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OF THE
UNITED STATES

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THE
PARIS PEACE
CONFERENCE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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United States, 1919,**

Volume IX

**The Paris Peace Conference,
1919**

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**Office of the Historian
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U.S. Department of State
May 2018**

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The Council of Heads of Delegations: Minutes of Meetings November 6, 1919, to January 10, 1920:

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November 6, 10:30 a.m. (HD-85)

[1] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 6, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 6, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/85

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/85

HD-85

[Document 1]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 6, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 6, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Capt. G. A. Gordon
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. G. Lothian Small
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	M. Zanchi
<i>Interpreter</i> —M. Mantoux	

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned.

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	General Bliss Dr. J. B. Scott
BRITISH EMPIRE	General Sackville-West Mr. A. Leeper
FRANCE	General Walch Colonel Roye M. Fromageot
ITALY	Lieut.-Colonel Toni M. Vannutelli-Rey M. Pilotti Prince Boncompagni
JAPAN	M. Nagaoka

1. (The Council had before it two telegrams from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 4th (See Appendix “A”) and November 5th (See Appendix “B”), a telegram from situation in the Interallied Military Mission dated November 5th (see Appendix “C”), and another telegram from the same sources dated November 3d, (See Appendix “D”). Situation in Hungary

M. PICHON pointed out that the telegram sent by the Council to Sir George Clerk on the preceding day¹ satisfied in great measure the requests contained in his two telegrams. Both Sir George Clerk and the Inter-Allied Military Mission were opposed to the despatch of Jugo-Slav and Czech troops. As the suggestion of the French Delegation had not met with approval the point would not be insisted upon.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that Sir George Clerk had asked authority to recognize at once the coalition government which he hoped would be formed. It would be well to give him this authority. The telegram of the preceding day gave him, as a matter of fact, an answer on this point. Sir George Clerk likewise desired not to be obliged to insist on the immediate withdrawal of Friedrich. On this point also the Council should meet his views.

M. PICHON said that a telegram should be sent to Sir George Clerk confirming the previous instructions of the Council and stating, moreover, that the Council relied on his tact. But the question still remained: what would happen after the departure of the Roumanian troops? Would not the presence of an Inter-Allied force be necessary? Would the Inter-Allied Mission suffice for the maintenance of order?

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that that question had already been raised in the telegram sent on the preceding day, which had crossed Sir George Clerk's telegrams. He wished to call attention to another point: would it not be well to request the Jugo-Slavs and the Czechs to retire immediately within their frontiers as laid down by the Council? According to the telegram of November 3rd, from the Inter-Allied Military Mission, the Czechs were raising difficulties with respect to the evacuation of the mines of Salgo-Tarjan: they were demanding as a condition precedent, reimbursement for their expenses relative to the supply of the Hungarian population. Would it not be well to request the Czechs to withdraw, at the same time assuring them that the Council would take into consideration the question of reimbursement for their expenses? Likewise, in the south, the Jugo-Slavs were still occupying the mines at Pecs,

whereas, according to the decisions of the Council, that territory was to remain in the possession of Hungary.

M. DE MARTINO thought that that was the time to insist upon all States bordering on Hungary recognizing the frontiers of the Hungarian State.

MR. POLK observed that the Governments concerned had been notified of the lines laid down as the northern and eastern frontiers of Hungary;² he wished to inquire whether there had been a similar notification with respect to the frontier between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained that at the time the Council had disallowed the Jugo-Slav claims in Baranya and Batchka,³ the Serbian Delegation had been notified of its decision.⁴ As a result of this notification the Serbs had formulated new proposals: They had, in particular, asked the right of exploiting the mines of Pecs for five years.⁵ The Serbian request had been referred to the Reparation Commission and the Economic Commission but both of these considered themselves without jurisdiction, as the question, to their minds, was essentially a political one; however, the Serbian request had neither been examined by the Central Territorial Committee nor the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Jugo-Slavia.

M. PICHON said that the Serbs must be informed that the territorial question had been settled, but that this decision would not prejudice the decision to be taken by the Council with respect to the exploitation of the mines of Pecs. He suggested that the latter question should be referred to the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Jugo-Slavia.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that a new fact had occurred; on October 25th the Serbian Delegation had asked that the evacuation of the territories actually held by the Yugo-Slav troops should be deferred until the question of the exploitation of the mines had been settled.

M. BERTHELOT thought the Yugo-Slav request inadmissible from the territorial point of view.

M. PICHON said it was agreed that the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs, as well as the Roumanians, should be asked to evacuate. Moreover, M. Berthelot would prepare a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

M. BERTHELOT read a draft telegram prepared in accordance with the views expressed by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt it useless, since it had been decided not to send Czech and Yugo-Slav contingents into Hungary, to ask Sir George Clerk if he deemed it expedient to send an Interallied force.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the question should nevertheless be raised, because if Sir George Clerk should say that such a force was necessary it would be worth while studying the plan anew. In view of Sir George's report as to the attitude of Friedrich it might be well to reflect on what would happen when Friedrich, with 30,000 men, found himself opposed to the Supreme Council and a mission of Generals without any troops.

SIR EYRE CROWE wondered what would happen if Sir George Clerk indicated that the sending of an Inter-Allied force was essential or even desirable. The only possible reply would be that no one could be sent.

M. BERTHELOT acknowledged that the situation would be difficult but he thought that it would not present an absolute impossibility.

M. DE MARTINO remarked that Italy would certainly not send any troops.

M. PICHON agreed that the French also would find great difficulty in sending any.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question was purely an academic one. The wording proposed by M. Berthelot presented the difficulty

that Sir George Clerk might well think that he was being offered something which the Council could not give him.

M. PICHON agreed that the telegram should be modified in the light of Sir Eyre Crowe's remarks and should state that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would find it very difficult to send any troops if the need should arise.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that Sir George Clerk should also be asked if he deemed the Hungarian Police force adequate to cope with the situation.

M. DE MARTINO desired a further addition to the effect that the Police force could be placed under the control of the Interallied Military Mission.

It was decided:

- (1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram prepared by M. Berthelot (See Appendix "E");
- (2) that the Czech and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments should be requested to withdraw their troops immediately beyond the frontiers of Hungary as laid down by the Council;
- (3) that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should be informed that the decisions taken by the Council with respect to territorial questions were final, but that the evacuation requested would not prejudice the solution of the question of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs;
- (4) that the request of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation proposing the grant to that Government for five years of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs, should be referred to the Committee for the study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Yugo-Slavia.

2. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that the Germans had given to the Press a fairly complete summary of the note⁷ and annexed Publication of protocol⁸ sent to them by the Council. He inquired if, under the circumstances, it would not be advisable to publish the

complete text of that note. Publication of the Note and the Annexed Protocol Addressed to the German Government by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to publish the text of the note addressed to the German Government relative to the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace as well as the draft protocol annexed to that note.

3. (The Council had before it a letter from General Nollet dated October 21, 1919 (See Appendix "F"), a note from the Drafting Committee dated October 28th [29th] 1919 (See Appendix "G"), and a letter from Marshal Foch dated November 3, 1919 (See Appendix "H").) Salaries of the Personnel of Commissions of Control in Germany

GENERAL WALCH read and commented upon Marshal Foch's letter.

MR. POLK, with respect to the organization of the personnel of the Commissions of Control, asked why it was necessary to call upon civilian engineers?

GENERAL WALCH explained that the military technical personnel was inadequate to control the manufacture of war material. It was necessary to call upon competent specialists who could not be found in the regular army.

GENERAL NOLLET had called upon about 10 engineers and about 40 university graduates. In so doing he had only followed the example furnished by the British Commission of Control.

(It was decided:

that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany not belonging to regular military forces, should be assumed by Germany.)

4. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 3, 1919 (See Appendix "I") Publication of the Correspondence With the Austrian Delegation

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the note of the British Delegation specified that extreme care should be exercised with respect to the publication of the Austrian Notes marked "Confidential".

MR. POLK said that evidently such notes could not be published without the consent of Chancellor Renner.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that Dr. Renner could be asked if he still objected to the publication of those Notes.

M. DE MARTINO observed that the publication of the notes raised some questions which were delicate from an Italian point of view, and he asked that a decision on this point be postponed.

(The question was adjourned)

5. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 30th, 1919 (See Appendix "J"), and a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 5th, 1919 (See Appendix "K") Demobilization of the Men of Haller's Army

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon these documents.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to approve the recommendations of the note of the Drafting Committee relative to demobilized Poles who had borne arms against Germany.)

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission dated October 31st, 1919 (See Appendix "L") Financial Measures of Coercion Taken Against Germany on Account of the Non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon this note. He observed that it was not correct to speak of the annulment of authorizations which might have been given: the question was one of revocation of said authorization. Germany could not now create new pledges by availing itself of authorizations previously given, inasmuch as any such authorizations were now revoked.

(It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee should prepare a reply to M. Lou-cheur's letter dated October 31st, 1919, relative to the interpretation of the financial measures of coercion taken against Germany on account of the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (See the Note of September 27th, 1919).⁹

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee (See Appendix "M") Liquidation of the Property of Inhabitants of Schleswig

M. FROMAGEOT stated that the Danish Government had pointed out that after the plebiscite the inhabitants of Schleswig would become Danish citizens. What would become of the interests of those newly-made Danish subjects whose property in the meantime might have been liquidated by one of the Allied and Associated Powers as belonging to enemy subjects? The Drafting Committee had considered this contingency in the note which the Council had before it. It appeared that answer might be made to the Danish Government along the lines of the last paragraph of the said note; the Allied and Associated Powers, however, would always be at liberty to avail themselves of their rights of liquidation with respect to such new Danish subjects as did not seem to merit the consideration therein contemplated. Moreover, if the Principal Allied and Associated Powers arrived at such a decision, they should notify the other Allied Powers who, doubtless, would raise no difficulty over adopting the same procedure.

M. PICHON suggested that the Drafting Committee should come to an agreement with the Economic Commission, which had the question

in hand, on the draft of a resolution to be communicated to the other Allied Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Danish Government would have to be approached.

MR. POLK took it as understood that the draft resolution would be submitted to the Council. He pointed out that he would have to refer the matter to his Government.

8. M. BERTHELOT reminded the Council that at a previous meeting the question of an American Military Mission reported to be at Riga had been brought up.¹⁰ According to his present information there appeared to be at Riga, besides a mission of relief and supply and a Red Cross mission, a mission under Colonel Holliday, who was reported to have arrived at Riga on October 15th. The Colonel was reported to have stated that he did not desire to collaborate with the Anglo-French Mission. Military Missions at Riga

MR. POLK explained that Colonel Holliday was there alone. His duties were purely to collect information, and he had no political role to play. Moreover, General Cheney would see that he did not exceed his powers.

9. M. DE MARTINO informed the Council that the Italian delegates to the Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions would arrive at Paris on November 10th. They would be ready from that day on to confer with their Allied colleagues. Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions

M. PICHON said that Marshal Foch would be informed of this.

10. M. DE MARTINO said that he had been informed from Vienna that Serbian and Roumanian representatives wished to participate in the work of the Commission, presided over by Sir Francis Dent, which was charged with the distribution of rolling stock. This claim seemed inadmissible, inasmuch as neither Serbia nor Roumania had signed the Austrian Treaty. Commission at Distribution of Rolling Stock

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Commission in question was only a provisional one.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained that it had been decided to send to Vienna a provisional Commission which would become a permanent Commission when the Treaty came into force. The character of the Commission was apparent from the fact that Hungary, an enemy country, was represented on it; it would therefore be difficult to deny representation to the Serbs and Roumanians.

M. DE MARTINO said that he would examine the question anew.

11. M. POLK said that his Government wished to know if the question of the recognition of Luxembourg was to be decided by the Council.
Luxembourg Affairs

M. BERTHELOT summarized the history of the question: when the question first arose five or six months ago the French Government declared that, from a political point of view, it would refrain from active participation in the Luxembourg question, and that it thought that the Belgian Government should be the first to make a decision. Belgium had told the French Government that it was opposed to recognizing the Grand Duchess. The French Government had transmitted this information to Rome, Washington and London and the Principal Powers abstained from recognizing the Grand Duchess. Eventually, and after at first refusing, Belgium consented that the fiancé of the Grand Duchess should be allowed to go to Luxembourg. The marriage was taking place that very day. Two days previously the Belgian Government had asked the French Government if it intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. He himself had replied by putting the same question to the Belgian Ambassador, since France had decided that Belgium should have the first word in political questions concerning Luxembourg. The Belgian Government had not yet replied. The French Government had been informed from other sources that the British Government intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. The French Government had then acquainted the British Government with the exact situation, at the same time informing the Italian Government.

M. PICHON said that the Council would arrive at a decision on the Luxembourg question.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 6, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-85

BUDAPEST, November 4, 1919.

Telegram From Sir G. Clerk to the Supreme Council, No. 3

Monsieur Diamandy came to see me this afternoon to tell me officially that Rumanian troops would begin their evacuation from Budapest November 9th and finish on November 11th. He was immediately followed by Count Somssich, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me that Friedrich was absolutely defiant; that if Allies insisted on his giving up post of Minister President he would go into opposition with nine of his present ministers and that after all it was not Hungary but Allies who wanted peace.

I told Count Somssich that I still hoped that wiser counsels would prevail but that if Friedrich maintained this short-sighted attitude I could do no more and should have to leave when Roumanians withdrew. I was not here to turn out Friedrich government and set up Opposition as a government; I was only here to ask Hungarians to form a temporary coalition government with whom Allies could deal.

I still hope that Friedrich may be induced to see reason but it is all the more necessary that I should have authority to recognise coalition government immediately on its formation if that proves to be possible.

Appendix B to HD-85

BUDAPEST, November 5, 1919.

Telegram No. 4 From Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council

Monsieur Cerruti, civil member of Italian mission, has just informed me of a telegram received by mission from Paris from which I understand following proposals are under consideration by Supreme Council.

1. That Friedrich shall be required to resign at once as he has been unable to form democratic government.
2. That Roumanians shall be required to evacuate at once.
3. That two divisions composed of Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slav troops under Allied command shall be sent into Hungary.

With regard to (1) I venture to ask for two or three days delay. I hope I am on the point of securing coalition government which all parties in Hungary will accept. I have got so far as to get provisional consent of Friedrich to resignation of office of Minister President. It is a task of great difficulty to bring various parties together and secure general consent but I shall know by end of week whether I can really count on success.

(2) As I reported in my telegram No. 3 Roumanian High Commissioner has definitely informed me that Roumanians intend to begin evacuation on November 9th. There is, however, one very important point on which I trust Allies will insist namely that Roumanians shall not remain on the Theiss but withdraw from limits of all territory that is to remain Hungarian. For one reason alone this is desirable namely because elections cannot be held until country is clear of foreign troops. But also difficulties are being raised by Friedrich party and others who say that Roumanian evacuation will not be genuinely carried out.

(3) I venture to express my earnest hope that under no circumstances will Jugo-Slav and Czecho-Slav divisions be sent into Hungary even under Allied officers. Result in country would be indescribable and I am convinced that Hungarians would at once sink all their differences and resist with such arms as they have to last man.

PARIS, November 5, 1919.

*[The Secretary General of the American Delegation (Grew) to the
Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Dutasta)]*

The Secretary General of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace has the honor to transmit herewith for Mr. Dutasta's information a very urgent telegram which has just been received from the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest.

"Budapest, November 5th.

"To the Supreme Council,

"Peace Conference,

"Paris.

"No. 775, Double priority. This Mission is aware that a telegram has been received in Budapest from Paris covering three points: First, the Friedrich Cabinet, second, the immediate Roumanian evacuation, and third, the occupation of Hungary by two divisions under Interallied officers, one division of Czecho-Slovaks and one division of Yugoslavs. Against this third proposition the Interallied Military Mission unanimously and urgently protests. Such procedure it is believed would stir Hungary into revolution and would destroy all prospects for an early solution of the Hungarian question. It is further urged that the Roumanians, the Yugoslavs and the Czecho-Slovaks be all required to retire at once behind their respective lines of demarcation.

"(Signed) Interallied Military Mission."

MR. DUTASTA,
Secretary General of the Peace Conference,

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Paris.*

Appendix D to HD-85

BUDAPEST, November 3, 1919.

*[The Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest to the Supreme
Council]*

Telegram

To the Supreme Council—Paris.

Supplement to Telegram No. 740 of October 31.

The Czecho-Slovak Government subordinates the evacuation of Salgo Tarjan to three conditions:

- 1st —The Hungarians are to be capable of insuring order;
- 2nd —The Hungarians are not to attack the Czecho-Slovaks;
- 3rd —The Hungarian Government is to reimburse the amounts advanced by the Czecho-Slovaks to feed the population.

The Commission has given the two first assurances. It is of the opinion that the execution of the third condition would be the cause of a new delay which must be avoided at any price. The Budapest mills are without coal.

The Commission replied to this effect.

The Commission asks the Supreme Council to use its influence with the Prague Government.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE DAY

Appendix E to HD-85

PARIS, November 6, 1919.

Telegram

From: Supreme Council.

To: Sir George Clerk, Budapest.

The Supreme Council has taken note of your telegrams of November 4^{[11](#)} and 5th,^{[12](#)} and of the telegrams from the Commission of Generals of November 3^{[13](#)} and 5th.^{[14](#)}

Although very precise indications were given you in our telegram of yesterday,^{[15](#)} the Supreme Council desires to reply to your further suggestions and specify its views on the following points:

- 1st) The Czech and Serb Governments will receive a formal invitation from the Conference to evacuate Hungarian territory, and to retire to the interior of the frontiers determined by the Supreme Council, of which notification has already been made.^{[16](#)} A similar invitation was telegraphed to Rumania on October 12th [*11th*].^{[17](#)}
- 2nd) It is to be understood that the evacuation by Rumanian troops is to be complete; these troops are not to remain on the Theiss, but to withdraw beyond the boundaries of the territory which will remain Hungarian, in order that the elections may take place without being influenced by the presence of Rumanian troops.
- 3rd) A telegram will be sent to Prague requesting the Czech Government to not subordinate the shipments of coal to a previous agreement concerning the payment of the coal supply indispensable in the operations of the Budapest mills. The Czech Government will be assured at the same time that the Allies will arrange the question without delay with the Hungarian Government in a legitimate manner.
- 4th) The unanimous opinion of the Commission of Generals, as well as your own, relative to the danger which the presence of Czech and Serb troops would present, even under an Allied Command, in Budapest, has decided the Supreme Council to renounce that idea.

However, you are requested to make a reply on the question which was posed yesterday, relative to the utility, or even the necessity, of a

bona fide Inter-Allied force to support the authority of the Commission of Generals and the orders of the Conference. The attitude of defiance adopted by Mr. Friedrich, referred to in your telegram of November 4th, immediately after the decision calling for the evacuation of the Rumanian troops leads us to fear that the reactionary elements will offer resistance as soon as the Allies will no longer have a sufficient local military force to force respect for their decisions. You must be aware, for that matter, that, under the present conditions, the sending of Allied troops by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would encounter serious difficulties. Do you consider that the local *gendarmerie* would be sufficient under the control of the Commission of Generals.

Appendix F to HD-85

DELEGATION OF THE INTERALLIED
MILITARY COMMISSION OF CONTROL¹⁴⁶
PRESIDENCY

BERLIN, October 21, 1919.

From: General Nollet, President of the Interallied Military Commission of Control.

To: President of the Peace Conference, Versailles.

Article 207 of the Peace Treaty provides that the upkeep and expenses of the Commissions of Control, as well as the expenses incident to their operations, will be charged to Germany.

The question having arisen, as to whether the pay of officers and men of the Military Commission, according to those provisions, would be assumed by Germany, various interpretations have been given.

Article 249 of the Peace Treaty, it is true, gives a definition of the term "upkeep", but it refers to the Armies of Occupation; and it is doubtful whether it can be applied for the determination of the administrative statute of the Military Commission.

On the other hand, certain Powers are supposed to have taken measures for the disbursement of the pay, on their territory, to their

nationals, who are members of the Military Commission. It may be asked whether these Powers have not already esteemed that the above-mentioned pay should be assumed by them.

In fact, operation expenses being equal for the Allied military of the same rank, while the pay is different, it may be advantageous not to impose on Germany expenses which vary, for the same rank, according to nationality.

This question, on account of these considerations and of the high moral interest which is, of course, attached to it concerning Germany, seems to me beyond the sphere of my duties and to call for a decision from the Allied and Associated Powers.

I have the honor to ask you to kindly provoke this decision.

NOLLET

Appendix G to HD-85

*Note for the Secretariat General Relative to the Payment of Officers
Who Belong to the Commissions of Control*

By the terms of Article 207 of the Treaty, Germany must bear (1) the costs, (2) expenditures and (3) upkeep of the Commissions of Control. This enumeration would be meaningless were it not to include all payments, consequently that of officers' pay.

Article 249 of the Treaty, in enumerating the various elements constituting upkeep, includes the pay of officers. It is true that this article especially refers to the troops of occupation. But there is a great similarity with the Commissions of Control; for, in both cases, it refers to the presence and maintenance in Germany of military elements necessitated by the guarantee of execution of the Treaty. In equity, it is a question of an expense caused by Germany, it is just that she bear it.

The inconveniences which may result from the inequality of pay in the different Allied and Associated Armies would be avoided if it

were agreed that the pay be disbursed by each State to its officers and that the reimbursement would be made by Germany.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

OCTOBER 29, 1919.
Appendix H to HD-85

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
THE ALLIED ARMIES No. 5249
GENERAL STAFF

G. H. Q., November 3, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: The President of the Council, the President of the Peace Conference (Secretariat General).

By letter No. 146, under date of October 21, 1919,^{[18](#)} General Nollet, President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany, requested you to be kind enough to have the Supreme Council decide whether the pay of Officers and troops in the Commissions of Control should be included in the upkeep expenses of the said Commissions, and later be charged to Germany.

No decision has been taken on this subject.

It follows that General Nollet experiences great difficulty in recruiting the civil personnel necessary,—interpreters and engineers—this personnel at the present time receiving no pay, but only having the right to allowances allotted to the Members of Commissions of Control.

This state of affairs is prejudicial to the good operation of the Commissions of Control.

Consequently, I have the honor to ask you to be kind enough to advise the Supreme Council of this question as soon as possible.

P. O. The Major General
WEYGAND

Appendix I to HD-85

NOVEMBER 3, 1919.

*[The British Plenipotentiary (Crowe) to the Secretary General of the
Peace Conference (Dutasta)]*

BRITISH DELEGATION

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: I have the honor to transmit herewith to Your Excellency a draft of resolution¹⁹ concerning the publication of the correspondence exchanged with the Austrian Delegation. I should be glad to see it on the calendar of the Supreme Council as soon as possible.

The question has been raised in the British Parliament as to whether this correspondence should be published and my Government is awaiting a decision of the Supreme Council before deciding in that matter.

By the way, I think I must remind you that, concerning the correspondence exchanged with the German Delegation, the Council of Four decided to communicate to the press all the German notes and Allied answers, without any change, gradually as they were received or sent. This procedure has been observed in certain cases but not for all the Austrian notes and those which were sent to them.

However, there seems to be no objection to the publication of the Austrian correspondence; only, exception should be made for certain notes marked "Confidential" by the Austrian Delegation (Nos. 360, 863, 906 and 1070).

When writing those notes the Austrian Delegation relied on the assurance given by the note of M. Clemenceau to Doctor Renner ("these notes would be of an absolutely confidential character and

would only be communicated to the members of the Supreme Council”).

With a view to rendering the Austrian notes intelligible, it will be necessary, as it was for the German notes, to publish certain parts of the original “peace conditions”, which were ulteriorly modified and replaced by the final text of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

Your Excellency will remember that M. Clemenceau has now removed the objections first raised by him against this method concerning the German correspondence. I informed Mr. Polk, Mr. Tittoni and Mr. Matsui of it, and I told them that my government proposed to publish the extracts in question.

EYRE A. CROWE

Appendix J to HD-85

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF

G. H. Q., October 30, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President Clemenceau.

A communication received from General Henrys states that the Polish Government has asked the Allied Powers to obtain authorization from the German Government that the demobilized soldiers of the P. A. O. F. (Polish Army Organized in France) be free to return to their homes, situated in the following regions:

- 1st —The regions which are, properly speaking, German;
- 2nd —The regions whose fate shall be decided by plebiscite;
- 3rd —The regions attributed to Poland, but not yet occupied by her.

It would seem that, in the present situation, the free return, to the regions above referred to, of the demobilized soldiers in question, cannot be demanded of Germany, since until the ratification of the

Peace Treaty, this Power has the right to consider the parties concerned as deserters from the German Army.

Under these conditions, the intervention of the Allied and Associated Powers could limit itself to obtaining the assent of Germany for the free return to their homes of demobilized soldiers belonging to the categories referred to above in paragraphs 2 and 3; those belonging to category 1 being retained in Poland up to the coming into force of the Treaty.

I would be grateful for information as to the decision which shall be taken on this subject by the Supreme Council.

P. O. Major General
WEYGAND

Appendix K to HD-85

Note for the Secretariat General Relative to Demobilized Poles

1. Neither the Armistice nor the Treaty contain stipulations expressly binding Germany not to institute proceedings against German Poles having served in the Polish Army for having taken up arms against Germany.

2. But, according to the provisions of Article 91 of the Treaty, Germany undertakes to allow German Poles domiciled in Germany to opt for Polish nationality.

According to the provisions of Articles 88, 95, and 96 of the Treaty, Germany undertakes to allow German Poles, born in the plebiscite zones or domiciled therein, to freely exercise their right of vote.

According to the provisions of Article 278 of the Treaty, Germany undertakes to release, from every point of view, the German nationals, acquiring a new nationality by virtue of the Treaty, of all allegiance to Germany.

Finally, according to the provisions of Article 277, Germany undertakes to assure to all Allied nationals, that is to say to the Poles, a constant protection to their body and their property.

3. In undertaking these suits, Germany jeopardizes the loyal execution of the engagements above referred to. On this point, to put Germany under the necessity of annulling and ceasing the said proceedings would be justified.

4. On the one hand, if Poles are to return to German territory, on the contrary there are the Germans on Polish territory. Both should be equally protected from all interference and any obstruction in the free exercise of their right of option and vote, and transfer of domicile.

An understanding on this subject would be of a nature to put an end to and prevent all difficulties in the future.

The presence at Paris on November 10 of German representatives for the settlement of questions raised by the coming into force of the Treaty, appears to furnish a favorable opportunity to proceed to this accord.

For the Drafting Committee
[No signature on file copy]

NOVEMBER 5, 1919.
Appendix L to HD-85

C. R. 359

59 RUE PIERRE CHARRON,
PARIS, October 31, 1919.

From: Loucheur, President of the Organization Committee of the Separations Commission.

To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honor to call your attention to the passage quoted below of the note communicated by the Allied and Associated Governments to

the German Government on September 27, 1919,²⁰ relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces:

“The evacuation shall commence without delay and shall continue without interruption.

“The Allied and Associated Governments declare positively, that if they are not satisfied that the measures demanded by them are in course of execution, they will not consider any of the requests being presented by the German Government relative to the furnishing of food products. Consequently, they have ordered that the study of these requests be postponed.

“The Allied and Associated Governments furthermore refuse any financial aid which would benefit the German Government at the present time, or that it might endeavor to obtain from the Allied or Associated Governments or from their nationals.

“In the event that the German Government may continue to disregard its engagements, the Allied and Associated Powers will take all measures they may judge necessary to insure the execution of the corresponding clauses of the Armistice.”

The Organization Committee of the Separations Commission assumes that the passage above applies only concerning the requests presented by the German Government upon dates subsequent to the sending of the note, and that it is not the intention of the Supreme Council to annul authorizations previously accorded for the sale or security of titles with a view to the purchase of foodstuffs for Germany.

Please, etc.

LOUCHEUR

*Note for the Secretariat General Relative to the Eventual
Liquidation of Property Belonging to the Inhabitants of Schleswig*

The Danish Minister, in his letter of October 24, 1919, remarked that the inhabitants of Schleswig, becoming Danish after the plebiscite, will not be able to avail themselves either of Article 297 *b*, alinea 3, to be exempt from liquidations, since they do not acquire the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power; or of Article 297 *i*, to be compensated by Germany for the consequences of these liquidations, since they will no longer be German nationals.

This consequence of the Treaty can only be contested by subtleties of interpretation which it would hardly be wise to adopt.

But, in any case, the liquidation is, according to the provisions of the Treaty, merely optional and the Allied and Associated Powers have full liberty to abstain, within the measures which they shall deem suitable, from exercising their right before as after the plebiscite. After the plebiscite this abstention shall be especially justified in respect to individuals which shall have ceased to be German nationals.

For the Drafting Committee
[No signature on file copy]

¹ Appendix B to HD-84, [vol. VIII, p. 959](#).

² Appendices V (E) and V (F) to CF-65, [vol. VI, pp. 413](#) and [416](#).

³ HD-21, minutes 6 and 7, and appendices F and G, [vol. VII, pp. 454](#), [468](#), and [471](#).

⁴ HD-32, minute 9, [ibid., p. 705](#).

⁵ HD-74, minute 7, and appendix D, [vol. VIII, pp. 733](#) and [741](#).

⁷ Appendix B to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 863](#).

⁸ Appendix C to HD-80, [ibid., p. 865](#).

⁹ Appendix E to HD-62, [vol. VIII, p. 419](#).

¹⁰ HD-79, minute 5, [ibid., p. 838](#).

¹¹ Appendix A to HD-85, p. 9 [*Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 1*].

¹² Appendix B to HD-85, p. 9 [*Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 1*].

¹³ *Supra*.

¹⁴ Appendix C to HD-85, p. 10 [*Pg. 10 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

¹⁵ Appendix B to HD-84, [vol. VIII, p. 959](#).

¹⁶ See appendix V (E) to CF-65, [vol. VI, p. 413](#); HD-21, minute 6, and appendix F, [vol. VII, pp. 454](#) and [468](#); HD-32, minute 9, *ibid*, [p. 705](#).

¹⁷ See appendix B to HD-68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#).

¹⁸ Appendix F to HD-85, p. 12 [*Pg. 12 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

¹⁹ Does not accompany the minutes in Department files.

²⁰ The translation here of the passage from the note is not identical with that in appendix E to HD-62, [vol. VIII, p. 419](#).

November 7, 10:30 a.m. (HD-86)

[2] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 7, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 7, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/86

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/86

HD-86

[Document 2]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 7, 1919, at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, November 7, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. Massigli

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. I. Bowman
Dr. James Brown Scott
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE
Admiral Groves, R. N
Lieut-Colonel Kisch
Mr. Palairat
Mr. E. H. Carr
Mr. H. W. Malkin

FRANCE
M. Ignace M. Laroche
General Le Rond
M. Fromageot
Commandant Lacombe
M. Escoffier

ITALY
Lieut-Colonel Piccio
Commandant Scanagatta
M. D'Amelio
M. Stranieri
M. Pilotti

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka

1. SIR EYRE CROWE stated he could not nominate the British Representatives as the experts of the British Delegation on that subject were in London. Execution of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty With Germany

M. DE MARTINO wished to remark that there already was a Commission of Responsibilities.

M. ESCOFFIER said the Commission of Responsibilities has finished its work; this was a question for a special Commission charged with the preparation of the execution of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty with Germany.

M. PICHON said that the Council agreed that the nomination of this Commission should be adjourned, but it was important that this should be settled in as short a time as possible.

M. DE MARTINO thought an adjournment necessary as he would have to get in touch with his Government.

It was decided:

- (1) that a Commission would be nominated, (a) to compare the lists of individuals charged with crimes to be delivered by the German Government; (b) to decide the composition, procedure and seat of the mixed tribunals to be set up under Article 229 of the Treaty with Germany;
- (2) that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers nominate as soon as possible their representatives on this Commission.

2. (The Council had before it a report of the Military Representatives at Versailles on the subject. (See Appendix "A").) Request for Instructions From the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to approve the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles dated November 5th, in answer to the request for instructions received from the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany (See Appendix "A").

3. SIR EYRE CROWE regretted that this declaration had been delayed by numerous communications with his Government. The present proposal resulted from the proposition which had already been made by the American Delegation and also by the Polish Commission;¹ in a few words, this proposition tended to eliminate anything in the nature of a temporary arrangement. The British Government was opposed to anything leading to a final union of Eastern Galicia and Poland. It had also discussed the question with Mr. Paderewski and had pointed out to the latter that Poland would be acting in a sense diametrically opposed to the claims made by Poland for the district of Teschen. A large majority of the population in Eastern Galicia was not Polish. The British Government thought that they ought not to shut the door to the real aims of Eastern Galicia which would allow its population to join other nationalities. It wished, therefore, to adopt the following suggestion, namely: Poland would get a Mandate for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations for a determined period, such as 15 years; the League of Nations could then consider whether Eastern Galicia should be joined to Poland or make some other political arrangement. The British point of view insisted that the settlement should be provisional. He personally had done his best to conciliate the views of the Council with those of the British Cabinet. British Declaration on the Question of Eastern Galicia

MR. POLK regretted that they were unable to reach an agreement on this subject; but he added that he had not given up hope of finding a satisfactory solution. What impressed the American Delegation was that if a date were fixed for a Mandate, it would mean that Galicia would be in a state of ferment, and Poland remain in uncertainty over this grave question. This case was not the same as that of other countries where a Plebiscite was asked for; it would be difficult to see where Eastern Galicia would go, if not to Poland. The problem was all the more difficult for Eastern Galicia on account of fighting taking place between Ukrainia and the Bolsheviks on one side and Denikin

on the other side. He wished to ask Sir Eyre Crowe the difference he made between the position of the British Government at this time and the position that it had taken before.

SIR EYRE CROWE answered that it was no longer a question of a plebiscite, but of giving a Mandate to Poland for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations.

MR. POLK suggested that the views of the British Delegation should be referred to the Polish Commission for examination and report for Monday, November 10th.

M. PICHON agreed.

It was decided:

to refer to the Polish Commission for examination and report to the Supreme Council on November 10th, 1919, the proposal made by the British Delegation tending to give Poland a Mandate for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations for a determined period.

4. (The Council had before it a note from the German Delegation dated October 3rd, 1919, on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy (See Appendix "B"), and the observations presented by the Belgian Delegation in its letter of October 14th, 1919 (See Appendix "C"). Consideration of Note From the German Delegation of October 3rd, on the organization of Plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy

MR. POLK said this matter had been brought to his attention and he understood the good faith of the Council was involved. He would suggest that this be referred to the Belgian Committee for examination.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Belgian Commission should prepare a draft answer to the German Note which the Council would have before it on Monday.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer back to the Commission on Belgian Affairs for examination the Note from the German Delegation dated October 3rd, on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy (See Appendix "B"), as well as the observations of the Belgian Delegation dated October 14th, 1919 (See Appendix "C").
- (2) that the Commission on Belgian Affairs should present to the Supreme Council at its meeting on November 10th, 1919, a draft reply to the German note.

5. (The Council had before it a report from the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Mission relative to the removal by German authorities of the material belonging to the German Government at Dantzig (See Appendix "D").) Removal by Germany Authorities of Material Belonging to the German Government at Dantzig

MR. POLK suggested that this question be referred back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report.

It was decided:

to refer back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the note of the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Commission in Poland, with regard to the removal of German Government property from Dantzig.

6. MR. POLK repeated what he had said at a preceding meeting:² the President would be very glad to call the first meeting of the Council, but the question had been raised in Washington as to his power under Article V of the Covenant to call the meeting before the Treaty had come into force: under Article V his power existed only from the date of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty; his suggestion was that the meeting should take place on the following day, but he had no objection to the procedure adopted by the Drafting Committee and in turn adopted by the other members of the Council. The real trouble was that the letter would be issued at a time when the pact had not yet come into force. Reply of President Wilson to the Communications Regarding the First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations

M. PICHON thought in that case that the convocation of the first meeting might be issued on the day when the ratifications were exchanged, and then that the meeting could take place the following day.

MR. POLK made it clear that he did not wish to insist on this, if the other members of the Council preferred the other solution.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the difficulty lay in the period which would elapse between the deposit of ratifications and the first meeting of the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that the President of the United States could now advise the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations that as soon as the treaty had been put into force by the deposit of ratifications, the President, acting under Article V of the Covenant, would send a telegram calling the first meeting, and it would be advisable to take all the necessary measures in provision of this convocation.

MR. POLK thought that Sir Eyre Crowe's suggestion was already covered by M. Clemenceau's letter.³ He also suggested that the State Department in Washington, on being advised of the exact hour of the deposit of ratifications, could notify to the representatives at Washington, of the Powers which were to be represented on the Council of the League of Nations, the first meeting of the Council; on the other hand, all the necessary measures would have been taken for the first meeting to take place.

M. FROMAGEOT said he understood the American argument, but thought there was great analogy between this case and the convocation of the Labor Conference at Washington.

MR. POLK said that everyone in America was attacking the legality of this convocation.

M. FROMAGEOT thought that if the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations considered only the question of nominating the Commission charged with the delimitation of the boundaries of the

Sarre district, the Council of the League of Nations would then have fifteen days within which to nominate the Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested there was the possibility of a ratification by the United States, in which case the first meeting might have a longer agenda: it was therefore important that the convocation of the first meeting should be considered immediately.

M. PICHON proposed that the question be referred to the Drafting Committee to examine whether it was possible to take into consideration the remarks made by Mr. Polk.

It was decided:

to refer back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the question of procedure to be followed for the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, taking into account remarks of a legal character made by the American Delegation.

7. M. BERTHELOT said that they had reasons to think that the Germans were going to answer their last Note⁴ by proposing that the conferences which were made necessary by the execution of the Treaty, should take place in Berlin on account of the great number of experts the German Government wished to send; and only the final conferences would take place in Paris. Execution of the Treaty With Germany

GENERAL LE ROND thought that all the questions which could not be considered in Paris should be taken up on the spot, and that it was not necessary to have conferences in Berlin. He also wished to add that, as the conferences between the Allies could not begin before November 10th, it would not be possible to meet the German representatives before November 15th.

8. M. PICHON stated that Mr. Venizelos would ask to be heard by the Council on the day that the report of the Inquiry Commission on Smyrna came under discussion. Agenda of the Supreme Council

9. MR. POLK asked whether the question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace should not be studied by a competent Commission. He suggested that it might be referred to the Central Territorial Committee. (This was agreed to.) Temporary Regime of Western Thrace

It was decided:

to refer back to the Central Territorial Committee for examination and report the question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 7, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-86**

MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES VERSAILLES, November 4, 1919.
SUPREME WAR COUNCIL SWC-478
90-MR

Draft Reply of Military Representatives at Versailles to Three Requests for Information Received From the Chairman of the Aeronautical Commission of Control at Berlin

In its meeting of October 29th, the Supreme Council decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles for their consideration and reply the following three requests for instructions received from the Chairman of the Aeronautical Committee of Control at Berlin:⁶

1. Whether the airship sheds in occupied Germany should be pooled and counted in for distribution with the aeronautical material in unoccupied Germany, or whether they should be allocated to the Nation in occupation of that territory in which the airship shed is?
2. Whether the phrase "No dirigible shall be kept" in Article 198 of the Peace Treaty shall be held to mean no dirigible of naval or military type, or no dirigible of naval, military or civil type?
3. Whether the military aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers are allowed under Article 200 of the Peace Treaty to fly over Germany and land in Germany during Allied occupation?

The Military Representatives having examined these questions in consultation with their aeronautical advisers—are of opinion:

As regards question 1:

That the Airship sheds and all other Aeronautical Material in the occupied areas in Germany shall be pooled and counted in for distribution with the Aeronautical Material in unoccupied Germany. The additional instructions contained in Article No. 7 of the report of the Supreme War Council on the distribution of Aeronautical Material, dated September 5th,[7](#) are provided for general guidance.

As regards question 2:

That the phrase “No dirigible shall be kept” in Article 198 of the Peace Treaty, shall be held to mean “No dirigible of Naval or Military type,” but the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall decide whether a dirigible is of civil type or otherwise.

As regards question 3:

That Article 200 of the Peace Treaty applies to the whole of Germany and not merely to the areas occupied by the forces of the Allied and Associated Powers.

G^{al} DESTICKER

*Military Representative,
French Section, S. W. C.*

UGO CAVALLERO

*Military Representative,
Italian Section, S. W. C.*

C. SACKVILLE-WEST

*Military Representative,
British Section, S. W. C.*

TASKER H. BLISS

*Military Representative,
American Section, S. W. C.*

PRESIDENT
THE GERMAN DELEGATION No. 28
OF PEACE

VERSAILLES, October 3, 1919.

From: Von Lersner.

To: President Clemenceau.

The provisions contained in Article 34, paragraph 2, of the Peace Treaty concerning the plebiscite at Eupen and Malmedy, are, in comparison with the provisions provided for regarding the other territory submitted to a plebiscite, so extraordinarily brief that a mass of important questions, are either not at all resolved or remain very unclear. The Allied and Associated Powers, in the several declarations made in the notes sent by them before the signing of the Treaty, made clear how these questions must be resolved.⁸ These declarations constitute some precious general principles; they still need however, a more ample development in their detail. The German Government considers it urgent that this development be perfected as soon as possible by an expose of the precise conditions. The German Government believes it their duty to insist on the necessity of complete clearness in all the questions treating the plebiscite; a necessity which is increased by the worry of the populations concerning the uncertainty which governs the application of the details of the plebiscite and concerning which the Belgian authorities adopt an attitude which flagrantly contradicts the solemn assurances of the Allied and Associated Powers which no longer furnish the least guarantee of a free and uninfluenced vote.

The German Government calls attention to the following points, which are of special importance:

1. In opposition with the provisions provided concerning all the other territories submitted to a plebiscite, it has not been exactly defined what persons are qualified to participate in the vote at Eupen and Malmedy. In Article 34, paragraph 2, the question concerns only "inhabitants". It is evident that the definition of the term "within the shortest possible time," is indispensable. The German Government believes it is in accord with the Allied and Associated

Governments by proposing to resolve the question in the same manner as for the other territories submitted to a plebiscite, a right of vote being accorded to every person, without distinction of sex, who:

A) shall have attained the age of 20 years at the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, and who:

B) shall either have been born on the territory or shall have resided therein for a determined period. In this regard, it would be opportune, in the opinion of the German Government, to fix the date as November 11, 1918. It would be, furthermore, understood that the persons having left the territory after the fixed date, but who have still retained their domicile, would have the right to vote and that the persons living outside of the territory and enjoying the right to vote therein, could, either return to vote or send their declaration, written, after having been previously legalized.

II. The question of settling what districts shall be subject to plebiscite also needs to be regulated. Article 34, paragraph 2, states that the registry shall be opened in Eupen and Malmedy, but immediately after, Eupen and Malmedy are spoken of as “these territories” (“the said territories”, “the above territory”); it cannot therefore refer to the cities, but rather to the spheres (*cercles*). The question concerning where the registers are to be opened has not been resolved. The German Government believes also that it is the intention of the Allied and Associated Governments to have the plebiscite take place by commune or, if the districts appear too small, by localities possessing a burgomaster. A like regulation would accord with the desires of the population, to whom it was indicated that, if the registers of only the cities of Eupen and Malmedy were opened, a number of inhabitants from distant localities would be unable to participate in the vote. Moreover, it appears opportune to remark that only by a vote by commune, could the League of Nations be furnished with the precise data necessary, in order to decide, which is its mission, whether the territories are to remain in part or wholly German.

III. A particular unrest appears to reign, on the point of just what question the inhabitants are to resolve by their vote. In Article 34, par. 2, it is stated that the inhabitants are, on the registers, to express the desire that “these territories remain entirely or

partially under German sovereignty.” If it is to be supposed that by these words the question which shall be introduced for the plebiscite is already formulated, that would then signify that each inhabitant should state not only if his own commune should remain German, but also make a similar declaration for all the other communes of the territory, even if they are entirely foreign to him. One would therefore have to require that each inhabitant make precise declarations concerning the outline of the entire frontier, such as it would be, from his point of view, desirable. But a very small number of the persons who are to participate in the vote are in a position to answer such a question.^f In view of the manifest impossibility for its execution, the provision mentioned in Article 34, paragraph 2, must not be interpreted to the letter. Its true sense only appears when the several declarations of the Allied and Associated Powers On the plebiscite question are taken into consideration. In Mr. Clemenceau’s note, dated June 15th [16th], it is stated that an annexion of territory to Belgium should be operated only on a basis of the decision of the population,^{8a} and in the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the German counterproposals, assurance is given that an attachment of territory to Belgium shall occur “only” in case the petitions addressed by the population of the territory shall be sufficiently supported.^{8b} In that way, it is expressly declared that the population will be asked to declare whether they desire reunion with Belgium. If, to this is added the text of the Treaty which speaks of a manifestation of the desire of the inhabitants to remain attached to Germany, and if it be considered that, in the note, above referred to, by President Clemenceau, the cessions of territory to Belgium are treated in the same phrases and under the same terms as the cessions of territory to Denmark, it results that the question which is to be decided by vote will be: Reunion with Germany or with Belgium. This method of formulating the question is, moreover, the only one which corresponds with the natural interpretation of a plebiscite which it is possible to reconcile with practical necessities.

IV. It has just been shown, that for reasons of a juridical nature, the question to be posed for a plebiscite, must be in the sense of a decision either for Germany or for Belgium. There remains to be

shown that this manner of formulating the question is also indispensable in the interest of the liberty of the vote. If, in fact, the inhabitants were asked to declare only if they wished to remain German, everyone who would participate in the vote would be considered as a protester and would run the risk of being treated at a disadvantage by the Belgian authorities on account of his vote.

If, therefore, guarantees are to be given to assure a free vote not subject to any influence, it is necessary, in the first place to be careful that the plebiscite question be formulated in the method indicated.

The Allied and Associated Powers have fully recognized the importance of guarantees for a free vote, not subject to any influence, and have made reiterated solemn and nonequivocal declarations in this matter. In particular, Mr. Clemenceau, President of the Council, declared in his note of June 16th that: "The decision of the inhabitants must be sought under conditions in which the complete liberty of the vote is assured." There also results from the perfect comparison established on this subject between Belgium and Denmark that, in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Governments, the Eupen and Malmedy plebiscite vote should be conducted under the same guarantees as the Schleswig vote. A still greater assurance is found in the reply to the German Counter-proposals in which it is stated: "The Treaty provides for the consultation of the population under the auspices of the League of Nations."

More clear and precise assurances could not possibly have been given. The German Government is justified in admitting that the Allied and Associated Powers, at the time that these assurances were given, had an absolutely definite plan in view, and the Government is of the opinion that, in order to soothe the population, the publication of this plan should not be longer delayed. If the plebiscite is to take place under the auspices of the League of Nations this method of procedure could not, in the opinion of the German Government, give efficacious results unless a Commission appointed by the League of Nations, and on which there should not be any Belgian or German member, is constituted and given the authority to take all measures which it may consider necessary to assure a free and untrammelled

vote. In order to be free it is necessary above all that the vote be secret.

With regret, the German Government is obliged to remark that the attitude taken up to the present time by the Belgian authorities in the Eupen and Malmedy districts does not coincide with the solemn assurances given by the Allied and Associated Powers. Numerous complaints and reclamations have reached the German Government from these two districts which indicate how Belgian authorities are at the present time attempting to impede a free and untrammelled vote. While refraining from presenting new documents on this subject at this time, the German Government restricts itself, for the time being, to bringing the following facts to the knowledge of the Allied and Associated Powers: promises of an economic order and of other natures are made to the inhabitants by the Belgian authorities, indicating that in case they did not vote in favor of Germany they would enjoy certain advantages, for example, exoneration of war charges; decrease in taxes; free entry of raw materials; construction of general utility establishments, etc. The Belgian administrative inspector at Eupen is particularly active in these influence procedures. His attitude regarding the future vote is characterized by the following: As the German Government is able to incontestably prove, he has declared that the first person who would vote unfavorably, would be thrown down stairs by him. In another circumstance, he declared that if an excessive number of persons came to vote he would close up the establishment and would keep several persons locked up for several days. His secretary, in the presence of a high Belgian functionary, made the declaration that no vote would take place. Other Belgians have stated that if a vote did take place, it would only be for form.

The Belgian functionaries are trying to influence the inhabitants by threats and by proceedings which are of a veritable [veritable?] blackmail nature. For some time, on occasions when the inhabitants had to address these functionaries in connection with requests of some nature or other, the Belgian authorities only agreed to their demands in case they gave a written declaration that they accepted annexation and would not vote against Belgium. Facts of this nature have been brought to the attention of the German Government in

great numbers. Declarations of this nature are extorted from the repatriated German soldiers in particular. In the City of Malmedy, a sort of plebiscite rehearsal has been undertaken; lists called protests were drawn up in which all persons who wished to vote for Germany figured. The registration of this decision was made in the presence of a Belgian officer, who warned the people that whoever voted for Germany would have to leave the country within a very short time. In other cases on the Belgian side those who would vote for Germany were threatened with expulsion, a threat which naturally has a powerful influence on the inhabitants living on their lands and properties. Consequently, even in the most enlightened circles the opinion is current that whoever votes for Germany would at the same time opt for Germany. This erroneous conception was intentionally encouraged from the Belgian side, as it was affirmed to the inhabitants that the vote and the option was the same thing, although, in Article 37 of the Peace Treaty, the right of option is treated separately and has absolutely no connection with the vote. Furthermore, from the Belgian side, it is pretended that the vote shall be public and that whoever may vote for Germany must make a complete exposition of the motives actuating his vote. Although the Belgian functionaries have, concerning the abuse of power which has been many times described, declared that they were acting on orders received from Brussels, the German Government does not wish to believe that these functionaries act in accord with the Belgian Government. The German Government awaits, hoping that the Belgian Government will immediately put a stop to the machinations of its representatives, machinations which intimidate the population and invite errors.

The best means for preventing a renewal of these regrettable acts, is, in the opinion of the German Government, to have immediate light shed on all the points above referred to and which are constituted by the existing doubtful questions of the plebiscite. The German Government, consequently, requests the Allied and Associated Powers to give them a prompt declaration on these points.

Accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER

PARIS, October 14, 1919.

CONTENTS

Note from the Belgian Delegation dated October 14, 1919, relative to Eupen and Malmedy.

BELGIAN DELEGATION

From: The Belgian Delegation.

To: Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

Pursuant to the communication from the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference under date of October 11,⁹ and after having duly noted the note No. 28 from the German Delegation dated October 5 [3],¹⁰ concerning the Eupen and Malmedy territories, the General Secretary of the Belgian Delegation has the honor to expose herewith the views of the Government of the King concerning Article 34, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The German note of October 5 [3] tends to admit the organization of a plebiscite in the districts of Eupen and Malmedy under certain conditions which are judged commendable, and with a view to determining if these territories shall be finally attributed to Germany or to Belgium.

Now, the entire question of the final attribution of these territories and of the intervention in this settlement of the vote of the population is wholly regulated by the above cited provision (Article 34, alinea 2) drawn up as follows:

“During the six months which shall follow the entry into force of the Treaty, voting booths shall be opened by Belgian authority in Eupen and Malmedy and the inhabitants of the said territories shall have the opportunity to express in writing their desire to have all or a part of these territories maintained under German sovereignty.”

And the third and last alinea of Article 34 adds: “The Belgian Government shall be expected to inform the League of Nations, whose decision Belgium agrees to accept, of the result of this popular consultation (in English: ‘public expression of opinion’).”

This text appears sufficiently clear in itself to require no further comment, and if, in the views of the German Delegation, it seems necessary to interpret and complete it, it is wholly because that Delegation admits *a priori* that the plebiscite question is analogous to the plebiscite which shall take place in the Saar Basin and Upper Silesia, in Eastern Prussia and in Schleswig, the conditions of which were minutely defined in the special provisions of the Treaty concerning them.

By admitting this plebiscite procedure concerning Eupen and Malmedy, the German note tends, naturally, to take into no account alinea of Article 34 of the Treaty, which regulates the question and which in no wise provides for a plebiscite.

In the first part of the German note, it is therefore proposed to define the attribution of a pretended right of vote “as resolving the question in the same manner as for the other territories submitted to a plebiscite”. But in such an event it would be necessary to commence by establishing, contrary to Article 34, that the territories of Eupen and Malmedy shall be the object of a plebiscite.

Part 2 of the note tends further to substitute for the two registers opened in Eupen and Malmedy, as indicated in Article 34, a system of voting by communes.

Continuing to deviate from the very clear text of Article 34, which gives each inhabitant of the districts of Eupen and Malmedy the opportunity to express their desire to see all or part of the district in which he lives maintained under German sovereignty, Part 3 of the note proposes that the vote be based on a question thus put: “Reunion with Germany or with Belgium.”

Finally, the 4th part of the German note ends by stating that the plebiscite should take place under the auspices of the League of

Nations. The League is to name a commission “in which there should be neither Germans nor Belgians” and which would organize a free and secret vote.

Thus, under an appearance of juridical argument, the note from the German Delegation ends by completely changing the sense, although very clear and simple, of the provision stipulated in alinea 2 of Article 34 of the Treaty.

Article 34 states that Registers shall be opened by Belgian authority at Eupen and Malmedy and that the inhabitants shall have the opportunity to express in writing whether they desire to see all or a part of these territories maintained under German authority. And, in place of these open registers in the two principal towns, the German Delegation offers to substitute a system of voting by communes, a sort of a plebiscite according to which the inhabitants would be invited to choose between Belgium and Germany, and finally, although Article 34 expressly states that the registers shall be opened by Belgian Authority, and further states that it appertains to the Belgian Government to bring the result of this popular expression to the knowledge of the League of Nations, which is not called to intervene in any matter up to this time; the system of the German note consists in prescribing a plebiscite and of confiding its organization to the League of Nations.

It is clearly evident that this series of considerations developed in the German note amounts only to a wish to substitute for the prescriptions of Article 34, alineas 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Versailles, a plebiscite system which is in no wise provided for in the Peace Treaty, at least as far as the territories of Eupen and Malmedy are concerned, and which can only be based on an idea of preference for the German Government.

It cannot be assumed for an instant that the representatives of the Governments who drafted Article 34 wished to organize for Eupen and Malmedy, a plebiscite system similar to that which was instituted for the Saar Basin, Upper Silesia, Eastern Prussia and Schleswig, and which, being clearly defined concerning these territories, was not defined in the same manner concerning the

territories of Eupen and Malmedy. Since such is the case, it is evident, that it was intentional.

In due time and place, the Belgian authorities shall not fail to comply with Article 34, alinea 2 of the Treaty of Versailles, by opening at Eupen and Malmedy registers by which the inhabitants of these territories shall have the opportunity to express by writing whether they desire to see all or a part of these territories maintained under German authority. Furthermore, the Belgian Government shall inform the League of Nations, whose decision Belgium has agreed to accept, of the results of this expression of opinion.

It shall be, therefore, the Belgian Government which shall act, itself and alone, by permitting the inhabitants who may be hostile or unfavorable to her to express themselves freely, and the League of Nations shall not intervene until later to study the value of these oppositions and the action to be taken concerning them.

By instituting this system of popular expression, the Allied and Associated Powers expressed their confidence in the loyalty of Belgium. The German Government, in reality, is attempting to influence the Powers, by false interpretations, to substantially modify the system established in formal terms by Article 34 of the Treaty of Versailles.

With evident intent to influence the Supreme Interallied Council, the German note concludes the considerations of a juridical order which have just been analyzed with a certain number of criticisms and accusations relative to the attitude of the Belgian authorities in the districts of Eupen and Malmedy.

Two other notes bearing the respective dates of October 6 (No. 30) and October 11 (No. 32) have arrived containing new accusations. The latter refers directly to Lieut. General Michel, Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian troops in occupied German territory, who is accused of having issued a measure of expulsion regarding certain individuals who evidenced a spirit of open hostility against Belgian occupation. A detailed report concerning these acts is requested from the Belgian authorities in occupied territory.

In the name of the Belgian Delegation,
Secretary General
P. O. Signed: **GUILLAUME**

Appendix D to HD–86

*Report From the American Representative on the Inter-Allied
Railway Mission to Poland With Regard to the Removal of German
Government Property From Dantzig*

Under date of October 29, the American Minister at Warsaw transmitted the following as the substance of a report from the American Representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Mission:

“On the protest of the workmen in the shipyards the German authorities have refrained from removing floating cranes and drydocks from Dantzig, which they considered they had the right to do under the terms of the Treaty. They have, however, removed a large amount of other materials, claiming that this was allowable under the Treaty.

“The American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Mission added that the foregoing information had been transmitted to Paris, and that the Mission had taken no other action in the matter which pertained exclusively to the Armistice authorities.”

¹ See HD–57, minute 3, and appendix C, [vol. VIII, pp. 270](#) and [280](#); HD–60, minute 9, and appendix K, [ibid., pp. 349](#) and [368](#).

² See HD–84, minute 2, [vol. VIII, p. 954](#).

³ Probably a reference to the draft letter prepared by the Drafting Committee for the President of the Conference, appendix F to HD–73, [ibid., p. 725](#).

⁴ Appendix B to HD–80, [ibid., p. 863](#).

⁶ See HD–78, minute 4, and appendix E, [vol. VIII, pp. 807](#) and [822](#).

⁷ Appendix B to HD 63, [ibid., p. 443](#).

⁸ See CF-24 and appendix, [vol. v, pp. 826](#) and [827](#); CF-61, minute 3, and appendix II, [vol. vi, pp. 324](#) and [330](#); CF-69, minute 2, and appendix II, [ibid., pp. 454](#) and [464](#).

^{8a} [Ibid., pp. 926](#), [932](#).

^{8b} [Ibid., p. 941](#).

⁹ Not found in Department files.

¹⁰ Appendix B to HD-86, *supra*.

November 8, 10:30 a.m. (HD-87)

[3] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 8, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 8, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/87

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/87

HD-87

[Document 3]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 8, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 8, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. Massigli

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General Bliss

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West
Mr. Forbes-Adam

FRANCE
M. Gout
General Bunoust

ITALY
M. Galli
Commandant Mazzolini
Prince Boncompagni

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that in the next to the last meeting the Council had had to pass upon a proposal made by General Walch on behalf of General Nollet. He had understood that it was a question of laying upon Germany the payment of the salaries of all the personnel of Military Commissions of Control in Germany. That proposition conformed to the point of view maintained by the British Government. He read, however, in the *procès-verbal*, that Germany was only being charged with the payment of the salaries of personnel

not belonging to the regular military forces, that is to say, the civilian personnel. There was no civilian personnel in these Commissions, or at least among the military members there were many who were civilian technical experts put on the footing of officers. Rectification of procès-Verbal HD-85, Minute 3¹

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that Sir Eyre Crowe's rectification called for no objection.

(It was decided:

to modify resolution No. 3 of H. D. 85, so as to read as follows:
"It was decided that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany should be assumed by Germany.")

2. M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the agenda brought up the discussion of the report of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna (See Appendix "A"). M. Venizelos had asked to be heard. It seemed to him that there were two questions in to be asked of M. Venizelos. First, he should explain the massacres of which the Greek troops were accused. Moreover, he himself was much struck by reading in the Commission's report that the Greeks would not be able to maintain themselves in Smyrna by their own efforts. The Greeks had been sent to Smyrna on the clear understanding that their occupation should not be taken as equivalent to a definite attribution of territory to them. He noted that the Greeks had gone beyond the limits of the Sandjak of Smyrna without the permission of the Council and had done so upon a telegram from M. Venizelos. He thought that it was necessary to remind them that the Turkish question was not settled and to ask them to state definitely if they could maintain themselves at Smyrna by their own efforts. The information received indicated that in many respects the conduct of the Greeks had been abominable, and that Turkey would never accept, unless obliged to by force, Greek occupation, or, to a certain extent, Italian occupation. As far as the Greeks were concerned, he thought this information was correct. The question would not have arisen if the Greek occupation had not given rise to certain incidents. It was not the Council's fault if the question had to be raised. The

Turkish problem was not settled. He felt that the Council would be more and more led to respecting the integrity of Turkish territory; under these circumstances it would be well to warn the Greeks that they should not behave as conquerors of Asia Minor. Report of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna

M. DE MARTINO wished to associate himself with what M. Clemenceau had just said: the military occupations in Asia Minor were clearly only provisional and should in no way prejudice the final settlement of the Turkish question. This question could not be divorced from the more general question of the fate of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire which was of interest to all Mediterranean powers. Italian opinion was clearly favorable to the principle of respecting the integrity of these territories. Moreover, he wished to point out that the relations between the Italian troops and the Turkish population in Anatolia were excellent and that no conflicts had taken place between them; on the contrary, on many occasions the local populations and authorities had indulged in manifestations of gratitude.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that the Council was entering upon a basic discussion of Greek occupation. He thought that the conclusions of the Commission went beyond the instructions received by it. The Commission had been formed, at the request of M. Venizelos himself, to investigate the massacres. Its report treated, in general terms, the whole problem of Greek occupation, and also questioned the decisions of the Supreme Council. What would happen if the Council, as the report suggested, asked the Greeks to leave Smyrna? Would they be replaced by Turks or was an Inter-Allied occupation contemplated? The affair of the Vilayet of Aidin had just shown how difficult of realization such an occupation was: the French Government had felt it impossible to send a battalion and, under these conditions, the British Government had not felt that it could assume this burden. If Inter-Allied occupation was impossible could the Council really think of allowing the Greeks to retire when there was no one to replace them. Could it possibly think of evacuating the country before peace had even been concluded?

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it clearly could not. He felt, with Sir Eyre Crowe, that it was impossible at the moment to ask the Greeks to retire but it would perhaps be well to have some officers on the spot who could inform the Council as to the situation at Smyrna.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Greeks unfortunately claimed that many of the difficulties arose from the fact that they did not have complete authority in that region. In any case it seemed impossible to agree with the conclusions of the Commission which proposed a regime under which the Greeks might perhaps occupy but the Turks would govern. Rather than create an organ of supervision it would be better to give the Greeks greater liberty of action and at the same time a larger and more definite share of responsibility.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the danger was that the Greeks would take too much latitude.

MR. POLK wished to know what the attitude of the Council was? It seemed to him that there was some thought of rejecting the conclusions of the report now before it. He was not so inclined. The Commission had thought its mission was to establish the responsibility for the events at Smyrna; it had pointed out these responsibilities as it saw them and had not hesitated to question the acts of the Council itself. The report contained serious matters. Did the Council intend or not to take them into consideration? For instance, paragraph 37 of the report pointed out that M. Venizelos himself had ordered the reoccupation of Aidin without taking the Entente into consideration. He felt that it was impossible not to repose confidence in the investigators whom the Council had chosen, or else another Commission should be sent.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the order given by M. Venizelos had already been discussed by the Council of Four.^{[2](#)}

M. DE MARTINO felt that it was impossible not to discuss the report inasmuch as it emanated from a Commission set up by the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the report would be discussed after M. Venizelos had been heard. (At this point M. Venizelos entered the room.)

M. VENIZELOS hoped that the Council would permit him to give a brief historical summary of the conditions under which the investigation had been conducted; he felt that this recapitulation would show that he had good reason to ask that this investigation should be considered null and void and that another investigation should take place. On the 18th of July, after he had asked the British Government, as a result of a question which had been put in the House of Commons, to send an investigating officer to Smyrna, the Supreme Council had decided to create a Commission of Investigation.³ No Greek officer sat on that Commission. He had protested to the President of the Conference and had received the reply that a Greek Representative should follow the work of the Commission.⁴ On August 22d he had been obliged to inform the Supreme Council that his representative, Colonel Mazarakis, was not allowed to be present at the taking of testimony, under the pretext that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses.⁵ The Commission had declared that it would confine itself to communicating the depositions to him. He, Mr. Venizelos, had protested against that decision, which was contrary to elementary rules of justice. Later on the Commission had made it known that the Greek representative would be put upon the same footing as the Turkish representative who was permitted to follow its work. Such similar treatment, offensive to an Allied people, forced him to protest. On the 14th of September he had again been obliged to protest because the Commission had refused to call the witnesses which the Greek Delegate had proposed should be heard, and because it had refused to communicate to Colonel Mazarakis the testimony which had been taken. The President of the Conference had replied to him that the Greek Delegate was not entitled to insist on being present at all deliberations of the Commission, but that the minutes, including the hearings of witnesses, would be delivered to Colonel Mazarakis who could then present his observations thereon to the Commission before the latter reached its conclusions.⁶ Nevertheless the Commission had not wished to communicate to the

Greek Delegate the depositions made before it on the pretext that secrecy had been promised certain witnesses. In so acting it had violated the most elementary principles of justice and it put, unintentionally doubtless, a positive premium upon false testimony. He had addressed himself to the Conference which had answered that it could not go behind a promise given by the Commission.⁷ He wished to press this point upon the Council; an investigation conducted under such conditions could not be trustworthy. It was impossible thus to pass judgment upon the honor of an army without having given that army the means of defending itself. He felt that he was entitled to satisfaction, since it was a question of a State which had always been faithful to its alliances and friendships, and since this request was formulated by a representative of that State who had always borne himself loyally towards the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if General Bunoust had any remarks to make as to the materiality of the facts in question.

GENERAL BUNOUST said that he did have some remarks to make. The Commission had never decided to communicate the depositions taken; it had unanimously decided that the depositions would lack sincerity if the Greek representatives had to be informed of them. The Turks would not have opened their mouths in the presence of a Greek officer. In spite of that precaution the Commission had sometimes had difficulty in finding witnesses; thus at Aidin no Turkish witnesses had been found. When the Supreme Council's telegram of September 30th reached the Commission it had not yet ended its labors; it had only concluded the summary of the established facts and it had transmitted this in full to Colonel Mazarakis. Colonel Mazarakis had presented observations on this subject which the Commission had taken into account on one point.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether, after the Commission had received the telegram of September 30th, it had taken depositions which it had not communicated to M. Venizelos' representative.

GENERAL BUNOUST thought that the Commission might, after that date, have taken the second deposition of Colonel Smith.

M. VENIZELOS did not wish to insist upon that point. He felt, however, that he might say, without offending anyone, that civil investigators would have been more anxious not to violate cardinal principles of justice, and that they would not, for instance, have allowed witnesses to be heard without being sworn. At Aidin the Commission might well have taken non-Turkish testimony and have been satisfied therewith. He felt finally that he might remark that the procedure adopted inevitably exposed the investigators to the danger of being carried away by false depositions and reaching unjust or inaccurate conclusions. The animosity between Turks and Greeks was an incontestable fact; moreover, it was certain that many Europeans in Smyrna preferred the continuance of the Turkish regime which, with respect to strangers, was a regime of special privileges, rather than the establishment of the Greek regime, which was a regime of equality.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if M. Venizelos did not intend to discuss the facts brought out in the report.

M. VENIZELOS said that he did not want to discuss conclusions based on testimony which had not been brought to the knowledge of the Greek representative.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it was a serious matter to make such a reply. The Council had expected from M. Venizelos precise answers on questions of fact. As head of the Government he must know if the alleged facts had really happened. He was astonished that M. Venizelos did not wish to discuss them.

M. VENIZELOS recognized that there had been excesses but he thought that they were readily to be explained. He admitted equally that the conditions under which the debarkation took place created an administrative responsibility of the Greek Command. The Greek Government moreover had inflicted heavy penalties. But the Council could not forget that the day before the occupation the Turkish population had assembled, and that protests against the occupation had been posted up.

GENERAL BUNOUST said that these posters were not appeals to resistance. The Turks were only asked to assemble in order to prove that the Turkish element was in the majority; the crowd of Turks, moreover, was not armed.

M. VENIZELOS observed that in any event there was a tendency to resistance, inasmuch as the day before civil prisoners had been released.

GENERAL BUNOUST explained that they had only been released during the night preceding the debarkation. The Commission's report, moreover, had recognized the responsibility of the Turkish Governor in these circumstances.

M. VENIZELOS added that stores of arms had been looted by the crowd. Under these conditions the debarkation took place. The officer commanding the Greek troops had been guilty of imprudence. The Council knew how gunshots, coming from parts unknown, had provoked a reply on the part of the Greek troops. A panic followed and that was the beginning of the excesses. He thought he ought to point out that the next day or the day after a Court-Martial had been organized, that in the first five days of its sitting this Court-Martial had condemned three Greeks to death, one of them being a looting soldier, and that it had totalled seventy-four convictions, of which forty-eight were of Greeks. Nothing more could be asked of the most civilized country. As for the massacre of the prisoners who were being led on board vessels in the harbor, Colonel Mazarakis' investigation, which had resulted in severe condemnation of the Lieutenant commanding the escort, had established that the excesses of which the prisoners had been the victims were largely due to the crowd, and that only about twenty prisoners had been killed. In any event, forty-eight hours after the debarkation of the troops, order had been reestablished. He wished to ask General Bunoust if since that time the city had not been perfectly calm.

GENERAL BUNOUST replied that such was the case.

M. VENIZELOS stated that Colonel Mazarakis did not agree with the Commission on the affair of Menemem. According to the Colonel, a

Greek battalion which had evacuated Pergamum, after having suffered serious losses, while entering Menemem had been attacked by Turkish fanatics. This attack had provoked excesses. The Commission, which did not consider that Turkish aggression had been established as a fact, had certainly been led into error by the witnesses which it had heard; it spoke of three hundred Turks killed; according to his information, only twenty had been killed. It was evident that on this point an investigation in the nature of a cross-examination would have been suitable.

GENERAL BUNOUST observed that the Commission had attached very little importance to the figures furnished it; it was perfectly aware of their inexactness. In any event it had not based its conclusions on a Turkish report, according to which one thousand were killed, but on an investigation made the day after the uprising by a French officer.

M. VENIZELOS stated that in the affair of Nazilli the fault lay with the Greek officer who, threatened with attack, thought he could evacuate the town prior to the time ordered by the English Admiral. In any event, in that affair, it was the Greeks who had suffered most. As for Aidin, he maintained that twenty-five hundred Greeks perished and that the number of Turkish victims was far less.

GENERAL BUNOUST explained that the Commission had relied upon a French investigation, according to which there were reported to be about twenty-five hundred Greek victims and fifteen hundred Turkish. The estimation of the number of Turkish dead was moreover difficult on account of the exodus of the population.

M. VENIZELOS acknowledged that Aidin, occupied by the Greeks and then evacuated, had been re-occupied on an order given by him, which order had had unfortunate results. He wished to give the reasons which had caused him to issue that order. The Greeks were in a state of war with the Turks. If the Turks could boast of having expelled the Greeks from Aidin, their situation at Smyrna would have become impossible; therefore he had given the order to re-occupy the town. Moreover, he had informed the Council of what he was doing. Already, prior to that time, he had instructed the Greek military authorities not to hesitate, in the event of attack by Turkish bands, to

go beyond the limits of the zone of occupation in order to break up centers of hostile resistance. In any event these incontestable facts remained: the Greek section of Aidin was entirely destroyed, twenty-five hundred out of eight thousand Greeks had perished, the Greek element formed the richest and most civilized part of the population; and it was the Greeks who had suffered most. He regretted that the procedure adopted by the Commission had not allowed the Turkish losses to be ascertained. Finally, he felt obliged to protest against the passage of the Commission's report which repeated an accusation of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the effect that the Greek Red Cross had introduced arms into Smyrna.

GENERAL BUNOUST observed that the Commission had not considered this accusation well founded.

M. VENIZELOS said that it was true that prior to the Greek occupation the Greek Sanitary Officer had insisted that the boxes of the Red Cross which were unloaded at the customs be not inspected, and that the Turkish Governor had consented thereto; but he could not allow the Greek Red Cross to remain under the shadow of suspicion. The Sheik-ul-Islam also pretended that the Greeks had taken advantage of their occupation to bring about an influx of Grecian population in those regions. That was entirely false: since the events of May, 1914, there had been in Greece 300,000 refugees from Asia Minor. He had ordered them to be repatriated, but it had been pointed out to him that the dwellings they had left were being inhabited by Turks whose lodging would have to be insured, and that the question was a delicate one. Under those circumstances the repatriation had been postponed. There had only been isolated cases of repatriation and he did not think that there were more than 5,000 or 6,000 who had returned. He felt sure that the excesses, which he deplored, had not gone beyond what should have been expected under analogous circumstances on the part of any army. The affair had certainly been exaggerated; moreover General Bunoust did not deny that severe punishment had been meted out to those found guilty. The Greek army had not deserved ill of its Allies and the Greeks had ensured the maintenance of order. If certain fugitive Turks had not returned to Smyrna that fact could be attributed to the pressure brought to bear on them by the Turks in the interior.

GENERAL BUNOUST remarked that it was quite possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what was the importance of the Turkish bands with whom the Greeks had to deal?

GENERAL BUNOUST said that the Commissioners had spent a day with these bands; and they did not seem to have great cohesion and they had no offensive capacity. The Nationalist movement, however, was a serious matter and it could arrest all military progress in Asia Minor unless an operation on a large scale should be decided upon.

M. VENIZELOS said that there was no question of that.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that that, however, was just what M. Venizelos had done. Greece had had a Mandate from the Conference and had not kept within the limits of that Mandate. Some members of the Council were wondering what would happen if the Turkish attacks should increase in severity. Could Greece, without the support of her Allies, make the necessary military and financial effort until such a time as the country should be completely pacified? That was the troublesome point.

M. VENIZELOS replied that certainly the longer the question was dragged out the more financial difficulties would increase for a small country such as Greece. She had an army of 12 divisions of 325,000 men; an army stronger than it was at the time of the Armistice. He felt assured that if the Conference should charge Greece with the task of defeating Turkey she would be able to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had put the question the other way.

M. VENIZELOS said that with 12 divisions he had nothing to fear. Mustapha Kemal only had 70,000 men. It was evident that if the present situation was unduly prolonged Greece would have financial difficulties, but he hoped that would not be the case.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked M. Venizelos in the name of the Council for his presentation of the case. (At this point M. Venizelos left the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the discussion be postponed until the following Monday. (This was agreed to.)

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 8, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-87**^{[8](#)}

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 7, 1919.

Translation^{[9](#)}

Report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry on the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjacent Territories

SUMMARY

History of the Commission

I. Statement of the Facts

Annex I. Letter to Colonel Mazarakis

Annex II. Observations of Colonel Mazarakis

II. Establishment of the Responsibilities

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COVERING LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

We have the honor to transmit to you the dossier, containing all the documents, relative to the investigations made in Asia Minor in conformity with your decision of July 22 [*18th?*], 1919.^{[10](#)}

Besides the Minutes of the meetings and their annexes, among which are the full texts of the testimony of the witnesses,^{[10a](#)} the dossier includes, in conformity with the instructions given in your telegram of July 26th,^{[11](#)} the following:

1. A statement of the facts which have occurred since the occupation.

This statement, which follows a chronological order as far as is possible, sets forth all the facts which have seemed to us to have had a repercussion upon the events and in particular upon those which are related in the complaint addressed to the Peace Conference by the Sheik-ul-Islam.^{[12](#)}

To this statement is attached the report drawn up by the Colonel designated by the Greek Government to follow the labors of the Commission.

This superior officer has received a copy of the statement of the facts established, but we have not felt called upon to communicate to him the sections on responsibilities and conclusions, believing that this mode of procedure was in conformity with the spirit of your instructions of July 22nd [18th?] and 26th mentioned above.

As we have informed you in our reply to your decision of September 30th, which was transmitted to you on October 3rd through the French High Commissioner in the Orient, we have not felt that we could communicate to the Greek representatives, without violating our promises, the testimony of the witnesses which were made to us under promise of secrecy.^{[13](#)}

2. A section relative to the establishment of the responsibilities.
3. The conclusions presented by the Commission.

These conclusions were unanimously adopted.

The Members of the Commission:

R. H. HARE
BUNOUST
A. DALL'OLIO
MARK BRISTOL

HISTORY OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE
GREEK OCCUPATION OF SMYRNA AND ADJACENT TERRITORIES

The Commission of Inquiry was created as a result of a complaint addressed by the Sheik-ul-Islam to the Peace Conference dated July 15th.

It was composed of the following members:

For America: Rear Admiral Bristol.

For France: Brigadier-General Bunoust.

For England: Brigadier-General Hare.

For Italy: Lieutenant-General Dall'Olio.

Lieutenant Luigi Villari was chosen Secretary General; the other officers attached to the Commission are the following:

For the United States of America: Lieutenant Dunn, Lieutenant Stewart (later replaced by Lieutenant Jones), Mr. Caessbrough (interpreter of Turkish).

For France: Lieutenant Rumerchène, Sub-Lieutenant Vitalis (interpreter of Greek) and Sub-Lieutenant Dugoureq.

For Great Britain: Commander Thomson (interpreter of Turkish), Captain Harris and Lieutenant Higham (during the stay of the Commission in Asia Minor).

For Italy: Lieutenant Villari and Lieutenant de Bosis.

The first meeting was held at the Italian Embassy at Constantinople on August 12th. At that time, it was unanimously decided that the Presidency would be held in turn by each member of the Commission, that if two meetings were held on the same day, they would be presided over by the same Commissioner, and that each meeting at Constantinople would be held at the Embassy of the country whose representative was President for the day.

Six meetings were held at Constantinople, the last on the 19th of August. The Commission then went to Smyrna, where it met for the first time on August 23rd, at the École Sultanieh, which had been placed at its disposal by the Turkish authorities. Twelve meetings were held at Smyrna; the last (the 18th) being on September 5th.

On September 6th, the Commission left for Aidin, where it remained until the 12th of the month. Three meetings were held at Aidin; on

September 10th, the Commission went to Girova, in the Italian zone, to hear the testimony of Turkish refugees from Aidin. On the 11th, the Commission went to Nazilli, in the zone occupied by the forces of the Turkish National Movement, where they questioned, among others, Greek refugees who had also fled from Aidin.

On the 12th, the Commission returned to Smyrna, where it held nine more meetings; four others were held respectively at Odemisch, at Menemen, at Magnesia and at Aivali. The last meeting at Smyrna (the 35th) was held on September 26th. Having completed the taking of testimony, with the exception of that to be given by some witnesses who were to be found at Constantinople, the Commission returned to that city, where it met for the Thirty-Sixth Session on October 1st. Eleven more meetings were held there, the last being on October 15th.

The total number of meetings held was forty-six.

The number of witnesses heard was 175, belonging to all nationalities and to every social order.

The dossier is made up in the following manner:

At each meeting the testimony of witnesses, the decisions of the Commission and in the most important cases, even the discussions have been recorded. A short résumé of the minutes, indicating the questions which were discussed or decided and the names of the witnesses questioned is annexed thereto, as well as the letters, reports and other documents bearing particularly upon the meeting in question.

The other documents are compiled in a special dossier.

The final report of the Commission consists of three parts.

- (a) The established facts, forming a chronological statement of the events which the Commission considered;
- (b) A statement of the responsibilities which in the opinion of the Commission may be deduced from the established facts, and

(c) The conclusions and recommendations which the Commission has felt useful to propose with a view towards remedying the abnormal conditions, as stated, in the territory's present situation.

The Secretary General
LIEUTENANT LUIGI VILLARI

STATEMENT OF FACTS WHICH HAVE ARISEN SINCE THE OCCUPATION AND WHICH HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED DURING THE INQUIRY BETWEEN AUGUST 12 AND OCTOBER 6, 1919

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 7, 1919.

1. Since the Armistice,^{[14](#)} the safety of the Christians in the Vilayet of Aidin has not been threatened.

The Greek population unquestionably was persecuted in 1914 and during the war and treated without any consideration during the first few months which followed the Armistice by the Vali Nouredin Pacha, but since the entering upon his duties of the present Vali, Izzet Bey, all the inhabitants, without distinction between races, have been treated with impartiality.

In spite of the presence of a few bands of brigands in the region, it is an assured fact that quiet has been restored.

Fears of massacres of Christians were not justified. Investigations prove that the proclamations calling the Moslems to a massacre of the Greeks, which a few weeks before the landing fell into the hands of the Greek authorities and which were sent to Athens, were not written by Turkish gendarmery officers whose signatures are attached to the proclamations. Those documents are certainly not authentic.

2. The conditions of security in the Vilayet of Aidin and at Smyrna, in particular, did not at all justify the occupation of the Smyrna forts by application of Article 7 of the Armistice conditions. (See the Minutes of the 37th meeting for the reservation made in this connection by General Dall'Olio, the Italian Commissioner.)^{[15](#)}

The internal situation in the Vilayet did not call for the landing of Allied troops at Smyrna.

On the contrary, since the Greek landing, the situation is troubled because of the state of war existing between the Greek troops and the Turkish irregulars.

3. The Smyrna forts were occupied on May 14th, 1919, by the Allied forces (British, French, Italian and Greek) upon the order of Admiral Calthorpe, of the British Navy, one of the Allied High Commissioners in Turkey for the execution of the terms of the Armistice. The order of occupation stated that it was being carried out in execution of Article 7 of the Armistice between Turkey and the Allied powers.

4. During the night of May 14th-15th, as a result of a proclamation, a meeting of several thousand Turks took place in the Turkish quarter near the Jewish Cemetery, but this meeting did not have as an object the organization of a resistance by force to the Greek landing. Its object was merely to prove that the majority and predominating population was Turkish rather than foreign.

5. The occupation of Smyrna by the Greek troops was ordered by the Peace Conference.¹⁶ The orders for the occupation were given by Admiral Calthorpe, representing this Conference.

The city of Smyrna was occupied on May 15th, 1919, by Greek forces, assisted by American, British, French, Greek and Italian naval forces.

The British, French, Italian and American naval forces landed small armed detachments to guard their respective consulates.

The Greek naval forces landed a detachment for the purpose of guarding the points of debarkation of the Greek troops. This unit was insufficient to preserve order and carry out its mission.

The Greek forces were composed of three regiments. The landing took place on the point and upon the quay opposite the Hotel Kramer. The troops began to land at 8:00 a.m.

6. No resistance to the landing was organized by the Turkish authorities; the shots fired by the Turks were only isolated cases.

7. Several hundred prisoners of all kinds escaped from the prisons in the neighborhood of the barracks a few hours before the occupation.

The Turkish authorities did not take effective measures to prevent or stop these escapes.

Some of these prisoners were able to procure arms from an arms-depot situated near the barracks.

8. The Greek Supreme Command took no previous measures to insure order during the march of the Greek troops through the city. Detachments of Greek marines were only placed in the immediate neighborhood of the two points chosen for the landing. In conformity with the orders of the Entente representative, the Turkish troops were kept in their barracks.

No liaison was established which would permit the Greek Command to have its orders transmitted to the Turkish authorities and in order to inform itself of the state of morale of the population.

9. The Greek military, civil and religious authorities did nothing to attempt to calm the crowd.

The ceremony performed by the Greek Metropolitan of blessing the troops upon their landing could only have had an unfortunate effect.

The crowd massed about the troops assumed an attitude of a kind to bring forth the anger of the Turkish inhabitants and to compel acts of violence on the part of isolated fanatics.

10. The orders concerning the landing were not strictly carried out. They were modified, without the consent of the Command, as a result of the intervention of the Commander of the *Averoff*, who had been advised of the formation of numerous Turkish gatherings in the direction of Carantina.

The Evzone companies which were to land at Carantina in order to occupy the hills which dominate the city on the south were brought to the Custom's quay where they were landed behind other units of the regiment. As for the itineraries followed, the commanders of the columns acted according to the directions in guides which were given them. They did not know that the Turkish troops were confined in their barracks near the Konak.

11. The first shots were fired near the corner of the Konak Square, at the entrance of the street which leads to Cocarialy.

It is impossible to establish with certainty by whom these first shots were fired. The Greek troops did not open fire and only replied to these first shots.

12. As a result of these first shots severe firing broke out. The Greek soldiers who were in the gardens of the Konak Square directed a violent fire against the windows of the barracks and the Konak.

It was impossible to ascertain exactly whether shots were fired from certain windows of the barracks after the beginning of the fusilade.

No traces of bullets were found upon the walls of the buildings opposite the barracks.

A few scattered shots appear also to have been fired by the Turks at certain points along the quays and in the city, in particular near the Greek Consulate, where according to Greek reports, the guard-detachment was obliged to protect itself by rifle shots against a Turkish attack.

13. On the road which they traversed between the Konak Square and the transport *Patris*, where they were imprisoned, the first convoys of prisoners, including officers and soldiers as well as the Vali and other officials, were made the object of acts of brutality by the crowd which accompanied them and even by some of the Greek soldiers who were escorting them.

All the prisoners were robbed. All of them were forced to shout: "Zito Venizelos" and to march with hands raised. Some of them were

massacred.

With one or two exceptions, the Greek officers did not show any restraining influence upon their men to prevent these acts of violence.

14. On May 15th and on the following days, the Greek troops arbitrarily arrested about 2500 persons, among whom was a certain number of children under 14 years of age. The staffs and the students of some schools were also imprisoned on the *Patris*. A considerable number of these prisoners were maltreated, robbed, and detained for several days under hygienic conditions which were objectionable.

15. During May 15th and 16th, numerous acts of violence and pillage were carried out in the city against the Turkish people and their homes. Fezzes were torn off and Turks no longer dared to go out wearing them. Numerous women were violated. Some assassinations were committed. Most of the acts of violence and pillage were done by the Greek population of the city, but it has been established that the soldiers took part in them and that the military authorities were very late in taking proper measures to place a stop to them.

16. The number of killed and wounded by the Greek troops on the day of the Smyrna occupation has been calculated in a different manner by the Turkish and Greek authorities. The number is approximately as follows:

Greeks: soldiers: 2 killed, 6 wounded; civilians: 20 killed, 20 drowned, 60 wounded.

Turks: 300 to 400 victims (killed or wounded).

17. As soon as the news of the landing of the Greek forces at Smyrna became known in the surrounding villages, the Greek inhabitants began to pillage Turkish homes and to steal Turkish live-stock; some Turks were likewise killed in the different villages.

18. The colonel commanding the Greek occupation forces received on May 21st the telegram sent from Paris on May 20th by M. Venizelos which regulated the occupation conditions for the San Jack of

Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali as well as for certain regions situated outside of the Sanjak of Smyrna.

19. Commodore Fitz-Maurice, the representative of the Entente after May 28th, received only on June 1st, instructions describing his powers vis-à-vis the Greek authorities in regard to the extension of the zone of occupation.

From the time of the departure of Admiral Calthorpe (May 21st) up to May 28th, the Entente representative was the French Vice-Admiral, Sagoy du Vauroux.

20. The High Commissioner of the Greek Government, who arrived at Smyrna on May 21st, acted contrary to the orders contained in the telegram of May 20th, by authorizing the colonel commanding the troops to give on May 23rd an order of operation which included:

- (a) The occupation of Aidin.
- (b) Intervention in the regions of Magnesia and Cassaba without having previously asked permission from the Entente representative.

The Greek High Commissioner has admitted before the Commission his responsibility concerning this affair.

21. In order to justify the extension of the Greek zone, the Greek High Commissioner supports himself with the following:

- (a) Unverified information received by the military authorities according to which public safety was threatened in the above mentioned districts.
- (b) The interpretation given by the military authorities to the interviews held with the British Colonel Smith who had no authority to replace the Entente representative.

Colonel Smith had no knowledge of the telegram sent on May 20th by Mr. Venizelos to Colonel Zafiriou. He never gave the latter any authorization, even verbal, to proceed to Aidin, Magnesia and Cassaba. He had only pointed out to Colonel Zafiriou the utility of sending some troops along the railway line as far as Trianda to

protect the line in the event that Colonel Zafiriou should have authorization to advance his troops.

Colonel Smith added that any occupation beyond Trianda might bring about disorders.

He informed his superior of this conversation.

22. The forward march and the installation of the Greek troops in the direction of Magnesia as well as at Eudemich, Aidin, and as far as Nazilli were first carried out under satisfactory circumstances in spite of the emotion in these districts caused by the news of the Smyrna events. The Greek Command committed an error in tolerating the acts of armed Greek civilians who under pretext of aiding the Greek troops indulged in pillage and committed all kinds of excesses.

A Court-Martial formed at Smyrna on May 16th by the Greek Command had pronounced (up to August 15th) seventy-four convictions, of which three were death sentences for the events of May 15th and 16th. Among those convicted were:

- 48 Greeks
- 13 Turks
- 12 Armenians
- 1 Jew

23. The state of excitement in the country caused by the Smyrna events increased progressively for the following reasons:

- (a) A great uncertainty reigned in regard to the territorial limits to be occupied by the Greek forces up to June 2nd, on which date, Commodore Fitz-Maurice of the British Navy was instructed to fix the limits of the occupation.
- (b) The rapid advance into the interior of the country by the Greek troops increased the state of unrest of the populations. Turkish notables began to leave the occupied region. The Turkish regular troops and the gendarmery deserted. The Greek civilians openly armed themselves. The activities of the brigands increased at the

same time as the number of acts of violence, robberies, and pillages.

- (c) The search for arms made in Turkish homes by Greek troops aided by armed civilians increased to a maximum the discontent of the population, because of the fact that it was a violation of a Moslem domicile which constitutes a particularly vexatious measure susceptible of provoking great irritation.

This state of excitement in the Vilayet of Aidin created the appearance of disorders which would seem to justify the extension of the limits of occupation by the Greek forces.

24. The arms which the Greek civilians carried were probably furnished them since the armistice by smugglers operating between the islands and the coast.

There is no way of proving the accusation made by the Turks against the Greek Red Cross on the subject of landing, at Smyrna, arms contained in cases bearing the marks of this institution.

It has been proved only that during the month of February, on several occasions, a great number of cases were discharged from the Greek ship *Adriaticos* and were not inspected by the customs. Turkish witnesses, who have been heard, swear that certain of these cases contained arms and ammunition.

The Greek authorities permitted inspection of these cases by the Turkish customs officials only during the first days of March.

25. Ayassoulouk was occupied on May 25th;

Deunendjid was occupied on May 25th;

Baladjik was occupied on May 25th;

Aidin was occupied on May 27th;

Eudemich was occupied on June 1st;

Nazilli was occupied on June 3rd.

26. Certain small attacks carried out against Greek outposts by Turkish bands or insurgents brought about reprisals by the Greeks, some of which may have been justified by the military situation. All these reprisals were carried out in brutal manner. Some assassinations were committed here and there.

27. The evacuation of Nazilli was executed during the night of June 19th-20th upon the initiative of the commander of the battalion of occupation. This evacuation was not carried out in conformity with the orders of the Entente representative given on June 14th, whereby the Turkish local authorities were to have been warned in advance of the departure of the Greek troops.

28. The Greek military authorities explain their move by stating that the battalion commander feared an attack and that, in order not to give the enemy an opportunity to be aware of his retreat, he did not inform the Turkish authorities of his departure. Orders relative to the evacuation of Nazilli were not given by the Greek Command until the 19th.

29. After this departure the Turkish authorities did not have time to create an organization to preserve order which would replace the gendarmery which had been disarmed and disorganized during the Greek occupation. They were therefore not able to prevent the pillaging and the massacring of certain Greek families by Turkish bands which entered Nazilli a few hours after its evacuation by the Greeks.

30. The inhabitants, numbering about thirty, arrested at Nazilli by the Greeks as suspects were taken with the retreating troops.

One of them was killed en route under the pretext that he was not able to walk.

Some of the others were able to escape, but the majority were killed at the village of Kiosk during a fight which took place while the troops were passing through this village and during which a Greek officer was killed.

31. After the evacuation of Nazilli by the Greek troops, attacks on the part of the Turks against Greek outposts and isolated soldiers increased.

In the entire region of Aidin the population, Turkish as well as Greek, was armed.

32. The Greek troops carried out armed reconnaissance parties in the vicinity of Aidin. In the course of these reconnaissances some villages were burned.

On June 27th, one of these reconnoitering parties was repulsed by bands which followed it up to the outskirts of Aidin. The fighting continued the 28th. Beginning on the 28th, the attackers used 105 cm. cannons.

The Greeks fell back.

The commander and Greek witnesses state that shots were fired by the Turkish inhabitants against units of retreating Greek troops at the time when they were passing through the Turkish quarter south of the railway line. Some of the fires which broke out in the Turkish quarter on the morning of the 29th began during the fighting.

Other fires also broke out in this quarter at different isolated spots.

A large number of Turks, men, women and children, who tried to escape from this quarter which was in flames were killed without cause by the Greek soldiers who were guarding all the roads and streets leading from this quarter towards the northern part of the city.

The Command and the Greek troops undoubtedly lost their tempers.

The Greeks evacuated the city during the night of June 29th–30th after having committed numerous outrages and crimes. A large number of Greek civilians who wished to flee and to accompany the troops on their retreat were prevented from doing so by the Command.

33. The fire in the Greek quarter was caused by the Turkish bands under chief Yuruk Ali which entered the town on the morning of June 30th and burned it entirely after having pillaged the houses, the occupants of which were killed.

A large number of the Greek inhabitants met in the streets were, without distinction for sex or age, killed unmercifully by the bands.

The inhabitants, numbering from 2,000 to 3,000, who escaped death but not robbery, were those who took refuge, before the arrival of the bands, in the convent of the French nuns, whence they were taken to the Konak under the protection of Colonel Cheffik Bey, Commanding the Turkish 57th Division.

At the same time, some notables who were able to get to the Konak were able to save their lives, but on the other hand some of them were executed.

It was not possible to establish with certainty the number of Greek or Turkish victims.

The representative of the Greek Government heard by the Commission on September 7th estimates that the number of Greek victims was about 2,000; 900 bodies up to this time had already been found. An English witness estimates this number to be about 400.

A French officer who made an investigation on the spot a few days after the events calculates the number of victims to be as follows:

1,500 to 2,000 Greeks;
1,200 to 1,500 Turks;

recognizing, however, that it has been very difficult to make the estimate of Turkish victims.

34. The Greek troops, aided by re-enforcements sent by General Nider, retook Aidin on July 4th. They burned the Turkish quarter, situated on the west side of the city, where were also located some Greek factories.

35. All together the fires between June 29th and July 4th have certainly destroyed two-thirds of the city of Aidin, the population of which was about 20,000 including approximately 8,000 Greeks.

The houses that were not burned were all pillaged.

36. Before the return of the Greeks to Aidin, the greatest part of the Turkish population left the city and surroundings in order to take refuge in the Italian Zone or in the Nazilli-Denizli region, where they still remain.

A thousand Greeks were taken into the Turkish zone, where, at the time of the visit of the Commission to Nazilli on September 11th, they were in a very miserable state.

37. The re-occupation of Aidin was ordered by the Greek Command in spite of the strict orders to the contrary by the Entente representative.

The Greek authorities acted in conformity with the formal order sent from Paris by M. Venizelos on July 2nd. This order did not permit any intervention in this matter by the Entente representative.

38. Most of the villages situated along the railway line between Baladjik and Aidin were destroyed by the fires started during the course of the military operations which were carried out in this region.

39. Calm has now been practically re-established, with the exception of the zone close to the front where skirmishes between the advanced posts are still taking place which are causing losses and which require military measures from which the inhabitants are suffering.

It is the same in the region of Eudemich where the Greek occupation was made under good conditions.

40. The occupation of the Vilayet of Aidin by the Greek forces has caused great material losses insofar as the crops and property are concerned.

The losses in crops, which are impossible to estimate, are due to pillaging and thefts and to the destruction of the live-stock, a part of which was taken for provisions by the Greek troops.

Destruction to property, of less importance, was the result of military operations and the combats which occurred between the Greek forces and the Turkish bands.

Other losses which were very considerable were due to the burning of houses, of villages and of the city of Aidin. It may be estimated that the losses resulting from the fire at Aidin represent an approximate value of 8,000,000 pounds sterling.

When the Turkish inhabitants abandoned their homes and fled from the districts occupied by the Greeks, they left their crops standing or abandoned them. The losses in beans, licorice root, and in figs may be estimated at 1,200,000 pounds.

The olive crop will suffer likewise, if conditions do not become better before the month of November.

41. Pergamos was occupied on June 12th. Since this city is in the northern part of the Smyrna Sanjack, the Greeks had the right to occupy it, in accordance with the orders of the Entente given in the telegram of May 20th.^{[17](#)}

The Commission did not go to Pergamos.

From the information secured, which is worthy of consideration, it appears that the Turkish irregulars who retook Pergamos, killed the Turkish inhabitants who had welcomed the Greeks. They also massacred and frequently tortured all the Greek soldiers made prisoners during the course of this affair at Pergamos.

42. On June 17th, after the evacuation of Pergamos, the Greek troops who regathered at Menemen, without any real reason, indulged in a veritable massacre of unoffending Turks. The municipal authorities state that more than 1,000 Turkish inhabitants were killed, but this number seems to be exaggerated. According to an investigation made

on the day following the event by a French officer, the number of Turkish victims was 200 dead and 200 wounded.

This massacre was not organized by the Greek Command. It was the result of a panic which ensued among the young troops, unseasoned and tired, who were still affected by the Pergamos events and whom their officers were not able to calm.

43. The Greek Military Command states that the Greek behavior was the result of an attack by Turks who, from a house near the station and from the Konak, fired shots at the Greek soldiers.

Numerous witnesses were heard on this subject. The Greeks were indefinite and on some occasions contradictory.

The Commission feels that the statements of the Greek Command cannot be considered correct.

44. The occupation of Magnesia, outside of the limits of the San-jack of Smyrna, took place on May 25th, without the authorization of the Entente representative, and without this high authority having been informed.

For military reasons, this occupation was extended and maintained as far as Ahmedli on the east and as far as Papazli to the northeast of Magnesia. The Greek troops even temporarily occupied AkHissar, but did not remain there.

The occupation of the Magnesia zone was carried out in the beginning without any difficulties. The relations between the population and the Greek troops became less cordial following the bad treatment to which some of the inhabitants were subjected in the way of looting and thefts committed on certain properties and because of searches made for the purpose of finding weapons.

The Turkish civil authorities have remained at Magnesia with the exception of the Mufti, who, called to Smyrna by the Greek authorities, fled to Constantinople.

The present situation is peaceful. Correct relations exist between the General commanding the division of occupation and the Turkish authorities.

45. After the Armistice, Greek bands from Mytilene made several raids in the vicinity of Aivali, stealing from and killing some Moslems. Reprisals were carried out by certain Turks of this district. These reciprocal acts of brigandage have not prevented the situation from being normal and satisfactory.

Beginning with the first day of the occupation of Aivali, the military authorities enrolled and armed Greek demobilized soldiers and civilians. They conducted themselves in a very bad manner and especially were accused of having burned two villages. A short time afterwards they were disarmed and dismissed.

The Turkish population is very much in the minority at Aivali where at the present time, there are not more than 20 Moslems.

The district is quiet but commerce has almost entirely ceased.

46. The Turkish refugees who left the territories occupied by the Greeks appear to be detained far away from their domicile, either by a lack of confidence in the Greeks or by the Turkish irregulars who are holding them back, perhaps for political purposes.

The number of these refugees is very large. The Commission was not able to estimate it exactly.

In certain regions, such as in the Valley of the Meander, entire villages, even among those which have not been burned, have had to be abandoned.

47. With reference to the bringing of Greeks into the province of Smyrna described in the complaint of the Sheik-ul-Islam, Moustapha Sabir, to the Peace Conference, the investigation has shown that:

(a) According to the telegram sent on May 7/20 by M. Venizelos the occupation had partly the object of making possible the

repatriation of the refugees present in Greece to the Smyrna Sanjack and the Kaza of Aivali.

(b) In certain districts and in particular at Pergamos and Phocée, the Greek refugees installed themselves and this was facilitated by an exodus on the part of the Turkish population.

(c) Because of the trouble that accompanied the occupation, the Greek authorities gave the order to stop mass repatriation. A few families in good circumstances and whose means of existence were known were the only ones authorized to return.

Other refugees were without doubt able to return by landing outside of the ports where the Greek customs exercised their control, but their number could not be large.

The accusation brought by the Sheik-Ul-Islam is not therefore entirely justified.

The Members of the Commission of Inquiry:

ADMIRAL BRISTOL

Delegate of the United States of America

GENERAL HARE

Delegate of Great Britain

GENERAL BUNOUST

Delegate of France

GENERAL DALL 'OLIO

Delegate of Italy

ANNEXES TO THE STATEMENT OF FACTS

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 14, 1919.

ANNEX I. LETTER FROM THE COMMISSION TO COLONEL MAZARAKIS,
APPOINTED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW THE WORK OF THE
COMMISSION

We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your report of
October 11, 1919, which we requested in our letter of October 7, in
order that the Peace Conference, after having taken cognizance of the

statement of the facts established by the Commission, may at the same time take note of the observations which the reading of this document may have suggested to you.

Your report will be attached to the dossier on the investigation in the same place as the statement which brought it about.

The various papers which you have transmitted to the Commission during the investigation and to which you allude in your report will also be attached to the dossier.

The Commission has taken note of the observations which you have presented under No. 14 in regard to the occupation of Aivali and has modified the text of No. 45 of its statement. We are transmitting to you a corrected copy attached herewith.

As you were informed during the meeting of October 13th, there is no cause for you to be surprised when you learn that, upon certain points, the opinion of the Commission is not in accordance with yours in spite of the statements of witnesses which you have produced.

In fact, not only does the appreciation of the same fact differ according to the individuals, but also, in view of the contradictions, all too numerous, which have unfortunately been presented in the Greek and Turkish testimony, the Commission has sometimes felt obliged, in order to try to bring out the truth, to attach particular importance to the testimony or to the reports emanating from persons not belonging to nations too directly interested in the settlement of the Smyrna question.

In conclusion, after having deliberated, the Commission has felt that, with the exception of the change made in the drafting of No. 45, there is no occasion for modification of its original statement which was unanimously adopted.

R. H. HARE
BUNOUST
A. DALL'OLIO

MARK BRISTOL

ANNEX II.—OBSERVATIONS^{*} OF COLONEL ALEXANDRE MAZARAKIS ON THE
STATEMENT OF THE INTERALLIED COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

1. In paragraph No. 1, it is stated that since the Armistice, the security of Christians has not been threatened in the Vilayet of Aidin. Nevertheless, the Commission admits that not only since 1914 and during the war had the Greek population been incontestably persecuted, but also during the first months which followed the Armistice they were not treated with any consideration. The Commission also admits the presence of certain bands of brigands, but states that fears of massacres were not justified.

The Commission will allow me to be influenced by the fact that the study of history and the recent experiences in regard to the welfare of the Christian populations in Turkey does not justify this statement. All the massacres and all the persecutions which have many times provoked European intervention have not been foreseen, and consequently, this intervention always arrived too late, after the acts were committed. Let me call to the attention of the Commission that a list of murders, acts of brigandage, and persecutions of all kinds committed by the Turks between the Armistice and the occupation of Smyrna has been transmitted to it; that a large part of the Greek population during this period found itself and even now finds itself exiled in Greece, having abandoned all of its lands occupied by the Turks, whereas the rest returned from the interior of Asia Minor, where they had been transported, reduced in number to a half or a third, in a terrible state of misery and ill-health, deprived of all means of reestablishing themselves and living. Under these circumstances, I regret that I cannot agree with the Commission that peace had been restored and that the fears for a new outbreak of Moslem fanaticism had no foundations, particularly on the eve of the decisions of the Peace Conference which naturally could and would increase this fanaticism.

2. The Commission feels (No. 2) that the occupation of the forts and the city of Smyrna was not justified by the application of the Armistice. It is not for me to set forth the reasons why the Peace

Conference ordered this occupation and specified that it should be carried out by Greek troops. Nevertheless, I take the liberty of observing that the execution of the Armistice was illusory; that the arms theoretically kept in the store-houses were, as facts have proved, at the disposal of the Turks; that the irregulars, tolerated if not encouraged by the Turkish authorities, were armed even with heavy artillery; that, without this occupation, the return, the installation in their seized homes, and the work of the Greek refugees would not have been possible; that finally, without entering into the plans of the Peace Conference concerning the fate of this region, which however should have played a role in the choice of the Army of Occupation, this choice was sufficiently justified by the fact that compact Greek populations have inhabited this region for centuries. As a matter of fact, alone in the San jack of Smyrna and the Caza of Aivali, before 1914, there were 495,174 Greeks and 219,583 Turks. If this population was reduced during the war by persecutions, famine and murders, there was all the more reason why the victorious Entente took measures for its full protection. I therefore believe that this occupation was not only justified but dictated by justice, public morality and ethnological reasons more than all other occupations carried out by the victorious Allies.

3. The Commission states that since the landing of the Greeks the situation has been disturbed on account of the state of war. I should like to request that the Commission kindly recognize, as it has done in many of the following paragraphs, that in the zone occupied by the Greek Army peace and order has been re-established since the first days, whereas the situation is disturbed and even anarchy reigns in the neighboring non-occupied regions, and that the situation would be completely peaceful if this indecision ceased. The Greek authorities would be able to carry out their duties, and the attacks from outside and the hope of influencing the decisions of the Conference would not encourage the Turks to exhibit any outburst of national feeling, if, on the contrary, the Turks knew that the Army of Occupation sent by the Conference would respect their rights, but would not tolerate in a passive manner attacks against its security or its dignity. The history of all occupations of the past and of present times, much more eventful and longer, is here to prove that no army ever before found itself in a like situation and exhibited greater

coolness, self-denial and discipline, and consequently it would be unfair to hold this Army responsible for certain isolated deeds, such as one may find even in time of peace and in the most civilized countries.

4. The Commission states (No. 4) that an assembling of several thousand Turks took place on the night before the occupation, but believes that this assembly did not have for its object the organizing of a resistance by force to the landing of the Greeks. It states also (No. 7) that several hundred prisoners of all sorts escaped from the prisons some hours before the occupation, that the Turkish authorities did not take effective measures to anticipate and prevent the escape, that some of these prisoners obtained arms from the nearby arms-depot, and finally, that the shots fired by the Turks (No. 6) were isolated acts.

The Commission will permit me to say that I am unable to assert with the same certainty that the object of the Turks in assembling was so peaceful after the provoking proclamations in the mosques, in the press and in public places, after the liberation and arming of prisoners and taking into consideration that it really matters little, from the point of view of responsibilities, if the shots fired against the Greek army were the result of an organization or the initiative of some individuals. The Greek Army at a time when it was attacked unexpectedly while marching in columns of fours with arms unloaded could not make this distinction; it was obliged, as any other army would be, to take severe steps to check the movement and to arrest the guilty and the suspected.

I must further observe with regret that while the assembling of Turks is judged with leniency, the religious ceremony and the expression of a natural feeling on the part of the Greek population are considered (No. 9) of a nature to provoke the anger of the Turkish inhabitants and to inspire acts of violence. If one wishes in the same manner to discover the underlying reason for the outburst of Turkish fanaticism it is much more natural to seek it in the presence of a victorious foe of despised Christians; yet it is difficult to avoid this agitation without leaving under the rule of a conquered enemy the Christian populations which have suffered so much for five centuries and

whose feelings are at least as worthy of consideration as those of their oppressors.

Wherever after victory Allied troops occupied a country up to that time under the yoke of the enemy, the kindred peoples welcomed them with real joy. If by foresight the Greek command ought to have acted with greater circumspection, I would have been the first to say so openly in my report. There is no reason for attributing the Turkish attack to the expression of sentiments by the Greek population when it is incontestable that right up to the moment when the first shots were fired by the Turks not one hostile act against them had been made.

I must also observe (No. 9) that there were no Greek civil authorities and that the military authorities naturally absorbed for several hours with the military aspect—the crushing of the resistance—were not able immediately to insure order in a large city containing such a variety of elements and which the Turkish gendarmery had left without any means for maintaining order.

I recall also that it was not a matter of some scattered shots fired by the Turks, but of a fusillade kept up not only in the neighborhood of the Konak and the barracks but all along the road which the first contingents of troops had to pass over in order to reach their objective, the crest at Carantina.

5. The Commission states (No. 14) that on the 15th day of May and succeeding days the Greek troops arbitrarily arrested about 2500 people. In a country where the Army of Occupation is attacked, where everyone is armed, I do not see how order could have been reestablished unless the military authorities had proceeded to arrest the guilty or those suspected. The procedure of arrest of ordinary times could not have been followed under circumstances when in reality there existed a state of war. Immediately after the re-establishment of order a Commission of which the Mufti was a member visited the prisoners and liberated the greater number.

If, during the first day, some acts of pillage or ill-treatment took place with regard to these prisoners and, in general, throughout the

town, the military authorities were the first to suppress them. This was done with so much severity that order was almost completely reestablished by the following day.

The Commission, moreover, will allow me to believe that a number of these crimes, notably cases of rape, took place only in the imagination of those who have made the charges. While I was at Smyrna several complaints of this sort were acknowledged, after a careful inquiry, as originating from women of doubtful morals. Besides, I cannot understand why these acts of which the Turks complain so readily are not reported immediately to the Greek authorities, who have acted with extreme severity in the rare cases where the guilt was proved, and I regret that I cannot place any confidence in the words of the witnesses who knew that they would not be contradicted, since their accusations were made in secret.

6. As for the number of Turkish victims at Smyrna, (No. 16) at Aidin, or elsewhere, free scope was given for the most fantastic estimates, especially in view of the fact that a large number of the Turkish inhabitants, having fled from the occupied zones, might easily be recorded among the disappeared as victims of the Greeks.

7. As for the excitement caused in the Vilayet of Aidin (No. 23), permit me to believe that it would be quickly allayed if the Turkish population were held accountable by a firm decision of the Conference fixing definitely the future of the country. The proof of this is that for almost a month the occupation of the whole region actually taken possession of, Magnesia, Eudemich, Aidin and even Nazilli, has been accomplished, as the Commission knows, under satisfactory conditions. I add also that nearly 150 zéibek who were outlaws in the mountains delivered themselves up to the Greek military authorities, promised to live quietly, and have been set free. Also, in almost all of the occupied towns the Mussulman population has given a warm welcome to the Greek troops. Therefore I agree entirely with the Commission that the uncertainty which exists on the subject of the limits of the territory to be occupied by Greek forces has helped to create and to increase the excitement, adding that this uncertainty has existed for five months, and I am also convinced that all the agitation on the part of the Turks would be

removed as if by a miracle on the day when they were to see themselves confronted with a definite decision from the Conference, when they could hope no longer for this agitation to influence this decision, and when they would know that the Greek army would have a free hand to defend the region which has been given her. I believe that the false situation in which the Greek army has been placed and still finds itself placed is the principal reason, if not the only reason, for the unrest of the Turks. Furthermore, in spite of all the complaints which they were able to present, we have sufficient proof that the Turkish inhabitants, who left their homes at the beginning, ask only to return, convinced that they could live quietly, but they are prevented from doing so by the bands. Several of these Turks, eluding the vigilance of the bands, have returned, notably in the regions of Pergamos and Magnesia.

The Commission in part attributes (No. 23) the unrest in the country to the searches made for the purpose of finding arms. These searches were the most legitimate and logical means which an Army of Occupation could take in a country where the Turkish population was armed and nearly all the magazines pillaged. Yet, except in isolated cases where the military authorities had found themselves obliged to enter houses from which shots were fired or where they were convinced that arms were hidden, the military command and the High Commissioner strongly insisted that these searches not be made, with the consequence that the entire Turkish population, particularly at Aidin, was armed, and Colonel Skinas, who was accused before a court-martial of not having taken measures to guard against the sad events which occurred in that town, defended himself by citing the formal orders which he had not to search Turkish houses. The Turks well knew of this defense and that is why all the proclamations of the military authorities calling upon the inhabitants to give up their arms were without any effect, and even today, we are certain that all the Turkish population is armed.

And so, I respectfully ask the Commission when it states that Greek civilians, who have lived for five years in terror, were carrying arms, to be kind enough at least to acknowledge that the Turkish populations were as well armed and to add that almost all the magazines were plundered in spite of the terms of the Armistice.

8. The Commission will be kind enough to recognize that the charges made by the Turks against the Greek Red Cross on the subject of arms contained in its boxes cannot be supported. It is stated, however, that these boxes were unloaded in the month of February and that several Turkish witnesses swore that they contained arms. Nothing is easier than to make charges without any proof. The Greek Red Cross was under no obligation to present its boxes of goods to the inspection of the Turkish authorities; if this was done voluntarily, it was to place an end to the slanderous charges of the Turkish press. I have already explained to the Commission that these boxes contained clothing for the refugees and that the boxes were shown in the hospital by the Director to Turkish functionaries and also to the Attorney-General. I note, incidentally, that these functionaries as well as the Turkish population poured into the hospital to be cared for and to receive medicines and that the Vali himself went there on Easter Day. The fine services which were rendered by this institution to all classes of the population, without distinction of race or religion, proved by statistics which have been given to you not only at Smyrna, but in all the surrounding countries, have been repaid by the Turks in the form of this slander as well as by the murder of Dr. Manolas, Director of the Bed Cross at Makri. Under these circumstances I beg the Commission to consider whether it is just to retain, even incidentally, an accusation which has not been proved.

9. The Commission states (No. 29) that at Nazilli, after the retreat of the Greek Battalion, the Turks massacred Greek families and pillaged their houses, and attributes these acts to the disorganization and to the lack of time on the part of the Turkish authorities. I may be permitted to believe, after the experience of Pergamos, where the Kaimakam and the Turkish officers directed the massacres, of Aidin, where the Division Commander was in the town while wholesale massacres were carried out, that in reality there is not any distinction between the Turkish authorities and the irregulars. Indeed, it is curious that the Turkish accounts published in the press state that the brigands were master of the situation at Nazilli.

I beg the Commission to be kind enough to state also that these massacres took place not only in the town of Nazilli, but also in the surrounding villages. At Aktché 47 Greeks were killed and the priest

burned alive. At Kiosk 47 were killed, one of whom was a doctor and another the priest, who had their noses and ears cut off and eyes gouged out beforehand. At Sultan Hissar, 3 were killed and 7 wounded. At Omourlou more than 90 Greeks were killed, and since the reoccupation 70 bodies have been found.

10. In recounting the events at Aidin, the Commission states (No. 32, page 6) that a large number of Turks, men, women, and children who tried to go out of the burning quarter, were wantonly slain by the Greek soldiers who evacuated the city during the night of the 29th and 30th, after having committed many assaults and crimes.

I can only express my surprise at such a statement. I have followed the numerous inquiries which were made regarding these events, and where Mussulmen, Armenians, etc., have testified, I have myself with persistence tried to find out by interrogating all the soldiers and civilians present, if such acts had really been committed. The conclusion which I have drawn from all this inquiry is that the Turks, whether irregulars or inhabitants of the town, fired upon the army, that the army replied, and that naturally there were victims on both sides during this combat which lasted almost two days. And so I feel justified in not giving credence to the statements of witnesses who have described these events according to this point of view. I wonder also how it would be possible to estimate the number of Turkish victims, since almost the entire Turkish population, conscious of its guilt, followed the irregulars before the reoccupation of the city.

I am also unable to admit that the Greek survivors were at the Konak under the protection of Colonel Cheffik Bey, Commander of the 57th Ottoman Division. I believe on the contrary that this officer, who entered Aidin with the bands, is also responsible for the cruelties committed and all the more so since it is proved that several of the Greek notables were led from the Konak and executed without the protection of this superior officer being in evidence.

If one wants to find the underlying cause for the misfortune of Aidin, it may be found in the strictness in spirit with which the Command executed the orders which he had not to pass to the south of the city, which he interpreted as forbidding even the most elementary

measures of security for his troops and forbidding him to proceed to disarming, all of which permitted the Turkish inhabitants to attack the troops in concert with the irregulars. Granted that their execution was unfortunate, these orders, showing the loyalty of the Greek commander and the profit which the enemy derived from them, are worthy of attracting the attention of the Commission.

11. The Commission states (No. 40) that the occupation of the Vilayet of Aidin by the Greek forces has caused great material losses. I may be permitted to consider that these losses, of which indeed the Greeks, particularly at Aidin, have suffered the greatest part, are not due to the Greek occupation which for almost one month caused practically no material loss, but to the irregular Turks who were the aggressors at Pergamos, Nazilli, and Aidin.

12. The Commission considers (Nos. 42 and 43) as inexact the statement of Greek witnesses concerning the shots fired by the Turks at Menemen against the Greek soldiers and which provoked the trouble in that town. Yet, the inquiry which was made the following day on these events by the military judge, M. Papageorges, and the former Mussulman prefect of Drama, M. Naib Zade Bey, as well as that made by Captain Apostolakis and the statements of more than twenty witnesses which I have personally examined are unanimous in agreement on this subject, and particularly regarding the murder of a Greek corporal and the shots fired from the house of Hassan Azap and from the Konak, as well as the number of victims, which is estimated at 40.

I am not in a position to know the reasons for which the Commission has arrived at this conclusion and which have outweighed the importance and veracity of the testimony heard, and consequently, I can only call attention to this disparity which perhaps would never have existed if the procedure had been that which was originally proposed by the Greek Government.

13. The Commission states (No. 44) that the occupation of the region of Magnesia was made without difficulty and that later the relations between the Turkish population and the Greek troops grew worse in consequence of ill-treatment, searching of houses, etc.

I am sorry, but I must protest against the charge always made exclusively against the Army of Occupation as a consequence of complaints on the part of the Turks. From the very beginning, I have submitted to the Commission a long list which contained the names of 115 Greek victims of Turkish bands in the region of Magnesia; in the same report were described the wholesale massacres of Greeks at Yorktchékioi, Papazli, Yakakioi, etc.

I therefore would request the Commission, once it has determined it suitable to state the grievances of the Turks, to be kind enough to record also in its report the massacres of Greeks in this region, whose lives are surely of a value equal to any damages mentioned, and without the recording of which the reading of the summary would give an impression that does not correspond to the actual facts.

I do not know whether the Commission learned, during its visit to Magnesia, that many Turkish inhabitants, having escaped from the surveillance of the bands, are returning to their homes. This is a fact which proves more than any statement or complaint, prepared with a political motive, how great is the confidence of the Mussulman population in the justice and order which now exists in the occupied zone in contrast to the lawlessness and repression exercised by the bands in the unoccupied zone.

14. The Commission expressed an opinion with regard to the sentiments of half the Greek population of Aivali (No. 45, page 4) which has caused me great surprise. I do not understand how the Commission can pretend that it learned the sentiments of the Greek population in Aivali, since in the few hours it remained there, it did not have time to hear, with the exception of the military and religious authorities, a single one of the many residents who were waiting to be heard, a list of whom I had submitted. Even in the event that any one person had been able to furnish this opinion, I believe that it should not be given a place in the form of a categorical statement by the Commission itself, without its having been confirmed by a much more general and more profound investigation among the people.

If the Commission thought for a single moment of the years of suffering which the Greeks in Asia Minor had undergone, of the war

of extermination which they have endured during the last five years and which, far from crushing their spirit, has on the contrary only intensified their national feeling, it would certainly be careful not to give out this opinion which is of a nature to wound deeply the national sentiment of the Greek people and against which I protest in a most strong and categorical manner.

[15.] The Turkish refugees who have left the territories occupied by the Greeks (No. 46) are kept away from their homes by the irregulars or rather by that Turkish organization which—it is a secret to no one—is cooperating with the Turkish Government. The political aim of this is clear. It is to influence the Conference during this period of waiting and indecision with regard to the political fate of this part of the Ottoman Empire.

The fact that many Turks have returned to their homes, particularly in the region about Pergamos and Magnesia, is proof of the confidence which the Greek administration has inspired in them despite the many difficulties against which it has had to struggle, for example, the presence of Turkish authorities who receive their instructions from the Ottoman Government, the inability to act freely in the different branches of the administration caused by the hybrid condition of the country, the continual worry about the security of the area threatened by the bands from without, etc. I am firmly convinced as a result of a close examination of recent history in the Near East and as a result of a minute study of the character of the Turkish people that we are in a position to know better than any other, having lived side by side for centuries, that if the people saw that so and so was the decision of the Conference, they would remain in or return to their happy homes, with the exception of a few professional agitators or exploiters, and be able to live after all in peace and to escape from an administration as criminal, as oppressive, as backward, and as indifferent for Turks as for Christians.

16. Regarding the sending of Greeks into the province of Smyrna as charged in the complaint of Sheik-ul-Islam (No. 47), I state that I have not had any acquaintance with this document in order to know exactly upon what facts the complaint is based. I judge nevertheless

that the question is not that of “the transportation of Greeks” but rather of the repatriation of Greeks who formerly lived in Asia Minor and who were driven out by the Turks after 1914.

This repatriation, so logical and so just, would naturally preoccupy the Greek Government, which for years has been paying out considerable sums for their support.

I have given to the Commission the correspondence exchanged on this subject between the Greek Commissioner at Smyrna, since his installation, and the royal authorities, as a result of which, severe orders have been given and carried out to prevent this repatriation.

Personally, I think that this measure, inspired by a sincere desire to avoid the creation of difficulties as long as the property of the expelled Greeks had been seized and occupied by the Turks, and by the desire not to create further estrangement between the two elements, was too severe. From the point of view of absolute justice, I wonder which has the most right, the landowner driven out and desiring to re-establish his home, or he who has arbitrarily taken possession of it, and what would be the judgment of a court in such a case. From a political point of view this measure has not been appreciated, for not only do the Turks also base their complaints on this matter, but even take advantage of it to pretend and to try to persuade the entire world that they have a numerical superiority in this region, and they are perhaps believed by those who, crossing the country, see Greek villages, the residents of which are still in exile or have perished in the interior of Asia Minor, inhabited by the Turks.

17. I beg the Commission alongside the established facts contained in its statement, to state also the numerous murders committed by the Turks against the Greek population not only in those places where it has held its inquiry, but also in those regions where the Greek Army has never set foot, and where, consequently, the responsibilities cannot be confused; for example, 47 at Philadelphia and surrounding districts; 110 to 115 to the South of the Meander, 14 at Makri, etc., which are included with the names and dates in the documents which I had the honor to submit to the Commission on the first day.

In conclusion:

- (1) The military occupation was made to reestablish order, to save the remnants of the Christian population, which has been persecuted, exiled, and massacred for five years, and to prevent a new outburst of Turkish fanaticism.
- (2) That all events which have had regrettable consequences took place following an attack by the Turks upon the Greek Army.
- (3) That the Greek authorities have not only acted promptly everywhere in trying to restore order, but even, I dare say, have shown and are showing kindness toward the Mussulman population.
- (4) That even the lack of foresight on the part of the Greek command at Smyrna may be explained up to a certain point if one considers that neither the Greek representative nor those of the Entente at Smyrna expected an attack by the Turks and that they took no effective measures to remove the Turkish troops and to prevent assemblies and the free movement of the people.
- (5) Perfect order exists in the zone occupied by the Greek Army, while outside of this zone there is complete anarchy.

COLONEL ALEXANDER MAZARAKIS
Delegate of the Greek Government

CONSTANTINOPLE , October 11, 1919.

II.—ESTABLISHMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 11, 1919.

1. The investigation has proved that since the Armistice, the general situation of Christians in the Vilayet of Aidin has been satisfactory. Their safety has not been threatened.

If the order to occupy Smyrna was given by the Peace Conference as a result of inexact information, the initial responsibility for the events falls upon the individuals or upon the governments who, without verifying it, established or transmitted information of this kind such as that referred to in No. 1 of the points established. (The

general representing Italy renews with regard to this subject the reservation inserted in the minutes of the 37th Meeting.¹⁸)

2. The initial cause of the events may be charged to religious hatred. The Greeks did nothing to prevent the demonstrations. Their occupation, far from presenting itself as the carrying out of a civilizing mission, at once took the form of a conquest and crusade.

3. The responsibility for the deeds which took place at Smyrna on May 15th and 16th, as well as in the immediate surroundings of the city during the first few days which followed the landing, falls upon the Greek Military High Command as well as upon certain officers who failed in their duty.

The Greek Government has recognized this responsibility by the sanctions which it has imposed.

Part of the responsibility, however, falls upon the Turkish authorities in Smyrna who before the arrival of the Greeks did not take any steps to prevent the escape and arming of common-law prisoners.

4. In the person of the High Civil Authority, which represents it at Smyrna, the Greek Government is responsible for the grave disorders which stained with blood the interior zone of the country during the advance of the Greek troops because:

(a) The above mentioned authority did not act in conformity with the instructions of the Supreme Council set forth in the telegram of M. Venizelos, dated May 7/20. Without having requested any authorization from the Entente representative, it permitted the military command to give the order, May 10/23, to send troops to Aidin, Magnesia and Cassaba, outside of the limits of the San jack of Smyrna.

(b) The same authority voluntarily kept the population in a state of ignorance as to the extent of the occupation. It thus contributed to increasing the state of excessive excitement of the Moslem inhabitants and consequently the disorders.

5. The Greek superior authorities are responsible because of the fact that they permitted the circulation in the country of armed civilians.

In some of their military or police operations, they even tolerated the employment of these armed civilians at the same time as that of regular troops.

6. The initial cause of the disorders which were brought about in the Meander Valley also originated in this occupation, carried out without any justification.

The regrettable deeds which accompanied the march and the installation of the Greek troops are the consequence of the state of war in which the country found itself when these troops advanced.

The hatred which has existed for centuries between the Turks and the Greeks has incontestably increased the frequency of barbarous acts.

In all justice, the Greeks should not alone be held responsible.

The same considerations should be applied to the events which took place in the district of Pergamos and those about Magnesia and Eudemisch.

7. On the other hand, the Greeks are alone responsible for the massacre at Menemen. This massacre was not prearranged. But the Greek Commander knew the state of excessive excitement of his troops as a result of the Pergamos incident and should have taken steps to keep under control the troops who, due to weakened morale, fatigue, and fear, committed, without any provocation, a veritable massacre of defenseless Turkish civilians.

The Greek officers present at Menemen completely failed in their duty.

8. Even though the present situation is better, order has not yet been re-established in the Vilayet of Aidin.

Practically all commercial transactions with the interior of Anatolia have ceased.

This situation is incontestably the result of the occupation and the state of war existing between the Turkish irregulars and the Greek troops, even though the latter now are not further extending their zone of occupation.

The heads of the Turkish national movement, who have cooperated with the former bandit chiefs, have not always had sufficient authority over their forces to prevent them from sometimes carrying out raids. Therefore, a part of the responsibility falls upon them insofar as present conditions in the country are concerned.

Behind their responsibility lies that of the Turkish Government, which, up to the present time, has had no authority whatsoever over the leaders of the Nationalist Movement.

The Members of the Commission:

**MARK BRISTOL
BUNOUST
A. DALL'OLIO
R. H. HARE**

[Reservation to the Minutes of the] Thirty-seventh Meeting

OCTOBER 2, 1919.

General Dall'Olio presented the following communication:

The Commission of Inquiry should examine the facts which accompanied and followed the occupation by the Greek troops of the districts of Smyrna, Aidin and Aivali, indicated in particular in the protest addressed to the Paris Conference by the Sheik-ul-Islam. Therefore, and because of the fact that these instructions are strengthened by the suggestion that the period to be examined is included between the Greek occupation and July 26th or 29th, I am of the opinion that we should not discuss the reasons which called

for the landing and the occupation of the forts. This matter is not under the jurisdiction of the Commission of Inquiry, but of the Conference, and consequently I believe it my duty to maintain my viewpoint, and I urgently request my colleagues to recognize the reasons set forth by me on this subject. In any case, I request that this declaration, which has a general character of reservation, be included in the minutes.

CONCLUSIONS PRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 13, 1919.

1. The situation created at Smyrna and in the Vilayet of Aidin by the Greek occupation is strained because:
 - (a) The occupation, which had as its principal purpose merely the maintenance of order, has in reality assumed all the forms of an annexation.
The Greek High Commissioner alone exercises an efficacious authority.
The Turkish authorities who have continued to carry on their functions no longer have any real power. They no longer receive orders from Constantinople and, on account of the almost complete disappearance of the Turkish police and gendarmery forces, they no longer have the means necessary for the execution of their decisions.
 - (b) The occupation imposes extensive military sacrifices upon Greece which are out of proportion with the mission to be fulfilled if this mission is temporary and should have only maintenance of order as its purpose.
 - (c) It is incompatible in its present form with the return of order and of peace for which the populations, threatened with famine, have great need.
2. The Commission deems:
 - (a) That if the military occupation of the country is to have as its sole purpose the maintenance of security and public welfare, this occupation should not be intrusted to Greek troops, but to Allied troops, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in Asia Minor.

(b) That the occupation by the Greeks alone should not be maintained unless the Peace Conference is resolved to announce the complete and definite annexation of the country to Greece.

In such a case freedom of action should be left to the Greek Commander vis-à-vis the Turkish forces.

(c) That the pure and simple annexation as above stated would be contrary to the principle proclaiming the respect for nationalities, because in the occupied regions, outside of the cities of Smyrna and Aivali, the predominance of the Turkish element over the Greek is incontestable.

It is the duty of the Commission to observe the fact that the Turkish national sentiment, which has already manifested its resistance, will never accept this annexation. It will submit only to force, that is to say, before a military expedition which Greece alone could not carry out with any chance of success.

3. In view of these conditions, the Commission proposes the following measures:

(a) To replace as soon as possible all or part of the Greek troops by Allied troops much fewer in number.

(b) If, in order to safeguard Greek self-respect, it is decided that a part of the Greek troops may cooperate in the occupation, distribute these troops in the interior of the occupied regions in order to prevent them from coming in direct contact with the Turkish national forces.

(c) As soon as the occupation by the Allies has been completed, require the Turkish Government to reorganize its gendarmery under the direction and command of Interallied officers.

This gendarmery should be constituted as soon as possible to assure order in the entire region with the purpose of replacing the Allied detachments.

(d) At the same time as the reorganization of the gendarmery, the Turkish Government should be required to restore its civil administration.

4. The heads of the national movement having on many occasions stated that their opposition was only directed against the Greeks, the measures proposed should dispose of all grounds for armed resistance on their part and return to the central government of Constantinople the authority which it no longer has.

Nothing should then prevent the disbanding of the irregular troops.

In case of the contrary, the Entente will finally be able to know what faith it can place in the protestations of loyalty made by the Turks, both by the leaders of the national movement and by members of the Government.

The Members of the Commission:

ADMIRAL BRISTOL

Delegate of the United States of America

GENERAL HARE

Delegate of Great Britain

GENERAL BUNOUST

Delegate of France

GENERAL DALL'OLIO

Delegate of Italy

¹ *Ante*, p. 5 [Pg. 5 is part of [Doc. 1](#)].

² The order by M. Venizelos for the reoccupation of Aidin was not given until July 2, 1919, and therefore could not have been discussed by the Council of Four.

³ See HD-10, minute 1, and HD-11, minute 4, [vol. VII, pp. 191](#) and [207](#).

⁴ See HD-12, minute 5, and appendix E, [ibid., pp. 238](#) and [249](#).

⁵ Appendix F to HD-64, [vol. VIII, p. 476](#).

⁶ See HD-64, minute 6, [ibid., p. 463](#).

⁷ See HD-71, minute 3, [ibid., p. 675](#).

⁸ Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 181.8302/3.

⁹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹⁰ HD-11, minute 4, [vol. VII, p. 207](#).

^{10a} Minutes of meetings and annexes not printed (Paris Peace Conference 181.8301/1-46).

¹¹ See HD-13, minute 12, [ibid., p. 264](#).

¹² Appendix A to HD-10, [ibid., p. 200](#).

¹³ See HD–64, minute 6, [vol. VIII, p. 463](#), and HD–71, minute 3, [ibid., p. 675](#).

¹⁴ For text of the Armistice with Turkey, October 30, 1918, see [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 441](#).

¹⁵ *Post*, p. 71 [*Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 3*].

¹⁶ See IC–181C, minute 17, [vol. V, p. 484](#).

¹⁷ CF–19, minute 2, [vol. V, p. 721](#).

* This report was accompanied by the following letter:

CONSTANTINOPLE, [Sept.] 29/October 12, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor of submitting to the Commission several observations which have been suggested to me by the statement of the results of the inquiry which you were kind enough to send me.

Be assured of my highest regards,

COLONEL ALEXANDRE MAZARAKIS

[Footnote in the original.]

¹⁸ *Post*, p. 71 [*Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 3*].

November 10, 10:30 a.m. (HD-88)

[4] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 10, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 10, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/88

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/88

HD-88

[Document 4]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 10, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 10, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. Massigli

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General Bliss
Colonel Embick
Mr. W. H. Buckler
Dr. I. Bowman

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West
Colonel Kisch
Mr. Tufton
Mr. Forbes-Adam
Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. H. W. Malkin

FRANCE
M. Cambon
M. Laroche
General Le Rond
General Bunoust
M. Fromageot
M. Escoffier
M. de Percin

ITALY
Commander Mazzolini
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Galli
M. Stranieri
M. Pilotti

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka

1. M. DE MARTINO asked if he might deliver a message from M. Tittoni who wished to express his great regret at not being able to be present at that meeting; he was obliged to leave on the following day and was still ill in bed. He had particularly hoped to be able to come to that meeting to bid farewell to his colleagues. At the same time he had asked M. De Martino to submit to the Council a consideration which had occurred to him with respect to its work. The Supreme Council had organized a Committee for the execution of the Treaty and that Committee, called the Committee of Ambassadors, although other than Ambassadors might sit upon it, was to be entrusted with everything concerning the execution of the treaties; the Supreme Council, on the other hand was entrusted with all work preparatory to the same treaties. In order to facilitate this division of labor and inasmuch as the large questions were at the moment not ready for settlement—such as the Treaty with Hungary, the question of the former Ottoman Empire and the Adriatic question—M. Tittoni wished to ask the Council to consider the possibility of adjourning, after the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty, until one of those questions should be ready for settlement. In the meanwhile all remaining unfinished work relative to the execution of the treaties could be entrusted to the Committee of Ambassadors. Italian Suggestion Relative to the Prolongation or Postponement of the Work of the Supreme Council

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that this question could not be raised without the consent of the Governments concerned. Of course three questions were raised by this suggestion: he thought that the Hungarian question would be satisfactorily settled. The question of Turkey was a difficult one, but he was willing, and thought it necessary, to take it up, and he felt that the British and American Governments would agree with his views. The question of the Adriatic was a most delicate one but it must be admitted that the Council was not at fault. The responsibility lay entirely with Italy. The Italian Government had been incapable of executing the orders given by the Council. The Council had formally decided that only one Italian battalion should remain at Fiume, but this order had been

flagrantly violated in such a manner that it seemed clear that the Italian Government had no control over its army and navy. The Command at Fiume had passed to D'Annunzio. He was not hostile to Italy but he was obliged to point out that the Italian Government had not been able to make its orders respected. He had supported the Italian point of view in a long telegram that he had sent to President Wilson, but he was very much embarrassed as to what he should further say, since he had received a courteous but emphatic reply from President Wilson to the effect that it was useless to make agreements with a Government which assumed obligations that it could not fulfill. French soldiers had been killed at Fiume and the French Government had taken no action; but such a situation could not be prolonged indefinitely.

M. DE MARTINO wished to be allowed to remark that a Government existed in Italy as well as in any other country. As to the point of being obeyed or not by the army at Fiume, it was in agreement with the Allied Governments that Italy abstained from attacking Fiume. If Italy was confronted with difficulties, of which the Council was well aware, that did not mean that the Italian Government had not taken up the question of Fiume with the very best intentions of settling it properly. The Italian Government had shown a spirit of conciliation which he thought M. Clemenceau would appreciate.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that nevertheless the fact remained that the Italian Government was not obeyed by its Navy. The greatest spirit of good will had been shown. For this reason no action had been taken as a result of the incidents at Fiume, but that situation must be put an end to. The postponement of the work of the Council could not be agreed to as long as that would result in the consolidation of the existing situation at Fiume.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed with M. Clemenceau, but felt that the points at issue with Germany and the Bulgarian question must first be settled before there could be any thought of postponement. He thought that these questions might be settled before the end of the month, by which time he hoped that all other questions, except the Turkish one, would also be out of the way. He therefore felt that there was no great difficulty in practice; the object aimed at by M. De

Martino could be met without necessarily adopting his plea for an adjournment of the Conference now.

MR. POLK also agreed with M. Clemenceau and observed that there were two or three questions which had to be settled before an adjournment could be thought of. He was of the opinion that those questions could be settled before December 1st. He also felt that it would not be fair to turn such questions over to the Committee of Ambassadors, which was only supposed to coordinate questions relating to the interpretation and execution of the Treaties.

M. CLEMENCEAU appreciated the troubles the Italian Government had had to encounter. However, that Government must settle the question of Fiume and get its army and navy under control.

M. DE MARTINO repeated that the Italian Government had the army and navy under control and was obeyed by them. If it had not wished to take military action against Fiume, it was because the Allied and Associated Powers had likewise not wished it. They had not wished to attack Fiume and *a fortiori* Italy had not wished to either. The situation there did not prevent his declaring that there was a Government in Italy and that the army and navy were under control of the Italian Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU declared that he must formally state that M. Tittoni had said, not once but many times, that the Italian Government could not take Fiume because the army and navy would not obey the Government. He thought M. Tittoni could not contest this, and he wished this to be formally put on record. The fact that the Italian Government had to contend with a very delicate question was no reason for attempting to place the responsibility on the other Allied and Associated Powers, who clearly could not be burdened therewith.

M. DE MARTINO said that such was not his intention, and that the sole question raised was one of expediting the work of the Council. M. Tittoni, who had to leave for Italy on account of the political situation, had hoped to return to take up the discussion of the important questions alluded to.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that such a solution would greatly embarrass him in any reply to President Wilson.

M. DE MARTINO said that he had transmitted the suggestion, but that if it were going to occasion great inconveniences he did not wish to insist upon it.

(It was decided:

to take no action on the Italian suggestion relative to the prolongation or postponement of the work of the Supreme Council.

2. (The Council had before it a note from the President of the German Delegation dated November 7th, 1919 relative to municipal elections in Upper Silesia (See Appendix "A").) German Municipal Elections in Upper Silesia

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the proposed action of the German Government was in utter defiance of the decisions of the Supreme Council.^{[1](#)}

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that strictly speaking the Council could not prevent such action on the part of the German Government before the Treaty came into force, but it could say that it had already warned that Government that such elections would not be recognized.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. POLK also agreed. He presumed that the Council was sure of its legal ground when sending such an answer.

It was decided:

that the Allied and Associated Powers should again inform the German Government that the municipal elections proposed to be held by it in Upper Silesia, prior to the coming into force of the Treaty, would not be recognized as valid.

3. M. BERTHELOT commented upon the note from the Swiss Legation. (See Appendix "B"). Note From the Swiss Legation Relative to Insertion in Treaties Still To Be Drafted and Signed of Clauses Relative to Swiss Neutrality

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that as such clauses were already contained in the Treaties with Germany and Austria there seemed no good reason for not inserting them in all the Treaties.

It was decided:

to act favorably upon the request of the Swiss Legation relative to insertion in Treaties still to be drafted and signed of clauses relative to Swiss neutrality, analogous to Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria (See Appendix "B").

4. MR. POLK informed the Council that he had just received a telegram from Admiral Bristol to the effect that fighting between Greeks and Turks had taken place near Soma because the Greeks had not obeyed the orders of General Milne not to advance the line of occupation until the 15th of November and to wait until the Turkish army obeyed the orders given it to retire on November 12th, and that the Greeks had acted on the orders of their own Government.
Situation in Smyrna

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired if this point had not already been raised by M. Venizelos at the preceding meeting of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it had not.

GENERAL BUNOUST was sure that it had not. The point Sir Eyre Crowe had in mind was the incident at Nazilli.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that M. Venizelos should be asked to explain the incident referred to in the telegram read by Mr. Polk.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the information contained in the telegram be sent to M. Venizelos and that he be asked for explanations.

(This was agreed to.)

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Investigation at Smyrna² dealt with two questions. The Commission had been appointed to investigate the complaints made by the Sheik-ul-Islam.^{2a} The Council might unwittingly have given the Commission too large a mandate but it had never contemplated that the Commission should go so far as to advise it whether or not there should have been a Greek occupation. He proposed to separate the report into its two component parts. The question raised by the second part of the report had already been presented in an acute form as a result of M. Venizelos ordering Greek troops beyond the zone of occupation laid down by the Council without consulting it. He thought that there was a good deal to be said for M. Venizelos in this connection inasmuch as he had sent many pressing communications to the Council which, owing to the great pressure of work, had not been promptly answered. The Council had ordered General Milne to determine the Greek zone of occupation;³ he had done so and on the other hand the Greek and Italian Governments, after satisfactory negotiations, had agreed to a line of demarcation between their zones.⁴ He felt that the other conclusions of the report might be accepted; but he was struck by the fact that a great deal of pertinent testimony had not been heard by the Commission, therefore it was difficult for the conclusions of the report to be accepted unreservedly, although he might have been inclined to do so if he had not heard M. Venizelos's explanations at the preceding meeting. For instance, with respect to the affair at Menemem, M. Venizelos had pointed out that the Greek authorities had made an accurate count of the victims and found that only 20 had been killed, identifying them by name, whereas the number fixed by the Commission as a result of an investigation made by a French officer had placed the number at several hundred. He did not feel qualified to state that a different procedure could have been adopted, but he felt that if the Greek side of the case could have been heard the conclusions of the report might have been different. In his opinion this was the one reservation to be made when accepting the report.

GENERAL BUNOUST observed that some question had been raised as to the Commission going beyond the mandate given it. He wished to point out that the report submitted consisted of three parts: a summary of the facts, the fixing of the responsibilities, and the conclusions. This conformed not only to the spirit but to the letter of the Council's mandate contained in its telegram to the Commission of July 26, 1919 (See H. D. 13, Minute 12).⁵ It had been suggested that the Commission was not justified in taking up the question of the expediency of the Greek occupation. He wished to reply that the complaint of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the Supreme Council had formed the basis of the investigation, and this complaint had pretended that the Greek occupation was unjustified. The Commission had therefore necessarily examined that question. To take up a question of detail, in an affair such as that at Menemem it was impossible for anyone to make an accurate estimate. The Commission did not insist upon the exactness of its figures but it was convinced that figures submitted by the Greeks could not be any more accurate. With respect to contradictory testimony he wished again to cite the affair at Menemem, where all the Turks had testified in one way and all the Greeks in another. The Commission had therefore tried to take the testimony of the witnesses who seemed to be the most reliable and it had taken a great deal of testimony from French, English and Italian witnesses. The testimony of M. Laplanche, a French employee of the railroad, had established that the day before the massacre in question the Turks had claimed that they feared a massacre and the Greeks had been informed of this but had taken no precautionary measures. The Greek battalion retreating from Pergamum had indeed been subjected to outrages, but when it once reached Menemem not a single shot had been fired at it. Many Greek witnesses claimed to have heard and seen shots but not one of them had been able to substantiate his evidently false statements. The Commission did not insist that the Greeks had prepared this massacre, but it was convinced that they had done absolutely nothing to prevent it and that the Greek authorities were obviously incompetent.

SIR EYRE CROWE had never doubted that the Commission had proceeded in the most sincere and honorable way, but, as M. Venizelos had pointed out, the principal accused parties had not

been heard. He had felt that although it had possibly been well not to acquaint the Greek representative with the names of the witnesses, it might have been possible to give him the depositions without giving him the names of the witnesses. But even this had not been done. He could not say that the conclusions of the report would have been different had such procedure been adopted, but it was evident that they might have been; therefore these conclusions were not entirely satisfactory. When the procedure adopted by the Commission had been brought to the attention of the Council it had not approved thereof; but it had then been too late to make an effective change. However, he did not wish to insist unduly upon this point for on the whole M. Venizelos had accepted the substance of the report, inasmuch as he recognized that abuses had been committed and had meted out punishment therefor. Furthermore, calm now reigned in and around Smyrna, and in fact everywhere except those points where Greeks were in armed contact with Turks. He felt that the Greeks had done their best and that on the whole they had succeeded rather well.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to ask General Bunoust if he felt that calm did in fact reign in the occupied territories.

GENERAL BUNOUST said that it did in the town of Smyrna, but that elsewhere the calm was only apparent and might well cease to exist at any moment. Furthermore, the town of Smyrna was nothing in comparison with the entirety of the occupied territories. There certainly was no calm at Aidin.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if the Greeks had withdrawn again within the Sandjak of Smyrna.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that General Milne had established a line beyond which the Greeks were to retire, and they had done so. There was, however, a small triangle in the region of Aidin where General Milne had proposed the following alternative: either the Greeks should be permitted to advance beyond the line of occupation previously laid down, or they should withdraw to a line behind the one at present held by them. In the latter event, General Milne had recommended an Inter-Allied occupation—i. e. Greek, French and

English—of the triangle comprised between the present line of Greek occupation and that to which they would be forced to withdraw. This solution, including the exclusion of Italian troops from the proposed Inter-Allied force of occupation, had been discussed and approved by the Supreme Council (See H. D. 66),⁷ although he himself had found it difficult to agree with that conclusion. He felt that an Inter-Allied occupation would be the best solution possible, but it had not proven feasible. He was convinced of the impossibility of telling the Greeks to evacuate and of letting the Turks in.

MR. POLK inquired if the town of Soma was in the vicinity of Aidin.

M. DE MARTINO explained that it was to the north of Smyrna. He wished to point out the following facts with respect to the region of Aidin. When the question was submitted to the Council as a result of General Milne's report three solutions became possible: to leave the Greeks where they were, to let the Turks occupy this territory, or else to effect an Inter-Allied occupation, necessarily including the Greeks in such a force since they were already there. Turkish occupation had not been considered. But when the point of Inter-Allied occupation was raised there was no longer a question of a line of demarcation between Greek and Italian zones of occupation; it was a question, on the one hand, of Italian occupation, and on the other hand, of Inter-Allied occupation. He felt that when the word "Inter-Allied" was used Italy could not be excluded. What had been decided upon was, he thought, contrary to the view of the French Government, because M. Pichon had told him before the meeting that M. Clemenceau's point of view favored Inter-Allied occupation with Italian troops. He did not intend to resuscitate that question, which had already been decided, but he did wish to say that according to information he had received from Constantinople the solution which had been adopted had produced a very bad impression, inasmuch as it had been interpreted as a proof of discord between the Great Powers. He felt that if the Allies, all of whom had interests in Moslem countries, did not give evidence of solidarity towards the Moslem world they would expose themselves to the greatest danger in the future. He had spent eleven years in Moslem countries and could affirm that within ten or fifteen years the Allies would have the greatest difficulty in maintaining their Moslem colonies. The exclusion of Italian troops

had made the Turks think that something queer was happening. When he had read the minutes of the meeting, at which he had not been present, he had seen that the reason given for exclusion of Italian troops from Aidin was the fear of disagreement and conflict with the Greeks. He wished to insist that these fears had no foundation. The Italian Government had come to two agreements with Greece. One of lesser importance, relative to the provisional line of demarcation between Greek and Italian troops, the other a more general agreement.⁸ He knew that the Allies were pleased that this latter agreement had been reached. In view of the terms of this latter agreement, which laid down a common line of action with a view to avoiding any cause of disagreement or conflict, he felt sure that if the Italian troops had encountered the Greek troops at Aidin no conflict would have taken place between them. He would like to have M. Venizelos himself questioned on this point. He wished to bring all this to the attention of the Council as a matter of record, although he did not intend at that time to reopen the question of Aidin.

MR. POLK inquired if the agreements referred to had been put on record.

M. DE MARTINO replied that the agreement respecting the line of demarcation had been put on record and that the other had not.

MR. POLK presumed that there was no objection to it being put on record.

M. DE MARTINO thought not, and said that he would speak to M. Tittoni on the matter.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that General Milne had proposed three solutions: as two of them were impossible, he suggested the other be adopted.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he had asked M. Venizelos if the Greeks were certainly able to hold the territory in question and had been told that they could.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the Greeks should then be allowed to remain at Aidin.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that it should not be forgotten that all those questions of occupation were purely provisional.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

M. DE MARTINO agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that General Milne had asked that the Greeks, if they alone were to supply the occupying forces, be allowed to advance beyond the present line of occupation, as that was a necessary condition of their being able to hold the Aidin region.

MR. POLK asked if General Milne had not made it clear that this proposed advance would necessarily mean further fighting between the Greeks and Turks.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied in the affirmative.

MR. POLK stated that he would have to make a reservation on this point. His Government had no troops to send, therefore although he could not unconditionally object to this solution, his Government did not wish to assent thereto, and felt that it must decline all responsibility.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it had been found impossible to find French or British troops to occupy this territory, but he hoped the point might again be raised and that M. Clemenceau might once more examine the possibility of sending French troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would again raise the question and would let Sir Eyre Crowe know on the following day, but he felt that he would not be successful inasmuch as France had no troops to spare. He thought it was no use for the Council to shut its eyes to the fact that the Turks would continue to harass the Greeks. If troops

were sent to this region it would result in protecting the Greeks from attacks which they had brought upon themselves.

MR. POLK said that he hesitated to express an opinion inasmuch as his Government could do nothing to help the situation by sending troops. But he wished to put himself on record as insisting that any further difficulties or fighting in Asia Minor would certainly make the ultimate settlement of the Turkish question more difficult. The Turks and Greeks would always fight each other; therefore, he felt that any decision which would necessarily bring them into closer and further armed contact was bad in principle.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that even if it were found possible to send an Inter-Allied force, that would not solve the question of conflicts between the Greeks and Turks. The fact of having the troops at Aidin would not have prevented fighting in Soma. M. Venizelos had rather taken the Council to task and it could not leave unanswered some of the points raised by him. It was perhaps true that the procedure adopted had not always been the best. He suggested that an answer be sent to M. Venizelos stating in substance that, although M. Venizelos' complaints as to the procedure adopted might have been justified in certain particulars, nevertheless he himself (M. Venizelos) had recognized that abuses has been committed, and further recommending to M. Venizelos the use of extreme caution in the future. In the same letter M. Venizelos should be informed of the decision taken with respect to maintaining Greek troops in Aidin and he should be forcibly reminded that all occupation was purely provisional.

GENERAL BUNOUST wished to point out that the Council proposed to tell M. Venizelos in effect that the Commission had not proceeded in the way it should have. He wished to warn the Council that any such action would be an impeachment of its own decisions. The Council in its instructions of July 26th had marked out the exact lines of action which had since been followed by the Commission, and subsequently had decided that Colonel Mazarakis should not be present at the meetings of the Commission (See H. D. 31).⁹ He wished to add that the Commission, in recommending an Inter-Allied occupation, had

desired to test the sincerity of the Turks who had repeatedly proclaimed that they only objected to an occupation by the Greeks.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that the Council had no wish to blame the Commission in any way. The question was whether the instructions had been well worded. He suggested that M. Berthelot prepare an answer to M. Venizelos, to be submitted to the Council, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting.

It was decided:

- (1) to ask M. Venizelos for explanations relative to the conflict between Greeks and Turks near Soma, reported in a despatch from Constantinople dated November 8, 1919;
- (2) that M. Berthelot should prepare, for submission to the Council, a reply to M. Venizelos, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.

5. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation regarding the exportation to Russia of German munitions and war material (See Appendix "C").) Exportation to man Munitions and War Material

SIR EYRE CROWE summarized the note from the British Delegation. He thought there was a good deal to be said in favor of helping General Denikin but he wished to point out that his Government was already heavily committed in supplying the northern Russian forces.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the manufacture and exportation in question could be stopped as soon as the Treaty had been put into force.

MR. POLK asked if it was proposed to do anything at that moment.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the manufacture and exportation could be stopped at once.

MR. POLK wondered if this was wise. He inquired if any right existed to stop this manufacture and exportation at the present time.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this right existed even under the Armistice. This was clear from the fact that the Germans themselves, in asking permission for this manufacture and exportation, recognized that the right to prohibit it existed under the Armistice.

MR. POLK wished to know what the reason was for prohibiting this manufacture and exportation; was the idea that ammunition factories should not be put into operation or was it in order not to help General Denikin?

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Germans be told that they could not manufacture and export the munitions and material in question.

MR. POLK said that he objected to these supplies being furnished by Germans but he did approve sending such supplies to General Denikin. If anyone else could supply him with the material in question he would be in favor of it. He wished to know who was going to pay for this material and how the payment would be made?

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that he was not sure. He thought that perhaps Bolshevik money would be used in payment.

M. BERTHELOT observed that the trouble was that there was no way of controlling the destination of this material.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the same group of manufacturers and exporters also supplied Colonel Bermond. [10](#)

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a reply be sent that inasmuch as the Council had no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and could not even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council could not sanction the manufacture and despatch of the munitions and war material in question. He asked who would convey this information and to whom the communication would be sent.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would send this answer to the British Military Representative in Berlin, in the name of the Council, for

transmission by him to the proper parties.

It was decided:

that Sir Eyre Crowe, in the name of the Council, should inform the British Military Representative at Berlin, for transmission by him to the proper parties, that inasmuch as the Council had no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and could not even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council could not sanction the manufacture and despatch of the munitions and war material in question (See Appendix "C").

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee relative to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (See Appendix "D").)

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee and explained that what was proposed therein was not a formal convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations prior to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Germany but only informal warning information. Reply of President Wilson Regarding the Convocation of the First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations

MR. POLK asked whether, assuming that the only thing the Council would do at its first meeting would be to nominate the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District, it would not be sufficient to call the meeting for the day after the deposit of ratifications.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that if it was sure that nothing further had to be done it would be sufficient. It was possible, however, that many and serious questions would have to be taken up especially in the event of the United States ratifying the Treaty prior to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. It was therefore better to take all preliminary precautions even if they should eventually prove useless.

MR. POLK thought that he would have to ask for an adjournment. He did not see the necessity for all these various notices. The question had once been very simple but it was now becoming very complicated. The only question he wished to raise was: did the President of the United States have the power to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations before the deposit of ratifications. If not, he thought the President could issue such a call on the day of the deposit of ratifications and that the meeting could be held the following day.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the solution proposed by the Drafting Committee involved no convocation which might be deemed premature.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that a further point had been raised: the United States might or might not ratify the Treaty prior to the date of the deposit of ratifications. Mr. Polk's point was only based on the United States not having ratified. The proposal of the Drafting Committee covered both contingencies.

MR. POLK said that he would refer the matter to his Government although he felt confident that there would be no objection.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would have to make a small reservation with respect to the place of the first meeting. There had been some previous discussion on this point of whether the meeting should be in Paris, or in London where the machinery of the League of Nations already existed. When the point had come up before the Council the British Delegation had not agreed that the meeting should be held in Paris. Since that time he had obtained his Government's consent to holding the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris if no other business was to come before the Council than the nomination of the members of the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District. That was all that he could agree to at the present time but he would try to obtain further consent for the first meeting of the Council to be held in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at that meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that he of course could not make any statement as to what would be on the agenda at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

MR. POLK thought that there was a great deal of unnecessary trouble in connection with this question. It was proposed to be entirely prepared for an important meeting of the Council on the day of the deposit of ratifications. Apparently that day would be somewhere in the neighborhood of November 25th. If that was so his Government's Delegate could not reach Paris in time, even if the United States had already ratified the Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the deposit of ratifications could be effected on or about November 27th, as far as the Allied and Associated Powers were concerned. It had become evident from various sources that the Germans would not sign the protocol without raising various difficulties. If the deposit of ratifications were delayed it would be on account of the German attitude.

It was decided:

to approve the recommendations of the Drafting Committee relative to the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (See Appendix "D") with the following reservations:

- (1) that Mr. Polk would refer the matter to his Government.
- (2) that Sir Eyre Crowe would refer to his Government the question of holding the first meeting of the Council in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at said first meeting.

7. (The Council had before it a draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy.¹¹ (See Appendix "E".).) Reply to the Note of the German Delegation of Oct. 3rd Relative to the Organization of the Plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy

It was decided:

to approve the draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the Plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy. (See Appendix "E")

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 10, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-88

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN DELEGATION No. 48

PARIS, November 7, 1919.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honor to reply as follows to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers of October 30, 1919, No. 1251.^{[12](#)}

The news that the Prussian Government expects very shortly, or more exactly, on November 9, 1919, to conduct municipal elections in Upper-Silesia, is authentic.

In Prussia, prior to the revolution, the so-called three-classes right of vote was in force, according to which the electors were divided according to taxation into three classes each one of which elected one-third of the municipal representatives. Thus, the greater were the differences in the taxations represented by the electors of one commune, the greater was the weight of the votes of the superior classes, and the more plutocratic was the right of vote. This institution of the former state was abandoned immediately after the revolution in favor of equal universal suffrage.

Although the elections have already taken place throughout the rest of Prussia, according to the new form, the municipal representation

in Upper-Silesia is still operated according to the old form. This situation is the more insupportable in that the local professional development has greatly exaggerated the difference between the poor and rich, and as, up to the present time, especially in the communes in which are located the mines and factories, the first and second classes are almost exclusively composed of the owners, contractors and directors of these establishments, and these classes choose from among themselves about two-thirds of the municipal commissioners.

For this reason, and now that tranquillity and order have been restored in Upper-Silesia, the German Government can no longer defer the municipal elections, delayed for numerous motives, and especially on account of riots. This is the more necessary in that the municipal elections are conducted in anticipation of the intermediary elections for the Landtags of districts and provinces, in particular the new provincial constitution of Upper-Silesia can only be applied as a basis of these elections.

In the course of the municipal elections, the interests of the portion of the population of Polish tongue will also be given due consideration. It is known that the Polish elements in Upper Silesia are found among the poorest part of the population, and for that reason it is clear that the maintenance of the superannuated voting system, and of the municipal representation thereby instituted, would be unrepresentative of the rights of that part of the population.

All guarantees are given for full liberty in the conduct of the elections. In particular, the Government has ordered, in favor of the Upper-Silesia fugitives, that upon their return to their domicile they will be given an opportunity to register on the supplementary lists of electors.

Finally, concerning the Peace Treaty, there is no motive given therein, in particular in the annex of Article 88, tending to prevent the Prussian State from exercising its sovereignty rights by insuring, until the entry into force of the Treaty, the administration of the territory which is to be submitted to a plebiscite in the future, or that

the question of the elections is to be in any manner submitted to the competency of the International Council.

The German Government entertains no doubt that, under these circumstances, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will forego their original objections to these elections in Upper-Silesia, considering that the Powers have declared their intention to pave the way for democratic principles in their establishment of peace.

Accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER

Appendix B to HD–88

PARIS, November 9, 1919.

I

SWISS LEGATION
IN FRANCE

From: Dunant.^{[13](#)}

To: President Clemenceau.

