree that the overthrow of Communism and establishment of a temporary military dictatorship under Boehm, Haubrich and Agoston, with an Interallied Commission to assist would be a solution. He was particularly interested in the Workmen's Council's participation, but it was pointed out that the Peasants' Council and later the Citizens' Council would have to be considered, so that there might be what could be called a consulting body which would advise the military dictatorship at such times as elections were practicable.

I was personally in full accord with Colonel Cunningham's proposition. It will be observed that I personally have had no communications on the subject of Hungary with either Dr. Bauer or Mr. Boehm. I trust that that aloofness will be regarded as having safeguarded the Government from any implied approval of the scheme.

I have indicated in my telegram of the 22d the strong belief, with which I understand Colonel Cunningham agrees, that the restoration of aristocratic rule in Hungary is to be avoided, and that if a Soviet Government were to be temporarily suffered, with Allied supervision, it would be such a decided improvement upon the existing terror and disorder as to deserve welcome. This has appeared particularly true inasmuch as it would be inevitably followed by a popular government just so soon as conditions warrant.

Yesterday, further conference was held at which were present Colonel Cunningham, Prince Borghese, Captain Gregory and myself. Captain Gregory has the confidence of all the foreign missions and his excellent work in all the old Austro-Hungarian Empire made his participation in every sense desirable. At this conference, which was held informally, the situation was discussed and certain tentative propositions were agreed upon, which Colonel Cunningham—again there was no personal connection with the Hungarian leader—was to present to him as a possible solution. It was then agreed that if Mr. Boehm accepted the conditions in principle, Mr. Allizé, former French Minister at The Hague, who is the representative in Vienna of the French Government, should be asked to attend. These propositions were as follows:

1. Boehm to assume the dictatorship with full governmental powers. As associates names of Garamy, Haubrich and Agoston suggested.
2. Complete stopping of Bolshevik propaganda, repudiation of Bolshevism and the dismissal of the regime of Bela Kun.
3. Until a government that will represent all sections of the community can be established, a military dictatorship for the period until that government could be established.
4. To stop immediately all acts of terror, seizures and confiscations.
5. An advisory body representing the Allies and Associates to be immediately summoned.
6. Blockade to be raised, and Allies and Associates to arrange immediately to supply food and coal, and to aid in opening the Danube river.
7. There shall be no prosecutions of a political character.
8. The question of socialization to be left to the final decision of the permanent government when that is established.

Mr. Boehm saw Colonel Cunningham in the afternoon and made no objections to the propositions. He asked, however, as to what the period of military dictatorship was to last, whether it was to be for weeks, months or years. He was informed that the period at the present moment could not very well be defined. He then accepted the proposition subject to the opportunity to consult his own people—those upon whom he would have to rely to overthrow Bela Kun and his satellites. He, however, indicated that the socialization of the

banks and industries presented difficulties political and technical, and that he could not tell the people immediately that there was to be return to private ownership. This matter he did not press. Mr. Boehm stated that he thought it would require two days for him to get an answer.

This matter was presented at a meeting at 10:30 last night, at which were present Colonel Cunningham, Prince Borghese, M. Allizé, Captain Gregory and myself. M. Allizé agreed to the proposition though he was a shade doubtful at first as to whether Mr. Boehm could put it through. It was then thought best that Colonel Cunningham should see Mr. Boehm today. The meeting, I am informed, occurred today. Mr. Boehm told Colonel Cunningham that he was arranging to see his friends and had seen one today but that he could not undertake to overthrow the Kun government until he was assured that the Allies and Associates approved the plan. Asked how long it would take to overthrow Bela Kun he said about forty-eight hours.

The other missions, the British, Italian and French, have I understand forwarded the plan which I gave in my telegram 646 of July 24th, 7:00 A.M., and which was written early this morning before the receipt of your telegram 137 of July 22d, 12:00 P.M. In my 646 [654] of July 24th, 6:00 [5:50] P.M.,⁸² I reported on the meeting of Colonel Cunningham and Boehm today. That I regarded as reporting facts.

It was stated at the meeting last night that it was understood that four Allied generals were to be sent to Hungary to study the situation, and everybody thought that should they come their presence would be regarded as a partial recognition, and would again strengthen the Bolshevik government. It was fully believed that it was imperative to keep up the impression that the Allies and Associates would absolutely refuse to deal in any way with the Bolsheviks.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁸⁰ *Ante*, p. 544 [*Pg. 544 is part of [Doc. 203](#)*].

⁸¹ Not printed.

⁸² *Ante*, p. 614 [*Pg. 614 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#), [Doc. 240](#), and [Doc. 241](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/203: Telegram

[Document 243]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Mr. Albert Halstead

PARIS, July 26, 1919—6 p.m.

141. Your telegrams 646, 647, 654.^{[83](#)} Commission does not wish you to carry on any negotiations with Boehm. You should have nothing whatsoever to do with the matter directly or indirectly.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{[83](#)} *Ante*, pp. 613 [Pg. 613 includes portions of [Doc. 237](#), [Doc. 238](#), and [Doc. 239](#)] and 614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#), [Doc. 240](#), and [Doc. 241](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/217a: Telegram

[Document 244]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State

PARIS, July 27, 1919—12 p.m.

3351. [From White and Bliss.] Council of Five decided yesterday to issue to Hungarian people the statement⁸⁴ published in to-day's papers, and of which you will receive copy, with summary of minutes of the meeting, because Hoover's representative, also British and French representatives, at Vienna feel confident that Boehm, now Hungarian Minister to Austria, but evidently not loyal to Bela Kun, will be able to overthrow him and his Government, provided nation assured that peace will be made with any government representing the people. Boehm has given certain assurances to the aforesaid representatives as to calling of Assembly and other popular measures in the event of his overturning Bela Kun, and Council of Five decided that while it would be unwise for Peace Conference to enter into any relations with Boehm, through its representatives at Vienna, the statement now issued would probably furnish the assurance to the nation, which he feels to be necessary in order to overthrow Bela Kun. Boehm has intimated that a month may be necessary before Kun can be got rid of. Halstead concurs in views expressed by other representatives but we have instructed him to take no part in negotiations directly or indirectly. The decision to issue the statement was made as an alternative to an attack upon Bela Kun by Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovak troops, or the parts of two French divisions, which Marshal Foch seemed to think would bring about his fall; but Clemenceau expressed himself very strongly as to his unwillingness to risk the life of a single French soldier in such an enterprise inasmuch as no assistance would be forthcoming from us or from Great Britain, and French nation pressing for rapid demobilization. White, Bliss.

⁸⁴ See HD-15, minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 317](#)⁸⁴.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/218

[Document 245]

Captain Bernath Weiss to Mr. Albert Halstead85

VIENNA, July 27, 1919.

Subject: Conditions in Budapest and Hungary.

In an interview I had with Bela Kun he manifested dissatisfaction with the blockade referring especially to food, medical supplies and printing paper. He said he would have liked to go the right but without success, wherein there was too much sympathy shown those who opposed the Soviet policy.

There seems to be a new plan tried with the peasants who are busy with the harvest but are not organized. In the past it was the habit of Bela Kun and his leaders to send young men into the country for the purpose of organizing Soviets or directoriums in various districts. These young men appeared to have lacked tact and the ability to make themselves understood with the results that the peasants resented the attitude of the agitators so that disorder and trouble followed. To show their strength it became the habit to hang a few peasants in the various villages, but this did not produce satisfactory results therefore more tact was necessary and the plan was adopted of appointing several peasants of prominence in a village who were easy to influence, as the heads of the directoriums. Flattered by this delicate attention the peasants seek to get results and keep quiet. It has been further decided not to interfere with the peasants any more than is necessary and the delightful practice of hanging them has been given up.

The harvest appears to be gathered but the threshing has not begun because of the want of coal or other fuel for the threshing engines. Wood is, however, brought down in so far as it is possible, but as yet the quantity is in no sense sufficient. It being impossible to properly

protect the unthreshed wheat it is feared that with the rainy weather a large proportion of it will rot in the sheaf.

I had a visit just before leaving Budapest from two newspaper men and two civilians, whom I regard as responsible persons. Discussing the government and its strength they declared it expected to be able to maintain itself but that preparations are being made for eventualities. Therefore, should the Roumanians defeat them badly, but be unable to follow them up for any reason, it is proposed to institute a reign of anarchy in Budapest. Asked what this would consist of the reply was that the plan was to let these activities depend upon developments. This it appears is not necessarily the plan of Bela Kuhn himself, but of one Cserny a notorious character, who has at least one murder to his credit, who is in charge of a body of criminals called "Lenine's Boys". This organization of about 1,500 criminals has been re-organized for the purpose of plundering the town of Budapest. This organization has 45 machine guns, 26 guns some of them of 15 cm calibre, and about 1000 hand grenades. In addition to these criminals there is the 31st infantry, the 101 artillery, the red guard of the second district and Bucharin attacking troops, also the reserve troops in Kelenfold and troops in the international barracks, all of whom are prepared to join.

When the attack on the Roumanian line began on the 20th instant one red regiment, which I believe is the 15th, joined the Szegedin troops. Two other regiments refused to fight unless they were permitted to go into battle under the red, white and green—the Hungarian flag. This was refused and they were interned at Miskolcs. In the crossing of the Theiss at Csongrad and Tiszafüred the red army failed to make adequate artillery preparation with the result that though they got over the river, their losses were very heavy, so heavy as to make it impossible for them to take any advantage of that crossing. The white guards on the side of the Roumanians were able to cross the Theiss on the 26th at Tiszafüred where the red guard had originally gone over.

The red guard is showing increased disorganization, which appears to make rather rapid progress. The report that their own countrymen, in the form of white guards, were opposing them has

had a striking effect. Whether Hungarians are actually fighting on the side of the Roumanians is not confirmed.

BERNATH WEISS

⁸⁵ Transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 354, July 27; received July 29.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/230

[Document 246]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 361

VIENNA, July 29, 1919.
[Received July 31.]

Subject: With reference to Hungary.

SIRS: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt yesterday morning of your telegram 141 of July 26, 6 P.M., with reference to my numbers 646, 647 and 654. The instructions will naturally be obeyed.

As I happened to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Cunningham and Prince Borghese at a lunch yesterday at which we were guests, I took occasion to inform them that I construed the notice issued by the allied and associated governments on the 28th, of which I was informed in your 142,^{[86](#)} as having taken the Hungarian question out of my hands, and could, therefore, proceed no further with consultations.

I trust I am correct in assuming that the mission still desires to receive all information obtainable about Hungary.

I also have the honor to enclose a translation of an article in the *Neue Tag* of yesterday evening entitled "Negotiations in Vienna".^{[87](#)}

The Hungarians mentioned in that article called on Colonel Cunningham and the Italian Minister, so I have been informed, of their own volition. It having been published that one of them, Mr. Boehm, had been there the article is manifestly published so as to make it possible for them to return to Hungary in safety.

This matter is simply noted for your information.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁸⁶ Not printed; for text of statement, see HD–15, minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 317](#)⁸⁷.

⁸⁷ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/243: Telegram

[Document 247]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA, August 1, 1919—11 p.m.
[Received August 2—3:15 a.m.]

687. Private information from Budapest reports overthrow Bela Kun, great rejoicings, first cabinet council at 6:00 tonight. Government Socialistic reported to have no Bolshevists. Minister President, Julius Peidl; Interior, Karl Payer; Foreign Affairs, Agoston; Finance, Miakits; War, Haubrich; Education, Garbai; Justice, Garami; Agriculture, Takacs; Food, Knittelhofer; Nationality, Knaller; Commerce, Dovczak. Weltner, Chief Workmen and Soldier's Council to come here immediately to appeal for Entente support. All private property to be returned. No reports as to Kun's fate.

HALSTEAD

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/258

[Document 248]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State88

No. 16

VIENNA, August 2, 1919.

Subject: The change of government in Hungary.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following comment upon the change of government in Hungary:

Evidence had been accumulating for several weeks that the regime of Bela Kun was growing weaker. The army was very dissatisfied with the withdrawal from Slovakia. This discouraged the Hungarians who had served with it for national reasons, and who opposed Kun's regime but suffered it in the hope of retaining more territory for Hungary than they thought would otherwise be possible. The blockade on the Hungarian border was another influence. The stoppage of coal shipments for threshing and industrial purposes, of raw materials, of paper for publications and commercial uses paralyzed the country.

The efficiency of the blockade was wholly due to the work of the American detachment at Brück-an-der-Leithe, at Ebenfurt, and at Wiener Neustadt. There were many indications of the discouragement caused by American efficiency and the refusal of the soldiers to be bribed. Whether Dr. Bauer acted on his own initiative or on the suggestion of someone else, perhaps persons now forming the Hungarian Government, or when he proposed to Colonel Cunningham, the British Representative, that William Boehm, former commander of the Red Army who came as Minister in succession to Czabol, is not clear. At any rate those conferences (which were reported to all Allied Missions), undoubtedly had great influence in the overthrow of Bela Kun.

Unquestionably the defeat of the Red Army at the hands of the Rumanians and the latter's rapid approach to Bucharest had a very great contributing effect.

The Hungarian difficulty now is to secure cooperation between all classes of that country so that orderly elections may be held in due course, and a government may be constructed which has the support of all the people. The proclamation of the new government gives no indication of any present intentions to cooperate with the peasants or with the citizens. However, unless within a reasonable period there be cooperation between all the classes the new government cannot expect to have popular support, because the workmen are in a large minority in Hungary and their strength lies almost wholly in the cities. Though the morale of the Red Army is broken that body is still a force.

The present government, though not wholly representative, is a decided improvement upon the rule of Bela Kun. It intends to preserve order, will evidently respect private property and will not engage in terrorism. While not ideal in its form it would seem to deserve favorable consideration as a temporary solution of the Hungarian difficulty.

It is respectfully suggested that if order is to be preserved in Hungary the blockade should not be continued, but should be lifted immediately and coal, raw materials, and food products should be permitted to come in. An allied committee to cooperate with and advise the cabinet would seem desirable. It could make it apparent that the new government in due time, that time depending upon developments—will be replaced by a representative cabinet.

It is further suggested that in the meantime efforts should be made to secure cooperation between the peasants and the people represented by the so-called government at Szeged with a view to making arrangements for a general election.

While preparations for elections are being made it would seem as if it should be possible to receive in Paris representatives of the Labor Government of the peasants and of the Szeged Government. Each

party could present its views as to the peace terms so that the Peace Commission may prepare a treaty for the signature of the representative government when that is organized. This would enable Hungary to be at peace with its present legal enemies at an earlier date than if negotiations were delayed until a representative government has been formed.

The present government should of course be required to comply strictly with the armistice conditions. The present government seems to offer such a government as that contemplated in the notice of the Allied and Associated Governments dated July 27th, which was forwarded to me in Telegram No. 142 of that date.^{[89](#)}

I trust I may be understood as not recommending recognition of the new government but of advising that it be utilized as the Mannerheim dictatorship in Finland was used to help restore order and to permit elections to be held.

The Hungarian Government is not ideal but it is the best that is at present possible. The new Minister President, Julius Peidl, was a prominent official in labor union affairs during the Hapsburg rule. He is not a Bolshevik and is very well respected. Garami, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the one person prominent in Hungary of whom no one who has talked with me on the Hungarian situation has any criticism to make and of whom everything favorable has been said. Garbai was in the Kun regime as a cabinet member but left, and is respected. He is a metal worker. Payer is also a metal worker of correct habits, clear headed and is very strong with labor. Haubrich is energetic, capable, and though a member of the Bolshevik cabinet was no communist. Agoston, a strong man, is the only university graduate in the present cabinet. Miakits is also a metal worker and not a bolshevik.

The cabinet as a whole is reasonably good and the overthrow of Bela Kun cannot be regarded as a subterfuge for the maintenance of a bolshevik regime.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁸⁸ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 368, August 3; received August 5.

⁸⁹ Not printed; for text of statement, see HD-15, minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 317](#)⁸⁹.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/261

[Document 249]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State90

No. 19

VIENNA, August 3, 1919.

Subject: Conditions in Hungary.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my dispatch No. 16 of yesterday in regard to the change of government in Hungary, and to add some further comments which the latest news seems to make desirable:

The favorable impression caused by the overthrow of the Bolshevik Government is increased by the news of the second day's developments. The promise of Foreign Minister Agoston to call a constitutional assembly shows a purpose to erect a representative government as soon as possible. The statement that there would be no immediate socialization, that is, no further socialization until a constitutional government has been created, but that industries that have already been socialized will continue to manufacture for the benefit of the community, strengthens the feeling that something is actually being done toward restoring order to Hungary.

Count Bethlen, the representative in Vienna, of the so-called Szeged Government, according to an interview in the *Neue Freie Presse*, assumes an encouraging attitude. He was naturally constrained to at once call attention to the fact that though the new government calls itself democratic it is in no sense democratic, because it is based on a small minority. He adds, however, that it is the first step toward re-establishment of order, and should be met with complaisance.

The attitude of the government of German-Austria toward the new government appears wholly correct. Its internment of the members of the former Bolshevik government, including Bela Kun, and its expressed willingness to hand these persons over to any authority

that is desirous to take them, is an evidence of strength and of willingness to meet the possible wishes of the Allies and associates.

The telegrams from this mission have recommended that the new government, without being recognized until it has become representative through the holding of elections, should be permitted to import raw materials, coal, food, paper, and other necessities. To make this possible it was urged that the blockade should be immediately removed.

Colonel Cunningham, the British representative, called at this mission while this dispatch was being dictated. He informs me that he saw William Boehm, the Hungarian Minister, this morning, and expressed the desire of the new Hungarian Government to erect a constitutional government at the earliest moment possible, and said he hoped that that could be done within ten weeks. He was asked whether it would be possible to include representatives of other classes of the people, including the Szeged Government, in the new cabinet. Boehm replied that this could not be done within eight days; the intimation was that it might then be possible. In reply to a further inquiry he indicated that they did not expect the immediate lifting of the blockade. He implied, however, that such action would be very gratifying. Colonel Cunningham suggested that it was highly desirable, in addition to the Allies' requirements in the note of July 27,^{[91](#)} that the mines should be immediately removed from the Danube. Mr. Boehm seemed to approve this idea.

There have been some indications of an effort to separate the French and the Italians and to cause them not to act in harmony in connection with the new Hungarian Government. I think I should say in this connection that though Monsieur Minister Allizé was doubtful at one time as to the possibility of overthrowing the Bela Kun government through indirect assistance of the missions here, there has been no real difference in opinion but the fullest accord. While I did not participate in the conferences after instructions from the commission in Paris, I kept in a position to know that harmony did exist. It seems desirable to refer to the attitude of the French and Italians to one another because of the telegram to the peace commission from Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli,^{[92](#)} in which he

stated that the new government would accept the eight points which the missions here had tentatively prepared, and which had been presented by Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham and Prince Borghese. To this I am informed Monsieur Clemenceau replied⁹³ that the Peace Commission could not recognize any terms except those approved by all missions.

I think it is proper at this moment to point out that had it not been for the conferences which occurred between Colonel Cunningham and Prince Borghese with the representatives of the soviet, Bela Kun would not have been deposed, massacres would have occurred in the streets of Budapest, and the Roumanian Army would have been in Budapest and have the city. The presence of this army, regarded by the Hungarians as their bitterest enemies, would not have made for any permanency of good order. It seems highly desirable that the Hungarians should be enabled to solve their own problems now that they have started so well, without military interference in the form of a large force.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁹⁰ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 371, August, 3; received August 5.

⁹¹ See HD-15, minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 317](#).

⁹² Of August 1; appendix A to HD-22, [ibid., p. 489](#).

⁹³ Telegram dated August 2; appendix B to HD-22, [ibid., p. 490](#).

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/274

[Document 250]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[94](#)

No. 25

VIENNA, August 5, 1919.

Subject: The Hungarian army in Budapest.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following comment on the conditions in Hungary:

The fall of the Bela Kun government was due to the note of the Peace Commission in Paris of July 27th,[95](#) which so strongly indicated that there could be no peace with Hungary until the Bolshevik Government was overthrown. The note was further influential in that it indicated a determination to be just if the armistice conditions were complied with. The note was tactful and strong and what was needed at the moment. Its effect was the greater because of the unofficial negotiations which had been taking place, that indicated the practical effort to solve the problem. I trust I may be permitted to say that without those unofficial negotiations the note of July 27th would not have been as effective, and would have been insufficient to overthrow the Bolshevik dictator.

It was only after the morale of the Bolshevik army had been destroyed that the Rumanians were able to make any progress. They have never stood against the Hungarian troops. Their approach may have hastened the formation of the new government, but Bela Kun would have been thrown out at the meeting which was to have been held in Budapest today.

The new government of Hungary started well—it made it at once apparent that it had done with Bolshevism and that it was ready gradually to include members other than those from the Working Men's Council in the cabinet. It was prepared to hold elections at as

early date as possible and even now it desires that the elections should take place in September. Such progress in the brief period of its life is remarkable. It showed an appreciation of the real necessities of the situation. At the same time the cabinet was prepared to meet any demand of the Allies. While its members would have preferred a workingmen's government it appears to have appreciated that such a government could not have been permanent and to have been actuated by a really patriotic motive. In such circumstances the arrival of the Rumanians was of necessity discouraging, but the government stood this test reasonably well.

In order to understand the feelings of the Hungarian people it is necessary to appreciate their view of the Rumanians. No apology is made for their political actions during the war, nor for the conduct of Hungarian troops when helping in the occupation of Rumania. In this connection it is only to be said that if peace is to come to this part of the world reprisals for past offenses must not take place and a national pride which delights in the occupation of a conquered capital cannot be encouraged. The Hungarians who are a proud people with a military record that must be recognized have always regarded the Rumanians with contempt, as a people of inferior courage and culture and whose soldiers lack in personal bravery. Consequently the presence of Rumanian troops is immediately provocative and calculated to cause those who are working for the reconstruction of Hungary to feel that their efforts are useless. Already the Rumanians have killed harmless people—have cut off communications and are behaving as conquerors who have no regard for the people they conquer. This behavior cannot bring permanent good order and can only leave a feeling of bitterness and breed a desire for revenge.

If the conditions in Budapest were such as to make the Rumanian troops immediately necessary for the preservation of order there could be some excuse for their continuance in Budapest. In the circumstances they only serve to invite disorder and to interfere with the rebuilding of the country. A small military force is necessary to insure public order and to prevent the creation of a *Volkswehr*, such as that in Austria, which in the future would interfere with real representative government. Such a force—a few battalions, could

come from nations who are regarded by Hungary as their equals and whose troops can be relied upon to conduct themselves in an orderly way. The Czechs and Servian troops would be equally undesirable because of the feeling against them, but no troops would arouse so much resentment as those from Rumania.

I would most respectfully but with the greatest possible earnestness emphasize the imperative necessity of requiring the Rumanian troops to immediately withdraw from Budapest and back to the line between Rumania and Hungary provided in the armistice terms. The new government needs encouragement and advice. This can only be made possible by the presence of allied representatives in the form of a commission. The blockade should be raised so that normal life can begin. The armistice terms must be strictly complied with and the military forces of the country disarmed. With this done Hungary could now solve her own problems and prepare to comply with the peace terms which will be imposed upon her and afterwards to solve her own domestic problems.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁹⁴ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 377, August 5; received August 7.

⁹⁵ See HD-15, minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 317](#).⁹⁴

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/339^{1/2}

[Document 251]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State96

No. 53

VIENNA, August 19, 1919.

Subject: Comments on Hungary.

SIR: I have the honor to remind the Department that after the sending of General Bandholtz as member of the Allied Military Commission in Budapest I ceased to make recommendations in regard to Hungarian affairs. It seems, however, that the situation in Budapest is such as to make it desirable that I should supplement the reports that have come from General Bandholtz by referring to conditions and commenting upon them.

Up to late yesterday the Roumanians were continuing to remove material and supplies from Budapest despite their promise to comply with the instructions of the Peace Conference. The reports that reached me of conditions in the Budapest hospitals are heart rendering. Wagon-load after wagon-load of food, as well as medicines, have been removed and the poor sufferers are not only deprived of food but even of the few medicinal necessities which have been left. The death rate of the children has advanced daily, and though it is pretended that orders to obey the Peace Conference have been issued the looting proceeds continuously. Day by day the bitterness is being engendered which is certain to destroy any possibility of future peace, for the Hungarian character is such that it will never forgive such injuries, especially when they are at the hands of a people for whom they have absolute contempt. I can only urge that the Roumanians be compelled to obey orders and to add that their failure to do so is another illustration of the fact that the Peace Conference has lost all moral force. It is further suggested that, while the Roumanians have reason to remember the atrocious treatment they received at the hands of the Germans and Hungarians, the

looting of Roumania was during the war. The looting of Hungary is when the war has been ended and the effort is being made to establish a durable peace. The Roumanians still expect to be reimbursed for their losses during the war, but it is respectfully urged that they be penalized in double the amount of the material, food supplies and other things, including railway cars, telegraph instruments and lines which they have stolen from Hungary.

The continuance of Archduke Joseph as Regent makes any permanent settlement of the government of Hungary impossible. The Socialists and some of the other classes resent the return of the Hapsburg and will never consent to remain under his rule. A government without Socialists that is not truly representative cannot last. It serves to delay the restoration of order and the institution of a real, representative peoples government.

I have [etc.]

[ALBERT HALSTEAD]

⁹⁶ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 404, August 19; received August 21.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/368

[Document 252]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State[97](#)

No. 61

VIENNA, August 26, 1919.

Subject: Roumanians and Magyars in West Hungary.

SIR: I have the honor to quote the following telegram received today:

“Halstead, American Commissioner, Vienna.—Roumanian troops are advancing towards Western Hungary proclaiming that they come to restore order. Unable to communicate with Allied Missions at Budapest. We beg you to listen to our protest against Roumanian action. In Western Hungary there is perfect order in all districts and both Hungarian and German speaking population continues the work of peaceful restoration which can only be disturbed by disorderly Roumanian soldiery. Asking you to forward our protest to Allied Missions. Sigray, Government Commissioner for Western Hungary.”

I have forwarded copies of this to the British, French and Italian Missions, as well as to General Bandholtz, the American Military Commissioner in Budapest.

Count Sigray's report of the advance of the Roumanians toward West Hungary is not confirmed but it is most credible because it is characteristic of the general attitude of the Roumanian army. No respect has actually been shown in Hungary for the commands of the Peace Conference. The Roumanian Generals have made promises which they were careful their subordinates did not carry out. Therefore, for them to send troops into the part of West Hungary which the Second Draft of the Peace Treaty assigned to Austria would not be surprising.

West Hungary is fertile, has had an abundant harvest, cattle are numerous and much other valuable loot could readily be obtained.

The assignment of West Hungary to Austria was the one change in the proposed Peace Treaty that gave any hope to Austria—it seemed to make easier the feeding of the great city of Vienna. It is therefore not surprising that the Acting Austrian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ippen, should have spoken to me today with great anxiety as to the effect of such an invasion as that of the Roumanians in West Hungary. The people are industrious and the peasants who formed the delegation that called at this Mission some days ago were a splendid type of hard-working men. They have suffered from Bolshevism and are now oppressed by Colonel Lehar the commander of the Magyar forces there with the direct purpose of preventing them from frankly expressing their preference for German Austria. The Magyars are seeking to follow the same practice that has been followed in all territories in which a plebiscite is to be held to show the popular wish. To be sure the Peace Conference has not ordered a plebiscite for West Hungary but the Workingmen's Council of Austria has demanded that one be held so that the people may not unwillingly be joined to this country.

The most active person on behalf of the Magyars in West Hungary is one Zsombor, who it is reported has already been in Paris to prove to the Peace Conference that West Hungary desires to remain Hungarian in spite of the fact that at least 75% of the population are German and have long suffered from Hungarian attempts to make them Magyar. Zsombor is said now to be preparing evidence to show to the Peace Conference that the West Hungarians are dissatisfied with the decisions of the Conference. In other words he is playing the old game of manufacturing a non-existent popular sentiment.

All reports about the West Hungarian population show that it desires to live in peace and that the people when not stirred up by Hungarian soldiers, if not exasperated by Roumanian looting and if not annoyed by the carpetbagger Hungarian officials will preserve order and live in peace. It seems further probable that they could alone with a volunteer police or *gendarmarie* preserve perfect order. It was to be expected, therefore, that the Acting Foreign Minister Mr.

Ippen should have today begged me to request the conference to require the withdrawal of all Hungarian troops from that section. He appreciated that the Peace Conference would consider that the absence of all troops might make conditions unsafe so he suggested that if any troops be sent an Italian detachment be chosen. Such a detachment would be preferable to soldiers from any of the countries which have gained territory by decisions of the Conference at the expense of Hungary.

I trust I may be permitted to express the opinion, and with all emphasis that is proper, that to permit the Roumanians or Magyars to loot the population of West Hungary will not only cause great suffering to a people who have kept order and have opposed Bolshevism but will seriously interfere with the policy of self-determination and have a bad moral effect in Austria which has so far without disorder accepted every decision of the Peace Conference. For the Austrians to see that the Peace Conference permits outside interference in territory that has been assigned to this country cannot but be unfortunate.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁹⁷ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 413, August 26; received August 28.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/376

[Document 253]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State98

No. 65

VIENNA, August 29, 1919.

Subject: The situation in Hungary.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that from information received from Hungary and from talks with various Hungarians the following appears to be the political situation:

The peasants are inclined to believe that a monarchical form of government is best for their country. Having experienced a so-called republican form of government under Michael Karolyi which so soon gave way to bolshevism, they are disposed to regard a democratic form of government as inseparable from the most radical socialism. Naturally conservative and opposed to socialization because they believe it would ultimately be applied to their own land they feel that their own safety and the welfare of the country would best be preserved by the return to a monarchy. As the socialists cooperated either to a greater or less degree with the Bolsheviks they are inclined to regard the average socialist as at least a first cousin to a bolshevik.

The Clerical Party is strongly monarchical and regards a republican form of government as likely to separate church and state and to lessen their moral hold on the people. The large land owners and aristocrats are naturally supporters of a monarchy because a republican form of government will destroy their privileges. A number of industrialists fear that socialism to a greater or less degree will be one of the policies of a democracy.

For these reasons the prospect is favorable for the election of a national assembly which will be ready to restore a monarchy, but one under which the people would have a real voice in the government.

Whether a Habsburg would be placed on the throne or some new royal house be selected is not as yet evident.

Minister President Friedrich who is at heart a monarchist is holding on to power in the hope of influencing the election. In the past there has never been a non-controlled election in Hungary and the outlook is not altogether favorable for a really free expression of the popular will.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

98 Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 415, August 29; received September 1.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/378

[Document 254]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State⁹⁹

No. 67

VIENNA, August 29, 1919.

Subject: Further remarks on the situation in West Hungary.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 66 of August 28th, entitled "The West Hungarian Situation."¹ In that despatch I forwarded copies of two letters received from Count Sigray which were calculated to create the impression that everything is peaceful in the four West Hungarian counties and that any discontent in those parts of West Hungary that are assigned by the Treaty of Peace to Austria is due to agitation from across the border.

I have had a talk today with Minister Ippen, the acting chief of the Foreign Office, who solemnly assures me that there has been no agitation for which Austria is either directly or indirectly responsible. He says that they are without official information as to conditions in West Hungary but are informed that influences from Budapest are being used to make the people believe that their union to German-Austria will be contrary to their best interests. He informs me that the troops in West Hungary are men from Transylvania and have no sympathetic feelings for the Germans of West Hungary. He has furnished me with the original of a proclamation that has been posted throughout the part of West Hungary that is assigned to Austria. A translation is attached hereto.²

In contrasting the statements made by Minister Ippen with those of Count Sigray it should be remembered that Count Sigray is not in the part of West Hungary that has been assigned to German-Austria and that he is a Hungarian and an aristocrat, looking at the situation from a purely Hungarian viewpoint. His letters admit the arrest of agitators and that people have been warned to be orderly. Though

the agitators were released the very fact of their arrest must be repressing in its influence.

Minister Ippen says that if a plebiscite were held in West Hungary today with the Hungarian troops from Transylvania still there, by reason of the menace of their presence that section of the country would certainly vote against a union with Austria.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

⁹⁹ Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 417, August 29; received September 1.

¹ *Ante*, p. 562 [*Pg. 562 includes portions of [Doc. 213](#) and [Doc. 214](#)*].

² Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/420

[Document 255]

Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State3

No. 76

VIENNA, September 7, 1919.

Subject: The situation in Hungary.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the situation in Hungary. The Magyar element in West Hungary is wholly indisposed to accept with calmness the decisions of the Peace Conference to join to Austria certain portions of the three western counties. The attitude is assumed that as no treaty has been negotiated with Hungary, the decisions of the Conference with regard to this former Hungarian territory carry no weight. The threat to resist Austrian attempts to take over the territory is significant of the state of mind of the Magyar leaders, but it does not threaten any actual clash between the Magyars and Austrians, because Austria has no military force that could be utilized for the occupation of the territory now assigned to it. The *Folkswehr* consist of men who find life comfortable at the expense of the government and who enjoy the authority that the uniform and the gun give to each. As a fighting force it has no value whatsoever.

It need not be emphasized, I am sure, that the attitude of the Magyar minority in West Hungary is not conducive to breeding respect for the authority of the Entente.

In Hungary proper the continued seizure of all kinds of property by the Roumanians and their contempt for the instructions of the Peace Conference are developing despair which tends to lead them to seek assistance wherever it may be obtained; while the Roumanians pretend that they are carrying out orders, and continue their thefts.

The authorities of the White Army under the leadership of Admiral Horthy who is the commander in chief of the Hungarian army, are enlisting men for military service. It is reported that efforts are being made to secure Jugo-Slavic assistance in driving the Hungarians [*Roumanians?*] out. The enlistment of men seems to be confirmed, but that the government of Jugo-Slavia would engage in such an enterprise would appear doubtful, because it would leave them open to aggression on the west from Italy, with whom relations cannot be said to be the most amicable.

I have [etc.]

ALBERT HALSTEAD

3 Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 427, September 7; received September 11.

The Bandholtz Mission to Hungary

[\[256\] The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Washington, July 25, 1919—6 p.m. [Received July 26—10 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.92/3: Telegram

[\[257\] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State](#)

Paris, August 7, 1919—10 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.92/3: Telegram

[\[258\] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, August 11, 1919. [Received August 11—6:15 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/6: Telegram

[\[259\] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, August 11, 1919. [Received August 12—3:50 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/7: Telegram

[260] The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Serbian Forces

Budapest, 11 August, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/64: Telegram

[261] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

Paris, August 13, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/10a: Telegram

[262] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 14, 1919. [Received August 15—12:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/11: Telegram

[263] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 14, 1919. [Received August 15—10 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/12: Telegram

[264] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 15, 1919. [Received August 17—10:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/14: Telegram

[265] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 16, 1919. [Received August 16—10:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/16: Telegram

[266] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 17, 1919. [Received August 18—4:20 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/19: Telegram

[267] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 18, 1919. [Received August 20—12:32 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/20: Telegram

[268] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 19, 1919. [Received August 20—1 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/21: Telegram

[269] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 20, 1919. [Received August 21—1:21 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/25: Telegram

[270] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 20, 1919. [Received August 20—11:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/26: Telegram

[271] The Interallied Military Mission to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 21, 1919. [Received August 21—11:35 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/28: Telegram

[272] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 21, 1919. [Received August 21—1 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/31: Telegram

[273] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 22, 1919. [Received August 22—11:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/34: Telegram

[274] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 22, 1919. [Received August 22—11:50 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/33: Telegram

[275] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 23, 1919. [Received August 23—9:45 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/37: Telegram

[276] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 23, 1919. [Received August 25—12:42 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/35: Telegram

[277] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 24, 1919. [Received August 25—1:50 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/42: Telegram

[278] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 24, 1919. [Received August 25—1:20 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/43: Telegram

**[279] The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander
in Chief of the Roumanian Forces**

Budapest, August 25, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/58

**[280] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace**

Budapest, August 25, 1919. [Received August 26—3:04 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/46: Telegram

**[281] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace**

Budapest, August 26, 1919. [Received August 27—11 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/48: Telegram

**[282] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace**

Budapest, August 27, 1919. [Received August 30—4:18 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/52: Telegram

[283] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 27, 1919. [Received August 30—6 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/53: Telegram

[284] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 28, 1919. [Received August 30—2:23 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/55: Telegram

[285] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/62

[286] The Interallied Military Mission to the Supreme Council

Budapest, August 29, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/61: Telegram

[287] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 29, 1919. [Received August 31—3:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/60: Telegram

[288] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 30, 1919. [Received August 31—6 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/64: Telegram

[289] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, August 31, 1919. [Received September 4.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/69

[290] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 2, 1919. [Received September 2—6:33 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/76: Telegram

[291] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 3, 1919. [Received September 3—2:50 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/81: Telegram

[292] The Prime Minister of the Hungarian Government (Friedrich) to the Interallied Military Mission

Budapest , September 6, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/97

[293] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 7, 1919. [Received September 7—1:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/94: Telegram

[294] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Officer in Charge in General Bandholtz' Absence

Paris, September 8, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/91: Telegram

[295] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 11, 1919. [Received September 12—1:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/102: Telegram

[296] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State

Paris, September 12, 1919—10 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/103a: Telegram

[297] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 12, 1919. [Received September 13—10:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/104: Telegram

[298] General Bandholtz to the Supreme Council

Budapest, September 13, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/108: Telegram

[299] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 14, 1919. [Received September 14—3:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/109: Telegram

[300] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 15, 1919. [Received September 15—11:15 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/113: Telegram

[301] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 15, 1919. [Received September 15—11:50 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/111: Telegram

[\[302\] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, September 15, 1919. [Received September 15—11:15 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/112: Telegram

[\[303\] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, September 16, 1919. [Received September 16.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/116: Telegram

[\[304\] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, September 17, 1919. [Received September 18—2:55 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/119: Telegram

[\[305\] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, September 18, 1919. [Received September 18—11:42 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/123: Telegram

[\[306\] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Budapest, September 19, 1919. [Received September 20—1:35 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/125: Telegram

[307] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

Paris, September 20, 1919—7 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/119: Telegram

[308] The Interallied Military Mission to the Supreme Council

Budapest, September 20, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/127: Telegram

[309] The President of the Day, Interallied Military Mission, to General Mardarescu of the Roumanian Army

Budapest , September 22, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/58

[310] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 23, 1919. [Received September 26—3:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/139: Telegram

[311] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 23, 1919. [Received September 30.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/136

[312] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 24, 1919. [Received September 26—2 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/140: Telegram

[313] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 25, 1919. [Received September 6 (26?)—6:50
p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/143: Telegram

[314] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 27, 1919. [Received September 28—1 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/152: Telegram

[315] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, September 29, 1919. [Received September 29—12:45 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/153: Telegram

[316] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 2, 1919. [Received October 3—10:44 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/160: Telegram

[317] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 3, 1919. [Received October 3—3:22 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/167: Telegram

[318] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 4, 1919. [Received October 4—6:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/169: Telegram

[319] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 5, 1919. [Received October 5—1:55 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/173: Telegram

[320] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 6, 1919. [Received October 6—9:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/175: Telegram

[321] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 6, 1919. [Received October 6—6:37 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/177: Telegram

[322] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 6, 1919. [Received October 6—6:34 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/176: Telegram

[323] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 7, 1919. [Received October 7—5:57 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/178: Telegram

[324] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 8, 1919. [Received October 8—5:27 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/181: Telegram

[325] The Interallied Military Commission to the Supreme Council

Budapest, October 8, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/182: Telegram

[326] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

Paris, October 11, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/183a: Telegram

[327] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 16 [13?], 1919. [Received October 16—1:07 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/194: Telegram

[328] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 13, 1919. [Received October 16—1:08 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/185: Telegram

[329] The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Royal Roumanian Forces

Budapest, October 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/28

[330] The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Royal Roumanian Forces

Budapest, October 15, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/58

[331] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 15, 1919. [Received October 15—9:42 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/190: Telegram

[332] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 15, 1919. [Received October 16—1:32 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/191: Telegram

[333] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 17, 1919. [Received October 18—9:07 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/197: Telegram

[334] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, undated. [Received October 21, 1919—10:36 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/201: Telegram

[335] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 23, 1919. [Received October 24—12:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/207: Telegram

[336] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 27, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/209

[337] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 30, 1919. [Received October 30—6:47 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/213: Telegram

[338] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 31, 1919. [Received November 1—10 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/214: Telegram

[339] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 5, 1919—8 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/221a: Telegram

[340] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 5, 1919. [Received November 5—11 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/224: Telegram

[341] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 6, 1919. [Received November 6—5:09 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/226: Telegram

[342] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 9, 1919. [Received December 1.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/271

[343] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 10, 1919. [Received November 11—8:18 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/234: Telegram

[344] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 12, 1919. [Received November 14—12:33 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/240: Telegram

[345] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, 13 November, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/22

[346] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 15, 1919. [Received November 15—10:40 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/247: Telegram

[347] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 15, 1919. [Received November 15—6:15 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/246: Telegram

[348] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 16, 1919. [Received November 16—9:15 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/248: Telegram

[349] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

Paris, November 17, 1919—9 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/248: Telegram

[350] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 17, 1919. [Received November 18—10:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/249: Telegram

[351] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 18, 1919. [Received November 18—7:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/251: Telegram

[352] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 19, 1919. [Received November 20—11:55 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/253: Telegram

[353] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

Paris, November 20, 1919—9 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/222: Telegram

[354] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 24, 1919. [Received November 25—12 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/260: Telegram

[355] The Interallied Military Mission to the Commanding General of the Roumanian Army of Transylvania

Budapest, November 26, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/58

[356] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 26, 1919. [Received November 26—9:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/262: Telegram

[357] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

Paris, November 27, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/262c: Telegram

[358] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna [Budapest], November 27, 1919. [Received November 29—
5:07 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/263: Telegram

[359] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 29, 1919. [Received November 30—10:20 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/266: Telegram

[360] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, November 30, 1919. [Received November 30—2:23 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/267: Telegram

[361] Report to the Interallied Military Mission Made by the Subcommittee Sent to Pecs on November 28, Returning December 1, 1919.

Pécs, November 28 to December 1, 1919

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/64

[362] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

Paris, December 5, 1919—9 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/266: Telegram

[363] General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, December 6, 1919. [Received December 7—2:27 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/279: Telegram

[364] General Bandholtz to the Interallied Military Mission

[Budapest,] 13 December, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/72

[365] General Bandholtz to Countess Karolyi

Budapest, 10 January, 1920.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/22

[366] General Bandholtz to the Hungarian Prime Minister

Budapest, 23 January, 1920.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/68

[367] The Commissioner in Hungary (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Budapest, January 31, 1920—8 p.m. [Received via Paris February 2—
10:02 a.m.]

763.72119/8881: Telegram

[368] The Commissioner in Hungary (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Budapest, February 9, 1920—10 a.m. [Received via Paris February 10
—12:45 p.m.]

763.72119/9004: Telegram

Paris Peace Conf. 181.92/3: Telegram

[Document 256]

***The Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1919—6 p.m.
[Received July 26—10 a.m.]

2636. Your 3231 and 3222 [3232?] and 3239.^{[1](#)} President has approved that army officer be detailed to represent the United States on mission to Hungary. General Bliss may make the selection from list which he has.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} None printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.92/3: Telegram

[Document 257]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 7, 1919—10 p.m.

3554. Your 2636 July 25, 6:00 p.m. At the meeting of August 4, the Supreme Council agreed to appoint an Interallied Mission of Generals composed of one representative each of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy to proceed immediately to Budapest accompanied by small escorts of Allied troops.² (See Mission telegram No. 3552 of August 7.)³ At the meeting of the Supreme Council of August 5,⁴ the following nominations were made: for the United States General Bandholtz, for Great Britain General Gorton, for France General Graziani, and for Italy General Mombelli. Council also drew up and approved the instructions to the Mission which were issued that evening by Marshal Foch.⁵ (See Mission telegram No. 3553 of August 7.)³ General Bandholtz was appointed under the authority given your telegram 2636.

Owing to the international importance of the matter and as immediate action was most necessary, arrangements have been made for an escort of 24 men to accompany the General, who will leave tonight with one aide and two orderlies on Mr. Hoover's train to Prague. The escort will follow as soon as possible. May I request that you be good enough to request the Secretary of War to issue such instructions as will enable General Bandholtz to draw for the funds necessary to defray his expenses, expenses of his staff and of the escort. In order that action might not be delayed the Mission has advanced the General today \$12,000.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

² See HD–23, minute 1, [vol. VII, p. 504](#) .

³ Not printed.

⁴ See HD–24, minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 528](#) .

⁵ See HD–24, minute 2 and appendix B, [ibid., pp. 528](#)  and [542](#) .

³ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/6: Telegram

[Document 258]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 11, 1919.
[Received August 11—6:15 p.m.]

1. Report arrival Budapest at daylight this morning. General Gorton and I in complete cooperation have tentatively organized Military Mission pending arrival of French and Italian representatives.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/7: Telegram

[Document 259]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 11, 1919.

[Received August 12—3:50 p.m.]

2. General Mombelli, Italian representative on Interallied Military Mission to Hungary, arrived this evening and is in entire conformity with Mission organization started by General Gorton and myself.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/64: Telegram

[Document 260]

***The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander
in Chief of the Serbian Forces***

BUDAPEST, 11 August, 1919.

It is reported that Serbian troops have this date crossed the Hungarian boundary prescribed by the Armistice conditions of November 13th, 1918.⁷ The undersigned having been appointed as members of the Interallied Military Mission to Hungary, request that if this report be true you take immediate steps to have any such invading forces withdrawn. The instructions to the Interallied Military Mission to Hungary include a requirement to have the troops of all neighboring powers remain behind the frontiers prescribed by the Armistice or to indicate such portions of Hungary as might be temporarily occupied. No authority has yet been given your forces for such occupancy. It is trusted and believed that the report in question is in error, or if not that it is due to mistaken instructions or excess of zeal on the part of a subordinate and that you will rectify same immediately. Please acknowledge receipt hereof.

GENERAL BANDHOLTZ
American Representative

GENERAL GORTON
British Representative

Copy respectfully furnished to Hungarian Government, Budapest.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ
American Representative
R. ST. G. GORTON
British Representative

⁷ [Vol. II, p. 183](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/10a: Telegram

[Document 261]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

PARIS, August 13, 1919.

1. [From Polk.] Your Mission's two telegrams of yesterday's date August 12th⁸ were considered this afternoon and the Supreme Council sends the following reply which you will please deliver to your colleagues:

“Interallied Military Mission, Budapest. We quite recognize that you cannot avoid having relations with any *de facto* government holding power in Budapest. You will however bear in mind that according to our information the Government of the Archduke Joseph⁹ has as yet little authority and has not so far been accepted by the country. We are most desirous of dealing directly with any genuine Hungarian Government in order to settle Terms of Peace and resume normal economic relations. But you must not be committed to any administration which has not authority to speak for the Hungarian people. While it will therefore be your duty to listen to anything the Government has to say you must remember that it has not yet been accepted by those for whom it proposes to speak.

The Mission of Allied Generals is invested with the authority conferred on it by the Supreme Council. It is not qualified from a military point of view to give direct orders to the Rumanian Generals but it is qualified to communicate to them the views of the Allied Powers.

If the Rumanian Government is decided not to break off from the Allied Powers, it will give its Generals the necessary orders

to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

The Conference cannot believe that the Rumanian Government will by refusing to conform to the views of the Allied Powers, take a decision so serious in its consequence.

(signed) G. Clemenceau”

For your information the last three paragraphs of the foregoing reply will be communicated to the Rumanian Government.

In order to avoid confusion it is suggested that the Mission number its telegrams. Polk.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁸ See HD–30, minute 1, [vol. VII, p. 677](#).⁸

⁹ The Social Democratic Government of Hungary was overthrown on August 6 and replaced by a government headed by Archduke Joseph. See HD–26, minute 1, and appendix A (iv) to HD–28, [ibid., pp. 603](#) and [657](#).⁹

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/11: Telegram

[Document 262]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 14, 1919.
[Received August 15—12:30 a.m.]

4. General Graziani, the French representative of the Interallied Military Mission, arrived on the evening of the 12th and was present at the session this date.¹⁰ He evidently expected the chairmanship of the Commission to go by seniority and so stated. He was informed of the arrangement made by the other three members of the Commission for rotation in chairmen and acquiesced with a reservation that it would be necessary to notify his Government as the French authorities undoubtedly expected the chairmanship to go by seniority. M. Diamandi, the Roumanian High Commissioner, and General Mardarescu, with General Holban, called upon the Commission in the morning session and explained the arrangement they had made for alleviation all [of?] the food situation in Budapest. Captain Gregory of the Food Administration was called in while these gentlemen were present and explained to them what he was prepared to do under favorable conditions. In the afternoon M. Diamandi asked for a private interview with the undersigned which took place during the afternoon and during which he stated that he regretted that there had been any misunderstanding whatever on the day preceding and added in effect that his Government was prepared to accept as final the instructions given the Military Commission by the Supreme Council.¹¹ His attention at the time was called to some excesses committed by Roumanians against Armenians [*Americans*] and he promised to have adequate measures taken for reparation and punishment. The Commission had an afternoon session during which the undersigned requested that M. Diamandi be asked to appear before the Commission and repeat officially the remarks he had made during the personal conference but he could not be found

and has therefore been asked to see the Commission tomorrow morning. The Italian, British, and American representatives are in complete accord and there is general harmony.

BANDHOLTZ

¹⁰ Presumably reference is to session of August 13.

¹¹ For text of instructions, see appendix B to HD-24, [vol. VII, p. 542](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/12: Telegram

[Document 263]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 14, 1919.
[Received August 15—10 a.m.]

5. Please consider my four previous telegrams^{[12](#)} as numbered accordingly.

The authorized Roumanian High Commissioner seems to be authorized to express only his personal opinions and to feel obliged to refer all official matters to his Government by courier. The whole game is one of delay. The French representative [who] was chairman is apparently not desirous to [of] expediting our work and proposed no session tomorrow as it is some kind of a religious holiday. He was overruled. He had an interview Wednesday night with Archduke Joseph during which the latter stated he would abdicate or resign as soon as a good Socialist government was organized. As matters were progressing too slowly the undersigned this afternoon submitted the following memorandum:

“To the Interallied Military Mission to Hungary.

1. It is submitted that it will be impossible for this Mission to carry out its instructions, as contained in 3a, while the Roumanians occupy the city of Budapest in force and exercise complete control over all municipal and government functions.
2. It is recommended that the Roumanian Commander in Chief be requested immediately conform to the following:
 - (a) Cease at once taking possession of any supplies or property of whatever nature.

- (b) Return at once to its owners all private property now in the possession of the Roumanians, such as automobiles, horses, carriages, or any other property of which the ownership is vested in individuals.
 - (c) Turn over immediately to the *de facto* Hungarian Government entire control of the post, telegraph, telephone and railroad systems.
 - (d) Cease at once all requisitioning of buildings, stores or property of any nature whatsoever.
 - (e) Cease at once all shipments of rolling stock or Hungarian property of any kind whatsoever, and stop and return to Budapest any rolling stock or property already en route or held at outside stations.
 - (f) Cease at once supervision over any public or private affairs in the city except insofar as may be directed by this Mission.
 - (g) Transfer Roumanian G. H. Q., or territorial headquarters not later than 6 (18 o'clock) 16th August 1919 from Budapest to such place as may be acceptable to this Mission.
 - (h) Retain one reenforced brigade of a composition to be agreed to by this Mission in Budapest or its immediate vicinity for the preservation of order.
 - (i) Station one division (infantry) not nearer than 40 kilometers to the city and one cavalry division at an equal distance. Both stations to be approved by this Mission (par. 3b).
3. It is understood that the Roumanian Government is in complete accord with the wishes of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference as expressed in the paragraph above referred to and its hearty cooperation can therefore be depended upon.
4. It is submitted that all of the foregoing is important and urgent. Bandholtz, American Representative."

As a result the Roumanian Commander has been asked to submit tomorrow morning a report as to strength of his forces in and near Budapest, what form of police force he is maintaining and exact

status of present requisition system with copies of his orders covering same.

BANDHOLTZ

¹² No. 3, August 12, not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/14: Telegram

[Document 264]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 15, 1919.
[Received August 17—10:30 p.m.]

7. Believe that Roumania doing utmost to delay withdrawal in order continue looting of Hungary. Despite promises and their issued instructions stop requisitioning in Budapest, is practically continuing. Their game is apparently to so discourage people of Hungary that political union with Roumania will be acceptable. Some Hungarians already willing accept union along line of Austria-Hungary Monarchy. Archduke last night told French General he had reconsidered and would not abdicate. This French General practically commanded Roumania Army, but withdrew to Bulgaria just prior invasion of Hungary. He did not arrive Budapest until night of August 12th and expected to preside over and dominate this Mission. He was evidently disappointed to find daily rotation of chairmanship in operation. Believe French somewhat favorable to Roumanians but do not desire offend Hungary; anyway there is no evident indication to expedite our work. Italians are apparently favorable to Hungary, but intensely disliked by Roumania. Most of the time of Mission sessions is devoted to oratory and gesticulation. So far English General and myself in complete accord.

This morning Roumanian General Holban wired to arrange at once with Hungarians and rearm 6,000 police for Budapest and to locate his men along city's perimeter. Beginning tomorrow Mission will be located in Royal Palace.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/16: Telegram

[Document 265]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 16, 1919.
[Received August 16—10:30 p.m.]

8. M. Diamandi and General Mardarescu with his Chief of Staff attends [*attended*] today's session of Interallied Military Mission which was presided over by the undersigned, and acknowledged for Roumania the validity of the Supreme Council's instructions to the Mission. They were handed a communication of which the following was text:

[“] 1. (a) Cease at once requisitioning or taking possession of supplies or property of whatever nature except in zones authorized by this Mission, [and] then only of such supplies as may be necessary for the Roumanian Army, and that this Mission be informed as to the kind of supplies which will be considered necessary.

(b) The Roumanian Commander in Chief to furnish without delay a map clearly showing the requisition zones and also indicating thereon the disposition of his troops.

(c) Return at once to its owners all private property now in the possession of the Roumanians, such as automobiles, horses, carriages, or any other property of which the ownership is vested in individuals.

(d) To arrange for the gradual return to the Hungarian Government of the railroad, post and telegraph systems.

(e) Make no further requisitions of buildings, stores or real property, and evacuate as rapidly as possible all schools,

colleges and buildings of like character.

(f) Cease at once all shipment of rolling stock or Hungarian property of any kind whatsoever, to or towards Roumania, and stop and return to Budapest any rolling stock or property already en route or held at outside stations.

(g) Limit supervision over public or private affairs in city to such extent as may be approved by this Mission.

2. The Roumanian Government to furnish this Mission not later than August 31st a complete list of all war material, railway or agricultural material, livestock or property of any kind whatsoever that has been taken possession of in Hungary by Roumanian forces.”

They were also told to cease further occupation of Hungary.

M. Diamandi handed the British member a communication from Roumanian Prime Minister saying that if the Mission did not act as he desired the Roumanian Army would be at once withdrawn and when questioned about it acted as though he had handed the wrong paper. In general Roumanians gave assurances of hearty cooperation with the Mission.

Receipt acknowledged of your telegram No. 6.^{[13](#)}

BANDHOLTZ

^{[13](#)} Dated August 15; it transmitted the text of the Roumanian reply of August 14 (appendix B to HD–31, [vol. VII, p. 688](#) ) to the note from the Peace Conference presented at Bucharest on August 9 (appendix B to HD–26, [ibid., p. 615](#) ) and the text of the reply of the Conference dated August 14 (appendix C to HD–31, [ibid., p. 691](#) )

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/19: Telegram

[Document 266]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 17, 1919.
[Received August 18—4:20 p.m.]

11. General Gorton, British representative, President at meeting of Interallied Military Mission this date. Yesterday Hungarian Government was requested to send Prime Minister and Food Minister to confer with Mission at 10:30 this morning, instead of which the entire Cabinet less any Food Minister reported. They stated that the place of Food Minister was vacant and it was explained to them that it was of the utmost importance that the vacancy be filled without delay by a person of highest qualifications. The Hungarians were also informed that they must collaborate with the Roumanians to the fullest extent and that this Mission expected both to make progress by acts instead of presenting mutual recriminations. Letters were prepared to be sent to the Roumanian Commander at the suggestion of the undersigned requesting him to submit daily reports of progress made in complying with the Supreme Council instructions as transmitted by this Mission, and informing him that this machine [*Mission*] could not concede that passes and papers of members of the interallied nationalities must be viséd by Roumanian headquarters, adding that each representative was empowered to issue letters of identity of persons of his own nationality.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/20: Telegram

[Document 267]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 18, 1919.
[Received August 20—12:32 a.m.]

12. Despite all promises Roumanians continue removing property and yesterday removed valuable long-distance telegraph equipment. There are strong rumors of Bolshevik activity and it is understood that propaganda is having some success among Roumanian troops. M. Diamandi this date during a private conference with Italian representative stated he did not expect to remain here long as Roumania was playing a losing game, intimating that the Roumanians might suddenly pull out all of their forces, this being in line with paper he appeared to have shown British representative in error. This gentleman also complained that the Mission had recognized the Hungarian Government by receiving the Cabinet yesterday. He was told that the members of the Cabinet were informed that our seeing them was not to be construed in any way as recognition of the Archduke's Government. Undersigned insisted a second [*at session*] this afternoon that Roumanian Commander or representative appear before the Mission to explain what had been done by Roumania toward complying with wishes of Supreme Council. The Italian representative argued long against summoning any such officer personally and insisted on having all such matters done in writing. As result of prolonged discussion all afternoon was wasted. However Roumanian Commander has been requested to come or send representative at tomorrow morning's session. The situation as regards the Hungarian Government is anomalous and it does not look as though this Government could ever have any stability. Almost daily there are several Cabinet changes and the Government is decidedly weak. If there is no intention on the part of the Supreme Council to recognize the *de facto* Government it is

believed that the Archduke should be notified accordingly. Admiral von Horthy formerly of the Austro-Hungarian Navy told Mission this date that he could organize an effective Hungarian Army within 4 days after permission to do so. If the Roumanians should decide to suddenly evacuate Budapest Admiral Troubridge could have eight monitors within the city within 4 hours.^{[14](#)}

BANDHOLTZ

^{[14](#)} For report to the Supreme Council by the Interallied Military Mission on the sessions of August 18, see HD-34, minute 8, [vol. VII, p. 739](#).^{[🔗](#)}

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/21: Telegram

[Document 268]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 19, 1919.
[Received August 20—1 a.m.]

14. General Holban Roumanian Commander of Budapest appeared before Mission this morning representing Roumanian Government and stated he could give information only on two points. One was the food question and the other the organization of the municipal police of Budapest. In regard to the first he was asked to explain the map he had furnished this Mission purporting to show food requisition zones, but he could not explain it and then claimed that he could not prepare a map that would show the situation. As regards the question of police he showed an organization scheme proposed by the Hungarians 2 days ago to which I [he] was opposed. On the 15th he was instructed to cooperate with the Hungarian[s] and immediately arm 6,000 police. Up to this date he had accomplished nothing. On occasion former interview he stated he had 15,000 men in Budapest and vicinity: today he said he had never had over 5,000. This is furnished as indicative of the general attitude of the Roumanians who are continuing with their removal of property despite their promises to abide by the instructions of the Mission. The undersigned insisted that the Roumanian Commander in Chief himself attend tomorrow's meeting in order that he may be called upon for definite replies to pertinent questions. Today's meeting was very harmonious and there was unanimity of opinion that very little can be accomplished with the present Hungarian Government. Telegram was sent Supreme Council along these lines.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/25: Telegram

[Document 269]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 20, 1919.
[Received August 21—1:21 a.m.]

16. The American representative presided at today's session. The Hungarian Minister of War discussed plans for reorganizing the Hungarian Army and was told to reduce same to writing and forward to Commission with least practicable delay. General Mardarescu the Roumanian Commander in Chief and M. Diamandi Roumanian High Commissioner accompanied by General Rudeanu, who in the future is to represent the Roumanian Government at meetings of the Mission, were introduced and were informed that although they had been requested on the 16th to take action along certain lines and to report daily progress, only one report had been received which covered only a fraction of the various subjects to be handled and that the Mission had no information that the Roumanian Government was complying with its request, but that on the contrary it had proof that the promises of the Roumanian Government had not been kept and that seizures and exportations were continuing. General Mardarescu made most evasive answers and was finally pinned down to replying in detail to the subject matter of the letter referred to: see my telegram No. 8 of August 16th. As regards subparagraph *a* he stated no requisition[s] had been made that were not absolutely necessary for the field use of the Roumanian Army and was informed that the undersigned had personal and positive knowledge that such was not the case and in particular that a large quantity of delicate instruments connected with the Bureau of Posts and Telegraphs had been removed and that he could be shown where hundreds of carloads of material not necessary for the Roumanian Army were waiting until the bridge over the Tisza River was completed in order to send them to Roumania. He finally promised to take this matter

up and to carry out the Mission's instructions. As to subparagraph 6 there has been small progress, the map submitted being practically valueless. As regards subparagraph *c* he admitted that steps had not yet been taken, but would have the matter looked into at once. As to subparagraph *d* he made a like promise. As to subparagraph *e* he stated it might be necessary to requisition buildings to meet emergency and was told that any such [matter] could be amicably settled with the Commission. As to subparagraph *f* he promised to have the matter taken up and like action with regard to subparagraph *g*. In general he promised to send in the future a daily report covering each of the above paragraphs. M. Diamandi requested that a Roumanian officer attend all sessions of the Mission whenever matters of importance were discussed with Hungarian officials. He was given no answer to this and the Commission decided to use its own judgment in the matter and simply report same without recommendation to the Supreme Council. In the afternoon General Rudeanu called upon the undersigned and stated that beginning with today a new leaf would be turned over and that I would find the Roumanians most anxious to cooperate with the Mission in every respect. He appears to be far more intelligent than either General Mardarescu or General Holban. It is understood that the British Mission in Paris looks with more favor on the Roumanians than formerly. The meeting of the Mission was most harmonious.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/26: Telegram

[Document 270]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 20, 1919.
[Received August 20—11:30 p.m.]

20. Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from the Supreme Council¹⁵ a report on Hungarian political situation will probably be wired tomorrow by Military Mission. This report will be a composite of memoranda from the four representatives. The memorandum of the undersigned was as follows:

“To consider the present political situation one must start in at least with the assumption of the reins of government by the Archduke Joseph.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Socialist Government had been started but a few days and that an enemy was in possession of the city, a *coup d'état* was pulled off by about 50 gendarmes with the accessory passivity of the Roumanians. The Archduke himself has shown that when it comes to diplomacy, political matters and the administration of a government he is still a babe in swaddling clothes. This is demonstrated by the seriousness with which he took an anonymous ultimatum, and by the various ridiculous administrative stunts he has pulled off. He is probably, when all is considered, quite popular in Hungary, but his popularity is neither so extensive nor so deep-rooted as he seems to imagine. It is believed he has been misled by his intimates, who have lured him into believing that he is the almost unanimous choice of the people of Hungary. However, either independently, or influenced by his mercenary advisors, he is believed to have been taking measures to perpetuate his office

by declaring martial law with the announced intention of arresting Bolsheviks. This is undoubtedly a transparent camouflage to conceal the real intention of disposing of all political opponents and of assuring his ultimate election.

The Hungarians had barely disentangled themselves from the meshes of bolshevism when the present regime came into existence. It would be a calamity if either the Bolsheviks or the Hapsburg[s] were allowed to control Hungary. To prevent this it is important that some strong men of real popularity and influence along all classes be placed in charge and given every assistance in reorganizing a semipermanent government. To restore a Hapsburg at this time when it is in the memory of everybody that the unfortunate dynasty was the intentional or unintentional cause of the Great War would seriously affect all the Allies and would give an impulse to bolshevism.

In brief, the Hungarian political situation is believed to be critical, but not beyond remedy. If the Roumanian Government will shift their gear from first to third and do their best to facilitate the organization of a government and the creation of a police force and an army of suitable size, and to arrange for gradual but prompt withdrawal behind its own recognized boundary, it is believed the present deplorable condition in Hungary can soon be brought to an end.”

BANDHOLTZ

¹⁵ See HD–32, minute 1 and appendix C, [vol. VII, pp. 694](#)  and [709](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/28: Telegram

[Document 271]

The Interallied Military Mission to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 21, 1919.
[Received August 21—11:35 p.m.]

18. In consequence of M. Pichon's telegram No. 7 dated August 19th¹⁶ and the publication by the Hungarian Government in the official journal of a state of siege in Hungary the Interallied Commission sent today for the Archduke Joseph and the Prime Minister who arrived at 11:15 a.m. The following note was then read to the Archduke and the Prime Minister by the President of the Day:

- “1. The Commission has been notified that the Hungarian Government in its official journal the *Budapest Kozlony* has proclaimed a state of siege in Hungary. The Hungarian territory is occupied by an army of the Allies and this army alone is authorized to issue such a proclamation.
2. The act of the Hungarian Government is wholly inexplicable, and a revocation of the proclamation is to be made at once.
3. A government which can act in such a manner cannot inspire any confidence.”

The Archduke said that the proclamation should at once be revoked and the Prime Minister then left the Commission for the purpose. The President of the Day then read the following to the Archduke alone:

“We think it our duty to inform Your Highness that the mere fact that the head of the state is a Hapsburg, diminishes the possibility of feeling confidence in the administration, which

has in any case been established by a *coup d'état* during a foreign occupation.”

The Archduke said he had been forced to assume head of the Government and [if?] he resigned there would be a return to bolshevism. He left the room in a very angry manner and without any ceremony.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

¹⁶ Apparently appendix C to HD-32, [vol. VII, p. 709](#).¹⁶

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/31: Telegram

[Document 272]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 21, 1919.
[Received August 21—1 a.m.]

18A. At session this date paper from Roumanian Government was submitted protesting against action of Archduke's Government in establishing martial law in portion of Hungary. Other protests were received against action of Hungarians in territory which had been given to Austria by Commission. The telegram which was received last night relative to Supreme Council's opinion of present Hungarian Government¹⁷ was also discussed, and in view of the fact that no progress could be made under present conditions it was decided to send for the Archduke and the Prime Minister. They were informed of the impropriety of declaring martial law under present conditions and the Archduke alone was then told that a government which acted in such a manner could not inspire confidence and it was added that we thought it our duty to inform him that the mere fact that the [head of the] state is a Hapsburg diminishes the possibility of feeling confidence in an administration which had in any case been established by a *coup d'état* during a foreign occupation. The Archduke stated that he was at the head of the Government because it was the wish of the people. He was told there was difference of opinion in regard to that. He then became angry, stated in effect that his giving up the Government would mean a return to bolshevism and left the room without shaking hands with anybody. It was difficult to tell whether his reference to bolshevism was in the way of a threat or a regret. The Roumanian General Rudeanu and M. Diamandi were then sent for and the situation was explained to them in order that they might be on the alert for any political disturbance. It is hoped now that some man in whom the Hungarians have confidence will be found to take up the reins of

government, in which case progress will be more rapid. The Roumanians continue with fair progress [*promises*] and statements, and underhand deeds. The French representative seems to be doing good teamwork at present. The British representative has been in perfect accord with me from the beginning. There seems to be something new that is brewing among the Italians.

BANDHOLTZ

¹⁷ Apparently appendix C to HD-32, [vol. VII, p. 709](#).⁴

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/34: Telegram

[Document 273]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 22, 1919.
[Received August 22—11:30 p.m.]

19. Last night Archduke called upon Italian representative, said he was too excited at yesterday's meeting to talk connectedly, that the Mission does not understand the Hapsburgs work only for best interest of Hungary, that he accepted office in order to lead his country up to the time of elections when the wish of his people will be sacred to him. He asked if yesterday's statement was [inspired] from Paris or only the Mission's opinion and was told that could not be answered. He then asked if it was inspired from Vienna and told he was wrong. He then wished to know if the Mission's statement to him on yesterday was to be considered as an order and was told that it was up to him to consider and interpret it. It is believed tomorrow [*now that*] he does not intend to quit office unless given more emphatic instructions. At this morning's session it was decided that the Roumanians must assist at once to organize 6,000 police for city [of] Budapest and that army for Hungary of 30,000 would be the basis for consideration. The undersigned called the Mission's attention to the fact that up to date no report had yet been received from the Roumanians, that they had not taken a single step to comply with instructions sent them except that they were allowing some food to come into Budapest, and it was insisted that the Supreme Council be notified accordingly in today's telegram. The question of individual and governmental claims will be a serious one and it will be impossible for this Mission to handle it with the means at its disposal. This would require [on] an estimate six officers each with an expert stenographer and a good interpreter, and suitable transportation for investigations. Claims and complaints are coming in daily in increasing numbers. The Supreme Council's telegram

relative to taking measures to prevent Roumanians exporting material from Hungary was received¹⁸ and read at the Mission's meeting about noon. It will be impossible for the Mission with the force at its disposal to take preventive measures along the lines indicated and it would take such large force to make such action in an effective manner that it is not believed to be feasible. A suggested substitute would be to have officers with small detachments along the Tisza River, in Budapest and other important centers, with authority to begin and take the numbers of all cars, take a rough inventory of their contents, and demand that such as were manifestly in direct violation [of] instructions be returned to Budapest and then to charge Roumania on her reparation claims for everything discovered. In addition to this a list could be made of what Hungary had in the beginning and the Roumanians be held responsible for what was missing. An endeavor will be made to assign three officers from French and Italian detachments to that duty at once. Last night I entertained the Roumanian officials on a beautiful friendly footing, but their policy up to date has not changed one iota. It is understood that the courier service which has just been started is to be abolished. It would be of great advantage if a dependable courier service could at once be established.

BANDHOLTZ

¹⁸ See HD-35, minute 4, [vol. VII, p. 774](#).[🔗]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/33: Telegram

[Document 274]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 22, 1919.
[Received August 22—11:50 p.m.]

21. This afternoon I personally investigated in a few of the complaints concerning Roumanian seizures, etc., and found them to be true. I then called upon Roumanian General Rudeanu, told him I had found his people were now removing 4,000 telephone instruments from private houses and were about to take the remaining half of the supplies of Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs which they had not taken in first requisition, that they were seizing the few remaining Hungarian breeding stallions, that they had sent word to the Ministry of Agriculture to deliver them all maps, instruments, etc., and that I could give him only too many instances of like character. I told him that his Government had repeatedly promised to carry out the Mission's instructions but that I had been here 12 days during which Roumanians had continued their seizures and had not returned a single thing despite their repeated promises. I added that we were all most anxious to cooperate but that I should like for once to telegraph my superiors that the Roumanians had shown any indication of an intention to play the game according to rule. He replied that in my place he would feel as I do, that he would confer with his colleagues tonight and would tomorrow let us know whether or not the Roumanian Government really intended to stop requisitioning and to return any property already seized. All of which [looks] like an admission they had all along intended to pursue the even tenor of their way regardless of the wishes of the Supreme Council.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/37: Telegram

[Document 275]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 23, 1919.
[Received August 23—9:45 p.m.]

22. Roumanian Commissioner Diamandi and General Rudeanu appeared before Interallied Military Mission, Italian representative presiding, 20 minutes late this morning. Diamandi said he had received instructions from his Government, that they desired to work in accord with Allies, that we must consider deplorable transportation condition in Roumania, that Roumanians found much of their own material here in Hungary showing a few first aid packets, etc., as proof, that Roumanian property thus found must naturally be subject to their unqualified seizure, that seizures would be limited to strict necessity but they must beg Conference to allow them to seize an additional 30 percent to fill up places in Roumania pillaged by the Huns, that Roumania had 1,200 locomotives at beginning of war and now had only 60, that it would be difficult to furnish a list of material seized in Hungary, that they could pay for seized automobiles, etc., with bonds as did the Central Powers, that they wanted to know who would guarantee their getting their share after they left Hungary, that it would be better to leave property in the hands of truthful allies than in the hands of an enemy who never kept any promise, and much similar persiflage. I stated in the presence of the Roumanians, to the Mission, that on three separate occasions the Roumanians had faithfully promised to carry out our instructions, that right up to the present time their seizures were continuing, they had returned nothing, they had made no progress reports as promised, that they had done practically nothing towards organizing a police, and that I personally wanted tangible proof that they were working in the complete accord they talked so much about. Diamandi said he could say no more than he had said and that any

questions put to him would have to be referred to Bucharest. This is his unvarying attitude and it always takes a minimum of 4 days for such action. This M. Diamandi has always been in the diplomatic service having served in Paris, Vienna, Berlin and elsewhere and was Minister to Russia when the Bolshevist regime started. He typifies the Roumanian policy of procrastination with a view to the complete draining of Hungary before they can be stopped. While the Roumanians were present the telegram was received from M. Clemenceau¹⁹ and they were told the bare fact of the Conference's attitude toward the Archduke. There is considerable evidence that the Roumanians are still striving to scare the Archduke's Government into a separate peace before it dissolves. Action will be taken on telegram this afternoon but inside of an hour after its receipt the Archduke was aware of same and he could have been told only by Roumanians. At this afternoon's session Diamandi will again be called and unless he makes a complete change of front I shall recommend that the Mission telegraph the Supreme Council that, as far as the Roumanians are concerned our time has been wasted and that it is useless to have any more transactions with them unless we have sufficient force to back up our demands.

BANDHOLTZ

¹⁹ Appendix G to HD-36, [vol. VII, p. 803](#).

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/35: Telegram

[Document 276]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 23, 1919.
[Received August 25—12:42 a.m.]

24. At 5 o'clock a copy of M. Clemenceau's telegram of this date^{[20](#)} was sent the Archduke and he was requested to inform this Mission what his intentions were not later than 8 o'clock. The resignations of the Archduke and entire Ministry were received at 8 o'clock. The Ministry was informed that they must organize a government. This because the Mission's instructions prohibit interference with internal affairs. In view of fact that Diamandi said at morning session he could say nothing in addition to what he had already told us the Mission this afternoon decided to telegraph the Supreme Council^{[21](#)} a statement of Diamandi's remarks and to add in effect that up to date so far as the Roumanians were concerned this Mission's time had been wasted and that it would be useless to continue its relations with a Government which continues a reprehensible policy of procrastination and which had repeatedly broken promises.

BANDHOLTZ

^{[20](#)} Appendix G to HD—36, [vol. VII, p. 803](#) [↗](#).

^{[21](#)} For text of telegram, see No. 180, contained in appendix B to HD—38, [ibid., p. 855](#) [↗](#).

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/42: Telegram

[Document 277]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 24, 1919.
[Received August 25—1:50 a.m.]

25. Up to noon today no further developments in Archducal situation. Yesterday afternoon after learning that Mission was not going to send for them again, Diamandi and General Rudeanu called upon British Admiral Troubridge apparently considerably discouraged. In my opinion the former was sent to Budapest to pull off a coup in the way of forcing Hungary to make separate peace with Roumania practically along lines of annexation. In this connection it is reported but not yet confirmed that on August 21st Roumanian Crown Prince as future King of Hungary gave audience to a number of Hungarian aristocrats. Unofficial ultimatum handed Archduke and sent through Ardeli the former Roumanian Minister to Hungary was unquestionably an act of Roumanian Government intended to scare Archduke into accepting their terms. Diamandi expressed to Admiral a desire to leave here soon as possible and he evidently follows [*fears*] that his diplomatic record has been smirched by Supreme Council's action in practically into force [*forcing*] Archduke to resign. There now remains to Roumanians only the thorough loot of Hungary which is going on systematically. I shall endeavor to send later today a telegram giving many of more glaring instances of this systematic looting, in case it may be desirable to give same to the press. A Roumanian naval officer had been sent to take over entire Hungarian river flotilla and he is likewise on verge of collapse due to fact that same is in Admiral Troubridge's hands. I have had the situation west of Danube investigated and find that Hungarians have still about 8,000 troops in that territory under Admiral Horthy whose force is well armed, has machine guns and artillery, is in a good condition of discipline, and is now formed into one division but

has enough officers for two more divisions. His headquarters are at Siofok about 110 kilometers from Budapest by railroad. This force is composed mostly of peasants with practically no Communists or Socialists. It is divided into three groups with one group headquarters at Szombathely, another at Dombovar and a third at Siofok. There are still some White Guard troops at Szegedin but mostly officers. In and around Budapest I am reliably informed there are at least 100,000 concealed arms that belong to the Reds: in the Csepel factory district alone there are 40,000 arms of which the Roumanians [got only 2,000. I have had instances reported in which the Roumanians] for small cash payments returned bolshevist arms. Despite their promises to the contrary and their denial that they have gone west of the Danube, the Roumanians at Veszprem just the other day removed and interned elsewhere all the Hungarian officers and noncommissioned officers in that place, and they undoubtedly intend to clean out as much of west Hungary as possible. Last night in drafting the telegram from the Mission to the Supreme Council²² the British representative and myself insisted that there be incorporated therein a statement to the effect that it was the opinion of the Mission that so far as the Roumanians were concerned the time of this Mission had up to date been lost and it would be useless to continue its relations with Roumanian officials who were continuing their policy of procrastination and who had repeatedly broken their promises. The French representative said he would draft this telegram but when submitted it did not contain the above statement. I was then asked to draft it in English which I did and it was translated in French for the telegram. However we found that French interpreter had changed the original French interpretation into what he called better French and had again left out the statement upon which we had insisted. The original French translation of my draft was finally turned over to General Mombelli, the President of the Day, for incorporation in the Mission's telegram. The foregoing has been read by General Gorton who concurs in same and requests that a copy be furnished the British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

²² See telegram No. 180, contained in appendix B to HD-38, [vol. VII, p. 855](#)²².

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/43: Telegram

[Document 278]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 24, 1919.
[Received August 25—1:20 a.m.]

26. The following instances of Roumanian requisitions and seizures are given for your information. August 17th all of the typewriters of the Underwood Agency, about 20, were seized. August 18th 30 carloads of wool, the property of the Hungarian Wool Trust were shipped [out] of Budapest. August 18th the Hungarian Minister of Hygiene reported the seizure of all their supplies by Roumanian officials. August 21st there was seized 63 carloads of coal which belonged to the Municipal Water Plant of Budapest. August 21st there was seized 110 race horses at the Alge Farm. These were the property of private individuals. August 22nd all of the machinery of the Hungarian state shops was dismantled resulting in 6,000 men being out of work. August 22nd a demand was made on the Minister of Agriculture for topographical charts, instruments, etc., stating that if they were not delivered same would be taken by force of arms. August 22nd the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that the Roumanians had requisitioned all of the valuable breeding animals on the three Hungarian state stud farms. On August 23rd 50 percent of all the material of the Ganz-Danubius Company, Limited, a large building concern, was taken, throwing out of employment over 4,300 persons. August 22nd there was being loaded the remaining half of the supplies of the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, the other half having been previously taken about August 10th. On August 22nd mechanics were being sent around to remove 4,000 telephones from private houses.

All of the foregoing occurred subsequent to the promise of the Roumanians that they would comply with instructions of the

Interallied Mission. Many delicate instruments were thrown into boxes and other receptacles in such a careless manner that they could never be of use to anybody. Many other similar instances occurred during the period indicated. As near as can be now estimated the Roumanians have seized about 60 percent of all Hungarian locomotives in good condition, 95 percent of all passenger equipment and about 5,000 freight cars.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/58

[Document 279]

***The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander
in Chief of the Roumanian Forces***

BUDAPEST, August 25, 1919.

Subject: Intentions of the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief in regard to operations in Hungary west of the Danube.

1. At a recent session of this mission your Excellency stated that the Roumanian Forces were not invading or occupying Hungary west of the Danube, but had sent thereto only contact patrols.
2. Information has now been received that Roumanian Forces stationed at Veszprem had ordered that all the Hungarian officers and sub-officers at the place be sent to Szekesfehervar and there interned. It was also learned that Roumanian troops had entered the city of Szombathely and were occupying a portion of same, in addition to which it has been learned that your troops in the town of Gyor had seized all the automobiles. Your excellency's attention is invited to the fact that none of these acts could have been performed by contact patrols, and it is requested that your Excellency inform the Interallied Military Mission by letter with the least practicable delay, as to the intentions of the Roumanian Government in regard to Hungarian territory west of the Danube.

PRESIDENT OF THE DAY

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/46: Telegram

[Document 280]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 25, 1919.
[Received August 26—3:04 p.m.]

28. The Roumanian attitude continues unchanged. The only improvement in the situation since my arrival is that some foodstuffs are being allowed to enter Budapest.

The Roumanians are believed to be planning to leave suddenly, just as soon as their loot appetite is satisfied. In the meantime every move they make [is] in the direction of turning Hungary over to bolshevism and chaos. General Holban in Budapest promised a week ago to arm at once 4,000 police with revolvers and sabres, but instead of this, and in marked defiance of this Mission's expressed request to keep all Roumanian troops east of the Danube, except the Budapest garrison, he is understood to be planning to overrun all Hungary and to disarm or destroy Admiral Horthy's small Hungarian nucleus, which is distributed as per my No. 25 of yesterday and which is the only defense Hungary would have against bolshevism in case of a sudden Roumanian evacuation.

Yesterday, Sunday afternoon, I visited the state machine shops and found the Roumanians had 135 carloads of machinery and material awaiting shipment and over 25 cars about to be loaded. I saw the places in the shops from which machinery had just been removed with some machinery about to be run out. The Roumanians oblige the Hungarian workmen to do the removing and were at it until 4 o'clock Sunday afternoon. This shop turns out work on the so-called chain system, so that the removal of a few pieces of machinery results in a complete shutdown.

The Archduke's successor has not yet been selected. Two delegations, one representing the small farmers and the other the industrial workers, wanted to see the Mission to demand suitable representation in the new government. All other delegations [*Another delegation*] calling themselves Christian Socialists came to protest against the Archduke's removal saying it meant turning over the country to the Jews and that Budapest should be called Judapest. They were all told that this Mission cannot mix in the internal affairs of Hungary.

Today's session of the Mission was practically routine, except that the British officer sent to inspect trains going to Roumania over the Szolnok Bridge reported the bridge will not be repaired inside of 2 or 3 weeks, but that he saw all ready to cross the bridge 150 locomotives, 200 to 300 empty freight cars, 4 aeroplanes on cars, 200 to 300 carloads of military supplies, 300 tank cars, and between Szolnok and Budapest many hundreds of carloads of merchandise.

It is regretted that it was necessary to send your No. 6 telegram^{[23](#)} and instructions contained therein will be complied with.

BANDHOLTZ

^{[23](#)} Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/48: Telegram

[Document 281]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 26, 1919.
[Received August 27—11 a.m.]

29. From two sources have received information that Roumania's attitude is due Prime Minister, who is striving to ensure victory his party in fall elections by display rich spoils of war from Hungary. To prevent anarchy in case of precipitate Roumanian evacuation of all Hungary, it is of prime importance that the Roumanians permit the immediate reorganization and arming of the municipal police, that they release interned Hungarian officers and that they stay east of the Danube. No government has yet been formed, but this Mission is daily besieged by delegations demanding suitable representation in the ministry, to all of whom is given the stereotyped reply that we cannot mix in the internal affairs of Hungary.

The anti-Semitic question is getting rather serious; reports were received yesterday that many Jews had been beaten in the streets of the city. Most of the petitions received insist that there be no Jews in the government.

Telegram No. 10^{[24](#)} received and copies furnished my colleagues.

Receipt acknowledged of No. 8.^{[25](#)}

BANDHOLTZ

^{[24](#)} No. 10 of August 25, 11 p.m., transmitted copy of telegram of same date from Supreme Council to Roumanian Government; for text of

telegram to Roumanian Government, see appendix C to HD-38, [vol. VII, p. 857](#)²⁵.

²⁵ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/52: Telegram

[Document 282]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 27, 1919.
[Received August 30—4:18 p.m.]

30. Owing to the fact that the Mission can have practically no relations with the Roumanian Commander in Chief until the Roumanians change their methods of procedure there can be very little done at the Mission's daily sessions beyond going over petitions and attending to similar business. Yesterday afternoon I was informed by a British press representative who was an eyewitness of the occurrence, that the Archduke and the Prime Minister Friedrich, who is now supposed to be reorganizing the Government, came to the press office in the Hotel Ritz and stated that a telegram had been received from M. Clemenceau practically recognizing the existing Government, by directing that three plenipotentiaries be sent to the Peace Conference to represent Hungary. He also reported that M. Friedrich later made public announcement of same in front of his house to an assembly of railroad employees and others. I told the correspondent that this Mission as yet had received no information of anything of the kind. The political situation in Hungary is daily becoming more acute. Friedrich is undoubtedly organizing a cabinet which would [*will be?*] entirely dominated by him and he is himself a tool of the Archduke. At the time of the Karolyi government all political parties except the Socialist were practically disrupted. They still exist in name but are lacking in organization. It is understood that Friedrich is the reorganizer of the so-called Christian Socialists who has [*which as*] previously stated is mainly anti-Semitic. This party according to best available information never had a representation of over 5 or 10 percent in the Hungarian Parliament but it is flooding members of the Mission with telegrams from all parts of country all worded alike and apparently all written by the

same person. Reports are that Friedrich is spreading rumors that the Entente has no troops without [*with*] which to enforce its demands except the Roumanians who are acting independently and that therefore it is up to Hungary to make settlement with the Roumanians, his own ultimate desire being the restoration of the Hapsburgs. The Roumanians have seized all the paper in Budapest and allow it to be issued only to the organs of organized parties. As a result only Friedrich's special pets will get paper and be able to turn out propaganda. A report was given me today that Friedrich is determined to proceed with the organization of a figurehead government and that he is planning to have disorders take place mainly in the way of Jew killing in case he is ousted. Individuals and others have approached me and are believed to have approached the other members of the Mission, asking for advice and assistance but he has [*have*] been invariably turned away with the information that members of the Mission cannot mix in the internal affairs of the country. At the present rate of progress and under present plan of procedure it is difficult to tell when any kind of a government will be organized. The number of unemployed as result of loss of machinery, etc., is rapidly swelling, and the situation is daily becoming more critical. In the meantime the Roumanians are continuing in their arrogance and systematic looting, and the Allied and Associated Powers are as a result losing in prestige.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/53: Telegram

[Document 283]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 27, 1919.
[Received August 30—6 p.m.]

31. Unsolicited reports of Roumanian seizures received this date contain the following: August 16th, Roumanians seized 106 additional passenger coaches. August 17th Roumanians seized 24 locomotives and 74 passenger, baggage and post cars. August 17th and 18th Roumanians forced the doors of the War Ministry, a great [removed] many articles such as theodolites, telescopes, cameras, typewriters, telephones and maps. On August 18th Roumanians seized from the estate of Ligetpuszta, county of Pest, cattle to the value of 700,000 kronen leaving 20,000 kronen in payment. On August 18th Roumanians seized from the Austrian firm Erste Osterreichische, Jute Spinnereinen und Webereinen 140,000 new flour bags all property of Austrian Government. August 18th Roumanians took from the factory of the Siemens-Schuckert Works Company 375 coils of insulated and other wire. August 19th machinery of the Hungarian ammunition factory valued at 10 million kronen was dismantled and removed. August 22nd the Roumanians were dismantling and removing the machinery of the Hungarian munitions factory. August 23rd the Roumanians removed from the Hungarian General Engineering Works 8 cars of aeroplanes, 6 carloads of material and half-finished goods, and also removed hydroplanes from station at Csepel despite the protest of the Commander of the Danube that such planes were for the use of the Allied forces. August 23rd the Roumanians removed from the state stud farm at Szekesfehervar 120 stallions. All of the breeding horses at Kisber have been loaded. All the stud animals at Babolna have been seized. August 23rd the Roumanians removed from the stores of the Ministry of Posts 1 million crowns' worth of machinery, tools

and uniforms. August 23rd the Roumanians removed without authority and without giving any receipt from the Ericsson-Hungarian Electric Company over 220,000 crowns' worth of electrical apparatus and material. August 24th the Roumanians removed from the estates of Count Julius Andrassy 1,500 hectolitres of wines and a great number of horses, oxen, sheep and farm implements.

This afternoon accompanied by General Gorton, the British representative, I visited several places in the city of Budapest and found the following: at warehouses of the Hungarian Discount and Exchange Bank I found that up to date the Roumanians had already seized there 2,448 carloads of miscellaneous molds [*goods*] and were carting part away each day. At the central depot of the Hungarian Posts and Telegraphs we found 7 cars already loaded, 2 with shoes and the rest with rugs, and 2 cars of uniforms had just been removed from the yard. They were also busy at the time preparing to remove machinery from the repair shop. At this place a Roumanian named V. Forrescj was in the charge of the work of removing the machinery. At the works of the Ganz-Danubius Company we found the Roumanians busily engaged loading 5 freight cars with material. At this place the Roumanian Lieutenant Vaude Stanescu was in charge of the work of removal. At Hungarian Military Hospital Number 1 we found the Roumanians had given orders that same be evacuated inside of 2 days by all patients. The Hungarians had removed all except 57 seriously wounded cases, which it was dangerous to remove. At the Hungarian central sanitary depot we found that the Roumanians had removed 132 carloads of material and saw them busily engaged in stripping the rest of the buildings. The Hungarian officer who had been sent there to take inventory of the goods removed had been ejected from the grounds. The Roumanian Major C. Georgescu was here in charge of the work of removal. In all cases where it is said Roumanians were removing it is meant the Hungarian prisoners were doing the work under Roumanian guards and supervision. If the Roumanians continue at the present rate they will soon leave Hungary as a charge upon the Allies instead of in a condition to pay any indemnity. General Gorton concurs in the foregoing and requests that a copy be furnished the British Mission.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/55: Telegram

[Document 284]

***General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***

BUDAPEST, August 28, 1919.

[Received August 30—2:23 p.m.]

33. Someone certainly backing Roumania. I believe it is Italy in effort to isolate Jugoslavs.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/62

[Document 285]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 29, 1919.

1. It is inconceivable that the Roumanians could continue as they have been doing were they not backed by somebody. One of the most prominent of the Roumanian Generals, after a good dinner on the evening of the 26th of August, stated to an American officer in effect that the whole trouble was due to the fact that two of the nations represented on the Interallied Military Mission were playing at International politics. This leaves no question as to which two were referred to.
2. The attitude of the Jugo-Slav plenipotentiary shows conclusively that he fears a combination of Italy, Austria, Hungary and Roumania, which would geographically, tactically, and in nearly every other way separate the Jugo-Slavs from the rest of Europe. The attitude of both the French and the Italian representatives at meetings of the Mission is peculiar and at times erratic. Frequently they apparently take opposing sides, but eventually get together. If for any reason it is apparently advisable in their opinion to retard progress they will combine and get into gesticulatory arguments in machine gun French, and it is impossible without being rude to check them.
3. At yesterday's meeting (August 28th, 1919) there was the strongest kind of evidence before us to indicate that Friedrich intended to remain at the head of the new Government, and that he was organizing a ministry which would practically be a continuation of the Archduke's cabinet. We had also received word that Friedrich had been disseminating information that he was in direct touch with the Peace Conference and among other things had stated that M. Clemenceau telegraphed him directing that three Hungarian plenipotentiaries be sent immediately to the Peace Conference. In

addition it was not certain in my mind that Friedrich when he had been called before the Mission at the time of the Archduke's resignation, had not misunderstood the Mission's intention and construed what was said to him as a suggestion to do just what he is now understood to have done. At the meeting in question, Friedrich, a Hungarian, spoke in German which was interpreted into French by an Italian Officer and then into English by a French Officer, this leaving so many channels of interpretation that some mistakes were inevitable. I recommended that M. Friedrich be invited to come before the Mission, accompanied by several members of the Cabinet, belonging to other parties, so that there would be plenty of witnesses, and that he be asked whether or not he had given out press reports in regard to sending Hungarian plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference, whether or not he had ever received word from the Supreme Council that they desired him to continue at the head of the Government, and also as to what his understanding was of the instructions from the Supreme Council as transmitted to him on the occasion of the Archduke's resignation. The British member sided with me, but the other two insisted that all of this should be placed in a telegram and wired to the Peace Conference for instructions. I told them that in my opinion this simply meant a delay of two or more days and that every day meant the loss to the Allies of millions of dollars worth of property looted by the Roumanians. As fast as any argument could be advanced they beat around the bush and introduced irrelevant subjects. I told them that this Mission would be responsible for any delays which could be avoided by intelligent action on its part, and if this Mission as such insisted on a policy of procrastination it left me no alternative but to inform my Government, and that in many matters I would necessarily be left to individual action. They immediately changed front, agreed to send for Friedrich, wrote out the questions to be propounded to him, and sent for him; but before he arrived we received his official communication announcing the formation of the new Government so that the whole affair lost any significance except as indicative of the occasional attitude of the Latin members of the Mission. The foregoing is not to be interpreted as indicating that there are any brawls at the Mission's meetings, because our relations are most amicable and the proceedings harmonious.

4. General Graziani yesterday read to us M. Clemenceau's reply to his message that he was not to be permanent chairman of this Mission.²⁶ The message was to the effect that M. Clemenceau had no objection to daily rotation in chairmanship. As matters stand, 50% of the meetings are presided over by the American and British representatives, and several times as much progress is made as would otherwise have resulted. A rumor is current today that M. Friedrich is inclined to accept the last unofficial ultimatum from Roumania which was sent you in code on the night of the 27th of August 1919,²⁷ and which in brief was: Roumanian occupation of Hungary for one year, cession by Hungary to Roumania of all strategic points, eventually the political union of the two countries, and several other points. I am forwarding reports of many rumors as received, not because they can be always verified, but because taken in connection with other information in your possession they might clear up a few otherwise obscure points.
5. I have been entertaining Roumanians, French, Italians and British to the limit and my personal relations with all of them are satisfactory, with the possible exceptions of the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief, Mardaescu, and the Roumanian Commander in the city of Budapest, Holban, who are such infernal liars that it is difficult to be patient. They have had the nerve to say that the Roumanian forces have seized nothing which was not necessary to their field operations, and all this while being confronted with proof that heavy machinery, out of machine shops, Gobelin tapestries, rugs, carpets, delicate scientific instruments, etc., were being seized in vast quantities.
6. In my telegram of yesterday²⁸ I called attention to the advisability of promptly recognizing a government of some form or other in Hungary at the earliest possible date because the Roumanians invariably advance the argument in justification of their looting that whatever they do is in enemy country. Whenever it is replied to them that it is not a question of taking what belongs to the enemy, but of really robbing the other Allies, when they are taking Hungarian assets, they always immediately change the subject and start in on other subjects, but invariably with their beautiful sophistry. I greatly doubt if it will be possible in this country to carry on an election which could express the will of the people.

7. As matters stand this Mission will be unable to accomplish a single thing unless backed by something stronger than telegrams to the Roumanian Government. It looks as though these telegraphic ultimata were accompanied by an explanation through other channels that the sting is to be removed before being applied. In any event they seem to have about as much effect as a milk poultice on a wooden leg. It is needless to add that the Roumanians are continuing as heretofore their systematic looting. So far they have disregarded practically every request sent them by this Mission, which is not only humiliating, but naturally results in the Hungarians beginning to lose all hope of assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.
8. I must again invite attention to the fact that in a little over a week my entire staff except myself and a few enlisted men will be obliged to leave Budapest, and that it will be impossible to accomplish much without a few officers and a good stenographer. The detachment could be reduced to about twelve men, but that would be the minimum. If it is intended that this Mission continue its sessions, it is urgently requested that either my present staff be authorized to remain or that their substitutes be sent immediately.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ

²⁶ For discussion by the Supreme Council of the question of the chairmanship, see HD-38, minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 836](#) .

²⁷ Telegram No. 34 not printed.

²⁸ No. 35¹/₂, not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/61: Telegram

[Document 286]

The Interallied Military Mission to the Supreme Council

[Translation]

BUDAPEST, August 29, 1919.

215. A telegram received yesterday by a member of the Mission inquires why, if the Mission considers that the Hungarian army is reduced to the effectives stipulated by the Armistice of November 13, the Supreme Council has not been advised of it; the telegram adds that the Supreme Council can not exact the withdrawal of the Rumanian army behind the line fixed by the Peace Conference until it can prove that all menace of military action on the part of Hungary against her neighbors is removed. Numerous messages sent by the Mission to the Supreme Council have declared that, with the exception of a small contingent, ill-equipped and counting less than 8000 men under the orders of Admiral Horthy, west of the Danube, the Hungarian army as an army has ceased to exist, and that the Rumanian forces have not evacuated Hungary because their presence is necessary until a Hungarian army sufficiently strong to maintain order in the interior can be organized. As the messages in question may have been ambiguous or inaccurately interpreted we wish to add now that, in the opinion of the Mission, the Hungarian army has for some time been reduced below the effectives mentioned in the armistice of November 13.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/60: Telegram

[Document 287]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 29, 1919.

[Received August 31—3:30 p.m.]

35A. At the session of the Mission this date a letter was received from the Roumanian General Rudeanu, in which he advanced the proposition for the Roumanians to hold their present line west of the Danube. As this covers most of Hungary and there was no reason for such action the Mission replied that in their opinion the Roumanians should immediately evacuate all of the country west of the Danube except a bridgehead at Budapest which would be ample to protect them from any possible attacks. Beyond transacting considerable routine business there was nothing else of note that occurred at today's session.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/64: Telegram

[Document 288]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 30, 1919.
[Received August 31—6 p.m.]

37. Friedrich today noon told one of my agents that unless the Entente had the plundering of Hungary stopped he would inside of 48 hours make peace with Roumania on her own terms as Hungary is prostrate and has lost all hope of any assistance from the Entente. General Gorton requests repetition to British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/69

[Document 289]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, August 31, 1919.
[Received September 4.]

1. There is enclosed herewith copy of Memorandum which was submitted this date for consideration by the Interallied Military Mission and which it was decided to hold in reserve pending notification of the reply of the Roumanians to the last ultimatum of the Supreme Council.²⁹
2. There are almost daily occurrences which might be construed as Roumanian hostility towards Americans, but which I think are really due to ignorance or stupidity. There is enclosed herewith copy of another letter³⁰ I have just sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief in regard to one of such occurrences.
3. On the 29th of August the Roumanian Plenipotentiary, Mr. Diamandi, went to see Admiral Troubridge, of whom previous mention has been made as being the British Naval Officer in Command of the Danube, and after the usual preamble told him in the course of the conversation that the Roumanians had now abandoned the idea of establishing a Dual Empire by uniting Hungary and Roumania, thereby admitting that they had been working along those lines.
4. Referring to the Roumanian ultimatum to the Friedrich Government, contained in my code telegram Number 34,³⁰ this was again the work of that Ardeli whom I have previously mentioned as having been the former Roumanian Minister to Hungary. He arrived here about the same time as M. Diamandi and on account of his acquaintance with prominent Hungarians, they have been using him to turn out these various ultimatums, knowing well that they could deny them as being official, and yet at

the same time in the eyes of the Hungarians they would have an official aspect.

5. Yesterday I telegraphed in code, Number 37,³¹ that Friedrich, the Prime Minister, had told one of my agents that he expected to make peace with Roumania inside of 48 or 72 hours, giving as his reason that Hungary was absolutely prostrate, completely at the mercy of her enemies, and that the Entente was unable to control the situation or even to alleviate conditions. A few hours after sending this by code I learned that Friedrich had been to see Admiral Troubridge and repeated to him practically the same conversation that he had with my agent.
6. As I understand the situation, there is no reason to sympathize with Hungary because when left to her own devices she was doing to herself through Bolshevism what the Roumanians are doing through an invading enemy. From what experience I have had here I should say that, given the same opportunity and the same motive as the Roumanians, the Hungarians would lie just as fluently as the former. On the other hand, I have yet to find in a single case I have investigated of Roumanian looting, any exaggeration in the Hungarian reports.
7. The tendency of the present Government under Friedrich is most reactionary in character. For a while they contented themselves with beating the Jews in the streets, but during the last few days we have reliable information that many prominent and wealthy men have been hung or shot in outlying towns. Friedrich's powerful minority which now controls the country, threatens to start a reign of terror not greatly dissimilar to that of Bela Kun.
8. The Archduke Josef in a recent talk with General Mombelli stated that in Hungary 80% of the people wanted the re-establishment of a Monarchy, that of those 80% a large number wanted to [sic] return of King Karl, and then modestly added that, however, a majority of the 80% wanted him (Josef) to be their King.
9. The Roumanians continue their looting and sacking of the country and we have had no intimation from any of them that their Government has yet received the Peace Conference's last ultimatum. I am telegraphing today³³ my opinion that it might hearten the Hungarians somewhat if they were given the text of that ultimatum so that they could understand that they were not

entirely forgotten and abandoned. As matters now stand, the Mission can accomplish nothing in carrying out its instructions until the Roumanians make a complete change of front.

10. It is my opinion that all this Roumanian pretense of enmity towards the Archduke and Friedrich is simply to disguise the fact that they know that through either of them they can practically do whatever they see fit. I am not sure that Friedrich is not in their pay although I have nothing but my own suspicions to go by. As previously stated in one of my reports, even the Roumanians sometimes inadvertently admit that two nations represented on this Mission are playing politics with them. Both the French and Italian representatives are on most amicable and cordial relations with me, but I think they put on too strong a camouflage of frankness in regard to certain matters to cover what they are doing along other lines. Of course it is apparent that the Italians would like to form a chain of nations cutting off the Jugo-Slavs. What the French are after is not so apparent unless it is commercial concessions and trade. Nobody seems to be able to think of any economic pressure that could be brought upon Roumania. She puts forward a strong plea of poverty, but on the other hand she will have replaced from Hungary everything she lost through the invasion of her own country, and then some, and in addition, I understand, she is having a banner crop.
11. Word has reached me that Lovacsy, who was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, has made up another Cabinet and proposes to try some time today, or very shortly, to oust the Friedrich Ministry.
12. In a few days I shall be obliged to return all of my officers and all but six of my men to Paris for demobilization. This will leave me badly handicapped. Many of the men are desirous of enlisting in the regular service. All of the officers desire to remain if they can do so, and 2nd Lieut. L. M. Hamilton desires a provisional regular army commission.
13. As the courier is waiting, this has been dashed off in a hurry and I realize, is very disconnected and rambling.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ

[Enclosure]

Memorandum to the Interallied Military Mission

BUDAPEST, August 30, 1919.

Subject: Results accomplished by Mission since its organization.

1. This is the eighteenth day since the entire membership of the Mission has been present in Budapest, and unfortunately it must be said that but for one or two negligible exceptions practically nothing has been accomplished by the Mission as regards the carrying out of the instructions given it by the Supreme Council. As this has been entirely due to the action of the Roumanian officials in practically ignoring the Mission, in declining to accept the Mission's instructions as authoritative, in utterly disregarding most of the Mission's requests, or may be due to procrastination, it is believed that the time has come when the facts should be presented to the Supreme Council. In substantiation of the foregoing there is presented in chronological order the more important requests made by the Mission to the Roumanian Government and in a parallel column the action taken on same:

REQUESTS MADE ON
THE ROUMANIAN
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
BY THE INTERALLIED
MILITARY MISSION

ACTION TAKEN BY THE ROUMANIAN
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON
REQUESTS OF THE INTERALLIED
MILITARY MISSION

August 12th. The Roumanian Commander-in-Chief by letter was requested to cease requisitioning and removing Hungarian property.

No acknowledgement was ever made of the receipt of this letter.

August 13th. General Holban the Roumanian Commander of the City of Budapest at a session of the Mission promised to divide the country about

On the 10th of August, General Holban having been sent for, appeared before the Mission with a map which was not arranged at all as he had promised, and which he could not at all explain. He finally admitted that he could not have a

Budapest into requisition zones which could be clearly identified, same to be in sectors radiating from Budapest, and every other sector to be exempt from Military requisition.

August 15th. General Holban appeared before the Mission and in reply to question stated that he had in the city of Budapest 15,000 Roumanian troops, of which number 10,000 were in the city proper and 5,000 in the outskirts. He was requested to reverse this order and place 5,000 in the city proper and 10,000 in the outskirts, which he promised to do. He was also asked to immediately proceed with the organization for Budapest of a Municipal Police Force of 6,000 men, which he promised to do.

August 16th. On this date a communication was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Roumanian Forces, of which the following is the substance:

—

As authorized by its instructions from the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, the

map made that could cover the requisition question.

General Holban when he appeared before the Mission on August 19th, stated that he had only 5,000 men in the entire city of Budapest, including its outskirts; this in direct refutation of his previous statement of 15,000. Under the circumstances he agreed to immediately organize 4,000 police for Budapest and report daily progress. On August 26th General Holban reported by letter that they were recruiting only thirty to forty police a day, and it would take four weeks to organize the police force.

On August 16th, M. Diamandi, accompanied by General Mardarescu, appeared before the Mission and stated that they were authorized by their Government to recognize the Interallied Military Mission to Hungary as the authorized representative of the Supreme Council and that they were prepared to carry out its instructions. On August 23rd, M. Diamandi appeared before the Mission and replied for the

Interallied Military Mission for Hungary requests that the following action be taken by the Roumanian Government:

1. (a) Cease at once requisitioning or taking possession of any supplies or property of whatever nature, except in zones authorized by this Mission, and then only of such supplies as may be necessary for the Roumanian Army, and that this Mission be informed as to the kind of supplies which will be considered necessary.

(b) The Roumanian Commander in Chief to furnish without delay a map clearly showing the requisition zones and also indicating thereon the disposition of his troops.

(c) Return at once to its owners all private property now in the possession of the Roumanians such as automobiles, horses, carriages, or any other property of which the ownership is vested in individuals.

Roumanian Government to the letter of August 16th, in which he justified Roumanian seizures, demanded a right on the part of the Roumanians to requisition 30% of all property in Hungary, and to seize all stuff which the Roumanians recognized as having been taken from Roumania; wanted to know who would protect Roumania in case they evacuated Hungary and left the property behind, and in general turned down all of the requests of the Mission of August 16th, stating that he could answer no questions in addition to what he had, and that all such would have to be sent to Bucharest for instructions.

- (d) To arrange for the gradual return to the Hungarian Government of the railroad, post and telegraph systems.
- (e) Make no further requisitions of buildings, stores or real property, and evacuate as rapidly as possible all schools, colleges and buildings of like character.
- (f) Cease at once all shipments of rolling stock or Hungarian property of any kind whatsoever, to or towards Roumania, and stop and return to Budapest any rolling stock or property already enroute or held at outside stations.
- (g) Limit supervision over public or private affairs in the city to such extent as may be approved by this Mission.

2. The Roumanian Government to furnish this Mission not later than August thirty first a complete list of all war material, railway or agricultural material, live stock, or property of any kind whatsoever that has been taken

possession of in
Hungary by Roumanian
Forces.

August 16th. General

Mardaescu, being present at a session of the Mission, was asked to cease operations in Hungary west of the Danube and withdraw his troops except at Budapest, to the east side of the Danube.

August 17th. A letter was sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief requesting that he send a daily report of the progress made in complying with the requests of the Mission contained in letter of the 16.

August 18th. A

communication was sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief, requesting that a Roumanian Liaison officer be in attendance at the Royal Palace during the hours of session of the Mission in case his services might be required.

August 18th. A letter was sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief asking him to attend the

General Mardaescu when present at the session of the Mission on the 16th stated that he had sent no troops west of the Danube except contact patrols which he deemed necessary for the security of his force. It is known positively that the General's statement was not true.

Only one reply was ever received to the Mission's letter of August 16th and this covered only two of the eight points, and in both cases begged the issue, and was in fact a non-compliance with the request.

For two or three days there was a Roumanian Liaison Officer in attendance at the Palace, but he never arrived until after 11: A.M., and on the date of this Memorandum did not show up at all, and towards the last was reporting at 12: Noon, and immediately departing in case there was nothing for him.

General Holban, on August 19th, appeared before the Mission in response to the request for attendance of an authorized representative of the

session of the Mission on the 19th, or send an officer qualified to answer all questions relative to the Mission's letter of the 16th, and in particular in regard to the requisitioning of telegraph and telephone instruments and material from the Directory of Posts and Telegraphs.

Roumanian Commander-in-Chief. General Holban stated, however, that he was authorized to cover only two points; namely the questions of the food supply in the city of Budapest, and the organization of the Municipal Police Force. General Holban was then requested to advise the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief that the Mission desired on the following day to see some Roumanian representative who could cover all the points of the Mission's letter of the 16th. On August 20th, M. Diamandi, accompanied by Generals Mardarescu and Rudeanu, appeared before the Mission, and General Mardarescu, after much dodging of the issue, promised faithfully to comply with the requests contained in the Mission's letter of the 16th. He stated furthermore that his force had made no requisitions that were not necessary for his Army in the field. This is known to be entirely contrary to fact. M. Diamandi also at this time demanded that whenever the Mission have interview on any importance subject with a Hungarian official, that a Roumanian officer be present at the time.

August 19th. A communication was sent to General Holban requesting information as to reported Bolshevist propaganda in Budapest Factories.

No answer ever received.

August 21st. A communication was sent

This was done only once.

to General Holban
requesting that he report
daily through the
Roumanian Liaison
Officer attached to this
Mission, progress in police
reorganization.

August 21st. General
Rudeanu, being present at
a session of the Mission,
was asked to explain the
necessity for the arrest and
internment of Hungarian
officers.

General Rudeanu replied that he would
have the matter investigated, and that
there was no internment, but that they
simply had to report once a week. The
Mission has never received any
information as to the result of General
Rudeanu's investigation and it is known
that Hungarian officials are still being
arrested and interned away from their
homes.

August 28rd. A
communication was sent
to General Holban,
informing him that the
Mission was of the opinion
that the Police Force of
Budapest should consist of
6,000 men and be
organized as rapidly as
possible.

Receipt of this communication was
never acknowledged.

August 28rd. M.
Diamandi and General
Mardaescu were told that
there was no longer any
need for the Roumanians
to make extraordinary
requisitions for their army
in Hungary, because they
had already been here
twenty days and the

Requisitions of all kinds of property have
continued without cessation.

situation must have returned to normal.

August 25th. A communication was sent to the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief stating that in the opinion of the Mission there was no necessity for Roumanian Forces to continue west of the Danube, and requesting information as [to?] what was proposed to be done by the Roumanian authorities in regard to this matter.

August 27th. A communication was sent to General Rudeanu to the effect that it was necessary to have in Hungary an army in addition to the police, that the nucleus for such an army was with Admiral Horthy, that an army could be organized only in territory not occupied by Roumanians, that the Roumanian internment of Hungarian officers was interfering with the organization of the army, that this question was not only important, but urgent, that it would undoubtedly so appear to the Roumanian

No attention ever paid to the communication of the 25th relative to Roumanian troops west of the Danube.

August 29th. Receipt of this letter was acknowledged by General Rudeanu who stated that the present Roumanian line west of the Danube (which extends nearly to Austrian territory) would not be extended, but that it was necessary for the protection of the Roumanian army; that the question of the Hungarian Army should be discussed by the Mission with Roumanian representatives and that when these matters were cleared up the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief would take suitable action as regards personnel and arms.

Commander-in-Chief, and that his opinion on each point was requested.

2. It will be seen from the foregoing that this mission has been unable to make any progress whatever in the performance of the duties expressly assigned to it by the Supreme Council. It is difficult to understand what motive can inspire the Roumanian Government in following its long continued line of conduct, but whether same is due to deliberate intent, to inefficiency of subordinates, or to any other cause, the result is the same. It is recommended that the Military Mission seriously study this matter and consider whether or not it should at an early date telegraph the Supreme Council to the effect that it is the unanimous opinion of the members that a continuation of the Mission at Budapest can result in nothing but humiliation and in a loss of prestige for our Governments.

²⁹ For text of telegram from the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government, August 25, see appendix C to HD-38, [vol. VII, p. 857](#).²⁹

³⁰ Not printed.

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ *Ante*, p. 664 [*Pg. 664 includes portions of [Doc. 287](#), [Doc. 288](#), and [Doc. 289](#)*].

³³ No. 40, not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/76: Telegram

[Document 290]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 2, 1919.
[Received September 2—6:33 p.m.]

46. Agent just returned from Bucharest states government officials there have same attitude towards Hungarian situation as army officers here. Roumanians insist they must be conferred with and have strong voice in settling question of Hungarian Army and all other Hungarian affairs. They maintain stand that their little war with Hungary takes precedence over the big war and that they have a right therefore to indemnify themselves out of Hungary before considering the claims of other allies.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/81: Telegram

[Document 291]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[Extract]

BUDAPEST, September 3, 1919.

[Received September 3—2:50 p.m.]

49. Roumanians from August 25th to September 1st moved across the Csongrad Szentes bridge 84 trains of 3,272 cars including Royal Hungarian train of 14 cars, 45 saloon, and 20 sleeping cars, railway material, war material, seaplanes, cannon, oil tanks, 51 carloads of leather equipment and 30 extra engines, that could be identified. In addition there were 2,460 sealed cars contents unknown. The bridge at Szolnok opened for traffic September 1st, which will accelerate removal of loot.

.....

BANDHOLTZ

***The Prime Minister of the Hungarian Government
(Friedrich) to the Interallied Military Mission***

[Translation]

34

SIRS: The present Government of Hungary, of which we wish to say with pride and satisfaction that it enjoys the absolute confidence of the greater part of the population of the country—finds itself without the necessary support on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers as well as on the part of their representatives. This state of things has created a situation for which we cannot assume responsibility, and it is in consequence of this situation that the Council of Ministers has considered surrendering the power at present in its hands, into the hands of the mandatories of the Powers of the Entente.

Allow us, Gentlemen, to refer first of all to the requisitions of the Roumanian army of occupation, brutally interrupting the continuity of productive labor, leaving hundreds of thousands of workmen without bread. To its great regret, the Government has not been able to provide for the masses of men out of work, seeing that its financial resources are completely exhausted. Moreover, it is obvious that the discontent of the masses who are unable to make a living will increase from day to day and will necessarily lead to outbreaks threatening public order and safety.

We must first of all insist on the fact of the requisitions of the Roumanian Army, striking at the root of the rural economy and depriving the farmers of draught animals, seed, forage and farm implements to such a degree that even the harvest of next year is

jeopardized. Now, if by these requisitions the economic order itself is deprived of the means of production, our country will no longer be able to support the public burdens and the feeding of the population will have to be effected by foreign importation. But as we also lack the financial means, it will be the Powers of the Entente who in the future will have to guarantee alone the public food supply. The stripping of the country of all means of communication by the Roumanian Army makes it impossible to provide the capital with food, coal and wood, so that without effective intervention and urgent measures on the part of the Associated and Allied Powers the Hungarian Government absolutely cannot assume responsibility in this matter.

What especially weighs upon the country is the fact that by reason of the occupation the Government cannot use the public revenues that it would have at its disposal under normal conditions. The collection of taxes and contributions is suspended, the raising of all other public revenues is impossible, because of the difficulties of communication, as well as by reason of the seizure of the service of posts, telegraphs and telephones. Not being able to meet the most urgent expenses, the Government is unable to pay the employees of the State and the public services. It is therefore in absolute need of benevolent aid from the Allied and Associated Powers, in order that the Government may improve its credit, and thereby avail itself of the services of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, and finally put its stamp on the notes of the Bank.

However, the most urgent task is the holding of the elections. All the preliminary arrangements are completed; but so long as the Roumanian occupation lasts the elections can neither be called nor held.

We take the liberty, therefore, to request that by agreement with the command of the Roumanian Royal Army, you will obtain evacuation of that part of the country beyond the demarkation line, as well as consent for the organization of an armed force necessary for the maintenance of order and public security.

According to our faith and belief, the elections will declare in favor of the present Government, that is to say, the new National Assembly will approve all the acts and measures of the Government.

With this absolute conviction, although under such circumstances no government can lay claim to the favor of being recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers, we appeal to the high representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers and beg them to intervene with their Governments in order that the agents of the Entente may enter into relations with this Government which enjoys the full confidence of the country, and that they may give its efforts favorable support, each lending assistance in order that, by the elections of the National Assembly, the country may come into possession of a legitimate government with power to establish a legal State.

We declare therefore, in the name of an overwhelming majority of the Hungarian nation, that if certain political parties at this time absent from the theater of our public life, shall henceforth enjoy the support of the Powers of the Entente and if by this fact it will be impossible for us to live up to the most elementary governmental duties relative to the consolidation of our country; the Government will be obliged to abandon its place and to hand over its power to the Allied and Associated Representatives.

Accept [etc.]

FRIEDRICH

BUDAPEST , September 6, 1919.

[34](#) File translation revised.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/94: Telegram

[Document 293]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 7, 1919.
[Received September 7—1:30 p.m.]