Article 435 of the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, recognized the guarantees stipulated by the Treaties of 1815, and especially by the act of November 20, 1815,^{[14](#)} in favor of Switzerland, guarantees which, by the terms of Art. 21 of the covenant of the League of Nations, constitute international obligations for the maintenance of peace.

A similar article (375) is incorporated in the Treaty signed at St. Germain on September 10, 1919.

The Federal Government is of the opinion that it is of primary importance that all the States which may in the future be members of the League of Nations, formally recognize the situation established

by the provisions above referred to; therefore it attaches the highest importance to having an analogous clause inserted in all the Peace Treaties yet to be concluded. It may be objected that neither Bulgaria nor Turkey had any part in the Treaties of 1815; but such an objection is countered by the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine in Article 21 of the Covenant which is reproduced in the draft of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria; for this reason it seems necessary that the Swiss Federal Council act in accordance with the only engagement which has been concluded in the interest of all Europe and with a view to the maintenance of peace.

I have the honor to bring the preceding to the attention of Your Excellency and I would be deeply grateful if you would have this desiderata expressed by my Government presented for a prompt examination.

Please accept, etc.

DUNANT

Appendix C to HD-88

Note by the [British] Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

The British Delegation has received a Despatch from the British Military Representative at Berlin containing the following information:—

“There is a definite Group in Berlin known as the Anti-Bolshevik League. They meet at the “Adlon” Hotel.

The members are:—

German:
— General von Lettow Vorbeck

Graf, von Donau.

Prof. Schiemann.

“Staff” Officers—Hauptman von
Lubers,

Lieut. Danks.

Russian: Bogdanoff, Russian merchant
— from Rostow.

Podalinski, formerly Governor
of S. Russia.

Beck, Marmarcheff (formerly
mixed up with Bermondts.)

Noske sometimes attends meetings. Probably only internal anti-Bolshevik measures are discussed in his presence.

This group have been, and still are, engaged in organizing the despatch of munitions to Denikin and munitions and money to Bermondts.

They obtain munitions from the Schilde Konsortium, Schwabische-strasse, 30 Berlin, W. 30. Krupps and Stiller have representatives working with Schilde in this office."

At its meeting on Saturday, October 11th,¹⁵ the Supreme Council decided that the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control set up by Articles 203–210 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany should direct, if they found it possible, that Russian arms, munitions and war material retained by Germany should be delivered to the Russian Armies recognized by the Allied and Associated Governments.

The transaction described in the above quoted extract from General Malcolm's despatch, however, is apparently concerned with new ammunition manufactured by a firm in which Krupp is largely interested, and is therefore not covered by the Supreme Council's resolution of October 11th.

It would accordingly appear necessary for the Supreme Council to decide the two following questions of principle:—

- (1) Whether Germany is to be encouraged to proceed with the manufacture of ammunition.
- (2) Whether it is desirable to facilitate the supply of German war material to the Army of General Denikin.

NOVEMBER 7, 1919.

Appendix D to HD-88

*Note for the Supreme Council Relative to the First Meeting of the
Council of the League of Nations*

1. It would seem to be acknowledged on the one hand, that the order of the day for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations depends on the ratification of the Treaty by the American Senate, the important questions being reserved until that time,—and on the other hand, that the designation of the representatives may depend on this order of the day, that is to say on the importance of the questions to be considered.

2. However, in case the American ratification would allow the consideration of important questions in the first meeting of the Council, there would be a great advantage in having this consideration take place at as early a date as possible, because, if this ratification had to be awaited to prepare the first meeting of the Council, there would be a regrettable loss of time.

It would therefore seem useful at the present time to anticipate the first meeting, while reserving the order of the day and the liberty of the Powers to designate their representatives in consequence.

3. With this end in view, the President of the United States could, at this time, notify the Powers that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held at Paris immediately after the signing of the *Procès-Verbal* of the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty and that an official convocation will follow, as soon as possible, giving the date and order of the day.

4. This note might be addressed by the President of the United States to the interested diplomatic missions at Washington, and the official convocation, addressed by the President of the United States, conformably with the Treaty, could be delivered on the spot by the American representative at the Peace Conference to the President of

the Conference, and by the latter to the representative of each interested Power.

PROPOSED NOTE TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE INTERESTED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AT WASHINGTON RELATIVE TO THE FIRST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The President of the United States of America has the honor to inform the Government of that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held at Paris immediately after the signing of the first *Procès-Verbal* of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles.

The date, hour and order of the day of this meeting will be advised in the official convocation which the President of the United States will request the American representative to the Peace Conference to transmit on the spot to each interested Power, through the kindness of the President of the Conference.

Appendix E to HD-88

Proposed Reply to the Letter of the German Delegation of October 3¹⁶ on the Question of Eupen and Malmedy, Submitted to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Belgian Affairs

MR. PRESIDENT: In reply to your letter of October 3 last, relative to the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, I have the honor to inform you that the interpretation given to this communication is not in conformity, either with the letter or the spirit, of Article 34 of the Treaty of Versailles.

A glance at this article suffices to show immediately that the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers was not to institute a plebiscite at Eupen and Malmedy similar to that to be operated in Upper-Silesia or Schleswig, but to allow those of the inhabitants of the interested circles, who desire to see the territory to which they belong maintained under German sovereignty, to freely express their wish.

If furthermore, reference be made to the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers made to the observations of the German Delegation under date of June 16, 1919,¹⁷ the interpretation of Article 24 [34] leaves no room for doubt.

In the covering letter accompanying this reply, it is said that the plebiscite provided for in Article 34 will be organized “with such precautions that the freedom of vote shall be entire”. Belgium, who is to assume full responsibility for all the necessary measures, will not fail to assume, in conformity with this obligation and under the conditions provided for by the Treaty, the free manifestation of the will of the inhabitants.

The last paragraph of Article 34 furthermore obliges Belgium to report the result of the popular expression to the League of Nations, and to accept its decision. The League of Nations, under whose auspices the plebiscite will thus take place, as confirmed by the reply of June 16 (Part II, Section I), will therefore be fully qualified to deal with the conditions under which the plebiscite will be effected, which is to be the base of its decision, and to take, in consequence, the necessary measures.

Please accept, etc.,

¹ See HD-76, minute 7, [vol. VIII, p. 769](#); also HD-78, minute 5, and appendix F, [ibid., pp. 808](#) and [824](#).

² Appendix A to HD-87, p. 44 [*Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 3*].

^{2a} Appendix A to HD-10, [vol. VII, p. 200](#).

³ HD-10, minute 4, [ibid., p. 194](#).

⁴ [Ibid.](#)

⁵ [Ibid., p. 264](#).

⁷ Minute 9, [vol. VIII, p. 512](#).

⁸ For text of general agreement, see Amedeo Giarmini, *I documenti diplomatici della pace orientate* (Rome, Edizione di politica [1922]), p. 27.

⁹ Minute 3, [vol. VII, p. 687](#).

¹⁰ Colonel Prince Avalov-Bermond, commander of the Russian Western Army of Volunteers.

¹¹ For note from German delegation of October 3, see appendix B to HD-86, p. 25 [*Pg. 25 is part of [Doc. 2](#)*].

¹² See HD-78, minute 5, and appendix F, [vol. VIII, pp. 808](#) and [824](#).

¹³ Dr. A. Dunant, Swiss Minister at Paris.

¹⁴ Declaration regarding the Helvetic Confederation, March 20, 1815, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. II, p. 142; Protocol regarding Cessions to Geneva, March 29, 1815, *ibid.*, p. 149; Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, *ibid.*, p. 3; Act of November 20, 1815, *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 359.

¹⁵ HD-68, minute 6, [vol. VIII, p. 580](#).

¹⁶ Appendix B to HD-86, p. 25 [*Pg. 25 is part of [Doc. 2](#)*].

¹⁷ [Vol. VI, pp. 926](#), [932](#), [941](#).

November 11, 10:30 a.m. (HD-89)

[5] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 11, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 11, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/89

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/89

HD-89

[Document 5]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 11, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 11, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. C. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. Massigli

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. I. Bowman
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE
Lieut.-Colonel Kisch
Mr. E. H. Carr
Mr. H. W. Malkin

FRANCE
M. Cambon
M. Hermitte
M. Kammerer
M. Fromageot
M. Escoffier
M. de Percin

ITALY
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri
M. Pilotti

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka

1. M. BERTHELOT said that the members of the Council had received the draft reply to M. Venizelos which he had been asked to prepare. He called the attention of the Council to the fact that two questions

on the subject of Smyrna had not been discussed the day before: M. Venizelos, on one hand, complained of the conditions which had governed the censorship, and expressed his intention of establishing a Greek censorship at Smyrna; on the other hand, the Inter-Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople had sent them on November 3rd a note¹ in which they criticized the attitude of the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna; the latter tended more and more to substitute his action as well to that of the High Commissioners as to that of the Turkish officials. In the draft reply which he had prepared he had taken those two points into consideration. Draft Reply to M. Venizelos

SIR EYRE CROWE was of opinion that the question should be examined at the next meeting, but he wished to state immediately that he did not entirely agree with M. Berthelot: was it possible for the Allies to supervise the Greek authorities at Smyrna from Constantinople? Besides, perhaps the draft letter pointed out too clearly to Venizelos that he was wrong.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed to adjourn the examination of the draft prepared by M. Berthelot.

(The examination of the draft reply to M. Venizelos was adjourned.)

2. MR. POLK wished to read a telegram addressed to the Supreme Council by the Secretary of Labor of the United States in his capacity as President of the International Labor Conference (See Appendix "A"). He explained that the American Delegation would not assume the responsibility for the terms of this communication. On the other hand, from the information he had received from Baron von Lersner, most of the German delegates had reserved berths which were leaving between November 15th and 20th. He would know the next day whether all the delegates had been able to secure berths.
Communication From the Labor Conference at Washington

M. CLEMENCEAU did not see what they could do for the time being.

3. (The Council had before it a letter from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation (See Appendix "B") and a report from the New States

Commission, dated November 8th, 1919, (See Appendix "C").
Observations of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation Regarding the
Minorities Treaty

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the report of the Commission, and upon the draft letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation appended to said report. He wished to call the attention of the Council to the fact that the Commission had been unanimous in thinking that it was satisfactory to send to the Serb Delegation a reply which would interpret the Treaty. The only disagreement was on one point. The drafting of Article II in the Serbian Treaty was different from the corresponding article in the other Minorities Treaty. Following M. Tittoni's suggestion, the Supreme Council had indeed decided on September 1st² to replace in the article in question, for the Serbian Treaty, the words "procéder de telle manière" by the words "prendre telles mesures." On the other hand, the corresponding English text was the same in all the Treaties, viz: "take such action." The majority was of the opinion that this difference in the drafting of the French text did not alter the sense and that nothing opposed itself to their informing the Serbs thereof. On the contrary, the Italian Delegation was of the opinion that it would be wiser to abide, without further explanation, with the decision of the Supreme Council. On the whole, they believed that their reply was of such a nature as to satisfy the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, except with regard to the Macedonian question. However, one difficulty still remained: it was likely that the Serbian Delegation might feel it hard to accept the decision of the Council which asked that it should recognize the right of option under the conditions provided in Article 4, for persons of Turkish nationality. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation would perhaps put forward objections on this point.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether there were any reasons to believe that the Serbs would make difficulties on this point.

M. KAMMERER said that in a private conversation, at a time when the question of a special clause on the subject had come up in the Minorities Treaty, M. Trumbic had expressed some doubt. He

thought that the Belgrade government would find it easier to make a simple declaration.

MR. POLK said he approved the report of the Commission; but asked whether it would not be easier to obtain the assent of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation if they were to give M. Trumbic the satisfaction of being heard by the Council? This would facilitate his task in his own country, for it could not then be said that the Conference had refused to hear the Serb Delegation.

M. KAMMERER said that from the very beginning the New States Commission had decided to hear no one.

MR. POLK remarked that one of the grievances of the Roumanians, which was unjustified, was that they had not been heard by the Council. He did not wish to insist, but they might give them such satisfaction if they were heard; this might be the best way of obtaining their signature.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether this might not be the source of further delays.

MR. POLK asked whether the Commission felt sure that the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation would be content purely and simply with the letter which was going to be sent.

M. KAMMERER answered that except with regard to Article 4, they had every reason to think the Serbs would sign. It might perhaps be wise to send them immediately the letter which the Commission had prepared: If they had any objections to make, the Council might hear them.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the Italian Delegation maintained its reservations regarding Article 11.

M. DE MARTINO stated that they did not insist for the sake of conciliation, but it was understood that the two expressions were of the same value; one could not conceive an intervention of the League of Nations if the League could not take such measures as might be opportune.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the report presented by the New States Commission with regard to the observations of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the Minorities Treaty;
- (2) that the President of the Conference should send to that Delegation the draft reply as prepared by the New States Commission.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question should be adjourned as the [Reparations Commission was not ready to discuss it. Allotment of Merchant Tonnage the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State

MR. POLK asked whether they could not inform the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation that the Separations Commission had instructions to hear its representatives. The Reparations Commission might be further informed that the Supreme Council desired that the request of the Jugo-Slavs be considered with the utmost care with a view of meeting the situation as far as compatible with the Treaty and the declarations of May last in the Council of Four.^{[3](#)}

SIR EYRE CROWE had no objections to make.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not have any either. He asked whether the Italian Delegation had any to offer.

M. DE MARTINO answered that he had none, if it was understood that the hearing of the Jugo-Slav Delegates by the Reparations Commission did not affect in any way or prejudice the decisions of this Commission.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Reparations Commission should be requested to hear a representative of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation regarding the distribution of shipping which belonged to the erstwhile Austro-Hungarian Empire, between Italy and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State;

- (2) that the Separations Commission be informed that it is the desire of the Supreme Council that the Jugo-Slav request be considered with the utmost care with a view to meeting the situation as far as compatible with the clauses of the Treaty and the declarations of May last in the Council of Four, it being understood that the Reparations Commission be given power of appreciation and decision;
- (3) that the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation be informed that the Reparations Commission had been instructed to hear its representatives.

5. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 7th, 1919 (See Appendix "D").) Removal of German Materiel From Dantzig

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to ask who would make the distinction between German Government property and private property.

M. FROMAGEOT answered that this distinction should not be very difficult to make.

MR. POLK inquired whether they could not await the arrival of the German Delegates to solve this question?

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether they would have the necessary powers.

MR. POLK said it was a violation of the Treaty: he thought that it would be saving time to follow his suggestion rather than send a new note.

SIR EYRE CROWE said they were confronted by a difficulty of form. They had before them a question which had been brought up only by an American report which stated, besides, that the Germans had ceased to remove, at least partly, the materiel in question. They did not know whether the materiel which was being removed did or did not belong to the state. Perhaps it would be sufficient to warn the

German Government that they would not permit the removal of government owned materiel.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the first thing to do was to verify on the spot to whom belonged the materiel which had been removed.

MR. POLK said that there were at Dantzig representatives of the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was for them to give the necessary information.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland be requested to advise immediately whether materiel removed by the Germans from Dantzig is State or private property;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee prepare a draft note warning the German Government that the Allied and Associated Powers will not allow removal or sale by German authorities of naval materiel at Dantzig, which belonged to the Reich, to the German States, or had been requisitioned by them.

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Secretary-General of the Conference dated November 8, 1919 (See Appendix "E").) Commission Charged With Preparing the Organization of Mixed Tribunals Set Up Under Article 229 of the Peace Treaty With Germany

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

That the Allied and Associated Powers having drawn up a list of individuals charged with crimes to be delivered by the German Government, should have a representative on the Commission whose appointment had been decided on November 7th,⁴ and which was charged with the organization

of mixed tribunals set up under Article 229 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. (See Appendix “E”).

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Commission on Polish Affairs dated November 10th, 1919 (See Appendix “F”) and a letter from the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation status of Eastern dated November 9th, 1919 (See Appendix “G”).) Status of Eastern Galicia

M. CAMBON said that before commenting upon the report of the Commission he wished to call the attention of the Council to the letter from the Secretary-General of the Polish Delegation. The American, Italian and Japanese Delegations were of the opinion that the request addressed to the Council should be granted. The British and French Delegations, on the other hand, thought that it was time to solve this irritating question.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Paderewski had already explained to the Council the Polish point of view.⁵ They did not see the use of hearing another Polish representative.

M. DE MARTINO said if it only meant a few days delay it might be courteous to grant it.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether Mr. Patek would be informed of the new conclusions arrived at by the Commission. In that case he would discuss them before the Council. Or would the conclusions be kept secret?

M. CAMBON said that they were not to be transmitted, but as usual there would be some leakage.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that if at each step they were to hear the Poles, they would never finish. They had come with great difficulty to an agreement. It would be imprudent to reopen the compromise which had been arrived at. However, he himself did not wish to oppose the granting of a short delay of three days for instance. In that case it should be taken into account that Mr. Patek would make objections and that he would ask for time to receive instructions

from Warsaw. (The American, Italian and Japanese Delegates stated that they did not insist.)

MR. POLK thought they might discuss the report and take a decision, with the reservation that they would give Mr. Patek a further hearing.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

M. CAMBON read and commented upon the report of the Commission. He said that no disagreement existed between the members of the Commission except in regard to Article 16 which concerned the representation of Eastern Galicia in the Polish Diet. While the text of the majority provided for a representation of Eastern Galicia in the Diet and defined the attributions of its representatives, the minority on the other hand, i. e. the British Delegation, wished to have the question of Eastern Galicia's representation in the Polish Diet discussed between Galicians and Poles. The majority was afraid that such a procedure would result in endless and violent conflict between Poland and Galicia.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated with satisfaction that the majority had made an effort to meet the minority half way. On his side the minority felt obliged to make some concessions. Three points would have to be discussed: 1—with regard to the duration of the Mandate which the League of Nations would give to Poland in Eastern Galicia, he had received instructions from Mr. Lloyd George to see that the duration of this Mandate should be limited to 10 years. He himself (Sir Eyre Crowe) proposed 15 years, the Commission had proposed 30 years, and finally 25 years had been agreed upon. He would be prepared to take the responsibility to accept this figure. If they did not agree on this point the American Delegation would come back to its former proposition and the question would be reopened. With regard to the Military service, he had already had occasion to express the reluctance of his Government to accept the principle of conscription in the territories placed under the control of the League of Nations. He accepted, however, in a spirit of conciliation, the proposed arrangement. Lastly, with regard to article 16, he wished to say that the British Government was in no way opposed to a representation of

Galicia at Warsaw. He only thought that the problem was of so complex a nature that it would be better to let the interested parties solve it themselves. He undoubtedly could accept the text proposed by the majority, but they should take into account the case where Poles and Galicians would agree upon another system; would they be bound by article 16, as proposed by the majority? The British Delegation could not accept the majority's text except with the following addition, "this arrangement shall be subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia."

M. DE MARTINO accepted the British Amendment.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that all the Delegations accepted the same.

M. CAMBON said that the changes which the Council had approved might necessitate some alteration of the articles originally adopted. He asked that the Council give the Commission on Polish Affairs the mandate to effect in accord with the Drafting Committee such changes of texts which would appear necessary.

MR. POLK said they were agreed not to publish anything concerning the decisions that had just been taken until the text of the Treaty had been definitely agreed upon.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the report prepared by the Commission on Polish Affairs or its majority, with regard to the text of the preamble and Articles 2 and 38 (See Appendix "F");
- (2) that Article 16, as proposed by the majority, be adopted with the following addition, "This arrangement shall be considered as subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.
- (3) that the Commission on Polish Affairs in agreement with the Drafting Committee, should modify the articles concerning the status of Eastern Galicia, which had already been adopted, so as to conform with the two preceding decisions;

- (4) that said decisions should not be final until a representative of the Polish Delegation had been heard by the Council;
- (5) that the decisions of the Council with regard to the status of Eastern Galicia should remain secret until further order.

8. (The Council had before it a list prepared by the French Delegation of the questions still to be decided by the Supreme Council. (See Appendix "H").) Questions Still To Be Decided by the Council

M. POLK thought that the Russian and Baltic questions could not be settled by the Council. Would it not be better to agree now that they should be dealt with by the respective Foreign Offices?

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question of Bessarabia should, however, come before the Council.

MR. POLK said the American Delegation was of the opinion that the Bessarabian question could not be settled at that time.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated they were clearly of the opinion that Bessarabia should go to Roumania.

MR. POLK said he was willing to discuss the question, but that this was not the time to make this session.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question of the Aaland Islands had already been put before the Council and that it had been decided to adjourn the settlement of same until it knew what attitude Sweden would take in regard to the blockade of Russia.⁶ In the same way, the problem of repatriation of Allied contingents and of enemy prisoners from Siberia, belonged to the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Committee of Ambassadors might deal with the settlement of these three questions: they were questions of execution of the Treaty. It was understood that the Delegations would send in to the Secretariat-General the additional lists which they had been asked to prepare.

MR. POLK asked whether the Dutch-Belgian Treaty would be ready in time for examination by the Council.

M. BERTHELOT thought so. An agreement seemed imminent.

MR. POLK asked whether the distribution of merchant ships was to be settled by the Supreme Council or the Reparation Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Council would discuss it and refer it back to the Reparation Commission if it were deemed necessary.

9. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation (See Appendix "I").) Allowances to Members of Boundary Commissions

SIR EYRE CROWE said the question had been put by the British Treasury, who wished to know from what date the allowances of members of the Boundary Commissions would be drawn.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the proposals made by the British Delegation offered certain difficulties. It did not seem just to begin the payment of allowances on the day when the nomination was notified to the Secretary-General of the Conference, for these notifications did not all take place at the same date. On the other hand, the date when the Treaty would be put into force was perhaps too late. It would be better to say that the allowances would become due from the constitution of the Commissions, leaving it to the Subcommittee of the Commission on the Execution of the Treaty to determine the application of that decision.

It was decided:

- (1) that the allowances laid down in the "Instructions regarding Boundary Commissions,"⁷ should begin to be payable to members of such Commissions, and be recoverable from the interested States, from the date of constitution of each Boundary Commission;
- (2) that the Subcommittee of the Commission on the Execution of the Treaty settle all details with regard to the application of this decision.

(The meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 11, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-89

PARIS, November 10, 1919.

[The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Dutasta)]

The Secretary General of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace presents his compliments to the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference, and begs to quote, at the request of the Secretary of Labor of the United States, President of the International Labor Congress, the following telegram, dated Washington, D. C, November 8, 1919, addressed by him to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference:

“The officers of the International Labor Conference at Washington are authorized to state that the Conference considers that it is of the highest importance for the success and value of the work of the Conference, that the German and Austrian Delegations should participate in all deliberations and decisions in regard to the questions on the agenda. They would recall the fact that the decision in favor of the participations of these nations was approved by the whole conference with only one dissentient vote.

The Conference can hardly prolong its sittings beyond the end of November.

They would therefore request the Supreme Council to take such action as will (facilitate) the arrival of the German and Austrian Delegations at Washington at the earliest possible moment.

They also think that they should point out that engagements have been entered into at Paris in this matter. W. B. Wilson,

President, H. B. Butler, Secretary-General”.

In this connection, the Secretary General of the American Commission is instructed to make clear the understanding that in transmitting the above-quoted message, the Government of the United States is not in a position to approve or disapprove of its contents, and that the Secretary of Labor is acting solely in his capacity as President of the Labor Conference.

To the SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE,
Quai d'Orsay, Paris.

Appendix B to HD-89

PARIS, November 5, 1919.

CONTENTS

Note, dated November 5th, from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on:

- 1: The Treaty of Peace with Austria;
- 2: The Minorities Convention.

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM
OF THE
SERBS-CROATS-SLOVENES

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT: The Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes has the honor to forward to the Supreme Council its observations on the Treaty of Peace with Austria and the Treaty on the minorities following the new instructions of the Royal Government.

TREATY OF PEACE WITH AUSTRIA

Although several of our very important requests have not been admitted in the Treaty with Austria, the Royal Government is ready to sacrifice them to the general interest, in order not to create

difficulties for the Peace Conference. Yet, this Delegation considers it necessary to draw the careful attention of the Supreme Council to an economic question of vital interest to our country and which should be discussed now, it being in close connection with the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

Our people on the Adriatic coast are a sea-faring people whose qualities are well-known to the whole world. Our navigation has never ceased to exist; its origin dates back for several centuries and developed even under the Austro-Hungarian Government, although Vienna and Budapest systematically ousted the native element and tried by every means to introduce the German and Magyar element even in the mercantile marine. In spite of these efforts and even before this war, the Yougoslavs possessed part of the Austro-Hungarian commercial fleet and indeed, generally speaking, this fleet could not have existed without our crews (sailors and captains), whose number is nearly 30,000.

Our State is in indispensable need of ships for coastal navigation and for trade with foreign countries, a need all the more absolute as international traffic by land will be inadequate for many years to come i. e. till a considerable system of railway lines will be built in our country, the rolling stock repaired and augmented and a steady supply of coal assured.

Sailing craft are the principal means of communication for the traffic with our isles and the small localities on the coast; on the other hand, fishing is the principal source of livelihood for our people on the coast. Considering the shortage of tonnage all over the world it will be difficult for a long time to come to charter vessels. All this is closely bound up with our economic restoration and consolidation which will depend on our foreign trade.

Bearing in mind that a certain part of the tonnage of the former Austro-Hungarian Commercial fleet belonged already before the war to our co-Nationals, our economic existence could be assured if this portion of tonnage were given to us.

Let us pass to the Peace Treaty with Austria in connection with this subject.

Annex III. (Part VIII. Reparations) stipulates the obligations which the present Austrian Government assumes towards the Allied and Associated Powers concerning ships and vessels under the Austro-Hungarian commercial flag, as well as those in construction.

By the first paragraph of this Annex, the Austrian Government in its own name, and in such a way as to be binding upon all parties concerned, cedes to the Allied and Associated Powers the ownership of all commercial and fishing vessels and ships belonging to subjects of the former Austrian Empire. The other paragraphs deal with the details of these stipulations. It is probable that analogous clauses will be introduced in the Peace Treaty to be concluded with Hungary.

The Treaty with Austria contemplates no exceptions, not even those existing in the Treaty with Germany regarding ships under 1000 tons and of 1000 to 16000 tons.

These stipulations by their rigour and inflexibility are more damaging to our State than to Austria, Hungary or the other States created by the dismemberment of the Danubian Monarchy, as none of these States possess a seaboard. Landlocked States can exist without ships. For our State such a situation would be disastrous, a navy being one of its vital organs. As the surrender of all the ships of the former Austro-Hungarian navy would injure our State alone, it would constitute a flagrant injustice which surely was not in the intentions of the Peace Conference.

For all the reasons pointed out above, we firmly believe that the Supreme Council will take the foregoing into consideration and give them a benevolent examination, inspired by a spirit of equity.

It is necessary that this investigation should be proceeded to at once as the question might otherwise be considered closed as soon as the Treaty with Austria comes into force.

If the Reparations Commission is not bound by some special decision it could proceed upon the basis of the Treaty alone.

In case the distribution of these ships is to be effected in proportion only to the losses incurred during the war by each Allied and Associated Power, the Kingdom of Serbia, which before the war possessed no access to the sea, nor any ships, could not obtain any part of the Austro-Hungarian fleet. Shipowners, at present subjects of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but former subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, would find themselves in a more unfavourable position than that of subjects of Germany, Austria or Hungary, who will receive an indemnity for their ships from their respective States. Contrariwise our subjects will receive no indemnity, their ships being devoted to the payment of reparations due by the enemy States.

To make it easier to understand this special question and its development since the conclusion of the Armistice, we take the liberty of drawing the attention of the Supreme Council to several other circumstances.

On the declaration of war, the Yougoslav shipowners placed all their vessels, in Allied or neutral waters, at the disposal of the Allies. Consequently, many big modern cargo-boats anchored at that time in the then neutral ports of Venice, Ancona and Brindisi preferred to remain under Italian protection to returning to Austrian ports, a return which could then have been easily made. There were also Yougoslav vessels in the British waters; the British Government treated them in a friendly manner. It chartered them at reasonable rates and used these vessels, the property of Yougoslav shipowners, flying the Austrian flag and anchored in British ports.

The Interallied War Council inserted clauses in the Armistice with Austria-Hungary, implying that vessels owned by Italians and Yougo-slavs of Austria-Hungary would receive friendly treatment.

According to information received by us, this question was discussed in May 1919 (probably the 22nd) by the Supreme Council,⁸ and on

that occasion the intention expressed was to apply special treatment, by which our shipowners would retain the ownership of their ships.

From the communications of Mr. Lansing, later on of Mr. Hipwood of the Board of Trade we came to the conviction that the United States and Great Britain were not going to apply the ton for ton principle to the Italians and Yougoslavs in the Adriatic, but that under the adopted scheme of distribution, the Reparations Commission would leave our shipowners the free disposal of their tonnage, formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian fleet. To enable the aforesaid Commission to proceed in this way, a side-agreement relating to Yougoslav shipowners is a necessary corollary.

When the Second Sub-Commission of Reparations met in London in March and April 1919 the President, Lord Cunliffe, informed our experts that the question of tonnage in the Adriatic would be reserved and submitted to special study.

Our Delegation is prepared to furnish more detailed information verbally through our experts, in so far as the Supreme Council shall judge it necessary to demand such information of it concerning the subject in question.

Proposition. The Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs-Croats and Slovenes has the honor to beg the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to submit this question to an immediate examination and to bring about a decision by which instructions be given to the Commission of Reparations to assign to our State such trading vessels as well as the fishing and sailing boats in the Adriatic as upon the date of November 4, 1918 were owned by our shipowners and capital in the Adriatic.

THE MINORITIES CONVENTION

The Royal Government has never contested the general principle of this convention. In the last Note⁹ addressed to the Royal Government of Rumania it was stated, according to press information, that the Peace Conference, while preserving intact the general principle which is the basis of the Minorities Convention, is

prepared to consider modifications available for application to the internal clauses of the Convention with Rumania. On this point we agree with the Conference and while respecting the general principle of the Convention which is the same in all Conventions of this kind—we beg the Supreme Council kindly to examine the following points which apply to internal conditions and which in accordance with the instructions of our Government, it is our duty to submit to it.

1) We ask that in the Preamble to the Convention it shall be added that Serbia loyally carried out the engagements accepted by her under the Treaty of Berlin.^{[10](#)}

This is a known fact. It is a matter of importance to us that it should be recognized in the Convention which creates the new clauses protecting Minorities at the moment in which it abolishes the engagements of the Treaty of Berlin. It would be a satisfaction equal to that most justly given to Greece by recognizing in the Preamble to her Convention that she intended equal rights irrespective of origin to all populations living within her territories.

2) The right reserved to the Principal Powers under Art. 51 of the Treaty with Austria originally embarrassed the Royal Government which feared lest the National Assembly would not ratify a blank cheque. But, in face of the Convention, it is obviously no longer a question of a blank cheque.

Nevertheless it must be pointed out that it does not transpire from the text of the Convention that the latter is connected with Art. 51 of the Treaty with Austria, nor that by the signature of the Convention the right reserved to the Principal Powers under Art. 51 becomes exhausted.

Consequently, we request that Art. 5 [51] of the Treaty with Austria shall be brought into relation with the Minorities Convention in such a way that it is made clear thereby that the right of the Principal [Powers], provided for in Art. 51 is exhausted by the Convention. We beg to observe that satisfaction in this direction has already been given to Poland in the introduction of the letter of June 24, 1919,^{[11](#)}

addressed by M. Clemenceau, in the name of the Conference, to M. Paderewski.

3) We demand that all territories of the Kingdom of Serbia, as constituted at the outbreak of the war, shall be excluded from the operation of the Minorities Convention.

We are obliged to return to this demand with insistence. Serbia enjoyed full sovereignty without any restriction when she entered this war. No power raised any objection against the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913,¹² by which she acquired new territories, not even Austria-Hungary, who had at first tried to do so. The Treaty of Bucharest has been considered as *res inter alios acta*. The obligation imposed by the minorities regime upon the territories of the Kingdom of Serbia could not be justified even by the fact that the Convention formally frees Serbia from the obligations which resulted for her from the Treaty of Berlin. These obligations, which were loyally observed by Serbia, have indeed already lost their *raison d'être*.

The objection that no distinction can be drawn between territories belonging to one and the same State is not justified, as this distinction entails no difficulty in the application of the Convention. Moreover, exceptions have been admitted under the actual Treaty, which recognizes that the provisions of Art. 9 should be applicable only to territories transferred to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes since January 1st, 1913. A second exception has been adopted in the Treaty with Poland.¹³ Indeed, Art. 9 of her convention stipulates that the rights accorded to minorities shall be applicable only to Polish subjects of German speech living in parts of Poland which prior to August 1st 1914 were German territory, to the exclusion of the rest of Poland's territories.

4) We request that in the French text the words "pourra prendre telles mesures" shall be replaced by the words "pourra procéder de telle façon" and that in the Italian text the words "possa prendere quei provvedimenti" shall be replaced by the words "possa procedere in tal maniera".

In none of the other Minorities Conventions nor yet in the original wording of the Convention with our State do the words “prendre Telles mesures” occur, but their place is taken by “procéder de telle façon”; which leads us to believe that this distinction is fortuitous, all the more as the English text is identical in all the Conventions. Special importance attaches to the French text in view of the fact that in case of divergence that is the one which will be appealed to.

Fundamentally there can be no doubt but that the obligation implied by the words “pourra prendre telles mesures” is certainly stronger and more serious than that implied by the phrase “procéder de telle façon”.

5) We consider that it is necessary for the sake of greater clearness in Art. 11 of the Minorities Convention and therefore request that it shall not intervene in differences between our State and private individuals belonging to minorities and that these differences should bear a legal character. That is why a special court has been created to meet this exigency. (Permanent Court of Justice).

As to the modifications provided by Art. 11 we request that it shall be recognized that it is merely a case of modifications which will facilitate the putting into effect of these clauses in the case that difficulties should arise; this has already been admitted in the reply of the Peace Conference to the observations of the Austrian Delegation¹⁴ (page 7, and in M. Clemenceau’s letter already referred to) (Part III).

6) It appears that Art. 3 of the Minorities Convention is in contradiction with Article 76 of the Treaty with Austria in so much as according to the latter, the acquisition of our nationality is subject to the authorization of our State for all persons habitually resident in the territories transferred to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and having acquired the right of citizenship (*indigénat*) since January 1st 1910; whereas according to Art. 3 of the Minorities Convention, these persons acquire our nationality *ipso facto* and without requirement of any formality if at the date of the coming into force of the Minorities Treaty they are habitually resident or possess the right of citizenship in these territories. If it is considered that

there is no contradiction here, the wording of Art. 3 is nevertheless lacking in clearness, and for this reason it ought to be drawn up in such a way as to be made to agree with Art. 76 of the Treaty with Austria, which has already been signed.

As regards Art. 3, it remains for us to point out that the question of habitual residence and right of citizenship must be defined in such a way, that the question of right of citizenship (*Pertinenza*, *Heimatsrecht*) applies only to such of our territories as belonged formerly to Austria-Hungary, where this institution existed, whereas that of domicile must be applied exclusively to Bulgaria where the right of citizenship does not exist.

Consequently we propose that the text of Paragraph I of Art. 3 of the Minorities Convention should be re-worded in the following manner:

“The Serb-Croat-Slovene State admits and declares to be its nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality Austrian and Hungarian nationals possessing rights of citizenship (*Pertinenza*, *Heimatsrecht*) and Bulgarian nationals domiciled on January 1st 1910 in territory which is or may be recognized as forming part of the Serb-Croat and Slovene State under the Treaties with Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria respectively, or under any treaties which may be concluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement.”

7) It goes without saying that the clauses of this Convention must be applied in accordance with the spirit of it, which does not tend to create privileges for the benefit of minorities, but to protect their natural right to their language and the profession of their religion. In view of the fact that owing to their intellectually and political backward condition, a large proportion of the minorities in our State might be prompted to misinterpret these clauses, it is necessary for the Conference to declare that it is not at all a case of privilege but of the protection of their rights. It is furthermore necessary to point out that persons belonging to minorities are bound loyally and completely to fulfil all duties towards the State incumbent upon them no less than upon all citizens. A declaration of this kind emanating

from the Conference would be authoritative, and would undoubtedly have a beneficial effect which would greatly facilitate the normal application of the Convention.

8) In the case that ameliorations should eventually be accorded to Rumania or to Greece, over the question of the Minorities Convention, we request that it should be recognized that they shall be applicable *ipso facto* also to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Such an assurance would permit us unhesitatingly to shorten the further discussion of the Convention.

Proposition. The Delegation insistently begs the Supreme Council kindly to examine the foregoing requests and to give it satisfaction by adopting them, taking into account the fact that as the Royal Government is animated by the desire to act always in perfect solidarity with the Conference, it hopes for a benevolent reception on the part of the latter.

His Excellency MONSIEUR G. CLEMENCEAU,
President of the Peace Conference,
Paris.

Appendix C to HD-89

NOVEMBER 8, 1919.

Draft of Report to the Supreme Council

The Committee on New States has examined the observations presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation with regard to the minorities treaty.^{[15](#)}

The remarks made, at least those which have appeared acceptable to the Committee, do not seem of a nature necessitating modifications in the text of a treaty which is already signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Likewise, after having carefully studied the various objections of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, the Committee considers that the

Supreme Council, if it considers it advisable, might address to the Delegation, in the form of a letter, a reply in which the clauses of the treaty regarding which observations have been presented should be explained in the degree which seems justifiable. This interpretation will give the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation certain of the satisfactions desired.

It is with this object that the Committee on New States has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council a draft letter to be addressed to the President of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.

The Committee has believed it opportune to profit by the occasion of the reply to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation to ask the latter to confirm in writing, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of November 1st [*October 29*]¹⁶ last, that Ottoman subjects who fulfil the conditions set out in Article 4 of the Minorities Treaty for obtaining Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality may profit from the said article.

Draft Reply To Be Addressed by the Supreme Council to the President of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the Subject of the Minorities Treaty

MR. PRESIDENT: The Supreme Council has examined with the greatest attention the observations contained in your letter of November 5th relative to certain provisions of the Minorities Treaty.

Having first taken note with pleasure of the assurance given by the Royal Government that it has never contested the general principle of this Treaty, the Council proceeded to study the remarks made with the desire of clearing up all the points capable of arousing in the mind of the Delegation and of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State an interpretation which would not be justified, and now makes the following replies, point by point:

1. It has never been the intention of the Supreme Council to raise any doubt concerning the manner in which the former Kingdom of Serbia executed its international engagements toward its population. The present reply may in this respect replace the insertion of a

special phrase in the preamble of the Treaty, which is no longer possible because the said treaty has already been signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

2. The signature by the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of the Minorities Treaty fulfils and entirely cancels, in the eyes of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the intention for which Article 51 of the Austrian Treaty, relative to the protection of minorities, was inserted. In consequence, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will ask nothing more of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State such as the signature of any new contractual provision concerning the said protection of ethnic minorities.

3. The distinction requested with a view to excluding from the Minorities Treaty the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia as it existed at the beginning of the war could not be granted by the Supreme Council, for the reasons already stated. Such restriction of the validity of the entire treaty, and not of only one clause, would bring into question the principles of the treaty itself, already contained in certain provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, now replaced so far as Serbia is concerned. It would not be in accordance with the other agreements already signed or prepared, whose principles must be identical according to the desires of the Royal Government itself.

4. The differences pointed out in Article 11 between the original draft of the treaty and the definitive draft, in the French and Italian Texts, does not represent in reality a modification of meaning. The fact that the English text has remained the same indicates clearly that it is only a question of a difference in drafting which does not necessitate an alteration of the treaty.

NOTE.—(This modification having been adopted by the Supreme Council on September 1st,¹⁷ the Italian Delegation does not believe this explanation should be given to the Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.)

5. It results from Article 11 that the Council of the League of Nations can take action only at the request of a state represented on the Council and not at the request of individuals belonging to minorities.

As to the judicial and non-political character of these disputes, the Supreme Council is pleased to give evidence of this in writing. It is furthermore clearly indicated by the fact that disputes are referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which constitutes a tribunal and not a political body.

If any difficulties arise in the execution of these clauses, their modification would be facilitated by the stipulation providing that this can be done with the consent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations, and that the Allied and Associated Powers now agree not to refuse their consent to any modification whatever of this nature.

6. The provisions of Article 3 of the treaty are made “subject to the treaties mentioned below”, notably to the treaty with Austria, as indicated in the following text. So far as the acquisition of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality by former nationals of Austria is concerned, therefore, the provisions contemplated in this respect in the treaty with Austria remain in force.

Respecting the observation relative to the question of domicile and *indigénat* the Supreme Council considers that the draft of Article 3 complies entirely with the meaning stated by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. The term “as the case may be” satisfies the request presented.

So far as concerns Article 4, which treats of questions of nationality connected with those of Article 3, the attention of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had been drawn to the omission of Ottoman nationals from the benefits of the provisions contemplated. The Supreme Council, while considering it impossible to modify the text already signed, and furthermore not wishing to ask the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to sign a formal agreement on this point, has confidence that this Government has no intention of refusing, to persons of Ottoman nationality who may fulfil the conditions set out in the said Article 4, the rights expressly granted to persons of Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian nationality. It requests the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation to be good enough to confirm this in writing.

7. In preparing this treaty, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have never intended to confer special privileges on minorities, but only to prevent racial conflicts by granting to these minorities equitable protection, and, by the guarantee of all their rights, to permit them to become loyal citizens of the state. There has been no idea of exempting them from the fulfilment of all their duties which are incumbent upon them in the same way as upon all other citizens. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers willingly give assurance of this to the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, as they are ready to give similar assurances to any other state signatory to a treaty relative to the protection of minorities.

8. So far as concerns the request of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation tending to grant to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the benefit of any modifications which may be finally granted to Rumania and Greece, the Supreme Council considers that it has fixed the fundamental principles on which should rest all the treaties relative to the protection of minorities and that it is not its intention to modify these principles.

With the exception of the observations presented on point 3, all the explanations which have just been made are of a nature to give satisfaction to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. They constitute the justified interpretation of the articles of the treaty on which explanations were asked.

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Council has decided after careful examination that it is not necessary, in order to give satisfaction to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, to modify the text of the treaty already signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The comments presented in the reply above will convey to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State the assurance of the sentiments of the Supreme Council, which is quite convinced of the desire of the Royal Government to act in perfect solidarity with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

*Note for the Supreme Council Concerning Naval Material at
Dantzig*

The Drafting Committee is of the opinion that the removal, or the sale by the German authorities of the maritime material which is at Dantzig and belongs to the Empire or to the German States, or was requisitioned by them, is contrary to the stipulations of Article 107 of the Peace Treaty, and that by taking such measures, at this time, Germany is jeopardizing the loyal execution of the Treaty.

The same solution would be difficult to support, if the matter concerned private properties, and the individuals interested spontaneously disposed of them.

For the Drafting Committee:
HENRY FROMAGEOT

NOVEMBER 7, 1919.
Appendix E to HD-89

SECRETARIAT GENERAL
OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 8, 1919.

COMMISSION ON CO-ORDINATION OF THE LISTS OF ACCUSED, AND
ORGANIZATION OF MIXED TRIBUNALS

The Supreme Council, in its resolution of the 7th of November,^{[18](#)} decided on the constitution of a commission charged with comparing the lists of accused, to be delivered by Germany, and organizing the mixed tribunals, provided for by Article 229 of the Treaty.

This Commission has been composed of the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Certain other. Allied Powers, notably Belgium, were alarmed on account of their eviction from the composition of this Commission. Besides Belgium, other Powers, (Greece, Poland, Rumania and Serbia) may have to claim accused persons of German nationality and have an interest in taking part in the organization of the mixed tribunals.

It would be advisable, in order to comply with the requests of these powers, as well as to be in the position of providing for eventual objections of procedure in the organization of mixed tribunals, to complete the resolution of November 7, by the following text:

“It is decided that the Allied Powers, which have compiled a list of accused to be claimed from Germany, will have a representative in the Commission (charged with the organization of this tribunal)”.

Appendix F to HD–89

NOVEMBER 10, 1919.

Note Presented to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs

QUESTION OF EASTERN GALICIA

In a resolution, under date of November 7,¹⁹ the Supreme Council decided to forward for consideration, to the Commission on Polish Affairs, the proposition made by the British Delegation, with a view to having the League of Nations give Poland a mandate of definite duration over eastern Galicia. Task Assigned to the Commission

The Commission on Polish Affairs, with an intention of conciliation, unanimously decided to accept the principle of a mandate. Although recommending to the Council the adoption of this solution, which, alone, under the present circumstances seems of a nature to realize the unanimity of the Delegations and to lead to a concrete result, the Commission deems it its duty to call attention to the fact that no mandate has been considered so far for the countries situated in Europe, and that Eastern Galicia profoundly differs from the territories to which the principle of the mandate has so far been applied. Adoption of the Principle of the Mandate

With respect to the duration of the mandate conferred on Poland, four Delegations^{*} were of the opinion that it should be fixed at

twenty-five years, thinking that it is necessary that the destinies of a sorely tried and profoundly troubled country, cannot be treated again before the legal age of a new generation which will have grown up protected from the agitations and the shocks caused by the world war. The British Delegate, nevertheless, has declared that his instructions did not permit him to accept an extension to twenty-five years of the ten-year period considered by the British Delegation. However, he agreed to call the attention of the British representative to the Supreme Council, to the arguments set forth by the majority of the Commission. Duration of the Mandate

At last the Commission unanimously concluded that it would be desirable that, at the expiration of a period during which the mandate would have been granted to Poland, the League of Nations receive full authority to maintain, revise, or modify the statute defined by the Treaty. This provision should be liberally interpreted and would imply for the League of Nations the power to entirely dissolve the system of mandate, and to pronounce, for instance, either the annexation of Eastern Galicia to Poland, or to another State, or to choose any other solution which it might deem proper. Competence of the League of Nations

Aside from the question of the mandate, the Commission attempted to compromise concerning the two points on which a disagreement existed between the majority and the minority of the Commission (See Report No. 5),²⁰ that is to say, on the principle of the representation of Eastern Galicia in the Diet of Poland (Article 16 of the Draft of Treaty) and on the military organization (Article 38). Discussion of Article 16 and of the Draft of Treaty

On the first question the divergence could not be settled, the British Delegation having maintained the text proposed for Article 16 by the minority of the Commission. He deemed, in fact, that it was a matter of principle which ought to be decided by the Supreme Council itself. He declared himself willing, however, to set forth to the British plenipotentiary the arguments presented by the majority to support its point of view.

On the question of the military organization, on the other hand, the Commission unanimously agreed to propose a new draft of Article 38, which would give to the Polish Government the right to apply in Eastern Galicia the military legislation in effect in Poland, with the reserve that the contingent thus recruited would constitute special units which, in peace time, would be located in Eastern Galicia and be at the disposal of the Polish Government in time of war for the defense of the national territory. This last expression is designed to forbid Poland the use of forces recruited in Eastern Galicia in any war which had not been forced upon her, but it must not be interpreted as implying the interdiction to use the troops of Eastern Galicia in a defensive war outside of the Polish frontiers.

If the propositions presented above by the Commission are adopted by the Supreme Council, it would be advisable to modify the next of the draft of Treaty, such as it appears in Report No. 5 of the Commission, as follows: ^{*}Proposed New Text

a)—In the preamble, suppression of the clause thus conceived:

“Until the moment when they will be invited to express, by vote, at present postponed on account of the troubled state of Eastern Europe, their desires relative to the definite political statute in those territories.”

(The Supreme Council, on the other hand, in its meeting of September 19th, decided on the suppression of the paragraph mentioned in Report No. 5 of the Commission and thus conceived: ²¹

“Considering that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the dismemberment of the latter.”)

b)—Article 2 would be thus drawn up:

“Poland accepts, in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, the mandate of organizing and governing Eastern Galicia, which will constitute an autonomous territory, within the limits determined by Article I.

“This mandate, which is conferred for a period of twenty-five years[†] at the expiration of which the Council of the League of Nations will have full authority to maintain, revise, or modify the statute defined by the present Treaty.”

c)—At last Article 38 would thus be drawn up:

“The legislation on military service in effect in Poland can be applied by Poland to Eastern Galicia, with the reserve that the contingent thus recruited will constitute special units, which, in peace time will be located in Eastern Galicia and will, in time of war, be at the disposal of the Polish Government for the defense of national territory.”

In case these suggestions be admitted, it would seem that the Commission should be directed to study in concert with the Drafting Committee, the modifications in form which it would be advisable to make in the other articles of the Treaty.

Appendix G to HD—89

PARIS, November 9, 1919.

From: St. Kozicki, Polish Delegation,

To: President Clemenceau.

Having learned that the Supreme Council is about to admit the question the Eastern part of Galicia for examination on the basis of a new plan which differs essentially from the plan previously discussed, and concerning which the Polish Delegates have not been permitted to express themselves, the Polish Delegation entertains the hope that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will not come to any decision without previously hearing the views of the Polish Delegates, as Poland is one of the Allied States.

In view of the fact that Mr. Dmowski is, unfortunately, seriously ill and that Mr. Paderewski is absent from Paris, the Polish Delegation has the honor to request the Supreme Council to kindly postpone its

decision on the fate of the Eastern part of Galicia until the Polish Delegates return to Paris and are allowed to present their case to the Peace Conference.

Please accept, etc.

General Secretary,
ST. KOZICKI

Appendix H to HD-89

Questions for Regulation by the Supreme Council

I.—SPECIAL QUESTIONS

A.—Execution of the Treaty with Germany.

Conditions governing the resumption of diplomatic relations. (A report to be furnished by the Special Commission).

Reorganization of the Superior War Council at Versailles to centralize the measures of execution concerning the military clauses of the Peace Treaty, in Germany and in the different occupied territories.

Extradition and trial of the Kaiser.

Nomination of the members of the Commission entrusted with the comparison of the lists of culprits presented by the different Powers and to regulate a procedure for the mixed tribunals (article 229).
Question of the representation of small Powers on the Commission.

Convention between Poland and the free city of Dantzig (a report to be furnished by the Commission on Polish Affairs).

Togo and Cameroun: employment of the contingents for the defense of the metropolitan and colonial territory.

B.—Execution of the Treaty with Austria.

Signing of the Treaty with Austria and of the treaties for the protection of minorities by: a) The Serb-Croat-Slovene State; b) Rumania.

C.—Execution of the Treaty with Bulgaria.

Question of the attribution of Bulgarian Thrace.

D.—Treaty with Hungary.

Question of the total or partial payment of the Rumanian occupation expenses;

The furnishing of coal to Hungary by Poland and the Czechoslovak State; (Article 207);

Exploitation of the Pecs Mines (report to be furnished by the Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav affairs).

II.—QUESTIONS IN COMMON

A—Distribution of enemy ships.

1) *Battleships.*

a) German and Austro-Hungarian battleships.

b) Reparations demanded by France and Italy for the interruption in their naval constructions during the war and for the employment of their shipyards and mills in the manufacture of war materials for themselves and the Allies.

2) *Commercial ships.*

a) General distribution of the merchant tonnage between those concerned.

b) German ships; question of tankers.

c) Austro-Hungarian ships. Distribution of the tonnage between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

B—Cost of upkeep of the armies of occupation.

III.—GENERAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS

A—Question of the Adriatic.

Frontiers between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

Fiume.

Montenegro.

Albania.

B—Russian and Baltic Question.

a) Recognition of Admiral Koltchak.

b) Finland (Petchenga and Carelia).

c) Aland Islands.

d) Baltic States.

e) Eastern frontiers of Poland.

f) Ukraina.

g) Bessarabia.

h) Caucasus State.

i) Repatriation of the Allied contingents in Siberia.

j) Repatriation of enemy prisoners in Russia.

C—Treaty with Turkey.

D—Treaty with Belgium and the Netherlands for the revision of the Treaties of 1839.

Appendix I to HD—89

Draft Resolution Regarding Allowances for Boundary Commissioners Submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation

The allowances, laid down in the “Instructions regarding Boundary Commissions,” Part III. Administration, dated October 6, 1919,^{[22](#)} shall begin to be payable to each member, and to be recoverable from the interested States, as follows:—

(a) In the case of those Boundary Commissions which have to be constituted within 15 days from the coming into force of a Treaty,

From the date of coming into force of this Treaty, or as soon after as the nomination of the member has been received by the Secretariat of the Peace Conference.

(b) In other cases, e. g., final demarcation of plebiscite areas,

From the first day of the period within which the Boundary-Commission is ordered to be constituted, or as soon after as the nomination of the member has been received by the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference.

¹ Appendix B to HD-90, p. 133 [*Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 6*].

² HD-44, minute 1, [vol. VIII, p. 30](#).

³ See “Decisions To Be Discussed With Small States”, CF-24/1, [vol. V, p. 836](#).

⁴ HD-86, minute 1, p. 20 [*Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 2*].

⁵ HD-59, minute 5, [vol. VIII, p. 330](#).

⁶ HD-64, minute 8, [vol. VIII, p. 464](#).

⁷ Appendix B to HD-70, [ibid., p. 655](#).

⁸ CF-24/1, minute 5, [vol. V, p. 834](#).

⁹ Appendix B to HD-68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#).

¹⁰ [Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 895](#).

¹¹ Appendix I to CF-85, [vol. VI, p. 629](#).

¹² *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

¹³ *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. III, p. 3714.

¹⁴ Appendix F to HD-38, [vol. VII, p. 859](#).

¹⁵ Appendix B to HD-89, *supra*.

¹⁶ HD-78, minute 3, [vol. VIII, p. 805](#).

¹⁷ HD-44, minute 1, [vol. VIII, p. 30](#).

¹⁸ HD-86, minute 1, p. 20 [*Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 2*].

¹⁹ HD-86, minute 3, p. 20 [*Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 2*].

* However, the American Delegation desires that it be specified that it accepted a limitation of the duration of the mandate only in the

hope of coming to a unanimous agreement. Therefore, if the British Delegation should not accept, definitely, this period of twenty-five years, the American Delegation reserves the right to stand by its first proposition, which consisted in entrusting Poland, under the conditions determined by the Treaty, with the mandate of administering Eastern Galicia as long as this system should give satisfactory results, the Council of the League of Nations remaining free to bring about a change in status at any time such change might seem to it desirable. [Footnote in the original.]

²⁰ Appendix C to HD-57, [vol. VIII, p. 280](#) .

^{*} On account of the short time available for the preparation of the report of the Commission, which ought to be submitted to the Council at its meeting of November 10, the new text proposed by the Commission could not be submitted for the consideration of the Drafting Committee. [Footnote in the original.]

²¹ See HD-57, minute 3, [vol. VIII, p. 270](#) .

[†] The British Delegate makes, concerning these twenty-five years, a reservation which has been defined above. [Footnote in the original.]

²² Appendix D to HD-70, [vol. VIII, p. 655](#) .

November 12, 10:30 a.m. (HD-90)

[6] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 12, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 12, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/90

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/90

HD-90

[Document 6]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 12, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 12, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. Massigli

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. W. H. Buckler

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West
Mr. Forbes-Adam
Mr. A. Leeper

FRANCE
General Weygand
M. Laroche

ITALY
M. Galli
M. Vannutelli-Rey

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a draft note to M. Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry, prepared by the British Delegation (See Appendix "A"), ¹ a telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated Nov. 3 (See Appendix "B"), and a letter from the Greek Delegation, dated Nov. 4 (See Appendix "C").) Note to M. Venizelos Relative to Incidents at Smyrna

M. BERTHELOT read the draft note prepared by the British Delegation.

M. CLEMENCEAU raised the following point of form: on page 2 he thought the word “observed” should be changed to read “felt” in the sentence reading: “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek occupation.”

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that in drawing up this note the British Delegation had wished to avoid mixing up two questions; he realized, however, that other questions, referred to on the previous day by M. Berthelot but not touched upon in this draft note, still remained to be settled. The question of the administration of Smyrna was a rather complex one and it might be well to turn it over to a Commission. A Commission on Greek Territorial Claims was already in existence. He understood that M. Venizelos had a good deal to say on this question and it would perhaps be better for him to be heard by that Commission.

M. DE MARTINO agreed, particularly as he thought it was time that a decision should be reached relative to the relations between the Greek army of occupation and the local authorities on the one hand, and the central Government of Constantinople on the other. It would be well to be guided by the principles of The Hague Convention.² On the other hand, it would be well to show consideration to M. Venizelos, who throughout the war had shown qualities of the highest value and whose difficulties were well known.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the question be referred to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims which, if necessary, could solicit the advice of the military experts.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that as General Bunoust, who was entirely familiar with the situation, was present he might give the Commission valuable advice.

MR. POLK called the attention of the Council to a paragraph of the draft note authorizing the Greeks to advance from Aidin up to the

river Kochak Chai. That clause was a very important one. It should be remembered that any further advance meant fighting between the Greeks and Turks. General Milne himself had recognized that fact. He therefore wished to ask if the Council deemed it advisable to assume the responsibility for such further conflict.

M. CLEMENCEAU again pointed out that he could send no troops; he felt that possibly the best solution would be to have M. Venizelos withdraw his troops from the region of Aidin where they had gone without the consent of the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that that meant letting the Turks occupy this region.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if the Italians were far distant from the Greeks in this region.

M. DE MARTINO explained that they were not; that the Italian forces were within six hundred meters of the line of the River Meander and the parallel railroad. The Greek line was along the north bank of the river.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that if the Greeks retired a triangle would be left between the river, the railroad and the Greek line, which included Aidin. To the south the line had been fixed by agreement between M. Venizelos and the Italian Government. He thought that it would not be advisable to withdraw the Greeks from the triangle in question and turn it over to Italian occupation.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that he had not made any such suggestion.

M. CLEMENCEAU then suggested that the Greeks could be left at Aidin, but that they should not be allowed to advance.

MR. POLK asked if General Milne himself had not said that a further advance by the Greeks would inevitably result in serious trouble.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that General Milne had rather said that he would be willing to authorize a further advance if the Council was

prepared for the fact that such an advance would mean encountering armed opposition. General Milne had favored that advance on strategic grounds.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that as M. Venizelos felt capable of conquering Asia, the Greek troops certainly should be able to maintain their ground at Aidin. He agreed with Mr. Polk that if the Council ordered a further advance it would be in a position of creating further trouble.

MR. POLK said that he could not agree to a letter authorizing the Greeks to advance in view of the fact that the authorities on the spot had said that trouble would certainly ensue. He thought that this would be tantamount to authorizing the Greeks to advance and conquer additional territory.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the only alternative was to let in the Turks who would then unquestionably start to massacre the Greeks.

MR. POLK asked if Sir Eyre Crowe felt convinced of this?

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did.

MR. POLK said that his personal view was that if this line of action were followed all Asia Minor would eventually have to be occupied.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Greeks be left at Aidin but that they be not authorized to advance further. (This was agreed to.)

M. DE MARTINO wished to ask Sir Eyre Crowe if he could give him some information on the intentions of the British Government relative to the occupation of Aidin. According to a telegram which he had received from Italian Authorities on the spot, English troops were reported to be ready to advance on Aidin. General Montague Bates, commanding the 83rd Infantry Brigade, was said to be in command of those forces. On November 4th more than 70 cars were reported to have left for Afium Karahissar in order to transport the British Troops.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the British arrangement had been made in contemplation of Inter-Allied occupation. As no French troops could be sent he thought that the British troops would likewise not approach Aidin.

It was decided:

to approve the draft note to M. Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna prepared by the British Delegation (see Appendix "A") after making the following modifications therein:

- (1) on the second page of this draft note the sentence: "It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself observed along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation", should be changed to read, "It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation";
- (2) the clause: "In the meanwhile allowing the Greek troops to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai, according to General Milne's recommendation" should be eliminated.

It was further decided:

to refer to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims the questions pertaining to the administration of Smyrna (See Appendices "B" and "C"), and that the Commission should be at liberty to take the advice of Military Experts, in particular that of General Bunoust.

2. (The Council had before it a reply from the Roumanian Government transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires of France, dated November 2nd, to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers dated October 20th [12th]³ (See Appendix "D").) Reply of the Roumanian Government to the Note of October 20th [12th]

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the answer was very unsatisfactory and was even of a nature to cause anxiety.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed. He felt that the answer was practically a refusal of all the demands presented by the Supreme Council. The only point upon which the Roumanians had even partially agreed was the evacuation of Hungary, and even on that point the Roumanian Government had made a most formidable reservation with respect to the extent of the Hungarian territory to be evacuated. The Roumanian answer gave no satisfaction to the Council's demand relative to the evacuation in so far as concerned the withdrawal beyond the river Theiss. On all other points the answer was evasive and defiant. The Council should carefully examine the present situation in Roumania. Its authority must be respected. M. Bratiano was merely dilly-dallying and playing for time, and the measures adopted by him had resulted in deluding the majority of his countrymen into thinking him a great patriot. He (Sir Eyre Crowe) felt that if the King and the majority of the Roumanians were made clearly to see that a persistence in their present attitude would necessarily mean a breach with the Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania's exclusion from the Alliance, then Roumania would adopt a more compliant attitude. He thought that in such an event the present Government would be forced to retire and that a Ministry would be constituted which would see the wisdom of meeting the Council's just demands and would act accordingly. He thought the above considerations should be put very plainly to Roumania and that it should be told that if its reply to the communication proposed to be sent by the Council were not satisfactory it would mean the breaking off of relations between Roumania and the Allied and Associated Powers. The Roumanians could not be driven out of Hungary by force as the Council had no force to dispose of, and it seemed to him that the only alternative was the line of action he had proposed.

MR. POLK said he welcomed any strong action.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the action proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe was strong enough to meet the requirements of the situation.

M. DE MARTINO inquired if it would be wise to adopt in its entirety Sir Eyre Crowe's suggestion, which involved threatening Roumania. The resulting situation if the Roumanians should refuse to agree to

the action proposed should be examined. If the Roumanians refused the situation would be worse than it was before.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the terms of the communication to be sent to Roumania were reasonably clear. They could be plainly told that they would be no longer in the Alliance.

M. BERTHELOT reminded the Council that at the time of signing the Austrian Treaty it had considered telling Roumania that Bukovina would not be attributed to it, but that in the Austrian Treaty it would be given to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This had not been done as it had seemed too severe a measure to be judicious at that time. However, as it was now proposed to exert pressure on Roumania, it was well to examine the means of bringing this pressure to bear and a similar plan might now be considered. Roumania might be told that her claims to Transylvania would not be recognized and that the question of Bessarabia would not be discussed until it could be taken up with a reconstituted Russia. He pointed out that the Roumanian reply was satisfactory in so far as it announced the imminent withdrawal of the Roumanian forces to the Theiss; the result had been to facilitate negotiations with the Hungarians. What he was now suggesting was primarily theoretical. The question of the advisability of taking such measures must still be decided, for when considering the question of punishing a Government it would be well not to lose sight of the fact that the population should not be wholly antagonized.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Council that Sir George Clerk had referred in a former telegram⁴ to Roumanian atrocities in Transylvania and the Council had inquired what part of Transylvania was meant.⁵ This question had not yet been answered but he had that day received a mass of documents relative to outrages in Transylvania, an examination of which might lead to the conclusion that the inhabitants of Transylvania were not as favorable to Roumania as might have been thought.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that two distinct questions were raised. First, was there a basis of right for taking away from Roumania the

Hungarian territories in question? The second question related to the outrages committed by the Roumanians in Transylvania.

MR. POLK said that he had always felt that if Roumania refused to accede to the very reasonable demands of the Council she should not have Transylvania given to her. He thought that such action was entirely too generous.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that the difficulty was that if Transylvania were withheld from Roumania that would involve an occupation by Allied troops, which was obviously impossible.

MR. POLK observed that if these territories were withheld from Roumania she would at least be in a position of never having been given them. Although occupation by the Allies was out of the question, he thought that such action would at least have a great moral effect.

M. DE MARTINO thought that the point of prime importance was to rehabilitate the prestige of the Council. The action proposed by M. Berthelot was certainly rather severe. He would have to consult his Government on that point. In the meantime he thought that the Ministers at Bucarest might be instructed to take further action.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not think this advisable in as much as the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Bucarest had already done all they could do.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in his personal opinion a communication should be sent to Roumania in the nature of a real ultimatum. He would, however, have to consult his government before agreeing to send such a communication.

MR. POLK inquired if it were necessary to send a communication of that nature. Could not an answer be sent to Roumania pointing out that her latest communication to the Council was no answer at all, and demanding a satisfactory answer from her.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that the time for such action had gone by and that the present was the time to act firmly and decisively.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. POLK also agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Roumania should be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers would withdraw their representatives from Roumania and that the Roumanian representatives in the various capitals, as well as her representatives at the Peace Conference, must also be withdrawn. He further suggested that M. Berthelot should draft a note, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting, this note to be submitted to the Council as soon as the Heads of Delegations had been able to consult their respective Governments.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that a diplomatic rupture was a serious matter and inquired if it was to be resorted to at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his patience was utterly exhausted. He had been long suffering with the Roumanian Government and had even been reproached for that attitude. The Roumanians always tried to prolong *pourparlers* indefinitely, and this must be put an end to.

M. MATSUI agreed to the action proposed. He, of course, would have to consult his Government, which he thought would not raise any objections. He wished to point out that his Government had no diplomatic representation in Roumania. In the meantime, in as much as he might not be able to receive an answer from his Government until some time after the other members of the Council had heard from their respective Governments, he was willing to agree with the view which would be adopted.

M. BERTHELOT summarized the contents of the communication to be prepared by him. He would recall to Roumania all that had been done for her and in her behalf by the Allied and Associated Powers and would point out the refractory attitude consistently maintained by Roumania with respect to the just demands of the Supreme Council.

M. DE MARTINO called attention to one paragraph of the Roumanian note which seemed to him to have some merit. That was the paragraph dealing with the granting of authority to the Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission to receive complaints relative to unauthorized requisitions. Roumania had pointed out that in this respect she had been treated worse than the Jugo-Slav State had been in the matter of its requisitions in the Banat.

M. BERTHELOT explained that the situations were not at all analogous. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had never been in opposition to the Council on this question.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that he had lately received a visit from Colonel Dimitrescu. He did not know the Colonel and was unaware how much importance should be attached to his statements. By way of information, however, he wished to tell the Council that Colonel Dimitrescu had complained of the Council's attitude towards Roumania and had pointed out that the present Government in Roumania, mainly composed of Generals, was only able to attend to internal affairs; he therefore hoped that the Council would have patience with Roumania until elections had been held and a government constituted which was qualified to deal adequately with foreign affairs as well as internal matters.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that no importance should be attached to these remarks of Colonel Dimitrescu; M. Bratiano was behind the whole matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the Ministry of Generals had been put in power so that precisely that argument could be advanced.

It was decided:

That M. Berthelot should draft a note to the Roumanian Government, for submission to the Council, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.

3. (The Council had before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 9th (See Appendix "E") and a telegram from the Inter-

Allied Military Mission dated November 10th (See Appendix "F").)
Situation in Hungary

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that the situation in Hungary seemed to have greatly improved. He called attention to Sir George Clerk's request that about 20 officers be sent to Hungary to be attached to various army and police units.

M. DE MARTINO said that he was in favor of sending these officers if the other members of the Council were also.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question of their payment would surely be raised. It seemed to him that they might well be paid by the Hungarian army.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed and said that he also favored sending these officers.

MR. POLK said that at present Colonel Yates, he believed, was in charge of the reorganization of the Hungarian *Gendarmerie*. He thought that his Government would have no objection to sending a few officers to Hungary temporarily but he would of course have to consult his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that it might be well in replying to Sir George Clerk to warn him to be on his guard against a restoration of the Hapsburgs under any guise.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that this might be unnecessary in as much as Sir George Clerk had indicated that Friedrich's departure was imminent.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that his retirement in many ways resembled that of M. Bratiano. Although nominally retiring he would still be remaining in power. He thought it would be well to include a general phrase of the tenor above suggested by him.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

It was decided:

- (1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should prepare, for submission to the Council at its next meeting, a telegram to Sir George Clerk in answer to the telegram, dated November 9th, received from him, and taking into account the telegram received from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 10th;
- (2) that the Heads of Delegation should examine the question of sending a total of about 20 Allied officers to Hungary.

4. (The Council had before it a note relative to the expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation for Plebiscite Areas. (See Appendix "G").) Expenses of Transportation of the Inter-Allied Troops of Occupation, and Maintenance of Said Troops and of Commissions, for Plebiscite Areas

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon this note and pointed out that the German Government would certainly raise the question of the payment of expenses of transportation.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the work to be done by these troops would be for the account of various interested countries. He thought that those countries might well bear the expenses.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the proper solution, but wished to point out that in the case of Danzig and Memel the Council had decided that those expenses should be borne by the local authorities.⁶

MR. POLK suggested that the matter be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(This was agreed to.)

M. DE MARTINO wished to bring up a question closely related to the foregoing one. In the plebiscite areas the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions would entail expenses which had not yet been estimated with exactness. These expenses, however, would be considerable. According to the terms of the Treaty these expenses were to be met by the local revenues of each plebiscite area. In the case of Allenstein, Eastern Prussia might be called upon

for partial payment in case the local revenues were not sufficient. In the remaining areas the local revenues should suffice. Under these conditions it seemed necessary that a more or less accurate estimate of the expenses of maintenance of those troops and Commissions should at once be made by a Committee of Financial and Economic experts who would be charged with determining whether or not the whole of those expenses should be apportioned to the local revenues of the plebiscite zones.

GENERAL WEYGAND observed that he had only raised the question of the expenses of transportation. The question of the expenses of maintenance was a far larger one. There had as yet been no means of arriving at a very accurate estimate of the transportation expenses but from some figures at hand it seemed that they would amount to two or three million francs. The amount of the expenses of maintenance he thought could easily be calculated.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that this latter amount could not be estimated with great accuracy because it was impossible at that time to know how long the various areas would be occupied.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the occupation would not be effected by a large number of troops and would not last for a long time, except possibly in the case of Upper Silesia where the local revenues would be amply sufficient.

M. DE MARTINO suggested that the Drafting Committee also examine this question at the same time as the question of the expenses of transportation.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that he would be able, with the aid of the Allied Military Representatives, to estimate the expenses of maintenance, and he would communicate that estimate to the Drafting Committee.

It was decided:

- (1) that the note relative to the expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation for plebiscite areas should be

referred to the Drafting Committee for examination and report;
(2) that at the same time the Drafting Committee, after receiving from Marshal Foch an estimate of the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions in the plebiscite areas, should determine by whom such expenses should be borne in case the local revenues were not in all cases sufficient.

5. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that a telegram had been received from Sofia saying that the Bulgarians were prepared to sign the Treaty without any conditions whatever. M. Stambouliski was anxious to be present at the signature of the Treaty, but as he was just leaving Sofia he would not reach Paris for several days. He, (M. Berthelot) thought there would be no harm in awaiting M. Stambouliski's arrival before proceeding to the signature of the Treaty, all the more so as there were several details still to be settled. For instance the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government which had to sign the Austrian treaty before signing the Bulgarian treaty, was prepared to sign the former when the question of the distribution of tonnage had been adjusted. The Council had also decided that certain clauses were to be inserted in the Bulgarian Treaty relative to the neutrality of Switzerland. Signature of the Bulgarian Treaty

(It was agreed that there was no objection to awaiting the arrival of M. Stambouliski before proceeding to the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)

6. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that according to a telegram from Prague the Czecho-Slovak troops had already been ordered to evacuate the mining district of Salgo Tarjan without awaiting a prior reimbursement of the Czecho-Slovak Government for expenses incurred by it on behalf of Hungary. M. Benes had desired to remain in occupation of two points in the neutral zone by way of guarantee, but if the Council did not agree with him he was not prepared to insist. Retirement Czecho-Slovak Troops From Mining District of Salgo Tarjan

7. GENERAL WEYGAND reminded the Council that at its meeting of November 4th [7](#) it had approved the communication sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government relative to the interruption of

railroad traffic in the occupied regions of Germany. The German Government had complied with the terms of this communication. Therefore, the day before Marshal Foch had consented to allow certain reductions in railroad traffic in the occupied territories. The matter was at that time settled satisfactorily to both sides.

Interruption of Railroad Traffic in Germany

8. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that a telegram from Belgrade had announced that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government was ready to sign the Austrian Treaty as soon as the distribution of Austrian commercial tonnage had been adjusted.

M. DE MARTINO stated that he had been informed the previous day that his Government and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had reached a complete agreement on this point. Distribution of Austrian Commercial Tonnage Between the Italian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 12, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-90**

Note to Mr. Venizelos Relative to Report of the Smyrna Commission of Inquiry

MR. PRESIDENT: The Supreme Council has received the letter which you were good enough to send on the subject of the Smyrna Commission of Inquiry. It has also taken note of the report of that Commission, and has examined their conclusions.^{[8](#)}

During your hearing by the Supreme Council on Nov. 8th,^{[9](#)} you made certain reservations respecting the conditions imposed by that Commission on the Greek representative, Colonel Mazarakis. These conditions appear to have prevented him from questioning the Turkish witnesses, and even from reading and examining their depositions. As you already know, the Supreme Council had not been notified beforehand of the procedure contemplated by that Commission, and at the time when it decided to comply with your request relative to the communication of the testimony to the Greek

Commissioner, the work of the Commission was already so advanced that it was no longer possible to give effect to the Council's instructions.^{[10](#)}

While thus admitting the reasonableness of the reservations which you thought fit to express, the Supreme Council does not think that the results of the Inquiry can be regarded as wholly vitiated, in so far as the excesses and acts of violence committed by the Greek troops are concerned. The Council has paid its tribute to the impartiality of the Members of the Commission, and to the scrupulous conscientiousness with which their work was performed.

The Council agrees that the incidents, which took place after the debarkation of the Greek troops at Smyrna, appear to indicate an almost total absence of the precautionary measures on the part of the Greek civil and military authorities, which the circumstances required; this omission was the principal cause of the unfortunate incidents reported by the Commission.

It is of opinion that, on the whole, the responsibility for the excesses committed and for measures the severity of which was not justified by the actual circumstances, rests upon the Greek military authorities. You yourself, moreover, with the loftiness and sincerity of your character, have recognized these faults and these abuses, and have ordered the punishment of the guilty.

The Supreme Council invites your most serious attention to these grave mistakes and trusts that the experience acquired by the Greek administration will enable it to avoid repeating them in the future. It takes note of your declarations respecting the order now prevailing in the city and in its neighborhood. It hopes that the dangerous irritation which at present appears not to have entirely ceased along the limits of the zone of Greek occupation will gradually be diminished by the wisdom and justice of the Greek administration, and through the work of delimitation recently completed by General Milne, Commander of the Allied Forces in Macedonia.

Respecting the region of Aidin, the Powers have decided that in view of the practical difficulties and of the political drawbacks which the

organization of an Inter-Allied occupation might entail, they prefer to maintain the situation as it actually exists and the Greek occupation.

From another standpoint the Council wishes to obtain from you information as to the circumstances under which, in violation of the decisions of General Milne, the Greek troops are said to have crossed at Soma, under orders from the Greek Government, the line of demarkation fixed by the Inter-Allied High Command.

Lastly, the Supreme Council reminds you that the *de facto* occupation by the Greek troops of Smyrna and of the neighboring district was only decided upon because of existing circumstances, and creates no new right for the future. This is merely a provisional measure which leaves entire liberty to the Peace Conference to settle the various problems presented by the Eastern Question upon consideration of the General position of the world and of the wishes and interests of the populations concerned.

Appendix B to HD-90

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 3, 1919.

Telegram From the French High Commissioner at Constantinople

[2045]. The Allied High-Commissioners at Constantinople have the honor to inform their respective Governments that the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna is attempting, more and more, to replace the authority of the Delegates of the High Commissioners and of the Turkish Government by taking complete charge of all matters.

The Allied organizations controlling the press censorship, the port and the industries are interfered with to a great extent. The local police and courts are unable to function, as the Greek authorities refer not only the cases resulting from acts which would come regularly under military justice, but also all crimes or misdemeanors and even cases coming under the sole competence of civil courts, to the Greek Court Martial.

On several occasions the Allied High Commissioners have called these facts to the attention of the Greek Minister at Constantinople, but without result. They request that the Supreme Council take any steps which it may judge opportune to provoke a change in Mr. Sterghiadis' attitude, in order that the Interallied Organizations may perform the role which is assigned to them, and that the Ottoman Government functionaries may exercise their authority in accordance with the conditions covering the Greek military occupation.

Appendix C to HD-90

PARIS, November 4, 1919.

CONTENTS

Letter from the Greek Delegation on the situation at Smyrna, and the censorship exercised by the Delegates of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in that city.

GREEK DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONGRESS

From: Venizelos,

To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honor to call to the attention of the Supreme Council of the Conference the situation created in Smyrna on account of the method employed by the Delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers concerning preventative censorship of the local press.

They have been particularly severe in treating all publications favorable to Greek occupation. Recently, they suppressed an article, in *La Liberté* in which Mr. Sartiaux, a French Engineer, maintained that French and Greek interests in Asia Minor, far from conflicting, were in perfect accord, and another in which the Greek High-Commissioner was praised for his action in insuring the public

lighting system which was totally compromised by municipal negligence.

On the other hand, they show a growing sympathy toward the so-called Turk nationalists, by allowing the publication of articles tending to excite the Mussulman populations to revolt against the Greek authorities. In this way they give the impression to the agitators that their actions are tolerated and even encouraged by the Powers.

An incident which occurred last week in Smyrna furnished undeniable proof of this attitude.

The Turkish journal, the *Sark*, was allowed to publish a signed article, which was extremely violent in injuring Greece. This article stated, notably, that the Greeks, and, in general, those who have fought against Turkey, are, "Poisonous insects, sucking the blood of the Turks for a century and a half." This publication produced a profound impression in Mussulman circles, who interpreted, as is natural, the toleration of the Inter-Allied censorship as an indication both of disfavor toward the Greek and sympathy toward the young-Turk revolution.

Greek authority immediately instituted proceedings against the author of the article, proprietor of the journal,—a Turk of Bulgarian origin, formerly secretary of the Bulgarian Consulate at Smyrna,—and the responsible editor, before a court-martial which sentenced the first two to one year imprisonment and a fine of 2,000 drachmas, and the third to six months imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 drachmas. The latter, having a good record, was put on probation and accorded immediate liberty. The French and Italian Delegates, at first alone, then accompanied by their English colleague, immediately protested to the Greek High Commissioner, stating that they could not agree to the actions taken against the publications authorized by the Inter-Allied censorship. The High-Commissioner replied, with reason, that the Greek Army assumes a triple responsibility in Smyrna, that of its own security, and the maintenance of public order, and finally the common interest of all the Allies, which is to see the vanquished enemy kept powerless to

prejudice the Allied victories and resist the future decisions of the Conference as long as the armistice lasts. Conscious of these responsibilities, he fully approved the decision of the court-martial, as it was his strict duty to neglect nothing to prevent, in the zone of Greek occupation, an uprising of the Mussulman population. Mr. Sterghiadis further remarked that, from a juridical point of view, the visa of the censorship has no competence to suppress the publications of unlawful character, nor to prevent the proceedings to which such publications might give rise and which can, strictly speaking, include, in cases of extreme fault or fraud, the censors themselves.

He did not fail to add that these censors assumed a heavy responsibility by showing such a great severity toward everything favorable to Greek interest and so much indulgence toward everything which encouraged revolutionary actions on the part of the Turks. As to himself, if it were possible for him to be disinterested in the suppression of publications helpful or in praise of Greek occupation, it would be impossible for him to recognize that the Inter-Allied censorship has the right to protect the liberty of the Turkish press to the detriment of the security of the Greek army and of the maintenance of order.

I have hastened to give my full approval to this statement and to prescribe the proper measures for a checking of the dangers created by this state of affairs.

This occupation of Smyrna should have, naturally, caused the censorship of the press to be confided to Greek military authority. Desirous, however, of not wounding the susceptibility of the Allies, the Greek Government has tolerated the Inter-Allied censorship—and it is inclined to continue to do so—but in order to parry the serious incidents which have just been indicated, the Greek Government has decided to have a parallel and independent censorship exercised by the Greek military authorities. Thus, in the future, if the Inter-Allied censorship continues to prevent all publications which appear reprehensible to it, the Greek censorship can, in its turn, prevent all publications contrary to Greek interests. This procedure can be a particular advantage, and is authorized by

the Salonika precedent, by which, during the war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern armies reserved the right to exercise, parallelly with the Greek censorship, and Inter-Allied censorship, although the occupied country was Greek and therefore Allied. This system would have still greater justification in Smyrna, as the army of occupation is in enemy country, and has more to fear for its security.

In bringing the preceding to the attention of Your Excellency, I seize the opportunity to point out that certain agents of the Powers disregard the intentions of their Governments, and continue to manifest, in a most unpleasant fashion, the ill humor which they feel in seeing Smyrna occupied by Greek forces. Considering the responsibilities which it has assumed by virtue of the mandate vested in it in Asia Minor, the Greek Government is unable—despite the deference which it is disposed to show toward the Delegates of the Allied Powers—to allow the security of its army to be imperiled, or the maintenance of public order confided to its trust to be compromised.

I am persuaded that by these actions, the Greek Government complies with the real intentions of the Allied Powers, which for these reasons, should instruct their agents at Smyrna to consider the situation with the objectivity necessary in order to avoid the regrettable complications which the enemies of the Entente alone are able to take advantage of.

Please agree, etc.

VENIZELOS

Appendix D to HD-90

[Reply of the Rumanian Government to the Note From the Supreme Council of October 12]

VERBAL NOTE

The Rumanian Government thanks the Supreme Council for the expressions of friendship and confidence which have been expressed and which are in accord with the firm desires of Rumania to maintain and develop her alliance and close collaboration.

The Rumanian Government leaves nothing undone to accord the interests of Rumania with those of the Representatives of the Conference in every instance.

To that end, anxious to avoid any delays which, under the present circumstances in Hungary, might aggravate the situation, it hastens to reply to the proposals of the Conference regarding the institution and operation of Inter-Allied Commissions at Budapest. The Rumanian Government thinks it opportune to not postpone their operation until the solution of the other two points presented in the last note from the Supreme Council concerning the Rumano-Hungarian frontiers and the Peace Treaty with Austria, relative to which the Rumanian Government begs to again call the attention of the Peace Conference by exposing the Rumanian point of view which it will have the honor to forward later.

The Rumanian Government is also happy to see that the Supreme Council, after having received and examined the Rumanian point of view as presented by Mr. Bratiano, affirm that there is not any noticeable difference of opinion on the general principle, in conformity with which the question of the requisitions made by the Rumanian army in Hungary is to be resolved.

As to the application of these principles, Rumania gladly accepts the proposal of the Supreme Council to have an Inter-Allied Commission instituted at Budapest, and is ready to designate a Rumanian representative to that Commission.

It further accepts—although not recognizing the necessity, that Inter-Allied organizations be established at Szolnok and Csongrad without delay for the control and verification of the car clearance of the trains crossing these bridges en route to Rumania. However, it would be opportune to accord other duties to these commissions and in

particular give them full authority to enforce the unloading of merchandise.

Concerning the abusive application of the general instructions relative to requisitions, the Rumanian Government regrets to note that the Supreme Council considered them of an importance and nature which correspond neither with the spirit of the order or the discipline of the Rumanian army.

The isolated cases which have been indicated to the Rumanian Government shall be investigated and any abuses confirmed shall be repaired and punished. However, to give the sub-Commission on Reparations authority to receive complaints concerning abusive requisitions would be submitting the Rumanian military authorities to an International treatment to which none of the other Allied armies of occupation have been subjected. Under similar circumstances, it is well known that the Serbian army refused to admit the application of analogous measures in the Banat, at the time the French command made a proposal to that effect, and the representatives of the Conference did not insist on compliance by the Government at Belgrade, despite numerous complaints from those affected.

The Rumanian Government fully shares the point of view of the Supreme Council with regard to the nature of the Hungarian Government and the conditions it must comply with. Having already turned over the rifles and ammunition destined for the police and Hungarian *gendarmerie*, the Rumanian forces have received orders to evacuate Hungary as far as the Theiss. They have postponed this evacuation up to the present time only at the request of the Allied representatives. They will also leave the territories between the Theiss and the new frontiers as soon as the Hungarian Government is in a position to furnish the necessary guarantees for the security of these territories.

According to the agreement established between the Rumanian High Command and the Representative of the Conference at Budapest, the retreat of the Rumanian troops will commence on November 10, with a margin of 3 days more or less, according to necessity.

The Rumanian Government is now preoccupied entirely with the work of reconstructing the Rumanian countries drained and impoverished by the countless extortions effected by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies during their occupation.

GENERAL VAITOIANU

NOVEMBER 2, 1919.

Appendix E to HD-90

Telegram From Sir George Clerk, Budapest, to the Supreme Council, November 9, 1919

No. 6

With reference to telegrams Nos. 3^{[12](#)} and 4.^{[13](#)}

I venture to express my sincere opinion that decisions of Supreme Council in regard to evacuation by Roumanians Czechs and Serbians and to action to be taken at Prague on question of coal will greatly help situation here. Atmosphere generally is much better than it was a fortnight ago and much uneasiness and mistrust has been dissipated. Most significant sign is that Admiral Horthy and leaders of extreme left met in my house two days ago and Admiral Horthy's declaration of impartiality and discipline of his army was fully accepted. There will always be a certain risk of incidents when Roumanians evacuate Budapest and Hungarians take over control but I had made up my mind as soon as I came here that such risk must be taken as nothing can really be done until Roumanians have left and I feel today danger is immeasurably less. Inter-Allied Mission of Generals, Admiral Troubridge and I have complete confidence in Admiral Horthy's loyalty and sincerity and there is every reason to believe his hold over army is really effective.

Question of police and *gendarmerie* is somewhat different. I had already discussed matter with Inter-Allied Mission and I feel that their authority over police and *gendarmerie* is a guarantee against latter abusing their power. It is scarcely possible for Allies to send troops or even police in sufficient numbers and my considered

opinion is that we must trust to our influence over Hungarian troops, *gendarmarie* and police.

Inter-Allied Mission of Generals agree but we would suggest immediate despatch of 20 Allied officers rank of major and captain to be attached to various armies and police units would be valuable safeguard and assistance.

Political situation is developing satisfactorily though there are still many obstacles to be overcome before complete solution can be reached. It must be realised that great bulk of opinion mostly ignorant in country stands behind Friedrich. Pendulum has swung violently from left to right but is now beginning to come slowly towards centre. But allowance must be made for present state of populace and to some extent to natural prejudice and changes of Government must be effected with as little disturbance of populace as possible.

All responsible politicians even these in Friedrich's cabinet now realise that coalition government must come and idea is becoming familiar to masses. Difficulties now are mainly reconciliation of personal interests and private political ambitions. I am not without hope of overcoming these difficulties only patience is required.

General sentiment of political leaders in country today so clearly recognises lines on which solution must be found and general atmosphere is so much better than it was a fortnight ago that I am fairly confident that law and order will be maintained. Impartiality of my mission is I think universally recognised as well as desire of Allies to help Hungary and confidence felt in mission of Generals and Admiral Troubridge is a moral factor of immense value.

It may take a little time to get satisfactory solution and Friedrich may resign and talk big but I am now much less anxious about internal peace and quiet here and Hungarian forces being used for reaction and oppression. While we are all here Hungarians will behave soberly.

Mission of Generals and Admiral Troubridge agree with terms of this telegram.

Appendix F to HD-90

No. 831

BUDAPEST, November 10, 1919.

From: Inter-Allied Military Mission,

To: Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, Paris.

The Rumanian Command today submitted a plan for the evacuation of Hungary as far as the Theiss river. The evacuation will commence on November 13th and will last 10 days. The Rumanian representative was requested to give details concerning the continuation of the retreat to the frontier, but replied that orders covering the evacuation beyond the Theiss had not yet been received from Bucarest. The Rumanian plan implies the removal of all temporary bridges on the Theiss. The Mission will demand that these bridges and also the pontoon bridges be preserved until the retreat toward the frontier be completed. At the request of the Rumanians, the Allied guards will take over the Danube bridges and those which unite Bude to Pest on the morning of the 14th, until such time as the Rumanians will have evacuated the city. An Inter-Allied Commission has been designated to supervise the Hungarian Government in its disposition of the war prisoners detained by the Rumanians. The Mission recommends that all war prisoners be released by the Rumanians and given a chance to choose between Hungarian and Rumanian nationality without any conditions as to their former residence.

INTER-ALLIED MILITARY MISSION, *Budapest*

Appendix G to HD-90

No. 1274 CRF

NOVEMBER 11, 1919.

Note on the Subject of Transportation Expenses of the Allied Contingents Designated To Occupy the Territories of Dantzig, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Memel, Schleswig, and Upper-Silesia

Marshal Foch has issued a memorandum of the questions for joint study with the Delegates of the German Government, relative to regulating the transportation arrangements of the Allied contingents designated for the occupation of Dantzig, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Memel, Schleswig and Upper-Silesia across Germany.

Among these questions is that of reimbursing the German railroads for the transportation cost.

All measures have been provided for the verification of transportation rights.

The question of final distribution of these expenditures will be decided later.

The Peace Treaty contains no provision relative to the transportation expenses of troops to the above-mentioned territories.

The only provisions carried in the Treaty treat expenses entailed by the Commissions, for their operations and the administration of the territories.

The provisions specified in Articles 95 (Eastern Prussia), 108 (Dantzig), 109 (Schleswig), differ, and are, at times, contingent upon a subsequent decision by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Under these circumstances, it is requested that the Peace Conference be asked to kindly decide upon whom the above-mentioned expenses will be incumbent.

P. O. Major General
WEYGAND

¹ Appendix A is apparently a revision of the draft here referred to.

² Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, [Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204](#).

³ See telegram to the British Chargé at Bucharest, October 11, appendix B to HD-68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#).

⁴ Appendix B to HD-83, [vol. VIII, p. 947](#).

⁵ HD-83, minute 2, [ibid., p. 936](#).

⁶ HD-75, minute 2, [vol. VIII, p. 747](#).

⁷ HD-83, minute 1, [vol. VIII, p. 936](#).

⁸ Appendix A to HD-87, p. 44 [*Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 3*].

⁹ HD-87, minute 2, p. 36 [*Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 3*].

¹⁰ HD-64, minute 6, [vol. VIII, p. 463](#); HD-71, minute 3, [ibid., p. 675](#).

¹² Appendix A to HD-85, p. 9 [*Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 1*].

¹³ Appendix B to HD-85, p. 9 [*Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 1*].

November 13, 10:30 a.m. (HD-91)

[7] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 13, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 13, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/91

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/91

HD-91

[Document 7]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 13, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 13, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West
General Groves
Lt.-Colonel Kisch
Commander Lucas
Mr. L. Leeper
Mr. Palairat

FRANCE
Colonel Roye
Captain Roper
M. Laroche

ITALY
Lt.-Colonel Piccio
M. Vannutelli-Rey

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

M. PICHON stated that M. Clemenceau had asked him to apologize for being unable to be present at the opening of the meeting. He proposed to start with the second item on the agenda, viz; the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

1. (The Council had before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk prepared by Sir Eyre Crowe (See Appendix "A").) Draft Telegram to

Sir Clerk George

SIR EYRE CROWE called the attention of the Council to the last paragraph of the draft telegram. He had thought it necessary to call the attention of the Hungarian Government very specially to the necessity of its troops evacuating the Comitadjes of Western Hungary, which had been given to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain.¹

It was decided:

to approve the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk (See Appendix "A").

2. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd (See Appendix "B") and a note from the British Delegation dated November 11th (See Appendix "C").) Instructions to Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the Supreme Council at its meeting of November 1st^{1a} had decided to obtain the advice of the Drafting Committee on the draft note prepared by the Aeronautical Representatives² in answer to a communication of the German Government dated October 12th.³ The Drafting Committee, having alluded to the fact that the question was already covered by a paragraph of the protocol to be signed by the German Plenipotentiaries,⁴ had concluded that it was useless to send that note.⁵ Since then, the question had again been discussed by the Aeronautical experts and the Drafting Committee. They had come to the conclusion that the protocol did not cover all the violations which the Germans had committed under that heading. Under these conditions it appeared advisable to reply to the German note of October 12th, and he thought that it would be necessary to put the question once more before the Drafting Committee.

M. DE MARTINO agreed that Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal was very opportune. It was a most important point which they should not

leave in the air, and he insisted that the proposal of the British representative be taken into consideration.

CAPTAIN ROPER said it was indeed extremely advisable that the views of the Supreme Council on that point should be made clear. There were, however, two ways of proceeding: they could either reply directly to the German Armistice Commission, or confine themselves to sending instructions to General Masterman.⁶ The draft instructions could be sent immediately, but the Drafting Committee was of the opinion that it would be advisable to await the coming into force of the Treaty before answering the Germans.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Drafting Committee might prepare at the same time draft instructions for General Masterman and a reply to the German Armistice Commission, which would be sent at a later date.

MR. POLK wished to ask to what extent the Germans could dispose of their aeronautical materiel, balloons, Zeppelins, etc.

GENERAL GROVES stated that the Germans could not dispose of anything which might be considered military or naval aeronautical materiel.

MR. POLK inquired who was the court of appeal on the military or naval character of that materiel?

GENERAL GROVES answered that it was the Aeronautical Commission of Control.

It was decided:

to entrust the Drafting Committee to prepare in agreement with the technical experts.

- (1) draft instructions for General Masterman;
- (2) a reply to the German note of October 12th, concerning German aeronautical materiel. (See Appendices "B" and "C").

3. (The Council had before it a draft letter to the German Delegation regarding elections in Upper Silesia (See Appendix "D").) Municipal Elections in Upper Silesia

MR. POLK said that the elections which had just taken place in Upper Silesia were partly favorable to the Poles. Would it not be inadvisable under these circumstances, to oblige the Plebiscite Commission to hold these elections in all cases null and void.

M. LAROCHE said he had asked himself the same question. The Polish Press considered those elections a great success for the Polish cause. The German papers, however, brought out the fact that the Poles had not obtained half the votes recorded. From a legal point of view it seemed difficult to annul the elections only in part; he thought it better to stick to the principle of declaring all elections void. The Plebiscite Commission might take on the spot all necessary administrative measures to maintain, in extraordinary cases the election in certain municipalities.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that Mr. Polk's observation might be satisfied by changing the last paragraph. They might use instead of saying, "That the Powers will consider as null and void", the words, "That they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc." On the other hand, the Powers wished this note to put an end to the exchange of correspondence with the Germans on that question. He, therefore, thought it more advisable to omit the paragraph beginning with the words, "in this connection the observations, etc."; as a matter of fact that paragraph contained allegations of fact which the Germans would be tempted to answer. If this omission were approved, the fifth paragraph beginning with the words, "It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc." might well be placed at the end of paragraph 2 which began with the words, "if the Versailles Treaty, etc."

It was decided:

to approve the draft letter to the German Delegation concerning municipal elections in Upper Silesia, with the following changes:

- (1) omission of paragraph 4, beginning with the words, "In this connection, etc."
- (2) paragraph 5, beginning with the words, "It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc." should be placed at the end of paragraph 2, which begins with the words, "If the Versailles Treaty, etc."
- (3) in the last paragraph replace the words, "that they will consider as null and void" by the words, "That they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc." (See Appendix "D").

4. (The Council had before it a letter from General Nollet to the President of the Conference, dated November 1st, (See Appendix "E"). Allowances to General Officers Attached to Military Control Who Are Not Chairmen Either of Commissions or Subcommissions

COLONEL ROTE read and commented upon the letter from General Nollet.

SIR EYRE CROWE said this was an important question, and he wished to know if the proposal made by General Nollet had the approval of the French Government.

M. PICHON said that the French Government had confined itself to communicating the letter of General Nollet to the Council without taking any position in the matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the questions with reference to the organization of these Commissions had been discussed very thoroughly and the draft which had been finally arrived at was the result of a compromise. It had been decided that the allowances would only be given in virtue of the function exercised by the officers, without taking into account their rank or situation. This question was an important one because its solution affected the problem of Reparations. If they now decided to give special allowances to officers on the ground that they were General Officers or because they were the senior representatives of their country, they would be departing entirely from the principles followed up to this time. He would very much like to have the opinion of the French Government

on that point, on the one hand because the French element was very strongly represented on the Commissions of Control operating in Germany, and because, on the other hand, it had seemed to him that the French Government was opposed in principle to any measure calculated to diminish the Separations fund. Should the Council be of the opinion that the request of General Nollet should be answered, he personally would not oppose it, but he wished to point out that they would be committing themselves to a new principle on a question which affected the problem of Reparations.

(At this point M. Clemenceau entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that it was advisable to adhere to the ruling which they had previously fixed. The arguments given by General Nollet did not seem very convincing. They had decided to remunerate, not the rank or situation, but the function, and he did not believe that there was any reason to change their attitude on that point.

COLONEL ROYE said that it was to be feared that, on account of the existing high cost of living in Germany, the allowances to officers mentioned in the letter of General Nollet might not be sufficient.

M. DE MARTINO said it was understood that no negative conclusion would be arrived at on this day, and that the question should be referred back to General Nollet for further information.

M. CLEMENCEAU said General Nollet's proposal did not seem to him to have sufficient grounds; but if he gave the Council some better arguments in a further note, he personally would not object to examining the question anew.

It was decided:

to adjourn the question raised by the letter of General Nollet dated November 1st, pending further information to be furnished by him. (See Appendix "E").

5. (The Council had before it a draft note to the Roumanian Government prepared by M. Berthelot, (See Appendix "F") Draft

Note to the Roumanian Government

M. BERTHELOT read the draft note, the Roumanian

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to inform the Council that he had been asked to receive General Coanda and M. Antonescu; he would receive them that afternoon, and he intended to confine himself to advising them to accept without further delay all the demands which were formulated by the Conference.

MR. POLK asked whether, in making reference in the second last paragraph of the letter to: "arrangements to be concluded with Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia" they did not seem to commit themselves to giving Bessarabia to Roumania, in the event of the latter country complying with the Council's demands.

M. BERTHELOT did not think so; the question certainly had been discussed by a Commission which had come to the unanimous decision to give the whole of Bessarabia to Roumania, but the Council had not taken any decision to that effect, and its liberty of action remained unimpaired.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated they would wait before taking a final resolution until all the delegates had received their instructions.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated he had already received his.

MR. POLK thought that the instructions he already had gave him sufficient authority to accept the draft under discussion. He would, however, let the Council know his decision at the next meeting.

M. DE MARTINO said that, as far as he was concerned, he expected to receive his instructions that very evening. He felt the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview which M. Clemenceau would have that afternoon with General Coanda and M. Antonescu. He expressed the hope that M. Clemenceau would speak to them with the firmness which he so well knew how to employ, and felt certain that he would obtain the results the Council desired. General Coanda was very intimate with M. Bratiano and capable of having a good influence upon him. He wondered whether it was wise to

discuss, as they were doing in the draft before them, the behavior of Roumania during the war. They were running the risk of starting a polemic, for Roumania would certainly be sure to answer that she had herself been abandoned by Russia.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that they also had been abandoned by Russia, which had not prevented their carrying on the war to an end. Three months before the Bucharest Peace^{6a} he had warned M. Bratiano that he was committing his country to a disastrous policy. M. Bratiano had protested that he would never conclude a separate peace, a protest which had not prevented his doing so.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether a period of six days was not a little short.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied he thought there was point in giving the Roumanians a rather short period; they would thus bring them to ask for a prolongation which the Council would grant. But the very fact of their having asked for a prolongation would, as a matter of fact, commit the Roumanians to an answer.

M. DE MARTINO thought it would be necessary to impose upon the Roumanians a definite time for the evacuation of the Hungarian territory to the east of the Theiss.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to know whether the Council would give him authority to acquaint unofficially the Roumanian delegates he was to see that afternoon with the draft under discussion.

MR. POLK said he would very willingly give this authority, especially as this document seemed to him remarkably well drafted.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what their attitude would be should the Roumanian delegates, after having been unofficially acquainted with the draft note, ask for a postponement of the official communication of the note.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they should in any case send the note as soon as it had been definitely approved.

It was decided:

to authorize M. Clemenceau to communicate unofficially to the Roumanian delegates the substance of the draft note to the Roumanian Government (See Appendix "F").

6. MR. POLK wished to ask, as a matter of information, whether the situation had been modified since the Luxemburg question had been discussed in the Council.⁷ He had been informed that the British Government had recognized the Government of the Grand Duchess. Recognition of Grand-Dual Government of Luxemburg

M. CLEMENCEAU had not heard that there had been any such recognition on the part of the British Government. Great Britain had only sent a representative to the wedding of the Grand Duchess. He would, however, be glad if Sir Eyre Crowe would acquaint himself with the exact situation. The situation as between France and Luxemburg was as follows: The majority of the Luxemburgers was favorable to a "rapprochement" with France, but the French did not wish to commit themselves to a policy which might involve them in difficulties with Belgium. As for the present Government of Luxemburg, the Grand Duchess was German by birth, and he believed, by sympathy. She was, however, obliged at this time to appear very francophile. There were no present difficulties between France and Belgium on the general question. The only question in dispute was a certain railroad administered by the Alsace-Lorraine Railroads, which Bismarck had taken away from France in 1871. The Belgians were claiming this railroad, which the French could not give them. That was a very small difficulty, which furthermore, was on the point of being settled. It was essential that the Principal Powers should act in accord concerning the recognition of the present Luxemburg Government.

M. BERTHELOT said the Belgians had asked the French whether they intended to recognize the Grand Ducal Government. They had answered it was for the Belgians first to take a decision on that point. The Belgians had then said they preferred to abstain provisionally from recognizing the Government of the Grand Duchess, and the French has based their attitude upon the Belgian. The sending of a

representative by the British Government to the wedding of the Grand Duchess had been a mere act of courtesy. Nevertheless from information they had received, it would appear that there had been at the same time recognition of the Luxemburg Government by Great Britain.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he would get information on the subject and communicate it to the Council.

(The question was then adjourned.)

7. MR. POLK wished to say a few words to the Council on the question of German oil tank ships. On September 27th,⁸ the Supreme Council by a vote to which he was a party, had decided Tank ships to ask the Germans to deliver the 14 German oil tank ships which were lying at Hamburg. Since that date he had several times discussed the question with Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Henry Berenger. There was a good deal of feeling in America on the question: for that reason he earnestly wished that, pending the outcome of negotiations, the ships under discussion should stay where they were. He thought his proposal would not raise any difficulties, as he hoped to arrive at a solution within three or four days. German Oil Tank Ships

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what were his objections to these ships being taken to an Allied port?

MR. POLK said that certain declarations Mr. Hoover had made had given the impression in America that the fate of these ships was already settled. Out of that arose the question which was the object of the negotiations then in progress.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that in the protocol submitted for the German signature the Council had confirmed the decision of September 27th by asking the delivery of all these ships, without specifying them by name. It did not seem possible to ask the Germans now to keep these ships; that would be to publish a difference of views between the Allies. It was to be hoped, however, that the Germans had not yet delivered the ships in question. If by chance they had already done so it would be sufficient to instruct the

Naval Armistice Commission to retain these ships without doing anything with them for the moment. He hoped Mr. Polk would not see any objection to this procedure.

MR. POLK said that the record of the meeting of September 27th showed that those ships were to be delivered to the Allies, but did not specify under what conditions the temporary operation of these ships should be regulated. He feared that if these ships were to be delivered by the Germans in the Firth of Forth a wrong interpretation of this measure would spread in America.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the discussion be adjourned to the following day.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 13, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-91

PARIS, November 12, 1919.

Telegram From the Supreme Council to Sir George Clerk

The Supreme Council have this morning considered your telegram No. 6 of November 9th.⁹ They desire to express their satisfaction at the success with which your efforts to unite different parties in a temporary coalition government are meeting. The Supreme Council are gratified to learn that in your opinion Admiral Horthy's assurances that the troops under his command will submit themselves to the wishes of the Peace Conference may be regarded as inspiring confidence. You will no doubt continue to bear in mind and to impress on all parties concerned that whatever political arrangements are now arrived at, they must afford no opportunity for aiding or favoring the return, whether by overt or covert methods, of the Hapsburg dynasty, an event which the Allied and Associated Powers would regard as a disaster and would in no case permit.

You will by this time have received the communications of the Supreme Council to the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments, dated November 7th calling on them to evacuate such parts of Hungary as are at present occupied by their forces.^{9a} Satisfactory assurances have already been received from the Czecho-Slovak Government. In a note from the Roumanian Government received yesterday,¹⁰ an undertaking is given of immediate evacuation of Hungary, but only as far as the Theiss. The Supreme Council have already, as you know, informed the Roumanian Government that they are required to evacuate the whole of Hungary at present occupied by them.¹¹ The Roumanian note is unsatisfactory in every respect and the Supreme Council are now considering what attitude they should adopt to make their authority respected. As soon as a decision is reached, you shall be duly informed.

The Supreme Council have also considered your proposal that the Allies should despatch twenty officers with the rank of major and captain for the Hungarian *gendarmerie*. They are favorably disposed to this proposal, but a reference to the several Governments is necessary before it can be definitely approved. The expenditure involved would no doubt be borne on the budget of the *gendarmerie* and be at the charge of the Hungarian Government.

* [—] The Supreme Council continue to receive from Vienna complaints that the troops of General Horthy refuse to evacuate the districts of Western Hungary assigned to the Austrian Republic by the treaty of St. Germain. They ask you to call the attention of the Hungarian military authorities to the necessity of agreeing to the territorial frontiers fixed by the peace conference as a preliminary to any measures of recognition or support.

Appendix B to HD—91

DRAFTING COMMITTEE
OF THE CONFERENCE

Note for the General Secretariat

In view of the clauses of the Protocol addressed to Germany,¹² it did not appear, in accord with the Inter-Allied High Command, opportune to reply to the German Note of October 12,¹³ relative to aeronautical material, at the present time.

In case, however, that the Inter-Allied Aviation Service would deem it necessary to not leave the said German note without response, it would be advisable to wait until the entry into force of the Treaty, as the stipulations of the Treaty could be more forcefully supported by the Aeronautic Control Mission which at that time will be definitely qualified to act officially.

For the Drafting Committee,
HENRI FROMAGEOT

NOVEMBER 3, 1919.
Appendix C to HD-91

11 NOVEMBER, 1919.

*[The British Delegation to the Secretary General of the Peace
Conference (Dutasta)]*

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: Your Excellency will no doubt remember that the Supreme Council, at its meeting on the morning of November 1st,¹⁴ decided to refer to the Legal Advisers a draft note prepared by the Aeronautical representatives¹⁵ in reply to the communication of the German Government of the 12th October relative to the sale of German Aeronautical material to foreign countries.¹⁶ The Council instructed the Legal Advisers to report on the question whether it would be necessary to despatch this note in view of the fact that the matter formed the subject of a paragraph in the Protocol¹⁷ which it is proposed to oblige the German plenipotentiaries to sign as a condition of the ratification of the Treaty of Peace.

At the meeting of the Council held on the same afternoon,¹⁸ the Legal Advisers reported that, in their opinion, the paragraph in question rendered the despatch of a separate note unnecessary and the Council accordingly decided that no note should be sent.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, since this decision was taken, the French and British aeronautical experts and the French and British Legal Advisers have again discussed the question and have arrived at the conclusion that the paragraph in the Protocol referred to above does not adequately deal with all the offences committed by the Germans in connection with this matter and that notably the following resolutions passed by the Supreme Council are not covered by the paragraph:

“That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.

“That the German Government shall be informed that the 500 engines sold to private companies shall be delivered to the Allies at once at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall forthwith be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. (August 6th).

“Most particularly, Germany may neither sell, give away or export any aeronautical material (aircraft, motors, spare parts) including motors captured from the Allies, or converted aircraft known as civil aircraft, which are in fact war material. (August 22nd).

“That all aeronautical material existing in Germany shall be considered as war material and may in consequence be neither transported, removed, lent, used nor destroyed, but shall be stored until such time as the Inter-Allied Supervisory Air Commission shall have made a pronouncement with regard thereto. (September 29th).[”]

The propriety of some of these resolutions is indeed even questioned in the German note of October 12th, to which the draft, suppressed by the Council, was intended to be the reply.

It appears most desirable that these resolutions, which have been transmitted to the German Government, should if possible be rigorously enforced, and it would appear that this can be done by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control as soon as ratifications of the Treaty have been deposited and the Commission begins to work.

If this is the case, it would seem advisable that the Supreme Council should address a communication to that effect to the Chairman of the Commission who, if he attempted to enforce the resolutions in present circumstances, would doubtless lay himself open to the retort that the German authorities have received no answer to the communication which they have addressed to the Supreme Council questioning its right to pass these resolutions.

It should further be noted that the German note referred to also raises certain points regarding the interpretation of the Treaty which require decisions of the Council for the guidance of General Masterman, to whom the German Aeronautical authorities have communicated to the substance of the note.

I would accordingly venture to suggest that the Legal Advisers should be requested to examine the German note of October 12th in connection with the resolutions above-quoted and to draft a communication to General Masterman on the subject for submission to the Supreme Council.

Believe me, my dear Ambassador,

Yours sincerely,

[No signature on file copy]

His Excellency MONSIEUR P. DUTASTA, *Ambassador,
Secretary General of the Peace Conference,
Paris.*

Proposed Letter to the German Delegation

To Baron von Lersner, President of the German Delegation.

In response to the question asked on October 30 last by the Allied and Associated Powers,¹⁹ the German Delegation replied, on November 7, that the municipal elections in Upper-Silesia would take place on the 9th instant.²⁰ At the same time, it explained the motives for which the Prussian Government thought it could disregard the observations of the Allied and Associated Powers.

If the literal meaning of the Treaty of Versailles be strictly adhered to, there can be no question but that the Prussian State has the right, up to the coming into force of the Treaty, to administer the territory of Upper-Silesia to be submitted to a plebiscite.

In fact, there is no doubt but that the results of the municipal elections conducted under these circumstances, being the first popular vote since the signing of the Treaty, would be interpreted by the national parties in opposition as an indication of their respective strengths, which indication might be falsified in such a manner as to prejudice the result of the plebiscite. It would therefore seem probable that these elections are to serve as pretext to an agitation destined to influence the future vote relative to the destiny of the country, although the conditions under which the balloting is taking place at the present time are far from resembling those which are to govern the operations of the plebiscite.

In this respect, the statements contained in your letter of November 7 relative to voting facilities to the Poles, and even to refugees, could not even be alluded to. Everybody knows that a large number of Poles had to leave Upper-Silesia on account of recent troubles. As to those who remained, the Allied and Associated Powers have good reasons to fear that they are not in the proper condition to express their vote with all the desired freedom.

Moreover, it is surprising that the Prussian Government, in order to proceed to these elections, has awaited the moment when the coming into force of the Treaty, it cannot deny this, is near.

Under these conditions, the Allied and Associated Powers are obliged to inform the German Government that they consider the municipal elections which have been held by Germany in Upper-Silesia before the coming into force of the Treaty, and against their motivated advice, null and void. The International Commission will therefore be invited to take the proper measures in this respect immediately upon its going into operation.

Please accept, etc.

Appendix E to HD-91

BERLIN, November 1, 1919.

CONTENTS

Letter, dated Nov. 1, from General Nollet relative to allowances for officers on Commissions of Control who are presidents neither of Commissions nor of Sub-Commissions.

DELEGATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED
MILITARY CONTROL COMMISSION
PRESIDENCY

From: General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.

To: The President of the Peace Conference, Versailles.

Under date of October 20th, 1919,^{[21](#)} the Supreme Council decided to again submit for supplementary information, the question of functional allowances to be allotted to general officers who are members of the Control Commissions in Germany, and are neither Presidents of Commissions nor of Sub-Commissions.

I have the honor to expose herein reasons tending to justify that the Generals above referred to be considered as of similar standing as the Presidents of sub-Commissions. This similarity of status was requested in my letter, No. 86, of October 9th.^{[22](#)}

There are two of these Generals on the Military Commission: General Calcagno, and General De Guffroy, respective heads of the Italian and Belgian Delegations; they have, for this reason, expenses resulting, not only from the command which they exercise in this capacity, but from their obligations towards the military of their nationality who, although not under their orders, stay in or pass through Berlin. Furthermore, their particular position as heads of delegations, which gives them an important consultative role in the Councils of the Military Mission, involves, of necessity, certain appearances, which incur considerable expense, owing to the conditions in Berlin. Therefore, it seems only just that General Calcagno and General De Guffroy be placed on the same status as the Presidents of sub-Commissions.

The same measures, it appears to me, should be applied concerning Colonel Furuya, Head of the Japanese Delegation, whose situation, in spite of the difference of rank, which should not enter into consideration in particular cases, is identical with that of the two generals referred to.

Finally, it should also be applied concerning General Walsh, Assistant to the President of the Military Commission. This general, in fact, will have frequent missions to perform in Germany in the course of which repeated contact with the various organs of the Commission will necessitate certain appearances, the cost of which should not be exclusively incumbent on him.

In conclusion, I have the honor to ask, for the above reasons, that the functional allowances granted to Presidents of sub-Commissions be also allowed to the Heads of the Belgian, Italian and Japanese Delegations, and to the General, Assistant to the President of the Military Commission.

NOLLET

Draft of a Note to the Rumanian Government

The Supreme Council has fully noted the Rumanian reply dated November 2nd and signed by General Vaitoianu.²³ The Council is obliged to affirm that this note is entirely unsatisfactory to the Allied and Associated Powers, and very seriously compromises relations between Rumania and the Allies. The Allies must request the Rumanian Government to make an unconditional answer.

Since the commencement of August, that is, from the time of the Rumanian occupation of Budapest, the Peace Conference has unceasingly requested Rumania to adopt an attitude in Hungary consistent with the principles of the Allies in common, and the engagements by which they are bound.

With indefatigable patience, and animated by the respect of the Allies for one another, and with the hope that the Rumanian Government would finally realize that it cannot with impunity, disregard these principles, and escape the reciprocal engagements of the Allies, the Peace Conference has made every effort to maintain the ties which unite the Allies with Rumania and to obtain Rumania's compliance with the decisions of the Supreme Council: on August 4,²⁴ August 5,²⁵ August 6,²⁶ August 7,²⁷ August 14,²⁸ August 23,²⁹ August 25,³⁰ September 5 [4]³¹ October 12,³² November 3,³³ and November 7 urgent requests were communicated to that end to the Government at Bucarest.

All these patient efforts resulted only in the reply of November 2, appealing in words, but negative in fact: concerning the three questions asked, acceptance of the frontiers fixed by the Supreme Council; signing of the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty; arrangement of the Hungarian situation; the note disregards the first two and replies only to the third.

Even on the third, none of the demands have been satisfactorily agreed to. The principle of discontinuing requisitions in Hungary is admitted, it is true, and also the institution of an Inter-Allied Commission at Budapest for the application of these principles, but Rumania, in making this latter concession, does not agree that the

Commission have authority to unload the merchandise which has accumulated in Hungarian cars on account of being held up for verification at the bridges, at this time, or that the Commission be qualified to receive complaints or to conduct inquiries into the abuses committed by the Rumanian military authorities. The retreat of the Rumanian troops is agreed to only as far as the Theiss, which does not comply with the decision of the Powers which specifies the evacuation of all Hungarian territory and their retreat to beyond the frontiers definitely fixed by them, a decision which was immediately agreed to by the other neighboring States, Czecho-Slovakia and Serbia.

To sum up, the Rumanian Government has continued for three months and a half to negotiate with the Conference, from Power to Power, and has not taken into account any other rights or interests than her own, and by refusing to accept the responsibilities of solidarity, although wishing to benefit from any advantages resulting therefrom.

The Conference makes a last appeal to the wisdom of the Government and of the Rumanian people before deciding the serious resolution of severing all relations with Rumania. The right of the Conference to be heard is based essentially upon the fact that Rumania owes to the Allied victory the incalculable service of having reconstituted her national unity by doubling her territory and her population. Without the immense sacrifices of the Allies, Rumania would be decimated, ruined and in bondage, and without any possible hope at the present time. Rumania entered the struggle for her own freedom at the end of the second year of the war, and by dictation her own conditions; it is true she made great sacrifices, and suffered hard trials, but she finally agreed to treat separately with the enemy and to submit to his law at a time when she still had under arms an army of more than 400,000 men; her liberty and her victory, as well as her future, she owes to the Allies.

How can such a situation be lost sight of, and so soon forgotten by Rumanian Statesmen?

In any event, the Supreme Council can wait no longer; Rumania is therefore invited to comply, without discussion, reservations or conditions, with the following resolutions:

- 1st) to entirely evacuate Hungarian territory by withdrawing to beyond the frontiers definitely fixed by the Conference.
- 2d) to agree to the constitution of an Inter-Allied Commission for deciding, controlling and judging the requisitions made in Hungary from the commencement of Rumanian occupation.
- 3d) to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.

The Supreme Council will wait six days for an affirmative or a negative reply by the Rumanian Government.

If this reply is not satisfactory to the Supreme Council of the Allies the Allies have decided to inform Rumania that she has become separated from them. They shall invite Rumania to immediately recall her Delegates to the Peace Conference, and will withdraw their diplomatic missions at Bucarest.

As to the fixing of frontiers still undetermined, the Peace Conference shall cease to sustain the territorial claims of Rumania.

It would be with the deepest regret that the Supreme Council of the Allies would be forced to break with Rumania, but the Council feels that it has been patient to the extreme limit.

¹ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910–1923, vol. III, p. 3149.

^{1a} HD–80, minute 4, [vol. VIII, p. 855](#).

² Draft note was prepared by the French delegation and not by the aeronautical representatives. For text, see appendix D to HD–80, [ibid., p. 868](#).

³ Appendix A to HD–78, [ibid., pp. 811](#), [816](#).

⁴ Appendix C to HD–80, [ibid., p. 865](#).

⁵ HD–81, minute 5, [ibid., p. 880](#).

⁶ President of the Interallied Aeronautical Control Commission in Germany.

^{6a} [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771*](#).

⁷ HD-85, minute 11, p. 8 [*Pg. 8 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

⁸ HD-62, minute 1, [vol. VIII, p. 403](#).

⁹ Appendix E to HD-90, p. 138 [*Pg. 138 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

^{9a} See appendix E to HD-85, p. 11 [*Pg. 11 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

¹⁰ Appendix D to HD-90, p. 136 [*Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

¹¹ Appendix B to HD-68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#).

^{*} Note by the British Delegation. This paragraph has been added as it seems opportune to settle this question at the same time as the evacuation of the Hungarian territory. [Footnote in the original.]

¹² Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#).

¹³ Appendix A to HD-78, [ibid., pp. 811](#), [816](#).

¹⁴ HD-80, minute 4, [ibid., p. 855](#).

¹⁵ Draft note was prepared by the French delegation. For text, see appendix D to HD-80, [ibid., p. 868](#).

¹⁶ Appendix A to HD-78, [ibid., pp. 811](#), [816](#).

¹⁷ Appendix C to HD-80, [ibid., p. 865](#).

¹⁸ HD-81, minute 5, [ibid., p. 880](#).

¹⁹ HD-78, minute 5, and appendix F, [vol. VIII, pp. 808](#) and [824](#).

²⁰ Appendix A to HD-88, p. 88 [*Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 4](#)*].

²¹ HD-73, minute 9, [vol. VIII, p. 716](#).

²² Appendix H to HD-73, [vol. VIII, p. 728](#).

²³ Appendix D to HD-90, p. 136 [*Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

²⁴ Appendix C to HD-23, [vol. VII, p. 517](#).

²⁵ Appendix A to HD-24, [ibid., p. 541](#).

²⁶ HD-25, minute 2, [ibid., p. 548](#).

²⁷ See appendix B to HD-26, [ibid., p. 615](#).

²⁸ Appendix C to HD-31, [ibid., p. 691](#).

²⁹ Appendix A to HD-37, [ibid., p. 819](#).

³⁰ Appendix C to HD-38, [ibid., p. 857](#).

³¹ Appendix E to HD-47, [vol. VIII, p. 111](#).

³² See appendix B to HD-68, [ibid., p. 583](#).

³³ Appendix D to HD-82, [ibid., p. 920](#).

November 14, 10:30 a.m. (HD-92)

[8] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 14, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 14, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/92

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/92

HD-92

[Document 8]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 14, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 14, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Rear-Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Lt-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.
Mr. E. L. Dresel
Mr. W. H. Buckler
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Hammond
Commander Dunne
Mr. A. Leeper

FRANCE
M. Henry Berenger
M. Laroche
General Le Rond
M. de Montille
M. Arnaroy
M. Aron

ITALY
M. Vannutelli-Rey
Comdt. Ingianni

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. M. CLEMENCEAU reported his conversation of the previous day with General Coanda and M. Antonescu. They had asked that the period

for a reply be extended from six to eight days inasmuch as they declared that they were able to assure him that within that time the Supreme Council would receive a favorable answer without qualifications, from the Roumanian Government. They had also asked that the sentence dealing with the conclusion of peace, while a Roumanian army of 400,000 men was still in the field, be expunged. His impression was that the Roumanians were really ready at last to give satisfaction on all points. He thought that when so doing they might try to discuss the question of the Minorities Treaty, but he did not think that they would offer serious resistance on this point and that any such discussion would really amount to nothing. Draft Note to the Roumanian Government

M. DE MARTINO reminded M. Clemenceau that at the previous meeting he had expressed the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview between M. Clemenceau and General Coanda and M. Antonescu, and he was glad to see that his confidence had in every way been justified.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it was as a result of his association with his Italian colleagues that he had acquired diplomatic skill. He suggested that a decision as to sending the draft note to the Roumanian Government¹ be postponed until all the delegates had received the instructions of their Governments.

(This suggestion was agreed to).

2. MR. POLK desired briefly to summarize the present status of the question of oil tank ships. On September 27th, after the matter had been discussed at several prior meetings, the Supreme Council had decided to allocate the tankers in accord with the plan of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.² At that time he had accepted and joined in the decision without being fully aware of the purport of the prior discussions and of the attitude of his Government. The position taken by the United States was that behind this question the ultimate and beneficial ownership of the tankers was a question for the Reparation Commission. The remaining question, which was the troublesome one, was as to the temporary allocation of these tankers. Messrs. Davis and Hoover had thought that this latter question had

already been decided in a sense contrary to that of the decision of September 27th, which had temporarily allocated these vessels between Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. When that decision had been communicated to his Government it had protested against it because it felt that this was contrary to a decision already taken. He now wished to suggest that pending a final decision, which he hoped would very shortly be arrived at, nine of the fourteen tankers in question be allowed to remain where they were so that there would be no change in the situation. He wished to explain the reasons for this suggestion. There was a great deal of feeling in the United States, and if the temporary allocation decided upon by the A.M. T. E. were to be put into effect it would cause his Government great embarrassment. If the decision of September 27th could be rescinded, and the tankers could be held where they then were pending a final decision, the shipping question he thought would become very simple. Question of German Oil Tank Ships

M. CLEMENCEAU asked why only nine of the tankers were spoken of. How many were there?

M. BERENGER replied that there were fourteen.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired why Mr. Polk had raised the point with respect to only nine of them.

MR. POLK explained that nine of these tankers were claimed by a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he then understood that no question was raised as to the temporary allocation of the other five tankers.

MR. POLK said that that was the case.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that a formal demand had been made upon the Germans to deliver these tankers. Furthermore, in the protocol drawn up for their signature,⁴ the point of the undelivered tankers had been specifically brought up. With respect to the attitude to be taken towards the German Government it seemed to him quite impossible to modify this demand which had already been formally

made. The Germans had been playing for time and counting on dissension between the Allied and Associated Powers. If the Germans had not yet delivered these tankers, and did not do so within a week or two, Mr. Polk's views would be partially met and the situation would be facilitated. If the ships had been delivered he was willing in deference to Mr. Polk's urgent representations to agree that the decision of September 27th be modified, but only to the following extent: if the tankers had been delivered to the Armistice Commission they should remain in the hands of the Armistice Commission instead of being temporarily allocated in the manner theretofore decided upon by the A.M. T. E.

M. BERENGER read the decision of September 27th (H. D. 62, Minute 1). This decision had been arrived at unanimously after a long and careful study of the question.

MR. POLK said that was not so as far as he was concerned.

M. BERENGER mentioned several instances showing that the United States Representatives on various Committees had been thoroughly familiar with the question in all its phases. Mr. Polk himself had had the questions put on the agenda on September 23rd. Previously there had been a full discussion at a meeting at which Mr. Dulles and others had been present. Telegrams had been exchanged and certainly the question was one of such importance that the United States Government must have been fully aware of it. As soon as the decision had been made known great pressure had been brought to bear both in New York and Berlin. The first effect of that pressure was that the Shipping Board had committed an act of violence in holding up the steamer *Imperator* and other passenger ships in contravention of the decision of the Supreme Council. Furthermore pressure had been exerted in Berlin to keep the tankers in Hamburg and not have them go to the Firth of Forth. This pressure had been brought by the Standard Oil Company which claimed the ownership of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. In October 1914 the tanker *Leda* had been taken by the British as a prize of war and condemned by a Prize Court, but thereafter, as a result of American representations, this ship had been given up by England to the American Government for the Standard Oil

Company. The *Leda* had been given up by the British Government as a result of the Standard Oil Company's claim of ownership of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. Twenty-seven other ships of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft in United States ports had been recognized as belonging to the Standard Oil Company, and judgments of competent courts had affirmed the Standard Oil Company's ownership of the stock in question prior to the time the United States entered the war; but the contention of the United States that the tankers now at Hamburg were in the same situation could not be sustained. He had heard rumors from well informed sources, that before the United States entered the war, i. e., in 1916, the Standard Oil Company had alienated its stock-holdings to a German concern. He agreed with Mr. Polk that the question of final ownership of the tankers could only properly be settled by the Reparation Commission. He wished to emphasize the fact that the solution of this question was most pressing; in fact it was vital inasmuch as some 50 thousand tons were involved and the scarcity of petroleum was world wide. On the other hand he agreed entirely with Sir Eyre Crowe with respect to the present disposition of these tankers. It would obviously not do to let the Germans see that there was still dissension on this point between the Allied and Associated Powers, dissension resulting from a question of private ownership and interests. The German need for petroleum had been recognized and that difficulty had been settled. The Germans had only begun to emphasize their lack of petroleum in July and they had requested the use of ships to remedy the existing scarcity. The Supreme Council had decided that these tankers could circulate under the Inter-Allied flag for one voyage; it had been thought that this would supply the German needs. He took note of what Mr. Polk had said regarding the feeling of the United States but he wished to point out that before any concession could be made to the views of the United States Government the Shipping Board would certainly have to release the *Imperator* and the other passenger steamers which were being illegally retained in United States ports. The questions were closely connected. If the Shipping Board released the ships referred to the nine tankers in question might go to the Firth of Forth and be held there until a final decision on this question was reached. In the meanwhile, the other five

tankers should be disposed of pursuant to the decision of the A.M. T. E. relative to their temporary allocation.

MR. POLK did not wish to take up the Council's time by replying separately to all the points raised by M. Berenger, but he felt obliged to make a few remarks. Of course he also felt that it was advisable not to show that there was any lack of solidarity between the Allied and Associated Powers but he felt that as far as this question was concerned the Germans were well aware that there was a division of opinion. The question of the ultimate ownership of the tankers was a technical and an involved one, which should be decided by competent courts and the Reparation Commission. With regard to the rumored sale by the Standard Oil Company of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft that was far more than a rumor; in fact it had been referred to by the United States representatives in reports submitted by them to their colleagues on Commissions. The question to be settled was what the legal effect of that sale was.

M. BERENGER said that that was the first time he had known definitely about that sale.

MR. POLK said that he meant the sale of the shares of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, and he wished to point out that said sale had not been recognized by the Alien Property Custodian who had seized the German securities. This had been set forth in a note presented by the United States representatives. It was not within his province to discuss the propriety of the action of the Shipping Board; what he wished to point out was that his Government felt, rightly or wrongly, that the question of title had been discussed long ago and that because such a question existed, the ownership of these tankers had not been settled, nor had the allocation thereof been settled at Brussels. The matter had been brought up at London where the United States was only formally [*informally*] represented; then it had been referred to the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels, where the United States was not represented at all. At that time it had been unknown to him that an agreement existed covering the division of passenger ships and

tankers between Great Britain and France, and that the allocation made depended thereon.

M. BERENGER said that he had not heard of any such arrangement between Great Britain and France.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he would have something to say on that point.

MR. POLK said that this agreement contemplated the delivery of passenger ships to Great Britain and tankers to France; he understood that a French company had been formed to enter the oil carrying trade. He was not stating these facts with any desire to engage in a controversy. He merely wished to show the feeling which existed in the United States. He had not been fully informed of all the points of discussion in this controversy, although as to that he was not seeking to present any excuses, but he could not help feeling that the other countries concerned had been fully aware of the delicate nature of the questions under discussion. The question had arisen in the French Chamber and a modification of the temporary allocation decided upon had been discussed. Public opinion in America had looked upon this as a permanent change in the allocation, contrary to the understanding which Mr. Hoover thought had been reached. He repeated that the Germans knew that there was a division of opinion on this question. He himself had done his utmost to see that the Protocol to be signed by Germany should not specifically mention these tankers. He only asked that the tankers should remain where they were. He wished to inquire if M. Berenger meant to say that if the *Imperator* and other passenger ships were not released by the Shipping Board the tankers should be allocated according to the decision of September 27th.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that it was a notorious fact that whenever the question of oil was touched upon, great difficulties resulted. With reference to the German knowledge of the division of opinion between the Allies, he thought he could not agree with Mr. Polk's point of view. A first decision had been taken and formally notified to the Germans. They had then received information from Standard Oil Company sources that no attention need be paid to this decision.

MR. POLK said that this was something that he did not know.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that from the information in his possession, he felt sure that it was so. There had then been further discussion in the Supreme Council and the Germans had been a second time instructed to deliver the tank ships. The Germans had been aware that there had been disagreement prior to that final decision, but they did not know that such disagreement had continued thereafter. The situation was not now as Mr. Polk thought, and the question had become one of the honor and prestige of the Allied and Associated Powers in the eyes of the Germans. Mr. Polk had made two statements which it seemed to him might be interpreted as raising a question of the good faith of the British Government and to these, of course, he must object. The first statement was Mr. Polk's reference to a decision taken at a meeting of the A.M. T. E. in London where the United States was only formally [*informally*] represented, and the subsequent reference of the question to the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels where it was known the United States was not represented. He wished to point out that the decision to hand over the ships was taken at a meeting at which a representative of the United States was present. The matter was then referred to the Supreme Economic Council. The suggestion therefore was that the decision had been arrived at over the heads of the Americans. He would emphasize that the proposal to refer the matter to the Supreme Economic Council was made by the United States representative himself with the implication that the United States would accept. He did not wish any possible impression to remain that the decision at Brussels was the result of taking advantage of the United States not being represented there.

MR. POLK said that of course he had meant to imply nothing of the kind.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the second point referred to by him was the alleged secret agreement between the French and British Governments.

(He then read from a letter received from the Ministry of Shipping on the subject).

There was no such agreement in existence. There was an agreement between Mr. Kemball Cooke and M. Loucheur in regard to allocation of passenger steamers which was perfectly plain and above-board. In fact, Mr. Cooke had announced it himself to the A.M. T. E. and had it circulated to all the Delegates with the Minutes. The following wording occurred in that agreement: "in consideration of the allocation to France of the tank steamers as decided by the A.M. T. E." Mr. Cooke [*Sir Eyre Crowe*] presumed that Mr. Polk was referring to that clause. If so it was a mare's nest, as that simply referred to the withdrawal of Great Britain's claim to certain tank steamers which was disclosed by the first examination of the percentage due to her on a rigid ton for ton basis in comparison to losses. As a matter of fact no bargain was possible with the French as neither were they in a position to make one nor were the British in a position to guarantee the delivery of the tank steamers. All the British had said was that they would not claim what they considered their just proportion of the tank steamers. The French Oil Shipping Companies were, of course, preparing for the management of these tankers. As it was then five weeks since the Supreme Council had allocated a considerable proportion of the steamers to France it did not seem unreasonable that the French should have been making preparations to take them over.

M. BERENGER pointed out that the agreement was dated November 10th and could therefore have had no effect on the decision taken by the Supreme Council on September 27th.

MR. POLK said that he had not claimed that the agreement was a secret one but had merely said that he had not known of it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said the whole trouble was that the United States claimants would not admit that the allocation was purely temporary; they wished to mix it up with the question of permanent ownership. He now found himself in a difficult position. The question had been raised of the 10 passenger steamers illegally held by the Shipping Board in the United States. He wished to remark that though there might be considerable feeling in the United States the indignation in England was even greater. He had just received peremptory instructions from his Government to submit the following decision to

the Supreme Council: that the Supreme Council should now address a formal demand to the United States Government that the 10 passenger steamers illegally retained by the Shipping Board in United States ports should be immediately released. He had not wished to present this question at that session, but as the matter of the retention by the Shipping Board of 10 passenger steamers had been raised, he felt obliged to inform the Council of the instructions he had received.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that public opinion in France was also greatly aroused over this question.

MR. POLK said that Sir Eyre Crowe had felt that he had laid great stress on his statements with respect to the fact that the decision reached by the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels was taken in the absence of American representation, and with respect to the formation of French Oil Shipping Companies. He wished to remind the Council that he was only stating the case as it was seen in the United States, whether rightly or wrongly. It was, of course, not his intention to make imputations of any kind; he merely wished to show that public opinion in America felt that a decision had been taken at Brussels when the United States had not been represented there.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked why the United States had not been represented on the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels?

MR. POLK explained that since Mr. Hoover had left American representation on the Supreme Economic Council had ceased. With respect to the formation of French Oil Shipping Companies the impression existed in the United States that these Companies were being formed to use ships to which United States interests had a valid claim.

M. BERENGER said that as far as he knew no French oil shipping companies had been formed.

MR. POLK said that their formation had been reported in the French press.

M. BERENGER replied that that was no more accurate than a great deal of other information appearing in the press.

M. DE MARTINO said that he did not wish to go into detail, but he desired to make a general observation. A good deal had been said about the impression that the Germans would have as to dissension among the Allied and Associated Powers on this question. He felt that on this occasion not only would the Germans receive such an impression but they would, for the first time, profit by it, and the prestige of the Council would be very badly affected. There was no country which did not have a very great interest in this question. Oil was badly needed everywhere and it was most injudicious to keep these tank steamers in idleness. He thought that public indignation would surely be aroused if the impression was created that these ships were not being used as a result of a theoretical discussion. He fully agreed with M. Berenger with respect to the nine tankers; that is to say, that they should go to the Firth of Forth and remain there until a final decision could be reached; while the other five tankers should be allocated according to the decision of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

MR. POLK said he would cable his Government with respect to this point.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the only point of agreement was that the ownership of the tankers in question should eventually be determined by the Reparation Commission. He agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the question raised by the action of the Shipping Board in the United States should not be taken up at that meeting. He thought it would be better to have the nine tankers go to the Firth of Forth until a final decision were had on the question. He appreciated the difficulties of the United States Government and wished to be of assistance to it as far as possible, because he thought it was not ultimately responsible for what had happened. He wished to point out, however, that with respect to the United States, the question was fundamentally one of private interests, whereas in France and England the question was one of general interest which affected everybody. Under these conditions he felt that private interests should give way. He trusted that when Mr. Polk, as he had said he

would, sent a telegram to his Government relative to the suggestion that the nine tankers should go to the Firth of Forth and stay there until a final decision had been reached on the matter, he would at the same time take into consideration the view he (M. Clemenceau) had just expressed, and that feeling in France and England was as fully aroused as it was in the United States.

MR. POLK wished to make it clear that his Government's solicitude was not for the Standard Oil Company; his Government felt that a matter of principle was involved. He thought that the Standard Oil Company did not consider that the present administration was in its favor.

3. (The Council had before it three joint notes from the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen. (See Appendix "A"). Joint Report From the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions Relative to the Plebiscite in Teschen

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions consisting of these three joint notes.

It was decided:

to accept the recommendations of the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen, contained in the three joint notes (See Appendix "A").

4. MR. POLK explained that Colonel Haskell, Inter-Allied High Commissioner for Armenia, was leaving Paris that night and that prior to his departure he thought it would be well for him to give the Council a brief summary of the conditions in Armenia. Situation in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan

COLONEL HASKELL informed the Council that the three republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were at daggers drawn with each other on almost all points. Georgia and Azerbaijan had perhaps some slight degree of good feeling towards each other, evidenced by a loose

defensive alliance concluded between them as a protection against a possible advance southward of General Denikin's army. Armenia had refused to join this alliance. Political and economic conditions in each of the three countries were in as bad a condition as could be imagined. He wished to point out that these three countries had been arbitrarily carved out and delimited. The only railway system from the Black Sea through to Persia traversed all three of these republics and either one of them had it in its power, under present conditions, to paralyze traffic. Aside from the animosity existing between these states, further material difficulties resulted from their arbitrary delimitation: for instance, all the railway repair shops were in Georgia and all the fuel for the operation of the railway system came from Baku in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, between these three republics there were various contested districts, and neutral zones which had been marked out by the British, which it had not been possible to change because they gave rise to such burning questions that no change could be adopted until all three republics were consolidated under one administration. He had been entrusted by the Supreme Council with representing it in Armenia, but he could not efficiently carry out the necessary work as long as Georgia and Azerbaijan remained without his jurisdiction. Moreover, owing to the fact that these two latter republics did remain without his jurisdiction, an anomalous situation was presented. Thousands of inhabitants of Azerbaijan were receiving relief in Baku and other localities, and the same was true of many Georgians at Tiflis and other points; though those destitute people were entirely dependent on the relief they received, the Relief Administration had no control whatever over the local administration. If all three republics were put under one administration the neutral zones referred to could be eliminated, and a definite frontier temporarily fixed. Such a solution would preclude the existence of a situation such as now existed, where a large number of Armenians found themselves within the political limits of Georgia. The Georgians would not feed them because they were of Armenian nationality, and on the other hand, the Armenians refused to give them any assistance inasmuch as they were living within the territorial limits of Georgia. There were no foodstuffs available anywhere, and all three of the republics were virtually living on the salvage of the Russian collapse. Economic life was at a standstill. Practically nothing could be imported inasmuch

as the money of all three of the republics had no purchasing value. The Caucasian ruble, which should be worth 51 cents was now only worth about 1 cent, and it had actually been found impracticable to issue paper money in smaller denominations than 10 rubles because the value of the paper was greater than the money. Foreign merchandise shipped on the railroad through to Persia was liable to be requisitioned by any one of the three Republics, as their need for everything was so great. The most essential need perhaps, was to control the system of through railway transportation. In Armenia alone some 800,000 destitute were being relieved and about 15,000,000 francs per month was being spent on this relief work. Armenians in foreign countries did indeed attempt to send some relief to their starving countrymen. Although those supplies got through the ports of Batum and its surrounding territory, where the British had an efficient administration, they were held up at various points in the interior by the Georgian authorities, and the same situation applied to all railway traffic.

MR. POLK explained that the Council had sent Colonel Haskell as its representative for relief work in Armenia and Colonel Haskell felt that it was necessary for him to have the same functions in Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to efficiently accomplish his mission. That matter could be settled later when the experts had been heard. As Colonel Haskell was leaving Paris that night, he (Mr. Polk) had thought that it might be of interest to the Council to hear his views.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked Colonel Haskell for his presentation of the question.

(At this point Colonel Haskell left the room.)

5. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation relative to measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria. (See Appendix "B"). British Proposition Regarding Measures To Be Taken To Remedy the Dearth of Rolling Stock in Austria

M. PICHON suggested that the British note be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Separation Commission.

It was decided:

to refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission the British note relative to measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria. (See Appendix “B”).

6. (The Council had before it a proposal from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian Coal. (See Appendix “C”). Proposal of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission Relative to the Distribution of Upper Silesian Coal

MAJOR ARON read and commented upon this proposal.

GENERAL LE ROND suggested that paragraph 2 of the proposal of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal be modified so as to provide that the requirements of Upper Silesia should first be satisfied.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft decision submitted by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal (See Appendix “C”), after modifying it so that the end of paragraph 2 should read as follows:

“A—to Upper Silesia	the tonnage which the Commission shall judge suitable to attribute to it.
—to Austria	200,000 tons per month.
—to Poland	250,000 tons per month.
B—to Germany	the surplus.”

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 14, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-92**

PARIS, November 11, 1919.

Report to the Supreme Council

DATE OF THE PLEBISCITE AT TESCHEN, SPISZ AND ORAVA

Article 4 of the Act of September 27,⁵ determining the conditions of the plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen and in the territories of Spisz and Orava, stipulates that the Commission charged with the organization of this plebiscite, should proceed to it “in the shortest time possible and, in any case, within the maximum period of three months from the notification of the present decision” to the Polish and Czecho-Slovakian Governments.

This notification having been given under date of October 1st, the time limit fixed expires on December 31, 1919.

The International Commission charged with the organization of the plebiscite has not yet left Paris. For reasons of a practical nature, it seems preferable that it proceed to Teschen only at the moment when the Plebiscite Commission of Upper Silesia itself will proceed to the territories which it is instructed to administrate. Now, the departure of the latter cannot take place before the going into force of the Treaty with Germany. The departure of the Teschen Mission is subject to the same delay.

Therefore, it seems impossible that the Teschen Commission will proceed to the plebiscite before December 31, because after its arrival on the ground—at a date which it is impossible to determine so far—it will not only have to organize the plebiscite zones, but to provide for the administration of the country and control the establishment of the electoral lists, according to the instructions given to it.

Under these conditions, the Commissions on Czecho-Slovakian and Polish affairs, assembled, have the honor to propose to the Supreme Council to notify the Polish and Czecho-Slovakian Governments, that the plebiscite cannot take place before December 31.

If the Supreme Council shares this point of view, the French Government, which notified these two Governments of the Act of September 27th, might inform them that, on account of the delay

occasioned by the circumstances at the beginning of the operations of the International Plebiscite Commission for the regions of Teschen, Spisz and Orava, the period of three months provided for by Article IV of this Act will begin, not from the date of the notification of October 1, but only from the day when the International Commission, arrived on the ground, will inform the Principal Allied and Associated Powers that it is beginning its operations.

This communication might be made to the Polish and Czecho-Slovakian Governments at the same time as that relative to the instructions given to the Plebiscite Commission of Teschen, and the general sense of which the Commissions on Polish and Czecho-Slovakian affairs, assembled, suggest, on the other hand, to communicate to those two Governments.

PARIS, November 8, 1919.

Report to the Supreme Council

PLEBISCITES OF TESCHEN, SPISZ AND ORAVA

Proposed Letter to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments

The Commission on Polish and Czecho-Slovak Affairs assembled, are of the opinion that the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments should be advised of the departure of the Interallied Commission of Teschen, indicating in a general way what the instructions of this Commission are.

The communication might be drafted as a letter to be addressed by the President of the Conference to each of the interested Delegations:

Mr. President: The decision of the Allied and Associated Powers under date of September 27, last, relative to the organization of a plebiscite in the regions of Teschen, Spisz and Orava, took into consideration the observations of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations regarding the conditions for voting.

I have the honor to inform you that the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, after careful examination of the question, gave instructions to the Interallied Commission of Plebiscite clearly indicating the meaning and purport of the conditions for the voting in question. These instructions are inspired by the idea that only persons who, in good faith, can be considered as having tangible ties with the country, will be allowed to participate in the plebiscite.

The Commission has received plenary powers from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to apply this decision.

A similar communication has been addressed to the

Polish }
Czecho-Slovak } Delegation.
“

Note for the Supreme Council

PLEBISCITE IN TESCHEN

The Commissions on Polish and Czecho-Slovakian affairs, after having examined the enclosed letter of the Interallied Control Commission of Teschen (Annex “A”), propose that the Secretary General of the Conference address to this Commission the answer in Annex “B”.

PARIS, November 11, 1919.

[Annex A]

INTERALLIED COMMISSION OF TESCHEN
No. 326

TESCHEN, Nov. 8, 1919.

From: The President of the Interallied Commission of Teschen.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference, Paris.

In a short time, the Interallied Commission of Teschen, which has been functioning since February last, will be replaced by a new International Commission, charged with supervising the plebiscite operations, and to assure the administration of Eastern Silesia during this period. I have the honor to ask you to kindly inform the Commission what it should do with its archives. As a great number of elements of these will be necessary for the new Commission, it seems advisable to leave them at Teschen at the disposal of the latter; but it should be understood that they will constitute a part independent of the archives of the new Commission, and that, when the operations of the latter will come to an end, it should have them sent to the Peace Conference in Paris, at the same time as its own archives.

LIEUT. COL. A. RISSI,
Italian Delegate.

Annex B

From: The Ambassador, Secretary General of the Peace Conference,

To: The President of the Inter-Allied Commission at Teschen.

I am directed by the Supreme Council to inform you that it approved the suggestions contained in your letter No. 326 of the 8th instant. It would be advantageous for the Plebiscite Commission to be placed in a position to refer to the archives of the Control Commission. Therefore, these archives should be placed at its disposal when it arrives in Teschen, although they should remain separate from those which it will have to constitute itself.

As to the powers of the Control Commission, they will cease when the Plebiscite Commission, assembled at Teschen, will officially inform it, at the same time as the Conference, that it begins its operations.

After this transfer of powers is effected, the members of the Control Commission are requested to kindly extend their stay in Teschen a few days, in order to personally give to their colleagues of the Control Commission, information which will be very useful to them.

Distribution of Rolling Stock Under the Austrian Treaty

NOTE BY BRITISH DELEGATION, FOR SUBMISSION TO THE SUPREME
COUNCIL

Sir Francis Dent, President of the Commission of Experts for the Distribution of Boiling-Stock under Article 312 [318] of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, has drawn attention to the fact that the main cause of the conditions which threaten the economic life of the Central European States is the want of movement of rolling-stock, which is in turn largely due to the hesitation shown by the various States to allow their wagons, including those claimed by them as booty, to pass out of the limits of their own territory.

As the result of Conferences held at Vienna between Sir Francis Dent, Mr. Lindley, British High Commissioner at Vienna, General Mance, President of the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council, and the technical representatives of the various States concerned, it was unanimously decided that the best method of overcoming the situation was for the Supreme Council to invite these States to send representatives to form a Committee at Vienna under the presidency of an independent Allied Chairman. There is a Railway Committee in existence, but it cannot be used for this purpose as it lacks the necessary powers. The matter is very urgent as the economic conditions, and in particular the question of coal supply, are critical. It is therefore recommended that the Supreme Council should express its concern at the aggravation of the serious economic situation in Central Europe by the present restrictions on wagon movement between the different States, and draw attention to the urgent need for creating an effective organization for wagon exchange, if the decisions of the Commission for the Distribution of Rolling-stock are to be executed. The Governments of Italy, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Rumania and Jugo-Slavia should be invited to send representatives to form a Committee at Vienna, which should hold its first meeting on December 4th. These representatives should have full powers to enter into arrangements for free wagon exchange without prejudice to the ownership of

rolling-stock established or claimed, and based on the right of maintaining equally [*equality?*] of wagon exchange subject to special arrangements agreed to by the Government concerned, of which the Committee should be advised. The Committee would have the right to make representations to the Governments concerned. Sir George Clerk might be asked to arrange for the nomination of a representative for Hungary. It would be desirable that the Ukrainian representative on the existing Committee at Vienna should become a member of the proposed new Committee. It is recommended that the Supreme Economic Council should suggest the desirability of appointing an independent Allied Chairman and designate for this post Sir Francis Dent, acting when necessary, through a deputy.

In the above proposals the American, French and Italian representatives on the Allied Railway Missions at Vienna agree.

NOVEMBER 13, 1919. **Appendix C to HD-92**

Draft Decision To Be Submitted to the Supreme Council

1. The Upper Silesia Commission is invited to come to an agreement with the Reparation Commission, and pending the constitution of the latter, with the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission regarding everything which concerns the distribution of Upper Silesian coal.

A Liaison Officer appointed by the Reparation Commission or by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission will be placed at the disposal of the Upper Silesia Commission, both to accelerate the solution of this question and to study any other questions which may fall within the sphere of the Reparation Commission.

For technical questions relating to coal, the Upper Silesia Commission will take the opinion of the Coal Sub-Commission for Mährisch Ostrau.

2. Previous to a concerted decision, as said above, with regard to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal, the Upper Silesia Commission

will adopt provisionally the following distribution of the present output:

(A)—to Upper Silesia	the tonnage which the Commission shall judge suitable to attribute to it;
to Austria	200,000 tons per month;
to Poland	250,000 tons per month;
(B)—to Germany	the surplus.

¹ Appendix F to HD-91, p. 154 [*Pg. 154 is part of [Doc. 7](#)*].

² HD-62, minute 1, [vol. VIII, p. 403](#) ; for discussions at previous meetings, see HD-59, minute 1, [ibid., p. 323](#) ; HD-60, minute 2, [ibid., p. 339](#) ; HD-61, minute 1, [ibid., p. 374](#) .

⁴ Appendix G to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

⁵ See HD-58, minute 2, and appendix B, [vol. VIII, pp. 300](#)  and [308](#) ; also HD-62, minute 8, [ibid., p. 412](#) .

November 15, 10:30 a.m. (HD-93)

[9] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 15, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 15, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/93

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/93

HD-93

[Document 9]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 15, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 15, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Captain Matteson, U. S. N.
Mr. A. W. Dulles
M. Buckler

BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. Forbes-Adam
Mr. A. Leeper

ITALY
M. Vannutelli-Rey

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the drafting of the resolution of November 11th¹ concerning the status of Eastern Galicia did not seem to him to agree entirely with the decision which had been actually taken by the Council. He had understood that their decision was an absolutely final one and the Polish Delegates would be heard, not by the Council, but by the Commission. Status of Eastern Galicia

M. CLEMENCEAU did not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe on that point; if his recollection was correct, the text of the resolution quite agreed with what they had decided. It was understood, however, that the hearing of the Polish Delegates would only be an act of courtesy on

the part of the Council. Their declarations would have no influence on the Council's decisions, and should not take more than one-half to three-quarters of an hour.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN stated that in accordance with the resolution of November 11th, the Secretary General had informed the Polish Delegation that M. Patek would be heard by the Council as soon as he arrived in Paris, and had insisted on the extreme urgency presented by the question of Eastern Galicia.

2. (The Council had before it the draft note to the Roumanian Government, inserted in the minutes of November 14th [*13th*] (See Appendix "A"^{[2](#)}). Draft Note to the Roumanian Government

M. BERTHELOT read the draft note.

MR. POLK asked whether it would not be advisable to refer, at the end of the third paragraph, to Sir George Clerk's Mission at Bucharest.

M. BERTHELOT said that, so as to take into account Mr. Polk's remark, which appeared to him quite justified, one might insert at the end of the third paragraph the following phrase: "in order to show the importance which the Conference attached to obtaining the reply of Roumania, it had even entrusted a special delegate, Sir George Clerk, to go to Bucharest."

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that in recognition of the good-will shown by General Coanda and M. Antonescu in the interview he had with them two days previous, he proposed to omit in paragraph seven the words: "the time when Roumania still had under arms an army of over four hundred thousand men." He also suggested granting to Roumania a period of eight days to make its answer known instead of six days which they had proposed to give them in their original draft.

MR. POLK suggested adding in Section 3 (on top of page 4) the following words: "under the conditions shown by the note from the Supreme Council, dated October 12th."^{[3](#)}

SIR EYRE CROWE proposed a change of form in the second last paragraph of the draft which he thought would read better as follows: "As far as the fixing of frontiers yet to be effected is concerned, Roumania will thus, by its own conduct, forfeit all title to the support of the Powers, as well as the recognition of its rights by the Conference.["]

M. DE MARTINO said that he found himself in a rather embarrassing situation. He had received his instructions, but these were not quite clear. He was told on one hand, not to oppose the Allies in the question of sending the note to Roumania, and on the other, not to subscribe to expressions which were too strong, and which would lend it a character of violence or of threat. As a matter of fact this draft threatened the Roumanians with a diplomatic rupture. Under these circumstances he had asked Rome for new instructions which he hoped to receive that day. He would like to know if Mr. Polk had already received his instructions.

MR. POLK said he was ready to accept the draft which was then before them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was extremely important that they should vote that very day. The immediate despatch of the note was necessary all the more because they were sure, according to the declarations made to him by the Roumanian Delegates that their demands would be accepted.

M. DE MARTINO stated he had also received the Roumanian Delegates. The latter had come away with the very best impression of their interview with M. Clemenceau and of the manner in which he had explained the situation to them. They had also told him that a misunderstanding had arisen between Sir George Clerk and Mr. Diamandi on the question of the evacuation. The Roumanians considered their retreat to the Theiss only as a first step towards the evacuation of Hungarian territory, and did not intend in any way to stop short on that river for a protracted period. They had also expressed themselves as ready to sign the Austrian Treaty. As for the rectifications of frontiers which were asked for by the Roumanians, they were of very secondary importance, and concerned chiefly the

Commissions of Delimitation on the spot. He wondered whether, taking into account the good-will which the Roumanians seemed to show, they might not subdue some of the expressions which were used in the draft note under discussion.

M. CLEMENCEAU felt obliged to remark that he had read the draft note to General Coanda and Mr. Antonescu. It therefore, seemed to him, under the circumstances, extremely unfortunate to change in the draft anything at all except the phrases concerning first, the Roumanian forces still under arms at the time of the Armistice, and second, concerning the period within which they demanded an answer—a period which they had agreed to extend from six to eight days. He had himself let the Roumanian Delegates hope for the granting of these two concessions. He did not think that they ought to make any further concessions, especially as General Coanda had already left for Bucharest to report on the situation with reference to the communication which he (M. Clemenceau) had read to him.

M. DE MARTINO hoped his instructions would arrive in the course of that afternoon and that he could make known his final answer between 4 and 5 o'clock. He felt certain, moreover, that he would receive authority to accept the note which was before them.

MR. POLK felt that a new delay in the despatch of the note would be extremely unfortunate.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the note should be sent as it had been read to the Roumanian Delegates. M. de Martino might let his Government know that there was, properly speaking, no threat towards Roumania as they were virtually certain that the Roumanians would accept their demands. Should the note not be sent immediately, the Council would be giving the Roumanians the impression that the Allies were hesitating.

MR. POLK maintained that the Council had already used towards the Roumanians language quite as severe.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that the acceptance of the note by General Coanda and Mr. Antonescu committed only themselves. The

Council did not know for certain what would be the attitude at Bucharest.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that the same thing had taken place concerning the Council's note of November 7th. The Italian Minister at Bucharest, alleging that he had not received direct instructions from M. Tittoni, had refused to join in the step taken in concert by his colleagues.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Delegation had received similar information from its representative at Bucharest.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Italian Delegation had, as a matter of fact, telegraphed to its representative at Bucharest to associate himself with his colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed to despatch the note to Roumania immediately. If the Italian Delegate could not accept that note, it would suffice to send a telegram to the Italian Representative at Bucharest advising him to abstain from joining his colleagues.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what decision would be taken with regard to publishing the note.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had promised in the course of his interview of November 13 with the Roumanian Delegates to support in the Council the non-publication of the note. The Roumanians had made a formal promise. He thought that they should take their good-will into account and not crush them under the blow of a publication, the effect of which in Roumania would certainly be very serious.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought they were not sure that Mr. Bratiano would appear as conciliatory as General Coanda.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that if Bucharest offered any difficulties the Council would then be free to publish the letter, and that, even without the toning down upon which they had decided that day. It should not be forgotten that General Coanda had answered for the King of Roumania.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he was quite ready to associate himself with the views the President had just expressed. They ought, however, to take care that the Roumanian Government should not take advantage of their silence to present the facts to Roumanian public opinion in a false light.

M. DE MARTINO remarked that the telegram to which he had referred previously and which directed the Italian Minister at Bucharest to join in the step taken by his colleagues was dated November 10th, 12:47 A.M.

M. BERTHELOT said that as the note of the Allies was dated November 7th, the slight misunderstanding which had taken place was easily explained by the interval of three days which occurred between the note and the telegram.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note to the Roumanian Government (See Appendix "A").

M. de Martino made the reservation that his final approval of the note would be made known in the course of the afternoon. If the instructions received by the Italian representative should not allow him to adopt the note, the Italian Minister at Bucharest would receive telegraphic instructions to abstain from associating himself with the step taken by his colleagues.

It was further decided:

not to publish, for the present, the note addressed to the Roumanian Government.

3. MR. POLK read the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on July 5th on the subject of Colonel Haskell's mission (See I. C. 201A).^{4a} He proposed to add after the word "Armenia" the words, "Georgia and Azerbaijan". The Council had heard at the preceding meeting Colonel Haskell's declarations.⁵ He simply wished to submit this proposal to the Council without insisting that it should

be accepted. Extension to Georgia and Azerbaijan of the Mission Already Entrusted to Colonel Haskell for Armenia

SIR EYRE CROWE said he had submitted this question to his Government. He thought he could already say that they would not object to the extension of Colonel Haskell's mission for the organization of relief in Georgia and Azerbaijan. He would, however, call to the attention of the Council the fact that in the resolution which had just been read Colonel Haskell was entitled High Commissioner. He wished to make his reservations on that title all the more so as he did not think that it corresponded with the functions with which Colonel Haskell had been entrusted.

MR. POLK said as the British were already represented in those regions, he proposed that Sir Eyre Crowe be good enough to submit a draft resolution at a later meeting.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Italians also had officers in the Caucasus. He would therefore consult his military experts, but he could already say that he was in favor of the American proposition.

It was decided:

that Sir Eyre Crowe, after consultation with the competent experts, would put before the Council a draft resolution extending the powers already conferred upon Colonel Haskell for Armenia (See I. C. 201-A of July 5th, 1919) to include Georgia and Azerbaijan in matters concerning relief work.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was advisable to take up as soon as possible the important questions which still remained to be decided by the Council. He wished to ask whether they should not examine the list of questions on the agenda of the Council which had been drawn up by M. Berthelot.⁶ Agenda of the Conference

5. SIR EYRE CROWE wished to call attention to the urgency of taking a decision concerning the provisioning of Vienna. Their information depicted the situation of the Austrian capital in a terrible light. To enable the Austrians to buy food, it seemed necessary to grant them a

loan. But he thought the guarantee for this loan should be a charge upon the Reparations Fund. That was an important question which the Reparation Commission ought to deal with immediately. The Question of Provisioning Vienna

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it did not rather concern a financial commission.