60. The Mission held no session this date. The French representative having left Budapest over Sunday and being unable to locate the Italian representative, General Gorton and undersigned, however, feeling that the matter was important sent Supreme Council following telegram:

“No P 6, August 7th [*No. 6—7 September*], 1919. M. Heinrich requests that the following be communicated to the Supreme Council:

‘I have the honor to inform you that I consider it my duty to resign my mandate to constitute a Cabinet, because it is evident that since I transmitted to you my propositions relative thereto, public opinion is expressing itself with increasing intensity and unanimity in favor of the present Government, formed under the Presidency of Mr. Etienne Friedrich, in such a way that I am forced to consider it impossible that my best-meaning endeavors be crowned with success. In conformity with the situation, I today tendered my mandate to the President of the Council, Mr. Etienne Friedrich, respectively to the Council of Ministers, to again devote my time exclusively to the affairs under my jurisdiction as Minister of Commerce.’

The mandate referred to was communicated to Supreme Council by Interallied Mission in their telegram of September

1st.^{[35](#)} Interallied Mission, Budapest.”

BANDHOLTZ

^{[35](#)} Not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/91: Telegram

[Document 294]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Officer in Charge in General Bandholtz' Absence

PARIS, September 8, 1919.

27. [From Polk.] Please rush following message to General Bandholtz: "Do not be drawn into discussion of diplomatic questions with Roumanian officials. Please telegraph immediately object of your trip." Polk.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/102: Telegram

[Document 295]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 11, 1919.
[Received September 12—1:30 p.m.]

62. As wired you I left for Bucharest on 6th. Your numbers 27 and 28³⁶ reached here on 8th. Reference to 27, I entered into no diplomatic discussion, although there was much heard in justification of Roumanian conduct which was along same lines as that of Roumanian here. I called upon the Prime Minister morning September 9th, he on me same afternoon. On both occasions Chargé d’Affaires present and immediately after each [he] dictated memorandums of same, which we both signed. Copies will be forwarded as soon as possible. There are two phases situation here:

Roumanians show that they are daily becoming more (?) [*irritated*] against American Government and Military Mission have been almost at a standstill since arrival. Intended to wire myself desiring to leave September 9th but September 6th Roumania said [if I could leave] that afternoon, they could push right through and [this] also gave [me] Sunday for travelling. Roumania feels request Military Mission might be quietly [*quickly*] complied with if explained to their higher authority. Also desired [to ascertain] whether growing hostile towards America personally or governmental. Was taken to visit King, then Prime Minister and Minister of War. All told same story, Roumania’s wrongs et cetera, which is told in detail in latest reports [*memorandum*] of Prime Minister’s interview briefly as follows:

Serbia allowed to loot Banat without interference, Serbia received some Danube River monitors while Roumania did not, Roumania not represented on any reparation commission; Roumania class[ed]

with Poland and Czechoslovakia, not treated as independent nation in minority question as embodied in treaty, Roumania at request Peace Conference had gone to war with Hungary thereby annulling armistice November 13 and now Allies trying prevent her having any fruits of victory. These not discussed by me, simply said that Military Mission orders were mandatory, and we were being blocked in carrying them out. Explained necessary preliminary step was Roumanian evacuation Hungary, which required evacuation bank west of Danube River to Ganfield, [*give a field*] for organization Hungarian Army and police, evacuation Budapest and complete evacuation Hungary by zones as might be requested time to time by Military Mission. This evacuation and details thereof only subject. Prime Minister said that he would agree to above if Hungary guaranteed not attack Roumanian security. Told him could only recommend this to colleagues who could only do likewise to Supreme Council. He seemed to accept this favorably, saying, it was all right while he was in power, adding thought another [*successor*] would do likewise. He expected resign almost immediately to avoid personally sign obnoxious treaty. This [*Successor*] will be entirely under his control.

Memorandum my conversation read colleagues. Anti-American sentiment worse Bucharest according Charge d'Affaires than here and can be practically all traced to French influence. French expect dominate Roumania; jealous any commercial or other rivalry in anticipation of which trying to discredit America and American citizens. Nonreceipt of Supreme Council's telegram to French Chargé d'Affaires³⁷ considered diplomatic joke. Prime Minister sent me copy his intended reply (?) me [*; this will be sent?*] to you with memorandum. Charge d'Affaires thought visit had done good; certain[ly] we are on more cordial terms with Roumania. If Roumania does not now quickly begin to play the game, can see no use continue this Mission.

Before leaving Paris mentioned might find advisable go Bucharest. Understood this approved. However, regret have gone without specific permission.

BANDHOLTZ

³⁶ No. 27, *supra*; No. 28 not printed.

³⁷ Appendix C to HD-38, [vol. VII, p. 857](#)³⁷.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/103a: Telegram

[Document 296]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State

PARIS, September 12, 1919—10 p.m.

4183. For the Secretary of War from Polk. General Bandholtz, who is doing most valuable work in Budapest will revert to the rank of Colonel on October 1st. As he is practically standing alone against the Roumanian activities, his reduction in rank would seriously injure his prestige and could not satisfactorily be explained to his colleagues and probably would be misrepresented by his enemies. Would it not be possible for General Bandholtz to continue his rank of Brigadier General until his work is completed? This really is a most important matter for this Government I earnestly hope that you can arrange it. It may be his work will be completed before October 1st, but there is no certainty for that happening. Please do all you can to help us. Polk.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/104: Telegram

[Document 297]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 12, 1919.
[Received September 13—10:30 a.m.]

65. Roumanian requisitions of rolling stock to September 8th include 1,160 passenger coaches, 62 court and special cars, 21 sleeping cars, 16 postal cars, 281 service cars, 15,161 ordinary freight cars, 7,713 flat cars, 1,767 oil tanks, 678 engines, and 289 miscellaneous. Hundreds of Transylvanians who refused to take oath of allegiance of [to] King of Roumania have been deported and are coming to Budapest and vicinity, thereby complicating the supply situation.

At request of Lieutenant Colonel Causey, Roumanian Commander in Chief was requested to turn over Hungarian telegraph line No. 264, so that the Peace Conference might have direct communication with Belgrade. General Mardarescu stated that he referred this matter to his Engineer Officer and would expedite a reply in every way possible.

General Bandholtz's entire procedure while in Bucharest was read his colleagues and met with their unanimous approval. A commission has left this date to investigate the report of the large quantity of Mackensen³⁸ supplies and Roumanian officials asked this date what we intended to do in regard to this question and were told that instructions to the Mission specifically included disposition of Mackensen material and that the Allies would take charge of and be responsible for same. It is reported that the Roumanians are deporting from Budapest to Roumania 1,000 iron workers with the object of making them set up and operate the seized machinery. This is being investigated. Generals Mardarescu and Holban and M. Diamandi appeared before Mission this date, it was understood for

the purpose of farewell call on the Mission, but nothing of kind came up. Several matters were discussed, but nothing settled except question of Mackensen material. Meeting was interrupted to attend review of Roumanian division at which all members of the Mission were present.

Diamandi stated that Roumania had unearthed Koran [*sic*] Hungarian conspiracy against Roumanian Army and Government, that Friedrich, Hungary's Prime Minister, seriously implicated. This being further investigated, probably Roumania will use this as pretext to get rid of Friedrich.

BANDHOLTZ

³⁸ Field Marshal August Mackensen, formerly in command of German forces in Roumania.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/108: Telegram

[Document 298]

General Bandholtz to the Supreme Council

[Translation]

39

BUDAPEST, September 13, 1919.

It appears from positive proofs furnished to the Commission by the Roumanian Command that the Friedrich Cabinet, contrary to the prohibition laid upon it, has encouraged the clandestine creation of a corps of troops at Budapest and suburbs.

The pretext for these measures is to place themselves on guard against Bolshevik movements which might possibly take place.

The Roumanians consider that they have the right to hinder the action of the Friedrich Cabinet; they would take measures including even arrests, but in a general way they would limit themselves to putting military guard over ministries to prevent access to them.

According to them the consequences would be the resignation of the present Cabinet and the possibility of constituting a ministry of coalition favorable to the Allies.

However, the consent of the Commission would be necessary to them and they would have liked to receive an assurance of it this morning, since their departure must soon take place. The Commission could not give the approbation asked for, but will send them before Tuesday a communication on that subject.

BANDHOLTZ

39 File translation revised.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/109: Telegram

[Document 299]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 14, 1919.
[Received September 14—3:30 p.m.]

67. General impression intensified by their own statements that Roumanians intend to leave suddenly. Hungarians think this will be for purpose of having their return requested on account of unsettled condition in which country will be left. Small Interallied detachment due to leave this date to guard Mackensen depot.

My own relations with Roumanians have undergone decided improvement. Unless special instructions are received for his retention I shall probably return Colonel Horowitz to Paris at an early date. Please see my No. 59.^{[40](#)}

If this Mission is [to] remain a month longer and his services can be spared request detail Colonel Raymond Sheldon, believed to be on duty with German prisoners of war, and of Lieut. Colonel Charles B. Moore, Director of Courier Service, Paris, whose services it is understood can be spared.

BANDHOLTZ

^{[40](#)} Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/113: Telegram

[Document 300]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 15, 1919.
[Received September 15—11:15 p.m.]

68. A telegram is being sent this date by the Military Mission⁴¹ to the effect that despite repeated and strenuous efforts of the Mission to start the organization of a police and army to handle the Hungarian situation whenever the Roumanians evacuate, there has been practically [nothing] done to date. This has been [due] almost entirely to the fact that the Roumanians pay no attention to our requests, put stumbling blocks in our way constantly and seem determined to leave Hungary wholly unprepared to handle internal disorder whenever evacuation takes place. The only apparent reason for the Roumanian attitude is their dislike of the Friedrich Cabinet and their determination to overthrow it. On the other hand many believe that it is their intention to leave the country in a condition of chaos so that their immediate return will be requested should they ever withdraw. Our instructions from the Supreme Council cannot be obeyed unless the Mission is enabled to enforce its demands on nations concerned.

French postal authorities have requested Hungarians to reestablish postal relations with them. This is impossible because the Roumanians have seized all the mail cars and the letters for distribution in Hungary itself are being piled up [in] the post offices.

The committee to inspect the Mackensen depot reported this date but found only 2,000 carloads all munitions and no arms.

Roumanians are continuing their seizures and exportations as heretofore and are now dismantling aeroplane factory. Have received

word that Roumanians understand Clarke's^{[42](#)} mission to Bucharest was to deliver an ultimatum to immediately evacuate Hungary and that they have received instructions here practically to leave at once. General Gorton requests that above be repeated to British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

^{[41](#)} Not printed.

^{[42](#)} Sir George Clerk.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/111: Telegram

[Document 301]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 15, 1919.
[Received September 15—11:50 p.m.]

69A [69]. The following telegram has just been received with request that it be forwarded.

“President Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris. The Hungarian Government, in view of the imminent danger which threatens the country on account of Roumania, desires to be placed under the protection of the Supreme Council of Versailles and requests the Supreme Council to make decision to this end as soon as possible. Friedrich MP, President of the Council.”

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/112: Telegram

[Document 302]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 15, 1919.
[Received September 15—11:15 p.m.]

69 [70]. The evening paper, which is the Roumanian organ, announces fall of the Friedrich Cabinet and states a new Cabinet with Perenyi as Prime Minister has been formed and includes Peidl, Garami and others. A member of this Cabinet states that Roumanians have approved of this Cabinet and will return all seized Hungarian property on conditions that treaty of peace is immediately signed and territorial and other concessions made. In case of refusal to sign such treaty the Roumanians will at once evacuate Hungary and leave the country in a state of chaos and disorder. The member referred to was advised to make no move without approval of Supreme Council.

It is not believed there will be disturbances beyond the power of the Hungarians to handle should the Roumanians leave as threatened. Please repeat to British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/116: Telegram

[Document 303]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 16, 1919.
[Received September 16.]

72. The Roumanians are beginning to evacuate portions of Hungary and as they are leaving on their eastward line of march are taking everything they can lay their hands on without offering payment in even the almost worthless white money. They are taking women's rings, children's earrings, the only pair of oxen in a family and each battalion and battery all the livestock and fodder that it is possible to transport.

The Hungarian rolling stock evacuated across the Theiss River to date is as follows:

684 locomotives, 231 saloon and private cars, 946 passenger coaches, 2,900 empty box and flat cars, 1,300 mixed carloads of munitions, 298 cannon, 43 autos, 56 aeroplanes, 1,400 oil tanks, 2,000 carloads railway material and agricultural machinery, 1,435 war material, 4,350 contents not visible; also many miscellaneous making total of 17,319 locomotives and cars. It is reported that another Mackensen depot has been located and committee is being sent to investigate.

Reference my telegram number 70 of yesterday⁴³ Perenyi stated that his government met with the approval of the Roumanian and Italian Governments. This has not been confirmed but there are other rumors to that effect.

Please repeat foregoing to British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

43 *Supra.*

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/119: Telegram

[Document 304]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 17, 1919.
[Received September 18—2:55 p.m.]

75. Despite assurances to the contrary from Roumanian sources latest reports indicate that Roumanians are leaving certain portions of Hungary. Another scheme is on foot for the impoverishment of the Hungarians. During Bolshevist regime 3½ billion kronen of money was printed by them. This is called white money to distinguish it from the former currency which is called blue money and the relative value of the two today by decree is 5 kronens white money for 1 kronen blue money. The French insisted that the Hungarian Government redeem with blue money at par about 300,000 kronens worth of white money in the possession of French subjects and agreed to give a quit claim which understand has been done. The Roumanians then demanded that the Hungarians give them 20 million kronens of blue money for 20 million kronens of white money. In the hope that this would result in getting white money out of the hands of the Roumanians and leave them only blue money with which to make payments this was verbally agreed to. The Roumanians now demand that 50 million kronen of white money be redeemed immediately with 50 millions of blue money and that a total of 150 million white money be redeemed in like manner within 3 weeks. If this is done Hungary will have no funds with which to make any payment for food and other supplies. I laid the matter before the Mission this morning and it was decided to protest to the Roumanian military commander against any such procedure. Radio reports are that Bratiano has resigned as Prime Minister of Roumania. French representative and British representative have each received message from his Commission in reply to the Interallied Military Mission's telegram⁴⁴ relative to Roumanian

[*Hungarian*] request concerning present Ministry. No instructions have yet reached me but it is understood that Clemenceau's to General Graziani was intended for the entire Mission which is acting accordingly.

BANDHOLTZ

⁴⁴ No. 292, September 8, [vol. VII, p. 216](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/123: Telegram

[Document 305]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 18, 1919.
[Received September 18—11:42 p.m.]

77. Reported additional Mackensen supply depots were only abandoned depot sites. Total rolling stock removed across Theiss River by Roumanians to date and noted by our observers is 759 locomotives and 18,495 mixed cars. Hungarians report about 31,000 mixed cars taken since beginning. Roumanians now making additional requisitions for proposed troop movements between 18th and 24th which Hungarians say will leave them only 4,500 cars for 6,000 kilometers of line. It takes 4,000 carloads per diem to feed Budapest alone. Roumanians do not seem to care what happens after they leave. Despite Roumanian statement that their troops are not leaving there have been since 10th instant 21 troop trains eastward bound over Szolnok Bridge and 17 trains carrying one cavalry division over Czongrad Bridge. Nevertheless Roumanian troops still west of Danube with entire regiments at few places. These are so-called contact patrols. Despite Roumanian promise to give rifles to Budapest police, nothing done yet, but on contrary they are now looting the police clothing and other depots and arresting the special policemen. The Mission has requested attendance of Roumanian Commander in Chief at tomorrow's session to answer questions as to whether or not he intends to permit organization of police and as to definite date for promised evacuation of trans-Danubia.

General Gorton requests that copy of foregoing be furnished British Commission.

Mr. Halstead⁴⁵ requested me to instruct Vienna operator to give him copies of Ammission telegrams and was told such instructions or

permission could only come from Ammission.

BANDHOLTZ

⁴⁵ For correspondence concerning the Halstead Mission in German Austria and Hungary, see pp. 528 [*Pg. 528 is part of [Doc. 193](#)*] ff.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/125: Telegram

[Document 306]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 19, 1919.

[Received September 20—1:35 a.m.]

79. General Mardarescu and M. Diamandi attended Mission's session this morning and admitted that two divisions and two cavalry brigades had left Hungary for concentration in the Banat on account of situation. They denied it was beginning of evacuation and promised to notify us whenever evacuation was decided upon. It was agreed to start at once on organization of Hungarian Army of 12,000 and *gendarmerie* of 10,000. Mardarescu promised to deliver to us 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns by 23d instant. Mardarescu asked if true that he had notified Hungarian Government to give him 100 millions kronen of blue money for same sum in white money by 5 o'clock this afternoon or he would revoke decree placing rate at 5 to 1. He stated in reply that some time ago the Hungarians had offered to make the exchange above referred to on condition that they could import 300 million kronen blue money from Vienna.

This was done and then they tried to avoid their part of bargain which he proposed to enforce. Minister of Finance flatly denies any such arrangement ever existed. Question of immediate evacuation west bank of Danube taken up and they promised to look into it alleging a fear that Hungarians might attack them. I told them that on August 25th they had likewise promised to look into this matter, that as matter of fact the Hungarians had nothing to attack them with, and that if there was any danger it would appear to any military man as being safer behind a bridgehead at Budapest and the Danube River than in scattered detachments 50 kilometers to the west. General Gorton and I alone were insistent in this. Some people make Ananias resemble George Washington. Refugees from Transylvania

report that Roumanians have so far deported 30,000 from city Koloszvar including all officials who will not swear royalty [*fealty*], all arrivals since July 1914, and all who have not been residents more than 18 years. Also reported several incipient peasant uprisings. Please furnish copy to British Commission. Mr. Halstead is deluging me with reports of atrocities committed in new Austrian territory by Hungarian White terrorists but all I can do is bring to attention Minister of War.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/119: Telegram

[Document 307]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

PARIS, September 20, 1919—7 p.m.

47. Presumption expressed in last sentence your 75^{[46](#)} is correct. Text of resolution adopted by Supreme Council on September 15th^{[47](#)} follows:

“It was agreed that the following telegram should be sent to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest:

‘We do not intend to interfere at all in the internal affairs of Hungary. Our only wish is the constitution of a stable government if this is possible and to this effect we invite you let the Hungarian authorities know that we desire the speedy constitution of a *gendarmerie* force capable of maintaining order after the withdrawal of the Rumanian army.

We therefore direct you to inform the Rumanian authorities of our intentions and at the same time to invite them in the most categorical way to give every facility so long as they keep Hungarian territory for the formation and armament of this *gendarmerie*.

In no case can there be any question of a loan.”

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{[46](#)} Ante, p. 681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)].

^{[47](#)} See HD-54, minute 5, [vol. VIII, p. 227](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/127: Telegram

[Document 308]

The Interallied Military Mission to the Supreme Council

BUDAPEST, September 20, 1919.

1722. [M2.] Unless there is quickly organized in Hungary some government which is recognized by the Entente the situation will with increasing rapidity as winter approaches get worse. The Military Mission cannot carry out plans for the reorganization of the Hungarian *gendarmerie* and police; for the release of Hungarian prisoners, and for the evacuation of Hungary, with a government which has no standing. Furthermore such a government cannot hold a general election; such a government cannot carry out satisfactory financial transactions as it proposely [*properly*] has no authority to levy or collect taxes; such a government cannot contract for future delivery of fuel and food supplies for the winter without which disorder and dire suffering are certain to ensue; and such a government cannot make a treaty of peace or perform any of the various functions necessary to a sovereign state. At the present rate of progress the Roumanians will continue indefinitely with their occupation and attended [*attendant*] looting [in] which they are daily becoming more expert, the Hungarians are becoming more and more discouraged, and famine, suffering and disorder are approaching. It is recommended that either the Friedrich Cabinet be recognized or that explicit instructions be given them [*as*] to what will be recognized.

The following synopsis of Roumanian seizures and exportations up to noon 18th instant is submitted. Seventy-five percent of east-bound trains are loaded with horses, cattle and forage under escort of Roumanian soldiers. On the 16th a train of 40 cars escorted by Swiss soldiers and intended for the provisioning of Bucharest passed through Szolnok. The Central Goods yard at Budapest is crowded

with trains loading seized property. At Kiskunfelegyhaza, wheat, oats and barley are being seized without leaving sufficient for seed and on the 17th and 18th 754 animals were likewise seized at that place. Waffen und Maschinenfabrik of Budapest reports that up to the 13th 212 carloads of machinery, tools, electric motors to an estimated value of 65 million kronen had been removed from their factory. Total number of engines to include 18th that have crossed Theiss River east-bound is 819 with 19,800 cars of all classes. End number M2.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/58

[Document 309]

The President of the Day, Interallied Military Mission, to General Mardarescu of the Roumanian Army

It was agreed at the Conference on Sept 19th last, at which your Excellency was present, that the Committee of which Colonel Berthon is President should proceed to Siófok to report upon the condition of Admiral Horthy's Army. It was also accepted by your Excellency that if the conclusion of the report should be that Admiral Horthy's Army had neither the intention nor sufficiently organized strength to be a danger to the Royal Roumanian Army, your Excellency would give orders for the withdrawal of all troops in Transdanubia to a bridge head with a radius of 20 Kilometers round Buda.

It is understood that your Excellency intends to leave Budapest on Thursday next, September 25th, and as Colonel Berthon's report can not be received before September 26th, it is requested that your Excellency will either await the report, or will arrange that the General Officer who will be entrusted with the command of your Army during your absence may be invested with authority to order the withdrawal of the troops to the bridge head, should the report referred to give the assurance that there is no danger of an attack by Admiral Horthy's Army.

The Interallied Mission attach the greatest importance to being able to inform the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference that the Royal Roumanian Army has been withdrawn to the bridge head.

R. G[ORTON]

BUDAPEST , September 22, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/139: Telegram

[Document 310]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 23, 1919.
[Received September 26—3:10 p.m.]

86. Chief of Budapest police reports that Roumanians have authorized Socialists to hold meetings today and that with an unarmed police force he will have difficulty in handling them. Mission directed that a letter be sent Roumanian authorities telling them that they will be responsible for anything that happens. The alleged purpose of the meetings is to overthrow the Friedrich Cabinet which their proclamations state has not been recognized by the Entente. Garami is understood to be behind these meetings. The whole thing looks like Roumanian scheme to oust Friedrich. An Under Secretary of the Hungarian War Office was yesterday arrested by the Roumanians for submitting to this Mission a memorandum to the Supreme Council without its having first been censored by the Roumanians. Roumanians started today to remove fire apparatus in Budapest but were stopped by Colonel Yates from this office. Roumanians on 19th promised 10,000 firearms and 40 machine guns to be placed at disposal of this Mission with few days for arming police. They now say the guns must be sent from Roumania which will take a week or two and they are attaching conditions to the distribution of such arms that severely nullify the entire proposition.

BANDHOLTZ

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 23, 1919.
[Received September 30.]

The usual state of uncertainty as to Roumanian intentions is still with us. However, since their bluff was called on the immediate departure threat they have been more reticent on that subject.

On the 25th of August the Roumanians were asked to immediately evacuate Western Hungary and they replied that they would take the matter up at once. On the 19th of September when General Mardarescu and M. Diamandi appeared before the Mission they were reminded of their promise and General Mardarescu made the ridiculous statement that he could not remove his troops from the west bank of the Danube until he was positive that the Hungarians were not going to attack him. I asked him if he could as a soldier state that he actually feared any such action on the part of the Hungarians. I also asked him if he did not know that, if the Hungarians contemplated an attack his present disposition of forces on the west side of the River was dangerous in the extreme as they were dispersed in small detachments which could be quickly and easily cut off, whereas on the other hand if behind the bridgehead of Budapest, and behind the Danube as an insuperable obstacle, they would be safe from any attack.

Prior to the arrival of the Roumanians at the session of the Mission on the 19th, the French and Italian members had each prepared a memorandum of decidedly searching and pertinent questions which they desired to propound to our visitors. As rehearsed to the accompaniment of flashing eyes, resounding diction and much table thumping, these memoranda sounded like a China Sea typhoon

compared to their gentle and zephyr-like delivery when the Roumanians arrived.

In the presence of the Roumanians I insisted that they be called upon to immediately evacuate Transdanubia and in this I was ably seconded by General Gorton. The French and Italian members, however, gave it as their opinion that General Mardarescu should have time to examine into the imaginary danger of Hungarian attack, so the Army Organization Committee, consisting of a French officer and a Roumanian officer with the former as chairman, was directed to investigate and report without delay.

After the Roumanians left I told our two colleagues that I thought we might just as well shut up shop and spend our time in joy-riding as to fritter it away in any more such sessions; that I knew and they knew that all the Roumanians wanted was time to do more looting, and that I proposed to be on record as absolutely opposed to any such ridiculous procrastination. They admitted then that they thought I was right, but that it would be better to put our demands in letter form. They then drafted and sent a letter which will have about as much effect on the Roumanians as a bed-bug bite on a crocodile. It has since been learned that the Roumanians had located an immense deposit of wool in West Hungary which they wished to remove.

At our meeting on the 22nd of September the cat came out of the bag with a loud yowl. I again brought up the subject of the Roumanian delay in evacuating Transdanubia and told my Latin colleagues that I considered that their yielding to the Roumanian's asinine demand that evacuation be deferred until it was shown that there was no danger from a Hungarian attack, made this Mission responsible for a continuation of the present rotten conditions in West Hungary with all of its attendant consequences; adding that there would be considerable delay before the committee sent to investigate could report and asking when the committee would have its report ready. This forced the issue and the French representative admitted that the committee had not yet started and would not start until the 23rd of September. As the start could easily have been made early in the afternoon of the 19th, this caused a delay of nearly five days.

As reports have been received of engagements between Hungarian and Roumanian patrols, General Gorton mentioned that he had an officer who could be spared, and suggested that this officer be sent to remain with the Hungarian Army to avoid as much as possible any of these minor engagements and to immediately investigate them and fix the responsibility whenever they occurred. The French member bitterly opposed this and was carrying on the discussion indefinitely when I suggested that the Committee on Army Organization, of which a French Lieutenant Colonel is chairman, have charge of this investigation also. This he consented to, and then I proposed that the British officer before mentioned, be placed as an additional member on this Army Committee and stated that I would furnish an American officer also, and that really the Committee should assume more of an Interallied aspect. He was obliged to swallow this proposition, and eventually the Italian representative stated that he would send an officer also.

.....

The handling of the Hungarian situation, boiled down, means that nothing can be accomplished until the Roumanians are in some way or other expelled from the country. Their entire conduct is marked by a combination of viciousness and child-like irresponsibility.

Some of the delicate scientific instruments which they have seized were removed from their places in such a manner that they could never again be utilized even had they been immediately restored after having been taken from their fixtures. When they arrive in Roumania they can never be more than so much junk.

A complaint has just been received from the Coal Mines of the Salgotarjan Company, Ltd., that they are practically put out of the production business on account of the Roumanians disarming their *gendarmerie*; the reason for the necessity of *gendarmerie* being that there are so many Bolshevists in the neighborhood who endeavor to influence the miners, that they cannot operate the mines without police protection.

It has been noted that many papers state that the Roumanians when they entered Hungary were received with loud acclaim by the population. On the 8th of August when they entered the city of Godollo the first thing they did was to go to the city treasury and appropriate 2,390,000 crowns. From another town in the vicinity they took 375,000 crowns. In general they interfere with governmental and municipal functions beyond anything ever contemplated by the rules and customs of war.

The situation is bad now, but as cold weather sets in it will be aggravated by the lack of fuel and the Roumanians seem to be unable or unwilling to see the trouble that is coming, or to admit that they can be in any way responsible for the consequences. It is not unlikely that the Roumanians are hanging on so as to leave the Hungarians in such a demoralized condition that they cannot for years to come make a dangerous recovery, and also they may be waiting for cold weather so as to be sure of a safe retreat. General Mardarescu has stated that when the Roumanians retire he will have a strong artillery rearguard and if he is molested he will shell and destroy Budapest and then reoccupy the city. It would be very easy for him, with his wonderful imagination and lack of military sense, to carry out such a program.

The telegram drafted at the Mission's session on the 20th, which was included in my telegram number eighty,⁴⁸ and which was sent to the Supreme Council on the 21st [20th] as the Mission's number M2, is as clear a statement of the situation as I am capable of making. For convenience and reference it is repeated and was as follows:

[Here follows the text of telegram No. 1722 (M2), September 20, from the Interallied Military Mission to the Supreme Council, printed on page 684 [Pg. 684 includes portions of [Doc. 307](#) and [Doc. 308](#).]

It is understood that Sir George Clerk will be here on Tuesday and it is hoped that he will bring news of some change of plan on the part of the Roumanians. As matters stand it looks as though a small third rate power had put over a tremendous bluff on the four great powers of the world. I have endeavored to find some economic pressure which could be brought to bear upon Roumania but have been

unable to locate any. If she were declared to have forfeited her rights as an Ally and could be blockaded and held in a state of non-intercourse with the rest of the world until restitution were made, it would restore some of the lost prestige of the four great powers. As Roumania has violated most of the agreements of the Allies she might also be informed that Transylvania, the Banat and Dobrudja will be taken away from her, all or in part, unless certain conditions are immediately complied with. The Roumanians are very much afraid of the Serbs, and they are not hankering for any brush with the Bulgarians in Dobrudja. They have, however, apparently got themselves so stirred up over the proposition that many minor wrongs have been exaggerated in their minds and they feel that they have received rotten treatment. I refer to the question of having had no monitors given them while several were given to Serbia; of having had no member on the board that investigated looted property in Bulgaria, while Serbia, Greece, Italy, France and other powers were represented; of having the "Minorities" clause thrust into the treaty, and many other things. It must be borne in mind also that for centuries these people, like the Filipinos, were under a foreign oppressor, and were obliged to deal so continually in false-hoods that they have become confirmed liars, and frequently cannot tell the truth when it would be in their interest to do so. If there were such a thing as an order of "Ananias and the Forty Thieves"—I could recommend many Roumanian candidates for decoration.

With reference to the resolution of the Supreme Council which was repeated in your telegram number forty seven, September 20th, it is regretted that this does not help or alter the situation. The Hungarian authorities have known all along that the speedy constitution of a *Gendarmerie* Force capable of maintaining order after the withdrawal of the Roumanian Army, was desired. The Roumanian authorities were informed six weeks ago of the Supreme Council's wishes and intentions in this respect and they were invited and requested repeatedly to afford every facility within their means for the formation and armament of such *gendarmerie*. It is only of late by giving this matter considerable of my personal time and attention and by having Colonel Yates placed in charge of a committee for the organization of the *Gendarmerie* that we have been able to make any progress whatever. The Hungarians are

powerless to do anything without the assistance of the Roumanians and the assistance of the latter has been obstructive rather than constructive.

Now that the Roumanians have ransacked practically all of the public buildings and large establishments in Budapest they have begun to turn their attention to the Royal Palace where the Mission has its offices. On the 17th when I was entering the court-yard, accompanied by Colonel Loree, I found a whole Company of Roumanians, armed with rifles and bayonets, blocking the carriage entrance. Colonel Loree and I expelled them at the point of our riding crops, and I afterwards located the officer in charge and made him apologize for such an intrusion.

I had heard that the Roumanians were lately seizing property and then making the owners ransom it back again, and on the 23rd instant I got a specific case where General Serbescu, the Roumanian Officer in charge of requisitions, had seized furs from a wholesale fur establishment and then allowed the firm to redeem their property on the payment of 1,100,000 crowns. General Serbescu advised them to come up to the Military Mission and have a protest made against the seizure as that would then cover him in the restitution. I shall locate a few more concrete cases of this kind and keep them on file. Of course, the question naturally arises as to how much of the ransom goes into the Roumanian treasury and how much into the private funds of the officers concerned, but in any event it shows one reason why the Roumanians are not anxious to leave the country.

All of my colleagues are located in very pretentious buildings. The Frenchman occupies the palace of the Countess Ladislaw Szeehenyi, who was formerly Miss Gladys Vanderbilt, and is surrounded by much pomp and circumstance. The Italian occupies an even more palatial building and is equally ostentatious. The British are able to combine by having both Admiral Troubridge and General Gorton here, and they are located in a fine building, but display a little less swank than the others. I am quartered in part of the home of Count von Edelsheim, which although not as pretentious either internally or externally as the dwellings of my colleagues, is nevertheless eminently suitable. We have all been giving rather big dinners and I

think I can state without boasting that our dinners have been a shade better than those of any of the others. Each other Mission has large numbers of soldiers and sailors constantly about and also a large number of officers. I now have twelve men, but they make up in quality what they lack in quantity and although we Americans are few in number I don't think there is an inclination on the part of anybody to think for a moment that America is playing second fiddle.

If the Roumanians leave we shall have much reconstruction work to do and the more officers I could have within reason, the more I could do. On the other hand, I realize, of course, that the Commission does not expect me to do the impossible and I shall always endeavor to do the best I can with the means at my disposal.

September 24th, 1919.

Yesterday afternoon I was called upon by Count Somssich, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who without any preamble asked me when I thought the Roumanians were going to leave. I told him I could make no more of a guess on that subject now than I could have made six weeks ago, and asked him why. He said—"That is also the way it looks to me and I can see no alternative but to make terms with the Roumanians. They are rapidly destroying our country and if we want to save anything from the wreck we must accede to their terms without further delay." I told him that I considered any such arrangement ridiculous because the Roumanians would force fulfillment of terms by the Hungarians, and would probably not comply at all with their part of the contract. He said he realized this, and proposed to fight fire with fire; in other words he would dicker with them and fill his part of the agreement only to such an extent as suited him. I told him I considered this decidedly reprehensible, and that I was positive that in the long run Hungary would win out by staying by the Entente. He said—"That may be so, but at present the Entente either cannot or will not help us. We have waited patiently for nearly two months and the outlook becomes more gloomy every day."

I asked him what arrangements he had made for discussing the matter with the Roumanians. He replied that he expected to discuss

the matter tomorrow (Wednesday) with M. Ardeli, the same *sub-rosa* gentleman who delivered the ultimata to the Archduke. He added that he would make no definite terms but would discuss the matter; if possible, get Ardeli to write out his conditions and then let me know. He asked me to mention the matter to General Gorton, the British representative, but to say nothing whatever to either the French or the Italian members.

I then asked if he had ever been approached at all by the French and he said—no, but that he knew that the French were willing to let the Roumanians do whatever they saw fit because they did not wish to offend the Roumanians and lose their trade.

I then asked him if he had ever been approached by the Italians and he said—yes, that General Mombelli at their first meeting had suggested that Hungary make terms with the Roumanians.

The substance of the foregoing was then placed in code and telegraphed to the American Commission.^{[49](#)}

At the meeting this date a letter was received from General Mardarescu, stating that he had found it necessary, instead of delivering at Monor the fire-arms destined for the police, to designate as the depot, Czegled, a place twice as far away; that this depot was not yet ready, would take some days to prepare; and furthermore that the arms he proposed to turn over to us were in Roumania and it would be necessary to ship them back. He then added that he could consent to no arms being delivered to the police at all until he had received an accurate report of the number of arms and amount of equipment in the hands of the Hungarians; that arms were to be given the Hungarians by the Roumanians assisted by the Entente; that only such arms as were absolutely necessary would be delivered to the police, and that the remainder would be returned to the Roumanians.

I then called the attention of my colleagues to the fact that on the 19th, when I had been fighting for the evacuation of Transdanubia, Minister Diamandi, with his greasy smile, had made the argument that he thought we were unreasonable and trying to do too much at

one sitting; that we had already in one day acquired ten thousand rifles and forty machine guns for the police and why try to do too much, all of which had had its effect upon Generals Graziani and Mombelli. I said that they could now see just exactly where we had been led to by the wily Roumanian and that we were like a lot of pack-mules following a bell mare.

General Mombelli, the president, asked me what I suggested and I insisted that a letter be written to General Mardaescu, stating that on the 19th instant we had invited his attention to the urgent necessity of immediately organizing and equipping the police; that he had agreed to furnish us ten thousand rifles and forty machine guns by the 23rd; that these arms were to be delivered by the Mission assisted by the Roumanians to the Hungarians; that he had broken his promise, and that we could not interpret his action other than as an intention not to afford any assistance whatever; that we should hold him responsible for any disturbances or troubles that might result from a lack of arms and equipment on the part of the police; and that we would advise the Supreme Council of his action.

General Graziani suggested that if we write that much, we add that the Roumanians could now show their desire to actually assist by turning over to us two or three thousand rifles. I stated emphatically that I would not put myself or my country in the position of bickering with the Roumanians for two or three thousand rifles when they might again make us ridiculous by refusing even this request, and I told him it was a beautiful and edifying sight to behold the representatives of France, Italy, Great Britain and the United States on bended knee, craving paltry favors from a third-rate power like Roumania and added that I would not agree to any such arrangement.

The letter was finally drafted and sent in substance as above indicated by me.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ

49 No. 87, September 24, *infra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/140: Telegram

[Document 312]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 24, 1919.
[Received September 26—2 a.m.]

87. Hungarian Minister Foreign Affairs informs me he can see no way getting rid Roumanians except accept their terms. He states that Hungary almost ruined; Entente cannot or will not help, and they must save what little left. He states that Roumanian, Ardeli, who gave ultimatum to Archduke, will confer with him today about terms, he will confidentially advise me as to same. He desired to make this known only to Americans and English as he mistrusted French; and furthermore, [Italian] General personally advised him to make terms with Roumania. He said main thing was to [get] rid of Roumanians. This leaves situation in Mission as follows: Americans and English trying to carry out Supreme [Council's] orders, French afraid to offend Roumanians thus encouraging them, Italians to back [*backing*] Roumanians who do as they please against an equally divided Mission.

French Minister to Roumania, now at Budapest but not advertising his presence. Diamandi, who went Monday to Vienna for several days, is hurrying back; arrives this morning.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/143: Telegram

[Document 313]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 25, 1919.
[Received September 6 (26?)—6:50 p.m.]

89. At meeting of Mission this date report received from committee sent to investigate danger of Hungarians attacking Roumanians which in effect as follows:

“Committee of unanimous opinion that Admiral Horthy’s army cannot in any way whatever be a menace to Roumanian Army, and that there is neither the danger nor the possibility of an attack on the Roumanian Army. Hungarian commander is organizing only such units as are authorized, he can now reoccupy Trans-Danubia except Budapest to the extent of maintaining order and in 8 days will have completed his organization.”

The Mission delivered this morning a letter to Roumanian commander quoting committee’s report concurring in same and requesting a reply by Sept. 28th as to decision of Roumanian Commander for transmission to Supreme Council. Roumanians have demanded 900 of 4,500 cars still remaining to Hungarians. Their attention invited to serious consequences that would result from execution of such demand and suggested they countermand same. Serbs have complained that although allies the Roumanians will not allow them to use Serb over telephone and telegraph lines. Relative to my wire number 87⁵⁰ Diamandi instead [of] Ardeli called upon Hungarian Minister [of Foreign Affairs] but terms not yet discussed. French and Roumanians owing to presence French Minister are having love feast. No other invitations. General Gorton requests copy of foregoing be sent British Commission.

50 *Supra.*

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/152: Telegram

[Document 314]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 27, 1919.
[Received September 28—1 a.m.]

95. Colonel Horowitz U. S. Army has just returned from visiting headquarters of Hungarian Army and reports as follows:

“On 24th and 25th I visited Siofok, headquarters of National Hungarian Army as member of the Interallied subcommittee, and I visited [*investigated*] reports of mistreatment and murder of Jews, and pogroms. I went thoroughly into the subject both with Jews of the neighborhood and with Hungarian officers and found that although there were several authenticated cases of mistreatment and even murders that these could not be traced even remotely to Hungarian Army authority. On the contrary the authorities are doing their utmost to prevent injustice and disorder in territory under [their] control. Every case reported is investigated and guilty offenders severely punished. I am convinced that rumors regarding so-called White Terror are unfounded. I consider the officers of the National Hungarian Army to be patriotic and inspired with most liberal sentiments of duty and justice. No well-behaved Jews or Christians need fear anything at their hands. They represent the visible and tangible support that Hungary now has and should be received with acclaim by Hungarian people instead of with suspicion and dread.”

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/153: Telegram

[Document 315]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, September 29, 1919.
[Received September 29—12:45 p.m.]

102. The Roumanians have agreed to evacuate Trans-Danubia except a bridgehead of about 35 kilometers mean radius from Budapest. They propose to abandon towns of Gyor, Veszprem and Szekesfehervar within 2 days after arrival of returning Hungarian forces at 30 kilometers distance from each of them and desire 2 days additional notice of Hungarian advance. Our subcommittee on army organization has been directed to take this up immediately and proceed as rapidly as possible. If Roumanians make their offer good they should begin evacuation [in] about 5 days.

The report of Colonel Horowitz on Jewish situation was read Mission and it was decided arrange for publication in slightly amended form in order to restore public confidence. As Colonel Horowitz is known to be of the Jewish faith himself it is believed his report will have an excellent effect. General Gorton requests copy of foregoing be furnished British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/160: Telegram

[Document 316]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 2, 1919.
[Received October 3—10:44 a.m.]

112. Replying to your No. 60 October 1st,^{[52](#)} U. S. Army officers on duty with this Mission are as follows: Officers of the Regular Army: Brig. General H. H. Bandholtz; Captain Nathan Horowitz, Coast Artillery; First Lieutenant Will Shafroth, Cavalry; Captain Charles B. Moore, Infantry, en route to report.

Officers not members of the Regular Army: Colonel J. T. Loree, Captain E. B. Gore, First Lieutenant Edward Montgomery, Second Lieutenant L. M. Hamilton.

In addition to foregoing following officers with military attaché to Roumania assist whenever practicable but are not assigned definitely to this Mission: Regular Army: Major H. E. Yates, Infantry, Captain W. E. Lucas, Infantry; Reserve Corps, Second Lieutenant N. B. Curtice, Motor Transport Corps.

BANDHOLTZ

^{[52](#)} Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/167: Telegram

[Document 317]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 3, 1919.
[Received October 3—3:22 p.m.]

115. For Polk from Bandholtz. Replying to your No. 63.⁵² There is only too much proof of Roumanian looting. I myself saw them taking hospital supplies and reported it at the time. They did not loot children's hospitals, but did cut off the usual supply of milk, which was equally bad. Concerning Mackensen supplies please see my telegrams Nos. 63, 65, 66, 68.⁵³ This depot contained no firearms whatever and only about 2,000 carloads of munitions. Roumanian tactics in regard to reorganization Hungarian police and Army have been constantly obstructive. They seem determined to force Hungary into a separate treaty and if obliged to evacuate, to leave her ripe for anarchy and bolshevism so that their return will be requested. Since August 16th there has been a committee of the Mission on claims and complaints of which Colonel Loree is chairman. Roumanian commander was requested to send a representative and sent a liaison officer who refused to assist in any investigations, and Roumanian commander insisted that all claims of any importance should be sent to him for final decision. Under the circumstances we have gone on investigating and accumulating evidence, which is in as good shape as possible with facilities at our disposal. Sir George Clerk has been given much data.⁵⁴

In my opinion the most crying need is to force the Roumanians to carry out the instructions of the Supreme Council as given to them by the Interallied Military Mission. Unless they evacuate Hungary as rapidly as we may require and in the meantime assist instead of obstructing our police and army organization matters will go from bad to worse. If for the first time they keep a promise and begin the

evacuation of Trans-Danubia tomorrow the 4th we shall have made our first step forward.

BANDHOLTZ

⁵² Not printed.

⁵³ No. 63 and No. 66 not printed; No. 65, p. 676 [*Pg. 676 includes portions of [Doc. 295](#), [Doc. 296](#), and [Doc. 297](#)*]; No. 68, p. 679 [*Pg. 679 includes portions of [Doc. 300](#) and [Doc. 301](#)*].

⁵⁴ For report by Sir George Clerk of his mission to Bucharest and Budapest, see appendix G to HD-67, [vol. VIII, p. 550](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/169: Telegram

[Document 318]

***General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***

BUDAPEST, October 4, 1919.
[Received October 4—6:30 p.m.]

118. As a necessary step to prevent some of the suffering that is sure to ensue from food and fuel shortage it is recommended that the Roumanians be obliged to return immediately such portions of seized Hungary rolling stock as directed by Interallied Military Mission.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/173: Telegram

[Document 319]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 5, 1919.
[Received October 5—1:55 p.m.]

124. First stage of Roumanian evacuation beginning Saturday passed off in satisfactory manner. [After] Roumanians left city of Gyor the unarmed police blossomed out with rifles. There were no anti-Semitic disturbances. General Gorton requests copy of above be furnished British Commission. Sir George Clerk left Budapest Saturday for Paris. Am sending a memorandum by his party. His opinions seem to have changed materially.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/175: Telegram

[Document 320]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 6, 1919.
[Received October 6—9:30 a.m.]

125. At a conference between Admiral Troubridge, and the French Generals Graziani and Franchet d'Esperey last Saturday at Szegedin which was called by the last named the Admiral recommended that Hungarian peace delegates to be approved by the Interallied Military Mission be sent to Paris without delay and it is understood such recommendation was telegraphed M. Clemenceau. Coincident with the practical stoppage by the rain of animal-drawn transport the Danube is usually closed to navigation. I understand that bad weather is certain to begin about November 1st. I cannot too strongly present the necessity for the immediate return of Hungarian rolling stock and the withdrawal of the Roumanians.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/177: Telegram

[Document 321]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 6, 1919.
[Received October 6—6:37 p.m.]

126. At a meeting of the Military Mission on October 1st it was decided that the Roumanians should not be allowed to remove from the National Museum in Budapest articles they claimed belonged to them as coming from Transylvania until such articles had been passed upon by a committee already appointed by the Mission and the Roumanian commander was notified accordingly. Last night about 9:30 I received word that the Roumanians were at the museum for the purpose of seizing such property. I hastened over accompanied by Colonel Loree and one American soldier and found the grounds and storerooms under strong Roumanian guard which we successfully passed. The Roumanian General Serbescu had been there with 14 trucks and a large detachment to remove the property, but the director of the museum refused to give up the key. General Serbescu said he had an order from General Mardarescu and High Commissioner Diamandi to seize such property and that he would return in the morning and force an entrance if necessary. He had then departed leaving the guard. I personally took over the key leaving a letter addressed to whom it may concern saying that the objects in the museum were under the charge of the Interallied Military Mission and that as President of the Day I had taken possession of the key. I then sealed the doors in the name of the Mission authenticating same by an American censorship stamp. At the session of the Mission this date my action was approved. Subsequently thereto a letter was received from Roumanian headquarters signed by both General Mardarescu and Minister Diamandi stating in effect that despite the decision of the Mission of October 1st they would assume responsibility for removing the

objects from the museum. In the meantime the seals are on the doors and we wait developments.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/176: Telegram

[Document 322]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 6, 1919.
[Received October 6—6:34 p.m.]

127. Reference my number 126 this date. The Military Mission has received from the Archbishop of Esztor [*Esztergom*] and Prince Primas of Hungary a letter stating that the objects which the Roumanians desired to seize were mainly from the private collection of the late Bishop of Nagy-Varad whose will left the disposition of this collection in the hands of the Prince Primas of Hungary on condition that it form an integral part of a Christian Museum at Esztergom or at Budapest. The Archbishop concludes with the following:

“I have honor of protesting in favor of the collections belonging to my church against any kind or [*of?*] pretention coming from whatever side and I request that the right of the Roman Catholic Church concerning the collections should be respected.”

The Roumanians finally had 1,000 rifles for delivery to the police but they were of many different makes and so unserviceable that they themselves admitted it would be necessary to take them back and [get] others in their place. This is a sample of Roumanian cooperation.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/178: Telegram

[Document 323]

***General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***

BUDAPEST, October 7, 1919.

[Received October 7—5:57 p.m.]

128. For Polk from Bandholtz. Seals on museum doors are as yet undisturbed. Roumanians have delivered 1,000 serviceable rifles for the police. Evacuation of western Hungary should end today. Colonel Moore has reported and order will be issued at once returning Colonel Horowitz to Paris.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/181: Telegram

[Document 324]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 8, 1919.
[Received October 8—5:27 p.m.]

133. On September 16th Roumanians notified Military Mission that all requisitions would cease except actually necessary for immediate army needs. Following are extracts from report of our committee which is endeavoring to keep track of Roumanian exportations: Requisitions of cattle, horses and grain continue, Mayor of Szolnok says never so numerous as at present. Trains loaded with horses passing daily through Szolnok. Animals requisitioned are still paid for but at Roumanian price which is 350 kronen per animal. At present rate of exchange this would mean less than \$5 United States currency or about £1 British currency. At Kiskunfelegyhaza 200 horses were sent to Roumania on 28th, also large quantities of forage. In Budapest on September 28 Roumanian lieutenant named Gotoschi seized three automobiles from Hungarian garage and shipped them to Roumania. Our record of rolling stock sent to Roumania up to midnight of 4th is 33,000 cars of all kinds and 1,230 locomotives.

It is reported that an Austrian Red Army is being formed independent of *Volkswehr*, chief of organization being William Boehm, former Commander of Red Army. It is understood to be their intention to break into Hungary with many thousands of workmen soldiers, working upon their feeling by telling them that which [*while*] Austria is starving there is still abundance of food in Hungary. It is stated that large sums of propaganda money are being spent in Austria.

Roumanians have requested Military Mission to aid them in getting two monitors and two vedette boats now in Danube near Budapest. Have been informed that this is a matter entirely within province of Danube River Commission.

Evacuation of western Hungary up to Budapest bridgehead completed without serious incident.

Many [*My*] seals are still on the storeroom doors of the National Museum. General Gorton requests copy of foregoing be furnished British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/182: Telegram

[Document 325]

***The Interallied Military Commission to the
Supreme Council***

[Translation]

BUDAPEST, October 8, 1919.

561. The withdrawal of the Rumanians and the corresponding advance of the Hungarians in trans-Danubia have come to an end without incidents. The following rolling stock was evacuated by the Rumanians beyond the River Theiss until midnight October 4 through Szolnok and Csongrad: full trains, 709 locomotives drawing 824 parlor cars, 76 private cars, 189 first class cars, 270 second class cars, 275 third class cars, 875 locomotives not under pressure, 406 brake cars, 479 empty cattle cars, 2,189 empty flat cars, 6,634 various cars loaded with grain, cattle, etc., 528 loaded with munitions, 1384 with guns, 322 with military train material; 331 with automobiles, 223 with aeroplanes, 68 with railroad material, 1,460 with agricultural material, 763 with other war material, 2,886 of unknown contents, 6,664 tank cars, 2230 [apparent omission]; those figures include 40 complete empty trains and 89 trains of Rumanian troops which passed through Szolnok between the 5th and 24th of September. From these figures must be deducted the locomotives, cars, etc., whose number shall be determined and which are to be sent back to Hungary in accordance with the agreement made on September 26 between the Rumanians and the director of the Hungarian railroads. The Commission is advised that the requisitions are still going on.

INTERALLIED MILITARY COMMISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/183a: Telegram

[Document 326]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General
Bandholtz***

PARIS, October 11, 1919.

76. [From Polk.] The Roumanians state that they have already delivered 1000 rifles and are immediately delivering the other 9000 for police. This statement was made to me personally by Mischu. Please let me know if delivery is being made. If not, show telegram to Roumanians and ask them to definitely notify you whether Mischu had any basis for making this statement to me. Polk.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/194: Telegram

[Document 327]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 16 [13?], 1919.
[Received October 16—1:07 p.m.]

145. Following telegram sent to Supreme Council this date by Interallied Military Mission:

“The Roumanians attempted early this morning to arrest Prime Minister Friedrich. The Interallied Military Mission, therefore, through its President of the Day delivered at Roumanian Headquarters the following memorandum:

The Mission considers it indispensable that the conduct of affairs by the Hungarian Cabinet be not interrupted for a single moment. Therefore, in the name of the Supreme Council the Mission demands that the Roumanian authorities leave the members of the Hungarian Government entirely alone in the conduct of the affairs of their departments until the Supreme Council has made known its decision.”

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/185: Telegram

[Document 328]

***General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate
Peace***

BUDAPEST, October 13, 1919.
[Received October 16—1:08 p.m.]

147. From Bandholtz for Polk. Reference your No. 76.^{[55](#)} Roumanians have delivered 4,000 rifles and promised to deliver 6,000 more today. If not delivered as promised will telegraph.

BANDHOLTZ

^{[55](#)} *Supra.*

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/28

[Document 329]

***The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander
in Chief of the Royal Roumanian Forces***

BUDAPEST, October 15, 1919.

Subject: Imposition of fine for Hungarian action toward Roumanian patrols who had gone beyond proper limits.

1. The Interallied Military Mission has learned that Your Excellency has imposed a fine of 1,250,000 kronen on the Hungarian Government as an indemnity for the death of certain soldiers of Roumanian patrols who had come into contact with patrols of the National Hungarian Army in Trans-Danubia.
2. The Mission is further informed that Your Excellency has intimated that if the fine is not paid by a certain date measures will be taken to prevent all food from entering Budapest.
3. The Mission desires to point out to Your Excellency, in the first place that according to the statement of your own Chief of Staff, the Roumanian patrols illegally penetrated beyond the neutral zone fixed between the troops of the Royal Roumanian Army in Trans-Danubia and the National Hungarian Army, and that this action naturally irritated the Hungarian Forces.
4. Secondly that an Interallied Committee, of which a Roumanian officer is a member, has been appointed to supervise the occupation by the Hungarian Army of the country evacuated by the Roumanians Forces, and that this Committee is properly the first authority to assign the blame in case of minor conflicts between the two forces. The Committee referred to, under the Presidency of Colonel Berthon, is at present engaged in an inquiry into the affair at Aba, and pending their report the Interallied Military Mission requests Your Excellency temporarily to suspend your orders regarding the payment of a fine.

5. The Mission cannot regard as serious Your Excellency's threat to starve the population of Budapest in case of non-payment of the fine.

PRESIDENT OF THE DAY

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/58

[Document 330]

***The Interallied Military Mission to the Commander
in Chief of the Royal Roumanian Forces***

BUDAPEST, October 15, 1919.

Subject: Evacuation of Hungary.

1. In compliance with the requirements contained in paragraph 3 (b) of the instructions from the Supreme Council the Interallied Military Mission has directed me to inform Your Excellency that it is desired that the Royal Roumanian Forces proceed with the evacuation of Hungary and without delay withdraw from the city of Budapest to a line at least fifty kilometres distant.
2. Your Excellency will recall that at one of the sessions of this mission which Your Excellency attended it was decided that an infantry division and a cavalry division at 30 kilometres distance would be sufficient for a moral effect upon the city should there be any incipient recrudescence of Bolshevism or any other disturbance.
3. The Interallied Military Mission requests of Your Excellency prompt information as to the date upon which the requested withdrawal will take place.

PRESIDENT OF THE DAY

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/190: Telegram

[Document 331]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 15, 1919.
[Received October 15—9:42 p.m.]

151. Polk from Bandholtz. Roumanians daily getting more arrogant. Have protested against Mission's plan for reorganizing Hungarian Army and although 5,000 police rifles have been delivered and remainder promised daily they have so interfered with recruiting that police reorganization at a standstill. The Archbishop here has complained that the Roumanians have arrested the Archbishop of Transylvania. At Mission's meeting this morning I recommended that letter be sent Roumanian commander, in effect as follows:

“Complying with Supreme Council's instructions, it is desired that Roumanian forces without delay withdraw from city of Budapest to line at least 50 kilometers distant and Mission requests prompt information as to date of withdrawal.”

This was approved and done. Please furnish copy of foregoing to British Commission. I wrote above-mentioned letter myself for signature of President of the Day, and of course clothed it in usual diplomatic garb.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/191: Telegram

[Document 332]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 15, 1919.

[Received October 16—1:32 p.m.]

154. Polk from Bandholtz. Roumanians have delivered 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns for police, but have [*gave*] no belts or accessories for machine guns, without which they are useless, gave no bayonets with the rifles and still lacking 700,000 cartridges.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/197: Telegram

[Document 333]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 17, 1919.
[Received October 18—9:07 a.m.]

157. Roumanian patrols continue to go beyond neutral zone and requisition in Trans-Danubian territory which has been given to the Hungarians. General Mardaescu has replied to Mission's letter relative to cutting off food supply of Budapest that he had been misunderstood. With reference to attempt to [*attempted*] arrest of Prime Minister Friedrich definite information of my agent has submitted report which rumors contains [*corroborate*], the following [is] synopsis:

On night of October 12th Crown Prince of Roumania held banquet in Hotel Hungaria at which champagne flowed freely. Crown Prince stated that he wanted to be Hungarian IV [*sic*] King to show his father that he would yet be a king and that there would be no difficulty in handling situation if present Premier were out the way. He said Friedrich usually hid with American or British and must be brought out. Prince and his officers decided reoccupy Trans-Danubia and to start trouble by sending patrols across present neutral zone. Although this was a drunken orgy it resulted in General Mosoiu signing order for Friedrich's arrest. My agent's reports will be sent by first courier.

Please furnish copy of foregoing to British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/201: Telegram

[Document 334]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, undated.

[Received October 21, 1919—10:36 a.m.]

167. Polk from Bandholtz. Telegram reference to duties of Sir George Clerk received⁵⁶ and promptly communicated to each member of the Mission and received with great satisfaction.

The Roumanians have again been notified this date that disturbances occurring along neutral zone of line of evacuation must be investigated and handled by Mission's army organization committee. Letter was received from General Mardarescu requesting that Roumanian officers be given free access museums for the purpose of selecting Roumanian documents, etc. He was informed that Roumanians could cooperate along these lines with the Mission's committee on museums. A reply was received this date from General Mardarescu to the Mission's request to continue with the evacuation of Hungary and to proceed at once with withdrawal from Budapest. He replied as follows:⁵⁷

“Concerning the second point of your note of October 15, 1919,⁵⁸ I have the honor to inform you verbally and in writing, that the Roumanian Command maintains its liberty with respect to operative questions, conforming entirely to the orders which it receives from General Headquarters. The Commander of the Transylvanian Troops, General Mardarescu.”

A letter was therefore sent him inviting attention to fact that Mission's request was strictly in accord with its instructions from the Supreme Council, that he had previously stated that Mission was

recognized as representing Supreme Council and that present action of Roumanian General Headquarters could be interpreted only as indicative of an intention on their part to no longer give this Mission its proper recognition and informing him that the Supreme Council would be notified accordingly.

On Saturday evening about 7:30 o'clock several Hungarian officials dashed into my office with the information that Roumanian company was en route to Government House to seize Friedrich. I went personally with one soldier and guarded the house while Lieutenant Hamilton went for a corporal and three men; on arrival they were placed as guards over the building. I then advised the President of the Day General Mombelli of action taken and he notified Roumanian Commander that the government building was under Interallied military protection. American guard was relieved today by British guard. After each Mission has furnished one guard detail the guards will be relieved as it is believed they will be no longer necessary. On 18th instant the Roumanian Seventh Infantry Division was proceeding thru Szolnok in easterly direction. On same date one regiment of Second Rifles Division was proceeding in same direction. Also on 18th the Sixth Division began to move from Czegled toward Szolnok and is believed to have an eastern destination. The First Rifles Division is moving into Budapest. On the 19th instant move [*most*] of the Roumanian troops of [*on*] west bank of Danube moved to east bank. General Mardarescu has been informed that he had promised to inform the Mission of any proposed evacuation and that such movements were believed to be of such a nature as to have rendered it advisable to advise this Mission of same.

A report received this date from Colonel Sheldon of the American Army corroborates in general the report of the Swiss Captain Burnier of the International Red Cross as to conditions in Roumanian prison camps at Arad, and Roumanian Commander has been requested to promptly arrange with the Hungarian Government for the release of Hungarian officer prisoners of war at Arad. Colonel Sheldon is continuing his investigations at other camps.

BANDHOLTZ

⁵⁶ Appendix C to HD–72, [vol. VIII, p. 698](#) .

⁵⁷ The following paragraph appears in French in the original; translation supplied by the editors.

⁵⁸ *Ante*, p. 703 [*Pg. 703 includes portions of [Doc. 330](#) and [Doc. 331](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/207: Telegram

[Document 335]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 23, 1919.
[Received October 24—12:30 a.m.]

172. At session on 22nd letter was received from Roumanian Commander in Chief disclaiming any intention to arrest Friedrich. It was simply a little patrol incident. Explanation as given was considered by entire Mission as too ridiculous for consideration.

The Yugoslavs have been causing trouble in the Baranya and especially in town of Pecs. As this district is entirely on the Hungarian side of Peace Conference line of demarcation [Yugoslav representative has been requested to withdraw] Yugoslav troops south of regular line.

Yesterday afternoon Minister Diamandi spent some time with me which was all wasted except as a personal visit. Roumanian attitude is that whenever Mission is at all harsh towards them the Mission is guilty of harsh conduct towards an ally; whenever the Roumanians go beyond all bounds in their handling of Hungarian situation and their attention is called to same the Mission has no right to mix in such matters because the Roumanian-Hungarian affairs is a special title [*little*] war between those two countries in which Roumania recognizes no allies. Sir George Clerk arrived early this morning.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/209

[Document 336]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 27, 1919.

It was noted in the telegram to: this Mission from the Supreme Council under date of October 29th [18th?] ⁵⁹, and referring to Sir George Clerk's Mission, that the Council had decided to take all the measures necessary to force the Roumanian Government to follow the line of conduct which it was requested to adopt. After a lapse off over a week there has been no apparent change in the Roumanian line of conduct.

Minister Diamandi called upon me recently and asked if the Mission had received a letter from him to the effect that the Roumanians were contemplating evacuation at an early date. I told him such a letter had been received ⁶⁰ and that as it covered practically the same ground as the last communication sent from the Supreme Council ⁶¹ for joint delivery by the various Allied representatives in Bucharest, to the Roumanian Government, the Mission had simply filed it. He stated that he had never heard of the communication from the Supreme Council to which I referred, so I told him that it was then simply a remarkable coincidence.

He still maintained that the Roumanian Government had a perfect right to seize and appropriate anything it saw fit in Hungary, and in particular such articles in the museums as they considered had come from Transylvania. I invited his attention to the telegram sent several weeks ago from the Supreme Council ⁶² to the effect that all these matters must be adjudged and settled by a reparation committee, and that Roumania was not on her own initiative to seize and appropriate whatever she saw fit. He replied that the Supreme Council was supreme only in matters which affected all of the Allies,

that the war between Roumania and Hungary was a separate affair in which Roumania could recognize no allies. This has been the Roumanian attitude from the beginning. Down in their hearts they know that they could never have come into Hungary had not the Central Powers been overthrown by the Entente, and even then had not the Peidl Government started to disrupt the Hungarian Army after its offensive of last July. Nevertheless they are constantly making the sophistical argument that the war with Hungary is their own private little war and that their victorious army is entitled to seize anything which they see fit, in order to get compensation for the seizures made by the Germans in Roumania. They decline to admit that the Hungarian assets should be pooled for distribution among the Allies until they have helped themselves to all that they want, in which case there will be nothing but trouble in the shape of a bankrupt country left for the Allies.

Sir George Clerk arrived on the evening of the 22nd or the morning of the 23rd and I had an interview with him at noon on the 23rd. In view of the fact that I had planned to take a trip to Belgrade I wished to discuss with him the advisability of taking it then or later, and he suggested, as nothing could happen before my return, that I take the trip immediately as contemplated. Accordingly I left Budapest on the night of the 23rd, arrived in Belgrade at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th, and left there on the night of the 25th, arriving back in Budapest about noon of the 26th.

While in Belgrade I called upon the Chief of Staff, the Acting War Minister, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Serbian officials. The Prince Regent was away at the time and would not return for several days and the War Minister was absent at some convention in Prague and would not return for over a week. The Prime Minister mentioned the fact that the Interallied Military Mission had requested the withdrawal of the Serbian troops from Baranya to the line of demarcation established by the Peace Conference,⁶³ and intimated an intention to comply with this request. They said, however, that owing to the absence of the Prince Regent and the War Minister, no Cabinet meeting could be held until their return, but in the meantime they would make an "Etude" of the question. Judging from past experiences, the word "Etude" means

indefinite delay, so I assume that the Serbians are going to be as slow as possible in withdrawing to the line of demarcation.

It is recommended that some pressure be brought to bear upon the Serbians to immediately evacuate the city of Pecs and that portion of Baranya which is left to Hungary as otherwise trouble is certain to ensue. I know that the Serbs have already communicated with the British suggesting that they retain the city of Pecs, and they either have sent or are contemplating sending a similar request to the Supreme Council. As near as I can learn, every one of these little nations has something in the way of coal, food or some other supply which all of its neighbors need badly, but which they would rather destroy than let a neighbor have. Any two of them seem to be able to agree about as well as two cats with their tails tied together and thrown across a clothes line.

I was able through the courtesy of our Minister, Mr. Dodge, to meet practically all the Serbian officials and the various Military Attaches at a luncheon and was able to form some idea of the Serbian situation. It looks as though Serbia and Roumania are going to be able to come to some sort of an understanding in regard to the Banat, and the Serbians seem to be inclined to let nature take its course in the Fiume question although they are very sore against Italy. They claim to admire the Hungarians very much and seem to realize that it is in their interest to be on friendly terms with Hungary in order to prevent the Italians from separating Yugo-Slavia from the rest of Europe by an Entente comprising Italy, Austria, Hungary and Roumania.

Sir George Clerk appeared before the Mission this date to discuss the general situation and it is noted that there is a marked change in his attitude as regards the Roumanians. He no longer seems to have in them the beautiful and sublime faith that characterized his attitude on the occasion of his first visit here. He created a most favorable impression upon all of the members of the Mission and is most cheerfully optimistic about soon being able to solve the Hungarian problem. There is every inclination on the part of all of the members of the Mission to cooperate with him to the limit.

He said among other things that Diamandi had told him that the Roumanians were going to evacuate Hungary in a very few days and the question of how to handle the situation when evacuation actually began was discussed by Sir George and the Mission. There was a consensus of opinion that the Roumanians would do everything possible to make our task as difficult as possible, that they would give practically no advance notice of the date of their departure, that they would continue to obstruct the organization of the police, that they would interfere with civil functions, and in general that they would continue the same *modus operandi* which they have carried on since the beginning. Of late they have been shifting some of their divisions about, and with unreasonable frequency have been changing the garrison of Budapest; the object undoubtedly being to let all their troops see the city, and to give all of them a chance at the looting of the metropolis. We are planning to anticipate all the difficulties in the way of the evacuation and it is not believed that there will be any serious disturbances. There certainly will be none that could not have been avoided had the Roumanians cooperated the way they should.

Mr. Schoenfeld, the American Chargé d'affaires at Bucharest left here last night, and I had a talk with him yesterday afternoon and explained to him briefly my opinion of the conduct of the Roumanians. ...

Mr. Schoenfeld informed me that the Roumanian press continues to be intensely hostile to Americans, and to me in particular, alleging that my apparent anti-Roumanian attitude is due to the fact that I am a hired minion of the Standard Oil Company. As I don't see their papers and couldn't read them if I did, and as my attitude has been approved by superiors, I am not worried about the Roumanian press.

Unless some signs of evacuation are soon apparent it is believed that nothing but a boycott with a severance of diplomatic and other relations will bring the Roumanians to terms. An ordinary ultimatum brings them to their senses about as much as an ice cream soda intoxicates a confirmed drunkard.

For the past few days the attitude of my French and Italian colleagues seems to be decidedly more sympathetic and whether this

is a personal change or indicates a change in the attitude of their governments I of course cannot tell, but assume the latter because our personal relations have always been most cordial and there have been no difficulties between us.

There is enclosed herewith and marked "Exhibit A" a copy of Hungarian newspaper of October 26th,⁶⁴ with a translation of a notice at the top of the first column. This, as will be readily seen, is an attempt by the Roumanians to prevent complaints from being sent to the Mission. The translation is as follows:

"Notice: All complaints concerning the Roumanian Troops of Occupation must be addressed to the Roumanian Troops direct. Complaints received through any other channels will not be dealt with."

October 31st, 1919

This is the seventy-second day since my arrival in Budapest. With three other general officers representing respectively the British, French and Italian Governments, I was sent here to carry out instructions from the Supreme Council, among which instructions were the following:

"(a) To insure the surrender to the Allies of the arms, munitions and war material in excess of the material necessary for the (Hungarian) units kept under arms; to include the material coming from the Mackensen Army."

With the exception of a small amount of Mackensen material comparatively recently discovered, the Mission has been able to comply with no portion of the above because the Roumanians had seized not only the excess referred to, but also practically all the other arms, munitions and war material in Hungary.

"(b) To regulate in accord with the Allied Commands the distribution of this various material among the Allied Powers interested, taking into account the military effort furnished by each and the present war situation."

For reason above given “(a)” the Mission has been able to comply with none of the foregoing.

“(c) To prevent on the part of the victorious armies all measures which would tend to excite the national sentiment in Hungary, or which in any way might prolong the troubled situation in this country and retard the conclusion of peace.”

Although the Mission established liaison with the Commander-in-Chief of the Roumanian Army, all of its requests along the lines of the foregoing have been either ignored or the Mission was given to understand that it was interfering in matters which was none of its business, and that the Roumanian occupation of Hungary was the result of a private war between Roumania and Hungary in which the Allied Powers had nothing to say.

“(d) To determine according to the situation of the moment the effectives and the emplacements of the Roumanian and Serbian troops that it will be necessary to maintain on Hungarian soil to guarantee order and the execution of the armistice.”

When the Roumanian Commander was requested to withdraw to certain emplacements he replied that the question of operations was one in which he reserved to himself complete liberty of action and that he was acting in accord with the instructions from the Roumanian General Headquarters.

“(e) To regulate with the Roumanian and Serbian Commands the withdrawal of the excess Roumanian and Serbian Troops.”

The above remarks under “(d)” apply here also.

In general, although representing the four great Allied and Associated Powers, this Mission has been treated by a third rate semi-civilized nation with contempt. All of the members of the Mission at various times must have felt personal humiliation and mortification over the way they as representatives of great nations have been treated.

The Roumanians made a great show of indignation at unsanitary conditions in the prisons of Budapest, which investigation showed they themselves were mainly responsible for, and it was found later that these conditions were as much superior to conditions existing in Roumanian prison camps as is a modern apartment house to a chicken-coop. They have treated the inhabitants not only of the occupied country between the Danube and the Theiss, but also of the portion of Transylvania to be ceded to them, in a manner that indicates that their civilization is about on par with that of the middle ages. Compared to most Roumanian officers a Filipino Ladrone leader is a polished gentleman and it is apparently about as easy to coax a Roumanian into being decent as it is to coax a turkey buzzard to dive for pearls.

I fear that in my notes of October 27th, I was a little bit premature in my estimate of the situation developing under Sir George Clerk because since then there seems to have been retrogression rather than progression. He seems to think that this is the beginning of a big diplomatic mission in which it will be necessary to execute many fancy steps before beginning the real dance.

Yesterday he apparently desired to appear in the role of a pacificator between four rough, rude, licentious and boisterous allied veterans and some kindly, sensitive and cultured Roumanian Generals. He sent a Sir Percy Lorraine to sound General Gorton about having the Allied Generals meet the Roumanian generals at dinner to talk matters over. By the time General Gorton had gotten through with him there could have been no doubt in Sir Percy's mind as to the kindly sentiments entertained by some of the Allied Generals towards their dear allies. Certainly there was no exuberant display of enthusiasm over the alluring prospectus submitted by Sir George.

It is understood that the Roumanians consider that Sir George desires to have them in occupation until a coalition government has been formed. In any event they seem to think that they have more to say about what government should be organized in Hungary than has anybody else. Although Sir George has been here now over a week, as previously stated, the situation instead of being better seems to have grown worse.

There is enclosed herewith and marked "Exhibit B"⁶⁵ a copy of the report of Colonel Sheldon's committee on conditions in Roumanian prisoner of war camps. If possible, this will be furnished in triplicate, but with the means at hand it is doubted if this can be done.

.....

It is well known that during the Bolshevik regime the Italians carried on many rather shady transactions with Bela Kun, and I can now state positively that Colonel Romanelli, who is the Italian political-military agent here, and who was in Budapest prior to the arrival of this Mission, has approached Count Somssich, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a proposition for an Italian-Hungarian Alliance, or at least Entente, among other inducements promising to arm and equip the Hungarian Army in case an understanding can be arrived at. Romanelli has also reproached Diamandi for having upset the fat into the fire by the extravagant Roumanian requisitions as it has left the Hungarians in such a mood that for fifty years they will never even think of an Alliance with Roumania, as result of which the Italians will not be able to carry out their beautifully conceived scheme for the isolation of Yugo-Slavia.

Upon examining the ammunition sent by the Roumanians for the use of the Hungarian police, it was found that all the shells in the first box opened had been punctured at the base of the bullet so as to render them useless. The attention of the Roumanians has been called to this and they are sending other ammunition. The punctures in question were not accidental, but had been done by a sharp instrument and although the Roumanians may be innocent of any intent to have worked a skin game, yet circumstantial evidence is strongly against them, and this is in line with their general style of procedure.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ

⁵⁹ Appendix C to HD-72, [vol. VIII, p. 698](#) .

⁶⁰ Not found in Department files.

⁶¹ Appendix B to HD-68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#) .

⁶² Appendix E to HD-47, [ibid., p. 111](#) .

⁶³ Text of request not found in Department files; General Bandholtz reported to Mr. Polk in undated telegram No. 177, received in Paris on October 27 (Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/211), that the request had been communicated to the Serbians on October 22.

⁶⁴ Not attached to file copy.

⁶⁵ Not attached to file copy.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/213: Telegram

[Document 337]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 30, 1919.
[Received October 30—6:47 p.m.]

181. To avoid overloading the line it is requested that the following telegram be delivered to the Supreme Council and that a copy be furnished the British Commission:

“Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris. Armistice of August 2nd between Roumanian and Hungarian forces provided that Hungarian officers should supervise disarming of their own troops and would then be given freedom with retention of arms. Hungarian troops being disarmed officers were required to report daily but about August 7th despite agreement many officers throughout Hungary were arrested and sent to Arad. Most all so-called prisoners of war were arrested after the armistice and when disarmed instead of being captured during a gallant advance. During transfer from place of arrest to prisons many of both officers and men were beaten, maltreated and robbed by Roumanian officers and soldiers’ and prisoners’ former [*female*] relatives insulted when visiting prisoners. Mission’s committee sent to investigate prisoner of war camps visited Arad Citadel, Brasso Citadel, Bertalon Hospital, Camp Christian, Camp Rajnov and Fogaras. Committee consisted of Colonel Raymond Sheldon, U. S. A., Dr. Hector Munro of International Hospital Relief Association, Captain Georges Burnier of Swiss Army and delegate on International Red Cross and First Lieut. Francesco Braccio of Italian Medical Corps. All reports of committee were unanimous, were practically same as quoted in telegram of October 13th⁶⁶ and in general resembled

following extracts from report on interned civilians at Arad, Brasso and Fogaras:

‘At Arad about 100 men and boys occupy casements [*casemates*] of fortress. No preparation whatsoever had been made for them. No beds nor wooden boards to sleep [on], floors were of concrete. No heating stoves, weather wet and bitterly cold. Many windows broken, food provided not by Roumanians but by local Hungarian Red Cross under order from Roumanians. Very few of the men had overcoats, none had blankets, many were without boots and underclothing. Some had no jackets. It would be difficult to describe the abject misery of these men and youths. Many were blue with cold; half starved and worried about their private affairs. Some were quite youths, one 16 years; some upwards of 60 years of age. At Brasso in citadel we found 121 civilian prisoners, mixed with military and in same building. Latrines are thoroughly unsanitary and inadequate. Among civilian prisoners are six women, one evidently an educated [woman] who has written poetry. They were housed in a room 10 feet by 19. Five sleep on one bench [and] one in a bed. No special sanitary arrangements were made for them and they have to use the men’s latrines. At Fogaras we found 72 civilian prisoners. They were housed with military and their condition has already been described. Many of these prisoners had no boots, no underclothing, and one had no trousers. He wore a kilt made of carpet. All were inadequately clad for winter weather. They accused Roumanian soldiers and in some instances officers of stealing their clothing, boots and private property. We found four boys, two of 13 and two of 14 years old. One old man of 76. Many were suffering from incurable diseases.’

Nevertheless we are still enemies [*allies*] of a nation guilty of conduct above described, which continues to treat inhabitants of country between the Danube and the Theiss as reported in

telegram of October 13th and which has repeatedly ignored or flatly turned down the requests of representatives of the Supreme Council. Roumanians claim many prisoners are Bolsheviks, but prisoners deny charges. On October 20th, Roumanian Commander was asked to immediately liberate officer prisoners of war and civilians at Arad and to arrange with Hungarian Government for liberation from other camps, and on October 22nd he was also requested to return from Szolnok to Budapest 43 idle locomotives that were urgently needed for food distribution. No action taken on any of these requests: not even the courtesy of a reply. Supreme Council's telegram of October 18th⁶⁷ stated that Sir George Clerk would inform Mission that the Council had decided take all the measures necessary to force the Roumanian Government to follow line of conduct it was requested to adopt. There is as yet no noticeable change in Roumanian attitude and situation becoming intolerable. If Roumanians allowed to remain until a coalition government is formed consequences, at present rate of progress, will be more serious. Difficulties encountered in accomplishing our mission are increasing rapidly. Under instructions of August 13th even though representing the Supreme Council this Mission can give no orders to Roumanians. In view of Mission's telegram of 13th instant stating that either the Roumanians should be forced to evacuate Hungary at once or that this Mission should be relieved it is realized that the Mission will not be held responsible for consequences that may result from Roumanian refusal to evacuate but it is deemed necessary to present the facts to the Supreme Council. Signed Interallied Military Mission."

BANDHOLTZ

⁶⁶ Appendix A to HD-71, [vol. VIII, p. 678](#) .

⁶⁷ Appendix C to HD-72, [ibid., p. 698](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/214: Telegram

[Document 338]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, October 31, 1919.
[Received November 1—10 a.m.]

182. At Mission's session this date it was decided to send Roumanians notice that committee on prisoner of war camps had found conditions such as to reflect great discredit on an Allied [and] Associated Power [and] to insist that all invalid prisoners and all civilians between 18 and 60 be immediately turned over to Hungarians, that so-called prisoners of war receive pay from date of arrest, that places for washing be supplied, that latrines be disinfected and made usable, that a reasonable sufficiency of food be furnished, that junior officers be treated as such, and that Hungarian Red Cross be treated according to customs of civilized warfare. Roumanians are sending to Budapest from Transylvania so many orphan children that the home cannot accommodate them and are persecuting all unorthodox religious denominations thus showing necessity for minorities clause in treaty. My colleagues are all thoroughly disgusted with our ally. Copy in duplicate of report on prisoner of war camps will go with my next memorandum.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/221a: Telegram

[Document 339]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 5, 1919—8 p.m.

5011. [From Polk.] General Bandholtz, the American representative on the Interallied Mission in Budapest, recommends that an American diplomatic or consular representative should be sent to Hungary as soon as possible. He states that he is obliged to take up cases of American citizens and handle these because they cannot get action from the Spanish Consul in charge of American interests. The Italians have already sent a diplomatic representative. I believe that we should send someone to Budapest with the same status as that of Halstead in Vienna. Coffin would seem to be the best possible choice if he could be spared and I feel that in view of the particularly difficult situation in Hungary, arising out of the policy and actions of the Roumanians, it would be highly desirable to have a first-class American representative on the spot when the Interallied Mission is withdrawn. Please inform me whether you think this can be arranged at an early date. Polk.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/224: Telegram

[Document 340]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 5, 1919.
[Received November 5—11 a.m.]

187. It is requested that the following telegram be forwarded to the Supreme Council:

Peace Conference, Paris. Number 775, double priority. This Mission is aware that a telegram has been received in Budapest from Paris covering three points.⁶⁸ First the Friedrich Cabinet, second the immediate Roumanian evacuation and third the occupation of Hungary by two divisions under Interallied officers, one division of Czechoslovaks and one division of Jugoslavs. Against this third proposition the Interallied Military Mission unanimous[ly] and urgently protests. Such procedure it is believed would stir Hungary into revolution and would destroy all prospects for an early solution of the Hungarian question. It is further urged that the Roumanians, the Jugoslavs and the Czechoslovaks be all required to retire at once behind their respective lines of demarcation. (Signed) Interallied Military Mission.

BANDHOLTZ

⁶⁸ Telegram from the Supreme Council to Sir George Clerk, November 5, appendix B to HD-84, [vol. VIII, p. 959](#).⁶⁷

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/226: Telegram

[Document 341]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 6, 1919.
[Received November 6—5:09 p.m.]

188. Although Diamandi on the 3d informed Sir George Clerk Roumanians would begin to evacuate on the 9th, no official word has yet been received by the Military Mission. Diamandi yesterday informed Gorton that they expected to be ready to evacuate on the 9th, to begin to do so on the 11th and to finish by the 13th, and stated that such communication had been sent to the Mission. We are now trying to find it. Everything indicates that Roumanians are planning to evacuate only to the line of Tisza. Their commander between the Tisza and the line of demarcation has organized a provisional civil government and has taken steps which indicate an intention to retain sovereignty. They will undoubtedly try to hold this territory in an effort to obtain demanded territorial concessions which were refused by the Supreme Council. Friedrich has announced willingness to resign whenever Roumanians withdraw to their line of demarcation.

BANDHOLTZ

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[Extract]

BUDAPEST, November 9, 1919.
[Received December 1.]

1. On November 6th I received a message from Minister President Friedrich asking if I would grant him an interview. Consent was reluctantly given and on the 7th, accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Somssich, he came to my office. He began by stating that he felt that America was just and impartial as regards the Hungarian question, and that he could come to me in the present difficulty and frankly and freely discuss the entire situation. I told him I would be glad to talk with him, that whatever I said must be entirely in an unofficial capacity, that my opinions must be considered as personal opinions, that they might be entirely wrong, but that with this understanding, such as they were, he was welcome to them. He acquiesced and explained that when the Archduke Joseph had been forced out of office by order of the Supreme Council he was naturally left as the head of the State, that he represented fully 90% of the Hungarian population, that his party insisted that he remain at the head of the Government, that he was very sure that in case he should quit that a political upheaval, if not a revolution, would ensue, and that his party insisted that he stand fast. I told him that there was one thing he must consider which was that the great American and British democracies would not stand for the perpetuation of the Hapsburg dynasty along the lines which were attempted, that he was considered now as the representative of that dynasty, and that he must as a result bear the burden of such responsibility. I told him that he might be the only man in Hungary

that could handle the situation, that his Government might be the only one that could be popular and efficient, but that this was not understood by the American and British public, that in a year or two by means of propaganda and by good works he might accomplish the conversion of sentiment in both America and Great Britain, but in the meantime what would happen to Hungary? I told him I felt it to be the duty of every patriotic Hungarian to make some personal or other sacrifice in the immediate organization of such a coalition cabinet as could be recognized and would be recognized by the Entente, and that every minute lost particularly at this stage of the game might mean irreparable loss for the future. I told him further that in case elections resulting favorably to him were held with him in power, that regardless of the fairness and justice with which such elections might be handled, there would always be a doubt in the American and British mind in regard to same. I suggested that he see Sir George Clerk at once, talk with him freely and frankly, and try to come to some understanding even though at what he might consider to be a temporary loss of personal prestige, and the sacrifice of personal ambition. I told him that my words might not be pleasant, but that they were those of a friend and that between gentlemen of intelligence only frankness was possible. I added along the lines of his original remarks that America had nothing to gain or lose, that we certainly were not looking for territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Hungary, nor did we propose to prostrate her financially by any exorbitant demand for indemnity. He said that he had understood that the Hungarians were to be given complete liberty of action in handling their own affairs, and I asked him why it was then that for three months all Hungary had been submissive under the Roumanian heel and had allowed the Roumanians to loot the country of rolling stock, machinery, food-stuffs, and all other kinds of supplies, and would now try to put up a bluff against the whole Entente in regard to the details of the organization of a temporary government. He next asked why the Entente had not put an end to Bela Kun, and I asked him why not go into ancient history, that he might as well ask why did Napoleon make the mistake of invading Egypt, why did the Hungarian King flee, why did the Hungarians allow Karolyi to come into power and turn the Government over to Bela Kun, and that we could go on asking why's indefinitely, but what we were up against was an actual condition with no time for theories.

He promised that he would give the matter immediate careful thought, and would go over and see Sir George Clerk. Later on in the evening I called upon Sir George and he said he had had quite a long, but not entirely satisfactory conference with Friedrich, who nevertheless was in an unusually reasonable mood as a result of his conversation with me.

.....

November 17th, 1919.

.....

21. Friedrich is still riding his high horse, and is apparently determined not to make terms with Sir George. It is known that several Hungarians have made the statement that there is no reason to bother about the Entente, that a combination which could not force the Italians out of Fiume and could not force a little nation like Roumania to obey its orders, could not impose its will upon anybody. The Friedrich Government is about to publish its election proclamation, and everything indicates that they will proceed to continue without regard to Sir George Clerk. I am afraid that the latter has become apparently so much identified with Garami and the other Socialists that Friedrich and his party will not listen to them.

22. As a matter of fact it is my personal opinion that it was most fortunate that as strong a man as Friedrich was at the head of the Government at this particular time and when so much was at stake. They cannot understand why, when they represent between 80 and 90% of the Hungarian nation they should not be considered as representative, and they add the argument that their stability has been proven by the length of time they have remained in control. Although the Friedrich Government is not ideal, I believe that the Entente would have been wise to have recognized it as being the *de-facto* Government and to have gone on with the Peace negotiations, as otherwise the present unfortunate condition bids fair to continue indefinitely.

23. As it is almost impossible to cover all details in telegrams and written reports, I have decided to send Colonel Loree to Paris with this memorandum so that he can explain to the American Commission any obscure points. He can also give a very good idea to the Commission as to the situation concerning Hungarian claims resulting from Roumanian occupation and likewise as to the extent of the Roumanian seizures.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/234: Telegram

[Document 343]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 10, 1919.
[Received November 11—8:18 p.m.]

195. Roumanians this date submitted plans for evacuation from Danube to Theiss, covering 10 days, beginning November 13th. Beginning 13th the withdrawal [*they withdraw*] close [to] Danube, on morning of 14th they withdraw from city of Budapest. During same bridges will be guarded by Interallied troops until Roumanians entirely outside the city. Evacuation then proceeds daily until Theiss River is reached where in accordance with present plans Roumanians will hold a line containing five bridgeheads including important points of Szolnok and Csongrad. When questioned their representative said they had received no orders from Bucharest to retire beyond Theiss River. He was told that Supreme Council had notified Mission that it was intention to have all occupying forces withdrawn immediately to Peace Conference lines of demarcation and that Mission desired as quickly as possible schedule for Roumanian withdrawal from line of Theiss to line of demarcation.

An Interallied committee has been detailed to supervise transfer to Hungarians of prisoners of war held by Roumanians. Roumanians should be required to immediately release all prisoners of war whether civil or military, and such prisoners should be given option of Hungarian or Roumanian citizenship and not be obliged to accept latter on account of residential periods or holding property in Transylvania. There are indications that the Roumanians within past few days have shipped a great number of prisoners east and are leaving behind only undesirables either physically or on account of bolsheviki tendencies. It is present Roumanian plan if they completely retire to take up all temporary bridges across the Theiss.

They should be required to leave all such bridges including pontoon bridges until further orders as otherwise it will be difficult to maintain communications with east Hungary.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/240: Telegram

[Document 344]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 12, 1919.
[Received November 14—12:33 p.m.]

199. Polk from Bandholtz. Roumanians working up to evacuation climax. They published in morning papers they proposed this date make free disposition of large quantities of food supplies. They then seized Hungarian Government food depot and made free distribution thereby completely upsetting Budapest rations system. It is understood they were photographed during the process as international philanthropists. Despite of the [*oft*- repeated promises their seizures are continuing up to the last. General Gorton requests repetition to British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/22

[Document 345]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, 13 November, 1919.

Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Siberia.

1. People are coming almost daily to the office of the American Mission, making heart-rending appeals for the liberation of their sons, husbands and relatives now held as prisoners of war at Vladivostok, and elsewhere in Siberia or Japan.
2. If there is any information available relative to the probable date of liberation of these prisoners, or any other information concerning their disposition, it is requested that same be furnished this Mission.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/247: Telegram

[Document 346]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 15, 1919.

[Received November 15—10:40 a.m.]

203. Polk from Bandholtz. Evacuation of Budapest by Roumanians and reoccupation by Hungarians accomplished without noteworthy incident. Shall return key to museum this date. Is report correct that Ammission closes temporarily or permanently at end of November?

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/246: Telegram

[Document 347]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 15, 1919.

[Received November 15—6:15 p.m.]

204. Polk from Bandholtz. Evacuations proceeding so far satisfactory. There is no question but what Roumanians determined to hold line of the Tisza River and destroy bridges if necessary. They have left no liaison officer behind for probable double purpose of covering their tracks and of preventing protests reaching them. I shall therefore send one of my officers to join them to keep up liaison. Their withdrawal from Budapest was very creditable. Local political situation is at present bad. Prospects for early agreement not bright.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/248: Telegram

[Document 348]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 16, 1919.

[Received November 16—9:15 p.m.]

205. For Polk from Bandholtz. Admiral Horthy's Hungarian National Army entered Budapest this date. Big celebration, everything quiet so far. There have been many arrests, but less than expected and whole proceedings have been rather dignified. Sir George Clerk much disturbed over arrest of some Social Democrats of bolsheviki antecedents and threatened to leave and to have Military Mission relieved within 24 hours if all arrested not at once liberated. This report spreading like wildfire and has had a bad effect. Friedrich still obdurate and causing Sir George much trouble. From all reports Roumanian evacuation being accomplished without unusual incidents, but they are determined to hold line of Tisza.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/248: Telegram

[Document 349]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

PARIS, November 17, 1919—9 p.m.

105. For Bandholtz from Polk. Your 205 just received.⁶⁹ I quite agree with Sir George Clerk that it would be most unfortunate for Horthy to begin by arresting Social Democrats unless there is positive evidence of their having committed crimes. Use all your influence to keep Horthy and Friedrich from playing the fool. Any campaign against the Socialists at this time would have a most unfortunate effect in the capitals of the world and would more or less justify the claims of the Roumanians that their presence in Budapest was necessary in order to keep the peace. If Horthy and Friedrich continue their campaign I do not see how it will be possible for the Peace Conference to insist on the Roumanians withdrawing further. Polk.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁶⁹ *Supra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/249: Telegram

[Document 350]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 17, 1919.
[Received November 18—10:30 a.m.]

206. Please have following telegram delivered:

“Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris. Conditions in city of Budapest and vicinity since Hungarian reoccupation have, everything considered, been excellent. Admiral Horthy’s troops have shown themselves to be well disciplined and under control. Before leaving Budapest General Mardaescu promised this Mission to loan 53 motor trucks to food distributors. He turned over only 36 many without wheels or motors and all practically unserviceable and then took these away when he left. It is recommended that Roumanian Government be required to return 53 serviceable motor trucks for purpose stated. In case there exists the erroneous impression that an Allied officer [is] in command of Hungarian police and gendarmes it is desired to state that an Allied officer has been supervising the reorganization of police and gendarmes, but in no sense has been in command or general control of same. (Signed) Interallied Military Mission.”

Big procession yesterday morning and big gala opera last night to celebrate Roumanian evacuation. No member of Interallied Military Mission attended either although British Admiral Troubridge and French Admiral with their staff occupied conspicuous boxes at opera and also attended public mass in the morning. Friedrich Government is about to publish election proclamation. Indications are that he will

not form coalition with Socialists and it is believed importance of latter is overestimated.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/251: Telegram

[Document 351]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 18, 1919.
[Received November 18—7:30 p.m.]

207. Polk from Bandholtz. Replying to your 105.^{[70](#)} The facts did not justify great concern over reported arrests. Horthy's conduct throughout has been excellent. Present indications are that Friedrich within 24 hours will be replaced by Apponyi or somebody else. Political outlook now encouraging. Reports of Roumanian progress in evacuation not so good. They have just seized entire Hungarian tobacco supply at Szolnok and it is reported excesses are being committed. They have left no liaison officer but one of my officers will be at their headquarters on 19th and report on conditions. Colonel Loree should arrive Paris Thursday with memorandum and so you can question him on all details prior to your departure.

BANDHOLTZ

^{[70](#)} *Ante*, p. 722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of [Doc. 348](#), [Doc. 349](#), and [Doc. 350](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/253: Telegram

[Document 352]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 19, 1919.
[Received November 20—11:55 a.m.]

208. Polk from Bandholtz. Again referring to your No. 105.⁷¹ Coincident with Roumanian evacuation Mr. Rattigan, British Chargé d’Affaires, arrived from Bucharest and apparently gave Sir George Clerk Roumanian version of what would happen when Horthy’s army entered Budapest. Sir George’s first telegraphic reports, if indicating that situation as regards arrest was serious, did not conform to actual conditions and this must have been due to extraneous influences. I have just seen him and shown him your message. He says he will at once telegraph an explanation which will allay any feeling of uneasiness caused by first reports and concurs in my opinion that any delay in complete Roumanian evacuation should not for one moment be considered. I have seen Horthy and have great confidence in his ability and good sense. Friedrich still megalomania but losing ground and it is believed solution in sight. Hungarians are accustomed to poster proclamations and propaganda and will undoubtedly pull off frequent foolish stunts but outlook is far from gloomy. Roumanians during withdrawal are now committing many depredations.

American Child Welfare Mission daily feeding 34,000 children of whom 23,000 in Budapest. American Red Cross also doing excellent work. Hungarian Government contributing liberally.

Interallied Military Mission has sent Colonel Yates, U. S. Army, a unanimous resolution commending his excellent work in supervising Hungarian police and gendarmes during Roumanian occupation and evacuation. Mission this date received from Sir George Clerk

telegram from Supreme Council of November 10th⁷² to effect that question of turning over Pecs coal mines to Serbians was under consideration and telegram has been sent Supreme Council⁷³ deprecating fact that Mission had not received any telegram concerning matter affecting military situation and requesting that Supreme Council sustain Mission's action in demanding that Serbians withdraw to line of demarcation.

BANDHOLTZ

⁷¹ *Ante*, p. 722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of [Doc. 348](#), [Doc. 349](#), and [Doc. 350](#)].

⁷² Presumably telegram dated November 6, appendix E to HD-85, [vol. IX, p. 11](#) .

⁷³ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/222: Telegram

[Document 353]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General
Bandholtz***

PARIS, November 20, 1919—9 p.m.

110. Your 189, November 6, 1919.⁷⁴ The Department advises that Ulysses Grant-Smith has been selected as Commissioner to Hungary and instructed to proceed immediately. Grant-Smith is at present a Counselor of Embassy in the Diplomatic Service in which he has served for 16 years. He has served in the former Embassy at Vienna for about 4 years in the capacity of Secretary and also as Counselor. He recently served as Chargé d’Affaires of the Legation at Copenhagen. He is now in the United States. This is for your confidential information and is not to be given out until made public by the Department.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁷⁴ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/260: Telegram

[Document 354]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 24, 1919.
[Received November 25—12 p.m.]

212. Polk from Bandholtz. At Hungarian Cabinet meeting this afternoon Friedrich resigns and Charles Huszar the new Prime Minister with his Cabinet will come into power. There seems to be general satisfaction with the new Cabinet except Barczy, Minister of Justice. One of my officers just returned from investigating conditions near Pecs coal mines now occupied by Serbians reports Serbian troops in bad state of discipline. Serbians have established complete civil government in territory entirely on Hungarian side of line of demarcation and announce intention of remaining permanently. Mine turns out about 1,500 tons of coal daily of which 1,200 tons are taken by Serbian Government, remainder being used locally but none whatever sent to Hungary. Reported from trustworthy source that Czechoslovakian authorities have taken possession of Archduke Joseph's estate at Kistapolcsan and are about to sell personal property of Archduke and Archduchess at auction or private sale, this to include their personal correspondence, the historical bridal robe of Queen Elizabeth, many valuable souvenirs, etc. Have telegraphed American Minister at Prague informing him that such action would be in contravention even of all customs of war and not thought possible any government could knowingly countenance same under present conditions. Personally visited Red Cross distribution this morning. Excellent work is being done and it is hoped that Major Moffatt may continue at least until after Government is established in Hungary. On Saturday I likewise attended Captain Richardson's meeting of the Children's Welfare Mission which is doing equally excellent work. I am informed from most reliable sources Italy has made secret pact with Croatia,

Dalmatia and Montenegro against Serbia whereby those countries acquire independence. Montenegro getting Cattaro and coast as far as Ragusa, Italy getting Fiume and important islands.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/58

[Document 355]

***The Interallied Military Mission to the
Commanding General of the Roumanian Army of
Transylvania***

BUDAPEST, November 26, 1919.

Subject: Bombardment of defenseless town.

1. The Interallied Military Mission has learned with surprise and astonishment that the Royal Roumanian Forces have fired upon the defenseless town of Tokaj, resulting in the killing and wounding of several inhabitants. It is likewise learned that the Roumanian Forces did not leave the vicinity of Tokaj on the date agreed to by them.
2. It is trusted that Your Excellency has already taken punitive measures in regard to the offenders in this case, and it is requested that this Mission be informed as to the result of Your Excellency's investigation, as such action as shelling a defenseless town during a time of armistice is entirely contrary to the customs of war.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ
Brig. Gen. U. S. A. President of the Day

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/262: Telegram

[Document 356]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 26, 1919.
[Received November 26—9:30 p.m.]

214. Request that the following telegram be forwarded:

“Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris, France. In August this Mission requested Serbian Government to evacuate Hungarian territory in the Prekmurje district⁷⁵ and likewise subsequently requested the Serbs to evacuate the occupied portion of Baranya including the city of Pecs.⁷⁶ Both of these requests were repeated to the Supreme Council. As result of investigation of an Interallied officer sent to Pecs on November 23rd it is now known that Serbs have made practical civil occupation of that entire country, that they are assessing fines upon Pecs and other towns and are giving everyone the impression that they intend to remain permanently. It is urgently recommended that the Supreme Council make decision without delay requiring Serbs to immediately retire beyond line of demarcation established by Peace Conference, or give them the territory they now occupy. This Mission is on record as recommending that the Serbs be required to immediately evacuate above-mentioned territory, including coal mines. The continued occupation of Hungarian territory by neighboring states and uncertainty attending same is seriously interfering with organization of Hungarian Government and will delay elections.

According to telephone message received by this Mission the Roumanians on 25th despite existence of armistice bombarded defenseless town of Tokaj, killing several

inhabitants. The Mission sends two officers to verify above telephonic report. On November [*September*] 26th the Roumanian[s] agreed to return to Hungary all locomotives and cars sent into Roumania subsequent to that date. Under this agreement they owe Hungary 69 locomotives and over 11,000 cars. Interallied Military Mission.”

BANDHOLTZ

⁷⁵ For text of request, see p. 636 [*Pg. 636 includes portions of [Doc. 257](#), [Doc. 258](#), [Doc. 259](#), and [Doc. 260](#)*].

⁷⁶ See footnote 63, p. 708 [*Pg. 708 is part of [Doc. 336](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/262c: Telegram

[Document 357]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

PARIS, November 27, 1919.

119. For Bandholtz from Polk. Colonel Loree read me your message in regard to the necessity of your staying in Budapest until after the elections. Please cable me fully as to whether it is still necessary to keep up the Inter-Allied military organization. It would seem that some American representation is necessary but now that the Roumanians have withdrawn would it not be sufficient for you to remain as Special Commissioner representing the United States. I make this suggestion for two reasons, first because I am anxious to withdraw from all Inter-Allied military commissions as far as possible on account of the danger of becoming involved in further obligations; second because I fear that criticism at Washington will not permit us to maintain a military mission which could be charged with interfering with the internal politics of Hungary. If you stayed there as High Commissioner until Grant-Smith arrives, would it be necessary for you to continue to have as large a staff as you have at present. A frank expression of your views is desired. Polk.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/263: Telegram

[Document 358]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

VIENNA [*Budapest*], November 27, 1919.
[Received November 29—5:07 p.m.]

215. Hungarian officialdom got wise to this being American Thanksgiving Day and flowers or calls were received from Prime Minister, Cardinal Csernoch, Archduke, Mayor of Budapest and many others. All expressed appreciation of America's interest in unfortunate countries of Europe and for material assistance in way of Red Cross supplies, child feeding, etc. No Roumanian liaison yet attempted with this Mission.

It is recommended that an Interallied committee be sent to investigate reported Roumanian atrocities in Transylvania. Roumanians holding fast to line of the Tisza. It is important that American representative on Reparations Committee arrive here with the least practicable delay.

BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/266: Telegram

[Document 359]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 29, 1919.
[Received November 30—10:20 a.m.]

Polk from Bandholtz. Replying to your No. 119.⁷⁷ In my opinion no longer necessity continuance Interallied Military Mission. All instructions already practically carried out far as possible. There is no reason for my remaining except as given in telegram to Loree, and appointment as Special Commissioner until short time after Grant-Smith's arrival, if soon, should [be] sufficient. Have already arranged to reduce staff and should like to retain until my departure Colonel Loree, Colonel Sheldon, Captain Gore, Field Clerk Fenselau and six enlisted men. My present funds last until December 15th at least and after that date expenses would average about \$100 per diem. Cost of fuel now exorbitant. Serbs reported evacuating Baranya district plundering as they go. This Mission has sent four officers there for appropriate action. Roumanians still holding fast to line of the Tisza and bragging they have now only army in Europe and can do as they please. Arrangements should be made for turning over at once to proper commission the Hungarian claims so ably compiled by Colonel Loree. The Vienna Commission [*Mission*] telegraphs that Paris pouch for Budapest was through carelessness of a clerk returned to Paris and our pouch for Paris was left in Vienna. My vocabulary cannot do sufficient [*the subject*] justice.

BANDHOLTZ

⁷⁷ Ante, 727 [Pg. 727 includes portions of [Doc. 356](#) and [Doc. 357](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/267: Telegram

[Document 360]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, November 30, 1919.
[Received November 30—2:23 p.m.]

219. Polk from Bandholtz. My officer sent to Roumanian Headquarters quotes General Mardarescu as saying he has no instructions to retire beyond the Tisza and that he should remain there until peace is signed with the Hungarians. That he sees no necessity for liaison with this Mission which was only authorized to arrange for evacuation to the Tisza and that all questions affecting territory now occupied should be taken up with his Government. This is the very attitude anticipated in my previous reports to Ammission and strengthens the opinion expressed in my other message this date⁷⁸ as regards Mission. Reported that Maniu who is a satellite of Bratiano has been appointed Roumanian Prime Minister.

BANDHOLTZ

⁷⁸ Not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/64

[Document 361]

***Report to the Interallied Military Mission Made by
the Subcommittee Sent to Pecs on November 28,
Returning December 1, 1919***

Pécs, November 28 to December 1, 1919

1. The sub-committee consisting of:

Lieutenant Colonel Chas. B. Moore, U. S. A.
Captain Visbecq, French Army,
Lieutenant Rogers, British Army,
Lieutenant Martini, Italian Army, accompanied by
Lieutenant Hardy, as Liaison Officer to the sub-committee

left Budapest on the night of November 28th, per written instructions contained in letter from the Interallied Military Mission signed by General Graziani, French Mission, President of the Day on November 28th. (Copy of both papers attached).⁷⁹ Before departure, the committee sent a telegram, transmitted by the Hungarian authorities, to notify the Military Commander of Serbian Troops in Pecs, and the Civil Government (Serbian) of our arrival.

2. The sub-committee returned to Budapest, arriving on the morning of December 1st, without having accomplished the Mission given it in the written instructions referred to above, for the following reasons:

Both the Military Commander of Serbian Troops at Pecs and the Serbian Civil Governor at Pecs refused absolutely to receive the sub-committee as an official delegation, as they had received no instructions from their Government at Belgrade.

The sub-committee presented to both the Military Commander and the Serbian Civil Governor, the order of mission given by General Graziani. They recognized this document as official as far as we were

concerned, but stated that they could not accept same as official on their part without instructions from their Government.

3. The impressions given the sub-committee were as follows:

1. That both the Serbian civil governor at Pecs, and the Military Commander of troops, anticipated the arrival of the sub-committee from the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest;
2. That both had received definite instructions from higher authority that they were not to discuss in any way, matters regarding the evacuation of Pecs, or the increase in police for the district, with the sub-committee sent by the Mission at Budapest;
3. The Serbian authorities refused to make any effort on their part to obtain the necessary permission to treat with the sub-committee regarding the evacuation of Pecs or increase in the local guards;
4. It seems that the Serbian authorities do not wish to recognize that the Military Mission of Budapest has any authority over any territory occupied by them at the present time, which may subsequently be assigned in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.

4. While in Pecs, several civilians wished to come to the train occupied by the sub-committee, to report and discuss certain matters with the committee. The Serbian authorities refused to grant permission for these people to come to us.

The Committee wished to communicate the matters above referred to, to the Mission at Budapest by telephone, but the authorities refused to allow the committee to talk by telephone to Budapest, stating that it could not be done as the lines were down. This statement was incorrect as I had arranged for direct communication with Budapest up to the border and beyond.

I asked to send a telegram and they refused to allow me to send all information desired. The telegram sent was as follows:

“Pecs, 2:30 P.M. 29 Nov. 1919—General Graziani, French Mission, Budapest. Sub-committee has arrived in Pecs. Both Serbian Civil Governor and Military Commander state that they cannot discuss with sub-committee our order of mission

at Pecs without orders from their Government. Awaiting orders from you in Pecs. Moore, Colonel.”

It was asked to communicate with the General, commanding the division in the occupied territory. This was also refused.

5. It is the impression of the sub-committee that the Serbians will evacuate Pecs, but without notice to the Military Mission at Budapest and not until they are quite ready to evacuate or are forced to evacuate Pecs. It was noticed in the railroad yard at Pecs that there were very few cars and I saw three locomotives where previously there had been more than a dozen. I noticed a train-load of coal and one of wood in the station which I was told, was destined for interior Serbia. One gentleman came to me, while going to the hotel, stating that requisitions were being made for his horses and cows. He requested that the Committee intervene for him. One official at Pecs whom I spoke to on the street told me that cattle, horses, etc.; also the small railroad on the property of the former Arch Duke of Hungary was being removed to the Serbian side of the line of demarcation. The infantry troops that were in Pecs and surroundings have been replaced by a cavalry regiment. The frontier has been reinforced by a number of Customs Guards, which were not in Pecs on my former visit, November 23rd. I was told that the tax of 20% on deposits in banks was to be enforced and that a day had been set, the 15th of December, by which this was to be paid. This latter was only mentioned in a casual conversation so I know of nothing definite in writing regarding the tax. On leaving, I wrote a letter and informed the Civil Governor and Military Governor that I would make a report to the four Generals and was leaving because the authorities at Pecs would not recognize the official capacity of the Mission without instructions from their government, therefore I could not stay without performing the Mission which had been assigned me. (Copy of this letter is attached hereto)^{[80](#)}

CHARLES B. MOORE
Lt. Col. General Staff, U. S. A.

79 Not printed.

80 Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/266: Telegram

[Document 362]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to General Bandholtz

PARIS, December 5, 1919—9 p.m.

127. For Bandholtz from Polk. Supreme Council has decided to dissolve Council of Generals. In view of that fact you will remain in Budapest⁸¹ as United States representative and can keep with you Colonel Loree, Colonel Sheldon, Captain Gore, Field Clerk Fenselau and six enlisted men. Will arrange with Loree for funds. Please release all other officers immediately and from time to time let such other officers go as you do not absolutely need. I will let you know as soon as I have any information in regard to Grant-Smith's arrival. It is understood of course that you have no diplomatic status in view of the fact that we have not negotiated treaty with Hungary and are merely there as military observer but can give such friendly advice to the Hungarian Government as is proper.

Permit me to say that the administration of your office meets with the hearty approval of this Mission. Polk.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁸¹ Apparently garbled in transmission and received by General Bandholtz as "Bucharest"; see telegram *infra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/279: Telegram

[Document 363]

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

BUDAPEST, December 6, 1919.

[Received December 7—2:27 p.m.]

230. Polk from Bandholtz. Your number 127 received.⁸² The reference to representative in Bucharest is interpreted as meaning Budapest. This force already reduced to prescribed limits with exception of two field clerks who will be relieved at once. I greatly appreciate Commission's approval of my administration, and it has been a pleasure to serve under superiors whose patience has been great and support unfailing. Persistent reports coming in that there has been bloodshed between Transylvania Roumanians and old Roumanians of Roumanian Army. Roumanian headquarters have established telegraphic liaison [with French] Mission but not with Interallied Mission. An agent's report [from] Bucharest says Roumanian Chief of Staff does not intend to withdraw from the Theiss to the line of demarcation until signing of general peace, as Roumania needs natural obstacle like the Theiss to insure her western front against attack. All tommyrot. Indications are that Roumanians will not sign peace treaty and will not retire from Theiss until forced to do so by economic or diplomatic pressure. Threat is [*The sooner is threat of*] last ultimatum carried out, the sooner will this situation improve. A high Hungarian official informs me that Hungary does not like Germany but that for self-preservation, both she and Austria will sooner or later be forced to join Germany. The Roumanian General in charge of requisition just prior to departure from Budapest surreptitiously changed several millions of crowns into Roumanian lei. This was all savings over expenses from four months' pay. Hungarians are persecuting Jews to considerable extent. I have just personally verified a case and took up same with

Hungarian Chief of Staff who promises immediate investigation and remedial action.

BANDHOLTZ

82 *Supra.*

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/72

[Document 364]

General Bandholtz to the Interallied Military Mission

[BUDAPEST,] 13 December, 1919.

Subject: Change of Status.

1. In compliance with telegraphic instructions from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, the undersigned this date ceases to be a member of the Interallied Military Mission.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/22

[Document 365]

General Bandholtz to Countess Karolyi

BUDAPEST, 10 January, 1920.

MY DEAR COUNTESS KAROLYI: The enclosed letter was received yesterday from the American Red Cross in Paris,⁸³ and I had one of my liaison officers immediately endeavor to telephone you its contents. As he could not reach you personally, but simply delivered the message I am enclosing this letter for your information.

In regard to the subject of Hungarian prisoners of war in Siberia I will furnish you the following extract from a recent letter which although not encouraging will at least enlighten you:

“These prisoners are in a very difficult situation, and, for your personal information, I can not see, at the present time, any immediate prospects of their repatriation.

The Supreme Council has decided that the repatriation of contingents of friendly troops of Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Poles and Roumanians is to be effected prior to the repatriation of enemy prisoners of war.⁸⁴ The friendly contingents aggregate some 72,000.

The finance necessary for the repatriation of the friendly contingents has been very difficult to arrange, but I think this will be covered by joint British and American credits. Our War Department reports that it will cost approximately \$250.00 per head to repatriate the friendly contingents.

You were kind enough to send me, in your letter of November 18 a list showing the total number of Hungarian prisoners now in Russia. Multiplying the total shown by your list by the \$250.00 factor demonstrates that the financial problem alone

for the repatriation of enemy prisoners is practically impossible to meet today. Our Government, under its laws, can not advance any credits on this account. The American Red Cross is endeavoring to raise money to provide some local relief, but this is dependent entirely upon voluntary contributions in America. It is not probable that an extensive program can be adopted. My suggestion is that the Hungarian Red Cross, or some other similar body in Hungary get in communication with the American Red Cross officials with a view to coordinating their activities. By this means the greatest possible relief may be afforded these unfortunate Hungarian Nationals now in Siberia.”

I regret exceedingly that the outlook is not more favorable but I know you prefer to have the whole situation placed before you.

I shall be very glad at any time to be of service.

Very sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

⁸³ Not printed.

⁸⁴ See HD-65, minute 4, [vol. VIII, pp. 488](#)–[489](#).

Paris Peace Conf. 181.921/68

[Document 366]

General Bandholtz to the Hungarian Prime Minister

BUDAPEST, 23 January, 1920.

Subject: Claims Bureau.

1. During the early meetings of the Interallied Military Mission that body received many claims and complaints from Hungarian subjects and others, and, therefore appointed a Committee to handle such questions with Colonel James T. Loree, U. S. A., as chairman.
2. At the same time the Hungarian Government appointed Minister Councillor Emil Zerkowitz to represent the Hungarian Government in taking up and discussing all claims brought before the committee.
3. Due to the failure of the Roumanians to appoint a representative on the committee the latter evolved into a Claims and Complaints Bureau for the remainder of its existence, and the compilation and tabulation of all claims and complaints was handled by Mr. Zerkowitz and his office force which work was done in a most careful and creditable manner.
4. As there has now been appointed an International sub-committee of the Reparations Commission of the Supreme Council, and the American Military Mission is about to leave Budapest, this opportunity is taken advantage of to inform Your Excellency of the excellent work done by Minister Councillor Zerkowitz and his efficient assistants and also to advise Your Excellency that on the 15th of February the Claims and Complaints Bureau may be discontinued.
5. This opportunity is likewise taken advantage of to thank the Hungarian Government for its cooperation and assistance in this important work.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ

763.72119/8881: Telegram

[Document 367]

The Commissioner in Hungary (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

BUDAPEST, January 31, 1920—8 p.m.
[Received via Paris February 2—10:02 a.m.]

Respectfully recommend that General Bandholtz be sent home on State Department detail until he has had an opportunity of reporting personally to the Secretary of State at Washington on conditions in Hungary, also that he be accorded the usual diplomatic customs courtesies as retiring Commissioner of the United States in Hungary on arrival at New York.

GRANT-SMITH

763.72119/9004: Telegram

[Document 368]

***The Commissioner in Hungary (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

BUDAPEST, February 9, 1920—10 a.m.

[Received via Paris February 10—12:45 p.m.]

General Bandholtz and staff left Budapest this morning on the direct special train bearing the Hungarian peace delegation to Paris.

GRANT-SMITH

Mission of Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Montenegro

[\[369\] Mr. A. J. Balfour to Colonel E. M. House](#)

Paris, March 28, 1919. [Received April 26.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.018/3

[\[370\] Colonel E. M. House to Mr. A. J. Balfour](#)

Paris, April 3, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.018/3

[\[371\] The Secretary of State to Mr. A. J. Balfour](#)

Paris, April 18, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.018/3

[\[372\] Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace \(Grew\)](#)

Paris, May 19, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01802/14

[373] Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Paris, May 21, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01802/15

[374] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Paris, May 30, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01802/14

Paris Peace Conf. 184.018/3

[Document 369]

Mr. A. J. Balfour to Colonel E. M. House

PARIS, March 28, 1919.
[Received April 26.]

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: I wish to approach you in regard to the present situation in Montenegro.

You will remember that so soon as it became evident that a state of civil war had broken out in Montenegro an endeavour was made by the French and British Governments to induce the United States Government to send American forces to occupy the country. The United States Government were, however, unwilling to do so and suggested that the best course to pursue would be merely to insist on the withdrawal of the Serbian forces operating in Montenegro.

The British and French Governments, however, were of the opinion that this would merely lead to renewed disorders and civil war, and they were prepared in principle to consider a joint Franco-British occupation. On examining the question however the British Military authorities decided it would be impossible for them to send British troops to Montenegro and further representations were therefore made to the United States Government, in the hope that they would reconsider their decision.

The United States Government replied on March 2nd that they were quite unable to modify their refusal to send American troops to Montenegro, and General Franchet d'Esperey has therefore given instructions that all Allied troops should be withdrawn from the country. These instructions apply not only to the French, British and American detachments but also to the Serbian and Italian detachments, and the result will be that the Montenegrins will be left to fight out their disputes alone.

So far as can be ascertained the majority of the Montenegrin people really desire to enter the Jugo-Slav State and the conflict which has arisen centres rather on the question as to whether this union should or should not be in the nature of complete fusion or whether, alternatively, some federal arrangement should be agreed on such as would reserve to Montenegro its autonomous rights. So far as our information goes we have no ground for supposing that there is any important movement in Montenegro either for complete independence or for the return of the Petrovich dynasty and we are ourselves inclined to feel that any statements which represent such a movement as being in existence emanate from Italian or other anti-Serbian sources.

It is fair to add that M. Radovich, the leader of the party of complete fusion, who has just arrived in Paris, has assured us in a most categorical manner that all reports which have reached us as to internal dissension in Montenegro have been wilfully exaggerated for the purposes of Italian propaganda.

The main conclusion which may be drawn from the above is that we do not actually know the real wishes of the Montenegrin people. In order that these wishes should be ascertained I would suggest that an Anglo-American Commission should proceed to the spot and I should be glad to learn whether the American Government will agree to this proposal and will nominate a representative accordingly. It is suggested that our own representative should be Count Salis, formerly His Majesty's Minister at Cetinje.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

Paris Peace Conf. 184.018/3

[Document 370]

Colonel E. M. House to Mr. A. J. Balfour

PARIS, April 3, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. BALFOUR: In reply to your letter of March 28, 1919, in which you suggest that an Anglo-American Commission proceed to Montenegro to ascertain the true wishes of the inhabitants after the withdrawal of the Allied troops now occupying the country, I hasten to inform you that this plan meets with the approval of President Wilson. He has appointed Lt. Colonel Sherman Miles,^{[1](#)} who at the present time is in the neighbourhood of Fiume, to be the American representative. A telegram has therefore been sent to him at Fiume^{[2](#)} to hold himself in readiness to join Count Salis at some point which may be mutually convenient so that they may then proceed to Montenegro and undertake their mission without loss of time.