MR. POLK said the Reparation Commission was already acquainted with the question. Mr. Rathbone had cabled Washington to explain the situation and to ask how far the American Government would consent to be committed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if immediate measures were not taken, it was to be feared that there would be from 300,000 to 400,000 dead that winter in the streets of Vienna. The Austrians realized the situation and were resorting to every possible means to get money. They were at the moment engaged in selling their art collections, pictures, jewels, etc, a procedure which was, as a matter of fact, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT said it was correct that the Austrians had tried to sell their "objets d'art", but in fact they had not managed to sell anything with the exception perhaps of a few isolated objects. He had, moreover, seen M. Benes, who had also depicted the situation at Vienna as tragic. He had stated that if the Powers were willing to help him, he would be in a position to send coal and food to Vienna.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Benes might be asked to discuss the question in agreement with the Reparation Commission.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for examination and report the problem of means to be adopted to ensure the provisioning of Vienna;
- (2) that M. Benes be asked to make known to the Committee his views on the subject.

6. M. BERTHELOT summarized Sir George Clerk's telegram, dated November 13th, (See Appendix "B"). He said that the information conveyed in this telegram was not very reassuring, and it seemed that the formation of a coalition cabinet was situation more uncertain than ever. Telegram From Sir George Clerk on the Hungarian Situation

M. CLEMENCEAU wished, in that connection, to say a few words concerning the attitude of Admiral Troubridge. No one contested the fact that the Admiral was a distinguished and capable man, but he was a partisan of Archduke Joseph. He had a right to be, but he wondered whether the Admiral was not going a little far in following his preferences, which apparently were not those of his Government. The information he was giving on Admiral Troubridge's attitude came from an excellent source and he wondered if it were not advisable for the British Government to take this situation into account, all the more so because the Admiral's influence throughout Hungary was considerable.

SIR EYRE CROWE said the Admiral had received instructions to comply with the policy of Sir George Clerk. He would not fail, however, to take up the question raised by M. Clemenceau.

7. MR. POLK said he would have an important statement to add to the declarations he had made at the preceding meeting on the oil tank ships,⁷ but as the French and British experts were not present, he proposed to adjourn this question to the next meeting. German Oil Tank Ships

8. M. BERTHELOT said that in the question of distribution of enemy ships, the naval experts had not yet succeeded in arriving at a complete agreement. He thought that an understanding would be made easier if the Council heard the question, inasmuch as the differences of views which existed seemed to him of slight importance. Distribution of Enemy Ships

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they could put the question on Monday's agenda.

9. M. BERTHELOT said that they had informed the Serbs that they would not be authorized to sign the Bulgarian Treaty until they had signed the Austrian Treaty. The Serbs had answered they could not sign the Austrian Treaty before the question of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian tonnage had been solved. That question could be discussed on Tuesday, for the British expert would then have received his instructions. Distribution of Austro-Hungarian Tonnage

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that if that question was settled on Tuesday, the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty could be set for Wednesday or Thursday.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 15, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-93**

NOVEMBER 15, 1919.

[Note From the Supreme Council to the Rumanian Government]

The Supreme Council has taken note of the answer of Rumania under date of November 2nd, signed by General Vaitoianu.⁸ It cannot but state that this note gives no satisfaction at all to the Allied and Associated Powers. This fact imperils, in the most serious manner, the relations of Rumania and her Allies, who feel bound to ask the Rumanian Government for a definite answer.

Since the first part of August, that is to say, since the moment when the Rumanian troops occupied Budapest, the Peace Conference has repeatedly asked Rumania to assume in Hungary an attitude conforming to the common principles of the Allies and the agreements binding them.

With indefatigable patience, inspired by the respect of the Allies for one another, and by the hope that the Rumanian Government would at last realize that it cannot with impunity disregard the principles and the reciprocal agreements of the Allies, the Conference has striven to maintain the bonds which unite the Allies to Rumania and to bring about a compliance by this Power with the decisions of the

Supreme Council; on August 4,⁹ August 5,¹⁰ August 6,¹¹ August 7,¹² August 14,¹³ August 23,¹⁴ August 25,¹⁵ September 5 [4],¹⁶ October 12,¹⁷ November 3,¹⁸ November 7, pressing requests were addressed to that effect to the Government of Bucharest. To indicate the importance which it attached to obtaining the reply from Rumania, the Conference even directed a special Delegate, Sir George Clerk, to proceed to Budapest [*Bucharest*].

All these patient efforts have resulted only in the answer of November 2, conciliatory in words, but, negative in fact; regarding the three questions asked, acceptance of the frontiers determined by the Supreme Council, signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria, and of the Minorities Treaty, adjustment of the situation in Hungary, the Note postpones the two first ones and answers only the third.

Even on the latter question, none of the admissions asked for are, in reality accorded. The principle of the discontinuance of requisitions in Hungary is admitted, it is true, as well as the institution of an Inter-Allied Commission in Budapest to apply these principles, but Rumania, in making this concession, recognizes neither that the Commission may have the goods, now accumulated in the Hungarian freight cars, unloaded without having yet passed the verification bridges, nor that it has authority to receive the complaints and conduct investigations on the abuses committed by the Rumanian military authorities. The withdrawal of the Rumanian troops is accepted only as far as the Theiss, and Rumania does not comply with the decision of the Powers which includes the evacuation of all the Hungarian territory and the withdrawal within the definitely determined frontiers, a decision which was immediately accepted by the other neighboring States, Czechs and Serbs.

In short, the Rumanian Government has continued, for the last three and a half months, to negotiate with the Conference, from Power to Power, taking into consideration no other rights or interests than her own, and refusing to accept the charges of solidarity, although she wishes to enjoy the benefit of them.

The Conference wishes to make a last appeal to the wisdom of the Rumanian Government and of the Rumanian people before taking

the grave resolution of severing all relations with Rumania. Their right to dictate rests essentially on the fact that Rumania owes the priceless service of having reconstituted her national unity, in doubling her territory and population, to the victory of the Allies. Without the enormous sacrifices consented [to?] by them, at the present time Rumania would be decimated, ruined and in bondage, without any possible hope. Rumania entered the struggle for her freedom at the end of the second year of the war, making her own conditions; it is true she made great sacrifices and suffered heavy losses, but she finally consented to treat separately with the enemy and to submit to his law; her liberty and her victory, as well as her future, she owes to the Allies.

How can such a situation be lost sight of and so soon forgotten by the Rumanian statesmen?

In any case, the Supreme Council can wait no longer; it invites Rumania to take without discussion, reservation or conditions, the following resolutions:

- 1st —To evacuate entirely Hungarian territory, withdrawing within the definite frontiers fixed by the Conference;
- 2nd —To accept the constitution of the Inter-Allied Commission provided for to decide, control and pass judgment upon the requisitions made in Hungary since the beginning of the Rumanian occupation;
- 3rd —To sign the Austrian Treaty and the Minorities Treaty, under the conditions indicated by the note of the Supreme Council of October 12.

The Supreme Council will wait eight (8) days for the affirmative or negative reply of the Rumanian Government.

Should this reply not give satisfaction to the Supreme Council of the Allies, the latter have decided to notify Rumania that she has separated herself from them. They shall invite her to recall immediately her Delegates at the Peace Conference and they will also withdraw their diplomatic missions at Bucarest.

As to questions concerning the settlements of boundaries, still to be made, Rumania will thus, by her own action, deprive herself of all title to the support of the Powers, as well as to the recognition of her rights by the Conference.

It would be with the profoundest regret that the Supreme Council of the Allies should see itself forced to sever relations with Rumania, but it is confident that it has been patient to the very last degree.

Appendix B to HD-93

D. November 13th, 1919.

R. 10.00 November 14th, 1919.

Telegram From Sir G. Clerk to the Supreme Council

No. 7

My telegram No. 6.²⁰ On my arrival here I at once realized two things. One, that Hungarians would do nothing until Roumanians left, and the other, that since Archduke's resignation Friedrich has acquired for various reasons into which I need not enter at present, a following in country so large and so excited against Communists and Jews, that it would be fatal to seem to override or fail to take into account opinions and feelings of those who are at present his followers. I have explained position of Allies to Hungarians of all parties and opinion is generally ripe for formation of coalition government. But personal position of Friedrich is main difficulty. Since method of telling him to resign premiership and to let someone else take it and form a government will not work because it would simply mean that Friedrich and great bulk of his followers, that is, by far the majority in country, would if he went at all go into opposition, and nobody could be found to make a Government in which the Christian National Party did not participate. It has therefore been necessary to proceed by way of telling Friedrich that he must first show what he can do towards satisfying Allies. His attempts have not yet succeeded and I informed him on the morning of November 12th that unless he was prepared to summon a general conference by

today, November 13th I should ask all political leaders, including himself and his Ministers, to meet me informally in order that I might explain the situation to them. As a result he has just informed me that he will at once issue invitations for a general political Conference.

Meanwhile I have seen the parties of the Left, viz, Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats, National Land Party also small Proprietors and Christian Social Democratic Party. These five Parties have united themselves into a block and they will meet Friedrich the Christian National in Conference. They will probably there declare that they will not accept Friedrich as Minister President, though they are ready to work loyally with Christian National block apart from Friedrich and that they will only enter a Government in which all of their five parties are represented. Government Parties will probably say they cannot give up Friedrich and there may be a deadlock unless the Christian National Parties have sense enough to see Friedrich must go.

I have a meeting with the Christian National leaders to-night and may get them to see what is at stake for Hungary. If nevertheless there is this deadlock it is possible that some influential person outside party politics such as the Cardinal Primate will try to effect a solution, but if such efforts fail I shall have to explain the position in the Press and say that as Hungarians cannot in this crisis agree upon a temporary Coalition Government where all Parties are fairly represented and insist on maintaining the rule of a single party I can do no more and intend leaving Budapest forthwith. Consequences will of course be that Hungary will have neither peace nor help from the Allies but will be left severely to her own devices. It is for Hungarians to decide if this is what suits them. I shall also dispel various delusions which Friedrich has endeavoured to create in the public mind, such as that I really represent only the Paris policy which is the French policy and that when I have gone and the French policy is shown to be a failure, then the English policy which is really favourable to Friedrich will have its day.

I still hope that the end may be satisfactory, but I send this telegram in order that the Supreme Council may know what I am doing and

may realize that in the present state of feeling in the country, violently anti-semitic and anti-socialist, Friedrich must be gradually pushed from office and cannot simply be turned out. Process is long and extremely trying but it is the only one which will not leave Hungary worse off than she is at present.

¹ HD-89, minute 7, p. 99 [*Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 5](#)*].

² Appendix A is the final text of the note. For text of the draft note, see appendix F to HD-91, p. 154 [*Pg. 154 is part of [Doc. 7](#)*].

³ See appendix B to HD-68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#) .

^{4a} Minute 3, [vol. VII, p. 28](#) .

⁵ HD-92, minute 4, p. 167 [*Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 8](#)*].

⁶ See appendix H to HD-89, p. 118 [*Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 5](#)*].

⁷ HD-92, minute 2, p. 159 [*Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 8](#)*].

⁸ Appendix D to HD-90, p. 136 [*Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

⁹ Appendix C to HD-23, [vol. VII, p. 517](#) .

¹⁰ Appendix A to HD-24, [ibid., p. 541](#) .

¹¹ HD-25, minute 2, [ibid., p. 548](#) .

¹² See appendix B to HD-26, [ibid., p. 615](#) .

¹³ Appendix O to HD-31, [ibid., p. 691](#) .

¹⁴ Appendix A to HD-37, [ibid., p. 819](#) .

¹⁵ Appendix C to HD-38, [ibid., p. 857](#) .

¹⁶ Appendix B to HD-47, [vol. VIII, p. 111](#) .

¹⁷ See appendix B to HD-68, [ibid., p. 583](#) .

¹⁸ Appendix D to HD-82, [ibid., p. 920](#) .

²⁰ Appendix E to HD-90, p. 138 [*Pg. 138 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

November 17, 10:30 a.m. (HD-94)

[10] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 17, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 17, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/94

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/94

HD-94

[Document 10]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 17, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 17, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. Ellis L. Dresel
Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Captain Madison, U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Commander MacNamara, R. N.
Commander Dunne, R. N.
Mr. A. Leeper
General Groves

FRANCE
M. Henry Berenger
M. Laroche
Ct. du Chayler
Ct. Levavasseur

ITALY
Admiral Cagni
General Cavallero
M. D'Amelio
M. Vannutelli-Rey
Capt. de corvette Ruspoli
Comt. Ingianni
Comt. Rugin

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation (See Appendix "A"), a historical résumé of the question by Captain Fuller (See Appendix "B") and a new British proposal dated November 14th, 1919 (See Appendix "C"). Disposition of Enemy War Ships

SIR EYRE CROWE said he had asked the British naval representative to summarize the proposals made by the British Admiralty, which he hoped would be approved by the Council.

CAPTAIN FULLER read and commented upon the Historical Summary (See Appendix "B") on the distribution of enemy war-ships, and upon the new British Proposal (See Appendix "C").

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to ask whether this proposition which had just been read was an entirely new one?

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that it was. The American and French Delegations had discussed this proposition but had not read the new text. The Italian naval expert had read the proposition and agreed with it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was impossible for him to make up his mind on a proposition which was quite new to him; he should first have to discuss the proposition with his naval experts.

MR. POLK asked Captain Fuller with reference to paragraph 3 what could prevent any country breaking up ships allotted.

CAPTAIN FULLER explained it was a question of labor and of shipyard facilities.

MR. POLK also asked why battle-ships, etc., should be loaned for one year.

CAPTAIN FULLER replied this was for experimental and propaganda purposes. The percentages laid out in the proposition were based only on information in their hands; other countries could furnish their own figures and it would be possible to come to an agreement.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the further examination of this question be postponed until the next day as he wished to examine the question closely with his naval experts.

(The question was adjourned until the next day).

2. MR. POLK stated that in the discussion which had taken place at the meeting of November 14th (See H. D. 92)¹ he had omitted to bring out an important point and wished to make the record complete. He had omitted in his discussion to go into the history of the question. Originally it had been agreed that all the German ships should be turned over to the Allies, who were to use them to furnish to Germany food which she needed, the charges to be attributed to the Reparation fund. At a meeting which had taken place at Brussels it had been voted that the 14 German oil tank ships should not be delivered. The Germans had asked to use these. At that time Messrs. Hoover and Davis had talked with their colleagues about the question of letting the Germans get oil; no record was made of these conversations, but the resolution read that temporarily the ships should be exempted from allocation. Since that time the American contention was that the Germans could operate the vessels under the Inter-Allied Flag and with an Inter-Allied representative on board, but it had been said that this could not be done. According to his information their records showed that exceptions had been made and that the Germans had operated certain ships with German crews on board, for instance: The *Fritz von Straus* from Hamburg to Hull, the *Kehrweider* and the *Paul* from Hamburg to New York, to obtain oil, also a number of other ships in the Baltic Sea, also certain ships used in the Mediterranean to repatriate German prisoners. In the discussion which followed the Scapa Flow sinking the question again came up; they maintained that it was not contrary to the Allies' views to let the Germans operate these ships to bring oil to Germany. On July 13th the question was again discussed in the Reparation Commission; but on August 15th the President of the A. N. A. C.² had cancelled the exemption without giving notice to the United States representative until the following day. The United States had always questioned that decision. The difficulty arose in this way: their understanding was, first, that the ships should be exempted to get oil and secondly that the ships could be operated by German crews

under the Inter-Allied flag and with an Inter-Allied Representative on board. They held further that other German ships had been given a free sailing to Constantinople and other ports. They had taken this to constitute a precedent. German Oil Tank Ships

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it seemed to be a question of whether or not German crews should be used on these steamers. He confessed it puzzled him very much why the American Government insisted upon the use of German crews. He asked what inspired that policy.

MR. POLK said that was the original American view and that contracts for transporting oil to Germany should be carried out.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that oil could reach Germany without using German crews; there must be another reason.

MR. POLK said there was no mystery about this. It was simply the question of the disposal of the ships: they wanted to let the Germans have a temporary use of the ships until the permanent title was decided upon.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that the United States' position amounted to ignoring the unanimous decision of the Supreme Council which had attributed the temporary management to the Allies.^{[3](#)}

MR. POLK repeated the view of his Government that the question had been discussed and agreed upon at Brussels.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that he must insist that at the time of the decision the Germans had made no demand for oil. The Allies did not take these ships simply because they had no need of them.

MR. POLK regretted the unfortunate situation created by the lack of minutes; there were the recollections of Mr. Hoover on the one hand and those of his colleagues on the other.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that with regard to the precedents which Mr. Polk had cited, he wished to make the following remarks. First, in the

Baltic, the Germans had long been allowed to navigate. As for the particular case of the *Fritz von Straus*, this was a ship of only 800 tons: There was very little interest to the Reparation Commission in this boat on account of its small tonnage. As to the other ships mentioned, it would be easy to ascertain the reason for their operation, and probably their small tonnage was again the reason. As for the German ships in the Mediterranean, that was a different question; the crews were Turkish and not German. The Supreme Council, as a matter of fact, had decided that the Allied Naval Armistice Commission was wrong and insisted on taking those crews off and putting on the Inter-Allied flag in place of the German.⁴ Under these conditions it appeared that the precedents cited by Mr. Polk did not carry much weight. He emphasized the fact that he had received formal instructions from his Government that these ships should not sail with a German crew. No other position could be taken by the British Government.

M. DE MARTINO stated that he had no objection to the first trip being taken, even with German crews on board, provided that the final distribution of these ships should not be prejudiced by this trip, and as a matter of fact, the final distribution belonged to the Reparation Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU then read a telegram from Admiral Goette to A. N. A. C, dated November 15th, (See Appendix "D"), from which it appeared that the Germans had informed the Allies that steps were being taken for the delivery of these steamers. That appeared to him to be a decisive fact which did not leave them any choice. What impression would the Council give to the whole world if it were to let the Germans keep these ships at that time? There seemed to him to be two questions. First, there was the question of final ownership which the Council had agreed should be settled by the Reparation Commission. There remained the question of operating the ships. He did not quite understand the position of the United States. What objection did the Americans have to an Allied rather than a German crew? He personally saw a very grave political and moral objection to German crews being used which he thought was even more important than the economic objection. There had just occurred at Berlin demonstrations in favor of Hindenburg which were of a

disquieting nature and had given a great deal of trouble to the German Government. These seemed to bear the marks of a Nationalist uprising. Therefore would it be opportune to let those ships sail with German crews and under the German flag? For himself, he had the greatest objections. There was no doubt whatsoever that the Principal Powers had pledged themselves to stand by the decisions of the Reparation Commission; that was full security for America. He therefore earnestly requested Mr. Polk to accept Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal so as to not make the situation more difficult. It seemed to him all the more important to come to an agreement on this question as there were a number of vital matters to be settled with the Germans, such as the delivery of guilty individuals. Should the Germans be allowed to operate these ships there would be general stupefaction in France. He had often shown readiness to make concessions, but always on one condition that public opinion should understand them. This would not be the case in the present instance. He understood there might be some American emotion on the subject, but he felt sure that America would understand France's position in the matter and he hoped that secondary considerations which moved American opinions would give way to the stronger, and, to his mind, more justified feeling of public opinion in France.

M. DE MARTINO stated that in view of the strong case presented by M. Clemenceau he was ready to agree with his views.

MR. POLK remarked that M. Clemenceau's declarations carried much weight and he also saw that the use of the German flag at this time might be misconstrued in France. They maintained however, that an arrangement had been made which had not been carried out. He also wished to point out that his position with his Government made it difficult for him to give his entire approval to the Chairman's views. As he understood the proposal which Sir Eyre Crowe had made at a preceding meeting, the 14 oil tank ships were to go to the Firth of Forth; 5 were to be operated, and 9 were to remain there until a compromise had been reached. He would recommend that proposal to his Government. He wished, however, to have the Council take note of the feeling in the United States on the question of the allocation of these vessels. He had not put up an imaginary case; they

did not agree and had not accepted the present system of distribution. He referred to the last sentence of the telegram from the British Ministry of Shipping to the British Delegation and he wished to ask Sir Eyre Crowe whether this phrase did not sound like a threat.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that the phrase occurred in an Interdepartmental telegram and represented simply the attitude of the Shipping Controller which was uncompromising.

MR. POLK asked whether it was not advisable to instruct the Naval Armistice Commission that no disposition of these 9 oil tank ships be made at this time.

M. DE MARTINO wished to ask what was to be done with the other 5?

M. BERENGER replied that according to his information only 11 ships remained which therefore would leave only two for the Allies.

M. DE MARTINO added that should this information be correct it would be very serious for Italy, as she had counted absolutely on sharing the 5 ships with France and Belgium to remedy the scarcity of oil fuel.

M. BERENGER wished to point out how important it was to prevent a further waste of these tank ships considering the shortage of oil fuel in Europe. Mr. Dulles, an American representative on the Committee of Organization of the Reparation Commission, had written to M. Loucheur on August 28th protesting that such a waste of fuel oil should not be permitted. Since that time these ships which could carry 60,000 tons could have made two trips and thus been able to bring 120,000 tons of fuel oil which had been lost to the Allies and Germany as well. If Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal were to be sustained by the Council, that would mean a continuation of this waste for three months or more as the Reparation Commission would not be taking a decision in the matter until then. The explanation of the Brussels meeting given by Mr. Polk could not be accepted. If Mr. Hoover had promised the Germans to give them exemption in favor of certain ships in order to get them oil, this was something that the Allies had never heard of and it did not figure in a single Allied

record. On March 29th M. Clementel had written, as President of the Supreme Economic Council, a letter which clearly showed that the Germans at that time were not in need of fuel oil, and he was not aware that an agreement had been reached between Mr. Hoover and the Germans. The Germans had emphasized on July 30th for the first time their need for fuel oil, and the real reason for exempting those tank ships had been that at that time there was sufficient tonnage in the way of tank ships. He could not tell whether the rumor were true that there had been an agreement between Messrs. Hoover and Davis and the Germans, and that a part of the payment had been made by the latter without any knowledge of the Reparation Commission.

MR. POLK stated that there had been no secret agreement between Mr. Hoover and the Germans. He could assure the Council of that.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how it came that there should be at this time such a need for oil tonnage when a few months previous that tonnage had been sufficient?

M. BERENGER explained that the use of fuel oil had been authorized recently by a law which had been passed by the French Parliament. This law had resulted in a great demand for fuel oil all the more as there was a great shortage of coal, and oil was needed for lighting, heating and transportation. He had asked the Standard Oil Company for tank ships and had been told that not a single one could be spared.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Berenger to let him have the exact figures of the needs of France and Italy in fuel oil.

M. BERENGER said he would.

M. CLEMENCEAU hoped that in the cable which Mr. Polk would send his Government submitting Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal, he would also point out the needs of France and Italy, and ask it to take into consideration this aspect of the question.

MR. POLK said he hoped they could reach a compromise on the distribution of those ships.

M. BERENGER said that they had considered the question of using a part of these German oil tank ships after a first trip by the Standard Oil Company.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he trusted Mr. Polk would explain the whole question to his Government with his customary liberality.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked he had based his proposal on Mr. Polk's hope of arriving early at an arrangement.

MR. POLK agreed.

M. DE MARTINO said he had just been informed that there actually were fourteen tank ships in German ports which would therefore leave five ships instead of the two which M. Berenger had previously spoken of.

M. BERENGER said there were nine oil ships claimed by an American corporation. There were two boats according to his information at the disposition of the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said they would await the result of Mr. Polk's cable for instructions.

SIR EYRE CROWE summed up that meanwhile they would instruct the Allied Naval Armistice Commission in the sense of his proposal.

It was decided:

- (1) to instruct the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to take delivery of the German oil tank steamers for the Firth of Forth;
- (2) to retain the nine oil tank steamers claimed by American interests without using them pending a further decision by the Council;
- (3) that the remaining ships be delivered for temporary management to the Allied and Associated Governments according to the decision taken by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive September 7th, 1919;

- (4) that Mr. Polk, while agreeing to the three above points, reserves to himself the right of again raising the question in the event of not obtaining his Government's approval;
- (5) that Mr. Polk should call his Government's attention to the very urgent needs of oil by France and Italy, which make necessary an immediate decision on the temporary allotment of the German oil tank ships.

3. (The Council had before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 13th (See Appendix "E"). Situation in Hungary

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon Sir George Clerk's telegram. This telegram showed that Friedrich was very obstinate and that the formation of a coalition cabinet met with great difficulties. Sir George Clerk had felt it necessary to inform Friedrich that his mission would come to an end if the present situation continued. He, Sir Eyre Crowe, had also read a telegram in the *Morning Post* that a coalition government had been formed at Budapest and would assume office. However, he had only seen this in the newspaper; and it seemed that Mr. Polk had received a telegram from General Bandholtz stating that the situation was still very acute at Budapest, and that Sir George Clerk had declared he would have to leave.

M. BERTHELOT alluded to declarations which the Hungarian War Minister had made on the entry of the National Hungarian Army in Budapest. These declarations were of a purely monarchist tendency and were clearly in favor of the return of Archduke Joseph.

MR. POLK said that from a telegram he had just received from General Bandholtz, Admiral Horthy was making a number of arrests and that Sir George Clerk and the Inter-Allied Military Mission had threatened to withdraw if these arrests were continued.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it advisable to await further information before doing anything.

(The question was then adjourned.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that M. Venizelos had made a protest against the declaration in the letter⁵ which the Supreme Council had recently sent to him to the effect that the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks should have a temporary character. He would like the question brought up at the next meeting as he did not wish such a statement to go unchallenged. Occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks

5. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 14, 1919 on the subject. (See Appendix "F"). Detention in the United States of Ex-German Passenger Vessels Allocated to Great Britain for Management

SIR EYRE CROWE said he felt all the more embarrassed at raising a subject which he knew was likewise embarrassing to his American colleague especially after the conciliatory spirit just shown by Mr. Polk; he was obliged, however, to bring it up according to the instructions he had received. He believed it was not claimed by anybody that the Shipping Board had any right to retain the ships in question, but unfortunately, perhaps on account of the President's illness which gave opportunities of administrative independence, nobody seemed to be in a position to give the Shipping Board the necessary instructions. Possibly also the Board was confusing this question with that of the oil tank-ships and was adopting an attitude which seemed to him one of mere retaliation. The need for these ships was very acute. A very large number of passengers were awaiting transportation. Civilians, including business men, could not go to the East this year owing to the lack of passenger vessels. The vessels in question had enormous tonnage and included the *Imperator*, a ship of over 50,000 tons. These vessels had been temporarily allocated to the United States for the repatriation of its army. As it had been unanimously decided at a meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in July 1919 that all the Steamers under discussion should be allocated to Great Britain for management, British crews had been sent to New York to bring them back but the Shipping Board had refused to give them up. The State Department agreed with the British Government but said it had no authority over the Shipping Board. The British Government had instructed him to present this memorandum to the Supreme Council believing that a resolution of the Council would oblige the Shipping

Board to deliver the vessels and that it might help the American Government to get over the difficulty.

MR. POLK said that he could not quite agree with all Sir Eyre Crowe had said on the subject. It seemed impossible for the Council to arrive at a resolution, which required a unanimous vote, as he could hardly be expected to join in a formal request to his own government. He would, however, cable to Washington Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal and state that such a resolution was before the Council.

It was decided:

that the American Delegation would cable to Washington the resolution proposed by the British Delegation to the effect that the Supreme Council address a formal request to the United States Government to hand over without delay, to properly appointed agents of the British Government, the passenger vessels illegally detained in United States ports.

6. (The Council had before it the report of the Special Committee (See Appendix "G"). Report of the Special Committee on the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations With Germany

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the report. He added that the paragraph on page 5⁶ of the report relating to the credentials of the Ambassador should be modified in accordance with the present attitude of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers toward Germany.

MR. POLK stated that the United States was not then in a position to send representatives, but he would make no objection to the report.

It was decided:

to accept the report as presented by the Special Committee, it being understood that the credentials of the Ambassador should be modified to agree with the attitude of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers toward Germany.

7. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee on the question (See Appendix “H”). Instructions to General Masterman Regarding the Disposal by Germany of Aeronautical Material

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the proposed instructions.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to accept the report of the Drafting Committee relative to instructions to be sent to General Masterman on the disposal by Germany of Aeronautical material.

8. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee on the subject (See Appendix “I”). Question of signature by Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Roumania of the Financial Arrangements of St. Germain

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon this note.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to invite Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to sign the two financial arrangements^{6a} along with the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.

9. (The Council had before it a note from the Austrian Delegation dated October 31st, 1919 (See Appendix “J”). Return of Austrian Prisoners From Serbia

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to approve the request made by the Austrian Delegation regarding the return of Austrian prisoners from Serbia.

(The meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 17, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-94

PARIS, November 16, 1919.

Note From the French Delegation

DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY BATTLESHIPS

The question of the distribution of the enemy battleships was several times discussed by the Supreme Council, without a decision being made. It was also the object of various Notes from the British, French and Italian Delegation. At last, the Naval representatives met a short time ago, and in four meetings examined the possible solutions.

It seems that differences which occurred between the Admirals, as well as the different points of view of the Allies, may now be conciliated by the Supreme Council, in order that, by mutual concessions, a definite solution of this controverted question may be reached.

- A -

The first question to be settled is that of the disposition of the ships: If the ships were to be finally broken up, it would have been absolutely useless to discuss their distribution to such a great length. The British Government, in its Note of October, indicated that it deemed that the ships should be broken up, but left to France and Italy the right to dispose of them, according to their wishes. The Japanese Government, on this point, as on the others, concurred in the British opinion. The Italian Government declared itself as willing to accept either of the solutions, but desires to be treated, in this matter, the same as on the others, like France. The American Government, although it maintained its point of view, according to which the ships ought to be sunk, gave to understand, in the course of a semi-official conversation by Mr. Polk, that the United States,

although having decided to destroy all ships allotted to her, would not contest the right of France and Italy to dispose of them.

- B -

The second question is that of the basis of distribution of enemy ships. The French Government is willing to accept the British scheme of distribution of the ships, according to the proportion of the losses suffered in surface ships by the Allied and Associated States, this distribution being based upon the attribution of a number of ships equal in each category to the number of lost ships. The French Navy asks that not only the quantity but the quality of the enemy ships delivered, be taken into consideration, and thinks that the British and American Governments will not make any objections to replacing, in the French share, the ships in bad condition out of the salvaged scuttled ships at Scapa Flow, or of the German Fleet, by ships of a higher value, which might be comprised in their own share, since these ships are destined to be demolished. It seems that the British Government, allowing for mistakes, is willing to accept the French proposal combined with its own. Japan and England (?). The American Admiral suggested that the financial effort of each country be taken as a basis: This suggestion was the only one of its kind, because it appears inadmissible that the loss of ships be not taken into account, moreover, the number of millions spent does not represent the whole national effort of a country. The basis suggested by the Italian Admiral seems complicated: The distribution would be made according to the age and number of lost ships, the age being calculated by taking into account the useful tonnage, the real tonnage, maximum duration and the real age of the ship; as the method of calculation of these different values may vary according to the country, such a basis would run the risk of provoking endless discussion.

It is for the Supreme Council to make a decision: It seems that the simpler the method of distribution will be, the more chances it will have of being practical. It is to be noted that the British, Japanese and French proposals, concerning the dreadnoughts, cruisers and destroyers, are almost identical.

The British suggestion according to which the method of distribution does not attribute any battleships to the smaller Allied Powers, to the New States and neutrals, was unanimously admitted.

- C -

The third question is that raised by the request of France, for a certain number of surplus ships, as a compensation for the abandonment of its naval construction, for the benefit of the armament, not only of her troops but of those of her Allies. The suggestion was made to attribute to France, in addition, and for that reason, a certain number of the Allied cruisers demanded from Germany as penalty for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow.

The French request was not admitted, so far, by the British Admiralty, which deems that the compensation, which it recognizes as legitimate, is represented by the right of disposing of the ships, instead of sinking them. The Italian Admiralty admits the French request for compensation only if she obtains an appreciably equal compensation, which is justified by the same reasons. The American Admiralty did not concur in the French request.

So stands the question of the distribution of enemy battleships. The various delegations seem to have received from their Governments the necessary authority to adjust the matter.

Appendix B to HD-94

16 NOVEMBER, 1919.

Enemy Surface Warships—Disposal and Distribution[7](#)

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

1. The question had not been separately considered by the Supreme Council since 25th April,[8](#) when the Peace Treaty with Germany was under discussion. No agreement was reached, and it was decided to leave the question open and merely demand the surrender of certain

ships from the Germans in the Treaty. The Italian representative was not present at this meeting.

2. On 25th [27th] June, the Admirals agreed on a draft for submission to the Supreme Council in which they stated their opinion that they could do nothing more until answers to certain questions had been given by the Supreme Council.⁹ These were:—

(a) Are the vessels to be:—

1. sunk—or
2. broken up—or
3. distributed without restriction as to their ultimate disposal.

(b) If they are distributed:—

1. is the distribution to be confined to the Allied and Associated Powers whose Navies have taken a prominent part in the war,—
or
2. are the smaller of the Allied Powers who possess Navies and the new states with maritime frontiers to participate.

The opinion of the Naval representatives in regard to the disposal of the ships were summarised as follows:—

U. S. A. to be sunk or broken up, with a preference for sinking.

*British
Empire* to be broken up.

Italy to be broken up; but if an exception is made and the vessels are allotted to any of the Allied Powers the Italian Navy should receive its due proportion.

Japan to be sunk or broken up with the same reservation as is made in the case of Italy.

France opposed to both sinking and breaking up; considered vessels should be distributed amongst the Allied and Associated Powers.

To these questions no answer has ever been received from the Supreme Council.

3. After the Scapa Flow sinkings, the matter was touched upon by the Council of Four on 24th and 25th June,¹⁰ and it appears from the

notes made by Sir Maurice Hankey which however were not stenographic, that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson implied that they agreed that France was entitled to special consideration on account of her inability to continue her building, due to the pre-occupation of her naval arsenals with the manufacture of munitions for the war on land, and that Great Britain was willing to include the ships sunk at Scapa in her share and waive her rights regarding the ships remaining at Scapa.

4. Since this date there have been interchanges of letters etc., between some of the representatives of the Five Powers.

5. With a view to endeavouring to obtain a settlement, the British representative submitted a memorandum to the Supreme Council on 10th October.

The French submitted an answering memorandum on 15th October. And the Italians did the same on 22nd October. Summarized the views expressed are:—

Britain wishes all ships to be broken up, the proceeds to be divided in the scale of losses of warships. As a concession to the fact that France and Italy have been unable to build during the war, Britain is ready to agree that the share of these two powers may be embodied in their fleets.

Italy agrees with the British view; but calculating by the military value of the ships lost she considers that the shares proposed should be counted on their military value and not on numbers only as was proposed by the British.

France demands:—

1. Free Disposal of all enemy craft by beneficiary Powers.
2. Distribution to be effected on the principle of the assignment of an equal number of ships of the same category as those of the lost ships.
3. Manner of distribution to take into account not only the quantity, but quality of the enemy ships surrendered.
4. Assignment to France of an additional number of units, as compensation for having suspended naval construction

for the purpose of equipping not only her own troops, but those of her Allies.

6. The U. S. A. and Japan have not submitted any memoranda to the Supreme Council, but have handed an expression of their views to the Naval Advisers. These are:—

First. All surrendered German and Austrian naval vessels to be sunk.

Second. All surrendered German and Austrian naval vessels to be destroyed by breaking up.

U.S.A. Third. If neither of these policies can be adopted, and distribution of the surrendered German and Austrian naval vessels becomes inevitable, then the United States will demand its share, based on total National Effort in war against Central Powers. The disposition of any such share awarded to the United States to rest with the United States. agrees with the British Memorandum; but on condition that it should be accepted by all the other powers represented and *Japan* with the reservation that in the case of the principle of free disposal, as proposed by the French authorities, being accepted, it should likewise apply to Japan.

7. Since the above memoranda have been submitted, the Naval Advisers have had frequent meetings to consider the matter, but have been unable to arrive at unanimity regarding the disposal of ships, principally by reason of the fact that the Supreme Council have not given their decision on the points raised by the Admirals' Meeting of 25th [27th] June. The British have now drafted a further proposal which it is hoped may bring about an agreement between the extreme views which have been expressed. This has not yet been considered by the Naval Advisers.

Appendix C to HD-94

14 NOVEMBER, 1919.

British Proposal Regarding the Distribution of Enemy Surface Warships

In accordance with the preamble to the naval, military and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, with the general spirit of that Treaty and of those concluded with the other enemy powers, all surface warships surrendered by enemy powers shall, with the exception of the few noted in paragraph 5 and 6 below, be broken up under the superintendence of an Inter-Allied Naval Commission.

2. The proceeds accruing from the breaking up of the warships shall be divided amongst the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the following computation of losses of surface warships sustained by these powers during the war:—

Great Britain	70%	Percentage to be amended to include compensation to—
France	10%	
Italy	10%	Greece who lost 1 T. B. D.
Japan	8%	Rumania who lost 1 T. B.
U. S. A.	2%	Portugal who lost 1 Gunboat

3. Enemy tonnage in the above proportions is to be allocated to each country for breaking up purposes by the Inter-Allied Naval Commission. Should any country be unable to break up its share, the Commission is to allocate it as necessary, preference being given to Allied countries.

4. As regards the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow, Great Britain has stated her willingness to bear the loss arising from that incident; but now that it is probable that compensation will be forthcoming from Germany in material which is not warship construction, Great Britain agrees that such compensation should be divided amongst the Allied and Associated Powers in a similar proportion to the proceeds of breaking up the enemy warships (paragraph 2, above).

5. In view of France and Italy being unable to build warships during the war, owing to their pre-occupation with the war on land, it is

proposed that they should be granted the following compensation in warships surrendered from the enemy fleets for use with their fleets or any other purpose they may desire:—

France 5 Light Cruisers and 10 T. B. D's.

Italy 5 Light Cruisers and 10 T. B. D's.

6. It is further proposed that the Inter-Allied Naval Commission shall loan to each of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers:—

1 Battleship

1 Light Cruiser

3 T. B. D's.

The duration of the loan to be one year, during which time these ships may be used for any purpose, except that of being embodied in the fleets of these powers. On the termination of one year after the arrival of these vessels in a port of the power to which they have been loaned, they must either be broken up under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission or sunk in deep water.

Appendix D to HD-94

[Telegrams Submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation]

1. Telegram from PANAC to the British delegation at the Peace Conference (Nov. 15th, 1919).

Following has been received from Admiral Goette No. 1112 of Nov. 14th, begins:—Reference your Wireless Signal 1237 of 28th October, steps are being taken for the delivery of the tank steamers, ends.

2. Telegram from the British Ministry of Shipping to the British delegation at the Peace Conference (Nov. 15th, 1919).

Message now received by PANAC from Goette that steps are being taken for delivery of tank steamers. Unless Supreme Council decides otherwise management arrangements previously made will be carried out on their arrival at Firth of Forth. So far as Shipping

Controller is concerned no compromise in this matter can be considered.

Appendix E to HD-94

Telegram No. 7 From Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council

[Same as appendix B to HD-93, printed on page 185 [*Pg. 185 is part of [Doc. 9](#)*].]

Appendix F to HD-94

*Detention in the United States of Ex-German Passenger Vessels
Allocated to Great Britain for Management*

Memorandum by British Delegation

1. The following ex-German steamers were allocated for temporary management to the United States for the repatriation of their army by the Allied Maritime Transport Council at its fifth meeting in February, 1919:—

<i>Name</i>	<i>Gross Tonnage.</i>
<i>Imperator</i>	52,117
<i>Kaiserin Augusta Victoria</i>	24,581
<i>Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>	17,082
<i>Mobile (ex Cleveland)</i>	16,960
<i>Zeppelin</i>	15,200
<i>Cap Finistere</i>	14,503
<i>Pretoria</i>	13,234
<i>Graf Waldersee</i>	13,193

2. When these steamers were first obtained from Germany in March last, Great Britain, recognizing the vital need of the United States to repatriate their army, fully and frankly acquiesced in these steamers being managed and employed by them, though such action delayed seriously the completion of the British repatriation.

3. The U. S. Government, having subsequently intimated that their repatriation work was complete, and that the steamers were available for other purposes, it was unanimously decided at a meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in London on the 30th July, 1919, that all the above mentioned steamers should be allocated to Great Britain for management. Mr. Anderson, representing the U. S., was present at this meeting.

4. Subsequently the French Government asked to be allowed to use some of these vessels. To meet this claim, an arrangement between the British and French Governments was arrived at, satisfactory to both parties.

5. The allocation of these steamers is only for temporary management, and does not in any way prejudice the final disposal of the steamers under the treaty of peace.

6. Great Britain's need of these vessels is acute. She has to demobilise her army in India before Christmas. Civilians, including business men, cannot go to the East this year owing to the lack of passenger ships. The waiting list of such passengers to all parts is enormous. Over 25,000 South African passengers are awaiting transportation quite apart from British passengers requiring accommodation. The same, if not worse, applies to India and the East, also to Australia and Canada, Great Britain has to repatriate 400,000 soldiers on long distance work.

7. In the month of September, British crews were sent to New York to bring back the S. S. *Imperator* and all arrangements were concluded with the U. S. military and naval authorities to move her, but at the last moment the American Shipping Board interfered and refused to allow the vessel to be delivered to the British representatives, stating that their instructions were that the *Imperator* and the seven other vessels had been assigned to them. All arguments failed to induce them to admit that such was not the case.

8. The vessels are, consequently, lying idle, and His Majesty's Government is incurring a cost of hundreds of pounds daily in

feeding and housing these British crews, which were sent to America to bring these ships over.

9. Neither the U. S. Shipping Board nor the U. S. Government have the smallest conceivable right to detain these vessels.

10. The most pressing representations have been made by the British Ambassador at Washington to the U. S. State Department on several occasions, and the State Department admit that the ships ought to be handed over, but its efforts have failed to move the American Shipping Board.

11. Early in October, Sir Joseph Maclay, the British Shipping Controller, made a personal appeal to the Chairman of the American Shipping Board to release these vessels, but with no result.

12. A complete deadlock has been reached owing to the unjustified action of the Shipping Board.

13. In these circumstances the British Government requests the Supreme Council to address a formal request to the U. S. Government to hand over the above mentioned vessels to properly appointed agents of the British Government without delay.

NOVEMBER 14, 1919. **Appendix G to HD-94**

Draft

*Report Presented to the Supreme Council by the Commission
Charged With the Study of the Questions Relative to Resumption of
Diplomatic Relations With Germany*

By a resolution under date of October 25, the Supreme Council decided: ¹¹ Mandate of the Commission

1st. That the Allied and Associated Powers, when diplomatic relations are resumed with Germany, will be represented in Berlin by Chargés d’Affaires, and that they will ulteriorly agree upon the date when Ambassadors should be sent;

- 2nd. That those of the Allied and Associated Powers which were, before the war, diplomatically represented at Dresden or at Munich, may continue to be represented if they deem it advantageous;
- 3rd. That a special commission will be charged with the study of the procedure which should be followed in the resumption of diplomatic relations. This Commission will comprise, etc.

The Commission came to the following conclusion.

1st. In order to notify the German Government of the names of the Chargés d’Affaires, nominated by each one of the Allied and Associated Powers, it would be advisable to have recourse to the intermediary of the neutral power, which was, during the war, entrusted with the protection of their interests in Germany. But it would only be a mere notification, not a request for acceptance. In fact, the Commission unanimously considered that it was not necessary to ask for the acceptance of the nomination of the Chargés d’Affaires, on account of the present conditions of our relations with Germany, and of the long interruption of diplomatic relations caused by the war. Conclusions of the Commission—2nd. Notification of the Names of the Chargés d’Affaires

The letter to the representative of the power charged with the protection of the interests of the country concerned, might be signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and drawn up in the following terms:

Renewal of Diplomatic Relations with Germany.

Draft letter to representative at	<table border="0"><tr><td>{</td><td>London</td><td>}</td><td rowspan="5">of neutral Government</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Paris</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Rome</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Tokio</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Washington</td><td>}</td></tr></table>	{	London	}	of neutral Government		Paris			Rome			Tokio			Washington	}
{	London	}	of neutral Government														
	Paris																
	Rome																
	Tokio																
	Washington	}															

ment in charge of {
British
French
Italian
Japanese
American } interests in Germany.

Your Excellency:—

Sir:—

The forthcoming entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919, will entail the renewal of diplomatic relations

between {
the British Empire
France
Italy
Japan
the United States } and Germany.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency / you that His Majesty the King / The President of the Republic / etc. has in these circumstances chosen Mr. to carry out the functions of chargé d'affaires in Berlin.

I should be grateful to Your Excellency / you if you would request your Government to announce this appointment to the German Government on the day following that on which the minute recording the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles has been signed.

Your Excellency's / Your Government should indicate to the German Government at the same time that Mr. will be the bearer of a letter accrediting him in the above mentioned capacity / of a telegraphic communication stating that a letter accrediting him / in the above mentioned capacity is on its way.

I have the honour, etc. ...

2nd.—The credentials which each of the Chargés d’Affaires will carry should, according to precedent, and to the principles of International law, be signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government concerned, and addressed to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs.* Credentials of the Chargés d’Affaires

It is proposed to draw it up as follows:

Renewal of Diplomatic Relations with Germany.

Letter of Credence
for
Chargé d’Affaires.

(To be addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

..... 1919.

Monsieur le Ministre:—

{ His Majesty the King
The President of the Republic } desirous of renewing the
diplomatic

relations between { the British Empire
France
Italy
Japan
the United States } and

Germany, which were interrupted by the war, has chosen Mr.
to carry out the duties of chargé d’affaires of the _____ in
Berlin pending the reestablishment of the Embassy / Legation.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of the appointment of
Mr. who will have the honour to convey to you in person the
present letter, and I request that you will receive him and will assist
him to carry out such instructions as I may have to transmit to him
in the name of {His Majesty the Republic}.

I am, with great consideration, Sir,

The credentials ulteriorly intended for the Ambassador should be signed by a chief of State and addressed to the President of the German Republic. It might be drawn up in the following terms: 3rd. Credentials of the Ambassador

Renewal of Diplomatic Relations with Germany. Letter of credence for M. Ambassador at Berlin.

{ His Majesty the King of Great Britain &c.
The President of the French Republic &c.

Desirous of reestablishing an Embassy in Berlin and of resuming thereby harmonious relations between {The British Empire / France, &c} and Germany, I have decided to accredit to Your Excellency in the capacity of Ambassador, M.

The distinguished qualities of M. are a sure guarantee of the zeal with which he will acquit himself of his important duties. With this conviction I request that you will receive him, and will give full credit to everything he may say on my behalf.

Given in the day of 19 ..

These proposed letters do not follow closely the formulas usually employed; the Commission is of the opinion that the terms chosen are sufficiently clothed with the courtesy in use in international relations, and that it would be out of place and inopportune to employ at the present time towards Germany formulas containing assurances of friendship and confidence which are usually employed in credentials.

4. The Commission has unanimously expressed the opinion that the Representatives of the Powers should follow the accepted customs as regards official calls and receptions, while naturally abstaining from all relations with the missions of the other ex-enemy Powers, so long as the Treaties with their respective Governments will not have been ratified. 4. Relations With German Official Circles

5. With a view to assuring as soon as possible the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Governments of Bavaria and Saxony, the Commission suggests the following procedure: the Chargés d’Affaires sent to Berlin would be bearers of letters addressed by their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers, Presidents of Saxony and Bavaria, who also direct Foreign Affairs. These letters would be delivered by a special courier, who might be one of the secretaries belonging to the missions accredited to Berlin, these missions coming to an understanding among themselves as to the choice of this collective courier. 5. Diplomatic Representation at Dresden and at Munich

On the other hand, as the interpretation of the new German Constitution, as regards relations of the Free States with foreign Governments, presents a certain uncertainty, it is proper that we should not expose ourselves to see Bavaria or Saxony refuse to receive diplomats accredited to them. The Commission is of the opinion that the Allied Governments should limit themselves to informing the Ministers for Foreign Affairs for each State in question, that they “propose” to send a Representative to them.

Therefore, the Commission submits to the Supreme Council the following draft:

Renewal of Diplomatic Relations with Germany.

Draft of letter to be addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister President of Bavaria in Munich / Saxony in Dresden.

(This letter to be sent simultaneously to Munich / Dresden by special courier from the diplomatic missions in Berlin of such of the Allied and Associated Powers who desire to renew separate relations with Bavaria. / Saxony.

The date on which the courier is sent to be agreed upon as [soon as] possible in Berlin between the Chargés d’Affaires of the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Courier to wait and bring back reply)

Sir:—

I have the honour to announce to Your Excellency that with a view to renewing the diplomatic relations

between { the British
Empire
France
Italy
Japan
the United
States } and Bravia / Saxony which were interrupted

by the war, His Majesty the King / The Government of the Republic, etc., proposes to send a chargé d'affaires to Munich, / Dresden whose name will be communicated to Your Excellency in due course. The chargé d'Affaires will superintend the work of the Legation until the arrival of the head of the mission.

I should be obliged if Your Excellency would be so good as to acknowledge the receipt of this communication.

I am, with great consideration, Sir,

(signature)

In case of a favorable reply, the Chargé d'Affaires might immediately be appointed and replaced, if need be, by the titular of the Legation, as soon as the interested power is represented in Berlin by an Ambassador.

6. The Mission [*Commission?*] finally considered what would be the composition [of?] Missions accredited to Berlin under the transitory regime preceding the arrival of the Ambassadors. In this order of things, it is of the opinion besides officials belonging to the diplomatic cadre, properly speaking, there would be no objection to immediately sending to Berlin agents whose mission would be of an economic character, such as commercial attachés. But, on the contrary, it appeared to them that the presence of military and naval

attaches was not desirable at the present time. The existence of numerous commissions of control is, in fact, of a nature to diminish the importance of the task of these offices, whose presence might, on the other hand, be inaccurately interpreted as to mean a tribute of confidence toward the German Military authorities. The Military and Naval attachés should, therefore, be sent to Berlin only at the time when the Chargés d’Affaires will be replaced by Ambassadors, in which personnel they will naturally find their place. 6. Composition of Mission Before the Arrival of Ambassadors

Appendix H to HD-94

Draft of Instructions To Be Sent General Masterman

Note to be handed to German Government:

According to Article 202, last alinea, of the Peace Treaty, Germany agrees to displace no aeronautic material, this material to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Germany, with a view to escaping this agreement, continually operates the displacement, and even the sale and exportation of this material. By attempting to thus render valueless the obligations which she assumed, she compromises the loyal execution of the Treaty signed and rectified [*ratified?*] by her.

The Allied and Associated Powers remind Germany that the measures thus taken by her cannot be justified, and that, in consequence, the said displaced, sold or exported material must be delivered to them according to the terms of the Peace Treaty, or, in default thereof, its equivalent value, upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

Appendix I to HD-94

[Note From the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council]

The Supreme Council has notified the Rumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that their respective governments will not be

permitted to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria without having first signed the Treaty with Austria and their Treaty with the Principal Allied Powers for the protection of Minorities.

The question arises as to whether the same obligations should not be extended to the two arrangements signed at St. Germain-en-Laye and which are essential for the liquidation of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, to wit:

- 1st, the arrangement between the Allied and Associated Powers concerning the contribution to the expenses of liberating the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,^{[12](#)}
- 2nd, the arrangement between the Allied and Associated Powers relative to Italy's share of reparations.^{[13](#)}

Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State figure in the list of High Contracting Parties to these two acts.

The Drafting Committee is of the opinion that Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State should be invited to sign the two financial arrangements along with the Treaty with Austria and the special treaty on Minorities.

It has asked the Secretariat General to bring about a decision of the Supreme Council on this subject.

Appendix J to HD-94

No. 1507

PARIS, October 31, 1919.

From: Plenipotentiary of the Austrian Republic, Eichoff.

To: Clemenceau.

In view of the recent requests made by Austria, the Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom has declared that it is disposed, with the reservation that the consent of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers in Paris would be granted, to repatriate the Austrian war prisoners detained in Serbia. Their number is

relatively unimportant, amounting in all to about 20 officers and a little more than 150 men.

Pursuant to my note of the 28th inst., No. 1489, I again have recourse to your Excellency and beg that you kindly intervene in our behalf with the Commissions and competent Delegates in order that the consent of the Peace Conference to the immediate liberation of the Austrian war prisoners may be granted, and that notification thereof may be made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government as promptly as possible.

EICHOFF

¹ Minute 2, p. 159 [*Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 8](#)*].

² Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

³ HD-62, minute 1, [vol. VIII, p. 403](#).

⁴ See HD-62, minute 2, [ibid., p. 406](#).

⁵ Appendix A to HD-90, p. 131 [*Pg. 131 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

⁶ *Post*, p. 207 [*Pg. 207 is part of [Doc. 10](#)*].

^{6a} Appendices I and J to HD-37, [vol. VII, pp. 830](#) and [832](#).

⁷ Memorandum by Captain Fuller of the British Navy.

⁸ IC-176E, minute 2, [vol. V, p. 238](#).

⁹ Appendix B to HD-17, [vol. VII, p. 364](#).

¹⁰ CF-90, minute 1, CF-91, minute 2, and CF-92, minute 7, [vol. VI, pp. 649](#), [656](#), and [671](#).

¹¹ HD-76, minute 5, [vol. VIII, p. 767](#).

^{*} According to the Imperial Constitution, the Chancellor of the Empire was the real Minister for Foreign Affairs, but this seems to be modified under the terms of the new Constitution (Article 5).

[Footnote in the original.]

¹² Appendix I to HD-37, [vol. VII, p. 830](#).

¹³ Appendix J to HD-37, [ibid., p. 832](#).

November 18, 10:30 a.m. (HD-95)

[\[11\] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 18, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.](#)

Paris, November 18, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/95

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/95

HD-95

[Document 11]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 18, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 18, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Captain Madison, U. S. N.
Lt-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.
Dr. J. B. Scott
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. A. Leeper
Commandant Dunne, R. N.
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Commandant MacNamara, R. N.
Mr. H. W. Malkin

FRANCE
M. Loucheur
M. Arnavon
Commandant Du Chayla

ITALY
Admiral Cagni
M. Vannutelli-Rey
Captain Ruspoli
Commandant Ingianni
M. Pilotti

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a note from the Reparation Commission dated November 17th on the observations presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation November 5th on the subject of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage.¹ (See Appendix "A"). Report of the Reparation Commission on the Demands Presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the Subject of the Distribution of Austro-Hungarian Mercantile Tonnage

M. LOUCHEUR felt that a certain confusion had arisen on this question. The note which the Council had before it came from the old Reparation Commission which had prepared the Peace Treaties. The Committee on Organization of the new Reparation Commission, over which he presided, had also had the question put before it, but had not yet considered it. As it was a question concerning the application of the Treaty, he thought that the Committee over which he presided was alone competent, and he asked that the discussion be adjourned. He believed he would be in a position to present a report to the Council on the following day at noon.

(The discussion of this subject was adjourned until the following meeting.)

2. M. PICHON observed that this question depended on the decision to be taken on the previous question, which had been adjourned. He proposed likewise to adjourn the discussion of this point to the following meeting. Signature of the Austrian Treaty by the Croat-Slovene Delegation

(This was agreed to.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that it was necessary to fix a date for signing the Treaty with Bulgaria. Signature of the Bulgarian Treaty

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that certain questions of detail had still to be settled before the signature could take place. The signature of Serbia was dependent on a prior settlement of the question of distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage. Within eight days the Council would know whether or not it could count on obtaining the signature of Roumania. Moreover, the Council had

decided, upon the request of Switzerland, to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty articles guaranteeing Swiss neutrality.² As far as the Bulgarians were concerned, no difficulties would be raised in this connection, but it would still be necessary to inform them of this matter upon the arrival of their delegates in Paris, which would take place the following day. These various considerations made it evident that the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty could not take place before the following Wednesday or Thursday.

(After a short discussion, Thursday, November 27th, was settled upon as the date for the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU felt inclined simply to reply to M. Venizelos that the Council adhered integrally to the text of the letter it had sent him on November 12th.³ M. Berthelot could undertake the preparation of this letter. Consideration of Letters of November 15th and 17th From M. Venizelos Relative to the Situation in Smyrna. (See Appendices “B” and “C”)

M. de MARTINO agreed entirely with M. Clemenceau’s suggestion. He wished to correct a misleading phrase in M. Venizelos’ letter of November 15th, (See Appendix “B”). It was there said (See page 2) that the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims had categorically approved the Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighboring region. He felt obliged then to point out that the Italian representative on that Commission had always contested the Greek claims.

It was decided:

- (1) that M. Berthelot prepare a letter to be sent to M. Venizelos informing him that the Supreme Council adhered integrally to the point of view set forth in its letter of November 12th;
- (2) that the above letter be signed by the President in the name of the Supreme Council and despatched immediately.

5. (The Council had before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 16th (See Appendix “D”).) Situation in Hungary

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon this telegram. He pointed out that the information contained therein was less satisfactory, that arrests of certain political leaders were taking place at Budapest, and that if the situation did not improve, Sir George Clerk might be obliged to carry out the threat which he had already several times made of leaving Hungary.

(Discussion of this question was adjourned pending the receipt of more precise information.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that as a result of the conversation he had had that morning with the French Naval Expert it had become apparent that the point of view set forth in the latest British proposition was an entirely new one.^{3a} He found it difficult to reach immediately a decision on such an important point in the absence of the Minister of Marine who was at that moment not in Paris. He felt that the Minister of Marine would not be disinclined to agree with the British proposals. Up to that time his own point of view had been somewhat different, but the new arguments presented to him had rather shaken his convictions and he was quite ready to change his previous point of view in order to arrive at an agreement. Nevertheless he wished time for reflection. He could not indeed pretend that the idea of destroying the vessels would not be very unfavorably received by French public opinion. If a solution of that nature were adopted, at the very least it would be necessary to draw up a statement clearly setting forth the reasons which militated in favor of that solution. Unfortunately the present state of the French navy was so regrettable that French public opinion would not understand why the navy should not use the share of German ships which were allotted to it. At any rate it would be necessary to act with due consideration for French public opinion which was acutely interested in this question. Distribution of Enemy Warships

(The discussion of this question was adjourned).

7. MR. POLK wished to call attention to the fourth paragraph of the decision relative to German Oil Tank Ships in the Minutes of the preceding meeting (H. D. 94, Minute 2),⁴ which did not entirely conform to what he had said. What he had actually said was that he

would undertake to transmit to his Government Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal, recommending its adoption, and that in the ships meantime the 9 oil tank ships of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft should be retained without being used. Correction of the Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of November 17, 1919, (H. D. 94) Relative to the German Oil Tank Ships

M. DE PERCIN asked if the remaining tankers could at once be used, as was set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the decision in question.

MR. POLK replied in the affirmative.

It was decided:

that paragraph 4 of the decision relative to German Oil Tank ships (meeting of November 17th, 1919, H. D. 94, Minute 2), should be modified to read as follows:

“(4) that Mr. Polk would transmit to his Government the foregoing proposals of Sir Eyre Crowe and recommend the adoption thereof, and that in the meantime the 9 oil tank ships claimed by American interests should be retained without being used.”

8. M. FROMAGEOT explained that the question of German ships transferred to Dutch Navigation Companies had been brought up by a note of the Council demanding that the Germans retain the 5 vessels in course of construction which they claimed to have legally transferred to Holland in 1915 and 1916.⁵ The Dutch Government had protested against this note and maintained that the Dutch Navigation Companies were legal owners of the vessels in question.⁶ The Dutch note had been replied to⁷ and Germany had replied to the note which had been sent it. The question raised was the validity of a change of flag during the course of a war of a vessel belonging to a belligerent country. That question had not been juridically decided in an identical manner by all the Allied and Associated Powers. In France a very ancient rule was followed which had been laid down at the time of the war of American Independence by an Ordinance of

1778. That ordinance settled that no ship could avail itself of a neutral flag if that neutral flag had been acquired in the course of the war. The French had never ceased to apply that rule. In America and England the system followed was apparently different, and a transfer made in good faith was considered valid in principle; but if account were taken of the jurisprudence of prize courts it would be seen that in practice decisions were in general similar to those arrived at in France. In any case, as it might well be embarrassing to ask their Allies to adopt a course that would not be fully consistent with the juridical principles which they accepted theoretically, he thought, in agreement with his colleagues, that it would be preferable not to reply to the German note until the Treaty had come into force. The Treaty specified (See Part VIII, Annex III, paragraph 7) that Germany must secure for herself the full title to the property in all those ships that were transferred during the war. Basing their position upon that very definite text, the Allied and Associated Powers would be legally justified in demanding from the Germans delivery, pure and simple, of those vessels, without needing to engage in theoretical and obscure discussions upon the validity of the transfers. German Ships Transferred During the War to Dutch Navigation Companies

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

not to reply before the Treaty came into force to the German note upon the German vessels transferred during the war to Dutch navigation companies.)

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 18, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-95**

[Report of the Reparation Commission on the Demands Presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the Subject of the Distribution of Austro-Hungarian Mercantile Tonnage⁸]

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation asks that the fishing boats and other commercial shipping belonging to the ex-Austrian owners of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on November 4, 1918, should be attributed to the said Kingdom.

The Reparations Commission of the Peace Conference is of the opinion:

1. That Austro-Hungarian fishing boats and other Austro-Hungarian ships of less than 2,000 tons might be left in the Adriatic ports to which they were respectively attached; and that the value fixed by the Reparations Commission of the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian or Turkish interests represented by these boats shall be charged to each of the states whose nationals are owners of such boats;
2. That, although under the principle of ton-for-ton distribution the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would not have any right to reparations in shipping because no maritime losses were sustained by it during the war, that State may nevertheless, like other Allied and Associated Powers, claim that recognition be granted the property rights in tonnage belonging to its nationals, rights which are entirely safeguarded by paragraph 20 of Annex II of Part VIII of the Peace Treaty; and that, with a view to regulating the question of tonnage in accordance with the rights and interests of the other states concerned, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State may be admitted to such arrangements as may be made in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of May 22, 1919, which arrangements should be submitted to the Reparations Commission.⁹

Appendix B to HD-95

PARIS, November 15, 1919.

*Letter From the President of the Greek Delegation, Dated,
November 15, Regarding the Situation in Smyrna*

GREEK DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONGRESS

From: M. E. K. Veniselos.

To: M. Clemenceau.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the letter which Your Excellency was kind enough to send me on November 12,¹⁰ relative to the Commission of Inquiry of Smyrna.

Owing to the spirit of friendly confidence inspiring the answer of the Supreme Council to the written claims and verbal reserves which I had the honor to set forth, I think it my duty not to insist on the errors in the investigation, consequent to the incontestable irregularities committed in the course of the procedure adopted by the Commission.

But it would be a slight on the respectful sincerity of the sentiments which I always expressed to the Supreme Council, to not point out to the benevolent attention of the Council the reflections suggested to me, on two points, by the answer given.

In the first place, the Supreme Council expresses the hope that the dangerous tension, which seems still to exist on the boundaries of the zone of Greek occupation, will be, little by little, reduced by the wisdom and justice of the Greek administration and, thanks to the work of delimitation recently terminated by General Milne, Commander of the Allied Forces in Anatolia.

The Supreme Council may entirely rely upon the maintenance of a perfect order in the zone of occupation of the Greek Army. But it would be a misunderstanding of the reality of the facts which provoked this dangerous tension, existing on the boundaries of the zone of occupation, to expect its reduction by the effects of Greek administration. In fact, its vigilance is all exercised within these boundaries while the tension referred to above results from attacks launched from outside. Their authors are not only free to organize them, but they were under the impression of being encouraged to do so by the procedure of the investigation in which they discerned disfavor for the Greek regime. Therefore, they continued their powerless aggressions again and again, as the risks were reduced by

the fact that Greek troops had to limit themselves to repulsing them without authority to pursue them.

An objective examination of the facts leads to the conclusion that the good order existing in the zone of Greek occupation, will be as well assured beyond its limits, as soon as the Turks, deprived of the hope of finding support in instigating trouble, will really become conscious of their defeat. This result will certainly be obtained by the definite decisions of the Peace Conference.

In the second place, the Supreme Council notices that the occupation of Smyrna was only decided for political reasons, and constitutes no new right in the future. May I point out that, whatever be the reasons for the decision to send Greek troops to Smyrna, the Supreme Council could not be mistaken as to the interpretation given it, with good reasons, by the Greek Government and people. The Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighboring region were not only well-known, but they had been officially formulated to the Conference, defended at length before the Supreme Council, and frankly approved by the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims. In occupying Smyrna, Greece knew that [although?] she was not yet legally, she was at least morally, entitled to it. She did not simply send her troops as executive instruments to a foreign country, as she had previously done in Russia, but as organs most interested in the success of an international mandate, with a view to maintaining order in an essentially great country. Therefore, although the occupation of Smyrna did not constitute, from a strictly juridical point of view, a new right to the benefit of Greece, in fact, it has created a new situation which should not be disregarded. It does not extend the rights which Greece previously had in Smyrna, and already recognized by the Commission on Greek Affairs, but at least it corroborates them and strengthens the legitimate confidence of the Greek nation in the final decision of the Peace Conference.

I entirely share this sentiment, as I am convinced that the rights of my country in Smyrna are in full accord with the general situation of the world, and with the wishes and interests of the population.

Please accept, etc.

E. K. VENISELOS

Appendix C to HD-95

PARIS, November 17, 1919.

*Letter From the President of the Greek Delegation, Dated November
17, Regarding the Situation in Smyrna*

GREEK DELEGATION TO
THE PEACE CONGRESS

The President of the Council

From: M. Veniselos.

To: M. Clemenceau.

Pursuant to my letter of November 15, I have the honor to reply to the passage of your letter of November 12 referring to the desire of the Supreme Council to obtain from me information relative to the conditions under which Greek troops crossed the line of demarkation, as fixed by the Interallied High Command at Soma.

I hastened to submit this question (*sic*) and the High-Commissioner of Greece at Smyrna has just furnished by despatch the following information:

In conformity with the proposals of General Milne approved by the Supreme Council, the Greek troops, after having occupied their new positions in the Pergamum sector, were obliged to cross the line in the direction of Soma, because of an aggression by Turkish bands, to pursue and disperse the assailants. Having achieved this purpose, they hastened to return to their original position. This action took place by virtue of a new authorization from General Milne by the terms of which Greek troops may, in defending themselves, counter attack and pursue the enemy beyond their line to a distance of three kilometers, under the obligation of returning to their original line after having dispersed the enemy.

Mr. Sterghiadis adds that the use made of this authorization was brought to the attention of General Harboursy, representative of General Milne, who formulated no observations nor reserves.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix D to HD-95

NOVEMBER 16, 1919.

Telegram From Sir G. Clerk, Budapest, to Supreme Council

No. 8

Order has so far been completely maintained and general life of city is quite normal but there have occurred instances of unauthorized arrests and attempted arrests of prominent socialists and social democrats. These are people who have been in consultation with me and in negotiation with present Government in regard to formation of a coalition. I have made strongest possible representations to Government who assures me incidents are completely unauthorized acts of individual officers or soldiers. This may be so but instances are all the more significant of lack of authority of Government. I have said that I can only regard arrests of political leaders with whom both I and government are in consultation as deliberate insults to Allies and that unless I have formal and definite guarantees that no one will be molested in this way I shall leave Budapest at once.

¹ For the note of November 5, see appendix B to HD-89, p. 103 [Pg. 103 is part of [Doc. 5](#)].

² See HD-88, minute 3 and appendix B, pp. 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 4](#)] and 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 4](#)].

³ Appendix A to HD-90, p. 131 [Pg. 131 is part of [Doc. 6](#)].

^{3a} Appendix O to HD-94, p. 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 10](#)].

⁴ Ante, p. 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 10](#)].

⁵ Appendix A to HD-70, [vol. VIII, p. 649](#).⁵

⁶ Appendix G to HD-82, [ibid., p. 929](#).⁶

⁷ Appendix E to HD-83, [ibid., p. 951](#).⁷

⁸ Appendix B to HD-89, p. 103 [*Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 5*].

⁹ CF-24/1, minute 5, [vol. V, p. 834](#).⁹

¹⁰ Appendix A to HD-90, p. 131 [*Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 6*].

November 19, 11 a.m. (HD–96)

[12] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 19, 1919, at 11:00 a.m.

Paris, November 19, 1919, 11 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/96

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/96

HD-96

[Document 12]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 19, 1919, at
11:00 a.m.**

Paris, November 19, 1919, 11 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. I. Bowman
Mr. A. W. Dulles
Lt.-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. Forbes-Adam

FRANCE
General Payot
General Le Rond
M. Laroche
M. Kammerer
M. de Montille

ITALY
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a report from the Committee on New States, and a draft treaty annexed thereto (See Appendix “A”).

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the report. He added that the only point on which the members of the Committee did not agree

was: who should sign the treaty. The majority was of the opinion that as the Principal Powers had imposed Article 56 upon Bulgaria, they should all sign this document, but the minority, that is to say the American Delegation, had made reservations on that point. Treaty Between Greece and Bulgaria

MR. POLK said he would put it up to his Government but he doubted that the United States Government would sign this Treaty; his feeling was that it would say “no”, as it had done in the case of the Treaty with the New States (Clauses relative to transferred territories).

M. KAMMERER asked whether the other Powers should sign in case America would not, and thought that had already happened in the Treaty with Austria.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the precedent pointed the other way; when America refused to sign, it had been decided that the other Allied Powers should also refrain from signing, this occasioning a delay which had prevented the Treaty being presented for signature to the smaller Powers.

MR. POLK said he saw the force of Sir Eyre Crowe’s argument and would refer this question to his Government.

M. DE MARTINO thought that the Great Powers could not refuse to take their part of the responsibility for the settlement of Balkan affairs. The question of immigration was one of the most important, and one which might permit grave abuses. As they all knew, racial rivalries were very frequent between those countries. He thought they would be abstaining from a duty which befell them as a moral obligation if they did not take an effective part in the execution of these clauses with Bulgaria by affixing their signatures thereto.

M. MATSUI said he had not yet received an answer from his Government on the subject. He believed it would be impossible for Japan to sign if one of the other Powers did not, but it was his opinion that all the Powers should sign.

M. KAMMERER said there remained a second point, namely, should the Treaty be submitted to the Bulgarian Delegation? It had already been sent to the Greeks and approved by M. Venizelos. He added that the American Delegation felt they were morally obliged to submit the text of this Treaty to the Bulgarians; the majority did not feel it as a moral obligation, but thought it might be opportune to do so.

MR. DULLES asked whether the Treaty could not become effective even if only Greece and Bulgaria were the signatories. It would be up to Greece and Bulgaria to carry their agreement into effect under the aegis of the League of Nations.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he saw no objections to submitting it to the Bulgarians and if it were found that they and the Greeks were prepared to sign it, perhaps by that time the other Powers would be ready too.

M. KAMMERER asked whether a delay of two days could be given Bulgaria for accepting this text?

(This was agreed to.)

It was decided:

- (1) to submit to the Bulgarian Delegation the Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria with regard to reciprocal immigration; (See Appendix "A").
- (2) that two days' time be given to the Bulgarian Delegation to consider this text;
- (3) that the question whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign this Treaty would be considered later.

It was further decided:

that Mr. Polk should refer to Washington the question of the signature of this Treaty by the United States.

2. (The Council had before it a note from the Committee on New States (See Appendix "B"). Signature of Minorities Treaty With

Roumania

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the report. He added that on October 12th when the Supreme Council had notified the Roumanian Government that they must sign the Minorities Treaty it was added that the Supreme Council would examine any modifications of text presented by the Roumanians provided that the general principles were not altered.¹ But the Roumanian Government had been notified that it must sign the Minorities Treaty before the Bulgarian Treaty. The period granted Roumania had almost expired. He asked whether a communication should be sent to the Roumanian Delegation asking them to submit observations without delay?

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the situation was less complicated than it appeared unless the Roumanians should happen to create difficulties. The Council had presented its ultimatum. The period expired on the following Sunday. Roumania would have to accept the principle of the Minorities Treaty but might suggest modifications for the Council's discussion, provided these modifications were confined to such articles as concerned Roumania, for example, articles 10, 11, and 12. They understood that the Roumanian objections referred more specially to general principles, and obviously the Roumanians would have to abandon these objections on account of the ultimatum sent them. He understood that no great value attached to articles 10, 11, and 12 either by the Roumanians or by the Council and the Council would therefore be ready to grant concessions if not to abandon the articles. It would be necessary to come to an agreement with Roumania within 24 hours.

MR. POLK said he would not like to commit his Government to accept these modifications at this time but he thought they probably could agree to some compromise when he received an answer from Washington.

M. DE MARTINO agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe and added that in order to facilitate the signature of the Treaty by the Roumanians, a declaration might be made to them such as the one which had been made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. That declaration stated

that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers did not have in mind to confer special privileges to any Minority, but only to prevent racial conflicts by giving the Minorities an equitable protection, and that they were ready to give the same assurance to any State which would sign the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities.

M. KAMMERER said there was no objection to such a declaration being made to the Roumanians, but he asked whether this should be done at once or whether it would be advisable to await such a request from the Roumanians.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it would be wiser to await the reply of the Roumanians to the Council's ultimatum.

It was decided:

- (1) that no answer was called for by the Roumanian note relating to the Minorities Treaty, and that no further action be taken until an answer had been received from the Roumanian Government to the note of November 15th;^{[1a](#)}
- (2) that if that answer were in the affirmative the Roumanian Delegation should be required immediately to put their observations before the Committee on New States;
- (3) that the Committee on New States should within twenty-four hours present a report to the Supreme Council on those observations; it being understood that the Minorities Treaty could not be modified in its general principles, but only in respect of such articles, e. g., 10, 11 and 12, as purely concerned Roumania. (See Appendix "B").

3. (The Council had before it a telegram from the Esthonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated November 12th (See Appendix "C").)
Request of the Esthonians for the Establishment of a Neutral Zone Between the Baltic States and Russia Under the Control of a Third State

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the telegram. He said that this request tended to replace the local troops in those territories by Allied troops. Third state thought this would not be an enviable

position for the Allies to be in between the Bolsheviks and the Baltic States, and that it would imply a sort of agreement between the Allies and the Bolsheviks.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he felt perfectly sure that it was the unanimous opinion of the Council that such a request should not be granted.

It was decided:

not to grant the request of the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs for the establishment of a neutral zone between the Baltic States and Russia under the control of a third State, to be appointed by the Conference. (See Appendix "C").

4. (The Council had before it a letter from the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation (See Appendix "D"). Note From the Polish Delegation Requesting That the Arrangement Regarding Galicia Be Communicated to Them

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the letter. He added that the Council had already decided on November 11th² to hear the Polish Delegates without communicating the report to them. He would ask the Polish Delegates to appear before the Council at the following meeting.

5. GENERAL LE ROND said that the question of transferring the sovereignty over the territories subject to a plebiscite had to be settled between the Commissions of the Allies and the German delegates, who had just arrived. The different plebiscite commissions had been organized since November 10th, but they had had great difficulty in getting their personnel; some of the members were still in Rome, others in London, trying to get it together. That was one reason why the discussion with the German delegates had not started. Organization of Plebiscite Zones in Germany

The questions to be discussed with the Germans arose from the application of the Treaty.

First, there was the question of administration of the plebiscite areas: there was no difficulty about that as it passed automatically to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Second, there was the economic organization which presented difficulties: as those economic services were administered mainly from Berlin, the relations between Berlin and those territories could not be suspended. It was necessary to provide for some liaison between the several Commissions and the Central Government at Berlin. The best solution would be to invite the Berlin Government to send an official belonging to the German Central Administration who would act as a sort of liaison officer between the Government and each of the Commissions. This official would have to be accepted by the Commission and must not belong to the province where he was to go, so that the local population should not be under the impression that the German Government was still keeping a hold over them. This official would be at the disposal of the Commission for all matters which concerned railways, postal, telegraph and mining questions, etc.

Third, there were also financial questions. Under the Treaty, all expenses were to be charged against local revenues; this should be interpreted to mean future as well as present revenues. The present local revenues would be insufficient to cover the charges set against them; in Upper Silesia for instance, the charge for military occupation alone would amount to fifteen million francs a month. In consequence, several solutions could be devised: a local loan guaranteed by resources of the territory, and which of course, would be borne ultimately by the Power to whom the territory would be attributed. Such a solution could be contemplated only in case of occupation for a long period, as in the case of Upper Silesia. The expenses to be incurred could be divided in three classes: First, expenses of administration by local officials. This was merely a continuation of the previous regime; therefore, it was natural that the Germans would have to find the funds. Secondly, the cost of maintaining forces of occupation: it would be difficult to ask the Germans to bear that expense; they would be justified in objecting and serious difficulties might be encountered. Another solution was to be found, and it would be necessary for the Principal Allied and

Associated Powers to advance these funds, either by bearing the expense each of their own forces of occupation, or by establishing a common fund. Third, the cost of maintaining the Commissions. This cost would be a much lighter charge, and funds could be advanced in two ways either by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by Poland. This latter method would be an equitable one and might well be accepted by Poland, as she had asked for the plebiscites.

He wished to point out that those expenses would only be made as advances, and that the whole amount would be refunded by the Powers to whom attribution of the territories would be made after plebiscite.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it was difficult to solve that question without the advice of financial experts. The argument, however, did not take into account cases like Danzig and Memel. Neither Poland nor Germany were concerned there. The matter would have to be referred to his Government.

GENERAL LE ROND thought that the point relating to the liaison between the Central German Government and the Commissions could be settled at once.

M. DE MARTINO said he did not think this question was on the agenda, and he was not ready to discuss it; as it was a financial matter he should have to refer it to his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought the point just referred to could be accepted at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked General Le Rond to prepare a report suggesting a solution to the financial questions.

GENERAL LE ROND replied that financial representatives should be appointed by each of the Powers to discuss this question.

MR. POLK said that as the United States Senate had not ratified the Treaty, the United States could not be represented.

After some further discussion,

It was decided:

(1) that in the course of negotiations with the German Delegates appointed to sign the protocol the German Government should be asked to appoint to each Government Commission an official who, having been accepted by the Commission, would act as an intermediary between the Central German Government and the Commissions;

(2) that financial representatives be appointed by each Power to prepare, together with General Le Rond, a report on the financial questions relative to the organization of plebiscite areas and to the occupation of Dantzic and Memel.

(Mr. Polk made the reservation that the United States Government could not be represented on this Commission as the Treaty with Germany had not yet been ratified by the Senate.)

6. GENERAL PAYOT said that Marshal Foch's staff had examined the question of transportation of troops and supplies with the representatives of the Allied armies and had drafted a memorandum which could be transmitted to the German Delegates who would have 48 hours to examine the proposal. If the Germans accepted this, the question would be settled; otherwise the Allied Delegates might see the German Delegates and come to an agreement with them. He pointed out that in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans, the question who would pay those expenses arose and as he had not known what the Council's decision would be, a non-committal formula had been adopted. Cost of Transportation of Troops and Supplies in Plebiscite Areas

SIR EYRE CROWE said there could be no doubt whatsoever that the cost of transportation of troops and of supplies was included in the costs of occupation and therefore should be borne by the States to whom attribution of territories would be made.

GENERAL PAYOT remarked that the cost of the transportation of troops alone would amount to approximately 5,000,000 marks.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, in order not to give the Germans the impression that all costs were being imposed on them, it should be made clear in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans that the costs of transportation were to be borne by the States to whom attribution of said territories would ultimately be made.

It was decided:

- (1) that a memorandum should be submitted to the German Delegates regarding the transportation of troops and supplies in the plebiscite areas;
- (2) that the cost of transportation of troops and supplies in the plebiscite areas should be a charge against the States to whom attribution of these territories would be made and that a phrase to that effect would be put in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans;
- (3) that a delay of 48 hours be given them for examination.

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 19, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-96**

NOVEMBER 17, 1919.

Report to the Supreme Council

In accordance with the decision taken by the Supreme Council on September 4th,³ the Committee on New States has continued its activities with a view to drafting a convention relative to reciprocal and voluntary emigration in the Balkan countries and has the honor to submit the attached draft for the approval of the Supreme Council.

In its report on this question addressed to the Supreme Council on July 30th,⁴ the Committee on New States indicated that it would be advantageous, with a view to the maintenance of peace, to bring the various Balkan States to participate in a convention regulating the modalities of voluntary emigration in these regions. But the Committee considered that although it seemed possible to provide in

the Bulgarian Treaty, and later in the Turkish Treaty, clauses specifying an obligation on the part of Bulgaria and Turkey to accept the convention prepared, yet on the contrary, so far as concerned Greece and Serbia, such a convention could not be imposed with authority and should be merely proposed for the acceptance of these states.

The Supreme Council, having accepted this point of view decided upon the insertion in the Bulgarian Treaty of paragraph 2 of Article 56, obliging Bulgaria to recognize the provisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers may judge opportune relative to the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of ethnic minorities.⁵

In its observations on the Treaty clauses, presented on October 24th, the Bulgarian Delegation declared that it raised no objection so far as Article 56 was concerned.

On the other hand, in submitting a draft statement of principles to the Greek and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations, the Committee on New States asked them if they would agree to participate in an agreement of this nature.

The Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, while approving the ideas which inspired the draft convention, replied that the emigration and immigration contemplated in this agreement could, in its opinion, be more advantageously regulated by direct understanding between the states interested.

To the contrary, the Delegation of the Kingdom of Greece, desirous of a conclusion on this subject, submitted to the Committee, which has examined it in detail, a complete text based on the draft statement of principles proposed. Making some alterations in this text, the Committee has drawn up a definitive project which has just been officially accepted by that Delegation.

The question then arose whether, since Serbia refused to participate in this convention, there would nevertheless be cause to prepare an agreement which for the moment would be entered into only between Greece and Bulgaria.

The Committee on New States unanimously decided that it would be preferable to carry the matter through, the treaty prepared being later imposed on Turkey and left open to acceptance by the other Balkan States.

The Committee on New States then discussed the question as to whether or not the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should affix their signatures to this Treaty in which they would figure as High Contracting Parties, or on the contrary if this Treaty, prepared by them, should now be signed only by Greece and Bulgaria.

The Majority of the Committee considered that paragraph 2 of Article 56 of the Bulgarian Treaty, although not giving precise details on this question, seemed to imply that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would participate in the convention whose acceptance by Bulgaria they had thus imposed in advance. Opinion of the Majority

The Majority of the Committee was therefore of the opinion that it would be proper to submit to the consideration of the Supreme Council the question as to whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would sign the treaty and whether it would not be expedient to consult the Drafting Committee in this regard.

The Majority of the Committee on New States, basing its opinion on paragraph 2 of Article 56 of the Treaty with Bulgaria, does not believe that it is obligatory to consult the Bulgarian Delegation concerning this draft convention, especially, as is recalled above, since the Bulgarian Delegation raised no objection to Article 56.

Nevertheless, although there is no obligation in this respect, the majority of the Committee considered it preferable, if the Supreme Council deems it wise that this draft treaty, in case it is approved, should be sent to the Bulgarian Delegation which would then have to declare within a very short time, say 48 hours, whether it has any observations to present.

The American Delegation, while in accord with the other Delegations that an agreement regarding reciprocal emigration in the Balkan

States is very desirable, does not share the view of the majority that under Article 56 of the Treaty with Bulgaria the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have assumed an obligation to guarantee any such arrangement by becoming signatory parties, and reserves its judgment regarding the desirability of the United States signing the projected agreement between Greece and Bulgaria. Opinion of the American Delegation

The American Delegation is further of the opinion that the impracticability of extending this agreement to other Balkan States at the present time might well cause the Bulgarian Delegation to object that the provisions of an agreement between Greece and Bulgaria as regards minorities were not “reciprocal” in the spirit of Article 56 of the Bulgarian Treaty, as they only concerned Bulgarian minorities in Greece and Greek minorities in Bulgaria, while making no provision for the large Bulgarian minorities in Macedonia, Serbia and the Dobrudja. In view of this fact, and as the projected Treaty might appear to be an aggravation of the Treaty of Peace and to go beyond the terms of Article 56, which provide that “Bulgaria Undertakes to recognize such provisions as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers may consider opportune with respect to the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of persons belonging to racial minorities,” the American representative is of the opinion that there is a moral obligation to submit the draft Treaty to the Bulgarian Delegation before proceeding to the signature.

[Annex]

Draft Agreement on Balkan Emigration

In the execution of the provisions of Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, dated the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece on the one hand and the Kingdom of Bulgaria on the other hand, agree on the following dispositions:

ARTICLE 1

Greece and Bulgaria grant respectively to their nationals belonging to minorities of race, of religion, or of language the right to declare their

wish to emigrate to the other country.

ARTICLE 2

Greece and Bulgaria undertake to facilitate in every way the exercise of the right provided by Article 1 and to interpose no obstacle, directly or indirectly, to freedom of emigration, notwithstanding all laws or regulations to the contrary, which should be considered as null and void in this regard.

In particular the exercise of the right of emigration shall not endanger the pecuniary rights of emigrants existing at the time of emigration.

ARTICLE 3

No obstacle shall be interposed to the departure of an emigrant for any cause whatever, except in case of a final sentence pronounced as penalty for an infraction of common law. In case of a sentence which is not yet final or of criminal process at common law against an emigrant, the latter shall be delivered by the authorities of the prosecuting country to the authorities of the country where the emigrant is proceeding, in order that he may be tried.

ARTICLE 4

The right of voluntary emigration to all persons more than 18 years of age. It may be exercised within a period of two years from the establishment of the Mixed Commission provided below by means of a declaration before the said Commission or before its representatives. The choice of emigration of the husband will carry with it that of the wife; the choice of emigration of the parents or of guardians will carry with it that of their children or wards less than 18 years of age.

ARTICLE 5

Emigrants shall lose the nationality of the country which they abandon at the moment when they leave it and shall acquire that of

the country of destination upon their arrival of [*in*] the territory of the latter.

ARTICLE 6

Persons who, in execution of the provisions below, take advantage of the right of emigration shall be free to carry with them or to have transported their movable property of all kinds. There may not be imposed upon them any export or import duty on this account.

Likewise, in case where the right of emigration is exercised by the members of a community which after their departure must be dissolved, the mixed Commission provided for below shall determine whether and under what conditions the said members shall have the right to carry freely or to have transported the movable property belonging to the said community, churches, convents, schools, hospitals or establishments of any kind.

ARTICLE 7

So far as immovable property is concerned, rural or urban, belonging to voluntary emigrants or to communities of emigrants, churches, convents, schools, hospitals, and establishments of any kind, they shall be liquidated by the Mixed Commission provided for below in conformity with the following provisions.

ARTICLE 8

Persons who, having left their original residence, are already established in the state to which they belong from the ethnical point of view, shall have the right to the value in exchange of the property left by them in the abandon[ed] country, as this may be fixed by the process of liquidation. This liquidation will be carried out according to the provisions established below.

ARTICLE 9

Within a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, there shall be created a Mixed Commission of live members, of whom one shall be nominated by Greece, one by

Bulgaria and the three others by the Council of the League of Nations, or, in its failure to do so, by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 10

This Commission shall be charged with the supervision and facilitation of voluntary emigration between the two countries and with the liquidation of the immovable property of emigrants.

It shall fix the modalities of emigration and of the liquidation of immovable property.

ARTICLE 11

The Mixed Commission shall have the power to proceed to estimate the value of immovable property, the parties interested being duly heard.

The increase in value of immovable property thus liquidated must be paid to the Commission by the Government of the country where the liquidation takes place, under conditions to be fixed by the Commission. The ownership of property whose value is thus paid to the Commission shall appertain to the state charged with the payment.

ARTICLE 12

The funds necessary to facilitate emigration shall be advanced to the Commission by the states interested under the conditions fixed by the former. The Commission shall advance to emigrants, within the limits of available funds, the value of their immovable goods.

ARTICLE 13

The cost of maintenance and operations of the Mixed Commission and its branches shall be borne by the Governments interested, in proportions to be determined by the Commission.

ARTICLE 14

The Mixed Commission shall have the power to take supplementary measures necessary for the application of the above provisions.

ARTICLE 15

Within a period of one year from the coming into force of the present treaty, the states having a common frontier with one of the states which are parties to this treaty shall have the right to declare their adherence to the said treaty.

Appendix B to HD-96

NOVEMBER 18, 1919.

[Note From the Committee on New States to the Supreme Council]

(Translation)

PEACE CONFERENCE
SECRETARY GENERAL

SIGNATURE OF THE MINORITIES TREATY BY RUMANIA

The telegram addressed to the Rumanian Government on October 11th⁷ contains the following statement:

“As soon as the Supreme Council learn that the Rumanian Government is prepared to sign the Treaty with Austria without reservation, they, for their part, will be happy to consider in common with Rumania such modifications of the clauses of the Minorities Treaty as particularly interest Rumania without affecting the general principle, with a view if possible to giving satisfaction to the Rumanian Government.”

By his letter of October 31st, the President of the Peace Conference notified the President of the Rumanian Delegation that Rumania would not be allowed to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria without previously having signed the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.⁸

By its telegram of November 13th [15th],⁹ the Supreme Council invited Rumania to declare, within a period of eight days, that she was ready to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaties under the conditions set out in the previous note.

As a result, according to the very terms of the notification of the Supreme Council, Rumania has the right to discuss anew, if not the principle at least the drafting of the Minorities Treaty.

But, since the Rumanian reply will arrive only three or four days before the signature of the Treaty with Bulgaria it is not evident how it will be possible within such a short time to receive the Rumanian observations, to study them, to reply to them, and to prepare Rumania to accept the final result of these labors.

Appendix C to HD-96

[The Esthonian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Peace Conference]

Telegram

PEACE CONFERENCE, PARIS.

S. S. REVAL 2375 /12 126 12 18 43.

I am directed by the Conference of the Delegates of the Balkan [*Baltic*] States of the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia to inform you that the Conference has decided that in the event of an armistice being possible between the Baltic States and the *de facto* Government of Russia, a neutral zone should be established between the Russian front and the Baltic States under the administration of a third State. Consequently, I have the honor to request the Peace Conference to entrust a State with the organization and control of the Administration in the neutral zone in order that the execution of the clauses of the eventual Treaty may be guaranteed.

ESTHONIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Appendix D to HD-96

POLISH DELEGATION
TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, November 17, 1919.

To the Secretary General of the Peace Conference:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 12¹⁰ and to inform you, at the same time, that the Polish Plenipotentiary Delegates, Messrs. Ladislas Grabski and Stanislas Patek have arrived in Paris and are ready to comply with the invitation of the Supreme Council.

The Polish Delegates would be pleased to become acquainted with the new draft of statute for Eastern Galicia, before they set forth their observations on the said statute.

¹ See telegram to British Chargé at Bucharest, October 11, appendix B to HD-68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#) .

^{1a} Appendix A to HD-93, p. 182 [*Pg. 182 is part of [Doc. 9](#)*].

² HD-89, minute 7, p. 99 [*Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 5](#)*].

³ HD-47, minute 4, [vol. VIII, p. 101](#) .

⁴ Appendix F to HD 25, [vol. VII, p. 590](#) .

⁵ HD-55, minute 3 (b), and appendix E, [vol. VIII, pp. 236](#)  and [244](#) .

⁷ See appendix B to HD-68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#) .

⁸ See HD-78, minute 3, [vol. VIII, p. 805](#) .

⁹ Appendix A to HD-93, p. 182 [*Pg. 182 is part of [Doc. 9](#)*].

¹⁰ See HD-93, minute 1, p. 175 [*Pg. 175 is part of [Doc. 9](#)*].

November 20, 10 a.m. (HD–97)

[13] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 20, 1919, at 10:00 a.m.

Paris, November 20, 1919, 10 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/97

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/97

HD-97

[Document 13]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 20, 1919, at
10:00 a.m.**

Paris, November 20, 1919, 10 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Henry White

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Colonel J. A. Logan
Dr. I. Bowman
Captain Madison, U. S. N.
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE
Lieut-Col. Kisch
Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. MacFadyean
Mr. Carr

FRANCE
M. Laroche
General Le Rond
M. de Montille

ITALY
M. D'Amelio
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. SIR EYRE CROWE called the Council's attention to the importance of definitely settling the conditions of Peace to be submitted to the Hungarians. The latest news from Budapest indicated that a coalition

Government was in process of formation. He had just received two telegrams from Sir George Clerk (See Appendices "A" and "B") which contained favorable news. A final, definite draft should be ready for submission by the time the Hungarians were in a position to send negotiators to Paris. But to arrive at such a final draft certain questions which were still undecided would have to be settled. The most important one related to the expenses caused by Roumanian occupation of Hungary and the means of meeting the same. If that point were now brought up for discussion it might take months to settle it. He thought it would be well to study the suggestion of the American legal experts that a clause should be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary giving the Reparation Commission power to settle that whole question in view of existing circumstances. The Drafting Committee might be asked to come at once to an agreement with the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission in order to draft such a clause. Another question to be settled related to the cession of Fiume; a formula to that effect would have to be found which could be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He thought that the Drafting Committee could likewise be charged with that task. Hungarian Treaty

M. BERTHELOT observed that as soon as the two points mentioned by Sir Eyre Crowe had been settled the Hungarian Treaty would be entirely ready for submission to the Hungarian Delegates.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Drafting Committee, in agreement with the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, should prepare a draft article to be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary giving the Reparation Commission full power to settle the questions raised by the expenses of Roumanian occupation of Hungary;
 - (2) that the Drafting Committee be charged with the preparation of a draft clause to be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary relating to the cession of Fiume by Hungary.
2. (The Council had before it a report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relating to the demands of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of the

distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage (See Appendix “C”).) Report of the committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission Relating to the Demands of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the Subject of the Distribution of Austro-Hungarian Mercantile Tonnage¹

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon that report. He was glad to be able to state that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, at a meeting attended by Italian and Jugo-Slav Representatives, had reached an unanimous decision. The formula agreed upon seemed to him a good one. With respect to vessels of less than 2,000 tons the owners were to be left a free choice of flag in accordance with their nationality. It was understood that further agreement would be reached with respect to vessels of greater tonnage and that the Jugo-Slav Delegates would be heard at the moment of reaching such an agreement.

M. DE MARTINO wished to emphasize the importance of this solution which had been made possible as a result of a spontaneous agreement between Italy and Jugo-Slavia. He was glad to note that M. Loucheur himself had brought up that point.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that he had appreciated the conciliatory attitude of the Italian Delegates on that point. He likewise felt called upon to note that M. Trumbitch had likewise abated his original claims.

M. DE MARTINO wished to bring up a related point on which he had come to an agreement with the Jugo-Slav Delegate, namely; that the delivery of Austro-Hungarian Mercantile tonnage in the Adriatic should take place within the period laid down by Part VIII, Annex 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, that is to say, within two months after the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. LOUCHEUR saw no objection in principle to the arrangement proposed by M. De Martino; he desired, however, further time to examine the question more closely.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the recommendations of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage;
- (2) that M. De Martino's suggestion, relative to the period within which such distribution should be made, be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

3. (The Council had before it a report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the provisional distribution of rolling stock between states forming part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (See Appendix "D"²).
Report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the Provisional Distribution of Rolling Stock Between States Forming Part of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

M. LOUCHEUR pointed out that the situation with respect to the rolling stock in the States forming part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was very serious. The majority of the States concerned had kept the rolling stock which they had at the termination of hostilities, and refused to let said rolling stock circulate beyond their respective boundaries. The result was that railway traffic was almost entirely stopped. To remedy this condition it seemed necessary to establish at Vienna a Commission charged with effecting arrangements with a view to reciprocal exchange of cars, without prejudice to established or alleged ownership of said rolling stock. A Commission charged with deciding questions of ownership of this rolling stock did indeed exist but it seemed essential to create a new Commission, charged with taking the necessary provisional measures, and which should be composed of representatives of each interested Government. This Commission was in principle favorable to the British proposition, but some objections having been raised by the American and Italian Delegations this proposition would have to again be examined by the sub-commission specially charged with questions concerning Austria. As the question was a very urgent one he asked that, if that sub-commission should reach a unanimous conclusion favorable to the British proposition—which would probably be reached that very day—he be authorized to take, in the name of the Committee on

Organization of the Reparation Commission, the measures necessitated by the adoption of the British proposition. If on the contrary, a unanimous solution was not reached, the question would be resubmitted to the Council.

It was decided:

- (1) that the question of the nomination of a Commission to sit at Vienna for the distribution of rolling stock between the States forming a part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission which, if its sub-commission specially charged with Austrian questions should reach a unanimous decision in favor of said nomination, should take the measures necessary to carry such decision into effect;
- (2) that if the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission or its sub-commission should not reach a unanimous decision, the question should again come before the Council at an early meeting.

4. (The Council had before it a report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the terms of a loan of \$100,000,000. by way of payment for the provisioning of Austria during the next six months (See Appendix "E").) Report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the Terms of a Loan of \$100,000,000. by Way of Payment for the Provisioning of Austria During the Next Six Months

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had examined the unanimous report submitted to it by the sub-commission sitting at Vienna. That sub-commission recommended as essential a loan to Austria of \$100,000,000. to cover the supply of food-stuffs and coal of which Austria would have need during the next six months. The action contemplated was of a very important character and evidently necessitated a careful study on the part of the Governments interested. Moreover a loan, however large, would not suffice to smooth away all difficulties. It was not only money that was needed, cars and food were especially necessary. He had recently had a

conversation with Mr. Benes. Apparently everything needed in the way of sugar, coal and shoes could be found in Czecho-Slovakia. Czechoslovakia had shown a willingness to join the consortium to be created with the object of restoring the economic life of Austria. On the other hand, it was essential to supply Vienna with grain. Grain was already scarce in Vienna and within three weeks it would be completely lacking. The Serbian portion of the Banat alone seemed in a position to furnish the necessary grain. He expected to see M. Trumbitch very soon and, if the Council did not object, to bring some pressure to bear on him to hasten the despatch to Austria of the grain which Jugo-Slavia had contracted to deliver and of which it had not yet delivered half. He himself thought that it became a question of a direct loan from Serbia to Austria and he would likewise confer with Mr. Trumbitch on that point. The Allied and Associated Powers in his opinion should only concern themselves with additional loans. Each Government would of course have to determine the extent of the financial aid which it was ready to give to the work of the rebuilding of Austria. He had not yet been able to see the French Minister of Finance on that point. He pointed out that the Government of the United States had several times declared that it could not participate in the loan question. The United States pointed out that as they had made large advances to the Allies it was incumbent upon the latter to make the financial arrangements which they judged essential with the States of Central Europe.

MR. WHITE observed that the Government of the United States had already several times defined its position on that question. In order to summarize the question without unduly taking up the Council's time, he wished simply to read the following memorandum:

“Paris, November 19, 1919.

The United States Government understands that this note from the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission must be passed on to the governments or the treasuries of the several Allied and Associated Powers.

The American Delegation desires to point out that the point of view of the United States was brought to the attention of the

O. C. R. C. by a note presented at the Plenary Meeting of Friday, September 17, 1919, and by numerous notes and memoranda presented to the O. C. R. C. and its several sub-committees from time to time since then. All these notes and memoranda have been distributed among the various Delegations.

It is requested that the various governments or treasuries consider carefully the various American notes and memoranda in reaching a decision.

The American Delegation refers particularly to the American memoranda presented at the meeting of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission on November 6, 1919 (17th Meeting) and the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of November 11, 1919.”

M. DE MARTINO said that in short it was a question of making an important loan to Austria. It seemed to him that it was not for the Council, but for the respective Governments, to reach a decision on that question.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it was only a question of the Council submitting a plan for the approval of the respective Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the situation was as follows: The Council had before it a unanimous report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission. He had transmitted the same to his Government. It did not seem to him that M. Loucheur's views corresponded entirely with the plan of action which was to reach an agreement between the various Governments as soon as possible. He felt obliged to state, moreover, that he had been informed from London that Great Britain could not consent to make a loan if America did not make one. He had received two telegrams from Vienna which showed the situation to be desperate. The first telegram, dated November 19th, said that within a week flour would be completely lacking at Vienna unless immediate measures were taken, and that snow-falls threatened to interrupt traffic between Vienna and Trieste, which would have disastrous consequences. The

Communist Party intended to take advantage of the threatened famine to create disorders, and as the Government was greatly weakened serious consequences were to be expected. A second telegram dated the same day stated that the railroad from Trieste was still open thus permitting the immediate despatch of flour to Vienna. The telegram added that strikes were imminent in Vienna, and also in the Province of Styria. The result of this was that the situation was most alarming and that some action must be taken within a week. He was informed that negotiations had taken place between Great Britain and Italy with a view of sending to Vienna a part of the grain then at Trieste, which would be paid for by the remainder of a loan of \$2,000,000. It seemed to him that the grain could be shipped to Vienna without awaiting a final settlement of the question of credits.

M. DE MARTINO said that he would recommend favorably to his Government Sir Eyre Crowe's suggestion. He wished also [to] point out that Italy had already sent a large quantity of food to Austria.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed fully with Sir Eyre Crowe. He thought it absolutely essential that the grain then at Trieste be immediately sent to Vienna. Moreover, he would see the Minister of Finance. He thought it important to submit immediately to the respective Governments the report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission then before the Council. Modifications, which a closer study of the question might seem to render necessary, could later on be suggested.

M. DE MARTINO called the Council's attention to the first paragraph of the conclusions of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission (See Page 3 of the Report, Appendix "E").^{[3](#)} It was there stated that the Austrian Government should forthwith prohibit by law the sale, transfer or disposal, outside of Austria or to other than Austrian nationals, of any assets of the country, either publicly or privately owned. That provision seemed to him unduly restrictive; its effect would be to prohibit all commerce with foreigners. The measures proposed should, he thought, only affect public property, or at the very most, real property belonging to individuals.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the paragraph criticized by M. De Martino would be studied anew; that, however, should not hinder the submission to the various Governments of the report in its present form. He wished to point out that said first paragraph, among other points, was aimed at the question of works of art, which had given rise to certain difficulties.

M. DE MARTINO replied that, in conformity with the Treaty of Saint Germain,^{3a} his Government was conducting *pourparlers* on that subject with the Austrian Government.

M. MATSUI feared that the geographic situation of Japan would make it difficult for his Government to render effective aid in a matter of such great urgency. However, he would not fail to telegraph his Government.

It was decided:

- (1) that the report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the terms of a loan of one hundred million dollars (\$100,000,000) by way of payment for the provisioning of Austria during the next six months (See Appendix "E") be submitted by the various Delegations for the examination of their respective Governments;
- (2) that the first paragraph of the conclusions of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, beginning with the words, "*First: Require the Austrian Government forthwith ...*" be examined again by the said Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

5. M. LOUCHEUR, before leaving the room, wished to call the Council's attention to the serious results, from the point of view of the execution of the Treaty, of the delay in the exchange of ratifications. The Germans had to make a series of deliveries the details whereof had to be settled before December 31st. With respect to coal, for instance, under the terms of the Treaty the Germans had to furnish fifteen hundred thousand tons per month; as the Treaty was not yet in force they had furnished only five hundred and ten thousand tons the preceding month and it was probable that their

November deliveries would be even smaller. On the other hand, with respect to personal property, the Allied and Associated Powers were unable to consummate any of the necessary arrangements. It would be easy to cite examples showing how serious a matter was the delay in the deposit of ratifications. Date of the Deposit of Ratifications of the Treaty with Germany

M. BERTHELOT said that the date of exchange of ratifications could not be fixed before Germany had made known its intentions with respect to signing the Protocol.⁴ Moreover, the organization of the Plebiscite Commissions would have to be completed. Everyone was unanimous in wishing that the Treaty enter into force as soon as possible. But, certain questions had to be settled first. Among them might be mentioned the negotiations between Poland and Germany, whose transfer to Paris had been requested by Poland.

M. LOUCHEUR thought certainly that before the exchange of ratifications the Germans should be made to sign the Protocol relative to violations of Armistice clauses. But, it did not seem to him that the question of Germano-Polish negotiations was germane to the putting into force of the Treaty. With respect to the Commissions, he thought that the Allied and Associated Powers could dictate their decisions to the Germans and that long negotiations would consequently be unnecessary. In any event, he wished to insist that the putting into force of the Treaty should not be indefinitely postponed. The Allied and Associated Powers were running the risk of being foreclosed with respect to certain of their demands. The Germans should at once be notified of a date on which the Treaty would be put into force. If they created difficulties the responsibility for delay would at least lie at their door. Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers possessed the means of bringing effective pressure to bear upon the Germans. The latter could be prevented from disposing of their foreign securities which they had great need of selling in order to procure foodstuffs.

GENERAL LE ROND called the Council's attention to the difficulties experienced by the Commissions in recruiting the necessary personnel. The British Treasury had not yet given an answer on the question of allowances to members of Commissions. That delay

made recruiting very difficult. A Commission had been established to examine into the financial organization of plebiscite zones and it was necessary that an agreement on that point be reached before the negotiations with the German Delegates could advantageously be begun.

M. PICHON proposed to settle upon December 1st as the date of exchange of ratifications.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that the Germans must be notified of that date and told that they would accordingly have to sign the Protocol before December 1st.

It was decided:

- (1) that the first of December be fixed as the date for the deposit of ratifications;
- (2) that the Secretary General of the Conference notify the German Delegation of the foregoing decision, and inform it at the same time that the Protocol relating to the nonfulfilment by Germany of certain Armistice Clauses must be signed by the German Delegates before that date.

6. (At this point M. Patek and M. Grabski entered the room). Status of Eastern Galicia

M. PICHON asked the Polish Delegates to be good enough to give the Council their views on the status of Eastern Galicia.

M. PATEK replied that they would be glad if they could first obtain the new draft which had been submitted to the Council.

M. PICHON explained that the Council wished to know their feeling on the general question.

M. PATEK said that M. Paderewski and M. Dmowski had already had occasion to speak to the Council on the status of Galicia.⁵ He wished to add several general words on the proposal under discussion, as well as on the impression which its adoption would certainly create

in Poland. Until the present time, Eastern Galicia had formed an integral part of Poland. Even during the partition Eastern Galicia had not been separated from the Polish provinces annexed to Austria. At the present time Poland was being offered a mandate for a territory which had never ceased to belong to it. Poland had indeed been told that the terms of this mandate were especially favorable; nevertheless, it meant separating Eastern Galicia from Poland. When Spisz and Orava were under consideration it was a question of territories belonging to Hungary which had not formed a part of the former Kingdom of Poland. Furthermore, the Poles had had to reach an agreement with the Czecho-Slovaks. But in Eastern Galicia they had no opponents. In fact, opposition could not be predicated of the Ukraine, which had no real existence, nor of Russia, which had no concern with Eastern Galicia. Therefore, if Eastern Galicia were no longer to be directly attached to Poland, the unanimous impression in his country would be that the Allies were taking away a province which belonged to Poland, and which was claimed by no other Government. Three days from that time Lemberg would celebrate the anniversary of its liberation from the Ukrainian yoke. Was he then to be told that a city in whose defense all classes of the population had freely shed their blood, was no longer on Polish soil? On the very day when celebrations would be held in honor of those who had heroically fallen in the streets of Lemberg, would it be announced in Paris that they had fallen on soil foreign to Poland? The Polish Army was at that very time opposing the Bolsheviks. Was it not to be feared that that Army would become demoralized if it suddenly learned that the city for which it had fought, that the territory which it had freed, were no longer to be considered as belonging to Poland. If the Polish troops got the impression that their leaders had deceived them when telling them a year ago that they were fighting in defense of Polish territory, it was to be feared that they would again believe themselves deceived when they were told that the Bolsheviks were the enemy to be fought. The objection indeed was made to the Polish argument that the population of Eastern Galicia was mixed and that hatred existed between Ruthenians and Poles. His reply was that in Eastern Galicia the proportion of mixed marriages was more than 35%. How could one speak of hatred under these conditions? The conclusion was inevitable that selfish intrigues of neighboring countries and

Austrian, and especially German money, which had sown seeds of discord in Eastern Galicia, were responsible for the bloody conflicts of recent times. It had been proven that Ruthenian agitators prior to the war had received money from German sources. That question had been brought up in the Reichstag and in the Parliament at Vienna, and no denial had been made of the specific facts adduced at that time. He recalled that the Germans had played a prominent part in the conflict which ravaged Eastern Galicia, and that in many cases, Ukrainian troops had been commanded by German officers. At the time when he spoke all conflict had ceased and calm had returned in Eastern Galicia. The representatives of the western nations found it difficult to appreciate the conditions existing in countries possessing less culture than theirs. The Ukrainian and Polish peasants had fought without being too clear as to the reasons therefor. While he spoke they were once more working shoulder to shoulder and living in perfect harmony. He also wished to present geographical considerations of great weight. Free access to the sea was a necessity for Poland. It did indeed reach the sea at Dantzig but only by a narrow corridor which was constantly threatened by Germany. It was essential for Poland to obtain access to the Black Sea through Roumania, and possession of Eastern Galicia was vital from that point of view. He wished to add a word on the internal situation. The Diet at Warsaw had unanimously voted that there could be no Poland without Eastern Galicia. It was far from his intention to wish to use Poland's internal situation as a threat but the Allied and Associated Powers must understand that the unanimous opinion of the Polish people had to be considered. M. Paderewski had been obliged to declare in parliament that he would not sign a Treaty which would take Eastern Galicia from Poland. If the solution of a mandate were imposed upon Poland, Paderewski's cabinet would have to resign; the Polish army, ill fed, ill clothed, engaged in a severe struggle against the Bolshevists, would be threatened with demoralization. The Polish people, finally, would not understand how its Allies could have taken from it Galicia which had always formed part of Poland and which no one was claiming. It was important that the Council should realize the gravity of the situation in Poland; on one side Bolshevism, on the other, German revolution. In the interior a threatened famine. The Polish army was strong and Poland counted on it as an element of order. If the Army became

demoralized Poland's situation would become most serious and it would be threatened with extinction. That would be a catastrophe which would certainly have an effect on the situation of the western Powers. The only solution was to allow Eastern Galicia to become an autonomous province of Poland, subject if necessary, to an effective international control. Any other solution would entail consequences for Poland which were greatly to be dreaded.

M. GRABSKI desired to add a few words to what M. Patek had said in order to show the Council the serious economic results for Eastern Galicia of any solution which would not make it an integral part of Poland. The situation in Eastern Galicia was in no way comparable to that of other regions which had suffered damages by the war. By virtue of the Treaty the Allied and Associated Powers were entitled to reparation for damages caused by the war, provided that they had taken part in the struggle on the side of the Entente. The Countries which during the whole war had been part of Austro-Hungary, which was the case of Eastern Galicia, had no legal right to any reparation. Eastern Galicia, however, was one of the regions which had suffered the most. It had been devastated successively by the Russians, Austrians and Ukrainians. If to these devastations, estimated at 22,000,000,000. crowns, were added the loss resulting from the depreciation of Austrian currency, the economic situation in Eastern Galicia would be seen to be desperate. Out of 2,500,000 hectares of agricultural land, 2,000,000 hectares were not under cultivation. If left to its own resources Eastern Galicia would be unable to bear the burden placed upon it. It had a vital need of the help of all Poland. Poland had not waited for Eastern Galicia to be given it to come to the help of its inhabitants which it justly considered brothers. Although Poland itself lacked rye and wheat and had had to solicit the help of the United States she had not hesitated to share her meager resources with Eastern Galicia. If the solution of a Mandate prevailed, separate liabilities would have to be established which Eastern Galicia could not meet. France, which so admirably understood the duty of national solidarity towards its devastated regions must understand that Galicia could only exist with the support of the remainder of Poland. Galicia's resources in petroleum would not suffice to amortize the numerous sums which would have to be advanced if its economic rehabilitation were to be made

possible. The situation of Eastern Galicia had been compared with that of Austria, but it had been forgotten that there was still large fortunes in Austria and that Austria had not been devastated by the war. Any solution which would paralyze Poland in the work of rehabilitation she had undertaken in Galicia would be disastrous to the economic future of that province.

M. PATEK said that the Poles had been told that there was little difference between a long term mandate given to Poland over Galicia and an annexation pure and simple of that province to Poland. In reality the difference was considerable, especially if account were taken of the fact that four plebiscites had already been imposed upon Poland, which had not failed to have a depressing effect on Polish public opinion. In conclusion he wished to point out that Poland was not asking her Allies to give her anything at all; she was only asking not to be deprived of the territory which she considered belonged to her as of right.

(At this point M. Grabski and M. Patek left the room.)

M. PICHON asked whether any member of the Council thought that the views just expressed by the Polish Delegates necessitated a change in the conclusions already reached by the Council.⁶

M. DE MARTINO was struck by M. Patek's observations on the necessity of a territorial connection between Poland and Roumania through Eastern Galicia. He did not propose, however, to reopen the discussion.

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the report of the Committee on Polish Affairs dated November 20th (See Appendix "F"). The Commission had been unanimous on all the articles considered, except on the second paragraph of article 2, where the majority of the Commission had proposed to insert after the words, "The Council of the League of Nations", the words, "deciding by a majority of votes".

M. PICHON pointed out that according to the covenant of the League of Nations the general rule was that a decision should be by unanimous vote, but that when it was a question of the status of

certain territories in analogous circumstances—like that of the Sarre—a majority of votes sufficed.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to point out that he had had some difficulty in inducing his Government to make the concessions which had finally rendered a unanimous agreement possible. If the question had to be reopened he could not be responsible for the consequences. That was why he preferred to abide by the text proposed by the British Delegation which, moreover, corresponded to that which had been adopted at a meeting of the Council.

M. LAROCHE said that there might be serious disadvantages if the opposition of a single power could render impossible the adoption of a measure agreed upon by all the other Powers represented in the Council of the League of Nations.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that as the other Delegations were favorable to a mandate of unspecified duration, he could not see why they should feel the adoption of the principle of a unanimous vote to be dangerous.

M. PICHON remarked that possibly in 25 years Germany would be represented on the Council of the League of Nations. He asked if it would not be dangerous to give Germany the possibility of preventing the unanimous will of the Allied and Associated Powers from taking effect.

SIR EYRE CROWE repeated that he was most reluctant to reopen that question. Moreover he pointed out that an agreement had been reached by the Council on the text presented by the British Delegation. It was on the Commission's own initiative that the question had again come before the Council at a time when it had a right to consider it finally settled.

MR. WHITE said that he could not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe's arguments. He felt that it was after all a question which concerned Poland rather than Great Britain.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired if it was not the American Delegation itself which had insisted that the question of a mandate should receive a permanent rather than a provisional settlement.

MR. WHITE said that he was informed by his experts that this interpretation of the attitude of the American Delegation was not exact.

M. LAROCHE explained that the text referred back to the Commission by the Supreme Council was open to revision. The jurists had brought up the question of the procedure to be followed by the Council of the League of Nations. Moreover, it should be noted that there was a great difference between a mandate of unlimited duration and a mandate perpetually renewed. If the Poles had been offered a mandate of unlimited duration their objections would have probably been much weaker. The attitude of the British Delegation did not seem to him entirely logical. That Delegation had insisted that the mandate be open for revision at the end of 10 years, it should, therefore, not favor a solution which would make any modification in the existing situation very difficult.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the arguments advanced by M. Laroche ran counter to the resolution previously adopted by the Council.⁷

M. PICHON said that he favored the point of view of the majority of the Commission but in order to arrive at an agreement he was ready to support the text proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe.

MR. WHITE stated that he was obliged to maintain his point of view and he asked M. Pichon to call upon Dr. Bowman who had some additional information to give.

DR. BOWMAN thought that it would be well to define clearly the American Delegation's point of view, which did not seem to have been entirely understood. The statements of the American Delegates on the Commission of Polish Affairs showed that they had desired a mandate of unlimited duration. On the other hand the British Delegation wished the mandate to be open for revision at the end of

10 years. By way of compromise a term of 25 years was agreed upon, and this had been accepted by the Council. When the question had come back to the Commission a further question had arisen as to the procedure to be followed by the Council of the League of Nations. That was an entirely different question from the previous one, and one on which no agreement had as yet been reached. If a unanimous vote was necessary, a single nation, possibly Germany, could prevent the opinion of all the Allies from taking effect. If what was aimed at was to reserve the possibility of taking Galicia from Poland, in the event of the latter committing abuses, it was necessary to provide for a decision to be reached by a majority vote. That would constitute a sufficient guarantee. On the contrary, if a unanimous vote was required, that would mean practically giving Poland a free hand. The idea of a majority vote was perfectly consistent with the idea previously expressed when asking that the mandate should be of unlimited duration. In both cases it had been desired to ensure to the League of Nations an effective control over the mandatory power. The original proposition of the American representative on the Commission on Polish Affairs was that at any time the Council of the League of Nations, deciding by a majority vote, could revise the mandate.

M. PICHON said that Dr. Bowman's arguments only strengthened the opinion he had already expressed, but in consideration of the attitude of the British Delegation, which had already made numerous concessions, he remained inclined to support Sir Eyre Crowe's proposition.

M. DE MARTINO said that he was likewise disposed to support Sir Eyre Crowe's proposition, always provided that a unanimous agreement could be reached on that very day. Personally he remained convinced that the solution of the majority of the Commission was preferable and he retained his freedom of action if the United States maintained its point of view.

MR. WHITE asked if the question could not again be referred to the Commission, which should try to reach an agreement.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that that would mean reopening the whole question.

M. LAROCHE pointed out that the Commission had already tried in vain to reach an agreement and he did not believe that a further discussion would succeed.

MR. WHITE asked to have until the following day to think the matter over. He felt that the question under discussion involved the very principle of the solution to be reached, and that that principle might become of vital importance. It would have seemed to him more natural for an agreement to be reached in favor of the majority point of view, rather than that the majority should abandon its original point of view to agree with the ideas of a single Delegation. A very dangerous situation would be created if Germany might become a possible arbitrator of the decisions of the Allied and Associated Powers in such a grave question.

M. PICHON said that for practical reasons, in view of the necessity of reaching a conclusion, and of the fact that the attitude of the British Government did not seem likely to be modified, he hoped that the Council could agree on the following day on the text proposed by the British Delegation.

(The discussion of this question was adjourned until the following meeting).

7. At the request of Mr. White this question was adjourned as well as the question relative to the request of the Polish Delegation that the negotiations between Poland and Germany on questions relative to the execution of the Treaty of Versailles be transferred to Paris.
Request of the Polish Delegations That the Negotiations With Regard to the Relations Between Poland and Danzig Be Transferred From Warsaw to Paris

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 20, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-97**

BUDAPEST, November 17, 1919.

Telegram From Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council

No. 9

With reference to my telegram No. 7 of November 13.^{[8](#)}

A meeting of the Government and the Opposition took place at five o'clock this evening at my house on Friedrich's invitation. I think that he intended that this conference should end in a deadlock and this would have occurred had I not called about forty representative Hungarians to a meeting at my house at 3 P.M. today. This meeting lasted five hours. I began by making a plain-spoken and full statement of the present situation in Hungary as it appeared to me and those present reached the general conclusion that Friedrich must cease to be Prime Minister. The Committee of Ten will meet again at my house tomorrow, but great progress has, in my opinion, been made today.

Appendix B to HD-97

BUDAPEST, November 18, 1919.

Telegram From Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council

No. 1.

Your telegram No. 12 [*Nov. 12?*].^{[9](#)}

In view of the remarkable order and tranquility which has signalled withdrawal of Roumanians and entry of Hungarian forces mission of Generals and I agree that despatch of further allied officers asked for in my telegram No. 6^{[10](#)} is no longer necessary.

Appendix C to HD-97

Opinion of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the Remarks Presented by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on 15th October [5th November?] Concerning the Distribution of Austro-Hungarian Tonnage^{[11](#)}

To the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers

The Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation requests that the fishing boats and other merchant ships which belonged to ex-Austrian shipowners of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom on 4th November, 1918, may be assigned to that Kingdom.

The C. O. R. C. is of opinion:

- 1) That Austro-Hungarian fishing boats and other Austro-Hungarian ships of less than 2000 tons ought to be left to their Allied owners or co-owners in the Adriatic, with liberty to fly the Italian or Serbo-Croat-Slovene flag, and that the value fixed by the Reparation Commission of the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish interests represented by these boats shall be charged to each of the States whose nationals are owners or co-owners of such boats.
- 2) That the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, like other Allied and Associated Powers, may claim that recognition be granted of the rights of ownership or co-ownership on tonnage other than that contemplated above belonging to its nationals and that, with a view to regulating the question of tonnage in accordance with the rights and interests of the other States concerned, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State shall be admitted to such arrangements as may be made in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of May 22nd, 1919,^{[12](#)} which arrangements should be submitted to the Reparation Commission.

If difficulties arise in execution, either as a result of change of owners or of co-owners since August 1st, 1914, or for any other reason, the decision will be taken by the Reparation Commission in conformity with the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

[See footnote 2, page 238 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 13](#)].]

Appendix E to HD-97

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX
COMITÉ D'ORGANISATION DE LA 390 C. R.
COMMISSION DES RÉPARATIONS

PARIS, le Novembre 14, 1919.

Letter, Dated November 14, 1919, From the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission Proposing the Amount and Conditions To Cover the Advances of Food Supplies and Coal to Austria During the Next Six Months

SIR: The Supreme Council decided by resolution of October 7, 1919 that a sub-Commission of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission should be constituted at Vienna.^{[13](#)}

The Sub-Commission has submitted an unanimous report, which has been carefully considered by the Organization Committee.

The main recommendation of the Sub-Commission is in effect the advance to Austria of \$100,000,000.00, to cover the supply of such foodstuffs and coal as will be required by Austria during the next six months. This advance, together with the sum of \$48,000,000.00, advance by the Allies during the last twelve months, would be consolidated into a single loan, to be secured by the total assets and by the present and future revenues, of the Austrian Republic,—the administration of both assets and revenues being entrusted to the Reparations Commission. It would be the duty of the latter during the next six months to formulate and put into operation a program for the economic and financial reconstruction of Austria.

If attention be confined to the financial aspect of the problem, with which the Organization Committee is more particularly concerned, it is clear that the sum of \$100,000,000.00, which is estimated as required as capital, can not be provided by Austria itself; it follows that the funds must be directly advanced by one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Recommendations of this scope raise questions which it is not within the competence of the Organization Committee to determine. They can, therefore, only submit them for the most immediate consideration and decision by the governments concerned.

It is quite clear that the respective powers themselves must decide whether to grant the loan, and whether the terms of any advances that may be made will permit the Reparations Commission to be entrusted with the responsibility contemplated.

The Organization Committee desires to express it as their opinion, that there is no escape from the conclusion, that it is only in the institution of a central controlling authority with wide powers over the financial and economic administration of Austria, that any hope can be found of the salvation of that country.

If the advances required can be supplied by any one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers, and on terms that will permit, it is the sense of the Organization Committee that the following plan be adopted:

That the Austrian Government be authorized to issue certificates of indebtedness in an amount to be determined by the Sub-Commission at Vienna, convertible into first bonds to be issued pursuant to Article 181 of the Austrian Peace Treaty. A portion of these certificates to be given to the British, French and Italian Governments as security, for all loans or credits heretofore made and to be given to the lending governments for all loans and credits hereafter to be made to the Austrian Government, in lieu and instead of the Austrian assets now held or about to be taken as security for loans or credits: such assets to be turned over to the Sub-Commission at Vienna together with all objects of art, the tobacco monopoly and the property of the late Royal and Imperial House, recently declared to be Government property, as well as any other liquid assets of the Austrian Government. All assets so turned over to be held by the Sub-Commission, and so far as available, to be administered by it for the purpose contemplated. The other portion of the certificates to be

applied from time to time by the Sub-Commission in such manner as it may deem proper and necessary in the interests of reparation, at the same time assuring to Austria her minimum requirements in food, coal and raw materials, as provided by Article 181 of the Austrian Treaty of Peace.

The Organization Committee further recommends that the foregoing plan be communicated at once to the Austrian Government, and if the Austrian Government shall request the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, in writing, to exercise immediately like powers to those conferred upon the Reparations Commission, and the Austrian Section thereof, by the Austrian Treaty of Peace, then the Sub-Commission in Vienna shall proceed as follows:

First: Require the Austrian Government forthwith to prohibit by law the sale, transfer, or disposal, outside of Austria or to other than Austrian Nationals, of any assets of the country, either publicly or privately owned, without the consent of the Sub-Commission at Vienna, and to declare void any such sales or transfers heretofore made after the signing of the Armistice of November 3, 1918,^{[14](#)} without the consent of the Austrian Government.

Second: To prepare forthwith and put into immediate operation a financial plan along the lines indicated in this report, in order to preserve Austria's assets for reparation, and assure to Austria a minimum supply of food, coal and raw materials.

Third: To exercise forthwith such control over the collection and expenditure of all taxes, customs and revenues of the Austrian Government as to the Commission shall appear necessary and desirable.

Fourth: To commend the study forthwith of the economic and financial conditions of Austria, and to prepare comprehensive plans for her rehabilitation, to the end that the reparation contemplated by the Austrian Treaty may be forth-coming.

There is appended for transmission to the Governments concerned a copy of the report of the Sub-Commission at Vienna, above referred to.

I am [etc.]

MAUCLERE,
*President of the Organization Committee of the Reparations
Commission.*

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ALLIED AND
ASSOCIATED POWERS.

[Enclosure]

***Report of the Vienna Sub-Commission of the Organising Committee of the
Reparation Commission***

To: The CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE OF THE
REPARATION COMMISSION,
59, Rue Pierre Charron, Paris.

SIR: In accordance with instructions this Sub-Commission commenced its sittings in Vienna on the 24th of October and, in view of the critical nature of the situation in Austria, find it imperative to make an interim report. The figures as to the requirements contained in this report were submitted, in the first place, by the Ministers and advisors of the respective Austrian Government Departments. The Ministers themselves were closely examined by the Sub-Commission and their estimates were then submitted to analysis by British food and commercial representatives resident in Vienna. They were then re-examined by the Sub-Commission and although they must necessarily be subject to revision in detail they may be accepted as presenting a fairly accurate summary of the situation.

The Governors of all the Provinces or their representatives were summoned to give their views particularly as to the exchange of merchandise between their respective provinces with the idea in view of producing an economic balance in Austria. Various financial experts and representative industries also were summoned and gave their opinions on technical subjects. By the information obtained in this way the Sub-Commission were able to form a true idea of the situation. All they have heard has led to a certainty that Austria is in a critical situation and has an immediate need of food and coal.

1. Need of Food.

The visible supplies, including the present harvest and counting on the complete fulfillment of all contracts entered into with the various countries, would only enable Austria to provide herself with cereals for three months more during the present cereal year and for a shorter period as regards meat, milk and fats. The Sub-Commission are convinced that a number of food contracts with other countries will not be fulfilled. It must, therefore, be estimated that Austria will be compelled to import 632,000 tons of food supplies for nine months of the cereal year ending September, 1920, at a total approximate cost of \$100,000,000 (dollars).

The failure of the neighboring states to deliver foodstuffs contracted for by Austria and the difficulties of obtaining and transporting food supplies within Austria itself have brought Vienna which constitutes about half of the total population, to the brink of starvation. On Wednesday, October 29th, the Austrian Food Controller reported to the Sub-Commission that there were no breadstuffs whatever in hand in Vienna as they had all been distributed as rations for the current week which ended the following Monday, while of fats, meat or any other foodstuffs controlled by the Government they had nothing. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement. At the same time it should be mentioned that on October 29th there were in transit from Trieste breadstuff supplies which, if duly delivered, would ration Vienna to November 11th. The gravity of the position lies in the probable recurrence of these acute shortages and the impossibility of relying upon railway deliveries. Existing food contracts are executed partially or not at all; the contract with the Serbs, already a heavy drain on Austrian finance, is at the moment completely stopped, the Serbs wishing to impose an exportation tax of 40%. Food furnished by contract with the Argentine and en route from Rotterdam is momentarily held by the Germans at Mannheim.

The Sub-Commission are unanimously of the opinion that, in accordance with the spirit of Article 181 of the Peace Treaty, 30,000 tons of foodstuffs, at the least, should be instantly provided for Austria. This quantity will constitute a slight insurance against the disorder and anarchy which must be anticipated if a city of nearly

three million inhabitants is constantly threatened with the lack of even the bare minimal rations.

2. Need of Raw Materials.

At the request of the Sub-Commission the Austrian Government submitted a statement of their minimal requirements, calculated on a basis pro rata with their minimal requirements of coal (See Annex A). The quantities asked for on the whole, appear justified. No estimate can be given in this report as to the approximate cost of these raw materials, but the Austrian Minister of Commerce states that, in his opinion, credits to the extent of 40 million dollars would be sufficient to start industries on a basis proportionate to the minimal amount of coal that could reasonably be expected. The Sub-Commission is inclined to think, after hearing the opinions of leading bankers and manufacturers of Vienna, that if the minimal coal for industrial purposes were forthcoming, the credits to the extent of 40,000,000 dollars would be sufficient to start with and that such credits for raw materials could be obtained by direct negotiations with foreign markets, and through private Austrian capital, providing the Austrian Government were in a position to assure the people of enough coal and food for human existence.

3. Need of Coal.

The bare minimal requirements of Austria for domestic and industrial uses appear to be in the neighborhood of 730,000 tons per month. If all the existing coal contracts between Austria and the neighboring states were fulfilled there would still remain a monthly deficit of, roughly, 200,000 tons. As a matter of fact, during the month of September Austria's total coal supply amounted only to 378,500 tons, mainly owing to the failure of neighboring states to live up to their contracts. It is also due to the latter circumstance that it has been found impossible to provide with any regularity the meagre ration of 7 kilos—say 15 lbs—of coal per week for each family in Vienna, where the use of gas and electricity is now far more stringently restricted than it was in London at any time during the war. The consequent suffering, now that the first snow has come, is intense. It is almost inconceivable to think that as the cold becomes

more acute the population of Vienna will continue to maintain their present helpless apathy, or that they are likely to exhibit the hardihood necessary to withstand the ordeal of semi-starvation combined with the misery of having no coal for warmth or cooking.

In order to provide the minimal coal requirements to preserve life and restart industry an amount of 200,000 tons of coal per month in addition to the existing contracts should be arranged for Austria. For this purpose a credit would be needed of, approximately 45,000,000 dollars. In order to facilitate the enforcement of the coal contract between Austria and the neighboring states, in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty, it would seem advisable that the Mährisch Ostrau Coal Sub-Commission should become a Sub-Commission of the Vienna Reparation Sub-Commission. This is in accordance with the views expressed by the Chairman of the Mährisch Ostrau Sub-Commission.

Wood for fuel is also fairly strictly rationed but the shortage of horses and other methods of transport makes it almost impossible for even the richest classes in Vienna to obtain wood. The Austrian Government have created a special Department to handle the distribution of wood in order to alleviate suffering caused through want of coal and they have been urged by the Sub-Commission to redouble their efforts in this direction. The Austrian Government state they will probably be compelled to close all the schools in Vienna for want of coal or wood.

During the first week of the Sub-Commission's sittings five food trains from Trieste were held up on the Austrian frontier through lack of coal to enable them to bring supplies to Vienna. During September the Austrian Railways obtained only 65 per cent of the coal they are allowed, which in itself is only 75 per cent of their normal requirements.

4. Development of the Greatest Amount of Production.

The Sub-Commission feel that this cannot be dealt with even cursorily, in an interim report. They have, however, had an opportunity of impressing on all the Landeschaupmann (Provincial

Governors) assembled at a meeting specially called by the Sub-Commission, the vital importance of removing all trade and other restrictions as between the Provinces in Austria itself. The tendency of the provinces to erect economic barriers and especially their indisposition to assist Vienna, has undoubtedly contributed to the present crisis, and must seriously retard development. It must not be implied, however, that in the solution of this difficulty lies the solution of the whole supply problem. Complete free trade as between the provinces and Vienna would not appreciably alter the figures of the immediate requirements as herein set forth, although it undoubtedly would tend to quicken reconstruction. Under this heading it should be stated that the Austrian Minister of Agriculture estimated that their minimal requirements of phosphate and manure for agricultural purposes and to minimise food imports next year would involve an expenditure, during the present cereal year of about 8,000,000 dollars. Experts estimate that with an expenditure of 8,000,000 dollars for chemical manures necessary to improve agriculture an increase of 26,000 trucks of corn could be expected next year. At the present rate of exchange this would represent a value of 1,300 million kronen.

5. Facilitation of Transport and Guarantee of Delivery of Supplies From Countries Bordering on Austria.

The Sub-Commission are in agreement in principle with the preliminary report of the Commission for the partition of the rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, as communicated to them by Sir Francis Dent, and have impressed upon the Austrian Government the importance of providing coal for their railways even at the sacrifice of all other considerations. The Austrian Minister of Railways has informed the Sub-Commission that he has no ground for complaint as to the proportion of coal which he is receiving for the railways.

In view of the disorganized state of the railways in Austria and in the neighboring states the Sub-Commission recommend that they, or their successors, should be empowered to constitute a Railway Section which would act as a traffic pool for the Danube Basin, the neighboring states of Austria to be represented on such a Section and

the Section to have power to hire, uniform and arm such numbers of railway *gendarmérie* as may be necessary to enforce the free and unimpeded movement of all trains. Without some such organization and without some semblance of power behind it, the inter-change of supplies necessary to the bare existence of the population would appear to be impossible. Under present conditions the return of any waggon, once it has crossed the frontier, to the State from which it started, is always extremely problematic. Under these chaotic circumstances there can be no certainty of food or coal supplies. It would probably also be desirable for the Danube River Inter-Allied Commission to act similarly as a Section of the Reparation Sub-Commission.

6. Payment by Austria.

It is impossible to consider the immediate provision of finance for food and coal for Austria without at the same time contemplating a plan for the complete re-organization of Austria's financial and economic system. The one is the complement of the other, the second being the natural and necessary corollary of the first.

The Sub-Commission are therefore of the opinion, in order to obtain for Allied interests and Austria the utmost benefits that there should be a long term floating loan which should be dependent only upon revenue. If this policy were adopted an immediate advantage would be gained by the credits obtained and at the conclusion of any period the assets of Austria would remain intact and available for the development of the country itself. If a fixed loan, redeemable by the sale of capital assets, were substituted for a floating loan, Austria at the redemption period, would be altogether without external credits. The main issue is that the Sub-Commission agree that Austria's existing credits should be improved by means of the extension of her liabilities by new credits on the lines of the floating loan, since credits at present existing are insufficient to construct economic stability.

If, for instance, the assets of a country were represented by 5 and its liabilities by 12, in the first case (diminution of assets) a ratio of 3 to 12 would be much less favourable than [*for?*] the renewal of

economic activity than the ratio obtained in the second hypothesis (increase of liabilities) 5 to 14.

In accordance with the terms of the letter of May 30th, 1919,^{14a} from the Austrian Delegates, the Austrian Government have submitted a first list of foreign securities amounting to 84,000,000 francs, to be applied to the 48 million dollar food loan. The Minister of Finance estimated the total value of the foreign securities at 300,000,000 francs. Their collection of gold towards the same purpose has amounted to 1,200,000 francs.

The Sub-Commission of the Reparations Commission consider that a sum of 100,000,000 dollars is necessary for Austria for the provision of food supplies and coal to cover a period of six months. The expenditure, if required, to be under the supervision of the Sub-Commission of the Reparation Commission or the Austrian Section of the Reparations Commission when appointed. This amount would leave a margin for the eventual purchase of fertilizers indispensable to the revival of agriculture and for the purchase of such raw materials as certain industries might not be able to purchase.

The Sub-Commission propose that a solution of the problem might be found in the issue of a long term floating loan for 100,000,000 dollars and that this loan should be consolidated with the 48 million dollars (approximately) advanced to Austria for the purchase of foodstuffs since the Armistice by Great Britain, France, and Italy. The arrangements for the guarantees of the interest and amortization on such consolidated loan should be those already pledged to the Allies in connection with the 48 million dollar loan, as determined in the letter from the Austrian Delegates of the 30th May, 1919, (Annex B) as well as revenues from existing monopolies or monopolies to be created. The tobacco monopoly, for instance, provides one of the most valuable resources of the Austrian Government's current Budget and this despite the existing lack of raw materials. The revenue of the tobacco monopoly can probably be increased by adapting such methods as "Système des Banderellos". Other monopolies might also be created, for instance, petroleum, alcohol, matches, Danube shipping, and in case of necessity, electric lighting.

In addition to these guarantees and securities for the interest and amortisation of the consolidated loan of 150,000,000 dollars, it might also be desirable to take over Austria's Customs revenues and the receipts of railways. At the present moment, in view of the desperate situation, the Austrian Government would be disposed to surrender these in addition to those guarantees already ceded. The Sub-Commission consider that the action outlined above would be in accordance with the letter and spirit of Article 181 of the Peace Treaty.

In view of existing conditions the Sub-Commission propose that a special Inter-Allied Commission should be constituted under the Austrian Section of the Reparations Commission for the purpose of administering the revenues given as security for the consolidated loan of 150,000,000 dollars.

In order to ensure any efficiency of reconstruction it is essential that at the expiration of the period covered by the above loan (six months) or earlier if possible, a definite plan of financial reconstruction should come into force. The financial position of Austria as estimated by documents submitted to the Sub-Commission by the Austrian Government will be found as Annex C. Several proposals as to financial reorganization have been placed before the Sub-Commission, notably the principle of two currencies by means of an issuing Bank, which is approved by the Minister of Finance, and also a proposal of a large international loan on long terms, with yearly redemptions. The Sub-Commission ask for the immediate appointment of an Inter-Allied Banking Commission at Vienna under the Sub-Commission of the Reparations Commission to study and devise a definite plan of financial reconstruction.

RECAPITULATION OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE SUB-COMMISSION

1. The provision of 30,000 tons of food immediately.
2. The provision of an additional 200,000 tons per month of coal.
3. The Mährisch Ostrau Coal Sub-Commission to be attached as Sub-Commission to Vienna Reparations Sub-Commission.
4. Credits for fertilisers.

5. Railway Section to be attached to Vienna Sub-Commission with power to guard and control all railways of late Austro-Hungarian Empire, both state and privately owned.
6. Inter-Allied Danube Commission to be similarly attached to Vienna Reparations Sub-Commission.
7. Loan of 100,000,000 dollars for six months to provide food and coal.
8. Consolidation of existing 48 million dollars loan with the 100,000,000 dollar loan.
9. Appointment of a special Inter-Allied Commission under the Vienna Reparations Sub-Commission for administering revenues given as security for the Consolidated Loan.
10. Appointment of Commission of bankers and financial experts to study and devise a plan for the definitive reconstruction of Austrian finance.

RENE CHARRON. *France.*

C. B. SMITH. *United States.*

A. TROVATI. *Italy.*

WILLIAM GOODE. *Great Britain.*

VIENNA , November 4, 1919.

Annex A

PARIS REPORT

NEED OF IMPORTED RAW MATERIALS AND SEMIMANUFACTURES FOR THE SPACE OF ONE YEAR (REVISED LIST)

No.	Article	Amount needed to set factories in full work.	Amount needed if factories only supplied with 70% of coal.
*1.	Raw cow-hides for shoe-soles	1,300,000 pieces	820,000 pieces
*2.	Raw hides for making leather for uppers	750,000 “	525,000 “
3.	Leather for uppers	16,000,000 square-feet	15,000,000 square-feet

4.	Skins of goats, kids, sheep and lambs	1,000,000 skins	500,000 skins
5.	Leather made of the same	1,000,000 square-feet	700,000 square-feet
6.	Patent leather	50,000 pieces	35,000 pieces
7.	Hogskin	200,000 skins	140,000 skins
8.	Skins of Crocodiles and Lizards	10,000 pieces	
9.	Hides of seals	12,000 “	
10.	Skivers	40,000 “	
11.	Morocco-goatskins	100,000 “	
12.	French Moroccos, moutons and goat-skins	30,000 “	
13.	Tanning materials (60% extract)	11,400,000 kilos	10,060,000 kilos
14.	Oilseeds	53,102,000 “	15,930,000 “
15.	Fat and grease	143,152,000 kilos	42,945,000 kilos
16.	Turpentine-oil	500,000 “	400,000 “
17.	Shellac	250,000 “	200,000 “
18.	Resin (colonhonium, light)	700,000 “	600,000 “
19.	Copal-Damar-resin	200,000 “	150,000 “
*20.	Naptha	860,000,000 “	602,000,000 “
21.	Benzine	38,000,000 “	26,600,000 “
22.	Kerosine	52,000,000 “	36,400,000 “
23.	Gas-oil	11,800,000 “	8,600,000 “
24.	Lubricating-oil light	3,900,000 “	2,730,000 “
25.	Lubricating-oil middle	4,900,000 “	3,430,000 “
26.	Lubricating-oil heavy	11,000,000 “	7,700,000 “
27.	Cylinder-oil	7,610,000 “	5,320,000 “
28.	Vulcan-oil	9,000,000 “	6,300,000 “
29.	Oil for motors	2,400,000 “	1,680,000 “
30.	Vaseline raw	2,460,000 “	1,720,000 “
31.	Paraffine	5,100,000 “	3,570,000 “

32.	Goudron	9,000,000 “	6,300,000 “
*33.	Pitch	5,050,000 “	3,530,000 “
34.	Coke of petrol	1,000,000 “	700,000 “
35.	Cotton	42,900,000 “	35,300,000 “
*36.	Flax combed	13,000,000 “	13,000,000 “
37.	Hemp	8,700,000 “	7,200,000 “
*38.	Yute raw	7,500,000 kilos	5,500,000 kilos
39.	Wool (fleece)	6,200,000 “	4,200,000 “
40.	Wool (skin-wool)	250,000 “	150,000 “
41.	Hair of divers animals	300,000 “	150,000 “
42.	Carded yarn and wool	236,000 “	180,000 “
43.	Yarn of silk	100,000 “	60,000 “
44.	Yarn of silk waste	40,000 “	25,000 “
45.	Rags	4,000,000 “	2,000,000 “
46.	Unfinished calicoes for printing	5,000,000 kilos	3,000,000 kilos
*47.	White and coloured calicoes	2,000,000 “	1,500,000 “
*48.	Woolen cloths	3,000,000 “	3,000,000 “
*49.	Silk materials and ribbons	1,000,000 “	800,000 “
50.	Rubber unwashed	1,100,000 “	500,000 “
51.	Asbestos for spinning	1,000,000 “	600,000 “
52.	Asbestos for the manufacture of tiles	5,000,000 “	800,000 “
53.	Antimone	300,000 “	200,000 “
54.	Lead	15,000,000 “	13,000,000 “
55.	Copper	20,000,000 “	15,000,000 “
56.	Nickel	1,800,000 “	1,300,000 “
57.	Quicksilver	300,000 “	300,000 “
58.	Tin	1,250,000 kilos	1,000,000 kilos
59.	Zinc	16,000,000 “	12,000,000 “
60.	Calcined aluminum oxide	8,000,000 “	6,000,000 “
61.	Bauxite	6,000,000 “	6,000,000 “

62.	Aluminum	4,000,000 “	2,000,000 “
63.	Ferromangan 50%	600,000 “	280,000 “
64.	Ferromangan 80%	4,317,000 “	1,819,000 “
65.	Ferrochrome (content of chrome)	40,000 “	30,000 “
66.	Ferro-wolfram and Chrome-ore (70% WO ₃) (content of wolfram)	200,000 “	170,000 “
67.	Ferro-vanadium (content of vanadium)	30,000 “	20,000 “
68.	Ferro-molybdenum (content of molybdenum)	20,000 “	10,000 “
69.	Kaolin	30,000,000 “	15,000,000 “
70.	Sulphurous pyrites	18,000,000 “	9,000,000 “
71.	Diamonds for industrial use	13,000 karat	8,000 karat
72.	Paper (qualities not produced at home)	10,000,000 kilos	7,000,000 kilos

REMARKS.

* re No. 1 Incl. hides of horse and calf, reckoned 1 cow-hide—2 hides of horses—4 hides of calf.

No. 2 Raw cow-hides incl. hides of horse and calf.

No. 20 80,000,000 respectively 56,000,000 kilos to be distilled, the rest for heating purposes for the electric station of the city of Vienna and different factories.

No. 33 Cotton yarn could be manufactured at home except a small amount of certain numbers and qualities.

No. 36 The only linen-mill working by water-power.

No. 38 If mill at Lajta-ujfalu (Western Hungary) [is?] to be considered, need amounts to 17,500,000 respectively 13,000,000

kilos [17,500,000 and 18,000,000 kilos respectively?]

No. 47 For making underlinen.

No. 48 Uncovered want for ready-made clothing industry and immediate use.

No. 49 Want of ready-made clothing-industry.

The dates concerning raw and auxiliary materials for the Chemical Industry will be furnished in a special supplement.

[Annex B]

15

[The President of the Austrian, Delegation (Renner) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]

ST. GERMAIN, May 30, 1919.

TO THE PRESIDENT: Following on the meeting which took place between the Delegates of the Financial Section of the Supreme Economic Council in connection with the Peace Conference, and several technical delegates of the Government of German Austria, I have the honour to acquaint you with the following declarations made in the name of the aforesaid Government. The Government of German Austria undertakes to secure the financial guarantee for the credits which have been opened, and are still to be opened by the Governments of the Entente for the provisioning of German Austria with the aid of one or other of the following means, or of more than one:—

1. Payment of gold and silver money belonging to physical and moral persons of Austro-German nationality, which will be requisitioned for this purpose under the terms of a law which will be submitted for the approval of Parliament. It is understood that this clause does not apply to the metallic reserve of the Austro-Hungarian Bank.

2. Delivery of the foreign securities belonging to the nationals of German Austria, and inscribed upon a list which will be drawn up by the creditor Governments after requisitioning of these securities under the terms of a law which will be presented to the Parliament by the Government of German Austria.
3. The handing over to the creditor Governments of the credits in foreign countries resulting from sales of timber coming from forests belonging to the State or to public or private persons, until the establishment of a mortgage upon the forests belonging to the same persons and having an area in excess of 500 hectares, under reservation of the sole liens (servitudes) or exploitation charges or mortgages in existence at the same date. Those forests will be excepted which belong to the nationals of the creditor countries before the 15th May, 1919.
4. Handing over of all the net product of the exploitation by the State of the salt mines situated in the territory of German Austria, and the establishment of a first mortgage upon the said salt mines, upon the factories, and all installations dependent thereon after repayment, or provision for repayment, of the mortgages already in existence.
5. For one portion of the credit a guarantee to be given by the city of Vienna. The Government will use all its influence to secure the allocation of the net revenues of sites built on, or not built on, and all the industrial concerns belonging to the town of Vienna, and to other towns of German Austria having a population in excess of 50,000 inhabitants, and the establishment of a mortgage upon the said properties.

The Government of German Austria will communicate as soon as possible, in any case before the end of June, 1919, the decision taken by the Austrian Parliament with reference to the objects mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 inclusive.

The creditor Governments, after having heard the financial experts of the German-Austrian Government, will inform this Government as to the revenues or guarantees required by them in the above list, in order to obtain financial covering for the food credits.

A special convention will fix the conditions of payment or the utterances of protests, as also the conditions of establishment of the guarantees required by them, the Government of German Austria to undertake at its own expense in due form all formalities necessary to this effect.

It is agreed that the guarantees thus handed over shall be liberated, and the mortgages thus constituted shall be written off *pari passu* with the partial repayments effected by the Austrian Government on account of the payment of the food credits which have been granted to it.

The Government of German Austria declares in general that it will earmark all its revenues of whatever sort to the liberation, at the times and places which will be determined, of the food credits which have been granted to it. In the meantime it remains to determine the methods of payment and the guarantees, as also the legal establishment of the said guarantees and mortgages.

We assume that the total of the pledges will be fixed in relation to the total of the credits, the value of the pledges being determined either by objective rules (for example, in the case of gold by the standard and weight, in the case of securities by the stock exchange value, deduction being made of the usual margin for the securities in question), or by an estimate drawn up by a Mixed Commission, for example, in the case of forests.

The question then for the moment is to determine the pledges sufficient to cover the food credit of 45,000,000 dollars granted hitherto. In addition to the total of this credit it will be necessary to obtain supplementary credits for the provisioning of our country; the covering of this credit should be accomplished by means of one or other of the pledges enumerated above.

Our intention being to abandon as quickly as possible the system of food credits, it is absolutely necessary to put our factories in operation once more, which makes necessary the purchase of raw materials in foreign countries, a purchase which could only be made when the Governments of the Entente have determined their choice

out of the list of guarantees, which contains practically the whole of our realisable assets.

Further, we consider it necessary that the Governments should choose those guarantees which by their nature lend themselves less easily to other transactions, that is to say, the guarantees referred to above under 3, 4, and 5, and that we should be left with those portions of the guarantees which permit us most easily to obtain other credits.

It would also be desirable that the contract relative to the pledges should provide for a possible substitution by agreement with the creditor Governments in order to liberate certain portions necessary to obtain other credits, and to replace these portions by other pledges considered adequate by the Governments of the Entente.

We assume, finally, that the creditor States will avoid in realising the pledges referred to above any measures which might affect the monetary situation in German Austria, which is already very serious.

I have [etc.]

RENNER

[Annex C]

Property in the Austrian Republic Belonging to the State

The property of the Austrian State consists of:

- I. Industrial concerns owned by the State.
- II. Government Buildings.
- III. Property of the former Emperor and his family.

In the former Austrian Empire the property owned by the State has never been valued. Though there existed an Inventory of all possessions and holdings, their value in cash never has been estimated. But even in case this had been done, the figures could not be taken as a proper basis, in view of the devaluation of the currency.

Also a comparison with similar properties belonging to private persons is of no use as the Government-Buildings (for instance Court-Buildings) lost [*lose*] their value as soon as they are no more used for their original purpose but for private purposes.

I. INDUSTRIAL CONCERNS OWNED BY THE STATE

These are the State railways, the tobacco and salt-monopoly, the telegraphs and telephones, the forests and mines.

1. *State railways:*

About 5000 km. of railways are State property (a great part of the Austrian railways for instance the Southern railway is private property.) The investment-value of the former Austrian State railways was estimated before the collapse of the Empire at 6400 million Kronen. This sum does not represent the present value, but the total of the expenditures made on building and acquiring the State railways in former Austria in a period of about 80 years.

If this value is divided in proportion to the number of Kilometers of the lines remaining within the Austrian Republic, the invested capital may be estimated at about 1600 million Kronen. The actual value is considerably higher, but exact figures cannot be given. It is not possible to give information concerning the rolling stock, as the repartition between the national states has not yet taken place. At present the railway-cars are actually common property. In the budget 1919/20 are estimated

the years receipts	at 590 mil K
the years expenditures incurred in operating the lines	at 943 “ “
the deficit	at 353 “ “

Since the drawing up of this budget the Government was compelled to raise the wages, besides the increasing coal prices caused more expenses, so that the actual deficit will be considerably larger. In this deficit is not included the expenditure for the payment of interests on the invested capital, as this forms part of the general public debt.

2. *The tobacco-monopoly.*

The assets of the tobacco-monopoly consists of:

- a) 11 factories, machinery, inventory and
- b) stocks.

From estimates, taken before the war, the value of a) can be fixed at 23 million Kronen. The stored up tobacco amounts to 6 million kg worth about 30 million Dutch guilders.

In the budget of 1919/20 are estimated
the receipts of [at] 328 million Kronen.

the expenses at 117 “ “

the profit at 210 “ “

The expenses, mentioned above will actually be considerably larger on account of the increase of the costs, especially of wages. On the other hand an increase of the receipts is planned for the next [near?] future by raising the prices of the products.

3. *Salt-monopoly.*

The salt-monopoly comprises the output of salt-mines. The salt is gained by conducting water into salt-mines; this water after being saturated with salt is boiled; and the pure salt remains after the evaporation of this water. The total production in the year 1917/18 amounted to about 150,000 tons. This production could increase if the salt-works had sufficient coal.

In the budget of 1919/20 are estimated

the receipts at 47 million Kronen

the expenses at 31 “ “

the profit at 16 “ “

The value of the factories, the machinery and the inventory is indicated at about 83 million Kronen. This sum does not comprise the value of the salt in the mountains.

4. *Post, telegraphy telephone.*

Post, telegraph, telephone are state-monopolies. The assets are buildings, apparatus, nets and supplies.; the value is estimated at 147 million Kronen.

According to the budget of 1919/20

the expenses	amount To	365 million Kronen
amount to		
the receipts	“ “	200 “ “
the deficit	“ “	165 “ “

On account of increased wages the deficit will be considerably larger; though a raise of tariffs is planned.

5. *Forests.*

800,000 hectares from property of the State.

320,000 of which are non-productive.

The value of the returns of these forests was estimated in 1910 at 50 million Kronen.

Considering the extraordinary increase of the prices of wood the present value of the state-forests may be taken with 650 million Kronen.

In the budget of 1919/20 are appraised:

the expenses	at	30 million	Kronen
the receipts	“	32 “	“
the profit	“	2 “	“

6. *Mines.*

Of the former large mining properties of the Austrian Empire only a few small mines worth about 5 million Kronen remained

In the budget of 1919/20 are appraised

the expenses	at	12 million	Kronen

the receipts	“	15	“
the profit	“	3	“

II. GOVERNMENT-BUILDINGS

The Austrian Republic possesses a great number of buildings, for the different administrative branches (courts, administrative authorities, schools, hospitals, a.s.o.)

These buildings have never been valued and this value cannot be estimated by way of comparison as they would lose their value as soon as they are used for other than administrative purposes.

The Austrian Republic possesses particularly in Vienna a large quantity of buildings of the former central-government, which merely will cause expenses, when the administrative apparatus will be restricted.

III. PROPERTY OF THE FORMER EMPEROR AND HIS FAMILY

This property consists partly of immovables partly of movables.

IMMOVABLES

These consist of

- a) crown-property.
- b) entailed property of the Imperial Family (Trust-Fund).

a) *Crown property.*

It consists of palaces, castles, theatres, museums, gardens, situated partly in Vienna, partly outside, also at Salzburg and Innsbruck. It comprises amongst others the “Hofburg”, the Imperial stables, the imperial museums, the opera house, the “Burgtheater”, the castle of Luxenburg, the castle in the Augarten and the castle of Schonbrunn. Most of these places possess huge gardens such as the park at Schonbrunn and the very spacious “Tiergarten”. It is impossible to tax the value even approximately as objects for comparison don’t

exist. Certainly the value must be estimated at several millions of dollars. Some castles possess very valuable furnitures and works of art.

b) Entailed property of the Imperial family (Trust fund).

The entailed property consists of 2 estates worth 700,000 dollars and 150,000 dollars respectively, 4 houses to let in Vienna worth about 340,000 dollars.

2. MOVABLES

a) complete collections.

b) scattered property places.

To the complete collections belong: The Imperial picture-gallery, the museums of art, the collection of engravings (Albertina) the Imperial Library, the Treasury and the Silberkammer. The scattered property serves for decorating and furnishing castles and palaces.

The valuation of these movables meets with some difficulty, it requires considerable time and a large staff of experts. We cannot even give an approximate estimate of the value of the picture gallery and the museums for instances. Recently a part of the Morgan collections has been sold for 20 million dollars, and yet the entire Morgan collection could naturally not compare with the treasures contained in the two above mentioned institutions. We do not want to mention a figure at random, but it surely could be said with great reserve that the picture gallery and the museums have a value that by far exceeds 80 million dollars. The collection of silver might be worth a million dollars. The Treasury contains the insignia of the crown, worth several million Kronen; the very valuable crown jewels (gems and pearls) are in the possession of the former Emperor and cannot be disposed of. It is not exaggerated if one values the movables at a sum exceeding the amount of 200 million dollars.

Concerning the complete collections we beg to refer to article 196 of the Peace Treaty, which forbids for the next 20 years the selling or

scattering of these collections, or the disposing of them in any way, unless the states concerned have come to a special agreement.

Budget of the Austrian Republic

In the budget of the Austrian Republic for the fiscal year 1919/20 are estimated

the revenues at	2548 million	Kronen
the expenses at	6547 “	“
the deficit with about	4000 “	“

The actual deficit however will be by far greater, it can already now be estimated at 8,000 to 10,000 mill, K, as the prices for foodstuffs are rapidly rising with the devaluation of the Kronen and the constant increase of wage scales not to be avoided. Besides the effects of the Peace-Treaty are not taken into consideration at the above estimates; this is especially the case as regards the state-liabilities, as the Austrian Republic has to take over two thirds of the debts of the former Austrian State.

The revenue of the State for the fiscal year 1919/20 are shown in the following list. The first column contains the gross receipts, the second column the net-receipts.

I. REVENUES

	<i>gross</i>	<i>net</i>
	<i>million Kronen.</i>	
Imposts	545	540
Custom	67	66
Excise	188	185
Taxes	229	225
Salt	47	16
Saccharine	15	10
Lotteries	66	17
Press	21	1
Mint	2	1

Woods	32	2
Railways	590 Deficit	353
Post Office	200 “	165
Miscellaneous	206	
	2548	757

II. EXPENSES

The first column contains the ciphers of the budget drawn up and printed July 1919. The second column contains the new expenses since then, so that the ciphers enumerated in the third column represent the probable expenses of the fiscal year 1919/1920.

[Translation¹⁶]

	<i>preliminary</i>	<i>addition</i>	<i>total</i>
	<i>Million Kronen</i>		
Public Safety	104		104
Defense	255	85	340
Monopolies	174	34	208
Government Operation	936	43	979
War Damages	330	1	331
Prisoners of War	169	1288	1457
Maintenance	71	27	98
Unemployment	65	130	195
Famine Measures for Government Officials	636	298	934
Reparations	200		200
State Schools (old & new)	997	775	1772
Pensions	85	20	105

Liquidation Expenditures	265	11	276
Remaining Government Expenses	879	75	954
Provisions.	1381	1713	3094
Expenses	6547	4600	11, 047
Revenues	2458		2, 548
Deficit	4000		8, 500

Appendix F to HD-97¹⁷

[Translation]

18

Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs to the Supreme Council

STATUTE OF EASTERN GALICIA

The Commission on Polish Affairs, in agreement with the Drafting Committee, has applied to the articles already adopted for the statute of Eastern Galicia the changes rendered necessary as a result of the decision of the Supreme Council on November 11.¹⁹

The two Commissions have decided on the text as it appears in the annex.