Sincerely yours,

E. M. HOUSE

^{[1](#)} Member of the Coolidge Mission.

^{[2](#)} Not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.018/3

[Document 371]

The Secretary of State to Mr. A. J. Balfour

PARIS, April 18, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. BALFOUR: With reference to your letter of March 28, 1919, to Mr. House, and the latter's acknowledgment of April 3rd, concerning the mission of Count Salis and Lieutenant-Colonel Sherman Miles in Montenegro, I beg to quote herewith, for your information, a telegram which I am sending to the Embassy at Rome, for the information of Colonel Miles:

“The British Embassy at Washington has informed the Department of State as follows, regarding alleged massacres of Albanians in Montenegro: ‘Gusinje, Plava, Ipek, Djakova, Podjour and Rosjhi, have all been scenes of terrorism and murder by Serbian troops and Serbian agents whose policy appears to be the extermination of the Albanian inhabitants of the region.’ It is desired that you consult with Count Salis and make an investigation of these reports.”

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01802/14

[Document 372]

***Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to the Secretary
General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
(Grew)***

Report No. 23

PARIS, May 19, 1919.

Subject: Political conditions in Montenegro.

1. In compliance with your telegraphic instructions of April 22,³ I went to Montenegro and cooperated in investigating conditions there with Count de Salis, British Minister to the Vatican.
2. In November 1917 the so-called elections of Podgeritea were held. It is very probable that the result of this election was influenced, as politics have always been in Montenegro, by the military power back of the winning party. In any event, the pro-Serb party won the election, assembled the Government, and imprisoned the leaders of the opposing parties. Even this did not apparently satisfy the Government at Belgrade, and about the 20th of April, 1918, the Serbians executed a quiet *coup d'état* and ejected all the Montenegrin officials. The country is now nominally under a civil "Minister-Delegate" from Belgrade, who happens to have been born a Montenegrin but who was educated and has lived all his life in Serbia. Under him are five prefects in the five districts of the country—all Serbians. There is also at Cetinje a Serbian Major-General, who intimated to me that he was under the real Governor of Montenegro. The country is certainly under Serbian military control, and I suspect that the General exercises the real power.
3. In the neighborhood of Antivari there are small bands of Montenegrin royalists, aided by local Albanians, who are opposing in a feeble manner both the Serbian Government and the Allied troops on the coast. Aside from this, the country is quiet. The Montenegrin civilians, who have always habitually borne arms, are

being disarmed by the Serbians. There are a few hundred Montenegrin youths under Serbian military training.

4. It would be absolutely impossible to ascertain the real political wishes of the Montenegrins except under a British or American occupation of the country. Even then, a plebiscite would have to be taken under conditions which would permit the people to understand very clearly exactly what they might expect from union with Serbia, union with Yugo-Slavia or from independence, and under what guarantees. As this would appear to be practically inadmissible, I consider that the best solution of the Montenegrin problem is the recognition by the Great Powers of the inclusion of Montenegro in the Yugo-Slav State, under guarantees from Yugo-Slavia that local autonomy will be granted and maintained in Montenegro. It is practically certain that even under these conditions the Serbians would use means of repression for political control in Montenegro; but, on the other hand, severe measures of repression will never repay the Serbians, because they are dealing with a warlike, mountainous [*sic*] people. I believe that in a comparatively short time the Montenegrins would reach their natural political level, and that the country as a whole would profit by the protection gained through inclusion in Yugo-Slavia and by direct contact with the higher civilization of the other Yugo-Slav States.
5. There are two other solutions. One is to abandon Montenegro wholly to Serbian control, which would be a political crime. The other is to reconstitute Montenegro as an independent state. I think this latter solution would be almost as great a mistake as the former, both because the barren mountainous district called Montenegro is geographically unfitted for self-sustained independence, and because there is no possible Government for an independent Montenegro except the dynasty of King Nicholas. It is, of course, impossible, without a plebiscite, to know what the Montenegrin people really think of King Nicholas, but all indications seem to show that he is discredited and despised by a majority of his people. At best his dynasty was loyally upheld by only the "Five Tribes" around Negusei and Cetinje. He himself has been a notorious intriguer throughout his career, and he will never be forgiven by the Montenegrins for the loss of Lovcen, and the

subsequent Austrian capture of Montenegro. Worst of all, he is an old man and his sons are degenerates, utterly unfit to rule.

6. The incorporation into Montenegro of the Albanian territory of Ipek by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913⁴ has led to massacres and deportations of the Albanians, and will be, if not rectified, a continuous source of trouble in the future. The Albanian and the Southern Slav are so totally different in all racial characteristics, and their racial animosity is of such long standing that it is impossible for them to live together peacefully within the same political boundaries. The drawing of a just nationalist boundary between Montenegro and Albania, as well as between Albania and the other states bordering on it, is a prime necessity for the future peace of the Balkans.
7. I would, therefore, suggest that the solution of the Montenegrin question be the inclusion of Montenegro into Yugo-Slavia, under Yugo-Slav guarantees of autonomy and of political rights, which should be, in proportion to the Montenegrin population, equal to each of those of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. I would also strongly recommend that the political boundary between Montenegro and Albania be defined carefully along the lines of long standing nationality, modified where necessary by geographic considerations, but never by favor to one people or the other for the part they may or may not have played in the war.

SHERMAN MILES

³ Quoted in note printed *supra*.

⁴ Signed July 28 (August 10), 1913, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

***Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to the Secretary
General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
(Grew)***

Report No. 24

PARIS, May 21, 1919.

Subject: Serbian massacres of Albanians in Montenegro.

1. In compliance with your telegraphic instructions,⁵ I investigated, as far as was practicable, the Serbian massacres of Albanians in Montenegro. As these massacres had ceased and the district in question had been entirely cleared of Albanians two months before I went to Montenegro, I found that the only evidence obtainable was that of the Albanian refugees near Scutari and the statements of the Serbian and Montenegrin officials.

2. It may be well to recall that the southeastern district of Montenegro (Berane, Ipek and Djacova) was given to Montenegro by the Great Powers in 1878.⁶ But the Albanians were so strong at that time that they were able to prevent the entrance of the Montenegrins into the ceded territory. The Great Powers, not being willing to enforce their decision, persuaded Montenegro to accept the sea-coast district of Dulcigno in lieu of that of Berane-Ipek-Djacova. Even then a naval demonstration was necessary to insure the Montenegrin occupation of Dulcigno. Finally the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 again gave the Berane-Ipek-Djacova district to the Montenegrins, as their share of the Turkish spoils. They occupied it, and even that year there was some trouble and Albanians were killed. In 1915 the Montenegrins and Serbs were driven south, through Albania. During the retreat the Albanians, in spite of their long standing feud with the Slavs, refrained from closing the mountain passes and permitted the Slavs to reach the sea unmolested.

3. On the 21st November, 1918, according to the Albanian accounts, Montenegrins in Ipek attempted to disarm an Albanian merchant. The Albanians resented this, and firing began. There was a small detachment of French Cavalry in the town, and several battalions of Yugo-Slav troops. The Albanians claim that, rather than fire on Allied troops, they withdrew.

4. Between the 15th and 25th of December 1918 the Albanians state that massacres took place in the district of Podgur, in which there were about 50 Albanian villages. Old men, women and children were massacred, 138 houses burned and about 400 houses pillaged. The Albanians who escaped fled to the mountains. The Albanians maintain that this affair was premeditated and brought about by the Serbians.

5. From the 25th of December to early in March, when the massacres appear to have ceased, the Albanian account is confused. Intermittent fighting and massacres occurred at Plava and Gusigne and in the Rugova, Pechter, Podgur and Rozai districts. The Albanians state that of the 15 villages in the district of Rugova not a soul is now left. Eight hundred people were massacred there, not counting the men killed while resisting. In the district around Rozai many villages were destroyed, and 700 Albanians were massacred without resistance. At Plava and Gusigne 333 women, children and old men were massacred.

6. In all these Albanian accounts, direct complicity of Serbian troops is charged, as well as barbarity in the form of the rape of girls and the burning alive of people. The Albanians state that there are none of their people left in the districts affected—that all have been massacred or have fled to the mountains or to Scutari. They place the number of Albanians killed since last November at 30,000.

7. The Serb-Montenegrin official account I got from a commission of two, who had been sent into the district in question to find out what had happened. They claimed to have spent three weeks in the district. They returned to Cettigne May 10th. I saw them the same day. There were a Montenegrin official from Antivari and a Serbian Colonel. According to their accounts, the Albanians resisted the

properly constituted authorities of the district, and about 100 people were killed. Those casualties were about equally divided between the Serbo-Montenegrins and the Albanians. Except for one or two Albanian women accidentally killed during the fighting in the villages, they deny that any unarmed Albanians suffered. They also deny that there were any atrocities committed.

8. Since my return to Paris, M. Radovitch⁷ has given me his version of the affair, in which the entire blame is put on the Italians, who, he claims, instigated the trouble by bribery.

9. The fact of the matter is that the affair took place in a very mountainous and inaccessible region between the last of November 1918 and the first of March 1919. Except for a small detachment of French cavalry, which was present at the outbreak of the trouble but which appears to have been withdrawn very soon afterwards, no foreigners witnessed any part of it. Captain Brodie (British Army), while attempting to enter the district in February, was arrested by the Serbians and taken under guard to Belgrade. The details of the affair and even the responsibility for its beginning will probably never be determined impartially.

10. But it is an incontrovertible fact that there are now between 2000 and 2500 Albanian refugees from Montenegro who are now near Scutari, and undoubtedly many more in the mountains. Americans, British, French and Italians have seen these people come in, and agree that they refuged out of their country taking with them little more than the clothes in which they stood. It is the grossest nonsense for the Serbo-Montenegrins to say that these Albanians, who had always lived in the district, abandoned their homes and property and fled in the depth of winter without being forced to do so. Nothing but force, accompanied by terrorism in the form of atrocities could have produced the results that were produced. Nor is it at all probable that the Montenegrins, unaided by the Serbians, could have forced the Albanians out. The latter are excellent fighters, and could only have been driven out by regularly organized Serbian or Yugo-Slav troops, probably (as the Albanians claim) equipped with mountain artillery.

11. Personally I believe, from what I could find out in Montenegro and Albania, that the Serbo-Montenegrins did massacre a large number of Albanians in southeastern Montenegro, and that this was done with the deliberate intention of clearing the Albanians out of the country they occupied. I do not believe that it is now possible to fix the responsibility for the actual outbreak of the trouble, nor determine impartially the details or the numbers killed. The figure given me by the British Mission in Scutari of between 18,000 and 25,000 Albanians killed is only an approximation, as is the Albanian estimate of 30,000 killed. But there can be no doubt that many hundreds, if not thousands of Albanians were killed and that most, if not all the rest were driven from their homes.

12. I believe that the Serbo-Montenegrins deliberately took advantage of the fact that the Great Powers were absorbed in bigger questions, and no one was watching them for the moment, to consolidate their hold on a territory given them by the Treaty of Bucharest, and to which they had no valid nationalistic claims. They should never have been allowed to do this; but they have done it, and I believe there is now but one way of partially repairing the wrong done—to disregard entirely the award to Montenegro of the Treaty of Bucharest, and to draw the new Albanian frontiers along nationalistic lines as they are known to have existed in 1913–14. Here and there geographic features will have to be taken into consideration, but neither side should be favored on the ground of what they are supposed to have done or left undone during the War. The Southern Slav and the Albanian are so essentially different, and even antagonistic in all characteristics that it is impossible to expect them to live in peace within the same political frontier for many generations to come.

13. I give herewith figures of the Albanian Committee in Scutari, organized for the relief of the refugees, on the population of the districts involved, as those populations stood before the war. I submit these figures for what they may be worth, without knowing whether or not they are accurate:

District	of Rugova	7,000
“	“ Plava-Gusigne	23,000

“	“	Rozai	18,000
“	“	Pechter	20,000
“	“	Podgur	15,000
Totals in districts affected			83,000

In the above districts (with the exception of Rugova, which was all Albanian) the population was about 5% Serb and 95% Albanian. In Pristina there were 91,000 Albanians and 6,000 Serbs. In the old Turkish vilayet of Kossovo there were 850,000 Albanians and 90,000 Serbs.

SHERMAN MILES

⁵ Quoted in note printed on p. 738 [*Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 371](#) and [Doc. 372](#)*].

⁶ [Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 866](#) .

⁷ Serbian delegate to the Peace Conference; former President of the Council of Ministers.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01802/14

[Document 374]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

PARIS, May 30, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my note to you of April 30th, replying to your inquiry about Montenegro,^{[8](#)} I referred to the Anglo-American Mission of Investigation, on which we were represented by Colonel Miles, and suggested awaiting his report before taking definite action.

Miles has now returned and has reported to the Commission,^{[9](#)} and submitted his summary of the situation in Montenegro, of which I enclose a copy.^{[10](#)}

His conclusions confirm reports from many other sources that the solution of the Montenegrin question, which would best meet the wishes of the people concerned, is the incorporation of this country into Yugo-Slavia under guarantees of autonomy and the protection of local rights.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

^{[8](#)} Neither printed.

^{[9](#)} For oral report to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, see minutes of the meeting of May 24, [vol. XI, p. 184](#).^{[10](#)}

^{[10](#)} Report No. 23, May 19, p. 738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 371](#) and [Doc. 372](#)].

The American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey (The King–Crane Commission)

[\[375\] Instructions for Commissioners From the Peace Conference](#)

25 March, 1919.

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[\[376\] The Secretary of State to President Wilson](#)

Paris, April 2, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.91/73

[\[377\] President Wilson to the Secretary of State](#)

[Paris,] 15 April, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.91/79

[\[378\] Mr. C. R. Crane and Mr. H. C. King to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Jerusalem, June 20, 1919. [Received June 21—2:50 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 867N.00/91: Telegram

**[379] Mr. C. R. Crane and Mr. H. C. King to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace**

Beirut, [July 10, 1919.] [Received July 12—6:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9102/3: Telegram

**[380] Report of the American Section of the International
Commission on Mandates in Turkey**

Paris, August 28, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9102/9

[381] Confidential Appendix to the Report Upon Syria

undated

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9102/10

Paris Peace Conf. 181.91/49

[Document 375]

Instructions for Commissioners From the Peace Conference

SM—140

FUTURE ADMINISTRATION OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE UNDER THE MANDATORY SYSTEM

Instructions for Commissioners from the Peace Conference to make enquiries in certain portions of the Turkish Empire which are to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of Governments acting as Mandatories for the League of Nations.^{[1](#)}

(Agreed to by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and M. Orlando.)

It is the purpose of the Conference to separate from the Turkish Empire certain areas comprising, for example, Palestine, Syria, the Arab countries to the east of Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Cilicia, and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor, and to put the development of their people under the guidance of Governments which are to act as Mandatories of the League of Nations. It is expected that this will be done in accordance with the following resolutions adopted by the Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan at a Conference held at the Quai d'Orsay on January 30, 1919.^{[2](#)}

“1. Having regard to the record of the German administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that in no

circumstances should any of the German Colonies be restored to Germany.

- “2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.
- “3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.
- “4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical positions, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.
- “5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.
- “6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes

of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

“7. They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes, and the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations.

“8. Finally, they consider that there are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory state as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

“In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge”.

And it is agreed that the administration of these mandates shall be in the spirit of the following document which was formally presented to the President of the United States on behalf of the Governments of Great Britain and France:

“ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION, NOVEMBER 9, 1918

“The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

“In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognise such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy”.

The Conference therefore feels obliged to acquaint itself as intimately as possible with the sentiments of the people of these regions with regard to the future administration of their affairs. You are requested, accordingly, to visit these regions to acquaint yourselves as fully as possible with the state of opinion there with regard to these matters, with the social, racial, and economic conditions, a knowledge of which might serve to guide the judgment of the Conference, and to form as definite an opinion as the circumstances and the time at your disposal will permit, of the divisions of territory and assignment of mandates which will be most likely to promote the order, peace, and development of those peoples and countries.

25 MARCH, 1919.

¹ For President Wilson’s proposal to appoint an Interallied Commission on Mandates in Turkey, and discussion of the proposal in the Council of Four, see IC–163A, March 20, 1919, [vol. v, pp. 1](#) ff.

² See BC–17 and BC–18, [vol. iii, pp. 785](#) ff. and [797](#) ff. For amendment of resolution 7 before adoption, see [ibid., p. 803](#).

Paris Peace Conf. 181.91/73

[Document 376]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

PARIS, April 2, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In connection with the instructions which were agreed upon by you, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Orlando on March 25, 1919, with regard to the sending of Commissioners from the Peace Conference to make inquiries in certain portions of the Turkish Empire which are to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of governments acting as Mandatories for the League of Nations, I respectfully request your authorization to sign the appended letters³ addressed to Mr. H. C. King⁴ and Mr. Charles R. Crane,⁵ designating them as the two American Commissioners.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

³ Neither printed.

⁴ President of Oberlin College, Ohio.

⁵ Treasurer of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.91/79

[Document 377]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

[PARIS,] 15 April, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have delayed replying to the enclosed^{[6](#)} because the other Powers involved seem to have virtually withdrawn from their agreement to send commissioners to Syria, but in case we alone send them, these letters would be just as suitable, and I am very glad to authorize you to sign them.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

^{[6](#)} Presumably Secretary Lansing's letter of April 2, *supra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 867N.00/91: Telegram

[Document 378]

***Mr. C. R. Crane and Mr. H. C. King to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

JERUSALEM, June 20, 1919.

[Received June 21—2:50 p.m.]

For President Wilson. Probably at no time has race feeling been so sensitive as just now. People in large bodies especially armed forces should move as little as possible and even then only with great care and on advice from competent officials in area affected. Careless descent of Greeks on Smyrna has produced distress reacting all over this coast where there was deep belief in our own declaration as well as in those of British Government and French Government made November 9⁷ on right of people to self-determination. Here older population both Moslem and Christian take united and most hostile attitude towards any extent of Jewish immigration or towards any effort to establish Jewish sovereignty over them. We doubt if any British Government or American official here believes that it is possible to carry out Zionist program except through support of large army.

**KING
CRANE**

⁷ Anglo-French declaration quoted in “Instructions for Commissioners”, p. 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 375](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9102/3: Telegram

[Document 379]

***Mr. C. R. Crane and Mr. H. C. King to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

BEIRUT, [July 10, 1919.]
[Received July 12—6:30 a.m.]

Commission has now covered strategic point[s] from Beersheba to Baalbek and from Mediterranean Sea to Amman. Every facility has been given Commission by various military governors, though inevitable some steering. Heartily welcomed everywhere. No doubt of great interest of people, some Bedouin delegates riding 30 hours to meet Commission. Gratitude to you and Americans constantly and warmly expressed. Popular program developed [*developing*] in range and definiteness showing considering [*considerable*] political insight. Much to indicate our inquiries greatly worthwhile and freer expression of opinion to American section than could have been made to mixed commission. Certain points are unmistakable. Intense desire for unity of all Syria and Palestine and for as early independence as possible. Unexpected[ly] strong expressions of national feeling. Singular[ly] determined repulsion to becoming a mere colony of any power and against any kind of French mandate. Only marked exceptions to this statement are found in strong parties of Lebanese who demand complete separation of Lebanon with French collaboration. In our judgement proclamation of French mandate for all Syria would precipitate warfare between Arabs and French, and force Great Britain to dangerous alternative. America genuinely first choice of most for mandatary because believed have no territorial ambition. General demand that essentially, same condition should hold for Iraq as for Syria. Both British Government and French officers share conviction that unity of whole of Syria and Palestine is most desirable. They feel that constant friction and danger to peace are otherwise inevitable between British subjects, French and Arabs. But there is little clear evidence that either British

Government or French Government are willing entirely to withdraw. Subsequent experience only confirms earlier dispatch concerning Zionism. Syria National Congress composed of 69 regularly elected representatives Moslem[s] and Christians from Syria including Palestine and Lebanon met at Damascus July 2nd. Formulated program acceptable to all Moslem[s] and many Christians, except that Christians preferring strong mandatary power for their protection. Congress asks immediate complete political independence for united Syria. Government a civil, constitutionalist, federal monarchy, safely guarding right of minority under Prince Feisal as king. Affirm Article 22 of Covenant does not apply to Syria. Mandate interpreted to mean economy and technical assistance limited in time. Asking this earnestly from America. Should America refuse then England. Deny all rights and refuse all assistance of France. Vigorously oppose Zionistic plan and Jewish immigration. Asking complete independence of Mesopotamia. Protesting against Sykes-Picot Agreement⁸ and Balfour Declaration.⁹ Concluding request that political rights be not stood [*less than*] under Turkey.

Whole situation here involves elements of world-wide importance. Solution proposed in Paris putting Syria under France would not strengthen friendly relations of France with England but the contrary. Arabs would certainly resist by every means. England would be obliged to choose between Arabs and French with Egypt and India in background. Moslem world undoubtedly be happy at seeing its last independent state disappear. Reduction of Turkey accepted as necessary political measure, but if followed [by] resistance to formation of Arab state invariably [*interpretation*] will be hostile [*hostility*] to Moslem world, an attitude neither England nor France can afford. But important move can be made greatly strengthen position of both. Emir Feisal despite limitation of education has become unique outstanding figure capable of rendering greatest service for world peace. He is heart of Moslem world, with enormous prestige and popularity, confirmed believer in Anglo-Saxon race; real[ly] great lover of Christians [*Christianity*], Could do more than any other to reconcile Christians [*Christianity*] and Islam and longs to do so. Even talks seriously of American college for women at Mecca. Most important Feisal be encouraged, support[ed] and given opportunity to work out his plan. Given

proper sympathy and surroundings no danger of his getting adrift or taking big step without Anglo-Saxon approval. Every doctrine and policy concerning Syria[n] state should take this intimate [*into*] consideration.

We are sending by courier important documents showing general conviction of people.

**CRANE
KING**

⁸ Agreement reached after discussions between Sir Mark Sykes and M. F. Georges Picot, regarding the eventual partition of Ottoman territories between Great Britain, France, and Russia.

For notes exchanged on May 9 and 16, 1916, between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon defining British and French claims in the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire, see G. Fr. de Martens, *Nouveau recueil general de traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international* (106), 3 sér., tome x, pp. 350 ff.

⁹ Declaration contained in Mr. Balfour's letter of November 2, 1917, to Lord Rothschild. See *London Times*, November 9, 1917, p. 7.

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9102/9

[Document 380]

***Report of the American Section of the International
Commission on Mandates in Turkey***

PARIS, August 28, 1919.

SECTION ONE	—Report upon Syria.
SECTION TWO	—Report upon Mesopotamia. ^{10}
SECTION THREE	—Report upon the non-Arabic-Speaking Portions of the Former Ottoman Empire. ^{11}

Submitted by the Commissioners:

Charles K. Crane
Henry Churchill King

SECTION ONE. THE REPORT UPON SYRIA^{[12](#)}

The American Commissioners of the projected International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, herewith submit their final report upon the Syrian portion of their task.

The Commission's conception of its mission was defined in the following statement which was given to the press wherever the Commission went:

The American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, in order that their mission may be clearly understood, are furnishing to the press the following statement, which is intended to define as accurately as possible the nature of their task, as given to them by President Wilson.

The American people—having no political ambitions in Europe or the Near East; preferring, if that were possible, to keep clear of all European, Asian, or African entanglements; but nevertheless

sincerely desiring that the most permanent peace and the largest results for humanity shall come out of this war—recognize that they cannot altogether avoid responsibility for just settlements among the nations following the war, and under the League of Nations. In that spirit they approach the problems of the Near East.

An International Commission was projected by the Council of Four of the Peace Conference to study conditions in the Turkish Empire with reference to possible mandates. The American Section of that Commission is in the Near East simply and solely to get as accurate and definite information as possible concerning the conditions, the relations, and the desires of all the peoples and classes concerned; in order that President Wilson and the American people may act with full knowledge of the facts in any policy they may be called upon hereafter to adopt concerning the problems of the Near East—whether in the Peace Conference, or in the later League of Nations.

This statement of the mission of the Commission is in complete harmony with the following paragraph from the Covenant of the League of Nations, particularly referring to portions of the former Turkish Empire: “Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”.

The Commission had in their survey of Syria the assistance of Dr. Albert H. Lybyer, Dr. George E. Montgomery, and Captain William Yale, U. S. A., as Advisors; of Captain Donald M. Brodie, U. S. A., as Secretary and Treasurer; of Dr. Sami Haddad, Instructor in the School of Medicine of the Syrian Protestant College of Beirut, as Physician and Interpreter; of Mr. Laurence S. Moore as Business Manager; and of Sergeant Major Paul O. Toren as stenographer. The advisers had all been previously connected as Experts with the Peace Conference in Paris, and had been students of the special problems of the Near East.

The report naturally falls into three divisions: Data, General Considerations, and Recommendations.

I—DATA

The Commission had already familiarized itself before leaving Paris with the full and varied reports and material coming into the office of the Western Asia Division of the Experts of the American Section of the Peace Conference, and with considerable other literature bearing on the Near East. The survey of Syria was made in the light of all this previous study.

The method of the Commission, in its inquiry in Syria, was to meet in conference individuals and delegations who should represent all the significant groups in the various communities, and so to obtain as far as possible the opinions and desires of the whole people. The process itself was inevitably a kind of political education for the people, and, besides actually bringing out the desires of the people, had at least further value in the simple consciousness that their wishes were being sought. We were not blind to the fact that there was considerable propaganda; that often much pressure was put upon individuals and groups; that sometimes delegations were prevented from reaching the Commission; and that the representative authority of many petitions was questionable. But the Commission believes that these anomalous elements in the petitions tend to cancel one another when the whole country is taken into account, and that, as in the composite photograph, certain great, common emphases are unmistakable.

The Commissioners were struck, on the other hand, with the large degree of frankness with which opinions were expressed to them, even where there was evident fear of consequences. In this respect the American Section had an evident advantage, which could not have held for a mixed Commission. Moreover, the nearly universal recognition of the fact that America sought no additional territory was favorable to a frank expression of opinion.

The direct data, furnished by the inquiry in Syria, are given in a series of tables, prepared by the Secretary of the Commission, and based immediately upon the Conferences of the Commission and the petitions there presented.

The area and towns covered by the Commission's inquiry are shown in the following itinerary for June 10th to July 21st, and in the table of the towns, classified according to the different divisions of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations—British, French, and Arab. These tables show that the Commission visited thirty-six of the more important towns of Syria, scattered through all the military areas, and heard delegations from other important centers. It should be noted that the list does not include at all the names of hosts of villages in the vicinity of towns visited, which were also represented by delegations before the Commission. Our records show

that there were 1520 such villages. Cilicia was briefly included in the Syrian inquiry, because it is disputed territory claimed both by Syria and by the Turkish-speaking portion of the former Turkish Empire.

THE ITINERARY

- June 10 Commission arrived in Jaffa.
11, Interviews at Jaffa.
12
13 By auto to Tel Aviv, Richon-le-Sion and Jerusalem.
14 Jerusalem. Official Calls.
15 (Sunday)
16 Jerusalem. Interviews.
17 To Bethlehem, Hebron and Beersheba by auto. Interviews at Bethlehem and Hebron.
18 Interviews at Beersheba, including Gaza delegations. To Jerusalem by auto.
19, Jerusalem. Interviews.
20
21 By auto to Ramallah and Nablus. Interviews at both places.
22 By auto to Jenin and Nazareth. Interviews at Jenin.
23 Interviews at Nazareth. To Haifa (Mt. Carmel Monastery) by auto. Interviews.
24 To Acre by auto. Interviews. To Nazareth by auto.
June 25 To Damascus by auto, via Tiberias and Capernaum.
26 Damascus. Official Calls.
27, Damascus. Interviews.
28
29 (Sunday)
30 Damascus. Interviews.
July 1 To Amman and Deraa by train. Interviews at both places.
2,3 Damascus. Interviews.
4 To Baalbek by auto.
5 Baalbek. Interviews. To Beirut by auto.
6 Beirut (Aleih).
7,8 Beirut. Interviews.
9 To Jebeil, Batrun, and Bkerke, by auto. Interviews at each place.
10 To Sidon and Tyre by auto. Interviews at both places.

- 11 To Ainab, Baabda, and Zahle by auto. Interviews at each place.
- 12 To Tripoli by yacht. Interviews.
- 13 To Alexandretta by yacht. Interviews.
- 14 To Ladikiya by yacht. Interviews. To Tripoli by yacht.
- 15 To Horns by auto.
- 16 Interviews at Horns. To Hama by auto. Interviews. To Aleppo by train.
- 17 Aleppo.
- 18, 19 Aleppo. Interviews.
- 20 To Adana, by train.
Adana. Interviews. To Mersina by train, via Tarsus. Interviews at
- 21 Tarsus and Mersina. Commission left Mersina on U. S. Destroyer *Hazelwood* for Constantinople.

CITIES AND VILLAGES OF SYRIA AT WHICH DELEGATIONS WERE RECEIVED BY
THE AMERICAN COMMISSION

I —O. E. T. A.¹³ (South)—Under British Military Administration—
Comprises Palestine west of Jordan line.

Acre

Beersheba—(Gaza)[†]

Bethlehem

Haifa

Hebron

Jaffa (Ludd, Ramleh)

Jenin

Jerusalem

Nablus

Nazareth—(Safed, Tiberias)

Ramallah

Richon-le-Sion

Tel Aviv

II —O. E. T. A. (East)—Under Arab Military Administration—Comprises all
of Syria east of Jordan line and Lebanon boundary.

Aleppo

Amman—(Es-Salt)

Baalbek

Damascus

Deraa

Hama
Homs
Moalaka

III —O. E. T. A. (West)—Under French Military Administration—Comprises Lebanon and Coastal Regions north to Alexandretta.

Ainab
Alexandretta (Antioch)
Baabda
Batrun
Beirut
Bkerke
Jebeil
Ladikiya
Sidon
Tripoli
Tyre
Zahle

IV —O. E. T. A. (North)—Under French Military Administration—Comprises Cilicia.

Adana
Mersina
Tarsus

An estimate of the population of the different districts is added at this point, for a better understanding of the tables and discussion which follow. The figures in all cases must be regarded as only approximate, but may be taken as giving a fairly accurate view of the proportions of the population.

Population Estimates

	O. E. T. A. South	O. E. T. A. West	O. E. T. A. East	Totals
Moslems	515,000	600,000	1,250,000	2,365,000
Christians	62,500	400,000	125,000	587,500
Druses		60,000	80,000	140,000
Jews	65,000	15,000	30,000	110,000
Others	5,000	20,000	20,000	45,000
Totals	647,500	1,095,000	1,505,000	
Grand Total				3,247,500

A map¹⁴ accompanies the report, tracing the route taken by the Commission; showing the boundaries of the military districts; the larger

Palestine desired by the Zionists; and the “larger Lebanon” desired by the Lebanese.

The tables showing the classes and number of delegations met by the Commission, should make clear how varied the population is, and also that no vital interest or element of the population has been omitted in the inquiry. At the same time it should be carefully borne in mind that the number of delegations is no proper index of the proportions of the population. The Christian population is divided into so many small groups that it is represented in the tables by a larger number of delegations than the Moslem majority.

CLASSIFIED LIST OF DELEGATIONS RECEIVED

	<i>O. E. T. A.</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>South</i>	<i>East</i>	<i>West</i>	
I—POLITICAL GROUPS:				
1. Mayors and Municipal Councils	12	9	13	34
2. Administrative Councils	2	7	6	15
3. Councils of Village Chiefs	22	20	23	65
4. Arab Sheikhs	6	22	2	30
5. Arab Societies	2	1	2	5
6. Moslem Christian Committees	3	1	0	4
Total Political Groups	47	60	46	153
II—ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GROUPS:				
1. Professions and Trades.	1	6	10	17
2. Farmers, etc	1	4	1	6
3. Young Men's Clubs	1	5	1	7
4. Chambers of Commerce	1	0	0	1
5. Miscellaneous Groups.	1	1	8	10
Total Economic and Social Groups	5	16	20	41
III—RELIGIOUS GROUPS:				
A—Christians—				
1. General Christian Groups (Composite).	7	3	3	13
2. General Catholic Groups	0	0	5	5
3. Christian Ladies	0	3	2	5

4. Protestants	9	5	7	22
5. Latins	9	2	4	15
6. Greek Orthodox	7	6	12	25
7. Greek Catholic	8	5	6	19
8. Maronites	7	2	7	16
9. Armenians (general groups)	1	0	3	4
10. Armenian Catholics	0	1	0	1
11. Armenian Orthodox	0	2	0	2
12. Syrian Catholics	1	2	1	4
13. Syrian Orthodox	0	3	0	3
14. Chaldean Catholics	1	1	0	2
15. Copts	1	0	0	1
16. Abyssinians	2 (53)	0 (36)	0 (50)	2 (139)
B—Moslems—				
1. Muftis and Ulema	7	7	10	24
2. Moslems Notables	2	10	3	15
3. Moslems (Sunnites)	9	2	10	21
4. Shiites	0	0	2	2
5. Moslem Ladies	0	2	1	3
6. Turkish Moslems	0	0	4	4
7. Ismailites	0	0	2	2
8. Dervishes	0	1	0	1
9. Circassians	0 (18)	2 (24)	0 (32)	2 (74)
C—Other Religious Groups—				
1. Jews	14	2	5	21
2. Druses	1	1	5	7
3. Samaritans	1	0	0	1
4. Persians	1	0	0	1
5. Nausairiyeh	0 (17)	0 (3)	5 (10)	5 (35)
Total Religious Groups	88	63	97	248
Grand Totals	140	139	163	442

The tables of summaries made to the Commission, written or oral or both, reveal the range of the discussions in the conferences, and the chief positions taken by the people. They are given by Military Districts, as well as for Syria as a whole, because the petitions vary considerably with the Districts.

PETITION SUMMARIES—O. E. T. A. (SOUTH)

Total Number of Petitions Received: 260	<i>No.</i>	<i>Per Cent.</i>
A—TERRITORIAL LIMITS:		
1. For United Syria	221	85.0
2. For Separate Palestine	3	1.1
3. For Separate Palestine under British if French have Syrian Mandate	1	.3
4. For Autonomous Palestine within Syrian State	24	9.2
5. For Independent Greater Lebanon	0	
6. Against Independent Greater Lebanon	0	
7. For Autonomous Lebanon with Syrian State	0	
8. For Inclusion of Bekaa with Damascus	0	
9. For Inclusion of Bekaa with Lebanon	0	
10. For Inclusion of Cilicia with Armenian State	0	
11. For Inclusion of Cilicia with Syrian State	0	
B—INDEPENDENCE:		
1. For Absolute Independence of Syria	174	67.0
2. For Independence of Iraq (Mesopotamia)	26	10.
3. For Independence of all Arab Countries	30	11.5
C—FORM OF GOVERNMENT:		
1. For Democratic Kingdom	5	1.9
2. For Emir Feisal as King	2	.8
3. For Democratic Representative Government	0	
4. For Guarding of Rights of Minorities	4	1.5
5. Arabic to be Official Language	10	3.8
6. For Abolition of Foreign Capitulations	5	1.9
7. For Autonomy for all provinces of Syria	0	
D—CHOICE OF MANDATE:		
1. British—		
a. For British Mandate	48	18.4
b. For British Mandate if mandate is obligatory	0	
c. For British "Assistance"	0	
Total British First Choice	48	18.4
d. For British Mandate as second choice	2	.8

e. For British "Assistance" as second choice	0	
2. French—		
a. For French Mandate	17	6.5
b. For French Mandate if mandate is obligatory	0	
c. For French "Assistance"	0	
Total French First Choice	17	6.5
d. For French Mandate as second choice	0	
e. For French "Assistance" as second choice	0	
3. American—		
a. For American Mandate	2	.8
b. For American Mandate if mandate is obligatory	3	1.1
c. For American "Assistance"	3	1.1
Total American First Choice	8	3.
d. For American Mandate as second choice	5	1.9
e. For American "Assistance" as second choice	0	
4. Choice of Mandate left to Damascus Conference	23	8.9
E—ZIONIST PROGRAM:		
1. For Complete Zionist program (Jewish State and immigration)	7	2.7
2. For Modified Zionist program	8	3.
3. Against Zionist program	222	85.3
F—PROTESTS AND CRITICISMS:		
1. Anti-British—		
a. General Anti-British Statements	0	
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	0	
c. Protests against Interference with free access to Commission	0	
2. Anti-French—		
a. General Anti-French statements	4	1.5
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	0	
c. Protests against Interference with free access to Commission		
3. Anti-Arab—		
a. General Anti-Arab Statements	7	2.7
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	0	

c. Protests against Interference with free access to Commission

4. Against Article 22 of League Covenant 0

5. Against Secret Treaties, especially treaties dividing Syria 0

PETITION SUMMARIES—O. E. T. A. (WEST)

Total Number of Petitions Received: 446

	<i>No.</i>	<i>Per Cent.</i>

A—TERRITORIAL LIMITS:

1. For United Syria	187	41.9

2. For Separate Palestine	1	.22

3. For Separate Palestine under British, if French have Syrian Mandate	0	

4. For Autonomous Palestine within Syrian State	0	

5. For Independent Greater Lebanon	196	43.9

6. Against Independent Greater Lebanon	108	24.2

7. For Autonomous Lebanon within Syrian State	33	7.4

8. For Inclusion of Bekaa with Damascus	1	.22

9. For Inclusion of Bekaa with Lebanon	7	1.5

10. For Inclusion of Cilicia within Armenian State	3	.67

11. For Inclusion of Cilicia with Syrian State	2	.45

B—INDEPENDENCE:

1. For Absolute Independence of Syria	130	29.1

2. For Independence of Iraq (Mesopotamia)	76	17.

3. For Independence of all Arab Countries	9	2.

C—FORM OF GOVERNMENT:

1. For Democratic Kingdom	96	21.5

2. For Emir Feisal as King	95	21.2

3. For Democratic Representative Government	26	5.8

4. For Guarding of Rights of Minorities	19	4.2

5. Arabic to be Official Language	0	

6. For Abolition of Foreign Capitulations	0	

7. For Autonomy for all provinces of Syria	13	2.9

D—CHOICE OF MANDATE:

1. British—

a. For British Mandate	4	.9

b. For British Mandate if Mandate is obligatory	0	
c. For British "Assistance"	4	.9
Total British First Choice	8	1.8
d. For British Mandate as second choice	26	5.8
e. For British "Assistance" as second choice.	70	15.7
2. French—		
a. For French Mandate	213	47.7
b. For French Mandate if Mandate is obligatory	1	.22
c. For French "Assistance"	1	
Total French First choice	215	48.1
d. For French Mandate as second choice	0	
e. For French "Assistance" as second choice	0	
3. American—		
a. For American Mandate	36	8.
b. For American Mandate if Mandate is obligatory	3	.66
c. For American "Assistance"	86	18.2
Total American First Choice	125	28.0
d. For American Mandate as second choice	3	.66
e. For American "Assistance" as second choice	3	.66
4. Choice of Mandate left to Damascus Conference	0	
E—ZIONIST PROGRAM:		
1. For Complete Zionist Program (Jewish State and immigration)	2	.45
2. For Modified Zionist Program	0	
3. Against Zionist Program	88	19.7
F—PROTESTS AND CRITICISMS:		
1. Anti-British—		
a. General Anti-British Statements	2	.45
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	0	
c. Protests against interference with the free access to Commission	0	
2. Anti-French—		
a. General Anti-French Statements	114	25.5
b. Specific Criticisms of Administrations	12	2.7
c. Protests against interference with free access to Commission	6	1.3

3. Anti-Arab—		
a. General Anti-Arab Statements	23	5.1
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	0	
c. Protests against interference with free access to Commission	0	
4. Against Art. 22 of League Covenant	78	17.4
5. Against Secret Treaties, especially treaties dividing Syria	48	10.7

PETITION SUMMARIES—O. E. T. A. (EAST)

Total Number of Petitions Received: 1157	No.	<i>Per Cent</i>
A—TERRITORIAL LIMITS:		
1. For United Syria	1022	94.3
2. For Separate Palestine	2	.17
3. For Separate Palestine under British if French have Syrian mandate	1	.08
4. For Autonomous Palestine within Syrian State	0	
5. For Independent Greater Lebanon	7	.6
6. Against Independent Greater Lebanon	954	82.0
7. For Autonomous Lebanon within Syrian State	0	
8. For Inclusion of Bekaa with Damascus	3	.25
9. For Inclusion of Bekaa with Lebanon	4	.34
10. For Inclusion of Cilicia with Armenian State	0	
11. For Inclusion of Cilicia with Syrian State	0	
B—INDEPENDENCE:		
1. For Absolute Independence of Syria	1066	92.2
2. For Independence of Iraq (Mesopotamia)	976	84.3
3. For Independence of all Arab Countries	58	5.0
C—FORM OF GOVERNMENT:		
1. For Democratic Kingdom	1006	87.0
2. For Emir Feisal as king	1005	86.9
3. For Democratic Representative Government	8	.68
4. For Guarding of Rights of Minorities	1000	86.5
5. Arabic to be Official Language	1	.08
6. For Abolition of Foreign Capitulations	0	
7. For Autonomy for all Provisions of Syria	1	.08

D—CHOICE OF MANDATE:

1. British—

a. For British Mandate	14	1.2
b. For British Mandate if mandate is obligatory	0	
c. For British “Assistance”	0	
Total British First Choice	14	1.2
d. For British Mandate as second choice	13	1.1
e. For British “Assistance” as second choice	962	82.2

2. French—

a. For French Mandate	41	3.5
b. For French Mandate if mandate is obligatory	0	
c. For French “Assistance”	1	.08
Total French First Choice	42	3.6
d. For French Mandate as second choice	3	.25
e. For French “Assistance” as second choice	0	

3. America—

a. For American Mandate	19	1.6
b. For American Mandate if Mandate is obligatory	2	.17
c. For American “Assistance”	975	84.3
Total American First Choice	996	86.1
d. For American Mandate as second choice	4	.34
e. For American “Assistance” as second choice	0	
4. Choice of Mandate left to Damascus Conference	0	

E—ZIONIST PROGRAM:

1. For Complete Zionist Program (Jewish State and immigration)	2	.18
2. For Modified Zionist Program	0	
3. Against Zionist Program	1040	90.0

F—PROTESTS AND CRITICISMS:

1. Anti-British—

a. General Anti-British Statements	1	.08
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	0	
c. Protests against Interference with free access to Commission	0	

2. Anti-French—

a. General Anti-French Statements	983	85.0
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	12	1.04
c. Protests against interference with free access to Commission	5	.51
3. Anti-Arab—		
a. General Anti-Arab Statements	5	.51
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	4	.34
c. Protests against Interference with free access to Commission	0	
4. Against Art. 22 of League Covenant	955	82.1
5. Against Secret Treaties, especially treaties dividing Syria	940	81.3

PETITION SUMMARIES—SYRIA COMPLETE

Total Number of Petitions Received: 1863	<i>No.</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
A—TERRITORIAL LIMITS:		
1. For United Syria	1500	80.4
2. For Separate Palestine	6	.32
3. For Separate Palestine under British if French have Syrian Mandate	2	.1
4. For Autonomous Palestine within Syrian State	24	1.29
5. For Independent Greater Lebanon	203	10.9
6. Against Independent Greater Lebanon	1062	57.0
7. For Autonomous Lebanon within Syrian State	33	1.76
8. For Inclusion of Bekaa with Damascus	4	.21
9. For Inclusion of Bekaa with Lebanon	11	.59
10. For Inclusion of Cilicia within Armenian State	3	.16
11. For Inclusion of Cilicia with Syrian State	2	.1
B—INDEPENDENCE:		
1. For Absolute Independence of Syria	1370	73.5
2. For Independence of Iraq (Mesopotamia)	1278	68.5
3. For Independence of all Arab Countries	97	5.2
C—FORM OF GOVERNMENT:		
1. For Democratic Kingdom	1107	59.3
2. For Emir Feisal as King	1102	59.
3. For Democratic Representative Government	34	1.82

4. For Guarding of Rights of Minorities	1023	54.9
5. Arabic to be Official Language	5	.27
6. For Abolition of Foreign Capitulations	10	53.
7. For Autonomy of all Provinces of Syria	19	1.02
D—CHOICE OF MANDATE:		
1. British—		
a. For British Mandate	66	3.53
b. For British Mandate if Mandate is obligatory	0	
c. For British “Assistance”	4	.21
Total British First Choice	70	3.75
d. For British Mandate as Second Choice	41	2.19
e. For British “Assistance” as Second Choice	1032	55.3
2. French—		
a. For French Mandate	271	14.52
b. For French Mandate if Mandate is obligatory	1	.05
c. For French “Assistance”	2	.1
Total French First Choice	274	14.68
d. For American Mandate as second choice	3	.15
e. For French “Assistance” as second choice	0	
3. American—		
a. For American Mandate	57	3.05
b. For American Mandate if Mandate is obligatory	8	.4
c. For American “Assistance”	1064	57.0
Total American First Choice	1129	60.5
d. For American Mandate as second choice	8	.4
e. For American “Assistance” as second choice	3	.15
4. Choice of Mandate left to Damascus Conference	23	1.23
E—ZIONIST PROGRAM:		
1. For Complete Zionist Program (Jewish State and immigration)	11	.59
2. For Modified Zionist Program	8	.4
3. Against Zionist Program	1350	72.3
F—PROTESTS AND CRITICISMS:		
1. Anti-British—		
a. General Anti-British Statements	3	15
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	0	

c. Protests against Interference with free access to Commission	0	
2. Anti-French—		
a. General Anti-French Statements	1129	60.5
b. Specific Criticisms of Administrations	24	1.29
c. Protests against Interference with free access to Commission	11	.59
3. Anti-Arab—		
a. General Anti-Arab Statements	35	1.87
b. Specific Criticisms of Administration	4	.2
c. Protests against Interference with free access to Commission	0	
4. Against 22d Article of League Covenant	1033	55.3
5. Against Secret Treaties, especially treaties dividing Syria	988	52.9

The Secretary's Summarized Statement of Significant Conclusions brought out in the Tables of Petitions, gives added information and discussion, greatly needed for a proper interpretation of the petitions and of our entire survey; and is therefore made the concluding section of the Secretary's presentation of data.

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS

I—The Value of the Petitions as an Estimate of Public Opinion in Syria:

The 1863 petitions received by the American Commission in Syria and the summary tables prepared from them cannot of course be regarded as a mathematically accurate analysis of the real desires of the peoples of Syria. There are at least five unavoidable difficulties that have qualified their accuracy:

1. The number of the petitions from the different sections of Syria is not proportional to their respective, populations, e. g., O. E. T. A. South, with thirteen cities at which delegations were received is represented by only 260 petitions, while 1157 petitions were received from O. E. T. A. East, in which but eight cities were visited. As the Commission progressed northward the petitions became more numerous, due to the increased time afforded for knowledge of the Commission's coming, for the preparation of petitions, for the activities of propaganda agents, and for the natural crystallization of public opinion.

2. The number of petitions from the different religious organizations is not proportional to the numerical strength of the religious faiths. This is especially true of the verbal requests made by delegations. In O. E. T. A. South for instance, on account of the number of sects of the Christian faith, 53 delegations of Christians were received, and only eighteen delegations of Moslems, whereas the Moslem population is fully eight times as large as that of the Christian. This disparity does not, however, hold for the total number of petitions, verbal and written, as it was corrected in part by the large number of petitions from Moslem villages presented to the Commission at Aleppo and other northeastern points.
 3. A number of petitions show clearly the influence of organized propaganda. This is sometimes evidenced in the petitions themselves by numerous similarities of phrasing, by many identical wordings, and by a few instances in which printed forms, obviously intended as models for written documents, have been signed and given to the Commission.
- In addition to the internal evidence, there were also many external indications of systematic efforts to influence the character of the petitions. The same Arab Agent was observed in four cities of Palestine, assisting in the preparation of petitions. Similar activities on the part of French sympathizers were observed in Beirut.
4. In addition to this general propaganda, which was entirely legitimate as well as natural and inevitable, it is certain that a small number of petitions were fraud[ul]ently secured. In two cases the signatures were in the same handwriting. Three instances of "repeater" signatures were discovered. In addition, the seals of new organizations, purporting to be Trade Unions of Beirut, were discovered to have been ordered by the same propaganda agent a few days before the arrival of the Commission. All possible precautions were taken to insure authenticity of petitions and signatures, but in view of the character of the Commission's survey and the limited facilities for close checking, the genuineness of all cannot be guaranteed.
 5. The value of the individual petitions varies also with the number of signatures, although mere numbers cannot be taken as the only criterion. For example, some petitions signed by only a small Municipal Council may represent a larger public opinion than a petition signed by a thousand villagers. The number of signatures is 91,079:26,324 for the Petitions of O. E. T, A. South, 26,884 for the Petitions of O. E. T. A. West, and 37,871 for the Petitions of O. E. T. A. East. This represents a general average of 49 signatures for each petition. The number of signatures varies widely from this average, but the totals for the different programs are fairly well equalized.

Yet despite these five qualifications, it is believed that the petitions as summarized present a fairly accurate analysis of present political opinion in Syria. The great majority of irregularities offset one another. The preponderance of Christian petitions in Palestine is balanced by the flood of Moslem appeals at Aleppo. The activities of French sympathizers in Tripoli probably did not influence the character of the petitions presented much more than the contrary efforts of the Independent Program representatives in Amman.

The petitions are certainly representative. As the classified list of delegations received by the Commission clearly indicates, the petitions came from a wide range of political, economic, social, and religious classes and organizations. It was generally known throughout Syria that the American Commission would receive in confidence any documents that any individual or group should care to present. In the few cities in which the military authorities sought to exert control, directly or indirectly, over the delegations, without exception the opposition parties found opportunities to present their ideas to the Commission, if not always orally, at least in writing.

II—Definite Programs Revealed in the Petitions:

Before considering the special requests contained in the petitions, it is advisable to present the six distinct political programs that were clearly revealed in the petitions, and that in some instances were developed during the investigation of the Commission. Of the 1863 petitions for Syria, 1364 are exact copies of some of these programs and many others have close resemblances. They are:

1. THE INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM.

The first petitions received by the Commission, those at Jaffa on June 11, except in the case of the Zionist statements, do not give evidence of any agreed and elaborated policy for the future of Syria. The petitions varied greatly in content and wording. There were, however, four of the twenty petitions at Jaffa that contained what may be termed an Independence Program with three “planks” in its platform: (1) The Political Unity of Syria, including Cilicia on the north, the Syrian Desert on the east, and Palestine, extending as far as Rafah on the south; (2) Absolute Independence for Syria; (3) Opposition to a Zionist State and Jewish Immigration. This program became the dominant note in the petitions presented in O. E. T. A. South. At Jerusalem, eight of the twenty-three petitions received contained the Independence Program, with practically identical wording. At Haifa

and Nazareth, two of the last cities visited in the District, if [it] constituted 35 and 10 respectively, of the 60 and 18 petitions presented. Of the 260 petitions from O. E. T. A. South, 83, or 32 per cent, were simply the Independence Program, while many others closely resembled it. One printed form of this program was received by the Commission as a petition at Jenin, June 22nd, and doubtless other printed copies had been models for many of the petitions received in the last cities visited.

2. THE "DAMASCUS" PROGRAM.

The original Independence Program was expanded on July 2d by the General Syrian Congress' meeting at Damascus into what came to be known as the Damascus Program. This program contained the three points of the Independence Program, modified by asking "assistance" for the Syrian State from America, or, as second choice, from Great Britain, and expanded by adding: (1) A rejection of Art. 22 of the League Covenant; (2) A rejection of all French claims to Syria; (3) A protest against secret treaties and private agreements (by inference the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration); (4) Opposition to independence for Greater Lebanon; (5) Request for a democratic, non-centralized government under Emir Feisal; and (6) A request for the independence and economic freedom of Mesopotamia.

Three petitions with the Damascus program in full had been received by the Commission prior to its adoption by the Syrian Congress. After that date 1047 of the 1473 petitions received during that period contained this program. Of that number, 964 were on printed blanks of which there were seven distinct "forms" with the program printed in full.

3. THE LEBANON PROGRAMS:

There are three distinct types of Lebanese Programs that appear in the petitions:

(a) The French Independent Greater Lebanon. This program asks for complete independence and separation from Syria for the Greater Lebanon, including the Valley of Bekaa and in some instances Tripoli. France is asked for as the mandatory Power. 139 of the 446 petitions received in O. E. T. A. West contain this program, with practically identical wording. Of these twenty are on three varieties of printed forms.

(b) The Independent Lebanon Program. Another distinct program asks for the same points with the exception of a French Mandate. 33 of the 36

petitions with the wording of this program are on two varieties of printed forms. In eight instances requests for a mandate are added in writing.

- (c) The Autonomous Lebanon Program. This program asks for a greater Lebanon as an autonomous province within a United Syrian State. No mandate is mentioned. 49 petitions are copies of this program, three of them on a printed form.

4. THE ZIONIST PROGRAM:

Eleven petitions with varying wording favor the Zionist Program of a Jewish State and extensive Jewish immigration. These are all from Jewish delegations. Eight other petitions express approval of the Zionist colonies in Palestine without endorsement of the complete program. Four of these latter are statements by Arab peasants that they are on good terms with the Jewish colonies.

III—Specific Requests as Given in the Tables: (Compare Summary)

A—TERRITORIAL LIMITS:

1. The largest percentage for any one request is that of 1500 petitions (80.4 per cent) for United Syria, including Cilicia, the Syrian Desert, and Palestine. The boundaries of this area are usually defined as “The Taurus Mountains on the north; the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers, and the line extending east of Abu Kamal to the east of Al Jauf on the east; Rafah and the line running from Al Jauf to the south of Akaba on the south; and the Mediterranean Sea on the West”. In addition to being the first plank of the Damascus program, a United Syria received strong support from many Christians in all the O. E. T. A.’s, as the number of petitions indicates.
2. In opposition to Syrian Unity, six of the nineteen pro-Zionist petitions ask for a separate Palestine, and presumably it is implied in the others.
3. In addition, two Christian groups in Palestine asked for a separate Palestine under the British, in preference to a United Syria under the French.
4. 24 petitions, chiefly from Christian sources in O. E. T. A. South, asked for an autonomous Palestine within the Syrian State. For many other delegations this was doubtless implied in the general request for independence and a non-centralized government.
5. In opposition also to a United Syria are the 203 petitions (10.9 per cent) asking for an independent Greater Lebanon. 196 of these came from Lebanon and 139 are copies of the French-Lebanon program.

6. The request for a United Syria is made even more emphatic by the 1062 protests against an Independent Greater Lebanon. These include the Damascus program petitions and some from Protestant and other Christian sources in Lebanon.
7. 33 Lebanese Delegations representing both Moslems and Christians, fearing the economic future of a separate Lebanon, asked for autonomy within a Syrian State. Others also regarded autonomy as implied in the requests for independence and a non-centralized government.
- 8–9. The Valley of Bekaa is usually regarded as an integral part of Greater Lebanon. 11 petitions, however, make especial reference to its inclusion, while eight ask that the Valley remain in the Damascus area.
- 10–11. Similarly, while Cilicia is definitely included in the demand for a United Syria made by 1500 petitions, two petitions asked specifically for it, while three requested that it be given to the Armenian state.

B—INDEPENDENCE:

1. The second largest percentage of all, 1370 (73.5 per cent) is for “Absolute Independence”, the second cardinal point of the Damascus Program, supported generally by all Moslem delegations. It is certain from the oral statements that accompanied the petitions that the term, “absolute independence”, was seldom used in the sense of an entire freedom from any foreign guidance such as that of a mandatary under the League of Nations, inasmuch as the request was frequently combined with a choice of mandate, and in all but a few cases with either a choice of mandate or a request for foreign “assistance”. While a few of the Young Arab clubs certainly desired freedom from all foreign control, the great majority asked for independence and defined a mandate to mean only economic and technical assistance, because of a widespread fear that the mandatory arrangement would be used to cloak colonial annexation.
- 2–3. Only a slightly smaller number, 1278 (68.5 per cent) asked for the independence of Iraq, or Mesopotamia. To these should be added 93 of the 97 petitions for the independence of all Arab countries, as in only four petitions do both requests appear, and the second includes the first. The phrasing “for all Arab countries” was first used in Palestine, and dropped for the special mention of Iraq in the Damascus Program. A total of 1371 petitions, therefore, asked for the independence and economic freedom of the Iraq regions.

C—FORM OF GOVERNMENT:

- 1–2. The establishment of a “democratic, non-centralized, constitutional” kingdom is one of the points of the Damascus program, as the number of

petitions for it, 1107 (59.3 per cent) indicate. All but five of these petitions, also, ask that Emir Feisal be made the king. These petitions were especially numerous in O. E. T. A. East, where 1005 of 1157 request both a kingdom and the Emir as king. This part of the program had apparently not been developed when the Commission was in Palestine, as only five of 260 O. E. T. A. South petitions referred to a kingdom, and only two mentioned Emir Feisal.

3. A request for a democratic representative government, presumably of a republican character, came to the Commission from 26 Christian groups in O. E. T. A. West, and eight groups in O. E. T. A. East, a total of 24 (1.8 per cent). This request was usually made in opposition to the Moslem idea of a Syrian kingdom under Feisal.
4. The request for proper safe-guarding of the rights of minorities included in the Damascus program was also made by many of the Christian groups in the Lebanon. The total is 1023 (54.9 per cent). This request received a more united support from both Moslems and Christians than any other, except anti-Zionism.
- 5–6. Five requests for the retention of Arabic as the official language (rather than Hebrew) and ten requests for the abolition of foreign capitulations, (officially annulled by the Turks, but without sanction of the Powers), came from scattered points in O. E. T. A. South.
7. Nineteen (1.02 per cent) petitions were received for the autonomy of all the provinces of Syria. This is in addition to the separate requests for autonomy of Lebanon and Palestine. Once more it should be said that many regarded a large measure of local autonomy as implicit in the general idea of a democratic, non-centralized government, but these nineteen groups made special reference to it.

D—CHOICE OF MANDATE:

With regard to choice of mandate, five classes of requests had to be distinguished, as shown in the tables. In addition to definite requests for a given nation as the mandatory power, a few groups gave their preference, “if a mandatory is obligatory”, i. e., rather under protest, while the great majority asked for “Assistance” rather than a mandatory, because of a misunderstanding, and the fear referred to above that a “mandate” is a convenient cloak for colonial aggression. Petitions of these three classes have therefore been grouped in the summary as “Total first choice”. In addition preferences for second choice of mandate and “Assistance” have been tabulated.

1. The total of the petitions asking for Great Britain as first choice is 66 (3.5 per cent). 48 came from Palestine; 13 are from Greek Orthodox delegations and four from the Druses. The second choice total is 1073 (57.5 per cent), due to the 1032 requests for British "Assistance" if America declined, in accordance with the Damascus program.
2. The French total for first choice is 274 (14.68 per cent), all but 59 of them from the Lebanon District. The second choice total is three.
3. The 1064 requests for American "Assistance" according to the Damascus Program, with 57 selections of America as mandatory power, and eight more if a mandate is obligatory, make up the first choice total of 1129 (60.5 per cent). The second choice total is 11.
4. 23 petitions received at Jenin, Haifa, and Nazareth just before the Damascus program was adopted, left the choice of mandate to the Syrian Congress. This means, therefore, an additional 23 for American first choice and British second choice total.

E—ZIONISM:

1–2–3. The petitions favoring the Zionist program have been analysed above in the discussion of programs. In opposition to these are the 1350 (72.3 per cent) petitions protesting against Zionist claims and purposes. This is the third largest number for any one point and represents a more widespread general opinion among both Moslems and Christians than any other. The anti-Zionist note was especially strong in Palestine, where 222 (85.3 per cent) of the 260 petitions declared against the Zionist program. This is the largest percentage in the district for any one point.

F—PROTESTS AND CRITICISMS:

Another distinct classification is that of protests and criticisms. Criticisms against nations have been divided into: (a) General statements criticising national claims, character, or policies, without making specific references; (b) Specific criticisms, usually of alleged mismanagement or corruption in the local military administration; (c) Protests against the interference of the local military authorities with free access to the American Commission.

1. Three general anti-British statements were presented.
2. The general anti-French statements were much more numerous, 1129 (60.5 per cent), due largely to the fact that such a protest is included in the Damascus program. There were also 24 specific criticisms of French administration in O. E. T. A. West, and 11 protests against deportation, armed guards, threats, and intimidation said to have been used by the French administrative authorities in O. E. T. A. West, to prevent

individuals with anti-French views from appearing before the Commission.

3. General criticism of the Arab Government appeared in 35 petitions, always from Christian sources, and expressing fear as to the fate of the Christians under an independent Arab rule. In addition the administration of O. E. T. A. East is criticized in four petitions.
4. The Damascus Program protest against applying Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to Syria is included in 1033 (55.3 per cent) petitions. This article states that “certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a state of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatary, until such time as they are able to stand alone.” This protest is in line with the Damascus Program plea for complete independence and the fear already referred to that a mandate might impair the full freedom of Syria. It is interesting to note that this protest did not appear until after the 22nd Article had been published in a statement given by the Commissioners to all the newspapers in Damascus.
5. One more protest is a part of 988 (52.9 per cent) petitions, a protest against secret treaties, treaties dividing Syria without the consent of the Syrians, and private agreements. The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration are not mentioned, but it is usually understood that they are referred to. This protest is included in the Damascus program and also received support from other elements.

These statements—chiefly tabular—prepared by the Secretary, of the results of the inquiry into Syrian opinion, need to be supplemented by a historical account prepared by the General Adviser, Dr. Lybyer. This account will help to put concretely the entire situation, and to give the atmosphere of our inquiry, and so complete the basic data as presented in the field.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

Introductory:

The whole area visited by the Commission during the forty-two days from June 10 to July 21 is Occupied Enemy Territory, under the supreme authority of General Allenby. The administration is conducted under the Turkish laws, with small local modifications, in many cases continuing in office part or all of the officials left behind by the Turks. A system of military governors and officers assigned to special duties, such as financial

and medical advice, liaison work, etc., parallels the civil administration. The whole area is in four portions, known respectively as O. E. T. A., (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration) South, West, East and North, and administered under the guidance respectively of English, French, Arab, and French officers. The order of description followed below is by these areas, and is nearly coincident with the itinerary of the Commission, the only exception being that much of O. E. T. A. East was visited before O. E. T. A. West. Fifteen days were spent in the South, ten in the West, fifteen in the East, and two in the North.

I—The Area Under English Occupation (O. E. T. A. South):

1. NARRATIVE—

Owing to changes of plan at a late date, the Commission arrived in Jaffa at a time when the British authorities were not expecting it, and the program followed there was arranged mainly without their help. The endeavor was made to ascertain the opinions and desires of every important group, sect and organization, of a few well-informed representative individuals, and of significant minorities or sub-divisions, especially in cases where there seemed to be disposition, for any reason, to suppress these. Because of the numerous subdivisions of the Christians and particularly of the Roman Catholics it was inevitable that from the beginning the Commission would give a disproportionate number of interviews and amount of time to them. The Commissioners had prepared a statement of their purposes, to be found elsewhere in this report, which was read to important groups, and given to the press in lieu of interview. Care was taken to make it clear, in response to frequent questioning, that the policy of the United States in regard to accepting a mandate anywhere was unformed and unpredictable, and that the Commission had no power of decision. Automobiles were secured from the A. C. R. N. E.,¹⁵ in order to be as little as possible dependent upon others than Americans. Word was given out that the Commission would not accept general social invitations or consent to demonstrations.

On leaving Jaffa the Commission stopped at two Jewish schools and took luncheon at the Richon-le-Sion colony, where it met the chief men of several Jewish colonies, as well as the members of the central Zionist Commission.

A week was spent in Jerusalem, with two days out for visiting Bethlehem, Hebron, and Beersheba. A limited amount of hospitality was accepted in a

quiet way from the British and French officials. In order that none might be offended the heads of the various religious groups were received, although some of them, as for instance the Copts and Abyssinians, had little to say along the line of the inquiry.

After leaving Jerusalem, a rapid journey was made through northern Palestine, delegations being received at Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth, Haifa and Acre. At most of these places, groups came in, not only from the surrounding country, but from other administrative centers which it was impossible to visit.

2. THE ATTITUDE OF THE OCCUPYING GOVERNMENT—

The British officials, from Major General Sir Arthur Money, who was in command of O. E. T. A. South, down to the youngest officer, were courteous, obliging, and helpful. Most of them had had Indian, Egyptian, or Soudanese experience before the Great War. As a body, they gave an impression of ability, efficiency, and a serious effort to administer the country for the good of the people.

It should be noted here that General Allenby detailed to accompany the Commission as aide Lt. Col. J. K. Watson, who had served for years in a similar capacity with Lord Kitchener and later with the Khedive of Egypt. His thoughtfulness, kindness, and efficiency, though the circumstances of travel were often trying, were unfailing, and the comfort, good health, and success in the investigation of the Commission were largely furthered by him.

3. WISHES OF THE PEOPLE—

The Moslems constitute about four-fifths of the actual population of Palestine, according to a recent British census. Except for certain official groups they were practically unanimous for the independence of United Syria, and were responsive to the current political influences. The organizations met at Jaffa took the position that Syria is capable of self-government without a mandatory power, but if one should be insisted upon by the Peace Conference, they preferred the United States.

At Jerusalem, however, and in all other places in Palestine, the program of independence was affirmed. For the most part, the question of a mandate was referred, either in writing, or more often in response to questions, to the approaching Syrian Congress at Damascus, at which they would have representation. Some Moslems, especially in the South, maintained

emphatically that they could accept no mandate whatever. It is evident that since the Damascus Congress later declared for American assistance, with the British as second choice, and emphatic refusal of the French, this is the program to which the great majority of the Moslems of Palestine are committed. Probably most of them had it in mind when they declared for reference to Damascus.

The Christians of Palestine, who altogether constitute less than ten per cent of the population, showed more difference of opinion. Some groups in the north, as the Latin Catholics of Tiberias and Haifa and most of the Christians of Nazareth, were with the Moslems for independence and the reference to Damascus. Maronites and Greek Catholics, and usually the Latin Catholics, were for a French mandate. The Greek Orthodox everywhere, according to an agreed program, were for a British mandate, as were several scattering groups. None asked directly for the United States, though the opinion was expressed that if there were assurance that we would come if asked, most Christians would favor this solution. The Christians were in general strongly in favor of a mandatory power, which should exercise a real control.

The Jews, who constitute a little more than ten per cent of the population, were all for Zionism, under a British Mandate. The Moslem and Christian population was practically unanimous against Zionism, usually expressing themselves with great emphasis. This question was closely connected with that of the unity of all Syria under one Government.

4. ZIONISM—

The Jews of Palestine declared themselves unanimously in favor of the Zionistic scheme in general, though they showed difference of opinion in regard to the details and the process of its realization. The elements of agreement may be stated as follows:

- a. Palestine, with a fairly large area, to be set aside at once as a “national home” for the Jews.
- b. Sooner or later the political rule of the land will become organized as a “Jewish Commonwealth”.
- c. At the start authorization will be given for the free immigration of Jews from any part of the world; for the unrestricted purchase of land by the Jews; and for the recognition of Hebrew as an official language.
- d. Great Britain will be the mandatory power over Palestine, protecting the Jews and furthering the realization of the scheme.

- e. The Great Powers of the world have declared in favor of the scheme, which merely awaits execution.

Differences exist especially along two lines:

- a. Whether the Jewish Commonwealth should be set up soon or after a considerable lapse of time.
- b. Whether the chief emphasis should be upon a restoration of the ancient mode of life, ritual, exclusiveness and particularism of the Jews; or upon economic development in a thoroughly modern fashion, with afforestation, electrification of water-power, and general full utilization of resources.

5. SPECIAL DISCUSSION:

The Custody of the Holy Places—For four centuries the Turk has served as guardian of the peace between Moslems, Christians, and Jews, and even between the different sects of each, in the Holy Land. Nor has his function been merely nominal: being really a foreigner and having upon himself the responsibility of government, he has, on the whole well maintained the *status quo*, or policed slow and delicate changes in one direction or another. Now that his authority is gone, a substitute must be provided, whatever be the new regime. This might be the mandatory power. If, however, any Roman Catholic power should receive the mandate, trouble would arise from the fact that at present the Catholics feel unfairly treated and claim increase of privilege at the expense of the Greek Orthodox. A Catholic power would be tempted promptly to disturb the equilibrium, especially during the eclipse of the power of Russia.

There is already a “Custodian of the Holy Places” for the Roman Catholics. Might not this idea be extended to the constitution of a permanent Commission for the Holy Places, on which might be placed this man, and representatives of Greek Orthodox Christianity, Protestant Christianity, Sunnite Islam, Shiite Islam, and Judaism. The Commission might be given authority and means to guard and care for all the places in Palestine that are sacred to the three religions, and to adjudicate all disputes about their custody. Its composition should ensure conservatism and promote harmony.

II—The Area Under French Occupation (Tyre to Alexandretta)

1. NARRATIVE—

The Commission reached Beirut after having visited Palestine and the southern half of the territory occupied by the Arab forces. Two days were spent in interviews in the city, and visits were paid by automobile to points from Tyre to Batrun. General Allenby was kind enough to place his yacht the *Maid of Honor* at the disposal of the Commission, and thus Tripoli, Alexandretta, and Ladikiya were seen. Delegations were thus heard from every part of O. E. T. A. West. Arrangements as to program, demonstrations, and the like, were in general maintained as in other areas. The French officials were at great pains to arrange suitably for the hearings of the Commission, and to provide for its comfort and well-being.

The women of the Moslem Trades School at Beirut had woven a rug for presentation to the Peace Conference, which is interesting as being a map, patterned so as to show the area claimed by Syrian Nationalists for United Syria.

2. WISHES OF THE PEOPLE—

In general the situation was in accordance with that in Palestine and the Damascus area. With few exceptions the Moslems were for American or British assistance according to the "Damascus Program"; the Druses were for an English Mandate; the Maronites and all varieties of Catholics were for France. But the Greek Orthodox were divided, instead of standing for a British Mandate as usually in Palestine and Damascus. The Ismailians were mostly for France, and the Nusairiyeh were divided.

Those who stood for a French Mandate were of different opinions as regards the place and relationship of Lebanon in Syria. From Tyre to Tripoli they mostly followed a rigid formula which calls for a Greater Lebanon, absolutely independent of the rest of Syria, and under France: the supporters of this view showed no response to the idea of Syrian national unity, and apparently wish to become French citizens at an early moment.

Others desire the unity of Syria under the French Mandate, preferring ordinarily that the Lebanon District should be enlarged and given a high degree of autonomy.

In the Lebanon proper the majority is probably sincerely for a French as opposed to a British, mandate. The Commission could not inquire whether those who declared for France were well disposed toward an American Mandate, in case this were possible and a French Mandate for any reason undesirable; but there were a number of emphatic assurances that the

great majority of the population, including even the Maronites, prefers America to any other; this is said to be based upon America's unselfish part in the war, her generosity before and after the armistice, and the personal relationships established by the large number of Lebanese who have gone to live for shorter or longer periods in the United States and who return home loyal.

The Druses ask emphatically to be left out of the Lebanon in case it be given to France.

But outside the Lebanon proper, in the areas which it is proposed to include in the "Greater Lebanon", such as Tyre, Sidon, "Hollow Syria", and Tripoli, a distinct majority of the people is probably averse to French rule. This includes practically all the Sunnite Moslems, most of the Shiites, a part of the Greek Orthodox Christians, and the small group of Protestants. Most of these ask earnestly for America, with Britain as second choice; the balance for Britain with America as second choice.

In the rest of O. E. T. A. West, north of the proposed Greater Lebanon, the majority is probably against a French Mandate in any circumstances. A considerable proportion of the remainder are averse to a separation from the interior of the country, and place the unity of Syria above their preference for France.

It is worthy of note that whereas the Syrian nationalists everywhere distinctly and by name rejected the assistance of France, no one who supported France declared for a specific rejection of England or America. In a number of instances, however, the fear was expressed by Christians that England, if made the mandatory power, would show more favor to Moslems than to Christians.

3. THE LEBANON—

The mountainous area set off in 1861 to be under the nominal protection of six European powers, with a Christian governor, has been a particular interest of France ever since. The population is largely Maronite and Roman Catholic. As in the case of all regions that have been removed from the direct jurisdiction of the Porte, progress has been comparatively rapid; roads have been built, trees planted, and a large number of stone houses erected. Money earned in America has helped greatly in these improvements. The Maronite ecclesiastical and monastic organizations have increased greatly in wealth in these years.

The Lebanon has been freed from the burden of military service, and taxes have consequently been light. The area has been predominantly Christian and the Christians have enjoyed rather more than their proportion of the offices. Druses on the other hand have shown a tendency to emigrate to join their brethren in the Hauran, and they resent the inequalities of treatment to which they have been subjected.

The French policy of “colonization” shows its fruits in many inhabitants of this area, as well as of Beirut and other parts of Syria, who feel that they know French better than Arabic, and who are apt to hold themselves as of a distinctly higher order of civilization than the people of the interior. It is among these that the idea of a complete political separation of the Lebanese area from the rest of Syria has taken root.

The propinquity of this area led the Turkish government to be lenient and favorable to Christians and others in adjacent regions, so that no very sharp line of difference of prosperity is visible. Nevertheless the appeal of lighter taxes and military service, greater security and opportunities for office-holding has an effect upon Christians in neighboring areas, so that many of them incline toward a Greater Lebanon under a permanent French mandate. But there is a considerable party, even among the pro-French, who are opposed to becoming a part of France. This is in fact the official Maronite position.

Any revision of the situation should not diminish the security of the inhabitants of the Lebanon, but should raise the rest of Syria to a like security. This can be provided for in a United Syria by a sufficient measure of local autonomy. Care should be taken to avoid leaving this portion of the country in a position of perpetual special privilege, in which the common burdens would rest more heavily on other areas.

III—The Area Under Arab Occupation.

1. NARRATIVE—

The Commission spent nine days in Damascus, six of which were filled up with interviews, held with representatives of religious and political groups, councils and boards of the Government, and prominent officials and other notable persons of every grade, including even the Emir Feisal and General Allenby. More time was spent here than anywhere else in Syria, because Damascus will be the capital of United Syria, if such be created, and an Arab government over O. E. T. A. East is already in operation there, showing much activity and endeavoring by accomplishment, display, and

intrigue to prepare the way for the larger unity. During the Commission's visit, the "Syrian Congress" met, whose charter and program are described below.¹⁶ The bazaars were placarded with the signs "We want absolute independence", and these were removed by government orders. The interview of the Commission with the Mufti, Kadi, and Ulema was published with considerable accuracy in the local newspapers (of course by no act or permission of the Commission), and this gave rise to animated discussions on the part of the people and the press. The commission accepted hospitality from the Emir Feisal on two occasions.

In the midst of the stay in Damascus a trip was taken southward to Amman and Deraa, for the purpose of conferring with people from the edge of the desert. The note received from all Moslems was for complete independence without protection or a mandatory power; but recognizing that they need financial and economic advice, they proposed after the recognition of independence, to ask advisers from America. Eloquent Arab orators appealed to America, as having freed them, to uphold their independence before the Peace Conference, saying that they hold our country responsible before God for completing the work we have begun. The Christians, who are few in these areas, were in great fear. They desire that a strong mandatory power be appointed over Syria, so that they may have full protection; they prefer that Britain be that power, and that the area be annexed to and governed with Palestine.

After leaving Damascus, a day was spent at Baalbek, where was encountered first, the struggle for and against annexing "Hollow Syria" (known as the Bekaa) to the Greater Lebanon. After ten days in O. E. T. A., West, the Arab area was entered again by the road from Tripoli to Horns. Delegations were heard at Horns, and Hama, after which three days were spent in Aleppo. Besides hearing delegations of all important Aleppine groups and opinions, visits were paid to the centers of relief for refugee Armenians.

The claim for the independence of Mesopotamia was presented very vigorously in the north. Certain groups at Aleppo were much interested, however, in pushing the boundary of Syria well to the east, so as to include the Syrian desert (*Badiet esh Sham*).

2. ATTITUDE OF THE OCCUPYING GOVERNMENT—

The higher Arab officials include a number of men of dignity, ability, intelligence, and apparent honesty and patriotism. Practically all are Syrian

born. Some of them, as General Haddad Pasha, chief of police and *gendarmierie*, and Said Pasha Zoucair, financial adviser, have been trained under British Administration in Egypt; and others, as Col. Yussef Bey, aide-de-camp of the Emir Feisal, General Jaafer Pasha, Military Governor of Aleppo, and Ihsan Allah Djabri, Mayor of Aleppo, have had their education and experience in the Turkish service. Most of the lower officials in this area (as well as in the other O. E. T. A. regions) have simply been continued from the Turkish regime, and in many cases are said to practice extortions and malversations as much as under the former Government.

Every effort was made to do honor to the Commission and execute its wishes. Sometimes ostentatious attempts were made to give the impression of absolute non-interference with freedom of access to an expression before the Commission.

3. WISHES OF THE PEOPLE—

The declarations in O. E. T. A. East were much nearer to unanimity than in the South or the West, as may be seen by a glance at the Tables of "Petition Summaries". The greater part of the declarations, both oral and written, conformed to the resolutions of the Syrian Congress at Damascus, which is discussed separately below. This program was reached by the action of conflicting forces, in the presence of a general feeling that it was overwhelmingly important for reasons of national safety to reach unity of expression. The pressure brought to bear by the Government and the different political parties was of undoubted weight in bringing into line opinions of a more extreme sort, such as those in favor of independence in the highest degree and those which called for a perpetual strong mandatory control. But on the whole there can be no doubt that the main elements of this program represent the popular will as nearly as that can be expressed in any country.

The people of the area declared themselves almost unanimously for United Syria, for its complete independence, and against any help from France, and against the Zionist program. The Moslems were in nearly unanimous agreement upon a request for American assistance. The Jews asked for autonomy for themselves, and the Zionist scheme for their brethren in Palestine. The Druses were for the Arab government under a British mandate. The Christians were divided, partly by sects and partly by geographical location. All of the few Christians in the south, including Latin Catholics, were for a British mandate, with America in case for any reason Britain cannot come. So also were the Greek Orthodox of Damascus, and a portion of the Greek Orthodox farther north. The small

groups of Protestants were for an Anglo-Saxon mandate, some preferring America and some Britain. The Orthodox Syrians were for America. All the Catholics (except at Amman and Deraa) and the Maronites were for France. Nearly all of the Christians were for a strong mandatory control.

4. THE SYRIAN CONGRESS AT DAMASCUS—

From the time of reaching Jerusalem, the Commission began to be told of a Congress that was in preparation, to be held soon at Damascus, which would for a large part of the population determine the question of a mandate. Sessions were held while the Commission was at Damascus and on the last day there, a deputation presented to the Commission the program that had been prepared.

The Congress was not elected directly by the people, or by a fresh appeal to the people, the reason given being that time was lacking to revise the voting lists and carry through a new scheme. At the last Turkish election, before the war, electors were chosen to select deputies for the Turkish parliament. The survivors of these electors chose the members of the Damascus Congress. Criticisms were made against the plan of choice to the effect that it was unconstitutional and extraconstitutional, that the electors had mostly belonged to the Party of Union and Progress, and that the members of the Congress were not distributed in proportion to population. 69 members attended, and about 20 others from the west and north had been elected, but had not arrived. There were a number of Christians in the Conference, but no Jews, though some Jews among the electors were said to have given their approval. Much evidence goes to show that the program prepared represents well the wishes of the people of Syria. The program is as follows:

“We the undersigned members of the General Syrian Congress, meeting in Damascus on Wednesday, July 2nd, 1919, made up of representatives from the three Zones, viz., the Southern, Eastern, and Western, provided with credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants of our various districts, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon the following statement of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us to present them to the American Section of the International Commission; the fifth article was passed by a very large majority; all the other articles were accepted unanimously.

“1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria within these boundaries. The Taurus System on the North; Rafah

and a line running from Al Jauf to the south of the Syrian and the Hejazian line to Akaba on the south; the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers and a line extending east of Abu Kamal to the east of Al Jauf on the east; and the Mediterranean on the west.

- “2. We ask that the Government of this Syrian country should be a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy on broad decentralization principles, safeguarding the rights of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Feisal, who carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited our full confidence and entire reliance.
- “3. Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area are not naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and that they are by no means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Roumanians at the beginning of their independence, we protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, placing us among the nations in their middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power.
- “4. In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference of this just protest for certain considerations that we may not understand, we, relying on the declarations of President Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an end to the ambition of conquest and colonization, can only regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete independence. And desiring that our country should not fall a prey to colonization and believing that the American Nation is farthest from any thought of colonization and has no political ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economical assistance from the United States of America, provided that such assistance does not exceed 20 years.
- “5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our desire for assistance, we will seek this assistance from Great Britain, also provided that such assistance does not infringe the complete independence and unity of our country and that the duration of such assistance does not exceed that mentioned in the previous article.
- “6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place.
- “7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine,

and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.

“8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone, which includes Lebanon, from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.

“9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and that there should be no economical barriers between the two countries.

“10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the southern part of Syria; therefore we ask the complete annulment of these conventions and agreements.

“The noble principles enunciated by President Wilson strengthen our confidence that our desires emanating from the depths of our hearts, shall be the decisive factor in determining our future; and that President Wilson and the free American people will be our supporters for the realization of our hopes, thereby proving their sincerity and noble sympathy with the aspiration of the weaker nations in general and our Arab people in particular.

“We also have the fullest confidence that the Peace Conference will realize that we would not have risen against the Turks, with whom we had participated in all civil, political, and representative privileges, but for their violation of our national rights, and so will grant us our desires in full in order that our political rights may not be less after the war than they were before, since we have shed so much blood in the cause of our liberty and independence.

“We request to be allowed to send a delegation to represent us at the Peace Conference to defend our rights and secure the realization of our aspirations”.

The program mostly speaks sufficiently for itself. Various points in it are commented upon elsewhere in this report. It is the most substantial

document presented to the Commission, and deserves to be treated with great respect. The result of an extensive and arduous political process, it affords a basis on which the Syrians can get together, and as firm a foundation for a Syrian national organization as can be obtained. The mandatory power will possess in this program a commitment to liberal government which will be found to be very valuable in starting the new state in the right direction.

[IV] *Cilicia:*

1. GENERAL—

- (a) The Commission did not endeavor to give thorough hearings in this region, feeling that it is not seriously to be considered a part of Syria, and desiring not to open up as yet the question of the Turkish-speaking portion of the former Turkish Empire.
- (b) The population statistics vary considerably but there can be no doubt of a marked Moslem majority in Cilicia before the war, now probably somewhat increased.

2. WISHES OF THE PEOPLE—

- (a) The Turks here, like most of those heard previously, wish to retain Turkish unity under the house of Osman, and leave the question of what shall be the Mandatory Power, if any, to the Turkish Government at Constantinople.
- (b) The Arabs (who are mainly Turkish-speaking, but are chiefly Nusairiyeh or Alouites) ask for union with Syria under a French mandate.
- (c) The Armenians (who are also chiefly Turkish-speaking) ask for the union of Cilicia with Armenia under an American mandate.
- (d) The other Christians, a small minority, are mostly for France, particularly the Greeks, who are working in close relation with the French in the northern regions of Turkey.

[V] *Mesopotamia:*

It was impossible for the Commission to visit Mesopotamia at this time. Earnest requests to make such a visit were presented at Damascus and Aleppo, accompanied by complaints that the British occupying forces are restricting freedom of speech, movement, and political action, and that they show signs of an intention to allow extensive immigration from India,

to the great detriment of the rights and interests of the inhabitants of the region.

A committee at Aleppo presented a program for Mesopotamia which parallels closely the “Damascus Program” for Syria. An abstract of their claims follows:

1. Mesopotamia should be completely independent, including Diarbekir, Deir-ez-Zor, Mosul, Bagdad, and Muhammerah.
2. The Government should be a constitutional civil kingdom.
3. The King should be a son of the King of the Hejaz, either Abdullah or Zeid.
4. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is protested against.
5. No outside government should interfere in the country.
6. After the recognition of independence, technical and economical assistance is to be asked for from America.
7. Objection is raised to all immigration and especially to that of Hindus and Jews.
8. The complete independence of Syria is asked for.
9. It is asked that there be no interference of France in Syria.

It will be noticed that conformably to the custom of all nascent nations, wide boundaries are claimed, which would involve difficulties with adjacent areas, such as Deir-ez-Zor with Syria, Diarbekir with Armenia, and Muhammerah with Persia.

The Orthodox Syrian Patriarch, from Der Zafran, near Mardin, met the Commission at Horns. He stated that 90,000 of his people were slain in 1915; when the British came in 1918, all were willing to submit to their rule; but emissaries came from Constantinople to stir up the Kurds and Arabs in favor of independence, and now the situation is much worse; the area occupied by his people should go with Mesopotamia, under the mandate of either America or Britain.

The entire data have been given, thus, so fully as to make it possible to test at every point the legitimacy of the inference drawn from the data, and of the final recommendations for action by the Peace Conference.

Further data for our final inference and recommendations were afforded by comprehensive reports of the entire survey, made by all three Advisers. The recommendations of the Commissioners have thus been shaped, in the light of surveys made from different points of view, and taking into account a wide range of considerations— local, national, racial, and religious;

considerations both of principle and of practical policy; and of the world's dire need of a peace everywhere justly and so permanently based.

II—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Commissioners have sought to make their survey of Syria, and the report upon Syria now submitted, in the spirit of the Instructions given them by the Council of Four,¹⁷ and especially in harmony with the Resolutions adopted on January 30, 1919 by the Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and with the Anglo-French Declaration of November 9, 1918—both quoted at length in the Commission's instructions. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth of the Resolutions adopted on January 30th are particularly pertinent to this report, and should be here recorded. The general purpose of the Peace Conference concerning these areas in the former Turkish Empire is here clearly disclosed:

2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.
3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.
4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical positions, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.
5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.^{[18](#)}

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In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The Anglo-French Declaration was spread broadcast throughout Syria and Mesopotamia, and, as bearing directly upon our problem, may also well be called to mind at this point:

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population.

In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the division too long exploited by Turkish policy.

Of this Declaration, M. Pichon very properly said in the French Chamber December 29th, 1918: "Of course we admit the complete freedom of the Conference, and its right to give these agreements their proper conclusions, but these agreements are binding both upon England and upon us". This statement is the more significant because it is exactly these two peoples of the Allies who are immediately related to the problems in the Arabic-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire.

Our survey made it clear that this Anglo-French Declaration, and similar utterances of the Peace Conference, and President Wilson's Fourteen Points,¹⁹ had made a deep impression upon the Syrian people and lay in the background of all their demands. The promises involved not only cannot justly be ignored by the Peace Conference, but should be faithfully fulfilled. This is particularly true of the British-French Declaration; for it is completely in accord with the repeated statements of the aims of the Allies, and was expressly directed to the Arabic-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire, especially Syria and Mesopotamia.

It is noted that these Resolutions of January 30th, 1919, and this Declaration of November 9th, 1918, clearly look to complete separation of the Arabic-speaking areas from Turkey; propose that Syria and Mesopotamia shall not be colonies in the old sense at all; shall not be exploited for the benefit of the occupying power; but shall rather be directly encouraged and assisted in developing national independence as quickly as possible. And the Declaration makes the promises equally binding for Syria and Mesopotamia.

The Resolutions and Declaration invoked in the Instructions given to our Commission thus form the basis of the whole policy of sending a Commission, and of ascertaining the desires of the people.

The sincerity of the professed aims of the Allies in the war, therefore, is peculiarly to be tested in the application of these aims in the treatment of the Arabic-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire. For the promises here made were specific and unmistakable. It is worth consideration, too, that the whole policy of mandatories under the League of Nations might here be worked out with special success, and success here would encourage the steady extension of the policy elsewhere, and do something so significant for world progress as to help to justify the immeasurable sacrifices of the war. There is also probably no region where the Allies are freer to decide their course in accordance with the principles they have professed.

The gravity of the Syrian problem is further to be seen in certain well-known facts. The fact that the Arabic-speaking portion of the Turkish Empire has been the birthplace of the three great religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and that Palestine contains places sacred to all three, makes Syria inevitably a center of interest and concern for the whole civilized world. No solution which is merely local or has only a single people in mind can avail.

As a portion of the bridge-land uniting Europe, Asia, and Africa, too—where in a peculiar degree the East and the West meet—Syria has a place of such strategic importance, politically and commercially, and from the point of view of world civilization, as also to make it imperative that the settlement here brought about should be so just as to give promise of permanently good results for the whole cause of the development of a righteous civilization in the world. Every part of the former Turkish Empire must be given a new life and opportunity under thoroughly changed political conditions.

The war and the consequent breaking up of the Turkish Empire, moreover, give a great opportunity—not likely to return—to build now in Syria a Near East State on the modern basis of full religious liberty, deliberately including Various religious faiths, and especially guarding rights of minorities. It is a matter of justice to the Arabs, in the recognition of the Arab People and their desire for national expression, and of deep and lasting concern to the world, that an Arab State along modern political lines should be formed. While the elements are very various, the interests often divisive, and much of the population not yet fitted for self-government, the conditions are nevertheless as favorable as could be reasonably expected under the circumstances to make the trial now. The mixed and varied populations have lived together with a fair degree of unity under Turkish domination, and in spite of the divisive Turkish policy. They ought to do far better under a state on modern lines and with an enlightened mandatory.

In any case, the oversight of a mandatory Power, and of the League of Nations, would prevent this attempt from taking such a course as that taken by the Young Turk Movement. The Arabs, too, will know that this is their best opportunity for the formation of an Arab State, and will be put on their mettle to achieve a distinct success. The insight and breadth of sympathy revealed by Emir Feisal make him peculiarly well fitted, also, for the headship of a State involving both Oriental and Occidental elements. The trial at least could safely be made under a sympathetic mandatory

Power, and made with good promise of success. If the experiment finally failed, division of territory could still follow. But to begin with division of territory along religious lines is to invite increasing exclusiveness, misunderstanding, and friction. As Dr. W. M. Ramsay has said concerning certain other portions of the Turkish Empire: "The attempt to sort out religions and settle them in different localities is wrong and will prove fatal. The progress of history depends upon diversity of population in each district". And there is real danger in breaking Syria up into meaningless fragments.

Any policy adopted, therefore, for Syria should look to "the establishment of a national government and administration deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations",²⁰ and should treat it as far [as] possible in harmony with its natural geographic and economic unity. This is the natural course to be taken, if at all feasible. It is directly in line with the expressed purpose of the Peace Conference. And it is the plain object of the desires and ambitions of a large majority of the population concerned.

It is interesting, also, to find that both British and French officers in Syria seemed agreed in the belief that the unity of all Syria under one mandatory was desirable; and that there were certain to be constant friction and dangers to peace among British, French, and Arabs, if both British and French remained in the country.

On the other hand, the practical obstacles to the unity of Syria are: the apparent unwillingness of either the British or the French to withdraw from Syria—the British from Palestine, or the French from Beirut and the Lebanon; the intense opposition of the Arabs and the Christians to the Zionist Program; the common Lebanese demand for complete separate independence; the strong feeling of the Arabs of the East against any French control; the fear on the part of many Christians of Moslem domination; and the lack of as vigorous a Syrian national feeling as could be desired. These obstacles will be discussed in the recommendations of the Commissioners.

In the light, now, of these practical obstacles to the unity of Syria, of the general considerations favoring that unity, and of the wide range of data secured by our survey, we turn to our recommendations.

III—RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commissioners make to the Peace Conference the following recommendations for the treatment of Syria:

1. We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of one or more powers) is brought into Syria, should come in, not at all as a colonizing Power in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatary under the League of Nations, with the clear consciousness that “the well-being and development” of the Syrian people form for it a “sacred trust”.

- (1) To this end the mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, in the annual reports of the Mandatary to the League or in other ways.
- (2) The Mandatary Administration should have, however, a period and power sufficient to ensure the success of the new State; and especially to make possible carrying through important educational and economic undertakings, essential to secure founding of the State.
- (3) The Mandatary Administration should be characterized from the beginning by a strong and vital educational emphasis, in clear recognition of the imperative necessity of education for the citizens of a democratic state, and the development of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation of national spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which has only recently come to self-consciousness.
- (4) The Mandatary should definitely seek, from the beginning of its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to independent self-government as rapidly as conditions allow, by setting up all the institutions of a democratic state, and by sharing with them increasingly the work of administration, and so forming gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly in the progress of the country, and forming at the same time a large group of disciplined civil servants.
- (5) The period of “tutelage” should not be unduly prolonged, but independent self-government should be granted as soon as it can safely be done; remembering that the primary business of governments is not the accomplishment of certain things, but the development of citizens.
- (6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatary in a country like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete religious liberty is ensured, both in the constitution and in the practice of the state, and that a jealous care is exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is more vital than this for the enduring success of the new Arab State.
- (7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount of indebtedness on the part of the new State should be avoided, as well as

any entanglements financially with the affairs of the Mandatory Power. On the other hand the legitimate established privileges of foreigners such as rights to maintain schools, commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject to review and modification under the authority of the League of Nations in the interest of Syria. The Mandatory Power should not take advantage of its position to force a monopolistic control at any point to the detriment either of Syria or of other nations; but it should seek to bring the new State as rapidly as possible to economic independence as well as to political independence.

Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of the Commission, the fulfillment of at least the conditions now named should be assured, if the Peace Conference and the League of Nations are true to the policy of mandates already embodied in "The Covenant of the League of Nations." This should effectively guard the most essential interests of Syria, however the machinery of administration is finally organized. The Damascus Congress betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country would become, though under some other name, simply a colonial possession of some other Power. That fear must be completely allayed.

2. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Syria be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria.

- (1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too small, and the economic, geographic, racial and language unity too manifest, to make the setting up of independent states within its boundaries desirable, if such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in language, culture, traditions, and customs.
- (2) This recommendation is in line with important "general considerations" already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations, as well as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.
- 3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general allotted. The Commissioners believe, however, that the claim of the Damascus Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either historically or by commercial or language relations. The line between the Arabic-speaking and the Turkish-speaking populations would quite certainly class Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too,

has no such need of further sea coast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.

- (4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of Syria, the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon, which have already had a measure of independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity, undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy, and especially in the case of strongly unified groups. Even the "Damascus Program" which presses so earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government "on broad decentralization principles."

Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary, it may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the State, rather than entirely independent of it.

As a predominantly Christian country, too, Lebanon naturally fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she would have a four-fold safeguard: her own large autonomy; the presence of a strong Mandatary for the considerable period in which the constitution and practice of the new State would be forming; the oversight of the League of Nations, with its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minorities; and the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity of such a state, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations. Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if Christians were present in the state in considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated outside the state, as experience of the relations of different religious faiths in India suggests.

As a predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if she were within the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs, and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar statement might be made for Palestine; though, as "the holy Land" for Jews and Christians and Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed more particularly in connection with the recommendation concerning Zionism.

3. We recommend, in the third place, that Syria be placed under on[e] Mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity.

- (1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria among several mandatories, even if existing national unity were recognized; or to attempt a joint mandatory of the whole on the commission plan:—neither of these courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people. It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to some such form of divided mandate; but it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as considerations already urged indicate.
- (2) It is not to be forgotten, either, that, however they are handled politically, the people of Syria are there, forced to get on together in some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another—the Arabs of the East and the people of the Coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations, by a single mandatory? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent fragments. And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable. But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates the differences and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern social consciousness points to the necessity of understanding “the other half”, as it can be understood only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatory ought to form a constant and increasingly effective help to unity of feeling throughout the state, and ought to steadily improve group relations.

The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among various groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the Turkish Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes plain that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike, not their exploitation, decent human relations are pretty certain to prevail, and a permanent foundation for such relations to be secured—a foundation which could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic groups.

The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good of all groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole of Syria under a single

mandate.

4. We recommend, in the fourth place, that Emir Feisal be made the head of the new united Syrian State.

- (1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the representative Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there seems to be no reason to doubt that the great majority of the population of Syria sincerely desire to have Emir Feisal as ruler.
- (2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their long training under tribal conditions, and with their traditional respect for their chiefs. They seem to need, more than most people, a King as the personal symbol of the power of the State.
- (3) Emir Feisal has come, too, naturally into his present place of power, and there is no one else who could well replace him. He had the great advantage of being the son of the Sherif of Mecca, and as such honored throughout the Moslem world. He was one of the prominent Arab leaders who assumed responsibility for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in the complete deliverance of the Arab-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. He was consequently hailed by the "Damascus Congress" as having "merited their full confidence and entire reliance." He was taken up and supported by the British as the most promising candidate for the headship of the new Arab State—an Arab of the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through his Sherifian connection, and through his broad sympathies with the best in the Occident. His relations with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly, and his kingdom would not be threatened from that side. He undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to the Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the East; but no man can be named who would have a stronger general appeal. He is tolerant and wise, skillful in dealing with men, winning in manner, a man of sincerity, insight, and power. Whether he has the full strength needed for his difficult task it is too early to say; but certainly no other Arab leader combines so many elements of power as he, and he will have invaluable help throughout the mandatory period.

The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the fact that an Arab of such qualities is available for the headship of this new state in the Near East.

5. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking

finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.

- (1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.
- (2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists, and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming great natural obstacles.
- (3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to—favoring “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”, “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”—it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified. For “a national home for the Jewish people” is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”. The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918,²¹ President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great “ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting”: “The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery”. If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine—nearly nine-tenths of the whole—are emphatically against the entire Zionist program.

The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the peoples' rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent—1350 in all—of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests—those for a united Syria and for independence—had a larger support. This general feeling was only voiced by the “General Syrian Congress”, in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of their statement:

7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title, but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.
8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria known as Palestine nor of the littoral western zone which includes Lebanon from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.
10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the southern part of Syria; therefore we ask the complete annulment of these conventions and agreements.

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than fifty thousand soldiers would be required even to initiate the program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions,

requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a “right” to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish state, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is “the Holy Land” for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: the places which are most sacred to Christians—those having to do with Jesus—and which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning, in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as “the Holy Land.”

In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an International and Inter-religious Commission,

somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatary and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this Commission.

6. The Recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity of recommending what Power shall undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.

(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the qualifications, ideally to be desired in this Mandatory Power: First of all it should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing to enter heartily into the spirit of the mandatory system, and its possible gift to the world, and so be willing to withdraw after a reasonable period, and not seek selfishly to exploit the country. It should have a passion for democracy, for the education of the common people and for the development of national spirit. It needs unlimited sympathy and patience in what is practically certain to be a rather thankless task; for no Power can go in, honestly to face actual conditions (like land-ownership, for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without making many enemies. It should have experience in dealing with less developed peoples, and abundant resources in men and money.

(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications, certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these qualifications that has not been more or less definitely indicated in our conferences with the Syrian people and they certainly suggest a new stage in the development of the self-sacrificing spirit in the relations of peoples to one another. The Power that undertakes the single mandate for all Syria, in the spirit of these qualifications, will have the possibility of greatly serving not only Syria but the world, and of exalting at the same time its own national life. For it would be working in direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the war, and give proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And that would mean very much just now, in enabling the nations to keep their faith in one another and in their own highest ideals.

(3) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30, 1919, quoted in our Instructions, expressly state for regions to be “completely severed from the Turkish Empire”, that “the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatary Power.” Our survey left no room for doubt of the choice of the majority of the Syrian people. Although it was not known whether America would take a mandate at all; and although the Commission could not only give no assurances upon that point, but had rather to discourage expectation; nevertheless,

upon the face of the returns, America was the first choice of 1152 of the petitions presented—more than 60 per cent—while no other Power had as much as 15 per cent for first choice.

And the conferences showed that the people knew the grounds upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared that their choice was due to knowledge of America's record: the unselfish aims with which she had come into the war; the faith in her felt by multitudes of Syrians who had been in America; the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in Syria, especially the College in Beirut, with its well known and constant encouragement of Syrian national sentiment; their belief that America had no territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian state was well established as her treatment both of Cuba and the Philippines seemed to them to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit; and her ample resources.

From the point of view of the desires of the "people concerned", the Mandate should clearly go to America.

(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already stated as needed in the Mandatory for Syria, America, as first choice of the people, probably need not fear careful testing, point by point, by the standard involved in our discussion of qualifications; though she has much less experience in such work than Great Britain, and is likely to show less patience; and though her definite connections with Syria have been less numerous and close than those of France. She would have at least the great qualification of fervent belief in the new mandatory system of the League of Nations, as indicating the proper relations which a strong nation should take toward a weaker one. And, though she would undertake the mandate with reluctance, she could probably be brought to see, how logically the taking of such responsibility follows from the purposes with which she entered the war, and from her advocacy of the League of Nations.

(5) There is the further consideration, that America could probably come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at least, with less friction than any other Power. The great majority of Syrian people, as has been seen, favor her coming, rather than that of any other power. Both the British and the French would find it easier to yield their respective claims to America than to each other. She would have no rival imperial interests to press. She would have abundant resources for the development of the sound prosperity of Syria; and this would inevitably benefit in a secondary way the nations which have had closest connection with Syria, and so help to keep relations among the Allies cordial. No other Power probably would be

more welcome, as a neighbor, to the British, with their large interests in Egypt, Arabia, and Mesopotamia; or to the Arabs and Syrians in these regions; or to the French with their long-established and many-sided interests in Beirut and the Lebanon.

(6) The objections to simply recommending at once a single American Mandate for all Syria are: first of all, that it is not certain that the American people would be willing to take the Mandate; that it is not certain that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially welcome America's coming—a situation which might prove steadily harassing to an American administration; that the vague but large encouragement given to the Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her large and influential Jewish population; and that, if America were to take any mandate at all, and were to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. For there is a task there of such peculiar and worldwide significance as to appeal to the best in America, and demand the utmost from her, and as certainly to justify her in breaking with her established policy concerning mixing in the affairs of the Eastern Hemisphere. The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could come into Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice to all the peoples concerned.

To these objections as a whole, it is to be said, that they are all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and that they only form the sort of obstacles that must be expected, in so large and significant an undertaking. In any case they do not relieve the Commissioners from the duty of recommending the course which, in their honest judgment, is the best course, and the one for which the whole situation calls.

The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked to undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.

If for any reason the mandate for Syria is not given to America, then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express request of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate be given to Great Britain. The tables show that there were 1073 petitions in all Syria for Great Britain as Mandatory, if America did not take the mandate. This is very greatly in excess of any similar expression for the French. On the contrary—for whatever reason—more than 60 percent of all the petitions, presented to the Commission, directly and strongly protested against any French Mandate. Without going into a discussion of the reasons for this situation,

the Commissioners are reluctantly compelled to believe that this situation itself makes it impossible to recommend a single French mandate for all Syria. The feeling of the Arabs of the East is particularly strong against the French. And there is grave reason to believe that the attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war between the Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain a dangerous alternative. The Commissioners may perhaps be allowed to say that this conclusion is contrary to their own earlier hope, that—because of France's long and intimate relations with Syria, because of her unprecedented sacrifices in the war, and because the British Empire seemed certain to receive far greater accessions of territory from the war—it might seem possible to recommend that France be given the entire mandate for Syria. But the longer the Commission remained in Syria, the more clear it became that that course could not be taken.

The Commissioners recommend, therefore, that if America cannot take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain; because of the choice of the people concerned; because she is already on the ground and with much of the necessary work in hand; because of her trained administrators; because of her long and generally successful experience in dealing with less developed peoples; and because she has so many of the qualifications needed in a Mandatory Power, as we have already considered them.

We should hardly be doing justice, however, to our sense of responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add some at least of the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed and implied in our conferences, which led to the preference for an American mandate over a British mandate. The people repeatedly showed honest fear that in British hands the mandatory power would become simply a colonizing power of the old kind; that Great Britain would find it difficult to give up the colonial theory, especially in case of a people thought inferior; that she would favor a civil service and pension budget too expensive for a poor people; that the interests of Syria would be subordinated to the supposed needs of the Empire; that there would be, after all, too much exploitation of the country for Britain's benefit; that she would never be ready to withdraw and give the country real independence; that she did not really believe in universal education, and would not provide adequately for it; and that she already had more territory in her possession—in spite of her fine colonial record—than was good either for herself or for the world. These misgivings of the Syrian people unquestionably largely explain their demand for “absolute independence”, for a period of “assistance” of only twenty years, their protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, etc.

They all mean that whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send into Syria, should go in as a true mandatory under the League of Nations, and for a limited term. Anything else would be a betrayal of the Syrian people. It needs to be emphasized, too, that under a true mandatory for Syria, all the legitimate interests of all the nations in Syria would be safeguarded. In particular, there is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory power, or in an independent Syria.

There remains only to be added, that if France feels so intensely concerning her present claims in Syria, as to threaten all cordial relations among the Allies, it is of course possible to give her a mandate over the Lebanon (not enlarged), separated from the rest of Syria, as is desired by considerable groups in that region. For reasons already given, (See Page 42)²² the Commissioners cannot recommend this course, but it is a possible arrangement.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES R. CRANE
HENRY C. KING

SECTION TWO. THE REPORT UPON MESOPOTAMIA

In view of the Resolutions, passed by the Peace Conference on January 30th, 1919, and of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 9th, 1918—on the eve of the Armistice—both of which documents class Syria and Mesopotamia together to be treated in the same way, and make to them the same promises and assurances, the Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference, adopt for Mesopotamia a policy in general parallel to that recommended for Syria, in order that the Anglo-French Declaration may not become another “scrap of paper”.

1. We accordingly recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration is brought into Mesopotamia, should come into Mesopotamia, not at all as a colonizing power in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatory under the League of Nations, with clear consciousness that “the well-being and development” of the Mesopotamian people form for it a “sacred trust”. To this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as

brought out from year to year, whether in the annual reports of the Mandatory to the League or in other ways.

The entire text of the first recommendation for Syria, with its subordinate recommendations, applies point by point to Mesopotamia as truly as to Syria.

If the Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and the appointed Mandatory Power loyally carry out the policy of mandatories embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the most essential interests of Mesopotamia would be fully safeguarded—but only so.

2. We recommend, in the second place, that the unity of Mesopotamia be preserved: the precise boundaries to be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the mandate has been assigned. It should probably include at least the Vilayets of Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. And the Southern Kurds and Assyrians might well be linked up with Mesopotamia. The wisdom of a united country needs no argument in the case of Mesopotamia.

3. We recommend, in the third place, that Mesopotamia, be placed under one Mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity. The economic, political, social and educational development of the people all call for such a unified mandate. Only waste, confusion, friction, and injury to the people's interests, could come from attempting a division and "spheres of influence" on the part of several nations. But this implies that the Mandatory Power shall not itself be an exploiting power, but shall sacredly guard the people's rights.

4. Since it is plainly desirable that there be general harmony in the political and economic institutions and arrangements of Mesopotamia and Syria; and since the people themselves should have chief voice in determining the form of government under which they shall live, we recommend that the Government of Mesopotamia, in harmony with the apparent desires of its people, be a Constitutional Monarchy, such as is proposed for Syria; and that the people of Mesopotamia be given opportunity to indicate their choice of Monarch, the choice to be reviewed and confirmed by the League of Nations. It may be fairly assumed that the 1278 petitions from Syrians for the independence of Mesopotamia—68.5 per cent of the total number received—reflects the feeling in Mesopotamia itself; and such contact as we have been able to secure with Mesopotamians confirms the assumption, and leads to the belief that the program, presented at Aleppo by representative Mesopotamians, headed by Jaafar Pasha, Military Governor

of the Aleppo District, and practically parallel to the Damascus Program, would be generally supported by the Mesopotamian people. Whether this support extends to each item in the program alike, and so to the naming of a King from the sons of the King of the Hedjaz, we have not sufficient data to determine, and so have recommended that a plebiscite be taken upon that point; although there is British evidence that many Mesopotamians have expressed themselves in favor of one of the sons of the King of the Hedjaz as Emir.

5. The Mesopotamian Program expresses its choice of America as Mandatory, and with no second choice. Undoubtedly there has been a good deal of feeling in Mesopotamia against Great Britain, and the petitioners specifically charge the British authorities in Mesopotamia with considerable interference with freedom of opinion, of expression, and of travel,—much of which might be justified in time of military occupation. But feeling so stirred might naturally breed unwillingness to express desire for Great Britain as Mandatory. On the other hand, the material in the pamphlet called “Copies and Translations of Declarations and other Documents relating to Self-Determination in Iraq” (Mesopotamia) was called out by an attempt on the part of the British Government in Mesopotamia to secure the opinions of leading men of all groups concerning “self-determination.” This material, just because reported directly to British officials, is doubtless somewhat more favorable to the British than it would otherwise be; but it gives unquestionably good evidence of much opinion likely to choose a British mandate. And after all, the range of choice of a mandatory, of sufficient power and experience and of essential justice, is decidedly limited, and it is by no means improbable that if the Mesopotamians were confronted by a refusal of America to take a mandate for Mesopotamia, they would make Great Britain at least second choice, as the majority of the Syrians did. There is supplementary evidence also upon this point.

Now it seems so unlikely that America could or would take a mandate for Mesopotamia, in addition to the possible consideration of Syria and Asia Minor, that the Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference assign the mandate for Mesopotamia to Great Britain: because of the general reasons already given for recommending her as mandatory in Syria, if America does not go in there; because she is probably best of all fitted for the particular task involved, in view of her long relations with the Arabs; in recognition of the sacrifices made by her in delivering Mesopotamia from the Turks, though with no acknowledgement of right of conquest, as her own statements expressly disclaim; because of the special

interests she naturally has in Mesopotamia on account of its nearness to India and its close connections with Arabia; and because of Work already done in the territory.

These reasons make it probable that the largest interests of the people of Mesopotamia as a whole will be best served by a British Mandate, in spite of the fact that from the point of view of world-interests, in the prevention of jealousy, suspicion, and fear of domination by a single power, it were better for both Britain and the world that no further territory anywhere be added to the British Empire. A British Mandate however, will have the decided advantage of tending to promote economic and educational unity throughout Mesopotamia and Syria whether Syria be under Great Britain or America—and so will reflect more fully than ever before, the close relations in language, customs, and trade between these parts of the former Turkish Empire.

In a country so rich as Mesopotamia in agricultural possibilities, in oil, and in other resources, with the best intentions, there will inevitably be danger of exploitation and monopolistic control by the Mandatory Power, through making British interests supreme, and especially through large Indian immigration. This danger will need increasingly and most honestly to be guarded against. The Mesopotamians feel very strongly the menace particularly of Indian immigration, even though that immigration should be confined to Moslems. They dread the admixture of another people of entirely different race and customs, as threatening their Arabic civilization.

Respectfully submitted,

[CHARLES R. CRANE]
[HENRY C. KING]

SECTION THREE. THE REPORT UPON THE NON-ARABIC-SPEAKING PORTIONS OF THE FORMER OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The method of inquiry, in making our survey of the Asia Minor portion of our task, has necessarily differed from that followed in the study of Syria. For our ultimate duty, according to our Instructions, is “to form an opinion ... of the divisions of territory and assignment of mandates which will be most likely to promote the order, peace, and development” of the peoples concerned.

Now we faced in Turkey a unique situation as to mandates. In Syria we were in a region already virtually separated from the Turkish Empire, a

region whose boundaries were in general clear, and a region recognized as under a temporary government. In such a territory, it was entirely feasible to go from community to community to seek the desires of the peoples concerning a mandate. None of these conditions held for Asia Minor.

For in the case of the proposed State of Armenia, for example, the territory was not yet set off, nor its boundaries even approximately known; the Armenians were not largely present in any of the territory to be assigned; the wishes of the Armenians themselves as to mandate were already known; and the wishes of the rest of the population could not be taken primarily into account, since the establishment of the Armenian State would be in a sense penal for the Turkish people, and naturally to be accepted only as a necessity.

If a Constantinopolitan State were to be set off, similar difficulties, in getting the wishes of the people upon a mandate, would be encountered. For the primary interest in such a State is a world interest, rather than a local one; the population would be likely to shift considerably with so new a policy, and so the choice of the present population, especially in such troublous times, would not be particularly significant; and the fact that a large element of the population belongs to the official class would make an unbiased opinion hardly possible.

Even in the portions of Asia Minor sure to be left with the Empire, an inquiry for choice of mandate, like that conducted in Syria, was not practicable. For the Peace Conference had not declared—at least up to the present—that Turkey must have a mandatory power over her, and consequently it was largely within her own choice whether she should have any mandatory at all, she had also long been an independent country, so that the mandate would be inevitably somewhat modified and adjusted through agreement with the Mandatory.

Moreover, even if an inquiry for choice of mandatory were feasible, it would be most difficult to get trustworthy results. For it is perfectly clear that opinion in Constantinople is not free to express itself. The Government pressure in various forms upon individuals and groups, and the partisan censorship of the Press, are both manifest. In the case of an American Mandate, too, it was not known whether America would take it at all; so that there was fear of punishment from some other Power, if declarations were made for America and she did not actually accept the Mandate. Like conditions held in the interior, and there is even less understanding there of the political situation; so that it was felt that there would not be much gain from further inquiry in other parts of the Empire,

in addition to the frequent reports by various investigators to which we already had access.

The plainly imperative need of the whole country for as prompt a settlement as possible of its fate also led the Commission to give up visits to various parts of the Empire, in order not to defer its report and so possibly delay action by the Peace Conference. The Commissioners have had the less hesitancy in hastening their report, because it was believed that the essential facts upon which recommendations must be based were already in hand.

In this situation, the method for our inquiry in Asia Minor has been: to build, first of all, on our two months study in Paris of the Turkish problem in the course of which we used the reports and other material of the Western Asia Division of the American Experts, and had many conferences with experts there, and with able authorities coming direct from Turkey; to take full advantage of all the general work done in the survey of Syria, as part of the former Turkish Empire, with its fundamentally similar problems and its incidental sidelights; especially to see as many representative groups and individuals as possible in Constantinople, and so to get reports on all phases of our inquiry, and from all parts of Asia Minor; to supplement the information so received with reports, for recent months, of the American Embassy and Consular Offices (through the kind cooperation of Admiral Bristol and Commissioner Ravndal); and to supplement still further reports of personal investigations by American Missionaries, knowing the country thoroughly, and by representatives of the A. C. R. N. E., and of American business corporations.

In this way a large mass of valuable material has been brought together and studied by all three advisers—Dr. Albert H. Lybyer, Dr. George B. Montgomery, and Captain William Yale, U. S. A.— who summarized their inferences from it, and reported on special phases of the common problem. To test our conclusions, expert advice at all possible points was also sought from American and other leaders—many of them personally known by members of the Commission. The report of the Commissioners is based on the whole of the resulting evidence.

Our report falls naturally into five divisions: pertinent action already taken by the Peace Conference; dangers from a selfish division and exploitation of the Turkish Empire; considerations looking to a proper division of Turkey; resulting problems; and recommendations.

PERTINENT ACTION ALREADY TAKEN BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE

To begin with, the action creating the Commission, of which the Commissioners now reporting make the American Section, was taken by the Council of Four. Our Instructions were called: "Instructions for Commissioners from the Peace Conference to make enquiry in certain portions of the Turkish Empire which are to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of Governments acting as mandatories under the League of Nations". The Instructions then go on to say: "It is the purpose of the Conference to separate from the Turkish Empire certain areas comprising, for example, Palestine, Syria, the Arab countries to the East of Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Cilicia, and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor, and to put their development under the guidance of Governments, which are to act as mandatories of the League of Nations".

So far as concerns Asia Minor, this commits the Conference to two courses of action: permanent separation from the Turkish Empire of "Armenia, Cilicia, and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor"; and dealing with these territories under the mandatory, not colonial, system.

That this is the deliberate purpose of the Council is further shown by the added statement: "It is expected that this will be done in accordance with the following Resolutions, adopted by the Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, at a Conference held at the Quai d'Orsay on January 30, 1919".

1. Having regard to the record of the German Administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German Colonies be restored to Germany.

2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these

colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principles that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical positions, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.^{[23](#)}

.....

In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The Resolutions clearly assert several things: (1) that in settling the issues of the Turkish Empire, account may rightfully be taken of any “menace” to “the freedom and security of all nations”; (2) that “the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years” constitute a special reason for separation of territory, but “without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire”; (3) that this separation of territory should be taken as a special opportunity to apply “the principle that the well-being and development of subject peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the

constitution of the League of Nations”; (4) that this principle should be carried out through the mandatory system, which the remaining resolutions carefully define.

The Instructions then continue: “And it is agreed that the administration of these mandates shall be in the spirit of the following document which was formally presented to the President of the United States on behalf of the Governments of Great Britain and France”:

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy.