However, a difference in views resulted with regard to article 2.

The American, French, Italian, and Japanese Delegations propose that at the expiration of the 25-year mandate given to Poland over Eastern Galicia, the Council of the League of Nations should have full

powers, deciding by a majority, to maintain or modify the present treaty.

The British Delegation draws up in due form a reservation with respect to the words “deciding by a majority of votes” added to article 2, paragraph 2 of the treaty, in order to indicate under what conditions the Council of the League of Nations, at the expiration of the 25-year period provided for by this article, may maintain, revise or change the statute of Eastern Galicia. The British Delegation points out that the Supreme Council, not having decided, when it examined article 2, that the Council of the League of Nations would decide by a majority of votes, had consequently determined that the vote should be unanimous. This decision is an integral part of the general regulations which have been adopted by the Council. Under these circumstances, the British Delegation does not consider itself authorized to accept the proposed modification.

PARIS, November 20.

Annex to the Report

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and Poland,

Being desirous of putting an end to the unhappy conflict which has long devastated Eastern Galicia, and of establishing in that country a regime which shall assure as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and safeguard the personal, political and religious liberty of its inhabitants;

Seeing that Poland is now, in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Powers, the State best able to re-establish free and well-ordered government in Eastern Galicia;

And desiring to conclude a Treaty to that end;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries the following, viz:

Who having communicated their full powers found in good and due form have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER 1.—*Statute of Eastern Galicia*

ARTICLE 1

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers transfer to Poland, and Poland accepts the mandate to organize and govern for a period of twenty-five years the territory defined hereinafter as the former Austrian “Kronländer” of Galicia and Bukovina, which shall constitute the autonomous territory of Eastern Galicia.

A. ON THE WEST

From the point where the old frontier between Austria-Hungary and Russia is met by the eastern administrative boundary of the commune of Belzec southwestwards, this communal boundary;

then the administrative boundary between the districts (Politische Bezirke) of Cieszanow on the west and Raza-Ruska on the east;

then south-westwards along the administrative boundary between the districts of Cieszanow and Jawarow, but cutting off the salient formed round the village of Lipowiec by a line to be fixed on the ground passing about 2 kilometres north of this place;

then southwards along the administrative boundary between the districts of Jaroslau and Przemyśl on the west and of Jawarow, Mosciska, Sambor and Stary-Sambor successively on the east;

then southwards to the salient about 1 kilometre southeast of point 519 (Radycz);

along the administrative boundary between the districts of Dobromil and Stary-Sambor;

thence south-westwards to the salient made by this administrative boundary about 15 kilometres south-west of Chyrow and about 2 kilometres south-east of point 733;

a line to be fixed on the ground cutting the Chyrow-Sambor railway about 2 kilometres east of Chyrow, then following the watershed between the basins of the Strwiaz and the Dniester;

thence southwards to its junction with the frontier of Czechoslovakia, about 2 kilometres south of point 1335 (Kalicz);

along the administrative boundary between the districts of Drobomil and Liska on the west and of Stary-Sambor and Turka on the east. The frontier, however, will diverge from this administrative boundary in the two following places, where it will be determined on the ground:

- (a) where the administrative boundary passes west of the Chyrow-Lutowiska road, so as to leave this road entirely in Polish territory;
- (b) in the neighbourhood of Bobrka, so as to leave this place in Polish territory.

B. ON THE SOUTH-WEST

From the point defined above to its junction with the boundary of the Bukovina, the old frontier between Galicia and Hungary.

Point 1655 which is the point of the Carpathians common to the basins of the three rivers Tisza, Visso and Czeremosz, is the point of junction of the three frontiers of Eastern Galicia, the Ruthenian territory of the Czecho-Slovak State and Roumania.

C. ON THE SOUTH-EAST

From the point defined above north-eastwards to its junction with the administrative boundary between the districts of Horodenka and Sniatyn, about 11 kilometres south-east of Horodenka,

the old boundary between the Bukovina and Galicia;

thence north-eastwards to a point to be chosen in the course of the Dniester about 2 kilometres below Zaleszczyki,

a line to be fixed on the ground passing through points 239, 312, and 317;

thence to the point where the old frontier between Austria-Hungary and Russia leaves the Dniester in a northerly direction, about 3 kilometres west of Jvanets,

the principal channel of the Dniester downstream.

D. ON THE EAST AND NORTH

From the point in the Dniester defined above to the point where it meets the eastern administrative boundary of the commune of Belzec;

the old frontier between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

A Commission composed of six members, five nominated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and one by Poland, will be appointed fifteen days after the coming into force of the present Treaty to trace on the spot the boundaries described above, in so far as provision therefor may not already have been made by other means. The decisions of this Commission will be taken by a majority, it being understood that in the event of an equality of votes the Chairman will be entitled to a second vote; its decisions shall be binding on the parties concerned. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne by the revenues of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 2

Text approved by the Delegations of the United States, France, Italy, and Japan.

Poland undertakes to execute under the control of the League of Nations and under the conditions stipulated in the present Treaty the mandate provided for in Article 1.

Text proposed by the British Delegation.

Poland undertakes to execute under the control of the League of Nations and under the conditions stipulated in the present Treaty, the mandate provided for in Article 1.

At the expiration of 25 years the Council of the League of Nations, *deciding by a majority of votes*, shall have full powers to maintain, revise or change the statute drawn up by the present Treaty.

At the expiration of 25 years, the Council of the League of Nations shall have full powers to maintain, revise or change the statute drawn up by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

During the regime established by the present Treaty, the treaties and agreements concluded or to be concluded by Poland shall take effect in Eastern Galicia unless it is otherwise stipulated.

ARTICLE 4

The interests of nationals of Eastern Galicia in foreign countries shall be protected by the diplomatic and consular agents of Poland.

ARTICLE 5

All liberties in private and public matters, all political rights, and all rights reserved to minorities, which are assured in Poland by the Polish laws, shall be assured in Eastern Galicia. In particular, the most complete religious freedom shall be guaranteed. The Orthodox Greek Catholic Church shall enjoy the same rights as the Roman Catholic Church.

ARTICLE 6

Poland undertakes that the laws applicable in Eastern Galicia regarding freedom of public meeting, association, speech, and the press shall take into account the special status of the territory, and shall ensure to the inhabitants the most complete liberty compatible with the maintenance of order and with the observance of the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 7

Polish and Ruthenian shall be recognized, on the same footing, as the official languages of Eastern Galicia, and shall enjoy the same rights.

Without prejudice to the guarantees assured to minorities by Article 8, each commune or municipality shall have the right to decide whether the Polish language or the Ruthenian language or both shall be taught in the primary public educational establishments.

Legislation on the subject of public instruction in secondary and higher educational establishments shall be within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia provided for in Article 10, subject to the provisions of Article 13.

In the allocation of public funds to the three grades of education, instruction given in Polish and instruction given in Ruthenian shall each receive its fair share.

ARTICLE 8

The provisions of the Treaty concluded on June 28, 1919,^{[20](#)} between the High Contracting Parties are hereby applied to Eastern Galicia, and shall be interpreted as follows: (1) The obligations imposed on the Polish Government by that Treaty shall be equally binding on the authorities of Eastern Galicia, within the measure of their competence; (2) the guarantees provided by that Treaty in favour of racial minorities, on the implicit assumption that the majority is Polish, shall apply equally in the event of the majority proving to be Ruthenian.

ARTICLE 9

There shall be no systematic introduction into Eastern Galicia of colonists from outside.

CHAPTER II.—*Diet of Eastern Galicia*

ARTICLE 10

There shall be in Eastern Galicia a Diet composed of a single Chamber elected by universal secret suffrage with proportional representation. The right of voting shall belong to both sexes without distinction.

A general election shall take place every five years. In the event of the dissolution of the Diet, a general election shall take place within a period of three months after such dissolution.

The Polish electoral laws shall apply to the elections to the Diet of Eastern Galicia, subject to the above provisions.

ARTICLE 11

The Diet shall be convened by the Governor provided for in Article 19, who may also adjourn it, close the session or dissolve the Diet.

The Diet shall hold two ordinary sessions in every year.

ARTICLE 12

The Diet of Eastern Galicia shall legislate on the following matters:—

- (1.) Exercise of public worship;
- (2.) Public education;
- (3.) Public relief;
- (4.) Public health;
- (5.) Provincial, district and local roads, and railways serving local interests;
- (6.) Encouragement of agriculture, trade and industry, including measures for facilitating credit, purchase or sale, for developing the employment of new technical processes, and for assisting research and experiments;
- (7.) Application of the general laws on the subject of control of water for irrigation or power purposes;
- (8.) Application of the general laws on the subject of the organization and administration of municipalities and districts;
- (9.) Taxes to be collected for the local budget of Eastern Galicia;
- (10.) Agrarian questions;
- (11.) All other matters with which the Diet of Poland shall have given it authority to deal.

Each year the Diet of Eastern Galicia shall vote, on the proposition of the Governor, the budget on the matters within its competence.

ARTICLE 13

Laws passed by the Diet shall be transmitted to the Governor by the President of the Diet. Any such law may, within one month from such transmission, be vetoed by the Governor acting on his own proper authority. This right of veto shall be overridden if, within a period of one year from the date at which it was exercised, the law is again passed by the Diet by a majority of two-thirds.

In legislation concerning public secondary and higher education, the Governor's right to veto shall, however, be absolute.

However, if an agrarian legislative measure, after having been vetoed by the Governor, is within a year voted again by the Diet by a two-thirds majority, the question shall be immediately submitted by the Polish Government to the Council of the League of Nations. The latter will decide, by a majority of votes, what action is to be taken and orders are to be given which may appear useful and suitable under the circumstances.

ARTICLE 14

No member of the Diet may be prosecuted or proceeded against in any way by reason of speeches, opinions or votes made, expressed or given in the Diet or on its Commissions.

During a session no member of the Diet may be arrested or prosecuted before the criminal courts without the authority of the Diet, except in the case of persons taken *in flagrante delicto*. The detention or prosecution of a member of the Diet shall be suspended during the whole of the session, should the Diet so require.

ARTICLE 15

The Diet shall draw up its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President and other officers.

The Supreme Court of Lemberg referred to in Article 27 shall decide all questions raised as to the validity of elections to the Diet.

CHAPTER III.—*Representation of Eastern Galicia in the Polish Diet and Administration*

ARTICLE 16

The electors of Eastern Galicia shall participate in the elections to the Polish Diet. With this object, the Polish laws with regard to the election to that Diet shall be extended to Eastern Galicia, subject to the reservation that proportional representation must be maintained in that territory.

The deputies elected in Eastern Galicia shall not take part in the deliberations of the Polish Diet on legislative matters of the same nature as those within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

This arrangement shall be subject to common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 17

The Polish Diet shall have the right to legislate for Eastern Galicia on all matters not within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 18

The Polish Council of Ministers shall include a Minister without portfolio appointed by the Head of the Polish State from among the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia. This Minister shall represent Eastern Galicia.

Special bureaux for the affairs of Eastern Galicia shall be organised in each Polish Ministry dealing with such affairs.

A high Ruthenian official shall be attached to the Polish Council of Ministers to act as adviser to the Council in matters particularly concerning Ruthenians and in the affairs of the Orthodox Greek Catholic Church.

CHAPTER IV.—*Administration of Eastern Galicia*

ARTICLE 19

The executive power in Eastern Galicia shall be entrusted to a Governor, who shall be appointed by the Head of the Polish State, by whom he may also be relieved of his functions.

ARTICLE 20

The Governor shall be responsible for the maintenance of order and public safety; he shall ensure the execution of the laws voted by the Polish Diet and the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 21

Subject to the right of veto provided in Article 13, the Governor shall promulgate the laws voted by the Diet of Eastern Galicia within a month from the time when they shall have been transmitted to him by the President of that Assembly.

ARTICLE 22

The matters within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia in accordance with Article 12 shall be under the direction of Ministers appointed by the Governor and responsible to the Diet. The Diet shall determine the number, duties, and salaries of such Ministers.

ARTICLE 23

Matters not within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia shall be under the direction in Eastern Galicia of Heads of Departments placed under the control of the Governor.

ARTICLE 24

The acts of the Governor as regards the matters referred to in Article 12 shall require the counter-signature of a responsible Minister, except in the exercise of the right of veto.

ARTICLE 25

The Governor shall appoint public officials. Polish or Galician laws, as the case may be, may, however, prescribe another method of appointment as regards subordinate officers. They may also determine the conditions required for appointment to any particular office.

The officers in the services dealing with matters referred to in Article 12 shall be appointed on the nomination of the responsible Minister.

ARTICLE 26

Eligibility for public offices shall not in principle be subject, either *de jure* or *de facto*, to any conditions in respect of race, religion or language.

Officials shall, subject to any necessary exceptions, be recruited in Eastern Galicia. Regulations issued by the Governor on the proposal of the Head of the department concerned, or of the responsible Minister, as the case may be, may prescribe that certain classes of official positions shall be reserved exclusively for natives of Eastern Galicia or persons fulfilling the conditions laid down by these regulations.

In making choice of officials from among candidates with equal qualifications, the numerical importance of the different national groups shall be taken into account.

CHAPTER V.—*Judicial System of Eastern Galicia*

ARTICLE 27

The Court of Lemberg will constitute a Supreme Court for the entire territory of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 28

The judges of Eastern Galicia, with the exception of those for whom an elective system may be adopted, shall be appointed by the Head of the Polish State on the nomination of the Governor.

The judges shall be irremovable; they shall only be deprived of office on a decision to that effect by the Court of Lemberg acting as the supreme disciplinary Council of the magistracy.

ARTICLE 29

Punishment imposed by the Eastern Galician courts shall be executed in Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 30

The Head of the Polish State shall have the right of pardon in respect of persons convicted by the courts of Eastern Galicia.

CHAPTER VI.—*Financial Regime of Eastern Galicia*

ARTICLE 31

The financial regime for Eastern Galicia shall be determined by a Polish law in conformity with the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 32

Property situated in Eastern Galicia formerly belonging to the Austrian Government, to the “Kronländ” of Galicia, or to the Austrian Crown, as well as private property in this territory of the former Royal Family of Austria-Hungary, is, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 204 of the Treaty of Peace between the High Contracting Parties and Austria, transferred to Poland, which shall provide for the administration of such property.

ARTICLE 33

Property at present appropriated to public services shall continue to be so appropriated. It shall not cease to be so appropriated except in accordance with legal procedure and on the recommendation of the authority charged with the administration of such services.

During the regime established by the present Treaty, the property referred to in Article 32 may not be alienated nor subjected to

charges the effect of which would outlast the duration of the said regime; in case a new status is established, in accordance with Article 2, leases outlasting the regime shall cease to have effect three years after the establishment of this status if they have not been expressly confirmed during this period. The above provisions are, however, not to be taken as preventing the employment of the aforesaid property for purposes of agrarian reform or of works recognized as being of public utility.

The provisions of this Chapter in no way prejudice the allocation of the said property to be made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the event of Eastern Galicia being in whole or in part separated from Poland.

ARTICLE 34

Additions to domanial property or property appropriated to the public services shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of Articles 32 and 33; they shall be the subject of a special account to be adjusted immediately in case a new status for Eastern Galicia shall be established, in conformity with Article 2.

ARTICLE 35

In the event of Eastern Galicia bearing the expense of any services of which in Poland the expense is borne by the State, Polish legislation shall fix the corresponding proportion of the proceeds of the general taxes raised in Eastern Galicia which shall be transferred to the budget of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 36

The budget of Eastern Galicia shall comprise:

- (1) As regards expenditure,
the expenditure connected with the matters referred to in Article 12;
- (2) As regards revenue,
 - (a) the proportion of the proceeds of the general taxes determined in accordance with Article 35;

- (b) the proceeds of supplements of the general taxes, voted by the Diet of Eastern Galicia;
- (c) the proceeds of duties and taxes imposed by the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 37

The Polish Government shall be responsible for the service of the debts which, under Articles 199 and 200 of the Treaty of Peace between the High Contracting Parties and Austria, are to be assumed by the territory of Eastern Galicia. In the event of this territory becoming either as a whole or in part separated from Poland, its contribution shall be determined in conformity with the principles laid down in Article 199 of that Treaty.

CHAPTER VII.—*Military Organization*

ARTICLE 38

Laws in force in Poland relating to military service may be applied by Poland to Eastern Galicia, with the reservation that the contingent thus recruited shall form special units, which, in time of peace, shall be stationed in Eastern Galicia and in time of war shall be at the disposal of the Polish Government for the defense of national territory.

CHAPTER VIII.—*Transitory Provisions*

ARTICLE 39

Until the Assembly of the Diet, the Governor of Eastern Galicia shall administer the territory in conformity with the provisions of the present Treaty.

In regard to matters which according to the present Treaty are within the competence of the Polish Diet, the Polish laws shall be introduced in Eastern Galicia by promulgation by the Governor. In regard to matters within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia, the laws and regulations in force on July 28, 1914, shall be applied without being promulgated anew.

The Governor shall take the necessary measures for the initial constitution of the administrative services. He shall fix the number of Ministers and the division of duties between them, the number and the division so fixed being maintained until modified by the Diet.

The Governor shall take the necessary measures with a view to the election of the Diet of Eastern Galicia at the earliest possible date in the conditions laid down in Article 10, so that the Diet may be able to assemble at the latest within a period of nine months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. It will be the duty of the Governor to assure the freedom of the voting, in conformity with the provisions of Article 6, and to proceed without delay to the convocation of the Diet.

The regime established by Chapters I to VI of the present Treaty shall come into force in every respect upon the assembly of the first Diet. Compulsory military service shall not be introduced in Eastern Galicia before that date.

ARTICLE 40

No inhabitant of Eastern Galicia shall be disturbed or molested by reason of his political attitude between July 28, 1914, and the coming into force of the present Treaty.

The present treaty, in French, in English, and in Italian, shall be ratified. In case of divergence the French text shall prevail. It is to come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbaux* of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at Paris, the sixth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

¹ Appendix B to HD-89, p. 103 [Pg. 103 is part of [Doc. 5](#)].

² No such report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission has been found in the Department's files. The document filed with HD-97 as appendix D duplicates note of the British delegation, appendix B to HD-92, p. 172 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], together with the resolution of November 14, referring this document to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission, HD-92, minute 5, p. 169 [Pg. 169 is part of [Doc. 8](#)].

³ *Post*, p. 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 13](#)].

^{3a} *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, pp. 3149, 3215.

⁴ Appendix C to HD-80, [ol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

⁵ For the statement of M. Paderewski on the status of Galicia, see HD-59, minute 5, [vol. VIII, p. 330](#) .

⁶ HD-89, minute 7, p. 99 [Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 5](#)].

⁷ See HD-86, minute 3, p. 20 [Pg. 20 is part of [Doc. 2](#)].

⁸ Appendix B to HD-93, p. 185 [Pg. 185 is part of [Doc. 9](#)].

⁹ Appendix A to HD-91, p. 149 [Pg. 149 is part of [Doc. 7](#)].

¹⁰ Appendix E to HD-90, p. 138 [Pg. 138 is part of [Doc. 6](#)].

¹¹ Appendix B to HD-89, p. 103 [Pg. 103 is part of [Doc. 5](#)].

¹² CF-24/1, minute 5, [vol. V, p. 834](#) .

¹³ HD-66, minute 3, [vol. VIII, p. 508](#) .

¹⁴ [Vol. II, p. 175](#) .

^{14a} Annex B, p. 264 [Pg. 264 is part of [Doc. 13](#)].

¹⁵ For the document filed as annex B there has been substituted a different translation of the same document taken from the minutes

of the Financial Sub-Commission of the Supreme Economic Council
(filed under Paris Peace Conf. 180.05201/1).

¹⁶ Translation from the German supplied by the editors.

¹⁷ Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 181.213202/13.

¹⁸ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹⁹ HD-89, minute 7, p. 99 [*Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 5](#)*].

²⁰ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3714.

November 21, 10:30 a.m. (HD-98)

[14] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 21, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 21, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/98

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/98

HD-98

[Document 14]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 21, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 21, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Henry White

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. Massigli

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Dr. I. Bowman
Mr. A. W. Dulles
Mr. Buckler
Lieut-Commander L. B. Green, U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Captain Fuller, R. N
Lieut.-Colonel Kisch
Mr. E. H. Carr
Mr. Forbes-Adam
Mr. H. W. Malkin

FRANCE
M. Laroche
M. Hermitte
M. Serruys
M. Fromageot
M. de Montille

ITALY
M. Galli
M. Stranieri
M. Pilotti
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka

1. M. CAMBON said that the British and American Delegations would make known their views on the text of Article II of the Eastern Galician Treaty.¹ Status of Eastern Galicia

MR. WHITE summarized the American point of view (See Appendix "A"). He added that he had thought it advisable to do so as at the preceding meeting the impression seemed to have been conveyed that the American position on the question was illogical.

SIR EYRE CROWE repeated that he could not change his attitude, and if the Council decided otherwise he would have to refer the question to his Government.

M. CAMBON said it was important to come to a decision on this vital matter and that he hoped the Council would give its decision at that meeting. As the Council had adopted Sir Eyre Crowe's views, he would ask Mr. White whether he could not modify his conclusions.

MR. WHITE then read an alternative text which he suggested be inserted in place of the present second paragraph of Article II of the Eastern Galicia Treaty: "At the expiration of twenty-five years the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or the Council of the League of Nations, to whom the Powers may delegate their rights under this Treaty, shall have full power to maintain, revise or change the status of the present Treaty". He thought this text would meet the objection that the requirement of unanimous decision of the Council of the League of Nations might render impossible a state favorable to Poland through the ultimate opposition of Russia in Eastern Galicia; and further that a second objection would be made [*met?*], namely, [*that?*] which might arise from the provision forcing upon the entire League of Nations the responsibilities of a Treaty concluded by the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

M. CAMBON asked whether this proposed new text met with the approval of the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the modified text still raised debatable questions and that he would have to present it for the approval of his

Government. At the end of twenty-five years it still gave to Poland no voice on the final decision of its affairs.

MR. WHITE remarked that he still feared that a Power hostile to Poland might change the status of Eastern Galicia.

M. BERTHELOT said there was a very sharp difference between the two points of view. To effect conciliation he thought that the Council might accept the principle of Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal by leaving it to the League of Nations to decide in twenty-five years the procedure which it would apply.

M. CAMBON said that, in other words, the Council might state at this time that the League of Nations would examine in twenty-five years' time the question of Eastern Galicia, leaving it to the Council of the League of Nations to decide whether it would take its decision by a unanimous or a majority vote.

M. LAROCHE stated that if the procedure to be followed were not specified, it was certain that, taking into account the provisions of the Covenant, the Council would have to decide by a unanimous vote, and yet twenty-five years later the Covenant might have been changed and the procedure applied at that time might be different.

M. CAMBON asked Mr. White whether, taking into account Sir Eyre Crowe's firm stand on the question, he did not feel like accepting the point of view of the majority.

MR. WHITE said he withdrew his objection provided his attitude were recorded in the minutes so that in twenty-five years Poland should not consider America responsible.

It was decided:

- (1) to accept the text of the Eastern Galicia Treaty as presented by the Committee on Polish Affairs;
- (2) that paragraph 2 of Article II should read as follows:

“At the expiration of the period of Twenty-five years the Council of the League of Nations shall have full powers to

maintain, revise, or modify the statute as defined by the present Treaty.”

2. (The Council had before it a note from the Committee on Greek Affairs (See Appendix “B”). Report of the Committee on Greek Affairs, Regarding Greek Administration in Smyrna

M. Cambon read and commented upon the draft telegram. He proposed the Council should address it to the Inter-Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople in Smyrna

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested the following modifications: the first paragraph from second line beginning “Greek claims” should read, “to examine the questions relative to the Greek Administration of Smyrna raised by your telegram referred to above.” In second paragraph, in place of “the suggestions to be presented to the Supreme Council” read “those questions and to present its recommendations to the Supreme Council”. For the phrase in lines 3 and 4, “which those conflicts have made clear” read, “which have brought about the situation indicated by your telegram.” In third paragraph, second line omit “if necessary”. At the end of last paragraph add, “your information and after hearing the Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople upon the whole question”.

MR. WHITE in turn suggested that, at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 3 there be added: “and to submit therewith your observations and if necessary your recommendations”.

It was decided:

to send to the Inter-Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, the draft telegram after modifications suggested by Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. White, as follows:

“Reference your telegram 2045.² The Supreme Council has entrusted the Commission on Greek Claims to examine those questions relative to the Greek Administration in Smyrna raised by your telegram referred to above.

In order to study those questions and present its recommendations to the Supreme Council, the Commission would like to know with certainty the concrete facts of every kind which could be considered to have brought about the situation indicated in your telegram, especially in the matters of criminal and civil jurisdiction, customs, postal and press censorship, administration of the port, etc.

You are consequently requested to collate without delay and in agreement with the Allied High Commissioners the information furnished by your representatives at Smyrna on the concrete facts specified above, and to submit therewith your observations and if necessary your recommendations. You will be good enough to communicate these to Paris as early as possible by means of a telegram drafted in agreement with your colleagues and indicating as far as possible the sources of your information, after having heard the Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople upon the whole question.”

3. M. BERTHELOT said M. Dutasta and himself had seen on the previous day the two German Delegates Herr Von Simson and Baron Von Lersner. The interview bore on the note sent to the German Government as well as the protocol annexed thereto.³ Mr. von Simson spoke practically all the time and Baron von Lersner did not take active part in the conversation. Mr. Berthelot had emphasized to Herr von Simson that he spoke in a personal and not in an official capacity. Herr von Simson first raised the question of participation by America in the Commissions on the execution of the Treaty. He had replied that it had been decided that America would not be represented finally on any of these Commissions until the Senate had ratified the Treaty, and that this decision had been accepted by all the Allies who agreed that the American seats on these Commissions, though they remained vacant, would be reserved. Communication by M. Berthelot of His and M. Dutasta's Interview With the German Delegates

Herr von Simson then raised questions of detail; first, Memel: he wished to know what would be the situation of that city and under what conditions it would be occupied by the Allies. He had replied that this was a subject which only interested the Allies, and that in any case, the situation of Memel would be settled in such a way as not to impose too severe charges on the city, and also the Allies considered that Memel would be incorporated in a new State.

Herr von Simson did not insist and next raised the question of the Sarre. To his questions he had replied, without feeling obliged to give him a full statement. He had told him that President Wilson had agreed to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, although the Senate had not yet ratified the Treaty; he had thought it inadvisable to inform him that the Council would settle only the question of delimitation of the Sarre and that the question of sovereignty over that territory would remain in abeyance.

Herr von Simson had then referred to the occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder. He had indicated that articles 95 and 97 of the Treaty did not consider the question in the same manner for the two Provinces; for Marienwerder the question of the possibility of occupation had been raised, which was not the case with Allenstein. That observation had embarrassed him somewhat and he had answered that his personal opinion was that it seemed possible to occupy both territories and that in any event, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers did not intend to impose too heavy a burden on those territories. When the German Delegates met the Allied Commissioners, observations could be made by the Germans and information would be given on those points. Incidentally he had informed him that a general meeting of the Allied and German Delegates would be held the following Monday, and that the Allies considered that only questions of principle should be raised and the discussion be as succinct as possible in the interest of Germany herself. Herr von Simson had agreed on the last point.

Herr von Simson had then raised the question of the Protocol: he said he did not understand the classification adopted by the Allies to distinguish between the Armistice Clauses partially fulfilled, unfulfilled, and violated. He had not understood why the Protocol

referred only to the Clauses whose execution was not provided for in the Treaty of Peace. In spite of three successive explanations, Herr von Simson professed not to understand. Mr. Berthelot had assured Herr von Simson that the Protocol specified only certain “violations, *among others*,” the Allies did not intend to raise the others.

The question of the Baltic Provinces preoccupied greatly the German Delegates: Herr von Simson had asked him whether, if the evacuation was not completed at the time the Treaty came into force, the Allies would continue the blockade. He had replied that the Allies did consider the question with a broad-minded spirit, and that if they had had recourse to a blockade, that was only because satisfaction had not been obtained. In proportion as the Allies recognized loyal and honest efforts on the part of Germany to expedite the evacuation, the blockade, he thought, would be relaxed.

MR. BERTHELOT asked whether in that statement he had properly interpreted the spirit of the Supreme Council.

(The Council agreed that he had.)

M. BERTHELOT continued that Herr von Simson had discussed the Scapa Flow sinking. M. Dutasta and himself had informed him that they were not qualified to discuss the question, but that a written answer should be made by the Germans. Thereupon Herr von Simson had stated that the attitude of the German Government had been quite correct and that the sinking of the German Fleet was due to a misinterpretation of facts, namely, that Admiral von Reuter had not been notified in due time of the renewal of the Armistice. He had given him to understand that whatever interpretation Admiral von Reuter put upon the incident, the Fleet at Scapa Flow had represented a German asset. That asset had disappeared and the responsibility of the German Government remained undiminished. As Herr von Simson considered that the responsibility of the Allies was involved, he had informed him that the Allies had examined from the technical and political points of view the question of interning the German Fleet in a neutral port; that the experts had explained that such a solution was impossible, as no neutral port had facilities to receive the German Fleet. On the other hand neutral

Governments had been disinclined to have this responsibility placed upon them; no Allied Power had wanted to retain the German Fleet, least of all the British. He had asked whether it was Herr von Simson's wish that he should say to the Supreme Council that the German Government denied responsibility for the Scapa Flow incident. Herr Von Simson refused to commit the German Government to that and said that a written explanation would be forthcoming.

After a brief reference to the submarines destroyed in the North Sea and on the Spanish coast, Herr von Simson had raised the vital question, from the German point of view, of the handing over of guilty individuals. He had stated that it was materially and morally impossible for the German Government to comply with that demand. To that statement Mr. Berthelot had replied that he was not qualified to discuss the execution of the Peace Treaty, but that if his personal opinion were asked for, he would say that the whole question had been examined by the Allies with the greatest care and that they had made every effort to see it from the German point of view. He had asked Herr von Simson whether he admitted that crimes had been perpetrated and that the guilty individuals should be punished. Herr von Simson agreed as far as to say that the guilty parties should be brought to judgment, but only before German tribunals; to which he had replied that the situation in that case would be yet more difficult for the German Government. Herr von Simson claimed that America, while admitting the principle that the guilty individuals should be handed over, did not insist on their being actually delivered up. Mr. Berthelot replied that he did not know the correctness of the statement, but that Herr von Simson certainly ought to realize that populations which had suffered directly from the war could not have the same feeling on that question as those that had not. There were crimes which families could not forget and, speaking to him as man to man, he had asked him whether if the German Government considered its duty in a loyal spirit, it would not find the difficulties less than it had at first believed. The Allies would not be implacable and if they recognized that a sincere effort was being made to hand over the guilty individuals, they might not insist on the extreme fulfilment of this clause; he had asked whether Herr von Simson did not think that there would be found German individuals, courageous

and patriotic enough to surrender themselves voluntarily. Herr von Simson did not think so and Mr. Berthelot had replied that such would not be the case in the Allied countries.

He had finally explained to Herr Von Simson that the Council had fixed the deposit of ratifications for December 1st but this would only be possible if Germany did not create any difficulty. Germany had had the protocol for the last three weeks and if Germany had observations to make she should do so immediately; the German Government should not forget that the execution of the Treaty would mean the repatriation of her prisoners.

The Council expressed thanks to M. Berthelot for his very valuable summary.

4. MR. WHITE stated that the Labor Conference at Washington which had been unofficial up to that time, wished to know, as it intended to adjourn on November 29th, whether the deposit of ratifications was set for December 1st; in that case the Conference would hold over until the 2nd or 3rd of December to pass official resolutions to confirm the work previously covered unofficially. Labor Conference at Washington

M. CAMBON replied that December 1st had been set and that the fact could be officially communicated to the Labor Conference.

5. (The Council had before it a report of the Special Economic Commission (See Appendix "C").) Report of the Special Economic Commission Regarding the Confiscation of Greek Orthodox Property in Hungary

M. Serruys read and commented upon the report. He said the Economic Commission was unanimous but not in agreement with the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee wished to insert in article 232 bis in the Hungarian Treaty the following paragraph, "The Greek Orthodox Communities established at Budapest and other cities of Hungary as well as religious or other foundations are particularly included in the companies and associations referred to in this article." If this paragraph were inserted an ambiguity would

be caused as the word “Orthodox” had a political meaning broader than the religious one, and he did not think that it came within the province of the Economic Commission to decide this point.

M. FROMAGEOT admitted that the argument of the Economic Commission had some weight, but the Drafting Committee did not think an ambiguity existed as the article referred to Allied subjects. He thought it would be sufficient, however in order to prevent any such ambiguity, to add to the paragraph read by M. Serruys the following phrase: “when subjects of Allied or Associated Powers are interested in those Communities or foundations”.

It was decided:

that the third paragraph of article 232 bis of the Hungarian Treaty be modified as follows:

“The Greek Orthodox Communities established at Budapest and other cities of Hungary as well as religious or other foundations are particularly included in the companies and associations referred to in this article, when subjects of Allied or Associated Powers are interested in those Communities or foundations.”
(See Appendix “C”)

6. (The Council had before it the documents covered by Appendix “D”). Draft Answer to the Danish Request Regarding the Liquidation of Property of Schieswigers Residing Abroad

M. Serruys read and commented upon the documents numbered II and III in the Appendix. He the Liquidation of added that in the question concerning liquidation of enemy property there had never been unanimity between the Allied and Associated Powers. Article 297 of the Versailles Treaty spoke explicitly of the power and not of the obligation to liquidate. As a matter of fact England had already liquidated German property, France on the contrary had confined itself to sequestration, and as there had never been a common policy it might well be dangerous to give the impression that a common theory and common arrangements were now obtaining. It was

exactly to avoid that inconvenience that the Economic Commission had proposed a noncommittal text. The Drafting Committee, on the other hand, in the draft it proposed (Number 4) was less noncommittal, and the Economic Commission saw great disadvantage in leaving the impression that a unanimous policy had been agreed upon by the Allies. The first sentence of the second paragraph as drafted by the Drafting Committee was too vague; it would be necessary to specify that the Allies should not undertake new measures of liquidation since at that moment measures were actually being executed in England, which could not be stopped. On the contrary the second sentence of the second paragraph did not go far enough; it anticipated only restitution of the proceeds of liquidation whereas in certain cases it was the liquidated property that would be handed over.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Drafting Committee had considered that matter from a purely practical point of view. As he had explained at a previous meeting of the Supreme Council,⁴ he had been mainly concerned with the difficult situation in which the Schleswigers were placed. Besides, the Drafting Committee's reply was merely a draft letter to the Minister of Denmark, not a legal document.

M. CAMBON said that the Council was not prepared to enter into questions of technical details. It would be well for the experts to come to an agreement and submit the agreed text to the Council at a future meeting.

It was decided:

that the special Economic Commission and the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft letter to be written to the Danish Minister, and that the draft agreed upon be presented to the Council at a future meeting.

7. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee (See Appendix "E"). Report of the Drafting Committee Relative to the Request of the Dutch Government for Permission To Export From Germany Certain War Material for Its colonies

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note. He said it was for the Council to decide whether it should maintain the terms of the Treaty and the legal position already adopted by the Council.

It was decided:

that a letter be sent to the Dutch Minister at Paris advising him that the Supreme Council maintained that no departure could be made from its rule vetoing the export of war materiel from Germany.

8. (The Council had before it the proposed Treaty (See Appendix “F”), the report from the Spitzbergen Commission (See Appendix “G”), and the addition to the draft reply to the Norwegian Minister (See Appendix “H”). M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the report. Draft Treaty Regarding Spitzbergen

(After a short discussion.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the proposed Treaty presented by the Spitzbergen Commission;
- (2) to approve the report of the Spitzbergen Commission, including the annexed letters;
- (3) to accept the addition to the draft reply to the Norwegian Minister, proposed by the Drafting Committee.)

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 21, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-98

Summary of American Position Regarding Eastern Galicia

On June 25th Mr. Lansing introduced into the Council a resolution authorizing the Polish military occupation of Eastern Galicia and the establishment of a civil government “under a mandate from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which shall be conditioned to

preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants”.⁵ His resolution further provided “that the mandate shall be predicated upon the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance, the time for the exercise of such choice to be hereafter fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or by a body to whom they delegate that power”. This proposition was submitted as a compromise between a proposition of Mr. Balfour for the appointment of a high commissioner under the mandate of the League of Nations and the proposition of Baron Sonnino for the unconditional surrender of East Galicia to Poland.

On the objection of Sir Eyre Crowe, to the word “Mandate” this was stricken from Mr. Lansing’s resolution and the word “agreement” substituted. With this exception Mr. Lansing’s resolution was accepted and served as the basis upon which the Polish Commission drafted its report No. 5 embodying a preliminary draft of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland establishing an autonomous Eastern Galicia within the Polish State.⁶ This draft treaty was drawn up on the general principle that a popular consultation should be held at some period to be determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers ten years after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty regarding Eastern Galicia.

Mr. Lansing’s resolution was introduced into the Council and the Polish treaty was largely prepared, at a time when conditions in Eastern Galicia were exceedingly troubled and when civil war between Poles and Ukrainians had hardly ceased.

When the treaty was considered in the Council toward the end of the month of September⁷ the situation was quite altered. According to reports of reliable and thorough observers, Polish occupation had resulted in the complete pacification of the country. The American delegation concluded it would be in the interests of peace and quiet to eliminate certain clauses which emphasized the provisional nature of the settlement while maintaining the rights of the Ruthenians and the principle of an eventual revision of the East Galician settlement in case of need. Therefore on September 25th Mr. Polk submitted for

the consideration of the Council a memorandum suggesting, in addition to certain minor alterations, that the clauses regarding a popular consultation should be replaced by a stipulation placing the treaty under the guarantee of the League of Nations and providing “The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Poland hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification whatsoever of this treaty in whole or in part which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.”⁸

The French, Italian and Japanese delegations accepted the principle of the American proposition but the British delegation, after reference to its Government, submitted a counter proposal providing that Poland should be granted a mandate over Eastern Galicia for a definite term of years—ten to fifteen. The French delegation proposed to modify the British proposition to grant Poland a twenty-five year mandate. The American delegation stated that it would accept the French proposition in case unanimity could be reached on this basis, but that otherwise it would revert to its original position that Poland should be granted an indefinite mandate subject to revision by the Council of the League of Nations at any time the settlement proposed should prove unsatisfactory.

The position of the American delegation has been controlled by the following considerations:

The only practicable solution of the immediate problem of administering Eastern Galicia is to entrust this administration to Poland. In the interests of peace it is necessary to create as solid an administration as possible; any administration that is clearly marked as “temporary” would fail to inspire the confidence and support which is necessary to restore normal conditions in Eastern Galicia and would foster propaganda and intrigue.

It is impossible, however, at the present time to state with accuracy what may be the ideal settlement of the Eastern Galicia problem, and it is therefore necessary to provide for a revision of any settlement in case the situation should demand it, although one cannot indicate

whether such a revision should ever be made, or if it should be made, whether at the end of one, five, fifteen or thirty years.

Therefore the most satisfactory solution is to entrust Eastern Galicia to Poland, with the understanding that no change will be made as long as this status proves satisfactory, but to provide very clearly for an immediate revision if and when the solution proves to be no longer a desirable one.

For this reason, in the opinion of the American Delegation, it should not be within the power of a single nation to prevent such readjustment of the situation at the end of twenty-five years, and, therefore, that a decision on this point should be possible by a majority rather than unanimity of the Council of the League of Nations.

PARIS, November 21, 1919. **Appendix B to HD-98**

Note for the Supreme Council Relative to Measures To Be Taken at Smyrna

According to a resolution of the Supreme Council under date of November 11 [12],⁹ the Commission of Greek Affairs has examined M. Venizelos' note of November 6 [4],¹⁰ to the Supreme Council, relative to censorship, and the despatch of November 3,¹¹ of the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, relative to the powers exercised by M. Sterghiadis and the Greek administration at Smyrna (the only documents submitted to it by the Supreme Council). It also heard General Bunoust and M. Venizelos on these subjects.

It therefore solicits the authorization of the Council to send the following despatch to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople.

PROPOSED TELEGRAM

I refer to your telegram No. 2045.¹¹

The Supreme Council has entrusted the Commission of Greek Claims to make proposals on the measures to be taken to diminish the friction pointed out between the Allied representatives and the Greek Administration at Smyrna.

The Commission, in order to examine the suggestions to be presented to the Supreme Council, is desirous of being accurately informed of concrete facts of every nature which were manifested by these frictions, notably in matters of civil and criminal jurisdiction, of customs, censorship, post and newspapers, port administration, etc.

You are therefore requested to immediately collect, in accord with the Allied High Commissioners, and if need be from information furnished by your representatives at Smyrna, the concrete facts above specified. You will please communicate them to Paris as soon as possible by a telegram drafted in common, indicating the source of information as much as possible.

Appendix C to HD-98

ORTHODOX GREEK COMMUNITIES IN HUNGARY

Draft of Report to the Supreme Council

The Special Commission of the Economic Commission examined the memorandum submitted by the Greek Delegation on October 15th to the Peace Conference, relative to the properties of the Greek Orthodox Community in Hungary.^{[12](#)}

The Committee considers that, as far as the Communities in question are associations in which the Nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers are interested, the measures necessary for the protection of their interests are provided for in the Peace Treaty with Hungary: In this Treaty are comprised, not only the usual provisions concerning the property, rights and interests of the Allied Nationals and of the Societies or Associations in which they are interested, when these properties were submitted to exceptional war measures or to transfer

measures; but still a supplementary disposition in order to frustrate any other acts prejudicial to this property taken from Hungary since the Armistice, and to insure the restitution of the property, as well as the payment of an indemnity and compensation for the damage or prejudice undergone.

However, it appears possible, according to the terms of the Greek memorandum, that the communities in question consist not of Greeks, but of Hungarian Nationals belonging to the orthodox Greek church.

To take measures in order to protect persons who are and remain Hungarian Nationals, would be absolutely contrary to the principles on which were based economic clauses of the Peace Treaty, and the Special Committee sees no reason, in so far as it is concerned, why an exception should be made in this case.

The question as to whether a special provision, relative to the protection of the ethnic or religious minorities should be provided for in the clauses of the Minorities Treaty, is beyond the competency of the Economic Commission.

Appendix D to HD-98

[Documents on a Reply to the Danish Request Regarding the Liquidation of Property of Schleswigers Residing Abroad]

I

FIRST PROJECT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Without renouncing, until the issue of the plebiscite in Schleswig, their right to sequester the property, rights and interests of German Schleswig nationals, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers consider that it is expedient, during this period, to postpone the liquidation of this property. After the result of the plebiscite, they will abstain from exercising their right of sequestration and liquidation in respect to the property, rights and interests of the

inhabitants of Schleswig, who will have definitely ceased to be German nationals.

II

NOTE TO THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 12, 1919.

The special Committee of the Economic Commission examined the text proposed by the Drafting Committee for the reply to the letter of the Minister of Denmark, under date of October 24th, relative to the liquidation and eventual indemnities for liquidation of the property sequestered in the Allied and Associated Countries and belonging to inhabitants of the part of Schleswig submitted to plebiscite.^{[13](#)}

The special Committee of the Economic Commission did not deem it proper to make an agreement so formal as that which had been considered by the Drafting Committee.

In fact, England is carrying out liquidations which the British Delegate declares impossible to be suspended, and, on the other hand, it appeared to the American Delegate that the text proposed by the Drafting Committee contains a formal promise which can only be formulated after a decision of the Congress.

Taking these considerations into account, the special Committee of the Economic Commission has the honor to propose the enclosed text to the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

D. SERRUYS

III

PROJECT, OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION

Without renouncing, until the issue of the plebiscite in Schleswig, their rights concerning the property, rights and interests of German Schleswig nationals, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

consider that it is expedient not to undertake, during the period from the going into force of the Treaty to the issue of the plebiscite, any new liquidations of this property.

On the other hand, it is desirable that, after the result of the plebiscite, the German nationals who will acquire automatically the Danish nationality, be treated with respect to the property, rights and interests in the Allied and Associated Countries, the same as the German nationals who automatically acquire the nationality of an Allied and Associated Power, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty.

Each Allied and Associated Power will consider the necessary measures to that effect, according to its own legislation.

IV

SECOND PROJECT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

1. It is not possible, at the present time, to impose upon Germany special obligations relative to property, rights and interests of Schleswig-Danish inhabitants in Germany;
2. It is not the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to take, until the result of the plebiscite, toward the property rights and interests of Schleswig inhabitants the liquidation measures which the Peace Treaty allows to be taken in respect of property rights and interests of German Nationals. It is not the more their intention, after the result of a plebiscite, to conserve to the prejudice of Schleswig inhabitants definitely becoming Danish, the product of liquidations which will have been effected, or will still be in force at this moment.

Appendix E to HD-98

Note for the Supreme Council Relative to the Request of the Netherlands To Receive War Material From Germany

In a letter under date of July 26 last, the Dutch Government requested information on “the exact interpretation to be given to the

words *war material* in Article 170 of the Peace Treaty.” It expressed the wish to be able to get from Germany naval material for the Dutch fleet.

They were informed on October 8 that Articles 170 and 192 of the Treaty stipulated the prohibition of export from Germany of all military and naval material and in consequence thereof the desire expressed by Holland could not receive satisfaction.

Another letter from the Dutch Minister under date of November 8, without disputing the interpretation of the said Articles, appeals to the Supreme Council requesting as an exception the authorization to import from Germany military and naval material which Holland might need for her colonies.

It is not within the competence of the Drafting Committee to appreciate the reply which it is proper to make to the Dutch Government from a political point of view. However, it takes the liberty of recalling to the Council the refusals already made in like cases to Spain and Denmark and, by right, the necessity that such a derogation, if it were accepted, be previously consented to by all the signatory Powers of the Treaty.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

NOVEMBER 19, 1919.
Appendix F to HD-98

Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen

[Here follows draft printed as appendix C to HD-60, [volume VIII, page 354](#).]

Appendix G to HD-98

PARIS, November 17, 1919.

PEACE CONFERENCE
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
SPITSBERG COMMISSION

To: Secretary General, Peace Conference, Paris.

In compliance with the unanimous wish of the Spitsberg Commission, I have the honor to forward to you herewith:

- 1st. —A corrected copy of the Treaty concerning the Spitsberg Archipelago.¹⁴
- 2nd. —A draft of reply to the Minister of Norway.
- 3d. —A draft of letter to be sent to the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden in Paris.

I should be grateful if you would kindly submit these documents, which were drawn up by the Commission, to the Supreme Council. The Treaty was corrected by the Drafting Committee and in conformity with the remarks presented by Norway.

If the Supreme Council approves the enclosed document, the Commission suggests the following procedure:

- 1st —It would be advisable that the Supreme Council send this answer to the Minister of Norway, accompanied by a definite text of the Treaty with a request that the latter acknowledge receipt as soon as possible.
- 2d. —As soon as the acknowledgment is received it will be necessary to invite the Government of the French Republic.
 - a) —To make known, in a period of six weeks, whether it has the intention of signing the Treaty.
 - b) —To address to the seven other contracting parties, through diplomatic channels the enclosed prepared letter, in order to ask them whether they have the intention of signing the Treaty.

The Commission thinks that His Britannic Majesty's Government will kindly agree to communicate this Treaty to the various

dominions of the British Empire, and to ulteriorly notify the French Government of their replies.

I should be much obliged if you would submit these suggestions to the Supreme Council at one of its next meetings.

Please accept, etc.

The President of the Spitzberg Commission
LAROCHE

II

DRAFT OF REPLY TO THE MINISTER OF NORWAY, TO BE SENT BY THE SUPREME COUNCIL

MR. MINISTER: In your letter of October 22d, you informed me that the Norwegian Government was willing to adhere to the Draft of Treaty to be concluded between the United States of America, the British Empire, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden, to the end of settling the Spitsberg question, including Bears Island, a draft which was adopted by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.

In order to avoid, in future, all misunderstandings, you added that the Norwegian Government deemed it fitting to offer some remarks concerning certain provisions of this Treaty.

I have the honor to inform you that the Supreme Council agrees with the Norwegian Government with respect to the interpretation which is to be given to the provisions referred to.

Concerning the observations presented by your Government, relative to aline 3 of article 3, the Supreme Council considers that it cannot give to the ships of the high contracting parties the right of trading between the ports of continental Norway. This provision only stipulates that the ships coming from and going to the regions referred to by Article 1, will have the right, one way as well as the other, to go into one or several Norwegian ports, in order to embark

or disembark passengers and goods coming from or going to Spitsberg, or for any other purpose.

The Supreme Council also confirms that Article 3, Alinea 4, only provides that the Norwegian Government must not, in the regions referred to in Article 1, grant to the Norwegian Nationals, ships or goods, or to those of another power, more favorable privileges than to the Nationals, ships or goods of the other contracting powers.

The Supreme Council considers as justified the remark made by the Norwegian Government concerning No. 9, Paragraph 1, and No. 11, Paragraph 2, of the Annex, it being understood that the time limit which will be determined for the payment of expenses, to which the transfer of temporary title to definite title is subordinated, will be a reasonable time limit.

So it is with the observation of the Norwegian Government, concerning the word “claimant” in alineas 901 (?) [9 (c) (1) and (3)] and 3 [11], paragraph 2. By “claimant”, the Treaty means the claimant and his predecessors, that is to say, from a juridical point of view, the person from whom the claimant holds his right.

The French text and the English text of the draft of Treaty were slightly modified in order to avoid all misunderstandings with respect to the various points above. On the other hand, the differences which had been noted, were carefully revised, and both texts were made identical. Only the word “headquarters” was maintained to express “siege principal”; this word being singular in English, as you can notice it on Page 84 of the German Treaty, Table 1, No. 11. I have the honor to send to you herewith a corrected copy of it.

I have the honor to inform you that the Supreme Council, making a note of the adhesion of the Norwegian Government of which you were kind enough to notify me, decided to invite the other eight contracting parties, as soon as the acknowledgment of receipt of the definite text inclosed with this letter will have reached it, to make known in a period of six weeks whether they are willing to sign this Treaty.

Please accept, etc.

[III]

DRAFT OF LETTER TO BE SENT BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

To: The Ambassadors of

England
United States
Italy
Japan

To: The Ministers of

Denmark
Netherlands
Sweden
in Paris.

MR. AMBASSADOR or MR. MINISTER: At the request of the Supreme Council, I have the honor to communicate to you the text of the draft of Treaty, relative to the Spitsberg archipelago, including Bears Island, which was adopted by the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The Norwegian Government, to which this draft was communicated, had just given its adhesion to it.

I should be grateful to you if you would kindly submit this text to your Government and ask it whether it is willing to participate in this Treaty as a high contracting party.

In case the Government of England,

United States
Italy
Japan
Denmark

Holland
Sweden

should agree to sign this convention, it is suggested that it inform me of its adhesion before December. ... On this date, in fact, according to the provisions provided by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the high contracting parties will have to designate their plenipotentiaries in order to sign, in Paris, the Treaty concerning Spitsberg. Beyond this date,

Great Britain
The United States
Italy
Japan
Denmark
Netherlands
Sweden

could be admitted to adhere only as a third power, according to the final clauses.

Appendix H to HD-98

Addition to Proposed Reply to Minister of Norway

SPITZBERG

Before the last paragraph add:

“The Norwegian Government calls attention to the fact that for constitutional and parliamentary reasons, it is obliged to submit the Treaty and the Mining Regime simultaneously to the Storting.

“The Supreme Council has no objections to the Norwegian Government submitting the mining regime to the consideration of the Contracting Powers immediately after the signing and before the ratification of the Treaty so that this

mining regime, once accepted by the said Powers, may be presented to the Storting at the same time as the Treaty itself.”

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

NOVEMBER 20, 1919.

¹ Appendix F to HD-97, p. 271 [*Pg. 271 is part of [Doc. 13](#)*].

² Appendix B to HD-90, p. 133 [*Pg. 133 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

³ Appendices B and C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, pp. 863](#)  and [865](#) .

⁴ HD-85, minute 7, and appendix M, pp. 6 [*Pg. 6 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*] and 18 [*Pg. 18 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

⁵ FM-27, minute 1, [vol. IV, p. 848](#) .

⁶ Appendix C to HD-57, [vol. VIII, p. 280](#) .

⁷ HD-57, minute 3, [ibid., p. 270](#) .

⁸ Appendix K to HD-60, [vol. VIII, p. 368](#) .

⁹ HD-90, minute 1, p. 121 [*Pg. 121 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

¹⁰ Appendix C to HD-90, p. 134 [*Pg. 134 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

¹¹ Appendix B to HD-90, p. 133 [*Pg. 133 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

¹¹ Appendix B to HD-90, p. 133 [*Pg. 133 is part of [Doc. 6](#)*].

¹² Appendix B to HD-74, [vol. VIII, p. 740](#) .

¹³ See appendix M to HD-85, p. 18 [*Pg. 18 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

¹⁴ See appendix C to HD-60, [vol. VIII, p. 354](#) .

November 24, 10:30 a.m. (HD-99)

[15] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 24, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 24, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/99

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/99

HD-99

[Document 15]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 24, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 24, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Henry White

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. De Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. Massigli

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General Bliss
Rear Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Colonel Logan
Dr. I. Bowman
Mr. A. W. Dulles
Lieut-Commander L. B. Green, U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Groves
Colonel Percival
Lieut-Col. Kisch
Major McCrindle
Mr. Carr

FRANCE
Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General LeRond
M. Laroche
M. Hermite
M. de Montille

ITALY
General Cavallero
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri
M. Manciola
Commandant Rugiu

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it two letters from Baron von Lersner to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference dated November 21st and 23rd, 1919, (See appendices "A" and "B").) Negotiations With the German Delegates

M. BERTHELOT read the first letter as well as the draft reply prepared by the French Delegation. (See Appendix "C"). He said it was evident that there was no sense in starting a discussion on the return of prisoners of war at a moment when that repatriation was to take place within eight days. Since the draft reply had been prepared they had received the second letter from Baron von Lersner which the Council had before it. The German attitude was all the more inexplicable since in the interview he had had with M. Dutasta and M. Berthelot, Baron von Lersner had asked him for the date of the first meeting of his Delegates with the Allied Commissioners; von Lersner had put a number of questions to him concerning the procedure to be followed and had expressed a desire to receive on Saturday evening the agenda of that meeting. That agenda had been sent him at the appointed hour. The attitude of Germany seemed to be determined by the delay that had occurred in the American ratification of the Treaty as well as by the Lodge motion tending to the restoration of the state of peace between the United States and Germany; Germany evidently hoped that a misunderstanding would arise between the Allies. M. Berthelot felt that it would be important to acquaint Washington with this tendency. The reply they had given on the question of the handing over of guilty individuals might have also an influence on the German decision. Von Lersner had made him understand that if the Entente maintained its demands, no German could wish to hasten by a single day the ratification of a treaty which, according to him, would plunge Germany in chaos.

M. CAMBON asked whether the draft letter which had just been read by M. Berthelot was approved by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it would be advisable to add a few words concerning the departure of the German Commissioners.

M. BERTHELOT agreed. The draft had been prepared before the second letter had been received. A post-script might be added.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it should be stated in that post-script that the departure of the German technical Delegates led one to think that the Berlin Government did not intend to ratify; also that it would be advisable to ask the German Government categorically yes or no, whether it meant to sign the protocol.

M. DE MARTINO said he thought it would be unwise to look as if they had any doubt about the final putting into force of the Treaty.

After further discussion, the text of the post-script was adopted as shown in Appendix “D”.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that it was important that the note should be sent without delay, and further that it should be published for the sake of the moral effect it would produce on German public opinion.

M. BERTHELOT said they could send the letter as soon as the President—who ought to sign it—returned, that was to say, that night.

MR. WHITE thought that it would be wise in that case to delay the publication for 24 hours.

M. CAMBON said the note would then be published the following evening.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the draft reply to the President of the German Delegation, together with the post-script shown in Appendix “D”;
- (2) that said reply be transmitted to Baron von Lersner as soon as possible;
- (3) that it be published on the evening of November 25th, (See Appendices “C” and “D”)

2. (The Council had before it a report dated November 21st, 1919 (See Appendix “E”).) Financial Arrangements in the Plebiscite

Territories and Occupied Territories of Danzig and Memel

GENERAL LE ROND read and commented upon the report of the Commission. He added that with regard to the application of the Treaty, the report had the approval of the legal experts. He would discuss separately, first the question of the Plebiscite Territories, secondly the question of Danzig and Memel.

Plebiscite Territories: the report had made no proposal except so far as concerned the normal administration expenses of the territories, and the supplementary expenses resulting from Inter-Allied government. As far as the military occupation was concerned, the Delegates had been of the opinion that it should be referred to their Governments.

According to the articles of the Treaty, expenses, whether they arose from administration or military occupation, should be in fine a charge on local revenues, present as well as future, but it was already certain that the existing local revenues would be insufficient to cover those expenses; they would, therefore, have to be met by advances, and it was to these that the report referred. Those advances which would properly be a charge on local revenues would have to be reimbursed later by the States to which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would attribute the territories after plebiscite. That point being once settled it remained to determine the sources from which those advances could be drawn. That being the question for immediate solution, and the question of military occupation expenses being reserved, the Commission asked the Council to approve its conclusions numbered 1 and 2.

MR. WHITE said he had no observations to make on points 1 and 2, but he wished on the question of military occupation expenses to read the following note which defined the American point of view. (See Appendix "F").

GENERAL LE ROND said that the American note referred to a question of form. It was quite clear that the expenses of occupation were a charge on local revenues, but those local revenues for the time being, were insufficient. They were burdening the countries where a

plebiscite was to take place with expenses which were beyond their temporary power to bear. Hence the necessity of making advances. The Commission had not dealt with the means of raising those advances so far as the military occupation expenses were concerned but no fundamental doubt on the question was possible.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he agreed with the conclusions of the report and with the note that Mr. White had just read.

M. DE MARTINO said that in a word it came down to obtaining the consent of Germany in the first instance upon the question of repayment of the costs of occupation of Marienwerder and Allenstein for which nothing had been provided in the Treaty.

GENERAL LE ROND said M. De Martino was speaking of the costs of occupation; he had to repeat that there was no possible doubt that the costs of occupation were a charge on the occupied territories and that the only question under discussion was a matter of deciding ways and means; how were they to obtain the necessary funds at the moment.

M. DE MARTINO said that he did not see why a distinction was made between the question of costs of occupation and that of other costs.

GENERAL LE ROND said he would reply to M. De Martino by sheltering himself behind the authority of the legal experts. They had been of the opinion that the Allies did not have the legal right to make the German State, considered as a whole, pay costs which, according to the terms of the Treaty, fell upon local revenues. The Commission as a matter of fact, had not dealt with the question and had been of the opinion that it should be referred to the different Governments.

M. DE MARTINO said that considering the importance of the question, and notwithstanding that the Commission, itself had left it in suspense, he believed it his duty to make a formal reservation on behalf of his Government.

M. MATSUI said the question did not arise for Japan as it did not send troops of occupation, but they agreed with the Commission as far as the interpretation of the Treaty was concerned.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that with regard to the costs of military occupation, it would be well to make a distinction between the question of advances which was referred to the examination of the various Governments concerned, and the question of repayment of those advances, which should be settled by an interpretation of the Treaty. In the case of Upper Silesia there was no doubt that the expenses would be borne by the local revenues in the future as well as the present. In the case of Marienwerder, on the other hand, the repayment of the costs of occupation was not provided for; possibly it was an omission, at any rate it was a point to be defined. In the case of Allenstein the occupation itself was not provided for, and still less the repayment of the costs of occupation.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what was the intention of the Italian Delegate in declaring that the matter had to be defined. Did he mean that a new Treaty had to be concluded with Germany or simply that the Supreme Council had to take a new decision? If he meant a decision of the Supreme Council he (Sir Eyre Crowe) would remark that the Council had already decided that all the costs would be a charge on the interested territories. They had already given their interpretation: what more could be done?

M. BERTHELOT said that in his interview with Herr von Simson he had indicated that that question was precisely of the same type as those which were to be settled between the German delegates and the Allied Commissioners. Herr von Simson had accepted this. He, M. Berthelot, had added that the Council had decided to have Allied troops occupy Marienwerder, and that the costs of occupation should be a charge on the local revenues. Herr von Simson had made no objection to this.

M. CAMBON said that that was a question of application of the Treaty, upon which it was for the Allied Commissioners and the German Delegates to come to an agreement.

GENERAL LE ROND said the solution would be arrived at quite naturally when the Allied and Associated Powers would attribute the territories submitted to a plebiscite. In the Treaties which would then be concluded between the Allies and the States to whom attribution would be made, nothing prevented the stipulation that costs of every kind should be a charge upon those States in exact proportion as the territories in question would be attributed to them.

M. CAMBON stated that the Council agreed on the conclusions numbered 1 and 2, point 3 remaining to be settled between the Governments.

M. DE MARTINO said the question of advances brought up the question of exchange, which was particularly important for the Italians. They proposed that the advance to be effected for troops, no matter to what nation they belonged, should be made in marks. It was not apparent why, in a country where the legal currency was the mark, allowances should be paid with another currency; all the more so inasmuch as the mark was also the legal currency in Poland. The pound sterling might serve as a basis, the rate of exchange being subject to revision on the first of each month. In that case, and to avoid considerable purchases of marks for certain countries, the Allies should agree among themselves so that the necessary amount of marks should be furnished by the Allied States who held the most.

GENERAL LE ROND said M. De Martino's remarks brought up two points: on the first point, the case was quite in accord with M. De Martino. Having been forced to choose a firm basis for the calculation of the rate of the allowances, it had taken the pound; but as a matter of fact, it was the gold dollar, a fixed standard, which should be the basis of calculation. It went without saying that the payments would be made in currency of the country, that was to say, in marks. In the second point, the question of exchange was not in the province of the Commission, but M. De Martino's remark deserved consideration.

MR. WHITE said he would note M. De Martino's proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he agreed with the proposals presented by General Le Rond. They could, for the moment, only take note of M. De Martino's proposal.

GENERAL LE ROND said there remained the question of Danzig and Memel.

As for Danzig, the British Government had already declared it was ready to make the advance of necessary funds to the administrative official who would represent the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. It was clear, as for Memel, that they ought to adopt the same solution as for plebiscite territories, namely, that all the costs of administration and of occupation be a charge on the State to which Memel would be attributed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. WHITE remarked that they had just spoken of a representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at Danzig. Should not the appointment of that official be approved by the Supreme Council?

SIR EYRE CROWE said the Supreme Council had already approved the nomination.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the conclusions of the report on the financial regime of the plebiscite territories and occupied territories of Danzig and Memel;
 - (2) that the costs of normal administration of said territories, as well as supplementary costs of administration resulting from the Inter-Allied government, should be ultimately placed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers upon the States to whom those territories would be attributed by Treaty. (See Appendix "E").
3. (The Council had before it a note of the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty of Peace, dated November 15th, (See Appendix "G").

GENERAL LE ROND read and commented upon the note of the Sub-Commission. He added that the Italian Delegation had just

communicated to him a proposal tending to modify the disposition of the scales of allowances, so as to distinguish in the allowances of presidents and commissioners, what was the representation allowance, properly so-called, the total allowance remaining the same. Allowances to Personnel of Administrative, Government, and Plebiscite Commission

SIR EYRE CROWE said he had had great difficulty in persuading his Government to accept the figures proposed by the Sub-Committee; he really thought them extravagant. He had already found the figures provided for the Delimitation Commissions too high. His Government was surprised that personnel could not be found at lower salaries. He would, however, as a compromise, and so as to hasten the entry into force of the Treaty, accept the proposed figures.

M. BERTHELOT said that those figures seemed high because it was forgotten that, while military personnel had their pay in addition, civil officials had not. They had, on the other hand, taken as basis for calculation of the allowances the amount allotted by the British Government to its High Commissioner on the Rhineland High Commission.

GENERAL LE BOND said that salaries, properly so-called, would remain for the Governments to bear, but only in the event that the latter thought they should be paid. It should not be forgotten that a certain number of officials employed as members of Commissions did not have any Government salary.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he thought it had been decided that it was only the allowances according to function that were to be a charge upon the occupied territories.^{[1](#)}

GENERAL LE BOND said that the decision had been that the local revenues should pay the allowances fixed, and that, if he might say so, they need not take salaries into account, the government appointing any particular official being free to pay him if it so desired.

M. BERTHELOT said that the case of military officials—a special one—should be placed on one side. On the other hand, the principle might be advanced that all officials be paid exclusively by the territory, the administration of which they belonged to. Officials who came for a country's welfare should be paid from the resources of that country. The case was similar to that of “counsellors” whom certain oriental or Far Eastern powers asked western nations to send them.

GENERAL LE BOND said the rate of allowances had been fixed in uniform fashion for all officials of a similar category, no matter what their salary might be in their own country.

MR. WHITE said he had not had time to discuss the question with his experts and must for the time being reserve his decision.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the explanation furnished by M. Berthelot and by General Le Rond changed the aspect of the question: it would obviously be much easier for his Government to accept that proposal which came nearer the point of view it had always supported. It was, then, understood that the rate of payment being thus reckoned, the Council considered that officials who received these payments should have no further claim.

M. DE MARTINO said he wished to know why a distinction had been drawn between allowances provided in the cases of Allenstein and Marienwerder and those provided for in the case of Upper Silesia?

M. BERTHELOT said that a decision had already been given which explained itself through the relative importance of territories to be administered and also through the duties which the officials would have to assume thereby.^{[2](#)}

M. DE MARTINO said it should be borne in mind, however, that the shorter the occupation the heavier relatively would be the expenses that members of the Commissions would have to incur.

GENERAL LE ROND said another consideration should not be neglected, however: an official who would be sent for instance, to Allenstein knew that he was only going there for a few months. In the

case of Upper Silesia, on the contrary, they were quite uncertain, as the occupation might last anything [*anywhere?*] from 8 to 20 months; therefore, to recruit the necessary personnel higher payments would have to be made.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed with General Le Rond: it was certain that a man who left a position for 18 months would have greater difficulty in having it kept for him than the man who only left his position for a few months.

M. DE MARTINO asked whether the question of allowances for troops of occupation could not be settled immediately?

GENERAL WEYGAND said it had seemed to them there was no reason to adopt on that subject a different ruling from that which had been followed for the troops of occupation of the Rhine. Each Government was free to fix for its troops the allowances which it thought advisable.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that the situation of troops which would occupy for instance, Upper Silesia could not be compared to that of French troops on the Rhine. There would be very great practical difficulties. It seemed impossible to the Italian Command not to fix a higher allowance for battalions which would be sent to Allenstein than to troops which occupied the armistice zone. It seemed very difficult to the Italians, for all kinds of reasons, to fix the rate of supplementary allowances to be given without previous agreement with the other General Staffs.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the French Government and the other interested Governments, with the exception of the Italian, had been of the opinion that it was for each of them to settle the rate which it thought advisable. They had not wished to fix a uniform rate. He felt no hesitation in saying that the French troops sent into Upper Silesia would receive slightly higher allowances than the troops on the Rhine.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question had already been the subject of discussion in the Supreme Council a long time before: but had not

then been settled.^{[3](#)}

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that uniform allowances had been agreed upon for personnel of Commissions of Control, no matter what the army of origin. If, however, in zones of occupation the allowances varied according to the army a very disagreeable situation might arise for soldiers in receipt of the lower allowances. The line officers who would receive a much smaller amount than officers, members of a Commission, would find themselves in a painful situation. They might at least agree to fix tables roughly analogous.

GENERAL WEYGAND said the case of isolated officers or non-commissioned officers could not be compared to that of commissioned or noncommissioned officers living with their formations. The latter had every kind of facility which isolated officers could not find. On the other hand officers of each nationality would live, each one in the sector allotted to his troops; there would be, therefore, no occasion for officers of the different armies to compare their respective positions. Had it not for that matter been thus all through the war?

GENERAL CAVALLERO said they were not at war any longer and the situation was a rather different one. He wished to point out that officers would probably sit on Commissions, whose situation would be clearly more attractive than that of their comrades of the line although their position might not be much more important.

M. CAMBON thought it would be better to leave each Government its freedom in the matter.

It was decided:

to approve the report of the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty, dated November 15th, concerning the rate of monthly allowances to the personnel of Plebiscite Commissions, with the reservation that the American Delegation communicate at the next meeting whether it accepted the proposals of the report. (See Appendix "G").

4. SIR EYRE CROWE said Sir George Clerk had telegraphed that he was on the point of leaving Budapest, having fulfilled his mission. Should the Council wish him to remain or have some communication to make to him, it should do so without delay. Sir George Clerk's Mission

M. BERTHELOT said Sir George Clerk gave the Council the assurance that Mr. Huszar was not Friedrich's strawman. Sir George Clerk had succeeded fully in his mission. It seemed that the Council could allow him to return. Sir Eyre Crowe might wire him that the Council was not opposed to his return and would be glad to hear his report.

5. (The Council had before it a letter from the Polish Delegation dated November 17th, 1919 (See Appendix "H") and a letter from the same Delegation dated November 19, 1919 (See Appendix "I").) Negotiations Between the Polish Government and (a) the City of Dantzig, (b) the German Government

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the letters. He added that it would be advantageous to be able to follow the negotiations in Paris itself.

SIR EYRE CROWE said the question was not exactly the same for the negotiations between Poland and the German Governments and between Poland and Dantzig. In the former case there was no difficulty in transferring the negotiations to Paris. In the latter, on the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the local factor played an important part. The Treaty to be concluded would go into all sorts of detail concerning the port, docks, customs, railroads, etc. Would it be wise to transfer to Paris the seat of these negotiations when an account had to be taken of local conditions? The representative of the Allies at Dantzig had a part to play in the negotiations: was it wise to eliminate him?

M. LAROCHE said the Polish Commission had quite definitely thought that because of local passions it would be wiser to withdraw the negotiations from the atmosphere of Dantzig just as it would be to withdraw them from Warsaw. That transfer would not prevent the representative of the Allies at Dantzig from intervening: his advice

would be asked for. Indeed in matters of technical details it would be easy to detach to the spot a sub-commission. To take into account the objection formulated by Sir Eyre Crowe, they might decide in principle that the negotiations would take place in Paris although the details should be settled on the spot.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he of course agreed that the decision should be taken at Paris but he considered it difficult to divide the negotiations into two classes. He would rather propose that Dantzig be made the seat of negotiations, it being understood that the scheme worked out at Dantzig be subject to revision in Paris.

M. BERTHELOT said the Council could adopt a formula of that kind.

M. CAMBON suggested that they could say—and in that way indicate that the Allied Representative at Dantzig had to take part in the matter—that the preliminary investigations should take place at Dantzig, that they would be carried out on the spot and that they would be transmitted to Paris for final decision by the Allied Representative who would submit the report.

MR. WHITE asked whether originally it had not been decided that the negotiations take place in Warsaw, the question interesting Poland in the first place.

M. LAROCHE said the Japanese Delegation had been opposed to that proposal as it did not have a representative at Warsaw who could follow the negotiations.

M. DE MARTINO said his instructions gave him authority to approve the transfer to Paris of all the negotiations in progress, whether in Berlin or Warsaw, between Germany and Poland. He asked whether the negotiations relative to Dantzig fell within that category.

M. CAMBON thought not.

MR. WHITE asked how the Commission would be composed, and why it could not meet at Warsaw.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that it was because Dantzig was the object of the negotiations; the Commission would include representatives of the free city and Poles.

M. LAROCHE said it was understood, then, that the scheme prepared at Dantzig could be modified in Paris. All the questions would be studied anew in Paris under the auspices of the Great Powers and with the cooperation of the delegates of Dantzig and of Poles.

MR. WHITE said he agreed on the principle, but he wished to read over the text of the resolution once it had been drafted.

It was decided:

- (1) that the negotiations between the Polish Government and the German Government take place in Paris;
 - (2) that the negotiations between the Polish Government and the Free City of Dantzig take place in Paris, with the cooperation and under the direction of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers;
 - (3) that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preliminary discussions, at which the Allied representative in the Free City of Dantzig is to be a party, should take place at Dantzig. That representative should send to Paris, with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzig, and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in paragraph 2.
- (The Council reserves to itself the final approval of the present resolution until a further examination.)

6. (The Council had before it a draft note dated November 24th, 1919 (See Appendix "J") Note to the German Government Concerning the Sale of German Aeronautical Matériel

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note to the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany for

transmission to the German Government, once the Peace Treaty came into force (See Appendix “J”)

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the appointment of a Sub-Committee charged with the improvement of circulation of rolling stock in the ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire. (See Appendix “K”). Sub-Committee of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission Charged With the Improvement of Circulation of Rolling Stock in Ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire

M. DE MARTINO said he accepted the draft recommendation of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, but wished to make the following declaration: It was well understood that the Sub-Committee would only function until a decision had been taken on the distribution of rolling stock between the several States inheriting territory of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire, in accordance with Article 318 of the Treaty of Saint Germain. That was in order to avoid possible confusion of competence.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he was surprised that the question had come up again. The Council had given the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission full powers to act in the event of its sub-commission on Hungarian [*Austrian?*] affairs being unanimous.⁴ M. Loucheur had told them that only questions of detail remained to be settled. He therefore could not understand, and thought the Council had grounds for being surprised that the matter was submitted to them a second time, considering the extreme gravity of the situation in Austria.

M. MASSIGLI pointed out that the terms of the decision adopted on November 20th, were unambiguous; in the case of unanimity the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission was to have acted without referring the subject anew to the Supreme Council.

(The Council took note of the declaration made by M. De Martino on the subject of the duration of that Sub-Committee’s activities.)

It was decided:

to approve the terms of the draft note of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission concerning the appointment of a Sub-Committee on rolling stock in the Ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire, an appointment which the Council considered as decided in its resolution of November 20th. (See Appendix “K”).

8. (The Council had before it the note of the British Delegation dated November 22nd (See Appendix “L”). German Soldiers in the Schlesvig Plebiscite Area

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to refer to the Drafting Committee for examination and immediate report the note of the British Delegation on demobilization by German authorities of a great number of soldiers in the Schlesvig plebiscite area. (See Appendix “L”).

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 24, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-99**

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

PARIS, November 21, 1919.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: M. Dutasta, Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

Your Excellency having been unable to receive me today, I do not wish to fail to communicate to you in writing the reason for my call.

Yesterday's conversation convinced M. Von Simson, Director at the Ministry, that before any future discussion on the coming into force of the Treaty, he should present an oral report to the German

Government, all the more so that, for the conventions to be concluded, the approval of the German National Assembly is necessary. Mr. Von Simson will therefore leave tomorrow evening for Berlin.

Furthermore, I feel obliged to inform Your Excellency that I protest most energetically against the fact of again associating the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and interned German civilians with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. The declaration of the Allied and Associated Governments separated this question from that of the coming into force of the Treaty. Should this promise now become valueless the promise of the French Government which is now given us again for consideration would meet with no confidence in the public opinion of Germany.

In closing may I not call to your attention the enclosed article published in the *Presse de Paris* of this date,⁵ on the question of the handing over of the accused.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

[*Extract From*] HD-41^{5a}

AUGUST 28, 1919.

RESOLUTION

The Declaration drafted by Mr. Balfour was accepted for transmission and publication. (The declaration follows):

“In order to diminish as rapidly as possible the sufferings caused by the war, the Allied and Associated Powers have determined to anticipate the date of ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, so far as the repatriation of German prisoners is concerned. The process of repatriation will begin immediately, and it will be conducted under the auspices of an

Inter-Allied Commission, to which will be added a German representative as soon as the Treaty comes into force.

“The Allied and Associated Powers desire to make it quite clear that the continuance of this benevolent policy, from which German soldiers will so greatly benefit, must depend on the fulfilment by the German Government and people of all their obligations.”

Appendix B to HD-99

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION No. 447

PARIS, November 23, 1919.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to request that your Excellency kindly postpone the session announced in the letter of the 22nd instant until the return of the Director of the Ministry, von Simson, and the experts accompanying him.

Kindly accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix C to HD-99

PEACE CONFERENCE
THE PRESIDENT

PARIS, November 22, 1919.

From: President of the Peace Conference.

To: Baron von Lersner, President of the German Peace Delegation.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 21st,⁶ which informs me of the departure of Mr. von

Simson for Berlin, to confer with the German Government regarding the conditions of the entry into force of the Treaty and, moreover, informing me of the necessity of the approval of the Conventions to be made by the German National Assembly.

This information leads to question whether the signature of the protocol of ratification of the Treaty (for which the Allied and Associated Governments arranged to be ready on December 1) can take place on this date, and this through the fault of the German Government, which has since November 1 been in possession of the Note of the Allies and of the accompanying protocol.⁷

This delay in the ratification of the Treaty would be the more regrettable as it might arouse doubts concerning the sincerity of Germany's intentions with regard to the execution of the agreements arising from the Armistice, and those contained in the Peace Treaty. Still, it would seem to be in the general interest and, primarily, in the interest of the German people, to ensure that the prompt going into effect of the Treaty bring about Peace and make possible the reconstitution which would thereby ensue to the entire world.

The signature of the protocol of ratification determines in particular the date of the return of the prisoners of war to Germany. On this subject I feel bound to reply to the inaccurate statement, reiterated in your letter of yesterday, that a promise had been made and not fulfilled by the French Government. The truth is quite different: On August 28th, the Supreme Council accepted a draft resolution concerning prisoners of war, to the effect of anticipating the date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty with regard to the repatriation of prisoners and the immediate beginning of the repatriation.⁸ This resolution was at once executed, and the repatriation of prisoners of war began. Thus the prisoners made by the British, American and Belgian Armies were returned to Germany, in full accord with the French Government. But the decision added that the continuation of this benevolent policy would depend upon the fulfillment by the German Government and people of all the obligations which are incumbent upon them. The date of the notification of the Allied and Associated Powers proved the patience of the Allies in waiting for the execution of the German agreements, as well as Germany's violations

of them on a number of very important points. The consequence of this could only be the discontinuance of the repatriation and the decision to strictly adhere to the clauses of the Peace Treaty, which make the return of the prisoners of war contingent upon the going into force of the Treaty.

The final ratification in eight days and the return of the prisoners to their homes depend on the German Government. It is only necessary that the Allied and German Commissioners agree on the practical conditions of the execution of the clauses concerning Eastern territories, and that the protocol, annexed to the notification of November 1st and providing for the integral execution of the clauses of the Armistice, and for the penalties for violations, be signed without any new questions being raised.

Please accept, etc.

Appendix D to HD-99

[Postscript to the Letter From the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau) to the President of the German Delegation (von Lersner)]

P. S. NOVEMBER 24, 1919.

Since the drafting of the present letter—the sending of which was only delayed by the absence of the President of the Peace Conference—a new fact was brought to the attention of the Supreme Council by your letter of November 23rd—the departure of the German experts, with Mr. von Simson, who arrived three days before to settle with the Allied Commissions the questions raised by the execution of the Treaty, and concerning the operations of the Plebiscite, Government and Delimitation Commissions.

The Supreme Council was extremely surprised by the departure of the German Delegates, which can only be interpreted as the proof of the determination of Germany to hinder again the preliminary agreements, indispensable for the final exchange of ratifications of

the Peace Treaty. This fact raises very regrettable doubts as to the intentions of the German Government.

The Supreme Council desires to be definitely informed on the subject in the shortest time possible, and holds the German Government fully responsible for the delay caused by it in the re-establishment of a state of Peace.

Appendix E to HD-99

Report to the Supreme Council on the Financial Regime of the Territories Submitted to Plebiscite and the Occupation of Dantzig and Memel

The Commission meeting in compliance with the resolution of the Supreme Council under date of November 19⁹ (10?) [sic] has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the following proposals:

I.—UPPER SILESIA

The only receipts at the disposal of the Inter-Allied Commission of Upper-Silesia, by virtue of the Treaty (Article 88) are those arising from local revenues. These receipts must provide for the following expenses:

- 1) Normal administration expenses of the territory;
- 2) Additional administration expenses resulting from the execution of the Treaty (Inter-Allied Government);
- 3) Costs of military occupation.

In the same measure that the present revenues from the territory will be insufficient to cover these expenses, future revenues will have to be anticipated, that is to say, advances pledged on the future receipts of Upper-Silesia must be obtained. In this way Upper-Silesia after the plebiscite will be burdened with a special debt by which the State or States to which territory is attributed will be held responsible for reimbursement.

As to the temporary burden of these advances, they should be divided according to the purpose for which they will be applied.

1st) Normal administration expenses of the territory.

The German Government, during the course of negotiations to be opened, will be asked to agree to supply the public banks of the territory as necessary to meet the normal administration expenses.

2nd) Additional administration expenses resulting from the Inter-Allied Government.

As regards additional administration expenses resulting from the execution of the Treaty, it seems natural that the Polish Government should be invited to make the necessary advances, the regime instituted having based on her claims on Upper-Silesia [sic].

3rd) Military occupation expenses.

Finally, for the military occupation expenses, it seems inevitable that the advance be made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Two methods of execution may be considered:

- a) Each State participating in the occupation will advance the necessary sum for the upkeep of its own troops.
- b) The occupation expenses of the various territories to be submitted to a plebiscite will be charged to a common account, the total to be distributed among the various States participating in these occupations.

Proposals 1 and 2 have been unanimously approved.

On the third point, the delegates think it advisable to refer the matter to their Government.

II.—ALLENSTEIN AND MARIENWERDER

As regards normal administration expenses, the solution proposed for Upper-Silesia should also be applied, it would seem, to the

territories of Allenstein and Marienwerder: the German Government should advance these expenses in case local revenues are insufficient.

The same solution, contrary to that proposed for Upper-Silesia, might be extended to the additional administration expenses due to the existence of a government Commission. This extension is justified in regard to Allenstein by the explicit provision of Article 95 which makes Eastern Prussia responsible for these expenses in case local revenues are insufficient; similarly, it can be proposed for Marienwerder.

For the occupation expenses, there is no reason to consider a solution different from that which will be taken for Upper-Silesia.

These proposals relative to the Allenstein and Marienwerder Commissions have been unanimously approved.

III.—DANTZIG AND MEMEL

The British Government accepts to advance upkeep expenses of the administrative official representing the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at Dantzig.

As to the occupation expenses of Dantzig and Memel, it would appear that the question should be solved in the same way as for the various territories above mentioned.

These proposals relative to Dantzig and Memel were unanimously approved.

Appendix F to HD-99

HOTEL DE CRILLON, November 24, 1919.

[Statement of the Position of the United States Government on the Question of Military Occupation Expenses]

Without desiring to provoke discussion but in order to leave no room for any misunderstanding, the United States Government desires to

state its position of record as follows:

1. The Annex to Article 88 of the German Treaty of Peace provides that “the cost of the Army of Occupation” in Upper Silesia will be a charge on the area. Other Articles by similar language provide for the payment of the expenses of the armies of occupation in the other occupied districts. In like manner Article 235 of the German Peace Treaty provides that the expenses of the armies of occupation subsequent to the Armistice of November 11, 1918, shall be paid out of the first sums’ received out of reparation.
2. The United States, therefore, has always understood that it is entitled to be reimbursed the exact cost of maintaining all its military forces in German territory or in the several plebiscite districts since November 11, 1918 until finally they are withdrawn.
3. While there have been many conferences on this subject and while the matter has been previously discussed in the Supreme Council, no representative of the United States Government has ever agreed to nor has had any authority whatever to agree to any other position or view.
4. If it be considered that the cost of the United States forces in any of the occupied territory or plebiscite districts, 3,000 miles from their base, is greater or will be greater than is desirable, nevertheless, it will be recalled that the Associated Powers have repeatedly requested the United States Government to consent to their use for this purpose. If the Associated Powers deem it to their interest to reduce the cost of the Armies of Occupation, it would appear to be preferable to request the United States Government to decrease its military representation rather than to resort to financial expedients the legality of which might well be questioned.

NOTE: Copies of this statement have been forwarded to the Commanding General of the American Forces in Germany, to the American Delegate, to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission and to the United States Secretaries of War, of the Treasury and of State.

Appendix G to HD—99

PARIS, November 15, 1919.

PEACE CONFERENCE
SUB-COMMITTEE OF EXECUTION

Note to the Supreme Council

Pursuant to its note of October 21,¹⁰ adopted by the Supreme Council on October 24 [23],¹¹ the Sub-Committee of Execution has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the rate of allowances for plebiscite commissions established after consultation with the representatives of these commissions.

I—MONTHLY ALLOWANCES

In the establishment of the rate of the proposed monthly allowances, the following elements were taken into consideration:

- 1st) Cost of living in the territories in question due to the local price of food-stuffs.
- 2nd) Necessity of recourse to countries now exporting for supplies, which will be rendered very onerous because of transportation conditions.
- 3rd) Difficulties met by the various Delegations in recruiting officials as well as secondary personnel because of the uncertainty of the present situation (unsatisfactory living conditions, uncertainty of the duration of the journey, relative insecurity, in a certain measure).
- 4th) Representative nature of Commission, especially as regards the President and the Commissioners.

These various considerations apply to all Commissions. They have a special significance for the Commission for Upper Silesia: to be noted especially the indefinite duration of sojourn which may vary from eight to twenty months and the fact that the supplying of Upper Silesia can be effected only across Germany and it requires the crossing of the entire German territory.

The resolution taken by the Supreme Council provides that the allowance clauses to be established by the Sub-Committee of

execution will vary according to the importance and the expenses of each commission.

The Sub-Committee considered that it was advisable to establish two categories:

a) One for the Commission of Administration and Plebiscite in Allenstein and Marienwerder whose task is the same and the duration of which must be similar.

It proposes to include the Teschen Commission because of the conditions of its mission.

b) The other for the Government and Plebiscite Commission in Upper-Silesia.

II—SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE PURCHASE OF WINTER CLOTHING

The Sub-Committee proposes that a special allowance for the purchase of winter clothing be allotted to all of the personnel of the Commission.

The rate proposed is the same for all Commissions.

1st) Monthly operating allowances in pounds sterling proposed for the various Commissions.

A)—Administration and plebiscite Commissions of Allenstein, Marienwerder and the Plebiscite Commission of Teschen.

President	350
Commissioners	250
Officials	{ 1st Class 160
	{ 2nd Class 120
	{ 3rd Class 100
Employees	{ 1st Class 60
	{ 2nd Class 45
	{ 3rd Class 30

B)—Commission of Government of and Plebiscite in Upper Silesia.

President

Commissioners

Officials	{	1st Class	200
		2nd Class	150
		3rd Class	120

Employees	{	1st Class	60
		2nd Class	45
		3rd Class	30

2nd) Allowances for the purchase of winter clothing for all Commissions.

Commissioners	}	80
Officials		
Employees		50

Appendix H to HD-99

POLISH DELEGATION
TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, November 17, 1919.

To: President Clemenceau.

Considering that, according to Article 104 of the Peace Treaty, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed to negotiate the conventions between Poland and the free city of Dantzig, the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference has the honor to request the Supreme Council to kindly designate Paris as the seat of these negotiations and to commence same with the least practicable delay.

Accept, etc.

A. PATEK
L. GRABSKI

Appendix I to HD-99

GERMAN [POLISH] DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, November 19, 1919.

From: MM. Patek and Grabski.

To: M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference.

The Supreme Council has requested the Polish Government, through the French Minister at Warsaw, to send to Paris technical representatives to take part in the negotiations concerning questions relating on the carrying out of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Polish technical representatives, provided with the necessary powers, recently arrived at Paris.

During the negotiations which have been going on in Berlin for some time between the representatives of Poland and Germany and of which the missions of the Principal Powers have been kept constantly informed, questions of supplies and carrying out of the Treaty, and also, among others, problems mentioned in the invitation were discussed.

With a view to the early opening of negotiations at Paris, the Polish Delegation takes the liberty to express the opinion that these negotiations should include not only questions proposed by the Supreme Council, but in general all problems relevant to the carrying out of the Treaty of Versailles by Poland and Germany.

The Delegation hopes that this opinion will be shared by the Supreme Council and that the negotiations which will soon begin will be carried on in conformity with this opinion.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Draft of a Note to the President of the Interallied Aeronautic Control Commission (C. A. I. C.) in Germany, for Transmission to the German Government Upon the Going Into Force of the Peace Treaty

No reply has been made to the German Note, Wako 3639, of October 12,^{11a} because such a reply would only have been a repetition of Marshal Foch's four telegrams under date of August 2 [7],¹² August 26,¹³ September 30,¹⁴ and October 18, communicated to the German Government.

All these telegrams having remained without results, General Masterman, President of the C. A. I. C, was requested to present to the German authorities the note of November, 1919,^{14a} again calling the attention of the German Government to the character of the measures taken or tolerated by it tending to have Germany avoid her obligations and jeopardizing the loyal execution of the Peace Treaty.

Therefore, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers wish to call the attention of the German Government to the lack of foundation for the objections which it had formulated against the just demands addressed to it.

As regards the objections raised in the 2nd alinea of Par. 2, according to which "Article 169 provides the surrender of material to be destroyed or rendered useless", the Principal Allied and Associated Powers consider this objection as irrelevant as aeronautical material is the particular subject of Article 202 (Section II, Air Clauses), the application of which would not be jeopardized by Article 169 which precedes it. The German Government is aware that by the terms of the said Article 202 all German air material which cannot be moved without special authorization of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, must be purely and simply delivered to the said Powers in such places as will be selected by the C. A. I. C.

Par. 3 of the German Note is not any better founded. The viewpoint of Principal Allied and Associated Powers as regards the non-military nature of certain airplanes has been repeatedly explained to the

German Government and the allegation that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would not allow the existence of nonmilitary planes is so little justified that on the contrary they have entrusted the C. A. I. C. with determining the military or non-military nature of these planes in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty.

As to the other objections raised by the German Government in the note above referred to, their discussion would appear to have no further interest after the coming into force of the Treaty.

As a result of the preceding remarks, and in conformity with the Treaty as well as the protocol under date of November, 1919, the C. A. I. C. is entrusted with requesting the German Government to take immediately the following measures of which they have been already notified:

- 1st) To furnish the C. A. I. C. a list of all aeronautical material sold or exported:
- 2nd) To deliver to the C. A. I. C. at such places as it may select all aircraft and aeronautical material captured by the German forces from the Allied and Associated Powers. Among this material the 500 motors especially referred to in Marshal Foch's telegram under date of August 7 must be immediately delivered at
- 3rd) To deposit at the places selected by the C. A. I. C. all aeronautical material in Germany (including material removed, loaned, utilized or sold), material which will later be recognized as civil by the C. A. I. C. will be released.
- 4th) To deposit with the C. A. I. C. before January 31, 1920, and according to the value of all aeronautical material the delivery of which has been made impossible by Germany.

NOVEMBER 24, 1919. **Appendix K to HD-99**

PEACE CONFERENCE
ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE OF
THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION

Secretariat

C. R. 412

From: M. Loucheur, President of the Organization Committee, of the Separations Commission.

To: The President of the Peace Conference, Paris.

I have the honor to transmit to you herewith a note from the organization committee of the Separations Commission to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, asking for the creation of a sub-commission, charged with improving the circulation of rolling stock on the railway lines of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Please accept, etc.

[Enclosure] [No signature on file copy]

Draft of Note From the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission

To: The Supreme Council.

**ON THE CREATION OF A SUB-COMMISSION CHARGED WITH THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE CIRCULATION OF ROLLING STOCK ON THE
RAILWAY LINES OF THE FORMER AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE**

Whereas, one of the principal causes of the serious difficulties which are disturbing the economic life of the states of central Europe is the tendency which is sometimes manifested to withhold the railway cars which are on their territory, or enter it.

Whereas, there is at the present time no organization with sufficient authority to insure the indispensable circulation of the rolling stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Whereas, it would be advisable to create to that effect, a Commission which, besides, would be entirely separate from the Commission of

Experts which is charged with the distribution of the Austro-Hungarian rolling stock, under the Presidency of Sir Francis Dent; and, whereas, nevertheless, Sir Francis Dent seems to be qualified to be also the President of this new Commission.

Whereas, on the other hand there is already in Vienna a sub-commission of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, which was created in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Council,¹⁵ to study and propose the necessary measures to improve the revictualling of Austria; the organization committee of the Reparations Commission proposes to the Supreme Council the following decision:

1st. —For the above mentioned purposes, a sub-commission will be instituted in Vienna in the shortest time possible, charged with insuring and regulating the circulation of rolling stock on all of the railway systems which were comprised within the frontiers of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

2nd. —This sub-commission will be subordinated to the Vienna sub-commission of the organization committee of the Reparations Commission.

3rd. —The Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Rumania, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Czecho-Slovak Republic, Austria and Hungary, will be invited by the Supreme Council to send representatives to this sub-commission.

The invitation to Hungary might be made through the intermediary of Sir George Clerk.

4th. —This sub-commission will have to:

- a) Propose to the organization committee of the Separations Commission the suppression of all other Inter-Allied organizations and commissions, whose powers are apt to duplicate those of the new commission.
- b) Organize the control of the rolling stock, at the present frontiers of the various interested States.
- c) Assure the normal exchange and return of railway coaches and locomotives; with the right of eventually making remonstrances on this subject to all the states which are withholding some.

- d) Study and recommend all provisions intended to hasten the transports between the various interested regions, especially with a view to improving the revictualling.
- e) Propose all proper measures for the representation of the interests of Eastern Galicia.

Appendix L to HD-99

Note by the British Delegation

Information has been received from Copenhagen showing that the German authorities intend to demobilize some of their military and naval forces at Flensburg and to provide them with civilian occupations within the plebiscite area.

In the view of His Britannic Majesty's Government it would be desirable to inform the German Government at once that this proceeding will not be allowed.

¹ See HD-32, minute 10, [vol. VII, p. 706](#); HD-58, minute 3, [vol. VIII, p. 305](#); and HD-75, minute 2, [ibid., p. 747](#).

² HD-75, minute 2, and appendix B, [vol. VIII, pp. 747](#) and [755](#).

³ HD-58, minute 3, [ibid., p. 305](#).

⁴ Meeting of November 20, HD-97, minute 3, p. 238 [*Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 13*].

⁵ Does not accompany the minutes in Department's files.

^{5a} Minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 957](#).

⁶ Appendix A, p. 315 [*Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 15*].

⁷ Appendices B and C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, pp. 863](#) and [865](#).

⁸ HD-41, minute 2, [vol. VII, p. 957](#); the text of the resolution is also attached to appendix A, *ante*, p. 315 [*Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 15*].

⁹ HD-96, minute 5, p. 225 [*Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 12*].

¹⁰ Appendix B to HD-75, [vol. VIII, p. 755](#).

¹¹ HD-75, minute 2, [ibid., p. 747](#).

^{11a} [Vol. VIII, p. 816](#).

¹² This telegram transmitted the text of the proposals accepted by the Supreme Council on August 6, HD–25, minute 14, [vol. VII, p. 563](#) .

¹³ For text, see appendix C to HD–37, [ibid., p. 823](#) .

¹⁴ This note transmitted the text of the decision of the Supreme Council of September 29, HD–63, minute 2, [vol. VIII, p. 430](#) .

^{14a} Appendix H to HD–94, p. 209 [*Pg. 209 is part of [Doc. 10](#)*].

¹⁵ HD–66, minute 3, [vol. VIII, p. 508](#) .

November 25, 10:30 a.m. (HD-100)

[16] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 25, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 25, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/100

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/100

HD-100

[Document 16]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 25, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 25, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Henry White

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Capt. G. A. Gordon
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. G. Lothian Small
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	M. Zanchi
<i>Interpreter</i> —M. Mantoux	

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. A. W. Dulles
Capt. H. Pierce

BRITISH EMPIRE
Lt.-Colonel Kisch
Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. E. H. Carr

FRANCE
Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General Le Rond
M. Hermite
M. Kammerer

ITALY
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. MARSHAL FOCH informed the Council that he had received a telegram from General Niessel, dated November 23rd (See Appendix "A"). According to this telegram the Germans were carrying out their evacuation by the Chavli-Tauroggen railroad. The Lithuanians, in spite of instructions received from General Niessel, had crossed that line at several points and attacked the Germans. In order to parry this attack General Niessel had dispatched Allied and German officers and hoped to succeed in checking the Lithuanians. In spite of

this, the German Government had ordered troops to cross the frontier in order to protect the railroad, although they had been told not to send any additional troops to that district. One train had already passed through. General Niessel desired the Council to make strong representations to the German Government. He proposed to send a telegram to General Niessel telling him that he had full power to take whatever measures seemed to him fitting and that any action on the part of the Council seemed calculated only to retard a satisfactory solution. Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if any news had been received from General Niessel regarding an armistice between the Germans and the Letts. He had received a somewhat obscure telegram from the Admiralty, evidently to the effect that there was such an armistice.

GENERAL WEYGAND said he did not think so. The last news received from General Niessel was that he had meant to go to Riga, but felt that his presence was necessary further south, especially as the Letts seemed able to hold their own against the Germans.

It was decided:

to approve the terms of the draft telegram prepared by Marshal Foch to be sent to General Niessel (See Appendix "B").

2. MR. WHITE referred to the resolution adopted by the Council at its previous meeting (See H. D. 99, Minute 3),¹ and announced that he accepted the proposals of the report in question. Allowances to Personnel of Administrative, Government, and Plebiscite Commissions

3. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that the Roumanian answer had not yet actually arrived. General Coanda, who was bringing this answer was on his way to Paris. According to the Roumanian calculation the time within which their answer was to be delivered only expired at noon of that day. Although, according to the idea of the Council that time had expired on Sunday, it seemed expedient to wait until General Coanda arrived, an event which would take place

at any moment. In the meantime, a strong speech from the Roumanian throne had indicated that under no conditions was Roumania willing to permit a rupture between herself and the Allied and Associated Powers. M. Antonescu had confirmed this information. Answer of the Government to the Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers^{[2](#)}

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that a real difficulty existed. He had heard from the British Representative at Bucharest that the Council's note had not been presented by the 22nd of November. The Council in discussing the draft note had changed several words and decided that the Roumanians were to have eight days from the presentation of the note. If then it had not been presented on the 22nd November the time could not be considered to have expired.

M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that he had received a telegram from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest dated November 21st to the effect that the latter had received the first and last parts of the Council's note to the Roumanian Government. An important part was still lacking and was being awaited before the note was presented. M. Misu, however, already knew the substance of the note through General Coanda. The French Chargé d'Affaires had made urgent representations to the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs as to the gravity of the situation, which permitted of no delay, and had told him that the Roumanian Government must declare itself ready to sign the Minorities Treaty unreservedly in consideration always of the assurance given by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in their note of the 12th October that they would examine certain modifications as to form.^{[3](#)} M. Misu had replied to the French Chargé d'Affaires that he would prepare a reply of that tenor and would do his utmost to obtain a favorable consideration of the matter from the King and Council of Ministers.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Council that the Roumanians had been told that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty until they had signed the Austrian Treaty.^{[4](#)}

As they could not sign the Austrian Treaty within the two ensuing days he did not see how they could sign the Bulgarian Treaty on

November 27th.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that a protocol could be signed, as had been the case at the time of signing the Austrian Treaty, giving the Roumanians additional time within which to sign the Bulgarian Treaty. That time might be fixed at a week.

M. DE MARTINO agreed that the Council should take no further action towards Roumania until the Roumanian reply had been received.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that all indications were that the Roumanians were certainly going to sign. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government was prepared to sign the Treaty with Austria as well as the Minorities Treaty and the financial arrangements. The Drafting Committee had prepared a draft agreement of adhesion to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government which would be communicated to all the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Saint Germain. With respect to the Roumanians the situation was different. The Minorities Treaty concerning Roumania had not yet been signed by anybody. Some modifications as to form would be made in this Minorities Treaty in order to meet certain views of the Roumanians. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers therefore could not sign this Treaty until the final terms thereof had been settled after consultation with the Roumanian Representatives.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that the Roumanians must give an unequivocal agreement to sign the Minorities Treaty, taking into consideration the fact that certain modifications in their favor might be made therein.

M. CAMBON suggested that after the receipt of the Roumanian reply the Roumanian Delegation be given a week from Nov. 27 within which to sign the Bulgarian Treaty, and that within that week the Minorities Treaty should be put into final form after conference with the Roumanian representatives; that said Treaty, as well as the Treaty of Saint Germain and the agreements related thereto, be signed by Roumania within that week.

M. BERTHELOT read the draft agreement of adhesion, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government (See Appendix “C”).

It was decided:

- (1) that in connection with the signing of the Treaty with Bulgaria on November 27th a protocol be prepared allowing the interested Powers to sign said Treaty with Bulgaria within one week from November 27th:
- (2) that within one week from November 27th Roumania should sign the Treaty with Austria, the Minorities Treaty, and the financial arrangements.
- (3) to accept the draft agreement of adhesion, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation;
- (4) that the agreement of adhesion when signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation be communicated to all the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Saint Germain.

4. (The Council had before it a note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation regarding the Minorities Treaty (See Appendix “D”).)
Note From the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation Regarding the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities

M. KAMMERER commented upon the note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation and stated that, on the whole, this note was satisfactory. He pointed out that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation had presented its interpretation of the clauses relative to freedom of transit and equitable treatment of commerce, which were involved in Article 51 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, and had stated that in the absence of a contrary reply from the Council it would consider that its interpretation was correct. He thought that the Serbian interpretation was, in fact, correct and he therefore proposed that no reply be sent to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. The question could therefore be considered settled.

It was decided:

that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were in full agreement with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation as to the interpretation of the Minorities Treaty, and that said Treaty be at once presented to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation for signature. (See Appendix “D”).

5. (The Council had before it the Bulgarian reply regarding reciprocal immigration between Greece and Bulgaria, dated November 23rd, (See Appendix “E”).) Reply to the Bulgarian Delegation Regarding the Treaty on Reciprocal Immigration

M. KAMMERER commented upon this note from the Bulgarian Delegation and stated that it was entirely satisfactory. The Bulgarian Delegation has asked for explanations with respect to two points. The Committee on New States agreed with the Bulgarian interpretation of these points. A satisfactory answer consisting of a few lines could be sent to the Bulgarian Delegation. A more serious question was the form of the Treaty. The United States representative had raised some question as to his Government's being able to sign, and the Japanese delegate had thereupon stated that in such an event, his Government might likewise be unable to sign. The Drafting Committee considered that the Treaty between Bulgaria and Greece relative to reciprocal immigration was in no way dependent upon the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. In fact Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Bulgarian Treaty itself, made that point clear. In order to meet the difficulty the Drafting Committee proposed the following solution: the Supreme Council should reach a decision which would be inserted in the preamble of the Greco-Bulgarian Treaty; for technical reasons it was preferable that this decision be dated Thursday, November 27th. The wording of the proposed decision was as follows:

“In view of the provisions of Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers deem it fitting that the reciprocal and voluntary immigration of ethnical, religious and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria should be settled by a convention concluded between these two Powers in the terms decided upon on this date.”

The foregoing solution represented the unanimous opinion of the Committee on New States, with the exception that the Italian representative had made the reservation that M. de Martino would have to give a final opinion on this point.

M. DE MARTINO said that he had already expressed his opinion that for reasons of general interest it was advisable that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign this Treaty. The decisions already taken by the Council relative to affairs in the Balkans seemed to him to have created many opportunities for trouble in the future. As a general thing he felt that those Powers who were directly interested in maintaining peace in the Balkans should participate more actively in Balkan affairs. However, as it was of great importance that the present question be settled without further delay, he was willing to withdraw his reservation on that occasion.

It was decided:

(1) that the Secretary General of the Conference reply to the Bulgarian Delegation that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were in agreement with the Bulgarian interpretation of the Treaty regarding reciprocal immigration between Greece and Bulgaria;

(2) to adopt the following resolution, to be dated as of November 27th, 1919, and to be inserted in the preamble of the Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria regarding reciprocal immigration:

“In view of the provisions of Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers deem it fitting that the reciprocal and voluntary immigration of ethnical, religious and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria should be settled by a convention concluded between these two Powers in the terms decided upon on this date.”

6. (The Council had before it a draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas (See Appendix “F”).) Report of the Drafting Committee on Maintenance

of Demobilized German Soldiers in the Schleswig in the Plebiscite Areas

M. CAMBON read the draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas. (See Appendix "F").

7. M. CAMBON read the resolution adopted by the Council at its preceding meeting (H. D. 99, Minute 5).⁵ The resolution had provided that the Council reserved to itself the final approval thereof until a further examination.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he accepted the text as read.

Mr. WHITE proposed that paragraph 3 of the resolution be modified to read as follows:

“that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preliminary studies by a special technical committee shall be made at This committee shall be composed of representatives of both Poland and Dantzig with the addition of the Allied representative at Dantzig. These technical studies, which may serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for under paragraph 2, shall be forwarded to Paris by this committee not later than one month after the coming into force of the Treaty.”

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what the object was in the change suggested by Mr. White. He wished to know if the word technical was intended to exclude anyone. Resolution Recording the Seat of Negotiations having To Do With the Relationship Between Poland and the Free City of Dantzig

MR. WHITE replied that it was not.

M. CAMBON said that he likewise was unable to understand the proposed change.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if that excluded the preparation of a draft Treaty.

MR. WHITE said that the object of the proposed change was merely to make it clear that only preliminary studies should take place at Dantzig.

MR. DULLES called attention to the fact that preliminary discussions had already taken place at Warsaw. If the resolution provided that preliminary discussions should take place at Dantzig it might imply the removal of the discussions from Warsaw to Dantzig. The Poles and the inhabitants of Dantzig both recognized that technical studies must take place at Dantzig. He also called attention to the fact that in the change proposed by Mr. White a time limit of one month after the coming into force of the Treaty was specified.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that it had been proposed to hold these preliminary discussions at Warsaw. That proposition had been rejected and a request had been made on the previous day that these discussions be transferred to Paris. He had then proposed that the preliminary discussions be held at Dantzig. He further added that the change proposed by the American Delegation contemplated that the Committee engaged in preliminary studies should report direct to the Supreme Council. He felt that this procedure was not correct and that as a matter of form it was the Allied Representative at Dantzig who should address the Supreme Council. He also felt that one month might prove to be too short a time within which to submit the report in question.

MR. DULLES remarked that discussions had already begun. Therefore by the time the Treaty came into force a further delay of one month might well prove sufficient. He quite agreed that the Representative of the Allies could and should address himself directly to the

Supreme Council but he thought that the Committee charged with the preliminary studies should also be able to do so.

M. CAMBON suggested that paragraph 3 be modified to read as follows:

“that prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature and preliminary discussions, to which the Allied Representative in the free city of Dantzig should be a party, take place at Dantzig. Within a maximum delay of two months after the coming into force of the Treaty the said Representative should send to Paris, together with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzig and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in the preceding paragraph.”

MR. WHITE agreed to that modification if it were satisfactory to the Poles.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that under the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany that was a matter for the decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers only.

M. CAMBON said that the Poles were interested in making preliminary studies and in participating in discussions, but they were not entitled to decide finally the question involved.

MR. WHITE wondered what the result would be if the Poles should refuse to accept the plan proposed.

M. CAMBON inquired whether Mr. White really expected such a refusal on their part. He pointed out that the Poles had asked to have the negotiations transferred to Paris, and their request had been granted. All that was necessary was to tell the Poles that it had been decided to grant their request.

M. BERTHELOT observed that certain questions necessarily had to be studied on the spot. He thought however, that the Council could reach a decision on that day and if necessary communicate it to the

Poles. If the Poles had any observations to present, the Council could, he thought, decide on the following day whether or not to take them into account.

MR. WHITE said that Dantzig had been taken away from Germany and made a free city not so much for the good of the inhabitants of Dantzig as for the benefit of the population of Poland.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked Mr. White what action he thought should be taken in case the Poles did not accept the plan proposed. Was it his intention that the Council should yield to the Poles.

MR. WHITE thought that the matter could then be discussed again.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that there was no point in that as the Council alone was charged with the duty of deciding.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that in all probability the Poles would willingly accept this plan.

MR. WHITE felt that he could only accept the resolution proposed after hearing the view of the Poles.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that meant not coming to a decision.

(After some further discussion,

It was decided:

(1) to accept textually the first two paragraphs of the resolution taken at the preceding meeting of the Council (H. D. 99, Minute 5, November 24th, 1919);

(2) that the third paragraph of said resolution be modified to read as follows:

“that prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature and preliminary discussions, to which the Allied Representative in the free city of Dantzig should be a party,

take place at Dantzig. Within a maximum delay of two months after the coming into force of the Treaty the said Representative should send to Paris, together with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzig and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in the preceding paragraph.”

(3) that the entire resolution be communicated on that day to the Polish Delegation, and that if said Delegation had any observations to present the Council would examine them at an early meeting.

8. (The Council had before it a letter dated November 15th from General Tcherbatcheff⁶ regarding Russian war material and supplies left in Roumania (See Appendix “G”).)

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that General Tcherbatcheff’s note alluded to a joint letter of the Ministers Plenipotentiary of France, England, the United States and Italy, dated March 3rd, 1918. As the text of that joint letter was not available he had telegraphed to the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest to obtain the same. He thought it would be well to await the receipt of that joint letter and to examine the same before taking any action on General Tcherbatcheff’s note.

Disposal of Russian War Materiel Left Roumania After
Demobilization of the Russian Army

(This was agreed to)

(The meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 25, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-100**

From: TILSITT
Received 11/23/19—9:00 p.m.

Telegram From General Niessel to Marshal Foch

To the Supreme Council:

In order to assure free evacuation of the German forces, [I?] commanded the establishment of a line of demarkation east of the Tauroggen-Chavli railway. The Lithuanian Government was invited by us to observe this line. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian forces attacked this line in several places on each side of the latter locality.

In order to put a stop to the fights begun, I sent to the spot Allied officers of the Mission, with Colonel Dosse and Admiral Hoppman.

We informed the German Government that we cannot authorize it to transport troops beyond the frontier of East Prussia. However, Noske⁷ decided to send contingents to assure the protection of the railway. The first convoy is already past the frontier. The strength of the contingents to be sent has not been communicated to us. The forces at the disposal of General Eberhardt⁸ were sufficient to guarantee the security of the Tauroggen-Chavli railway. We think that the officers who were sent there will suffice to restore order.

It would be advisable to exercise, without delay, an energetic pressure on the German Government, in order to prevent the arrival of new troops from rendering more difficult the settlement of an already intricate situation.

Appendix B to HD-100

NOVEMBER 25, 1919.

From: M. Foch.

To: General Niessel, President of the Interallied Commissions on Baltic Territories, Tilsitt.

“In accord with the Conference:

I approve all measures taken in order to put a stop to the Lithuanian attacks against the Chavli-Tauroggen railway.

Full authority is given to you by the Conference, to assure the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the Germans, and

consequently, to take in Berlin the action which you might deem proper.

Any intervention of the Conference would only weaken your action, and would run the risk of being too late.”

FOCH

Appendix C to HD–100

Declaration of Adhesion

The undersigned, plenipotentiary Delegates of His Majesty the King of the Serbs-Croats & Slovenes, acting by virtue of their full powers duly recognized as good and valid, declare that His Majesty the King of the S. C. S., adheres, on behalf of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, without condition or reserve:

- 1st) To the Peace Treaty signed at St. Germain-en-Laye by (enumeration of Principal Allied and Associated Powers) and Austria on September 10, 1919, together with protocol and declaration;
- 2nd) To the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the S. C. S. State, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers September 10, 1919;
- 3rd) To the arrangement between (enumeration of Principal Allied and Associated Powers) relative to the Reparations as regards Italy, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919;
- 4th) To the arrangement between (enumeration of Principal Allied and Associated Powers) relative to sharing of expenses for the liberation of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present Declaration of Adhesion and have affixed their seals.

Done at: on the day of, 1919.

Appendix D to HD–100

PARIS, November 23, 1919.
No. 4615

DELEGATION OF THE
KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS & SLOVENES
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

From: M. Pachitch.

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 13th⁹ in which the Supreme Council was good enough to reply point by point to that part of my letter of November 5th¹⁰ containing the observations of the Delegation of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. relative to certain provisions of the Minorities Treaty.

I note with pleasure the replies which the Supreme Council was kind enough to give to points 1, 2 and 4 to 8 of my letter, these replies giving satisfaction in general to the observations of the Delegation contained in the corresponding points. May I not be allowed to call attention to this fact, for it proves that our demands, maintained within a reasonable limit, were inspired by the desire to facilitate the task of the Supreme Council in the establishment of the necessary guarantees for the protection of Minorities in our State.

On the other hand, our Delegation can but express its keen regret that the Supreme Council has not excluded from this obligation the pre-war territories of Serbia (point 3). We still believe that our demand is not only based on the right acquired by Serbia, but that it is also compatible with the general principle of the Minorities Convention. It finds justification in Serbia's conduct towards Minorities according to the engagements taken by the Treaty of Berlin which is formally admitted in your letter. We are also convinced that the Serbian Government and army have well deserved this consideration by the sacrifices consented to and the martyrdom endured for the common cause of the Allies, that of right and justice. In spite of everything, the perfect comprehension which the Royal Government has of the relations of our State with the Allied union

leads us to accede on this point to the desires of the Supreme Council.

As to paragraph 3, of point 6 of your letter, the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State willingly accedes to the desires of the Supreme Council; it formally declares that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes grants to persons of Ottoman nationality complying with the conditions of Article 4, all rights expressly granted by the said Article 4 of the Convention to persons having belonged, up to the time of the signing of the respective Treaties, to Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationality. This recognition will become effective on the day the Convention is signed by our Delegation.

As to point 2 of the reply, it undoubtedly gives entire satisfaction to our corresponding demand: however, I insist upon pointing out that the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State considers, as regards this point of the reply, that the signing of the Minorities Convention entirely fulfills and exhausts the aims sought by the insertion of Article 51 in the Peace Treaty with Austria providing not only for the protection of Minorities but also for freedom of transit and equitable treatment of commerce.

Consequently, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will, in this respect make no further request of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to sign any contractual provision whatsoever concerning not only the said protection of ethnic minorities but also the freedom of transit and equitable treatment of commerce. Although we are certain that this interpretation of the second point of our reply entirely reflects the opinion of the Supreme Council, our Delegation is of the opinion that it is necessary to bring out more especially this interpretation, freedom of transit and equitable treatment of commerce not having been especially mentioned in your reply. In case the Supreme Council has no objection to this interpretation, the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will consider it just as authentic and valid as a confirmation in writing from the Supreme Council.

Moreover, the Delegation has the honor to declare that it shares entirely the viewpoint of the Supreme Council; according to the

observations presented in our reply relative to certain moot clauses of the Minorities Convention, your letter suffices to affirm the value of these observations to be the same as though they were contained in the very text of the Minorities Convention; it considers that this affirmation gives sufficient satisfaction to our State and, in consequence, it is not indispensable to modify the Convention already signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Finally, the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State expresses its satisfaction for the favorable solutions given to some of its demands; it again affirms the will of the Royal Government to collaborate in perfect harmony with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and thanks the Supreme Council for the assurance of the sentiments which it was kind enough to express regarding our State.

Please accept, etc.

NIK. P. PACHITCH

Appendix E to HD-100

(Translation)

BULGARIAN DELEGATION NEUILLY SUR SEINE, November 23, 1919.
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE No. 537

MR. PRESIDENT: The Bulgarian Delegation has the honor to inform the honorable Peace Conference that it entirely approves the provisions of the draft convention regarding reciprocal emigration between Greece and Bulgaria,^{[11](#)} which was submitted to it by Your Excellency's letter dated November 19, 1919.

Bulgaria has always appreciated the humanitarian principles of the protection of minorities by which the above-mentioned draft is inspired. Furthermore, the present legislation of Bulgaria contemplates no obstacles to the emigration of Bulgarian subjects of different nationality. The Bulgarian Delegation, which has ascertained with the greatest satisfaction that the draft presented to

it is based upon entire reciprocity between the two states interested, hastens to adopt the provisions all the more willingly because the composition and function of the Mixed Commission provided for in Articles 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 are of such a nature as to inspire in it the greatest confidence.

However, the Bulgarian Delegation ventures to present the following observations concerning certain details of the convention.

It is of the opinion that the provisions of Articles 6, 7, 8, and 11 do not invalidate any duties and debts which the state or individuals hold against emigrants and that these duties and debts should be liquidated before the emigrant in question obtains the permission to take his property with him outside the frontiers of his former country. The Bulgarian Delegation considers likewise that these provisions will not be of such a nature as to prevent the state interested from demanding from emigrants the payment of all taxes in arrears, a common case in Bulgaria, where, on account of the war, the collection of taxes is made very irregularly.

The Bulgarian Delegation understands that by virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2, and by application of the rules of reciprocity, the increase in value of immovable property liquidated shall be paid to the state interested and that particularly it shall not be retained on account of the unilateral application, with regard only to Bulgaria, of Article 177, *b* and *h* of the Peace Treaty. However, the conditions necessary for its application are completely lacking in this case. Otherwise, the reciprocity by which the draft convention is inspired would be vain and the financial situation of Bulgaria would have to support new charges, difficult at present to foresee.

I beg you, Mr. President, to accept the new assurances of my very high consideration.

STAMBOLUSKI

To His Excellency
M. GEORGES CLEMENCEAU,
President of the Peace Conference.

Appendix F to HD-100

DRAFTING COMMITTEE OF THE
PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, November 24, 1919.

Re. demobilized Germans at Flensburg

Proposed Note To Be Addressed to Germany

According to information which has reached the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, German authorities are placing in the Schleswig plebiscite zone men supposed to be demobilized from the German military and naval forces.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers inform the German Government that if, according to Article 109 of the Treaty of Versailles, "military persons, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the German army, who are natives of the zone of Schleswig in which the plebiscite is taken, shall be given the opportunity to return to their native place in order to take part in the voting there", it is not the intention of the said Powers to tolerate in the zone in which the plebiscite is taken, supposedly demobilized men who do not come within the category referred to in the Treaty.

Appendix G to HD-100

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
RUSSIAN ARMIES WITH THE No. 11571
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND
HIGH COMMAND

PARIS, November 15, 1919.

From: General Tcherbatcheff, Military Representative of the
Supreme Chief of Russia with the Allied Governments and High
Command.

To: The President of the Council, Minister of War.

I have the honor to call your attention to the fact that, during the demobilization of the Russian Armies on the Rumanian front, I have as Commander-in-Chief of that front, and in accord with the plenipotentiary ministers of the Entente in Rumania, elaborated the order in which the material and war supplies left in Rumania were to be kept and restored afterwards to Russia.

The plenipotentiary ministers of France, England, United States of America and Italy, communicated to me in their joint letter of March 3–16, 1918, copy of two notes addressed by them to the Rumanian President of the Council and in which the plenipotentiary ministers explained their essential point of view on Russian goods, namely: That these goods remain the property of Russia, that the Rumanian Governments was to keep them temporarily, and had no right not only to use them, but still [less?], to transport them without previous authorization by the representatives of the Entente Powers which had guaranteed that property. The Rumanian Government consented to those stipulations.

During the German occupation of Rumania the plenipotentiary ministers of the above-mentioned Entente Powers, in a joint letter of July 13/26, 1918, confirmed to the Rumanian Government that they maintained the same point of view with respect to the Russian property which remained in Rumania.

After the organization of Denekin's volunteer army, the question arose of using our material and war supplies which remained in Rumania.

With the assistance of the representatives of the Entente in Rumania, the authorization was obtained from the Rumanian Cabinet (Decision of December 14, 1918, No. 1103) to send a small part of this material and supplies to General Denekin's army.

But, in spite of the entire help of the representatives of the Entente Powers in Rumania, and of the reiterated promises of the representatives of the Rumanian Government, General Denekin's Army only received a very small part of our property.

Furthermore, hindering us by every means from receiving this property which belongs to us, the Rumanian Ministry of War, had not only been taking stock of all Russian store houses, but has been appropriating our goods for its own use, without any control or authorization, thus violating the principles which had been established by four Entente Powers, and to which the Rumanian Government had agreed.

The Military representative of the Russian Armies at Bucarest, has employed all possible means in order to obtain the shipment promised. But, in spite of all the steps of the plenipotentiaries of the Entente Powers in Rumania, the Rumanian Government goes no further than making promises.

On account of the foregoing, I deem it indispensable to beg you to kindly place on the calendar the question of the restitution to the Armies of Southern Russia of the Russian material and supplies which remain in Rumania, and to have sent, in the first place, rifles, cartridges and munitions, heavy artillery, and machine guns.

As the Entente Powers consented to protect the property of Hungary, their former enemy from the exaggerated pretensions of Rumania, they cannot (Were it only for the sacrifices made by Russia) ignore the plundering of Russian property which remained in Rumania, including war material of forty-three infantry divisions of twelve battalions each.

These goods are recognized as our property by the Entente Powers; and were only turned over for temporary safe-keeping to the Rumanian Government, and they are at the present time, indispensable to the Russian Armies, which are waging a hard war against the Bolchevists.

I beg you to kindly inform me of the decisions taken in this matter.

GENERAL TCHERBATCHEFF

¹ *Ante*, p. 308 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 15](#)].

² Appendix A to HD-93, p. 182 [Pg. 182 is part of [Doc. 9](#)].

³ See telegram to the British Chargé, appendix B to HD–68, [vol. VIII, p. 583](#) .

⁴ See HD–78, minute 3, [ibid., p. 805](#) .

⁵ *Ante*, p. 312 [*Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*].

⁶ Chief Military Representative in Paris of Admiral Kolchak's Government.

⁷ Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defense.

⁸ German commander-in-chief in the Baltic Provinces.

⁹ See HD–89, minute 3, and appendix C, pp. 95 [*Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 5](#)*] and 110 [*Pg. 110 is part of [Doc. 5](#)*].

¹⁰ Appendix B to HD–89, p. 103 [*Pg. 103 is part of [Doc. 5](#)*].

¹¹ See HD–96, minute 1, and appendix A, pp. 221 [*Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 12](#)*] and 228 [*Pg. 228 is part of [Doc. 12](#)*].

November 28, 10:30 a.m. (HD-101)

[17] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 28, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 28, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/101

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/101

HD-101

[Document 17]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 28, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 28, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Rear-Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Lieut-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.
Colonel J. A. Logan
Dr. J. B. Scott
Dr. I. Bowman

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir R. Tower
Mr. Palairat
Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. Carr
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Commander MacNamara, R. N.
Lieut-Colonel Kisch

FRANCE
M. Cambon
General LeRond
M. Kammerer
M. Leygues
Commandant LeVasseur

ITALY
Admiral Cagni
M. Ricci Busatti
M. Dell'Abbadessa
M. Stranieri
Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli

JAPAN

1. M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. George Leygues to discuss the last British proposal relative to the distribution of enemy surface warships, dated November 14th, (See Appendix "A").

M. GEORGE LEYGUES said that for many months the naval experts had discussed the question of distribution of enemy warships without being able to reach an agreement. Great Britain and the United States were of the opinion that those ships should be destroyed. France asked to keep the ships which would be allotted to her, and desired, on the other hand, to obtain an additional share owing to its inability to build warships on account of the war, France having been forced to concentrate all her energies towards the production of war materiel, not only for herself but also for her Allies. Distribution of Enemy Warships

The British note of November 14th was an effort to bring together the different points of view and to come finally to an agreement. The French Navy was equally very desirous to settle a question which had been under discussion for such a long time, and although the British proposal did not agree on important questions with the French point of view, he felt ready on his part to accept it as a basis for discussion.

He then read and commented upon the different paragraphs of the British proposal.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not understand the purpose of paragraph 6, which allotted to each one of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers a certain number of ships for the period of one year.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that it had been pointed out that certain Powers were anxious to have ships temporarily allotted, which they might use either for propaganda, or experimental purposes. The British Government did not, however, attach much importance to that proposal, and would not disapprove the omission of the paragraph in question.

M. LEYGUES said those ships might to some extent be considered as trophies. Furthermore, they might be of use from the point of view of instruction, and also for firing practice. He was not averse to accepting the paragraph as proposed by the British Delegation.

MR. POLK said he would have to offer objections on certain points of the British proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that under those circumstances, it would be preferable to discuss the proposal submitted to the Council paragraph by paragraph.

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 1 of the British proposal.

MR. POLK wished to ask why the question of distribution of surface enemy warships had been treated separately from that of submarines. The American point of view was that the submarines should likewise be destroyed.

CAPTAIN FULLER said those two questions had always been discussed separately and it was to be feared that if they were to mix them up at this time, they would find it impossible to come to an agreement.

MR. POLK asked what advantage there was in discussing those questions separately. Did certain Powers wish to keep enemy submarines?

M. LEYGUES stated that France and Italy desired to keep some. (Paragraph 1 was accepted):

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 2.

MR. POLK said the American Government could not accept the ratio of two percent given to the United States, which it considered as being manifestly insufficient. The United States did not desire to keep those ships, but considered it was a question of principle which affected the national feeling. They had the impression that the basis adopted for the distribution was not fair. The amount of tonnage sunk ought not to be the only factor estimated, and they thought that other factors should be taken into account, such as the effort made

by the different navies in the course of hostilities. America had thought that all those ships should be destroyed, and for that reason had not attached great importance to the question of distribution. But it was now different. He had made some mistakes in his life; and one of the mistakes he regretted the most was to have agreed to accept the principle that a reparation was due by the Germans for the sinking of their fleet at Scapa Flow.¹ He did not wish to discuss anew a decision taken by the Supreme Council and which held; he could not but regret however that the Council should have thought it necessary to exact from Germany the delivery of a part of her civil materiel, which resulted in placing the Allies in a better situation than the one they had before the Scapa Flow incident, and which rewarded them to some extent with the crime committed by the Germans.

At any rate, he considered that the ratio of two percent attributed to the United States was not fair, and that they should get more.

CAPTAIN FULLER said they had only given round numbers, and for that reason the results indicated in the note were not absolutely final. Those figures, however, should not be greatly changed if the criterion of losses suffered by the different navies was maintained, which criterion had formed the basis for their work.

As far as the British share was concerned, they did not absolutely insist upon having a ratio of seventy percent given them, although that represented the exact percentage of their losses as compared with the losses of the other navies.

MR. POLK asked whether the naval experts could not examine once more those percentages and make the necessary changes.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that in order to accomplish that work successfully, they should know precisely what basis to adopt. It had been suggested on the American side that the national effort of the different Allies should be taken as a basis for distribution. It seemed, however, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to calculate the national effort of a Power, and they had preferred not to embark

upon a course which would lead them to making delicate comparisons.

MR. POLK stated his instructions did not allow him to accept the figure of 2%. He admitted that the national effort of the different Powers was indeed difficult to figure out and compare, but he thought that by discussing the question with the naval experts he might succeed in putting together the foundations of an agreement. He would find it impossible to make a definite proposal on that day, but he hoped to be able to do so the following day. He wished to repeat that as the United States meant to destroy their share of the enemy warships it only entailed as far as they were concerned a question of principle, but that question interested the national American feeling to a very high degree.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that before starting to change the percentage, it was necessary to agree on the general basis to be adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be wise to adjourn the discussion of paragraph 2 of the British proposal until the next meeting. One might hope that in that time an agreement would be arrived at between Mr. Polk and the naval experts.

(The discussion of paragraph 2 of the British proposal was adjourned to the following day.)

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 3.

(The principle of paragraph 3 was adopted.)

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 4.

MR. POLK said he did not object to accepting that paragraph; he, however, wished to state once more that they considered that a decision of the Council in demanding reparations from the Germans for the scuttling of their fleet at Scapa Flow had been a mistake. It was an entirely questionable principle, that of profiting by the enemy's crimes in order to reward themselves.

(Paragraph 4 was adopted).

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 5.

(Paragraph 5 was adopted).

CAPTAIN FULLER then read the 6th and last paragraph of the British proposal.

MR. POLK said he did not have any fundamental objection to that paragraph, but considered the wording might well be modified. He also made the same remark concerning paragraph 3. He would like to discuss that question of form with Captain Fuller and the naval experts.

CAPTAIN FULLER said there remained a question on which the naval experts wished to have the decision of the Supreme Council. A certain number of small Powers had requested to have enemy warships handed over to them. Some of those Powers had even put forward fairly extravagant claims, either for surface warships or for submarines. In case the Council should decide to refuse those requests, they still had to consider the question whether small patrol boats should be handed over to those Powers to be used for policing purposes.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if they decided to grant the requests made them by the small Powers, they would have to decide whether the ships should be taken from the enemy fleet or ceded by the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the latter alternative presented certain disadvantages. He could not very well imagine, for example, the Italians offering patrol boats to the Yugo-Slavs.

M. DE MARTINO said they should first ascertain whether the Yugo-Slavs had lost any ships. If they had suffered losses in ships of war, that could only have happened naturally in the course of fighting in which they had taken part as Austrians, that is as enemies fighting against the Allies. They, therefore, did not have any right to obtain ships in compensation of losses they had not suffered.

ADMIRAL CAGNI said that that case had already been examined in paragraph 2 of the British proposal under discussion. That

paragraph specified which were the small Powers which had suffered losses and which consequently were entitled to compensation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it very difficult to embark on a procedure which would lead to giving the small Powers which had not suffered losses during the war either a share of enemy warships or even small vessels intended to be used for police work. The case of Powers alluded to in paragraph 2 was, of course, reserved.

M. DE MARTINO said that the British memorandum of October 10th had recognized the principle that none of the small Allied States which had not suffered losses should receive enemy warships. That principle had been adopted by the French and Italian Delegations. Naturally that was all the more applicable to new and to neutral States as paragraph "C" of the British note for that matter specified.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought that the Council agreed in refusing the request of the small Powers, whether for warships or small patrol boats.

It was decided:

- (1) to adopt paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the British proposal dated November 14, 1919, relative to the distribution of enemy surface warships, paragraphs 3 and 6, however, being subject to modifications of form;
- (2) that Mr. Polk should examine with the naval experts the questions raised by paragraph 2 of the British proposal and that he should make a proposal on that subject at the next meeting of the council;
- (3) that the Powers, other than those referred to in paragraph 2, should be given neither ships of war nor ships intended for police work. (See Appendix "A").

2. M. CAMBON said that at its meeting of November 25th,² the Supreme Council had adopted the following resolution concerning the negotiations between Poland and the City of Dantzig:
Negotiations between Poland and the City of Dantzig

“It was decided:

(1) to accept textually the first two paragraphs of the resolution taken at the preceding meeting of the Council (H. D. 99, Minute 5, November 24th, 1919);³

(2) that the third paragraph of said resolution be modified to read as follows:

‘That prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature and preliminary discussions, to which the Allied Representative in the free city of Dantzig should be a party, take place at Dantzig. Within a maximum delay of two months after coming into force of the Treaty the said Representative should send to Paris, together with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzig and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in the preceding paragraph.’

(3) that the entire resolution be communicated on that day to the Polish Delegation, and that if said Delegation had any observations to present the Council would examine them at an early meeting.”

As he had been instructed by the Council, he had communicated the above resolution to M. Patek, who had been satisfied with it on the whole, but had expressed the desire to obtain two modifications relative to paragraph 3 of that resolution.

As indicated in the note which the Council had before it (See Appendix “B”), Mr. Patek desired it should be clearly brought out that only preparatory studies of a purely technical character should take place at Dantzig, and that political negotiations should be held in Paris. In order to avoid all misunderstanding on that point, Mr. Patek asked for the suppression, in paragraph 3, of the following words: “et des pourparlers” (English text: “and preliminary discussions”). Mr. Patek further asked that the period of two months within which the proposals prepared at Dantzig should be transmitted to Paris, be reduced to one month. He contended that

the Polish situation was extremely precarious and that she had the greatest interest in being put in a position to profit without delay from all advantages that those negotiations might confer upon her.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Supreme Council of his warning that if their decisions were continually submitted to the Poles for approval, they would receive a succession of objections. The Polish objection to the word “pourparlers” only reproduced the objection put forward by the American delegation. He was quite willing to omit the word. But if nothing was put in its place, the result would be to exclude the Poles themselves from the discussions at Dantzig; for “pourparlers” implied the participation of both parties, whilst “studies techniques” might be limited to one of the parties. Nor was it possible to admit the exclusion of “political” questions; in practice no hard-and-fast line could be drawn by questions which were political and questions which were economical. He would propose to adopt the following wording, which he thought would in substance meet all objections:

“3.—that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature in which representatives of Poland and of the free city of Dantzig participate, under the chairmanship of the Allied Representative at Dantzig, should take place at Dantzig;”

M. CAMBON said he personally was of the opinion that Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposed modification should be accepted; it defined happily the situation, whilst satisfying the Polish request.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that on the second point raised by the Poles, he would remark that the period of two months which he himself had proposed, was far from being extravagant, considering that the negotiations were to take place between Poland and the city of Dantzig and that the latter had first of all to be constituted by the League of Nations. As a matter of fact, the period of two months was a maximum and there was nothing to prevent the negotiations being ended before that period expired.

M. CLEMENCEAU was of the opinion that they should stand by the original period of two months.

It was decided:

- (1) to change the text of the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the resolution of November 24th, concerning the negotiations between Poland and the free city of Dantzig, as follows:

“(3) that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature in which representatives of Poland and of the free city of Dantzig participate, under the chairmanship of the Allied Representative at Dantzig, should take place at Dantzig;”

- (2) to maintain without modification the second sentence of paragraph 3 of the above mentioned resolution.

3. M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee, dated November 26th, relative to the exequaturs of foreign Consuls at Dantzig (See Appendix “C”).

MR. POLK asked to be allowed to consider the question; he would make known to the Secretary General as soon as possible whether he could accept the text which was before the Council. Exequaturs of Foreign Consuls at Dantzig Prior to the Definite Establishment of Free City

It was decided:

to adopt the note of the Drafting Committee, dated November 27th [26th], relative to the exequatur of the Foreign Consuls at Dantzig (See Appendix “C”); under reserve of the final approval of Mr. Polk, who would communicate his point of view to the Secretary General as soon as possible.

4. M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation, dated November 27th, relative to the communication to Spain and to Sweden of Article 435 of Versailles (See Appendix “D”).

Communication of Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles to Spain and to Sweden

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to adopt the note of the French Delegation, dated November 27th, relative to the communication of Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles to Spain and to Sweden (See Appendix “D”).

5. M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon a letter from the President of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the question (See Appendix “E”). Request of the Austrian Delegation for the Insertion of an Article in the Hungarian Treaty to Guarantee Food Supplies From Hungary to Austria

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to refer to the Economic Commission the letter of the President of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission dated November 21st, relative to the request of the Austrian Delegation for the insertion of an article in the Hungarian Treaty to guarantee food supplies from Hungary to Austria. (See Appendix “E”).

6. SIR EYRE CROWE said, that he had received from the British Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest a telegram indicating that the Allied note to the Roumanian Government⁴ had been delivered on November 24th. The Roumanians had professed to be at the height of a cabinet crisis, and that the new cabinet would need a few days to examine the note. Their argument seemed somehow to have impressed the Allied representatives at Bucharest. The British Chargé d’Affaires suggested that an additional period of two days be granted to the Roumanians. The Italian Minister, more generous, proposed to give them twenty

days. It seemed to him that the Allied representatives at Bucharest did not quite realize the situation. The additional Protocol to the Treaty with Bulgaria gave Roumania a supplementary period of eight days in which to sign that diplomatic document. It was therefore absolutely necessary that the Roumanian answer arrive before the expiry of the period fixed by the Protocol. He thought it would be important to inform the Allied representatives at Bucharest of that situation. Roumanian Questions

M. BERTHELOT thought that the Council would agree to reckoning the period only from the day when the note had been handed to the Roumanian Government, that is to say, November 24th. Accepting that starting point, the period would expire on the following Tuesday, December 2nd, at midday. They ought to consider that, in his opinion, the Roumanians had not exceeded that period, provided their reply had left Bucharest before the 2nd of December at midday. The slowness of communications ought to be kept in mind and their reply might take 48 hours to arrive at Paris. In that case it would coincide almost exactly with the period fixed in the protocol and expiring on Friday, the 5th of December, at midday. They could make known to the Roumanians by their representatives at Bucharest that if the Supreme Council were not in possession by the 5th of December at midday of a satisfactory reply from the Roumanians the measures announced in the last note of the Allies would be put into effect. He had had a visit that morning from M. Antonescu. The latter had led him to understand that if he might let it be known at Bucharest, as his personal impression and without committing the Council in any way, that the Allies would be disposed to grant certain concessions in the Minorities Treaty, the acceptance of that Treaty by Roumania would be greatly facilitated. The points to which Roumania attached the greatest importance were:

First, the omission in the preamble of the following passage:

“Considering that, in the Treaty of Berlin, the independence of the Kingdom of Roumania had only been recognized conditionally;

Considering further, that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers wished to recognize the independence of the Kingdom of Roumania unconditionally, in its former and new territories.”

Second, the insertion in the preamble of a formula affirming that the Treaty had been accepted by Roumania only after discussion and agreement, in order to prevent Roumanian opinion from considering the Treaty as having been purely and simply imposed upon Roumania, That modification, like the previous one, seemed to him personally quite acceptable.

Third, the Roumanian Minister had asked finally—and this was more serious—for the omission of the two articles numbered 10 and 11 relative to the situation of the Jews. He also asked that the Allies consent to the insertion in the preamble of a sentence by which the Allied and Associated Powers would recognize the “décret loi” of May 22, 1919, concerning the status of Jews in Roumania.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it quite possible to omit the two articles concerning Jews which had latterly been criticized as going into too much detail, all the more so as the Jews themselves did not seem to be particularly anxious to have those articles retained. On the other hand he saw great objection to inserting in the protocol a reference to the “décret loi” of May 22, 1919. That “décret loi” was, as a matter of fact, far from satisfying the Jews, and by making special reference to it, the Powers would seem to acknowledge that it was a sufficient concession on the part of the Roumanians. For that reason he did not think it possible to accept M. Antonescu’s suggestion but he would not object to the omission, pure and simple, of the 2 articles in the Treaty concerning Jews, the more so as general guarantees applying to all Minorities remained in force in the Treaty with Roumania and would constitute sufficient protection for the Jews.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French Delegation has accepted the 2 articles on the Jews so as not to differ from the majority of the Commission, but it was of the opinion that those articles were unnecessary, especially with regard to the recognition of the Sabbath as a legal holiday.

M. DE MARTINO said that on the New States Commission, of which he had been a member, he had thought that in the interest of the Jews themselves it would be a mistake to ask special privileges for them. Such a way of acting could only end in deepening further the gulf which separated them from the rest of the population, with which on the contrary they should make an effort to identify themselves. In Jewish circles opinion was, for that matter, divided upon the expediency of such privileges; the more uncompromising Jews demanded them, but those of more liberal tendency did not wish even to hear about them. He, therefore, identified himself very willingly with the proposal to omit articles 10 and 11 dealing with the Jews.

MR. POLK said that he saw no difficulty as far as concerned the preamble, but could they not for the Jews, adopt a text similar to that which occurred in the Greek Minorities Treaty.^{[5](#)}

M. BERTHELOT said that in the Treaty with Greece articles specially referring to the Jews no longer appeared.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Mr. Polk alluded to a text which had really figured in the draft Treaty with Greece, but which, for reasons unknown to him, had disappeared from the final text. In his opinion, it would be best that the New States Commission should meet that afternoon and try to agree on a text which would be submitted to the Council at its next meeting.

M. KAMMERER said he thought he should point out that the omission in the Treaty with Roumania of articles concerning Jews might have its effect on the Treaty with Poland.^{[6](#)} Poland would not fail indeed to ask the omission of the guarantees she had granted to the Jewish element if it appeared that similar guarantees were not asked of Roumania.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the situation of the Jews in Poland was exceptionally unfavorable and that the regulations in favor of the Jews imposed upon Poland justified themselves.

He wished to return to the question of the time limit. Were they to grant an extension of two days to the Roumanians when the latter had not asked them for anything? That would seem to him extremely difficult. He would rather suggest that the Roumanians be informed through the Allied representatives at Bucharest that they could not modify the terms of their ultimatum which had been adopted only after ripe reflection, and that the Roumanian answer should be handed to the Allied representatives at Bucharest before December 2nd at midday. They ought to say in addition, for the sake of their representatives, that, the time limit laid down by the protocol expiring on December 5th at midday, the Roumanian answer should reach Paris before that date. They would further have to consider whether it would not be advisable, in the event of the situation not improving at Bucharest, to publish the last note of the Allies to Roumania. That was a question which they might well discuss at the next meeting.

It was decided:

- (1) to instruct the Allied representatives at Bucharest to inform the Roumanian Government that its answer should be delivered to them before December 2nd at midday;
- (2) to inform the Allied representatives at Bucharest that the Roumanian answer should be telegraphed without delay to Paris so as to reach the Council before December 5th at midday, on which date expires the time limit laid down in the additional protocol to the Treaty with Bulgaria for the signature of said Treaty by Rumania;
- (3) to refer to the New States Commission, which shall submit a report to the Council at its next meeting, the examination of changes requested by the Roumanian Delegation in the preamble and in the terms of the Minorities Treaty with Roumania.

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 28, 1919.

British Proposal Regarding the Distribution of Enemy Surface Warships

ENEMY SURFACE WARSHIPS—DISPOSAL AND DISTRIBUTION

[Here follow texts printed as appendices C and B to HD–94, pages 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 10](#)] and 199 [Pg. 199 is part of [Doc. 10](#).]

Appendix B to HD–101

POLISH DELEGATION TO
THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, November 26, 1919.

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT: Ambassador Jules Cambon, in his capacity as President of yesterday's session of the Supreme Council read me the draft resolution with reference to negotiations relative to the Free City of Dantzig.⁷

Allow me to present the following observations on this draft:

1st, the most practical and the most just division of this work would be a division such as:

- (a) Preparatory work of a purely technical character,
- (b) Political negotiations.

It would be advisable to choose specialists for each category of work. (1) The technical work should be carried on by specialists at Dantzig as the nature of developments themselves require. (2) As for political questions they should be transferred to Paris and placed in the hands of statesmen who direct political matters. It would be useless to send to Dantzig the Commission of Experts and at the same time the Political Commission. It would be equally useless to commence political negotiations at Dantzig and then during the course of this work to transfer the experts to finish their work in Paris. Finally, it would be useless for the technical experts to commence preliminary *pourparlers* and elaborate other plans since these technical matters could be transmitted to the diplomats in Paris as a base for their political negotiations.

For all of the above reasons I have the honor to beg the Supreme Council to be good enough to change the draft so that only the preparatory work of a purely technical character shall be carried on in Dantzig, while the political work from beginning to end, that is to say, throughout its whole course, take place in Paris. It would be advisable then to strike out from the draft read me, in the third paragraph, the words “et des pourparlers préliminaires”.

Permit me also to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the length of time which has been granted to the Commission for the Execution of its preliminary work.

This work is already for the greater part prepared by the interested parties so the work of the experts will not necessitate a great deal of time.

In any case it would be an easier matter for the experts to do their work a little less thoroughly than for the Polish population and the inhabitants of the Free City of Dantzig to remain expectant of the re-establishment of the reciprocal relations which they have already awaited so long.

For these reasons I have the honor to beg the Supreme Council to reduce to one month (in place of two months) the time designated for the preparatory work.

ST. PATEK
Délégué Plenipotentiaire de La Pologne

Appendix C to HD-101

DRAFTING COMMITTEE
OF THE CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 26, 1919.

*Note Relative to the Exequatur of Foreign Councils [Consuls] at
Danzig*

The Drafting Committee thinks that, during the period from the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Germany to the definite

establishment of a status of the free city of Danzig, the delivery of exequatur will be incumbent upon the representative of the principal Allied and Associated Powers to which the sovereignty is transferred by Article 100 of the said Treaty.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

Appendix D to HD-101

PARIS, November 27, 1919.

Note From the French Delegation

NOTIFICATION OF ARTICLE 435 TO SPAIN AND SWEDEN

The Swiss Minister at Paris has been entrusted with asking the French Government if it did not deem it the proper time to invite the signatory Powers of the Treaties and Acts of 1815⁸ mentioned in Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, but not signatories of this latter Treaty, to adhere to the provisions of the said Article 435.

Pursuant to these steps, the French Delegation asked the Drafting Committee what procedure should be adopted. The Drafting Committee agreed that a note might be addressed, through the French Government, to the Spanish and Swedish representatives at Paris, and to this effect it approves the enclosed text.

The French Delegation has the honor to propose to the Supreme Council, should it deem that the time has come to take the steps requested by the Swiss Government, to authorize the French Government to hand the Spanish Ambassador and the Swedish Minister at Paris a note drawn up in the terms approved by the Drafting Committee.

SPANISH AMBASSADOR

SWEDISH LEGATION

VERBAL NOTE

Questions of Zones:—

The Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers, of the one part, and Germany of the other part, signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, includes in its article 435, a clause according to the terms of which the High Contracting Powers while recognizing the guarantees for Switzerland stipulated in 1815, declare that they abrogate the provisions of the acts and treaties of 1815 relative to the neutral zone of Savoie, as well as the free zones of Upper Savoie and the Gex district. The same clause is duplicated in Article 375 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919. These stipulations are appended in a certified true copy of Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles and its annexes.

It has been agreed with the Swiss Government that the Powers not signatory to the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, who signed the Treaties of 1815 and the declaration of November 20, 1815, mentioned in articles 435 and 375 above referred to, will be requested, through the French Government to kindly adhere to the stipulations of these articles.

For the Spanish Embassy: Spain, while not having signed the final act of the Congress of Vienna, having later given its adhesion, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic has the honor to beg His Excellency the Ambassador of Spain to kindly ask the Royal Government to also give its adhesion to the appended stipulation.

M. Pichon is pleased to take this opportunity to renew to His Excellency Monsieur Quinones de Leon the assurances, etc. ...

For the Swedish Legation: The Swedish Government having signed the final act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic has the honor to beg the Swedish Minister to be kind enough to ask his government to give its adhesion to the appended stipulation.

M. Pichon is pleased, etc. ...

Appendix E to HD-101

PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, November 21, 1919.

ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE French Secretariat

OF THE

No. 1231

REPARATIONS COMMISSION

From: M. Loucheur, Minister of Industrial Reconstruction.

To: President of the French Delegation with the Supreme Council.

Mr. Eichhoff, Plenipotentiary of the Austrian Republic, has deemed it advisable to inform me and I think it proper to transmit to you a few observations relative to possibilities which he hopes to find in the peace negotiations with Hungary for the improvement of food conditions in Austria.

Before the dismemberment of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Vienna and the Alpine countries, which constitute the present territory of the Republic, received their supplies of flour, meat, fat and dairy products from Hungary as they procured coal from the regions which today form part of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. As regards coal, Art. 224 of the Peace Treaty with Austria formally guaranteed exportation from Czecho-Slovak and Polish mines to Austria. M. Eichhoff asks that in the future Treaty with Hungary an article be inserted similar to the article mentioned treating with the exportation of Hungarian foodstuffs to Austria. Of course, in compensation, this article would also contain a provision guaranteeing the Hungarian State rights corresponding to the demands stipulated in favor of Austria; effectively, this provision would guarantee to Hungary such industrial products and especially agricultural implements which Austria usually furnishes her.

M. Eichhoff thinks that such an arrangement would contribute to bringing back to work the agricultural populations in Hungary and the industrial in Austria, and in case the Peace Conference should care to approve it, he would be at the disposition of the latter to determine the drafting of a text corresponding to his suggestion.

¹ HD-79, minute 2, [vol. VIII, p. 834](#) .

² HD-100, minute 7, p. 333 [*Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 16](#)*].

³ *Ante*, p. 312 [*Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*].

⁴ Appendix A to HD-93, p. 182 [*Pg. 182 is part of [Doc. 9](#)*].

⁵ Appendix F to HD-82, [vol. VIII, p. 922](#) .

⁶ Signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3714.

⁷ HD-100, minute 7, p. 333 [*Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 16](#)*].

⁸ Declaration regarding the Helvetic Confederation, March 20, 1815, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. II, p. 142; Protocol regarding Cessions to Geneva, March 29, 1815, *ibid.*, p. 149; Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, *ibid.* p. 3; Act of November 20, 1815, *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 359.

November 29, 10:30 a.m. (HD-102)

[18] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 29, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 29, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/102

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/102

HD-102

[Document 18]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 29, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, November 29, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian
Small

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Rear-Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Colonel J. A. Logan
Lieut-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.
Mr. A. W. Dulles
Capt. H. Pierce

BRITISH EMPIRE
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Commander MacNamara, R. N.
Mr. Colles
Mr. E. H. Carr
Colonel Beadom
Lieut-Colonel Kisch

FRANCE
M. Georges Leygues
M. Cambon
General Weygand
M. Laroche
Commandant LeVasseur
M. Kammerer

ITALY
Amiral Cagni
M. Manciola
M. Stranieri
Cap. de corvette Ruspoli

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. MR. POLK stated that he had been unable to come to an agreement with the naval experts as to the questions raised by paragraph 2 of the British proposal (See H. D. 101, Appendix "A");¹ he would therefore have to refer the matter to Washington. Distribution of Enemy Surface War ships

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if this meant referring the whole question.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the points raised in paragraph 2 of the British proposal were alone meant.

MR. POLK agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know what the United States' proposal was.

MR. POLK explained that they had been unable to come to an agreement as to figures. The amount of national effort, as a basis of distribution, which had been proposed in Committee by the American representatives, had now been abandoned. Captain Fuller had proposed certain figures which were arbitrary, inasmuch as they were not based on exact data, and which the American representatives could not accept without referring the question to Washington.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know what basis of distribution was desired. If the United States had abandoned the idea of having national effort the basis of distribution, what other basis could be adopted except the clear one of losses. He wished to know if the United States desired a still different basis. He did not see how the principle of distribution according to percentage of losses sustained in the war could be combined with another principle, for example, that of national effort.

MR. POLK pointed out that the basis proposed was a distribution of 70% to Great Britain, 10% to France, 10% to Italy, 8% to Japan and 2% to the United States. He felt that the effort of the United States

had been larger than was reflected in such a distribution. The United States had had eight super-dreadnaughts with the Grand Fleet and, he thought, more destroyers than any other Power. The United States did not desire to keep the ships in question but considered it was a question of principle which affected the national feeling. The question was one of satisfying public opinion. The United States might have over-estimated the effort it had made, but did not feel that a 2% distribution correctly estimated or reflected its effort. He wished, further, to point out that the basis of loss suffered took into account ships which had been lost not necessarily in action; a great many had been lost in harbor and it was not sure whether or not they had been lost as a result of enemy action. For instance, some of the losses might have been the result of boiler explosions and similar accidents.

ADMIRAL CAGNI stated that the large Italian ships which had been lost in harbor had clearly been destroyed by enemy action, and that this was susceptible of proof by documents in his possession.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his sole desire was to arrive at clearness. The discussion still left obscure the position as regards the principal issue. He would like to know if the United States wished to eliminate from the basis of losses suffered, ships not sunk at sea by enemy action.

MR. POLK said that this was not what he had in mind. The figures then under discussion of losses suffered were arbitrary. No hard and fast rule had been adopted for determining these losses; for instance, it seemed to him that the 10% of losses as given for France and Italy did not correspond exactly with the losses suffered. He wished again to point out that some of the ships lost might or might not have been lost as a result of enemy action.

M. DE MARTINO said he wished to disagree formally with that last point of Mr. Polk's. Italian losses had not been arbitrarily calculated. The vessels lost in port had been lost as a result of enemy machinations. The result was just the same if a ship were lost in this way as if it had been sunk at sea. He therefore maintained his point

of view that ships lost in that manner must enter into the calculations of losses suffered.

MR. POLK thought that M. de Martino was putting up a man of straw to be knocked down. He, himself, was not questioning the right to include such losses in the calculation of losses suffered, nor was he questioning the fact that some Italian ships might have been sunk in port by enemy action. If it could be proved that such was the case, then there could be no question as to its being proper to include such losses in the calculation of losses suffered. All he had said was that, as a general matter, some of the ships included in the calculations of losses might well not have been lost as a result of enemy action.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he unfortunately had a passion for clearness but he still remained confused. He would like again to ask what the standard was. He appreciated Mr. Polk's difficulties relative to American public opinion but it seemed to him that the easiest way to satisfy fair public opinion in every country was to state a clear principle of distribution and nothing could be clearer than actual losses suffered. If it was decided to give a certain percentage of enemy ships to certain countries without such distribution being based on a clear and logical principle it would be necessary to explain to the satisfaction of public opinion in all countries why different nations were given an arbitrary percentage of ships. A distribution of 2% to the United States was not unfair for he thought that the United States losses had been so small as not to reach in fact the percentage of 2%.

MR. POLK agreed that the losses had indeed been small. He agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe's point of view but the difficulty he felt was that the proposed percentage of distribution was arbitrary. It was true of course that no United States ships had been lost in port but he still felt that it was arbitrary to include all ships lost in port irrespective of the cause.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the calculation was not arbitrary and was based on the principle of losses suffered.

MR. POLK reiterated that he thought the figures of 70–10–and 10 percent must be arbitrary. He thought it inconceivable that the French and Italian losses were exactly the same. In any event he had certain instructions and at the present stage of the discussion he would have to refer the matter to his Government.

CAPTAIN FULLER stated that by actual calculations the French and Italian losses were almost identical: 10.70% for the French and 11.45% for the Italians.

SIR EYRE CROWE proposed the following solution: to accept as the standard the percentage of warships sunk by definitely proved action of the enemy whether at sea or in port.

ADMIRAL CAGNI pointed out that in the event of such a solution being adopted it would be necessary to institute an inquiry for each ship lost. In many cases losses were due to collisions resulting from war navigating conditions. Such losses were as fully entitled to be included as losses resulting more directly from enemy action. Certainly the most long drawn out inquiries in each case would have to be expected.

M. CLEMENCEAU declared that he was ready to accept Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal.

MR. POLK again pointed out that he would have to get instructions from his Government.

M. DE MARTINO inquired whether Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal would eliminate such collisions as those mentioned by Admiral Cagni and also losses resulting from mines?

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that to meet M. de Martino's suggestion he would propose that the standard of distribution might be all ships sunk at open sea and all ships sunk elsewhere through definitely proved enemy action.

MR. POLK said that he would cable his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU approved this new proposal in principle.

ADMIRAL CAGNI thought it would be well to definitely approve the other points raised by the British proposal.

MR. POLK said that he had accepted those points in principle subject to changes of phraseology to be arrived at between Admiral McCully and Captain Fuller. He had no objection to France and Italy receiving the ships specified in paragraph 5 of the British proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE understood that it had been decided that Greece, Roumania and Portugal should each receive as compensation a ship corresponding to the one lost by each of these Powers, as specified in paragraph 2 of the British proposal.

(This was agreed to).

ADMIRAL McCULLY suggested that in the final clause of paragraph 1 it be provided that the surface warships surrendered by the enemy Powers should be either sunk or broken up. It might well be more expensive at times to break up the ships than to sink them.

M. CLEMENCEAU took it as understood that the Power receiving the enemy warships would have the option of sinking or breaking them up.

(This was agreed to).

ADMIRAL McCULLY in discussing paragraph 3 of the British proposal relative to the allocation of enemy tonnage to be broken up by the Inter-Allied Naval Commission proposed that the breaking up or sinking be begun immediately and be completed within one year and furthermore that none of the sunken vessels and no parts or portions of them were to be incorporated in the naval forces of any Power.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was utterly unable to agree with this proposal. It seemed to him an impossible procedure.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would put an extreme case which would test the proposed principle; was it meant that if a vessel had been broken up, none of the steel from such vessels should ever find a place in another ship?

M. CLEMENCEAU felt that each Power should be enabled to sink or break up the vessels allocated to it in such manner as it should see fit.

MR. POLK pointed out that it would then be possible for all the necessary parts, such as engines, guns, etc., to be taken off an enemy warship and put onto a ship belonging to the Power to which such vessel had been allocated.

M. CLEMENCEAU felt that the proposal in question implied a mutual distrust, and he considered such a condition would be almost humiliating.

M. LEYGUES thought that a condition of this kind was one which could only logically be proposed by the Germans. If such a solution were adopted it would be equivalent to the Allies imposing upon themselves conditions which were more difficult than those they were imposing upon the enemy.

MR. POLK said that he would like to know frankly what was intended. If it were intended to use this material in the manner which had just been suggested, he thought it would be better to say so clearly. His idea was that the principle had already been accepted that the enemy warships were to be destroyed. If it were now intended to save certain parts thereof, he felt that that was an extreme departure from the principle of destruction.

M. LEYGUES pointed out that as a result of the enormous losses suffered by certain nations, public opinion in those nations would simply not be able to comprehend why boilers and other similar useful parts of enemy warships could not be used.

MR. POLK replied that that was exactly what he meant. If it were not intended to destroy the ships completely, he thought it should be so stated. He merely wanted to know what the intentions were.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it had been agreed to destroy them as ships but not to demolish them.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not understand the proposal advanced by Admiral McCully. He did not see why it was necessary to pulverize the enemy warships. To his mind, destruction meant the destruction of enemy warships but not the destruction of their component parts. When artillery material had been taken from the Germans there had been no objection to using the same. England was at the present time building a warship costing several millions of pounds; this showed that there was no contemplation of adopting the principle of total disarmament. The idea of building ships out of enemy material had been made a matter of reproach. For his part, he could not see any harm in taking for instance a boiler from an enemy warship and putting it into a warship to be built two years later. France had reduced her armaments to the minimum and might have done so too soon. England had not demobilized her navy, and certainly he was far from reproaching her therewith. It should not be forgotten that France's financial situation made it impossible for her to build up a powerful navy, and consequently there was nothing to fear from her in that respect.

MR. POLK repeated that it was merely a question of so saying unequivocally if it was desired to use material from the enemy warships in the manner which had just been discussed; the original idea had been to destroy all enemy warships.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the words "breaking up" had always been used instead of the word "destroying". Consequently, it had been contemplated that parts of these enemy warships were to be put to some use. He instanced the operations of breaking up of ships: when a ship was no longer useful they did not pulverize it but broke it up and made use of the parts. If it had been contemplated that the ships were to be completely demolished there would have been no use calculating their distribution so carefully.

MR. POLK said that he did not wish to hold the matter up, but he must go on record as saying that the United States Government did not consider that the procedure proposed carried out the principle that had been decided upon. He felt that when the enemy ships were taken to the yards the greater part of them would doubtless be devoted to war purposes.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if the words actually used were “breaking up” or “destroying”.

CAPTAIN FULLER replied that “breaking up” was the actual text.

MR. POLK said that the American idea had always been that the enemy warships would be destroyed so that there would be that much less naval war material in the world.

M. LEYGUES replied that Admiral Benson had repeatedly expressed this view, but that the French and Italian representatives had never agreed thereto and that the question had never been formally voted upon.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question of the time within which enemy warships were to be sunk or broken up should be settled. The British suggestion had been two years and the United States had thought one year sufficient.

MR. POLK said he would not make any difficulties on this point.

M. LEYGUES thought the delay should be even greater. The breaking up of ships was a long and costly operation as the English had discovered in their inquiry relative to Scapa Flow. It might be almost impossible to get the necessary workmen or appliances within a shorter period.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested a three year period.

MR. POLK wished to go on record as considering this entirely too long a delay. However, he did not intend to prevent a decision being reached.

It was decided:

- (1) that any Power receiving enemy warships not to be incorporated for use with its fleet, should have the choice of sinking or breaking up said enemy warships;
- (2) that any Power receiving enemy warships to be sunk or broken up should effect said breaking up or sinking within a period of three

- years after the arrival of said vessels in one of its own ports;
- (3) that Greece, Roumania and Portugal each receive as compensation one enemy warship corresponding to the warship lost by each of these Powers, for use with its fleet or any other purpose that it might desire;
 - (4) that Mr. Polk should refer to his Government the question of the percentage of distribution among the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of enemy warships and of the proceeds accruing from the breaking up thereof;
 - (5) that except as modified by the foregoing paragraphs, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the British proposal (See Appendix "A" H. D. 101) be adopted unchanged.

2. CAPTAIN FULLER read a summary on the situation relative to the surrendered enemy submarines, dated November 28th, (See Appendix "A"). The question now was what view France took.

M. LEYGUES stated that France had always been opposed to breaking up the surrendered enemy submarines inasmuch as she had always felt that this question was tied up with the question of future submarine warfare. If, however, the question of prohibiting future submarine warfare were now brought up, he would be prepared to discuss it. Distribution of Enemy Submarines

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Council that this question had been put within the competence of the League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that submarine warfare could consequently not now be discussed. The question remained whether enemy submarines were all to be destroyed or to be submitted to the same treatment as enemy surface warships. He then read to the Council a French proposal relative to the distribution of enemy submarines (See Appendix "B"), and a statement relative to the number of submarines in each navy (See Appendix "C"). He asked if the former might be accepted as a basis of discussion.

M. MATSUI pointed out that when the question of the distribution of submarine motors had arisen a different proportion had been

adopted than was then proposed. Japan desired that the two should be similar.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that this French proposal was merely to serve as a basis of discussion and that therefore M. Matsui's objection was not immediately involved.

MR. POLK took it as understood that in discussing this proposal the question of principle as to whether or not the submarines were to be destroyed, was still before the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out, with reference to the first paragraph of the French proposal, that France had hitherto opposed the destruction of submarines. In the proposal then submitted by her she had made a large concession which should influence the other members of the Council in reaching a decision.

MR. POLK announced that he agreed with the first paragraph of this proposal, with the exception that he would like an eventual explanation as to the small number of submarines therein referred to.

M. MATSUI said that he could not give any decision on the matter until the following Monday, as he had just received this proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that the discussion be continued without necessarily reaching a decision on that date.

MR. POLK, with reference to the second paragraph, said that although he had no present objection to the figures in question, he wished to inquire if the distribution was to be made for the purpose of eventually breaking up the submarines.

M. LEYGUES replied that that was so. With reference to the third paragraph of the French proposal, he read and commented upon the figures presented in Appendix "C". He pointed out the heavy losses suffered by France and the fact that she alone had not been able to indulge in any naval construction, all the resources of her shipyards having been devoted to production of land war material for herself and her Allies.

M. DE MARTINO agreed with M. Leygues in what he had said with respect to the French situation. Although Italy was not in exactly a similar position, she occupied a position intermediate between that of England and of France. Italy had likewise been greatly handicapped by having to stop her naval construction on account of having to devote such resources to the production of land war material. If France, by way of compensation for such a situation, was to receive a certain number of submarines, Italy likewise should have some. He did not have exact figures at hand, but would refer to Admiral Cagni for such figures; he thought that this matter might be further examined into.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was quite ready, as far as France was concerned, to agree to the same principle with respect to submarines as had been determined upon with respect to surface ships. His Government would be glad if the ten submarines to be allotted to the French might be selected from among such as had not disgraced the flag. His Government would be glad of this for sentimental reasons.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if there were ten such submarines available.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that there were more than ten in French ports.

M. LEYGUES agreed with the British proposition, provided that ten submarines of that kind could be found available for delivery to France. If they could not, the French would have to fill up their quota from other enemy submarines.

SIR EYRE CROWE accepted M. Leygues reservation. He did not feel quite sure that M. De Martino was entirely correct in saying that Italy occupied a position intermediate between that of France and England. He was of course not entirely familiar with the figures that had just been furnished but they seemed to show that in Italy new construction had been relatively greater and losses relatively less than in other countries, and he felt that from that point of view it was really England that was in the intermediate position.

MR. POLK felt that in this respect France occupied a unique situation. He would recommend the acceptance of the French proposal to his Government, but with respect to the proportions suggested for distribution of enemy submarines he would likewise have to refer the question to his Government. President Wilson when in France had taken a strong position with respect to total destruction of enemy submarines.

M. MATSUI said that he would make the same recommendation to his Government as did Mr. Polk.

ADMIRAL CAGNI remarked that the French figures (Appendix "C") did not give an exact idea of the situation as far as Italy was concerned. It was true that Italy had constructed submarines during the war but the majority of them were very small submarines for work in the northern Adriatic and could scarcely be used for any other purpose. The Italian Admiralty was quite ready to recognize the special situation of the French Navy to which it extended its sympathy.

(Further discussion of this question was provisionally adjourned).

3. M. KAMMERER informed the Council that the Committee of New States had been unanimous in agreeing to expunge from the preamble of the proposed Minorities Treaty with Roumania all reference to Roumanian independence (paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble to the proposed Minorities Treaty). The United States alone had not been in favor of expunging the last paragraph of the preamble and of eliminating all reference to the Treaty of Berlin.^{[2](#)} The majority felt that as the text in question favored Roumania it might well be eliminated upon the request of Roumania. The United States Delegation had proposed to substitute for the last three lines, the following: "recognize that Roumania is definitely discharged from the obligations undertaken by article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin." As the other Delegations had not agreed to this the American Delegation had reserved its judgment giving as its reason the fact that no written observations had been received from the Roumanian Delegation which would show whether or not its request was well founded. Roumania had desired a clause inserted showing that the terms of the Treaty were finally agreed upon after consultation with

the Roumanians. It had been unanimously decided that there was no objection to the insertion, as a new paragraph in the preamble, of the following clause: "And after discussion and agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers." The Committee had then discussed the request of the Roumanians for the suppression of articles 10 and 11 granting special protection to the Jews. The majority were in favor of the elimination of both articles; the American Delegation alone reserved judgment on this point again stating that since the Roumanians had submitted no formal observations the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should not be put in the position of prejudicing the question of the protection of the Jews as a result only of informal conversation with M. Antonescu —this question of the protection of Jews having been insisted upon in the case of Poland. Since the majority of the Committee had been in favor of the suppression of these articles, and since it had been necessary to reach some conclusion which could be presented to the Supreme Council on the following day, it had been decided to present the views both of the majority and of the minority and to leave it to the Supreme Council to settle the question. On this understanding it had been proposed that the following paragraph should be inserted in the preamble as a new paragraph, the American Delegation accepting this proposition only in case its view was overruled by the Supreme Council and the two Jewish clauses were eliminated. "Whereas Roumania has declared its intention of recognizing as Roumanian nationals *ipso-facto* and without the requirement of any formality the Jews inhabiting all the territories of Roumania". Modification of Roumanian Minorities Treaty

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that further discussion of this question be adjourned until the receipt of the Roumanian answer. The nature of that answer might well change his opinion.

MR. POLK said that that was the point that he had always been trying to make.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was ready to make concessions if the Roumanian signature could certainly be obtained thereby but otherwise there was no point in making such concessions.

SIR EYRE CROWE was entirely of the President's opinion provided the Roumanians gave proof immediately of deserving the concessions proposed.

It was decided:

that further discussion on this subject be adjourned until the receipt of the answer to the last note sent by the Council to the Roumanian Government.^{[3](#)}

4. M. CLEMENCEAU informed the Council that the King of Roumania had addressed a letter to President Poincaré. This letter was certainly a most unfortunate one, and was evidently prepared under the influence of M. Bratiano. It was in substance one long series of complaints. It appealed to President Poincaré to intervene with the Supreme Council, and this could certainly not be tolerated. Letter From the King of Roumania

M. BERTHELOT read the letter from the King of Roumania to President Poincaré. (See Appendix "D".)

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that this constituted a good commentary on General Coanda's activities.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not yet seen President Poincaré. He suggested that a joint answer be prepared by France, England and Italy. He understood that the letter had not been sent to President Wilson or to the Emperor of Japan. This constituted a most serious act of discourtesy.

SIR EYRE CROWE informed the Council that he had also had bad news from the British representative at Bucharest. M. Maniu had stated that the Roumanians did not intend to retire away from the Theiss prior to the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He felt that the time had come to publish the last note of the Council to the Roumanian Government. Perfect ignorance still existed in Roumania with respect to the attitude of the Supreme Council.

MR. POLK agreed that the Roumanian press was full of misstatements relative to the attitude of the Allies.

M. DE MARTINO agreed with M. Clemenceau's suggestion as to a joint answer. He thought that it was a matter to be arranged between the Governments concerned.

It was decided:

to publish in the morning press of Sunday, November 30th, the text of the last note of the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government.

5. (The Council had before it the draft of an additional protocol to the Treaty concluded at Versailles between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, June 28th, 1919 (See Appendix "E").)⁴ Treaty Regarding Eastern Frontiers of Poland

M. CAMBON in commenting upon this draft protocol pointed out that in the absence of a regularly constituted Russian Government it had hitherto seemed impossible to assign definite eastern frontiers to Poland. Nevertheless it had been recognized that in order to enable Poland to administer the territory occupied by her it was necessary to establish at least a provisional eastern frontier comprising territories which were indisputably Polish. By a decision of the Supreme Council (H. D. 60)⁵ the Drafting Committee had been charged with examining the formulation of such an agreement and it had been unanimous in presenting the present protocol. The frontier line having already been laid down by the Council the labors of the Drafting Committee were limited to matters of form.

MR. POLK pointed out that in the first article the full and complete sovereignty of Poland was formally recognized by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. He wondered whether this did not constitute a final gift on the part of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and whether it did not mean shutting the door to any future negotiations with Russia.

M. CAMBON explained that all the territories in question were incontestably Polish. When part of the Russian Empire they had been described as forming a part of the Kingdom of Poland.

MR. POLK said his only doubt was whether it were wise to give this recognition in so formal a way as by signing a protocol of this nature. He thought it possible that Poland might receive this communication in some other form.

M. LAROCHE pointed out that the protocol only bound the signatories thereto.

MR. POLK said that nothing, however, could more formally bind the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that this question had come up previously and that it had been agreed that the Drafting Committee should determine the necessary formula. The Council would recall the famous declaration of Kerensky relative to all territories bona-fide inhabited by Poles. Furthermore this was not in contradiction with the Council's note to Admiral Koltchak.^{[6](#)}

MR. POLK observed that the Drafting Committee had been asked to find a formula for communicating to Poland the Council's decision relative to Poland's eastern frontiers. It seemed to him that this was more than a communication. He was prepared to cable his Government but under his present instructions he could not sign such a protocol.

M. CAMBON thought the question was covered by previous decisions of the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if it were necessary to retain the word "Polish" in the first paragraph of Article 1. He thought that if this word was omitted the substance would be retained and only a cause of irritation removed.

MR. POLK said that he would get instructions from his Government.

(Further discussion on this question was adjourned until an early meeting of the Council.)

6. (The Council had before it two notes relative to the expenses occasioned by the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war and refugees in Germany (See Appendices “F” and “G”).)

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon these two notes. He called attention to the unanimous conclusions of the Financial Sub-Commission (See Page 6, Appendix “F”). Russian Prisoners of War and Refugees in Germany

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the Italian representative had made a reservation with respect to the expenses concerning refugees from Kiev (See page 2, Appendix “F”), and wished to associate himself with that reservation. The German Government had stated that the Allied and Associated Powers had assumed the responsibility for the maintenance of these refugees, but no evidence had been adduced to show that the German Government was telling the truth. The Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin had apparently not gone into that question. He thought that it should be further examined and that the Commission at Berlin should be charged with the duty of verifying the truth of the statement of the German Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed. He had thought that as General Malcolm had presented the matter in that manner, the question had already been examined. He called attention to the proposed resolution contained in the second note (See Appendix “G”). It was his personal opinion that that point had already been settled by the Council’s decision of November [October] 11th.⁷ General Malcolm might be informed to that effect, but certainly the German Government knew that already. A further question remained to be examined. He had been informed that the expenses of the Commission at Berlin amounted to twenty thousand marks per month. He further pointed out that the Germans had said that their delegate would not be named until the Allies had indicated that they were willing to cooperate in the sense of assuming their share of the expenses. He thought that the Germans could now be notified that they were to

assume all the expenses connected with the maintenance of those Russian prisoners and refugees.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether it was contemplated that the Allied and Associated Powers should pay the twenty thousand marks referred to or that the Germans should do so.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that the Allied and Associated Powers were to pay it.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the Allied and Associated Powers had washed their hands of these prisoners and refugees. It was not to their interest to maintain that Commission. If the Germans were told that they had to assume all the expenses they would wish to eliminate that Commission, and for his part, he was willing that this Commission be abolished. There could be no objection to having an officer on the spot exercise some control, but he considered the continuation of that Commission unnecessary.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that humanitarian, as well as political reasons, made it advisable that the Allied and Associated Powers should continue to interest themselves in the lot of these prisoners. He proposed to prepare a draft letter to General Malcolm.

MR. POLK pointed out that the position of the United States was that it had no money for that Commission. As the United States Government has already contributed over half the expenses of this work in Germany, it considered that it was in no way obligated to participate in the payment of outstanding indebtedness, nor was it directly interested in the method adopted for the payment of those outstanding bills. He thought that even if General Malcolm recommended it, his Government was in doubt as to whether any basis of right existed for creating or maintaining a Commission not provided for in the Treaty. His Government considered rather that this was a suitable time to withdraw.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed that the coming into force of the Treaty offered a good chance to withdraw if this were considered advisable;

but the question was whether political considerations with respect to Russia would not render it expedient to continue this work.

MR. POLK observed that the Commission would be without power or money. They might take decisions, but would have no way of enforcing them. He thought that that meant putting the officers on that Commission in a most difficult situation.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Germans should be told that they must meet the expenses of the Commission. The Germans would then refuse and the Commission would cease to exist.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that the Italian representative had made an additional reservation with respect to the basis of distribution of the expenses of maintenance of the Russian prisoners (See page 2, Appendix "F"); he wished to maintain that reservation.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the German Government be informed that it would have to meet all expenses until such time as the Treaty went into force.

MR. POLK said that he felt most strongly that after the Treaty came into force such a Commission had no place in Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that it be decided that when the Treaty went into effect the Commission would cease to exist.

M. DE MARTINO agreed.

MR. POLK agreed also, but wished to put on record the remarks he had previously made as to the attitude of the American Delegation in view of the discussion which had taken place.

It was decided:

- (1) that the International Commission at Berlin be charged with the duty of verifying the statement of the German Government that the Allied and Associated Powers had assumed the responsibility for maintaining the refugees from Kiev;

(2) that General Weygand prepare a draft letter to General Malcolm, for submission to the Council, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting.

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , November 29, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-102**

Surrendered Enemy Submarines

SUMMARY OF SITUATION, 28TH NOVEMBER, 1919

1. At a meeting of the Admirals on 27th June 1919, all except the French were in favor of the destruction of all surrendered enemy submarines.

2. After the surrender of the submarines, it was agreed that a certain number should be broken up, but when fifty-four had been sold for breaking up, it was agreed by the Supreme Council that no more should be broken up pending a decision on the whole question of the disposal of the enemy fleets. The proceeds of the fifty-four which have been broken up are being held in trust for the Allies in the same way as the submarines themselves.

3. A certain number of submarines have been supplied to France, Italy, U. S. A., Japan and Belgium for propaganda purposes, viz.

Great Britain	5
France	15
Italy	10
U. S. A.	6
Japan	7
Total	43

and Belgium has been loaned one for a few weeks.

4. The present situation of enemy submarines including those for propaganda purposes is as follows:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number</i>

Great Britain (49, and 54 sold for breaking up)	103
France	46
Italy (18 completed Austrian and 10 German)	28
U. S. A.	6
Japan	7
Total	190

5. The losses of the Allies in submarines during the war are as follows:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Approximate percentage of each nation's submarine losses to total Allied losses in submarines</i>
Great Britain	55	70
France	14	18
Italy	8	10
U. S. A.	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	78	100

Appendix B to HD-102

French Proposals Concerning Enemy Submarines

All the sub-marines turned over by the enemy powers, with the exception of the small number indicated in Par. 3 below, shall be demolished under the supervision of an Interallied Naval Commission.

2nd The distribution of the sub-marines between the Allied and Associated Powers shall be operated proportionally to the losses suffered by them in sub-marines (percentage already established concerning the distribution of their motors already turned over by their owners.)

Great Britain	70%

France	18
Italy	10
United States	2

3rd France, alone among all the Allied Navies as not having constructed sub-marines during the war, shall receive 10 German submarines in good condition as a compensation.

Appendix C to HD-102

NUMBER OF SUBMARINES IN EACH NAVY

	Existing in 1914	Vessels entering service during the war	Lost	Remaining at the end of the war
England	60	127	55	132
America	31	60	1	167
		77 (in shipyards)		
France	45	21 (of which the latest were finished in 1912) [?]	14	52
Italy	19	51	8	72
		10		

Appendix D to HD-102

BUCAREST, November 24, 1919.

[King Ferdinand of Rumania to the President of the French Republic (Poincaré)]

TO: HIS EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

During the long trials undergone by my people and myself, the manifestations of friendship which I received from Your Excellency, as well as the words, never to be forgotten by Rumania, which you uttered at the opening of the Conference,⁸ lead me to think that it is not necessary to again set forth the nature of the Rumanian actions

during the war, and to insist on the loyalty, devotion and efficacy of the assistance lent by Rumania to her great Allies, at the cost of the most bloody and heavy sacrifices.

In spite of the fact that, from the beginning of the operations of the Conference, the Council of Four alone made all the decisions, Rumania, in order to prove her fidelity and solidarity, has, however, submitted to the stipulations which were decided upon, unknown to her and against her interests, until she was put in such a position that she could only sign at the cost of her dignity and independence. However, the Supreme Council which proved, and is still proving, such great magnanimity in the questions not yet settled, or the solution of which seems difficult to obtain, treats Rumania with a violence inconsistent with our friendly relations and the principles of justice.

This policy of the Allied Governments, in contradiction with our actions and feelings, can but have the worst consequences on the role of order and peace which Rumania should have in this part of Europe.

It is believed that I am creating difficulties, while I only defend a just cause, and the fact that my appeals are not listened to is indirectly favoring the danger which threatens every nation for, the encouragement given to the elements of disorder by the attitude of the Supreme Council, has a tendency to lessen the authority of my Government, who are only guilty of defending the order, honor and independence of their country.

However, it would be natural that the great Allies, whose responsibilities are in proportion with their power, support what represents the best guarantee of order against invading anarchy, as was recently proved in Hungary and on the Dniester.

In the name of these principles, I deem it my duty to appeal to you in order to bring the Government of the Republic to a more friendly and just attitude toward us.

I apply, for the same purpose, to His Majesty, the King of England, and His Majesty, the King of Italy.

FERDINAND

Appendix E to HD–102

Additional Protocol to the Treaty Concluded at Versailles Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, June, 28, 1919

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, and JAPAN, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and POLAND,

Recognizing, by common agreement, that it is important as soon as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty, in which the Polish nation is placed and to make it possible for the Polish Government to proceed, according to the conditions previously provided by the Treaty with Poland of June 28, 1919,⁹ to organize a regular administration of the territories so far regarded as Polish.

The undersigned duly authorised by their respective Governments have agreed to the following provisions.

ARTICLE 1

Without prejudging the provisions which must in the future define the eastern frontiers of Poland, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers hereby declare that they recognize the full and complete sovereignty of Poland over the Polish territories of the former Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below:

From the point where the old frontier between Russia and Austria-Hungary meets the river Bug to the point where it is cut by the administrative boundary between the districts of Byelsk and Brest-Litowsk,

the course of the Bug downstream;

thence northwards this administrative boundary to where it forms an acute angle about 9 kilometres north-east of Melnik;

thence north-eastwards to a point on the course of the Lesna Prawa where the latter is cut by the forest running from south to north which passes about 2 kilometres west of Skupowo,

a line to be fixed on the ground leaving in Poland the villages of Weirpole, Stolbce, Piesczatka and Wolka, cutting the railway Byelsk-Brest-Litovsk at the point where it crosses the road from Visoko-Litovsk to Kleshcheli;

thence northwards to a point where the Narev-Narevka road cuts the Gainowka-Svisloch railway,

a line to be fixed on the ground along the forest road mentioned above;

thence north-eastwards to a point on the river Svisloch 4 kilometres to the north of Yalowka where it is joined by the river passing this town,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the course of the Svisloch downstream, then the course of the Laszanka upstream, then the course of the Likowka upstream to a point about 1½ kilometres west of Baranowo;

thence north-north-westwards to a point on the Grodna-Kuznitsa railway about 500 metres north-east of the bifurcation of Kielbasin,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence north-westwards to a point on the course of the Lososna about 2½ kilometres south-west of its confluence with the Nyeman,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the course of the Lososna downstream, then the course of the Nyeman downstream, then the course of the river Igorka, which

passes Warwischki, upstream to its source;

thence west-south-westwards to a point on the course of the Chernohanja (Marycha) near Sztudjanka,

a line to be fixed on the ground following a left bank tributary;

thence upstream the course of the Chernohanja to a point about 2½ kilometres to the east of Zelwa;

thence northwards to a point on the Berzniki-Kopciowa road about 2 kilometres south-east of Berzniki,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence north-westwards to the most southerly point of the reentrant of the northern administrative boundary of the district of Suwalki (about 7 kilometres to the north-west of Punska),

a line to be fixed on the ground, proceeding generally parallel to the line of the small lakes between Berzniki and Zegary and about 2 kilometres to the east of these lakes, turning west to reach a point of Lake Galadusya about 2 kilometres north of Zegary, crossing this lake to its north-western point and leaving Punska in Poland;

thence northwards the administrative boundary of Suwalki to its junction with the old frontier between Russia and East Prussia,

The rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the East of the said line are expressly reserved.

ARTICLE 2

The proportion and nature of the financial or other charges of the former Empire of Russia which Poland will have to bear by reason of the placing of the territories of this former Empire under her sovereignty shall be fixed in conformity with the stipulations of Article 21 of the Treaty concluded with Poland on June 28, 1919.

Future conventions shall regulate all other questions which may arise from the recognition of the sovereignty of Poland over the territories described in Article 1.

Done at Paris, the 1919 in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic; and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

Appendix F to HD-102

Note to the Supreme Council

The Special Paris Commission which is entrusted with the questions concerning the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, examined the following points communicated by the Supreme Council:

- 1st) —Reimbursement of the flour advanced by the German Government until August 23rd, 1919.
- 2nd) —Liquidation of the liabilities of the Inter-Allied Commission, namely, 400,000 marks.
- 3rd) —Reimbursement to the German Government of the expenses incurred for the Kiev refugees.
- 4th) —Employment of the Russian money which remained in the hands of the German Government (20 million roubles).

According to the reports emanating from the International Commission in Berlin, the following obligations will be incumbent upon the Allied and Associated Governments:

Due the German Government:

For provisioning of the Kiev refugees 2, 000, 000 marks

Value c. i. f.(?) German ports (?) 2400 tons of wheat flour or of 2700 tons of rye flour, supplied to the Russian prisoners of war, and the reimbursement of which is requested in kind. 7,680,000 marks.

Due the British Red Cross:

Advances made by the British Red Cross, to be reimbursed in francs or in pounds sterling 400, 000

10, 080, 000 marks

After having examined the data given by the International Commission in Berlin, the Paris Commission expressed the opinion that the above account only deals with correct and legitimate expenses, and that the principle of their settlement can be admitted. The Italian Delegate, however, makes reservation with respect to the views of his Government concerning the provisioning of the Kiev refugees for two million marks, until an investigation has been conducted on the conditions under which the corresponding agreement was made.

In the sharing of the liabilities in question, between the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, the Commission took as a basis the following decision of the Supreme Council of supplies, under date of February 1st, 1919.

RUSSIAN, SERBIAN AND RUMANIAN PRISONERS IN GERMANY

“The Council approves the decision made by the permanent committee in its meeting of January 28th.

“The French Government is entrusted, in the name of the four Associated Governments, with the provisioning of the Russian, Serbian and Rumanian prisoners in Germany.

“The distribution and the supervision of this provisioning in Germany will be exercised by the Inter-Allied Military Committee at Berlin, under the presidency of General Dupont, in co-operation with the Red Cross organizations of the various nations. The sums necessary will be temporarily advanced by France. The distribution of the expenses between the four Associated Governments is to be ulteriorly regulated.”

This basis of distribution being admitted, with the reservation made by the Italian Delegate with respect to the approval of his Government, each Delegate gave the elements of the following

account which totals the supplies so far furnished by their respective Governments.

	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Approximate value in marks*</i>
France	11,000,000 Francs (100 mks.—38.25 fcs)	28,710,000
Great Britain	80,000,(000) pounds (1 pound—88.50 mks)	7,080,000 (Obvious error)
United States	2,500,800 dollars (1 dollar—20 mks)	50,015,000
This amount comprises 1,727,800 dollars representing the supplies furnished by the American Red Cross, by virtue of a special agreement with the Government of the United States.		
Italy	Account	
Total		85,806,000

In order to determine the share of each of the four Powers and the total cost of the upkeep of the Russian prisoners of war, and of the Kiev refugees, it was decided that the present amount of the debt to be paid, would be added to the cost of the supplies previously furnished, and that this general total would be divided into four, the quotient representing the share of each Power:

Present debt	10,080.000
Amount of previous	85,806.000
Total	95,886.000
Share of each of the four Powers:	23,971.000 marks

From the above data, it appears that France and the United States have given more than their share to this common operation of the Allies. On the other hand, Italy and Great Britain did not assume their share of the liabilities. Consequently, it is incumbent upon them to assume the present debt, according to the following distribution:

Great Britain:	1,500.000
Italy:	<u>8,580.000</u>

10,080.000

The Commission suggested that, in this distribution, the Government of Great Britain should assume, as a contribution to the total reimbursement to be effected, the 400,000 marks advanced by the British Red Cross; the balance of the English debt, and the total amount due by Italy shall, if the Supreme Council approves this proposal, and through the intermediary of the Separations Commission, and under reserve of approval by the Italian Government, be applied to the credit of Germany, through the debit of the reparations account of Great Britain and Italy.

The French and American Delegates declared that, if these proposals were adopted by the various Allied and Associated Governments, they think that their respective Governments, except in case their parliaments should not approve, would very likely not insist, that the surplus of their share in this common operation be reimbursed to them.

With respect to the proposal that a part of the twenty million roubles temporarily in the hands of the German Government should be used for the regulation of the pending accounts, the Commission is of the opinion that this sum should not be deducted in any way, on account of the important questions mixed up with the disposition of the funds in question.

Concerning the request that the cereals supplied by Germany should be reimbursed in kind, the Commission thinks that, as Germany did not comply with the demand made by the Supreme Council to withdraw the German troops from the Baltic provinces, it is neither advisable, nor necessary, at the present time, to effect a reimbursement in kind, but that a sufficient satisfaction would be given to Germany, by crediting her with a sum representing the reparations account. The especial situation of the American Delegate is pointed out to the Supreme Council. In fact, he is instructed to make officially known that the American Government is obliged to refuse all financial assistance, which would aim to continue the provisioning of the Russian prisoners of war, or of the Kiev refugees, at present in Germany. That is why the American Delegate informed

the Commission that it must be understood that no representative or agent of the Government of the United States has the authority to make any financial agreement in the name of his Government, with respect to the affair in question, and declared that the figures given in the present note, relative to the debts to be paid, represent the exact balance at present payable.

The British, French, Italian and Japanese Delegates declared that, although they have no instructions to make any official statement in the name of their Governments, however, they are of the opinion that their treasuries would consider the matter from the same point of view as the American treasury; consequently, the Commission asks that the International Commission in Berlin be informed, that according to the decision of principle already made by the Supreme Council, it has no authority to make any financial agreement in the name of the Five Powers collectively.

Therefore, if the above proposals are approved by the Supreme Council, the points submitted to the Special Commission in Paris would be settled as follows:

The 400,000 marks due the British Red Cross (Question No. 2) will be reimbursed to the latter by the British Government;

The flour advanced by the German Government (Question No. 1) will be reimbursed, not in kind, but in currency, that is to say, 7,680,000 marks; this amount will be added to the 2,000,000 marks due for the upkeep of the Kiev refugees (Question No. 3) and the payment of the sum of 9,680,000 marks would be effected by applying an equal sum to the credit of Germany, in the reparations account; 1,100,000 marks being charged to the English account and 8,580,000 marks to the Italian account. The employment of the 200,000,000 Russian roubles retained by the German Government (Question No. 4) will be postponed until the settlement of similar questions of a larger extent.

Appendix G to HD-102

Note to the Supreme Council

The Special Commission in Paris, entrusted with the question concerning the Russian prisoners of war in Germany has taken note: On one hand, of the answer of the German Government to the resolution of the Supreme Council under date of October 11th,¹¹ and, on the other hand, of Marshal Foch's remarks, relative to the German Note.

The Delegates unanimously decided to submit to the Supreme Council the following recommendation.

“The Special Commission has the honor to request that the two following points be specified in the reply which will be made to the German note:

“1st.—The Allied and Associated Powers have decided to incur no more expenses for the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, except those necessary for the upkeep of their representative to the International Commission in Berlin;

“2d.—The International Commission in Berlin will be a control commission only.”

¹ *Ante*, p. 355 [*Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 17*].

² *Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 895* .

³ Appendix A to HD-93, p. 182 [*Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 9*].

⁴ For text of the treaty, see *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3714.

⁵ Minute 9, *vol. VIII, p. 349* .

⁶ Appendix I to CF-37, *vol. VI, p. 73* .

⁷ HD-68, minute 4, *vol. VIII, p. 579* .

⁸ Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session of January 18, 1919, *vol. III, pp. 157* , *159* .

⁹ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3714.

* The Commission, having no data on the dates on which the supplies mentioned above were made, took as a basis, for the conversion into marks, the rate of exchange of August 25. Therefore, the above figures should be examined before being definitely admitted. In fact, each Delegate has expressly reserved for his Government the right to

modify the total of the sums representing its contribution to the provisioning if, ulteriorly, other items of expense were to be comprised in it. [Footnote in the original.]

¹¹ Resolution not printed; for discussion thereof, see HD-68, minute 4, vol. [VIII](#), p. 579. .

December 1, 10:30 a.m. (HD-103)

[19] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, December 1, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 1, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/103

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/103

HD-103

[Document 19]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, December 1, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 1, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman
Sir George Clerk

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Percin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Hinchley
Cooke

FRANCE

M. Massigli

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Bliss
Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Mr. E. L. Dresel
Dr. J. B. Scott
Lieut-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.
Mr. A. W. Dulles
Captain H. Pierce

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Lieut-Colonel Black
Sir P. Loraine
Mr. E. H. Carr
Mr. H. W. Malkin

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
M. Cambon
General Weygand
General Le Rond
M. Laroche
M. Fromageot

ITALY

General Cavallero
Admiral Grassi
M. Ricci-Busatti
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri

Commander Fea

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

M. Nagaoka

1. (The Council had before it a report from Sir George Clerk to the President of the Conference, dated November 29th, 1919 (See Appendix "A"). Sir George Clerk's Report on Hungarian Affairs

SIR GEORGE CLERK summarized the report sent by him to the Council and brought out the following additional points. In his report he had mentioned the respective positions of M. Friedrich and M. Huszar and had shown how difficult it was to obtain the collaboration in the same Government of the leaders of the National Christian Party and the National Democratic and Jew leaders. Personal differences had furthermore added complications to party questions. He wished to draw the Council's attention to the unique situation in the country occupied by Archduke Joseph. It was true that he was a Hapsburg but he had always lived in Budapest; he had formerly been Palatine of Hungary and he was considered a true Hungarian. Moreover, he had been opposed to the Hapsburgs at Vienna. Archduke Joseph had taken an important part in making M. Friedrich understand the real situation. He (Sir George Clerk) had likewise pointed out in his report how greatly his mission had been helped by the position which the Allied and Associated Generals and Admiral Troubridge had acquired at Budapest. The Generals and the Admiral enjoyed in Hungary a reputation for impartiality which gave special weight to their opinions. In case the Council considered that the Mission of the Generals had now come to an end, and if it decided to recall them, it would be well to leave there some officers who had been on that Mission. It should not be forgotten that the Generals had collected a mass of documents, relating especially to the conditions under which the Roumanian requisitions were effected and to the requisitions themselves. These documents might be of great use in the future. In any event, he thought that if the Generals left Budapest the Allied and Associated Powers should replace them by High Commissioners and that some officers who had been on duty with that Mission should be placed under them. These Commissioners should be charged with the duty, and that would give the Hungarians a high

opinion of the Allies' sense of justice, of establishing the events which had happened in the regions occupied by the troops of states bordering on Hungary. He had acquired the conviction at Budapest that the Hungarians were prepared to accede to the Council's demand that peace be signed. But there were two points to which they seemed to attach great importance, and which they would like the Council to examine before the terms of the Treaty were settled. In the first place, his attention had been called to the work accomplished by the hydrographic service of the old regime. If Hungary did not constitute a unit from the ethnographical point of view, it undoubtedly did constitute one from geographical and economic points of view. The remarkable work accomplished throughout all Hungary by the hydrographic service had been carried out on a unique plan. It was greatly to be feared that if the maintenance of this work were left to the new states receiving parts of former Hungarian territory the whole system would soon be broken down. He thought it important that a permanent regime be organized which should be charged with ensuring the upkeep and development of the work accomplished in that line by the former Government. The second question raised was as to the Presidency of the Hungarian Delegation which would be sent to conclude a Treaty of Peace. For the reasons indicated in his report the Hungarians would like the Delegation to be headed by Count Apponyi who had played a great part in the recent negotiations. Unfortunately, however, Count Apponyi had a bad reputation in western Europe, and he himself was well aware of it. Nevertheless it was true that he and Count Andrassy, were perhaps the only Hungarians possessing a true knowledge of the general European situation. If he were to accept the Presidency of the Hungarian Delegation, Apponyi would be obeying his sense of duty alone. He would be guided by no personal ambition. The economic situation of Hungary like that of Austria, was desperate, unless the Allies could see their way to giving it financial aid. The territory which remained Hungarian could furnish no indispensable raw materials and the situation was all the more serious since there was scarcely any more Hungarian rolling stock in existence. It was essential to send immediately to Hungary at least the material necessary for the reparation of locomotives and cars which still remained. Finally he did not wish to fail to point out to the Council that all Hungarian public opinion was extremely eager

for the return of the Hungarian and Austrian prisoners in Siberia, as to whose fate there was great anxiety. To sum up, he brought back from Budapest the impression that the Hungarians were inspired in general with a desire to collaborate with the Allies. They were beginning to realize the error they had committed, the responsibility for which, moreover, they were now placing on Austrian policy. They hoped that the Allies would help them and give them a chance to prove their good will, otherwise, following Austria, they would have to lean towards Germany.

MR. POLK asked Sir George Clerk if the Serbs were still occupying the Pecs mines.

SIR GEORGE CLERK answered that they were.

MR. POLK thought it important that the Council reach a decision in that matter, requesting the Serbs to retire.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the question had last been referred to the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-slav Affairs.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that that Commission be asked to submit a report the following day.

MR. POLK asked if Sir George Clerk had thought it necessary that General Bandholtz should remain at Budapest until the arrival of the civilian Allied High Commissioners or would it suffice to keep a field officer there who might not be a General.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said he only meant that it was necessary for someone to remain; he personally would recommend retaining at Budapest a field officer and several subaltern officers of each nation, so that the latter could be sent on missions throughout the country.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Sir George Clerk had not indicated in his report what procedure he advised for entering into negotiations with Hungary. He wished to know whether it was possible to ask the Hungarian Government to send its representatives.

SIR GEORGE CLERK replied that the Hungarians were ready and were awaiting the invitation of the Council.

M. DE MARTINO observed that they could be asked to come immediately.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was merely necessary to send them a letter inviting them to come on a given date to a given place. Sir George Clerk had spoken a little while before of Count Apponyi. Personally he was not one of his admirers but it seemed to him very difficult to prevent his coming. The Council had never told enemy States how their Delegations should be composed and moreover he was not sure that any right existed to tell them to send such or such a person.

SIR GEORGE CLERK observed that Count Apponyi did not wish to come if his presence would be distasteful to the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the Hungarians were entitled to do what they thought best for their cause.

M. BERTHELOT observed that Count Apponyi could be reproached with always having been a rabid Germanophile and an ardent advocate of the oppression of small nationalities; evidently these facts did not recommend him to the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that that was true, but that he did not feel sure of the tendencies of the other persons who might be sent.

MR. POLK thought that if Count Apponyi was allowed to come it would be the surest way of destroying his popularity in Hungary.

M. DE MARTINO agreed with Sir George Clerk's suggestion.

SIR GEORGE CLERK remarked that, as M. Clemenceau had said, it was a question for the Hungarians to decide.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he saw some objections to Apponyi just as M. Berthelot had done, but after all he thought that this question concerned the Hungarians alone.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council then had nothing to say to the Hungarians except that they should send their Delegation. In the event of their consulting Sir George Clerk as to the effect which might be produced if Count Apponyi or any other individual should head their Delegation he thought that Sir George Clerk should reply that he was not competent to answer. He asked what date should be set for summoning the Hungarians.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it was not necessary to specify a date.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was true and that it would suffice to ask them to come as soon as possible.

M. BERTHELOT read a draft telegram to be sent to Hungary in clear over the American wire (See Appendix "B").

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was then agreed that the Hungarians should be asked to come to the Chateau de Madrid at Neuilly. He added that the Council thanked Sir George Clerk for his report and for the manner in which he had accomplished his Mission.

MR. POLK said that in view of the remarkable way in which Sir George Clerk had accomplished his Mission he thought the Council would doubtless see fit to formally put on record its especial thanks.

(This was agreed to.)

It was decided:

to send to the Hungarian Government a telegram (See Appendix "B") notifying it to send to Neuilly as soon as possible its representatives to receive the conditions of Peace.

2. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference dated November 27th, 1919 (See Appendix "C").

M. CLEMENCEAU summarized Marshal Foch's letter. Letter From Marshal Foch on the Military Situation in Germany

GENERAL WEYGAND read a draft note which the Marshal proposed to send to the German Government.

MR. POLK said he had no objections to make, but that in view of the present attitude of the German Government, he wondered if it were wise to send it any more notes. He felt, however, that that was a question to be decided by the British and French Governments.

M. CLEMENCEAU admitted that the attitude of the German Government was not good, but felt that that was no reason why it should not be warned that the Council was not deceived as to what was going on. They could not do more for the moment but he felt that they should not do less.

SIR EYRE CROWE approved the draft note which had just been read.

M. DE MARTINO also felt that it was fitting to recall the Germans to their duty. However, it should not be forgotten that the internal situation of Germany was a difficult one. There was a party which seized all pretexts for retarding the putting into force of the Treaty; care should be taken not to play into its hands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that nothing was being done except to keep an account of German shortcomings with respect to the Armistice and the Treaty. He thought that such an account was necessary.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note to the German Government prepared by Marshal Foch (See Appendix "D").

3. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference, dated November 28th, 1919, (See Appendix "E"). Relations Between the Estonian Government and General Yudenitch

MARSHAL FOCH read and commented upon that letter. He added that he had just received a telegram from General Yudenitch¹ setting forth his difficulties and asking, in case it was not desired to let him

remain in Esthonia, that he be transported elsewhere with his troops, for instance, to the territories under General Denikin's control. In view of the rapid march of events, he (Marshal Foch) thought that it would be well, without further delay, to inform the Esthonian Government that General Niessel was directed by the Council to intervene in the matter and that from now on the Conference invited the Esthonian Government to hold in abeyance all measures relative to the disarmament of General Yudenitch's army. To sum up, he proposed: first, that General Niessel, as soon as he should have settled matters in Courland—which apparently would be on or about December 15th—should be sent to Esthonia to negotiate an agreement between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenitch; secondly, that in the meantime, the Esthonian Government be invited by General Niessel's representative on the spot to hold in abeyance all hasty measures which it might take against General Yudenitch, until the Conference, which was considering the question, should intervene.

MR. POLK had no objections with respect to the second proposal. As to the first, he felt that he could not accept it without referring it to his Government, since it was tantamount to giving General Niessel a political mission, whereas, it had formerly been stipulated that the General should not have any mission of that nature.

SIR EYRE CROWE, although he had no personal objections to the proposed procedure, felt himself to be in a similar situation. He would have to refer the matter to his Government, which had formerly demanded that it be clearly understood that General Niessel's Mission should have nothing to do with the Russian side of the Baltic problem. On the other hand, he thought that it would be well to ask the Esthonian Government immediately to hold in abeyance all hasty measures.

M. DE MARTINO had no objections to the Marshal's proposals.

M. MATSUI associated himself with the opinion expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Council was therefore agreed to approve in principle Marshal Foch's second proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that that was so, but that it was to be clearly understood that the Esthonian Government would not be told that the Niessel Mission was to settle the question.

It was decided:

to request the Esthonian Government to hold in abeyance, until further notice, all hasty measures against General Yudenitch and his army, and to inform it that the Council had taken the question under consideration. (See Appendix "E").

4. (The Council had before it a draft form of organization of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Bulgaria, prepared by the military, naval and air representatives at Versailles dated November 24th, 1919 (See Appendix "F"). Organization of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Bulgaria

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to approve the draft form of organization of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, provided for in Articles 94 to 100 of the Bulgarian Treaty of Peace, prepared by the military, naval and air representatives at Versailles, (See Appendix "F").)

5. (The Council had before it a note from the German Delegation dated November 27th, 1919. (See Appendix "G").) Reply to the German Note on the Scapa Flow Incident

M. BERTHELOT said that a draft reply had been prepared but that upon examination, in agreement with the legal experts, it had seemed that this draft did not exactly meet the situation. It had especially made no allusion to a phrase in the German note of September 3rd, which established the general responsibility of the German Government in that affair. He proposed that the Drafting

Committee be charged with preparing a new note, which moreover, could be very brief.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the Drafting Committee could confer with the naval experts.

It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee, in agreement with the naval experts, should prepare and submit to the Council at its next meeting a draft note to the German Government in reply to the German note of November 27th, 1919, concerning the Scapa Flow incident.

6. (The Council had before it a note from the German Delegation, dated November 27th, 1919 (See Appendix "H", and a draft reply to that note (See Appendix "I").) Reply to the German Note Regarding Prisoners of War

CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had before it the draft reply which had been prepared, but before any discussion thereof he wished to make a preliminary statement. The French Government in no wise desired to hold the German prisoners, who required 40,000 men to guard them, and whose presence was becoming objectionable to the inhabitants of the devastated regions. But he felt that it was not possible under existing circumstances to repatriate those prisoners in contravention of the terms of the Treaty.

MR. POLK remarked that he had not had time to acquaint himself with the draft reply. He had no doubt that it would be satisfactory and he would send his reply to the Secretary General during the course of the afternoon.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as soon as Mr. Polk's acceptance was received he thought that it would be advantageous to publish the note.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft reply to the German note of November 27th, 1919, concerning prisoners of war and to publish it, with the reservation that Mr. Polk in the course of the afternoon would notify the Secretary General of the Conference of his decision.

7. (The Council had before it a letter from General Tcherbatcheff to Marshal Foch, dated November 17th, 1919 (See Appendix "J"), and transmitted by a letter of Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference (See Appendix "K").) Letter From General Tcherbatcheff Relative to Stocks of Russian Cartridges in Germany

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the letter of General Tcherbatcheff. He observed that the question was not a new one: General Dupont had formerly pointed out that the Germans to whom these cartridges had been sold were proceeding to destroy them. On November 1st Marshal Foch had warned the German Government that it should not authorize the destruction of these cartridges. Moreover, on November 10th the Council had forbidden the manufacture in Germany of materiel destined for General Denikin's army.² At the present moment, following upon that decision, General Tcherbatcheff was asking for authority to buy Russian cartridges from the individuals who were withholding them. Marshal Foch thought it impossible to authorize the sale by Germans to Russians of material which, according to the terms of the Treaty, belonged to the latter.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that what General Weygand had just said became true from the date of the entry into force of the Treaty. It should not be forgotten that that material had been ceded to Germany by virtue of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.³ That Treaty, it was true, was to be annulled by the Treaty of Versailles, but it would only be annulled after the entrance into force of the latter.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that Sir Eyre Crowe was evidently right from a legal point of view, but it seemed to him difficult to authorize the Germans to sell materiel which in a week perhaps might become Russian property. Moreover, it was undoubtedly true that General Denikin needed ammunition, but the assembling of that ammunition, dispersed in Germany, would be a long process;

consequently, it could not prove an immediate help to General Denikin. By refusing General Tcherbatcheff's request General Denikin would not be directly harmed. The day the Treaty came into force it would become the duty of the Military Commission of Control to recover this ammunition and give it the destination provided by the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was evident that if General Denikin did not immediately need those cartridges, his request might be refused. If, on the contrary, he needed them at once it seemed to him that a reply might be sent to General Tcherbatcheff saying that he was free to buy, but that he should also remember that as soon as the Treaty came into force those cartridges had to be delivered to him. He was afraid that a categorical refusal might be badly interpreted by General Denikin.

MR. POLK said that if there was any way of working out this matter it should be done.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that it was therefore proper to write General Tcherbatcheff showing him the difficulties raised by his request and giving him a free choice in the matter.

It was decided:

that Marshal Foch should inform General Tcherbatcheff of the difficulties raised by his request, at the same time advising him that the Allied and Associated Governments did not oppose the purchase for the account of General Denikin from the Germans, who were withholding them, of Russian cartridges which General Denikin might urgently need.

8. M. CAMBON said that at the last meeting of the Council the American Delegate had made reservations relative to the draft protocol submitted to the Council.⁴ He wished to point out that on September 25th, the Council approved Poland Report No. 6 of the Commission on Polish Affairs.⁵ That report contained a description of the eastern frontiers of Poland. He thought that it would be rather

difficult for the Council to now reconsider the decision then taken.
Determination of Eastern Frontiers of Poland

MR. POLK pointed out that there was a slight misunderstanding. He had never objected to the decision of September 25th; he had merely asked if it was necessary to notify the Polish Government of that decision in the solemn form of a protocol.

M. CAMBON said that he believed, indeed, that a protocol was not necessary and that a decision of the Council would suffice.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Cambon come to an agreement with the Drafting Committee and submit a draft to the Council at its next meeting.

It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee, in agreement with the Committee on Polish Affairs, should submit to the Council at its next meeting a draft form of notification to the Polish Government of the decisions of the Council concerning the eastern frontiers of Poland.

9. (The Council had before it a letter from M. Plamenatz to the President of the Conference, dated November 26th, 1919 (See Note From Appendix "L"). Note From Montenegro Relative to the Possible Signature of a Separate Peace With Germany, Austria and Bulgaria

M. BERTHELOT thought that the best course would be to simply ignore the letter which the Council had before it.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

M. DE MARTINO agreed, but wished to know if the Council intended to take up the examination of the Montenegrin question which had to be settled some day.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was another question. If the Italian Government wished to bring up that problem it should make some proposal on the subject.

It was decided:

that no reply should be sent to the letter from M. Plamenatz threatening the Allied and Associated Powers with a separate peace between Montenegro and Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria.

10. MR. POLK said that as the Drafting Committee was present it might perhaps give some information to the Council as to the points in the Hungarian Treaty upon which no decision had yet been reached. Hungarian Treaty

M. FROMAGEOT replied that the Treaty was ready except the reparation and financial clauses as to which, in spite of repeated attempts, he had been unable to receive any definite reply from the Commissions concerned. Moreover, his Committee had prepared Article 207, similar to Article 224 of the Austrian Treaty, but that article had still to be approved by the Council. Finally, pursuant to the task given it of preparing for the Hungarian Treaty an article which would not prejudice the final solution of the Fiume problem, his Committee had drafted an article which it was prepared to submit to the Council, and with reference to which the members of the Drafting Committee were in agreement on all save very minor points.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the Council could consider all those questions at its next session.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Reparation Commission should be asked to present its report on the following day.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Council should examine at an early meeting the articles of the Hungarian Treaty on which no decision had yet been reached;
- (2) that the competent Commissions which had not yet done so should immediately submit their reports to the Council.

(The meeting then adjourned).

29 NOVEMBER, 1919.

[Report of Sir George Clerk on Hungarian Affairs]

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL: In pursuance of the instructions of the Supreme Council⁶ I arrived in Budapest on October 23 last, in order to put before the Government of M. Friedrich the conditions under which the Supreme Council would be prepared to treat with the Hungarian Government.

The main condition was that such a Government must include representatives of the different political parties in Hungary, It also must be such as to satisfy the Supreme Council that it was able to maintain law and order, to hold elections based on universal suffrage, in a free, impartial and democratic manner, and be prepared to send delegates to Paris to negotiate the peace with the Allies.

It is unnecessary for me to give a long account of the tedious and difficult negotiations which were necessary before this result could be achieved, but it may be desirable to explain briefly the reasons why the negotiations were long and difficult.

Over four years of unsuccessful war, and the collapse of the whole administrative machine under the revolutionary Government of Michael Karolyi, followed by a communist regime, which again was immediately succeeded by the Roumanian occupation, had reduced the Hungarian spirit to a condition of apathy and depression which it required pressure from outside to rouse to action. On the other hand the Communist Regime, of which the most prominent leaders were Jews, and its association with certain members of the Social-Democratic Party, had produced an inevitable reaction. Feeling throughout the country was excited to the highest pitch and very little would have led to an outburst of wild fanaticism. Moreover, M. Friedrich, the titular Minister-President had become in the minds of the vast majority of the Hungarian people the symbol of this reaction against Jewish and Communist influence and anything that had the

appearance of attacking or weakening his position was liable to be misinterpreted and to arouse an outburst of unreflecting but none the less dangerous, chauvinism.

Another element in the situation, which had to be taken seriously into account, was the attitude of M. Friedrich, as expressed in the course of an interview which I had with him immediately on my arrival in Budapest. M. Friedrich asserted that during the three months for which his Government retained office, the whole country had rallied almost unanimously to his banner; the different Christian parties had fused together into a solid block which stood behind him. Personally he was ready to do his best to meet the desires of the Entente, but he was no longer a free agent, as he had been when he assumed power, but merely the trusted spokesman of the Christian National Block. He had already gone as far as possible in broadening the basis of his Government, but any attempt, even if made by himself, to introduce a Social-Democrat or a Jew, or any individual even remotely connected in the popular mind with the Communist regime was foredoomed to failure. His followers simply would not hear of it, and his action must be guided by their will. If amalgamation with the Extreme Left were contemplated, then he preferred to hand over the Government of the country to the Allied and Associated Powers, failing which he would go into opposition to any Government which might take office, and the whole Christian National Block would follow him. Lastly: M. Friedrich sought to impress upon me the magnitude of the service which he had rendered to the Entente by refusing repeated and tempting offers of direct negotiation with Roumania and hinted that any other Government but his was likely to succumb to them.

It was, therefore, necessary to move carefully and to work so that the country gradually awoke to the fact that the wishes of the Entente were not directed against the feelings of the Hungarian people, but were solely intended that those sections of the Hungarian people who were all classed together as enemies of the State, should not suffer injustice when the elections came to be held.

But it was immediately clear to me that nothing effective could be done so long as the dead-weight of the Roumanian occupation lay

upon the country. One after the other, leading Hungarians of independent views, said the same thing to me—that it was useless to try to modify or reconstruct the Friedrich Government while the Roumanian occupation continued. To do so would inevitably involve disturbance and possibly worse, while, if a new Government resulted, which was in itself doubtful, that Government would lose its authority in a day, once it were seen that the Roumanians still remained. Moreover, it was obviously impossible to hold proper elections in any district still occupied by foreign troops. I had, therefore, no hesitation from the outset in urging the earliest possible withdrawal of the Roumanian troops upon the Roumanian authorities in Budapest. It was true that this involved a certain risk. In the unoccupied provinces, and to some extent in Budapest itself, there was much wild talk about the fate in store for the Communists and Jews, and in the capital the Jewish and Social-Democratic sections of the people looked forward with great anxiety to the day when the Roumanians would leave and Horthy's "White" army come in. On the other hand the organization of the *gendarmierie* and the police was under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals, who were sufficiently confident of the behaviour of these forces to confirm my intention to take the risk. There remained Horthy's army. Admiral Horthy came to see me at my request from his headquarters and in the course of a long conversation, I became convinced of his sincerity and patriotism, and above all of his complete recognition of the fact that it would be fatal for Hungary if disorders or abuses followed on the arrival of his troops in Budapest.

In taking this decision, I realized that I was throwing away the best lever with which to secure the withdrawal of M. Friedrich, for I could have used the departure of the Roumanians as a bargain and I could have easily brought about a change of Government. But I felt the gravest objections to putting the Roumanians in any way into a position which would enable them to say that their stay in Hungary was undertaken or prolonged at the request of the Allies. It would have been fatal to put the Allies under any obligation to Roumania. I, therefore, steadily pressed for their immediate evacuation.

Meanwhile, as it became clearer that the Roumanians were really going, the attitude of M. Friedrich and his immediate supporters

stiffened. More than once I received assurances that once the departure of the Roumanians was definite he would be prepared to meet the wishes of the Allies in every way, and resign his office. But with that departure, there came an instantaneous change which, with the experience that I had acquired of M. Friedrich's character and political tactics, caused me no surprise. There was now, according to M. Friedrich, no reason why he should not remain in office, as desired by practically the whole country, and although the Allies certainly wanted peace, Hungary could quite well get along without it. Fortunately there were in Hungary people of wider political experience and M. Friedrich was gradually forced to see that he must make an attempt to meet the wishes of the Allies. I cannot say that the attempt was undertaken very wholeheartedly. It ended with an invitation to the actual party leaders, sent on by M. Friedrich without my knowledge, to meet at my house in a conference, which was so arranged as to lead inevitably to a deadlock. M. Friedrich would then have been able to turn to me and say that I myself was a witness of how his best efforts were useless and that the only chance for the country was to retain a Government which represented 80 or 90 per cent of the population. This Conference was to meet at 5 p.m. on Nov. 18th. To checkmate this manoeuvre, I invited about 40 of the leading Hungarians to meet me informally at 3 p.m. on the same day, in order that I might put before them the situation in Hungary as I saw it. The Friedrich Party came to this meeting with the definite decision that M. Friedrich must remain Minister-President, or the whole Christian National Block would go into opposition. I spoke very plainly, and at least made the Friedrich party see that Hungary must have peace. I then left those present to discuss the position amongst themselves. The discussion lasted till late in the evening and swallowed up the proposed inter-party conference which M. Friedrich had called together. The position that evening was that Count Apponyi, nominated by the Extreme Left Social-Democratic Wing, was generally accepted by all parties outside the Christian National Block as the man who should form a Coalition Government corresponding to the wishes of the Allies. Even in the Christian National Block a large number of leading men were prepared to accept Count Apponyi, but the party as a whole insisted that if it was really impossible to keep M. Friedrich as their leader, the new Minister-President must at least come from the party. The

Conference was resumed at my house next day and resulted in the agreement of all parties to accept M. Huszar, Minister of Education in the Friedrich Government, as Minister-President, provided that he could form a Government of all parties which would be acceptable to the country and agreeable to the Allies.

The hope and expectation of M. Friedrich and his immediate adherents was that that task would prove impossible, and would break M. Huszar's political neck, for he was by far M. Friedrich's most dangerous competitor for leadership. His rivals counted, soundly enough, on the fact that the Social-Democrats, who would have come in almost without terms under Count Apponyi, would exact so high a price from M. Huszar that the Christian National Party would be bound to refuse to pay it. Moreover the five parties of the Left had formed themselves into a block and announced their intention of standing or falling as a whole.

However, in the end M. Huszar succeeded, although his negotiations were almost ruined at the last moment. The Social Democrats insisted that the portfolio of Justice must be given to M. Barczy, a former Burgomaster of Budapest, a leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, and a representative of M. Vaszonyi, the Jewish leader, who had left the country. Such a nomination aroused a storm in the Christian National Block—indeed a week earlier it would have been unthinkable—and the whole fabric threatened to collapse. M. Huszar came to me in despair and I at once gave him a letter congratulating him on his success in bringing all parties together, and especially on the appointment of a member of the Democratic Party as Minister of Justice. No better guarantee could be given to the Allies of the genuine intentions of M. Huszar to meet their wishes. I added a warning to the Democratic Party that their integrity and impartiality would be measured in the eyes of the world by their administration of this high office, whose function it was to try those who had robbed and murdered in the times of the Communist Government. Armed with this letter M. Huszar brought his party to heel at once and was able to bring home to the parties of the Left the serious responsibility that lay upon them to see that the Ministry of Justice was administered with absolute impartiality. Even this concession, however, did not completely satisfy the Social Democratic Party,

which bluffed up to the last moment and only withdrew its exorbitant demands when informed by M. Huszar that I had set a time limit for the formation of the concentration [*coalition?*] Government. Both parties were likewise aware that I should not have hesitated to make it known both to the Supreme Council and to public opinion where the responsibility lay if the negotiations had broken down.

M. Karl Huszar is still young, barely 40, I think, the son of very poor parents, and himself a village school teacher. He entered Hungarian political life as early as he could and has consistently upheld Democratic views and fought for the betterment of the working classes. His personal honesty is above suspicion and he enjoys respect among all political parties. He has great energy and force of character and is well fitted to lead Hungary through this troubled stage of its existence.

I think I should also place on record the fact that the final assent of all Hungarians to a Coalition Government was due more than anything else to the wisdom and influence of two men whose names would rather suggest reaction—Count Apponyi and Admiral Horthy.

Count Apponyi, who had withdrawn altogether from the political arena and was living in retirement on his estate near Pressburg, came to Budapest at my request. His arrival was the signal for a remarkable demonstration in the whole Hungarian press, which voiced the general feeling which was noticeable everywhere that, now that Count Apponyi had come, the solution would be found. By the irony of circumstances, Count Apponyi, who has never yet been Minister-President of Hungary, was proposed for this office on this occasion by his consistent and most bitter political opponents, the Social-Democrats—a striking testimony to their belief in his honesty and patriotism—and rejected by the Christian National Block, of whose policy he had been the accepted life-long exponent. Working solely for what he believed to be the interests of his country, Count Apponyi banished all personal feeling and it was his influence used on every party that more than anything else enabled M. Huszar to amalgamate the various resisting elements.

Admiral Horthy not only in every particular carried out the assurances that he gave me on the occasion of my first interview with him, but ever since his arrival with his troops in Budapest on the day the Roumanians left he showed himself the leader of an army which is really national and a servant of the State, and used his full influence, at the moment greater than that of any man in the country to make all Hungarians see that the only possible course for Hungary is to meet the wishes of the Allies. The extraordinary smoothness and absence of disorder which marked the departure of the Roumanians and the entrance of the Hungarians was due very largely to the arrangements carefully worked out by the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals and Admiral Troubridge with Admiral Horthy's staff, but most of all to the complete hold which Admiral Horthy had over the forces under his command.

Two days before the Roumanian departure some of the Social-Democratic and Jewish leaders came to me, to announce that they themselves intended to leave the city, as they would certainly be arrested when the "White" troops came in, and they told me that the feeling in the Jewish and working-class section of the population was one of the greatest anxiety. I pointed out that for them to go at such a moment would be a grave political error from their point of view; I said that I personally had the fullest confidence in Admiral Horthy's sincerity and in his power over his troops and thus persuaded these gentlemen to remain. I myself spent the whole of the afternoon of the transitional period in the Jewish quarter and I cannot imagine anything more normal or more peaceful, or more evident of confidence. It is true that there were one or two arrests of prominent people, but these were carried out by subordinates without orders from, or the knowledge of, the Government; and, immediately on my representation, and in some cases before, the victims were released.

The Government as now constituted is really representative of Hungarian opinion—in fact the left wing is proportionately more strongly represented in the Cabinet than its power in the country justifies—but the complete realisation of the necessity for peace and the preliminary necessity to meet the wishes of the Allies has made possible the fusion, temporary though it be, of political opposites, the

thought of which six weeks ago would have aroused utter incredulity in the minds of nearly every Hungarian.

I should like to testify to the extraordinary respect and attention which was paid to me personally by all the Hungarians, as well as by their Press. Even those who were hardest to convince and most profoundly disagreed with the object for which I was sent to Budapest, were agreed that my Mission served no personal end but was simply carrying out its duty as impartially as it could, and I received the most loyal assistance from nearly everyone.

I am also much indebted to the support and assistance of Admiral Troubridge and of the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals. I not only have to thank them for their great and ready help in all personal and departmental difficulties, but also for the fact that their influence was directed throughout to support my mission and to convince the Hungarians that the Allies were completely in unison.

But the real reason why my mission achieved its object was because the Hungarians themselves wished it to do so. During the time I spent at Budapest I heard the views of Hungarians of every shade of opinion, stated, I must admit, with great moderation. They realise that though they can claim, with justice, to be a great and civilised race, they allowed their foreign policy to be controlled in another, and to them a foreign capital, and largely by reason of that now find themselves deprived of large territories where, whatever their political behaviour towards their non-Magyar fellow nationals, they had built up a culture and civilisation which, it is difficult to deny, stands far higher than that of the neighbouring States, whose conduct has been in many respects deplorable.

They recognize, I think the broad justice of the inclusion of peoples of one common stock in one State, but they feel that the Allies have, inevitably perhaps but unfortunately for Hungary, only heard one side of the case and have, in doubtful instances, naturally given the benefit to those who fought on their side. Moreover the Hungarians plead for consideration of geographical and economic, as well as of purely national, factors.

The Allies certainly intend to be as just to their late enemies as to themselves, and to see that the small States, aggrandised through the war, do not, by abuse and oppression, cause the world to feel that the result of the war has after all only been to substitute one unrighteous system for another and to sow the seeds of inevitable future conflicts. It is because my experience in Hungary makes me feel that there is a serious danger of this occurring and being aggravated by a rupture of old economic ties and commercial relations, which affects the private citizen far more intimately than great political changes, that I venture to close my report with some observations on what is happening on the borders of Hungary and on the position of that country in general.

It is impossible to see a higher civilisation hopelessly mishandled by those who are still learners in the art of Government, without some sympathy for the victims and without some compunction for one's own share in what is happening. For instance, it seems unnecessary and uncivilised, and, I think, illegal, for the Roumanians to call for an oath of allegiance from university professors whose town and University have not yet been definitely handed over to them. But this is what the Roumanians did in the University of Kolosvar in May last. The professors very rightly said that they were still Hungarian subjects and could not consider themselves released from their duties as such until the Peace Treaty had definitely allocated Kolosvar to Roumania. The Roumanian answer was to turn the professors out of their posts, out of their houses, and to force them to work as labourers, to keep body and soul together. One distinguished Professor of Geography, who has a world wide reputation, was forced to hoe potatoes for a living and he gave his lectures to four pupils who hoed the rows on each side of him. He was then arrested, put in prison and made to clean the latrines. He was finally allowed to leave with his family in a cattle truck, but at the sacrifice of his personal possessions and of the fruits of his whole scientific life.

Another distinguished professor, over 70 years of age and an invalid, was arrested on an unfounded charge of Bolshevism, beaten, and put in prison, where he still remains.

Officers of the Hungarian Army have been carried off in numbers for enquiry as to their behaviour during the Communist regime, and are confined in filthy barracks, doing manual work, under-fed, unpaid, with no clothes save those they have on, cut off from all outside communication. And so it goes on.

It is difficult to believe that the cause of Roumania is helped by this sort of thing.

In the territories occupied by the Serb-Croat-Slovene troops abuses of all sorts are committed and it is credibly reported that the country is being stripped bare where it is being evacuated. I have already reported the instance of the unfortunate land-owner who was shot dead with his small child and whose wife was seriously injured, simply because they happened to live in a house the contents of which appealed to the covetousness of the Serbian soldiers. In justice to the Serbians it must be added that the complaints about such abuses are directed far less against the authorities and forces of the old kingdom than against the new and imperfectly disciplined levies from the Serb, Croat and Slovene population of the absorbed territories.

In the district in the occupation of the Czechs there is a home of the Archduke Joseph. It is true that he is an Archduke and a Habsburg, but he can not help either of these things, and he paid for this home 24 years ago out of his private funds and has spent the greater part of his life there. The Czechs continue to take away his private property in the house and are now proposing to sell by auction the wedding dress of his wife,—a gift from the Empress Elizabeth whose wedding dress it had also been—and all her private family letters. The Church lands of the Archbishopric of Esztergom, now in Czecho-Slovakia, have been taken from the Hungarian ecclesiastical authorities, and the educational and humanitarian institutions which existed on the revenues of those properties have been ruined.

This form of ignoble persecution is unfortunately all too typical of the Allies whom we have made independent States.

It is for these and similar reasons that I have urged that Inter-Allied Commissions should be sent to see what is really happening in these lands which may eventually fall definitely to the lot of Roumania, Serbia, of Czecho-Slovakia, but are now suffering the fate of a village in debatable ground in Macedonia. It might be argued that the Allies cannot insist on sending a Commission into regions which have been definitely assigned to those countries, but I venture to observe that where there is evidence that the authorities of those countries are anticipating and abusing the rights which the final Treaty of Peace may give them, the Allies owe it to themselves to see that their good name is not brought into disrepute. The danger of this is, unfortunately, serious and growing. In fact in my humble opinion there should be a Central High Commission for all these countries with real powers of inspection, and full authority to check abuses and outrage.

Hungary is dying for lack of coal and wood—the latter both for fuel and for pit props. About September 24th General Serbescu on behalf of the Roumanian military authorities, made a formal agreement with the Hungarian Government whereby all locomotives and wagons that were taken from Hungary after 8 a.m. on September 26th were to be returned at once. The number of wagons still owing under this formal agreement is about 11,000. Budapest is faced with complete disaster unless it can get coal to run the trams, lighting, gas works, mills, hospitals, and municipal administration, and heating of all private houses. The Czecho-Slovak Government have agreed to allow Hungary 60 wagons of coal a day, if Hungary will lend them 3,000 wagons for a year. The Hungarians have not got these wagons and asked the Roumanians to let them have 5,000 out of the 11,000 which they admittedly owe. Nothing is done and there is no machinery which can effect the urgent and direct action which alone can save the situation. Again there is a definite agreement in operation between the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Governments by which the latter have undertaken the continuous supply of wood for fuel and pit props. Quite suddenly, without reason given, the Czecho-Slovaks have cut off the provision of this wood with the result that even the Budapest bakeries will have to cease work, owing to lack of fuel. Here again there is nobody that can enforce the maintenance of formal obligations. It would be easy to multiply

instances of the selfish and callous policy pursued by these newly created States, but what I wish to bring out is that the final result will inevitably be that the Great Powers, not only for humanity, but in order to prevent a recurrence of chaos in Europe, will be obliged to provide remedies out of their own resources at an infinitely greater cost and when bitter experience has so driven home to those who have suffered the futility of trust and confidence in the Allies that no amount of eleventh hour charity will restore that political balance which can alone be a guarantee for the peace of Europe.

Perhaps the best instance, and one where there is still time to act, of the desirability of strong Allied action lies in the duty of finding a successor to carry on the water control system of the Hungarian plain. A glance at the map will show that the whole of Hungary, ringed round by the Carpathians, is one geographical unit. The Hungarians have worked out a scientific, efficient, and elaborate control of their water-ways—their knowledge of this subject is probably the highest in Europe—but if each of the new States is to be left to follow its own sweet will in the territories which it has acquired, great economic harm will result, not only to the whole geographic system, but to the individual State. I venture to think that as soon as possible some international body should be instituted which, basing itself on the labors of the Hungarian Government, should provide a permanent and impartial control of all this water system, directed to the interests of all the countries concerned.

In conclusion I venture to submit, on the direct experience that I have now been privileged to have of Hungary and to some extent of Austria, that any idea of immediate payments on account of reparation from those countries must be abandoned. On the contrary, if we are not to condemn millions of human beings to misery and starvation, if we are not to be responsible for a catastrophe almost as great, and in its ultimate consequences possibly even greater, than the war itself, so far from exacting reparation, we have to find funds to keep Austria and Hungary alive. I should be the last to deny that this can be exaggerated. There is a feeling of helplessness in both countries which leads them to expect everything for and to feel incapable of doing anything for themselves. But their financial situation and their losses through the war are such

that unless they get some measure of immediate help they will inevitably collapse into utter ruin and despair. It is one more instance of the creditors of a bankrupt having to decide whether they should cut their losses or take over control themselves and put in more money in order to recover, in time, what they have originally risked.

Moreover, if the two countries feel that they have been able, through the help of the Allies, to avert the complete breakdown of their material and economic existence and to gain a foothold on the arduous path of reconstruction much will be done to diminish the likelihood of Austria seeking union with Germany as her one remaining chance of salvation, and to strengthen the Hungarians in their resolve to abjure for ever the German connection against which they have fretted for so many generations and from which they hope that they have now been finally released.

I can only say that both Austria and Hungary long for strict Allied control, so long as it is designed to help them to live, and that the neighbouring States, our present Allies, need firm supervision and guidance to make them fit to enjoy the inheritance which has fallen to them through our sacrifice and effort.

I have [etc.]

GEORGE R. CLERK

Appendix B to HD-103

DECEMBER 1, 1919.

[Mr. Frank L. Polk to the American Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Mission to Hungary (Bandholtz)]

GENERAL BANDHOLTZ, *Budapest*.

Please deliver following message, textually, from M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, to Mr. Huszar, President of the Council of Ministers of Hungary.

“The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, after information received from Sir George Clerk, its Delegate at Budapest, decided to invite the Hungarian Government to send Delegates to Neuilly (Chateau de Madrid) supplied with the necessary powers to conclude peace with the Allied and Associated Powers.

Consequently, the Hungarian Government is requested to despatch its delegates to Neuilly without further delay. G. Clemenceau.”

POLK
Am[erican] Mission

Appendix C to HD-103

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE
ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF
5505

G. H. Q., November 27, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President Clemenceau.

From information sent from Berlin by Generals Nollet and Dupont or collected in the neutral zone by General Degoutte, it appears that the military situation of Germany at the present time is as follows:

Germany has organized two armies:

A) One comprising:

The remnants of the former army, about	320,000 men
The remnants of the former army, about	80,000 “
The volunteer Corps, about	30,000 “

Making a total of about

430,000 men.

These formations are under the Minister of War. Their existence is admitted by the German Government which intimates that it will disband the remnants of the former army and the volunteer corps and gradually reduce the Reichswehr to the effectives provided for by the Peace Treaty.

That is the official army.

Besides this official army, there is also in preparation a veritable reserve constituted by the Zeitsfreiwillige (voluntary time enlistments) of which a census is taken, who are subject to call and to military training, having their own arms and ammunition depots.

These men are carefully recruited from among those having Monarchist or pan-German tendencies. Their effectives are rapidly increasing. To each formation of Reichswehr corresponds a Zeitsfreiwillige formation.

B) The other, comprising:

	Permanent formations of from 600 to 1,200 men distributed among the important localities. Recruited from among
Police Detachments (Sicherheitspolizei).	{ the former officers or non-commissioned officers who may pass in or out of the Reichswehr and who are provided with all the engines of war (guns, airplanes, machine guns, grenades).
	A kind of national guard. A census is taken
The Einwohnerwehr.	{ of the men; they are drilled periodically, and have their depots of arms and munitions.

These formations whose effectives are unknown, but continue to increase, are commanded and administered by a staff composed of officers and non-commissioned officers of the former army and having an organization similar to that of an army corps, division or regiment.

They are under the orders of the Ministry of the Interior.

That is the unofficial army, the dissimulated army.

The German Government admits its existence but pretends that it is only a matter of measures taken for the maintenance of order.

It may be clearly seen from the above that Germany has begun to form a military organization absolutely contrary to the military clauses of the Treaty. General Degoutte having pointed out to me the existence in neutral zone (Frankfort, Hanau, Hamburg) of certain staffs and depots of arms and munitions not provided for by the clauses of the Armistice, I directed him to demand from the German Command the immediate withdrawal of these staffs or depots. But it is not possible before the coming into force of the Treaty to impose upon the German Government the suppression of the military organization which it is forming.

However, it seems necessary to keep the Supreme Council informed of the situation above set forth and to advise the German Government that all the military provisions which it has taken, contrary to the clauses of the Treaty, must be revoked without delay upon the coming into force of the Treaty.

F. FOCH

Appendix D to HD-103

Proposed Note to the German Government

According to corroborative information received up to the present time, the German Government has been preparing and has realized considerable development in its military forces for some time back.

Apart from the Reichswehr, it has organized permanent forces which are designated as Sicherheitspolizei and which have all the characteristics and value of chosen troops.

These forces are commanded and administered by Staffs constituted from a military personnel. These formations, although attached to the Ministry of the Interior, have characteristics which deny their avowed purpose as police forces, and their development is in contradiction with Article 162 of the Treaty.

Furthermore, under the name of Zeitfreiwillige and Einwohnerwehr, Germany is forming a reserve force, subject to call and military drill, having at their disposition munitions and arms depots. These organizations are contrary to the military clauses in general and, in particular, to Article 178 of the Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments point out at this time that these provisions, adopted in contradiction with the spirit and terms of the Treaty, might be interpreted as an intention on the part of the German Government to not comply with the Treaty. Consequently, they invite the German Government to annul the above indicated measures at once or, in any event, that upon the entry into force of the Treaty:

all forces, so-called police, be carried in the effectives provided for by the Treaty, and in a constitution in conformity with their character of local or municipal police;

The staffs, aside from those provided for by the Treaty, be dissolved;

all reserve organizations be discontinued.

Appendix E to HD-103

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, November 28, 1919.
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES No. 5514
GENERAL STAFF
3RD SECTION

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President of Council.

According to reports from General Etievant, the Russian Northwest Army, after the failure of its attempt against Petrograd, was repulsed in direction of Esthonia.

Youdenitch wants to reorganize it.

But the Esthonian Government seems unwilling to receive it, and wants to disarm it, and enlist the volunteers in its own army and dissolve the rest.

This situation requires an immediate solution, as, it can cause conflicts between Russians and Esthonians at any moment.

General Etievant suggests, to this end, that the Entente intervene in order that the Esthonian Government receive the Youdenitch Army on its territory, and respect its autonomy, so as to enable this army to reorganize and reinforce itself with the Russian elements of the Bermondtsky army, which General Niessel can send to it, to receive the war material intended for it and, thus, to be put in a position to resume its operations against the “Red” army.

These suggestions seem acceptable, for, it seems that the Entente cannot permit the nucleus of the Youdenitch Army be disbanded, without renouncing its principal instrument in Northern Russia against the Bolchevists.

But the measures to be taken can only be determined on the spot. They imply the conclusion of agreements with the Baltic States—in particular with Esthonia—which a representative of the Entente, only, can successfully negotiate, as a compensation for the assistance lent to these states to liberate them from the Bolchevists and the Germans.

General Niessel, on account of his present situation, seems to be the right man to be entrusted with this mission, when he has regulated the evacuation of the German troops.

It is sufficient to give him the necessary instructions.

If you share this point of view, I have the honor to ask you to kindly submit to the Supreme Council the following resolution:

“The Allied and Associated Powers, with a view to continuing, as far as possible, to help the anti-Bolchevist forces, at present under the orders of General Youdenitch, and to facilitate the reorganization of these forces, direct General Niessel to intervene, in their name, with the Esthonian Government and with General Youdenitch, to the end of bringing about and facilitating the conclusion of the necessary agreements, for the establishment in Esthonia and the reorganization of the Russian Northwest Armies.”

FOCH

Appendix F to HD—103

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY, NAVAL &
AIR REPRESENTATIVES

S. W. C. 483

VERSAILLES, 24 November, 1919.

*Draft Organization of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control
Provided For in Articles 94–100 of the Treaty of Peace “With
Bulgaria*

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS

ARTICLE I

Three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control shall be established:—

A Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control,
A Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control,
An Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

They shall represent with the Bulgarian Government, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in everything that concerns the carrying out of the Military, Naval and Aeronautical Clauses respectively.

Those Commissions shall enter on their duties on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

ARTICLE II

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged (Article 94) with supervising the execution of the Military Clauses as defined in Article 98. It will be presided over by a French General.

ARTICLE III

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged (Article 94) with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses as laid down in Article 99.

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be presided over by a French Admiral or Senior Officer.

ARTICLE IV

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged (Article 94) with the supervision of the execution of the Air Clauses as laid down in Article 100.

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be presided over by a British General or Senior Officer.

ARTICLE V

The General Officers or Senior Officers and the Admiral mentioned in Articles II, III and IV shall each of them attach to the two others a Permanent Representative (Assisted if necessary by other Officers) charged with ensuring liaison between them.

POWERS OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

ARTICLE VI

The Powers of each of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control are defined in Articles 94–100 of the Treaty of Peace.

ARTICLE VII

The General Clauses (Articles 101–104 of the Treaty of Peace) shall be under the supervision, in so far as each of them is concerned, of the Military, Naval and Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.

EXPENSES OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

ARTICLE VIII

The maintenance and expenses of the Commissions of control and their working expenses, are chargeable to Bulgaria, in accordance with Article 97 of the Treaty of Peace. These expenses shall be paid direct through the Presidents of the Commissions to the parties concerned, by the Allied and Associated Governments, who shall obtain repayment of such expenses from the Bulgarian Government.

ARTICLE IX

The Bulgarian Government shall be notified by the President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control of the Accommodation required for the Commissions of Control, and of the duty incumbent upon it of providing such accommodation in accordance with Article 96 (paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Peace).

ARTICLE X

The Officers and Men forming part of the Military, Naval and Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, shall receive financial assistance which shall be identical to that fixed for the corresponding Commissions in the case of Germany. The amount of the allowances thus granted shall be revised every three months, consideration being taken of the economic conditions prevailing in Bulgaria.

The question of the Transport in Bulgaria of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control (Military, Naval and Aeronautical) as well as that of their accommodation, and of the provision of their supplies

during their stay in this country shall be regulated and co-ordinated by the President of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

The amount of the allowances to be arranged for in these conditions ought to be a generous one, and ought to be chargeable to the first payment to be made by Bulgaria. It is in the general interest to reduce it as far as possible in attaching to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control no more than the absolutely indispensable number of Officers.

DURATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

ARTICLE XI

The duration of the activities of each Commission shall be limited to the complete execution of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses under its supervision in the time limit fixed by the Treaty of Peace. In case the execution of these clauses be not completed within the period fixed, this fact shall be reported by the Commissions concerned, to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, who will decide on the measures to be adopted.

Until a decision is reached, the Commissions shall continue to supervise the execution of the particular Clause in question.

ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

ARTICLE XII

The General Officer presiding over the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Staff which shall include Officers of each of the Armies of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. He, moreover, shall be assisted by the necessary technical personnel (legal, financial, &c).

The Commission shall sit at Sofia.

ARTICLE XIII

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall include 2 sub-commissions:

- a) A Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armaments, Material and Fortifications;
- b) A Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training.

SUB-COMMISSION FOR MUNITIONS, ARMAMENT, MATERIAL AND
FORTIFICATIONS

ARTICLE XIV

This Sub-Commission shall include in its duties, the supervision of the execution of Articles 76–82 and of Table V of the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by an Italian General or Senior Officer assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; it shall sit at Sofia.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission shall be decided by the President.

This Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Philipopolis, Iamboli, Varna and other places which may be considered necessary.

SUB-COMMISSION FOR ESTABLISHMENTS, RECRUITING AND MILITARY
TRAINING

ARTICLE XV

This Sub-Commission shall include in its duties the execution of Articles 64–75 and Tables I, II, III, IV of the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by a British General or Senior Officer assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; it shall sit at Sofia.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission shall be decided by the President.

This Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Philipopolis, Plevna, Shumla and other places which may be considered necessary.

ARTICLE XVI

The number of Officers who are to form part of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control might be fixed, in number, on the following proportion:—

France	6/20ths.
Great Britain	5/20ths.
Italy	5/20ths.
U. S. A.	3/20ths.
Japan	1/20th.

ORGANISATION OF THE NAVAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

ARTICLE 17

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses of the Treaty of Peace (Articles 83 to 88).

ARTICLE 18

The Commission shall be presided over by a French Admiral or Senior Officer and shall include a Senior Officer of each of the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 19

The Commission shall be entitled to call upon technical advisers of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers if their presence is considered necessary by the Commission.

ORGANISATION OF THE AERONAUTICAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

ARTICLE 20

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control charged with the supervision of the execution of the Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace, shall be composed as follows:—

A principal Commission and a Staff, which shall sit at Sofia;
A Sub-Commission on Production;
A Sub-Commission on Military and Naval Aircraft.

ARTICLE 21

The Principal Commission presided over by a British General, or Senior Officer, shall consist of a Senior Officer of each of the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 22

The Sub-Commission on Production shall supervise particularly the execution of the Clauses of Article 92.

It shall be presided over by a French Senior Officer, and shall sit at Sofia.

The number of Officers required for this Sub-Commission shall be fixed by the President.

ARTICLE 23

The Sub-Commission on Military and Naval Aircraft shall supervise with regard to these different branches, the execution of the Clauses other than those of Article 92.

It shall be presided over by an Italian Senior Officer, and shall sit at Sofia.

The total number of Officers required for this Sub-Commission shall be fixed by the President.

ARTICLE 24

The proportion of Officers forming part of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be the same as that fixed in Article 16.

DESTICKER.	C. SACKVILLE-WEST	UGO CAVALLERO.	S. D. EMBICK
<i>Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Major-General Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council.</i>
LEVAVASSEUR,	M. H. MACDONALD,	GRASSI,	McCULLY,
<i>Captain. French Naval Representative</i>	<i>Commander, R. N. British Naval Representative</i>	<i>Admiral. Italian Naval Representative</i>	<i>Rear-Admiral. American Naval Representative</i>
DUVAL,	P. R. C. GROVES,	PICCIO,	A. LIPPINCOTT,
<i>General. French Air Representative.</i>	<i>Brig-General. British Air Representative.</i>	<i>Lt-Col. Italian Air Representative.</i>	<i>Colonel. American Air Representative.</i>
	WATANABE,	OSUMI,	
	<i>General. Japanese Military Representative.</i>	<i>Captain. Japanese Naval Representative.</i>	

Appendix G to HD-103

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION No. 53

PARIS, November 27, 1919.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: His Excellency, M. Clemenceau.

I have the honor to forward to you herewith a memorandum from the German Government concerning the Scapa Flow affair.

Please accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Concerning the Scuttling of the German Battleships at Scapa Flow

In a note of November 1,⁷ the Allied and Associated Governments made the establishment of the first Protocol of deposit of ratification and, consequently, the going into force of the Peace Treaty, dependent upon the signature of a special Protocol⁸ regulating the execution of the clauses of the Armistice not yet fulfilled by the Germans. They inclosed in their note a draft of Protocol containing the enumeration of the clauses of the Armistice, which they consider as not yet executed. As was already affirmed by Germany, in the conversation which incidentally took place on the subject, the German Government does not intend to oppose the establishment of such a Protocol, although it is bound to affirm with all its energy that if some conditions of the Armistice are not entirely executed, Germany is not responsible for it. The German Government also admits that the Protocol enumerates the obligations which remain to be fulfilled by Germany. Verbal negotiations will be necessary to specify to what extent the enumeration contained in the Protocol conforms to the truth and, to settle the question of juridical consequences which would eventually result from the non-execution of the obligations which have not yet been fulfilled. On the other hand, in conformity with the agreement made in the course of the conversation which took place on the subject, it is necessary to set forth, from now on, the point of view of the German Government on one of the questions contained in the Protocol and, in particular on

the question of the scuttling of the German battleships at Scapa Flow: In fact, it is considered on the German side, that this question cannot be dealt with from the point of view of the non-execution of the clauses of the Armistice; therefore, a special discussion on this subject is necessary at first.

In a note of June 25th⁹ the Allied and Associated Governments mentioned the scuttling of the German ships at Scapa Flow as a violation of Article 23 and 31 of the Armistice, for which the German Government should be made responsible. At the same time, referring to Articles 40 and 41 of the Hague regulations on the laws of war on land,¹⁰ they reserve the right to require a reparation for the damage suffered by them. The German Government, in answer to this note, refrained from setting forth its juridical point of view, because the accurate information on this incident promised to the German Armistice Commission by the British Admiralty had not yet reached it, and because sufficient information was lacking on the accuracy of these facts. Consequently, the German reply of June 28th was limited to establishing that the scuttling of the ships had been executed by Admiral von Reuter and his subordinates unknown to all German civilian and military authorities. In its subsequent note of September 3rd, the German Government also abstained from judging the incident from a juridical point of view; this note, in fact, aimed to obtain the liberation of the crews of the ships held as prisoners of war. Now, the Allied and Associated Governments, again referring to Articles 23 and 31 of the Armistice Convention, in reality, pretend to obtain a reparation for the damage, which is supposed to have been caused by the scuttling; they require that Germany comply with demands of an extraordinary importance. On account of these conditions, it is necessary to make the following remarks: With regard to Article 31 of the Armistice Convention, the German Government thinks that this provision, which forbids the destruction of ships or material before the evacuation, delivery or restoration, does not cover the case considered. The note of November 1st discovers in Article 23 of the Armistice Convention the obligation for Germany to maintain, in good condition, the ships conducted to the Allied ports, on the ground that these ships were destined to be subsequently surrendered. This interpretation of Article 23 cannot be admitted. The Armistice Convention contains no provision

concerning the fate of the ships. The fact that the latter were preferably (or originally, in German; *in erster Linie*) to be held in neutral ports and that the German crews were to remain on board, rather proves that the fate of the ships was not intended to be regulated by the Armistice Convention. From the German point of view, the internment should not be considered as the preliminary of a definite surrender. The First Lord of the British Admiralty himself, Long, several times distinguished very plainly between internment and surrender, according to the meaning of this word in the Armistice Convention. Consequently, the German Government had fulfilled the obligations resulting from Article 23, since it had sent its ships to the Firth of Forth within a period of seven days. Thus, the aim of Article 22, which was to render impossible the resumption of hostilities by the German Navy during the Armistice, was attained.

Therefore, in the opinion of the German Government, the question of the interpretation of Article 31²³ [31 and 23] of the Armistice Convention, as well as the questions as to whether the scuttling of the ships, is in contradiction with any stipulation of the Armistice Convention, does not need to be discussed. Similarly, the German Government is of the opinion that the point is not whether the scuttling caused a damage, or not, to the Allied and Associated Powers. The decisive element in the appreciation of this incident, is the fact that the scuttling of the ships must not be put down to the attitude of the German Government but to the attitude of the Allied and Associated Governments. In fact, in contradiction with the provisions of Article 23 of the Armistice Convention, the Allied and Associated Governments interned the German battleships not in a neutral port but in an enemy port. According to the inquiries made on the German side, they did not even try to intern the said ships in the neutral ports which were qualified to be chosen, in particular in Dutch or Scandinavian ports. During the negotiations for the prolongation of the Armistice, at Treves, on January 15, the Germans already protested against this fact. This protest, although several times repeated, remained without an answer. But, as the internment took place in a British Port, the Allied and Associated Governments should have at least organized it in such a way as to correspond to the internment in a neutral port. Instead of that, the crews, in spite of reiterated protests, were treated like prisoners of war. Wireless

relations with their country were forbidden them; they were even forbidden to use, although they requested it, their wireless receiver, in order to listen to the radiograms of the press; they only received mail once a week. Censure was so strict that three weeks, at least, elapsed before news could reach them. At the time of the scuttling, the last mail steamer had arrived a week previous; the mail *B 98* only arrived after the scuttling.

Now, the interruption of relations between the crews and their country resulted in that, in those unfortunate days, Admiral von Reuter was led to suppose that the Armistice expired on June 21st at 12.00. The details of the facts were already set forth in the German note of September 3rd, according to authentic declarations of the Admiral which reached Germany on that date. According to the terms of these declarations, the supposition made by the Admiral was caused by the news published by the English papers, to which he had recourse for his information. A copy will be found in the Annex^{10a} of the news published in the *Times* of June 16th and 17th; the first of these advices reached Admiral von Reuter the day before the scuttling, the second reached him on the day of the scuttling itself. It appears from these facts that the Admiral did not know that the remittance of the ultimatum of the Allied and Associated Powers had been delayed from June 16th, 12:00 o'clock, to June 16th, 7:00 p.m. Therefore, it is established that Admiral von Reuter, during the stay of his ships at Scapa Flow, was beyond the jurisdiction of the German Government; for this reason, any responsibility of the German Government for the actions of the Admiral is, at first sight, out of the question. The responsibility of the State for the action of its agents implies, in fact, that the said agents obey the orders of the State. The Fatherland is not responsible for the orders given by a military chief, prisoner of war, neither towards the State in which he is residing, nor towards any third person. On the other hand, it is ascertained that the treatment inflicted upon the Admiral by the British authorities and, particularly, the interruption of the communications between him and the Fatherland (as circumstances which ought to be considered as the real cause of the scuttling) were contrary to the stipulations of the Armistice Convention. A State is not qualified to ask another State for a reparation for a damage due to the violation of a Treaty by the applicant State, and which the

other State was not in the position to prevent, for the very reason that the Treaty had been violated.

Therefore, as such an agreement would not be justified, the German Government is obliged to refuse to agree in any way to execute obligations which might be imposed on it on account of the scuttling of the German battleships. However, in case the Allied and Associated Governments should not admit this point of view, and in order not to delay by a debate of this kind the going into force of the Treaty, which it also earnestly desires, the German Government proposes to submit this affair to the permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The Court of Arbitration should decide first, whether the German Government is responsible for the scuttling of the ships; in case this question should be affirmatively settled, the Court of Arbitration would have to appraise the damage which resulted to the Allied and Associated Powers from the scuttling itself, and to say how Germany can repair it.

Appendix H to HD-103

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION No. 54

PARIS, November 27, 1919.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: President Clemenceau.

Replying to your note dated November 15, which reached me on November 21, relative to the repatriation of the German war prisoners in France, I have the honor, by order of my Government, to communicate the following to your Excellency:

1st) The French Government affirms that it has never promised anything further than the execution of the clauses of the Peace Treaty.

Doubtless the French Government has forgotten the official declaration which was published by the Havas Agency on August 29, 1919. That declaration was drawn up as follows:

“With a view to diminishing the sufferings, caused by the war, as rapidly as possible, the Allied and Associated Powers have decided to ignore the ratification date of the Peace Treaty with Germany when treating the repatriation of German prisoners.

“The repatriation operations will commence immediately, and will be conducted under the auspices of an Interallied Commission, to which will be added a German representative upon the entry into force of the Treaty. The Allied and Associated Powers desire it to be fully understood that the continuation of this policy of favor, offering such great advantages to the German soldiers, will depend upon the accomplishment, by the German Government and the German people, of all the obligations incumbent upon them.”

The French Government does not affirm that this promise was withdrawn because the German Government and the German people have not accomplished the obligations incumbent upon them. Such a withdrawal should at least have been communicated to the German Government.

The French Government simply denies having made any promise whatever. This contradictory attitude is the more incomprehensible in that the statement of August 29 was not a spontaneous concession made from reasons of humanity, but more the counterpart of concessions to which the French Government had influenced the German Government by promising a favorable attitude in treating the question of the prisoners of war.

The questions at issue at that time were, on one hand, the delivery of coal, and on the other, the case of Sgt. Mannheim:

1st) At the time of the Paris negotiations concerning the deliveries of coal to France, a statement was made to the German representative on August 22, intimating that Germany could not expect the fulfillment of her desires in the question of war prisoners except upon the commencement of coal deliveries; on the contrary, as soon as deliveries of coal would have been

commenced the Entente would accord a generous treatment of the question;

2nd) Relative to the case of Sgt. Mannheim, the German Government had refused to pay the fine of about a million francs imposed upon the city of Berlin under threat of military penalties. From an authorized French source the German Government was informed that the question might be settled in a friendly manner: in that case, Marshal Foch would use his influence to effect as prompt a repatriation as possible of the German war prisoners.

At Paris, as well, the Mannheim case was at the same time treated in conjunction with the war prisoners question. When, on August 26th, the German representative, after having promised an immediate commencement of coal deliveries, expressed a desire to base the early repatriation of the war prisoners upon the promise which had been made during negotiations, satisfactory assurances were given him, and it was added that the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, would write to him on this matter within a short time. But, at the same time, the French representative requested an intervention for the payment of the fine of a million francs imposed concerning the Mannheim case, stating that the settlement of that matter was an important item with the President of the Council.

At that time it was agreed in Berlin to place one million francs at the disposal of the French Government for the Red-Cross, in order that, within one week after the payment of this sum, the Commission, provided for by Article 215 of the Peace Treaty to regulate the repatriation of war prisoners, might convene, and that proper announcement might be made by the Havas Agency.

As the installation of the Commission progressed slowly, and as the German representatives in Paris insisted upon the keeping of the promise, he was informed, on September 28, that the War prisoner question had been regulated; henceforth transportations destined for Germany were to continue without interruption. In the first place, all the prisoners detained in England would be repatriated, then those in America, and lastly those who were detained in France. In the opinion of the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, the Franco-German negotiations concerning these transportations were useless.

The French Government, therefore, cannot deny that Germany, several months ago, by agreeing to important sacrifices, obtained a formal promise that the repatriation of the war prisoners would not be delayed until a time fixed by the Peace Treaty, and that, on the contrary, this repatriation would begin without delay.

In the Government's note dated November 15th, not only is the obligation of the French Government to repatriate the war prisoners without delay contested, but the note exposes in detail the reasons for which the French Government is not inclined to willingly commence this repatriation before the entry into force of the Treaty.

This exposé contains a list of all the grievances that the French Government formulates against the German Government, and it is on these prisoners of war that the French Government causes these grievances to fall. In contradiction with the principles of generosity and humanity continually affirmed by the French Government, it is the innocent who are forced to pay for the pretended discrepancies of the German Government; as it is the innocent who are retained as hostages in order that the desire of the French Government may receive satisfaction.

Such a policy should be the more severely condemned in that the information claiming that the German prisoners in France are well treated from both a material and moral point of view is unfortunately far from the truth. As in the past, they are submitted to the laws of war, applied with a pitiless severity. In many respects, their clothing and nourishment are insufficient for the cold season, and the war prisoners are, in majority still cut off from all communication with the mother country.

On account of the situation so clearly established by the promise of the French Government, it appears superfluous to insist further concerning that part of the note. However, in order to dissipate any false impression, the German Government considers it proper to proffer the following remarks:

1st) The German Government did not refuse, as the note inclines to establish, to comply with the consequences involving from the fact

that it affixed its signature to the Peace Treaty, which provides for the delivery of persons accused of having violated the laws of war. Fully recognizing the obligation resulting from the Treaty, the German Government called attention rather to the difficulties which oppose the execution of these clauses and, without submitting a formal proposal, requested the Allied and Associated Governments to study on their side how it would be possible to reach, by some other means, the end which they are pursuing. Moreover, the German Government made this effort before the note of the Allied and Associated Governments of the month of November had been received by it.

2d) The note asks what the inhabitants of the devastated regions might think if the prisoners of war who are employed in the much needed cleaning up operations cease their labors before the period fixed by the Peace Treaty and are authorized to leave France.

The German Government does not believe that it can reply to that question in the sense intimated by the note. On the contrary, it is convinced that the French population has a great deal of sympathy for the war prisoners and, despite their own sufferings, would prefer to see the prisoners recover their liberty, rather than see them atone for acts, for which they are in no wise responsible, by performing the labor of slaves.

3rd) from an authorized French source, it has been solemnly affirmed several times since July 11, that the question of war prisoners was not to be confounded with the question of restoring the devastated regions. If no definite agreement has yet been reached upon the employment of German civil manual labor, the German Government is not responsible for it. Upon the signing of the Peace Treaty, the German Government declared itself ready to furnish German manual labor for reconstruction operations, and in the course of the negotiations which were carried on on this subject, it made careful proposals concerning the employment of this manual labor. At the same time, in the interior of Germany the preparations which had commenced before the signing of the Treaty regarding the sending of this manual labor were pushed with the greatest celerity. The French Government was fully aware of all this. The German

Government regrets that, despite its repeated requests, it has not yet been possible to have the French Government make a definite statement concerning the German proposals, and to designate the sectors in which the reconstruction operations are to be accomplished by German workmen.

4th) It is impossible to understand the reproach made toward the German Government pretending that it refused to take the necessary temporary measures to facilitate the execution of the Peace Conditions in Schleswig and Upper-Silesia. The preparations for executing the stipulations of the Treaty in the Schleswig plebiscite zone were fully facilitated by the German Government. Studied negotiations took place between the Government and the International Commission, which, during the plebiscite, is to take over the administration of the territory. In the course of these negotiations an agreement was reached on all essential points. Representatives of the Commission are already functioning, with the approval of the German Government, in the plebiscite zone.

Concerning Upper-Silesia, the German Government declares itself ready to comply with the desire expressed by the Allied and Associated Governments relative to the despatch of a Military Inquiry Commission. It is also well known that, according to the observations made by that Commission, the responsibility for the troubles which occurred in the month of August and, consequently, the responsibility for the sufferings endured by the population as a result, are in no wise incumbent on the German Government.

5th) The German Government rejects the accusation of having systematically delayed the execution of the clauses of the Armistice Convention. Germany has done everything in her power to fulfill the extremely heavy obligations imposed by that Convention. The German Government, furthermore, has no intention of discussing the numerous violations of Armistice, the numerous and serious abuses, as well as the excesses by which its adversaries violated the said convention, at this time. The Government knows that at this time its voice would be unheeded. A time will come, more equitable, when it will be known which of the two parties has the greatest right to raise complaint.

6th) Concerning the scuttling of the war ships at Scapa Flow, that question will be treated in detail in another document.^{[10b](#)}

The question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces is, furthermore, not open to discussion at this time since it has been submitted to examination by an Interallied Commission presided over by General Niessel, the results of which examination are being awaited.

7th) Concerning the reproach addressed to Germany in the note “of having retained an equivocal article in the Constitution up to the present time,” a question which was settled long ago, and concerning which the German Government complied with all the claims of the Allied and Associated Governments, is again presented.

8th) Finally, the note affirms that the German Government pursues a tireless propaganda, backed by important resources, against the Allies throughout the entire world.

The German Government can only express its astonishment that such absurd falsehoods find credence and are considered as worthy of chronicle in an official document. The German Government hopes that the Allied and Associated Governments will not allow their attention to be detracted by this from the question of war prisoners, which is becoming daily more serious and urgent, and concerning which Germany believes she is entitled to the sympathy of all civilized peoples.

Accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER

Appendix I to HD—103

PARIS, December 1, 1919.

Note From Supreme Council to German Delegation

To: Baron von Lersner.

On November 27th last, you addressed a letter to me relative to German prisoners of war, which contained a series of statements whose incisive tone cannot mask their inaccuracy.^{[11](#)}

In a general way, in the prisoner of war question, Germany had but one right formulated by the Peace Treaty which she has signed: Repatriation to begin on the day of the coming into force of the Treaty following the definite exchange of ratifications. Any modification of these stipulations which are law for the parties, is a favor. The statement that the prisoners are innocent persons without responsibility in the war does not bear examination.

Your note states that the French Government has taken in the first place, on August 29th, 1919, and later, either on the delivery of coal by Germany or the payment of a million to the Red Cross as expiation for the assassination of Sergeant Mannheim at Berlin, definite obligations for the anticipated repatriation of German prisoners of war. This triple statement is absolutely without foundation. The French Government has never assumed any obligation in the matter which was within the jurisdiction of all the Allies.

The declaration of August 29 which, for reasons of humanity and not as a counterpart of concessions made by the Germans, announced the decision of the Allies to anticipate the date of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty as regards the repatriation of prisoners, is posterior to conversations relative to coal and Sergeant Mannheim. This declaration is not made between the French Government and the German Government under the form of a promise resulting from a negotiation. It is a humanitarian declaration by all the Allies relative to all German prisoners captured by them. The declaration reads: 1st:—The immediate commencement of repatriation; 2nd:—the possible interruption of this benevolent policy in case the German Government and people did not fulfill all the obligations incumbent upon them by the Armistice, which binds them until the definite ratification of the Treaty.

In conformity with this unilateral decision of the Allies, repatriation immediately began and continued for several months by the return

of German prisoners from England, America and Belgium.

Again in conformity with the declaration of August 29th, the repatriation of prisoners has been suspended because of violations, non-execution and incomplete execution of the Armistice clauses by the German Government.

The promise and the threat, freely made by the ensemble of the Allies, has thus strictly been executed. In the note of November 1,^{[12](#)} the German Government was advised of its non-execution of obligations assumed by the Armistice of November 11, 1918, one year previously. It was advised of the measures and penalties provided for assuring the integral execution of the Armistice clauses not renewed in the Peace Treaty.

The French Government follows no policy based on the non-repatriation of prisoners of war, and does not make use of it as a means of pressure. It adheres to the Articles of the Treaty and if the benevolent measure inaugurated August last has not been followed to the end, it is solely because of the non-execution by the German Government of its own obligations.

The responsibility of Germany for the delay in the return of German prisoners is directly engaged in the most precise manner by the fact that she has not yet replied to the note of the Allies under date of November 1, and that after having sent her Commissioners to Paris to arrange for the functioning of Commissions on the Execution of the Treaty, she sent them back to Berlin two days after their arrival, although the date and the conditions for the examination of questions asked had been fixed in accord with her delegates.

It is the German Government which is seeking to make use of the prisoner of war question to excite German public opinion against the Allies, and especially against France; the proof may be seen in the fact that the Conference, determined that the ratification and the coming into force of the Peace Treaty should take place on December 1st, fixing thereby the date for the early return of the prisoners; instead of agreeing to the last negotiations under consideration, the German Government has taken a dilatory attitude and begun a

discussion in an unjustifiable tone relative to the repatriation of prisoners, whose return at the end of last month, that is to say, a few days later depended on itself. The dilatory character of such a proceeding and the delay in the ratification, caused by Germany, makes her entirely responsible for the upkeep of her prisoners in France where, moreover, they have been treated not only in a humane way, but also with kindness.

Without going into detailed explanation outlined relative to Schleswig and Upper Silesia, or in the matter of the Baltic Provinces (where Germany decided to partially fulfill her obligations only when constrained and forced to do so), or Article 61 of the Constitution, which has not been suppressed up to the present time (The German Government always delaying until the last moment, and until morally and physically constrained to execute her obligations); I will only consider the discussion concerning the handing over of the accused.

The Germans themselves do not deny that numerous crimes have been committed and that universal morality would be seriously injured if these crimes, whose authors are known, should remain unpunished. Any human being going through the northern regions of France, as well as into Belgium and who sees with his own eyes these provinces systematically ravaged, with all industrial establishments leveled to the ground, dwellings reduced to dust by savage methods, all the fruit trees sawed within a meter of the ground, mines blown up and filled with water, human work of entire centuries spitefully annihilated, cannot understand Germany's hesitation to consent to the reparation for her crimes. If the same impartial observer then heard from the mouths of the inhabitants the tale of the treatment to which they have been subjected for four years, the violences and the abominable constraints imposed on young girls, brutally separated from their families; he would be unable to restrain his indignation in face of the attitude of Germany and the arrogant tone of your letters.

As to the Allies, they are profoundly surprised to see that German public opinion, even at the present time, is so unconscious of its responsibilities as not to ask, itself, for the just punishment of crimes committed, and that among the criminals there seem to be neither

sufficient courage, nor patriotism, to come forward for trial as they have deserved, to defend their conduct, and to facilitate, for their country, the fulfillment of its obligations. Until the German conscience understands, like that of the whole world, that wrong must be righted, and criminals punished, Germany must not expect to enter the communion of Nations, nor obtain from the Allies forgetfulness of her crimes or attenuation of just peace conditions.

Appendix J to HD-103

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES PARIS, November 17, 1919.
WITH THE ALLIED GOVERNMENT No. 3-1103
AND HIGH COMMAND

From: General Tcherbatcheff, Military Representative of the Supreme Chief of Russia, with the Allied Government and High Command.

To: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

I have the honor to call your attention to the fact that the Russian Armies, which are fighting against the bolchevists, are almost deprived of cartridges (*cartouches de 3 lignes*) for the Russian rifles.

All the stocks of Russian cartridges which were possessed by the Russian Armies and the Entente are already exhausted. Nevertheless, two big stocks of those cartridges still exist, one in Rumania, of which I had the honor to inform you by letter on November 15th, No. 11570, [11571?] [^{12a}](#) and another in Germany.

According to the information of the Russian Delegation on matters pertaining to prisoners of war in Berlin, there are in Germany about 150,000,000 Russian cartridges. This number is not exaggerated.

However, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs affirms, according to the communiqué of the Russian Delegation, that the German Government does not possess any Russian cartridges.

It may be inferred therefrom that the Government sold those cartridges to private individuals. The latter have two alternatives; either to clandestinely pass those cartridges to the Bolchevists, which they have certainly been doing, or to sell them directly to the anti-Bolchevist Armies, which is not in accord with the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, according to which the war material is to be gratuitously restored to the Russian Government.

Owing to the bad faith of the German authorities, no blockade is capable of stopping the sale of cartridges to the Bolchevists. On the other hand, it would be very difficult to force the German Government to restore these cartridges to Russia. In any case, even if it were possible to discover the stocks of the latter, the search would be so long that the individuals interested would have time to pass the cartridges to the Bolchevists.

I think that the only means of receiving the cartridges in the shortest time possible, is to authorize the Russian authorities to start negotiations with all the persons who possessed them, for the purchase of cartridges, and, then, to charge this purchase expense to the account of the German Government, if this is not contrary to the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

On account of the great necessity for the Russian Armies to have these cartridges, in order to energetically continue the fight against the Bolchevists, I beg you to kindly give the necessary orders so that the possibility of resuming possession of these cartridges, be studied as soon as possible, apart from the general question of the delivery of Russian war material.

I am sending in the same mail, a letter on the same subject, to the President of Council, Minister of War.

I earnestly beg you to kindly inform me of the decision made.

GENERAL TCHERBATCHEFF

THE MARSHAL
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF General Staff G-3
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES Paris, 4bis, Bd. des Invalides.
No. 5.421

PARIS, November 21, 1919.

From: The Marshal of France,

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

By letter No. 3-1,103—of November 17,¹³ General Tcherbatcheff requests me to have the possibility of assuring the Russian authorities the immediate possession of Russian gun cartridges in Germany considered without waiting for the general question of restitution of Russian war material.

I have the honor to enclose herewith copy of this letter, as the procedure of General Tcherbatcheff can only be carried out after proper decision by the Supreme Council.

P. O. The Major General:
DESTICKER

Appendix L to HD-103

ROYAL MINISTRY
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FOR MONTENEGRO

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, November 26, 1919.
No. 1086

From: F. S. Plamenatz.

To: President Clemenceau.

It is in vain that the Royal Government of Montenegro referred up to the present time to Montenegro's incontestable rights in her demands to be represented at the Peace Conference. The latter has disregarded all these justified claims. It has persistently refused to take into account the fact that Montenegro voluntarily entered the war and that according to the very avowals of the Serbian

Government which is hostile to Montenegro (“Military efforts of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes during the war of 1914–1918, p. 16”), Montenegro has lost 20,000 soldiers killed and a third of her population. The Peace Treaties with Germany and Austria have been signed without the presence of Montenegro although she has been at war with them from the very first day. Within a few days will be signed the Peace Treaty with the third Enemy State, Bulgaria, and again without the participation of Montenegro.

Such an attitude by the Peace Conference might lead us to suppose—which the Royal Government of Montenegro refuses to believe—an aid designed to favor Serbia in the perpetration of her crime against Montenegro, a crime surpassing in horror that committed by William II against Belgium in 1914. The attitude adopted by the Conference is not only contrary to the solemn obligations taken by the Governments of the Great Powers in respect of Montenegro, but is also contrary to the decision of the Supreme Council,¹⁴ a decision which, moreover, is unjust and disadvantageous for Montenegro.

On behalf of the Royal Government, I have the honor to renew my protest against the injustice of the Peace Conference with regard to Montenegro, and I beg it to respect their rights and to convoke our Delegate as soon as possible with a view to the subsequent signing of the Peace Treaties with Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that should the contrary be the case, that if within a short time no reply to our justified request reaches us from the Peace Conference the Royal Government of Montenegro will do what duty and right impose upon it, and what any other Government would long since have done. It will address the Governments of Germany, Austria and Bulgaria with a request to conclude a peace treaty, Montenegro not caring to remain in a state of war with these countries.

The responsibility for these steps will not rest upon Montenegro, but upon the Peace Conference.

At the same time, I have the honor to call your Excellency’s attention to the fact that the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Neuilly do

not prohibit the Governments of Germany, Austria and Bulgaria to conclude a peace Treaty with Montenegro.

Please accept, etc.

F. S. PLAMENATZ

¹ Gen. Nicholas N. Yudenitch, commander in chief of the White Russian forces in the Baltic Provinces.

² HD–88, minute 5, p. 84 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 4](#)].

³ [Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442](#) .

⁴ See HD–102, minute 5, and appendix B, pp. 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 18](#)] and 377 [Pg. 377 is part of [Doc. 18](#)].

⁵ See HD–60, minute 10, and appendix L, [vol. VIII, pp. 350](#)  and [370](#) .

⁶ See HD 71, minute 2, [vol. VIII, p. 674](#) .

⁷ Appendix B to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 863](#) .

⁸ Appendix C to HD–80, [ibid., p. 865](#) .

⁹ Appendix XI to CF–92, [vol. VI, p. 695](#) .

¹⁰ Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed October 18, 1907, [Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204](#) .

^{10a} Annex not attached to file copy of this document.

^{10b} See appendix G, *supra*.

¹¹ Appendix H, *supra*.

¹² Appendix B to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 863](#) .

^{12a} *Ante*, p. 342 [Pg. 342 is part of [Doc. 16](#)].

¹³ *Supra*.

¹⁴ BC–Al, minute 2, [vol. III, p. 487](#) .

December 2, 10:30 a.m. (HD-104)

[20] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, December 2, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 2, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/104

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/104

HD-104

[Document 20]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, December 2, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 2, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Hinchley-
Cooke

FRANCE

M. Massigli

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral McCully, U. S. N.

Mr. E. L. Dresel

Dr. James Brown Scott

Colonel Logan

Mr. A. W. Dulles

Lieut-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West

Captain Fuller, R. N.

Commander MacNamara

Mr. H. W. Malkin

General Mance

Lieut-Colonel Kisch

Colonel Beadon

FRANCE

M. Leygues

M. Camhon

M. Laroche

Commandant Le Vasseur

M. Fromageot

ITALY

General Cavallero

Rear-Admiral Grassi

M. Ricci-Busatti

M. Vannutelli-Rey

M. Stranieri

1. (The Council had before it an account of an interview which had taken place on December 1st, 1919, between M. Dutasta, Secretary General of the Conference, and Baron von Lersner. (See Appendix "A"). Interview Between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner

M. DUTASTA said that the Council had before it a correct account of the conversation which had taken place the preceding day between Baron von Lersner and himself. M. Arnavon had been present at that meeting and had taken notes of the interview. At the close of Baron von Lersner's statements, he, M. Dutasta, had asked Baron von Lersner to read over the notes, which had been approved by the German Delegate.

M. Dutasta wished to point out: first, that Baron von Lersner had referred to a conversation which had taken place between them on October 14th [13th?], 1919;¹ his contention then was that the possible nonratification by the American Senate of the Treaty with Germany would lead to a new situation, and that a new agreement would have to be entered into between the Powers which had ratified the Treaty and Germany; he, Lersner, now maintained that M. Dutasta had accepted his contention: this was absolutely false. M. Dutasta had only taken good note of what Baron von Lersner had said on that day without binding himself in any way. He had always pointed out to Baron von Lersner that he, M. Dutasta, spoke only as an Inter-Allied representative and that he could not express any personal opinion which would commit him.

Secondly, Baron von Lersner had referred to a contradiction between the note of November 22nd (last paragraph),² which stipulated that the protocol of November 1st should be signed unconditionally by Germany, and a conversation which he and Herr von Simson had had with M. Berthelot and M. Dutasta, according to which they had understood that they were invited to hold negotiations, both verbal and in writing. He, M. Dutasta, wished to point out that they had never held that language.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that as von Lersner's declaration brought up several difficult and important questions, he thought it very advisable to adjourn the discussion to the next meeting.

(The discussion was adjourned until the following day).

2. (The Council had before it a note of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, dated December 1st, 1919. (See Appendix "B"). Exploitation of the Pecs Mines

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the report. He added that he strongly advised the Council to submit that question to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, as the latter chiefly was concerned in solving the problem of coal distribution in Central Europe.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed, but wished to point out that the solution should be offered in a very short time so as to be included in the Hungarian Treaty.

MR. POLK asked M. Laroche whether the proposition as made in his report provided for the evacuation of the Pecs district by the Serbs.

M. LAROCHE said that that was understood.

It was decided:

to refer back the question for immediate examination and report to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, recommending the adoption of the following paragraph to be inserted in the Hungarian Treaty:

"Hungary shall furthermore give to the Allied and Associated Powers an option, as reparation in part for the annual delivery during the five years which follow the coming into force of the Treaty, of a quantity of steam coal from the Pecs mines, which shall be fixed periodically by the Reparation Commission, and which the latter will dispose of in favor of the Serbo-Croat-

Slovene State under conditions determined by the Commission.”

3. (The Council had before it a draft reply to the German note of November 27, 1919³ on Scapa Flow (See Appendix “C”). Answer to German Note of November 27th on Scapa Flow

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it would be inadvisable to separate the question of Scapa Flow from the question of the general German attitude, which would be dealt with on the following day. He wished to add that he considered the draft reply a very satisfactory document.

MR. POLK said he would be ready to discuss the question at the next meeting.

(It was agreed to adjourn the discussion until the following meeting.)

4. (The Council had before it a draft article concerning Fiume, to be inserted in the Hungarian Treaty. (See Appendix “D”). Report of the Drafting Committee on the Hungarian Treaty

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the draft article. He added that the Council should decide whether the second paragraph should be drafted as in the first alternative or the second.

M. SCIALOJA stated he agreed on the first part of the draft: that was a formula which had already been used in the Treaty with Austria. He thought it was useless to draft the second paragraph according to the second alternative, for that would entail great difficulties for the future. He felt that Hungary should obligate itself to recognize the Council's decisions and should not have any kind of supervision thereon. If the second alternative were accepted, Hungary could object that because of disagreement between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State it could not recognize the solution. A distinction was being made between Italy and the Principal Powers. Why should this be so? There was no reason why Italy should be distinguished from the other Principal Powers and put on a standing with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. If that draft were accepted, it would mean

adding another difficulty to those which were already involved in the Fiume question.

MR. POLK said that a reply could be made to one of M. Scialoja's objections by deleting the word "Italy", and the sentence should read: "The Principal Allied and Associated Powers in agreement with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State ..."

M. SCIALOJA said he wished to point out that the second alternative would create a departure from the system which had prevailed until then; this was a Treaty with Hungary and not a Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. It would simply mean a complication of the question which seemed quite useless.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it advisable not to mention either Italy or Jugo-Slavia in the paragraph. He could not be accused of partiality against the Jugo-Slavs, but he felt that he could not let Jugo-Slavia have a control over decisions which the Conference took as a sovereign body. It would be sufficient in the second alternative, if the Jugo-Slavs were to refuse to accept the decision of the Conference, for the whole question to be reopened once more by Hungary.

M. SCIALOJA pointed out the analogy with the Dalmatian question. It had been stated in the Austrian Treaty that Austria accepted the decisions of the Conference regarding Dalmatia. Why should Hungary be treated differently?

SIR EYRE CROWE said his views were entirely covered by the precedents adopted by the Conference. In many other cases a cession of territory and abandonment of sovereignty rights had been decided upon, but a stipulation such as the one proposed in the second alternative had never been, and could not now be made.

MR. POLK thought it might be a little difficult to settle that question according to precedents alone. This was the first case where a party was a claimant and also a judge; Italy, he thought, would be both in this case.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that was not absolutely accurate.

M. SCIALOJA said that Italy had already held that position in the Trentino question.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Dalmatian question could be cited as analogous with the case under discussion.

MR. POLK said that was the type of question which might provoke war and he did not think they were doing justice to the Serbs.

M. SCIALOJA thought the risk of war would be greater if six Powers instead of five had to agree.

MR. POLK stated the United States had always felt that Jugo-Slavia should be consulted on the questions which involved the security of peace in Central Europe: he did not wish to obstruct the Treaty but wanted only to put on record his reservation on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Mr. Polk on his declaration that the Jugo-Slavs should be consulted, but it was precisely for that reason that the question of an agreement with Jugo-Slavia should not be mentioned in a Treaty with Hungary.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that he himself had not wished to have it understood that the Jugo-Slavs were not to be consulted. He thought the Serbs should be heard in the same way as the Poles.

MR. POLK repeated that in this case two litigants were at swords' point on the question, in which one sat as judge and party at the same time, and the other one outside, but he did not wish to insist.

It was decided:

to insert the following article in the Hungarian Treaty, (Part III, Political Clauses, Section 5—Fiume):

“Hungary renounces all rights and title on Fiume and the adjacent territories belonging to the former Kingdom of Hungary, and included within the boundaries which shall be fixed at a later date.

Hungary agrees to recognize the stipulations concerning those territories, especially on the nationality of the inhabitants, which shall be included in the Treaties intended to settle the present questions.”

5. (The Council had before it a note of the British Delegation dated December 1st, 1919 on the subject (See Appendix “E”). Appointment of a Committee To Distribute the Rolling Stock of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon the British proposal.

M. SCIALOJA asked that the question be adjourned until the following day as he wished to consult his Monarchy experts and examine the question before giving his views thereon.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was urgent as a meeting was to be held on December 11th.

(The discussion of this subject was adjourned until the following meeting).

6. (The Council had before it a report of the Drafting Committee on the question (See Appendix “F”).

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon report. Report of the Drafting Committee Claims of Inheriting States for Rolling Stock of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to approve the conclusions of the report presented by the Drafting Committee on the subject.

7. (The Council had before it a proposed declaration submitted by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix “G”). Approval of Declaration

Submitted by the Drafting Committee Relating to the Provisional Eastern Frontiers of Poland

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the proposed declaration. He added that taking into account the objection which had been raised at the preceding meeting he had prepared a document which took the form of a simple declaration to be signed by the President of the Conference.

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to approve the declaration as submitted by the Drafting Committee relating to the provisional Eastern Frontiers of Poland. (See Appendix "G").

8. M. FROMAGEOT stated that the rights of Poland on the former German and Russian territories had been recognized; Eastern Galicia was about to have a special status, but no disposition had been made of the southwestern part of Poland (Western Galicia) and the boundaries between Poland and Czechoslovakia had not yet been determined. It should, therefore, be necessary to recognize the sovereignty of Poland in Western Galicia on the one hand, and on the other, the rights of Czecho-Slovakia on the territories which belong to it should be recognized. He recommended that a treaty be drafted, which would transfer the rights and title on the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Government belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers by virtue of the Peace Treaties, to both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Furthermore, the sovereignty rights of Poland on the territories bordering Czecho-Slovakia should be recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and by Czecho-Slovakia on the other. Lastly, the sovereignty rights of Czecho-Slovakia on the territories which were attributed to it should be recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers, and it was also of great importance that the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia should be determined by a single document, which had not yet been done. He summed up by suggesting to the Council that a draft Treaty be

prepared which would solve only questions of sovereignty rights as well as determine the frontiers. Western Galicia

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council would charge the Drafting Committee with the preparation of such a Treaty.

It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft Treaty which would:

- (1) attribute Western Galicia to Poland, and fix its boundaries;
- (2) determine the frontiers of the Czecho-Slovak State, recognizing the sovereignty of that State over the territories comprised within said boundaries.

9. (The Council had before it the French proposal concerning Enemy Submarines, (See Appendix "B" to H. D. 102).⁴ Distribution of Enemy Submarines

M. LEYGUES said that on November 29th, 1919 the Council had adopted the principle of the French proposal.⁵ He asked the Council to vote upon the same.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the American Delegation had made certain reservations on the second paragraph of the proposal.

MR. POLK said he had no objection to offer with regard to the first and third paragraphs. As for the second paragraph, he could not accept the proportion given therein, but he expected to receive instructions from his Government at any time. He had proposed to his Government that it would be better to accept nothing on account of the unfair ratio attributed to the United States.

M. MATSUI said that his instructions allowed him to accept paragraphs 1 and 3 of the French proposal. He wished however to make a reservation on paragraph 2: a certain number of submarines had already been distributed between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, i. e., 43 submarines; Japan had received seven,

which Japanese crews had taken from England to Japan at a great cost, and the Japanese Government envisaged great material difficulty in bringing those submarines back to Europe. He proposed that the submarines which had been attributed for propaganda purposes should definitely belong to the Power to which they had been attributed: it being understood that those submarines should be broken up and the material taken therefrom should belong to the Power to which attribution had been made. He added that the same principle had been adopted for surface vessels.

M. LEYGUES said he accepted the Japanese proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE also accepted it, but wished to state that the breaking up of those submarines should be made under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Commission. He asked whether it would not be advisable to omit the sentence beginning with the words, "percentage already established ... etc." of the second paragraph.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. POLK said he understood the Japanese reservation applied to all Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the American Delegation made its reservation on the whole of the second paragraph or only on the figures showing the percentage each Allied and Associated Power should receive.

MR. POLK said the American Delegation wished to reserve the whole paragraph.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that the time limit within which submarines should be destroyed had not been mentioned in the French proposal, and he suggested one year.

M. LEYGUES said he accepted that time limit.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the American decision would arrive before Mr. Polk's departure.

MR. POLK said he was sorry he could not give a definite reply to Sir Eyre Crowe's question.

M. LEYGUES said the French Delegation had accepted the British declaration according to which the 10 submarines attributed to France as a special compensation should be selected from those which had not participated in the submarine warfare. It had done this, provided that 10 such submarines could be found available for delivery to France. If such were not available, he had understood that the French Government could take those submarines wherever they happened to be.

M. LEYGUES said that he had just received a telegram to the effect that two of the German [floating?] docks at Hamburg had been sold to Holland and had already been removed to that country. He wished to bring the attention of the Council to the dangerous situation in which the Allies would find themselves if they were to find German ports empty of all materiel.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that question should be referred to the naval experts for examination and report.

It was decided:

- (1) that all the submarines turned over by the enemy Powers, with the exception of the small number indicated in paragraph 4 below, should be demolished under the supervision of a Naval Inter-Allied Commission;
- (2) that the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes should not be made the subject of a further attribution, but that said attribution should be final. Those submarines should be demolished by said Powers under the supervision of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission;
- (3) that the principle and percentage of distribution of enemy submarines be provisionally reserved;
- (4) that France, for the reason that she is the only Power not having constructed submarines during the war, should receive ten German submarines in good condition, as compensation; the latter

to be selected preferably amongst those which had not taken part in submarine warfare, wherever they stood;
(5) that the period granted to each of the Allied and Associated Powers for the destruction of submarines to be broken up should be one year; (See Appendix “B” to H. D. 102).

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , December 2, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-104**

DECEMBER 1, 1919.

[Report of an Interview Between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner]

Mr. Von Lersner, President of the German Delegation, requested to be received by the Secretary General of the Conference, to whom he made the following statements which have been collected almost textually:

“I am directed to inform you verbally of my Government’s reply to the Supreme Council’s note of November 22 and 24.^{[6](#)}

“Should you desire a written reply, I could hand it to you later, but this reply is yet in Berlin and will require time.

“I must set forth that the President’s doubts relative to our intentions as to the fulfillment of the Treaty are, in our opinion, absolutely deprived of all foundation. We reject the reproach made us of being responsible for the delay of the coming into force of the Treaty. We ratified on July 16, and we have since then awaited the coming into force, that is to say, the first protocol of exchange of ratifications. Since the day following your ratification, I have had full powers to sign the *procès-verbal*.

“It was not until November 2 that we were informed of the ratification by three of the Great Powers.^{[7](#)} Nevertheless, the Powers did not declare themselves ready for the coming into

force of the Treaty as was provided at the end of the Versailles document. This coming into force was made subject to new conditions which were very severe and which refer to the Treaty itself.⁸ The German Government today, as before, is ready: it desires a prompt reestablishment of peace by the coming into force of the Treaty.

“A large number of stipulations of the Treaty provides the participation of America. You recall, Mr. Ambassador, that on October 14 we were agreed that an accord would be concluded on this subject between the Ratifying Powers and Germany. We now consider that this accord should not limit itself only to the territorial questions of the East. We are quite willing to do our share, but as you know all Germany considers the participation of America as an important guarantee. We will give our assent to the coming into force despite the absence of America; but for us, it will be a sacrifice, and, in compensation, we expect that you will favor our requests relative to the extradition of the guilty and prisoners of war.

“The German Government opposes a refusal to the demand contained in the Note of November 22 (last paragraph) stipulating that the protocol of November 1 must be signed unconditionally. This demand is in contradiction with your declarations and those of Mr. Berthelot made to M. von Simson and myself when you invited us to oral and written negotiations.

“I again wish to touch on the objections which we raised against the protocol. For us, the Baltic question has been settled. On questions of lesser importance, agreement will be easy (on rolling stock, for instance); but what we absolutely refuse is: 1st) the demands presented as compensation for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow; 2nd) the eventual military measures provided for in the last paragraph. For us, they are unacceptable.

“We trust with confidence that you will adopt our viewpoint.

“We ask that a provision be inserted in the protocol stipulating that the repatriation of prisoners of war will not be allowed to be subjected to any condition whatsoever, unless to that provided for in Article 221 (return of French prisoners of war retained in Germany).

“As regards the promises which we declare were made us relative to the repatriation of our prisoners of war, the German Government reserves the right to reply later.”

Upon leaving, M. von Lersner stated that the German Government had approved the departure of M. von Simson.

Appendix B to HD-104

DECEMBER 1, 1919.

*Note Presented to the Supreme Council by the Commission on
Rumanian and Jugoslav Affairs*

The Commission on Rumanian and Jugoslav affairs, in conformity with a decision taken by the Supreme Council under date of November 6th,⁹ has examined the question relative to the request made by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, asking that the exploitation of the Pecs mines be attributed to that State for a period of five years.

The Commission is of the opinion that it is impossible to separate this question from the general question of the situation in Central Europe relative to the coal supply.

The Commission was also of the opinion that it is impossible for it to obtain definite information concerning the respective needs of the States in question, although fully recognizing the motives upon which the Jugoslav Delegation bases its request, the Commission will willingly favor the solution which was proposed by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission concerning which it has unofficial notice.

This solution would add to Annex V, Par. 1, of the Treaty with Hungary, the following phrase:

Furthermore, Hungary accords to the Allied and Associated Powers, as partial reparation, an option on the annual delivery during the five years which shall follow the entry into force of the Treaty of a quantity of traction coal to be taken from the Pecs mines, and which will be determined periodically by the Reparations Commission, and will be disposed of in favor of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in the conditions which will be fixed by the Reparations Commission.

From a political point of view, as well as the economic interests in question, this solution appears entirely satisfactory to the Commission because it authorizes a qualified medium, that is, the Reparations Commission, to take all useful measures concerning the different interests, with a full knowledge of the case.

Consequently the Commission proposes that the Supreme Council recommend an examination of this solution, which appears fair to it, by the Reparations Commission. The Commission, however knows of no better means than that the Reparations Commission present a definite opinion to the Supreme Council.

Appendix C to HD-104

DECEMBER 2, 1919.

SCAPA FLOW AFFAIR

Proposed Answer to the German Note of November 27, 1919^{[10](#)}

To: Baron von Lersner;

On November 27th last, you were kind enough to forward me a memorandum in which the German Government rejected the reparations demanded by the Allied and Associated Powers in their note of November 1^{[11](#)} for the destruction on June 22 [21], 1919, of the

German fleet anchored at Scapa Flow, and proposed to submit this affair to arbitration.

The German Government, to which the Allied and Associated point of view was communicated on June 28 [25], 1919,¹² and which, on June 28th and September 3, 1919, made it the subject of its communications, today claims that this destruction in no way constitutes a violation of Germany's obligation,—that the destroyed war ships were not, at the time of their destruction, destined to be handed over to the Allies,—and more than that, that the destruction should be imputed to the Allied and Associated Powers themselves which, “in contradiction with the provisions of Article 23 of the Armistice had interned the war ships not in a neutral port, but in an enemy port.”

The Allied and Associated Powers can only see in the German memorandum an attempt, difficult to explain, to voluntarily delay the coming into force of the treaty and the definite re-establishment of peace.

In its note of September 3 last, addressed to the Allied and Associated Governments, after having noted the authentic statements of the Admiral commanding the destroyed German fleet, the German Government, far from disregarding the obligations incumbent upon it, in this respect toward the Allies, had, on the contrary, set forth that the Admiral had in no way had “the intention of violating the obligations that the German Government had assumed.”

The German Government itself also recognized that in destroying the German fleet the Admiral commanding had acted according to a general order, it added that the Admiral was aware that the German proposals themselves concerning the peace conditions provided that the fleet be credited to reparations.

It is precisely the destruction according to the orders of the German Government of what Germany thus should have handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers which, whatsoever the personal responsibility of Admiral von Reuter and his subordinates,

constitutes a violation of the Armistice as well as an act tending to annul obligations already agreed to and on the point of being definitely signed.

Finally, it is hardly necessary to recall that the choice of roads at Scapa Flow for lack of proper neutral port is, in every way, in conformity with the letter as well as the spirit of the text of Article 23 of the Armistice.

Under these conditions, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers consider that the German Government cannot repudiate today the responsibility incumbent upon it or seek, through arbitration, a solution for acts of war the settlement of which belongs to the said Powers.

Consequently, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, invite the German Government, in conformity with their note of November 1 last, to sign without further delay the protocol, thereby allowing the exchange of ratifications and the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, and thus by the return to normal life appease the sufferings of the people.

Please accept, etc.

Appendix D to HD-104

HUNGARIAN TREATY

PART III—*Political Clauses*

SECTION V—FIUME

Article 53 (Proposed)

Hungary renounces all rights and titles over Fiume and adjacent territories, belonging to the former Kingdom of Hungary and comprised in the boundaries which will be fixed later.

1st alternative: Hungary agrees to recognize the stipulations which are to be drawn up relative to these territories, notably concerning

the nationality of the inhabitants, in the Treaties destined to regulate the present affairs.

2nd alternative: Hungary agrees to recognize the stipulations elaborated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in conjunction with Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State relative to these territories, notably concerning the nationality of the inhabitants.

Appendix E to HD-104

Note by British Delegation Submitted to the Supreme Council

WAGON EXCHANGE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

In a telegram (copy attached “A”) dated 8th November, 1919, General Mance, President of the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council, as a result of personal negotiations in Vienna with technical representatives of the States concerned, recommended the formation of a Committee at Vienna to regulate provisionally, the exchange of rolling-stock across frontiers.

On November 10th Mr. Lindley, British Commissioner at Vienna, telegraphed strongly supporting this proposal, which met with the approval of Sir Francis Dent.

The above communications were embodied in a note by the British Delegation dated 13th November,^{[13](#)} which was considered by the Supreme Council on November 20th.^{[14](#)}

Unfortunately, through a misunderstanding of the nature of the proposal, the question was referred to the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission, who are not concerned with the majority of the countries affected by the proposal.

The Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission in a report dated 21st November made certain recommendations which were approved by the Supreme Council on November 24th.^{[15](#)}

These recommendations differ fundamentally from the original proposal by General Mance, which was based on understanding with representatives of the States concerned. The essence of General Mance's proposal is the bringing together of responsible representatives of the various Railway administrations in Central Europe under an independent Chairman, with a view to their instituting a provisional scheme for freer wagon exchange in the special conditions now obtaining, when the ownership of a large proportion of the rolling-stock has not been determined. The Allied and Associated Powers have of course no authority to impose such an arrangement. The intervention of the Supreme Council was contemplated solely for the purpose of facilitating its general acceptance by the several States. On the other hand, the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission propose to constitute a Commission on which America, Great Britain and France will be represented, in addition to the States primarily concerned, and which will be subordinated to an inter-allied organization. Further, the proposal of the Organizing Committee does not guarantee as a basis the right of maintaining equality of wagon exchange, and incidentally does not explicitly state that any arrangements entered into by the Committee will be without prejudice to the ownership of the rolling-stock established or claimed.

As it was evident during the negotiations in Vienna that the only possible basis of agreement is one which will avoid the appearance of interference with the internal organization of each railway administration, and which will respect the existing distribution of rolling-stock as a provisional starting point, General Mance is of the opinion that the proposals of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission will not be acceptable or workable and would therefore defeat their own object.

It is therefore recommended that the question should be reconsidered, and that (1) invitations should be issued by telegram to the countries concerned on the lines of the original proposal, (draft attached—"B"), (2) the proposed Committee should in no way be considered as subject to any inter-allied organisation, it being left to Sir Francis Dent.

As regards the arrangements for a representation of the interests of Eastern Galicia, the simplest procedure might be for the Committee to co-opt the representative now at Vienna.

29:11:19.

A.

En clair Telegram From General Mance, Vienna, to Astoria, Paris

D. 8/11/1919.

R. 9/11/1919.

Reference Sir Francis Dent's suggestion re need of better wagon movement—forwarded by Mr. Lindley. Have discussed matter with technical representatives of Central European States now at Vienna. Recommend Supreme Council should invite Governments of Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Italy to send representatives to form committee at Vienna.

First meeting on December 4th.

These representatives should have full power to enter into arrangements for free wagon exchange without prejudice to the ownerships of rolling-stock established or claimed and based on the right of maintaining equality of wagon exchange, subject to special arrangements agreed to by the Governments concerned and of which the committee should be advised. The committee should have the right to make representations to the Governments concerned. The Allied Generals at Budapest should nominate representative for Hungary and a representative of Ukraine should if possible be similarly appointed, as there is one on the existing Railway Committee at Vienna. This latter committee cannot be used as they lack the necessary powers. In issuing invitations Supreme Council might express its concern at the aggravation of serious economic situation in Central Europe by the present restrictions on wagon movement between the different States and draw attention to the urgent need for creating an effective organization for wagon exchange, if the decisions of Sir Francis Dent's Reparation

Commission are to be executed. Although the work of the proposed Committee is quite distinct from that of Sir Francis Dent's Commission, Supreme Council might suggest desirability of appointing independent Allied Chairman and that Sir Francis Dent acting when necessary through a deputy should be designated for that post. Unanimous view here in favour of independent Allied Chairman and Sir Francis Dent believed to be most acceptable. We could find qualified deputy in which case Sir Francis Dent would accept Chairmanship. American, French and Italian representatives on Allied Railway Mission here agree with above proposals. As matter is urgent trust action will be taken before my return. Ends.

B.

Draft Communication to Government of Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Roumania, Yugo-Slavia and Italy

Copy to be sent to the Allied Generals at Budapest, with a view to the nomination of a Hungarian Representative

As a result of reports received from its technical advisers, the Supreme Council are greatly concerned at the aggravation of the serious economic situation in Central Europe by the present restrictions on wagon movement between the different states, and are further impressed by the urgent need for creating an effectual organization for wagon exchange, in view of the execution of the decisions of the Reparation of Rolling Stock Commissions provided for in the Treaties of Peace. They have therefore decided to invite the Governments of Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Roumania, Yugo-Slavia and Italy to send representatives to form a provisional committee at Vienna; the first meeting of which should take place on December 11th. It is important that the representatives sent should have full power to enter into arrangements for free wagon exchange without prejudice to the ownership of rolling-stock established or claimed, and based on the right of maintaining equality of wagon exchange, subject to special arrangements agreed to by the Governments concerned, and of which the Committee should be advised. The Committee would have the right to make representations to the Governments concerned.

The Supreme Council suggest that it is desirable to appoint an independent chairman to the proposed Committee, and while recognizing that the work of the proposed Committee is quite distinct from that of the Reparation Commission for the rolling-stock of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, they suggest that Sir Francis Dent, acting when necessary through a deputy, should be designated as Chairman. The Supreme Council trust that this proposal, which is made in the common interests of all states concerned, and after the fullest possible local enquiry, will receive the cordial support of the Government. The favour of a reply by telegram is requested.

Appendix F to HD-104

DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Note Concerning the Rolling Stock of the State Railways in the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

1. The Serb-Croat and Slovene State claims:

1st.—The rolling stock captured by Serbia in 1918 and taken to Salonika.

This claim is well-founded; it is in conformity with Article 53, alinea 1 of the Hague regulations, which recognizes to the belligerent the right to take over enemy state material.^{[16](#)}

2nd.—The material seized in 1918 in Serbia and on the Austro-Hungarian territory occupied by the S. C. S. Army.

- a) —The material found in freed Serbia before the Armistice was legally taken. The claim, under this first item, is, therefore justified.
- b) —No material could be captured after the Armistice. The material delivered after the Armistice was turned over to the Allies in common. Although the S. C. S. Army occupied some territories after the expiration of the Armistice, it could not legally capture any material. Therefore, the claim, under the second item, is not founded.

3rd.—The material delivered by Hungary, by virtue of the Armistice of November 13, 1918.^{[17](#)}

Article 4 of this Armistice provides for the delivery to the Allies and not to Serbia, therefore the claim, under this item, is not founded.

The fate of this material, with respect to Austria, is regulated by Article 199 of the Treaty of St. Germain, and will probably be also regulated by similar stipulations of the Hungarian Treaty.

II. Italy, as a power occupying the Austrian territory, and, for this reason, in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, objects both to any particular claim on the material delivered, or to be delivered by virtue of the Armistice of November 3, 1918,^{[18](#)} or to a distribution of this material, by virtue of Article 318 of the Austrian Treaty.

This objection is founded, as the material concerned was delivered in common to the Allied and Associated Powers, and consequently ought to be shared as a common property definitely attributed to the Allied and Associated Powers by Article 199.

III. Poland claims the material found in Russian territory.

Before the Armistice, the Austro-Hungarian material found in Russian territory, was reconquered by the Austro-Hungarian Armies, and the Polish elements which were fighting among the Austro-Hungarians could not acquire any right to this material.

After the Armistice, as the Polish troops were belligerent against Austro-Hungary, the Armistice did not authorize Poland to take the material found in the occupied territory and to attribute this material to itself.

Poland will have rights on this material only according to the terms of Article 318 of the Austrian Treaty and of the similar Article of the Hungarian Treaty. Therefore, its present claim does not seem to be founded.

IV. The Czecho-Slovakian State, Poland, the S. C. S. State, and Italy are filing conditional claims concerning the material found in the Austro-Hungarian territory occupied by them, when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was dismembered.

It appears from the remarks made in the Above I, II, and III paragraphs, that: 1st.—That part of the material which was legally captured and that part of the material delivered, or to be delivered by virtue of the Armistice, in order to become common property of the Allies consequent to the Peace Treaty, should be excluded from the distribution provided for by Article 318; 2nd.—The rest of the material should appear in the inventory of the material to be distributed according to Article 318.

In other words, the inventory provided for by Article 318 should be established under the date of the Armistice, and should not compromise the material, the fate of which was already regulated at that date, either as a result of legally valid war actions, or as a result of the Armistice itself.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

Appendix G to HD-104

Declaration Relating to the Provisional Eastern Frontiers of Poland

DECLARATION

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers recognizing, that it is important as soon as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty, in which the Polish nation is placed, and without prejudging the provisions which must in the future define the eastern frontiers of Poland, hereby declare that they recognize the right of the Polish Government to proceed, according to the conditions previously provided by the Treaty with Poland of June 28, 1919,¹⁹ to organise a regular administration of the territories of the former Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below:

From the point where the old frontier between Russia and Austria-Hungary meets the river Bug to the point where it is cut by the administrative boundary between the districts of Byelsk and Brest-Litowsk,

the course of the Bug downstream;

thence northwards this administrative boundary to where it forms an acute angle about 9 kilometres north-east of Melnik;

thence north-eastwards to a point on the course of the Lesna Prawa where the latter is cut by the forest road running from south to north which passes about 2 kilometres west of Skupowo,

a line to be fixed on the ground leaving in Poland the villages of Weipole, Stolbce, Piesczatka, and Wolka, cutting the railway Byelsk-Brest-Litovsk, at the point where it crosses the road from Vysoko-Litovsk to Kleshcheli;

thence northwards to a point where the Narev-Narevka road cuts the Gainowka-Svisloch railway.

a line to be fixed on the ground along the forest road mentioned above;

thence north-eastwards to a point on the river Svisloch 4 kilometres to the north of Yalowka where it is joined by the river passing this town,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the course of the Svisloch downstream, then the course of the Laszanka upstream, then the course of the Likowka upstream to a point about 1½ kilometre west of Baranowo;

thence north-north-westwards to a point on the Grodna-Kuznitsa railway about 500 metres north-east of the bifurcation of Kielbasin,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence north-westwards to a point on the course of the Lososna about 2½ kilometres south-west of its confluence with the Nyeman,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the course of the Lososna downstream, then the course of the Nyeman downstream, then the course of the river Igorka, which passes Warwischki, upstream to its source;

thence west-south-westwards to a point on the course of the Chernohanja (Marycha) near Sztudjanka,

a line to be fixed on the ground following a left bank tributary;

thence upstream the course of the Chernohanja to a point about 2½ kilometres to the east of Zelwa;

thence northwards to a point on the Berzniki-Kopciowa road about 2 kilometres south-east of Berzniki.

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence north-westwards to the most southerly point of the reentrant of the northern administrative boundary of the district of Suvalki (about 7 kilometres to the north-west of Punska),

a line to be fixed on the ground, proceeding generally parallel to the line of the small lakes between Berzniki and Zegary and about 2 kilometres to the east of these lakes, turning west to reach a point of Laka Galadusya about 2 kilometres north of Zegary, crossing this lake to its north-western point and leaving Punska in Poland;

thence northwards the administrative boundary of Suvalki to its junction with the old frontier between Russia and East Prussia.

the rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the East of the said line are expressly reserved.

Made at Paris, the 1919.

¹ See HD-72, minute 7, and appendices H and I, [vol. VIII, pp. 690](#), [706](#) and [707](#).

² Appendix C to HD-99, p. 316 [*Pg. 316 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*].

³ Appendix G to HD-103, p. 414 [*Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

⁴ *Ante*, p. 375 [*Pg. 375 is part of [Doc. 18](#)*].

⁵ HD-102, minute 2, p. 366 [*Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 18](#)*].

⁶ Appendices C and D to HD-99, pp. 316 [*Pg. 316 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*] and 318 [*Pg. 318 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*].

⁷ See appendix B to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 863](#).

⁸ Appendix C to HD-80, [ibid., p. 865](#).

⁹ HD-85, minute 1, p. 2 [*Pg. 2 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

¹⁰ Appendix G to HD-103, p. 414 [*Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

¹¹ Appendices B and C to HD-80, pp. 863 [*Pg. 863 is part of [Doc. 45](#)*] and 865 [*Pg. 865 is part of [Doc. 45](#)*].

¹² Appendix XI to CF-92, [vol. VI, p. 695](#).

¹³ Appendix B to HD-92, p. 172 [*Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 8](#)*].

¹⁴ HD-97, minute 3, p. 238 [*Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 13](#)*].

¹⁵ HD-99, minute 7, and appendix K, pp. 314 [*Pg. 314 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*] and 325 [*Pg. 325 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*].

¹⁶ Convention Respecting the Laws and Custom's of War on Land, signed October 18, 1907, [Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204](#).

¹⁷ Military convention between the Allies and Hungary, signed at Belgrade, [vol. II, p. 183](#).

¹⁸ [Vol. II, p. 175](#).

¹⁹ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3714.

December 3, 10:30 a.m. (HD-105)

[21] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 3, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 3, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/105

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/105

HD-105

[Document 21]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 3, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 3, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. Hinchley
Cooke

FRANCE M. de Percin

ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. E. L. Dresel
Rear-Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Colonel J. A. Logan
Lieut-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West
General Mance
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Mr. Palairet
Mr. A. Leeper

FRANCE
General LeRond
Commandant LeVasseur
M. Mauciere
M. Kammerer

ITALY
General Cavallero
M. Vannutelli-Rey
Commandant Fea

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. M. CAMBON said that in the absence of M. Clemenceau, who regretted being unable to attend the meeting before eleven o'clock, he proposed to commence with the discussion of the seventh point on the agenda, which related to the personnel for the German mine sweeping service. Personnel for the German Mine Sweeping Service

(The Council had before it a note from the naval representatives relative to the said question (See Appendix "A").)

M. CAMBON observed that the Council had before it an unanimous report of the naval representatives which proposed to some extent to grant the German request relative to retaining a certain number of men for mine sweeping, who should not be included in the total strength of the German Navy laid down by Article 183 of the Treaty of Versailles.

SIR EYRE CROWE saw no objection to adopting the unanimous report of the naval experts, but he wished to observe that a concession was thereby being made to the Germans since according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace the total strength of the German Navy was not to exceed fifteen thousand men. He felt that this was not a very opportune moment to let the Germans know that such a concession was being made. Consequently, he thought it might be well to adopt the report in principle but not to communicate the decision to the Germans before it was known what line of action should be taken with respect to their attitude.

MR. POLK stated that he was ready to agree with the views of the majority.

M. SCIALOJA agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe. With respect to communicating the decision to the Germans he thought the Council might decide that point after having discussed the question raised by the present attitude of the Germans toward the Allied and Associated Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed entirely. He further thought that this point might be embodied in the Protocol¹ to be signed by Germany.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve in principle the report of the naval experts relative to the personnel for the German Mine Sweeping Service (See Appendix "A");
- (2) not to communicate that decision to Germany prior to a further discussion by the Council, which at that time should likewise determine whether that point should not be incorporated in the protocol to be signed by Germany.

2. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated December 1, 1919, relative to German activities in Schleswig. (See Appendix "B").)

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that, as was shown by the note before the Council, reports from Copenhagen indicated that the Germans were persisting in their schemes for getting around certain of the terms of the Treaty relating to the Schleswig plebiscite; thus it was that the German Colonel commanding the German troops in Schleswig had been given employment in that city and that troops under his command had been disguised as his employees. That was a barefaced subterfuge which could not be tolerated. However, he had not suggested any decision because he felt that nothing could be done until the coming into force of the Treaty. When the Treaty came into force it would be easy to send troops to Schleswig to drive out those disguised soldiers, but for the moment it seemed difficult to make any demand upon Germany on that point. He pointed out that the British report strongly urged that a third battalion be sent to the plebiscite zone. He had confined himself to bringing this request to the Council's attention. German Activities in Schleswig

M. CAMBON said that the Council took note of Sir Eyre Crowe's statements, as well as of the request made by Sir Charles Marling. After the Treaty came into force the Council could then decide what should be done.

(This was agreed to.)

3. (Upon the request of M. Scialoja that question was adjourned.)
Plans of the Turkish Government Relative to the Reconstruction of Constantinople

(At this point M. Clemenceau entered the meeting.)

4. M. MAUCLERE said that the Subcommittee created at Vienna by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission charged with ensuring the food supply of Austria, had noted the extreme gravity of the economic situation in Vienna and the remaining Austrian territory. It had noticed that the difficulties of supply were largely due to the imperfect circulation of rolling stock. It had presented a report on this subject, dated November 4th, 1919, showing that a final distribution of rolling stock belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Empire had not been made as between the States containing territories which were part of that former Empire, inasmuch as each of those new States was trying to keep within its territories all the rolling stock which was there. They were hoping thereby to ameliorate their situation and at the moment of final distribution to obtain a larger share in proportion to the amount of rolling stock actually in their possession at that time. With a view to remedying that serious situation, the British Delegation had also proposed^{1a} that the Supreme Council invite the States containing territories which were part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire to send representatives immediately to Vienna, with a view to the formation in that capital of a Commission on which all the interested States of Central Europe would be represented, and which would be presided over by an Allied representative. The question had thus been presented in two different ways. On the one hand, the Committee on Organization of the Separation Commission was considering the question through its Subcommittee at Vienna; on the other hand, the Supreme Council had had the question directly presented to it by the British Delegation. Those two propositions were inspired by somewhat the same motives. The Supreme Council having then referred the examination of the question to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, the latter had referred it to its Subcommittee especially charged with Austrian questions, and had presented to the Supreme Council a report suggesting a decision. The text of that report was as follows:

Creation of a Commission To Organize the Circulation of Rolling Stock in the States Containing Territories Which Were Part of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

“Whereas, one of the principal causes of the serious difficulties which are disturbing the economic life of the states of central Europe is the tendency which is sometimes manifested to withhold the railway cars which are on their territory, or enter it;

Whereas, there is at the present time no organization with sufficient authority to insure the indispensable circulation of the rolling stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire;

Whereas, it would be advisable to create to that effect a Commission which, moreover, would be entirely separate from the Commission of Experts which is charged with the distribution of the Austro-Hungarian rolling stock, under the Presidency of Sir Francis Dent; and, whereas, nevertheless, Sir Francis Dent seems to be qualified to be also the President of this new Commission;

Whereas, on the other hand there is already in Vienna a subcommission of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, which was created in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Council,² to study and propose the necessary measures to improve the revictualling of Austria, the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission proposes to the Supreme Council the following decision:

- 1st. —For the above-mentioned purposes, a sub-commission shall be instituted in Vienna within the shortest time possible, charged with ensuring and regulating the circulation of rolling stock on all of the railway systems which were comprised within the frontiers of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.
- 2nd. —This sub-commission shall be subordinated to the Vienna sub-commission of the Committee on Organization

of the Reparation Commission.

3rd. —The Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Roumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Czechoslovak Republic, Austria, and Hungary, shall be invited by the Supreme Council to appoint representatives on this sub-commission.

The invitation to Hungary might be made through the intermediary of Sir George Clerk.

4th. —This sub-commission shall be charged with:

- (a) —Proposing to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission the suppression of all other Interallied organizations and commissions, whose powers are apt to duplicate those of the new commission.
- (b) —Organizing the control of the rolling stock at the present frontiers of the various interested States.
- (c) —Assuring the normal exchange and return of railway coaches and locomotives; with the right of eventually making remonstrances on this subject to all the States which may be withholding such rolling stock.
- (d) —Studying and recommending all provisions intended to expedite transportation between the various interested regions, especially with a view to improving the revictualling.
- (e) —Proposing all proper measures for the representation of the interests of Eastern Galicia.”

The Supreme Council approved that proposal and a letter was being prepared to be sent to the various interested Governments when the Supreme Council received a new note from the British Government (See H. D. 104, Appendix “E”),³ which showed that a misunderstanding had arisen. The British Delegation, in fact, wished the proposed new Commission to be fully independent of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission. The Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had considered that note and had decided, with the exception of the British Delegate who maintained his point of view, that there was no reason to modify the draft decision of the Supreme Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to point out some of the reasons which determined the attitude of the British Delegation on that question. The question was an old one since it had been raised on September 26th [29th?^{3a}]. The British Delegation thought that under present conditions the intervention of the Reparation Commission was in no wise justified, and its information led it to believe that the proposed procedure would not be accepted by Poland, Czecho-Slovakia or any of the new Allied States which were in no way subject to that Commission. The Reparation Commission in fact was a body which had been created to act in the interests of the Allies against the enemy Powers. It therefore, was not qualified to intervene in the relations between the Allied and Associated Powers and Allied States. Moreover there was in existence a Commission charged with the distribution of Austro-Hungarian rolling stock. That Commission acted on principles entirely different from a juridical point of view from those actuating the Reparation Commission. Indeed it only acted in the general interest and not exclusively in the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers. At the present time it was proposed to create a third body which would be charged with effecting a provisional exchange of rolling stock, without touching the question of ownership. That new body could only obtain satisfactory results if it could count on the good-will of the interested States, since it had no means of coercing them and has no right to use any such means. It should not be forgotten that it was a question of dealing with new nationalities who were very jealous of their own authority and, would not tolerate in their internal affairs the intervention of the Reparation Commission which had no authority over them. The British proposition had been made in order to avoid that difficulty. If there were any chance of obtaining a satisfactory settlement of the question it could only be by appealing to the good-will of the interested States. If it should seem to be absolutely necessary to establish some connection between the new Commission and some body already in existence, the former should not be subordinated to the Reparation Commission but rather to the Commission charged with the final distribution of rolling stock, which constituted an analogous problem. He, himself thought it would be better to let the proposed Commission be entirely independent. In any event he thought it would be a serious mistake to subordinate it to the Reparation Commission which had no concern with that question,

and he felt that the British proposal was the only one which could work out a practical solution of that question.

M. MAUCLERE said that the following reasons had led his Committee to its decision. There was no question of imposing the control of the proposed Sub-commission upon the new States. It was merely desired to obtain from the good-will of the interested States their acceptance, without any obligation on their part, of the intervention of that Commission which was charged only with ensuring the normal exchange of rolling stock. The difference of views only concerned the advisability of subordinating that Commission to the sub-commission at Vienna, which itself was subordinated to the Reparation Commission. The sub-commission at Vienna did not, strictly speaking, have anything to do with a problem directly relating to reparations since it was limited to ensuring the food-supply of Austria. As the Reparation Commission constituted the only body of any permanency provided for the execution of the Treaty in that respect, there was a natural tendency to attach to it the temporary bodies which were also studying means to reestablish in Central Europe a normal economic regime which alone would allow enemy States to fulfil the obligations assumed by the Treaties. In a general way, therefore, it could be said that the question of reparations dominated the whole problem. The Commission at Vienna nevertheless has a well defined object which was to ensure the food-supply of Austria. That question of food supply was itself dependent upon the question of the circulation of rolling stock. The Commission which it was proposed to create should consist of a representative from each of the interested States in addition to a representative of each of the Great Powers. The chief difficulties found their source in the lack of coal and food supplies as a result of imperfect railway circulation. There were numerous organs which had been created by the Supreme Council or which had created themselves through the force of circumstances, and which were concerning themselves with the same questions. Duplication of work was inevitable. In order to eliminate this duplication as much as possible it became necessary to attach these various Commissions to higher bodies and in this regard the Reparation Commission seemed the most suitable by reason of its semi-permanent character.

SIR EYRE CROWE understood that it might be necessary in order to avoid duplication to establish a logical plan of organization; although logic, especially when applied from afar, often led to impractical results. But it did not seem to him logical to attach to the Reparation Commission, merely because it was a somewhat permanent body, a sub-commission which had to handle a question essentially different from those in which the Reparation Commission was interested. He repeated that if it were necessary to attach the new sub-commission to a Commission already in existence, the Commission charged with the distribution of rolling stock was the only possible one. It was not only a question of the food supply of Vienna and of the Austrian Republic. Difficulties of the same nature presented themselves between the New States and he did not think it probable that Italy or Jugoslavia, for instance, would accept the authority of a Commission which was subordinated, no matter in how slight a degree, to the Reparation Commission.

MR. POLK said that according to his information the interested States would not object to the solution proposed by the majority of the representatives on the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission. M. Benes, in particular, had made statements to that effect.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his information did not conform to that of Mr. Polk's.

M. MAUCLERE said the sub-commission charged with the Austrian question was unanimous with the single exception of the British Delegate. The Italian Delegate, in particular, in accepting the proposition, specified—which moreover conformed to the views of the Commission—that there should be no question of control exercised by the Commission, which could only appeal to the good will of the interested States.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that appeals to the good will of the interested States had been made for four months and that no result had yet been obtained. There was no other way of solving the present situation than to accept the proposals of the British technical experts

who were on the spot and consequently in a position to judge matters wisely.

M. MAUCLERE pointed out that each of the interested States would be represented on the Commission which it was proposed to create. Therefore the situation would not be the same as before and there should be more chance of success.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if the British proposition were adopted the interested States alone would be represented, with the exception of the President who would represent the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

M. SCIALOJA wished to point out that Italy was the only one of the States obtaining territory belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which had fully carried out its obligations with respect to rolling stock. She was moreover interested in having good railway service over the Austrian lines. It was entirely a question of ensuring railway service and that question had no political aspect. It was only necessary to organize what was called in Italy a cumulative service, that is to say, exchange of cars on the frontiers. It was less an affair of organization than one of personalities. It must be recognized that Sir Francis Dent had fully succeeded in his work and that all the interested States were agreed as to recognizing his skill and ability. The man who was needed had been found in him, and the Council would attain its object if it placed under him the representatives of the interested Governments who trusted him. He did not think that it would be useful to have Delegates from the other large Powers on that Commission. That might result in the danger that the Commission, if it had too many representatives from the large Powers, might be tempted to exceed its jurisdiction. It had already been suggested that the Commission might extend its control to all the Italian railway service including internal traffic. It went without saying that Italy could not accept such an extension of the Powers of the Commission and that the latter must content itself with exercising a limited control. After all the proposed Commission was a technical one. It was fitting that the Council should limit itself to defining its jurisdiction in a precise manner. The question as to

whether or not it should be attached to the Reparation Commission seemed to him after all a relatively minor one.