This is as admirable a statement of the spirit in which mandates should be administered as could be asked, and reflects honor on the two great Allies from whom it originally came.

Taken as a whole, the actions of the Peace Conference, in which all the Allies have shared, reflected in the forming of the Commission on Mandates and embodied in the Instructions to the Commission, form a solid basis for the policy to be adopted in Asia Minor. It is no sentimental program; but it is just on the one hand, and considerate on the other. If the Conference proceeds, in its further dealings with Turkey, honestly and

strongly and consistently to build on the foundations so prepared, essential justice will be done to all the peoples concerned, rankling wrongs will be set right, and the purposes of the Allies will be just so far vindicated.

And the Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that vindication is greatly needed just now. For there are set directly over against such a procedure as that now outlined and to which the Peace Conference is in principle and in all honesty committed, the still active policies of the old diplomacy of secret treaties and understandings and of division of spoils among victors. The direct consequences of such selfish and ultimately self-destructive policies are to be seen in all the world today. It is to be feared that some of the highest aims of the Allies in the war have already been well nigh lost, because of these policies creeping in, in all manner of "settlements"; It concerns the Peace Conference to decide whether the same fateful method is to be followed in Turkey.

II

THE DANGERS OF A SELFISH DIVISION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

In considering recommendations concerning the future administration of large parts of the former Turkish Empire, involving millions of people, it is imperative that the Peace Conference should make clear to itself from the beginning the serious dangers involved in the selfish and divisive national and corporate policies, into which the Allies have been drifting in their treatment of the Turkish Empire; and should squarely challenge that drift at once.

No doubt this policy of selfish exploitation in Turkey is in its entirety not the deliberate aim of any Power. Much confusion has unavoidably prevailed. The demands upon the Allies and upon the Peace Conference have been beyond human power wholly to meet. Under the pressure of immediate necessity for some kind of action, many steps have been taken in good faith, which have later proved temptations to selfish advantage, and provocations to jealousy and suspicion. The situation, too, has been most complex, by reason of previous engagements, and of countless interrelations of interest—private, party, national and international. This complexity has often made it honestly difficult to disentangle exactly the right course.

But however the drift toward selfish exploitation of the Turkish Empire has come about, there should be no mistake about the fact or its dangers. It

needs to be said and heeded, that Constantinople is once again a nest of selfish, suspicious, hateful intrigue, reaching out over the whole Empire, if not the world. What will it mean if this policy is allowed to prevail? In definitely raising this question, the Commissioners are not for an instant supposing that there is any easy and inexpensive solution of the Turkish problem. The justest solution at best will not be wholly welcome to Turkey, and will encounter her opposition. But in such a solution the Allies could at least know that their sacrifices were being made for the establishment of progressively righteous relations among men, not for sowing the seeds of endless and bitter discord.

In seeking, then, a practical plan for the righteous treatment of the Turkish Empire, the Allies should bear clearly in mind, that their fidelity to their announced aims in the war is here peculiarly to be tested; and that, in the proportion in which the division of the Turkish Empire by the Allies is made a division of spoils by victors, and is primarily determined by the selfish national and corporate interests of the Allies, in just that proportion will grave dangers arise.

- (1) Such a division, in the first place, would have to be forced upon the peoples concerned—not chosen by them. Every separate occupation of territory would be resented, and felt to be a constant injustice. The feeling of the Turkish people concerning the occupation of the Smyrna region by the Greeks is illustrative. They cannot be convinced that such seizure of territory can be harmonized with the professed principles of the Allies in the war. In such a case there is no possibility of laying the foundations of truly cordial relations with the Turkish people.
- (2) In the second place, just because these occupations of territory have to be forced upon the Turks, a large number of troops would be required to establish and maintain each occupation. With the intolerable burdens which the war has brought upon all the nations, and with the insistent demands for the demobilization of troops, this would be certain to prove an increasingly serious situation. The number of troops required for an occupation looked upon as temporary and for police purposes, is no measure of the forces required to maintain an aggressive and permanent seizure of territory, as the Turks themselves proved to their sorrow both in Macedonia in 1903–06 and in Yemen through a series of years. The selfishly divisive policy will go far toward turning Turkey into an armed camp, and breeding a constant state of brigandage.
- (3) It should not be forgotten, either, in the third place, that this selfishly divisive policy would naturally provoke violent retaliation, as in the whole region of Smyrna. Such retaliation, too, is likely to be visited not

only upon the immediate aggressors, but also upon the Christian population generally. For a selfish division and exploitation of territory may easily induce in the Turks the attitude, that, since the worst from outside is probably to come upon them in any case, they may as well take the occasion to rid themselves entirely of those whom they look upon as internal enemies. In that case the Allies would have to share the guilt of the Turks.

- (4) Such selfish exploitation of Turkey, also, would not only certainly call out the resentment of the most solid portion of the American people, as emphatically not illustrating the ends for which America came into the war; but would also tend to alienate the best sentiment among all the Allies. To eliminate from the cause of the Allies this weight of moral judgment would involve a loss of influence in the world—already greatly diminished—not lightly to be faced.
- (5) Such exploitation would mean, too, the deliberate sowing of dissension of the gravest kind among the Allies themselves, threatening the moral unity of their cause and entailing serious world consequences. This situation has already come to pass in no small degree. Only moral blindness can deny it. Suspicion and distrust are rife, and the meanest kind of intrigue against one another has been seen in not a few situations. It may be doubted if the moral unit of the Allies is more than a fraction of what it was in the war or in the early days of the Armistice. Now that is a calamity well nigh immeasurable, and it can be cured by no mechanics. Are the Allies to go on increasing this moral dissension among the world's leaders, and deliberately inviting the moral shipwreck of the world by their policies in Turkey?
- (6) Coupled with similar decisions already reached, selfish division and exploitation in Turkey would also go far to convince men of independent moral judgment all over the world—including many previously ardent upholders of the cause of the Allies—that the aims of the Allies had become as selfish and ruthless as those of the Germans had been. That would carry with it its own fateful consequences.

For example, no thoughtful man who had the opportunity of watching in France the stream of American officers and soldiers and of able men enlisted for various forms of service to the soldiers, as they came and went, could fail to see among these men, as the Armistice went on, the spread, like a contagion, of depression and disillusionment as to the significance of the war aims, because of the selfish wrangling of the nations. The fact should be squarely faced that thousands of Americans who served in the war have gone home disillusioned, greatly fearing, if not convinced, that the Allies had not been true to their asserted war aims, and have been

consequently driven to an almost cynical view of the entire conflict—cynicism, that made them feel like withdrawing all further American help, and henceforth washing their hands of the whole European imbroglio. This attitude has been reflected in many other American citizens who had been devoted supporters of the Allied cause. Now that is not a good result for America, for the Allies, or for the world.

But that situation, and similar situations among the best in all the Allies, can be changed only by some clear demonstration that somewhere and on a large and impressive scale, the often asserted high and unselfish aims of the Allies have been honestly carried out. That would come like an invigorating breeze out of the North, bringing new faith in men and in the genuineness of human ideals and endeavor.

That opportunity is offered, in a peculiar degree, in the righteous settlement of the problems of the Turkish Empire. No namby-pamby, sickly sentimental treatment is called for here. There are great and lasting wrongs in Turkey which must be set right. And there are world relations and interests honestly to be recognized and permanently to be satisfied. For the sake of justice to Turkey herself and to all her subject peoples; for the sake of the honor of the Allies and the renewed confidence of men in them; for the stemming of the tide of cynicism and selfish strife; for a fresh and powerful demonstration of moral soundness in the race; the Allies should recognize the grave dangers of all selfish exploitation of Turkey, and turn their backs on every last vestige of it.

III

CONSIDERATION LOOKING TO A PROPER DIVISION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

But if a selfishly exploiting division of the Turkish Empire is not justified it may be asked: Why is it necessary to divide Asia Minor, at least, at all? For such a division there are at least two great reasons: first, the hideous misgovernment and massacres of the Turkish rule; and second, Turkey's utter inadequacy to the strategic world position in which she is placed.

1. In the first place, there cannot be left out of account the hideous misgovernment of Turkey for centuries, even for citizens of the Turkish race.

- (1) One may recognize fully the agreeable and attractive personal qualities of the Turks that commonly make them the best liked, probably, of all the peoples in the Empire, and that almost unconsciously turn most foreigners who stay long in the country into pro-Turks. One may recognize, too, that

there has long been in the Turkish Government a kind of negative, indolent tolerance of other peoples, that allowed them much of the time to go on in their own ways, though constantly despised, robbed, oppressed. It may be granted, also, that the Turks have been successful in keeping, through long periods, widely scattered areas together and giving them a sort of unity, by the method of “divide and rule”, of leaving regional governments pretty largely to themselves so long as the Turkish revenues were obtained; and of using other races very largely as officials. It is only fair, also, to remember the very considerable amount of demoralization caused by the perpetual intriguing of European powers in Turkish affairs.

(2) But while all this may be freely admitted, it must still be clearly seen, that the Government of the Turkish Empire has been for the most part a wretched failure, in spite of generally good laws. For that Government has been characterized by incessant corruption, plunder, and bribery. It might almost be called a government of simple exploitation. So that Ramsay, who judges the Turk leniently, feels obliged to say: “The Turk is not naturally a good officer or a good official”. ...²⁴ “Bribery is the universal rule”.²⁵ And he speaks of the deep-seated mingled hatred and fear on the part even of the Turkish peasantry for government officials. In fact it is hardly too much to say that Turkish history shows gross neglect of the most ordinary and essential duties of a government in the Empire as a whole.

(3) And the treatment of the other subject races has been still worse than that of the Turks. For them nothing has been secure—whether property, lives, wives, or children. To all this have been added the horrible massacres of the Armenians, especially since Abd-ul-Hamid’s time, and somewhat similar deportations of the Greeks. Both races have proved themselves abler, more industrious, enterprising, and prosperous than the Turks, and so have made themselves feared and hated, doubtless not altogether without some provocation on their part in certain cases. And these massacres have been due to deliberate and direct government action, in which the Turkish people themselves have been too willing to share. They have not been crimes of the passion of the moment. And they have involved cruelties horrible beyond description.

For it must not be forgotten that this thing was not done in a corner. The evidence for few events in history has been more carefully gathered, sifted and ordered. The Bryce report upon *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–16*,²⁶ leaves no room for doubt of the essential facts. It is idle to attempt to deny it, or appreciably to mitigate its force.

Lord Bryce, himself a trained historian, says of the report: “Nothing has been admitted the substantial truth of which seems open to reasonable doubt”. And in estimating the value of the evidence, he calls attention to these facts: (1) “Nearly all of it comes from eye witnesses”; (2) “the main facts rest upon evidence coming from different and independent sources”; (3) “facts of the same, or of a very similar nature, occurring in different places, are deposed to by different and independent witnesses”,—including Danish and German witnesses; (4) “the volume of this concurrent evidence from different quarters is so large as to establish the main facts beyond all question”; (5) “in particular it is to be noted that many of the most shocking and horrible accounts are those for which there is the most abundant testimony from the most trustworthy neutral witnesses. None of these cruelties rest on native evidence alone”. And he adds: “A recollection of previous massacres will show that such crimes are a part of a long settled and often repeated policy of Turkish rulers” ²⁷ “The attempts made to find excuses for wholesale slaughter and for the removal of a whole people from its homes leave no room for doubt as to the slaughter and the removal. The main facts are established by the confession of the criminals themselves ²⁷ The disproof of palliations which the Turks have put forward is as complete as the proof for the atrocities themselves.”

Mr. Moorfield Storey, ex-President of the American Bar Association, records the natural verdict of one skilled in the weighing of evidence, when he writes to Lord Bryce: “In my opinion, the evidence which you print is as reliable as that upon which rests our belief in many of the universally admitted facts of history, and I think it establishes beyond all reasonable doubt the deliberate purpose of the Turkish authorities practically to exterminate the Armenians, and their responsibility for the hideous atrocities which have been perpetrated upon that unhappy people.”

It is not pleasant to call these dark facts to mind, but unfortunately there is only the slightest evidence that the Turkish Government or people as a whole have recognized or repudiated the crime of the Armenian massacres, or done anything appreciable to set them right. Some small groups of Turks have characterized these crimes aright, but there is almost nothing to show repentance or the fruits of repentance on the part of the great majority of the people or of their leaders, or to give reasonable hope that the massacres might not be repeated; though there is doubtless some excuse for the comparative indifference with which these massacres have been regarded by the Turks, because of a certain amount of revolutionary activity on the part of Armenians in some cases, and because of the widespread

wretchedness and want and sufferings of the whole Turkish population in ten years of war and disorder.

Now these crimes—black as anything in human history—cannot be simply forgotten and left out of account in seeking a righteous solution of the Turkish problem. If the rankest conceivable wrongs are not to be passed over in silence, it is inevitable that any just solution of the Turkish problem must contain that small measure of justice which it is now possible to render in this case.

It is strange that Lord Bryce in reviewing all the evidence concerning the Armenian massacres of 1915–16 should feel compelled to say: “The record of the rulers of Turkey for the last two or three centuries, from the Sultan on his throne to the district Mutessarif, is, taken as a whole, an almost unbroken record of corruption, of injustice, of an oppression which often rises into hideous cruelty. ...²⁸ Can anyone still continue to hope that the evils of such a government are curable? Or does the evidence contained in this volume furnish the most terrible and convincing proof that it cannot longer be permitted to rule over subjects of a different faith”? Is it strange that he should be unable to shake off the conviction that these facts are inevitably knit up with a proper solution of the problem of Turkey: “It is evidently desirable”, he writes, “that the public opinion of the belligerent nations—and, I may add, of neutral peoples also—should be enabled by knowledge of what has happened in Asia Minor and Armenia, to exercise its judgment on the course proper to be followed when, at the end of the present war, a political re-settlement of the Nearer East has to be undertaken”.

Surely the Peace Conference was justified in its resolution: “more particularly because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia ...²⁸ must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire”.

That the formation of a separate Armenian State is the deliberate intention of the Peace Conference seems further indicated in the later actions of the Conference concerning Armenia, like the appointment of Colonel Haskell as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the four Great Powers, and the appointment of Major General Harbord by President Wilson to investigate conditions in Armenia.²⁹ Many incidental things also indicate the general expectation on the part of the Allies that an Armenian State will be formed.

(4) The great and primary reason for this decision by the Peace Conference, is undoubtedly to be found in the Armenian massacres which have just been reviewed. But it might still be asked whether the situation created by the massacres could be met only by the formation of a separate Armenia. For such a separation, it must be admitted, involves very difficult problems. Why, then, is it necessary to set off an Armenian State? What are the reasons?

The only possible substitute for a separated Armenia is a general mandate by one of the Great Powers over all Asia Minor, which should ensure equal rights to all elements of the population,—to all races, and to all religions. If such a mandate were honestly carried out, we should certainly hope for a far better government on modern lines. But under the proposed mandatory system of the League of Nations, it is intended that the mandate shall be for a limited period. Even if that period were considerably prolonged, what would happen when the Mandatary withdrew? It is impossible to be sure, if the Turks still constituted the majority, that the state would not slump back into many of its old evils, including oppression of other races. The history of the Turks, unfortunately, gives all too small reason to hope for more.

The reasons for a separate Armenia, then, may be said to be: because of the demonstrated unfitness of the Turks to rule over others, or even over themselves; because of the adoption of repeated massacres as a deliberate policy of State; because of almost complete lack of penitence for the massacres, or repudiation of the crime—they rather seek to excuse them; because practically nothing has been done by the Turks in the way of repatriation of Armenians or of reparations to them—a condition not naturally suggesting a repetition of the experiment of Turkish rule; because, on the contrary, there is evidence of intense feeling still existing against the Armenians, and implicit threatening of massacre; because there has been sufficient proof that the two races cannot live peaceably and decently together so that it is better for both that they have separate states; because of complete failure of the strong clauses of the Treaty of 1878³¹ to protect the Armenians; because the most elementary justice suggests that there must be at least some region in Turkey where Armenians can go and not have to live under Turkish rule; because nothing less than that could give to the Armenians any adequate guarantee of safety; because, consequently, nothing less will satisfy the conscience of the world upon this point; because in this day of opportunity for small nations under the League of Nations, the Armenians have surely earned the right, by their sufferings, their endurance, their loyalty to principles, their unbroken spirit and ambition, and their demonstrated industry, ability and self-reliance, to

look forward to a national life of their own; because such a separate state would probably make more certain decent treatment of Armenians in other parts of Turkey; and because there is no adequate substitute for such a state. In the interests of the Armenians, of the Turks, and of the peace of the world alike, the formation of a separate Armenian State is to be urged.

2. But the reasons for some righteous division of Turkey do not lie simply in that “historical mis-government”, which justly challenges her rule over any other people; but also in her utter unfitness for the strategic world position in which she is placed. The very fact of her age-long misrule, coupled with her occupation of territory of critical significance to the world, constitutes her a “menace to the freedom and security of all nations”, and makes unusual restriction in her case necessary, for the greater good of the world and of her own subject peoples.

(1) For Turkey is held, as Dominian has said, by “a people whose incompetence to convert nature’s gifts into use or profit is historically patent” (Dominian, *Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*, p. 236). But, striking as has been their economic failure, the failure of the Turks has been far more than merely external or material. She has acted rather as a kind of blight upon all the peoples she has conquered. As Ramsay—possibly too strongly—puts it: “The action of the Turks in every department of life has simply been to ruin, never to rebuild. ...³² They destroyed the intellectual and moral institutions of a nation; they broke up and dissolved almost the entire social fabric; they undermined every educating and civilizing influence in the land, and they brought back a great part of the country to the primitive simplicity of nomadic life”. “There is hardly a social institution in Asia Minor, showing any degree of social constructiveness, that is not an older Anatolian creation, Moslemized in outward form, and usually desecrated in the process”. (Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey*, pp. 264, 265).

(2) Now the evil of this blighting influence of Turkish rule is vastly increased because of the critical significance of the territory which she occupies. First of all, in the words of another, “Turkey is before everything else a roadway—a bridge-land. ...³² No solution of the political problem involved can be attained without full consideration of its geographic aspects”. “Turkey has been a highway of commerce and civilization between Europe on the one hand and Asia and Africa on the other. ...³² The through roads converging into the Turkish territory are probably the oldest commercial routes of the world. At any rate they connect the sites on which the most ancient civilization rose”. By position, then, Turkey lies “at the

junction of three continents, and therefore on the main field of history”, and is “the site of convergence of the main avenues of continental travel”; and becomes, thus, in a peculiar degree, “the meeting place of races which are generally associated with the three continents which the country unites. Aryan, Tatar, and Semitic peoples therefore are strongly represented in the land”. With this advantage of position her remarkable topography combined to “create Turkey’s relation with the world beyond its borders”. “This relation was facilitated by the admirable set of natural routes which lead in and out of the country”: by the Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, Turkish Straits, and the Black Sea, “the shores of which are closely dotted with the terminals of great avenues from northeastern Europe, as well as all of northern and central Asia. ...”³² and by “the rift Valley of Syria”. Hence “the Eastern question is as old as the history of civilization on this particular spot of the inhabited world”—always “this momentous international problem of determining which people or nation shall control the Straits between Europe and Asia, who shall get toll from the enormous transit trade of the region”. (See Dominian, pp. 248 [Pg. 248 is part of [Doc. 79](#)], 222 [Pg. 222 includes portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 is part of [Doc. 75](#)], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of [Doc. 75](#)], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of [Doc. 75](#)])

Now under the new conception of a League of Nations, and of mandatory powers who are to think of the “well-being and development” of peoples temporarily placed under their care as a “sacred trust of civilization”, it is proposed to change this age-old Eastern Question from one of a selfish scramble among the nations to one of recognizing here a great and distinctly international or world interest; to make definite provision for this world interest, and yet not only with full justice to the Turkish people more immediately concerned, but to their greater advantage. For, except for a practically all-powerful nation, a position like that of Turkey, makes the land inevitably a perpetual prey of warring powers, so that Dominian could say quite truthfully of Turkey: “The land staggers under the load of misfortune which its central position in the Eastern Hemisphere has heaped upon it”. The situation has been inevitably one of exceeding difficulty for Turkey.

Is it not high time, then, in this crisis of the world’s history, and after the immeasurable sacrifices of the Great War, that intelligent men should recognize the stupid futility of the old method of incessant political and commercial national strife, and face this agelong Eastern Question in a totally new spirit?

(3) But because Turkey has been so markedly a “bridge-land”, it became also “the debatable land”; so that Ramsay can say that at the present day the central movement in Asia is, what it always has been, a conflict between the Eastern and Western spirit. “About 1070 most of Asia Minor became Oriental in language and in Government”. “For nearly eight centuries the Oriental element reigned supreme in Asia Minor and swept far into Europe. ...³³ But step by step Asia has been driven back, and in Asia Minor the old struggle has recommenced”. “On the west coast of Asia Minor the Greek element has increased enormously in strength while the Turkish element has grown weaker”. The Oriental element “dies out in these parts by a slow but sure decay”. “A revival of Orientalism” was planned and directed by Abd-ul-Hamid and by the later Young Turk movement. “But even in the Eastern parts of Asia Minor, the Oriental spirit is doomed”. “Orientalism is ebbing and dying in the country”. (Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey*, pp. 127, 129, 131, 157, 158)

Ramsay’s analysis is probably correct and important. But is there not something far greater to be looked for, than that gradual driving out of the “Oriental spirit” in Turkey? In one sense, doubtless, that spirit is doomed and must go. We are to be done with Oriental domination in Turkey, it may be hoped, when we get states which know in their citizens no privileged and unprivileged classes, but only equals before the law. But are we not also to be freed from Occidental domination? Was it not one of the greatest of the convictions of the Allies in the war, that no nation, no “Kultur”, however great and fine it might be, was good enough to blot out all others? Are there not priceless Oriental values, gratefully to be recognized and sedulously to be preserved? And may not Turkey, just because she has been, through the ages, “bridge-land” and “debatable land”, become in some rich and high sense mediating-land as well between the Occident and the Orient, teaching the nations how to combine the quietism of the East, and the pragmatism of the West; the religious dependence of the East, and the scientific mastery of natural forces of the West; the mental and spiritual fellowship of the East, and the mental and spiritual independence of the West?

As illustrative of the spiritual values still resident in Islam, for example, may be mentioned the remarkable and inspiring achievements of the Senussi sect, in establishing a vast state in a most barren unpromising land, and in up-lifting, organizing, and harmonizing a most backward and degenerated population in the heart of Africa within a comparatively few years, and under influences purely Moslem. Such a state should not be needlessly encroached upon. It rather affords ample warrant for expecting

that under new democratic processes and in due time the Moslems will prove themselves able to build up and manage their own states in the Arabian and Anatolian peninsulas. If the Entente powers are sincere in their declarations not further to harass the Moslem world and so give excuse for a pan-Islamic movement, they should also at once definitely and publicly renounce all further political encroachments on that world, and outline a clear policy of uplifting the Moslems, already subject to their control, by enlarged opportunities both in education and in public service.

(4) With the vision of such larger possible goals for this “bridge-land” and “debatable land” of the Eastern Hemisphere, one approaches the problem of the control of Constantinople and the Straits in a different spirit. The situation is so unique, the relations so complex and far-reaching, the responsibilities so heavy, and the possibilities so enthralling, that no one nation can be equal to the task,—least of all a nation with Turkey’s superlatively bad record of misrule. No situation in the world demands so compellingly international rule—not only to put an end here to the selfish scramble and perpetual intrigue of the nations, but also, above all, to rise to the possibilities of this strategic opportunity, for the benefit of all the race.

This calls for a Constantinopolitan State, directly and permanently vested in the League of Nations, but best managed probably through a single mandatary as trustee, steadily responsible to the League and removable by the League.

Such a solution, at first sight, will undoubtedly be unwelcome to most Turks. But Turkey is simply not conceivably equal to a great world responsibility; and the larger world interests must prevail. Moreover, it is certainly better for Turkey herself to be delivered from this intolerable responsibility, and to have her own government taken out of the midst of what has been, through the centuries, a center of boundless intrigue. The common people of Turkey would lead a much happier life in a state freed from outreaching imperialism, and at liberty to devote itself to the welfare of its own citizens.

3. If one turns aside now for a moment from the immediate problem of Asia Minor to that of the former Turkish Empire as a whole, other reasons for division of the Turkish Empire may be suggested.

(1) For one thing, there would be real danger, even under a mandate, in keeping intact the Turkish Empire as a whole—the danger of a later revival of the Turkish Empire and a repetition of its past history, on account of the

often revived jealousies of the Powers. That danger is not to be lightly regarded.

(2) The Turkish Empire, too, as it has existed, is not truly a unit from any point of view,—certainly not the Arabic and the non-Arabic-speaking portions. Its interests—except those of good government— are not one. It is hardly too much to say that however much the land has been a single unit with reference to intercontinental travel and trade, the fact remains that it has been clearly subdivided within itself. There would probably be distinct gain, consequently, in similarly dividing its problems, and seeking separate solutions for them. Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, for example, each has a kind of unity of its own.

It was natural, therefore, that the Peace Conference should have resolved that Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia should be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. The first three have already been dealt with in the preceding reports of this Commission. It may be briefly pointed out here, however, that these areas are naturally cut off from Turkey, because of their different language, customs, and civilization; that the people do not wish further connection with Turkey, but were rather greatly rejoiced to be freed forever from the Turkish yoke; and that there is opportunity in the Arabic-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire for at least two strong national states—Syria, including Palestine, and Mesopotamia, in accordance with the hopes of the Peace Conference and the desires of the people themselves. Both Syria and Mesopotamia should be, of course, under mandatories for a time.

IV

RESULTING PROBLEMS

The considerations now dealt with looking to a righteous division of the Turkish portion of the former Ottoman Empire, clearly involve the setting off of an Armenian State, and of a Constantinopolitan State; but as clearly imply the continuance of a distinctly Turkish State, with guarantees of justice to all its constituent peoples. The resulting problems, now to be considered, therefore, naturally become: the problem of a separate Armenia; the problem of an international Constantinopolitan State; the problem of a continued Turkish State; the problem of the Greeks; and of other minority races.

1. THE PROBLEM OF A SEPARATE ARMENIA

(1) The reasons why it is necessary that a separate Armenian State should be set up, have already been fully given. (See Page 16)³⁵ They need not be restated.

(2) The conception of such a State. It is well to have in mind the exact nature of the State proposed in this report, in order to prevent misunderstandings on any side.

It is not proposed in such a state to establish the rule of a minority of Armenians over a majority of other peoples. That would inevitably seem to the Turks to be very unjust, and would at once excite resentment and unremitting opposition. Moreover, such an arrangement would be unfair to the Armenians as well, for it would place them from the start in a false and untenable position. It would put them, too, under great temptation to abuse of power. And it would be no fair trial of a truly Armenian State. It would, of course, also make any mandate mean little or nothing, if not make it entirely impossible.

But such a separated State should furnish a definite area into which Armenians could go with the complete assurance, that there they would never be put under the rule of the Turks. It should be also a region in which Armenians could gradually concentrate, and from which the Turkish population might tend increasingly to withdraw; though no compulsion should be put on any people.

All this necessitates a strong Mandatory Power. The State could not even start without such help. This separated State should be therefore a state definitely under the rule of a Mandatory Government, organized on modern lines to do justice to all elements of the population: and a state from which the Mandatory should not withdraw, until the Armenians constituted an actual majority of the entire population, or at least until the Turks were fewer than the Armenians. This would necessarily mean that full Armenian self-government would be long delayed. And that fact should be definitely faced as inevitable. The conditions are such that there is no defensible alternative.

(3) The term of the Mandate is practically involved in the conception of the State, which is forced upon us. It cannot be a short-term mandate, not because of any reluctance to withdraw on the part of the Mandatory, but because under the peculiar circumstances, a true Armenian State cannot be established in a brief period of time, however ardent the desires of both the Armenians and the Mandatory Power. For the Armenians cannot safely

undertake the government independently, until they constitute an actual majority. There is also the added consideration of the natural need of considerable time for the amalgamation and consolidation of the Armenian people, as against some tendency to split up into fragments. The mandate must be long enough, too, to make the people thoroughly ready for both self-government and self-protection, through an increasing use of Armenians in the government even from the beginning.

(4) An American Mandate Desired. It seems universally recognized that the Armenians themselves desire an American Mandate. And this choice is apparently generally approved by America's Allies. The Turks, too, though not wishing any separate Armenian State, would probably favor an American Mandate for Armenia, if there must be an Armenia at all.

(5) The Conditions upon which America would be justified in taking the mandate for Armenia may be said to be: the genuine desire of the Armenians; the cordial moral support of the Allies in carrying out the mandate; willingness on the part of the Armenians to bear with a pretty long mandatory term, for the reasons already stated, and to give up all revolutionary committees; that Armenia should have territory enough to ensure a successful development; and that the peculiarly difficult mandate for Armenia should not be the only mandate given America in Turkey. None of these conditions, perhaps, call for comment, except the last, which will come up for later consideration.

(6) The Extent and Boundaries of the Armenian State. The General Adviser, Dr. Lybyer, has expressed so exactly the convictions of the Commissioners concerning the extent and boundaries of the Armenian State, that his statement may well replace any other discussion of this question:

1. The Armenians should be provided with a definite territory, and organized as soon as practicable into a self-governing independent state. Otherwise the questions of their safety and of their ceasing to be a center of world-disturbance cannot be answered.
2. This area should be taken from both Turkish and Russian territory. The wars of the 19th century divided the proper Armenian land between these two empires.
3. The Armenians are entitled to an amount of Turkish territory which takes into account their losses by the massacres of 1894–6, 1908–9, and 1915–16. These losses may be estimated at one million.
4. They should not be given an excessive amount of Turkish territory, if their state is to be practicable.

- a. The Turks, Kurds, and other races should not be left with a just grievance, since that would solidify their traditional hostility, and embitter them against the League of Nations.
 - b. It has been questioned, even by many of themselves, whether the Armenians are ready for self-government at present; certainly an imperial rule by them over other peoples should not be thought of for the present or the future.
 - c. It is too much to ask of the League of Nations or a mandatory power that they undertake to hold down and perhaps squeeze out a large majority, in order that a small minority may have time to multiply and fill the land.
 - d. There is a limit beyond which the project of ever producing an Armenian majority is actually not feasible; that is to say, if the Armenians are assigned too large an area, they will never be able to occupy and hold it.
 - e. The idea has been suggested that Armenia should be developed as a wall of separation or a buffer state between the two Moslem areas occupied by Turks and Arabs. This might be done by a compact, homogeneous state with considerable population and resources, but it is a burden which the Armenian state cannot be expected to bear within a conceivable time.
5. The proposed large Armenia, to extend from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, is probably impossible of realization, and therefore should not be planned for. It encounters all the objections previously mentioned.
- a. In 1914 and before 1894 the Armenians were in a small minority in such an area, probably never exceeding twenty-five per cent. If they should be given the control, the majority populations would be injured, in violation of all "Wilsonian principles" and war aims. With allowance for the estimated million who perished, and assuming that all these could have been fathered into the territory, the Armenians would still now number only about one-third of the total population.
 - b. There never was an Armenia which ruled all this territory. The real Armenia, as maps and records show, was a highland country, which at one time reached the Caspian Sea, which came near to the Black Sea without reaching it, and which never came near the Mediterranean Sea. The Lesser Armenia of the Middle Ages in the Cilician region was the result of the expulsion and flight of Armenians from further east,—a process which scattered them over a large area, in which they have ever since been in a minority almost everywhere. The demand for both areas is therefore an imperialistic claim, based historically upon an overstrained interpretation of facts.

- c. The Armenians are reduced, allowing for the return of survivors, to about ten per cent of the population in the large area proposed. Assuming an optimistic amount of migration of other Armenians into, and of Turks and Kurds out of the land, the Armenians would still constitute only about one-fourth of the population. (See appended table of estimates of population.)³⁶ The situation of a mandatory power would be extremely difficult in defending this minority, which would as future owners and rulers of the land, be much more obnoxious to the majority than at present.
 - d. No European power will undertake so difficult a task, and it must therefore be left to the United States. If the American people should be induced to begin the process, and this should turn out to be fundamentally unjust, they would modify their intention. The chances are considerable that the large Armenia would never become an Armenian State at all, but a mixed State, composed of minorities of Armenians, Turks, Kurds, etc., which could not maintain internal order or security against external aggression without the support of a strong mandatory power. This would disappoint both the Armenians, who could never control the government, and the mandatory power, which could never leave the country.
6. On the contrary, an Armenia reduced to the Armenian highlands in both Turkey and Russia, with an outlet on the Black Sea, would have a good chance of establishment and continuance. The Turkish area which the Russians held in 1917 may be taken approximately as the Turkish portion of this "Small Armenia", and the present territory of Russian Armenia as the remainder. Engineers could overcome the physical obstacles to internal and external communication.
- a. The Turks and Kurds could not rightfully complain of such an area, because it is the historical Armenia, and because if the million dead Armenians could be restored and brought into the land, the Armenians would have about one-half the population (See table.)³⁷ Migration of Turks and Kurds from this area can be more easily accomplished than from the larger land, inasmuch as a considerable proportion of them fled before the Russians, and thus are in a dislocated condition.
 - b. The Armenians might become the majority of the actual population within a few years, and with that in view, and with the smaller area, they could be given a larger share in the administration from the start, and trained more rapidly to self-government.
 - c. The duration of the mandate would be materially shortened, with a soldier [*solider?*] ethnical foundation and a more compact area. The

Mandatory would need far fewer troops, and would be put to much less expense.

- d. The doubts as to the possibility of erecting an Armenian State in the larger area, are reduced for the smaller land. The mandatory power could with a prospect of success, keep in mind the giving of control to the Armenians, since they would after a time not be a minority, causing trouble by incessant pushing for special privileges of an economic and political nature, but a majority with a just right to a larger place.
 - e. This land having secure frontiers, as was tried out thoroughly during the Great War, gives promise of self-defensibility. A state reaching to the Mediterranean is a far more difficult matter, with its long frontiers, containing each a number of vulnerable spots, and its permanent difficulties of international communication, due to the broken configuration of the land. Its very existence might moreover be regarded by the Turks and Arabs as a provocation.
 - f. The economic opportunity of an Armenia on this basis would be ample; all essentials for food, fuel, and shelter can be obtained locally, and surpluses are easily to be produced which can be exchanged for other wares.
 - i. In Turkish Armenia the Armenians were able to live and often to prosper, and yet they paid considerable taxes and were subject to frequent robbery.
 - ii. In Russian Armenia the Armenians have thriven greatly, under only moderately favorable conditions.
 - iii. This area is crossed by commercial routes of immemorial importance, notably through Erzingan and Erzerum between Anatolia and Persia and Trans-caucasia, and through Trebizond toward the Persian Gulf. This guarantees the importance of several towns at nodal points, such as Kars, Erivan, Erzerum, Mush, and Van, and suggests valuable possibilities in the direction of transportation, trade, and manufacture for export.
7. All this is argued with the best interest of the Armenians in mind, on the basis of genuine friendliness toward them, and of concern to give them a real and not an illusory opportunity. They are in genuine danger of grasping at too much and losing all.
- If they establish themselves securely in the more restricted area, and if Anatolia fails to develop as a well knit and successful state, there is no reason why the question should not be resumed later of connecting Cilicia with Armenia.

Estimates of the Population of an Armenian State:

The appended tables are the result of an effort to compare the population of Armenian areas according to two plans. That which includes a "Larger Turkish Armenia" was worked out by the American Division of Western Asia at the Peace Conference, and can be examined more fully in the records of the Conference. It represents probably, subject to minor alterations, the best possible arrangement on the basis of giving an outlet on both the Black and Mediterranean Seas; the frontiers follow natural features, and the connection with Cilicia is made as narrow as practicable. The "Smaller Turkish Armenia" suggested in the text cuts off for Armenia in Turkey substantially that portion of the Armenian plateau which was held by Russia in her period of advance during the Great War. The phrase "Differential Area" was chosen to represent what is left after subtracting "Smaller Turkish Armenia" from "Larger Turkish Armenia", and extends from Mersina to Kharput and north to the Black Sea.

A. BEFORE 1914. This table is estimated from the statistics prepared by Drs. Magie and Westermann. Percentages are attached. The Moslems are not separated into groups; they include about 400,000 Lazes on the Black Sea coast between Trebizond and Batum; about one half are Turks; most of the remainder are Kurds, some of them are Shiite or Kizilbash, and the remainder Sunnite. Dr. Magie's figures may under-estimate the Armenians in some areas. Certainty will never be attained as to the numbers of the different elements in Turkey until a scientific ethnological survey has been made under disinterested control.

Area	%	Moslems	%	Armenians	%	Greeks	%	Others	Total
Larger Turkish Armenia	71	3,073,000	21½	933,000	6½	289,000	1	34,000	4,329,000
Differential area	73	1,697,000	20	461,000	6	136,000	1	18,000	2,312,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia	68	1,376,000	23½	472,000	7½	153,000	1	16,000	2,017,000

B. IN 1920. It may be assumed that in 1920 order will be restored so that all survivors can return, of the Armenians who were deported or who fled into Russia, and of the Turks and Kurds who fled from the territory occupied or threatened by Russia. An estimate follows, in which it is guessed that in the "Smaller Turkish Armenia" 50 per cent of the Armenians and Syrian Christians have perished, and 20 per cent of the Greeks and Moslems. The Armenians of the "Differential Area" had not the same opportunity to

escape into Russia, and it is guessed that 75 per cent of these have perished.

Area	%	Moslems	%	Armenians	%	Greeks	%	Others	Total
Larger Turkish Armenia	80	2,459,000	11	351,000	8	232,000	1	17,000	3,059,000
Differential Area	85	1,358,000	7	115,000	7	110,000	1	9,000	1,592,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia	75	1,101,000	16	236,000	8	122,000	1	8,000	1,467,000
Estimated losses in whole area		615,000		582,000		57,000		17,000	1,270,000

C. In order to give the Armenians the benefit of their entire losses in Turkey during the war, one million may be added to the numbers of Armenians according to each plan. This of course has no relation to the practicability of establishing an Armenian State, but it displays the justice, on the basis of majority, of assigning them the “Smaller Turkish Armenia”.

Area	%	Moslems	%	Armenians	%	Greeks	%	Others	Total
Larger Turkish Armenia	60	2,459,000	33½	1,351,000	6	232,000	½	17,000	4,059,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia	45	1,101,000	50	1,236,000	5	122,000		8,000	2,467,000

D. IN 1925. It may be assumed that on either plan, changes will take place between 1920 and 1925 in the following manner: 20 per cent of the Moslems will leave, and 300,000 Armenians will come from other parts of Turkey and the world. No account is taken of natural increase but this would act against the percentage of the Armenians, because they lost men in far greater proportion than women, and because they are less numerous than the Moslems, particularly when the larger area is considered. It appears that in normal times before the war Armenians increased more rapidly than Moslems, because of differences in social systems and military service; conditions will probably reduce these differences in the future.

Area	%	Moslems	%	Armenians	%	Greeks	%	Others	Total

Larger Armenia	60 ¹ / ₂	1,867,000	23	651,000	8	232,000	¹ / ₂	17,000	2,867,000
Differential Area		1,086,000		115,000		110,000		9,000	
Smaller Armenia	57	881,000	35	536,000	8	122,000	¹ / ₂	8,000	1,547,000

E. COMPLETE ARMENIA IN 1920. It remains to add Russian Armenia to the Turkish areas considered. The assumption has been made that Russian Armenia will contain in 1920, after the Turkish Armenians have gone home, a population of about one and one-half times as great as that estimated by Mr. Lynch, in his *Armenia*, Vol. I, p. 451.³⁸ His actual figures, as of about 1890, for the Russian part of the Armenian plateau, are: Armenians 519,238, Moslems 459,580, Greeks 47,763, others 69,129, total 1,095,710.

Area	%	Moslems	%	Armenians	%	Greeks	%	Others	Total
Russian Armenia	40	600,000	50	750,000	3	50,000	7	100,000	1,500,000
Larger Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia	67	3,059,000	24	1,101,000	6	282,000	3	117,000	4,559,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia	57	1,701,000	33	986,000	6	172,000	4	108,000	2,967,000

F. COMPLETE ARMENIA IN 1925. Finally it may be assumed between 1920 and 1925, 250,000 Armenia[ns] [will return?] from the remainder of Russia and from other parts of the world, and that a like number of Moslems will emigrate. Again no account is taken of natural increase, which might make a small addition to the American [*Armenian*] percentage.

Area	%	Moslems	%	Armenians	%	Greeks	%	Others	Total
Russian Armenia	23	350,000	67	1,000,000	3	50,000	7	100,000	1,500,000

Larger Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia	53	2,317,000	38	1,651,000	6½	282,000	2½	117,000	4,367,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia	40	1,231,000	50	1,536,000	6	172,000	4	108,000	3,047,000

The whole calculation then shows a possibility under favorable conditions that by 1925 the Armenians can be in a small majority in an Armenia erected on the smaller basis. They would constitute about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the population in the Russian portion, and a little over $\frac{1}{3}$ in the Turkish portion.

In an Armenia on the larger basis they would not exceed 40 per cent for the whole area in 1925, and would then constitute about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the population in the Russian portion, and not over $\frac{1}{4}$ in the Turkish portion.

2. THE PROBLEM OF A SEPARATE CONSTANTINOPOLITAN STATE

(1) *The Conception of such a State.*

In facing the problem of a separate Constantinopolitan State, there should be, first of all, a clear understanding of the nature of the state proposed.

The definite plan for a League of Nations with its mandatory system, it should be noted, gives new help in the solution of this difficult question. It is proposed that the Constantinopolitan State, as a great international interest, should be directly in charge of the League of Nations for the good of all the nations; in the sure conviction that even “national interests are often promoted better by international cooperation than by international competition”.

The State would be administered through a mandatory for the League—a Mandatory appointed by the League, responsible to the League, and removable at the will of the League, but held permanent except for cause;

for it is plain that there should not be any unnecessary shifting in the administrative power.

The Mandatory, moreover, should be a real mandatory for the League, a trustee for international interests, not a power using its position to advance its own national interests. To this end, the Mandatory should be territorially and strategically disinterested.

The Constantinopolitan State could be administered by an International Commission, like the notably successful Commission on the Danube; but the problem here is more complex, and the single Mandatory would seem to have some decided advantages over the Commission plan. In the case of the Constantinopolitan State, for example, there would be actual governmental functions to be exercised, as there are not in the same sense in the control of traffic on the Danube. These could be better handled by a regularly organized government. The Mandatory, too, as directly controlled by the League of Nations, would be even more truly international than an international commission of the old kind. And, practically, a single mandatory would naturally be better able to avoid friction, wrangling, and divided counsels, and so to prevent exasperating and dangerous delays. It would also have more immediate power behind it.

Such a State should include Constantinople, and have charge of its administration. This is the more demanded, for Constantinople is a markedly cosmopolitan city, where the Turks are probably not even in the majority. This State should also have a reasonable territory on either side of the Straits. All fortifications should be abolished. This international territory would of course be open to all people for any legitimate purposes. Like the District of Columbia in America, it would be a natural place for great educational and religious foundations, so that such Moslem institutions could remain and be further built up. The Turkish population, equally of course, would be free to stay. But Constantinople would not longer be the capital of Turkey. In the administration of the State, however, all possible consideration should be given to Moslem sentiment, and reasonable practical adjustments arranged. The Sultan might even conceivably continue to reside at Constantinople, if that were desired under the conditions named.

(2) The Reasons for such a State.

What are the reasons which make the establishment of an international Constantinopolitan State, as now conceived, imperative, in the final settlement of this War?

- (i) President Wilson himself, in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, made much of by the Turks, points at least in this direction, when he writes: "The Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees". It would seem that that end could be accomplished in no way so surely and so permanently, as by an International State under the League of Nations. The need at least, of some such internationalization is manifest, when it is remembered that the Straits have been closed almost continuously since 1911.
- (ii) Woolf hardly overstates the need of drastic action in this matter, when he says: "Constantinople and the narrow straits upon which it stands have occasioned the world more trouble, have cost humanity more in blood and suffering during the last five hundred years, than any other single spot upon the earth. Certainly during the last hundred years it has been the chief European centre of international unrest. From it, and about it, have radiated continually international rivalries and hatreds and suspicions. It was the direct origin and cause of a large number of the wars fought in the nineteenth century. It is not improbable that when Europe in her last ditch has fought the last battle of the Great War, we shall find that what we have again been fighting about is really Constantinople".³⁹ Now, this perpetual centre of intrigue and endless cause of trouble must be done away with.
- (iii) The close of this greatest of wars, with its many new adjustments, and particularly with the break-up of the old Turkish Empire, gives an unrivalled opportunity to clear up, in a permanent way, once and for all this great plague-spot of the world. If this opportunity is now neglected, or grasped only in nerveless vacillating and selfish fashion, we shall have again the old intolerable situation. We are confronted by a great challenge. Timid counsels should not prevail. As Woolf puts it: "Constantinople is the test of the Great War's result. If it can be, and is, given to any one State, it means the rule of the world by war; if ...⁴⁰ it be administered by all for all, Constantinople means the rule of the world by peace".
- (iv) The responsibility for so fateful and strategic a world-center is also too heavy for any single power, however great, to carry; least of all Turkey with her terrible record of mis-government and massacre. It would be hard to choose out of any list of leading nations, a nation less fitted for this world task than she. She has completely forfeited any claim to such a responsibility.
- (v) Moreover, as we have already seen, it would be to the distinct advantage of Turkey's own new democratic government to be definitely withdrawn from this centre of intrigue. Thoughtful Turkish leaders already realize

the evils which have come from this intrigue, and might well welcome—even though with natural reluctance—the kind surgery which should sever their State from such a seat of infection. At the same time, the Turks remaining within the boundaries of the International State, under a competent mandatory, would certainly have the best government they have ever had.

- (vi) The situation, furthermore, cannot be dealt with adequately or with any final satisfaction, except internationally and through an international state. And the League of Nations and the Mandatory System, as planned by the Peace Conference would seem to suggest both a new and stable method for establishing and administering such a state, and a method growing directly out of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Until such an International State is definitely established, there will be endless intrigues on the part of various Powers to possess or control the Straits. So long as a state as weak as Turkey has any kind of hold upon this critically significant territory, intrigues will be encouraged. The Greeks, for example, have already declared their ambition to have Constantinople in their hands, and are conducting a campaign of propaganda to that end. That is typical of what may be expected to go on, until a thorough-going and permanent solution of the problem of the Straits is adopted, in an International State.
- (vii) It deserves to be especially emphasized that the reason for the establishment of an International Constantinopolitan State, is not to humiliate Turkey or any Moselm interest; but simply to face squarely and honestly a situation which is a constant menace both to the peace of Turkey and to the peace of the world; and, deceiving ourselves no longer with vain makeshifts, to determine upon the only fundamental solution. No such fundamental readjustment can be made, doubtless, without some disturbance and sacrifices; but it can be counted certain that all related interests—economic, political, social, and religious—will in the end gain from a permanent solution of this vexing world-question.

(3) Extent and Boundaries.

The discussion of the extent and boundaries of the Constantinopolitan State is by the General Adviser, Dr. Lybyer, and puts clearly the elements of that problem, anticipating a completer study on the ground by the special Boundaries Commission later recommended.

1. The primary reason for the setting off of a separate area at Constantinople, to be forever under a special regime controlled by the League of Nations, is that the straits between the Black Sea and the

Mediterranean, being a concern of many nations, who cannot remain satisfied with the ownership of any one power, should be permanently and freely open.

2. Inasmuch as the Sea of Marmara is small, and in a sense may be regarded as simply an enlargement of the Straits, a minimum boundary must include not only the whole of both sides of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but also the entire shore of the Sea of Marmara. The American expert in International Law at Paris pronounced that serious complications might arise if an independent state should reach these waters at any point.
3. Constantinople is also the place where railways make the crossing between Europe and Western Asia; arrangements for the stations and yards of these need to be taken into account.
4. On account of the ready access by water and rail the economic support of the city does not need to be provided for completely within the boundaries of the state, except as regards the water-supply. It would be convenient, of course, to have room for dairy and vegetable farming, in view of the trouble of crossing frontiers.
5. Inasmuch as the population has always been greatly mixed,—a condition which will undoubtedly continue, and since it may be assumed that the League of Nations will provide for the security of all elements without privilege or favor, there is no need to adjust the boundary to racial groups.
6. On the European side, it is better, all things considered, to leave with Constantinople the present remnant of Turkey in Europe, accepting the Turco-Bulgarian frontier of 1915 subject to minor modifications. The Constantinople area needs no more land than is included by an adjustment of the Enos-Midia line, as shown on the accompanying map;⁴¹ but the question of disposing of the remainder of “Turkish Thrace” is so acute, that the best solution is to leave this also with Constantinople.
 - i. This area was ceded to the Balkan Allies early in 1913, and assigned to Bulgaria, but it was recovered by Turkey after the second Balkan war. If Bulgaria continues to be kept out of her rightful lands in Macedonia, she has some ground for claiming Turkish Thrace as a region for the settlement of refugees. As regards Turkish and Bulgarian Thrace, there has been a considerable exchange of population since 1915, so that few Bulgarians remain in the area, while the number of Turks has been increased.
 - ii. Greece has claimed the territory, but statistics submitted by the Greeks do not estimate that before 1912 the Greek population of the territory between the Enos-Midia line and the present Bulgarian

frontier was more than 147,000, or 42 per cent of the whole. Their own statements show that a large proportion of this number migrated between 1912 and the Great War. They do not state the reciprocal fact that an approximately equal number of Turks migrated from territory acquired by Greece in 1913 and settled here, so that there was not a mere expulsion of Greeks, but a fair exchange of population. The Greek population was then probably not over 25 per cent of the whole in 1914. It is less at present, but changes during the Great War should hardly be taken into account. The claim of Greece to this area cannot be justified.

- iii. On the basis of population, Turkish Thrace was really Turkish in 1914, the proportion reaching at least 60 per cent.
 - iv. There is no prospect that, without violent changes, any other element than the Turkish will become a majority of the population within a considerable time. In case this should ultimately happen, in such a way as to make alterations of boundaries desirable, the League of Nations could transfer a portion of Thrace out of the Constantinople area.
7. On the Asiatic side, the frontier beginning on the Black Sea coast a short distance east of the mouth of the Sakaria river, might run east of the river to Ak Sofu Dag, cross to Geul Dag, pass southwestward to the ridge between Isnik and Yenisehir, and proceed westward along the heights south of Mudania and Pandemia as far as the boundary of the Sanjak of Bigha, which it might follow to the Sea south of Mt. Ida.
- i. The line between the Black Sea and Ismid is located east of the Sakaria, including the marshy area near the river's mouth, in order to facilitate engineering problems of drainage, and provide an area suitable for dairy farming within the reach and control of Constantinople.
 - ii. Brusa would better be left to the Turks, because it has no relation to the defense of the Straits; because the local population is predominantly Turkish; and because the Turks are sentimentally attached to this as the first Ottoman capital. To take from them all three capitals, Constantinople, Adrianople, and Brusa, would be very severe.
 - iii. The Troad Peninsula, while predominantly Turkish, constitutes such a separate physical area that it cannot well be divided. Therefore, for the defense of the Dardanelles, it must all go with the Straits.
8. The total population of this area would be at the outset about two millions, of whom about 60 per cent would be Turks, 25 per cent Greeks, and 10 per cent Armenians. The proportion of Turks would be likely in time to decrease, and that of Greeks and western Europeans to increase, especially in Constantinople and the smaller cities of the area.

3. THE PROBLEM OF A TURKISH STATE

We have now frankly recognized the necessity, in bare justice to the Armenians, for an Armenia separated from Turkey, and the equal necessity for a separated Constantinopolitan State, in response to a just and imperative world interest. Turkey is thus called upon to surrender her sovereignty over certain modest portions of Asia Minor, but in no way treated as her own conquerors treated territories won in war.

(1) General Extent.

But in pursuance of this different spirit shown in conquest, if the principles of national unity and of self-determination are to be truly applied to the Turkish people, Anatolia, the bulk of Asia Minor remaining, with ample outlets to the sea, should be left for a Turkish State, but under such conditions as may sacredly guard the rights of all minorities, whether racial or religious. This would give to Turkey a comparatively very large area—larger than France,—having a population—one fourth of that of France—of approximately ten millions, of whom some eight millions are Moslems (about seven millions, Turks) and one and one-half millions, Greeks. This should assure to the new Turkey an ample opportunity of development. In the interests of a reasonable self-determination for some of the smaller racial groups, it may be also necessary to allow their transfer, if they so choose, to Syria or Mesopotamia, or to grant them at least local autonomy.

(2) Reasons for a Mandate for the Turkish State.

It seems to be generally recognized by the Turkish people themselves, that the surest and speediest road out of their present evil conditions is by way of a mandate under the League of Nations, and so shifting from an imperialistic state to a democratic one. And from every point of view, that appears desirable. Indeed, it seems impossible to expect any satisfactory change in the government of Turkey by any other method. And if the Turks had not themselves suggested a mandatary, the Peace Conference might well have felt obliged to require one.

This general statement, indeed, may be said to include the specific reasons why Turkey should have a mandate: to secure genuinely good government, without oppression, bribery, or corruption, for the Turks themselves; to guarantee the rights of all minorities—racial or religious; to deliver Turkey from the demoralization of incessant intrigue from outside; to secure, without selfish exploitation by the Mandatary or any other outside Power, Turkey's economic development and economic independence, for there is

not the slightest doubt that she has been living far below her material possibilities; in line with the Allied settlement with Germany, to disband the most of the Turkish Army and do away with all military conscription, depending upon a well organized *gendarmarie* for the larger police duties of the State,—all this for the better good of the common people and to break the power of intriguing imperialists over them; to put beneath all Turkish life a national system of universal education, that should lift her entire people; to train the various peoples of the State steadily into self-government; in a word, to make of Turkey a state of a high order on a modern basis of equal rights to all before the law, and of full religious liberty. This would inevitably result in a state not purely (though predominantly) Turkish in race and in control, a cosmopolitan state in which various racial stocks were contained and in whose government all representatively shared.

(3) Turkey's Desire for an American Mandate.

For reasons given in an earlier section of the report—especially since the Peace Conference had not declared that Turkey must herself have a mandate, and because a free expression was not allowed—it has been very difficult to get clearly decisive evidence of the desires of the people of Turkey upon the choice of mandate. But many indications tend to confirm the opinion that the great majority of thoughtful Turkish leaders sincerely desire an American mandate.

That a nation so long independent should seek a mandate, in any sense of the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and it tends to confirm the opinion of a trustworthy and university-trained Turkish journalist, who wrote: “The Turks have been so hardly tried by the events in the past, that most of them are ready to submit themselves to some regular schooling, instead of making any hazardous experiments with new ignorant leaders.” And he thus sums up Turkish public opinion concerning a mandate for Turkey:

The following divisions can be noticed: (1) the large majority which realizes that the country has only the choice between an American Mandate and an eternal chaos, coupled with foreign occupation and the loss of national unity; (2) a minority which does not like to discuss any settlement which implies a theoretical restriction of sovereignty; (3) a minority of supporters of an English solution.

As giving an idea of the strength of the American majority, he calls attention to “the elements which make it up”:

The National Congress, a body formed in Constantinople several months ago by the delegates of 53 different Turkish societies and organizations, is one of the chief supporters of the American Mandate. As all the Turkish intellectual organizations are represented in the Congress, it may almost be considered as representative of the educated classes in general. The National League, containing about 40 of the most respected citizens and Senators is also for the American Mandate. This means at the same time, the majority of the Senate. The "Nationalist" Party in Anatolia in general are in favor of the American Mandate. The professors of different faculties of the university favor the American Mandate. So do most of the lawyers, teachers, technicians, and merchants. At present, most of the papers with large circulations are taking the same view of things. This state of things is very surprising, because there is, on the one hand, a very active propaganda for the English Mandate; on the other hand the Americans do not make any propaganda.

Another journalist gave detailed corroborative evidence looking in the same direction. For example, he said that he had been carrying on a campaign in his Constantinople paper for three months for an American Mandate, and that this campaign had called out only two letters of protest, while, on the contrary, many words of approval had come from men of all parties. The delegations who have met the Commission, when the question of mandate was taken up, have generally favored an American Mandate. A delegation representing the intellectual leaders among the women, including presidents of educational institutions and of national and provincial educational associations, were especially emphatic in declaring for an American Mandate. The general judgment of the most trustworthy observers whom the Commission were able to consult confirmed these results. The delegates of a Congress held a few months ago at Smyrna, and representing 1,800,000 people, have declared for an American Mandate. The Congress at Sivas held on the 20th of August, probably the most representative recent gathering of the Turkish people, is expected by those in closest touch with the movement for which it stands, to declare for an American Mandate.

On the whole, it is highly probable that a large majority of the Turkish people, wishing a mandate at all, would favor the American Mandate.

(4) Territorial Conditions in Anatolia.

To complete the survey of the problems involved in a reconstitution of the Turkish State in Anatolia, a general discussion, in brief summary, of territorial conditions in Anatolia—touching also upon various subject races—seems called for. This is also furnished by the General Adviser.

I. After setting off definitely from the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914 all the Arabic-speaking areas, Armenia, and the Constantinopolitan State, there remains a large mass of territory, in which the greatest single element of population is Turkish (this word being limited to those persons whose mother-tongue is Turkish and who profess the Mohammedan religion). Claims have been advanced toward setting off portions of this remaining area, by Kurds for “Kurdistan”; by Greeks for “Pontus”,—an area along the Black Sea coast from Sinope to Batum; by Syrians for Cilicia; by Italians for Adalia and the whole southwest; and by Greeks for Smyrna, and the west. The only one of these portions that is advisable, in the opinion of the Commission, actually to handle separately at present, is “Kurdistan”. All will be discussed briefly in the order named.

II. KURDISTAN. The Kurds claim a very large area, on the basis of their distribution, but since they are greatly mixed with Armenians, Turks, and others, and divided among themselves into Kizil-bash Shiites and Sunnites, it seems best to limit them to the natural geographical area which lies between the proposed Armenia on the north and Mesopotamia on the south, with the divide between the Euphrates and the Tigris as the western boundary, and the Persian frontier as the eastern boundary. A measure of autonomy can be allowed them under close mandatory rule, with the object of preparing them for ultimate independence or for federation with neighboring areas in a larger self-governing union. It is possible to shift most of the comparatively small numbers of both Turks and Armenians out of this area by voluntary exchange of population and thus obtain a province containing about a million and a half people, nearly all Kurds. Full security must needs be provided for the Syrian, Chaldean and Nestorian Christians who dwell in the area. This plan would probably provide for all of the Sunnite Kurds in Turkey, and the Kizilbash group lies almost wholly to the west. The area contemplated looks more to the south than the west and lies wholly about the upper waters of the Tigris and its tributaries. It would seem better, therefore, unless the population itself strongly prefers the other plan, to place it under the control of the power which cares for Mesopotamia, than to connect it with Armenia across the mountains at the north, or with Anatolia with which it would have only narrow contact at the west.