M. MAUCLERE said that the Italian Delegate on his Committee had indeed pointed out that no reproaches could be directed towards Italy with respect to the exchange of cars, and the Committee had willingly endorsed his statement. The Italian Delegate had likewise wished to have it specified that there could be no question of the new Commission having any jurisdiction over internal railway organization and the Committee had agreed with that point of view. With respect to the composition of the Commission he thought that he should point out that all the large Powers were equally interested in maintaining stable conditions in Central Europe, and that the situation there depended largely upon possibilities of food supply which in turn necessitated a good organization of transportation service.

MR. POLK said that although that question did not especially interest America he wished to point out that the American Representative on the Committee of Organization had not accepted the British proposal. The Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission was already occupied with the distribution of coal, which was a question of the greatest importance. It seemed to him difficult to separate that question from the question of provisional distribution of cars. These two problems were in fact most closely connected. If the proposed Commission was to be entirely independent, and only responsible to the Supreme Council or to the respective Governments, no coordination of effort could be obtained. He reiterated that according to his information the Czechs, Poles and other interested States would be prepared to accept the proposal of the majority.

M. SCIALOJA said he did not see any great difficulty in the matter; he wished only to insist that the jurisdiction of the Commission should be precisely defined.

SIR EYRE CROWE regretted that the British considered the plan presented to be absolutely impracticable. The American Representative on the spot, moreover, had said that he was fully in

agreement with the British proposal. That question in no way concerned the Reparation Commission. The latter had an undeniable tendency to extend its functions more and more. He thought it dangerous to follow that line of action. Moreover, M. Scialoja had said that it was less a question of organization than of personalities. It was certain that Sir Francis Dent, who M. Scialoja was kind enough to praise, could not collaborate in a task which he considered doomed to certain failure.

MR. POLK said that the official American Representative, Colonel Smith, was not in favor of the British proposal. Both he and Colonel Causey, who was also at Vienna, accepted the principle of the formation of a new Commission, but contemplated its subordination to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission. He was for a coordination of the different commissions and not in favor of the complete independence of the proposed new Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that a distinction should be made between two questions. One was a question of the composition of the Commission; the other was whether or not it should include representatives of all the Great Powers, or only representatives of the interested States presided over by a representative of the Allies.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that the British proposition presented certain possible advantages from a technical point of view but from a political point of view it seemed impossible that only one of the Great Powers should be represented.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if Sir Eyre Crowe could not alter his proposition so as to facilitate an agreement.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that if the Council wished to create a Commission including representatives of all the Principal Powers his Government would not oppose it, but their Delegates could not take part in that work. As to the second question, that is to say, whether or not that Commission should be subordinated to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, he felt obliged to say that his Government was definitely opposed to all thought of

attaching it to the Reparation Commission, and that if the Council decided in that sense he could not agree with its decision and would have to ask for new instructions from London. Moreover he felt that the first question was far more urgent than the second one.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if Sir Eyre Crowe would agree to the proposed Commission being attached to the Commission charged with the final distribution of rolling stock.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would be ready to eventually examine that solution but for the moment he felt that it would be better to make the proposed Commission absolutely independent.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it was rather dangerous to give the proposed Commission complete independence.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that that was however the only way of obtaining a practical result.

GENERAL MANCE wished to insist upon the effect which the present disagreement might have upon work already accomplished at Vienna in this respect. The Communication Section of the Supreme Economic Council was a purely consultative body. Except in a special case it had no power of its own and could only act through the personal influence which it exerted on the administration with which it came in contact. It was one of the only bodies which had no political complexion and which was inspired solely by the general interest. He thought that that special situation should be taken into account and that any proposition which might entail the retirement of Sir Francis Dent would run the risk of endangering results obtained by virtue of hard, and on the whole fruitful, labor. It seemed to him dangerous to embark upon an entirely new policy and to destroy, in the presence of a serious economic situation, a body which had already proven its worth.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe's opinion that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had a tendency to progressively enlarge its functions and he realized that it might be dangerous not to counteract that tendency but as M.

Loucheur was then absent and was expected to return the following day he thought it would be difficult to reach a decision without consulting him. Consequently he felt that it would be preferable to adjourn the rest of the discussion of this subject to a meeting at the end of the week.

(This was agreed to.)

5. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that M. Vesnitch had given him a letter from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation showing that the Jugo-Slav Government had been prepared to sign the Austrian and Minorities Treaties when, on November 21st, it had been informed that it was also to sign the two financial arrangements signed at Saint Germain September 10th.⁴ One of those arrangements had greatly disturbed the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government by its provisions for a set-off between the sum due to Jugo-Slavia by way of reparation and those which it would have to pay out as its contribution to the expenses of the liberation of the territories acquired by it. The Serb-Croat-Slovenes maintained that such a provision would prevent their receiving anything from the reparation fund within 10 years, and would place them in an impossible economic situation as a result of the serious losses which the years of occupation by the troops of the Central Empires had inflicted upon them. The Jugo-Slav Delegation was convinced that if it could discuss that question directly with the former Reparation Commission an agreement could be reached prior to the following Friday, which was the expiration of the time limit granted it for signing the two Treaties and the two Financial Arrangements. Advantage might be taken of the presence in Paris of the Prince Regent, who had Technical Delegates with him, and the former Reparation Commission might be charged with preparing a report to be submitted the following Friday after having conferred upon this question with the Jugo-Slav Delegation. Financial Arrangements With Serbia

It was decided:

- (1) that the former Reparation Commission submit to the Council on Friday, December 5th, a report relative to the request of the Jugo-

Slav Delegation seeking to obtain a modification in one of the financial arrangements signed at Saint Germain, September 10th, 1919;

(2) that the said Commission, before preparing its report, should hear the Jugo-Slav Delegates on that subject.

6. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation summarizing the contents of a telegram from the French Chargé d’Affaires giving the point of view of the British, French and Italian representatives at Bucharest. (See Appendix “C”). Roumanian Reply

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation. He observed that the name of the American representative was not mentioned, although it was not said that he had adopted an attitude differing from that of his colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if the new Roumanian Ministry had been formed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Roumanian Government was quite capable of having deliberately brought about a Ministerial crisis in order to have a pretext for not replying to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers.⁵

M. BERTHELOT said that the French representative at Bucharest had, moreover, telegraphed that Vaiva Voevod had been elected President of the Chamber. He was opposed to a policy of resistance, and upon assuming the Presidential chair had made a speech in which he had insisted upon the necessity of Roumania’s not weakening the ties binding her to the Allies. Apparently the general impression of the last few days was more satisfactory, although surprises were of course always possible. The British Chargé d’affaires had made representations to the Queen and emphasized the dangers which Roumania would incur by refusing to sign. Roumania would find herself entirely isolated from a diplomatic point of view, and she would be obliged to maintain large forces under arms; the result would be a general discontent which might endanger the Dynasty itself. The Queen had seemed impressed with that argument and has promised to use her influence over King Ferdinand to induce him to

give a favourable reply to the Allies. The question now was whether or not the Council would grant the Roumanians the delay they requested on the ground that their Ministerial crisis did not permit them to reach an immediate decision. It was to be feared that an open break would be badly received at that moment by public opinion, and in any event, it could not be denied that the decision now being deliberated would have most serious consequences.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the Roumanians had deliberately provoked a ministerial crisis in order to gain time. Nevertheless, in order to run no risk of antagonizing public opinion, he was inclined to grant the Roumanians a final short delay, six days for instance. But it should be clearly indicated that that delay would not be prolonged under any circumstances.

SIR EYRE CROWE admitted that he felt a great hesitancy in giving his final opinion; there were many arguments in favor of both conclusions. On the one hand the Council had already sent a very succinct ultimatum to the Roumanians and it might be most disadvantageous to grant a prolongation of the time limit. He felt that the attitude of the various diplomatic representatives at Bucharest had not been at all satisfactory. They had not obeyed their instructions and they had led the Roumanians to hope that the Council's decisions were not final. Quite possibly the Roumanian reply might have been more satisfactory if the attitude of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers had been more firm. His impression was that whatever the Council did the Roumanians were determined not to sign. The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers seemed to think that if the Council granted a further delay to the Roumanian Government the latter would emancipate itself from M. Bratiano's influence and would at last see where its true interests lay. He was far from being convinced thereof. M. Bratiano was no longer in power and his party no longer had a majority in Parliament; but he remained very powerful. His counsels had certainly prevailed once more, and if the Council now seemed to hesitate his influence could not be increased. As to Vaiva-Voevod, he thought that he was quite unreliable: he was, in fact, nothing more than M. Bratiano's puppet. It was true that the decision was a serious one, but he pointed out that that decision had

already been taken eight days before when the ultimatum had been sent. The foregoing considerations seemed to him of great weight, but, on the other hand, he was aware that in view of the difficulties raised by the situation in America and the arrogant attitude which Germany seemed to wish to assume it was necessary to move cautiously, and that it might not be advantageous to have an open break with Roumania.

MR. POLK remarked that he had telegraphed the American Minister at Bucharest that he was not satisfied with his attitude and that in any event, in case of a severance of relations, he should leave Bucharest with his colleagues.

M. SCIALOJA said that he had given the Italian representative at Bucharest very clear instructions directing him to remain in complete agreement with his colleagues and to model his attitude upon theirs.

He had been ordered to urge the Roumanian Government to conform to the decisions of the Council. With respect to the general question, he felt that the Roumanians could not well be refused a short and final delay. It was quite possible that the Ministerial crisis was only a subterfuge; nevertheless, it was necessary that there should be a Government at Bucharest in order that a valid decision could be reached there. At a time when the enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers seemed to be again lifting their heads, it would be very serious if a breach were made in the ranks of the Allies. If, as he felt sure, Roumania finally decided to sign, the prestige of the Conference would be greatly increased. For these reasons he was in favor of M. Clemenceau's proposal to grant the Roumanians a final extension of six days.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed fully with all Sir Eyre Crowe had said, especially concerning the perfidy of M. Bratiano and the intrigues of the Roumanian Government. It was nevertheless true that an open break would be very serious, especially at that time when the situation in America imposed added caution. The regrettable attitude of the diplomatic representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers made it possible to excuse, to a certain extent, the Roumanian

attitude. However, to make assurance doubly sure and to be well within its rights, he thought that the Council had better grant Roumania the extension of six days. He did not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe as to the Roumanian Government definitely refusing to sign. The Queen of Roumania, who was a very sensible and clever woman, seemed to have been impressed by the representations of the British representative at Bucharest. Her influence might be decisive; furthermore, he knew that influential politicians were bringing pressure to bear on King Ferdinand in order to induce him to yield. But if this extension were granted it should be clearly set forth that no consideration of any nature could induce the Council to grant a further extension.

SIR EYRE CROWE recognized that there was a great deal of truth in what the President of the Conference had just said, and he was ready to agree in principle with his point of view, but he felt that the Council should calculate very carefully the date the extension would expire so as to give Roumania the time necessary to make her reply. Account should be taken of the extraordinary delays always encountered by telegrams sent to Bucharest, and the Council should carefully determine the conditions under which its communication to the Roumanian Government was to be sent and delivered. A further question was that of the publication of the notes of the Council. It seemed to him that now was the time to have recourse to publication. The Council should not fail to avail itself of the means at its disposal for acting upon Roumanian public opinion which still remained ignorant of the true situation.

M. BERTHELOT did not think that it would be advisable at that time to publish the notes addressed to the Roumanian Government. What was above all desired was to obtain the Roumanian signature. That would not be facilitated by a publication which might wound the national pride so excessive in Balkan countries. On the other hand, there would be no disadvantage in publishing the notes of the Council if the severance of diplomatic relations became a *fait accompli*.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to again insist upon one point, to wit, the extreme importance of the Roumanians having no knowledge of the

deliberations of the Council or of the differences of views which might have arisen on that serious question.

M. BERTHELOT thought that a special note might be published summarizing the last exchanges of notes with Roumania and setting forth the reasons why the Council had felt obliged to grant a last extension of time to the Roumanian Government. That would be a way of enlightening public opinion without wounding any sensibilities.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that M. Berthelot might prepare a draft of that nature which should be submitted during the course of the day to all the heads of delegations and, if approved by them, should be published in the press of the following day.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in view of the uncertain communications between Paris and Bucharest, the Council at the same time that it sent a telegram, might ask a member of the Roumanian Delegation, M. Antonescu for instance, to go to Roumania. He would personally carry the Council's message and could exert his influence at Bucharest towards obtaining an agreement. The telegram to be prepared by M. Berthelot should specify that it bound all the Powers and that none of the representatives at Bucharest of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should await special instructions.

It was decided:

- (1) that M. Berthelot should prepare, and submit on that day to the Heads of Delegations, a telegram informing the Roumanian Government that the delay granted it to submit its reply was extended for six days, that is to say, until noon on Monday, December 8th; that the said telegram should be sent directly to Bucharest and a copy delivered to M. Antonescu requesting him to deliver it personally to the Roumanian Government;
- (2) that the question of detail concerning the sending and delivery of the communication to the Roumanian Government should be examined by M. Berthelot and his conclusions submitted during the day to the Heads of Delegations;

(3) that M. Berthelot should prepare a note for publication in the press explaining the attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers towards Roumania, and that said note should be submitted during the afternoon to the Heads of Delegations.

7. MR. POLK, referring to the decision taken on November 28th, relative to the Exequaturs of Foreign Consuls at Dantzic (See H. D. 101, Minute 3),⁶ said that he accepted the recommendations of the Drafting Committee provided that the temporary representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should not have the right to refuse Exequaturs to Consuls of the Allied and Associated Powers. Exequatur of Foreign Consuls at Dantzic Prior to the Definite Establishment of the Free City

It was decided:

that during the period between the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and the definite establishment of the free city of Dantzic, the exequaturs of foreign consuls should be delivered by the representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to which the sovereignty was transferred by article 100 of the said Treaty; provided that the said representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers could not refuse to grant exequaturs to the consuls of the Allied and Associated Powers.

(The meeting was then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , December 3, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-105**

Note by the Naval Representatives for Submission to the Supreme Council

PERSONNEL FOR THE GERMAN MINESWEEPING SERVICE

The Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers met on the 24th November, 1919 to consider the German Note (No. 38 of 20th October, 1919) on the subject of the personnel for the German Minesweeping Service.

The Naval Representatives reached the conclusions which are shown in the accompanying memorandum.

N. A.	For the United States of
McCULLY	America
LE VAVASSEUR	For France
L. FULLER	For Great Britain
M. GRASSI	For Italy
M. OSUMI	For Japan
	[Annex]

Personnel for the German Minesweeping Service

25 NOVEMBER 1919.

With reference to the German Delegation's Notes Nos. 38 and 46 of 20th October and 4th November 1919 respectively, on the subject of the crews for the German mine-sweeping vessels, the view of the Allied Naval Advisers is that under the terms of the treaty of Peace with Germany, the Allied and Associated Powers have the right to require that the Mine Clearance Personnel should be included in the 15,000 officers and men of which the German Navy is, in the future, to consist:—

2. This opinion is based on the following reasons:

- (a) Article 183 lays down a total personnel of 15,000 officers and men for the German Navy to include all Services.
- (b) Article 182 states that a certain number of Minesweeping vessels may be kept in commission until the completion of mine-sweeping. (N. B. 130 of these minesweeping vessels are torpedo craft.)

3. The German requests for minesweeping vessels (comprising 328 in all) were granted *in toto* by the Allied Naval Armistice

Commission in order to allow of the earliest possible clearance of the minefields in the interests of all nations.

4. It is considered that the number of men asked for by Germany is excessive. The following is a comparison of the British and German numbers employed.

	<i>Vessels</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Average per Vessel</i>
British	1000	900	15,000	16
German	328	755	14,535	47

5. The Principal points on which Germany bases her demand for additional crews over and above the 15,000 allowed by Article 183 are as follows:—

Protest

Reply

(a) 15,000 officers and men allowed by Art. 183 are required to man the remaining German warships.

There is no necessity to man these ships until the minefields are cleared away [;] for their own safety it is better that they should not be manned and should remain in harbour.

(c) [*sic*] Crews must be specialists.

Quite unnecessary. A very small proportion of specialists only is required. The British and French started minesweeping at the commencement of the war without practically any trained men. Recently the United States Navy cleared the North Sea barrage without any previous experience.

(d) Article 183 implies the obligation to retain crews in commission.

On the contrary, it purposely makes no mention of personnel which is entirely dealt with in the next article viz, 183 which ends by stating that “No Naval corps may be organised in Germany without being included in the above strength.”

(e) Need of personnel for mine-sweeping only temporary

No reason therefore why permanent men should not be used temporarily.

6. During the winter months, minesweeping in the Baltic is largely impracticable. In consequence practically half the mine clearance personnel will not be employed, and opportunity can then be taken to make the necessary changes.

7. In view however, of the importance to the general interests of commerce that the minesweeping should be completed as early as possible, and as its rapidity depends not only on the number of vessels, but also on the personnel, the following concession is proposed:—

The German Navy may include, for a maximum period of eight months from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, in addition to the personnel prescribed in Article 183, a number of men who shall be exclusively employed in the mine-sweeping provided for in Article 193. This additional number of men shall at no time exceed 10,000 and shall be progressively reduced from time to time in such manner as the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall determine, so that at the end of the period of eight months above referred to, the personnel of the German Navy shall not exceed the figure stipulated in Article 183.

Appendix B to HD—105

*Memorandum for the Supreme Council*⁷

Information has been received by His Majesty's Government from Copenhagen to the effect that Doctor Koester, the German "Kommissar" for Slesvig-Holstein, who resides in the town of Slesvig, has taken an office in the town of Flensburg and has stated that he intends to remain in the plebiscite area during its occupation by the international commission.

It is further reported that Colonel Frumme, who was previously in command of the German troops in Flensburg, has been given an appointment,^{*} nominally under the Ministry of Labour, and has already taken an office in one of the barracks of the town, where he has a staff of some 200 non-commissioned officers and men. It is

reported on reliable authority that these persons are still inscribed in the official military accounts and are still drawing pay as members of the German army.

Sir Charles Marling, who has telegraphed from London his comments on these reports, observes that it is impossible to permit a measure which is nothing but a retention of troops under the thinnest disguise, or to recognise an authority set up at the last moment without the consent of the international commission. He adds that the proposed residence of Dr. Loester [*Koester?*] at Flensburg would appear at first sight to be an attempt to evade the provision of the treaty by which German civilian officials are to leave the plebiscite area.

He strongly urges that a third battalion of allied troops should be placed at the disposal of the commission in view of the intention of the German Government—unmistakably shown by the above-mentioned information—to influence in their favour the voting in the plebiscite area.

DECEMBER 1, 1919. **Appendix C to HD-105**

DECEMBER 2, 1919.

Note From the French Delegation

The French representative at Bucarest telegraphs that the Rumanian reply has been delivered to the Legations. This reply commences with a justification of the Rumanian policy since the beginning of the war, and recalls the sacrifices suffered by Rumania. It indicates that the Ministry, besides not being parliamentary, has resigned and cannot make a decision involving so gravely the future of the country. It begs a delay of sufficient length to enable a Ministry created by the Parliament to declare itself validly.

The British, French and Italian representatives are of the opinion that the request for a delay is one of the most justified under the existing circumstances. They are moreover under the impression that the new Government, which will be supported by a majority

constituted outside of the liberal party, will be better disposed than the resigning government.

It is to be feared that in refusing a prolongation of the delay the campaign of the liberal party, which is attempting to swing the other parties in line with its *intransigence*, would not be facilitated. The British and Italian representatives insist also upon the danger which might arise from any weakening of the authority of the state, direct or indirect, which might be favorable to the bolshevist movement.

¹ Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

^{1a} See appendix B to HD-92, p. 172 [*Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 8](#)*].

² HD-66, minute 3, [vol. VIII, p. 508](#) .

³ *Ante*, p. 441 [*Pg. 441 is part of [Doc. 20](#)*].

^{3a} HD-63, minute 4, [vol VIII, p. 433](#) .

⁴ Appendices I and J to HD-37, [vol. VII, pp. 830](#)  and [832](#) .

⁵ Appendix A to HD-93, p. 182 [*Pg. 182 is part of [Doc. 9](#)*].

⁶ *Ante*, p. 351 [*Pg. 351 is part of [Doc. 17](#)*].

⁷ From the British Delegation.

^{*} It is not clear from the telegram what is the nature of this appointment. [Footnote in the original.]

December 4, 10:30 a.m. (HD-106)

[22] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, December 4, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 4, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/106

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/106

HD-106

[Document 22]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, December 4, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 4, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Hinchley-
Cooke

FRANCE

M. de Percin

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Rear-Admiral McCully, U. S. N.

Mr. E. L. Dresel

Mr. A. W. Dulles

Dr. I. Bowman

Lieut-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Saekville-West

Lieut-Colonel Kisch

Captain Fuller, R. N.

Lieut-Commander Dunne, R. N. V. R.

Mr. Ibbetson-James

FRANCE

M. Georges Leygues

Marshal Foch

M. Jules Cambon

M. Sergent

General Weygand

General LeRond

Commandant le Vavas seur

ITALY

General Cavallero

Rear-Admiral Grassi

M. Stranieri

Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli

Commandant Fea

Commandant Ingianni

1. M. LEYGUES said that he was in receipt of a number of telegrams from the French Naval Officer in charge of the ex-Austro-Hungarian warships at Cattaro, which referred to a state of excitement prevailing amongst Hungarians and Jugo-Slavs at that place. He thought that the situation of the enemy warships in that port was rather precarious. The enemy fleet there was composed of approximately 40 units of which 6 or 8 were important. He felt that an incident similar to that of Scapa Flow should not be repeated in any event. He added that Cattaro was a difficult port to supervise on account of its geographical situation, and he was of the opinion that the security of those enemy warships would be far greater in a French port such as Bizerte. He, therefore, proposed that the enemy warships at Cattaro should be convoyed to a French port, where they would of course remain at the disposal of the Conference and their definite attribution would not be prejudiced in any way thereby. Secondly, he proposed that the naval forces of the other Allied and Associated Powers should help the French Navy in the convoying of those vessels from Cattaro to a French port such as Bizerte, which was a long and difficult process. Question of ex-Austro-Hungarian Ships at Cattaro

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether warships which were being guarded by the Italian Navy happened to be in Italian ports.

M. LEYGUES replied that there were such ships at Pola and some in Venice.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he accepted the French proposal in principle but would, of course, have to refer to the Admiralty the question of helping the French navy in the convoy of those warships.

MR. POLK said there were also two Austrian warships at Spalato under guard of the American Navy.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether those ships could not be taken out at the same time as the ships at Cattaro.

MR. POLK replied they were quite willing to have those ships taken out and sent anywhere but American ports.

M. LEYGUES suggested that the question of convoy should be referred back to the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.

MR. POLK said there was a doubt in the minds of the naval authorities regarding the authority of the United States over the enemy warships at Spalato. There had been a decision by the Board of Admirals, but no definite mandate from the Conference had been received for those ships. He inquired whether the French position was the same.

M. LEYGUES replied it was the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission which had given its decision in the matter and therefore the situation was the same for America and France.

It was decided:

- (1) to adopt the French proposal that the ex-Austro-Hungarian warships at Cattaro should be convoyed to a French port, preferably Bizerte;
- (2) to refer to the Inter-Allied Naval Commission for examination and report the question of aid to be given the French navy by the other Allied and Associated navies in the convoy of ex-Austro-Hungarian warships from Cattaro to a French port.

2. M. LEYGUES said that a letter from the Polish Delegation had been communicated to him asking that enemy warships be allotted to Poland. That request brought up once more a recent decision of the Council to the effect that no enemy warships would be attributed to small Powers.¹ He thought it advisable for the Council to examine their decision anew. As a matter of fact, Belgium had in her possession from ten to fifteen enemy warships among which were some German torpedo boats which had been found at Antwerp and others which had escaped to Holland and been returned to Belgium. She had asked to be allowed to keep those warships for the reason that she needed them badly in view of the extended coast line. He was of the opinion that it would be extremely difficult to ask Belgium to return those ships and that such a procedure would certainly hurt the national feeling. Under those circumstances it seemed all the more difficult to refuse the requests for enemy warships of other

small Powers, among which some, as Poland for instance, had been created from nothing and therefore relied on the Conference for assistance. Among the German warships were torpedo boats and destroyers of relatively small fighting value which nobody wanted; would it not be possible to give a certain number of ships selected amongst those to be destroyed, provided they were used for purposes of policing the coast, fisheries, prevention of smuggling, etc. He called the attention of the Council to the fact that in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria that State had been allowed, under Article 83, to keep a certain number of warships for police and fishery duties, and for that reason it seemed difficult to refuse the claim made by small Allied Powers when a similar one had been granted to an enemy State. Attribution of Enemy Warships to Powers With Limited Interests

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could agree at once with M. Leygues' proposal. The British Admiralty had always maintained that a certain number of smaller ships could be allotted to small States for police duties.

MR. POLK said he wished to inquire whether there would be a distribution of those smaller vessels among all the other small Powers, or whether that distribution should apply only to Poland and Belgium.

M. LEYGUES thought that such attribution could be made to all the smaller Powers having an outlet to the Sea, but in practice the question was only of particular interest to Poland and Jugo-Slavia, not to speak of Belgium.

M. SCIALOJA agreed with the French proposal provided that only smaller boats be attributed for strictly police purposes as in the case of Bulgaria.

MR. POLK also agreed provided all the smaller States got them.

It was decided:

- (1) to allow Belgium to keep the small enemy warships held in her ports provided such ships be used only for police work;
- (2) to give a certain number of small enemy warships, selected from amongst those to be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to all the Allied States with limited interests making a request for such vessels, provided such ships be used solely for police work;
- (3) to refer to the naval experts for examination and report the questions raised by the above paragraph 2.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

The Heads of Delegations held a conference *in camera*.

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, December 5, 1919.

¹ HD-101, minute 1, p. 345 [*Pg. 345 is part of [Doc. 17](#)*].

December 5, 10:30 a.m. (HD–107)

[23] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, December 5, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 5, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/107

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/107

HD-107

[Document 23]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, December 5, 1919, at 10:30
a m.**

Paris, December 5, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. G. A. Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Hinchley-
Cooke

FRANCE

M. Massigli

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. E. L. Dresel

Rear-Admiral McCully, U. S. N.

Dr. James Brown Scott

Lieut. Commander Koehler

Mr. A. W. Dulles

Mr. F. Neilsen

Mr. Hodge

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. A. Leeper

Mr. H. W. Malkin

Captain Fuller, R. N.

FRANCE

M. Mauclore

M. Serruys

M. Laroche

General Le Rond

M. Fromageot

ITALY

Admiral Grassi

M. Ricci-Busatti

M. Dell'Abbadessa

M. Stranieri

Commandant Fea

M. Pilotti

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. M. MAUCLERE said that as far back as the 1st and 4th of July the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation protested against the terms of the Financial Arrangements¹ proposed as a result from the Austrian Treaty. In a letter dated December 2nd, to the President of the Peace Conference the Delegation had renewed that protest. Serbia agreed without objection to the first three articles of the Financial Arrangement concerning the States containing territories which were part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with the exception of Italy. She protested against the last two articles of that Arrangement, or to be more accurate, against Article 5. Article 4 of the Financial Arrangement of September 10th defined the situation of States which, by reason of sums due from them as a result of acquiring property and possessions of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or by way of contribution to expenses of liberation, owed a greater sum than that to which they were entitled by way of reparation. That article provided that the States in that situation, for instance the Czecho-Slovak State, should issue bonds for an amount equal to that excess; those bonds were to bear interest at five percent from January 1926 only, and were repayable on and after January 1st, 1931; amortization to be effected within a period of twenty-five years from the latter date. Article 5, on the other hand, defined the situation of States which by way of reparation had a credit greater than the debt due from them on account of the property and possessions transferred to them or of the expenses of liberation for which they were responsible. It provided that the amount to be carried to the debit of those States should be accepted on account of the payment of reparations, and that those States should receive no immediate payment, by way of reparation, as long as the other States to which reparation was due had not received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation. Serbia protested against that provision. She asked to be treated as well as the States which had not been laid waste and to whom, nevertheless, important concessions had been made, since the debt which they had contracted on account of their liberation only bore interest after a considerable delay. In conformity with the task which it had received from the Supreme Council,^{1a} the Reparation Commission on the

preceding day, had met the Serbian representatives and they had agreed on a solution. Articles 4 and 5 of the Financial Arrangement were to be eliminated and replaced by a new article reading as follows: (M. Mauclere then read the text of the new Article 4 proposed by the Reparation Commission (See Appendix "A"). That article in no way changed the situation of the States affected by the former Article 4. Its only effect was to place in the same situation as the latter, the States affected by the former Article 5. The debt due by these latter States would likewise be represented by bonds issued under the same conditions as those provided for by former Article 4. As those bonds matured the Reparation Commission would withhold from the sums due to the States in question by way of reparation such sums as became necessary for interest payments and amortization. Serbia, therefore, preserved all its rights to immediate reparation. The Italian Delegation adhered to that condition on the condition that the Special Arrangement concluded with respect to Italy should be modified in a similar manner. At the last minute and after the meeting ended the Serbian Delegate presented a new demand with a view to securing for his country treatment similar to that accorded to Belgium and to have granted to it a priority of 2,000,000,000 francs on the reparation account. He, (M. Mauclere) had replied that the Commission was not competent to pass upon that demand. He pointed out moreover that that was the first time that the Serbs had raised the question and they in no wise made it a condition precedent to their signing the Financial arrangement. Signature of the Financial Arrangements at Saint Germain by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government

SIR EYRE CROWE said the Arrangement reached was perfectly satisfactory to him but its application raised certain difficulties; he did not at the moment see how a Financial Arrangement which had already been signed could be changed.

M. BERTHELOT added that the question was all the more delicate as the Serbs had to sign the Bulgarian Treaty before noon of that very day. There had been some thought of asking them to sign a promise to sign the Financial Arrangement which now had to be changed. They could, on that day, only sign the other diplomatic instruments.

M. FROMAGEOT said it was difficult to find a suitable procedure. The Powers might draw up a declaration modifying Articles 4 and 5 of the Financial Arrangement. The Serbs, while adhering to the Arrangement, would adhere at the same time to the declaration modifying the latter; that solution raised practical difficulties in view of the short time remaining in which Serbia might sign. Perhaps that delay might be extended with respect to the Financial Arrangements.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Council should leave the legal experts to find a suitable procedure.

M. SCIALOJA took it to be understood that the Financial Arrangement relative to Italy was to be similarly modified.

MR. POLK agreed with the proposed solution. He was favorable to the granting of the final Serbian demand mentioned by M. Mauciere and he hoped that it would be put upon the agenda of an early meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

M. MAUCIERE wished to point out to the Council that M. Loucheur desired to know the exact meaning of the words: "property and possessions transferred" which were to be found both in Article 207 [208?] of the Treaty with Austria and in the Financial Arrangements. He said that M. Loucheur interpreted them as meaning real property and possessions.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that that was a question of interpretation of the Treaty which was not within the competence of the Council.

It was decided:

- (1) to accept the modifications proposed by the Reparation Commission to the Arrangement between the Allied and Associated Powers relative to contribution to the expenses of the liberation of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with a view to replacing Articles 4 and 5 of that Arrangement by a new Article 4. (See Appendix "A".)
- (2) that the Drafting Committee be charged with modifying in the same manner the Arrangement between the Allied and Associated

Powers relative to the reparation account with regard to Italy.
(3) that the Drafting Committee be charged with determining the procedure to be followed so that the modification of the said Financial Arrangements thus rendered necessary should not prevent the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government from adhering to the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty, and from signing the Bulgarian Treaty, within the time limit provided.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU thought that it would be well to adjourn until the following day the examination of that draft reply² as well as of the general note which was to be sent to Germany.³ The draft of that latter note did not fully Satisfy him. Draft Reply to the German Note Concerning Scapa Flow

EYRE CROWE agreed, but wished to make a remark on the subject of the note relative to Scapa Flow. The British Admiralty had just published some documents which showed in an incontrovertible manner that the German Government gave instructions to sink the fleet. He thought that these documents had been communicated to the Drafting Committee. In his opinion the answer should take them into account.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that his Committee had in fact regretted having had no other knowledge of these documents than through the press; however, his Committee would receive them that afternoon.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to make another observation concerning the passage in the draft of the general note relating to Scapa Flow and to the compensation which was being demanded. He proposed that the Council's answer on this point should read as follows: "A reply, annexed hereto, to the German note of November 24th [27th] on Scapa Flow establishes the legal point of view. The Allied and Associated Powers examined the question before making their demands, and they do not share the fears expressed by the German Government regarding the disastrous effect on the economic life of German ports. The term of the protocol must stand. On receipt of a complete list of all the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, which is demanded by the protocol, the Allied and Associated Powers will make known their selection, keeping in view

the general economic situation of the German ports. Should thereafter the German Government think that it is able to prove that some particular demand is of a kind gravely to affect Germany's legitimate requirements in respect to the maintenance of her fluvial navigation or similar vital economic interests, the German Government may present its claim to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers who will be prepared to consider them in a spirit of equity after consultation with their naval advisors and after hearing the Reparation Commission."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that text satisfied him fully.

MR. POLK asked who would examine the German claims. There would no longer be a Supreme Council and the Ambassadorial Council^{3a} would not be competent to pass upon them.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that there had not been any decision as to what body would succeed the Supreme Council, but it was certain that some competent authority would exist.

MR. POLK doubted it. He pointed out that there already existed a Reparation Commission which was competent to determine that matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the question could not be determined by the Reparation Commission alone. It also affected the naval authorities.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Reparation Commission was not competent to reach a decision which had to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. POLK said that the real question, however, was whether the Germans could fulfil their obligations if they were deprived of the material essential to the existence of their ports and their fluvial navigation. He was afraid that the only idea of the naval experts was to seize that material.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the naval experts would be heard and also the Reparation Commission. After that the Governments would decide.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that that reply would satisfy Mr. Polk.

MR. POLK said that he was sorry that essentially commercial material was being taken by way of compensation for war material. He reiterated that the only question was whether Germany needed that material in order to furnish the reparation owed by her. The Reparation Commission was the body which could answer that question.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether Mr. Polk would be willing to refer to the Reparation Commission the question of the German ships held in American ports. It should not be forgotten that the Scapa Flow affair came under the Armistice.

Mr. POLK replied that he would not object if the Reparation Commission would decide to give back the *Imperateur*. Aside from that, in the case under consideration, he wished to know who would have power to pass judgment if it were not the Reparation Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that it would be the Five Governments; they had settled all the questions concerning the Armistice.

M. BERTHELOT wished to make two observations: first of all, he did not think that the documents published by the British Admiralty, which Sir Eyre Crowe had just referred to, were as convincing as the latter seemed to think. He, M. Berthelot, had informed M. Fromageot of their substance and the latter had thought that it would not be advisable to engage in a long discussion with the German Government on that subject, but that it would be better to utilize the avowals made by the Germans in their notes.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that it would be well, nevertheless, to take into account the Admiralty's documents.

M. BERTHELOT added that, on the other hand, it seemed to him desirable that the Drafting Committee should point out in the note that military action did not necessarily imply a resumption of a state of war. There were many precedents for that view.

(The discussion of that subject was then adjourned).

3. (The Council had before it a draft Treaty prepared by the Drafting Committee (Appendix "B") and a modification of the last part of Article 2 of that draft (See Appendix "C").) Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Poland and the Czechoslovak State

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon these two documents.

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

- (1) to accept the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Poland and the Czechoslovak State, prepared by the Drafting Committee;
- (2) that the last part of Article II of that Treaty be drafted as indicated in Appendix "C".

4. (The Council had before it a note dated December 3rd, 1919, (Appendix "D").)

GENERAL LE ROND read and commented upon that note. It seemed that the best solution would be to have the joint expenses common to the whole Commission which, moreover, would certainly not exceed 50,000 francs per month, provisionally covered by advances of equal sums by the various Powers represented on the Commission. The Presidency of the Commission in fact belonged to the United States and it was only provisionally being held by France. Expenses of the International Teschen Commission

M. SCIALOJA asked if the same principle applied to the expenses of military occupation.

GENERAL LE ROND replied that on that point it had already been decided that the various interested States should determine the amount of the allowances that they deemed suitable and should make the necessary advances.

It was decided:

that the joint expenses common to the whole International Teschen Commission be defrayed by equal sums to be advanced by the various Powers represented on that Commission.

5. SIR EYRE CROWE informed the Council that according to a telegram which he had received from Bucharest the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had agreed with the Rumanian Government on a formula which the latter would accept and which would be satisfactory to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. That formula was reported to have been already telegraphed to Paris. Romanian Affairs

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that on the preceding day he had seen General Coanda who had spoken in a most satisfactory manner. He knew nothing, however, of the formula that Sir Eyre Crowe mentioned.

M. BERTHELOT said that a telegram had indeed arrived but it was still in an incomplete condition; the part which had been deciphered seemed satisfactory. As soon as complete text was available it would be sent to the various Delegations.

6. (The Council had before it a draft of the Financial Clauses dated December 1st, 1919. (See Appendix "E" and the Economic and Reparation Clauses, (Appendix F). Financial Economic and Reparation Clauses of the Treaty of Peace With Hungary

M. SERRUYS read and commented upon the proposed measures relative to the economic and reparation clauses. He pointed out that all members of the Economic Commission were in agreement and that that Commission was likewise in agreement with the Reparation

Commission. The principal provisions concerned the supply of coal from the mines at Pecs by Hungary to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. That supply would be controlled by the Reparation Commission. In a like manner the Economic Commission had thought that the Treaty should provide for the supply by Austria to Hungary of food stuffs within limits to be fixed by the Reparation Commission if a direct agreement were not reached between the interested parties. Finally the Commission had decided on the proposal of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, to add two paragraphs to the article corresponding to article 264 of the Treaty of Saint Germain in such a manner as to adapt it to Hungarian special legislation. On the other hand it had rejected a Serbian demand which sought a revision of the principle, already many times affirmed, which prohibited liquidation of enemy property in transferred territories.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that all that remained to be done was to refer these texts to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty.

MR. POLK said he would have to make a reservation with respect to the solution given to the question of the Pecs Mines.

It was decided:

to accept the Financial, Economic and Reparations clauses of the Treaty with Hungary and to refer the same to the Drafting Committee for final drafting; with the reservation that Mr. Polk should inform the Secretary General of the Conference whether he accepted the provisions relative to the coal of the Pecs Mines.

7. M. CLEMENCEAU informed the Council that the President of the Austrian Delegation had just handed him a request of Chancellor Renner that he be permitted to come to Paris to consult with the Council on the economic situation of Austria. He (M. Clemenceau) felt that both from a political point of view and for humanitarian reasons it would be well to accede to that request and to reply that the Council would be glad to have M. Renner come to Paris.
Communication from the Austrian Delegation

M. DUTASTA remarked that it was only that morning at 10 o'clock that he had seen M. Eichhoff. The latter would certainly appreciate the promptness with which the Council had given an answer.

It was decided:

that the Secretary General of the Conference should immediately inform the Austrian Delegation that, far from being opposed to Chancellor Renner's coming to Paris, the Council would be glad to have him come.

8. MR. POLK said that the decision reached at the meeting of the Council on the preceding day⁴ relative to the former Austro-Hungarian warships at Cattaro under guard of the French navy Former had not covered the case of the warships at Spalato under guard of the American navy. The Council, however, had recognized that the American navy had a right to convoy these warships to another port. Former Austro-Hungarian Warships at Spalato

It was decided:

that the two former Austrian warships now at Spalato under guard of the American Navy might, if the American Naval authorities so desire, be convoyed from Spalato to a port to be designated by the American Naval authorities, in accordance with the principle decided upon by the Council at its last meeting with respect to former Austro-Hungarian warships under guard of the French Navy at Cattaro (See H. D. 106, Minute 1).

(The meeting then adjourned).

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS , December 5, 1919. **Appendix A to HD-107**

[Text of the New Article 4 of the Financial Arrangement of September 10, 1919,⁵ Proposed by the Reparation Commission]

Article 4

Each of the said States shall, within three months after the request will have been made by the Reparations Commission, issue bonds for a sum equal to the sum due by that state, on account of its liberation, increased by the value of the goods and properties transferred; and shall deliver them to any person or to any organization which the governments of the U. S. of America, of the British Empire, France and Italy may designate.

These bonds shall be payable to bearer, and the principal and interest payable by the issuing state, without deduction of any tax or charge imposed by it, or under its authority. These bonds shall bear interest at 5%, payable semi-annually, beginning from the 1st of January, nineteen-hundred and twenty-six. They will be paid off in twenty-five annual installments, in equal amounts, beginning January 1st, 1931. The issuing state can nevertheless, if it so desires, pay off at any period all or part of these bonds at par and with all corresponding interest, provided it advises the governments of the United States, British Empire, France and Italy of its intention, ninety days in advance.

In proportion to these maturities, the Reparations' Commission shall retain, from the sums due to each of the interested states, under the designation "Reparations" the necessary sums for the payment of the interest, and the redemption of the bonds mentioned above.

Appendix B to HD-107

Poland and Czechoslovakia

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Poland, and the Czecho-Slovak State.

Desiring to assure the sovereignty of Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State over the territories recognized as belonging to them respectively.

The undersigned, after exchanging their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Subject to the special provisions of the Treaties and Decisions concluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement, the High Contracting Parties recognize the sovereignty of Poland over the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy lying to the north of the frontier line hereafter described:

From a point on the coarse of the Oder immediately south of the Ratibor-Oderberg railway—south-eastwards to the point of meeting of the three old boundaries between Galicia, Hungary and the Duchy of Teschen,

a line to be defined subsequently in accordance with the Decision of September 27, 1919;⁶

thence to the point where it is met by the western boundary of the political district of Nameszto,

the old boundary between Galicia and Hungary;

thence eastwards to the point where this old boundary is met by the southern boundary of the political district of Trsztena,

a line to be defined subsequently in accordance with the Decision of September 27, 1919,

thence to point 2508 of the Magas Tatra,

the old boundary between Galicia and Hungary;

thence to point 1052 about 13 kilometres north-west of Olublo,

a line to be defined subsequently in accordance with the Decision of September 27, 1919,

thence eastwards, then east-south-eastwards to a point about 2 kilometres south of point 1335 (Halicz) where it meets the administrative boundary between the districts of Lisko on the west and of Turka on the East,

the old boundary between Galicia and Hungary.

This is the point common to the three frontiers of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Galicia.

The Boundary Commission provided for in the seventh paragraph of Article 83 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany concluded on June 28, 1919, will have to trace on the spot the frontier line described above.

ARTICLE 2

Subject to the special provisions of the Treaties and Decisions concluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement, the High Contracting Parties recognize the sovereignty of the Czecho-Slovak State over the territories defined by the frontiers laid down: with Germany, by Article 27, 6., and Article 83 of the Treaty of Peace concluded with Germany on June 28, 1919; with Austria, by Article 27, 6. of the Treaty of Peace concluded with Austria on September 10, 1919; with Hungary, by Article 27, 4. of the Treaty of Peace concluded with Hungary on 1919; with Poland and Eastern Galicia by Article 1 of the present Treaty and by Article 1, B and C of the Treaty relating to Eastern Galicia concluded on; and with Roumania by the following line:

From point 123 which is the point common to the three frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia (Ruthenian territory) Roumania and Hungary, north-eastwards to the course of the Batar,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence eastwards to the point where it is left by the administrative boundary between the comitats of Ugocsa and Szatmar.

the course of the Batar upstream;

thence in a general easterly direction to point 652 situated on the Avas range about 6 kilometres south-west of Velete,

a line to be fixed on the ground parallel to the road Halmi-Tiszaújlak at a minimum distance of one kilometre from it, cutting the railway about 500 metres to the south of the station of Nevetlenfalva, then following generally the watershed between the basins of the Batar on the north and the Tur on the south and passing through points 238 and 582;

thence south-eastwards to point 943, south of Remete,

the watershed between the basins of the Tisza on the north and the Tur on the south;

thence northwards to a point to be chosen in the course of the Tisza about 1 kilometer upstream from Remete,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence eastwards to a point to be chosen above its confluence with the Visso, so as to leave the Maramarossziget–Borsa railway entirely in Roumanian territory while giving to the Ruthenes the maximum facilities for linking up the line Huszt, Also-Aspa, Korösmezo north of the river and entirely in Ruthenian territory,

the course of the Tisza upstream;

thence eastwards to point 1655 which is the point on the Carpathians common to the basins of the three rivers Tisza, Visso and Czeremosz,

the watershed between the basins of the Tisza and the Visso.

Point 1655 is the point common to the three frontiers of Czechoslovakia, Eastern Galicia and Roumania.

The present Treaty, in French, in English and in Italian, of which the French text shall prevail in case of divergence, shall be ratified. It will come into force at the same time as the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary.

The deposit of ratifications will be effected at Paris at the same time as the deposit of ratifications of the said Treaties.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case, they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Paris one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Powers who sign the Treaty.

Appendix C to HD–107

[A Modification of the Last Part of Article 2 of the Draft Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers Poland and the Czechoslovak State]

The present Treaty, in French, in English and in Italian, of which the French text shall prevail in case of divergence, shall be ratified. The deposit of ratifications will be effected at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A first *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

The present Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it when the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary have come into force for the said High Contracting Parties.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

Appendix D to HD-107

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
AT TESCHEN

3 DECEMBER, 1919.

[Note to the Supreme Council]

The International Commission at Teschen, on account of the short duration of its mandate, should assume no part of the administration of the country; consequently, it shall have no local revenue to collect, and the totality of its expenses shall be advanced by the Allied Governments.

It seems advisable that each Power advance the amount of the expenses for its Delegation. As to the common expenses of the entire Commission (Secretariat, interpreters, rents, heating, light, etc.) they may be either advanced by that of the Powers to which the President belongs, or covered by equal advances made by the various Powers, represented in the Commission. A decision should be taken to that effect.

Appendix E to HD-107

[Treaty of Peace With Hungary]

PART IX.—*Financial Clauses*

ARTICLE 180

Subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may make, the first charge upon all the assets and revenues of Hungary shall be

the cost of reparation and all other costs arising under the present Treaty or any treaties or agreements supplementary thereto, or under arrangements concluded between Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers during the Armistice signed on November 3, 1918.⁷

Up to May 1, 1921, the Hungarian Government shall not export or dispose of, and shall forbid the export or disposal of, gold without the previous approval of the Allied and Associated Powers acting through the Reparation Commission.

ARTICLE 181

There shall be paid by the Government of Hungary the total cost of all armies of the Allied and Associated Governments occupying territory within the boundaries of Hungary as defined by the present Treaty from the date of the signature of the Armistice of November 3, 1918, including the keep of men and beasts, lodging and billeting, pay and allowances, salaries and wages, bedding, heating, lighting, clothing, equipment, harness and saddlery, armament and rolling-stock, air services, treatment of sick and wounded, veterinary and remount services, transport services of all sorts (such as by rail, sea, or river, motor-lorries), communications and correspondence, and, in general, the cost of all administrative or technical services the working of which is necessary for the training of troops and for keeping their numbers up to strength and preserving their military efficiency.

The cost of such liabilities under the above heads, so far as they relate to purchases or requisitions by the Allied and Associated Governments in the occupied territory, shall be paid by the Hungarian Government to the Allied and Associated Governments in crowns or any legal currency of Hungary which may be substituted for crowns at the current or agreed rate of exchange. In cases where an Allied Government, in order to make such purchases or requisitions in the occupied territory, has incurred expenditure in a currency other than crowns, such expenditure shall be reimbursed in any legal Hungarian currency at the rate of exchange current at the date of reimbursement or at an agreed rate.

All other of the above costs shall be paid in the currency of the country to which the payment is due.

The above stipulations will not apply to military operations carried out after November 3, 1918, without the assent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and not provided for by the Armistice Agreements of November 3, and 13, 1918,⁸ except to such extent as the Reparation Commission shall decide, and the Reparation Commission shall have, so far as these operations are concerned, full power to decide all questions, especially those relating to:

- (a) the costs of the armies engaged in such operations, particularly the determination of their nature and amount, the portion of such costs to be charged to Hungary, the manner and currency in which such portion is to be paid, and any possible arrangements as regards preference or priority in connection with such payment;
- (b) the requisitioning in the course of the operations of property and securities of every description, particularly the possible classification of any portion of such property or securities as war booty, the valuation of such property or securities, the extent to which restitution should be made, debiting on the reparation account of the sum representing the property or securities not restored against the Power in possession thereof, the method of payment (in cash or as a set-off on the reparation account) of the sums so debited, and the dates on which such payment or set-off is to be made.

ARTICLE 182

Hungary confirms the surrender of all material handed over or to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the Armistice of November 3, 1918, or any supplementary arrangements, and recognizes the title of the Allied and Associated Powers to such material.

There shall be credited to Hungary, against the sums due from her to the Allied and Associated Powers for reparation, the value, as assessed by the Reparation Commission, of such of the above

material for which, as having nonmilitary value, credit should, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission, be allowed to Hungary.

Property belonging to the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals restored or surrendered under the Armistice Agreements in specie shall not be credited to Hungary.

ARTICLE 183

The priority of the charges established by Article 180, shall, subject to the qualifications made below, be as follows:

- (a) the cost of the armies of occupation, as defined under Article 181, during the Armistice.
- (b) the cost of any armies of occupation, as defined under Article 181, after the coming into force of the present Treaty;
- (c) the cost of reparation arising out of the present Treaty or any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto;
- (d) the cost of all other obligations incumbent on Hungary under the Armistice Agreement or its extensions, or under this Treaty or any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto.

The payment for such supplies of food and raw material for Hungary and such other payments as may be judged by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be essential to enable Hungary to meet her obligations in respect of reparation shall have priority to the extent and upon the conditions which have been or may be determined by the Governments of the Said Powers.

The payment of the costs of the armies employed in the operations effected after November 3, 1918, without the assent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and not provided for in the Armistice Agreements of November 3 and 13, 1918, shall have priority to the extent and upon the conditions fixed by the Reparation Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article 181.

ARTICLE 184

The right of each of the Allied and Associated Powers to dispose of enemy assets and property within its jurisdiction at the date of the

coming into force of the present Treaty is not affected by the foregoing provisions.

ARTICLE 185

Nothing in the foregoing provisions shall prejudice in any manner charges or mortgages lawfully effected in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers or their nationals respectively before the date at which a state of war existed between Austria-Hungary and the Allied or Associated Power concerned by the government of the former Kingdom of Hungary or by Hungarian nationals on assets in their ownership at that date, except in so far as variations of such charges or mortgages are specifically provided for under the terms of the present Treaty or conventions supplementary thereto.

ARTICLE 186

1. Each of the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred, and each of the States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, including Hungary shall, in so far as territory is assigned to it in accordance with the present Treaty, assume responsibility for a portion of the debt of the Hungarian Government which is specifically secured on railways or other property, and which was in existence on July 28, 1914. The portion to be so assumed by each State shall be such portion as in the opinion of the Reparation Commission represents the secured debt in respect of the railways and other properties transferred to that State under the terms of the present Treaty or any treaties or agreements supplementary thereto.

The amount of the liability in respect of secured debt so assumed by each State other than Hungary shall be valued by the Reparation Commission, on such basis as the Commission may consider equitable, and the value so ascertained shall be deducted from the amount payable by the State in question to Hungary in respect of property of the former or existing Hungarian Government which the State acquires with the territory. Each State shall be solely responsible in respect to that portion of the secured debt for which it assumes responsibility under the terms of this Article, and holders of

the debt for which responsibility is assumed by States other than Hungary shall have no recourse against the Government of any other State.

Any property which was specifically pledged to secure any debt referred to in this Article shall remain specifically pledged to secure the new debt. But in case the property so pledged is situated as the result of the present Treaty in more than one State, that portion of the property which is situated in a particular State shall constitute the security only for that part of the debt which is apportioned to that State, and not for any other part of the debt.

For the purposes of the present Article there shall be regarded as secured debt payments due by the former Hungarian Government in connection with the purchase of railways or similar property; the distribution of the liability for such payments will be determined by the Reparation Commission in the same manner as in the case of secured debt.

Debts for which the responsibility is transferred under the terms of this Article shall be expressed in terms of the currency of the State assuming the responsibility, if the original debt was expressed in terms of Austro-Hungarian paper currency. For the purposes of this conversion the currency of the assuming State shall be valued in terms of Austro-Hungarian paper kronen at the rate at which those kronen were exchanged into the currency of the assuming State by that State when it first substituted its own currency for Austro-Hungarian kronen. The basis of this conversion of the currency unit in which the bonds are expressed shall be subject to the approval of the Reparation Commission, which shall, if it thinks fit, require the State effecting the conversion to modify the terms thereof. Such modification shall only be required if, in the opinion of the Commission, the foreign exchange value of the currency unit or units substituted for the currency unit in which the old bonds are expressed is substantially less at the date of the conversion than the foreign exchange value of the original currency unit.

If the original Hungarian debt was expressed in terms of a foreign currency or foreign currencies, the new debt shall be expressed in

terms of the same currency or currencies.

If the original Hungarian debt was expressed in terms of Austro-Hungarian gold coin, the new debt shall be expressed in terms of equivalent amounts of pounds sterling or gold dollars of the United States of America, the equivalents being calculated on the basis of the weight and the fineness of gold of the three coins as enacted by law on January 1, 1914.

Any foreign exchange options, whether at fixed rates or otherwise, embodied explicitly or implicitly in the old bonds shall be embodied in the new bonds also.

2. Each of the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred, and each of the States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, including Hungary, shall assume responsibility for a portion of the unsecured bonded debt of the former Hungarian Government [as?] it stood on July 28, 1914, calculated on the basis of the ratio between the average for the three financial years 1911, 1912, 1913, of such revenues of the territory distributed in accordance with the present Treaty and the average for the same years of such revenues of the whole of the former Hungarian territories as in the judgment of the Reparation Commission are best calculated to represent the financial capacity of the respective territories. In making the above calculation, the revenues of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall not be included.

The responsibilities in respect of bonded debt to be assumed under the terms of this Article shall be discharged in the manner laid down in the Annex hereto.

The Hungarian Government shall be solely responsible for all the liabilities of the former Hungarian Government incurred by it prior to July 28, 1914, other than those evidenced by the bonds, bills, securities, and currency notes which are specifically provided for under the terms of the present Treaty.

Neither the provisions of this Article nor the provisions of the Annex hereto shall apply to securities of the former or existing Hungarian

Government deposited with the Austro-Hungarian Bank as security for the currency notes issued by that bank.

ANNEX

Financial Clauses

The amount of the former unsecured Hungarian Government bonded debt, the responsibility for which is to be distributed under the provisions of Article 186, shall be the amount of that debt as it stood on July 28, 1914.

Each State assuming responsibility for the unsecured debt of the former Hungarian Government shall, within three months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, if it has not already done so, stamp with the stamp of its own Government all the bonds of that debt existing in its own territory. The distinguishing numbers of the bonds so stamped shall be recorded and shall be furnished, together with the other records of the stamping, to the Reparation Commission.

Holders of bonds within the territory of a State which is required to stamp old Hungarian bonds under the terms of this Annex shall, from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, be creditors in respect of these bonds of that State only, and they shall have no recourse against the Government of any other State.

Each State which, under the terms of Article 186, is required to assume responsibility for a portion of the old unsecured Hungarian Government debt, and which has ascertained by means of stamping the old Hungarian bonds that the bonds of any particular issue of such old Hungarian bonds held within its territory were smaller in amount than the amount of that issue for which, in accordance with the assessment of the Reparation Commission, it is held responsible, shall deliver to the Reparation Commission new bonds equal in amount to the difference between the amount of the issue for which it is responsible and the amount of the same issue recorded as held within its own territory. Such new bonds shall be of such denominations as the Reparation Commission may require. They

shall carry the same rights as regards interest and amortisation as the old bonds for which they are substituted, and in all other respects the conditions of the new bonds shall be fixed subject to the approval of the Reparation Commission.

If the original bond was expressed in terms of Austro-Hungarian paper currency, the new bond by which it is replaced shall be expressed in terms of the currency of the State issuing the new bond, and for the purpose of this currency conversion, the currency of the new State shall be valued in terms of Austro-Hungarian paper kronen at the rate at which those kronen were exchanged for the currency of the new State by that State when it first substituted its own currency for Austro-Hungarian paper kronen. The basis of this conversion of the currency unit in which the bonds are expressed shall be subject to the approval of the Reparation Commission, which shall, if it thinks fit, require the State effecting the conversion to modify the terms thereof. Such modification shall only be required if, in the opinion of the Commission, the foreign exchange value of the currency unit or units substituted for the currency unit in which the old bonds are expressed is substantially less at the date of the conversion than the foreign exchange value of the original currency unit.

If the original bond was expressed in terms of a foreign currency or foreign currencies, the new bond shall be expressed in terms of the same currency or currencies. If the original bond was expressed in terms of Austro-Hungarian gold coin, the new bond shall be expressed in terms of equivalent amounts of pounds sterling and gold dollars of the United States of America, the equivalents being calculated on the basis of the weight and fineness of gold of the three coins as enacted by law on January 1, 1914.

Any foreign exchange options, whether at fixed rates or otherwise, embodied explicitly or implicitly in the old bonds shall be embodied in the new bonds also.

Each State which under the terms of Article 186 is required to assume responsibility for a portion of the old unsecured Hungarian Government debt, which has ascertained by means of stamping the

old Hungarian bonds that the bonds of any particular issue of such old Hungarian bonds held within its territory were larger in amount than the amount of that issue for which it is held responsible in accordance with the assessment of the Reparation Commission, shall receive from the Reparation Commission its due proportionate share of each of the new issues of bonds issued in accordance with the provisions of this Annex.

Holders of unsecured bonds of the old Hungarian Government debt held outside the boundaries of the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred, or States arising out of the dismemberment of that Monarchy, including Hungary, shall deliver through the agency of their respective Governments to the Reparation Commission the bonds which they hold, and in exchange therefor the Reparation Commission shall deliver to them certificates entitling them to their due proportionate share of each of the new issues of bonds corresponding to and issued in exchange for their surrendered bonds under the provisions of this Annex.

The share of each State or private holder entitled to a share in any new issue of bonds issued in accordance with the provisions of this Annex shall bear such proportion of the total amount of bonds of that new issue as the holding of the State or private owner in question of the old issue of bonds bears to the total amount of the old issue presented to the Reparation Commission for exchange into new bonds in accordance with the provisions of this Annex.

The Reparation Commission shall, if it think fit, arrange with the holders of the new bonds provided for by this Annex a consolidation loan of each debtor State, the bonds of which loan shall be substituted for the various different issues of new bonds on such terms as may be agreed upon by the Commission and the bondholders.

The State assuming liability for any bond of the former Hungarian Government shall assume any liability attaching to the bond in respect of unpaid coupons or sinking fund instalments accrued since the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

In addition to the former unsecured Hungarian Government bonded debt to be divided as above, there shall also be divided among the several States, in the same proportion, the amount of the former unsecured Austrian Government bonded debt which represents the liability of the former Hungarian Government for that debt, as provided by the additional convention relating to the contributions of the countries of the Sacred Hungarian Crown to the charges of the general debt of the Austro-Hungarian State approved by the Austro-Hungarian Law of December 30, 1907, B. L. I. No. 278.

Each State which, in virtue of the present Treaty, assumes responsibility for a part of this Austrian debt shall deliver to the Reparation Commission new securities for an amount equal to the part of the above-mentioned Austrian debt which is attributed to them.

The terms of these securities shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission. They shall be such as to represent as exactly as possible the conditions of the former Austrian securities prior to 1867, for which these securities are to be substituted. The new securities will be delivered to the States or holders of Austrian securities, who will have the right to a portion of each of the new issues made in accordance with the provisions of the Annex to Article 203 of the Treaty with Austria.

ARTICLE 187

1. In case the new boundaries of any State, as laid down by the present Treaty, shall divide any local area which was a single unit for borrowing purposes and which had a legally constituted public debt, such debt shall be divided between the new divisions of the area in a proportion to be determined by the Reparation Commission in accordance with the principles laid down for the re-apportionment of Government Debts under Article 186, and the responsibility so assumed shall be discharged in such a manner as the Reparation Commission shall determine.
2. The public debt of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be regarded as the debt of a local area and not as part of the public debt of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

ARTICLE 188

Within two months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, each one of the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred, and each one of the States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, including Hungary, shall, if it has not already done so, stamp with the stamp of its own Government the securities of various kinds which are separately provided for, representing the bonded war debt of the former Hungarian Government as legally constituted prior to October 31, 1918, and existing in their respective territories.

The securities thus stamped shall be withdrawn and replaced by certificates, their distinguishing numbers shall be recorded, and any securities withdrawn, together with the documents recording the transaction, shall be sent to the Reparation Commission.

The stamping and replacement of a security by a certificate under the provisions of this Article shall not imply that the State so stamping and replacing a security thereby assumes or recognizes any obligation in respect of it, unless the State in question desires that the stamping and replacement should have this implication.

The aforementioned States, with the exception of Hungary, shall be free from any obligation in respect of the war debt of the former Hungarian Government, wherever that debt may be held, but neither the Governments of those States nor their nationals shall have recourse under any circumstances whatever against any other States, including Hungary, in respect of the war debt bonds of which they or their nationals are the beneficial owners.

The war debt of the former Hungarian Government which was prior to the signature of the present Treaty in the beneficial ownership of nationals or Governments of States other than those to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is assigned shall be a charge upon the Hungarian Government only, and no one of the other States aforementioned shall be held responsible for any part thereof.

The provisions of this Article shall not apply to the securities of the former Hungarian Government deposited by that Government with the Austro-Hungarian Bank as security for the currency notes of the said bank.

The existing Hungarian Government shall be solely responsible for all liabilities of the former Hungarian Government incurred during the war, other than those evidenced by the bonds, bills, securities and currency notes which are specifically provided for under the terms of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 189

1. Within two months of the coming into force of the Treaty with Austria, each one of the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred, and each one of the States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, including Austria and Hungary, shall, if it has not already done so, stamp with the stamp of its own Government the currency notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank existing in its territory.
2. Within twelve months of the coming into force of the Treaty with Austria, each one of the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred, and each one of the States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, including Austria and Hungary, shall replace, as it may think fit, the stamped notes referred to above by its own or a new currency.
3. The Governments of such States as have already converted the currency notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank by stamping or by the issue of their own or a new currency, and in carrying out this operation have withdrawn, without stamping them, a portion or all of the currency notes circulating in their territory, shall either stamp the notes so withdrawn or hold them at the disposal of the Reparation Commission.
4. Within fourteen months of the coming into force of the Treaty with Austria, those Governments which have replaced notes of the bank by their own or new currency, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, shall transfer to the Reparation Commission all the notes, stamped or unstamped, of the bank which have been withdrawn in the course of this replacement.

5. All notes transferred to the Reparation Commission under the provisions of this Article shall be dealt with by that Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Annex hereto.
6. The Austro-Hungarian Bank shall be liquidated as from the day succeeding the day of the signature of the Treaty with Austria.
7. The liquidation shall be conducted by receivers specially appointed for that purpose by the Reparation Commission. In conducting the liquidation of the bank, the receivers shall follow the rules laid down in the Statutes or other valid instruments regulating the constitution of the bank, subject, however, to the special provisions of this Article. In the case of any doubt arising as to the interpretation of the rules concerning the liquidation of the bank, whether laid down in these Articles and Annexes or in the Statutes of the bank, the decision of the Reparation Commission or any arbitrator appointed by it for that purpose shall be final.
8. The currency notes issued by the bank subsequent to October 27, 1918, shall have a claim on the securities issued by the former or existing Austrian and Hungarian Governments and deposited with the bank by those Governments as security for these notes, but they shall not have a claim on any other assets of the bank.
9. The currency notes issued by the bank on or prior to October 27, 1918 (in so far as they are entitled to rank at all in conformity with this Article), shall all rank equally as claims against all the assets of the bank, other than the Austrian and Hungarian Government securities deposited as security for the various note issues.
10. The securities deposited by the former or existing Austrian and Hungarian Governments with the bank as security for the currency notes issued on or prior to October 27, 1918, shall be cancelled in so far as they represent the notes converted in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as it existed on July 28, 1914, by States to which territory of that Monarchy is transferred or by States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, including Austria and Hungary.
11. The remainder of the securities deposited by the former or existing Austrian and Hungarian Governments with the bank as security for the currency notes issued on or prior to October 27, 1918, shall be retained in force as security for, and in so far as they represent, the notes issued on or prior to October 27, 1918, which on June 15, 1919, were outside the limits of the former Austro-

Hungarian Monarchy, that is to say, all notes of this description which are presented to the Reparation Commission in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, and also all notes of this description which may be held elsewhere and are presented to the receivers of the bank in accordance with the Annex hereto.

12. No claims on account of any other currency notes issued on or prior to October 27, 1918, shall rank either against the general assets of the bank or against the securities deposited by the former or existing Austrian and Hungarian Governments as security for the notes, and any balance of such securities remaining after the amount of securities mentioned in the two preceding clauses has been calculated and deducted shall be cancelled.
13. All securities deposited by the former or existing Austrian and Hungarian Governments with the bank as security for currency note issues and which are maintained in force shall be the obligations respectively of the Governments of Austria and Hungary only and not of any other States.
14. The holders of currency notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank shall have no recourse against the Governments of Austria or Hungary or any other Government in respect of any loss which they may suffer as the result of the liquidation of the bank.
15. Nevertheless, if any difficulties shall arise owing to the date of the signature of the present Treaty, the dates at which any of the operations laid down by this Article are to be carried out may be altered by the Reparation Commission.

ANNEX

—1—

The respective Governments, when transmitting to the Reparation Commission all the currency notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank withdrawn by them from circulation in accordance with the terms of Article 189, shall also deliver to the Commission all the records showing the nature and amounts of the conversions which they have effected.

—2—

The Reparation Commission, after examining the records, shall deliver to the said Governments separate certificates stating the total amount of currency notes which the Governments have converted,

- (a) within the boundaries of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as they existed on July 28, 1914,
- (b) elsewhere.

These certificates will entitle the bearer to lodge a claim with the receivers of the bank for currency notes thus converted which are entitled to share in the assets of the bank.

—3—

After the liquidation of the bank is completed, the Reparation Commission shall destroy the notes thus withdrawn.

—4—

No notes issued on or prior to October 27, 1918, wherever they may be held, will rank as claims against the bank unless they are presented through the agency of the Government of the country in which they are held.

ARTICLE 190

Each one of the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred, and each one of the States arising from the dismemberment of the Monarchy, including Austria and Hungary, shall deal as it thinks fit with the petty or token coinage of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy existing in its territory.

No such State shall have any recourse under any circumstances, on behalf of either itself or of its nationals, against any other State with regard to such petty or token coinage.

ARTICLE 191

States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred and States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy shall acquire all property and possessions situated within their territories belonging to the former or existing Hungarian Government.

For the purposes of this Article, the property and possessions of the former or existing Hungarian Government shall be deemed to include the property of the former Kingdom of Hungary and the interests of that Kingdom in the joint property of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as all the property of the Crown and the private property of members of the former Royal Family of Austria-Hungary.

These States shall, however, have no claim to any property of the former or existing Government of Hungary situated outside their own respective territories.

The value of such property and possessions acquired by States other than Hungary shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission and placed by that Commission to the credit of Hungary and to the debit of the State acquiring such property on account of the sums due for reparation. The Reparation Commission shall deduct from the value of the public property, thus acquired an amount proportionate to the contribution in money, land, or material made directly by any province or commune or other autonomous local authority towards the cost of such property.

Without prejudice to Article 186 relating to secured debt, in the case of each State acquiring property under the provisions of this Article, the amount placed to the credit of Hungary and to the debit of the said State in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be reduced by the value of the amount of the liability in respect of the unsecured debt of the former Hungarian Government assumed by the State under the provisions of Article 186 which, in the opinion of the Reparation Commission, represents expenditure upon the property so acquired. The value shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission on such basis as the Commission may consider equitable.

Property of the former and existing Hungarian Government shall be deemed to include a share of the real property in Bosnia-Herzegovina of all descriptions for which, under Article 5 of the Convention of February 26, 1909,⁹ the Government of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy paid £.T.2,500,000 to the Ottoman Government. Such share shall be proportionate to the share which the former Kingdom of Hungary contributed to the above payment, and the value of this share, as assessed by the Reparation Commission, shall be credited to Hungary on account of reparation.

As exception to the above there shall be transferred without payment:

- (1) the property and possessions of provinces, communes and other local autonomous institutions of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including those in Bosnia-Herzegovina which did not belong to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy;
- (2) schools and hospitals the property of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Further, any building or other property situated in the respective territories transferred to the States referred to in the first paragraph whose principal value lies in its historic interest and associations, and which formerly belonged to the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Ragusa, the Venetian Republic, or the Episcopal Principalities of Trient and Bressanone, may, subject to the approval of the Reparation Commission, be transferred to the Government entitled thereto without payment.

ARTICLE 192

Hungary renounces, so far as she is concerned, all rights accorded to her or her nationals by treaties, conventions or agreements, of whatsoever kind, to representation upon or participation in the control or administration of commissions, state banks, agencies, or other financial or economic organizations of an international character exercising powers of control or administration and operating in any of the Allied or Associated States, or in Germany,

Austria, Bulgaria or Turkey, or in the dependencies of these States, or in the former Russian Empire.

ARTICLE 193

1. The Hungarian Government engages to recognize the transfer provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty with Austria relative to the delivery of the sum in gold deposited in the Austro-Hungarian Bank in the name of the Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt as security for the first issue of Turkish Government currency notes.
 2. Without prejudice to Article 227, Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty, Hungary renounces any benefit disclosed by the Treaties of Bucharest^{[10](#)} and Brest-Litovsk^{[11](#)} and by the Treaties supplementary thereto.
- Hungary undertakes to transfer either to Roumania or to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as the case may be, all monetary instruments, specie, securities and negotiable instruments or goods which she has received under the aforesaid Treaties.
3. The sums of money and all securities, instruments and goods, of whatsoever nature, to be delivered, paid or transferred under the provisions of this Article, shall be disposed of by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in a manner hereafter to be determined by those Powers.
 4. Hungary recognizes any transfer of gold provided for by Article 259 (5) of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Versailles on June 28, 1919 between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and any transfer of claims provided for by Article 261 of that Treaty.

ARTICLE 194

Without prejudice to the renunciation of any rights by Hungary on behalf of herself or of her nationals in the other provisions of the present Treaty, the Reparation Commission may, within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty, demand that

Hungary become possessed of any rights and interests of her nationals in any public utility undertaking or in any concession operating in Russia, Turkey, Germany, Austria or Bulgaria, or in the possessions or dependencies of these States, or in any territory formerly belonging to Hungary or her allies to be transferred by Hungary or her allies to any State, or to be administered by a mandatory under any Treaty entered into with the Allied and Associated Powers, and may require that the Hungarian Government transfer, within six months of the date of demand, to the Reparation Commission all such rights and interests and any similar rights and interests owned by the former or existing Hungarian Government.

Hungary shall be responsible for indemnifying her nationals so dispossessed, and the Reparation Commission shall credit Hungary on account of sums due for reparation with such sums in respect of the value of the transferred rights and interests as may be assessed by the Reparation Commission, and Hungary shall, within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, communicate to the Reparation Commission all such rights and interests, whether already granted, contingent or not yet exercised, and shall renounce on behalf of herself and her nationals in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers all such rights and interests which have not been so communicated.

ARTICLE 195

Hungary undertakes to refrain from preventing or impeding such acquisition by the German, Austrian, Bulgarian or Turkish Governments of any rights and interests of German, Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish nationals in public utility undertakings or concessions operating in Hungary as may be required by the Reparation Commission under the terms of the Treaties of Peace or supplementary treaties or conventions concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German, Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish Governments respectively.

ARTICLE 196

Hungary undertakes to transfer to the Allied and Associated Powers any claims to payment or reparation by Germany, Austria, Bulgaria or Turkey in favour of the former or existing Hungarian Governments, and in particular any claims which may arise now or hereafter in the fulfillment of undertakings made from July 28, 1914, to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

The value of such claims shall be assessed by the Reparation Commission, and shall be transferred to the Reparation Commission for the credit of Hungary on account of the sums due for reparation.

ARTICLE 197

Any monetary obligation arising out of the present Treaty and expressed in terms of gold kronen shall, unless some other arrangement is specifically provided for in any particular case under the terms of the present Treaty or of treaties or conventions supplementary thereto, be payable at the option of the creditors in pounds sterling payable in London, gold dollars of the United States of America payable in New York, gold francs payable in Paris, or gold lire payable in Rome.

For the purposes of this Article, the gold coins mentioned above shall be defined as being of the weight and fineness of gold as enacted by law on January 1, 1914.

ARTICLE 198

Any financial adjustments, such as those relating to any banking and insurance companies, savings banks, postal savings banks, land banks, mortgage companies or other similar institutions, operating within the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, necessitated by the partition of that Monarchy and the resettlement of public debts and currency provided for by these Articles, shall be regulated by agreement between the various Governments concerned in such a manner as shall best secure equitable treatment to all the parties interested. In case the Governments concerned are unable to come to an agreement on any question arising out of this financial adjustment, or in case any Government is of opinion that its

nationals have not received equitable treatment, the Reparation Commission shall, on the application of any one of the Governments concerned, appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators, whose decision shall be final.

ARTICLE 199

The Hungarian Government shall be under no liability in respect of civil or military pensions granted to nationals of the former Kingdom of Hungary who have been recognized as nationals of other States or who become so under the provisions of the present Treaty.

Appendix F to HD-107

FRENCH REPUBLIC, PARIS, December 5, 1919.

MINISTRY
OF COMMERCE, OF THE INDUSTRY
OF POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS

From: Economic Commission.

To: Peace Conference.

I have the honor to communicate:

1st) The text of an article to be inserted in Part VIII of the Treaty with Hungary, relative to the furnishing of traction coal from the Pecs Mines by Hungary to Serbia.

2nd.) The text of an article to be inserted in Part X (economic clauses) relative to the furnishing of coal to Hungary by the Czechoslovak State and Poland.

This text is equivalent to Article 224 of the Treaty with Austria.

3d) An article to be annexed to the preceding, relative to the furnishing of food products to Austria by Hungary.

4th) The text of an article to replace aline 6, Article 266, in the Treaty with Hungary.

These texts in the adoption of which the special committee of the Economic Commission was unanimous, were presented during the

session this day, to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, and were adopted, subject to an examination by the Drafting Committee.

You were kind enough to communicate Note 4668, from the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, containing various remarks relative to the economic clauses.

The Special Committee of the Economic Commission examined the Serbian counter-proposals and did not believe they could be accepted:

In fact, the first of these proposals becomes invalid on account of the text adopted in Article 232 of the Treaty with Hungary.

The fifth of these proposals becomes invalid through the application of an article in the Treaty with Hungary analogous to Article 273 in the Treaty with Austria.

The second and fourth appeared in opposition with the principles already adopted, both concerning the Treaty with Austria and the Treaty with Bulgaria.

As to the third Serbian proposal, relative to the article in the Treaty with Hungary, analogous to Article 271 in the Treaty with Austria, the Special Committee of the Economic Commission was unfavorable to its acceptance but decided to request further information from the Financial Commission.

SERRUYS

[Enclosure 1]

TREATY WITH HUNGARY

Pecs Mines

It is proposed that Annex V below be completed by the underlined alinea:

Annex V, Paragraph I.

“Hungary accords to each of the Allied and Associated Governments, as partial reparation, an option for the annual delivery for a period of five years to follow the entry into force of the present Treaty, of the raw materials enumerated below to an extent which will accord with their annual pre-war importations from Austria-Hungary to a proportion which the resources of Hungary considered in connection with her frontiers, such as they are defined by the present Treaty, and with pre-war resources of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Construction timber and wood products.

Iron and iron alloys.

Hungary further accords to the Allied and Associated Powers, as partial reparations, an option for the annual delivery for a period of five years to follow the entry into force of the present Treaty, a quantity of traction coal to be taken from the Pecs Mines and which shall be periodically determined by the Reparations Commission, and which will be disposed of in favor of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State under conditions which shall be fixed by the Reparations Commission.["]

Paragraph II.

The price of the products referred to in the preceding paragraphs will be the same as the price paid by the Hungarian nationals, as the packing and shipping conditions, as far as the Hungarian frontier are more advantageous, agreed upon for the delivery of the same products to Hungarian nationals.^{[12](#)}

Paragraph II [III?].

The options of the present annex will be exercised through the intermediary of the Reparations Commission. The latter will have power, for the execution of the above provisions, to statute on all questions relative to the procedure, qualities and quantities of the supplies, the delays, methods of delivery and payment. The orders,

with all necessary specifications, should be notified to Hungary 120 days before the date set for the commencement of their execution, concerning deliveries to be made after January 1, 1920, and 30 days before that date concerning deliveries to be made between the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty and January 1, 1920. If the Commission esteems the complete fulfillment of the orders is of a nature to weigh heavily upon Hungarian industrial needs, it may extend or cancel them and thus fix all priority orders.

[Enclosure 2]

Article 224

Par. 1.—Special arrangements are concluded between Poland, the Czecho-Slovak State and Hungary concerning the reciprocal furnishing of coal, foodstuffs and raw materials.

Par. 2.—Until the conclusion of these arrangements, but in no case for a period of more than five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the Czecho-Slovak State and Poland agree to impose no export duty or restriction of any kind relative to the exportation of coal or lignite to Hungary to an amount which will be determined, failing an agreement between the States concerned, by the Reparations Commission. In determining this amount, the Reparations Commission will consider all the elements, including the amount of coal and lignite furnished to the territories of Hungary as they now exist by Silesia before the war, and the territories of the former Austrian Empire transferred to the Czecho-Slovak State and Poland, by virtue of the Peace Treaty, as well as the amount now available for exportation to these countries, and the amount of traction coal which Hungary is to furnish the Allied and Associated Powers as partial reparation, by virtue of the option accorded them by Article — of Part VIII (Reparations). Reciprocally, Hungary should furnish the Czecho-Slovak State and Poland the amount of foodstuffs and raw materials cited in Par. 1, in conformity with whatever decision may be made by the Reparations Commission.

Par. 3.—The Czecho-Slovak State and Poland agree further to take all measures necessary during the same period to assure that all these products are accessible to purchasers living in Hungary under

conditions as favorable as those which govern the sale of products of the same nature in a similar situation concerning the purchasers living in the Czecho-Slovak State or in Poland, in their respective countries or in any other country.

Par. 4.—In cases of difference relative to the execution of interpretation of any one of the preceding provisions, the Reparations Commission will render decision.

[Enclosure 3]

Article 224 bis

- 1) Special arrangements shall be concluded between Hungary and Austria concerning the reciprocal exchange of foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods.
- 2) Until the conclusion of these arrangements, but in no case for a period of more than five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, Hungary agrees to impose no export duty or restriction of any kind relative to the exportation into Austria of foodstuffs of every kind, produced upon Hungarian territory, to an amount which will be determined by the Reparations Commission, failing an agreement between the States concerned. In determining this amount, the Reparations Commission will consider all the elements, and in particular, the production and consumption needs in the two countries interested. Reciprocally, Austria should furnish Hungary the amount of raw materials and manufactured goods cited in paragraph 1, in conformity with whatever decision may be made by the Reparations Commission.
- 3) Hungary agrees further to take all necessary measures, during the same period, to assure the accessibility of all these products to purchasers living in Austria under conditions as favorable as those which cover the sale of products of the same nature in an analogous situation to the purchasers living in Hungary, in their country, or in any other country.
- 4) In cases of difference relative to the execution or interpretation of any one of the preceding provisions, the Reparations Commission will render decision.

[Enclosure 4]

PEACE CONGRESS
CZECHO-SLOVAK DELEGATION

Annex

Addition to the Text Proposed by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation

Legacies, donations, funds, institutions of all kinds founded or created in the former Kingdom of Hungary and destined for the use of nationals of the former Hungarian State will be placed by Hungary, in all cases where these foundations are located on her territory, at the disposal of the Allied or Associated Powers, of which the said persons are now or will become, by virtue of the provisions of the said Treaty, nationals, in these States in which these institutions were located on July 28, 1914, taking into account the payment effected regularly for the purpose of the foundation.

In cases where the statutes of the protection foundations which shall continue to be administered by the Hungarian State, make their advantages subject to Hungarian nationality, the presumptive beneficiaries will retain their right to the pensions, education indemnities, dowries, etc. ..., even if they have acquired or will later acquire, by the terms of the present Treaty, the nationality of one of the States issues of Hungary, i. e., Czecho-Slovak State, Rumania, Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Austria.

In the case where, on account of the extinction of a family in favor of which any foundation has been made, the funds should revert to the Hungarian State or to an institution of the Hungarian State, all rights of succession will revolve to the State to which the last beneficiary belonged.

¹ Appendices I and J to HD-37, [vol. VII, pp. 830](#)  and [832](#) .

^{1a} HD-105, minute 5, p. 458 [*Pg. 458 is part of [Doc. 21](#)*].

² For text of German note of November 27, see appendix G to HD–103, p. 414 [*Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*]; for draft reply, see appendix C to HD–104, p. 439 [*Pg. 439 is part of [Doc. 20](#)*].

³ General note was sent December 8; text not found in Department files.

^{3a} For the establishment of the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, see Resolution B, p. 858 [*Pg. 858 is part of [Doc. 43](#)*].

⁴ HD–106, minute 1, p. 468 [*Pg. 468 is part of [Doc. 22](#)*].

⁵ Appendix I to HD–37, [vol. VII, p. 830](#) .

⁶ HD–58, minute 2, and HD–62, minute 8, [vol. VIII, pp. 300](#)  and [412](#) .

⁷ [Vol. II, p. 175](#) .

⁸ [Vol. II, pp. 175](#)  and [183](#) .

⁹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CII, p. 180.

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771* .

¹¹ *Ibid., 1918 Russia, vol. I, p. 442* .

¹² In the final text of the treaty with Hungary, this paragraph reads as follows:

“The price paid for the products referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be the same as the price paid by Hungarian nationals under the same conditions of shipment to the Hungarian frontier and shall be subject to any advantages which may be accorded similar products furnished to Hungarian nationals.”

December 6, 10:30 a.m. (HD-108)

[24] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, December 6, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 6, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/108.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/108.

HD-108

[Document 24]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, December 6, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 6, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Hinchley-
Cooke

FRANCE

M. Massigli

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N.

Mr. Ellis L. Dresel

Colonel J. A. Logan

Lieut-Commander Koehler, U.S.N.

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West

Captain Fuller, R.N.

Lieut-Commander Dunne

Mr. A. Leeper

Mr. Ibbetson-James

FRANCE

M. Loucheur

M. Cambon

M. Laroche

M. Mauclore

M. Seydoux

M. Kammerer

M. Sonnolet

M. Cheysson

ITALY

Rear-Admiral Grassi

M. Dell'Abbadessa

Commandant Fea

Commandant Ingianni

1. (The Council had before it 5 resolutions passed at meetings of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome, (See Appendix "A".).)
Resolutions Passed at the Session of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome: (a) Austria, (b) Danger of Nonratification, (c) Armenia, (d) Russia, (e) Oil Tankers

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon the resolutions. He added with regard to the question of provisioning of Austria the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had examined at a meeting held on the preceding day the question of provisioning Austria and they were waiting for a reply from the Italian Government with reference to the sending of 12,000 tons of cereals to Vienna from Trieste following an agreement made between Italy and Austria. He had also seen Mr. Austen Chamberlain in London; the British and French Governments were willing to do their utmost to help until the credit opened for the provisioning of Austria had been exhausted. With regard to the situation of the Armenian refugees in the Caucasus, the Supreme Economic Council wished to bring the attention of the Supreme Council to the great importance of providing for the provisioning of those refugees and he understood that the Armenians had applied to the American Delegation direct. He wished to ask Mr. Polk what could be done in the matter.

COLONEL LOGAN stated that a telegram from Mr. Hoover had been received to the effect that an arrangement had been entered into with the Grain Corporation to supply 35,000 tons of cereals on credit to Armenia, to be distributed under Colonel Haskell's supervision. Furthermore, the American Red Cross had given 1,700,000 dollars for relief purposes.

M. LOUCHEUR said that with regard to the Russian question, he was of the opinion that it would be advisable to await a solution of the Russian problem before taking any action in the matter.

MR. POLK said that he had just received a proposal from the American Government on the question of the tank ships which Mr. Dresel would submit to the French and British Delegations. He

wished to put on record that the United States were not now represented on the Supreme Economic Council.

(The Council took note of the resolutions passed by the Supreme Economic Council at Rome and of M. Loucheur's declarations on the subject.)

2. (The Council had before it a letter from the President of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission to the President of the Peace Conference, dated November 27th, 1919, to which were attached a memorandum by the American Delegation, two notes from the French Delegation,¹ and a list of products prohibited from importation into Germany, for which the French Government asked that free entry into Germany be allowed. (See Appendix "B").) Note From the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission Regarding (a) Customs Paid on Franco-German and Germano-Belgian Frontiers: (b) Payment of German Customs Duties on a Gold Basis

COLONEL LOGAN read and commented upon the memorandum presented by the American Delegation to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, dated November 27th [8th], 1919.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the German Delegation had proposed that the German Government be allowed to establish the customs duties in gold marks, more exactly in paper marks, taking the rate of exchange into account. He was of the opinion that at the present time no reply should be made to Germany before the exchange of deposit of ratifications and the signing of the Protocol.² On the other hand, a very important question came up in which France and Great Britain were especially interested: Germany had edicted a series of import prohibitions; it could not be contested that that was her right, but she should not be allowed to evade the provisions of the Treaty in order to treat the Allies in different ways. He therefore suggested that a solution be adjourned until Germany had signed the Protocol and the deposit of ratifications had taken place. In the second place, the right of prohibiting imports should be connected with the whole question of the payment of customs duties.

MR. POLK said that, with reference to the memorandum of the American representative on the Reparation Commission, the difficulty was that for some time past Germany had been applying two principles in the payment of German customs duties: in ports she had applied a gold basis, but on her land frontiers payment was being made in paper. That was a discrimination in favor of the countries which were importing by land as against those importing by sea.

COLONEL LOGAN said that France and Belgium were paying one-ninth of the import duties that Great Britain and America paid on a gold basis.

M. LOUCHEUR remarked that such a fact had never been brought to his attention nor, as far as he was aware, to the notice of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

MR. POLK said that Sir John Bradbury and Mr. Rathbone had both raised the question.

M. LOUCHEUR said everybody agreed that there should be no different treatment between the Allies and that payment of customs duties should be made in gold. He insisted on what he had said before, that no answer should be made to Germany at the present time and that the question of import prohibitions should be settled at the same time.

MR. POLK suggested that the questions be referred back to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for consideration. The questions were covered by Article 269 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

M. LOUCHEUR said he did not agree: the provisions of the Treaty were that customs duties should not be changed during a certain lapse of time, but payment on a gold basis would entail an increase of customs duties.

M. SCIALOJA thought that it would be advisable to consult the Economic Commission, as the questions were not entirely within the

province of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

M. LOUCHEUR remarked that there no longer was an Economic Commission and that on the other hand the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had consulted the economic experts.

M. MATSUI agreed with M. Scialoja, and said that he had some time ago, when the Treaty with Germany was being prepared, proposed a clause which would have prevented Germany from prohibiting any importations. Such a clause had not been accepted, but nevertheless he was of the opinion that the economic experts should be heard.

M. LOUCHEUR said that up to that time they had never referred to Commissions which were charged with the preparation of the Treaty, questions of execution of the Treaty; he proposed that representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission should study the questions in accord with economic experts, and Japan would have an opportunity to be heard.

MR. POLK wished to propose the following resolution: that the questions be referred back to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission with instructions to take the necessary action without delay and further to decide itself such questions in the future.

M. LOUCHEUR thought that the question was important and should be referred back to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

MR. POLK asked why this question should come back to the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it was a question involving other matters of political importance and that although he agreed in principle with Mr. Polk's proposition, he was of the opinion that the questions should still be referred back to the Supreme Council

without delay, and that at any rate no action should be taken before the Germans had signed the protocol and the deposit of ratifications had taken place.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer back to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission in accord with economic experts both the question of payment of German customs duties on a gold mark basis, and the import prohibition by Germany;
- (2) that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission submit immediately a report to the Council;
- (3) that no reply be given to Germany until she had signed the protocol and the Treaty of Peace had come into force.

3. M. BERTHELOT said they had received a letter from Bucharest dated November 30th which related to an incident which had taken place in the past, but which was of a certain importance. Before withdrawing, the Government of M. Misu and General Vaitoianu had tried to put a negative answer before the Powers; but the Allied representatives had evaded such a manoeuvre on the part of the Liberal party. Roumanian Answer

Telegrams sent from Bucharest between December 2nd and 4th gave the following information: M. Vaida-Voevod, before seeing the King of Roumania, had had a conference with the Allied representatives, the result of which was that as regards requisitions in Hungary Vaida-Voevod would be ready to accept the appointment of an Inter-Allied mixed Commission as proposed but maintained that it would be impossible that such a Commission should have the power to inflict penalties; on the other hand, the Roumanian army would withdraw to the boundaries fixed by the Peace Conference. He would take note of the assurances given by the Supreme Council, and expressed his conviction that the Council would be able to find a solution satisfactory to Roumania. It had been feared for some time that the King would call to power M. Maniu, but in the morning of December 3rd M. Maniu had refused, and M. Vaida-Voevod had been asked to form a cabinet. Thereupon M. Vaida-Voevod had consulted all the political leaders with the exception of the Liberals,

and had concluded from his consultation that they would be in favour of the signature by Roumania; he had authorised the Allied representatives at Bucarest to telegraph to Paris that the majority of the parties was in favor of Roumanians signature and promised to sign if the King accepted the Cabinet.

M. Antonescu, furthermore, was about to arrive in Bucharest; under those conditions one could well hope that a satisfactory telegram would be received from Roumania within the time limit laid down by the Council.

(The meeting then adjourned).

(The Heads of Delegations then held a conference *in camera*.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, December 6, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–108

Resolutions of the Supreme Economic Council

The Supreme Economic Council having taken knowledge of the decision (H. D. 94/1) [94, *minute 2*]³ of the Supreme Council, and particularly of Pars. 2 and 5, esteems that, considering the general coal and production situation throughout the entire world, it is necessary that the German tankers be utilized; it requests that immediate measures be adopted covering the utilization of these vessels for the transportation of mineral oils which may be used to supply the needs of countries suffering from coal shortage.

The Supreme Economic Council having taken note of the affirmations of Lord Curzon relative to the critical situation actually existing in Armenia, [is] desirous to show its sympathy for the Armenians and to express its regret that it has no available resources to offer assistance to Armenia.

The Supreme Economic Council esteems that the assistance necessitated by the Armenians in distress, as well as the assistance necessitated by Austria, concerns not only the Powers represented on

the Supreme Economic Council, but all the civilized peoples of the world.

The Supreme Economic Council deems it opportune to indicate to the Presidency of the Conference in Paris the increasing danger to which the economic life of all the Allied countries is exposed by the delay in the exchange of the Peace Treaty ratifications.

The Supreme Economic Council has taken note of the decision of the Supreme Council of November 15th,⁴ charging the C. O. C. R. with the duty of studying the problems concerning the provisioning of Austria.

The Supreme Economic Council which was previously able partly to relieve Austria's distress thanks to credits granted by England, France, Italy and with the Assistance of America, finds itself at the present moment without the power and necessary resources to render efficacious assistance, and it can only in the most pressing manner draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the extreme urgency of finding a solution capable of remedying a tragic situation which cannot continue without imperilling the security and the honor of the civilized nations of the entire world, who will have to bear the responsibility for it.

The Supreme Economic Council has also taken note of the declarations of the English, French and Italian treasuries, attesting the impossibility of increasing the financial charges of countries whose resources have suffered so seriously from the war.

The Council finds that in any case the financial resources required should be furnished not only by the Governments participating in the Supreme Economic Council, but by all the other nations and it recommends the examination of the possibility of an international action of this kind.

The Supreme Economic Council, wishing at the earliest possible moment to place the surplus stocks of food of South Russia (as compared to the local needs of this region) at the disposal of general revictualling, draws the attention of the Council of Five to the

necessity of considering, in anticipation of the time when Moscow and Petrograd become accessible to supplying of food to the population of these cities.

Appendix B to HD-108

PEACE CONFERENCE
ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE Secretariat
OF THE C. R. No. 442
REPARATIONS COMMISSION

NOVEMBER 27, 1919.

From: President of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.

To: President of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to forward you herewith copy of a note delivered to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission by the American Delegate.

This note raises the two following questions:

1st) The necessity for the immediate creation, by the German Government, of a customs control along the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers.

The Organization Committee recognizes that it is to the interest of the Allied and Associated Powers to see a customs control established which would increase Germany's capacity of paying the debt incumbent upon her under the head of reparations. Besides, it appears from the most recent information that this customs control has recently been established.

2d) The possibility of Germany exacting the payment of this duty on the basis of the value of the mark gold, insofar as such duty would not be in contradiction with the stipulations of Article 269 of the Peace Treaty.

The Organization Committee believes that it should recall that this question was discussed during the course of a conference with the German Delegates, at Versailles on October 10.

That Conference, while not unfavorable to the payment of duties in gold, took advantage of it as an instrument to be used in exerting pressure on Germany and laid down the condition that Germany would have to furnish guarantees that the customs system (without Allied supervision) of granting importation licenses for Germany would not in any way conflict with the application of Articles 264–5 and –6 of the Treaty.

Under these conditions, the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission renounced, for the time being, exacting the immediate payment of duties in gold, in spite of the interest of this measure from a point of view of reparations, in order to not deprive the Supreme Council of an instrument of pressure in its relations with Germany.

As this has been shown as unsatisfactory up to the present time, and the German reply concerning importation licenses (copy of which is hereto annexed) being very ambiguous, the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission decided, in the course of its session of November 14, 1919, to indicate to the Supreme Council the important interest there would be from a reparations point of view to have a solution made which would permit Germany to make collections, without delay, of duties on a basis of the value of the mark gold.

Kindly accept, etc.

LOUCHEUR

[Annex 1]

Note

B–172

8 NOVEMBER, 1919.

NECESSITY OF THE IMMEDIATE CREATION BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT OF A CUSTOMS CONTROL ON THE FRENCH-GERMAN AND BELGIAN-GERMAN FRONTIERS

The American Government instructed its Delegation to call the attention of the C.O.C.R. to the fact that it constantly receives reports mentioning that, on account of the absence of the customs control on the French, German and Belgian-German frontiers, important quantities of various kinds of products were and are, every day, imported to the occupied German territory.

The American Government cannot be indifferent to the existence of such a state of things, which deprives Germany of an important source of revenue and, consequently, has direct influence on its capacity to pay the debt which is incumbent upon her, under the reparations item.

The American Delegation is aware that, in order to assure its own protection, the German Government established on the right bank of the Rhine, a customs control on the frontier of the territories occupied by the Allies.

After the ratification of the Peace Treaty, Germany will have the right to establish a customs control on the French, German and Belgian frontiers, but the gravity of the situation seems to justify immediate measures. Therefore, we propose that the organization Committee should suggest to the Supreme Council to give the German Government an official notification of the authorization granted to it to institute this customs control under the date of November 20; and add that, according to the provisions of Article 269 of the Peace Treaty with Germany the Allied and Associated Governments allow that the payment of the duties imposed be effected on the basis of the value of the gold mark, as far as these duties are not in contradiction with the stipulations of the said article.

[Annex 2]

Memorandum Submitted by the German Delegation on the Importation Policy

To: The Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission,
Paris.

Referring to the interview which took place on October 11 with Mr. Mauclere, I take the liberty to forward to you herewith a memorandum concerning the application of the prohibitions to importations to Germany. This memorandum explains the point of view of the German Government such as it is, according to the opinion of the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Bergmann, of Mr. von Le Suire, and of myself.

In conformity with the discussion which took place, I again remarked that it is very urgent and important for us to immediately re-establish the German customs houses, all along the frontier, for the application of the customs regulations and of the prohibitions of imports and exports. Therefore, I earnestly reiterate the request to cancel the instructions contrary thereto, which were given to the occupying authorities. Besides, I beg you to kindly inform me as soon as possible when the discussions will start, concerning the imports from Alsace-Lorraine, and during which it would be advisable to deal with the question of the imports from France in general.

DR. SCHMITT

[Enclosure to Annex 2]

Memorandum Concerning the Application of the Prohibition To Import to Germany

In the meeting of October 10 of this year, the Allied and Associated Governments raised the question as to whether it would not be necessary to guarantee the uniform application of the German prohibitions to import, with respect to all countries, by determining certain quotas for the various goods to be imported and distributing these quotas in an equal manner. It seems that such a method cannot be realized. There is a fundamental difference between the application of prohibitions to import by the Allied and Associated Governments and by Germany. This difference is caused by the diversity of the situation. It is possible to determine quotas in the

Allied and Associated countries for the importation of various goods, because the Allied and Associated Governments have so many items at their disposal that they can pay for the importation of goods in way of quotas. On the contrary, in Germany it is not possible to determine any quotas because Germany has no items at all, or very little, at her disposal. Therefore, in Germany it will be necessary to proceed otherwise. In general and in principle, Germany should prohibit all importations, and only make exceptions in certain cases, by an especial authorization.

Thus, there is in Germany a general prohibition to import. This prohibition concerns all goods. It was cancelled for certain goods; for a certain category of other goods, the customs houses were authorized in general to allow the importation of the goods in question to Germany, without special authorization. A list will be made and sent to you of the goods for which the prohibition to import was cancelled, as well as a list of the authorizations given to the customs houses. Besides, exceptions will be made to this prohibition to import, as above mentioned, in certain cases, by special authorization. These authorizations will be granted by a central service in Berlin. They should mention, in a precise manner, the names of the sender and of the recipient, as well as the kind and the quantity of the goods. They will be granted when the central service thinks that the importation of those goods does not prejudice the aims of the prohibition to import; therefore, it will be when the necessary items for the payment of the goods will be available, or when credits will be granted on these goods, for a period long enough and under favorable conditions, or when the exportation of German goods will compensate the importation of the goods in question, either as a result of a special exchange, or of an agreement between two different states. It is not possible to establish detailed principles with regard to the question in which cases especial authorization can be granted, on account of the diversity of relations and of the difficult situation in which Germany finds itself. In particular, it is impossible to determine in general the conditions of credit.

The German prohibition to import constitutes a temporary measure intended to surmount the consequences of the war and should be cancelled when the situation again becomes normal. At present,

however, it is absolutely impossible to do without it, or else, the German rate of exchange could not again become normal. In future, the prohibitions to import could only exist as far as the various nations will agree on them; for instance, for hygienic reasons, for reasons of public security, for measures taken by the League of Nations, pursuant to hostile manifestations, for the application of monopolies and similar institutions, and for the execution of a national economic policy. On the other hand, it is out of the question to apply the German prohibition to import in such a manner that the goods of the various countries would be treated in different ways. This cannot be, on account of the very spirit of this prohibition. On the contrary, the German prohibition to export will be applied in a uniform manner by the Allied and Associated Powers (Article 264, alinea 2, Peace Conditions) as to the goods coming from the producing countries, if the items are available in order to effect the payment of the goods, if the necessary credits are granted, or exchange questions, either for each different case, or subsequent to agreements between the states, do not prejudice the German rate of exchange. In case it should happen that goods are offered by various countries to the Allied and Associated Governments for importation and under the same conditions, it should be considered, in fact, whether contingents can be fixed to the various countries in question. However, in the present state of affairs, it seems absolutely unlikely that this case might happen.

[Annex 3]

FRENCH DELEGATION

Note for the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference

GERMAN COMMERCIAL REGIME. PROPOSAL OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION

1. In a meeting which took place on October 10th last with the German Delegation, the Allied representatives asked how the German Government intended to apply Articles 265 and 266 of the Peace Treaty, in regard to the German imports and exports.

The German Delegation only replied that the prohibition to import constitutes a measure without which it is impossible to do at the present time.

2. The prohibition to import which affect[s] nearly all the goods upon their importation to Germany, and the control existing on those imports, enables Germany to make differences to the detriment of the trade of any of the Allied and Associated States; consequently, it is contrary to the stipulations of Article 265 of the Peace Treaty.

3. The same difference is made for the exports which are subjected to a very strict control, as different prices are established or determined, according to the import countries.

These provisions are contrary to Article 266 of the Peace Treaty.

4. Now, the German Government requests the right to require the payment of the customs duties on the basis of the gold mark, on the French and Belgian frontiers, as is already done on its maritime frontiers; the French Delegation considers that, from the reparations point of view, it is advisable to give this authorization to the German Government; but it thinks that it is also advisable to examine from the same point of view the question of the measures taken by this Government, in order to reduce the freedom of imports and exports.

5. Although the economic recovery of Germany is necessary to enable her to repair the damages which she made, notably in France, it is no less necessary that the trade of the Allied and Associated Countries, and in particular that of France, be not directly prejudiced by this recovery.

6. That is why the French Government, after having closely studied the measures taken by the German Government, in order to regulate the import and export of goods, declares that its adhesion to the payment in gold of the customs duties on the German frontier is subordinated to the following conditions:

(a) Germany will restore full freedom of import for the products, a list of which is hereto annexed.

- (b) In case it should not, from the Reparations point of view, appear possible to lift the embargo on all those products, quotas will be established and distributed between the export countries, according to the average of the last three pre-war years, provided the share of France may not be under the average of her imports during the last three years, the calculation being made in weight.
- (c) Germany will authorize, without restriction, the export of all spare parts for machines and rolling stock of all kinds exported from Germany. Besides, as Germany forbids the export of certain products which do not appear on the prohibition list, but for the reasons that they are provided for, either for deliveries to be made, or because they are used as substitutes, no prohibition of this kind will be made or maintained without the approval of the Reparations Commission.

7. The Articles which do not appear on the present prohibition list of imports and exports should freely go in and out, and this freedom should not be restricted, directly or indirectly.

[Enclosure to Annex 3]

List of Products Appearing on the German List of Prohibitions To Import and of Which the French Government Requests the Free Entry to Germany

1. Wines of all kinds, including aperitive and medical wines.
2. Cognacs and brandies, and other products made from natural alcohol of wine, of fruit or fruit seeds.
3. Bonded liquors.
4. Flowers, plants and foliage for ornamental purposes.
5. Seeds.
6. Abrasives.
7. Graphite, plumbago, and stove-blackening.
8. Soaps of all kinds and in all forms.
9. Resins, gums, lacs and varnishes.
10. Animal and vegetable wax.
11. Slaughter-house waste of all kinds.
12. Phosphates, superphosphates and Dephosphoration dress.
13. Tartar, tartaric acid and tartrates of all kinds.
14. Rock salt and sea salt.

15. Tanning and tinctorial woods and their extracts.
16. Chrome, nickel, cobalt, antimony, and their ores and alloys.
17. Turpentine.
18. Miscellaneous perfumes.
19. Glues and gelatines.
20. Medicines and patent medicines.
21. Silks and miscellaneous silk goods, natural or artificial.
22. Woven stuffs and pure or mixed woolen stuffs, carpets, blankets and similar articles.
23. Cotton threads and cloths of all kinds, pure or adulterated.
24. Men's, women's or children's garments of all kinds.
25. Hats and hat trimmings.
26. Finished leathers and skins.
27. Baskets and basket work.
28. Exotic woods, in the rough or finished.
29. Corks and cork articles.
30. Porcelain and china articles.
31. Glasses and optic articles.
32. Mirrors and crystal, cast or blown.
33. Iron and iron alloys.
34. Plates or copper threads; all kinds of articles made of pure or alloyed copper.
35. Motor vehicles for passengers or goods, spare parts.
36. Spare parts for bicycles and motorcycles.

¹ The documents attached to the letter of November 27, 1919, in the file copy of the minutes include only one note from the French delegation, but include a memorandum submitted by the German delegation not mentioned here. See pp. 512–516 [*Pg. 512 is part of [Doc. 24](#)*].

² Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

³ *Ante*, p. 188 [*Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 10](#)*].

⁴ HD–93, minute 5, p. 180 [*Pg. 180 is part of [Doc. 9](#)*].

December 8, 10:30 a.m. (HD–109)

[25] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, December 8, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 8, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/109

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/109

HD-109

[Document 25]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, December 8, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 8, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Lothian
Small

FRANCE

M. De Percin

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Rear Admiral McCully
Mr. L. Dresel
Dr. I. Bowman

BRITISH EMPIRE
Capt. Hinchley Cooke
Lt. Col. Kisch

FRANCE
M. Laroche
M. Kammerer
M. Cheysson

ITALY
Gen. Cavallero
Col. Castoldi

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu.

1. The Council had before it a letter from General Franchet d'Esperey relative to the expenses incurred in the occupation of Western Thrace. (See Appendix A).

MR. BERTHELOT said that General Franchet d'Esperey explained that on account of England and Italy's practical abstention, France was the only principal Power intervening in the occupation of Western

Thrace with forces of a certain importance. She was therefore left alone to support rather high expenses incurred by that occupation. It would be advisable for the Council to decide under what conditions those expenses should be finally settled. Cost of Administration of Western Thrace

MR. DE MARTINO said that General Franchet d'Esperey's letter indicated two possible solutions for the payment of expenses: either a distribution of same between all the Principal and [sic] Allied and Associated Powers, and [or?] the payment by the State to which the territories of Western Thrace would be finally attributed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that concerned the final settlement of expenses. What they had to decide first was the question relating to the temporary settlement of the costs of occupation.

MR. CLEMENCEAU summed up by saying that it was a question of finding out who would advance the funds, whether it would be France or all the Allied states.

MR. BERTHELOT said that as a matter of fact it was France which had been advancing the necessary amounts, as she alone had taken part in that occupation with forces of any importance.

MR. DE MARTINO said he found it difficult to discuss that question at that meeting. The Italian Delegation only received the night before, between eleven o'clock and midnight, the documents relating thereto. He would ask the Secretariat General to let him have the necessary documents in time so as to be able to study them at leisure, preferably two days before that when the matters came up for discussion before the Council.

MR. LAROCHE stated that when the Central Territorial Committee had been charged with the examination of that question by a decision of the Supreme Council,¹ it had asked General Franchet d'Esperey for supplementary information. The Council [*Committee*] had the latter before it on all such information. On the other hand, it had charged the Financial Commission with a detailed examination of that question. The Council might decide to refer the question to the latter

Commission, which would examine same in accord with the Central Territorial Committee. It would, however, facilitate the task of that Commission if the Council would take a decision as to whether France alone should continue to support the expenses incurred or whether a proportionate distribution should be examined.

MR. DE MARTINO said he did not wish to insist on his proposal to adjourn the question, and was ready to settle it on that day. He thought, with Mr. Laroche, that it could advantageously be referred to the technical experts. He should add, however, that in case the Council should decide that the expenses should be distributed in proportion to each Power, he could not accept such a decision without having received instructions from his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he wished to remark that from the document before them it was only a question of meeting the costs of the present military occupation, as the civilian costs were entirely covered by the local budget. General Franchet d'Esperey pointed out that the proposed budget for the territories in question foresaw an excess of receipts of two millions. That circumstance seemed to him a means of evading the present difficulty. Such an excess might allow for the reimbursement, little by little, of advances made for the military occupation.

MR. LAROCHE said that estimation only referred to a budget which was not yet in working. General Franchet d'Esperey had even had to accord to the government of Western Thrace an advance of 1,500,000 francs in order to enable it to function until such time when a regular financial regime should be established.

MR. DE MARTINO asked whether those 1,500,000 francs did not represent sums of money drawn upon the civilian administration of the Koritza district.

MR. BERTHELOT said that was exact.

It was decided:

to refer back for examination and report, to the Financial Commission, in accord with the Central Territorial Committee, the question of the distribution of expenses incurred by the occupation of Western Thrace (see Appendix A).

2. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation (See Appendix B). On Mr. Clemenceau's proposal:

It was decided:

to refer that question to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission, for examination and report (see Appendix B). Belgo-German Convention Relative to the Reimbursement of German Marks Held by Belgium

3. The Council had before it a note from the Polish Delegation (see Appendix C). Rights of Poland to Reparation

MR. BERTHELOT read and commented upon that document.

After a short discussion, it was decided:

to refer to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission the examination of questions relative to the rights of Poland to reparation, brought up by the note from the Polish Delegation (see Appendix C).

4. The Council had before it a list of outstanding questions to be settled, drawn up by the Secretariat General (see Appendix D). MR. BERTHELOT read that document. He said it would be interesting to have Mr. Polk point out to the Council before his impending departure those questions upon which he had received instructions and those he was not ready to discuss.

Racapitulation of Question Still Remembering To Be Settled

MR. POLK said that he had received a reply from Washington on the first question concerning the reorganization of the Supreme War

Council of Versailles. He would take the liberty to speak about it with Mr. Clemenceau after the meeting.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said he would be happy to have a conversation with Mr. Polk on the subject. Then the question could be submitted at its next meeting.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he had not yet received a final reply from his Government, but he thought that their military experts favored the adoption of the proposal which had been submitted them.

MR. POLK said that with regard to the extradition of the Kaiser he did not see why the question should come up again before the Council.

MR. BERTHELOT asked whether there did not still remain the question of defining under what conditions the request for extradition should be drawn.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the text of the note to be addressed to the Dutch Government asking for the extradition of Wilhelm II had been settled a long time ago.^{[2](#)}

MR. POLK said that he thought the Togo-Cameroun Question was a question for the Council of the League of Nations.

MR. CLEMENCEAU did not agree. He said there had been decisions of the Conference on that question,^{[3](#)} and that he had conferred about it, especially with Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. POLK said there had also been conversations on the subject in London between Mr. Lloyd George and Colonel House. The question had not come up before the Council during the time he had been present.

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated the question would be examined by the Council at its next meeting, and the minutes of the Council relating to that subject might be consulted.

MR. BERTHELOT said that with regard to the designation of the authorities to whom should be remitted the sums mentioned in Article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles, they were confronted by an Italian request. The question of substance had already been settled; it was merely a matter of designating the competent authorities.

MR. POLK said he did not remember that the question had been discussed in his presence.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that question might be put on the agenda of the next day's meeting.

MR. BERTHELOT said the Italian Delegation had also brought up a request regarding the attribution to Italy, in the former German Colonies, of coaling stations for transatlantic navigation.

MR. POLK said he could not take any position on that point without instructions from his Government.

MR. DE MARTINO said he did not insist to have that question put on the following day's agenda.

MR. BERTHELOT said that the question raised by the creation of a committee for the distribution of rolling stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire had already come up many times before the Council,⁴ and could be discussed the following day in the presence of Mr. Loucheur. On the other hand, he did not think that there was any need of putting on the agenda the question of the attribution of Western Thrace.

MR. POLK said that it would certainly be impossible for him to give on the following day a final reply on that question.

MR. BERTHELOT said that amongst the questions which concerned all the Allies, there remained to be settled the general distribution of enemy merchant shipping, as well as that of oil tank steamers.

MR. POLK said that with regard to the question of oil tank steamers Mr. Dresel, who would remain in Paris, would continue the

negotiations with Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Henry Berenger.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the question of the distribution of merchant tonnage did not concern exclusively the Reparation Commission.

MR. BERTHELOT said he would submit a note to the Council at its next meeting. They would then have certain objections to put forward, notably on private agreements which had taken place between some of the interested countries.

He thought it would also be necessary to settle the question of the cost of the armies of occupation. Differences in points of view had taken place on the subject, and Mr. Polk had proposed that only a fraction of those costs should enjoy a priority right with regard to reparations to be made by Germany.

MR. POLK said he had made a suggestion of that kind, but from a personal point of view, without binding his Government. Now the American Treasury did not agree with the views he had expressed at that time. He thought the question might be referred to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission which might, after examination of same, submit a report to the Council of Ambassadors.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that that question concerned the military experts rather than the Reparations Commission.

He thought, furthermore, that an agreement had already been made.

MR. BERTHELOT said that he would look up the texts and see where the matter stood: the question might come up the following day before the Council.

MR. POLK said that he would, as a matter of fact, be enabled to give a decision at the next meeting on the subject.

MR. BERTHELOT said that the great questions of general policy could not evidently be settled on the following day. There would, therefore,

remain only the question of distribution of costs for the Chambéry-Turin Railroad.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that was a question of improvements which had been made on the Modane Railway during the war. They had been decided upon by the Supreme Military Council of Versailles and had for principal object to improve, in the common interest of the Allies, the conditions of military transportation between France and Italy. It had been decided, in principle, to distribute the costs between Great Britain, America, France and Italy. It still remained to determine the total cost of the work and the conditions under which the distribution should take place. That question had already been examined at different times by the Supreme War Council at Versailles and by other Commissions. A final solution, however, had not yet been obtained.

MR. DE MARTINO said that the Italian Delegation had sent to the Secretariat General, at its request, a list of the questions it believed should be taken up by the Supreme Council. He noticed that a certain number of those questions did not figure on the list submitted to them by the Secretariat General. He was quite ready to discuss the opportunity of putting on the list such or such a question, but he would have liked to have been enabled to point out the reasons for which the Italian Delegation thought it advisable that those questions should be discussed, and also to hear the arguments of the other side. He thought it would be opportune for the Secretaries of the various Delegations, assisted if need be, by technical experts, to agree between themselves to put on or leave off such and such a question.

MR. DE ST. QUENTIN said that it was easy to take up, point by point, the enumeration which figured on the list prepared by the Italian Delegation. There was first a proposal for the appointment of a commission for the execution of colonial clauses provided for in the Treaty of Versailles. They had been of the opinion that the approaching coming into force of the Treaty made it unnecessary to organize such a commission, whose powers would necessarily expire as soon as the Treaty was put into force. The questions which that

commission would have to examine would belong, after the Treaty came into force, to the Council of Ambassadors.

MR. DE MARTINO said that the technical experts of the Italian Delegation were of the opinion that the creation of that commission would still offer certain advantages.

MR. DE ST. QUENTIN said that their technical experts did not see the use of creating such a commission on account of the short time which separated them from the coming into force of the Treaty.

MR. DE MARTINO said there also was the question which concerned the district of Radkersburg, about which the Austrian Delegation had offered a number of objections.

MR. DE ST. QUENTIN said that indeed there had been various Austrian objections in that matter, but that, as long as the Serbs had not signed the Treaty of St. Germain, it was difficult to reproach them with regard to the execution of clauses of that Treaty.

MR. DE MARTINO said that there was also a question relative to the military clauses of the Treaty with Hungary.

MR. DE ST. QUENTIN replied that the French Delegation had formulated a reservation on the total forces provided for the Hungarian Army under the conditions of peace. That reservation, however, had been withdrawn, and a unanimous decision had been taken so that the question no longer existed.

MR. DE MARTINO said that M. De St. Quentin was too familiar with all those questions to enable him to pursue such a discussion with him. Their list, however, contained other questions, and he contended it would be advisable to have an agreement on the subject between the different secretaries.

[5.] MR. BERTHELOT said they had received a telegram from Bucharest dated December 6th, 7 P.M., of which only the first part had been deciphered; it was a telegram emanating from the four Allied representatives at Bucharest. M. Vaida Voevod, who was the chief of the new cabinet, had renewed to the Allied representatives

the assurance that Roumania was disposed to sign the Treaty with Austria, which involved the acceptance in principle of the Minorities Treaty. They did not yet have the rest of the telegram, but the beginning thereof was certainly encouraging. Roumanian Question

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he also had received a telegram from Bucharest which did not give the text of Mr. Vaida Voevod's declaration; it only stated that the text thereof was satisfactory on the whole.

[6.] The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch on the question, dated December 5, 1919 (See Appendix E).

COLONEL GEORGES commented upon that note. He said that General Tcherbatcheff had taken up with them the request to buy a part of the stock of Russian cartridges remaining in Germany and of which Denikin's army was in urgent need. The German Government had conceded a great part of the 150 million Russian cartridges existing in Germany to private parties, and had demolished others so as to get the metal they contained. The question raised by General Tcherbatcheff's request was a delicate one for the reason that Article 116 of the Treaty of Versailles expressly reserved to Russia the right to get back those cartridges, and because Article 169 of the same Treaty imposed upon Germany the obligation to restore to the Allies (and, consequently, to Russia) the war material belonging to them and still remaining in her possession. Russia might therefore in principle recover possession of that war material, once the Treaty came into force. To authorise the acquisition for money of that material might therefore seem contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. On the other hand it was difficult to reject the request presented by General Tcherbatcheff, taking into account the urgent needs of General Denikin's army in cartridges for small arms. Purchase of Russian Munitions of War in Germany for Account of General Tcherbatcheff

The Supreme Council, the question having been brought up before it by Marshal Foch, had recently decided to let General Tcherbatcheff choose himself between the two systems which might be envisaged.⁵ General Tcherbatcheff had just informed Marshal Foch by a letter,

dated December 3, that on account of the lack of supplies from which the Denikin Army suffered, he reiterated his request tending to obtain an authorization to purchase Russian cartridges in Germany. Under those conditions Marshal Foch submitted to the Council a draft resolution which specified the special reasons why such a purchase was authorized as an exceptional measure, so as to prevent the creation of a precedent. COLONEL GEORGES then read a draft resolution, which was adopted. (See Appendix E, Document IV)

It was decided to accept the draft resolution presented by Marshal Foch as follows:

“Owing to the urgent need of the Russian Armies, the Allied and Associated Powers will not oppose the purchase by the representative of General Tcherbatcheff of cartridges for Russian rifles which the German Government is actually supposed to hold, or which it may have disposed of to individuals.

This decision, motivated by the exceptional situation of the Russian Armies, is strictly limited to cartridges for portative arms intended for these armies.

It does not imply in any way whatsoever that the Allied and Associated Powers recognize the validity of the transfers which the German Government may have made to individuals of a material which it should return to the Allied and Associated Powers in execution of Article 169 of the Treaty and which should go to Russia in execution of Article 116.

II. The above resolution shall be sent to General Tcherbatcheff and the German Government by Marshal Foch.

III. The notification to General Tcherbatcheff shall be completed by the following addition:

While raising no opposition regarding the purchase of these cartridges and while reserving, in regard to Germany, the rights conferred on Russia by virtue of Article 116 of the

Treaty of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to confirm hereby the fact that General Tcherbatcheff has been informed, in advance, that the purchase of the cartridges existing in Germany must be effected by the Russian authorities at their own risk and peril, without guarantee or intervention by the Allied and Associated Powers.[”]

7. The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch on the subject, dated December 5. (See Appendix “F”).

COLONEL GEORGES read and commented upon that document.
Purchase of Russian Munitions of War in Germany for Account of Finland

After a short discussion it was decided not to authorize the execution of the order for Russian cartridges effected in Germany by the director of a Finnish munition factory.

(The meeting then adjourned).

Appendix A to HD-109

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF

A. G. H. Q., November 15, 1919.

From: General Franchet d’Esperey, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in the Orient.

To: Minister of War, Paris.

In conformity with the instructions of the Peace Conference which you transmitted to me, I have proceeded with the interallied occupation of Western Thrace.⁶

Owing to the almost complete abstention of Italy and England, France remains the only large power taking part in this occupation with rather important forces, and consequently, obliged to shoulder considerable expenses.

To my mind, these expenses cannot be borne by us.

In order to safeguard the interest of the French treasury, and to enable it to cover the advances it is obliged to make, I have taken, owing to the urgency of the situation and without instructions from you, the following measures:

Absolute separation of civil and military expenses.

1. Military expenditures:

As France is operating in Thrace as the mandatory of the Allied and Associated Powers, the expenses occasioned by this occupation should be paid, either by being distributed among all the Powers, or else by the State to which Thrace will finally be attributed.

In order to establish our rights, all the accounts of all corps and services were closed the day before the occupation of Thrace. Dating from the first day of occupation, new accounts were opened under the usual headings, but forming separate accounts so that it is possible to keep track of all the expenses.

2. Civil expenditures.

Expenses of a civilian character will be entirely charged to the Thracian budget.

According to the instructions of the Conference, the local authorities have been maintained, and under the control of officers of the Occupation Corps, persons of the country have been chosen to take the place of high Bulgarian functionaries whom it was impossible to maintain.

A rough draft of the budget shows 6,000,000 expenditures and 8,000,000 assets,—the *boni* making it possible to reimburse, gradually, the military expenses.

In order to enable the Government of Western Thrace to function from the beginning, I am having a credit of 1,500,000 francs awarded to it.

As soon as the organization of Western Thrace shall have been completed I will send you a general report on the subject, but I wished at present to inform you of the measures taken to safeguard the interests of the French Treasury.

FRANCHET D'ESPEREY

Appendix B to HD-109

FRENCH DELEGATION

DECEMBER 7, 1919.

*Convention Made Between Belgium and Germany for the
Reimbursement of Marks Held in Belgium*

I.

An understanding was reached at the end of 1918 between France and Belgium for the purpose of having the two countries act in agreement in regard to the liberation of German marks which they hold.

This agreement was inspired by the principle that an interallied policy in financial matters seems the only means of imposing the Treaty on Germany and that in acting separately the Allies would play into the hands of the latter power.

France has remained fervidly attached to this policy. Belgium would seem to have all the less reason to withdraw from it, as she obtained from the Supreme Council an allocation of 2 billions, 500 million francs as priority on reparations.

II.

The French Government, however, has just learned that Belgium has made a separate convention with Germany providing for the reimbursement of 6 billion marks left in Belgian territory and exchanged by the Belgian Government at the rate of 1 franc 25. The arrangement, negotiated in the greatest secrecy by M. Franqui,

Director of the Société Générale de Belgique, is, in the main, as follows:

Belgium will remit to Germany, after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, the entire sum of the 6 billion marks. She will in exchange, receive bonds in marks, to be reimbursed within twenty years by six monthly payments. These bonds shall receive interest at 5% from May 1st, 1921. Each group and the interests on the entire amount will be payable in new bonds. Germany will assume, and will pay, by new bonds, whose interest shall be 5%, the difference of the exchange. In this way, for each check due, the German Government will deliver, in new bonds:

1. The capital of the bond, i. e., 150,000,000 marks.
2. The interest—i. e., for the first semester, 150,000,000 marks.
3. The difference between the exchange of the day on the bonds due and on the interests due at that time. The new bonds, issued for the settlement of the differences of the exchange will, in turn, produce an interest of 5%.

If in 1929 Germany has not entirely paid up the amount, a new delay of ten years will be given her, and new bonds will be issued for this period.

The operation planned by the Belgian Government would seem, from a double point of view, to require the intervention of the Allied and Associated Governments.

In the first place, Belgium, in obtaining a special advantage from Germany, acts against the interest, not only of France but of all the Allies in general, since Germany's ability to pay will be diminished in regard to them.

In the second place, it would seem as if Germany would require the authorization of the Reparations Commission before she can issue the bonds necessary for the re-purchase of Belgian marks.

The French Delegation finds that the question is one that should be submitted to the Supreme Council, and requests that it be inserted in

an early agenda.

Appendix C to HD-109

[Note From the Polish Delegation to the Supreme Council]

The President of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission informed the Polish Delegate, in an interview with him, that Poland's rights to reparations for damages of war by Germany and her Allies, in execution of the Treaty of Peace, would be contested in the Reparations Commission.

It is this Commission, to which the Polish Delegate will only be called to set forth the rights of his country, that has the final word. A detailed memorandum will be sent it on the subject, in which the justification of the Polish claims will be set forth from a legal point of view.

But there is also a political side which the Commission might not consider but to which the Polish Government believes it important to draw the French Government's attention.

A decision which would deprive Poland from all claims to reparations would produce a profound disillusion, it would alarm public Polish opinion in the extreme, and it might be interpreted by the public as a change of Allied policy in regard to Poland. For it would not understand why Russia, whose territory has suffered only slightly as a result of the war, should benefit by a right to reparations (Paragraph 116 of the Peace Treaty) while Poland is deprived of them, particularly as Poland has been almost exclusively the battleground of military operations in the East, and has been subject to devastation not less than Belgium or Serbia, and who, finally, has agreed to assume part of the Russian debt.

According to the Treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain, Poland is to contribute to the mutual reparations fund, considerable amounts to the credit of Germany and Austria. If the Polish claims are recognized if only in part, the liabilities which Poland assumes in this way would be balanced. If the contrary should take place, not only

would Poland be deprived of all reparations, but would be obliged to contribute to those of the others.

The need of reconstituting the industrial and agricultural life of the devastated countries, as well as the precarious condition of Polish finances, so harmed by the war, a war defensive in the East against the Bolshevist danger which is threatening all Europe, make it absolutely impossible for the Polish Government to assume any new charges.

PARIS, December 5, 1919. **Appendix D to HD-109**

List of Questions To Be Settled

I. SPECIAL QUESTIONS

A.—Execution of the Treaty with Germany.

Reorganization of the Superior War Council of Versailles to centralize the executive measures for the military clauses of the Peace Treaty in Germany and in the different occupied territories.

Extradition and trial of the Kaiser.

Togo and Cameroun. Using contingents for defending metropolitan and colonial territory.

Choice of the authorities to whom should be turned in the sums of money referred to by Article 259 of the Treaty with Germany. (Transfer, within a delay of one month dating from the entry into force, of the sum in gold which was to have been deposited in the Reichsbank in the name of the Council of Administration of the Public Ottoman Debt to guarantee the first issue of paper money of the Turkish Government.)

Attributing to Italy coal deposits for transoceanic navigation.

B.—Execution of the Treaty with Austria.

Commission for the distribution of rolling stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

C.—Execution of the Treaty with Bulgaria.

Attribution of Western Thrace. Administration of Western Thrace.

II. QUESTIONS TO BE TREATED JOINTLY

A.—Distribution of enemy merchant ships.

a) General distribution of merchant tonnage to the interested parties.

b) Question of tank ships.

B.—Cost of the Armies of Occupation.

III. GENERAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS

A.—The Adriatic Question.

B.—Russian and Baltic Questions.

Aaland Islands,

Bessarabia,

The rights of the Danube Commission in Bessarabia.

C.—Treaty with Turkey.

D.—Treaty with Belgium and Holland for the Revision of the Treaties of 1839.

IV. DIVERS

Distribution of expenses of the Chambery-Turin Railroad.

Appendix E to HD—109

[No. 5585]
Document No. 1

A. G. H. Q., December 5, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: The President of the Peace Conference,—General Secretariat.

In execution of the Resolution of the Supreme Council of December 1,⁷ I have explained to General Tcherbatcheff, by letter No. 5541 of December 1st, of which copy is enclosed, the solution and the reservations proposed by the Supreme Council concerning the request addressed by this General Officer regarding the purchase of Russian cartridges for portative arms in Germany.

By letter No. 3–1170 of December 3, of which I am also enclosing a copy, General Tcherbatcheff replies that he maintains his request for the purchase.

In order to proceed with the final arrangements of this question, I have the honor to forward you a copy of a draft resolution, based on the one hand on the request of General Tcherbatcheff, and on the other on the opinions expressed at the meeting of December 1st of the Supreme Council.

by order of the Major General,
WEYGAND

[Enclosure 1]

II.
3rd Section,
No. 5541.

DECEMBER 1, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: General Tcherbatcheff, Representative of the Russian Armies to the Allied Governments and High Commands.

Subsequent to my letter No. 3423 of November 21, replying to your letter No. 3–[1]103, of the 17th,⁸ I have the honor to inform you that

the Supreme Council studied this morning the question of the delivery of cartridges for Russian rifles, now existing in Germany.

Two solutions were considered:

1. The execution, pure and simple, of the Article 169 of the Treaty of Peace (Restitution by the Commission of Control, at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty).

This solution is not of immediate realization, but it has the advantage of guaranteeing completely the rights of Russia in restitutions.

2. The purchase of cartridges existing in Germany by Russian authorities, at their own risk and without guarantee or intervention of the Allied and Associated Powers.

This solution has the serious drawback of implicitly recognizing the Germany's right to dispose of Russian material. Besides the final payment will be hard to collect. Finally the carrying out of the deliveries will require a certain time.

The Supreme Council finds that this second solution would involve future operations concerning restitutions which Russia has the right to demand from Germany, and I would ask you, therefore, to examine the questions from both sides and to send me your final propositions in regard to the decision to be taken.

FOCH

[Enclosure 2]

III.

PARIS, December 3, 1919.

*Representative of the Russian Armies, to the Governments and
Allied High Commands*

3-1170

From: General Tcherbatcheff.

To: Marshal Foch.

In reply to your letter of December 1, No. 5541, in which you propose two solutions to settle the question of the Russian cartridges in Germany, that is to say, either their restitution, according to Article 169 of the Treaty of Peace, or their purchase by my representatives, I have the honor to inform you that owing to the circumstances set forth in my letter of November 17th, No. 3-1103, and the report of my representative in Berlin, in which he tells me of the growing decrease of the cartridges (there are, at the time being, only 75 million instead of 150 million) as well as the urgent need of Russia for these munitions, and finally, to the delay in the entering into force of the Peace Treaty, I am obliged to choose the second solution.

Consequently, owing to the exceptional character of this measure, which concerns exclusively cartridges for Russian firearms, I have the honor to request the authorization to effect the purchase of these cartridges.

GENERAL TCHERBATCHEFF

[Enclosure 3]

IV.

DECEMBER 5, 1919.

Draft Resolution

Owing to the urgent need of the Russian Armies, the Allied and Associated Powers will not oppose the purchase by the representative of General Tcherbatcheff of cartridges for Russian rifles which the German Government is actually supposed to hold, or which it may have disposed of to individuals.

This decision, motivated by the exceptional situation of the Russian Armies, is strictly limited to cartridges for portative arms intended for these armies.

It does not imply in any way whatsoever, that the Allied and Associated Powers recognize the validity of the transfers which the

German Government may have made to individuals, of a material which it should return to the Allied and Associated Powers in execution of Article 169 of the Treaty and which should go to Russia in execution of Article 116.

II. The above resolution shall be sent to General Tcherbatcheff and the German Government by Marshal Foch.

III. The notification to General Tcherbatcheff shall be completed by the following addition:

While raising no opposition regarding the purchase of these cartridges and while reserving, in regard to Germany, the rights conferred on Russia by virtue of Article 116 of the Treaty of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to confirm hereby the fact that General Tcherbatcheff has been informed, in advance, that the purchase of the cartridges existing in Germany must be effected by the Russian authorities at their own risk and peril, without guarantees or intervention by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Appendix F to HD-109

General Staff, 3rd Section.
No. 5586

A. G. H. Q. DECEMBER 5, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

By the telegram of which a copy is enclosed, the French Military Representative in the Baltic States advises of an order for Russian cartridges placed in Germany by the Director of a Finnish munition factory, and asks if this order can be authorized.

It is my opinion that the Allied and Associated Powers should, in principle, forbid these contracts which are in contradiction to the spirit of the Treaty of Peace.

The draft resolution enclosed with my letter No. 5585 of December 5,⁹ provides for an exception to this rule only as far as the Russian Armies are concerned, their military situation being exceptionally serious and their needs urgent.

The military situation of Finland does not seem to me to justify such an exception.

If the Supreme Council shares this view of the matter, I shall advise Colonel Etievant of this decision.

By order of the Major General:
WEYGAND

[Enclosure]

Telegram

HELSINGFORS, December 1, 1919.
At 19:50.

Representative of Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs that Engleberg, director munition factory Ruhimaki, Finland, left for Germany October 4 to place order for 25 million Russian cartridges. He is supposed to have placed this order between October 10th and 15, probably with the house of Burtmuller of Greusen-in-Harz, which had offered 100 million cartridges, setting forth the need of Finland to obtain without delay these cartridges, and the political situation of the German Government which makes it impossible to conclude such contracts openly.

Representative asks Minister of Finances and me to take the necessary steps that the factory of Ruhimaki may receive the munitions in question. I have replied I am studying matter.

These contracts seem to me to be contrary to the spirit of the Treaty of Peace. I would ask you to let me have your instructions.

¹ HD–86, minute 9, p. 24 [*Pg. 24 is part of [Doc. 2](#)*].

² CF–93 and appendix II, [vol. VI, pp. 699](#) and [704](#); CF–95, *ibid.*, p. [721](#).

³ See BC–18, [vol. III, p. 797](#).

⁴ HD–66, minute 6, [vol. VIII, p. 510](#); HD–85, minute 10, *ante*, p. 7 [*Pg. 7 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*]; HD–92, minute 5, *ante*, p. 169 [*Pg. 169 is part of [Doc. 8](#)*]; HD–97, minute 3, *ante*, p. 238 [*Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 13](#)*]; HD–99, minute 7, *ante*, p. 314 [*Pg. 314 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*]; HD–104, minute 5, *ante*, p. 433 [*Pg. 433 is part of [Doc. 20](#)*]; HD–105, minute 4, *ante*, p. 450 [*Pg. 450 is part of [Doc. 21](#)*].

⁵ HD–103, minute 7, p. 391 [*Pg. 391 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

⁶ See HD–56, minute III, [vol. VIII, p. 263](#); HD–57, minute 2, *ibid.*, p. [270](#); HD–58, minute 1, *ibid.*, p. [300](#).

⁷ HD–103, minute 7, p. 391 [*Pg. 391 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

⁸ Appendix J to HD–103, p. 425 [*Pg. 425 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

⁹ *Supra*.

December 9, 10:30 a.m. (HD-110)

[26] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, December 9, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 9, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/110

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/110

HD-110

[Document 26]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, December 9, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 9, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. De Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Hinchley-
Cooke

FRANCE

M. Massigli

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Rear-Admiral McCully

Mr. Ellis L. Dresel

Dr. J. B. Scott

Dr. Bowman

Mr. A. W. Dulles

Capt. Madison, U. S. N.

Lt. Cdt. Koehler, U. S. N.

Colonel J. A. Logan

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Fuller

Capt. MacNamara

Cdt. Dunne

Gen. Sackville-West

Gen. Mance

M. Leeper

M. Carr

Sir J. Bradbury

M. Malkin

FRANCE

M. Leygues

M. Loucheur

M. Cambon

M. Henry Simon

Gen. Le Rond

M. Laroche

Cdt. Levavasseur

M. Kammerer

M. Fromageot

ITALY

M. Bertolini
Gen. Cavallero
Admiral Grassi
M. Rieci-Busatti
M. Dell'Abbadessa
M. Manciola
Col. Bassetto
Cmdt. Fea
Col. Castoldi
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri
Cmdt. Ingianni
M. Antonucci

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka

1. (The Council had before it a modified text dated December 9th [8th] of the British proposal of November 14th /See Appendix "A"/, as well as draft orders for the Inter Allied Naval Commission dated December 9th /See Appendix "B"/). Distribution of Enemy Warships (Surface and Submarines)

M. LEYGUES stated that the Naval Experts had asked the Council to define various resolutions taken by the Conference at its last meetings. Paragraph 1 of the resolution of November 29th (H. D. 102, Minute 1)¹ should have the following words added thereto: "Under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission". The following paragraph should be substituted for paragraph 2 of the resolution of December 2d (H. D. 104, Minute 6 [9]):² "that the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes should not be made the subject of further attribution and should be allowed to remain in charge of those Powers now holding them but that those submarines should be demolished by the said Powers in the same way as the other submarines, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission."

M. MATSUI said that the new text did not correspond exactly to the proposal he had made. He would, however, if all the Powers agreed to adopt the same, recommend its acceptance by his Government. For the time being he could only accept it whilst making that reservation.

M. LEYGUES said that in the first paragraph of the resolution of December 4th (H. D. 106, Minute 2)³ it would be advisable to delete the last part of the sentence: "such ships ... for police work". Belgium might therefore use in any way she saw fit the ships in question. Paragraph 2 of the same resolution should be modified as follows: "to allocate a certain number of small enemy warships, chosen from amongst those which would otherwise be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to Poland and to Yugo-Slavia, those vessels to be used for police purposes only."

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether it would not be advisable to give the same privilege to Portugal which had suffered losses during the war. Portugal, as a matter of fact, had already made repeated efforts to that effect.

M. LEYGUES said that Portugal, like Greece and Roumania, had already received a warship in compensation of her losses at sea.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Portugal had suffered losses at sea, which was not the case with Roumania. It therefore had good reason to ask for more.

M. LEYGUES said that if they granted the request of Portugal, Greece and Roumania would also ask for something, and it would be difficult not to give them satisfaction.

MR. POLK asked whether a share could not be allocated to Brazil.

M. DE MARTINO said that 22 Powers had asked for the attribution of warships.

M. LEYGUES said it was understood that those ships should be employed for the policing of the coast and that they should be

delivered without armament. On the other hand some modifications had been made to the British proposal of November 14th⁴ which the Council had accepted in principle on November 29th.⁵ The British note proposed a distribution of the proceeds of the sale of materiel accruing from the breaking up of enemy warships. It was now agreed that the materiel itself should be distributed. On the other hand, new time limits had been accepted for the breaking up of surface warships allocated for propaganda purposes. The time limit for the breaking up had been lengthened to 5 years, but at the end of 18 months those ships should already be out of commission. The naval experts had decided upon 6 units as the number of ships to be allocated to Poland and Yugo-Slavia for naval policing; that figure was perhaps too small.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the proposal provided that the allocation should be open to reconsideration by the Powers: was it at that time necessary to fix final figures.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be too late to do so once these ships were broken up. A decision should be taken immediately.

M. LEYGUES said that he proposed to allocate 12 small vessels to Yugo-Slavia and 6 to Poland. Brazil, Portugal, Greece and Roumania would also receive 6 vessels.

It was decided:

(1) to accept the British proposal modified as contained in Appendix "A", it being understood that the American reservations concerning paragraph 2 thereof remains; and to adopt Appendix "B" proposal;

(2) that paragraph one of the resolution of November 29, 1919 (H. D. 102, Minute 1) should be completed as follows: "Under the superintendence of the Interallied Naval Commission;" and Paragraph 2 should be modified as follows: "That every Power receiving enemy warships to be sunk or broken up should sink them or dismantle them within a period of 18 months; and every such Power should complete the breaking up of such ships within a period of 5 years after their arrival in one of its home ports";

(3) that paragraph 2 of the resolution of December 2nd (H. D. 104, Minute 6 [9]) should be modified as follows: “with the reservation of Mr. Matsui’s acceptance;

“That the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes should not be made the subject of further attribution, but should be allowed to remain in charge of those Powers now holding them. But that these submarines should be demolished by the said Powers in the same way as the other submarines, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.”

(4) that paragraph one of the resolutions of December 4, 1919 (H. D. 106, Minute 2) be modified as follows: “To authorize Belgium to keep the small enemy warships which are in her ports.”

(5) that paragraph 2 of the same resolution should read as follows: “To allocate a certain number of enemy warships, chosen from amongst those which would otherwise be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to certain other Powers; those vessels to be used for police purposes only;”

that allocation should be made as follows:

Poland	6 enemy torpedo boats
Serb-Croat-Slovene State	12 enemy torpedo boats.

“The following States: Brazil, Greece, Portugal, Roumania should, if they should so desire, receive 6 similar enemy torpedo boats each;”

that no other enemy warship be allocated to another State with the exception of those above mentioned and those figuring in Appendices “A” and “B”.

2. M. BERTHELOT said that from the telegrams they had received from Bucharest, M. Vaida Voevod had given instructions to the Roumanian Delegation to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Treaty with Bulgaria. On the other hand General Coanda had shown him the text of the telegram which he had received from the Roumanian Government in which he was asked to obtain a delay for the

signature of the Minorities Treaty⁶ until the arrival of new Delegates. He (M. Berthelot) had pointed out to General Coanda that such a thing was impossible and that the Roumanian Delegation would have to sign the three Treaties at the same time. General Coanda had admitted that he had instructions to do so. It was, nevertheless, true that their representatives at Bucharest thought that the Treaty should be modified and that the Council was to take without delay a final position in the matter. Treaty Between the Principal Powers and Roumania for the Protection of Minorities

M. KAMMERER said he had the honor of explaining to the Council the changes proposed by the Commission which had prepared the Minorities Treaty. In the first place, the Commission was unanimous in proposing the omission in the preamble of all reference to the independence of Roumania. It was, however, of the opinion, with the exception of the American Delegation, that it would be necessary to omit in the same preamble any reference to the Treaty of Berlin.⁷ Lastly, it had been decided to insert in the preamble a sentence to the effect that Roumania had discussed the Treaty. That sentence was as follows: "... had, after a common examination come to an agreement in order to execute the present Treaty." The Drafting Committee had already given final form to that preamble. The essential question remained, that is the Jewish question. With the exception of the American Delegates the members of the Commission were in favor of the omission of Articles 10 and 11 concerning the Jews: those were the articles which had raised in Roumania the most violent protests.

MR. POLK asked whether it would not be sufficient to adopt for Articles 10 and 11, the text figuring in the Treaty with Greece.⁸

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was certain that the articles in question of the Roumanian Treaty entered into a great deal of detail, especially on the Sabbath, when as a matter of fact the general principle, which alone was of importance, was recognized by the general clauses of the Treaty.

M. KAMMERER said that another reason militated in favor of the omission of the articles concerning the Jews. The Commission had examined the "décret loi" which had been published in May last by

the Roumanian Government. It was quite true, however, that that document was not entirely satisfactory. The fact, nevertheless, remained that they had given the Jews the option of nationality without condition, and what was more important to the Roumanian Jews was that they should not be treated as aliens. The American Delegation had not thought that it could adopt the opinion of the majority; it argued amongst other reasons that the Roumanians had not formulated any definite request on the subject.

MR. POLK said that at the present time Mr. Paderewski's Government was confronted in Poland by very great difficulties. The opposition reproached him especially with having granted too much to the Allies. If at this time they were to give the Roumanians more favorable conditions on the Jewish question than those which had been imposed upon Poland, Mr. Paderewski's position would be made more difficult. He proposed that Articles 10 and 11 be omitted and replaced by Article 10 of the Greek Treaty.

M. KAMMERER said that it was concerning Article 11 that the Roumanians were raising the strongest protest.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question was raised in quite different terms in Roumania and in Poland. The Poles held pogroms: the Roumanians merely refused to grant the Jews the rights of citizenship and the Roumanian Jews were protesting against that situation. He had received a call from the Grand Rabbi and from Mr. Edmund de Rothschild on the subject. Both had declared expressly to him what he had just told the Council. They had even added that the majority of the Roumanian Jews would prefer the omission of Articles 10 and 11 which, although they seemed to confer upon them a special status, seemed to place them outside the body of the nation.

MR. POLK said he admitted that the situation of the Jews was not the same in Roumania as in Poland: but what troubled him most were the effects of their decision of [on?] the political situation of the Polish Government. He recognized, however, that a number of criticisms could well be formulated concerning the articles in question.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the British Jews would also prefer that no mention be made in the Treaty of the Sabbath.

M. DE MARTINO said that he had received similar indications. As, however, it was the pogroms which were especially to be feared in Poland, he asked whether there was in the Polish Treaty provisions which secured the Polish Jews from those dangers.

M. KAMMERER said that for all these reasons the majority of the Commission had deemed it preferable to omit articles 10 and 11 and to insert in the considerations the following paragraph: "Lastly, considering that Roumania has declared her intention of recognizing as Roumanian subjects, with full rights and without any formality, Jews inhabiting all the territories of Roumania, and unable to claim other nationality."

MR. POLK asked if it would not be possible to turn that paragraph of the preamble into a special article of the Treaty.

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that it seemed to him that it would indeed not be difficult to insert in the Treaty an article by which Roumania would declare that she recognized the Jews as Roumanian subjects.

It was decided:

- (1) to omit in the preamble in the Treaty with Roumania for the protection of minorities, all reference to the independence of Roumania, as well as to the Treaty of Berlin.
- (2) to insert in that preamble a sentence indicating that the Treaty has been prepared after agreement with Roumania.
- (3) to omit articles 10 and 11 concerning the status of Roumanian Jews, and to replace same by a new article in which Roumania should declare that she recognizes as Roumanian citizens with full rights, all Jews inhabiting the Roumanian territories and unable to establish citizenship of another nationality.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said they should adjourn the discussion of that question until Mr. Polk had been able to examine it with his Government and to communicate its opinion thereon. He, however,

took the liberty of insisting that Mr. Polk be good enough to give an answer to the Council as soon as possible. Reorganization of the Supreme War Council at Versailles

SIR EYRE CROWE said that as far as he was concerned he had already shown that he thought that their military authorities were favorable to the proposal, but he had not yet received the formal authority to accept it.

MR. POLK said that the recommendations he had made on the subject to Washington had not been approved, but that as soon as he knew that the Allied Governments were in agreement, he would insist once more with his Government and would communicate its decision without delay.

(This discussion was adjourned.)

4. (The Council had before it a note of December 8th, 1919 /See Appendix "C"/).

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the note submitted to the Council. Execution of Article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would accept the proposal.

M. DE MARTINO said that he had not had time to consult his experts on the subject and that it was impossible for him to give an immediate decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was only a matter of requesting Germany to hand over a determined amount of gold. There was no question either of distributing or of allocating finally that gold.

M. DE MARTINO said that under these circumstances he would accept the proposal.

It was decided:

(1) that Germany should be requested to transfer to Paris, under the same conditions as the Russian gold, by virtue of Article 19 of the

Armistice Conventions of November 11, 1918,⁹ the gold deposited with the Reichsbank by the public Ottoman debt, referred to in Article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles;

- (2) that the gold when transferred to Paris under the provisions of Article 259 should be delivered to whosoever would be entitled to it as soon as the decisions had been taken on the subject by the Allied and Associated Powers.

5. (The Council had before it a report of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs dated December 8 [9], 1919 /See Appendix "D"/). Frontiers Between Hungary and Croatia

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon the report.

M. DE MARTINO said he did not wish to break the unanimous feeling of the Council and that he would agree with the opinion of the majority. He wished, however, to point out that the new delimitation which was proposed to them would be extremely sinuous.

It was decided:

- (1) that the frontier of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, from the railroad one kilometre southwest of the station of Gyékényes until a point 9 kilometres approximately east of Miholjac-Dolnji, should follow the former administrative line between Hungary and Croatia;
- (2) that the frontier should be modified in such a way as to leave the Gyékényes Bares railroad entirely in Hungarian territory, including the station of Gola;
- (3) that the station of Gola should receive a mixed organization, allowing it to serve the locality of Gola;
- (4) that the Article prepared by the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs in its report No. 2 of April 6, 1919, adopted by the Supreme Council,¹⁰ and which places the railroad from Kotor to Bares under international superintendence, should be inserted in the conditions of peace with Hungary;
- (5) that the Drafting Committee be charged, after having consulted, if deemed necessary, the Commission of Ports, Waterways and

Railways, with conforming the text of the conditions of Peace with the above decisions.

6. M. HENRY SIMON said that the question which he desired to submit to the Council had already been brought up on January 30th¹¹ at a time when the future of German colonies had been discussed. Two theses were then confronting each other: on the one hand that of France and the Dominion Government; on the other hand that of Great Britain and America. They had then agreed upon an intermediate text which had become article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations. It was stated in that article, that [in] certain territories (Togo and Camerouns were amongst them) that no military instructions should be given to natives, "except for purposes of police and the defense of the territory". M. Clemenceau, at the meeting of January 30th, as expressed in the official minutes (I. C. 128) had requested that the latter formula should be, if not modified at least interpreted in such a way as to allow for the employment of those native contingents for the defense of the metropolitan territories as well as the colonial. President Wilson and M. Lloyd George had agreed with M. Clemenceau, and at the Commission on Mandates the Delegates, with the exception of the French Delegates, had wished to limit the employment of troops raised under those conditions to the defense of the Colony. The French Delegation insisted that the first interpretation be maintained. Employment of Contingents From Togo and Camerouns for the Defense of Metropolitan and Colonial Territories

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Government had proven that it knew how to manage native populations. They had been able, while the war was in full swing, to raise 75,000 native troops without the least difficulty when it had been predicted that it would be impossible to raise over 30,000 without shedding blood. At the time of discussion in the month of January he had understood President Wilson to have some difficulty in granting to France what she asked for the reason that he feared to create a precedent which would oblige him to grant the same rights to other Powers but while he insisted upon keeping that text he had very clearly expressed and the minutes proved this, that he accepted the interpretation accepted by France to the text under discussion. They could evidently not admit

that they should have the right to raise soldiers in their former colonies and that such a right should be refused any of the others. The natives would think, and their prestige would suffer by it, that the Powers were holding them in guardianship. He did not ask that the text be modified, but wished to ask that the text whilst remaining as it was, they might be however, able to raise troops without restriction.

M. BERTHELOT inquired whether the Council would allow him to read an extract of the meeting of January 30th:

(Extract from H.D. [*Council of Ten*] Meeting (I. C. 128) January 30, 1919.)

“MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was nothing in the clause under review to prevent that. The words used there were: ‘for other than police purposes and the defense of territory’. He really thought that those words would cover the case of France. There was nothing in the document which would prevent their doing exactly the same thing as they had done before. What it did prevent was the kind of thing the Germans were likely to do, namely, organize great black armies in Africa, which they could use for the purpose of clearing everybody else out of that country. That was their proclaimed policy and if that was encouraged amongst the other nations even though they might not have wars in Europe, they would have the sort of thing that happened in the 17th and 18th centuries in India when France and Great Britain were at war in India whilst they were fairly good friends in Europe. Then they were always raising great native armies against each other. That must now be stopped. There was nothing in this document which prevented France doing what she did before. The defense of territory was provided for.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that he had exactly the same power as previously. It only prevented any country drilling the

natives and raising great armies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not want to do that. All that he wished was that the matter should be made quite plain, and he did not want anybody to come and tell him afterwards that he had broken the agreement. If this clause meant that he had a right to raise troops in case of general war, he was satisfied.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that so long as M. Clemenceau did not train big nigger armies for the purposes of aggression, which was all the clause was intended to guard against, he was free to raise troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not want to do that. He therefore understood that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was adopted.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was consistent with the phraseology.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was quite satisfied."

SIR EYRE CROWE said that under these conditions he wondered why the question should be raised anew.

M. HENRY SIMON said that it was raised because the Commission on Mandates whilst establishing the text of the "B" Mandates, that is to say the African Mandates, had disagreed on the subject of article 2 of those Mandates which provided for the employment of native troops: while the majority wished to limit the employment of those troops to the defense of the colony the French Delegation asked that it be specified that they might also be employed for the defense of the metropolitan territory.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they might maintain the text as it appeared in Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he accepted on condition that it be understood that for the interpretation of that text, they would refer

to the Minutes of the Supreme Council meeting of January 30th.
(I.C. 128)

SIR EYRE CROWE said he thought he remembered that in the conversations which had taken place in June and July on that question, Mr. Balfour had said that probably the word, "territory" was a little equivocal, but that it gave France all she wanted. The best would be as a matter of fact to maintain that text and to interpret it in the spirit of the discussion which had taken place on January 30th.

MR. POLK said that that question had been discussed in London and he could not take a decision. He would recommend that solution to his Government and he felt pretty certain that it would not make any objection to it.

M. MATSUI said that as they were discussing the question of Mandates, he wished to repeat that the Japanese Delegation on the Commission of Mandates had formulated a reservation on the subject of the "C" Mandates. They might discuss that point another day but it was well understood that their reservation of the "C" Mandates remained at the present time.

It was decided:

that under reserve of the American Government's approval, the words, "defense of the territory" in Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations, and in the text of the "B" Mandates, should be interpreted in conformity with the discussion which had taken place on January 30th, 1919 (I. C. 128) before the Supreme Council.

7. M. FROMAGEOT said that a certain number of questions relative to the Treaty with Hungary were still in suspense. The Drafting Committee would like to get a decision from the Supreme Council thereon. He would first wish to know whether the Council, as the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation had requested, meant to give to the Yugo-Slav State a priority concerning reparations. Treaty with Hungary

M. CLEMENCEAU said that was a grave question which he could not solve immediately. He proposed that it should be referred back to the Reparation Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that the Commission should make haste.

M. FROMAGEOT said that in the second place, they had been charged with the insertion, with regard to labor, of the same articles as in the other Treaties. These articles had reference to a Conference at Washington, which as a matter of fact had already taken place but which certainly were not official as no Treaty of Peace was then in force. They asked to be authorized to say in the articles of the Treaty with Hungary that the first session of the Labor Conference would take place at date to be fixed later. Lastly, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation in a letter of December 3rd had asked different modifications in the articles concerning Canals and Waterways. It would be advisable to bring this up before the competent Commission.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer back to the Reparation Commission for immediate examination and report the request presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation concerning the attribution to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State of a right of priority with regard to reparations;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee insert in the Treaty with Hungary an article stipulating that the first session of the Labor Conference should take place at a date to be fixed later.
- (3) to refer back to the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission, for immediate examination and report, the observations presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of the clauses of the Treaty with Hungary concerning canals and ways of communication.

8. M. LOUCHEUR said that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had met that morning to settle the question of the payment in gold of customs duties. They had agreed substantially that they ought not to commit themselves to a definite

future policy. The solution they proposed was as follows: Collection by Germany of Customs Duties in Gold Marks

The Allied and Associated Powers agree that Germany be immediately authorized to increase the amount of specific pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a measure as the Reparation Commission should deem it to be a just equivalent of the depreciation of German currency;

The necessary negotiations with various Powers on the question of import prohibitions into Germany, as well as the question of exports, should be opened or continued;

If such negotiations had not resulted within a period of three months in a conclusion which should be deemed satisfactory by the said Powers, the question should be entirely examined anew.

M. MATSUI said that as no Japanese expert had been present at the meeting held that morning he could not accept that text immediately.

It was decided:

under the reservation of Mr. Matsui's acceptance:

- (1) that Germany be immediately authorized to majorate the amount of specified pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a measure as the Reparation Commission should deem it to be a just equivalent of the depreciation of German currency;
- (2) that the necessary negotiations with various Powers on the question of import prohibitions into Germany, as well as on the question of exports, should be opened or continued;
- (3) that if such negotiations had not come within a period of three months to a conclusion which should be deemed satisfactory by the said Powers, the question should be entirely examined anew.

9. M. LOUCHEUR said that a sub-committee had been appointed to make an estimation of the cost of the Armies of Occupation during the Armistice. That sub-committee had very nearly finished its work but the question of principle still remained. Could each of the armies

of occupation claim the complete reimbursement of its expenses, when as a matter of fact the cost of maintenance of the American soldier was nearly double that of the French soldier. Under those conditions they could only request Mr. Polk to examine anew with his Government the suggestion which he himself had proposed and which at a later time the American Delegation had withdrawn. Cost of the Armies of Occupation

MR. POLK said that he held little hope of success.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his Government also was not disposed to accept another solution.

M. LOUCHEUR said that under these circumstances he felt he must say that the solution which would be taken would cause in France great astonishment.

MR. POLK asked whether the question had not been solved by raising the rate of allowance granted to French officers and soldiers.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed that was so for the future: but the future counted for little in that question for the army of occupation would not be very large. It was only a question of the past and the brutal fact was that France, which had maintained an army double that of the British and of the Americans together, would not get a larger amount.

MR. POLK said that he proposed that Mr. Rathbone and the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission examine the question anew. Mr. Rathbone would then make a proposal to the American Government.

M. DE MARTINO said he was in accord with that proposal but in principle he associated himself with the observations presented by the French Delegation.

(The question was referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for further examination).

10. M. LOUCHEUR said that since he had conferred with General Mance he had acquired the conviction that there existed a complete misunderstanding on the attributions of that Commission between the British and French Delegations. From the explanations given by General Mance the Commission would be organized voluntarily by the interested States, that is to say, by the States inheriting the former Monarchy to settle between themselves the movements of the rolling stock. Those States, so as to facilitate the discussions, were hoping to have as Chairman an independent personality who would not be a party to the question. Under these circumstances it was clear that the Reparation Commission did not have to interfere but the question of choosing the President was a delicate one inasmuch as Sir Francis Dent was too occupied at the present time to be able to assume that function. He had suggested to General Mance that France and Great Britain might agree on the choice. Commission for the Distribution of Rolling Stock and Material Belonging to the Former Austro-Hungarian Empire

M. DE MARTINO said that he wished to be allowed to participate in that choice.

GENERAL MANCE said that it was a question of the choice of a person, and that the Powers did not interfere.

M. DE MARTINO agreed but asked to participate in the choice under these circumstances.

M. LOUCHEUR said he had no objection.

It was decided:

to accept the principle of the British proposal concerning the meeting at Vienna of a commission composed of delegates from the States acquiring territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in order to regulate the exchange of cars between those states, on condition that the French, British and Italian delegates agree on the choice of a president who shall not belong to any of the interested States.

11. (The Council had before it a telegram from the. Military Interallied Mission dated December 3rd, 1919 (See Appendix “E”), and a telegram of the Hungarian Government dated December 4th, 1919 (See Appendix “F”). Hungarian Peace Delegation

M. BERTHELOT read the two telegrams and added that the Hungarian Government seemed to attempt a sort of blackmail upon the Council by asking for the freedom of Souabe and Magyar agitators. He did not think that the Allies ought to be drawn into the controversy, [into] which the Hungarians were trying to draw them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was clear that they could not ask the Roumanians to set at liberty people, the reasons for their arrest, which they were ignorant of. He proposed that they reply that it was none of their business.

It was decided:

to reply to the Hungarian Government to the effect that the Supreme Council did not have to intervene to obtain the freedom of agitators whom Roumanian authorities might have deemed it necessary to arrest.

12. M. CLEMENCEAU said that before adjourning the meeting he wished, in the name of the Council to express to Mr. Polk all the sincere regrets caused by his departure and at the same time the hope that they would always have in him, better than an Ally, he meant, a friend.^{[11a](#)} Departure of Mr. Polk

(Approval).

(The meeting then adjourned).

PARIS, FRANCE, December 10, 1919.

Appendix [A] to HD–110

The three [*sic*] memoranda herewith comprise:

(a) Resolutions of Supreme Council H.D. 102 (1), H.D. 104 (VI [IX]) and H.D. 106 (II), as unanimously understood by the Naval Advisers.

(b) Proposals regarding the distribution of Enemy Surface Warships, as amended by the Resolutions of the Supreme Council on the British Memorandum of November 14th, 1919.^{[12](#)}

(c) Draft Orders for the Inter-Allied Naval Commission charged by the Supreme Council with superintending the disposal of the surrendered enemy warships.^{[13](#)}

(d) Copies of Supreme Council Resolutions:—

H.D. 101 (1) 28/11/19^{[14](#)}

H.D. 102 (1) 29/11/19^{[15](#)}

H.D. 104 (VI[IX])

H.D. 106 (II) 4/12/19^{[17](#)}

8 DECEMBER 1919.

*Resolutions of Supreme Council, HD-102 (1), HD-104 (VI [IX]),
HD-106 (II)*

At a meeting of Naval Advisers held this afternoon, Monday, December 8th, 1919 at Ministry of Marine, Paris, with reference to the above resolutions of the Supreme Council, it was unanimously decided that:—

H.D. 102 (1) Paragraph 1. The sense of the resolution of the Supreme Council would be better expressed by adding the following words at the end of paragraph (1):—

“Under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.” (INC)

H.D. 104 (VI [IX]). Subject to the approval of the Japanese Delegate it was decided that the sense of the Supreme Council would be better expressed if the following paragraph were substituted for paragraph (2):

“That the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes cannot be made the subject of further attribution and shall be allowed to remain in the charge of those Powers now holding them. But that these submarines should be demolished by the said Powers in the same way as the other submarines, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission”. (INC)

Paragraph 6. That this resolution was inaccurate and should be deleted.

H.D. 106 (II) Paragraph 1. That the sense of the Supreme Council would be better expressed if the last part of the sentence were deleted and the resolution were to read:—“It was decided to authorize Belgium to keep the small enemy warships which are in her ports.”

Paragraph 2. That the resolution taken by the Supreme Council should read:—

“To allocate a certain number of small enemy warships, chosen from amongst those which would otherwise be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to Poland and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, these vessels to be used for Police purposes only.[”]

_____United States of America.

_____France.

_____Great Britain.

_____Italy.

_____Japan.

8 DECEMBER 1919.

Proposal Regarding the Distribution of Enemy Surface Warships

All changes from the British Proposal of 11/11 [14]/19 are underlined in the following text.

In accordance with the preamble to the naval, military and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, with the general spirit of that Treaty and of those concluded with the other enemy powers, all surface warships surrendered by enemy powers shall, with the exception of the few noted in paragraphs 2 (b), 5 and 6 below, also paragraph (5) (II) and (5) (III) of Draft orders to I. N. C.^{17a} be broken up or sunk under the superintendence of an Interallied Naval Commission.

2. (a) Enemy Tonnage of Surface Warships, shall be divided up between the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the following computation of losses of surface warships sustained by these powers during the war:—

The U. S. A. reserve the portion of this paragraph between the brackets shown ^{17b}

Great Britain	70%
France	10%
Italy	18%
Japan	8%
U. S. A	2%

(b) Other Allied Powers which lost surface warships during the war shall have these losses replaced by an enemy ship of a type similar to that lost. These ships may be used for any purpose to which these powers may desire to put them. The distribution under this head shall be as follows:

Greece	1 T B D
Roumania	1 T B
Portugal	1 Gunboat

3. (a) Enemy tonnage in the above proportions is to be allocated to each country for breaking up or sinking, under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission. Should any country be unable to break up its share, it may place it in another country for breaking

up, subject to conditions detailed below, preference being given to Allied Countries.

(b) The ships are to be Sunk or rendered incapable of any further service as Naval War vessels, in the judgment of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission, within a period of 18 months and to be completely broken up within 5 years from the date when they arrive in a port of the power to whom they are allocated.

4. As regards the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow Great Britain has stated her willingness to bear the loss arising from that incident; but now that it is probable that compensation will be forthcoming from Germany in material which is not naval construction, Great Britain agrees that such compensation should be divided in a similar proportion to that adopted for the enemy surface warships. (Para. 2 (a) above).

5. In view of France and Italy being unable to build surface warships during the war, owing to their preoccupation with the war on land, it is proposed that they should be granted the following compensation in war ships surrendered from the enemy fleets for use in their fleets or for any other purpose they may desire.

France 5 light cruisers & 10 T. B. D.

Italy “ “ “ “ “

6. It is further proposed that the Naval Inter-Allied Commission shall loan to each of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers:—

1 Battleship

1 light cruiser

3 T. B. D.

This loan will be for one year and during this time these ships may be used for any purpose whatsoever provided that they are not incorporated into the navies of these Powers. At the end of a year after these ships have arrived in a port to the power to which they have been allotted they shall be broken up under the supervision of the I. N. C. or sunk in deep water, under conditions identical to those which were set forth in paragraph 3 (b) above.

The material from the breaking up of these ships will belong to the Powers to which they were allotted.

Appendix B to HD-110

9/12/19.

Draft Orders for Inter-Allied Naval Commission for Superintending the Disposal of Enemy Warships (Supreme Council. H. D. 102 (1))

1. (a) The Inter-Allied Naval Commission for superintending the disposal of enemy warships will be referred to as the I. N. C. and will consist of a British Flag Officer as President and a flag officer or captain from the U. S., France, Italy and Japan.

(b) Technical Advisers will be attached to the Commission as each member may desire.

(c) The I. N. C. may delegate such of its duties as it may consider desirable to the Naval Attaché in any of the countries concerned.

(d) Any of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which may not have ratified the Treaty of Peace with Germany when the I. N. C. first meet, may, pending ratification of the Treaty of such power, have a representative at the meetings, who may take part in the discussions, but will not be empowered to vote on decisions.
2. The I. N. C. is to assemble in London at as early a date as practicable without necessarily waiting for the Treaties of Peace to come into force.
3. The pay of the officers as allowed by their Governments, also their actual and necessary expenses will be paid by each Government concerned. The general expenses of the I. N. C. will be shared by the various Governments concerned in the same proportion as the percentages decided on for the division of the enemy surface warships.
4. Surrendered Enemy Warships.

- (a) The Inter-Allied Naval Commission of Control (A. N. A. C.) will supervise the transfer of ships from German to Allied Ports, where they will be held in trust for the I. N. C. by the Powers in whose ports they are until they are definitely allocated to the Powers concerned.
- (b) The I. N. C. will make agreements with the Naval Authorities of the countries concerned to have the ships sunk or rendered incapable of any further service as Naval War Vessels, in the judgment of the I. N. C, within a period of 18 months, and to be completely broken up within 5 years from the date they are handed over to the said authorities in their ports.
- (c) The I. N. C. will arrange with the interested Naval Authorities as to their visiting the yards, where the breaking up of the enemy vessels is in progress.
- (d) The I. N. C. are to render half-yearly reports to the Allied and Associated Powers as to the progress of demolition of the Enemy warships.

5. Ex-Enemy Warships and Submarines which need not be broken up.

Ex-enemy ships are allotted to the following Powers and are exempted from being broken up or sunk:—

(i) Vessels to be employed as the Government to which they are allotted may desire:—

France	5 light cruisers 10 Destroyers 10 Submarines.
Italy	5 light cruisers 10 destroyers.
Greece	1 Destroyer 6 T. B.
Portugal	1 Gunboat 6 T. B.
Roumania	1 Torpedo Boat 6 T. B.
Brazil	6 T. B.

(ii) To be disarmed with the exception of one gun and used for police duties.

Poland 6 torpedo boats.

Serb-Croat-Slovene 12 torpedo boats (These vessels will not be employed until the maritime frontiers] of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State are defined.)

(iii) The following States to have the option of receiving similar vessels if they desire them: Greece 6 T. B., Portugal 6 T. B., Roumania 6 T. B., Brazil 6 T. B.

6. Surrendered German ships.

(a) With a view to facilitating the selection of the ships for the French and Italian Navies, *vide* paragraph 5, the 13 light cruisers and also 20 Destroyers to be surrendered by Germany will proceed to a French port in the first instance. The French Government being responsible for these ships until the final allocation concerning them has been made.

(b) With regard to the remaining German ships, those allotted to the United States and Japan will proceed in the first instance to a British port and those for France and Italy to a French port. The United States, Italy and Japan should take over their responsibilities regarding the ships allotted to them, as soon as such ships arrive in a British or French port.

7. The following ex-enemy ships are to be loaned to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of propaganda and experiments, in accordance with H. D. 102 (1).

Capital Ships

Great Britain *Baden*

United States *Oldenburg* Class one vessel or *Hindenburg* if U. S. desire to save her.

France *Baden, Goeben, or Oldenburg* Class one vessel.

Japan *Oldenburg* Class one vessel.

Italy *Tegetthoff*.

*Light
Cruisers.*

Great Britain	<i>Nurnberg</i>
United States	<i>Frankfurt</i> or one of the latest type L. C's which may be available after the 10 L. C's referred to in par. 5 (1) have been allocated.
France	<i>Emden.</i>
Italy	<i>Sankt Georg</i>
Japan	<i>Strassburg</i> or one of the latest type L. C's which may be available after the 10 L. C's referred to in par. 5 (1) have been allocated.

T. B. D's. The U. S. A., Great Britain and Japan are entitled to choose 3 T. B. D's each from those saved at Scapa Flow.

The allocation of the remaining T. B. D.'s is deferred until the T. B. D's referred to in par 5(1) have been selected.

In connection with the above the following vessels are provisionally selected:—

Great Britain	V. 46 G. 102 S. 137
United States	V. 100 (1 1,300 ton 1916–17 class). 1 1000 ton 1916–17 class. 1 750 ton 1916–17 class.
France	
Italy	
Japan	(1 1300 ton 1916–17 class) 1 1000 ton 1916–17 class 1 750 ton 1916–17 class.

8. (a) All ex-enemy submarines will be dealt with in accordance with H. D. 104 (VI [IX]) of 2nd December and the general principles denoted above.

(b) The I. N. C. will select the 10 submarines referred to in H. D. 104 (VI [IX]) par:4.

9. The I. N. C. is charged with taking all [steps?] necessary for carrying out the decision of the Supreme Council in accordance with the following provisions to which the Council have given their approval.^{[18](#)}

Appendix C to HD–110

PARIS, December 8, 1919.

Note for the Supreme Council

EXECUTION OF ARTICLE 259 OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

According to article 259 Germany must transfer, within one month from the going into force of the Treaty, to such authorities as determined by the Allied and Associated Powers, the sum in gold deposited in the Reichsbank in the name of the Administrative Council of the Public Ottoman Debt as guarantee for the first issue of the Turkish Government's paper money, as well as the gold deposit constituted in Germany as counter part to the gold advance accorded in 1915 by the Public Ottoman Debt to the Imperial Ottoman Government.

Although the delay of one month imposed for the transfer does not imply foreclosure if the request for transfer is subsequent to it, it would seem best to designate, now, the authorities to whom this gold should be transferred. This choice cannot be made within the given time by the Reparations Commission which is not yet ready to function. On the other hand, the question of division or attribution of the gold is not under discussion.

The French proposed to invite Germany to transfer this gold to Paris in the same way that the Russian gold was delivered by virtue of Article 19 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918.^{[19](#)}

The gold transferred to Paris by virtue of Article 259 would be transferred to whom it should finally go to as soon as the decision shall have been made by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Appendix D to HD-110

PARIS, December 9, 1919.

*Report of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs to
the Supreme Council*

I. CLAIMS ADVANCED BY THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE DELEGATION

Article 27 of the Conditions of Peace with Hungary determine that the frontier between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State shall follow the course of the Drave from the point where this river joins the Mur to a point situated about 9 kilometers east of Miholjac-Dolnji.

By a letter dated November 27th 1919 the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State asked the Conference to maintain, in this section, the former administrative boundary between Croatia and Hungary. This boundary which corresponds to a former bed of the Drave, passes, sometimes North, sometimes South of the present bed but does not differ essentially from it except in the region of Gola where it attaches to Croatia a population of about 5,000 people living North of the river.

II. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission of Roumanian and Yugo-Slav affairs examined the Serb-Croat-Slovene claim in its sittings of December 1st and 8th.

Opinion of the American, British and French Delegations:

- a) That there is a definite advantage in maintaining an administrative frontier which has existed for several centuries and which is rigorously determined.

- b) That the Drave, not being embanked in this section, the frontier would be continually displaced from one point to another, and if, to do away with this obstacle, the present course were staked out, the line thus traced would soon cease to correspond to the bed of the river.
- c) The disadvantages, from an economic point of view, of the administrative boundary which cuts and again cuts across the windings of the river would be equal for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and for Hungary; the two States, to whom the Internationalization of the waterway of the Upper Danube guarantees the free navigation of the Drave, would be obliged to come to a direct understanding to carry out the necessary works.
- d) The administrative frontier, making the Hungarian railway from Gykényés to Bares pass under Serb-Croat-Slovene control for a few kilometers only, would create a difficult situation; nevertheless, measures must be taken to ensure that the Hungarian railroad station of Gola continues to supply the Croatian village of the same name.

The American, British and French Delegations have, therefore, the honor to propose to the Supreme Council:

- a) That the frontier between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Hungary, from the railroad bridge to one kilometre to the Southwest of the station of Gykényés, to a point about 9 kilometres to the East of Miholjac-Dolnji, follow the former administrative boundary between Hungary and Croatia.
- b) That the line be straightened so as to leave the railroad from Gykényés to Bares, including the station of Gola entirely in Hungarian territory.
- c) That this station receive a mixed organization which will enable it to serve the town of Gola.
- d) That the article, placing under international control the railroad of Kotor to Bares, prepared by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav affairs in its report No. 2 of April 6, 1919, and adopted by the Supreme Council,²⁰ be inserted in the Conditions of Peace with Hungary.
- e) That the Drafting Committee, after having consulted, if it considers it necessary, the Commission of Ports, Waterways and

Railways, be charged with making the text of the conditions of peace conform to the above decisions.

Opinion of the Italian Delegation.

“A” The Italian Delegation, while appreciating the value of the geographical and economic arguments advanced by the other Delegations, finds: (a) That the administrative frontier between Hungary and Croatia, who were part of the same State, no longer corresponds to the conditions which should be met by a political boundary between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

(b) That there is every reason for a political frontier to follow geographical lines, and from a military point of view especially, the course of the Drave, constituting the only important natural obstacle in this region, gives, for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State as well as for Hungary, the best frontier possible.

“B” Desirous, however, of not breaking the unanimity of the Commission, it agrees to the propositions of the other delegations as far as the Gola region is concerned, from the bridge of the railroad at Gykényés to Belavar.

c) As for that part of the frontier which is included between the last point of Miholjac-Dolnji it declares that it has not received instructions and reserves the opinion of the Italian representative on the Supreme Council.

Appendix E to HD–110

BUDAPEST, December 3, 1919.

Telegram Sent by the Interallied Military Mission to the Peace Conference

979

The Hungarian Government asks that the persons whose names follow be attached as technical delegates to the delegates called to

Paris: M. Emile Grandpierre, Commissary of the Comitatus of Kolozs, expert for Transylvania; Mr. Gaspard Muth, for the Minorities of Southern Hungary; M. Louis Servatius, subprefect of the Comitatus of Brasso for the Saxon minorities of Transylvania. These gentlemen have a broad knowledge of the political and economic conditions of the territories mentioned, which is indispensable for the Delegation.

The Hungarian Government asks the Supreme Council to have the Roumanian Government set free Muth who is interned at Fogaras, and Servatius who is a prisoner at Brasso, and furnish passports and *sauf conduits* for the three delegates to Budapest as well as guarantee the security of their families and property in the territory occupied by the Roumanians.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

Appendix F to HD-110

BUDAPEST, December 4, 1919.

Telegram Transmitted by the American Delegation

MONSIEUR GEORGES CLEMENCEAU,
President of the Peace Conference,
Paris.

No. 225

The Hungarian Government has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the telegram dated December 1 by which the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers have had the kindness to invite it to send delegates to conclude peace.²¹ The Hungarian Government will make every effort to act on this invitation within the shortest time possible. It desires, however, to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to a note previously sent to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest,^{21a} in which it sets forth that a certain number of people intended to form part of the Peace Delegation

must be set free and furnished with the necessary passports to go to Budapest.

These persons are, particularly, M. Emile Grandpierre, Commissary of the Government of the Comitatus Kolozs at Kolozsvár, Mr. Louis Servatius, sub prefect of the Comitatus Brassó at Brassó and of M. Gaspard Muth, at Fogaras. Of these, the two first are imprisoned and the last mentioned, Mr. Muth, interned.

The Hungarian Government takes the liberty of asking the Supreme Council to have the Roumanians guarantee the security of the families and property of the above mentioned delegates.

**HUSZAR
BANDHOLTZ**

¹ *Ante*, p. 360 [Pg. 360 is part of [Doc. 18](#)].

² *Ante*, p. 435 [Pg. 435 is part of [Doc. 20](#)].

³ *Ante*, p. 469 [Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 22](#)].

⁴ Appendix C to HD-94, p. 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 10](#)].

⁵ HD-102, minute 1, p. 360 [Pg. 360 is part of [Doc. 18](#)].

⁶ Appendix D to HD-25, [vol. VII, p. 579](#).[☞]

⁷ [Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 895](#).[☞]

⁸ Appendix F to HD-82, [vol. VIII, p. 922](#).[☞]

⁹ [Vol. II, p. 1](#).[☞]

¹⁰ On May 12, 1919; see BC-61, [vol. IV, p. 501](#).[☞]

¹¹ BC-18 (IC-128), [vol. III, p. 797](#).[☞]

^{11a} Following Mr. Polk's departure with the American Commission on December 9, the United States was represented by an observer, Hugh Campbell Wallace, Ambassador to France, 1919-1921.

¹² Appendix C to HD-94, p. 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 10](#)]; HD-102, minute 1, p. 360 [Pg. 360 is part of [Doc. 18](#)].

¹³ Appendix B to HD-110, p. 551 [Pg. 551 is part of [Doc. 26](#)].

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 345 [Pg. 345 is part of [Doc. 17](#)].

¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 360 [Pg. 360 is part of [Doc. 18](#)].

¹⁷ *Ante*, p. 469 [Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 22](#)].

17a *Infra*.

17b Brackets not indicated in original.

18 These provisions do not accompany the file copy of this document. Presumably the reference is to the decisions of the Heads of Delegations on November 29, p. 360 [*Pg. 360 is part of [Doc. 18](#)*].

19 [Vol. II, p. 1](#) .

20 On May 12, 1919; see BC-61, [vol. IV, p. 501](#) .

21 Appendix B to HD-103, p. 404 [*Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

21a See *supra*.

December 16, 10:30 a.m. (HD-111)

[27] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held at M. Clemenceau's Residence, Paris, on Tuesday, December 16, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 16, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/111

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/111

HD—111

[Document 27]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held at M. Clemenceau's
Residence, Paris, on Tuesday, December 16, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 16, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace.

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe.

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin.

ITALY
M. de Martino.

Secretary
M. Trombetti.

JAPAN
M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Lothian
Small.

FRANCE

M. Massigli.

ITALY

M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned.

FRANCE

M. Loucheur.
M. de Percin.

ITALY

M. Vannutelli-Rey.
M. Dell'Abbadessa.

1. M. BERTHELOT said that according to a note which General Weygand had just submitted, the British Government would not be in a position to send troops into the plebiscite regions before January 15th. Because of delays which had taken place in the coming into force of the Treaty that Government would have as a matter of fact to send into those territories not the troops then under arms, but troops of the regular army. Those contingents would not be ready to set out before January 15th; until that time only small detachments could be sent to the spot. Coming Into Force of the Treaty With Germany

2. MR. WALLACE stated that he wished to make a declaration to the Council to the effect that his Government had delegated him only to observe, and that he was not qualified to participate in the discussions. He was only to communicate to Washington what was going on. When decisions had to be taken he would have to refer to

Washington and would communicate to the Council the answers of his Government. Powers of the American Representative

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council took note of Mr. Wallace's declaration. He would like to know whether Mr. Wallace had powers to sign the protocol with Germany¹ and to approve the text of the reply which the Council would have to make to the German Delegation.

MR. WALLACE replied that he had powers to sign the Treaty with Hungary but had no powers to sign anything whatever with Germany.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would make this observation to Mr. Wallace—and it was a point which might well be intimated to the Government at Washington—that the signature of the protocol did not commit the American Government any further than did the signing of the Treaty.

MR. CLEMENCEAU felt that a remark should also be made that Mr. Polk had approved all the correspondence which the Council had sent to the German Delegation concerning the protocol.

MR. WALLACE said he would refer the question immediately by cable to Washington.

3. (The Council had before it, first, a note from the German Delegation dated December 14, 1919 /See Appendix "A"/, second, a note from the German Delegation /See Appendix "B"/ third, a note from the Secretary General of the Peace Conference reporting the declarations made by M. von Lersner dated December 15, 1919 /See Appendix "C"/.) Note of the German Delegation in Reply to a Note From the President of the Peace Conference Dated December 8, 1919

M. BERTHELOT gave a résumé of the German note of the 14th December drawing the Council's attention to the following essentials: the first paragraph was important. The Germans declared in effect that they would not raise any difficulty on account of the absence of American Delegates on the Commissions. There were means, he

believed, for calling attention to this declaration in suitable form: he had asked M. Fromageot and the Drafting Committee to be good enough to consider the point. The second paragraph raised a delicate question: M. von Lersner said that his Government took account of the interpretation given by the Supreme Council to the last paragraph of the protocol of the 1st November but in doing so M. von Lersner went a little further than the Council had done. To go by the German note it would appear that the Council had declared that its right, "to have recourse to measures of coercion, military or other, would obtain no longer than the moment of the reestablishment of the state of Peace by the coming into force of the Treaty". That text would seem to say that after the Treaty came into force the Allied and Associated Powers could no longer have recourse to any military measures without actually making a declaration of war. It seemed advisable in his opinion, while noting that the German Government withdrew the objections it had formulated, to indicate that measures of coercion remained possible from the legal point of view even after the coming into force of the Treaty. He had asked the legal experts to prepare a formula in that sense.

M. CLEMENCEAU considered that they ought to make only a general formula and that it was very inopportune to speak of measures of military coercion.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that that was his opinion also.

M. BERTHELOT said that was precisely what he had wished to say. It was all the more necessary not to leave that phrase unanswered since the German note said expressly, "measures of coercion, military or other". The only point in the remainder of the Allied note to which the German Government raised objections was the Scapa Flow incident. While accepting total reparation for the destruction of the fleet it had announced for that purpose that new proposals would be made by the experts coming from Berlin. The German Delegation had asked that a meeting be held that afternoon at 4 o'clock. The French Delegation on its part had no objection. The meeting would take place at 3 rue François 1^{er}. After that conversation the Reparation Commission could meet to estimate the value of the reparations that Germany offered. The German note made no

allusion to the handing over of light cruisers. They would, therefore, conclude that the Germans accepted the point, but it would be well to throw light upon this point. As to repatriation of the crews interned as a result of the Scapa Flow affair, that was a question which concerned the British Government and upon which they could not make a reply until they had been told by the British Government of its point of view.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he would submit the question to London but there was another point upon which he would very much like to be enlightened. The Council had decided that *pourparlers* of a technical nature should take place with the Germans before the coming into force of the Treaty in order to settle the procedure to be adopted.² Had the German technical delegates returned?

M. BERTHELOT said that it was obvious that the Germans must be asked to send their technical delegates without delay, but he thought there would be no difficulty on that point. Von Simson had anticipated none and had even declared that agreement upon those questions could be arrived at in the course of two or three days.

(The Council noted M. Berthelot's statements: the meeting of Naval Experts and of members of the Reparation Commission with the German experts would take place that afternoon at 4 o'clock at 3 Rue François 1^{er}.)

4. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation dated December 12th, 1919, on the question of the Vorarlberg /See Appendix "D"/ and a note from the same Delegation concerning "dangers of breaking up of Austria". /See Appendix "E"/.) Question of the Vorarlberg

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a call from Chancellor Renner who in his conversation had shown the most conciliatory dispositions and had protested the good will of Austria with respect to the execution of the Treaty of Saint Germain. The Chancellor had appeared to be to him a simple and well meaning man. There was no doubt that his Government was confronted by very serious difficulties, and its situation would be compromised if he did not

leave Paris with satisfactory promises on the subject of the provisioning of Vienna. He had deemed it advisable to assure him that at that time the Council was considering the Austrian question in a spirit of good will.

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the notes which the Council had before it. He added that it was quite clear that separatist activities could not be tolerated without the consent of the League of Nations. Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint Germain was emphatic on that question. Under these circumstances it might well be opportune to transmit to Chancellor Renner a declaration which might be worded thus:

“The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, anxious to ensure the integrity of Austria within the frontiers assigned to it, and agreed to have the provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye observed, declare that they will oppose every effort which tends to endanger the integrity of Austrian territory, or which, contrary to the provisions of Article 88 of the said Treaty, would result in compromising in whatever manner, directly or indirectly, the political and economic independence of Austria.”

Such a declaration would have as corollary the measures which the Powers would take in favor of the provisioning of Austria.

M. DE MARTINO said it was certain that from a geographical standpoint the Vorarlberg occupied an eccentric position in Austria and from that point of view the union might be grounds for long discussions. But the Council was confronted by a political question of the highest importance. If a separatist movement got a footing in the Vorarlberg there was no doubt that it would spread to Styria, Carinthia and to the Tyrol. It would, therefore, be wise to stop immediately a movement of that nature. That was the reason why he entirely approved of the proposed declaration which was then before them.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he also approved.

MR. MATSUI said that he agreed.

It was decided:

That the following declaration be submitted to Chancellor Renner in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers:

“that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, anxious to ensure the integrity of Austria within the frontiers assigned to it, and agreed to have the provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye observed, declare that they will oppose every effort which tends to endanger the integrity of Austrian territory, or which, contrary to the provisions of article 88 of the said Treaty, would result in compromising in whatever manner, directly or indirectly, the political and economic independence of Austria.”

The American Ambassador undertook to refer the text of this declaration to his Government.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that before hearing Chancellor Renner it would be advisable to ask M. Loucheur to communicate to the Council the proposals of the Reparation Commission. Provisioning of Austria

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission had considered during a number of meetings the situation in Austria. It had taken the following decisions:

(1) An arrangement had been concluded with Italy in view of sending immediately from Trieste to Vienna 30,000 tons of wheat. That wheat would be paid for out of the balance of the credit of 48,000,000 of dollars, which had been opened for the provisioning of Austria, and would insure Austria's existence until February 20.

(2) The Reparation Commission requested France and Great Britain to open a credit in favor of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on condition that such a credit be used for the provisioning of Austria. France was ready to open immediately to that effect a credit of 50,000,000 francs, the British Government was studying the possibility of opening a similar credit, which would only be done if the Serb-Croat-Slovene State actually furnished the amount of food stuffs it was to deliver. It was certain that it had not done so in the past. They were considering the sending of a commission on the spot which would supervise the regularity of deliveries. That credit of 100,000,000 of francs would enable Austria to live from February 20 to the end of April. The difficulty was to insure the provisioning of Austria from the end of April until the end of September, the O. C. of the R. C. had agreed on the necessity of opening a total credit of 100,000,000 of dollars, it was, however, necessary in order to do this, first, that guarantees should be had, and in the second place that dollars should be obtained. Neither Great Britain nor France had any, and there could be no doubt on the subject, nothing was possible without America's participation. If an agreement did not take place between America, Great Britain, France and Italy, there would be famine in Austria from the first of May; there was no means in the world of preventing that fact.

MR. WALLACE asked whether Mr. Loucheur was speaking in the name of the Reparations Commission; in that case Mr. Rathbone might be heard.

MR. LOUCHEUR stated that the Commission was of the unanimous opinion that a credit of 100,000,000 dollars was necessary.

MR. WALLACE stated that if that question was to be discussed in substance he would ask that Mr. Rathbone be heard by the Council.

MR. LOUCHEUR said that it was not a question at this time of discussing the point in substance. He was making a summary statement which the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission had asked him to make; but it was certain that they would have either the next day or the day after, to discuss that grave problem with the participation of the members of the Reparation

Commission. His duty was to tell the Council that famine was threatening.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council would hear the Reparation Commission at its next meeting.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Austrian Delegates had on the other hand told them that the Vienna Government had received an offer from a Dutch group which was ready to advance 30,000,000 florins to Austria against the promise that, if at a later time the Austrian Government was to grant to an industrial company the monopoly of tobacco, it would enjoy a priority right for the concession of that monopoly. Mr. Rathbone had alluded to that fact in saying that they were eating the artichoke leaf by leaf: that was quite exact; but they had no other solution. The Organization Commission of the Reparation Commission therefore proposed to approve the contract between the Austrian Government and the Dutch group on condition that within two or three months, the Reparation Commission was able to work out, in order to float Austria financially, a possible scheme, it would be able to reimburse the Dutch group. From the information in their hands, that group would accept such a scheme. To summarize briefly, they proposed that the Council should reply to Chancellor Renner by giving him immediately relief and by informing him that they were going on with the study of a reorganization of the Austrian finances.

Chancellor Renner then entered the room.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Chancellor Renner to speak. Hearing of Chancellor Renner

CHANCELLOR RENNER then read the declaration contained in Appendix "F".

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would ask M. Loucheur to inform the Chancellor of the decision taken by the Supreme Council and the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission, following declarations made by Chancellor Renner and by the members of the Austrian Delegation, had taken a certain number of measures involving immediate application:

- (1) through the assistance of America, the good will of the Italian Government and that of Great Britain, and with the aid of France, 30,000 tons of wheat would be sent from Trieste into Austria; that measure was already being executed.
- (2) France and Great Britain were studying the opening of a credit in favor of Serbia against the latter's delivery to Austria of the wheat it had promised her. The credit would only be opened in the measure where wheat would be delivered to Austria; an Allied mission would supervise on the spot those deliveries.
- (3) The Austrian Government had requested the release of a certain number of foreign securities which it had loaned when the first credit of forty-eight millions of dollars had been opened. They were now studying that proposal, and would be able to reply to it within eight days. They should, however, remark at once that they did not think that the securities in question constituted for Austria a means of finding within a short time the resources which she needed. Lastly, with regard to the loan for a first mortgage of the sum of thirty millions of florins, the Reparation Commission agreed to authorize the signing of the contract in question, with certain reservations which would be communicated that evening to Chancellor Renner, but which were not of a nature to prevent the execution of the proposed loan.

They had thus insured the immediate future of Austria. As far as a much more important program was concerned, which had been submitted to them by Chancellor Renner, the Powers would examine it and would communicate their opinion within a very short time, but they found it impossible to give an answer on that day concerning the general question.

CHANCELLOR RENNER said that he first wished to thank the Council and the Reparation Commission for the speed with which the requests presented by them had been examined, and also for the replies which had just been made known to them. With regard to the

first point, the assurances which were given them that 30,000 tons of wheat would be sent immediately had caused them great relief; they did not know a few days before whether there would be bread in Vienna for Christmas. He took the liberty of insisting before the Italian representative, so that the sending of that wheat should not suffer any delay: they would thus have flour for the holidays.

MR. DE MARTINO said that he believed that the first trains were already on the way; if they were not, they would be leaving right away.

M. LOUCHEUR said that M. Bertolini, the Italian representative on the Reparation Commission, had given them the day before the most reassuring information on the subject.

CHANCELLOR RENNER said that with regard to the opening of a credit to Serbia, he thought he should point out that they had once before made a formal contract for food stuffs with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State: under the provisions of that contract, and notwithstanding the great difficulties which they had had in obtaining them, they had deposited with the Serbian Government 140 millions of Serbian crowns, and up to this time they had received nothing, or practically nothing.

M. LOUCHEUR said it was certain that Jugo-Slavia had not kept its promises. For that reason he was to meet the Serbian ministers the next day in order to take in accord with them the necessary measures.

CHANCELLOR RENNER stated that a few days before he left Vienna they had signed with Serbia a new agreement. Notwithstanding the great lack of rolling stock in their yards, they were lending her fifty engines so as to insure the transportation of that wheat.

Unfortunately, however, on account of the late season which made it difficult to navigate the Danube, he believed it would be difficult to obtain it. He therefore feared that the happy solution found by the Allied and Associated Powers would not be sufficient to furnish them with the necessary food stuffs. He hoped, however, that the mission

which M. Loucheur announced was to be sent might achieve the execution of the contracts.

On the other hand, they were well aware that the foreign securities which they were asking the Council to release would not suffice to get them out of trouble. It was only an expedient. They were, however, forced to have recourse to it as practically Austria did not dispose of any more foreign securities.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the British and Italian representatives were awaiting the reply of their respective governments to the proposals of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission. They hoped that in four or five days they would be enabled to communicate their decision to the Chancellor.

CHANCELLOR RENNER said that with regard to the monopoly of tobacco he was hopeful that the discussion which would take place that afternoon before the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission would have favorable results for them.

Lastly, he was happy to hear that a prompt answer would be made to the general proposals which they had presented. Already the concessions which had been made to them guaranteed that they would be able to live during the next few weeks. At that they would be receiving mostly wheat, and they lacked everything. The fact should not be lost sight of, however, that if they did not succeed in getting up a program on the whole question which would carry them until the next crop, Austria would go from bad to worse: they would remain condemned to live from day to day. When they had left Vienna, their provisioning was only insured for three days! It did not need much effort to understand that such a situation embittered individuals, exasperated passions; and in order to establish a normal situation little by little one should see clearly a few months ahead. He therefore took the liberty of insisting before the Supreme Council and the Reparation Commission in order that a methodical organization might be got under way which would last for ten months. If that result were obtained, he could guarantee that Austria and Vienna would work. People came to Vienna from all Eastern countries to obtain goods. As soon as they were enabled to work they

would have no difficulty in exporting their products and would thus be capable of earning their bread and paying their debts.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he would reply to Chancellor Renner that they were studying the program which he had submitted to them; they were quite aware that the measures which had already been decided upon would only suffice for two or three months. He wished, however, to point out that the possible loan of thirty million florins would enable Austria to acquire other things besides wheat.

CHANCELLOR RENNER wished, before leaving, to thank the Council and the Powers represented thereon for the assistance which had been given them. He hoped that the message which they could bring back to Vienna before Christmas would be a consolation for the populations. But in any event he wished to state that immediately after the holidays they would make efforts to better their relations with Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia: they wished to forget the past and work together on the foundations laid by the Treaty of St. Germain.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council thanked Chancellor Renner for the assurances of good will which he had just given. On their side they wished to express the firm hope that the promises made on both sides would be held.

CHANCELLOR RENNER then withdrew.

(The meeting then adjourned).

Appendix A to HD—111

DECEMBER 15, 1919.

Note From the German Peace Delegation to the Supreme Council

(Presented in French, by M. von Lersner)

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

PARIS, December 14, 1919.

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT: In reply to the note of December 8, I have the honor, at the order of my Government to inform your Excellency of the following:

The German Government wishes to do away with the misunderstanding which creates the impression that in compensation for the absence, for the time being, of the Delegates of the United States, in the Commissions provided for by the Treaty, Germany requests the right to have the terms of the Treaty modified in regard to the extradition of persons accused of infractions against the laws of war, and the repatriation of prisoners of war. The repatriation of prisoners of war has not been mentioned in this connection. In regard to the extradition, the German Government, before receiving the Allies' note of November 1,³ stated the reasons which would seem to make it necessary to attenuate the terms of the execution of the Treaty.⁴ These reasons still deserve, to the same extent, the most serious consideration by the Allied and Associated Powers. But, the German Government has never made its consent to the going into force of the Treaty dependent on previous agreement on this question.

The German Government takes note of the fact that according to the intention of the Supreme Council, the right, as reserved in the last paragraph of the Protocol of November 1,⁵ to have recourse to measures of coercion, military or otherwise, will only be effective until the state of peace shall have been established by the coming into force of the Treaty, and that the fulfilling of obligations, provided for by the Protocol, will not, from that time on, be guaranteed by stipulation other than the general stipulations of the Peace Treaty and the methods generally recognized by the law of nations. Under those conditions, the German Government does not maintain the objections made so far regarding the last paragraph of the Protocol.

The German Government also takes note of the declaration according to which it is the intention of the Allies to repatriate, from the time of the deposit of ratifications, the prisoners of war whose liberation, after the conclusion of peace can no longer be subordinated to any but the conditions referred to by Article 221—conditions which have already been fulfilled.

Aside from the terms of the Protocol of November 1st regarding the destruction of the German warships at Scapa Flow, and in view of the relative unimportance of the undertakings in question, and in the expectation that the deliveries effected in the meantime will unquestionably be taken into account, the German Government will raise no objections to the contents of the Protocol. The German Government only wishes to record the fact that the delays and the infractions of the Armistice, which, according to the Allies, have taken place, are not to be ascribed to it.

As for the affair of Scapa Flow, the German Government renounces replying in a detailed fashion to the separate note which the Allies submitted on the subject.^{5a} It limits itself to the following observations:

The so-called contradiction between the memorandum of November 27th⁶ and the notes of June 28th and September 3rd, do not exist in reality. These notes do not discuss the legal aspect of the question. The memorandum only examines the legal side of the affair, and sets forth the arguments that a court of arbitration should take into consideration.

Through an inaccurate translation, the sense of the passage of the letter of May 9th, from Admiral von Trotha, which was cited, is completely altered. From the original text, as well as from the passages preceding and following it, it appears that it refers to instructions given to the Naval Delegates for the negotiations at Versailles, and not, as the Allied note supposes, to an order given Admiral von Reuter.

In the order sent by Admiral von Reuter, June 17th, to the commanders of the warships, and which has just been published by

the British admiralty, it is stated that the Admiral should not destroy the ships unless the enemy attempted to take them over, without the assent of the German Government, but that the ships should, on the contrary, be surrendered to the enemy if the German Government accepted the Peace terms. This order proves, once more, that it is only the mistaken impression that the Armistice had ceased and that a state of war again existed which impelled Admiral von Reuter to act as he did. He thought it his duty to act, under those circumstances, according to the general order which, in case of war, imposes on every naval officer the duty of not allowing his ship to fall into the hands of the enemy. A similar order exists, besides, in the British and French navies.

The German Government maintains its opinion that the best way to arrive at a just solution of the dispute would have been to submit it to the International Court of Arbitrage at the Hague. This measure would in no wise have delayed the going into force of the Treaty nor the signature of the Protocol, modified accordingly.

The German Government can only regret that the Allies, on the contrary, should have taken the standpoint that it is a question of acts of war, the settlement of which rests with the victor. Desirous, nevertheless of doing everything within its power to do away with all obstacles which may oppose a prompt reestablishment of peace, the German Government declares its willingness to make good the damage caused to the Allied and Associated Governments by the destruction of the ships. It cannot, however, carry out this reparation in the manner provided for by the Protocol of November 1st, as a careful examination of the matter has shown that the demands formulated in the protocol would compromise in an irreparable way the economic life of Germany and would end by excluding all possibility of fulfilling the other enormous obligations which the Treaty imposes on Germany. It cannot be that the Allies wish to demand that the German Government assume such a new obligation. According to the note of December 8th they are, themselves, disposed to avoid causing such a fatal injury to the vital interests of German economic life. They have declared themselves ready to examine the question as soon as the German port material has been surrendered to them. The German Government desires, immediately

to submit its data to the Allies and the other necessary data which will show to what an extent the fulfilment of these demands will harm the economic capacity of Germany. It has entrusted a commission of experts with the task of placing these data before the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers and to furnish them will [*with?*] all desired explanations. It will formulate at the same time definite and detailed propositions on a mode of reparation which, while creating a new and heavy load for Germany in her present position will not be incompatible with her vital interests.

After having, in this way, declared itself ready in principle to afford reparation for the destruction of the ships in question, the German Government believes it may expect that the crews held until now on board will be repatriated without delay.

The German Government hopes in this way that it will be possible to proceed with the signature of the Protocol immediately, and to effect the coming into force of the Treaty, and the return of peace, so ardently desired by the German people and the entire world.

Please accept, Mr. President, etc. etc.

BARON VON LERSNER

Appendix B to HD-111

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

PARIS, December 15, 1919.

From: Von Lersner.

To: Dutasta.

I have the honor, pursuant to our conversation of this date, to inform your Excellency that the Technical Commission, which should arrive tomorrow, will be composed as follows:

Dr. Seeliger, Privy Legation Adviser
Mr. von Gagern, Navy Commander

Mr. Schreiber, Privy Admiralty Adviser
Mr. Loewer, Naval Construction Adviser
Mr. Eich, Privy Adviser
Mr. Blohm, Certified Engineer
Mr. Prltzer, Director
Mr. Muller, Labor Representative

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix C to HD-111

DECEMBER 15, 1919.

Note From the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference

In transmitting the German reply⁷ to the Secretary General of the Conference, M. von Lersner stated that he had been instructed with making the following point clear: The German Government never considered it was its right to obtain a modification of the Treaty on the ground that the United States have not yet ratified and consequently will not be represented in the Commissions for the time being. The German Government adheres to Article 440, which stipulates that the Treaty will go into effect immediately upon the ratification by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Regarding the matter of Scapa Flow M. von Lersner stated that a delegation of German technicians would arrive in the morning. The Delegates would be supplied with all the necessary documents. The German Government was desirous of having this Commission meet, if possible as soon as to-morrow afternoon, a Commission of Allied technicians. M. von Lersner assured that in this event the Allies by to-morrow evening would be convinced of the absolute impossibility for Germany to satisfy the demands of the Allies concerning the 400,000 tons requested.

M. von Lersner again insisted on Germany's very great and sincere desire for the re-establishment of a state of peace. But he added,

begging that the Secretary General should not misinterpret his words, that if the Allies insisted on the actual surrender of the material described in the Protocol, the German Government would find it impossible to sign. But immediately thereafter he referred to the fact that not only would the experts enlighten the Allies but would propose compensations very acceptable to them. M. von Lersner brought out the point that the German Government, in this matter, has set all questions of pride completely aside since it agrees to reparation for acts for which it continues to assert it is not responsible.

Appendix D to HD-111

12 DECEMBER, 1919.

From: French Delegation.

To: Secretariat General of the Delegation of the United States of America.

VORARLBERG QUESTION

From reports which reached the French Government, the Government of Vienna and public opinion in Austria are very much concerned about the separatist movement which is to be observed in Vorarlberg.

The Landtag of this region discussed on December 6, the question of its union with Switzerland. On this subject, it has taken the four following decisions:

- 1) It asks the Central Government to recognise the right of self-determination for Vorarlberg, and to refer this question to the Supreme Council at Paris, (League of Nations).
- 2) These authorities are invited, in case of necessity, to proclaim themselves the right of self-determination of the country.
- 3) The communes are invited to prepare the electoral lists, with a view to an eventual plebiscite.

- 4) The provincial authorities are invited to take the necessary measures, in case they should have to exercise the right of self-determination.

These decisions have been communicated by the Landtag to the Chancellery of the State of Vienna, which has answered by the following telegram:

“The Government will close no legal way to Vorarlberg, if the Landtag presents to the Government in Vienna a proposition authorising the negotiations of Vorarlberg concerning its union with Switzerland; the proposition will be forwarded to Paris; but the Government will, at the same time, reserve the right to make the necessary declarations in the interests of Austria. Vice-Chancellor Fink’s proposition, presented Tuesday, will therefore be accepted by the Government. The Government will, of course, be obliged to oppose, by every means in its power, any action directed against the Peace Treaties or the existing laws. It advises legal methods.”

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot remain indifferent to this question. It is certain, as the Austrian Delegation says, in its letter of December 2, that the separation of Vorarlberg from Austria, would “lead sooner or later to a complete disintegration of Austria”. The demonstrations of the Vorarlberg people and of their Landtag have stimulated the ferments of dissolution throughout the Republic. It is reported that the province of Salzburg demands its reunion with Bavaria, and that a similar movement is growing in Northern Tyrol. The agents of the Government of Budapest are circulating through the Comitats of western Hungary, which were attributed to Austria, organising an agitation in favor of a plebiscite. It may be remarked, on this subject, that the Austrian Government now realises the danger of the solution it had the imprudence to request in its counter-propositions.

The decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the frontiers of Austria, determined in the interest of Europe, which inspired it with the desire to facilitate in every way the existence of this State, should

influence it to give the Austrian Government official support in the question of Vorarlberg.

The Supreme Council might take advantage of Chancellor Renner's presence in Paris to transmit to him a declaration in which the Allied and Associated Powers state that they adhere, and will adhere, as far as concerns the territory of the Austrian Republic, to the frontiers which have been fixed by the Treaty of St. Germain.

The Chancellor might be authorised to publish the declaration of the Supreme Council. This demonstration would strengthen the authority of the Austrian Government in all the regions where separatist tendencies exist. Concerning Vorarlberg in particular, it would contribute to wipe out the movement which is gaining hold in certain Swiss classes for the incorporation of Vorarlberg with the Confederation. The partisans of the incorporation invoke the danger for Switzerland if Vorarlberg were attached to Germany. Now, this eventuality would be excluded, if the Allied and Associated Powers would affirm their desire to see the integrity of the Austrian Republic maintained.

Appendix E to HD-111

*Dangers of the Disintegration of Austria*⁸

The deplorable situation now existing in Austria from an economic point of view favors all efforts towards disintegration instigated in the country by the pan-Germans who thus hope to annex the new State piece by piece by evading the provisions of the St. Germain and Versailles Treaties which prohibit the attachment of Austria to Germany.

The Vorarlberg Landtag decided, on December 6, to request the Government at Vienna to recognize a right of self-determination to the province, and to submit the question to the Supreme Council at Paris and to the League of Nations. Preparatory measures for an eventual plebiscite were taken, as well as provisions with a view to the separation from Austria.

In Switzerland public opinion is considerably stirred up, but is divided.

In certain circles, especially in the Germanic districts, a propaganda for the annexation of Vorarlberg to Switzerland is being conducted, while another current of opinion is hostile to such annexation through fear of seeing the religious or linguistic proportion displaced in the Confederation.

However, the Swiss Government has taken the following position, viz., that it will not favor the annexation of Vorarlberg to Switzerland as long as the integrity of Austria is maintained. It is only in the event that Austria would become disintegrated and the annexation of Vorarlberg to Germany a possibility, that Switzerland would support the independence of Vorarlberg and even consider its annexation, to prevent such an eventuality.

It is also agreed in Switzerland to submit the question to the League of Nations if need be.

On the other hand, an annexationist movement is being manifested in the Limburg district favoring Bavaria, and a similar movement is also evident in the Tyrol where it has assumed the form of a request for economic annexation with Germany.

Finally, the Hungarians announce that they will claim a plebiscite for the districts of Western Hungary, which were annexed to Austria by the St. Germain Treaty. The Government at Vienna, greatly alarmed, appeals to the Powers to obtain the solemn assurance that they will not permit a like destruction of the work of the St. Germain Treaty.

Article 88 of this Treaty is formal, and is drawn up as follows:

“The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her

admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.”

These provisions were taken with a view to protecting European interests which exist more than ever and which should create a desire to favor the Austrian State by every means.

It is therefore proposed to accord the Austrian Government public support in the form of a declaration which might be drawn up as follows and delivered to Chancellor Renner:

“The Allied and Associated Powers, desirous of assuring the existence of Austria within the frontiers as assigned, and determined to have the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye respected, declare that they will oppose every effort of a nature to infringe upon the integrity of Austrian territory or which, contrary to the stipulations of Article 88 of the said Treaty would result in compromising in any manner, whether directly or indirectly, the political or economic independence of Austria.”

It is understood that in order to give full force to this public declaration, the Supreme Council should offer at the same time full security to Austria relative to her provisioning, and also take all measures necessary to insure her economic life.

Appendix F to HD–111

[Declaration by the Chancellor of Austria (Renner)]

MR. PRESIDENT, GENTLEMEN OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL: In a moment of most distressful plight [of?] the people of Austria, in behalf of which we appear before you, in taking refuge with the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, we are well aware of the fact that here in Paris not only the political fate of countries but also the economic existence of nations are decided on. Our Mission is not a political one. In St. Germain our political future has been settled and our people, represented by the National Assembly, a body elected in general suffrage, has accepted with a majority of five-

sixths of all men and women in Austria the terms of the St. Germain Treaty as a basis for their political existence and future, and thus adopted with confidence the system established in St. Germain.

Since that time our people have come into a desperate situation; seven millions of people are literally on the point of perishing by hunger and cold. In the name of humanity we implore the powers ruling the world to put an end to these atrocious sufferances unworthy of modern civilization; to put an end to this destruction of all working power, to the fearful mortality of children, to the physical and moral infirmity of the future generation!

May I be spared to picture to you the present state of our country and the suffering of our people. I know that the exhaustive and conscientious reports of the Missions did not leave the Governments of the Great Powers in doubt as to our present situation. The daily rations, which hard working people have contented themselves to live on, are so small that the more fortunate nations of the west could hardly conceive how a household could be kept on them. Today we are not able to deal out but a portion of said rations, and even that not to all of our people.

In Vienna we could only distribute 100 gr. of bread and flour a day and head, these last few weeks; at some other places outside of Vienna there was no bread at all. Nevertheless our people maintained peace and order up to the last moment. There is hardly a foreigner who did not admire them for this heroism. For this patience has been shown by our people now for years. With painful regret I have to confess that acts of violence and pillage have occurred these last few days. We condemn and punish such deeds, but the judges' verdict is influenced by pity. Unspeakable care has brought us here, we fear that we do not possess the strength to leave this place if this care is not taken from us.

For even these small and irregularly dealt out rations could only last till about the middle of January, at which time we will be left without any food. The Austrian Government could not remain in office up to the very moment when the last kg. of flour, the last deka of fat has been given out, and the six million people are facing complete

exhaustion of all their supplies. The Government bears before its own country and the entire world the responsibility that mankind shall not be surprised by such a catastrophe, which is bound to deal a heavy blow on the conscience of the civilized world.

I hardly need to cite the reasons, which have brought matters so far. There are chiefly two reasons: our own country in its present shape was only able to produce even in good times of peace a third or fourth of the year's demand in breadstuffs. Therefore self-aid is of no avail to us. The second reason is that the agriculture of the neighboring countries and of Eastern Europe is run down to such an extent that it yields only a small or no surplus at all. Our next neighbors are mostly showing the best intentions, but we could convince ourselves that partly their soil, partly their railroads are giving out. The Austrian Government has in conformity with its duty and with the aid of the Great Powers made all efforts to assure our demand through agreements, but to our great distress we had to convince ourselves during these last few weeks, that it is impossible to build up our provision-system on an exchange of goods with our neighbors, and that the East could at the best supply additional contributions only. This disappointment prompted us to look towards the West, and this was the source of our second more fateful embarrassment.

Even in case a credit for the purchase of foodstuffs should be granted in the West to the Austrian Government, the provisions could only then be started moving and therefore could not arrive in time, but at the best in two months.

Through our disappointment in the East turned towards the West we see to our own great dismay, that the time is too short. We cannot wait until the provisions are shipped across the Atlantic Ocean. Our first prayer therefore is, that the quantities needed for the taking care of the minimal rations for the next two months be advanced us out of the stocks available in Europe.

The breakdown of our currency-system, an event which has not its equal and could not be foreseen in its actual extent by anyone, makes it impossible for us to pay in our own money. We therefore must

pray that the food supplies conceded out of the European Stocks be credited to us “in natura”, and that we obtain at the same time a credit, which would enable us to buy immediately, that is to say in this very hour, in countries across the Ocean, in order that the grain shipped from over there not only could replenish the said stocks, but also reach our country as soon as possible, to be distributed there. Not until then can a regular provisioning-service be taken up.

This, however, requires on the other part that our people are placed in a position to have continuous work. We must work in order that we ourselves may provide for our living and meet the obligations imposed on us by the Treaty of St. Germain. In our country employers and employes have after months of deep depression following the catastrophe of war shown the best intentions to resume work, but lack of food and above all of coal rendered it impossible to revive industrial activity. For unfortunately nature has denied to the territory awarded to us by the Treaty of St. Germain any coal-field worth while mentioning. We can only obtain the necessary minimum of food and raw materials, if the leading Allied Powers grant us a credit sufficient for said purpose. The Austrian Republic as created by the Peace of St. Germain does not possess at present foreign currency, contains incoherent parts of the whole productive machinery of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and requires a transition period in order that its people could rearrange their activity in conformity with the changed conditions.

Such credits are provided for in the peace terms. The provisions contain moreover all guarantees which Austria has to offer and all means of control to which Austria has to submit itself in order to assure repayment of said credits and reparation. We realize that it will require a length of time until a complete plan for the execution of these peace terms is worked out and carried into effect. The Austrian Government and people therefore appreciated it greatly that the Sub-Committee of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission was sent to Vienna several weeks ago, where its members devoted themselves with great zeal and pain to their difficult task. But I want to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the fact that this aid may come too late, if we are left in this uncertain state of affairs for months to come and are prevented from

resuming activity, living through all this time from hand to mouth. Under the present circumstances no conscientious man could remain in a responsible public position knowing that it is impossible for him to help, so that without the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers our country would be delivered to full anarchy. The existence and social order of our population being in greatest danger we have full confidence that our appeal will be favourably understood and be followed by an immediate intervention. Our life after being assured by your assistance we shall make all efforts to help ourselves as far as our strengths go.

It would be our greatest satisfaction to reach the point where we do not have to come for help any more as every state has to overcome its difficulties by itself.

The Austrian Government is fully conscious of the responsibility which it carries for the existence of the Austrian people and the maintenance of order in their own country. And—to be sure—we are pleading here above all the cause of the people. But we have the frankness to declare that we do not carry this responsibility alone, but that we are standing under higher duty while we are taking care of our people's welfare. Europe is still far from a state of political steadiness of organized economic affairs and of social security, which state to attain must be the aim of all fair-minded people. We have the feeling that our country is the centre of the actual economic depression and the spot where the social suffering has reached its highest point. Our breakdown is bound to affect the whole system of the new states created by the Treaty of St. Germain and of entire Central Europe, it is bound to shake up the economic conditions of the entire world, so that no country, no part on our earth could get away from it. Therefore we comprise all we need in this one prayer:

Give kindly to our state, which in full confidence adopted the system established by the Great Powers, by your support a chance to save itself in order that it may fulfill its duty at its proper post and in the same time in the service of the entire world.

¹ Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

² HD–80, minute 2, and appendix B, [vol. VIII, pp. 847](#) and [863](#).

³ Appendix B to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 863](#).

⁴ See HD–21, minute 1, [vol. VII, p. 449](#).

⁵ Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#).

^{5a} See draft note printed as appendix C to HD–104, p. 439 [*Pg. 439 is part of [Doc. 20](#)*].

⁶ Appendix G to HD–103, p. 414 [*Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

⁷ Appendix A, p. 567 [*Pg. 567 is part of [Doc. 27](#)*].

⁸ Note from the French delegation.

December 17, 10:30 a.m. (HD-112)

[28] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 17, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 17, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/112

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/112

HD-112

[Document 28]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 17, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 17, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Lothian
Small

FRANCE

M. de Percin

ITALY

M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF:
Colonel J. A. Logan.
Mr. Rathbone.

BRITISH EMPIRE:
M. Leeper.
Cdt. MacDonald.
Cdt. MacNamara.

FRANCE:
M. Loucheur.
M. Leygues.
Gen. le Rond.
Admiral Levavasseur.
M. Hermitte.
M. Massigli.

ITALY:
M. Bertolini.
C. Amiral Grassi.
Cdt. Fea.

JAPAN:
M. Shigemitsu.

1. M. LOUCHEUR said that the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission had examined at its preceding meeting the general economic situation of Austria. He had had the honor of

explaining the day before to the Supreme Council the measures proposed for providing Austria with food stuffs for from two to two months and a half.¹ There still remained to be examined measures of a more general order which would insure the economic uplift of Austria for a longer period. From information received that morning the negotiations concerning the loan of 30,000,000 florins which Austria was trying to conclude with a Dutch group were proceeding and it could be hoped that the *pourparlers* would succeed. Economic and Financial Assistance to the Austrian Republic

The Organization Committee had received from the Austrian Chancellor and from the Food Minister a memorandum which gave an estimate of the measures which would be necessary each month to insure the provisioning of Austria, that estimate gave the following figures:

Monthly:

50,000 tons of wheat, i. e.	\$5,500,000.00
1600 tons of meat, i. e.	1,000,000.00
3400 tons of fats, i. e.	2,700,000.00
30,000 boxes condensed milk, i. e.	300,000.00
making a total of	
	\$9,500,000.00 each month.

They would therefore, so as to take care during seven months of Austria's needs, require a sum of seventy million dollars as a minimum. The figure asked by the Austrian Delegation for the same period amounted to one hundred million dollars. The financial effort to be accomplished was therefore included between two figures.

The Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission could only refer to the letter which it had sent on the 14th November last to the President of the Conference.² It had pointed out in that letter that it was not for it to decide on the principle of the loan to be granted to the Austrian Republic. That question was not within its competence and concerned exclusively the different Allied governments. The

Organization Committee would therefore limit itself, in case the principle of a loan was adopted, to suggesting certain measures of protection, such as the establishment of a certain control over the finances of Austria. The Austrian Government should furthermore promise to have certain financial laws voted so as to give the Powers all desirable guarantees. Before examining those questions in detail, it was, however, advisable to solve the question of principle and to know whether they intended or not to grant Austria an important loan which might vary between seventy and one hundred millions of dollars. That was a question which the Organization Committee now asked the Conference to settle.

M. CAMBON said that it was important to settle before anything else the question of principle, and he would ask the representative of the United States of America to give his opinion on the matter.

MR. WALLACE said that he would refer the question to his government that very day, and hoped to obtain a reply within two or three days.

M. CAMBON said it seemed to him extremely important, as well as to the French Government, to come as promptly as possible to Austria's help, so as to avoid throwing into absolute want the population of the small Austrian State which the Allies had just created.

MR. WALLACE said that M. Cambon had not been present at the preceding meeting where he had very clearly stated his position.³ His principal duty consisted in following the meetings of the Council as an observer and in forwarding immediately to his government all questions of a nature to be submitted to its decision. He did not have the necessary powers to express before the Council opinions which would be binding upon the American Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question had already come up before the Council and it had been decided that it concerned the governments alone.⁴ The British Government, as a matter of fact, was ready to bear its share of the expenses involved in the economic reestablishment of Austria, but only on the formal condition that America should also stand its share. That consideration was all the

stronger as in the actual state of the financial market nothing of any value could be done without the help of the United States. It was not pounds or francs that they needed, but dollars, which they could only obtain from the United States. His Government had made every effort to arrive at an agreement on the subject with the Government at Washington. It had telegraphed many times, but no decision seemed to have been yet taken at Washington. They still hoped that a favorable decision might be taken in the United States, and if so, he could assure the Council that his Government would act in the most sympathetic spirit towards the Austrian Republic.

M. DE MARTINO said that they had the strongest reasons, as well from a humanitarian as from a political point of view for coming quickly to Austria's help, whose actual situation appeared extremely serious. They had, however, as Sir Eyre Crowe recalled, decided that it belonged to the governments alone to take decision on the loan which should be granted to the government at Vienna. The Italian Government had not yet taken a decision, and it was natural that it should await, before doing so, the result of the negotiations taking place between London and Washington. It was indeed a question of obtaining dollars, which the United States alone were able to supply.

M. MATSUI said that he had also referred that question to his Government and had not yet received a reply. He was therefore not able to state precisely what attitude would be adopted by the Japanese Government; but he hoped that it would be able to participate in the common task.

M. CAMBON said that under those conditions he did not see that they could do anything more on that day, and he proposed to adjourn the discussion until such time as the interested governments would have made known their decisions.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to ask how far they had got on the question of wheat, which the Serbian Government was to deliver to Austria. Numerous difficulties had come up on the subject, and he hoped M. Loucheur had been able to obtain from the Serbian Delegates the promise that they would fulfil their contract.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he was going to see that very afternoon Mr. Trumbitch as well as the Serbian Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Lascovitch. As he had informed the Council on the preceding day, he intended to propose that an interallied commission be sent which would be charged with the verification on the spot of the conditions under which the food stuffs were sent, and which would insure the satisfactory settlement of all questions concerning the performance of the contract made between Austria and the Jugo-Slav Government.

(The discussion on that question was adjourned to a later date.)

2. M. LOUCHEUR read and commented on a note of the Organization Committee on the subject (See Appendix A). He said that the difference of interpretation which had taken place in the Committee of Organization concerning the resolutions adopted by the Council on the 6th and 9th of December⁵ seemed to be of merely academic interest. As a matter of fact Germany having sent delegates to Paris with a view to signing the protocol and the latter appearing on the whole to be in a conciliatory spirit, it might be hoped that the exchange of ratifications might take place within a very few days and that the Treaty might then come into force. He did not, however, see any objection to addressing at this time a letter to the Germans telling them what it had done at its meeting of December 9th (H. D. 110). If the Council so decided the Organization Committee would immediately prepare a draft letter which would be submitted to the Council. Collection by Germany of Customs Duties in Gold Marks

It was decided:

that the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission should submit to the Council a draft letter to the German Delegation informing it of the decisions taken by the Council at its meeting of December 9 (H. D. 110) concerning the question of collection by Germany of the customs duties in gold marks.

3. M. LOUCHEUR said that the members of the Reparation Commission had held a meeting on the previous day with the naval

experts and those sent by Germany at which it had been discussed the questions relative to the reparations claimed for the Scapa Flow affair. They knew, that by the last German note Germany declared itself unable to surrender the 400,000 tons of naval material which had been claimed from her.⁶ They thought, however, that the Germans were going to propose compensations of another order. Indeed, the German note stated that “the German Government has charged a commission of experts to put these data before the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, and to give them the necessary explanations; it will formulate at the same time precise and definite proposals for a mode of reparations which, although it would mean a new and heavy burden for Germany in its present situation, would not be contrary to its vital interests”, that sentence seemed to indicate on the part of the Germans an intention to offer compensations to the Allied Powers for that part of the claimed naval material which they declared they were unable to surrender. Report of the Conference Between the Allied and German Delegates on the Subjects of Reparations Claimed by the Supreme Council for the Scapa Flow Sinking

The Germans, however, had not made any proposal of that kind. They had been satisfied with giving a list of materiel actually existing in their ports, which they estimated approximately at 700,000 tons, of which 500,000 tons were docks and the remainder dredges, tugs, etc. The figures given by the Germans did not agree with those furnished by the Allies' own experts. The difference was approximately one of 85,000 to 90,000 tons. As a matter of fact a meeting between their naval experts and those of the Germans had been held on the previous evening. The figures given by the two parties had been compared, but he did not yet know the results obtained at that meeting.

Supposing, however, that the figures as given by the Germans were correct, the Germans offered to deliver to the Allies 192,000 tons out of the 700,000 which they claimed to have. He made no difficulty in admitting that, if the Germans only possessed 700,000 tons of port material, they could not surrender 400,000 thereof. But the important point was that the Germans up to this time offered no

compensation whatsoever for the 208,000 tons which they declared they were unable to surrender.

Under these conditions a first question came up on which they needed a decision of the Supreme Council. Should their Committee limit itself to examining whether the Germans were offering them a sufficient proportion of their available port materiel. Should they, on the contrary, examine what compensations the Germans could give them? From a purely personal point of view it seemed to him that they might request the Germans that they promise to build within a time limit of from three to five years a quantity of docks corresponding to the 208,000 tons which they refused to surrender.

Contrary to their expectations, the Germans had also raised the question of the five light cruisers which, according to the provisions of the protocol,⁷ were to be delivered to the Allies. The Germans insisted on keeping those five cruisers, maintaining that their ports and coastline would remain without proper defense if those ships were taken away from them. They offered in exchange to surrender to the Allies five other cruisers actually under construction. They, however, had been unable to furnish any precise time when the building of those cruisers would be completed. The Germans were to get information from Berlin on the subject, and the experts might probably know where they stood on the following day. Before examining that question, however, it was important that the Council take a decision as to whether the Organization Committee should or should not be asked to examine what compensations the Germans could furnish for that part of the material which had been claimed and which they declared it was impossible for them to surrender.

M. LEYGUES said that before seeking for a compensation, it would be necessary first to confirm the exactness of the figures given by the Germans. The figures which had been arrived at by their experts after a conscientious and thorough search, coincided in fact with the data furnished in 1916 by a special German review, *The Germanischer Lloyd*. As they had naval experts on the spot, they might ask them to verify rapidly in the German ports the correctness of the figures which had been given them. If they found out that those figures were exact, they might look for compensation in

another direction. But the difference was too important, approaching at least 85,000 tons, for them to accept without any verification whatsoever the figures given by the Germans.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he quite realized the importance of verifying the German figures. But such an investigation might necessarily take a certain time, and it was important before all not to delay the signature of the protocol, and consequently the coming into force of the Treaty. They might proceed at once with the signature of the protocol, accepting the German figures under reserve of later verification which might be made quite rapidly. If the figures given by the Germans were found to be wrong, the Allied and Associated Powers would thus be enabled to increase their claims. He did not think that the Germans would object to such a procedure for they had informed them on the preceding day that their data were exact to within five percent. It belonged, however, to the Council to reply to the question which he had put a few minutes ago. Should the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission be charged with finding another form of compensation?

MR. WALLACE asked whether the Organization Committee could not give an opinion to the Council on the question of principle raised.

MR. LOUCHEUR said that he did not think that the Organization Committee would be in a position to do so. It was, as a matter of fact, a political question in the first place. Should the Allies maintain the point of view they had expressed to Germany in the shape of an ultimatum? From the special point of view which interested the Reparation Commission the question was a secondary one. It was indeed quite clear that they would not be able to make the Germans pay twice, and that what they would pay on the one hand they would not pay on the other.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he fully agreed with Mr. Loucheur that it was an essentially political question, and for that reason he was not in a position to take an immediate decision. He had telegraphed to his Government on the previous evening explaining the general lines of the situation as it appeared to him. They should not forget that their last note^{7a} demanded from Germany the signature of the

protocol as it stood. It was only after that signature that the Powers were to examine whether certain concessions could be made to Germany. The first question before them, therefore, was to know whether they ought to abandon the principle which they had formally laid down. It should indeed not be lost sight of that the Germans were trying to bring them round to a procedure which was just the opposite. They wished to bargain first and sign afterwards. He had also drawn the attention of the British Government to the fact that the German Government had been satisfied with offering them half of what they had demanded from it, without giving detailed explanations on that reduction.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he must admit that the Germans had handed to them a very long and rather complete memorandum on the subject. He thought, however, that it was quite certain that a complete acceptance of their demands would throw German navigation into very deep trouble, especially on account of the lack of tugs.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was whether the Organization Committee was in a position to judge on the German claims from the indications furnished by that memorandum, without having recourse to an investigation on the spot. He would add that his own experts had told him that the explanations given in the German memorandum were very vague and were confined to ideas of a very general character. He would, however, refer that question also to his Government.

M. LOUCHEUR said that in the next conversation he would have with the Germans he would ask them for more precisions and would make every effort to force them to put their cards on the table.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the third point which had attracted his attention was the remarkable discrepancy in the figures of the port material then in Germany. For example, in the list drawn up by the Allies figured two floating docks of very large dimensions at Dantzig. According to the Germans there were no docks at Dantzig. As it happened they had in Paris certain of their Allied experts who, he was assured, had seen those docks at Dantzig with their own eyes.

When the Germans told them that those docks did not exist it might well be that they simply meant that they had been sold. That would be a fact which would be easy to verify as they had people at Dantzig. An answer could be had in two or three days.

To sum up, he would say that he could not express an opinion on the procedure to be followed towards the Germans, for the reason that the question of procedure was closely allied to that of principle. Four questions were raised:

1. Could they abandon the principle they had sustained until now towards the Germans, namely that they, the Germans, should sign the protocol before any discussion, and that it would only be then that the Council would examine concessions they might eventually make?
2. Were there grounds for verifying on the spot the data furnished by the Germans?
3. Were they ready to make concessions in the amount of materiel claimed by them, and, if so, how far should those concessions go?
4. Lastly, should they look for a compensation for that part of the tonnage which the Germans said they were incapable of handing over?

On the other hand, he was very much struck by the views expressed by Mr. Loucheur on the necessity of arriving at an agreement as soon as possible so as not to delay once more the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. DE MARTINO said that there was no doubt that the *pourparlers* which were going on concealed the Germans' desire to bargain and to obtain some advantages before the signature. They certainly had great interest in preventing that little game. They should not, however, lose sight of the fact that, of all the aims they had before them, the most important of all was to reach, as quickly as possible, the coming into force of the Treaty which alone would allow the Reparation Commission to function. They should, according to him, subordinate all other considerations to that fundamental aim. The question of reparations to be exacted for the Scapa Flow incident presented itself under a double aspect; a political and a technical

one. From the technical point of view, his experts informed him that it was not impossible that certain mistakes might have been made, such as, for instance, that docks might have been counted twice. He was not competent in those matters, but it seemed to him that they should take into account a certain possibility of errors. An investigation on the spot might of course be advantageous, but such a procedure would take time and delay the coming into force of the Treaty. From a political point of view they should not hide from themselves the danger there would be in delaying the Treaty's coming into force, on account of the interior situation of Germany, which was evidently unstable. They should avoid giving the Imperialist Party, which might not perhaps be numerous but which was energetic, and troublesome, an occasion to resume its agitation against the Government.

He did not make any proposition, but wished to point out the interest there would be in putting the Treaty into force as rapidly as possible. They should, according to the expression used on the preceding day by Mr. Clemenceau, avoid giving the Germans the possibility of rebounding and of creating new difficulties for the Allies.

M. MATSUI said that they all seemed agreed on the necessity of a prompt coming into force of the Treaty. Mr. Loucheur's proposal tending to sign the protocol without delay, with the reservation of an ulterior verification of the figures furnished by the Germans, seemed to him opportune. It did not however, seem absolutely necessary to him that a decision should be arrived at on that day, and there would be no inconvenience in waiting a day or two, which would perhaps allow for certain verifications.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he was to see the German experts at three o'clock. He would then make them define the reasons for the reduction they proposed. He would, furthermore, ask them once more whether they offered any compensation whatsoever for the missing tonnage.

MR. WALLACE said that his opinion was that it would be preferable to await, before taking a decision, the instructions of their respective

governments.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had seen Mr. Clemenceau that same morning and that he had explained the situation to him. He, of course, was not qualified to speak for the President before the Council, but he thought he could give it his impression simply for their information. Mr. Clemenceau was of the opinion that a reply should be made to the last German note: 1, in order to take note of the German declaration that no difficulty would be raised on account of the absence of the American or other delegates on the Commissions; 2, to define the sense to be given to that part of the note concerning measures of coercion. He had prepared, in accord with M. Fromageot, two draft texts on the subject, which had been approved by the President of the Council and might be discussed when the whole of the reply to be made to Germany came up for examination. Mr. Fromageot had observed to him that amongst German precedents alone might be found seven or eight cases of measures of military coercion taken without a declaration of war, such as those of Haiti or Zanzibar.

On the other hand it was necessary to request the Germans to send delegates immediately to take up practical questions relative to the functioning of plebiscite and other commissions. If negotiations on the subject were not immediately opened, the coming into force of the Treaty ran the risk of being materially delayed.

He would not speak for the moment of the question of the light cruisers which would be taken up by the Minister of Marine.

On the question of substance which had been submitted by M. Loucheur, M. Clemenceau was of the opinion that the 192,000 tons offered by the Germans should be accepted, and that a compensation should be found for the lacking tonnage. On account of the necessity of arriving at a quick solution, they might immediately proceed to sign with the reservation of a later verification of the figures which had been furnished. Should those figures be found incorrect, the Allies would be entitled to claim a greater portion of the German port materiel.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether it would not be advisable to ask the Germans to send delegates at once to take up the questions relative to the practical organization of the commissions provided for by the Treaty, without awaiting the drafting of the note addressed to the Germans.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Dutasta observed that the procedure proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe would have the inconvenience of giving the Germans the impression that they were ready to yield on the question of reparations to be furnished by them for the Scapa Flow incident. It would be wiser to await the result of the next meeting with the German delegates which would take place that very afternoon. The German delegates sent from Berlin to examine the question of organization of the Commissions should have instructions to sign within 48 hours.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he would report to the Council at its next meeting the result of the interview which he would have that afternoon with the German representatives.

M. LEYGUES said that, concerning the question of the light cruisers, he wished to state that he was not of the opinion that the German proposal should be considered before the exchange of ratifications. They were not, as a matter of fact, in a position in the short time which separated them from that exchange, to appreciate the exactness of the information given by the Germans. The latter offered them, in exchange for the five cruisers which they were to surrender, five ships which were still on the ways, and they ignored the progress of their construction. As that was an important question, especially for the French Navy, he would ask to be allowed to examine it at leisure, and this would not be possible until after the signature of the protocol, for investigations would have to be made which would take from fifteen days to three weeks at the minimum.

M. BERTHELOT said that it might perhaps be possible to tell the Germans that they maintained their claims on the question of the cruisers, with the possibility of examining after the coming into force of the Treaty whether certain substitutions might prove acceptable.

M. CAMBON said that if they told the Germans that they would examine the question after the coming into force of the Treaty they would either think that the Allies intended to deceive them with a view to obtaining their signature, or consider that reply as a tacit agreement to give them satisfaction, at least in part. It therefore seemed to him that, as Mr. Leygues had objections to put forward against the Germans' claim, it would be best to reply by a pure and simple refusal which would not, however, prevent their eventually examining the question anew, should there be need to do so.

M. LEYGUES said he entirely agreed with the views of the Chairman.

M. BERTHELOT said that the ships under construction which the Germans offered to exchange for those they claimed, should be demolished under the provisions of the Treaty. Their claim was, therefore, contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty.

M. CAMBON said that the latter consideration seemed to him final and, in his opinion, should lead the Council to refuse the Germans' demand purely and simply.

MR. WALLACE said that it seemed a very reasonable conclusion to reach.

ADMIRAL GRASSI stated that before denying purely and simply the Germans' claim, it would be wise to remark that if things remained as they were Germany would find itself in the following year with five light cruisers which would be twenty years old. Under those conditions she would be entitled according to the terms of the Treaty, to rebuild new ships in place of those old units. A net loss would result in the way of labor and construction materiel. What was the need of obliging Germany to destroy war ships which she had in her ways, if she was to rebuild new ones six months later?

MR. MATSUI said that he thought it preferable to maintain their demand as it stood.

MR. WALLACE said that he wished to point out that the opinion which he had expressed was purely personal; in that question as in all

others he was not qualified to bind his Government, unless he had received explicit and precise instructions to that effect.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would observe that Mr. Polk having already signed the protocol,⁸ it did not seem that new instructions should be necessary when it was merely a question, as was the case for the question of the cruisers, of maintaining the text of that protocol.

M. LEYGUES said that as a matter of fact the Council had reached, on the question of the cruisers, a unanimous decision.⁹ The discussion which had taken place with regard to the new request of the Germans did not bear in any manner whatsoever on the principle of that decision, but merely on the forms of its execution. Under those conditions and without, of course, wishing to exercise any pressure of [on] the representative of the United States, it seemed to him that new instructions were not necessary. He would point out that this was a question which interested France primarily and which only offered for America and Great Britain interest of a secondary nature. He would, however, simply mention that the principle had been adopted unanimously by the Conference.

MR. WALLACE stated that he felt obliged to repeat that everything he might say before the Council was unofficial, except in cases where he had received explicit instructions from his Government. He hoped it would not always be necessary to repeat that all that he said here had an unofficial character.

M. CAMBON said that the question was whether they maintained prior decisions of the Conference or whether they accepted the new request formulated by the Germans with regard to the cruisers. It seemed to him that instructions would only be necessary in the second case. If another procedure were adopted by the Council the Germans would have it in their hands to suspend the execution of the Treaty by making new requests. He personally would be of the opinion that they maintain the text already arrived at and that they should answer the Germans by a pure and simple refusal.

M. LEYGUES said that the question was quite different for the cruisers and for the docks and port materiel.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that was not quite certain. They had made a proposal to the Germans. The Germans now made a counter-proposal. It was for them to examine it and to decide whether they would strictly adhere to the text of the protocol, or whether they would envisage certain modifications on that point.

M. CAMBON said that to consent to changes on that question would be to open the door to a whole series of German claims.

M. LEYGUES said that the Council had decided to demand from the Germans five cruisers which had been designated by name. The Germans now asked to keep those ships and offered in exchange warships which were still under way. The Germans did not therefore contest the principle of their demand; they only discussed the forms thereof. But as they lacked precisions on the progress of construction of those ships, it would be better for them to stand by their former demand which would also offer the advantage of not risking, by starting a new discussion, to delay the date of the signature of the protocol and the coming into force of the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they were evidently entitled to maintain the original text of the protocol, and, as far as he was concerned, he did not see any objection thereto.

It was decided:

to maintain, with regard to the question of the five light cruisers to be delivered by Germany, the text of the protocol such as it had been fixed on November 1, by the Supreme Council.

(The discussion was adjourned to a later date).

4. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Drafting Committee was engaged upon two questions for which a solution was necessary in view of the final preparation of the Treaty with Hungary. Right of Priority Claimed by Serbia for Reparations

The first concerned the request of Serbia to obtain a right of priority on reparations to be furnished by Hungary and Austria. The Serbian request had been referred to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission. The latter, however, had not yet communicated its views on the subject.

M. DE SAINT-QUENTIN said that the delay came from a confusion which had taken place between the former reparations commission and the Commission presided over by M. Loucheur. The misunderstanding, however, had now been cleared up and the Organization Committee was to furnish a report on the question the following day.

5. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the second question was whether Article 232, Paragraph A, of the draft Treaty with Hungary, protected sufficiently the nationals of Allied and Associated Powers who held bank notes issued by the Bela Kun Government. It would be advisable to have the Financial Commission examine whether a special clause should not be inserted in the treaty with Hungary so as to insure the protection of their nationals who possessed such bank notes. Protection of Allied and Associated Nationals, Bearers of Bank Notes Issued by the Bolshevist Government of Hungary

It was decided:

to refer back to the Financial Commission the question of whether in the draft treaty with Hungary a supplementary clause should not be added to the appendix concerning reparations, in order to insure the efficacious protection of the interests of nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, bearers of bank notes issued by the Bolshevist Government of Hungary.

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix "A" to HD-112

DECEMBER 15, 1919.

*Note From the Organisation Committee of the Reparation
Commission on the Payment of German Customs Duties in Gold*

From: Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.

To: The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.

1. The attention of the Supreme Council is drawn to the following fact:

According to the British and American delegates, the text proposed and adopted by the Supreme Council in its meeting of December 9,^{[10](#)} included the suppression of the third paragraph of the Supreme Council's resolution of December 6^{[11](#)} on the same subject;—in other words the letter informing it of this decision should be sent to Germany immediately without waiting for the signature of the Protocol^{[12](#)} and the coming into force of the Treaty.

According to the Belgian, French and Italian delegates, the proposed text was, on the contrary, subject to the reservation of the third paragraph of the above mentioned decision of December 6th.

The three delegates, American, British and Italian, agreed on the following resolution:

They advise the Supreme Council that in their opinion, in the interest of Reparations, No. 3 of the decision of December 6th should be modified and the proposition adopted by the Committee should immediately be communicated to Germany.

If the letter is not sent before the ratification of the Treaty, then, in the opinion of the British and the American Delegations, it should not be sent in its present form.

Placing themselves on the standpoint of "Reparations", the French and Belgian Delegates were of the opinion that the payment of customs duties on a gold basis should be authorized.

But, from the same point of view, and in the superior interest of Reparations, those two delegates were also of the opinion that all measures for exerting pressure which may bring about the rapid ratification of the Treaty, should be maintained, and, consequently the annulment of No. 3 of the Resolution of the Supreme Council of December 6th, should not be requested.

By the order of the Committee,
The Interallied Secretary,
Signature (Illegible)

RESOLUTION: (H. D. 108, December 6, 1919, 108–A)

It was decided:

- (1) to refer back to the Committee on Organization of the Reparations Commission in accord with economic experts both the question of payment of German customs duties on a gold mark basis and the import prohibition by Germany.
- (2) that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission submit immediately a report to the Council.
- (3) that no reply be given to Germany until she had signed the protocol and the Treaty of Peace had come into force.

RESOLUTION (H. D. 110, December [9], 1919).

[MINUTE] VIII. PERCEPTION [COLLECTION] BY GERMANY OF CUSTOMS
DUTIES IN GOLD MARKS

It was decided, under the reservation of Mr. Matsui's acceptance:

1. that Germany be immediately authorized to majorate the amount of specified pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a measure as the Reparations Commission should deem it to be a just equivalent of the depreciation of German currency.
2. that the necessary negotiations with various Powers on the question of import prohibitions into Germany, as well as on the question of exports, should be opened or continued;
3. that if such negotiations had not come within a period of three months to a conclusion which should be deemed satisfactory by

the said Powers, the question should be entirely examined anew.

¹ HD-111, minute 5, p. 562 [*Pg. 562 is part of [Doc. 27](#)*].

² Appendix E to HD-97, p. 253 [*Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 13](#)*].

³ HD-111, minute 2, p. 559 [*Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 27](#)*].

⁴ HD-97, minute 4, p. 239 [*Pg. 239 is part of [Doc. 13](#)*].

⁵ HD-108, minute 2, p. 505 [*Pg. 505 is part of [Doc. 24](#)*]; HD-110, minute 8, p. 545 [*Pg. 545 is part of [Doc. 26](#)*].

⁶ Appendix A to HD-111, p. 567 [*Pg. 567 is part of [Doc. 27](#)*].

⁷ Appendix C to HD-30, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

^{7a} General note dated December 8, 1919; text not found in Department files.

⁸ The protocol had not been signed. See HD-114, minute 2, p. 611 [*Pg. 611 is part of [Doc. 30](#)*].

⁹ HD-80, minute 3, and appendix C, [vol. VIII, pp. 847](#)  and [865](#) ; HD-81, minute 4, and appendix D, [ibid., pp. 878](#)  and [905](#) .

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 592 [*Pg. 592 is part of [Doc. 28](#)*].

¹¹ *Post*, p. 592 [*Pg. 592 is part of [Doc. 28](#)*].

¹² Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

December 18, 10:30 a.m. (HD-113)

[29] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Thursday, December 18, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 18, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/113

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/113

HD-113

[Document 29]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Thursday, December 18, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 18, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace.

Secretariat
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE
M. Cambon.

Secretaries
Mr. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint Quentin.

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretariat
M. Trombetti.

JAPAN
M. Matsui.

Secretariat
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Captain Winthrop.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain Lothian Small.
FRANCE	M. Massigli.
ITALY	M. Zanchi.
<i>Interpreter</i> —M. Mantoux	

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. Rathbone,
Capt. Madison, U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. Leeper,
Mr. Carr,
Lt. Col. Kisch,
Capt. Fuller, R. N.,
Cdt. MacDonald, R. N.,
Sir John Bradbury.

FRANCE
M. Leygues,
M. Loucheur,
Marshal Foch,
Gen. Weygand,
Gen. Le Rond,
M. Laroche,
C. Amiral Levavasseur,
M. Hermite,
M. de Montille.

ITALY
M. Bertolini,
C. Amiral Grassi,
M. Stranieri,
Cdt. Fea.

The Council had before it a note from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated December 14, 1919. (See Appendix A).

MARSHAL FOCH summarized and commented upon the note of December 14th. 1. Situation in the Baltic Provinces

He added that it seemed difficult to disarm completely the anti-Bolshevist force represented by what was left of the Yudenitch Army. If the Esthonian Government, provisionally at least, did not wish to confer with the Bolsheviks, it should utilize that force. But the possibility of utilizing it later and of agreement between Esthonia and Yudenitch presented a series of local questions which were difficult to judge from that distance. It was for that reason that he proposed to send General Niessel to examine on the spot whether it would be possible to arrange for an agreement between General Yudenitch and the Esthonians.

MR. WALLACE said that he could not give any opinion before he had received instructions from his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the Council remembered that when the instructions for General Niessel had been drafted, the British Government had clearly indicated that Russian questions of a political nature would not be in the province of the mission.¹ He was still bound by that reservation, all the more so as the situation in the Baltic provinces was more obscure, and he did not know what were the intentions of his Government. Under those circumstances he could not then agree to give General Niessel an interallied mission of a political character. That would be contrary to the principle which they had previously adopted. General Niessel, however, was a French officer, and he could not object in any way to his being sent to Esthonia in that capacity.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he did not conceal the fact that he was indeed raising a new question, also that the mission under discussion was entirely independent of that which had been previously entrusted to the General. But he wished to call the attention of the Conference to the fact that, if the Allied and Associated Powers wished to act, there was not a moment to lose. If they delayed any longer, it would mean the complete dissolution of the Yudenitch Army and the development of a new center of anarchy. He also felt convinced that an interallied mission could alone have a chance to

succeed: General Niessel could only be sent there in that quality. He repeated that there were in Esthonia remnants of forces which could still be utilized in the pursuit of a policy; but it was quite true that they should first decide upon that policy. They should especially foresee that the Esthonian Government, before listening to their advice, would begin by asking them to recognize it. At any rate, and if they did not wish to be faced once more by ruin, it was important to define their policy without delay.

M. CAMBON asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe could not telegraph his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would do so; at the moment he did not know how far the decisions which had been taken in London might have modified the situation.

M. DE MARTINO said that he gathered, from all that had been said by Marshal Foch, first, that it was urgent to take certain measures, and on the other hand, that the mission which he proposed to have sent, should have an interallied character. He could not give a final opinion before knowing that of his colleagues; but he approved in principle the proposal which was submitted. He would like to take advantage of this occasion to ask the Marshal what was the exact situation of the Yudenitch Army at the present time.

GENERAL WEYGAND said it was difficult to give exact figures: one might say approximately that the Army was made up of from 20,000 to 30,000 men, a part of which had been treated by the Esthonians as civilian refugees who were now dispersed, while there still remained under arms from 5,000 to 15,000 men. A telegram addressed to Marshal Foch by their representative with that army, depicted the situation as being very critical. The French officer telegraphed on the 16th of December that the Yudenitch army could still fight for seven days against the Bolsheviks, but that, if, after that period relations between it and the Esthonian Government had not improved, it meant a conflict with Esthonia. They already had been informed that Russian officers had been murdered at Narva.

MR. MATSUI said that if the other Powers were agreed to send an interallied mission, he would not be opposed to it. He would, however, remark that the Japanese officer who belonged to the Niessel mission was on the point of receiving another appointment; it would therefore be impossible for him to accompany the mission if it were sent into Esthonia.

MR. CAMBON said that they could apparently not think of taking any decision if they did not know the opinion of the British Government. He would urge Sir Eyre Crowe to make every effort to obtain a reply in as short a time as possible, and he hoped it would be a favorable one.

(The rest of the discussion was adjourned).

The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation (See Appendix B.)

MR. LAROCHE read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation, and added that the frontier adopted on August 1st by the Supreme Council practically gave the whole of Bukovina to the Roumanians, as it only excluded from Roumanian territory a narrow strip which was crossed by the railway connecting two Galician towns.² It was true, however, that the Roumanians were making unofficial efforts to have the original administrative frontier maintained as it stood. Now that the Roumanians had signed the Treaties of St. Germain and Neuilly it seemed opportune to notify them the decision taken on August 1st, the more so as the proposed frontier already figured in the treaty relative to Eastern Galicia.³ 2. Notification to Roumania and Poland of the Frontier Between Roumania and Eastern Galicia in Bukovina

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not object to that proposal in principle; he wished, however, to know what exactly, at that time, their relations with Roumania were; what treaties General Coanda had signed, and whether a reply to their ultimatum⁴ had been received.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that the Roumanian Delegation had signed the Minorities Treaty, had agreed to the Austrian Treaty and the Financial Arrangements, as well as to the Bulgarian Treaty. Roumania was, therefore, so far as her signature was concerned, on the same footing at that time as the other Allies. But so far as he knew, no reply had been made to the other questions raised in the note of the Supreme Council.

MR. LAROCHE said there was no doubt that Roumania was in the throes of an internal crisis; the cabinet crisis was not, properly speaking, at an end. He was, however, of the opinion that the Council should not confuse Hungarian affairs with the question of Bukovina. One of the interested parties already knew the line of the new frontier; they ought to finish that question. It was quite true that Roumania had not yet entirely acceded to their demands, but on the other hand, her claims had not received entire satisfaction in Bukovina.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was of the same opinion, and he thought they should strengthen the government of Mr. Vaida Voevod. On the other hand, he would urge that they insist upon a reply to their ultimatum from Roumania, and also that she conform to the injunctions she had received from the Supreme Council concerning the Hungarian affairs, further, that question could not be separated from that of the blockade of Roumania. They had already decided upon certain restrictive measures in regard to trade with that country.⁵ His Government considered that it would be well to suppress these measures: they were troublesome and served no purpose, for, according to information in their hands, goods were passing pretty freely across the land frontier, and maritime trade alone was held up. They did not think, however, notwithstanding the drawbacks for them of such a blockade, that it would be possible to suppress it entirely as long as the Government at Bucharest had not replied definitely to their demands. It would be necessary, he thought, to let the Roumanian Government know under the existing circumstances that the blockade could not be raised so long as it had not itself replied.

MR. CAMBON said that they might take a decision concerning the frontier of Bukovina, and ask Mr. Berthelot at the same time to use his influence with the Roumanian Delegation in order to hasten its reply.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that they should tell the Roumanians that they were ready to raise the blockade, but that Roumania must first accept the demands which had been formulated by the Council.

MR. DE MARTINO said that he approved the two decisions which were then proposed.

It was decided:

- (1) that the line of the Roumanian frontier in Bukovina, already approved by the Supreme Council on August 1st, should be notified to the Roumanian and Polish Delegations;
- (2) that the Roumanian Government should be requested to reply in as short a time as possible to the last note of the Supreme Council, and that it should at the same time be informed that, failing a satisfactory reply to the said note, it was impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to raise the blockade measures which had been taken toward Roumania on August 25, 1919.

The Council had before it a telegram from Colonel Haskell, dated December 1, 1919, transmitted by the American Delegation. (See Appendix C).

MR. CAMBON asked whether the American Delegation supported Colonel Haskell's proposal. 3. Line of Demarcation Between the Government of General Denikin and the States of the Caucasus

MR. WALLACE replied that it did not, but was contented with transmitting it; Colonel Haskell, he would add, had acted in this matter as an Interallied representative.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he feared that if Colonel Haskell's proposal were adopted, it would create serious difficulties. The zone assigned to General Denikin had been fixed a long time ago: he thought that if the line then fixed were changed, they would be

raising a wasp's nest. The present situation was very confused; they had no authority over General Denikin. How could they tell him that he must retire beyond a new line which would be fixed by them? If he refused to obey, how could the Council enforce its decisions? The whole problem of the Caucasus was involved, and, of that they knew very little and exercised over it no control. His opinion was very clear: they should leave things as they were; though of course, he was quite ready to draw the attention of his Government to that proposal.

MR. DE MARTINO said that the Haskell proposal had made an extremely favorable impression on him. It was calculated to protect from troubles and disorders of all kinds a region most important for them, economically speaking. They knew what guerilla warfare meant as practiced in those countries, and what ruins it accumulated. It would be to the advantage of those territories to fix a limit to the advance of the Denikin Army. Sir Eyre Crowe thought that a decision in that question was of considerable political importance; he agreed, but asked whether it would not be possible to say that the fixing of the new line of demarcation would not prejudice the final settlement of the problem.

MR. MATSUI said that he was not informed on the subject; he was, however, very much struck by Sir Eyre Crowe's argument.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in his opinion the difficulties were greater than Mr. de Martino seemed to think. General Denikin actually occupied the territories in question; they would therefore have to drive him out.

MR. STRANIERI said that, according to information in their hands, Denikin had occupied the northern slopes of the Caucasus, "The Republic of the Mountaineers", but had not occupied the Daghestan.

MR. CAMBON said that it seemed to him very difficult to take a decision in such a state of uncertainty.

MR. DE MARTINO admitted that they should first make out exactly what the situation was, and that the examination of the question might be then taken up.

MR. CAMBON said they would therefore adjourn the discussion until such time as they should have more complete information.

(The discussion was then adjourned).

The Council had before it a note of the British Delegation, dated December 17, 1919, relative to the repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war held by the Allies. (See Appendix D).

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council had before it the note of the British Delegation. The repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war did not seem to offer great difficulties. The only question was to find how they should arrange for the repatriation of prisoners of war belonging to territories, formerly Bulgarian, but now outside the frontiers of Bulgaria; they proposed to give those prisoners the option of deciding upon being sent back to Bulgaria or to their country of origin. 4. Repatriation of Bulgarian Prisoners of War

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

- (1) that there was no objection to the repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war;
- (2) that such prisoners of war belonging to territories formerly Bulgarian and now situated outside the frontiers of Bulgaria, should have the option of declaring whether they preferred to be sent back to Bulgaria or to their country of origin.

MR. MATSUI said that he was happy to inform the Council that he was authorized by his Government to withdraw the reservation which he had formulated on December 9th, concerning the distribution of enemy submarines.⁶ 5. Distribution of Enemy Submarines

The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation on the conditions under which the German warships should be delivered to the Allies. (See Appendix E).

MR. LEYGUES read and commented upon the note of the French Government. 6. Conditions Under Which the German Warships Should Be Delivered

MR. WALLACE stated that he could not give any opinion on the matter without the instructions of his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if he understood the French proposal correctly, it meant requesting the Germans to surrender into the same ports as the warships, the armament materiel instead of destroying it.

MR. LEYGUES agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE feared that such a proposal would raise difficulties for it seemed to him that it was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty, a modification of the Treaty would be necessary, for which they would have to obtain the approval of all the signatory Powers. The same difficulty, however, did not exist for the five light cruisers whose surrender was demanded in the protocol of November 1:⁷ it was not impossible, as a matter of fact, to modify the protocol which had not yet been signed.

ADMIRAL GRASSI said that he shared the opinion just expressed by Mr. Leygues. It was not a question of modifying the Treaty, but only of interpreting Article 192. That article stipulated as follows:

“The warships in commission of the German fleet must have on board or in reserve only the allowance of arms, munitions and war material fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

The allowances of materiel in excess were to be surrendered to the Governments of such Powers at the places to be indicated by them. In that way, the surrender would take place in two periods: first the ships would be surrendered, then the materiel disembarked from them. Article 192 did not evidently apply to the materiel of warships which were to be, or which already had been, surrendered to the

Allies. It only applied to the materiel of warships which remained German.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Article 185 was however explicit: it stipulated that the ships which were to be surrendered to the Allies should be surrendered in a state of disarmament. Article 192, on the other hand, declared that the materiel remaining in Germany would be destroyed. He proposed that the question be referred back to the legal experts for examination.

MR. LEYGUES said that two cases should be distinguished: first, that of warships whose surrender was provided for in the protocol of November 1st. It was natural that the materiel belonging to those ships should be surrendered at the same time as the ships themselves. The second case was that of warships whose surrender was provided for in the Treaty of Peace. He admitted that there was a question of interpretation of the Treaty; which might be submitted to the legal experts.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they should, however, observe, concerning the first point, that they had communicated to the Germans a draft protocol and that they would be proposing its modification. Would the Germans accept that modification? The Council should envisage the possibility of a refusal.

MR. LEYGUES said that they did not ask for any modification of the protocol. They insisted, on the contrary, that it be signed as it stood. The protocol did not in any place state that they would not receive the armament materiel of the warships whose surrender they demanded.

MR. CAMBON said that the first question was, therefore, solved as Mr. Leygues had requested; the second was referred back to the legal experts for examination.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Interallied Naval Commission of Control should take the steps necessary in order that the materiel, belonging to the five

light cruisers to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers under the provisions of the draft protocol of November 1st, should not be destroyed, but surrendered in the same places as the ships from which such materiel had been disembarked;

- (2) that the Drafting Committee be requested to examine whether, under the terms of Articles 185 and 192 of the Treaty of Versailles, the materiel disembarked from the warships referred to in Article 185, in execution of the clauses of the Armistice, should be necessarily destroyed after it had been surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. LOUCHEUR said that they had met the German delegates on the preceding afternoon. It had been impossible to reach an agreement on the tonnage of the docks then in Germany. The Germans continued to insist with the greatest energy that there did not exist at Dantzig docks of 50,000 tons, and that the dock of 80,000 tons which figures on the Allied list was really a second entry of two docks—one of 43,000 tons and one of 37,000 tons, both of which also figured therein. They had therefore reserved the right of verifying those figures and the German delegates had agreed. There remained, therefore, a difference of 85,000 tons between their figures and those of the German delegation. Before submitting the rest of the discussion, he wished to state that if the Reparation Commission had been consulted at the time the protocol had been drafted, certain of its members would have been opposed to demanding from Germany a compensation for the Scapa Flow incident which would reduce its capacity of payment. They had asked the German delegates whether, outside of the 192,000 tons which they were ready to grant, they had some compensation to offer. After much hesitation they had declared that they could offer 50,000 tons of new docks to be built within a period of one and one-half years. They had taken note of that proposal, and the German delegation had withdrawn.

7. Report of the Conference Between the Allied and German Delegates Concerning the Reparation Demanded for the Scapa Flow Affair

He had then put the following questions to his colleagues:

- (1) Did they consider as sufficient, for the time being, the immediate surrender of 192,000 tons, taking into account the economic

situation in Germany?

- (2) In the affirmative, were they of the opinion that it was advisable, notwithstanding, to demand a supplementary compensation to be furnished later?

The American delegate had answered the first question in the affirmative. He considered that the second raised a political problem, upon which he had no opinion to express. From the point of view of reparations he considered it was not advisable to make other demands of Germany.

The British Naval delegate had repeated the reservation made that morning by Sir Eyre Crowe. He was not convinced by the German explanations. As for Sir John Bradbury, the British representative on the Reparation Commission, he reserved his opinion: he considered especially that the Germans might compensate the loss of their floating docks by using for their merchant fleet the dry-docks of their naval arsenals. He thought that the question of reparations was for the Supreme Council to decide.

The Italian delegate had replied in the affirmative to the first point; and considered on the other hand, as Mr. Loucheur did, that it would be advisable to request the Germans to build 80,000 tons of new docks for the Allies.

The Japanese delegate deemed insufficient the German proposals. In his opinion, a compensation was necessary.

The Belgian delegate had adopted the opinion of the French delegate. From the standpoint of reparations, he believed that they should ask Germany as little as possible in the way of supplementary compensation.

The French delegates were divided; the naval representative had maintained that it would be wise to claim 400 [400,000] tons. He, personally, was of the opinion that they could be satisfied with the immediate surrender of 192,000 tons, but from the political point of view, a compensation was necessary. If the German figures were correct, their original demands should naturally be reduced from

400,000 to 315,000 tons. The deficit was therefore reduced to 123,000 tons. He observed that the Germans would be furnishing them with new docks, built according to their indications and specifications, which had a certain advantage. Fifty thousand tons was an insufficient figure, but 80,000 tons of new docks might be considered as the equivalent of 120,000 tons of used docks. He therefore concluded that they should accept the German proposal and that they should ask, in the way of supplementary compensation, for the building of 80,000 tons of new docks.

They should, at any rate, not lose sight of two different considerations: they should remember that from the political point of view, they had decided upon a definite figure, and they could not, under penalty of losing prestige in the opinion of the world, renounce purely and simply their demands. But at the same time they should not forget that they had the greatest interest not to weaken the Germans' capacity for payment and if they wished to receive something they should raise that capacity to its maximum.

MR. LEYGUES said that a misunderstanding existed between the Naval experts and the members of the Reparation Commission which it was important to clear up. They had asked Germany for 400,000 tons of docks on account of the scuttling at Scapa Flow of 430,000 tons out of 510,000 tons which were there interned. Thus had disappeared the pawn which the Allies had in their hands. It was in the way of a reparation and of a penalty that the Council had decided on October 24th [30th] to demand the surrender of port materiel.⁸ When the protocol of November 1st had been drawn up, that materiel had been estimated at 400,000 tons. There was a decision of the Conference, which should be carried out. It would be serious to give way, for the moral question was as important as the material one: if they yielded, Germany would be encouraged in starting once more. They should beware: and they had good reasons for doing so. The Allies themselves were acting in good faith; they would reduce their demands if it were proved that they were exaggerated. It would be a mistake to make a concession right away. They would be the first to yield if they had proof that their claims could not be satisfied without paralyzing the economic life of Germany and endangering her capacity for payment; but he pointed

out that Germany possessed a great many dry-docks in her naval ports; and as she had no more warships she might therefore employ those dry-docks in the repair of her commercial fleet. As a matter of fact, under the provisions of the Treaty, she did not possess ships of over 1600 tons. They should therefore decide that the terms of the protocol be maintained, with the reservation that if, at a later time, it was proved that they had committed an error in their figures, such an error would be taken into account.

MR. LOUCHEUR said it was clear that no one thought of accepting with closed eyes the figures furnished by the Germans. He should, however, add that he did not share Mr. Leygues opinion. He could not approve of a policy which consisted in imposing penalties which militated against their reparations in money.

SIR EYRE CROWE believed that, as they must all reserve the opinion of their Governments, the discussion might well be adjourned. Meanwhile, however, what would happen to the conversations with the Germans? He admitted he was in no wise convinced by the German arguments. A telegram he had before him affirmed that four weeks ago there was at Dantzig a dock of 40,000 tons if not of 50,000. Somebody was therefore lying.

MR. LOUCHEUR replied that the German delegates had categorically told them on the preceding day that there did not exist large docks at Dantzig. They had asked them whether those docks had not been sold. The Germans had replied that all sold docks figured on the lists furnished to the Allies.

MR. CAMBON said that before the discussion was resumed by the Council, it would be wise for each Government to investigate the veracity of the documents furnished by the Germans.

MR. LEYGUES said that the Armistice Commission had already been asked to shed light upon the question of the Dantzig docks.

MR. LOUCHEUR said that under those conditions all conversations between the Germans and themselves would actually be useless. The negotiations could only be resumed when they knew the opinion of

the various Governments, and when the information asked of the Armistice Commission had been received.

(The discussion was then adjourned).

(The meeting adjourned.)

Appendix A to HD-113

A. G. H. Q., December 14, 1919.

*Note From Marshal Foch to the Supreme Council on the Evacuation
of the Baltic Provinces*

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,
General Staff
3rd Section

No. 5680

From information sent by General Niessel inclusive of December 11th, it appears that the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops may be considered as almost completed.

At this date there were, in the Baltic States, only light contingents marching towards the German frontier and at about a day's march from this frontier, as follows:

5,000 men of the German Legion marching towards Tilsitt,
6,000 men of the Iron Division marching towards Memel.

All were to have crossed the boundary by December 13th according to the agreements made by General Eberhardt.

The German Delegation to the Baltic Commission has, besides, asserted that all the German detachments or isolated men remaining in Latvia or Lithuania after this date would be considered as outlaws and thereby abandoned to the Letts and the Lithuanians.

Once the evacuation is over, it remains for General Niessel to:

Make the Germans deliver, according to the decision of the Supreme Council, the rolling stock necessary for the functioning of the Latvian and Lithuanian railroads.^{[9](#)}

Make sure that the Germans have strictly observed their agreements regarding the surrender of war material to Lithuania, as ransom for their free passage.

As for the penalties to be taken and the reparations due on account of exactions of the German troops in occupied territory, it has been telegraphed to General Niessel that he was not empowered to negotiate in regard to them without special instructions from the Supreme Council.

It may therefore be considered that General Niessel's mission is almost completed, as far as the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces is concerned.

II.

The Baltic Provinces thus being freed from German oppression, it is in the Entente's interest to maintain the solid rampart which they formed against Bolshevism.

From this standpoint, it is urgent to settle, as soon as possible, the disagreement between Youdenitch's Army and the Esthonian Government, a disagreement which seriously compromises the military situation on the North Eastern front and which the Bolsheviks are cleverly taking advantage of by vigorous offensive actions.

Now the steps taken by the Allied Representatives, either on their own initiative or according to the decision of the Supreme Council of December 3 [1],^{[10](#)} to obtain from the Esthonian Government the measures necessary for the upkeep of Youdenitch's army, as an organized Russian force, have not been successful.

The Esthonian Government, so far, has given only dilatory replies; it has continually delayed the date of its reply to the communication from the Supreme Council.

Detachments of the North Western Army penetrating on Esthonian territory therefore continue to be disarmed, dispersed, and the irremediable disintegration of this army will soon be completed.

The time seems therefore to have come to act in a more efficacious manner; to act, to try to find and to establish, between the Esthonian Government and Youdenitch's Army, a community of views and means which are indispensable for the continuation of their joint action against Bolshevism.

But the Allied and Associated Governments will not be able to carry out such an understanding, practically, except by the intermediary of a qualified representative, who can judge the situation on the spot, who can bring about the necessary "rapprochements", and, equipped with powers which will enable him to negotiate directly with the Esthonian Government and General Youdenitch according to the general sense of the instructions already sent by the Supreme Council.

General Niessel, whose qualities of force and decision have asserted themselves in the settling of a delicate question, will soon be in a position to fulfill this new mission.

Appendix B to HD-113

[Note From the French Delegation to the Supreme Council]

FRENCH DELEGATION

By a note dated July 30, 1919,^{[11](#)} the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs proposed, regarding the Roumanian frontier in Bukovina, the following line:

“A line leaving the thalweg of the Dniester to a point about 2 kilometers below Zaleszczyki.

“Thence South West to a point where the administrative boundary between Galicia and Bukovina joins the boundary between the districts of Horodenka and Sniatyn, at about 11 kilometers South East of Horodenka:

“A line to be determined on the ground, passing by the hills 317, 312 and 239.

“Thence, towards the South West, the old administrative boundary between Galicia and Bukovina to the point where it joins the former frontier between Hungary and Galicia.”

By a resolution of August 1st, the Supreme Council approved the proposal of the Commission, “on condition that Roumania proves her good will in regard to the Allies with respect to the signature of the Peace Treaty and the settlement of various other questions of interest to it.”^{[12](#)}

The condition set by the Supreme Council having been fulfilled, the French delegation has the honor to ask that the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference be invited to inform the Roumanian and Polish Delegations of the frontier described above which interests Roumania and Eastern Galicia.

Appendix C to HD–113

Telegram Received From Colonel Haskell, December 1, 1919

“An Agreement has been signed between the Armenians and Tartars by Premiers Khatissian (Armenia) and Ussobbokoff (Azerbaijan).

“The Agreement provides:

- “(1) The Governments pledge themselves to stop the present hostilities and not to resort again to force of arms.
- “(2) They agree to open roads into Zangazour to peaceful traffic.
- “(3) All controversies, including borders, are to be settled by peaceful agreement, or, failing this, are to be left to a

neutral party as arbitrator, said party to be the High Commissioner.

“(4) An International Conference was called to discuss all questions causing dispute or friction, the delegates being given full authority to settle same by agreement or arbitration.

“(5) Agreements effective as of dates on which they are signed.

“In view of above developments believe peace can be kept in the Caucasus if the menace of military operations against Transcaucasia by volunteer army is removed.

“Denikin has recalled his Missions from both Georgia and Azerbaidjan. The possibility of his attacking Azerbaidjan through Daghestan virtually forces Azerbaidjan to seek Turkish aid. It is recommended, if it is believed advisable, after considering this matter from other standpoints, that the Peace Conference define the boundaries of Denikin’s activities with reference to the Caucasus, at least until the final decision of the Caucasus question is reached. The limits recommended to such activities should follow those previously described by the British, namely: from the Caspian Sea five miles south of Petrovsk, west to the border of Daghestan, thence following the boundaries of the former Russian Governments Terek and Rouban and Mekadir River to the Black Sea at Gagri Gateologate.”

HASKELL

Appendix D to HD-113

DECEMBER 17, 1919.

Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

REPATRIATION OF BULGARIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN ALLIED HANDS

In the opinion of the British War Office there is no longer any objection from a military point of view to the repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war in Allied hands provided that the

necessary means of transport are available. The following are the numbers of Bulgarian prisoners of war in British hands:

Egypt	86
Malta	22
Salonica	1, 823
Canada	11
Australia	6
Total	1, 948

A further question which arises in this connection is that of the repatriation of prisoners belonging to territories formerly Bulgarian but now outside the frontiers of Bulgaria as fixed by the Treaty of Peace.

Appendix E to HD–113

DECEMBER 13, 1919.

Memorandum From the General Secretariat on the Conditions Under Which the German Warships Must Be Delivered to the Allies

1. Article 185 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany prescribes that within a delay of two months, from the coming into force of the Treaty, 8 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 42 destroyers and 50 torpedo boats shall be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Allied ports to be indicated by the said Powers.

These warships shall be disarmed as prescribed in Article XXIII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918,^{[13](#)} and they must have all their guns on board.

2. The Interallied Naval Commission determined, December 4, 1918, the conditions of disarming to be the following:

All the essential parts of the artillery and the “appareils de reglage de tir”, munitions and explosives, war material and spare parts, torpedoes, wireless apparatus, etc., shall be landed.

3. The above measures, taken with regard to the warships brought to Scapa Flow and to those remaining in German ports, were measures of precaution.

They have been maintained in regard to the warships figuring in Article 185 of the Treaty, and in regard to the 5 light cruisers which are to be surrendered according to the Protocol of November 1, 1919,^{13a} because these ships are to be brought to Allied ports by German crews.

4. In order to leave Germany only the material and munitions necessary for arming the number of battleships determined by the Treaty, Article 192 prescribes that all the material in excess of these quantities shall be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and is to be broken up or rendered useless.

In this material, therefore, might be included that taken off the ships as measures of precaution and now deposited in the arsenals. Such a measure is inexplicable, granted the decisions taken recently by the Supreme Council on November 28th and 29th authorizing each Power to dispose as it sees fit of the material and ships which it is to break up.¹⁴

Still less justifiable is this measure in regard to the light cruisers and destroyers allotted to France and Italy which they may incorporate in their fleets. If deprived of the material described above, these ships are useless from a military point of view.

5. For this reason it is proposed:

- a) that the material landed from the ships surrendered or to be surrendered by Germany be delivered in the same place as the ships from which it was taken:
- b) that this material be selected at the request of the interested Powers, by the Interallied Naval Commission of Control:
- c) that only such arms, munitions and war material as remain within the hands of the German Government, in excess, after delivery of the material indicated under “a” and “b” be broken up or rendered useless.

¹ HD–84, minute 4, and appendix D, [vol. VIII, pp. 955](#) and [961](#).

² HD–21, minute 9, [vol. VII, p. 455](#).

³ Appendix F to HD–97, p. 271 [*Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 13*].

⁴ Appendix A to HD–93, p. 182 [*Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 9*].

⁵ HD–38, minute 3, [vol. VII, p. 836](#).

⁶ HD–110, minute 1, p. 535 [*Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 26*].

⁷ Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#).

⁸ See HD–79, minute 2, [vol. VIII, p. 834](#); see also HD–81, minute 4, [ibid., p. 878](#).

⁹ HD–83, minute 5, [vol. VIII, p. 944](#).

¹⁰ HD–103, minute 3, p. 389 [*Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 19*].

¹¹ Appendix I to HD–21, [vol. VII, p. 474](#).

¹² HD–21, minute 9, [vol. VII, p. 455](#).

¹³ [Vol. II, p. 1](#).

^{13a} Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#).

¹⁴ HD–101, minute 1, p. 345 [*Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 17*]; HD–102, minute 1, p. 360 [*Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 18*].

December 20, 3 p.m. (HD–114)

[30] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held at M. Pichon's Room, Saturday, December 20, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, December 20, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/114

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/114

HD-114

[Document 30]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held at M. Pichon's Room,
Saturday, December 20, 1919, at 3 p.m.**

Paris, December 20, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretariat
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretariat
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretariat
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretariat
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretariat
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Lothian
Small

FRANCE

M. Massigli

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
M. Rathbone

GREAT BRITAIN
Capt. Fuller
Cdt. MacNamara
M. Malkin

FRANCE
M. Leygues
Admiral Levavasseur
M. Fromageot
M. Cheysson
M. Laroche
M. de Montille
M. Escoffier

ITALY
M. Ricci-Busatti
C. Admiral Grassi
Cdt. Fea
M. Bianchi

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka
Cdt. Osumi

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, with regard to the Scapa Flow question, he had not yet received general instructions from his Government. In fact, he had only received instructions on two special points: 1, they were ready to repatriate prisoners from Scapa Flow as soon as the

Germans had signed the protocol;¹ 2, on the other hand, his Government was opposed to any modification whatsoever of the protocol with regard to the surrender of the five light cruisers. To agree to the German claim would, as a matter of fact, be contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty, and they were of opinion that no modification could be made to the Treaty without the assent of all the signatory Powers, a course which obviously would carry them too far. He was still waiting, as he had already mentioned, for the instructions of his Government regarding the other questions. They had, on the other hand, received a note from the French Delegation on the question of the five light cruisers, which they had not yet had time to examine, but which would entail a modification of the protocol.

1. Compensation Claimed by the Supreme Council From the German Government for the Scapa Flow Affair

MR. LEYGUES said that the French Delegation had indeed envisaged a different solution from that which had been originally proposed. It would be advantageous to accept in part the Germans' request under the following conditions: They would begin by taking delivery of the five light cruisers of the *Graudenz* type which they had demanded from the Germans according to the terms of the protocol. They would, however, exchange those cruisers for new cruisers under construction as they were completed. That would involve no change in the principle laid down in the protocol. But they would get material advantages in this way, that if they only left to the Germans old cruisers which would very shortly be twenty years old, Germany would be free, according to the terms of the Treaty, to build new ones as soon as the 20-year period had been reached. With the solution they proposed, on the contrary, the Germans would not be able to build new warships for eleven years and their naval forces would be diminished accordingly. They were, therefore, of the opinion that their proposal was advantageous, not only for France and Italy, but in a general way for all the Allies.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he fully admitted the force of the arguments made by the Minister of Marine, but the fact remained that his solution implied a modification of the Treaty, which the British Government would not deem possible except with the assent of all the signatories.

MR. LEYGUES replied that Sir Eyre Crowe's remark was quite correct, but they should not conceal the fact that the situation created by the Treaty was abnormal and illogical. They were obliging the Germans to destroy their existing ships, and inside of a year they still might build new ones, certainly a paradoxical situation.

MR. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but said that they were confronted by the Treaty, and the British Government was opposed to any modification of the Treaty. It therefore seemed to him necessary to await, in order to discuss the Scapa Flow question in its entirety, until Sir Eyre Crowe received from London the general instructions he was expecting.

(The discussion was adjourned).

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that they were not ready to draft a reply to the German Note until they had agreed on the questions which were still pending, such as the Scapa Flow affair. He therefore proposed to adjourn the discussion. 2. Reply to the German Note of December 14²

MR. WALLACE then stated that at the meeting of the Council last Tuesday he had been asked by the President whether he would sign the protocol on behalf of the United States.³ He undertook to obtain the views of his Government in the matter, and he had now to say that he had received instructions that the United States could not be a signatory to the Protocol.

He said it would be recalled that at the same meeting of the Council a draft of a declaration to Chancellor Renner was presented and approved by his colleagues. At the same time he informed the Council of his instructions and made it quite clear that he would refer such matters to his Government. The declaration in question was communicated to Chancellor Renner the day following the meeting, that was to say, last Wednesday, and he informed his Government to that effect. In reply, he had been informed that in view of the existing circumstances the Government of the United States was not in a position to take any action whatever, on account

of the fact that the Austrian Treaty had not been presented to the United States Senate.

He said that, in this connection, and in order to make his position quite clear, he had been instructed to state that in view of the fact that his participation in the deliberations of the Council was merely one of an observer, it could not be presumed that the United States was a party to any action, declaration, or resolution of the Council unless the Government of the United States expressly declared its consent thereto.

MR. BERTHELOT remarked that the situation did not present itself in the same manner in the two cases referred to by Mr. Wallace. As a matter of fact, the protocol had been signed by Mr. Polk on November 1st. No American signature was any longer necessary if the text of the protocol was not modified, and the signature of the Germans was the only one required.

MR. WALLACE said that M. Clemenceau had asked him on the preceding Tuesday whether he would be in a position to sign the protocol. He therefore assumed that the protocol would be modified, and consequently that new signatures would be necessary; and that is why he had asked for the instructions, the sense of which he had just communicated to the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that no member of the Council had yet signed the protocol. What had been signed was the note submitting to the Germans the draft protocol. He did not believe that that would do away with the signing the protocol itself, even in the case where no modifications were adopted.

M. FROMAGEOT said that it did not seem necessary that the protocol should bear the signatures of the Allied Representatives. If they referred to precedents they found that the declaration relative to the non-application of Article 61 of the German Constitution^{3a} had only been signed by the German Representative. The delegates of the Allied Powers had simply witnessed the fact of the German signature. There was only in the protocol the question of a unilateral agreement which Germany should undertake. Therefore Germany's signature

was the only one required. The Allied Representatives, or some of them, might, however, witness the fact that the signature had been given.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the protocol presented itself in such a form that the procedure suggested by M. Fromageot would be applicable.

M. FROMAGEOT said that it certainly did. It would only be necessary to omit the word "protocol" and to replace it by the term "declaration", or some analogous expression.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as far as the declaration made to Chancellor Renner was concerned, Mr. Wallace was not authorized by his Government to subscribe to it at this time. On the other hand he did not believe that they should foresee any difficulty on the part of Austria, who had no interest in raising doubts on the validity of their declaration. As a matter of fact, the American Government had only declared war on Austria very late. They all understood the present difficulties of the situation in America and they naturally did not wish to do anything which might increase those difficulties. On the other hand, however, they had brought to a satisfactory conclusion the important questions which had been submitted to them. They could therefore only take note of the American Ambassador's declaration and carry on the discussion in order to arrive either at a general signature; for it was likely that the situation might change in America, or to another solution which they would have to envisage at the proper time.

MR. WALLACE said he would be glad to act as soon as he received instructions allowing him to do so, and he hoped that it would not be long before he received satisfactory instructions.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that as a matter of fact the declaration made to Mr. Renner did not necessitate the signatures of all the delegates; it had sufficed that he, as President of the Conference, sign the note by which that declaration had been communicated to the Chancellor.

MR. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee as shown in Appendix "A".

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had listened with much pleasure to the ingenious and subtle arguments of Mr. Fromageot. It had, however, seemed to him that the latter must admit that those arguments were more ingenious than convincing. Besides, their enemies could themselves also show ingenuity, and he considered it would be dangerous for them to start a controversy, the result of which would be doubtful. If they were to tell the Germans that Article 192 did not apply to the materiel disembarked in execution of the Armistice they would be giving them a pretext which they would not fail to grasp to avoid proceeding with the destruction of that materiel. The literal sense of Articles 185 and 192 seemed to him to be that the materiel which was disembarked should be destroyed under the same conditions as all the war materiel remaining in Germany. While he did not object to the grounds underlying M. Fromageot's argument, he yet did not wish to do anything which implied a modification of the Treaty. Even supposing that M. Fromageot's argument could triumph, it would not be for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to make good a lacuna in the Treaty. It would be necessary to get the consent of all the signatory Powers. Therefore, he thought it wiser to adhere to the most natural interpretation of the Treaty, notwithstanding the slight inconveniences which might be attached thereto and not to set out upon a course that was dangerous and full of pitfalls. He would add that the arguments which he had just put forward did not apply to the case of the five cruisers referred to in the protocol. As a matter of fact, the Treaty was not involved in that case and it would be sufficient to change a few words in the protocol in order to obtain the desired result.

3. Conditions Under Which the German Warships Should Be Surrendered

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that they should be careful not to touch the protocol; the discussion which had just taken place should incline them to great prudence in that respect.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether certain changes would not be indispensable in any event, considering they had already decided that they would grant certain concessions to the Germans. If they did

not modify the protocol it would be necessary, at the very least, to have it followed by an interpretative note.

MR. DE MARTINO admitted that it would be dangerous to modify the Treaty in any fashion whatsoever. But as it was only a question of interpretation, could they not sound the Germans to find out if they would not consent to surrender that materiel, a course which would avoid them the trouble and expense of destroying it? As soon as the exchange of ratifications had taken place, the Commission of Control might be asked to give the Germans their interpretation of Articles 185 and 192.

MR. CLEMENCEAU remarked that in any case they were entitled to demand that the breeches of guns be put back in place as the Treaty provided that the war ships to be delivered should have their complete artillery on board.

ADMIRAL LEVAVASSEUR said that it would likewise be important to have the materiel other than artillery, especially in the case of the destroyers, torpedoes and torpedo tubes.

MR. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but remarked that they were confronted by the Treaty; they could not run counter to its stipulations. He thought, however, that they might propose to the Germans the interpretation suggested by Mr. Fromageot without, however, insisting if the Germans should refuse to accept it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said if they proposed that interpretation, it was to be feared that the Germans would immediately accept it, and that they would avail themselves of it so as not to destroy any of the materiel which had been disembarked. If they were to give the Germans the example of interpreting the terms of the Treaty in a way not strictly impartial, they would be exposed to endless chicane on the part of the Germans.

MR. FROMAGEOT said that they might ask the Germans to surrender the torpedoes and torpedo tubes without furnishing any explanation. They could always wait and see whether the Germans accepted their demand.

MR. CLEMENCEAU inquired whether the term “Complete artillery” did not also imply the surrender of munitions.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the English text had the words “guns” which did not seem to admit of such a broad interpretation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they might anyhow try to obtain the accessory materiel, such as torpedoes, etc. If they met with a refusal there would always be time to take counsel.

MR. WALLACE inquired whether a verbal communication would be made, or a written note.

MR. CLEMENCEAU replied that a verbal communication would suffice.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Germans would be asked verbally to deliver the warships which they were to surrender according to the terms of the Treaty and which were not meant to be destroyed, not only with all their artillery, but also with their munitions and accessory materiel, such as torpedoes, torpedo tubes, etc.
- (2) that that demand, however, should not be made a condition *sine qua non* of the exchange of ratifications.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the report of the Organisation Commission of mixed Tribunals and also the reply of the Drafting Committee to certain questions put by that Commission (the two papers contained in Appendix B). He added that the question submitted to the Drafting Committee had some rather difficult aspects because acts involving violations of the laws of war could hardly have been committed on Polish territory in the course of hostilities, taking into account the fact that there had then been no organized and recognized Polish Army, and that Poland had not yet existed as a State. It would, however, seem unjust to reply to Poland's request by an absolute refusal. It seemed that there might be grounds for giving different solutions according to the cases

presented, and that the question was above all one of concrete fact. 4.
List of Guilty Germans, Presented by the Polish Delegation

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that his legal experts had told him that that question presented certain difficulties which were technical but of considerable importance. On the British side, the question had been more especially examined by Sir Ernest Pollock. As the French and Belgian representatives on the Organization Commission of Mixed Tribunals, that is to say, Mr. Ignace and M. Rolin-Jacquemyns, were going to London, where they would meet Sir Ernest Pollock, he proposed to adjourn the discussion on that subject until they knew the results of the interviews that would have taken place.

It was decided:

To adjourn the discussion of questions raised by the Polish request relative to German subjects guilty of violating the laws and customs of war until they know the results of the interviews which Sir Ernest Pollock, Mr. Ignace and M. Rolin-Jacquemyns were to have in London on the subject.

MR. CHEYSSON read and commented upon the Note of the Financial Commission (See Appendix C) on the memorandum of the British Delegation (See Appendix D) relative to bank notes issued by the Bolshevik Government of Hungary. 5. Rights of Allied and Associated Nationals, Holders of Bank Notes Issued by the Sovietist Hungarian Government

It was decided:

To approve the Note of the Financial Commission (See Appendix C).

MR. LAROCHE read and commented upon the note of the Secretariat General, as shown in Appendix E, relative to that question. 6. Insertion in the Hungarian Treaty of Clauses Relative to Certain Railroads of Common Interest to Hungary and (a) Serb-Croat-Slovene State (b) Roumania

It was decided:

To accept the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary relative to certain railroads presenting a common interest for Hungary and neighboring States. Those clauses should be inserted in the form under which they figured in Appendix E (see Articles 302 and 303).

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

MR. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation as shown in Appendix F.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he quite agreed that something should be done to prevent Germany from having a predominant diplomatic situation at Vienna; he thought it inadvisable, however, for the Allies to address themselves directly to Germany, all the more so as Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles did not seem to offer very strong grounds for action. He would prefer to use the second method suggested by the note before them, and to approach the Austrian Chancellor on the matter. If they considered the very favorable frame of mind actually evinced by him for the Allies, it was hardly likely that they would meet with a refusal. 7. Diplomatic Representation of Germany at Vienna

MR. WALLACE said that he would refer that question to his Government and would advise it of the resolution which seemed to be preferred by the Council; he would ask his Government to concur therein.

It was decided:

That the Chancellor of the Austrian Republic be advised that the Allied and Associated Governments would not view with approbation the sending by Germany to Vienna of a diplomatic representative having the rank of ambassador.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions of his Government.

MR. BERTHELOT said that he had had an interview with General Weygand on the questions raised by the transportation of the Allied troops charged with the occupation of the plebiscite regions in Germany. Certain material difficulties might arise by reason of the holiday period which was before them. General Weygand thought that in case the ratifications were exchanged on the following Tuesday or Wednesday, there would be grounds to specify that the measures of execution would only begin on January 5th. Such a solution would allow them to reach the time when the British troops could themselves be transported; that, according to the information in their hands, would not take place before approximately January 15. 8. Transportation of Troops in the Plebiscite Zones of Germany

MR. DE MARTINO inquired whether the transportation of British troops would be completed shortly after January 15th.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the difficulty arose from the fact that they could not send the troops raised by conscription who would have to be relieved practically at once. They would have to have recourse to forces made up of volunteers, and these would not be ready for transportation until about January 15th. They might perhaps be able nevertheless to send off their advance guards a little sooner. It would be sufficient for the British contingents to be transported amongst the last.

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix A to HD-114

Note From the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council on the Conditions for the Surrender of German Warships

1. The text of article 185 seems to provide that the ships shall be delivered in a state of disarmament, according to Article XXIII of the Armistice,^{3b} with exception of the guns which must all be on board.

It was in this state that they were first supposed to be sunk, a provision which was afterwards replaced by surrender. Nothing was

then said, and nothing has since been said, concerning the material which had been disembarked.

2. All the material, besides the artillery, disembarked from the ships to be surrendered, appears as being part of the material referred to in Article 192 as material “actually in the hands of the German Government” and in this respect to be surrendered to be broken up.

3. Nevertheless, in case that the Allied and Associated Powers should agree with Germany that, besides the ships to be surrendered in a state of disarmament, according to Article 185, the material which was aboard should also be surrendered, such a special agreement might be considered.

Certain members of the Drafting Committee are of the opinion that such an agreement would be facilitated by the following arguments: Article 185 in speaking of material in the hands of Germany, to be surrendered for breaking up, does not refer to the material disembarked according to the provisions of the Armistice, remaining under the supervision of the Allied and Associated Powers as provided by Article XXIII of the Armistice. The text provides nothing in regard to this material and there is, therefore, an omission which, by mutual agreement, it is desirable to complete.

DECEMBER 19, 1919. **Appendix B to HD-114**

DECEMBER 17, 1919.

*List of Germans Accused of Crimes Contrary to Laws of War—
Submitted by the Polish Delegation*

ORGANIZATION COMMISSION
OF MIXED TRIBUNALS
(AND OF REVISION OF LISTS)

The list of German nationals demanded by Poland includes 361 names.^{*}
—

The Polish Government asks to bring before its tribunals, and eventually before mixed tribunals, German nationals guilty of violations of the laws and customs of war, these violations having been committed since the time that the territory which was to become Polish was the theatre of atrocities and exactions (August 1914), until a time later than the Armistice (sometime in 1919).

The Polish Delegation remarks that the cases maintained by it refer only to acts committed on territory formerly Polish-Russian, excluding violations committed on the territories formerly Polish-Austrian or Polish-German.

From what date on is the Polish Government entitled to claim German nationals for prosecution before its military tribunals?

The Organization Commission of mixed tribunals (and of revision of lists) did not consider itself able to determine this date and has the honor of asking the Supreme Council to take a decision in this respect.

The Polish Army was recognized as belligerent by the great Powers in September–October, 1918. (Recognition, by France, September 28, 1918; by England October 11, 1918; by Italy October 12, 1918; by the United States of America, November 1, 1918.)

If this date of September–October were maintained, Poland would, in reality, be able to claim very few Germans.

She would have still less if the date when Poland was recognized as an autonomous state were considered. In spite of the participation of Polish Delegates at the Peace Conference, it remains nevertheless that Germany only recognized Poland by the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, and the Allies can only oppose to Germany the date of ratification of the above Treaty (July 10, 1919) if Germany does not contend that the Treaty is not yet in effect [*sic*].

On the other hand, the Organization Commission of Mixed Tribunals is of the opinion that the Supreme Council could act in accordance with the spirit of the drafting of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty of

Versailles. The object which is proposed by this Treaty is to punish crimes committed in violation of laws and customs of war.

The doctrine of the Commission may be summarized as follows:

“The basis of the Allies’ action is the prosecution of crimes which are not excusable because of demands of a military nature. Whatever is true in this regard of belligerent countries is equally true in regard to countries which, although they may not have been in war, have been the victims of atrocities committed by Germans. The horrors that took place in Poland wounds every human sentiment, and from the standpoint of penalties to be imposed, these cases should be considered as having been committed in the course of a period of war.”

It may also be advanced that at the time when these crimes were committed the accused were subject to the decisions of the German, Austrian and Russian military tribunals because of the nationality of the victims and of the territory where they were committed.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that the case of Poles in Germany will be the same as that of Czecho-Slovaks in Austria, Roumanians in Hungary, Yugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary.

As memorandum and for reference, certain dates are given below, which in regard to Poland, may eventually be taken as a starting point for the incriminations:

- 1) Decree (French) creating an autonomous Polish Army in France, on the date of June 4, 1919;
- 2) Recognition of the Polish National Committee.
(By France, June 20, 1917; by England, October 15, 1917; by Italy, October 30, 1917; by the United States of America, December 1, 1917).
- 3) Decree (French) organizing the military justice of the Polish Army.
- 4) Recognition of the Polish Army as autonomous Allied and belligerent Army, September–October, 1918.

Reply of the Drafting Committee

DECEMBER 18, 1919.

To the question asked by the Organization Commission of the Mixed Tribunals, i. e.

“From what date on is the Polish Government justified in claiming, for judgment by its own military tribunals, German nationals?”

The Drafting Committee makes the following reply:

From August 2, 1914, on condition that it is a question of violations of the laws and customs of war which injures a person classed as a Polish national according to the Treaty.

The question as to whether the charges constitute a violation of the laws and customs of war or not, is a question to be decided according to the circumstances of the matter and from the standpoint of the law of nations.

Appendix C to HD-114

PEACE CONFERENCE
FINANCIAL COMMISSION

DECEMBER 19, 1919.

Note for the Supreme Council

A decision of the Supreme Council of Dec. 17, 1919,⁴ has sent to the Financial Commission, a note from the British Delegation, concerning the prejudice suffered by the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, who possess bonds issued by the Hungarian Bolshevik Government.

The Financial Commission, after having examined the question is of the opinion that, the information which it at present possesses does not enable it to judge whether the Allied and Associated nationals have been affected by “an exceptional war measure” taken either by the Government of Bela Kun enforcing the circulation of the “white

banknotes” and substituting them for the “blue banknotes” previously in the possession of the Allied and Associated nationals, or by the Hungarian Government which fixed the value of these “white banknotes”, at the fifth of their value.

The Commission is of the opinion that complementary information should be asked for from the British Delegation, concerning the conditions under which were made:

1. The operations of withdrawal and exchange of the white and blue banknotes, possessed by Allied and Associated nationals.
2. and concerning the means of establishing and controlling the importance of the prejudice suffered by Allied and Associated nationals.

Moreover, the Commission thinks that, after having received from the British Delegation the above information, it will be necessary to ask the Economic Commission, which prepared the draft of Article 232 of the Treaty with Hungary whether the measures taken by Bela Kun and the Hungarian Government may be considered as “exceptional war measures” such as referred to in Annex to Article 232.

Appendix D to HD-114

Note From the British Delegation re Banknotes Issued by the Bolshevik Government in Hungary Held by Nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers

In connection with the Hungarian Treaty a question has arisen with regard to the position of Allied and Associated nationals in Hungary who hold notes issued by Bela Kun. These notes, called “white” notes, were issued by the Bolshevik Government, who compelled their acceptance, declaring them to be of equal value to “blue” notes, and withdrawing the latter from the banks at the same time. These “white” notes are now practically valueless as the Hungarian Government recently ordered that they should be accepted at one-fifth of their face value only. Allied and Associated nationals,

therefore, who acquired them upon constraint from the Bolshevist Government will be heavy losers.

As it seems doubtful whether Article 232–A of the draft treaty with Hungary affords sufficient protection for the interests of Allied and Associated nationals in this matter, it is suggested that an addition should be made to the annex to the Reparations Clauses, for the purposes of safeguarding the interests of Allied and Associated nationals who became possessed of the Bolshevist notes in the above-mentioned circumstances.

16 DECEMBER 1919. **Appendix E to HD–114**

*Clauses To Be Inserted in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary in
Regard to Certain Railways Which Have an Interest Both for
Hungary and the Neighboring States*

I. HUNGARY AND THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE

In its meeting of December 9, 1919, (Resolution HD–110–IV [V]),⁵ the Supreme Council decided:

- 1st: that the station of Gola, situated in Hungarian territory would be given a mixed organization enabling it to serve the locality of the same name situated in Serb-Croat-Slovene territory.
- 2nd: that the article prepared by the Commission of Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, in its report No. 2 of April 5 [6], 1919, adopted by the Supreme Council⁶ providing for the placing under international control of the railway line from Kotor to Bares, will be inserted in the conditions of peace with Hungary. The experts in regard to railways who have been consulted by the Drafting Committee found that the text proposed by the Territorial Committee could not be maintained as they stood, but would have to be changed to harmonize with the general provisions of Articles 301–302 which gives the settling of all general disputes regarding the Hungarian railways to a Commission of Experts chosen by the Allied and Associated Powers and in which Hungary would be represented. They have drafted a proposed article which solves in this sense the two questions which have been asked by the

Supreme Council. This article would take the place of No. 303 (See Annex I).

II. HUNGARY AND ROUMANIA

On the other hand the several members of the Roumania and Jugo-Slav Affairs have reminded the Drafting Committee that the Supreme Council has adopted the article proposed by the Commission in its report No. I of April 6, 1919, in order to place under international control the railway line from Nagy-Szalonta to Arad via Gyula and Békéscsaba.⁷

The railway experts have at the request of the Drafting Committee composed a draft clause which corresponds to the decision of the Supreme Council as far as it is compatible with Article 301. This clause would be the third paragraph of Article 302 (See Annex II).

Annex I

ARTICLE 303

In order to assure to the city and the district of Gola in Serb-Croat-Slovene territory the use of the station of Gola in Hungarian territory as well as the railway line which serves this city and this district, and in order to assure the Serb-Croat-Slovene state of the free use of direct communication by rail between Csaktornya-Nagy-Kanisza and the line of Zágráb-Gyékenyés during the period necessary for the completion of the direct railway line in Serb-Croat-Slovene territory between the lines mentioned above, the conditions for the exploitation of the railway station of Gola and the railway line Kotor-Barcs will be determined by a convention to be made between the interested administrations of the Hungarian and the Serb-Croat-Slovene railways. If these administrations cannot agree on the terms of this convention the points of dispute will be settled by the Commission of Experts provided for in Article 301 of the present treaty.

Annex II

ARTICLE 302 (3d paragraph).

In the same way the arrangement for the exploitation of the section situated in Hungarian territory and the line cutting Nagyszalonta to Arad and to Kisjenő by Békéscsaba will guarantee direct passage in every way across Hungarian territory to Roumanian trains having Roumanian traction and crews. Nevertheless, unless it should be otherwise determined this passage right will cease on the completion of a direct junction situated entirely in Roumanian territory between the lines Nagyszalonta–Békéscsaba and Kisjenő–Békéscsaba at the expiration of ten years after the coming into force of the present treaty.

Appendix F to HD–114

From: French Delegation regarding Diplomatic Representation of Germany at Vienna.

To: The Supreme Council.

The Allied and Associated Powers have shown their intention of being represented at Vienna by agents having the rank and quality of ministers plenipotentiary. The new Austrian State has not the importance which would justify the sending of ambassadors, which would be, besides, discourteous to the new Allied States who are all much more populated than Austria.

According to concurring information, the German Government had decided to send an Ambassador to Vienna. Its representative would, therefore, have a preponderant influence, and the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers would, in a way, be relegated to a rank incompatible to the dignity of their Governments.

The object which the German Government has in view is evident. We are in the presence of a manoeuvre which is contrary to the object of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which is only in appearance respected by Germany but which is violated in spirit. To admit that the representatives of Germany at Vienna should be in a special position above all would be to give a tacit assent to the annexationist

propaganda and to favor a characterized tentative [sic] against Austria's independence. The Allied and Associated Powers are, therefore, justified in opposing the realization of this plan.

In order to arrive at this, two procedures may be employed at the same time: First, a note should be sent to the German Delegation at the Conference to inform it that the Allied and Associated Governments have been advised of the German Government's intention to maintain an embassy at Vienna. That they feel bound to inform it that they will only have legations, and that under those conditions the presence of an embassy from Germany would be interpreted as being contrary to the spirit of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, and of a nature to create difficulties in the relations between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers; that the latter, consequently, would wish to receive from the German Government the assurance that it would be represented at Vienna by an agent who would not have rank superior to minister plenipotentiary and who should be accredited as such.

Second, Chancellor Renner should be advised by a note transmitted to the Austrian Delegation of the communication sent to the German Government. He should also be told that the Allied and Associated Governments will not send any ministers to Vienna if the German Government is represented by an ambassador. The Austrian Government could, in this way, fall back on this conception to refuse to recognize a German ambassador.

ARTICLE 80 OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

Germany acknowledges and will fully respect the independence of Austria within the frontiers established by the present Treaty, as inalienable, except by the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

¹ Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

² Appendix A to HD-111, p. 567 [Pg. 567 is part of [Doc. 27](#)].

³ HD-111, minute 2, p. 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 27](#)].

3a For draft text of declaration, see enclosure to appendix B to HD–52, [vol. VIII, p. 193](#) .

3b [Vol. II, p. 1](#) .

* The Polish Delegation states that this list has been reduced 50%.
[Footnote in the original.]

4 HD–112, minute 5, p. 590 [*Pg. 590 is part of [Doc. 28](#)*].

5 *Ante*, p. 541 [*Pg. 541 is part of [Doc. 26](#)*].

6 On May 12, 1919; see BC–61, [vol. IV, p. 501](#) .

7 See BC–61, [vol. IV, p. 501](#) .

December 22, 10:30 a.m. (HD-115)

[31] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, December 22, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 22, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/115

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/115

HD-115

[Document 31]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, December 22, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 22, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Arnavon
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

Captain Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE

Captain Lothian
Small

FRANCE

M. Massigli

ITALY

M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Mr. Rathbone

GREAT BRITAIN
Capt. Fuller, R. N.
Cdt MacNamara, R. N.
Mr. Malkin
General Mance

FRANCE
M. Leygues
M. Loucheur
M. Cambon
Gen'l Le Rond
C. Amiral Levavasseur
M. Fromageot

ITALY
M. Ricci-Busatti
C. Amiral Grassi
Cdt. Fea

JAPAN
M. Nagaoka
M. Osumi

MR. CLEMENCEAU suggested that before dealing with the agenda he would like to raise a question which he hoped would not cause any difficulty. The Council had decided some weeks previously to give a

25-years mandate to Poland for the administration of Eastern Galicia.¹ That decision had occasioned lively protest in Poland, and the Polish representatives had insisted that the question should be examined anew. According to them a resolution of that nature would have a very favorable effect on public opinion, and to some extent, keep their army free from Bolshevik propaganda. On his visit to London he had interviewed Mr. Lloyd George on the question; later he had asked Sir Eyre Crowe to request Mr. Lloyd George to be good enough to put before them a text which they could adopt; the English Prime Minister had proposed that very day the following formula: 1. Status of Eastern Galicia

“The decision recently taken at Paris, granting to Poland a mandate of 25 years over Eastern Galicia, ought to remain in suspense and be the subject of a new examination to be conducted later.”

MR. DE MARTINO approved the text, all the more for the reasons adduced by the Polish Delegation which seemed to him not without foundation.

MR. MATSUI also approved of the proposal.

It was decided:

That the execution of the recent resolution which accorded to Poland a 25-years mandate for Eastern Galicia should be suspended and that the question should be re-examined later.

SIR EYRE CROWE informed the Council that his Government was pressing for the Council to take a definite decision upon the mandates for former German colonies. The mandates were ready for South-East and South-West Africa, as also for the Pacific Islands; they could also be ready for Togoland and the Cameroons since the only litigious question had been settled, namely, the employment of native troops.² 2. Mandates

MR. CLEMENCEAU suggested that that last question had not been completely settled for Mr. Polk had stated that he must make a

reservation on behalf of his Government and he (Mr. Clemenceau) anticipated no difficulty on the point, but agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the question ought to be put upon the agenda for an early meeting.

SIR EYRE CROWE was glad to be in a position that day to acquaint the Council of the opinion of his Government. In conformity with the view of the majority of the Council, the British Government considered it preferable not to modify the protocol⁴ but thought that it would be well, nevertheless, to settle some procedure for acquainting the Germans that concessions were possible. It had, for example, already been established that in the Allies' calculations there was an error of 80,000 tons. Under those circumstances the British Government believed that there were grounds for reducing the Allied demands from 400,000 tons to 300,000 tons, the Allied experts having to agree among themselves the nature of the material to be handed over and the conditions of its delivery. The protocol would then be signed by the Germans alone and in its present form; at the same time the latter would be informed that the Allies were ready to make such concessions as were recognized by their experts to be legitimate. 3. Reply to the German Note.³ Settlement of Scapa Flow incident

MR. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe meant discussion between Allied experts alone or between those and the German experts.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that he meant between Allied experts.

MR. LEYGUES said that in those circumstances he accepted the British proposition: the protocol to be signed as it stood but no note would be taken in the application of admitted errors.

MR. LOUCHEUR asked whether the British Government meant to accept the immediate delivery of the 300,000 tons or did it agree that a part only of that materiel ought to be handed over, the remainder to be delivered later.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained his Government was of the opinion that they should ask for immediate delivery. The second procedure that namely which had in view the handing over of new docks constructed specially, presented, as a matter of fact, numerous disadvantages even from the point of view of reparations. It was preferable that the Germans should give at once what they could and afterwards set themselves to work in their own interest as well as in that of the Allies to supply the remainder. If the Allied demands were excessive it was for the Germans to furnish the proof; if that proof were forthcoming they could have to take action correspondingly. The case was for that matter anticipated in a perfectly unambiguous phrase of the protocol.

MR. LEYGUES considered it certainly probable that a mistake in calculation had been made; but it was the more necessary to have proof of it, since the Allied estimates had been founded upon German figures.

MR. CLEMENCEAU asked to have matters made still clearer. Was he to write to the Germans that they maintained in principle the stipulations of the protocol but that the Council was ready to take into account any error that they might have made and reduce its demands in consequence?

SIR EYRE CROWE considered that a question of procedure: In principle he did not think it necessary that the declaration be made in writing; but it was important that the Germans should know that in the event of their supplying proof of mistake in calculations the extent of their demands would be immediately diminished.

MR. LOUCHEUR thought it necessary to be still more precise. The Germans claimed that there was a miscalculation of 160,000 tons in the Allies figures—over the Dantzig docks, and that other of 80,000 tons which, according to the Allied contention, existed at Hamburg and which was identical with that already appearing on the Allied statement as two docks—one of 37,000 tons and another of 43,000 tons. But the German experts pointed out further the existence of 60,000 to 80,000 tons of docks which did not appear upon the Allied estimates, the result being that the difference between the

German and the Allied calculations made a total of 80,000 tons. Should they then say to the Germans that they would agree to a reduction of 160,000 tons, or only 80,000 tons, and admitting that they would reduce the demands by 100,000 tons, were they going to specify that they already agreed to the reduction of 100,000 tons under reserve of verification of figures? Again, was Sir Eyre Crowe prepared to go further still? Apparently, the Germans were going to stick to the 192,000 tons which they had proposed. Were they agreed to go beyond that and demand 300,000 tons, or would they, on the contrary, agree to make ultimately a new concession upon that last figure?

MR. CLEMENCEAU, looking at the matter from the point of view of procedure, preferred the method proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe. According to his information the Germans were ready to sign; were indeed troubled at the delay that had intervened. He thought, therefore, that for the moment it would suffice to stick to Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal to maintain their demand, indicating to the Germans that they would be prepared ultimately to reduce them if error in their calculations were proved. If, in these conditions, the Germans did not agree to sign they could fall back upon the proposition of Mr. Loucheur and discuss figures, but he felt, that there would be no real controversy, especially if at the time of handing over the note Mr. Dutasta made a verbal communication also.

MR. DE MARTINO believed, as he had indeed pointed out at a previous meeting,⁵ that at the actual moment they must before all else have the treaty come into force. To attain that essential end the means were comparatively unimportant. In those circumstances he associated himself with the proposition which the President had just formulated.

MR. MATSUI likewise gave his approval to the proposition.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that in the verbal communication to be made to Baron von Lersner, Mr. Dutasta could perfectly well indicate that if an error of 80,000 tons in the calculations were definitely established the Allied demands would be reduced by the 100,000

tons. In that way the Germans would have complete reason for giving their signature.

MR. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the question of the immediate handing over of tonnage remained. Would they start by taking the 192,000 tons which the Germans offered, or would they await, before taking anything whatever, the definite establishment of the figures?

SIR EYRE CROWE thought they might well commence by taking delivery of what had been actually offered.

MR. LOUCHEUR suggested that there would, therefore, be grounds for saying in the verbal communication: Let the Germans sign the protocol as it stands; they stated, it was true, that in the Allied calculations there was an error of 80,000 tons; they would verify; if the German information were exact their demands would be reduced by 100,000 tons. Let the Germans then start at once the delivery of the 192,000 tons they had offered. If they showed that the Allied demands were excessive the Allies would reduce them to the degree considered necessary.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that such an affirmation was, for that matter, already in their last note, but there were grounds for inserting in their reply a paragraph maintaining that they did not recognize any sales that Germany had made. They undertook not to paralyze German economic life but that undertaking had another side, namely that Germany did not get rid of the docks she possesses.

MR. LOUCHEUR said he would go further: they ought to prohibit the Germans for a period of one or two years from selling any dock whatever; the concessions they were able to make now were not for the purpose of allowing the Germans to sell any part of the materiel.

MR. LEYGUES thought that it was not necessary to insist too much in the verbal or written communication upon the possibility of further concessions. The Germans would take advantage of it; indeed, it was important to be on their guard against figures the Germans supplied. He would remind the Council that the Commissions of Control had

discovered in German ports 30 submarines more than they had declared.

MR. CLEMENCEAU summarized. They were agreed upon the general lines of the reply and he thought the Council was unanimous in considering that they should be sent with the least possible delay. He would be unable himself to be present at a meeting of the Council the following day: in these circumstances he proposed that the Heads of Delegations meet that evening at 7 o'clock in his cabinet to decide upon the terms of the note.

That proposition was adopted.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that the reply ought to take account of the position of the prisoners of Scapa Flow, as also of the question of the five cruisers. On the matter of the prisoners his Government made no difficulty about handing them over, it being understood that it should retain those who were guilty of a crime.

MR. LOUCHEUR asked whether the destruction of the vessels would be considered a crime.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that obviously it would not. As for the cruisers, it was a case of maintaining purely and simply the demand formulated in the protocol.

MR. LEYGUES said that in order not to delay agreement he would not insist upon the proposition formulated by the French Delegation. He would, however, take the liberty of indicating that their proposition satisfied France and Italy and in general all the Allies. By 1920, if they adhered to the protocol and the terms of the Treaty, the Germans would have three cruisers that had reached the age limit and which, consequently, they would be entitled to replace. In 1923 they would have three more. The Allies were then going to oblige them to demolish at once ships which they had under construction and to let them build others immediately afterwards, since they were entitled to replace those cruisers which were left to them as soon as those had attained the age limit. That was a situation that seemed really to have very little justification. The other system would have

been more satisfactory. The Germans would have handed over five cruisers. Just as the ships which were actually on the slips had been completed they would have handed over these to the Allies who could have given back to them in exchange the cruisers already surrendered. Now those last ships, by the terms of the Treaty, could only be replaced in eleven years.

SIR EYRE CROWE perfectly recognized the force of the arguments developed by Mr. Leygues. It was none the less true that the adoption of his proposition would render a modification of the Treaty necessary—a very grave matter. Further, nothing obliged the Germans to replace immediately ships that had reached the age limit; they might very well wait some time before doing that.

MR. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that it was unnecessary to deal with that point in their reply since the German note made no mention of cruisers.

MR. LOUCHEUR agreed but pointed out that the Germans had affirmed that their reply had been misinterpreted and that their intention from the beginning had been to ask for the non-surrender of the cruisers; that was the reason for specifying in its letter that it refused this concession.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that it would be a good plan for the naval experts and the Drafting Committee to consult.

MR. CLEMENCEAU summed up that it was understood that a meeting would take place at 4 o'clock to prepare the text and that that text would be presented at the 7 o'clock meeting of the Heads of Delegations that night.

MR. LOUCHEUR explained that when the Serbian Delegation had acquainted him with their demand he had replied that the question could only be examined by the Reparation Commission when that had been constituted, namely, after the coming into force of the Treaty: the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission was not qualified to grant their request. 4. Demand of the Serb-

Croate-Slovene Delegation for Priority of Treatment in the Matter of Reparations

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether, in those circumstances, they had to change anything whatever in the Hungarian Treaty, what mattered most at the moment being contained therein.

MR. LOUCHEUR replied that they had not. The Serbian demand concerned the Treaty with Germany and bore upon sums to be collected from Germany, for the Serbian Delegates considered that there would be very little to collect from Hungary. In the matter of Hungary, the Serbian demands concerned only the mines of Pecs.

MR. FROMAGEOT: The Drafting Committee had been under the impression that the demand of the Serbian Delegation had in view the Treaty with Hungary, but he must acknowledge that they had never received a copy of any note on the subject.

MR. DE MARTINO, for his part, understood that it was a request for priority in regard to reparations due by Germany, and he felt obliged to say at once that the Italian representatives considered the demand to have slight justification.

SIR EYRE CROWE concluded that there was, therefore, nothing to prevent the Drafting Committee giving the Treaty with Hungary definite form.

MR. LOUCHEUR added that the question of the mines of Pecs remained and that its text would be drafted within 24 to 48 hours.

The Council had before it two draft letters prepared by the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission. (See Appendices "A" and "B".)

MR. LOUCHEUR said that the drafts were unanimously approved by the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission. After a short discussion it was decided to adopt the draft letters prepared by the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission to be sent to the German Delegation concerning the collection of custom

duties in gold marks. 5. Draft Letters to the German Delegation on the Subject of Collection by German of Custom Duties in Gold Marks

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he had already indicated the very strong desire of the British Government to see raised the blockade measures which had been adopted towards Roumania;⁶ it felt, however, unable to do so until Roumania had replied to the ultimatum of the Supreme Council.⁷ 6. Restrictions Upon Commerce With Roumania

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that, in consideration of a decision taken at a previous meeting of the Supreme Council,⁶ Mr. Berthelot had called General Coanda and indicated to him the importance that the Powers attached to receiving a prompt reply from the Roumanian Government; the Allied representative at Bucharest had been acquainted with this step to enable him on his side to act to the same end.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that, for his part, he must admit having thought, perhaps wrongly, that after the signatures of the Treaties by Roumania the resumption of commercial relations presented no difficulties and so far as France was concerned, he had authorized that resumption. Naturally, he would have no objection whatever to the British Government doing the same. From the legal point of view he recognized that Sir Eyre Crowe was perfectly right.

MR. DE MARTINO asked whether the President, therefore, was of the opinion that all Powers could resume commercial relations with Roumania.

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that that was his opinion.

It was decided:

To authorize the resumption of commercial relations with Roumania;

That whatever has been the formula adopted, Mr. Wallace would refer the resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation, dated December 20 [13], 1919, (Annex “C”), also a draft letter to the President of the Roumanian Delegation, adjoined to that note (Annex “D”).

GENERAL MANCE read and commented upon the note of the British Delegation.

MR. DE MARTINO suggested the advisability of specifying in line five of the draft letter that the inventory referred to the rolling stock of the railways. 7. Letter to Roumanian Delegation on the Subject of an Inventory of the Rolling Stock on the Roumanian Railways

MR. CLEMENCEAU said it would suffice to adopt the following text: “To have prepared an inventory of the rolling stock on all their railways.”

MR. DE MARTINO asked exactly what was the bearing of the proposal leading to that inventory: “Sunday, 4th January, 1920, and thereafter every fourth Sunday.”

GENERAL MANCE explained that they believed these periodical inventories necessary to enable them to establish definite statistics, but that they did not expect that there would be need to adopt that procedure for more than three or four months.

It was decided:

To address to the President of the Roumanian Delegation the letter appearing in Annex “D” on the subject of an inventory of the rolling stock on the Roumanian Railways.

(The meeting then adjourned).

Appendix A to HD—115

PARIS, December 19, 1919.

[Draft Letter to the German Delegation]

“To The President of the German Peace Delegation,

I have the honor to inform you that the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to authorize Germany to immediately increase the amount of specified pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a proportion as the Reparation Commission shall deem it to be a just equivalent to the depreciation of German currency.

The negotiations necessary with various Powers for prohibition of importations into Germany, as well as for exportation, shall be opened or continued.

If, within a period of three months these negotiations have not given a result deemed satisfactory by the said Powers, the question shall be entirely examined anew.

Please accept, etc.”

Appendix B to HD-115

ORGANIZATION COMMITTED OF
THE REPARATION COMMISSION

DECEMBER 20, 1919.

To the Supreme Council.

Following our letter C. R. 460, dated December 19, 1919,^{[8](#)} regarding the collection, by Germany, of customs duties in proportion to the depreciation of German currency, we have the honor to enclose herewith a draft letter explaining the interpretation which the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission gives, for the time being, to the expression “in such a proportion as the Reparation Commission shall deem it to be a just equivalent to the depreciation of German currency.”

The Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission expresses the desire to have this draft sent at the same time as the first draft, C. R. 460, or within the shortest time possible.

By Order of the Committee,
THE INTERALLIED SECRETARIES
[Enclosure]

PARIS, December 20, 1919.

“To the President of the German Delegation.

By my letter No. ... of December, 1919, I had the honor to inform you that Germany is authorized to immediately increase the amount of specified pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a proportion as the Reparation Commission shall deem it to be a just equivalent to the depreciation of German currency.

It therefore becomes the duty of the Reparation Commission to establish the rules according to which this equivalence is to be calculated.

Provisionally, and until the Reparation Commission informs you of what these rules are to be, Germany must take the steps necessary to ensure that the customs duties which she imposes are not superior to pre-war customs duties, expressed in marks, calculated at the rate of exchange on the dollar, the date of collection.

Please accept, etc.”

Appendix C to HD-115

DECEMBER 13, 1919.

*Note From the British Delegation Regarding a Letter to Roumania
on the Inventory of Rolling Stock*

From: British Delegation, Paris.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: Brigadier General Mance, British Delegate on the Committee of Ports, Waterways and Railways, President of

the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council, informs me that he has sent Your Excellency a letter dated the 6th of this month from Sir Francis Dent, President of the Commission for the Distribution of Rolling Stock belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In this letter, of which I am enclosing a copy⁹ (in case you should wish to refer to it), Sir F. Dent asks whether it would not be possible to ask the Roumanian Government, once more, to communicate the complementary details regarding the rolling stock as furnished by the other governments represented on the Commission.

This step has become necessary owing to the fact that so far no representative of Roumania has been present at the meetings of the Commission, although at my request the Roumanian Government was invited, about a month ago, to choose this representative at once.

Furthermore, the Director of the Roumanian railroads declared that he could not furnish the desired information unless he were previously authorized to do so by his Government.

As the first inventory of rolling stock takes place January 4, 1920, the question is of an urgent nature. For this reason General Mance has prepared in this sense the enclosed minute of a note which he proposes to send to the Roumanian Delegation by the President of the Peace Conference.¹⁰ The object of this note is to make sure that the necessary measures will be immediately taken by Roumania. I have the honor to propose that this minute, which after having been examined, was approved by the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council, be submitted to an early meeting of the Supreme Council.

I add that General Mance is asking by telegram, Sir F. Dent to send directly to Bucarest the necessary documents, in care of the French officer who assures the liaison between the Roumanian Government and the Commission in Vienna.

Please accept, etc.,

Appendix D to HD-115

*Proposed Letter to the President of the Roumanian Delegation,
Paris*

In order to facilitate the re-establishment of normal conditions in Central Europe, the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council have requested the countries of Central Europe, through its liaison officers, to have made an inventory of all their railroads belonging to the state or to private persons. This request, to which was joined a request for complementary details, was simultaneously communicated to the representatives at the Commission for the Distribution of Rolling Stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but owing to the absence of the Roumanian Delegate it could not be brought to the attention of the Roumanian Government in this way. The proposed inventory was to take place Sunday, January 4, 1920, and the following Sundays every four weeks, these being the dates on which inventories should take place in France and Belgium. All the other countries have agreed to proceed with this inventory.

The French representative of the Communications Section, however, has been advised by his Liaison Officer in Roumania that the Director of the Roumanian Railways did not believe he could proceed with this inventory without the authorization of his Government.

Owing to the early date of the inventory, the Supreme Council begs the Roumanian Delegation at the Peace Conference to kindly telegraph its Government, dwelling on the advantages of the proposed inventory, the facilities which will thereby accompany exchanges at the frontier, and the repercussion on economic conditions of Central Europe and requesting it to authorize this inventory.

Examples of the forms for inventory which it is desired to have have been sent to the French Railroad Officer in charge of the liaison at Bucarest. Details as to the complementary information requested by

the President of the Distribution Commission was forwarded at the same time.

¹ HD-98, minute 1, p. 285 [*Pg. 285 is part of [Doc. 14](#)*].