III. "PONTUS". About one-half of the area asked for by the Greeks of "Pontus" should be included in the Armenian State, in order to give it access to the sea. The remainder is needed by Anatolia for the same reason. There were approximately 200,000 Greeks in each of these portions in 1914. This would seem to be too small a minority in both Armenia and Anatolia to be erected into an autonomous province. The rights of these Greeks can in each state be provided for fully by general laws, enforced in each case by the mandatory power until such time as the states are ready for self-government with adequate protection of minorities.

IV. CILICIA. Cilicia is claimed by both Armenians and Syrians, in each case by a minority which did not exceed 25 per cent in 1914. Reasons are stated above for not giving it to the former. It is unimportant to Syria as an outlet, since that area has many ports. But it is very valuable to the areas both at the northeast and the north. It should not be separated economically from Anatolia at present, and if at any future time the Armenians should receive it, provisions would have to be made for the use of its ports by the interior regions of Anatolia from Kaisariyeh to Konia.

The region between Cilicia and Armenia, containing Albistan, Malatia and Kharput is claimed by the Armenians, but should also be left with Anatolia. It contained in 1914 a mixture of Turks, Kizilbash, Armenians, Sunnite Kurds and others, proportioned apparently in the order named. Strong mandatory control would be difficult because of the distance from the coast across rough mountainous country, but it would be very necessary, lest the region become a hunting ground for Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian bands, each anxious to acquire the territory for its people.

V. ADALIA AND THE SOUTHWEST. Italy's claim to the southwest of Asia Minor rests upon nothing that is compatible with the principles of the Commission's instructions. There are no Italians native to the country, and no evidence exists that the population desires Italy as a mandatory over them. In this region the Moslems are to the Greek Orthodox Christians as ten to one. None of this area should be separated from Anatolia.

VI. SMYRNA AND THE WEST. The problem of the west coast is a difficult one, not because of the intrinsic situation, but because of the persistency of the Greek Government in demanding an area there, and of the fact that a Greek army is in occupation.

Nowhere except perhaps in the Sanjak of Smyrna and certain coastal Kazas is the Greek Orthodox population in a majority, and the complete proof that it is in majority there awaits an impartial census (See the

accompanying sketch map).⁴² If any question existed previously as to the unwillingness of the majority of the population in the area now occupied by the Greeks to be annexed to Greece, or to have Greece as a mandatory, the question has been answered by the circumstances of the occupation. The question has also been answered as to whether the Balkan State of modern Greece has reached such a degree of civilization, that it can be entrusted with mandatory rule over a people of different faith and hostile feeling.

The Greek army and all authority of the Greek government ought to be withdrawn from an area where better order was kept by twelve British Officers than can be maintained by one hundred thousand Greek troops. There can be no settled peace until either a Greek conquest has swept far to the interior, with great destruction of property and life, or until the Greek power is wholly removed. In the latter case the question would still remain: Should an area in Western Asia Minor be set off as a special Greek region and placed under a separate mandate? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:

- (1) The character of the country is such that no good natural boundary can be found except high up in the hills. If such a boundary be traced, the population within it would be so markedly Moslem (about three to one) that the area could have no special Greek character.
- (2) If on the other hand a more or less arbitrary line be drawn farther west, it could not constitute a good barrier for defense against smugglers or brigand bands.
- (3) Any line drawn now would be regarded, more or less, as an economic barrier, cutting off Smyrna and other coast cities from some of the trade with the interior, to mutual disadvantage.
- (4) Neither Greeks nor Turks in Western Asia Minor would believe anything except that it is the intention of the League of Nations to permit Greece later to annex the territory set off, and perhaps to extend her holdings further. The elements would therefore be present for a Macedonian system of sustained brigand warfare, which could be kept down only by more military effort and expenditure than any mandatory power cares to assume.

Shall any measures be taken then to develop a special Greek area in Asia Minor? The maximum that would seem to be advisable at the present would be that a strong mandatory power should be entrusted with a single mandate for all Anatolia, and should take special pains to protect Greeks and Turks alike and preserve order in the west, with the possibility of a limited locally autonomous Greek area. The question of a future separated

Greek area could then be left in abeyance, to be brought up again if circumstances justify.

VII. A MANDATE FOR ANATOLIA. While the instructions of this Commission do not directly mention the assignment by the League of Nations of a mandatory nation to assist the Turks, many of the Turks themselves have suggested such a plan, and some have presented urgent requests for America as the mandatory power. The need of supervision over finance, public works, education, internal order, and all the processes of government is hardly less for the Turks, despite their centuries of political experience, than for the Armenians, Syrians, and Mesopotamians. It is in fact impossible to discern any other method of setting Western Asia in order. The Turks if left to themselves in a condition of poverty, ignorance, and general exhaustion, with a feeling that they had been unjustly treated and then abandoned by all the world, could not fail to be a source of trouble and disturbance until another crisis, with perhaps another great war, would necessitate some such solution as is now suggested, but under conditions less favorable to success.

VIII. THE DESIRABILITY OF A SINGLE MANDATARY FOR ARMENIA, ANATOLIA, AND CONSTANTINOPLE. While it is desirable that Armenia, Anatolia, and Constantinople should be placed under separate mandates, and governed by separated administrations, it is also desirable that the three mandates should be held by one great power.

- (1) These areas have been held together for several centuries, and have a great number of close ties of all sorts, the delicate adjustment of which can be best accomplished under one power.
- (2) Unity of economic control, with similar commercial laws, coinage, weights, and measures, and language of business is advantageous to all concerned.
- (3) Problems of repatriation and exchange of populations, can be arranged more justly and promptly under one mandatar.
- (4) The adjustment of the public debt will be easier.
- (5) The building of railroads and the improvement of routes of travel can be better arranged.
- (6) Police control and repression of brigandage will be far simpler. On the contrary, the holding of the three areas by separate powers permits the taking of refuge by bandits and criminals across the borders.
- (7) Unity is urged by many well-informed foreigners, looking from various points of view. Many of these favor not merely a single mandatory power, but a single mandate. Practically all the benefits can be obtained

by the first plan that could be obtained by the second, and many serious difficulties can be avoided, such as arise from persecution of Armenians, interference with navigation, and complications of intrigue.

- (8) Friction which might arise between three mandataries, and which might conceivably lead to a great war, could be eliminated.
- (9) The transition would be more easily acceptable by the Turkish people, than if two or three powers should take control of the three areas. The fact that the mandatary would probably establish a central control in Constantinople would aid the transition still further.

In the foregoing discussion of Territorial Conditions in Anatolia, various minority peoples have been briefly studied. It seems necessary to consider further, at this point, only the rather pressing problems of the Greeks.

4. THE PROBLEM OF THE GREEKS

- (1) The situation of the Greeks is not that of the Armenians. The Greeks have suffered much in deportations by the Turks, but there have been no such extensive massacres of the Greeks as of the Armenians. The Greeks, too, in the adjacent Greek Islands, have a possible congenial refuge within former Turkish territory, such as the Armenians do not have. The Greeks also have, in territories recently acquired by Greece, opportunities for settlement on Greek soil, for which there is no parallel for the Armenians. The general situation of the Greeks, too, in diminished numbers, is much less desperate than that of the Armenians. Moreover the Greeks are more widely scattered in small groups through Turkey than the Armenians. The drastic remedy of establishing a state for the Greeks completely separated from Turkey, seems, therefore, both less possible and very much less desirable.
- (2) The results of the Greek Occupation of Smyrna do not seem to indicate that the Greeks of Turkey should now be given rule over others or be granted their own full independence. Local autonomy in a territory strictly confined to a district in which they were in a decided majority would seem the most that could be recommended at present.
- (3) The ability of the Greeks is not in question, nor their enthusiasm for education. On the contrary, both factors make it the more probable that they could continue to hold their own within the Turkish State. Indeed, the special gifts of the Greeks generally make them particularly successful as colonists. The probability is that they would lose on the whole, rather than gain, in being completely set off from Turkey. In spite of the violent antagonisms of recent years, Ramsay may well be right in

saying: "The Turks and the Greeks will united make a happier country than either race could by itself." The two races supplement each other. (4) There is to be added, that the apparent purpose of the Turks to ask for a mandate, and of the Peace Conference to appoint such a mandate, gives promise of a new Turkey, in which the rights of the Greeks would be fully guarded at least for the term of the mandate.

A trial certainly should be made by the Greeks of life in the Turkish State under the new conditions, before further independence should be sought. The constitution of a new Turkey on modern lines, the steady watchers and influence of the Mandatary, and the supervision of the League of Nations and the right of appeal to it—all combine to give the Greeks every assurance of fair treatment and equality of opportunity, at least during the term of the mandate. It would be the business, too, of the Mandatary to do all possible to develop the whole people into capacity for self-government. The help of a national system of education, too, would do much to assure that the abuses of the old time would not return; and the term of the mandate would naturally continue until there was good promise of Turkey's success as a modern state. Even after the mandate had expired, the League of Nations could still act, upon necessity, to prevent all gross invasions of the rights of minorities.

In the light of all these considerations, it would seem best not to set off any independent Greek territory for the present, in the belief that in the long run the better good both of the Greeks and of the Turks is to be found in their union in one cosmopolitan state.

V.—RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations, dealing with mandates in the Asia Minor portion of the former Ottoman Empire, follow naturally upon the preceding discussions of pertinent action already taken by the Peace Conference; of dangers arising from a selfish division and exploitation of Turkey; of considerations looking to a proper division of Turkey; and of problems naturally resulting. For the recommendations built directly on foundations already laid by the Peace Conference: They aim to prevent a selfish exploitation and division of Turkey. They intend not less surely to ground such division of Turkey as is recommended solely upon considerations of justice and the good of all men. And in this spirit they endeavor honestly to face the grave problems arising, and to seek their solution in the light of the full discussion which precedes. That discussion has been so full, that the Recommendations of the Commissioners need do little more than summarize conclusions, except upon two points,—the reasons for a general

American Mandate, and the conditions upon which such a mandate might be taken by America.

The Commissioners recommend:

1. The formation, under a Mandatary, of an Armenian State, completely separated from Turkey, as defined in the preceding section of the report (Page 22 ff.),^{[43](#)} for reasons already fully given (Page 16.)^{[44](#)}

It is consequently recommended that Cilicia should not be separated from Anatolia at present.

2. The similar formation, under a Mandatary, of an International Constantinopolitan State, completely separated from Turkey, as defined in the preceding section (Pages 29 ff.),^{[45](#)} also for reasons already fully given (Page 31.)^{[46](#)}

3. The appointment of a Mandatary for the continued Turkish State, in line with the apparent wishes of the majority of the Turkish people; the major terms of the Mandate to be defined by the Peace Conference or the League of Nations, and further adjustments to be arranged between the Mandatary and Turkey. The reasons for the Mandate and its necessary scope have been already fully given (Pages 35 ff.)^{[47](#)}

4. That, for the reasons already stated, (Pages 42–43)^{[48](#)} no independent territory be set off for the Greeks; though local autonomy be granted to that portion of the sanjak of Smyrna which has a decided majority of Greeks, but under the general mandate for Turkey.

5. That a commission or commissions on boundaries in Asia Minor be appointed to study on the ground and to exactly define the boundaries of the states named in the first three recommendations, and the precise limits of any locally autonomous area in Smyrna. The definition of the boundaries of the Turkish State would require the study and definition of the northern boundaries of Syria and Mesopotamia as well, with special reference to allowing to the Kurds a measure of autonomy under close mandatory rule, possibly in connection with Mesopotamia, and with the clear understanding that the rights of the Syrians, Chaldean, and Nestorian Christian minorities in this whole region shall be carefully guarded.

6. A general single mandate for the whole of Asia Minor (not assigned to Mesopotamia or Syria) to include under it the mandate for Armenia, the

mandate for the Constantinopolitan State, and the mandate for the continued Turkish State, each with a governor of its own to ensure full attention to its particular interests, besides a governor-general over the whole. The various interrelations and common concerns of the constituent states would thus be studied and cared for, as well as their individual needs. The reasons for such a general mandate are fully given on page 41,^{[49](#)} and need not be repeated here.

7. That the United States of America be asked to take this general single mandate together with its inclusive mandate for the Armenian State, the Constantinopolitan State, and the continued Turkish State. This recommendation is made for the following reasons which need to be developed in full:

(1) As already pointed out, it seems to be generally desired that America should take the mandate for Armenia. In this, both the Armenians and the Allies seem agreed—and even the Turks, if there must be an Armenian State at all. Nevertheless, America cannot wisely take this mandate without at the same time taking a mandate for the rest of Asia Minor as well.

For, in the first place, this Armenian Mandate would be in many respects the most difficult of all: because it would begin in relations of bitter hostility; because the State would have to be built from the bottom under most peculiar circumstances; and because the Mandate would have to be prolonged against the impatience of the Armenians. And these difficulties would all be accentuated, if the surrounding conditions could not be determined. It concerns the world that this Armenian State should clearly succeed. Its Mandatary should not be needlessly handicapped.

In the second place, the problems of the different States in Asia Minor are too closely related to be wisely entrusted to entirely different Powers, with different ideals and methods. That situation would inevitably tend to produce friction, waste, and bad feeling, and unsatisfactory conditions in one state would naturally spread to other states also.

In the third place, if the rest of Turkey, outside of a modest Armenian State, were divided into spheres of influence and exploitation areas, the direct hindrance to the working out of a truly conceived mandate in Armenia would be well nigh insuperable.

The American Mandate for Armenia, thus, calls for a general Mandate over all of Asia Minor.

(2) America is also the most natural Power to take the mandate for the International Constantinopolitan State, as well as for Armenia; for the simple reason that she is the only Great Power territorially and strategically disinterested. The Mandatary for this international state should be herself strong, to discourage any further intrigue for control of the Straits; disinterested, to command the confidence of all the nations concerned; and in unmistakably earnest sympathy with the aim of such a state, and with those international means by which this aim is to be achieved,—the League of Nations and its Mandatory System. These needed qualifications are best met by America. Now the full fruits of such an international state cannot be secured, unless the rest of Asia Minor is made a fit environment for such a state, practically embodying the same great principles.

The mandate for the Constantinopolitan State also calls for a general mandate over all Asia Minor.

(3) It is to be added that America is also the most natural Power for the Mandate over the new Turkish State, because the Turkish people want her, and generally trust her, as the evidence previously given indicates; and because America is peculiarly prepared to meet the needs of the Turkish people in this crisis in their history, as the reasons to be given for a general American Mandate will later bring out.

The desired American Mandate for the new Turkish State, then, calls also for a general Mandate over all Asia Minor.

(4) The best solution for mandates in Asia Minor would seem then to be, to combine all three mandates in a composite mandate, which would be put in the hands of America as the single Mandatary.

The general reasons for a single Mandatary for all Asia Minor, already given on page 41,⁵⁰ are not to be lightly regarded. They give solid grounds for a composite supervisory mandate.

The further direct reasons for making America that single Mandatary should now be considered. To begin with, there is the recognized fact that all the other Great Allies are already heavily loaded with colonial responsibilities, which of itself suggests a special obligation here for America. But the positive reasons—if there are any—lie necessarily in some special fitness of America for the particular task in hand,—a fitness growing naturally out of her experience as a great growing democracy, largely freed hitherto from European entanglements. Those reasons, that is, lie inevitably in certain dominant national convictions of America; in a

certain idealistic international faith; in her record in these international relations; and in the indications of her duty at this critical point in human history. All of these considerations concern the Turkish situation.

In the first place, we have found both the Syrian and Turkish peoples recognizing that at the foundation of the common life of America were to be found certain great dominant convictions. They saw that she had a passion for peace and for the possibility of its attainment, in spite of all sordid manifestations to the contrary, and that to bring such a righteous peace nearer, she entered this war. They saw that she had a passion for democracy, for the common man everywhere, in spite of inconsistencies at home and abroad, and could treat men of all races with a genuine respect born of some insight into their own individual gifts. They felt sure that she would not go into any situation simply to dominate, and to stamp American customs on a people. They knew that, because she really believed in democracy, she had also a passion for universal education, as possible for the rank and file of every nation, and as absolutely essential to a democracy. They believed, therefore, that, as a Mandatary, she would gird herself to help a people to fulfill its own highest possibilities. They believed, indeed, that she had a passion for the development of a national spirit in every people, not as narrow conceit, but as faith in a divine individuality, to which the people must be true, if they were to be significant members of that larger fellowship of nations for which the world longs. They instinctively felt, thus, that she combined in a way fairly unique, educational emphasis with respect for the values of another people. They knew, too, that with a high religious idealism, America somehow combined belief in the principle of the separation of Church and State in governmental administration, for the highest good both of religion and of the state, and was thus especially fitted to render help to a state like Turkey at so peculiarly critical a point in her transition from an imperialistic to a democratic state on modern lines and with complete religious liberty.

In the second place, with these mastering convictions, the Syrians and Turkish people believed that America combined a certain idealistic international faith, in her stubborn belief in the League of Nations and in the possibilities of its mandatory system, when honestly carried out. She was naturally prepared, therefore, they believed to throw herself into the responsibilities of a Mandate; steadfastly to seek to train the people entrusted to her care into self-government and into economic independence; and promptly to withdraw when that task was complete, for she would measure the success of her stewardship by both the completeness and the promptness with which her task was accomplished.

In the third place, both the Syrian and the Turkish people, in expressing their desire for an American Mandate, have laid steady emphasis upon the assurance which came from America's record in dealing with other peoples. They believed in her unselfish aims in the War, and that she was now seeking for no share in the spoils of the War. They believed that she had no territorial or imperialistic ambitions. They believed in her high and unselfish aims in dealing with Cuba and the Philippines. They believed that she was not involved in any joint plan for an exploiting division of either Syria or Turkey. They believed in the high quality of her relief service and especially of her educational service in both countries,—a service so fine, that so competent and impartial an observer as Ramsay can say: "I firmly believe that Robert College has done more to render possible a safe solution of the 'Eastern Question' in Turkey than all the Ambassadors of all the European Powers have succeeded in doing to render that solution difficult". They believed that, so far was America from scheming to obtain a Mandate in Asia, she was honestly reluctant to undertake such a mandate of any kind.

In the fourth place, America is peculiarly fitted to be the single Mandatory Power for all Asia Minor, not only because of her national convictions, her international faith, and her record, but also because the course of duty for her would seem to lie in this direction.

It is no part of the task of the Commissioners to determine whether America is now willing to accept the general single mandate for Turkey, with its three involved subordinate mandates. It is their business to point out where, in their honest judgment, that mandate belongs (if proper conditions can be fulfilled), and so give an opportunity to the Peace Conference to put the resulting obligation squarely up to the American people.

Can America deny all obligation in this matter of a mandate for Turkey? She has believed perhaps more than any other people, in the high possibilities of the League of Nations; but, if the League of Nations is not to be a sham and a delusion, all nations must be willing to bear their share in the resulting responsibilities. America, certainly, cannot be an exception. She came into the War, too, with the ardent faith and hope that a more democratic world might result. Is she willing to carry those war purposes through to the end? Here in Turkey is an unrivalled opportunity to try those purposes out, for the good not only of a single people, but of the entire world; for here in Turkey has been through centuries a center of intrigue and strife that has engulfed all nations in its consequences.

Moreover, America's intervention in the War went far to determine the War's issue. Was that intervention justified? America must still do her utmost to complete the proof.

But America's obligation goes still deeper, in this desperate hour of human need. Men still need peace—long deferred. They need far better provision for bodily wants. They need simple homely happiness. But beneath all this, they need renewed faith in one another and in one another's honest purposes of good. The War destroyed that faith between the hostile forces, the settlements of the War, it is to be feared, have gone far to destroy that faith among the Allies themselves. It is not roseate dreaming, but practical politics of the most imperative sort, to do something to bring back men's faith in men. If we can see the radical necessity of such faith, to prevent or break a financial panic, are we to see less clearly in times like these, of a moral world panic? Cynicism and disillusionment, as we have seen, are rife. Can they be conquered? Only by indisputable examples to the contrary. It may be doubtful, then, if America could do anything so significant for the human race today, as to prove that she had not forgotten her own ideals and purposes in the war, but was willing to give a new and even greater proof of them in undertaking unselfishly a difficult and distasteful, but highly important and far-reaching task—by taking on the general mandate for Turkey, (as well as for Syria, if the Peace Conference thought best). In fidelity to herself does not America owe that demonstration to the world? It is hard to estimate the immense effect of so important a mandate under the League of Nations being carried through with absolutely honest unselfishness. It would make a reality of the League of Nations; it would make a reality of the Mandatory system. It would set a new standard in international relations. It would renew men's faith in one another. It would help to save America herself from a disastrous reaction from her genuinely high aims in the War.

Nothing has been said of America's ample means for the economic development of Turkey's large resources; though it is not suggested that the financial relations of Turkey to America should be finally other than those of self-respecting independence. Turkey's present condition, however, is so necessitous in a thousand ways, that very large amounts of capital would be initially required, and returns at first would be small and slow. But before the mandate ended a fair return on capital, put into direly needed public improvements and the development of natural resources, might probably be expected, at the same time that Turkey's own interests were guarded against selfish and monopolistic exploitation. America should not come into the Turkish Mandate with the expectation of large

financial profits. But if even so favorable a result as that indicated proved quite impossible, America might well spend millions to insure relations of peace and good will among nations, rather than the billions required for another war, sure to come if the present cynical national selfishness and lack of good will are not checked.

As against the considerations now presented, it might be urged that the very suggestion of so large and significant a mandate for America is itself proof that America too is grasping imperialistic power. The answer is, that America's idea of a mandate is emphatically that a mandate is for a limited term (so that even if a mandate for Syria were added to the mandate for Turkey the whole would mean no long retention of power by America, except as the League of Nations should continue her as mandatary over the Constantinopolitan State); that she literally does not want this mandate, except to meet her fair share of responsibility in the world today; that she would have to be persuaded by a campaign of education to take it on; and that she ought not to take it at all, if certain important conditions cannot be fulfilled.

(5) Considerations on which America would be justified in taking a composite general mandate for Asia Minor. Those conditions are: that she is really wanted by the Turkish people; that Turkey should give evidence that she is ready to do justice to the Armenians, not only by the allotment of the territory within her borders, recommended for the Armenian State, but also by encouraging the repatriation of Armenians, and by seeing that all possible just reparation is made to them as they return to their homes; that Turkey should also give evidence that she is ready to become a modern constitutional state, and to abolish military conscription; that Russia should be ready to renounce all claims upon Russian Armenia; that the Allies should cordially welcome America's help in the difficult situation in Turkey; and especially that all plans for cutting up Turkey, for the benefit of outside peoples, into spheres of influence and exploitation areas should be abandoned. These conditions are necessary to a successful solution of the Turkish problem. Unless they are fulfilled, America ought not to take the mandate for Asia Minor. And the Commissioners do not recommend that the mandate be given to America if these conditions cannot be essentially met.

Respectfully submitted,

[CHARLES R. CRANE]
[HENRY C. KING]

- ¹⁰ Post p. 799 [Pg. 799 is part of [Doc. 380](#)].
- ¹¹ Post, p. 802 [Pg. 802 is part of [Doc. 380](#)].
- ¹² For confidential appendix to this report, “for the use of Americans only,” see p. 848 [Pg. 848 includes portions of [Doc. 380](#) and [Doc. 381](#)].
- ¹³ Occupied Enemy Territory Administration.
- [†] Delegations were received from cities and villages named in parenthesis. [Footnote in the original.]
- ¹⁴ Not attached to file copy of the report.
- ¹⁵ American Committee for Relief in the Near East.
- ¹⁶ Post, p. 779 [Pg. 779 is part of [Doc. 380](#)].
- ¹⁷ Ante, p. 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 375](#)].
- ¹⁸ The following omission indicated in the original report.
- ¹⁹ [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12](#) .
- ²⁰ Quoted from the Anglo-French declaration of November 9, 1918; see p. 784 [Pg. 784 is part of [Doc. 380](#)].
- ²¹ [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 268](#) .
- ²² Ante, p. 789 [Pg. 789 is part of [Doc. 380](#)].
- ²³ The following omission indicated in the original report.
- ²⁴ Omission indicated in the original report.
- ²⁵ W. M. Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey* (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1897), pp. 164 and 165.
- ²⁶ Great Britain, Cd. 8325, October 1916.
- ²⁷ Omission indicated in the original report.
- ²⁷ Omission indicated in the original report.
- ²⁸ Omission indicated in the original report.
- ²⁸ Omission indicated in the original report.
- ²⁹ See [Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. II, pp. 824](#)  ff; [ibid.](#) , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, [vol. VII, pp. 28](#)  and [43](#) ; [ibid., vol. IX, p. 167](#) .
- ³¹ [Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 866](#) .
- ³² Omission indicated in the original report.
- ³² Omission indicated in the original report.
- ³² Omission indicated in the original report.
- ³² Omission indicated in the original report.
- ³³ Omission indicated in the original report.
- ³⁵ Ante, p. 814 [Pg. 814 is part of [Doc. 380](#)].
- ³⁶ Post, p. 825 [Pg. 825 is part of [Doc. 380](#)].
- ³⁷ Post, p. 826 [Pg. 826 is part of [Doc. 380](#)].

³⁸ H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia, Travels and Studies* (London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901).

³⁹ Leonard S. Woolf, *The Future of Constantinople* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917), pp. 11–12.

⁴⁰ Omission indicated in the original report.

⁴¹ Not attached to file copy.

⁴² Not attached to file copy.

⁴³ *Ante*, pp. 819 [*Pg. 819 is part of [Doc. 380](#)*] ff.

⁴⁴ *Ante*, p. 814 [*Pg. 814 is part of [Doc. 380](#)*].

⁴⁵ *Ante*, pp. 828 [*Pg. 828 is part of [Doc. 380](#)*] ff.

⁴⁶ *Ante*, p. 829 [*Pg. 829 is part of [Doc. 380](#)*].

⁴⁷ *Ante*, pp. 833 [*Pg. 833 is part of [Doc. 380](#)*] ff.

⁴⁸ *Ante*, pp. 840 [*Pg. 840 is part of [Doc. 380](#)*] ff.

⁴⁹ *Ante*, p. 839 [*Pg. 839 is part of [Doc. 380](#)*].

⁵⁰ *Ante*, p. 839 [*Pg. 839 is part of [Doc. 380](#)*].

Confidential Appendix to the Report Upon Syria

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For the Use of Americans Only

INTRODUCTORY

Since the Commission was the American Section of a projected International Commission on Mandates in the Turkish Empire, it has seemed best to prepare the report in such form that copies could be furnished to representatives of all the Allied Powers, if that were desired. The body of the report, therefore, though trying squarely to face all the facts, has been written with that possibility in mind.

At the same time, there was material, involving criticism of our Allies, that ought not to come into a report to be put into their hands, and yet that the American Delegation to the Peace Conference and our own State Department ought to have, as involved in a complete statement of the case. That material prepared by Dr. Lybyer has been gathered into this Confidential Appendix.

The opportunity has also been taken to bring in some supplementary discussions, that treat with a little more detail certain important aspects of our inquiry and so throw light on the broader bearings of our report.

I—THE INTERFERENCE OF THE OCCUPYING GOVERNMENTS WITH THE COMMISSION'S INQUIRY

1. O. E. T. A. South—the British—

In each area the policy of the occupying government had a special effect upon the course of the inquiry.

At Jerusalem and Jaffa the British military governors were consulted in the preparation of the Commission's programs. At the other places they prepared the entire program themselves. No attempt was discerned to hinder any groups which desired to meet the Commission, although there were a few complaints as to restricting the size of the delegations. In one or two cases it was necessary to request a governor to leave the room, since it was the uniform rule to allow no officials (nor indeed anyone besides the Commission, a delegation, and perhaps an interpreter chosen by the delegation) to be present during interviews.

There was some evidence that attempts had been made to influence opinion in favor of a British mandate, though with no great amount of success. The "Moslem Christian Committee" and the officials of Jaffa, the Kadi of Jenin, and some groups at Acre, were said to have been chosen by the occupying government and were declared not to represent the people. Two or three military governors seemed to have taken some action to procure votes for Britain. Orders had been issued at Jaffa against declaring for complete independence. Evidence appeared of some French activity in this area, likewise with little success. There was much enterprise on the part of members of the Arab Government at Damascus. Such persons were not hindered by the British authorities from moving about freely, distributing printed forms and giving instruction according to definite programs.

It may be remarked that a number of the British officials, including some at Jerusalem, were proceeding as though expecting that Britain will remain permanently in control of Palestine. For instance, they were planning for the growth of cities, the building of roads and railways, and the construction of harbors. On the other hand, some expressed a desire that America should come as mandatory power. There was a general agreement that France could come to the control of all Syria only with a great show of force, and the probability of considerable fighting.

2. O. E. T. A. West—the French—

It was too evident that in all O. E. T. A. West, the French military governors had worked with varying energy and success to obtain the

reality or at least the appearance of a desire for a French mandate. Their propaganda, some of which they carried on directly, and some through native officials and agents, took many forms. The Commission saw inspired articles in the newspapers, attempts at browbeating and espionage, the hindrance by French soldiers of the attempts of individuals and groups to reach the Commission, and the ushering in of officials, manifestly unsuited to their positions, freshly appointed in the room of others who had been removed because they had declined to support a French mandate. Authentic information came to hand of threats and bribes and even imprisonment and banishment for the same purpose. The management of the sessions at Tyre, Baabda, and Tripoli was so bad as to be insulting to the intelligence and almost to the dignity of the Commission, and was saved from this at other places only by the greater intelligence and natural politeness of some French officers who kept their methods out of sight.

Agents of Prince Feisal were also working in a limited way in O. E. T. A. West, in support of the program of the Syrian Congress at Damascus. There was no evidence of direct action by the British in this territory. Perhaps there was an ulterior motive in the special and somewhat conspicuous kindnesses which they showed the Commission during these days.

3. O. E. T. A. East—the Arabs—

In O. E. T. A. East there were evidences of considerable pressure exerted by the Government to secure the union of all elements upon one program. This took the form for the more intelligent groups of the declaration of the Syrian Congress at Damascus. For others, as the Circassians and Bedouins, who appeared at Amman, a selection of simpler and more easily comprehensible points from this program was emphasized. In that area in particular, government agents tried hard to persuade, cajole, or threaten all, Christians and Moslems alike, into subscribing. No good evidence appeared anywhere of actual violence, imprisonment, or banishment with a view to influencing declarations before the Commission. The Emir Feisal had concluded agreements with the Druses and the Greek Orthodox Christians as represented by their patriarch, in which these agreed to

support his government in return for a measure of autonomy and promises of proper treatment. It is noteworthy that these agreements involved a request for a British mandate, which the Druses and the Greek Orthodox stood by, while the Congress went over to asking for an American mandate by preference.

Some British officers showed signs of disappointment at the declaration in favor of the Americans as first choice. One of them in consequence recommended to his government to decline a mandate over Syria, and the Commission was informed that Mr. Balfour sent a message to this effect, which General Allenby conveyed to the Emir Feisal. Evidence was presented that the Emir had tried immediately before the arrival of the Commission in Damascus to secure the support of certain councils for a request for a British mandate, and that he had failed. While he stated personally to the Commission that America and England are equally satisfactory to him, it may be that because of the benefits he has received and continues to receive from England, and because of the better prospect of a speedy larger Arab union if Syria and Mesopotamia and other areas are under the same supervision, he prefers in his inmost heart the mandate of Britain.

II—SUMMARIES OF ARGUMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION

1. For and Against Zionism—

The arguments in favor of Zionism as presented by its supporters have often been stated and need not now be presented in detail. The chief elements are that Palestine belonged once to the Jews, and they were driven out by force; for two thousand years they have been longing and praying to come back; while the Jews of the world are now far too numerous to be collected in Palestine, they are entitled to have somewhere a state, which can be a refuge to the oppressed among them, and an expression of their continuance and unity; despite proposals at Paris, there is persecution of the Jews in Poland at the present moment; there is a prospect of the disintegration of the Jews in western civilization, and their coalescence with the nations where they reside; they should have an opportunity to restore their ancient language and culture and preserve them in the old environment; there is no need of displacing the present

population, for with afforestation, modern methods of agriculture, utilization of waterpower, reclamation of wastelands, scientific irrigation, and the like, the land can contain several times its present number of inhabitants; if some of the present population desire to sell their lands, they will receive a good price and there is plenty of room for them in other Arab countries; the Jewish colonies have been a great benefit to the native Arabs by teaching methods of agriculture, improving sanitation, and the like; the unfolding of the Zionistic plan would bring great prosperity to all in the land, both present population and immigrants.

The native Arabs and Christians, who so unitedly oppose Zionism, urge the following principal considerations: the land is owned and occupied by them; Arabs were there before the Jews came; the Jews were immigrants, who treated the former inhabitants with the greatest cruelty, and who remained a comparatively short time; they were unable to maintain control over the whole land or even union among themselves; they were expelled by the Romans and formed permanent residence elsewhere 2000 years ago; the Arabs conquered the land 1300 years ago and have remained ever since; it is their actual home, and not merely a residence of long ago; as Christians and Moslems, they can honor all the Holy Places whereas the Jews can honor only their own; the Jews are a religion and not a nation; they will if given control forbid the use of the Arabic language, the measure which caused the break between the Young Turks and the Arabs; the Jewish colonies have shown no benevolence to the Arabs in their neighborhood; it is denied that their activities have influenced the Arabs toward progress; the Jews have much money, education, and shrewdness, and will soon buy out and manoeuvre away the present inhabitants; the Arabs are friendly toward the Jews long resident in the land who use the Arabic language; they will resist to the uttermost the immigration of foreign Jews and the establishment of a Jewish Government.

2. Arab Feeling toward the French.—

While the Commission was prepared beforehand for some disinclination toward France in Syria, the strength, universality and persistency of Anti-French feeling among practically all Moslems and

non-Catholic Christians (except a division of the Greek Orthodox), came as a distinct surprise. Friends of the French affirmed that it is due to German and Turkish, succeeded by Arab and British propaganda, and that it is not deep-seated. The Commission went to great pains in testing these affirmations by questioning. Germans and Turks did conduct a vigorous propaganda during the war against the French, and against the other Allies as well. There was no evidence found of direct propaganda by the British against the French, and frequent denials were made that the Arabs had worked thus. It was said several times that the French had themselves conducted an anti-French propaganda by their actions since the Armistice. On the other hand, it was charged that some Arabs were working against the French, and also against the British and all foreigners. Friends of France say that the Moslems of Syria resent the just punishment which the French gave them in 1860, and their disposition to treat the native Christians as fully equal to the Moslems, an attitude which the British do not take in Egypt and India.

Apart from the questions of process and recency, the anti-French feeling does seem to be deep-rooted in a large proportion of the Syrian population. This appears in an examination of the principal reasons given by the Syrians for their opposition to all French interference in their affairs. They say:

- i. The French are enemies of religion, having none at home, and supporting Roman Catholics abroad for purely political motives.
- ii. They disapprove of the French attitude toward women.
- iii. The French education is superficial, and inferior in character-building to the Anglo-Saxon. It leads to familiarity with that kind of French literature which is irreligious and immoral. The Moslems recognize that the time has come for the education of their women, and they say that those who receive French education tend to become uncontrollable.
- iv. The French have not treated the natives as equals in Algeria and Tunisia, but have imposed indifferences in office holding and in various civil rights. This argument was presented very often and developed in some detail.

- v. The French have shown a marked tendency to give an undue proportion of offices, concessions, and the like, to the Christians of Syria. Non-Catholics complain that the same discrimination is shown in favor of Catholics and Maronites.
- vi. By this discrimination, and by various intrigues since the occupation, the French have increased the religious divisions in Syria, which had been reduced greatly during the war. They thus endanger the possibility of Syrian nationalism, on a non-religious basis.
- vii. The French are inclined to a policy of colonization, by which they wish to substitute the use of the French language for native tongues, and make the people into Frenchmen. The Syrians wish to preserve the use of the Arabic language, and to retain their separateness. Furthermore, it is inherent in this policy that the French would never leave Syria.
- viii. The French have lost so many men in the war, that they are unable to give needful protection or adequate administration. This is illustrated by the few soldiers and the inferior type of French officers and officials, now in Syria. (Friends of the French deny that France lacks good officials, and blame the French foreign office for choosing badly those who are sent out. Again, while for the English the Eastern service is a career and draws the best of the young men, for the French it seems a kind of exile and the best prefer to remain at home). It was affirmed that bribery and intrigue are worse in the French area now than under the Turks.
- ix. The French have suffered financially in the war to such an extent that they have not the means to restore France itself or to develop what possessions they have already. They cannot therefore give Syria the financial and economic support she needs.
- x. The French are inclined toward financial exploitation of subject areas, and would govern Syria not for its own development, but for the profit of Frenchmen.

It is not necessary here to try to estimate the measure of truth that lies behind these statements. It is sufficient to note that most of the Syrians believe substantially the whole of this, and are therefore very strongly against French control of the country.

Much feeling persists in connection with the execution of Arabs by Jemal Pasha, and this acts against the French. Despite the fact that France was intriguing with the Arabs against the Turks before the Great War, the knowledge that M. Picot upon leaving his position as consul in 1914, failed to secure his correspondence, so that fatal evidence fell into Turkish hands, has played into position so that France is held responsible for the hangings. Every reference to the “Arab Martyrs”, by subscriptions for their orphans, exhibitions of these children, meetings of the relatives—the “Unfortunate Syrians”, now not only strengthens the sentiment for Arab Independence, but stirs feeling against France.

3. The Request for an American Mandate.—

Four possibilities were seriously contemplated by the supporters of a United Syria: absolute Independence, the mandate of Britain, the mandate of France, and the mandate of America. The only considerable groups that favored division were those who supported a separate Palestine for Zionism under Britain, and a separate Lebanon, whether or not enlarged, under France in case the rest of Syria is under another mandatory. Only Jews supported the Zionistic scheme, except that a few Christians were willing to entrust the question to the mandatory power. The Jews are distinctly for Britain as mandatory power, because of the Balfour Declaration, though many think if the scheme goes ahead, American Jews will become its chief promoters. France is felt to be against it and America indifferent. As regards the Lebanon, the official Maronites and Catholics who support a separation scheme are undoubtedly sincere. Not only have they many sentimental ties toward France but they realize that no other power than France will support them in their privileged situation.

Many of their followers, especially those who have personal ties with the United States, would rather have the United States than France. Those outside the Lebanon area who are undoubtedly for France as a mandatory power are comparatively few. They include most of the Catholics of every description, and a section of the Greek Orthodox who would have been for a Russian Mandate had Russia not collapsed. The latter group prefers France to Britain, but there was

evidence that many of them would prefer America to France, if there were a certainty of acceptance.

In all Syria surprisingly few, aside from the Druses, declared for Britain as first choice—not nearly so many as for France. The fact is that Britain and America were classed together, with a distinct preference for America, but both were greatly preferred to France. The Jews and the majority of the Greek Orthodox, and some of the Protestants, were for Britain. The great majority of the Moslems were for Britain as second choice. Most of those who made Britain their first choice were for America as second choice. Practically no one was for America or England as first choice and France as second choice.

Practically all of the Moslems, who number about four-fifths of the population of Syria, are for America as their first choice. It is true that there was little direct expression of this in Palestine, since after the first declarations at Jaffa, the question of choice of mandate was held up and referred to Damascus. Possibly this was done under instructions from the Emir Feisal, who may have been trying to hold the field for Britain. If so the evidence of sincere declaration for America is all the stronger, since the Congress reached unanimity for America. As for the Christians, while comparatively few declared directly for America as first choice—only a part of the Protestants and Syrian Orthodox and Armenians—they were bound by old ties and recent agreements to declare for Britain or France, but a large proportion mentioned America as second choice, and stated that they would welcome her, while there were abundant assurances that an American mandate would be satisfactory to practically all. The members of the Commission can entertain no doubt of the genuineness of the desire for the United States as mandatory power, in view of the countless earnest appeals, both by individuals and groups, and of the manifest enthusiasm shown on many occasions, in spite of the Commission's discouragement of demonstrations and avoidance of every form of ostentation. It was furthermore always possible to ask why a group or individual objected to France or England, but not to ask why a group failed to declare for the United States. It is of course also a fact that France and only less openly England were making bids for the mandate, while the United States was not.

The principal reasons advanced for desiring an American mandate were as follows:

- i. Confidence in President Wilson as mainly responsible for the freedom of Syria, and as championing the rights of small and oppressed peoples.
- ii. Gratitude to America for relief of the starving and naked. Thanks to President Wilson and America was expressed in a thousand forms and with the greatest emotion, independently of the desire as regards a mandate.
- iii. The feeling that America came into the war for no selfish reason, and could be trusted to take care of a small people in an unselfish way.
- iv. The knowledge that America is not a colonizing power, seeking to govern for the advantage of its own people, and to exploit the governed. The examples of Cuba and the Philippines were frequently cited.
- v. The feeling that America can be relied upon to withdraw from the country when her work is done, which is the case with no other power. The experience of Cuba was contrasted with that of Egypt and Algeria.
- vi. The feeling that America is rich, and abundantly able to advance the means for the desirable speedy development of the country economically.
- vii. A hearty approval of and desire for the extension of American education in the country. England has done little educationally for Syria. While France has done much, she seeks to denationalise the native peoples and make Frenchmen of them. America, especially through the Syrian Protestant College, has taught Syrian nationalism. The American training and the Anglo-Saxon literature and civilization, are regarded as morally superior to the French.
- viii. A conviction that America will be absolutely fair and just as between the different religions and sects. France would be expected to favor Christians, especially Roman Catholics, and England to favor Moslems.
- ix. America is abundantly supplied with trained men, from whom experts can be supplied in "various branches of science, industry, administration, and above all education."

x. The Americans are “lovers of humanity.”

Many British officials, not excepting General Allenby, think the best solution to be an American mandate over the whole of Syria. England might be very glad to get out of the difficulties of the situation in this way. As for France, she cannot desire to take the whole of Syria, when so much of it is utterly averse to her. She also may ultimately conclude that the best way out is complete withdrawal. This would perhaps not hurt her pride seriously if at the same time England were to withdraw, and if her special pre-war relationships be scrupulously continued.

III. SPECIAL DISCUSSIONS

1. French Feeling toward the British—

It is evident that the French feel resentment toward the British as not having played a fair game in the Syrian area. Without going into historical details, the Sykes-Picot agreement provided that France should have ownership or influence in a large area, including Damascus and Cilicia, and extending to Sivas and Harpoot, while England should be in a similar position toward the former Turkish area southeast of this. At the present moment, France is threatened with the loss of all her sphere, while England complacently holds all that was then assigned to her, and extends her influence toward much of the rest. America, by showing interest in Armenia, and even by the sending of the Commission on Mandates to Syria, seems to the French to be an accomplice of England in despoiling France. The French feel that the English took advantage of their dire necessity, by reason of which they were obliged to keep practically all of their men in France, to occupy more than a due share of Syria, and to seduce the affection of the Arabs. They also resent the payment by the English to the Emir Feisal of a large monthly subsidy, which they claim covers a multitude of bribes, and enables the British to stand off and show clean hands while Arab agents do dirty work in their interest. They feel that in arming the Arabs, the British are again working against the French. They claim further that the British are more or less directly responsible for the undeniably strong anti-French feeling shown by practically all the Moslem and non-Catholic

Christian elements of Syria. They feel that Britain has been unable to resist the desire to connect Egypt with Mesopotamia under one control as a bulwark of India and a new field for profitable commercial exploitation.

It cannot be denied that some of the French contentions are difficult of refutation, and that the whole situation is such that British honor would seem cleaner if Britain were to withdraw wholly from Syria. Yet the aversion of the people to France, however it may have arisen, is so great and deep-seated that England cannot leave Syria to France without seeming to abandon her friends to their enemies, a process which would probably react strongly in Egypt and elsewhere in the Moslem world. There is good reason then for the position of many Englishmen, who are strongly desirous that America should take the whole situation off their hands, including with the French and Arab entanglements, the promises to Zionism.

2. French "Rights"—

The denial in the "Damascus Program" that the French have "Rights" anywhere in Syria leads to an inquiry into the bases on which such rights might be claimed. In brief, there have been in Syria Roman Catholic missionary workers, using principally the French language, for several centuries. These have developed an extensive system of churches, schools, and monasteries. France has had commercial relations and small groups of resident citizens since the Middle Ages. French has long been the principal western language used in Syria. France has taken a special interest in the Maronites, and intervened on their behalf in the Lebanon in 1860.

None of these relationships, however, give the least "right" to claim territory or mandatory control. Otherwise it could be held that America, through her missionary work and business relationships, had acquired a measure of political rights in India, China, South America, and Syria itself. France herself could claim all of Turkey with nearly the same justification. It would compromise all the missionary work in the world if the doctrine were admitted that such work establishes political claims. No doubt the French have acquired many personal relationships and sentimental attachments. But there

is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory power, or in an independent Syria.

3. *The “Greater Lebanon”*—

The latest policy pushed by the French in the Lebanon region contemplates complete separation of the country from Tyre to Tripoli, as far inland as the crest of the Anti-Lebanon, to be given to France in case the remainder of Syria should go to another mandatory power. Such a plan is objectionable for many reasons:

- i. It is apparently contrary to the wish of the majority of the people in the area itself.
- ii. The Syrians outside the area are so opposed to the plan as to be inclined to make war rather than accept it.
- iii. If put into effect by overwhelming force, a state of settled equilibrium could probably never be attained, because of such questions as the just control of “Hollow Syria”, where the Christians by their own figures own 65 per cent of the property, but have only 40 per cent of the population; the water supply of Horns, which comes from territory claimed for the “Greater Lebanon”; the commercial access to the sea of the regions of Damascus and Aleppo. In short, the land is too small, and too intimately connected, to be capable of satisfactory division.
- iv. The separation off of the Greater Lebanon, especially if accompanied by a separation off of Palestine, would intensify the religious differences in Syria, which it is most desirable to diminish in favor of the growth of national feeling. The tendency would be for Christian Syrians to concentrate in the Lebanon, Jews in Palestine, and Moslem Syrians in the remainder of the country.
- v. The government in each area would countenance and probably conduct intrigues in the other regions.
- vi. The three areas would be implicitly hostile, and must either carry heavy burdens of armament against each other, or be protected at great expense by the mandatory powers.
- vii. The mandatory powers would themselves be in danger of hostility over the questions which would inevitably arise between the portions of a country and a people thus unnaturally severed.

A plan which would add to the Greater Lebanon the remainder of O. E. T. A. West, extending from Tripoli to Alexandretta, and give the whole to France, and at the same time give the interior to Britain, would intensify all the above difficulties, and would besides cut off Aleppo and western Mesopotamia from access to the sea.

4. The Emir Feisal's Position—

Unless the attempt be made to rule Syria as a conquered country, or unless the experiment of republican government be tried in the old land, the obvious plan is that the Emir Feisal should be head of the State, Third son of the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein, who was recognized during the war as King of the Hejaz, the Emir Feisal led the Arabs in cooperation with the Allies against the Turks, and entered Damascus in triumph. He spent several months in Paris, and returned a few weeks before the arrival of the Commission. He had agreed with Clemenceau to labor at allaying the Arab feeling against the French, but believing after a time that the French were playing false with him, he ceased his efforts. Shortly before the arrival of the Commission in Damascus, he endeavored to obtain declarations in favor of a British mandate. He assured the Commission that he will be pleased with either Britain or America as Mandatory Power.

The British Government has been advancing money to his government for a long time, and at present allows it \$750,000 per month (LE 150,000). Of this Feisal draws about 200,000 per month for his personal expenses, staff, propaganda, agents, etc. The balance is spent on the administration and the army of 7,000 and *gendarmerie* of 4,500, in supplement to the inadequate receipts from taxation.

The estimate was made that the Prince could manage under settled conditions with a salary of \$125,000 per year, and that after a few years the country could carry itself by taxation, maintaining a very small army. This does not allow for carrying a portion of the Ottoman debt, nor for large expenditure on needed public improvements.

The present attachment of the population to Prince Feisal varies in the different regions. Not many Christians declared themselves positively in favor of him. Some others said he is a good man, with bad advisers. Others fear him because of his membership in a powerful Moslem family. The Moslems of Palestine made almost no declarations in his favor. It was said that if he would come to Palestine, all Arabs would be enthusiastically for him. In all O. E. T. A. East, and among the Moslems of the West, he was asked for, often with enthusiasm. An exception was found in some Moslems of the north, who said they do not know him.

Emir Feisal gave the impression of being kindly, gentle, and wise. Whatever be the case previously, he has had during the past two years in the desert and at Damascus and Paris an excellent political education. He desires the friendly cooperation of the Moslems and Christians of Syria, and wishes to promote the education of Moslem women. Some say that he is not as strong as the men around him, but he gave the impression of being able to maintain his leadership. He promises well as a constitutional monarch, who could work amicably in coordination with a mandatory power.

It should be provided in case he remain the head of the Syrian state, that he renounce all rights of inheritance of the crown of the Hejaz; otherwise serious complications might arise in the future.

5. The "Rights of Minorities"—

One clause in the Damascus program promises full recognition of the "rights of minorities" in the Syrian constitution. On account of the evident fears of many Christians, based on the policy of massacre that has been employed so often in Turkey, the Commissioners took pains to inquire of many Moslem groups what they propose to do to ensure the rights of the smaller sections of the population. The answer was sometimes given, logically enough, that there would be no minorities, since all would be absolutely equal in the new state. But ordinarily, the promise was made of constitutional guarantees. There was discussion in the Damascus Congress of a proposal to grant Moslems one-half of the seats in the future legislative assembly while the other half would be distributed among the rest of the

population. What method might be used in apportioning seats to different groups and sects, as the Druses, Maronites, Shiites, Nusairiyeh, Ismailians, Turks, Jews, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, etc. was not discussed; the mere enumeration suggests the difficulty of the problem.

Mention has been made already of the agreements made by Prince Feisal with the Druses and the Greek Orthodox. He promised in return for the Greek Orthodox support that he would govern under seven conditions:

- (1) He would rule in the fear of God without despotism.
- (2) He would establish constitutional government.
- (3) He would respect all religions.
- (4) Equal rights should be enjoyed by all.
- (5) Public security should be guaranteed for all; the private carrying of rifles should be prevented.
- (6) Public instruction should be equal: Greek Orthodox schools should be on the same basis as Moslem schools.
- (7) No one should hold office because of family or influence, but only because fitted for the place.

These conditions are superior in form, from the standpoint of a modern state, to the Turkish system of recognizing a certain measure of autonomy and self-government in various religious groups, thus perpetuating differences and making concessions which later become privileges and the source of friction. It would be better to aim at one system of education, wherein certain hours each week should be set aside for religious instruction under special teachers for each group, than to have several state-supported school systems. But these are details for future adjustment. Suffice it to say that great readiness was shown by the majority group to provide adequately for the protection and rights of the other groups, and it remains only to bring this purpose into action.

It is desirable to bear in mind that the Moslem and Druse minority in the Lebanon is also in need of protection, and that in the event of a Jewish majority in Palestine, Moslems and Christians would need protection there. A former governor of the Lebanon stated that a

large part of his work was given to watching lest the Maronites and other Christians infringe the rights of the Moslems and Druses.

6. *“Complete Independence”*—

One item in the Damascus program deserves special attention, as going below the problem of a mandate, namely the request for “complete independence”. The protest against the application to Syria of Article 22 of the Covenant is closely related to this. The feeling that the Syrians are in at least as advanced a condition as were the different Balkan States when their independence was arranged for was present in the first Moslems whom the Commission met in Syria, and the same note was sounded everywhere by some of the delegations. The groups which were inclined to support this view in an extreme form were Bedouins, villagers of the south and east, and some of the younger Moslem men. The Syrian Union Party declared in this direction, and the few but prominent men and women related to the “Arab Martyrs”—the men who were executed by Jemal Pasha for intrigues against the Turkish Government—were very emphatic against any form of relationship to another nation: The Syrian Union Party ask that the League of Nations guarantee the independence and the Constitution of Syria. The declaration was made that when Syrians now abroad return, there will be a sufficiency of educated and trained men to govern the country well.

On the other hand, a large proportion of the learned men and of others from the older and wiser among the Moslems, recognized fully that some form of mandatory control is necessary, since the Syrians have long been in subjection, few of them are educated, and the country is poor and backward in its development. The Christians and most other non-Moslem groups are unanimous in the belief that a strong mandate is necessary for a considerable time, because they do not feel confidence in an Arab Government, which in a country four-fifths Moslem might be too favorable to the majority.

The Nations in forming the League have pronounced in the Covenant that Syria should be under mandatory control. The Commission did not find reason to recommend modification of this decision but abundant cause for holding it to be just. The failure of the Young

Turkish attempt to conduct a self-governing state in which Moslems and Christians should be equal makes it especially desirable that the new Syrian state should in its first years be watched closely, since it has the additional difficulty to be overcome of emergence from subjection.

The 4th Article of the “Damascus Program” provides for the possibility of a mandate, defining it “as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete independence”. Here also the restriction may be too great. The Mandatory Power should have a real control over the administration, so as to eliminate as far as possible corruption, waste, inertia, serious errors of judgment, etc.

In spite of all that was said in favor of complete independence, it is altogether probable that either America or Britain would be allowed without resistance as much control as the Council of the League of Nations judges to be wise. In fact assurance was given on very high authority that the demand for complete independence is to an extent artificial, being in part motivated by the fear of a French mandate, and in part by apprehension of the conversion of mandatory control into permanent possession. If adequate assurances be had against both these possibilities, the objectors to a mandate, limited so as to secure its exercise in the interests of Syria, will be reduced to a small and impotent group. In time, when all things are ready, a true and lasting “complete independence” can be awarded by the League of Nations.

7. Syrian Nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Islamism—

The programs presented to the Commission by all the Moslems and about two thirds of the Christians of Syria were nationalistic; that is to say, they called for a United Syria under a democratic constitution, making no distinctions on the basis of religion. In response to repeated questions in many places, it was steadily affirmed by the Moslems that they had no desire whatever for Moslem privilege in the government, nor for political union with the Arabs of the Hejaz, whom they felt to be in another state of civilization. They asked regularly for the independence of Mesopotamia, and a few of them

hoped for some form of political union with that area. A few asked for the independence of all Arab countries.

The Commissioners often asked the question of Moslems, whether they considered the Caliphate to be at Stamboul or at Mecca. With very few exceptions they replied that it belongs now to King Hussein in Mecca. One or two said that it belongs still to the Turkish Sultan, and cannot be changed except by an agreement of all the Moslems in the world. All affirmed that King Hussein is in no sense their political head, but only their religious head. Prayers are said in his name, and certain seals for public documents bear his name.

Certain Christians, on the other hand, affirmed that the sentiment of Syrian Nationalism is new and feeble, and that the expressions of it made before the Commission gave a false impression. They claimed that the Christians who adhere to this view do so as making a desperate effort to live on good terms with the Moslem majority, and that the Moslems much prefer a Pan-Arabic or Pan-Islamic Scheme, and would quickly abandon Syrian nationalism if they saw a chance for the success of either of these ideas. It would seem safe to assume that those who speak for themselves strike nearer the truth than others who assume to speak for them. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to give consideration to the criticism.

Pan-Arabism in a narrower sense would unite under one independent government the Arab-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire. This would not necessarily be a theocratic Moslem state, though the large majority would belong to the different Moslem sects. It is hard to see how such a federated state, with its territory largely desert and lacking a center and speedy communications, could be more of a danger to the world than the Turkey of which it formed a part.

In a larger sense Pan-Arabism would wish to add also the Arab-speaking belt across North Africa. Since this is held by three great powers, each of whom has a larger population and infinitely greater resources than the Pan-Arab area contains its accomplishment against their will is a mere dream.

Pan-Islamism in a narrow sense would reestablish one government in the former Turkish empire by agreement of the two Moslem groups of north and south, the Turks and the Arabs. The Commission found no sign of a desire for the reestablishment of the rule of Turkey over the Arabs. One former deputy in the Turkish Parliament did indeed suggest that an Ottoman prince might be chosen as king of Syria, but this was an individual opinion. On the other hand there were many expressions of joy and thankfulness because of the end of Turkish rule. If there is any thought of a federation of Arabs with Turks, or of a political union of any sort, the Commission saw no trace of it. Still less was there any sign of movement toward the realization of a larger Pan-Islamic idea. The Turks had some thought of this early in the war, but it disappeared in favor of a Pan-Turanian idea on a racial or linguistic rather than a religious basis, from the time when Jemal Pasha hanged the leaders of the Syrian Arabs.

One may conjure up the picture of an attempt at restoring the Saracen Empire, by the stages of Syrian, Arabian, and Mesopotamian independence, followed by federal union in a strong conquering state, which would then become imperialistic in the directions of Persia, Armenia, Turkey, and North Africa; but the Commission discerned no trace of such a notion, nor is it practically conceivable under present world conditions. If the European civilization has sufficient wisdom to avoid further extensive self-destruction, it can with the greatest ease control the Moslem world; it is not necessary for those who labor to establish the League of Nations to contemplate the opposite possibility.

The fundamental question in this connection and indeed in several other great immediate problems is the basal attitude of the Christian toward the Moslem world; shall this be friendly or hostile? In the war now ending, Christian Governments gave their Moslem Allies promises of fair treatment and full rights. Now the Moslems of Syria offer their hands to their non-Moslem fellow-Citizens with the promise of putting religious separation out of sight. Shall they be taken at their word? Or shall they be told: we do not believe what you say; we do not trust you; we think it best to break our word with you,

so that you may not have the opportunity to break your word with us?

The western world is already committed to the attempt to live in peace and friendship with the Moslem peoples, and to manage governments in such a way as to separate politics from religion. Syria offers an excellent opportunity to establish a state where members of the three great monotheistic religions can live together in harmony; because it is a country of one language, which has long had freedom of movement and of business relations through being unified under the Turkish rule. Since now the majority declare for nationalism, independent of religion, it is necessary only to hold them to this view through mandatory control until they shall have established the method and practice of it. Dangers may readily arise from unwise and unfaithful dealings with this people, but there is great hope of peace and progress if they be handled frankly and loyally.

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