² HD-110, minute 6, p. 541 [*Pg. 541 is part of [Doc. 26](#)*].

⁴ Appendix C to HB-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

³ Appendix A to HD-111, p. 567 [*Pg. 567 is part of [Doc. 27](#)*].

⁵ HD-112, minute 3, p. 582 [*Pg. 582 is part of [Doc. 28](#)*].

⁶ HD-113, minute 2, p. 596 [*Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*].

⁷ Appendix A to HD-93, p. 182 [*Pg. 182 is part of [Doc. 9](#)*].

⁶ HD-113, minute 2, p. 596 [*Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*].

⁸ *Supra*.

⁹ Does not accompany the minutes in Department files.

¹⁰ *Infra*.

December 24, 10:30 a.m. (HD-116)

[32] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 24, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 24, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/116

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/116

HD-116

[Document 32]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 24, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 24, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. Lothian Small
FRANCE	M. de Percin
ITALY	M. Zanchi
<i>Interpreter</i> —M. Mantoux	

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Fuller, R. N.
Cdt. MacNamara, R. N.

FRANCE

M. Leygues
M. H. Simon
M. de Peretti
Gal Le Rond
M. Laroche
M. Hermitte

ITALY

M. Dell' Abbadessa
M. Catastini

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled that the Supreme Council had recently decided upon the allocation to Poland of a certain number of German ships for police purposes.¹ The British Government asked whether that decision might not lead to certain difficulties between Germany and Poland, the more especially as it was a case of giving to that latter Power German vessels actually stationed at Dantzig. It was worth while considering in those circumstances whether it were not preferable to give to Poland an equivalent number of Austrian ships.

1. Allocation of Vessels to Poland

It was decided:

To refer to the Naval experts the question whether it were practicable to substitute for the German ships destined to be sent to Poland for policing her coasts an equivalent number of Austrian ships.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated his opinion that the resolution on the conditions of surrender of German warships was not exactly in accord with the decision taken by the Council at its meeting of 18th December. It was necessary to distinguish between the case of the vessels referred to in the Peace Treaty and the case of the vessels dealt with in the protocol.³ As the Council had decided to make no modification in the protocol it appeared to him that they ought to confine themselves in that matter to purely unofficial dealings with the Germans. The resolution, as actually formulated, maintained, on the contrary, that the Interallied Naval Commission of Control was to take the steps necessary for having the material of the five light cruisers, referred to in the protocol, delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers in the same places as the vessels themselves from which it had been stripped. He thought that the resolution ought to be amended so as to indicate that an unofficial advance should be made to the Germans either through the Naval Commission or through the Secretariat General. 2. Rectification of Minutes of Meeting of 18th December, H. D. 113²

MR. LEYGUES had no objection to the Germans being approached unofficially provided the desired result were obtained, that was merely a question of form to which he attached no importance.

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that he was equally of opinion that an unofficial step was preferable for the principal Powers had no right to act merely on their own account in the name of all the Powers who were signatories of the Treaty. He would ask Sir Eyre Crowe to be good enough to bring to the following meeting of the Council the text in writing of the modification that he proposed.

The Council had before it the account of two conversations that had taken place on the 23rd December between Mr. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner. (See Appendix A.) 3. Note of 22nd December to the German Delegation

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that when Mr. Dutasta had put before the Baron von Lersner the Council's last note, the German Delegate had at first appeared very disagreeably impressed. He had declared that he would set out for Berlin that very day, accompanied by all the German experts. But in the afternoon he had come round and told Mr. Dutasta that he had changed his mind, that he would remain in Paris and content himself by sending to Germany only some of the experts from the German Delegation. Baron von Lersner had likewise declared that he would advise his Government to institute immediately an inquiry into the tonnage actually existing in Germany. But if Baron von Lersner had in mind an inquiry made by the German Government alone, he did not think that the Council ought to agree to this procedure but that it must insist that the inquiry could only have value if it were made in co-operation with the Allied Naval representatives.

MR. DUTASTA pointed out that von Lersner meant it in the latter sense.

MR. DE MARTINO emphasized that the Germans must be made to consent to the inquiry taking place only after signing.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that according to the opinion of his Naval experts a serious inquiry into the number of docks existing in Germany would require weeks to carry out. If they did not wish to delay indefinitely the coming into force of the Treaty, it would indeed be necessary to require the Germans to give their signature before any inquiry.

MR. CLEMENCEAU thought that they ought to await the reply which the German Government would make to their last communication. When the Council had received that reply, they could let the German Government know that [*what*] they demanded of them, the first demand of all being that they should sign the protocol, the inquiry having to be made later. He would be inclined not to publish their last note, the substance of which was already known to the public; publication of the exact text would run the risk of creating in Germany a disagreeable impression and consequently of delaying the signature.

MR. WALLACE asked whether the German experts had all departed for Berlin.

MR. DUTASTA explained that a certain number of them had gone but that some remained in Paris. He felt that he ought to explain further that von Lersner had declared that Germany could not in any case sign the protocol before agreement had been arrived at on the quantity of tonnage to be demanded of her.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that that would involve a delay of a month.

MR. DUTASTA said that Baron von Lersner had told him that in his opinion they could on the same day sign the agreement regarding tonnage, the protocol and the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications. To hasten communication between the German Delegation and Berlin, he had thought it right to make representations to the P. T. T.⁴ in order to have telegraphic wires with Germany which had been damaged by the storm immediately restored.

MR. LEYGUES suggested that the Interallied Naval Commission at London ought to be asked to hold itself in readiness to leave at any moment for Germany in order to verify the figures supplied by the Germans.

MR. CLEMENCEAU felt that there was no purpose in the Naval Commission leaving in a body. The presence of an English Admiral seemed to him quite sufficient.

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that he regretted having to leave the Council shortly as he had a meeting in the Chamber from which he could not be absent. Had Mr. Wallace any communication to make on the subject of the Convocation by the President of the United States of the first Council of the League of Nations. 4. Convocation of the First Council of the League of Nations

MR. WALLACE said he would like to ask at what time President Wilson ought to convoke the first Council of the League of Nations.

Without doubt that question depended upon the moment of signing the protocol. But he would like to know what interval after the date of the exchange of the ratifications should elapse before the Council should be convoked.

MR. DE MARTINO pointed out that it had been decided that the Council of the League of Nations would be convoked on the first or second day after the exchange of ratifications.⁵

MR. MANTOUX recalled that there had even been a document drafted which was to be sent in advance to the members of the League who were to take part in the Council.

MR. CLEMENCEAU asked whether that notification had been sent.

MR. WALLACE thought that it had not.

MR. DUTASTA explained that it was the Drafting Committee that had been entrusted with preparing the document; he would discover whether it had been sent out or not.

MR. CLEMENCEAU, having handed over the Presidency to Mr. Jules Cambon, left the Council.

The Council had before it drafts of conventions relative to mandates to be attributed: 5. Draft of Conventions Relative to Certain Mandates

- A. To the British Empire for part of German East Africa. (Appendix B).
- B. To Belgium for part of German East Africa. (Appendix C).
- C. To the British Empire (Union of South Africa) for German South West Africa. (Appendix D).
- D. To the British Empire for the Island of Nauru (Appendix E).
- E. To the British Empire (New Zealand) for German Samoa. (Appendix F).
- F. To the British Empire (Australia) for the German possessions in the Pacific, south of the equator other than Nauru and Samoa. (Appendix G).

G. To Japan for German possessions in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator. (Appendix H).

MR. CAMBON stated that the drafts before them were simply the resolutions arrived at by the Mandates Commission in London in execution of a decision of the Supreme Council dated 7th May, 1919 put into treaty form.^{[6](#)}

SIR EYRE CROWE made the comment that the pact of the League of Nations had provided for three different forms of mandate. In execution of those provisions the Mandates Commission had drawn up three types of mandates—A, B, & C. The form of mandate “A” had not been decided upon in London but texts had been drafted for types B. & C. Those texts had been sent to the Legal Advisors who had not modified the substance but had only put them in Treaty form. Those were the texts revised by the Legal experts which were actually submitted to the Council. They did not differ therefore, except in certain formal and unimportant modifications from the texts adopted by the Mandates Commission in conformity with Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations. He thought therefore that the Council would have no difficulty in adopting these texts. The question of Togo–Cameroon was not actually before the Council no definite understanding having been yet arrived at, but he thought it would be easy to come to an agreement and that the question could come before the Council very soon.

They were, on the other hand, confronted by a Japanese reservation applying to Mandate “C”, dealing with the ex-German possessions in the Pacific. Japan desired evidently the insertion in the “C” type of mandate certain clauses relative to equality of treatment in economic matters—clauses which were embodied in the “B” type. He could very well understand Japan’s interest in that modification but it appeared to him contrary to the Treaty. The difference indeed between the “B” and the “C” mandates was precisely that in the “C” type the territory with which the mandates dealt formed an integral part of the territory of the mandatory states and entered consequently into the revenue and administrative system of that state. There was a much closer connection between the mandatory power and the territory over which it exercised its mandate in the “C” type than in the “B”

type. He therefore considered that they could not satisfy the demand made by the Japanese Delegation without modifying the explicit terms of Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations and consequently of the Treaties already signed.

MR. HENRY SIMON stated that so far as concerned the two first drafts of conventions submitted to the Council, those namely relative to German East Africa, he did not think that they could raise any difficulty, the Mandates conferred upon the British Empire on the one hand and on Belgium on the other being both of the “B” type.

MR. CAMBON asked whether then the Council adopted in principle the drafts of conventions dealing with the Mandates to be given over ex-German East Africa to the British Empire and to Belgium. They could then pass to the discussion of the drafts conferring upon the British Empire (Union of South Africa) mandate over German South-West Africa.

MR. MATSUI stated that although Japan had no direct interest in that region, he felt obligated to make a reservation upon the point. The type of mandate involved being the “C” type, the same, that was to say, as that of the territories in the Pacific. He had circulated a note indicating the point of view of the Japanese Government upon the “C” type of mandate and the modifications that would have to be introduced to conform with his view. (See Appendix I).

The matter was for Japan at once a political question and one of principle. From the point of view of principle they considered that all states, members of the League of Nations, ought to enjoy “equal opportunity” in the same degree and that consequently the principle of equality of treatment in the economic sphere must be understood among the guarantees provided for in paragraph 5 of the same Article 22, in the interest of the native population. When the discussion of that general question had come before the Supreme Council two definitely opposed theories were discussed—that of annexation and that of mandates.⁷ An intermediate solution had been found at the end of several days’ discussion at which he had been present. There was no question at the moment of any discrimination whatever between the members of the League of

Nations. They ought not to lose sight of this, that the League of Nations was founded upon the principle of absolute equality between its various members. His Government maintained that Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations ought to be interpreted in the sense that the conditions of equality in matters of currency and commerce alluded to in paragraph 5 were part of the guarantees implied in paragraph 6 at the end.

Independently of that question of interpretation, the matter presented itself for Japan in its political aspect. They had entered the war in 1914. It was the Japanese fleet that had driven the German cruisers from the Pacific and from the Indian Ocean. Now in the Pacific Isles which belonged to Germany before the war, natives of Japan had enjoyed complete equality of treatment with the natives of other Powers, including Germany. Japan now required the assurance that that situation would not be modified in such of the German possessions as were coming under the mandate of the United Kingdom or its Dominions. If that were not so, Japanese nationals would find themselves, after the war in which they had participated as victors side by side with their Allies, in a situation inferior to that they had enjoyed before the war. Their public opinion would be totally incapable of understanding and of accepting such a paradoxical consequence and could not endure Japanese nationals being on a footing different from those of other nations. It was in virtue of these considerations that the Japanese Delegate on the Mandates Commission had made a formal reservation upon the text adopted for the "C" type of mandate. The Japanese Parliament was actually on the point of assembling: he thought indeed that its first session was taking place that very day. They ran the risk of finding themselves in an extremely awkward situation unless they received the assurance that the rights of Japanese nationals in the ex-German possessions in the Pacific, which were coming under England or its Dominions, were respected. Japanese public opinion would experience serious disillusion and would be fully justified in so feeling. His Government asked therefore that article 5 of the draft of the "B" type of mandate, as it appears in the text worked out in London should be inserted in the draft of the "C" type. He had communicated to his Government the drafts of mandates drawn up in London and had received in reply the instructions, the substance

of which he had just communicated to the Council. He had not yet received instructions about the texts which were at the moment put before them and which he had telegraphed to Tokio, but as they [*there*] were between those various documents only differences of form, he had ground for thinking that the instructions he had received would not be modified. In any case he was for the moment bound by the instructions he had received and he hoped that his colleagues would find it possible to satisfy the legitimate demands of the Japanese Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that article 5 of the draft of mandate “B”, to which Mr. Matsui had referred, bore in the text which he had before him and which the Legal Advisers had revised the number 8. But it was the same text.

He could not very well see how the modification to the “C” type of mandate demanded by the Japanese Government could be made without going directly against Article 22 of the Treaty which Japan had accepted since it had signed and ratified it. Paragraph 6 of Article 22 deliberately omitted the words which appeared at the end of paragraph 5 and which tended to ensure to members of the League of Nations equality of conditions in currency and commerce. If that difference had been formulated between the mandates “B” and “C”, it was done intentionally, since the territories under mandate “C” were an integral part of the territory of the mandatory Power, a state of affairs involving as a consequence equality of treatment between all the members of the League of Nations on the territory of the mandatory power itself. It seemed to him that by the very fact that it had signed the Treaty, the Japanese Government had already accepted the general principle of discrimination between the mandate “B” and mandate “C”, a principle the suppression of which it was that Japan was then demanding.

MR. DE MARTINO explained that in the question of mandates in general Italy had no special interests. He recognized nevertheless all the importance of the arguments which the Japanese Delegate had just expounded, alike from the point of view of the general principle of the liberty of traffic which they ought naturally to try and safeguard to the fullest possible extent and because of the fact that

Japanese nationals ran the risk of finding themselves in a situation worse than that they had enjoyed before the war. But since, for that matter, he recognized that serious interests were involved from the point of view of Great Britain towards which country he would by no means adopt an unfavorable attitude, he would simply adhere to whatever decision would be taken by the majority.

He had said that Italy was not specially interested in the question of mandates. Their disinterestedness was due to the fact that Italy had been excluded from participation in the mandates over the former German colonies in Africa. He repeated to the Council what he had already had occasion to say elsewhere, that that exclusion seemed to him to be a mistake. The Council ought rather to have created upon the African continent, the future of which did not appear in a very reassuring light, a solid united interest of all the Powers. He did not mean however to raise the question anew and he made his remarks in a purely platonic spirit.

MR. HENRY SIMON explained that at London the French had supported the British interpretation of Article 22 and could not but adhere to their former point of view.

MR. MATSUI said that he had expounded the point of view of the Japanese Government and that he saw nothing to add to his former explanations. His instructions did not permit him to accept the draft submitted to them for the "C" type of mandate.

MR. CAMBON said that he considered with Sir Eyre Crowe that the Japanese Government, by the mere fact that it had signed the Treaty, had accepted the distinction between the "B" and "C" mandates, which was clearly formulated in Article 22 and the mandates commission had merely executed the provisions of that article.

MR. MATSUI said that a difference in interpretation existed between them; the Japanese Government considered in fact that the guarantees provided for in Paragraph 6 of Article 22 included similarly conditions of equality of treatment discussed at the end of Paragraph 5. It was in giving it that interpretation that the Japanese Government had accepted Article 22.

MR. CAMBON did not consider that it was possible to interpret the concluding provision of paragraph 6 in so wide a sense.

It was not indeed only the guarantees provided in the interests of the population.

MR. MATSUI claimed that equality of treatment too was as much in the interests of the native population as in that of foreign nationals.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the interpretation given to Article 22 by the Japanese Delegation did not seem compatible with the text. The guarantees understood in Article 6 meant only the prohibition of the abuses discussed in paragraph 5, such, for example, as were mentioned in the Treaty, the treatment of slaves, traffic in arms and in alcohol, etc. It could not be maintained that equality of treatment in the economic sphere fell within the same category. No subtlety of interpretation could avail against the fact that the passage relative to equality of treatment which had appeared in paragraph 5 had been deliberately omitted from paragraph 6. As he understood it the Japanese Government was bound by its acceptance of Article 22 and obliged consequently to recognize the fundamental difference that separated mandate “B” from Mandate “C”, and which it then desired to have suppressed. He hoped that a more careful examination of the question would enable the Japanese Government to become convinced that the interpretation it was proposing was diametrically opposed to the letter and the spirit of Article 22.

He would like to offer one further observation arising out of a remark just made by the Italian Delegate. The question involved—and under discussion at that moment—was not one as between British and Japanese interests. The three classes of mandates had been determined according to geographical considerations and the clauses of the “C” type of mandate engaging their attention then applied equally to all the former possessions of Germany in the Pacific which were coming within the mandatory power of Great Britain, its dominions or Japan. The same treatment would therefore be applicable to all territories in the Pacific for which a mandate was envisaged. The differences existing between the “B” and the “C” types

of mandate resulted therefore directly and solely from the provisions of Article 22.

MR. MATSUI felt that he could only repeat that he was bound by the instructions received from his Government which considered its proposal in conformity with the principle of equality of treatment which served as the basis of the pact of the League of Nations and which was furthermore justified by the political considerations which he had adduced.

MR. CAMBON asked whether Mr. Matsui could not accept the draft before the Council under the reserve of gaining the approval of the Japanese Government. The other members of the Council appeared indeed unanimous for the adoption of the British interpretation of Article 22.

MR. MATSUI maintained that as he had already said he had asked for instructions when he sent to Tokio the drafts of the mandates prepared in London. He had so far received no instructions regarding the texts before them, but it was very unlikely that he would receive different instructions since between the former and the new text there appeared to be more unimportant differences of form.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that Mr. Matsui might not perhaps consider it necessary to maintain the reservation he had formulated in so far as concerned the mandate of the Union of South Africa over German South West Africa. He had himself said, indeed, that Japan had no direct interests in that zone. If Mr. Matsui would agree to confine his reservation to the territories of the Pacific, the Council would be in a position at the very least to settle that day the question of South West Africa.

He would also very earnestly urge the Japanese Delegate to make known to Tokio that the interpretation given by the Japanese Government did not appear to any of the other Delegations compatible with the text of the Treaty. He hoped that Mr. Matsui would gain acceptance for the arguments that had been put forward

by the Council and would be good enough to recommend to his Government the adoption of the drafts they were discussing.

MR. CAMBON emphasized that they ought not to forget the need there was of arriving at a solution. Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal seemed to him acceptable so far as concerned German South West Africa and he would be glad if Mr. Matsui would kindly let his Government know that in the opinion of the other Powers represented on the Supreme Council Japan was already committed on that question by the fact that it had signed the Treaty.

MR. MATSUI said he would send to Tokio an account of that discussion and would ask for new instructions. For the moment he was bound by the instructions he had received already. He would further like the Council to consider how important for Japan was the question of principle involved therein. Japanese public opinion would be quite unable to understand why their nationals should be in a more unfavorable situation after, than they had been in before the war, the more so as Japanese Squadrons had driven the German fleets from the waters of the Pacific.

As to the suggestion made by Sir Eyre Crowe and supported by M. Cambon on the subject of German South West Africa he regretted that he could not associate himself with it. German South West Africa fell as a matter of fact under the type of mandate "C" and he was consequently unable to withdraw a reservation bearing upon the very principle of that type of mandate.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished in no way to deny the force of Mr. Matsui's argument, but he could only repeat that in his belief Japan had already accepted the provisions which it was then actually asking to have modified.

MR. MATSUI said that their acceptance ought to be understood in the sense that equality of treatment was for them part of the guarantees provided for in paragraph 6 of Article 22.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that that paragraph concerned only guarantees provided in the interests of the native population,

namely, liberty of conscience and of religion, prohibition of commerce in arms and in alcohol and other provisions of the same nature.

MR. MATSUI pointed out that his Government believed that the principle of the Open Door was also in the interest of the native population.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that on referring to the minutes of the meetings of the Mandates Commission one might easily see that the provision dealing with equality of treatment inserted in paragraph 5 had been omitted deliberately and of design from paragraph 6. The Japanese line of argument consisted, on the contrary, in maintaining that the principle of the Open Door was understood in paragraph 6. That appeared to him in complete contradiction, not merely with the text of the paragraphs in question, but also with the efforts of the Commission.

MR. MATSUI maintained that the principle of equality of treatment upon which they were basing their arguments constituted the very basis of the pact of the League of Nations. It was clearly set forth in explicit manner by Article 23, paragraph (e) of the pact.

SIR EYRE CROWE repeated that he appreciated the force of the Japanese argument, but those arguments ought to have been adduced at the time of the discussion of the "B" and "C" types of mandate. It did not seem to him possible at that time to reopen the question without going against Article 22.

MR. CAMBON thought it necessary to suspend the discussion until Mr. Matsui should have received instructions from his Government.

MR. WALLACE said that in the event of his having to sign the drafts then before them, he would, in order to save time, ask instructions from Washington immediately.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the United States being a party to those acts, the signature of the American Delegate was indispensable.

MR. MATSUI added that Sir Eyre Crowe had just said that the drafts before them had been revised by the Drafting Committee. There must be some mistake for the Japanese Delegate on that Committee, Mr. Nagaoka, had no knowledge of those texts.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he believed that those texts had been submitted to the Drafting Committee, but he might have been mistaken.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained that the text could not indeed have been prepared by the Drafting Committee for they had come to them in English, and communications from the Drafting Committee were generally prepared in French.

MR. CAMBON held that in those circumstances they might refer all those drafts of conventions to the Drafting Committee, it being understood that the drafts “A” and “B” relative to German East Africa were approved in principle by the Council.

It was decided:

To instruct the Drafting Committee to revise the texts of the drafts of conventions submitted to the Council relative to the attribution of mandates, it being understood that the drafts “A” and “B” dealing with German East Africa (British and Belgian mandates) were approved in principle by the Council. On the other drafts of conventions, discussion would be resumed once the Japanese Delegate had received instructions from his Government.

Mr. Wallace would refer that resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

The meeting adjourned.

Appendix A to HD-116

[Report of Conversations Between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner]

NOTE

Mr. Dutasta, Secretary General of the Conference received Baron von Lersner, President of the German Delegation, at ten-thirty this morning, December 23rd. He gave him the letter from the Supreme Council of December 22nd, and asked him to read it.

He then verbally informed the President of the German Delegation, as directed, of the message from the Supreme Council. Baron von Lersner seemed much impressed. He asserted that the German Government, could not, in any case, sign the Protocol⁸ before an agreement had been reached as to the deliveries to be made by Germany. He added that owing to the importance of the matter, he was obliged to leave for Berlin this evening, accompanied by all the experts, military, naval and others.

He asked the Secretary General of the Conference not to interpret this general departure as a rupture. He will leave a representative at Avenue de la Bourdonnais whose name will be given later.

Mr. von Lersner expressed the desire to put down, in writing, a résumé of M. Dutasta's declaration. He did not ask the latter to initial it.

At 2:45 Mr. von Lersner asked to be received immediately by Mr. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Conference, who received him at 3:30.

Mr. von Lersner informed the Secretary-General of the Conference that, contrary to his decision of this morning, he as well as Mr. von Simson had decided to remain at Paris unless he received contrary instructions from his Government.

Mr. von Lersner said that, after the communications of this morning, the German Delegation had the impression that the Allies were not in a hurry to put the Treaty into force. Mr. Dutasta declared that on the contrary, the Supreme Council unanimously desired the going into force of the Treaty, provided Germany gave all the satisfactions asked for.

Before leaving Mr. von Lersner said to Mr. Dutasta that he would advise the Berlin Cabinet to have made immediately by the Interallied Commission, the investigations provided for in the note of December 22.

Appendix B to HD–116

Convention Relating to the Mandate for the Part of German East Africa Assigned to Great Britain

WHEREAS by Article 119 of Part IV (German Rights and Interests outside Germany) of the Treaty of Peace, Germany renounced in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including therein German East Africa; and

WHEREAS, in accordance with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of said Treaty, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of conferring a mandate upon His Britannic Majesty to administer part of German East Africa, and have decided to conclude a convention for this purpose; the High Contracting Parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say—

The President of the United States of America:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

The President of the French Republic:

His Majesty the King of Italy:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

1. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer upon His Britannic Majesty a mandate to be exercised in conformity with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, to administer the former German Protectorate of German East Africa, excepting the following portions:—

- (a) The area situated at the mouth of the Rovuma River and to the south of that river;
- (b) The area situated to the west of the following line:—

From the point where the frontier between the Uganda Protectorate and German East Africa cuts the River Mavumba a straight line in a south-easterly direction to point 1640, about 15 Kilom. south south-west of Mount Gabiro.

Thence a straight line in a southerly direction to the north shore of Lake Mohazi where it terminates at the confluence of a river situated about 2½ kilom. west of the confluence of the River Msilala.

If the trace of the railway on the west of the River Kagera between Bugufi and Uganda approaches within 16 kilom. of the line defined above, the boundary will be carried to the west, following a minimum distance of 16 kilom. from the trace, without, however, passing to the west of the straight line joining the terminal point on Lake Mohazi and the top of Mount Kivisa (2100), situated on the Uganda—German East African frontier about 5 kilom. south-west of the point where the river Mavumba cuts this frontier.

Thence a line south-eastwards to meet the southern shore of Lake Mohazi.

Thence the watershed between the Taruka and the Mkarange and continuing southwards to the north-eastern end of Lake Mugesera.

Thence the Median line of this lake and continuing southwards across Lake Ssake to meet the Kagera.

Thence the course of the Kagera downstream to meet the western boundary of Bugufi.

Thence this boundary to its junction with the eastern boundary of Urundi.

Thence the eastern and southern boundary of Urundi to Lake Tanganyika.

The boundary described above is shown on the attached British 1:1,000,000 map G. S. G. S. 2932 Sheet Ruanda and Urundi.

2. Boundary Commissioners shall be appointed by the British Empire and by Belgium to trace on the spot the line described in Article 1 (*b*). In case any dispute should arise in connection with the work of these Boundary Commissioners, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final. The report by the Commissioners giving the final description of this boundary after it has been actually demarcated on the ground, together with copies of the necessary maps annexed thereto and signed by the Commissioners, shall be made in triplicate; one copy shall be deposited in the Archives of the League of Nations, one shall be kept by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and one by the Government of His Majesty the King of the Belgians.

3. His Britannic Majesty, hereinafter called the Mandatory Power, accepts the mandate thus conferred upon him, and will execute the same on behalf of the League of Nations and in accordance with the following provisions.

4. The Mandatory Power shall be responsible for the peace, order and good government of the Territory, and undertakes to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants. The Mandatory Power shall have full powers of legislation and administration.

5. The Mandatory Power undertakes not to establish any military or naval bases, not to erect any fortifications, and not to organize any native military force in the Territory except for local police purposes and for the defense of the Territory.

6. The Mandatory Power undertakes—

(I) To provide for the eventual emancipation of all slaves, and for as speedy an elimination of domestic and other slavery as social conditions will allow.

(II) To suppress all forms of slave trade.

- (III) To prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory labor except for essential public works and services, and then only in return for adequate remuneration.
- (IV) To protect the natives from fraud and force by the careful supervision of labor contracts and the recruiting of labor.
- (V) To exercise a strict control over the traffic in arms and ammunition and the sale of spirituous liquors.

7. The Mandatory Power undertakes that in the framing of laws relating to the holding or transference of land he will take into consideration native laws and customs and will respect the rights and safeguard the interests of the native population.

No native land may be transferred, except between natives, without the previous consent of the public authorities, and no real rights over native land in favor of non-natives may be created except with the same consent.

The Mandatory Power undertakes to promulgate strict regulations against usury.

8. The Mandatory Power undertakes to secure to all citizens and subjects of Members of the League of Nations the same rights as are enjoyed in the territory by his own nationals in respect to entry into and residence in the territory; the protection afforded to their person and property; the acquisition of property, movable and immovable; and the exercise of their profession or trade, subject only to the requirements of public order and compliance with the local law.

Further, the Mandatory Power undertakes to ensure to all citizens and subjects of the Members of the League of Nations, on the same footing as to his own nationals, freedom of transit and navigation, and complete economic, commercial and industrial equality; provided that the Mandatory Power shall be free to organize essential public works and services on such terms and conditions as he thinks just.

Concessions for the development of the natural resources of the territory shall be granted by the Mandatory Power without

distinction on grounds of nationality between the subjects or citizens of all members of the League of Nations, but on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the local government.

The rights conferred by this Article extend equally to companies and associations organized in accordance with the law of any of the members of the League of Nations, subject only to the requirements of public order and compliance with the local law.

9. The Mandatory Power undertakes to ensure to all complete freedom of conscience, and the free exercise of all forms of worship without distinction, which are consonant with public order and morality.

Missionaries of all such religions shall be free to enter the territory, and to travel and reside therein, and to acquire and possess property; to erect religious buildings, and to open schools throughout the territory.

But the Mandatory Power shall have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good government, and to take all measures required for such control.

10. In accordance with these provisions, the Mandatory Power undertakes to apply to the territory the benefits of any general International Conventions already existing, or that may be concluded hereafter respecting the slave trade, the traffic in arms and ammunition, the liquor traffic, and the traffic in drugs, as well as the Conventions relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, the laws of aerial navigation, and postal, telegraphic, and wireless communication.

The Mandatory Power undertakes to operate in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

11. The Mandatory Power shall be authorized to constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal and administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories under his own sovereignty or

control; provided that the measures adopted to that end do not infringe the provisions of this mandate.

12. The Mandatory Power shall extend his diplomatic protection to the natives of the territory when in foreign lands, under the same conditions as to his own nationals.

13. The Mandatory Power shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information concerning the measures taken to apply the provisions of this mandate.

A copy of all laws and regulations made in the course of the year and affecting property, commerce, navigation, or the moral and material well-being of the natives, shall be communicated therewith.

14. The Consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

15. If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or application of this mandate, which cannot be settled by negotiations, this dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be established by the League of Nations.

States, members of the League of Nations, may likewise bring any claims on behalf of their subjects or citizens for infractions of their rights under this mandate before the said Court for decision.

Done at the day of, a single copy of which shall remain deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and of which certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Powers, signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations the day of

Secretary General

Convention Relating to the Mandate for the Part of German East Africa Assigned to Belgium

WHEREAS by Article 119 of Part IV (German Rights and Interests outside Germany) of the Treaty of Peace, Germany renounced in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including therein German East Africa; and

WHEREAS, in accordance with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of conferring a mandate upon His Majesty the King of the Belgians to administer part of German East Africa, and have decided to conclude a convention for this purpose; the High Contracting Parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say—

The President of the United States of America:
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

The President of the French Republic:
His Majesty the King of Italy:
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:
His Majesty the King of the Belgians:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

1. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer upon His Majesty the King of the Belgians a mandate to be exercised in conformity with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, to administer the portion of the former German Protectorate of German East Africa situated to the west of the following line:—

[Here follows the same text, *mutatis mutandis*, as in appendix B, *supra*, beginning with the description of the boundary in section 1 (b), page 650 [Pg. 650 is part of [Doc. 32](#).]

Appendix D to HD–116

Convention Relating to the Mandate for German South-West Africa

WHEREAS by Article 119 of Part IV (German Rights and Interests outside Germany) of the Treaty of Peace, Germany renounced in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including therein German South-West Africa; and

WHEREAS in accordance with Article 22 of Part 1 (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of conferring a mandate upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on His behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa to administer the territory aforementioned, and have decided to conclude a Convention for this purpose; The High Contracting Parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The President of the United States of America:
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of
India:

The President of the French Republic:
His Majesty the King of Italy:
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor
of India, for and on behalf of His Union of South Africa:

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due
form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer upon His Britannic Majesty the mandate to administer the former German Protectorate of South-West Africa. This mandate will be exercised on behalf of His Britannic Majesty by His Government of the Union of South Africa in conformity with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919.

ARTICLE 2

His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of His Union of South Africa (hereinafter called the Mandatory Power), accepts the mandate thus conferred upon Him, and will execute the same on behalf of the League of Nations, and in accordance with the following provisions.

ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory Power shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to this mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require. The Mandatory Power undertakes to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to this mandate.

ARTICLE 4

The Mandatory Power undertakes that the slave trade shall be prohibited, and that no forced labor shall be permitted except for essential public works and services, and then only for adequate remuneration. The Mandatory Power further undertakes that the traffic in arms and ammunition shall be controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed by the parties to this Convention on the 10th September, 1919,⁹ or of any convention amending the same. The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.

ARTICLE 5

The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal police and the local defence of the territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory.

ARTICLE 6

Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory Power guarantees in the territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, and undertakes to allow all missionaries, the subjects or citizens of any member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling.

ARTICLE 7

The Mandatory Power shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assured under Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6.

ARTICLE 8

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate. If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of those provisions which cannot be settled by negotiation, this dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be established by the League of Nations.

Done at the day of a single copy of which shall remain deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and of which certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations the day of . .
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Secretary-General

Appendix E to HD-116

Convention Relating to the Mandate for Nauru

WHEREAS by Article 119 of Part IV (German Rights and Interests outside Germany) of the Treaty of Peace Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including therein Nauru; and

WHEREAS in accordance with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of conferring a mandate upon His Britannic Majesty to administer the island aforementioned, and have decided to conclude a Convention for this purpose; The High Contracting Parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The President of the United States of America:
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of
India:
The President of the French Republic:
His Majesty the King of Italy:
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer upon His Britannic Majesty a mandate, in conformity with Article 22 of Part 1 (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, to administer

the island of Nauru (“Pleasant Island”, situated in about 167° longitude East and 0°25’ latitude South).

ARTICLE 2

His Britannic Majesty (hereinafter called the Mandatory Power) accepts the mandate thus conferred upon Him, and will execute the same on behalf of the League of Nations, and in accordance with the following provisions.

ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory Power shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to this mandate as an integral portion of His territory. The Mandatory Power undertakes to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to this mandate.

[Here follows text as printed in appendix D, *supra*, beginning with article 4, page 656 [*Pg. 656 is part of [Doc. 32](#)*.]

Appendix F to HD–116

Convention Relating to the Mandate for German Samoa

WHEREAS by Article 119 of Part IV (German Rights and Interests outside of Germany) of the Treaty of Peace Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including therein German Samoa; and

WHEREAS in accordance with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of conferring a mandate upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand to administer German Samoa, and have decided to conclude a Convention for this purpose; the High Contracting Parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, (that is to say):

The President of the United States of America:
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of
India:

The President of the French Republic:
His Majesty the King of Italy:
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor
of India, for and on behalf of His Dominion of New Zealand;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due
form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer upon his
Britannic Majesty the mandate to administer the former German
Islands of the Samoan Group. This mandate will be exercised on
behalf of His Britannic Majesty by His Government of the Dominion
of New Zealand, in conformity with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of
the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed
at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919.

ARTICLE 2

His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of His
Dominion of New Zealand (hereinafter called the Mandatory Power)
accepts the mandate thus conferred upon Him, and will execute the
same on behalf of the League of Nations, and in accordance with the
following provisions.

ARTICLE 3

In case of any dispute arising as to whether any island is or is not
included in the above mandate, the question shall be referred to the
Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

ARTICLE 4

The Mandatory Power shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to this mandate as an integral portion of the Dominion of New Zealand, and may apply the laws of the Dominion of New Zealand to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require. The Mandatory Power undertakes to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to this mandate.

ARTICLE 5

The Mandatory Power undertakes that the slave trade shall be prohibited, and that no forced labour shall be permitted except for essential public works and services, and then only for adequate remuneration. The Mandatory Power further undertakes that the traffic in arms and ammunition shall be controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed by the parties to this Convention on the 10th September, 1919,^{[10](#)} or of any convention amending the same. The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.

ARTICLE 6

The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal police, and the local defense of the territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory.

ARTICLE 7

Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory Power guarantees in the territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, and undertakes to allow all missionaries, the subjects or citizens of any member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling.

ARTICLE 8

The Mandatory Power shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7.

ARTICLE 9

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate. If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of these provisions which cannot be settled by negotiation, this dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be established by the League of Nations.

Done at the day of a single copy of which shall remain deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and of which certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations the day of

Secretary-General

Appendix G to HD-116

Convention Relating to the Mandate for the German Possessions in the Pacific Ocean Situated South of the Equator Other Than Samoa and Nauru

WHEREAS by Article 119 of Part IV (German Rights and Interests outside Germany) of the Treaty of Peace Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including therein German New

Guinea and the groups of islands in the Pacific Ocean lying south of the equator other than German Samoa and Nauru; and

WHEREAS in accordance with Article 22 of Part 1 (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of conferring a mandate upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia to administer the territories and islands aforementioned, and have decided to conclude a Convention for this purpose: The High Contracting Parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

The President of the United States of America:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

The President of the French Republic:

His Majesty the King of Italy:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, for and on behalf of His Commonwealth of Australia:

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer upon His Britannic Majesty a mandate to be exercised on His behalf by His Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, in conformity with Article 22 of Part 1 (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, to administer the former German colony of New Guinea and the former German islands situated in the Pacific Ocean, and lying south of the equator, other than the German islands of the Samoan group and the island of Nauru.

ARTICLE 2

His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of His Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter called the Mandatory Power), accepts the mandate thus conferred upon Him, and will execute the same on behalf of the League of Nations, and in accordance with the following provisions.

ARTICLE 3

In case of any dispute arising as to the boundary of the said colony or as to whether any island is or is not included in the above mandate, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

ARTICLE 4

The Mandatory Power shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to this mandate as an integral portion of the Commonwealth of Australia, and may apply the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require. The Mandatory Power undertakes to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to this mandate.

[Here follows text as printed in appendix F, *supra*, beginning with article 5, page 659 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 32](#)].]

Appendix H to HD–116

Convention Relating to the Mandate for the German Possessions in the Pacific Ocean North of the Equator

WHEREAS by Article 119, of Part IV of the Treaty of Peace (German rights and interests outside Germany), Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her over-seas possessions, including therein the groups of Islands in the Pacific Ocean, lying north of the Equator; and,

WHEREAS, in accordance with Article 22 of Part I of the said Treaty (Covenant of the League of Nations), the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of conferring a mandate upon His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, to administer the territories and islands aforementioned, and have decided to conclude a Convention for this purpose; the High Contracting Parties have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The President of the United States of America:
His Majesty, the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India,
The President of the French Republic,
His Majesty, the King of Italy,
His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan:

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer upon His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, a mandate to administer, in conformity with Article 22 of Part 1, (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28 June 1919, the former German Islands situated in the Pacific Ocean, north of the Equator.

ARTICLE 2

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan (hereinafter called the Mandatory Power) accepts the Mandate thus conferred upon him, and will execute the same on behalf of the League of Nations, and in accordance with the following provisions;

ARTICLE 3

In case of any dispute arising as to whether any island is or is not included in the above mandate, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

ARTICLE 4

The Mandatory Power shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to this mandate, as an integral portion of the Empire of Japan, and may apply the laws of the Empire of Japan to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require. The Mandatory Power undertakes to promote to the utmost, the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to this mandate.

[Here follows text as printed in appendix F, beginning with article 5, page 659 [*Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 32](#)*].]

Appendix I to HD—116

[Note by the Japanese Plenipotentiary (Matsui) Indicating the Point of View of the Japanese Government Upon the “C” Type of Mandate]

I. The Commission on the Mandates Regime adopted two kinds of Mandates, respectively called Mandates “B” and “C”, and destined to be applied to the territories referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. However, the conclusions of this Commission did not express the unanimous opinion of the Commission, on account of the reservations made by certain Delegations.

As far as the Japanese Delegation is concerned, the Japanese Delegate proposed to the Commission to insert in the clause of Mandate “C” the stipulations of Article 5 of Mandate “B” on the principle of “equal opportunity”, the benefit of which is enjoyed by the nationals of States members of the League of Nations, on territory administered by the Mandatories.

This proposal not having been accepted by the Mandates Commission, the Japanese Delegate was obliged to make reservations concerning the draft of Mandate “C”, such as it was approved by the other members of the Commission.

II. It seems to us that no differences can be accepted between Mandate “B” and Mandate “C”, especially with respect to the advantages of the open-door policy, which the States members of the League of Nations should enjoy on an equal footing.

According to paragraph 6 of Article 22, the territories of Mandate “C” shall be administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of this territory, as distinguished from territories of Mandate “B”. This paragraph, thus drafted, however, gives the Mandatory no right to go against the elementary principles of the League of Nations, which are the expression of justice and equity.

It would be in flagrant contradiction with the very spirit of this regime to reserve more favorable treatment for some members of the League than for others.

III. Concerning the Southern Pacific Islands, which are to be administered according to the provisions of Mandate “C”, Japan has special interests, as considerable capital is invested in these islands and the natural resources of the country were improved thanks to the continual efforts of Japanese nationals.

If the Japanese Government makes a point of formulating the preceding proposition this is because it has in mind the situation of its nationals in Australia subjected to a regime different to that of other foreigners.

In this connection, if the same conditions were to spread to the territories of the Mandate, which may be feared owing to the present policy of the Australian Government in the islands which it occupies, it would be contrary to the spirit of the League of Nations. It would be a real injustice, equivalent to barring Japanese nationals from all kinds of trade and be prejudicial to their rights.

IV. It will be remembered that before the war, the Japanese were treated by the German authorities as on an equal footing with nationals of other countries, from a point of view of commerce, navigation, establishment and acquisition of property.

Japan's participation in the war against Germany, the assistance which she lent to her Allies, to enable them to apply the Mandate regime to those territories, would lead, if the principle of "equal opportunity" were not admitted, to depriving Japanese nationals of the advantages which they formerly enjoyed and would place them in a situation inferior to that which they held when those territories were in the hands of the enemy.

Japanese public opinion could not possibly admit such a paradoxical consequence, and could not understand such a result crowning the efforts made by the country. The Japanese Government would be unable to justify the situation and assume responsibility in face of public opinion.

V. For these reasons the Japanese Government is unable to accept Mandate "C" such as it has been drawn up by the majority of Mandates Commission. Therefore, the Japanese Government proposes that stipulations similar to those in Article 5 of Mandate "B" relative to equal opportunities, be inserted in the clause of Mandate "C".

[Annex]

Article V of Mandate "B"

[Here follows text as printed in appendix B, article 8, page 652 [*Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 32](#)*].]

¹ HD-106, minute 2, p. 469 [*Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 22](#)*].

³ Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

² Minute 6, p. 599 [*Pg. 599 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*].

⁴ Ministre des Postes, Télégraphes, et Téléphones.

⁵ For text of the decision, see HD-88, minute 6, and appendix D, pp. 85 [*Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 4](#)*] and 91 [*Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 4](#)*].

⁶ IC-181G, [vol. V, p. 506](#) .

⁷ BC-10, minute 4, [vol. III, p. 718](#); BC-12, [ibid., p. 738](#); BC-13, [ibid., p. 749](#); BC-14, [ibid., p. 758](#); BC-17, [ibid., p. 785](#); BC-18, [ibid., p. 797](#).

⁸ Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#).

⁹ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3752.

¹⁰ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3752.

December 27, 10:30 a.m. (HD-117)

[33] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held at M. Clemenceau's Residence, Paris, on Saturday, December 27, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 27, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/117

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/117

HD-117

[Document 33]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held at M. Clemenceau's
Residence, Paris, on Saturday, December 27, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 27, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

GREAT BRITAIN	Capt. Lothian Small
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	M. Zanchi
<i>Interpreter</i> —M. Mantoux	

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Fuller, R. N.
Cdt. MacNamara R. N.
M. Malkin

FRANCE

M. Leygues
Gen. Weygand
Gen. Le Rond
Contre Admiral Levassasseur
M. Laroche
M. Hermitte
M. Fromageot

ITALY

C. Admiral Grassi
Cdt. Fea
M. Pilotti

JAPAN

M. Nagaoka

MR. DUTASTA informed the Council that Baron von Lersner had visited him on the previous day. The Chairman of the German Delegation had come to discuss two kinds of questions with him: he had first stated that the German Government was prepared to receive the Allied Naval experts responsible for determining the exact number of floating docks existing in Germany. Baron von Lersner had even added that his Government would like the experts to start as soon as possible. He had also come to ask whether the Allied Powers were prepared to allow their technical delegates to

negotiate with the German experts of whom Mr. von Simson was the head. Otherwise Mr. von Simson and his colleagues would leave again for Berlin. Mr. Clemenceau, to whom he had reported this request, was of opinion that the opening of negotiations as soon as possible between the experts of both sides could not but be beneficial. He had informed Sir Eyre Crowe of this opinion. 1. Reply of the German Government to the Note of December 22

SIR EYRE CROWE added that he had already telegraphed to London as a result of the communication made to him on the previous day, pointing out that in his opinion their experts should leave as soon as possible for the German ports. He believed, moreover, that the inquiry which they were about to make would last some time—the experts even suggested several weeks. However that might be, they were in rather a difficult position. They had verbally informed the Germans that they were prepared to make them concessions: the Germans asked them to define those concessions in a sort of agreement to be signed before or at the same time as the Protocol. Such a procedure would necessarily involve an alteration in the text of the Protocol.¹ He was uncertain whether it would not be better, instead of so doing, to indicate if possible, in the Protocol in its present form that the figures claimed was the maximum. This solution would certainly involve a slight alteration of the Protocol and it would consequently be necessary to obtain the consent of the American Government to this alteration: but he thought it unlikely that this consent would be refused, since from the outset the American Delegation had been of opinion that their conditions were too hard and since Mr. Polk had insisted that the Reparation Commission should be consulted: Mr. Wallace might sound his Government on that particular and point out to it that the proposed change would be in conformity with the American views and that the Germans alone would have to sign the new document in the presence of the Allied delegates.

MR. CLEMENCEAU personally thought it would be better, if possible, not to alter the Protocol. They might merely note the concessions they had decided to grant Germany in a letter to Baron von Lersner. The German delegation was already aware of them from the verbal communication for which Mr. Dutasta was responsible.

MR. DE MARTINO pointed out that this procedure had the drawback of causing discrepancy between the Protocol and the letter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that for his part he was ready to accept this proposal if the Germans could be persuaded to agree to it.

MR. WALLACE stated that if the Council so desired he was in a position to explain the views of his Government on this question. The American Government had repeatedly declared that the question of reparation to be demanded of Germany must be considered from a purely economic point of view. Germany's power to make reparation depended on her power to produce and export. It was thus closely connected with the economic conditions of the world at a time when a large part of it was in a critical economic position. The American Government could not, therefore, accept any claim for reparation seriously affecting Germany's power of payment. It had realized that by claiming the surrender of docks, dredgers and harbor material they had committed a great mistake. President Wilson had always thought that German ships surrendered to the Allies as reparation should be destroyed. The fact that the German crews had destroyed them themselves did not therefore cause such heavy loss to the Allies that they were justified in renouncing that principle of reparation which he had just recalled. As to the acceptance of the original Protocol by Mr. Polk, the Council would recall the fact that the American delegate had afterwards regretted it.² The American Government therefore accepted the delivery of the 192,000 tons which Germany declared her readiness to supply, but it was definitely opposed to any supplementary cession of harbor material as reparation for the Scapa Flow incident.

MR. CLEMENCEAU begged to point out that Mr. Polk had formally accepted the Protocol providing for the surrender by Germany of 400,000 tons of floating docks. He made the following proposal: the Protocol should not be altered, and, in his capacity as President of the Conference, he would write to Baron von Lersner specifying the concessions they were prepared to make. But they could obviously decide nothing without the consent of the British Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE hoped to obtain that consent but they must not ignore the fact that if their action had not the desired effect their position would be rendered more difficult.

Would it not be sufficient for the moment to have another conversation with the German delegates and to tell them that their claims were satisfied on the whole. They could then be asked whether they wished these promises to be noted in writing and if they would then be satisfied. If the German reply was in the negative they would have the advantage of not having compromised themselves.

MR. CLEMENCEAU thought this suggestion excellent: Mr. Dutasta might see Baron von Lersner that very day and ask him what satisfaction he desired. It was, moreover, possible that Baron von Lersner would reply that he wished for an alteration of the Protocol. They would then see what could be done.

MR. DUTASTA said that his interview with Baron von Lersner had given him the impression (which was, however, a purely personal one) that if the Supreme Council were to confirm in writing the verbal communication made in its name and definitely stated that after the immediate supply of the 192,000 tons proposed by the Germans themselves time would be granted for the delivery of the material still to be supplied, it would be possible to come to an arrangement. The German experts were most alarmed at the demand for immediate delivery of all the material claimed.

MR. BERTHELOT supposed that under those conditions the Protocol would not be altered.

SIR EYRE CROWE feared that they could not really avoid altering the Protocol in this way.

MR. DE MARTINO agreed with the last speaker. The American representative should at once ask for the consent of his Government to a possible alteration of the Protocol.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it might be enough to add a few words to the Protocol stating that they only claimed a quantity of docks, dredgers, floating cranes not exceeding 400,000 tons. Such a formula would allow of all necessary arrangements with Germany without involving more serious alteration of the Protocol.

He indeed thought it difficult to sign the Protocol without altering it, since they had not stated elsewhere in writing that they would not demand 400,000 tons.

MR. BERTHELOT saw no real difficulty: a “contre-lettre” would be sufficient.

MR. DUTASTA thought this all the more possible as they had already expressly stated in the Note³ accompanying the Protocol that their claims might be reduced in order to take into account the economic difficulties facing Germany.

MR. CLEMENCEAU asked whether there was any objection to a conversation between Mr. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner with a view to inducing the latter definitely to state his point of view.

SIR EYRE CROWE would prefer that the Secretary-General should in no case state that they would if necessary accept the delivery of new material specially constructed for them.

MR. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought Mr. Dutasta might make the following statement. The inquiry which they were about to make was twofold: first there was the verification of figures, which might be fairly quickly done; then there was also the investigation of the possible effects of the execution of the Protocol on German economic life. This was a much more delicate problem, the solution of which might take much time: he thought it would be difficult to pledge themselves on the second point. On the other hand, it would be easy to reduce their demands if they had made a mistake in the facts concerning the docks of Hamburg or of Dantzig.

MR. DUTASTA also pointed out that, if they were prepared to grant a delay in delivery, the German objection based on the eventual paralysis of the economic life of the country fell through to a great extent.

MR. CLEMENCEAU suggested that as a preliminary Mr. Dutasta might state that they had requested of London that the experts might be sent speedily.

(Mr. Clemenceau withdrew and Mr. Cambon took the chair).

A note, dated 26th December, 1919, from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies was laid before the Council. (Annex A.)

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented on Marshal Foch's note. He added that there were points in the reply to the German experts to our Memorandum which could be accepted and others which did not admit of discussion. For instance, it was certain that whatever were the arrangements made between the Germans and the Poles for the evacuation of territories ceded to Poland, there was no need to await the 26th day after the coming into force of the Treaty in order to let our troop trains through; before that date at least two trains per day could run through Western Prussia. Other questions were of a more difficult nature. If they were satisfied with the four trains per day offered by the Germans, a period of twenty days would be necessary for the transport of troops for Upper Silesia and the occupation of other territories would not be completed for 40 days. He asked the council whether such a state of affairs would not have drawbacks; for his part, he thought it would. 2. Transport of Allied Troops in Plebiscite Territories

On the other hand, if they managed to run six trains per day, transports for Upper Silesia would be completed in 15 days and at the end of twenty-five days, the northern territories would have received the contingents allocated to them. Should the Council consider it necessary that the occupation troops should all be on the spot within a period of 15 days from the coming into force of the Treaty, a larger number of trains would obviously be required. However, in view of the fact that they had claimed 10 trains per day

and that the Germans offered them four, he thought they might easily demand 6.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if, at the rate of 6 trains per day, the transport of troops was effected within a period of 25 days, that was a solution which could be accepted. He would not say the same if the transports would not be completed for 40 days.

MR. DE MARTINO refused to give an opinion in the absence of his military expert, but was ready to agree with the opinion of the majority.

GENERAL WEYGAND said his opinion was that of all the military delegates who had examined the German Note together.

MR. DE MARTINO withdrew his reservation in those circumstances.

MR. CAMBON said the Council therefore invited General Weygand to demand 6 trains per day.

GENERAL WEYGAND passed on to another point: if transport began immediately on the coming into force of the Treaty and if this coming into force was close at hand, they would be obliged to mark time, owing to the special position of the British contingents which could not leave the Rhine before about January 20. Such interruption might have a bad effect on the Germans and he therefore thought it best that transport should take place without interruption. That would be possible if it began on January 8 at the rate of 4 trains per day or January 13 at the rate of 6 trains per day.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought General Weygand's scruple probably useless as it was doubtful whether the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications would be signed before January 13.

GENERAL WEYGAND asked, however, that trains might be fixed to run on January 13 if the Treaty came into force before that date. As he required 5 days to settle the final details, he also asked to be informed 5 days before the coming into force of the Treaty.

MR. CAMBON assured General Weygand that he would be informed in good time by the Secretariat-General.

GENERAL WEYGAND said there remained the question of wagons and that of the cost of transport. The Germans declared that they could supply no wagons. The French lines could supply a certain number of trucks and of flat wagons, but no passenger wagons; the men must, however, travel in heated wagons. He would add that it was morally essential that the Allied soldiers should be as well treated as the German prisoners, for whom heated passenger wagons perfectly fitted were provided. With the consent of the Council, he would therefore demand passenger wagons of the Germans.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that, if necessary, the German prisoners might wait a few days.

MR. CAMBON noted that the Council approved of this proposal.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that, with regard to the cost of transport, the Germans claimed payment at the general rates in force for goods and passenger transport. He thought this claim incredible.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it quite inadmissible.

MR. CAMBON agreed that this claim could not be accepted and that no discussion of the point by the Germans could be allowed.

It was decided that, with a view to the transport to plebiscite territories of Interallied contingents, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies should:—

1. (a) Require the German Government to run a minimum of six trains per day;

- (b) Require the German Government to supply all the passenger wagons required;

- (c) Refuse to allow these transports to be effected at the rate generally in force in Germany and demand the application of the military rate.

It was also decided that if the transport was effected at the rate of six trains per day, these trains should not begin to run before January 13, in order that it might continue uninterruptedly until the completion of the transport.

2. That the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies should be informed five days beforehand of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.

A note dated December 26, from the Naval experts was laid before the Council. (Annex B.)

After a short discussion, it was decided that the Interallied Naval Commission should come to a final decision regarding the transfer to Poland of ex-Austrian torpedo-boats, taking into consideration the views developed in Annex B. 3. Enemy Ships Allocated to Poland for Policing and Guarding the Coast

A note dated December 26, 1919, from the French and Italian naval experts was laid before the Council. (Annex "C".)

MR. LEYGUES read and commented on the Note from the French and Italian experts. 4. Conditions of Delivery of German Warships

SIR EYRE CROWE thought they were all agreed in wishing to grant the request of the French and Italian navies if possible. But the question was whether that request was in conformity with the Treaty. It had been recognized at a previous meeting that it was not and that they must content themselves with semi-official overtures to the Germans. The Joint Secretariat had formulated the Council's decision inaccurately.⁴ Under these conditions the naval experts had met again but the French navy had preferred to begin the discussion afresh. They were faced by a difficulty which they all desired to settle and he was quite prepared to consent to refer the matter once more to the legal experts, unless Mr. Fromageot who was present, could give their definite opinion at once.

MR. DE MARTINO said that the Note explained by Mr. Leygues had been drawn up in agreement with the Italian experts. He therefore

agreed with this argument.

MR. MATSUI thought that in Common sense the claim made by the Minister of Marine seemed well-founded, but Sir Eyre Crowe had rightly pointed out that the terms of the Treaty and the Protocol were so definite that a claim seemed hardly possible. He thought the question should be referred to the legal experts.

MR. LEYGUES asked Mr. Fromageot for his opinion.

MR. FROMAGEOT stated that Article 185, which, moreover, in its original form provided for the destruction of the ships, referred to Clause 23 of the Armistice Convention,⁵ which stipulated that vessels must be disarmed. Article 185 nevertheless added that the artillery must be completely re-embarked.

VICE-ADMIRAL LEVAVASSEUR pointed out that only the breeches had been re-embarked.

MR. FROMAGEOT said that disembarked material was at present in the hands of the German Government. It therefore belonged to the categories referred to in Article 192 of the Treaty. As for the five cruisers the delivery of which was provided for in the Protocol, that document certainly made no mention of Article 192 and there was no question of any destruction. It only referred to Article 185, i. e. it specified that the ships should be handed over disarmed with their artillery. The destruction of the material was doubtless not provided and the Treaty did not come into play, but if they wished to obtain the delivery of all that material, it was nevertheless necessary to alter the terms of the Protocol.

MR. LEYGUES thought Mr. Fromageot confused two ideas when he declared that material disembarked under Article 185 came under the categories referred to in Article 192. In reality, they must distinguish between three kinds of boats: (1) boats referred to in Article 185. It was not stated that material disembarked from them belonged to the German Government and would not be handed over to the Allies. Indeed, this material had only been disembarked because they mistrusted the German crews responsible for handing

over the vessels. (2) Article 190, on the other hand, specified that a certain number of ships should be left at the disposal of Germany. Article 192 concerning the destruction of excess material only referred to material disembarked from the vessels mentioned in Article 190. He thought it impossible to combine Article 185 with Article 190. Still less could they adduce Article 192 in relation to the third category of vessels, i. e. the cruisers the delivery of which was claimed by the Protocol of November 1. He would go further and would ask whether it was possible in international law to hold that a vessel should not be surrendered with all its material, unless it was expressly stated that before delivery such material should be disembarked for purposes of destruction.

MR. FROMAGEOT regretted that he could not accept the point of view of the Minister of Marine. It was indeed true that, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, a vessel must be surrendered with all its material and appliances, but Article 185 referred to by the Protocol definitely provided for the disarmament of ships to be surrendered. Article 192 seemed to have a general bearing. Nevertheless, it might be argued (he was not very convinced of the value of the argument) that the material disembarked from the vessels referred to in Article 185 was not in the hands of the German Government, since it was placed under Allied control; consequently, it would not come under the scope of Article 192.

MR. LEYGUES thought the meaning of article 192 perfectly clear; the word "in excess" contained therein clearly indicated that it applied to arms and material of all kinds disembarked from the vessels referred to in Article 190. He was quite prepared to accept a formula which would give the result he was seeking in any way whatever, but how could they prove to public opinion or a parliament that, while they left Germany armed cruisers, they allowed her to surrender disarmed boats. He thought it rather dangerous to count on verbal communications and German good will in order to attain their object. He was afraid Germany would not lose such a good opportunity to be unpleasant. He must, moreover, point out that in reality the cruisers concerned had not been disarmed.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered that all this should have been thought of when the Protocol was drafted.

MR. DE MARTINO thought it would be best if the naval experts and the drafting committee examined the question together once more.

SIR EYRE CROWE said they were faced by a purely legal problem, that of the interpretation of the Treaty. Discussion at that meeting had produced no fresh arguments; he was afraid the fresh examination by the legal experts would lead to no better results.

MR. FROMAGEOT said they would be pleased to reconsider the question, but was afraid they could reach no other solution.

SIR EYRE CROWE returned to his original suggestion. Could not Mr. Dutasta discuss the matter with Baron von Lersner since it was of no importance to the German Government, as the material would not be left to it in any case?

MR. LEYGUES thought such action would have serious draw-backs: what would be their position if the Germans refused their request, even unofficially.

SIR EYRE CROWE said the same question might be raised with regard to the Protocol. They did not pledge themselves to anything. It was merely a matter of an inquiry.

MR. CAMBON asked whether the Minister of Marine agreed that the Germans should be asked this question by Mr. Dutasta.

MR. LEYGUES said he did not agree, and asked again what their position would be in the event of a German refusal.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that if they insisted on settling the question they must then alter the protocol.

MR. CAMBON said he was struck by Mr. Leygues' argument. He was indeed afraid that unless Mr. Dutasta was successful, they would be in a worse position. They had the choice of two solutions: either a

fresh examination of the question by the legal experts, or a conversation between Mr. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner.

MR. DE MARTINO thought a conference between the naval and legal experts might be very helpful; hitherto they had deliberated separately.

MR. MATSUI agreed with this opinion.

SIR EYRE CROWE was not opposed to referring the matter to the legal experts.

It was decided that the Drafting Committee and the naval experts should examine together the conditions of surrender of German warships destined for delivery to the Allies.

An *aide-mémoire* from the Swiss Legation in France was laid before the Council, to which was annexed the Federal Decree of November 21, 1919, concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations, (Annex D) together with a note from the Drafting Committee, concerning the *aide-mémoire*. (Annex E). 5. Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations

MR. FROMAGEOT read and commented on the note of the Drafting Committee.

MR. DE MARTINO asked whether the Swiss *aide-mémoire* had been transmitted to the French Government or to the Peace Conference.

MR. FROMAGEOT replied that it had been transmitted to the French Government.

MR. CAMBON asked whether there was any need to answer it.

MR. FROMAGEOT thought there were drawbacks to leaving the Swiss arguments unanswered.

MR. CAMBON thought it better that the reply should be drafted and sent on behalf of the Conference. He proposed that the Drafting Committee should submit a draft to them.

It was decided to accept the principles developed in the Drafting Committee's note with regard to the Swiss *aide-mémoire* concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations.

It was also decided to instruct the Drafting Committee to prepare a draft reply to that *aide-mémoire*.

The meeting was adjourned.

Appendix A to HD—117

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
FRENCH REPUBLIC
PARIS, December 26, 1919.
CABINET OF THE MARSHAL No. 2,087/CRF

Note Relative to the Transportation of Governmental Commissions and Troops of Occupation Across Germany to the Territories of Eastern Germany

On December 20 the German Delegation replied to the Memorandum, presenting the proposals of the General Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, relative to the transportation of the Governmental Commissions and troops of occupation across Germany to the territories of Eastern Germany, which was received by the Delegation on November 20.

The German reply presents important modifications in the proposals of the Marshal's Staff.

The reply was examined during an Interallied Conference on December 22nd.

The examination showed that it is possible to comply with the German demands on a certain number of points, but that it is absolutely necessary to maintain the original proposals on the following points:

1.—DURATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION

We requested a total of ten trains per day on the lines other than those used by the Italian troops. Under these circumstances the transportation of the troops would require about fifteen days, and would permit us to have our troops in a position to operate within the period fixed by the Peace Treaty.

The Germans offer us four trains per day^{*} and add that these trains will be unable to cross Eastern Prussia until after the 26th day following the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. Under these conditions the time required for the transportation of the troops, properly speaking, would be about 41 days, with a blank of 7 days between the transportation to Upper-Silesia and the transportations destined for the Baltic regions[†]. This delay appears irreconcilable with the necessity to place Allied troops at the disposition of the Plebiscite Commissions of Government at the proper time.

2.—TROOP TRAINS

We requested the Germans to furnish all the material necessary (with the exception of a part of the material destined for the American transportations) namely:

5,268 Coaches	(Aside from those for the Italian Army)
720 “	(For the Italian Army)
5,988 Coaches	

The Germans contend that they are unable to furnish any coaches.

The French and Italian railway systems are, in fact, in a position to furnish an important amount of material, but no passenger coaches. Now, it is necessary that our men travel in heated passenger coaches. In the first place because the trip, which will require at least four days, will be effected in open winter in particularly cold regions, and in the second place, because the German prisoners of war will be repatriated at the same time with accommodations carefully prepared by the German Government, and it would be inadmissible to allow our men to be transported over the same lines in unheated box cars. It is to be noted, moreover, that any transaction with the

Germans relative to diminishing the number of trains utilized, will be taken as a diminution of the number of coaches necessary to carry out the transportation.

3. PAYMENT OF THE TRANSPORTATIONS

We requested that the military tariff in use in Germany to November 1, 1919, be admitted similar to its application during the transportation of the Haller Army.

The Germans offer the "General tariff in use concerning travellers and merchandise."

An estimation already made relative to the liquidation of the cost of transporting the Haller Army indicated that the two tariffs would have been (at the time of the execution of the Haller transportation) in the relation of: 1 to 4.

It seems inadmissible to accept such an increased tariff.

Therefore, the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, proposes, unless opposed by the Supreme Council of the Governments, when negotiations relative to this question are again resumed, to exact that the Germans:

1. —Furnish the daily number of trains necessary to complete the transportation of troops so that those destined for Upper Silesia will be at their destination within a period of fifteen days, and those destined for the other territories within a period of from twenty to twenty-five days.
2. —Furnish all the passenger coaches, and a part only of the other cars.
3. —Agree to the application of the military tariff to the different troop transportations.

Information as to whether the above proposals are accepted or not is respectfully requested. In the affirmative they could be used as a basis in conducting further negotiations with the German Delegates.

F. FOCH

[Annex]

Note

The number of trains bound to Upper Silesia and Teschen is: 60.

The transportation, at the rate of 4 trains a day will last $60 \div 4 = 15$ days.

The journey to reach the lines of Western Prussia lasts three days.

The last train shall reach the vicinity of these lines: the 18th day.

As the trains destined for the Baltic territories can only use these lines from the 26th day, there will be between the trains of the two series, a blank of: 7 days.

From that time, there will remain 54 trains for the Baltic territories, having yet to make a journey of at least one day.

Their passage will last $54 \div 4 = 14$ days.

Their transportation will be finished after: $26 + 14 + 1 = 41$ days.

In the above calculation, it is supposed that the transportation begins from the going into force of the Peace Treaty.

If notification were necessary from the day of going into force, the transportation, carried out according to our requests, would still last 15 days; but the notice being deducted from the above blank of 7 days, the transportation carried out according to the German proposals, would last: 41 days (duration of notice).

NOTE.—The trains containing the Commissions are supplementary.

Project

QUESTION OF THE ATTRIBUTION TO POLAND OF AUSTRIAN TORPEDO-BOATS

1. —There exist 25 former Austrian torpedo-boats (of the sea-going model, 197–246 tons) finished since 1913–14.
2. —From a political point of view, it seems undesirable that former German torpedo-boats be attributed to Poland for, flying the Polish colors, they would be obliged to stay at Dantzig.
3. —From a naval point of view, the difficulty of transferring the Austrian torpedo-boats to Dantzig still exists. There is no reason why this difficulty should be unsurmountable, although the transfer should be carried out in a favorable season.
4. —The cost of the journey should be charged to the Polish Government.
5. —Moreover, as the Serbian-Croatian-Slovanian State shall receive 12 torpedo-boats, which will very likely be chosen among the former Austro-Hungarian torpedo-boats, certain difficulties might arise between those States and Poland, with respect to the choice of the torpedo-boats for the two States.
6. —It is recommended that these reasons be communicated to the Interallied Naval Commission (I. N. C.), as this organization will be responsible for the distribution of former enemy battle-ships, and that the final decision concerning the transfer of former Austrian torpedo-boats, be entrusted to the I. N. C.

Appendix C to HD–117

DECEMBER 27 [26], 1919.

Conditions for the Delivery of German War Vessels⁶

During the session of December 24th, of the Supreme Council,⁷ Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that he did not believe that the resolution taken on December 18th⁸ relative to the cruisers to be delivered according to the protocol,^{8a} was fully in conformity with the decision of the Council. He esteems that in order to regulate this question we

must, rather than have official intervention on the part of the Control Commission, act unofficially with the Germans, through the intermediary of the General Secretariat of the Conference.

After the Allies refusal by the Allies [*sic*], any attempts of this nature appear to be destined to be unsuccessful unless we offer an advantage of some kind in exchange.

Such steps are not necessary. In our opinion the texts do not prescribe the destruction or rendering useless of the material dismantled from the ships, the delivery of which is provided for either by the Peace Treaty or by the Protocol.

Since the entire question depends on these texts, may we be permitted to examine them anew.

The first paragraph of Article 185 of the Peace Treaty provides for the delivery of the ships. Now, a battle or merchant ship is equipped with certain material suitable for the service for which it was intended, and when, after a purchase, or for any other reason, a ship is delivered, it is turned over with all material belonging to it.

The Germans cannot contend that the principal Allied and Associated Powers at the time they provided for the turning over of these ships, did not intend to claim, or would not be justified in claiming the armament material and the munitions.

It is true that Paragraph 2 of Article 185 prescribes that the ships are to be in a state of disarmament, as is also prescribed by Article XXIII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.⁹ However, this precautionary measure was taken because the ships were to be conducted to the Allied ports by the Germans, and it in no wise modifies the principle concerning the delivery, as prescribed in the first paragraph;

The arms, munitions, and war material of every kind, including the torpedoes and the mines carried in the inventory of the ships are, therefore, to be delivered at the time of delivering the ships. This material cannot be included in that referred to in Article 192, the delivery of which is to be effected with a view to destruction by the

principal Allied and Associated Powers. The powers remain free to dispose of the material of the ships which are to be turned over to them as they may deem fit.

As no provision concerning this material is made in the Peace Treaty, it does not seem that the Germans can be forced to deliver it in Allied ports, therefore, it must be taken over in Germany by the Powers concerned, or in case the Germans claim it as impossible for them to man the ships themselves, as is provided for in Article 185, it might be loaded on the ships before their departure from Germany.

For these reasons, the following text is proposed in connection with the conditions for turning over the German war vessels:

- (a) The delivery of the ships includes that of the material.
- (b) The Interallied Naval Control Commission will take all measures necessary to insure that the arms, munitions and all war material figuring in the inventory of the delivered ships will be completely turned over.
- (c) As this material no longer belongs to the German Government after the going into effect of the Treaty, it should not be included in that prescribed in Article 192 of the Peace Treaty to be destroyed or rendered useless.

Appendix D to HD-117

SWISS LEGATION IN FRANCE

[PARIS, December 18, 1919.]

*[Memorandum From the Swiss Legation Regarding Switzerland's
Joining the League of Nations]*

A) "Although the deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919, has not yet taken place and, consequently, the Swiss Federal Council has not been officially invited to declare that Switzerland will accede to the League of Nations, in conformity with the terms of Article I of the Covenant of April 28, 1919, the Swiss Federal Council has the honor to inform the Government of the French Republic that the Swiss Federal Assembly decided, on

November 21, 1919, in favor of Switzerland's entry in the League of Nations, text of which decision is annexed hereto.

“The Federal Council will make a formal declaration of the accession of Switzerland, to the Secretariat General of the League, at the proper time. However, in compliance with a desire expressed by the Commission of the Swiss National Council, the Federal Council begs to indicate at this time that, in its opinion, the vote of the people and the Swiss cantons on the Federal Bill of November 21, which will be promulgated as soon as circumstances permit, should not, necessarily, have to be operated within the time stipulated in Article I of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It would be absolutely contrary to the constitutional customs of Switzerland to submit a proposed bill to the people before its juridical bases had been established, as the realization of the League of Nations is dependent on the accession of all the States to whom the Covenant accords, in relation to their special political importance, permanent representation on the Council of the League.

“The Federal Council is convinced that a notification of the decision of the Swiss Federal Assembly, made within two months after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, will assure Switzerland, without anticipating the decision of the people and of the cantons, all the rights due a State invited to accede to the League of Nations in the capacity of original member. Switzerland is the only country in which the principle of popular vote in the question of accession to the League of Nations is a constitutional necessity, but as this principle is in entire conformity with the conception of the international regime which is the object of the League of Nations, the Federal Council is firmly convinced that Switzerland will not be placed at a disadvantage by reason of the democratic character of her constitutional law.”

B) The Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation.

“After having taken note of a message from the Federal Council, dated August 4, 1919:

“Whereas the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, recognized in particular by the Act of November 20, 1815,¹⁰ is considered, according to Article 435 of the Peace Treaty concluded on June 28, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, as an International agreement for the maintenance of peace.; and whereas, the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, according to Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations may be considered as inconsistent with none of the provisions of the said Covenant.

“Hoping that the present League of Nations will extend, in the near future, so as to become universal,

DECREES that:

I. Switzerland adheres to the Covenant of the League of Nations agreed upon on April 28, 1919, by the Peace Conference, assembled in Paris.

The provisions of the Federal Constitution concerning the promulgation of the Federal Laws shall apply to the ratification of the amendments made in the said Covenant, and to the approval of all conventions pertaining to the League of Nations.

The decisions relative to the violation [*denunciation*] of the Covenant or exclusion from the League of Nations, should be submitted to a plebiscite.

Article 121 of the Federal Constitution, concerning popular expression, is also applicable to the decisions relative to a violation [*denunciation*] of the Covenant or to exclusion from the League.

II. The present Federal decision shall be submitted to the vote of the people, as soon as the five Great Powers shall have adhered to the Covenant.

III. The Federal Council is charged with the execution of the present decision.”

Note¹¹ Relative to the Swiss Note of December 18, 1919, Concerning the Adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations¹²

C) “1. It is evident that the Swiss Note does not authorize Switzerland’s adherence to the League of Nations, as is, moreover, recognized by Switzerland herself, as she referred to an ulterior formal declaration.

“2. According to Article 1 of the Covenant, the declaration of adherence must be made without reservations. Consequently, Switzerland cannot, expressly or implicitly subordinate her adherence to a referendum, which she contends is compulsory by her constitutional law. Questions of Swiss Constitutional law, such as the necessity of a referendum, concern Switzerland only and are not of interest to the other Powers.

“3. It can be sustained that the date for the commencement of the two month period, allowed the Powers in which to make their declaration, is not necessarily connected with the ratification of the German Treaty, since the Covenant, of which the Powers can take advantage, is also incorporated in the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties, and that the entry into force of those two Treaties will doubtless be subsequent to that of the German Treaty. It is known that China, which is neither among the signatory Powers of the German Treaty nor the invited Powers, is, nevertheless, a signatory of the Covenant, by the fact that she has signed the Austrian Treaty.

“In the event that Switzerland would allow the two months following the entry into force of the German Treaty to lapse, she could still demand the delay provided for by the Covenant in the Austrian or Bulgarian Treaties, and adherence to this Covenant within the period of two months which will follow the entry into force of these Treaties.

“If, the non-adherence of Switzerland at the time of the entry into force of the German Treaty, cannot prevent the constitution of the League of Nations and the commencement of its functions, it can, on the other hand, seriously interfere with the establishment of the League at Geneva.

“4. The Swiss Note quotes April 28, 1919, as the date upon which the Covenant was adopted.

“It should be noted that the only official text is that which was signed, that is to say the text of the Treaties, and first of all, that of the German Treaty of June 28, 1919.

“5. The theses of the Swiss Note, according to which the realization of the League of Nations is dependent on the ratification of the five Principal Powers, cannot be accepted.

“On this point, it is clearly stipulated in the final clauses of the Treaty, in all its parts, inclusive of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) will enter into force for all the Powers which will have ratified at that time, upon ratification by three of the Principal Powers and Germany.

“6. The decision of the Federal Council, [text] of which was annexed to the Note from the Swiss Government, contains various considerations in its preamble concerning the relation between the adherence of the Helvetic Confederation to the League of Nations and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, as well as between Articles 21 and 435 of the Treaty.

“Regarding this question, which was the object of certain developments in the Message of the Supreme [*Federal*] Council of August 4, 1919, it would be advisable to not appear to silently acquiesce purely and simply in the views of the Federal Council, but to hold the entire question for examination and whatever solution it may be deemed proper to adopt.”

¹ Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

² HD–101, minute 1, p. 345 [*Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 17*].

³ Appendix B to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 863](#) .

⁴ See HD–113, minute 6, p. 599 [*Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 29*]; HD–116, minute 2, p. 638 [*Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 32*].

⁵ [Vol. II, p. 1](#) .

^{*} They have suggested, it is true, to effect a part of the transportation by sea, but the Allies have not the necessary ships at their disposal. [Footnote in the original.]

[†] See note hereto annexed. [Footnote in the original.]

⁶ Note from the French and Italian naval experts.

⁷ HD-116, minute 2, p. 638 [*Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 32](#)*].

⁸ HD-113, minute 6, p. 599 [*Pg. 599 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*].

^{8a} Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

⁹ [Vol. II, p. 1](#) .

¹⁰ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. III, p. 359.

¹¹ From the Drafting Committee.

¹² Appendix D, *supra*.

December 29, 10:30 a.m. (HD–118)

[34] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Monday, 29 December, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 29, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/118

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/118

HD-118

[Document 34]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the
Quai d'Orsay, Monday, 29 December, 1919, at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, December 29, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace,

Secretary
Mr. Harrison,

GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe,

Secretary
Mr. Norman

FRANCE
M. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta,
M. Berthelot,
M. De Saint Quentin.

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti,

JAPAN
Mr. Matsui,

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

GREAT BRITAIN	Captain Lothian Small
FRANCE	M. de Percin,
ITALY	M. Zanchi.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Fuller, R. N.
Cdt. MacNamara, R. N.
Mr. Malkin

FRANCE

M. Leygues,
M. Loucheur,
Marshal Foch,
Gen. Weygand,
Adl. Levavasseur,
M. Laroche,
M. Fromageot.

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero,
C. Adl. Grassi,
M. Dell'Abbadessa,
M. Pilotti,

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu,
M. Nagaoka,
Cdt. Osumi.

M. DUTASTA said that in accordance with the Council's instructions^{[1](#)} he had had a conversation on Saturday evening with Mr. von Lersner.

He had taken great pain not to commit the Council in anything whatever and to give to his conversation purely unofficial and personal character. Mr. von Lersner after hearing his exposition had told him that without committing his Government he was himself of

opinion that an immediate agreement was possible upon the basis outlined. He had also said that he would telegraph to Berlin immediately, and that he would visit him that evening. It was probable therefore that they would know immediately exactly where they stood. [1.] Conversation Between M. Dutasta and Mr. de [von] Lersner [on?] the Subject of the Protocol

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what exactly were the suggestions made by M. Dutasta to which Mr. von Lersner had agreed.

M. DUTASTA answered that he had said the Conference was ready to confirm in writing the declarations made verbally to the Head of the German Delegation in the course of the previous conversation; that he had added that the Allies would be satisfied provisionally with the 192,000 tons offered by the Germans allowing them the additional time required for handing over the remainder of the materiel. In that way they were answering the objection raised by the Germans to the effect that the immediate handing over of all the materiel claimed would imperil their economic existence. As he had said, Mr. von Lersner had shown himself satisfied on the whole with those proposals. The only objection Mr. von Lersner had made, one which, in his opinion, might easily be taken into consideration was that the date of signing the Protocol^{1a} ought to coincide with that of the coming into force of the Treaty. The Germans seemed to attach great importance to the point since that affected intimately the burning question of prisoners of war. He had considered that he might tell von Lersner that he did not anticipate any difficulty on that subject.

He had further drawn M. von Lersner's attention to the fact that the negotiations which were proceeding might be disturbed if the German Government were to send the Council a note refusing to sign the Protocol as it stood. M. von Lersner had answered that he did not know whether a note to that effect were not already on the way; if it were so it was probable that the German Press would publish it, but in any case he would not submit such a note to the President of the Conference, and he hoped that no notice would be taken of anything that might appear in the German Press.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that Mr. Dutasta's report was on the whole satisfactory. Concerning the question of sending naval experts to Germany, he had, at M. Clemenceau's request, telegraphed to London. He had received a telegram from the British Admiralty, saying that the experts who had been appointed would not be ready to start before the following day.

MR. DE MARTINO thought that there need be no difficulty in granting the German request to have the date of signing the Protocol coincide with that of the coming into force of the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they need only fix the date in such a way as to render possible the military arrangements required by the occupation of the plebiscite areas.

GENERAL WEYGAND added that certain political questions which were then being discussed by General Le Rond and the German experts relating to the conditions under which the transfer of authority would take place in the plebiscite zone, must be taken into consideration.

M. DE MARTINO considered that it would be well to advise those commissions to conclude their work as quickly as possible.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the negotiations were commencing that very day.

M. CAMBON thought if M. Dutasta's impressions were correct they might well expect the signing of the Protocol by the Germans within four or five days.

GENERAL WEYGAND was afraid that the negotiations between General Le Rond and the German experts were perhaps already finished. The General Staff of the Army itself required four or five days to prepare the transportation of troops. On the other hand, as he had already indicated to the Council there was something to be said, if a sort of hiatus between the departure of the French and the Italian troops on the one hand and of the British troops on the other were to be

avoided, for postponing the transport until about the 12th or 13th January.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it unnecessary to start the transportation of troops on the very day of the Treaty's coming into force; there was, of course, a decision of the Supreme Council to that effect,² but it was for the Council itself to modify the decision if it thought it necessary.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that there was nothing to prevent them really from delaying the transport until perhaps 10 days after the Treaty's coming into force. If that were to take place on the 3rd January, for instance, the troops might start moving on the 13th.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the General's proposal was the best procedure to adopt.

M. DUTASTA explained further that Mr. von Lersner had anticipated no objections on Germany's part to the handing over of the five light cruisers.

M. DE MARTINO asked if he might draw the Council's attention for a moment to a question that did not appear on the agenda. The Italian Delegation had just received from Klagenfurt communication of very disquieting nature. The inhabitants were dreading a *coup de main* by the Jugo-Slavs in that zone, certain number of them had even asked that a part of the Italian detachments in the neighborhood might be dispatched to Klagenfurt. It was certain that the decisions of the Conference ought to be respected and that a military operation by the Jugo-Slavs would take away all value from the proposed plebiscite. Steps ought obviously to be taken at once, therefore, if the Council did not wish to find itself confronted with a *fait accompli*. He would add that they had an Italian officer on the spot who confirmed those local reports of which he had just spoken. 2.
Situation at Klagenfurt

SIR EYRE CROWE added that the other allied governments also had officers on the spot.

M. CAMBON said that before taking any decision whatsoever it would be necessary to have fuller information. They had to deal with a nervous and divided population and it was very probable that while certain of the inhabitants complained to the Italian authorities about the activities of the Jugo-Slavs, others were addressing to Belgrade complaints of the exactly opposite nature.

M. DE MARTINO asked how they were to set about making the proposed inquiries and suggested that the President of the Conference might address the Austrian or the Jugo-Slav Government.

M. CAMBON suggested that it would be much better to ask first of all the allied officers who were on the spot their opinion on the situation.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that certain difficulties had already occurred owing to the fact that the officers whom the Allies had there seemed to consider themselves as forming an Interallied Commission that was not at all the case. They had been sent at a moment when an armistice between the Serbs and the Carinthians had to be negotiated, it was important not to allow those officers to retain the impression that they constituted a commission invested with power by the Supreme Council.

M. CAMBON suggested that in order to obviate the difficulty pointed out by Sir Eyre Crowe, it might be sufficient that each Government consult individually the officer it has on the spot.

M. DE MARTINO insisted that the Council ought not to forget how urgent the question was and that unless they acted quickly they ran the risk of finding themselves in the presence of a *fait accompli*.

M. CAMBON suggested that it was very important that in their fear of finding themselves before a *fait accompli*, they should not act in the very way in which to create one.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether they might not very well address themselves directly to M. Troumbitch and ask him frankly what truth

there was in the reports. It was certain that the Serbs had no right whatever to go to Klagenfurt, but he felt that he must say frankly that he did not give implicit faith to the reports that seemed so to disquiet their Italian colleague.

M. DE MARTINO said that further the Serbs were making restrictions upon traffic which could not be prolonged indefinitely.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that all the interested parties stopped traffic in turn. Similar complaints were raised against the Italians.

M. DE MARTINO could not believe that report was accurate. It was the Italians who were victims in the situation.

It was decided:—

1. that the Allied and Associated Governments address separately their officers on the spot a request for information about the situation in the Klagenfurt Basin, and especially about the possibility of a *coup de main* by the Jugo-Slavs.
2. that an inquiry be addressed to M. Troumbitch asking him for an explanation of the situation at Klagenfurt and of certain reports alleging that the Jugo-Slav Government intended, contrary to the decisions of the Conference, to send troops to Klagenfurt.

M. LOUCHEUR explained that para. 2 of Appendix 4 of part 8 of the Treaty dealing with reparations distinguished between 2 kinds of substitutes for the materials destroyed or removed by Germans, the one by equivalents—Para. 2 (a)—and the other by direct supply—Para. 2 (b). In para. 3 it was provided that the lists dealing with the articles mentioned in para. 2 (a) were to be supplied within the 60 days following the coming into force of the Treaty. So far there was no difficulty, but the lists dealing with Articles mentioned in Par. (b) were there required to be supplied to the Reparation Commission by the Allied and Associated Powers on the 31st December 1919 at the latest. At the same time when that had been drafted, it had been considered that the Treaty would be in force at the latest in the month of August, and that the Reparation Commission would have had several months before it to procure those lists. It was obvious

that in the existing state of things the lists could not be supplied at the time indicated as the Treaty was not yet in force and the Reparation Commission was not yet functioning. A modification was therefore necessary; but no arrangement to that effect was necessary perhaps with Germany, since it was stated in the paragraph concerned that the list had to be supplied to the Reparation Commission. Germany might claim, it was true, that if those lists did not arrive to the Reparation Commission until a date later than the 31st December 1919, its own situation was modified adversely. Personally he considered that the Reparation Commission need not consult Germany at all in order to extend the period provided for in para 3, and that the question was entirely a matter for the Allied Powers. They might, however, take advantage of the negotiations actually going on with the Germans regarding the signing of the Protocol to ask from them a declaration that they would not raise objection to the change from the period provided for in para. 3. That way of looking at it had the advantage of cutting short all later discussion. They had then alternative solutions: it was for the Council to decide between them. 3. The Time Period Provided for in Annex 4 of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that they might combine the two solutions. On the one hand they might themselves decide to prolong the period expiring on the 31st December and, on the other, communicate that decision to M. von Lersner. He thought they need not anticipate difficulty on that point.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out the Treaty of St. Germain contained the stipulation identical with that of which M. Loucheur had just spoken. The last date—31st December 1919—appeared there also. It would be necessary therefore to extend to the Treaty of St. Germain the same resolution that they were going to introduce in the Treaty of Versailles.

It was decided:

- (1) that the final date—31st December, 1919 provided for in line 2, para. 3 of Appendix IV of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles for the Allied and Associated Powers to deposit with the Reparation

- Commission the lists dealing with the articles mentioned in para. 2 (b) of the aforesaid appendix shall not in law prevent the Allied and Associated Powers from presenting those lists at a later date.
- (2) that a communication shall be made to M. von Lersner to inform him of the decision taken by the Council,
- (3) that the decision appearing in the 1st paragraph of the present resolution shall apply equally to the final date—31st December, 1919—provided for in section 2 of para. 3, Appendix IV, of Part VIII of the Treaty of St. Germain.
- (4) that a communication shall be made to the Austrian Delegation informing it of this decision taken by the Council, (para. 3 of the present resolution).

(Mr. Wallace will refer this resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government).

M. LAROCHE said that they had just received a telegram addressed to M. Clemenceau from their Ambassador at Washington from which it appeared that the President of the U. S. A. was ready to convoke the Council of the League of Nations on the first or second day after that of the coming into force of the Treaty.

4. Convocation of the First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it has also been decided that preparatory measures should be taken by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to acquaint the Governments concerned unofficially of the date arranged for the first convocation of the Council of the League of Nations in order that no delay should occur.

M. DE MARTINO thought that they must also come to an understanding as to the agenda. Certain questions were of supreme interest for Italy, that especially of reciprocal emigration in the Balkan Peninsula. It would be well that that question be placed on the agenda as the Council of the League of Nations had to nominate a commission for dealing with the application of the convention arrived at upon that subject.

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled that the agenda of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations included only 2 questions, that of

the Sarre and that of the confirmation of Powers of the existing secretariat of the League of Nations. He would also remind the Council that his Government had agreed upon the first meeting being held in Paris on the explicit condition that the agenda be limited to those questions.

MR. WALLACE asked whether the Council wished that President Wilson fix the meeting for the day after that of the coming into force of the Treaty or for the day following that. He would like to be able to give Washington a definite indication on that point.

M. CAMBON thought it would be necessary to examine that question anew in the presence of M. Clemenceau.

M. DE MARTINO suggested that it would be well for them to ask whether it was really necessary to limit the agenda of the first meeting so strictly.

M. MANTOUX explained that the Secretariat of the League of Nations had examined the question of the time of its convocation. If the existing agenda were maintained there would be no objection to the first meeting being held on the first or second day after the Treaty's coming into force. But if the agenda were to be extended, it would become necessary to consider a more distant date.

M. LAROCHE explained that in submitting M. Jusserand's telegram to the Council, they had not intended to open debate the more especially as M. Clemenceau did not yet know of the telegram.

M. CAMBON believed that it would indeed be necessary to resume the discussion of that question at a later date—(further discussion was, therefore, postponed).

MR. FROMAGEOT explained the conditions under which this question had been referred for examination to the Drafting Committee and the Naval experts, and he commented upon the Drafting Committee's note which appears as Appendix "A". 5. Conditions of Surrender of the Ships Demanded From Germany

MR. LEYGUES read a note drafted by the Naval experts of the French Delegation. (Appendix “B”).

He added that he did not wish to insist upon the arguments he had already presented on this question, but the affair had been examined in all its details and might be considered as fully elucidated. He would however remark that in Article 185 of the Treaty of Versailles, there was no question of the destruction of the materiel of the vessels which were to be handed over. It was wrong in that connection to invoke Article 192 as the protocol referred exclusively to Article 185 and to that alone. He had not any intention to read into the text of the Treaty a sense contrary to what it really signified. He adhered strictly to the letter of Article 185 in which there was no mention of destruction. If Article 192 could be quoted against his reading, it ought to have been mentioned in the protocol.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this was the third [*fourth?*] time the same question had come before the Council.³ Always the same arguments were invoked and the same conclusions drawn. He had found nothing really new in Mr. Fromageot’s exposition and in the remarks of Mr. Leygues. He himself adhered to his opinion namely that the text of the Treaty was explicit. The Council was committed to the texts that it had signed. It was easy to see that the Chairman of the Drafting Committee himself believed that the meaning of the Treaty was unambiguous. He believed that every impartial reader of the Treaty must conclude that they were obliged to carry out destruction of materiel of the ships alluded to in the Treaty. He had no doubt that by recourse to subtle and ingenious argument they could manage to read into the texts under discussion a sense contrary to that they signified. His naval and legal experts, thought, as did he himself, that there could be no possible doubt about the interpretation of the Articles in question. They were bound by Article 192. It was perfectly true, as the Minister of Marine had said, that the protocol referred explicitly only to Article 185. That Article did not speak of the destruction of materiel, but it did say clearly that the ships must be handed over disarmed. Now Mr. Leygues was asking precisely that their armament be left on them, a demand which was exactly contrary to the text of Article 185.

He considered that a very clear distinction had to be made between the ships, the surrender of which was required under the Treaty and those alluded to in the Protocol. The fate of the former could be altered only by a modification made in the Treaty which would require not only the approval of all the Allied Powers but also, as he believed, Germany's. The first time that that question had been raised, it had been decided on Mr. Clemenceau's suggestion that they must adhere strictly to the Treaty. He himself saw that the gravest inconvenience must result from any change from that point of view. So far as concerned the ships whose surrender was required by the Protocol, the question presented itself differently. He thought that it would be comparatively easy to obtain the German delegation's approval upon that point. For indeed, their demand was reasonable, it imposed no new burden on the Germans, and it was easy to combine that demand with the concessions which on the other points raised in the protocol they had already decided to make to the Germans. Under the circumstances, he thought that they need not expect to meet great difficulty from the Germans. If, nevertheless, difficulties did occur, they had still another card to play. The Germans had some time before asked permission to retain, in addition to the number of sailors provided for in the Treaty, supplementary crews to man their service of minesweepers. The Council had decided to accede to that request without, however, having acquainted the Germans.⁴ The moment seemed to him therefore to have arrived for availing themselves of that concession. If the Germans were to create difficulty on the question of the armament of the cruisers, they could tell them that they refused their demand for additional crews for minesweepers. It was greatly to the interest of the Germans that their own request be granted, and they had, on the other hand, no interest whatever in refusing the Allied request. He thought that in those circumstances, there was no doubt about the reply they would make. By addressing the Germans frankly they would be following a straight a [*and*] honest path and he did not doubt that that would lead them to the goal they had in view.

MR. DE MARTINO said that in agreement with the opinion of Admiral Grassi he supported the views expounded by Mr. Leygues.

MR. MATSUI recognized the inconvenience to France and Italy of having the German vessels handed over stripped of their munitions and armament. Nevertheless, after having himself personally examined the question, he found it difficult to adopt the legal interpretation proposed by Mr. Leygues, and he thought with Sir Eyre Crowe that they were bound by the text of the Treaty, which seemed explicit.

Mr. CAMBON believed that the proposition formulated by Sir Eyre Crowe offered many advantages and that upon it they could arrive at general agreement. He would ask Mr. Leygues if he would consent to fall into agreement with that.

MR. LEYGUES could not help still thinking that the point of view which he had explained was in agreement with legal truth, but he did not wish to prolong the discussion indefinitely, and was quite ready to support the British proposal if that were certain to be the practical means of reaching the desired end. He continued to believe, however, that very possibly the German reply would be a refusal. What he was anxious for was to obtain guarantees that the negotiations would succeed.

MR. CAMBON suggested that if they proposed to make concessions to the Germans in exchange for the one they had asked, there was a great chance of succeeding. It was the old method of "do ut des" which was the A. B. C. of diplomacy. They might well, while reserving the question of principle, get the Secretary General to make an unofficial advance to the Germans in the manner suggested by Sir Eyre Crowe.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that it would be all the easier for the Secretary-General of the Conference to broach the question with Mr. von Lersner in that the latter had said that Germany would probably make no difficulty about the surrender of the five light cruisers demanded by the protocol.

MR. LEYGUES said that he supported Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal if it were understood that the question of principle regarding the interpretation of Articles 185 and 192 of the Treaty of Versailles

remained intact and was not decided in one sense or another by the Supreme Council. It might be raised again in the event of the unofficial *pourparlers* with the Germans not arriving at a solution satisfactory to the French and Italian natives [*navies*].

It was decided:

1. That, without prejudice to the general question of the interpretation of Article 185 and 192 of the Treaty of Versailles, Mr. Dutasta should negotiate unofficially with Mr. von Lersner with a view to obtaining agreement that the five light cruisers to be surrendered under the protocol should be handed over with their munitions and armament complete.
2. That Mr. Dutasta be authorized, should he consider it absolutely necessary, to let von Lersner know that if that request were admitted by the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers were disposed in exchange to authorize Germany to retain in addition to the total number of seamen provided for by the Treaty a certain number of crews for her mine sweeper service.
3. That in the event of the *pourparlers* undertaken by Mr. Dutasta not arriving at a satisfactory result, the whole question would come before the Council again.
4. That the present resolution annul the resolutions upon the same subject agreed upon at the meetings of the 18th and 20th December.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

The Council had before it a Note by Marshal Foch dated 25th December (Appendix "C").

MARSHAL FOCH told the Council that General Niessel, who had been sent by the Council to the Baltic Provinces to ensure the evacuation of those provinces by the German troops, had step by step fulfilled his Mission. Meanwhile the fate of the army of General Yudenitch who had been thrown back upon the Esthonian territory was becoming tragic on account of the difficulties which had cropped up between General Yudenitch and the Esthonian Government. In a

note of the 28th November, he had asked the Supreme Council whether it were not expedient to adopt in Esthonia a policy analogous to that which had produced such excellent results in Courland.⁵ It was a matter of re-establishing good relations between the Esthonians and Yudenitch's troops in order to set up in those regions which were most particularly threatened by the stress of revolution, a barrier against the Bolshevik forces. On the 1st December the Council had replied to his communication that the Mission entrusted to General Niessel was purely military and that there could, therefore, be no question of giving it a political nature.⁶

6. The Proposed Mission of General Niessel to Reval

Since the date of that reply of the Supreme Council the question of Courland had been settled to their entire satisfaction. He had proposed anew in a Note of 14th December that General Niessel should be sent to Reval to try and establish an understanding between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenitch.⁷ The question was all the more pressing since the army of Yudenitch was daily going more and more quickly to pieces. The movement [*moment?*] for action seemed favorable seeing that the negotiations between the Esthonian Government and the Soviets had just been broken off as a result of the extravagant claims of the Bolsheviks. The hour seemed to have come for taking steps if the Council were to remain faithful to the policy it [*that?*] had been already formulated, that, namely, which consisted in establishing in the Baltic Provinces a barrier against the Bolsheviks. In order to realize that policy, it was important to constitute a group in which the Lithuanians and the Letts would take part, as well as the Esthonians whose situation was more particularly threatened. General Niessel, having completed his mission, was on his way back. He had telegraphed to the General to await new instructions at Berlin; it appeared to him that General Niessel was indicated as the agent of the policy he had just defined. In his opinion it was essential to send to the spot representatives of the powers who could arrest the steady decomposition of the Yudenitch Army and make some use of the debris. It was urgent to come to a decision on the matter because of the disquieting situation in Esthonia, and also in order to take advantage of General Niessel's

stay in Berlin, as he could easily be sent from Germany into Esthonia.

MR. WALLACE said that he would transmit Marshal Foch's proposals to his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that on that question he did not have full powers and must ask for instructions from his Government. The Russian question was indeed a very delicate one.

MR. DE MARTINO stated that he also would consult his Government.

MR. MATSUI said that he would do likewise.

MR. CAMBON said that he would do likewise.

MR. CAMBON summed up saying that Marshal Foch had rightly shown how urgent it was to come to a decision. He hoped that the Governments consulted would let their answers be known by telegram and as soon as possible.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if they were not empowered to take active steps at once in Esthonia, it was nevertheless necessary to have on the spot an intelligence agent, and General Niessel was obviously fitted to fulfil that role.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that he could not agree to the proposal even in that form without first having instructions. They had, for that matter British agents in Esthonia.

MR. CAMBON insisted that under those circumstances the answers of the several Governments ought to be obtained quickly.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he intended telegraphing to General Niessel to return to Paris, where he could be sent into the Baltic Provinces if the Council were to decide later that that were necessary. He felt that he ought to draw the Council's attention to the particularly happy way that General Niessel had acquitted himself in the Mission it had entrusted to him. He thought that the Conference might like to express to him its satisfaction.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he wished to support what the Marshal had just said; he did it all the more gladly since the task entrusted to General Niessel had been particularly delicate and since many of them at the moment of the General's departure had believed his Mission doomed to failure.

MR. DE MARTINO associated himself heartily with the words of Marshal Foch and Sir Eyre Crowe.

It was decided:

To entrust the Secretary-General of the Conference to communicate to General Niessel the following resolution of the Supreme Council;

“The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers expresses to General Niessel its complete satisfaction with the remarkable way in which he acquitted himself in the particularly difficult and delicate Mission which was entrusted to him in the Baltic Provinces as well as with the entirely successful results which he obtained.”

MR. FROMAGEOT commented upon a Note of the Drafting Committee on that question (Appendix “D”).

MR. CAMBON stated that as concerned the question raised by the special situation of the German Minister at Caracas, he thought that they would all agree in considering that that diplomat ought not to be recognized by their diplomatic agent until he had offered new letters of credence. It would be well to ask the Allied representatives to take the matter up with the Government of Venezuela. They could telegraph to their representatives asking them to take united action with the Government of Caracas.

7. The Rank of German Diplomatic Agents in Neutral Countries

MR. LAROCHE suggested that they should send a telegram saying that the Supreme Council had examined the question raised by the irregular situation of the German Minister at Caracas and instructing

their representatives to abstain, so long as that situation remained unchanged, from taking part in any meeting of the diplomatic corps at which the German Minister was present. Other Delegations ought to ensure that similar instructions be sent to Caracas at the earliest possible moment. There was no time to lose; it was already the 29th December, and it was desirable that those instructions arrive before the diplomatic reception on the 1st January.

MR. CAMBON said that upon the second point which the Drafting Committee had examined he agreed entirely with the opinion that it had expressed. However disagreeable it might be for them to see a German representative occupy the rank of Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, they could not well go against the rule established by international custom.

MR. DE MARTINO said that that was also his opinion.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he too was in agreement with the President:

It was decided:

1. That each Delegation ask its Government to send instructions to its representative at Caracas instructing him to point out to the Venezuelan Government the irregular situation of the German Minister at Caracas, inasmuch as his letters of credence were granted by the old Imperial Government, and instructing the representatives to abstain so long as the German Minister had not received new and regular letters of credence from taking part in any meeting of the Diplomatic Corps at which the German Minister was present.
2. To raise no objection to the rank already reached by German Diplomatic Agents in neutral countries.

Mr. Wallace would refer the above resolution to Washington for instructions of his Government.

The meeting was adjourned.

Appendix A to HD–118

Note From the Drafting Committee Relative to the Conditions Covering the Delivery of German Ships

It is evident primarily that Germany, aside from the materiel left to her, must deliver all material whether it belongs or not to the cruisers to be handed over; that is, whether it belongs to cruisers to be delivered in execution of the Treaty as [*or?*] those to be delivered in execution of the Protocol.^{[8](#)}

The question arises as to whether, after the delivery of the materiel, Germany is justified in demanding its destruction.

According to certain members of the Committee, any demands on the part of Germany would in this case be without foundation for the following reasons:

1. —In the first place, it may be argued that upon complete delivery of the materiel, Article 192 becomes annulled as far as Germany is concerned, and its destruction is a measure which concerns the Principal Powers exclusively and is no affair of Germany's. On this basis, a German [*demand?*] would be inadmissible.
2. —Even admitting that Article 192 intended to establish Germany's right to demand destruction, it could be held that Article 185, 1—by stipulating that this or that ship is to be “delivered”, provides for the delivery of the ships and all their armament, that is, their materiel. Article 183, 2—by stipulating that these ships are to be in a state of disarmament does not impose any restriction in the obligation to deliver but only indicates in what condition the ships should be delivered, and does not imply any reduction in the armament or materiel to be delivered.

If it were otherwise, it would be difficult to see why, referring to the ships now interned in neutral ports, Article 184 should provide for their delivery inclusive of material. The solution to the question should be the same in both cases. Consequently, the material referred to here does not come under the provision for destruction as

provided in Article 192, and any claims made by Germany under this head would be unjustified.

Certain members of the Committee, on the contrary believe that the texts of the Treaty and the Protocol (which refers to the Treaty) [and?] the arguments above referred to would not be sufficiently strong to reply successfully to an objection on the part of Germany. On the other hand, concerning the five cruisers to be delivered in execution of the Protocol, the difficulty could be solved by means of an interpretative note of the said Protocol.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

DECEMBER 27, 1919.
Appendix B to HD-118

PARIS, December 29, 1919.

Note as to the Material Taken From German Warships⁹

It appears from the exchange of opinions which took place before the Council¹⁰ as well as from the Drafting Committee's note of December 27th, that:

- 1) It is possible to consider as not being part of the material referred to in Article 192 of the Treaty, which was to be broken up, the material disembarked from ships the delivery of which is prescribed by the Treaty of Peace as well as by the Protocol of November 1st.¹¹
- 2) This is possible without changing the texts and without asking the Germans, in advance, whether they consent to this material not being destroyed.
- 3) As any written or oral request on the part of the Allies would certainly meet with a refusal, on the part of the Germans, it is better to refrain from taking any steps in this direction.

These considerations would allow each of the five Great Powers to bring to their ports the material and the munitions of the ships

attributed to them. In view of the fact that the preceding propositions refer only to the light cruisers and destroyers which were not to be broken up, it is proposed that the resolutions of December 18th and 20th be modified as follows:

“The Interallied Naval Mission of Control will take the necessary measures to ensure that the material belonging to the light cruisers and destroyers which were not to be broken up, be delivered in full and not destroyed”.

Appendix C to HD-118

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

GENERAL ALLIED HEADQUARTERS,
General Staff December 25, 1919.

1* Section

From: Marshal Foch,

To: Mr. Clemenceau.

After the interview I had with you on Dec. 24, I received a telegram informing me that General Niessel has probably left Riga on Dec. 22, for Berlin.

Consequently, I am sending to General Niessel in Berlin, a confirmation of the telegram which I sent him on the 23rd to Riga, to order him to limit his intervention concerning the reparations claimed from the German Government, by the Lithuanian and Lettich Governments.

Moreover, I invite him to wait in Berlin, instead of in Riga, for any ulterior instructions which might eventually order him to Reval, in case the Supreme Council should deem it necessary to entrust him with negotiations with the Esthonian Government, for the settlement of the question of the Youdenitch Army.

[Annex]

Telegram

STOCKHOLM, December 22, 1919, 2 p.m.
Received on 23rd, at 7 p.m.

I have just received from Riga, dated yesterday, the following telegram:

“Diplomatic No. 107.

1—General Youdenitch went back this afternoon, after having failed in his negotiations.

The Government is very displeased with the Esthonians, who refuse to permit the cession to Latvia of the material of the North West Army.

2—General Niessel intends to leave tomorrow night, Monday. He has had here the best reception, and has produced (omission) a deep and favorable impression.

3—General Turner of the Interallied Mission will remain at Riga as Chief of the English Military Missions.”

DELAVAUD¹²

Appendix D to HD-118

DECEMBER 24, 1919.

*Note From Drafting Committee to Supreme Council Relative [to]
German Diplomatic Representatives in Neutral Countries*

From: Drafting Committee.

To: Supreme Council.

GERMAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

The Supreme Council decided, July 25, 1919,¹³ to invite Germany to “furnish new credentials to those of her diplomatic agents, accredited abroad by the former Imperial Government, at present in function”.

1. The Minister of France at Caracas advises that the German Minister to Venezuela is an agent accredited by the former Imperial Government (in whose favor he is continuing his propaganda) and he has never presented any credentials from the new German Government.

Regarding this point, it is evident that the German minister, representing a fallen sovereign, cannot legally be considered the German representative to Venezuela. An observation to the effect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Venezuela would legally be justified.

2. The question has arisen as to whether German diplomatic agents, accredited by the former Imperial Government but having presented credentials from the new government, can take advantage of the seniority acquired by means of their former credentials. This point is of interest in the recognition of the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.

Hitherto, according to diplomatic rules and practices, new credentials, of the same rank, have been recognized as not modifying the seniority acquired by the priority of the first reception.

The instructions of the Secretary of State of the United States of May 27, 1886 (IV, Moore’s Digest, p. 734) are to this effect, and authors on the subject express the same opinion.

After the Russian Revolution, new credentials were presented by the Russian Ambassador in Paris who still holds the rank acquired in seniority.

The thesis that Germany of today is different from the former Russian Empire, would be dangerous, owing to the consequences that could be deducted from it.

Under those conditions, the Drafting Committee is unanimously of the opinion that a protest from the Allied and Associated Powers regarding the rank, acquired by seniority, of German diplomatic agents, in neutral capitals would not be opportune.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRY FROMAGEOT

¹ See HD–117, minute 1, p. 666 [*Pg. 666 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].

^{1a} Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

² HD–72, minute 1, [ibid., p. 684](#) .

³ See HD–113, minute 6, p. 599 [*Pg. 599 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*]; HD–114, minute 3, p. 613 [*Pg. 613 is part of [Doc. 30](#)*]; HD–117, minute 4, p. 672 [*Pg. 672 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].

⁴ HD–105, minute 1, p. 448 [*Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 21](#)*].

⁵ Appendix E to HD–103, p. 407 [*Pg. 407 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

⁶ HD–103, minute 3, p. 389 [*Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 19](#)*].

⁷ Appendix A to HD–113, p. 604 [*Pg. 604 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*].

⁸ Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

⁹ Drafted by the naval experts of the French Delegation.

¹⁰ HD–113, minute 6, p. 599 [*Pg. 599 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*]; HD–114, minute 3, p. 613 [*Pg. 613 is part of [Doc. 30](#)*]; HD–117, minute 4, p. 672 [*Pg. 672 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].

¹¹ Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

¹² Louis Charles Delavaud, French Minister at Stockholm.

¹³ HD–13, minute 17, and appendices L and M, [vol. VII, pp. 268](#) , [301](#) , and [302](#) .

December 30, 10:30 a.m. (HD-119)

[35] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, December 30, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 30, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/119

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/119

HD-119

[Document 35]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, December 30, 1919, at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, December 30, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau

Secretaries
M. Dutasta,
M. Berthelot,
M. Arnavon,
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. De Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain Lothian Small,
FRANCE	M. Massigli,
ITALY	M. Zanchi.
<i>Interpreter</i> —M. Mantoux	

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. Fuller, R. N.
Cdt. MacNamara, R. N.
Mr. Malkin.

FRANCE

M. Loucheur
M. Cambon
Marshal Foch
Gen. Weygand
Gen. Le Rond
M. Laroche
M. Serruys
M. Fromageot
Capt. Roper

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero
C. Adl. Grassi
M. Pilotti

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka

MR. DUTASTA told the Council that in company with Mr. Loucheur he had had a visit on the previous day from Mr. von Lersner. From statements made to him by the President of the German Delegation it appeared that the Germans were ready to sign the protocol¹ as it stood; the signature would coincide with the exchange of ratifications. Those instruments once signed, the Supreme Council

would submit to Mr. von Lersner a letter declaring the undertaking given by the German Delegation to surrender without delay 192,000 tons of docks, and agreeing, for the surrender of the remainder over a period of from two to three years. Mr. von Lersner had tried to bargain about the handing over the five cruisers required by the protocol. Confronted by the categorical statements made by Mr. Loucheur and himself on the utter impossibility for the Allies of allowing any discussion of that subject, the President of the German Delegation had not insisted. He had, on the other hand, asked for certain precision on the method of calculating the tonnage still to be surrendered. On that point, a certain ambiguity seemed to remain in his mind, and then Mr. Loucheur took part in the discussion in order to remove it. 1. Conversation of 29th December Between Mr. Dutasta and Mr. von Lersner

MR. LOUCHEUR explained that in Mr. von Lersner's telegram to his Government, the text of which he had communicated to Mr. Dutasta and himself, he had said in effect that if it were shown that there actually existed at Hamburg and at Dantzig a deficit of 180,000 tons as compared with the figure appearing on the lists of the Allied experts, the Allied demands would be reduced by that amount of tonnage. Such a formula might well have been a source of misunderstanding. As a matter of fact, while it was possible that Allied experts were mistaken to the extent of 130,000 tons they had on the other hand established in conformity with the figures submitted by the German Delegates the existence of 80,000 tons about which, apart from those figures, they had been ignorant. He had thought it well, therefore, to make clear the position taken by the Allies; the demand for 400,000 tons by the Allies had been based upon an inventory established by them according to which Germany possessed on the 1st November a total tonnage of x tons. The German experts had furnished a statement which are still to be verified and which represented a lower figure— y tons. From the 400,000 tons claimed by the Allies they would deduct the difference $x-y$ or more exactly the difference really established after verification.

MR. DUTASTA stated that as a result of their conversation they had drafted a letter which after the exchange of signatures would be

addressed to the President of the German Delegation and of which he would of course have previous acquaintance. The draft was as follows. (Mr. Dutasta then read the draft letter which appears as Appendix A.)

SIR EYRE CROWE saw some disadvantage in saying that there would be granted to the German Government for the surrender of the required tonnage a period of from two to three years: it would be better he thought to be a little more precise.

MR. LOUCHEUR agreed and said that the text he proposed was as follows:

There will be granted to the German Government for the delivery of the sum total tonnage a period not to exceed two years.

SIR EYRE CROWE accepted that text and suggested that it would be well not to leave the task of determining the tonnage to be surrendered to the Reparation Commission alone; would it not be well to specify that the Naval experts should be heard.

MR. LOUCHEUR thought indeed that the matter could be decided between these (and on the following day the Reparation Commission would be notified). But there would be no advantage whatever in stating that specifically in the letter to be addressed to Mr. von Lersner.

SIR EYRE CROWE concluded that the conversation just reported to the Council had had a result even more favourable than they had hoped for.

It was decided:

- (1) That after the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles and the signing by the Representatives of the German Government of the protocol of the 1st November, the President of the Peace Conference shall address to the President of the German Delegation in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers the letter the draft of which appears in Appendix B.

(2) That the Reparation Commission in fixing the tonnage of floating docks &c. to be handed over by the German Government as reparation for the Scapa Flow incident, and in fixing also the 192,000 tons of which the German Government proposed delivery, shall take the opinion of the Naval Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

The Council had before it a Note from the British Delegation on the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission within the area occupied by American troops. (Appendix "C").

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon the British Note. 2. The Jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission

MR. CLEMENCEAU thought it quite impossible that the territories occupied by American troops should be without the jurisdiction of the High Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it probable that the American command would accept an arrangement by which it recognized the jurisdiction of the Commission, it being understood that America would have an unofficial place on that body.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that in fact there were only two possible hypotheses: either the American troops were on the Rhine as a conquering army or they were there as a result of an Inter-Allied agreement and because America had its place in the concert of the Allies. It was obviously the second hypothesis which was the true one.

MARSHAL FOCH said that a question of principle dominated the whole situation. So long as the armistice regime lasted, the whole of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine were placed under common jurisdiction. The day the peace treaty came into force and on which therefore the armistice regime ended that common jurisdiction disappeared, but that was only in order to give place to another

jurisdiction which extended equally over the territories of the left bank.

MR. CLEMENCEAU thought that they ought to come to a decision. If their decision gave rise to objection on the part of the American Government, that Government would communicate their decision.

It was decided:

That on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission will extend over all the territories on the left bank including those at present occupied by the American troops.

(Mr. Wallace will refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

GENERAL WEYGAND told the Council that on a previous day he had had a long meeting with the German Delegates in order to arrange the conditions of the transport of Allied troops in the territories submitted to plebiscite. At a previous meeting, the Council had indicated to him on what points concessions were possible and upon what others he ought to make none.² On the matter of the number of trains that should be run each day he had, conforming to the Council's instructions, demanded six. The German Delegates had declared that in principle they were willing to grant that number; they required, however approval from Berlin. On the matter of transport in Western Prussia, the German Delegation had likewise declared itself ready to examine their demands and he thought that it would agree to them. It had nevertheless pointed out that from the 12th day and as a result of special arrangements come to between Germany and Poland, the Poles would have taken possession of Western Prussia. The German Delegation considered therefore that the Polish Government ought to take its share in supplying the transports and stores necessary. There was obviously a complication since it would be necessary to appeal to the Polish experts, but that was a difficulty in detail which they could easily overcome. In the third place, Germany agreed to supply the passenger carriages

necessary for the transport under the reserve that the Allies furnish part of the remainder of the material; they had come to an agreement about that condition. The German Delegation however had asked it to be recorded on the *procès-verbal* that they formulated reservations on the possibility of Germany's furnishing the number of carriages demanded. There remained the question of the payment for the transport. On that point, he had not received a sufficiently satisfactory result, and the German Delegates had appeared to be decided not to yield; they alleged that a law of the Empire stipulated that in time of peace the military tariff could be applied only to the transport of German troops; a new law would therefore be necessary. He had replied that they had only to pass such a law. The Germans refused to say [*pay?*] anything whatever on the transport of troops going to Dantzic and Memel, territories purely and simply taken away from them. As for plebiscite areas they were ready to advance the cost of transport [;] if the plebiscite were favourable to Germany, the question would be by that very fact decided; if not, the administration of the German railways would demand from the beneficiary states repayment at full tariff of the cost of transport. 3. Allied Contingents in the Plebiscite Areas

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether they could calculate approximately the difference between those two tariffs.

GENERAL WEYGAND gave the information that the proportion was as 4 or 5 to 1. On that point he required definite instructions from the Council. Should he adhere to his position or leave the matter over in favour of the Reparation Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE doubted whether the Reparation Commission was competent; further the question affected rather Poland and Denmark.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed; it was obvious (and that was what annoyed him) that they were playing with the finances of Denmark and Poland.

MARSHAL FOCH considered that they might lay it down as a principle that Allied troops would be transported on the same terms as

German troops since they were crossing Germany after agreement with the German Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE believed that the Marshal was right. No bargaining was possible on that point.

GENERAL WEYGAND considered that in those circumstances he would maintain his original demands, avoiding naturally anything which might embitter the discussion; he would give an account of the results obtained.

In the course of the discussion with the President of the German Delegation, Counsellor of Embassy, Göppert, had asked what were the exact numbers of troops to be sent into the Plebiscite areas. He had said (and that indeed had determined the reply) that Mr. Berthelot in the previous conversation had not felt that he ought to give that information. The General had therefore not satisfied his curiosity. Ought he to do it.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the General himself saw any objection to doing so.

MARSHAL FOCH thought it all the easier to give the information since the Germans knew the number of trains required of them, and consequently they would not find it difficult to calculate the numbers of the occupying troops.

GENERAL WEYGAND concluded that Mr. Göppert had raised finally a question of principle on the subject of the occupation of the territories of Allenstein: he had emphasized that the Treaty had not provided for sending Allied contingents into that zone and added that the German Government was in a position to assure the maintenance of order; his [*he?*] would not object, however, to a Government force of one battalion being sent there to ensure the safety of the Allied Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked how many battalions they had anticipated sending for the occupation of Allenstein.

GENERAL WEYGAND answered that four battalions had been intended.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that it was hardly permissible to allow the German Government to maintain troops in an area subject to plebiscite, and thought that the Council should adhere to its previous decisions.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that he was of the same opinion.

It was decided:

- (1) that, in his negotiations with the German technical experts, the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, shall maintain his demand that the transport of Allied troops to plebiscite areas, as also to Dantzig and Memel, be on the conditions laid down in the German military tariff;
- (2) that the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, is authorized to make known to the German delegates, the number of troops provided for the occupation of plebiscite areas;
- (3) that he will notify those delegates the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers to have the Allenstein territory occupied by interallied contingents.

MR. CLEMENCEAU made the proposal to the Council to fix then the date of the coming into force of the Treaty; for his part, he thought of the 7th or 8th of January.

GENERAL WEYGAND remarked that, in any case, the transports would commence only on the 13th. 4. Date of the Coming Into Force of the Treaty of Versailles

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the President had in mind sending an ultimatum to Germany about the date.

MR. CLEMENCEAU replied that he had not. Mr. Dutasta could propose to Mr. von Lersner the 8th of January for the exchange of ratifications; that having been agreed to, he would tell the German Delegation officially the date chosen.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in those circumstances the earlier date should be chosen; they might as well decide on the 7th as on the 8th.

MR. DE MARTINO was of that opinion and said that it was understood that the treaty came into force on the day of the deposit of ratifications.

MR. CLEMENCEAU agreed and said that there was no objection to the date of the 5th being decided upon. If that was too early the 7th might be selected.

It was decided that the Secretary General of the Peace Conference should inquire of the President of the German Delegation whether he was prepared to sign the Minutes of the deposition of ratifications on the 5th of January.

In case that date were too early the depositions of ratifications would take place on the 7th or, at the latest, on the 8th of January.

At this point Mr. Clemenceau retired and Mr. Cambon took the chair.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this question had been adjourned on the previous day owing to the absence of the President.³ As Monsieur Clemenceau had just left it seemed to him again difficult to discuss it then. Nevertheless he wished to state that he had inquired of his Government regarding the Agenda of the first meeting of the Council. The opinion in London was that only the nomination of the Delimitation Commission of the Saare should appear on the Agenda but perhaps the views of his Government had since changed in view of the imminent visit of British Cabinet Ministers to Paris. 5.

Summoning of the First Meeting of the league of Nations

MR. BERTHELOT believed that Sir Eric Drummond would prefer that the first meeting of the Council should not take place on the day after the entry into force of the Treaty. Sir Eric Drummond in fact wished to give this meeting a solemn character and desired that the Council should not meet until eight or ten days after the entry into force of the Treaty so that he might make due preparation.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether such delay would be in any way inconvenient.

MR. BERTHELOT replied that this delay would not be inconvenient if the only item on the Agenda were to be the Delimitation Commission of the Saar though he regretted that it was not possible to nominate immediately the Government Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that, in any case, if the Treaty were to come into force on the 5th of January no time was to be lost and this question would have to be settled on the following day.

The Council had before it a Note of the German Delegation dated October 16, 1919, (Annex D) and a note of the Drafting Committee dated December 24, 1919 (Annex E).

MR. BERTHELOT commented on the note of the German Delegation and on that of the Drafting Committee. He added that the Drafting Committee were unanimous in their opinion that the interpretation given to Article 109 of the Treaty of Peace by the Belgian General commanding the Fourth Zone, General Michel, was erroneous. 6. Voting Rights in Schleswig

SIR EYRE CROWE concurred in the opinion of the Drafting Committee, and thought that it should be communicated to the Military authorities concerned.

MR. CAMBON said that the necessary instructions would be given.

It was decided that the Allied Authorities of the Territories of the left bank of the Rhine should be informed that persons born in Schleswig and domiciled outside the zone of the plebiscite could, according to the Treaty, claim a right to vote.

Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

The Council had before it draft instructions for dispatch to General Mastermann, President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control at Berlin, dated December 24, 1919. (Appendix F). 7. Instructions to the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Berlin

After a short discussion it was decided to approve the draft instructions to be sent to the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Berlin. (Appendix F.)

The Council had before it a letter of the Serbo-Croate-Slovene Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference dated December 12, 1919 (Annex G) and of a letter of the Secretary General of the Economic Commission to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference dated December 27, 1919. (Annex H). 8. Modifications in the Economic Clauses of the Treaty With Hungary Requested by the Serbo-Croate-Slovene Delegation

MR. SERRUYS read out and commented on the note of the Economic Commission. He added that since the note of December 27 now before the Council had been drafted, the Italian Delegation had withdrawn its adhesion to the conclusions in this note and had brought forward a serious objection thereto. The Italian Delegation drew attention to the fact that if the Articles in the Hungarian Treaty corresponding respectively to Article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles and to Article 211 of the Treaty of St. Germain were to be modified, the Hungarian State might have to bear a heavy burden inasmuch as the repurchases of the entails (*majorats*) would apply equally to the territories ceded to Roumania. In those circumstances the Italian representatives thought that the question chiefly concerned the Reparation Commission because the solution proposed would be tantamount to granting to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State a real priority in the matter of reparations. The Economic Commission therefore thought that it ought to propose to the Supreme Council that the whole matter including the Commission's own suggestions should be referred to the Reparation Commission for examination.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether the proposals of the Economic Commission would have the effect of modifying in any way the Treaty with Germany or the Treaty with Austria.

MR. SERRUYS replied in the negative.

MR. DE MARTINO said that if the matter were simply one of referring the whole question to the Reparation Commission, he was quite

agreeable. But if it were necessary for him to express an opinion, he would have to reserve it on account of the absence of his technical advisers.

MR. CAMBON observed that there was no need to express any opinion.

It was decided to refer to the Reparation Commission, for examination and immediate report, the note of the Serbo-Croate-Slovene Delegation, dated December 12, concerning the liquidation of Hungarian properties situated in the territory transferred to the Serbo-Croate-Slovene State, together with the proposals of the Economic Commission contained in its note of December 27, 1919, to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question of the repayment of the cost of transport and maintenance of Russian prisoners of war in Germany should be brought before the Council at an early opportunity. The matter had been held over. 9. Determining of Agenda

MR. CAMBON replied that the question would be put on the Agenda for to-morrow.

SIR EYRE CROWE also desired to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the British Delegation had been requested to circulate a Note concerning the general methods of reparation to be applied to Hungary. His Government had suggested the adoption of a new system in the case of Hungary: but it had subsequently recognized that this proposal involved serious difficulties and he was now instructed to withdraw it.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN pointed out that, according to a report of the Economic Commission, the British Government had obtained what they wished as regards one point: the arrangements already made forbade for a period of five years the establishment of Customs barriers by the neighbouring States who had acquired territory formerly Hungarian.

MR. DE MARTINO observed that the Council had decided on October 2 to send an Interallied Commission of Officers to the Comitadjis of Western Hungary ceded to Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain.⁴ But, as a matter of fact, that Commission had never proceeded to the spot. In view of the declaration recently communicated to the Chancellor Renner in the name of the Supreme Council,⁵ it would be advisable that effect should be given to the decision of October 2.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that the French Delegation had had a meeting with the Italian Delegation and had just drafted a note on the subject which would be circulated to the members of the Council.

MR. CAMBON said that this question would be placed on the Agenda for the following day.

(The meeting then adjourned).

Appendix A to HD-119

PARIS

*Draft Letter to the Germans Regarding the Signature of the
Protocol*

To: Baron von Lersner.

Now that ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles have been exchanged and the Protocol of November 1st⁶ signed by the qualified representative of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers wish to assure the German Government again that in demanding reparations for the scuttling of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, their object was not to injure Germany's vital economic interests. By the present letter they confirm the declarations which the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference was directed to make, verbally, on this point, December 23rd, to the President of the German Delegation. These declarations were as follows:

1. The Secretary-General was authorized by the Supreme Council to assure the German Delegation that the Interallied Commissions of Control and the Reparation Commission would act scrupulously in conformity with the assurances contained in the note of December 8, concerning the safeguard of Germany's vital economic interests.
2. As the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers are inclined to believe that part of the data upon which they based their demand for 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges may have been inaccurate in certain minor details, they think a mistake may have been made as to the 80,000 tons of floating docks in Hamburg. If the investigation to be conducted by the Interallied Commission of Control proves that an error has really been made, the Allied and Associated Powers will be disposed to reduce their claim proportionately, so as to bring the quantity down to 300,000 tons, in round figures, or even lower, if convincing arguments prove that this is necessary. But absolute facilities must be granted authorized representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers to make all necessary investigations, in view of verifying the German assertions, before any reduction of the original demands of the Protocol can be made by the Allied and Associated Powers.
3. The Allied and Associated Governments, referring to the last paragraph of the memorandum containing their reply, do not consider that the scuttling of the German ships at Scapa Flow constitutes a crime of war for which individual penalties should be demanded according to Article 228 of the Peace Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers, always actuated by the desire to consider Germany's vital economic interests, have presented a claim for 400,000 tons, based on an inventory made by them, according to which Germany was supposed to have had on November 1st a total tonnage of tons. The German experts made a statement, to be verified, which sets forth an inferior amount of tonnage tons. Consequently, from the 400,000 tons claimed by the Allies will be deducted eventually the difference between the first figures and the second, or rather that actually found upon investigation.

The Allied and Associated Powers add that the 192,000 tons proposed by the German Government must be delivered

immediately. As for the remainder of the tonnage, as determined by the experts, the German Government will be given a delay of from two to three years for delivery.

Appendix B to HD-119

PARIS

*Draft Letter to the Germans Regarding the Signature of the
Protocol*

To: Baron von Lersner.

As the Protocol of November 1st⁷ has been signed by the qualified representative of the German Government, and the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles deposited, in consequence, the Allied and Associated Powers wish to assure the German Government again that although they claimed necessary reparations for the scuttling of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, they do not wish to injure Germany's vital economic interests. By the present letter they confirm the declarations which the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference was directed to make, verbally, on this point, December 23, to the President of the German Delegation. These declarations were as follows:

1. —The Secretary-General was authorized by the Supreme Council to assure the German Delegation that the Interallied Commissions of Control and the Reparations Commission would act scrupulously in conformity with the assurances contained in the note of December 8, concerning the safeguard of Germany's vital economic interests.
2. —As the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers are inclined to believe that part of the data upon which they based their demand for 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges may have been inaccurate in certain minor details, they think a mistake may have been made as to the 80,000 tons of floating docks in Hamburg. If the investigation to be conducted by the Interallied Commission of Control proves that an error has

really been made, the Allied and Associated Powers will be disposed to reduce their claim proportionately, so as to bring the quantity down to 300,000 tons, in round figures, or even lower, if convincing arguments prove that this is necessary. But absolute facilities must be granted qualified representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers to make all necessary investigations, in view of verifying the German assertions, before any reductions of the original demands of the Protocol can be made by the Allied and Associated Powers.

3. —The Allied and Associated Governments, referring to the last paragraph of the memorandum containing their reply, do not consider that the scuttling of the German ships at Scapa Flow constitutes a crime of war for which individual penalties should be demanded, according to Article 228 of the Peace Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers, without losing sight of the vital economic interests of Germany, requested 400,000 tons on the basis of the inventory made by them, according to which Germany had, on November 1, a total tonnage of tons. The German experts made a statement, to be verified, which sets forth an inferior amount of tonnage tons. Consequently, from the 400,000 tons claimed by the Allies will be deducted eventually the difference between the first figures and the second, or rather that actually found upon investigation.

The Allied and Associated Powers add that the 192,000 tons offered by the German Government must be delivered immediately. For the remainder of the tonnage as determined by the Reparation Commission, a time limit of not more than two years will be granted the German Government for full delivery.

Please accept, etc.

Appendix C to HD—119

*Note To Be Submitted to the Supreme Council by the British
Delegation*

“The question has been raised whether [upon?] the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and the Rhineland Agreement, the jurisdiction of the Rhineland High Commission will extend to that portion of the occupied territory which is in occupation by the United States troops.

“In the opinion of the British Government the answer must be in the affirmative. There is nothing in the Rhineland Agreement about the different zones of occupation, which have been established by an internal arrangement between the Allied and Associated Powers concerned. As the Agreement comes into force in the same way as the Treaty of Peace and as the view of the Allied and Associated Powers is that the rights of those Powers under the Treaty are not affected by the fact that it has not at the moment been ratified by the United States, it follows that the Rhineland Agreement will come into force for the whole of the occupied territory, although the United States will not be in a position to avail themselves of the provisions of the Agreement until they have ratified. It will result that the High Commission, though officially without an American Representative, will, on the coming into force of the Agreement, enjoy the jurisdiction conferred by it over the whole of the occupied territory. Arrangements will no doubt be necessary between the Allied and Associated Powers, on the assumption that the U. S. troops will remain in occupation, for the practical working of the situation thus created; as against the Germans it would appear that the rights of the U. S. troops to remain in occupation can only be derived from the terms of the Armistice, but so far as the jurisdiction over the whole of the occupied territory is concerned, the Armistice will be superseded by the Rhineland Agreement as soon as the latter comes into force.

“If the above view commends itself to the Supreme Council, the British Government would suggest that the Council should pronounce a decision to this effect.”

Appendix D to HD-119

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION No. 23

PARIS, October 16, 1919.

From: The German Delegation.

To: The President of the Conference.

Subject: Passports for Inhabitants of Schleswig residing in occupied territory.

The German passport section in occupied Rhineland territory asked, by a note dated September 29, the High Command of the 4th Zone, at Mayence, that persons in the occupied territory, residents of Schleswig, be granted facilities to leave in order to take part in the plebiscite.

The High Command replied to this note by referring to Article 109 of the Treaty of Peace:

“Only the inhabitants of Schleswig who were born in the zone where the plebiscite is taken, or have been domiciled there since a date before January 1, 1900, or were expelled by the German authorities without having a domicile there” are allowed the right to vote. I consider, under those circumstances, that your request should be regarded as not having been made. The Lt. General Commanding: Michel.

Appendix E to HD-119

DECEMBER 24, 1919.

*Note From the Drafting Committee Regarding the Right To Vote in
the Plebiscite Zone in Schleswig*

From: The Drafting Committee.

To: The General Secretariat.

THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN SCHLESWIG

(Reply to the Note of December 23, 1919)

In providing in Article 109 that the “population domiciled in the territories” of Schleswig would be “called upon to pronounce by a vote”, the Treaty laid down the principle of a plebiscite and not the definition of the people having the right to vote. On the other hand, by adding “a vote”, which will be taken “under the following conditions” ... 2.—the right of vote shall be given etc.,” the Treaty determined which persons would have the right to vote.

It is, however, clearly provided that in this respect the right to vote depends on: birth in the territory or domicile, or expulsion.

The right to vote, therefore, could not be refused to persons fulfilling one or the other of those conditions. Particularly persons born in Schleswig but domiciled outside these territories, may, according to the Treaty, claim the right to vote.

For the Drafting Committee:
HENRY FROMAGEOT

Appendix F to HD-119

DECEMBER 29, 1919.

*Note From the Commission on Air Clauses With Draft Instructions
for the Inter-Allied Air Commission of Control in Berlin*

COMMISSION ON AIR CLAUSES OF THE PEACE TREATY

From: Gen. Duval, president of the Commission on Air Clauses.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to send to you, in order to be submitted to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, a draft of instructions to be sent to General Mastermann, President of the Interallied Air Commission of Control in Berlin.

This draft of instructions, adopted by the Commission on Air Clauses has been read and corrected by the drafting Committee of the Peace

Conference.

Draft of Instructions To Be Sent to General Mastermann, President of the Interallied Air Commission of Control in Germany

I remind you that the air material referred to in Art. 27 and 28 of the Armistice Convention of Nov. 11, 1918,⁸ has been the subject of an inventory, as far as the material existing at the beginning of 1919 is concerned, in the naval bases recognized by the German authorities, according to the telegram from Admiral Goette, dated March 27, 1919, as bases for the collection and storage of material.

Therefore, it will be incumbent upon you, as soon as the Peace Treaty goes into force, to require the delivery of this material, a list of which appears in the report of the Air Section of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission. (ANAC).

Appendix G to HD-119

PARIS, December 12, 1919.

DELEGATION OF THE SERBCROAT-SLOVENE KINGDOM
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE
4, rue de Presbourg.

From: Pachitch.

To: Clemenceau.

In my note of November 27th last, and in the Memorandum annexed thereto, (Annex "D"), I had the honor to insist that the question concerning the properties, rights and interests of the Hungarian nationals located on transferred territories, be settled in the Peace Treaty with Hungary on a basis of the same principles admitted in the Peace Treaty with Germany; principles which to a certain extent are common law in such matters.

The importance which this question presents for us obliges me to again take the matter up by submitting certain considerations which were not sufficiently set forth in our preceding memorandum. These

points are of a nature to exercise an important influence in the adoption of a solution relative to the measures which should be applied concerning the properties of Hungarian nationals who will remain within the boundaries of our State.

During the occupation of Serbia which, as is known, lasted more than three years, the Budapest Government maintained the high hand in the administration of our State, which was considered, according to the ideas reigning at that time in the relations between Vienna and Budapest, as being within its sphere of influence.

The Hungarian Government has never failed to use this exceptional “de facto” situation in obtaining an advantageous regulation of the conditions of the domestic laws existing between her nationals and Serbian subjects at the time of the declaration of war.

Although, at the time of the invasion of the country, there existed a law in Serbia proroguing all matured paper, the Austro-Hungarian General Government at Belgrade, immediately after its installation, caused the repeal of these legal provisions, in violation of the Convention of the Hague,⁹ and replaced them by a decree declaring all Austro-Hungarian credits in Serbia redeemable at once. A special organization was created at once by the General Government and the collection of all these credits instituted, without regard for absent, mobilized debtors. Naturally, there was no hesitation in applying a forced execution of these measures with the result that the property of Serbian debtors was sold at an excessively low price by public auction. Of course, the sequester placed on the possessions of Austro-Hungarian nationals in Serbia was immediately raised and they were reinstated in all their rights.

Consequent to that condition of affairs, the situation in Serbia in 1919 with relation to Hungary, relative to property, rights and interests, is as follows:

Hungary has collected all her credits from the Serbian nationals, and her own subjects have been reinstated and are in possession of all their seized property (there are scarcely any Hungarian structures in Serbia). We are, therefore, in our relations with Hungary, relative to

domestic law, in a very unfavorable position. We are deprived of a pledge which the Allies qualified as “essential” (Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Remarks of the German Delegation, page 51)¹⁰ for the recovery of their credits from the enemy, and for the payment of the indemnities due Allied nationals, as a result of the application of exceptional war measures and provisions concerning the possessions, rights and interests of our nationals in Hungary.

The only way left by which we may reestablish the situation and repair the detrimental consequences of the arbitrary measures of the Hungarian Government in Serbia can only be realized by the insertion of provisions relative to the possessions, rights and interests of nationals, in the Peace Treaty with Hungary similar to those which were inserted in the Peace Treaty with Germany. This measure would not constitute a privilege in our favor, and we do not ask for any advantage other than those recognized to our Allies in their relations with Germany. What we claim is simply the application of common law, and the maintenance of the same principles which were admitted in settling the same question in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

The derogation admitted, to the advantage of Austria, in Article 267 of the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain, has already caused us considerable injury. But we understood the gravity of the motives which provoked the adoption of that exceptional measure by our Allies and we kept silent in face of the superior interests to which our pledge was sacrificed. However, it is unnecessary to extend that measure in favor of Hungary, that is: to have it apply in a case concerning which the motives invoked for Austria have no application. Such a provision would be absolutely unjustified, and would cause us an extremely prejudicial injury in every respect.

With confidence in the high spirit of justice of our Allies, we feel certain that they will protect our interests and we are firmly convinced, after examination of the reasons above presented, our claim will be accorded favorable consideration.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix H to HD-119

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PARIS, December 27, 1919.
INDUSTRY, POSTAL AND FRENCH REPUBLIC
TELEGRAPHIC SERVICE CABINET OF THE MINISTER No. 334

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Ambassador of France, Secretary Gen'l of the Peace Conference.

The Economic Commission has examined, in detail, the Serbian note under date of December 12,¹¹ treating the interdiction to liquidate Hungarian property in the territories transferred to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

The Commission esteems that, by the application of the Articles of Part X of the Peace Treaty, especially those having reference to the prejudices caused by decisions rendered in cases of property, rights and interests, without the party concerned having an opportunity to offer any defense, the cases indicated by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, treating the actions of the Hungarian authorities relative to the recovery of the Hungarian credits during the occupation of Serbia, justify the Serbian Government in demanding an indemnity from the Hungarian Government.

The Economic Commission was uncertain as to whether, in order to permit the Serbian Government to reimburse its nationals for the damages caused by the above mentioned acts, it would be advisable to authorize a liquidation of Hungarian property in new Serbia. The commission recognized, however, that even if this authorization were accorded to the Serbian Government, the Government might be unable to employ the proceeds of the liquidation as a reparation of the damages in question, since by the terms of Article 297 of the Treaty with Germany (249 of the Treaty with Austria) the proceeds of the liquidation can be levied upon only for indemnities relative to the properties or credits of Serbians in Hungary.

However, the Economic Commission esteemed that, by a slight revision of Article 260 of the Treaty with Germany (211 of the Treaty with Austria) it would be possible to meet the serious objection presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, without infringing on the general system which rules in the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria concerning enemy property in transferred territory.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation specified, in demanding the liquidation of Hungarian property in the transferred Hungarian territories, that an interdiction to permit the liquidation would maintain, within the territories which the former Empire recognized as of Hungarian influence, the economic superiority of Hungary as beneficiary, not only of the most of the public concessions, (transportation means, canals, lighting, etc.) but also of the *majorats* which afford certain Hungarian subjects with an important economic influence over vast domains and seigneurial rights, which might entail difficulties of an administrative or political nature.

The Economic Commission esteemed that it was impossible to not recognize the argument presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, and is of the opinion that satisfaction might be accorded Serbia by a sufficiently extensive application of Article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles (211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain), which provides that in the transferred territories, the Reparation Commission may, within a period of one year after the entry into force of the Treaty, demand that the enemy State acquire full rights or interests for its nationals in all enterprises of public utility, or in all concessions. With special reference to the question of *majorats*, the Economic Commission is of the opinion that mention of the *majorats* be inserted in the Article above referred to in the Treaty with Hungary, under the form “demand that Hungary acquire full rights or interests for her nationals in all enterprises of public utility, or in all concessions, as well as in all *majorats*, etc. ...”

In order that, on one hand, the regime adopted concerning enemy property situated in transferred territory be not infringed on, and on the other hand, equitable guarantees be assured the Serb-Croat-Slovene State against a danger which cannot be disregarded, it will

be advisable after having introduced the revision proposed by the Economic Commission in Article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles (211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain) that the Supreme Council indicate to the Reparation Commission that an extended application of this Article is to be anticipated regarding the Hungarian territories transferred to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

D. SERRUYS

¹ Appendix O to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

² HD–117, minute 2, p. 670 [*Pg. 670 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].

³ HD–118, minute 4, p. 690 [*Pg. 690 is part of [Doc. 34](#)*].

⁴ HD–65, minute 8, [vol. VIII, p. 491](#) .

⁵ HD–111, minute 4, p. 561 [*Pg. 561 is part of [Doc. 27](#)*].

⁶ Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

⁷ Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

⁸ [Vol. II, p. 1](#) .

⁹ Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed October 18, 1907, [Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204](#) .

¹⁰ [Vol. VI, pp. 926](#) , [983](#) .

¹¹ Appendix G, *supra*.

December 31, 10:30 a.m. (HD-120)

[36] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Wednesday, December 31, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 31, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/120

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/120

HD-120

[Document 36]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Wednesday, December 31, 1919, at
10:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 31, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace,

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe,

Secretary
Mr. Norman

FRANCE
M. Cambon.

Secretaries
Mr. Dutasta,
Mr. de Saint Quentin.

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

GREAT BRITAIN Captain Lothian Small

FRANCE Mr. de Percin.

ITALY Mr. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Fuller, R. N.
Cmdr. MacNamara, R. N.
Mr. Malkin
Mr. Carr
Lt. Col. Beadon

FRANCE

Gen. Weygand
Gen. Le Rond
Adl. Le Vasseur
Mr. Serruys
Mr. Fromageot
Mr. Tannery
Mr. Hermitte
Mr. de Montille

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero
Mr. Pilotti

JAPAN

Mr. Shigemitsu
Mr. Nagaoka.

M. DUTASTA told the Council that at five o'clock on the previous day he had had an interview with M. von Lersner and had communicated to him the draft letter that was to be addressed to the German Delegation by the President of the Conference.¹ The only thing left blank was the space for the figures relative to tonnage as estimated by the Allies on one hand and by the Germans on the other. Mr. von Lersner appeared on the whole satisfied with the letter. His only hesitation had been about the period of two years granted to the Germans for supplying the additional port material: he thought that

period too short. He had told Mr. von Lersner that in his own opinion it might be possible to have the time extended to thirty months. Mr. von Lersner had gone away satisfied, and it was agreed between them that the afternoon of January 6th, might be taken as the date for signing the Protocol which would take place at the Quai d'Orsay, and would coincide with the coming into force of the Treaty.

1. Negotiations Relative to the Signing of the Protocol

Since that interview Captain Fuller had submitted the figures to be inserted in the blank spaces left in the draft letter. The estimate of the Allies was 624,275 tons and that of the Germans, 527,380 tons. These figures referred to the docks exclusively, and the difference between the two figures would, after verification, be deducted from the 400,000 tons originally claimed. He had then had the completed text presented to Mr. von Lersner by Mr. de St. Quentin. In acknowledging the document Mr. von Lersner told Mr. de St. Quentin that M. Loucheur had given, as the Allied figure, 700,000 tons and claimed that the situation was considerably modified if the estimate of the Allies was only 624,000 tons. Under the circumstances Mr. von Lersner said that he would be obliged to telegraph Berlin for instructions. What had occurred in reality was that M. Loucheur had suggested the estimate of 700,000 from memory and, no doubt, as an example for the sake of argument. The Germans were not justified in basing an argument on that estimate which was indicated merely in the course of conversation. And it ought further to be borne in mind that the figures submitted by Captain Fuller and which appear in the draft letter were more favorable to the Germans than those established by the French Admiralty, namely 612,000 tons.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN stated that Mr. von Lersner had claimed in his presence that the figure of 700,000 tons had been given in the course of the discussion that took place between the Allied and the German Experts. But, as a matter of fact, no trace of that figure having been given could be found in the *procès-verbaux*, and their Experts could not recall having heard it quoted. There was every ground for thinking that Mr. von Lersner's affirmation was inexact.

MR. DUTASTA mentioned that, as he had already said, the figures referred to the floating docks alone. No statistics had been supplied on the number of tugs, cranes, etc., in the possession of Germany.

He did not think that the opposition thus created *in extremis* was very serious. If the Germans had given exact figures there was the assurance of their having 100,000 tons at least to hand over. Mr. von Lersner had on several occasions confided to him that the German Government was prepared by way of compromise to hand over a total of 260,000 tons. In any case putting the situation at its worst from the German point of view they would not demand from them more than 300,000 tons. He did not think that the Germans intended to withhold their signature for a difference not exceeding 50,000 tons at the most.

In the course of the interview Mr. von Lersner told him the anxiety caused to the German Government by the question of the actual handing over of the vessels that were to be delivered to the Allies. In a round about way he had led him to understand that the German Government had no great confidence in the officers and crews on board those vessels. He was afraid that if those ships had to leave for Allied ports with the crews who were actually on board they ran the risk of their being scuttled either when they set out or during the voyage. He had told Mr. von Lersner that such action would be extremely serious. Mr. von Lersner had agreed and added that the German Government acknowledged how serious the consequences might be. It was precisely for that reason and being himself powerless in the matter, that he wished to draw the attention of the Allied and Associated Powers to the situation. He had suggested that the German Government might assemble all the ships in question in one port, and take off the crews, and that the Allies might send their own crews to take possession of the ships and man them into their own ports. He had confined himself to telling Mr. von Lersner that he would report his statements to the Council.

MR. CAMBON summarized, saying that in Mr. Dutasta's explanation the Council was confronted with two distinct questions. Would they discuss first of all the question of the figures given by the Allies on the one hand and by the Germans on the other?

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that there could be no question about changing their figures which were based upon statements of facts. The estimate of 700,000 tons was only a maximum figure.

MR. DE MARTINO did not think the difficulty serious and thought that the Allies had merely to maintain the figures they had already decided upon.

MR. DUTASTA said that they would therefore stand by the terms of their note and await the German reply.

MR. CAMBON said that the second question was rather important: he thought that they ought first of all to send it to the Naval Experts for examination.

ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR recalled that he had already suggested that this question would come up when he had said that the Germans had professed that probably they would be unable to sail their boats into Allied ports. If it were not German crews who manned the vessels that were to be handed over in our ports, the precautionary measures they had taken, such as disarmament, became purposeless.

It was decided:

- I. To extend to thirty months the period granted to Germany for handing over the tonnage in excess of the 192,000 tons whose immediate delivery the German Government proposed.
- II. To refer to the Naval Experts for examination the measures to be taken in order to obviate the possibility of the ships that were to be surrendered to the Allies by Germany being scuttled by the German crews.

Mr. Wallace would refer the first paragraph of this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.

GENERAL LE ROND told the Council that the negotiations with the German Delegation presided over by Mr. von Simson concerning the application of the clauses of the Treaty to Plebiscite Areas had opened on the preceding day. The German Delegation had from the outset shown itself disinclined to accept any of the articles and

inclined, rather, on several points to refer to the Government at Berlin on the grounds that it had not itself full powers to decide. 2. Negotiations Relative to the Transfer of Powers in Plebiscite Areas

The German Delegation advanced certain inadmissible claims such as maintaining the power of German Courts of Appeal or Supreme Courts outside of the Plebiscite areas, over the inhabitants of those territories in spite of the fact that the latter had been placed under Interallied Government. It had explicitly stated that it considered the inhabitants of those territories as remaining under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court at Leipzig before which they might be tried for high treason against the German Government.

The President von Simson had alluded in a threatening way to the possibility of German officials leaving the Plebiscite areas en masse. In a general way the Delegation had seemed inclined from the beginning to dispute the ground step by step and to take no personal responsibility for the decisions. Count Lerchenfeld had even declared that certain decisions could not be taken without reference to the Reichstag.

In the course of the Conference the attitude of the German Delegation became gradually more conciliatory when confronted by the firmness of the Allied position, and because it was made clear to it on several points that the rights conferred by the Treaty upon the Commissions were wider than those they meant to exercise in the beginning of their administration.

It remained certain, nevertheless, that the German Delegation would on certain important points, refuse to take decisions and would refer to Berlin, a fact which pointed to a slowing up of negotiations the more especially since telegraphic communication with Berlin was at the moment very unsatisfactory.

He felt obliged to tell the Council his very definite impression that the policy of the German Delegation was to have the Protocol² signed as soon as possible and consequently the Treaty come into force, in order that they might reject after its coming into force the conclusion of negotiations regarding the Plebiscite areas. In that way the

Germans reckoned to have greater opportunity of rejecting the Allied Demands. The more Mr. von Lersner seemed anxious to bring matters to a close, the more Mr. von Simson seemed trying to drag the negotiations out. The negotiations would be resumed on the following day and one meeting would probably suffice to expound the Allied demands relative to the administration of Plebiscite areas. All the delays that might occur would be owing to the fact that the Germans would not have full power of decision.

He would remark however that on certain points the statements of the German Delegation had seemed to him worthy of attention. For example, Mr. von Simson had pointed out that Memel, which was to be definitely separated from Germany, was actually being administered by German officials, and that some understanding must be reached to give their administration security until a new one took over from them. That situation ought to be examined for it was obvious that they could not leave that territory indefinitely under the direction of one single Allied officer surrounded by a purely German administration, the more especially as those officials were perfectly free to withdraw if they liked.

MR. CAMBON felt that the idea at the back of the German mind could be clearly seen from General Le Rond's account. He was convinced that, peace once established, the Germans would reject all the demands relative to those territories. They ought, he considered, to indicate clearly to the Germans that the negotiations then taking place must be completed before the signing of the Protocol. Monsieur Dutasta might be charged with making that declaration to Mr. von Lersner at their forthcoming interview. The methods adopted by the German Delegation to lengthen the negotiations made the Germans themselves responsible for any disadvantage accruing from the delay.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that they ought even to advise the Germans that it would be impossible for the Allies to adhere to the date of January 6th agreed upon for signing the Protocol if as a result of the obstructionist methods of the German Delegation the negotiations relative to the transfer of powers in the Plebiscite areas had not previously been concluded.

GENERAL LE ROND wished to add that the draft financial arrangements discussed on the previous day had so far not been met with any objections on the part of the Germans. There were grounds therefore for thinking that the occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder would not impose on the Allies any final expense.

As for Upper Silesia, the question had already been settled with the Polish Government which was going to advance the necessary sums.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the question of the occupation of Allenstein had been raised.

GENERAL LE ROND said that it had not.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that in agreement with the decision taken by the Council at its previous meeting³ he was communicating to the Germans on that day the Allied decision, to occupy Allenstein.

M. CAMBON thought that they would all be agreed upon making the communication to the Germans that Sir Eyre Crowe had suggested.

M. DE MARTINO agreed and said that they ought to demand from the Germans the undertaking that as the negotiations relative to Plebiscite areas had to be completed before the Treaty came into force, the measures of execution only be decided afterwards and step by step.

It was decided:

To entrust M. Dutasta with making it known verbally to M. von Lersner that the signing of the Protocol and the coming into force of the Treaty could not take place until after a satisfactory arrangement of the question relative to Plebiscite Areas, questions which were the subject of [at] that moment of negotiations between the Commission presided over by General Le Rond and the German Delegation presided over by M. von Simson.

GENERAL LE ROND suggested that considering the indefensible claims put forward by the Germans it seemed absolutely necessary to fix the conditions under which protection of nationals of the Plebiscite areas would be assured. 3. Protection of Nationals of Plebiscite Areas

GENERAL LE ROND then read the note which appears as Appendix "A".

After a short discussion, it was decided:

1. that the nationals of the different Plebiscite areas be [as?] defined in the Treaty of Versailles, being entitled to vote in the Plebiscite, shall be placed for this purpose while outside of the said territory, under the protection of the Diplomatic and Consular agents of the allied power holding the presidency of the Commission in said territory and in all other respects shall receive that protection.
2. That foreign consular agents actually carrying out their duties shall be recognized by the Inter-Allied Commission; that foreign consular agents who shall be appointed during the period of the Commission's administration shall be required to receive that recognition in advance; that the consular agents of the Principal Powers shall be considered to have full right to this recognition; that the present decision shall be made known to the interested powers.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Delegation had had a note circulated (Appendix "B") explaining the point of view of His Majesty's Government, namely, that the Allied forces occupying Plebiscite areas and Danzig and Memel ought to be considered troops of occupation within the meaning of Article 249 of the Treaty of Peace. The British Government considered that each of the states taking part in the occupation of Plebiscite areas ought, as was the case in the occupation of the Rhine, to make the necessary advances for the maintenance of its own troops. As for recovering the cost, that ought to be asked from the beneficiary states in proportions

corresponding to the attribution of territories by the Plebiscite. 4.
Conditions of the Advance of Funds To Meet the Expenses of Allied
Troops in the Plebiscite Areas

GENERAL CAVALLERO considered that the explanation made by Sir Eyre Crowe did not coincide entirely in its latter part with the text of the British note to which he referred. That note said in effect that repayment of the expenses was to be a priority charge against Germany. If he had understood Sir Eyre Crowe it was his opinion that the beneficiary states were to make this repayment in proportion corresponding to the territories attributed to them. The French accepted Sir Eyre Crowe's point of view; they could not, on the other hand, take the point of view set forth in the British note. As already explained in a note of the Italian Delegation dated 25th December,⁴ Article 249 applied in fact only to German territories and that was not the case with Danzig and Memel, which were no longer part of Germany. Now Article 87 of the Treaty relative to Upper Silesia said that the expenses of occupation were to be borne from local revenues. Since they might anticipate that part at least of the territories under consideration would return to Poland it would be going against the spirit of the Treaty to lay the whole of the cost upon Germany alone.

SIR EYRE CROWE accepted the point of view maintained by General Cavallero.

GENERAL LE ROND considered it well to be quite clear on the point that this was only a question of advances for the costs had to be reimbursed ultimately by the beneficiary states. They accepted the British proposal that each power advance the costs of maintenance of its own troops.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that there remained one point to make clear. They had told the Germans that they still wished to occupy Allenstein. But that occupation was not provided for in the Treaty. Reimbursement of costs was provided for in the Treaty only in the case of Upper Silesia.

GENERAL LE ROND considered that it was easy to anticipate in the case of Allenstein and Marienwerder repayment of the costs by the states to which those territories would be attributed. The question on the other hand remained open in the case of Danzig since in that case there was no attribution of territories.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that they had had in view in the case of Danzig only the establishment of a base; later if the Allied High Commissioner required it the troops entrusted with guarding that base could be employed for the maintenance of order in Danzig and the surrounding district.

M. DE MARTINO said that he would let his Government know the decision that had been taken but he would have to reserve his decision since in financial matters he could not act without instructions.

Under reserve of the Italian Government's approval it was decided:

1. —that each state taking part in the occupation of territories submitted to Plebiscite shall make the advances of funds necessary for the maintenance of its own troops.
2. —that the reimbursement of those advances shall be made for all the Plebiscite areas by the beneficiary states in proportions corresponding to the territories attributed to them.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government).

MR. FROMAGEOT said that the Supreme Council having been good enough to approve at the meeting before last the conclusions of the note presented to it by the Drafting Committee⁵ on the subject of the Swiss Note of the 18th December 1919,⁶ concerning the accession of the Swiss Confederation to the League of Nations, they had prepared a draft letter to the Federal Government in the sense of that note which they had been presented (Appendix "D"). 5. Draft Reply to the Swiss Note of 18th December '19 Concerning Switzerland's Accession to the League of Nations

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he approved the note submitted to the Council. But they had decided that the reply to the Swiss Government ought to be made in the name of the Supreme Council and not only in the name of the French Government.

M. FROMAGEOT explained that the Drafting Committee had prepared the reply in that way because it had not known whether the other Powers had been sent similar communications by the Swiss Government. But it would be easy to effect in the text the changes necessary to make it in accordance with the decisions recalled by Sir Eyre Crowe.

It was decided:

1. To adopt in principle the note prepared by the Drafting Committee, (Appendix "D").
2. That the changes necessary be introduced in the text so that the reply be made not in the name of the French Government but in that of the Supreme Council to which the question had been referred by the French Government.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government).

The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference, dated 1st December (Appendix "E") and a note of the Paris Inter-Allied Commission of Russian prisoners of War in Germany dated 6th December (Appendix "F"). 6. Winding Up of the Inter-Allied Commission of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany

GENERAL WEYGAND commented upon Marshal Foch's note. He added that the agreement arrived at within the Commission on Prisoners of War had been unanimous, but for a reservation made by the Italian Delegate on the basis of the distribution of the costs of maintenance of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany.

M. TANNERY explained that for the winding up of the Berlin Commission it had been agreed that the expenses would be divided

into four between the four Great Powers there represented. But the share of the U. S. A. and of France already considerably exceeded a quarter. The remainder was therefore to be defrayed by Great Britain and Italy. The Italian Delegate had always made a reservation for the approval of his Government.

M. DE MARTINO said that he must maintain the Italian Delegate's reservation until his Government had given its decision.

GENERAL WEYGAND wished to point out that the question of the maintenance of refugees from Kiev had been reserved until further information could be obtained.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in accordance with instructions from his Government he wished to raise a question which, although not exactly the same as that under discussion, was related to it. If he understood the matter rightly there existed at the moment no commission for Russian prisoners of war in Germany other than the Berlin one, and it was the Council's intention to bring that one to an end without replacing it in any way whatever.

Now his Government had just been in negotiation at Copenhagen with a representative of the Soviets over the question of the liberation of English prisoners in Russia. There were in Russia many British prisoners whose repatriation was extremely desirable. The other Powers doubtless were in the same situation. The Soviet representative in the Copenhagen negotiations had put forward one condition as a *sine qua non* for the continuation of those negotiations. He demanded that the Soviets be represented in the Berlin Commission charged with controlling the repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany. General Malcolm, consulted on the subject by the British Government, had answered that he could see no difficulty in the way of granting the demand formulated by the representative of the Bolshevik Government, the more especially as the Commission did not exist any longer. Apparently therefore the creation of a new commission was being considered and that was what he could not understand since if he had rightly interpreted the previous discussion the Council had wished to wind up the existing commission and not to replace it by any other at all. He would ask

therefore, did there exist such a commission, different from the Berlin one, or, was it proposed to create a new one.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the difficulty was due to a subtlety of interpretation. The Inter-Allied Commission of Russian prisoners in Germany had recently been transformed into an international commission by the addition of a German delegate. That transformation had taken place at the moment when it had been decided to assume no further financial responsibility for the fate of Russian prisoners in Germany and to leave to the Commission only measures of control. But the German Government had considered that, the Allies rendering no more financial aid, the existence of that Commission interested them no longer and abstained from nominating a delegate and in those circumstances the Commission had not sat. It was in that sense that one might say with General Malcolm that the new Commission never having sat, did not in fact exist.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether at the moment when they had decided upon the suppression of the Inter-Allied Commission they had really intended to substitute for it an international commission or to recognize the existence of one. If he rightly remembered the last state of the question they had decided upon the suppression pure and simple of the commission which therefore was to dissolve as soon as certain questions still pending had been settled.[7](#)

COLONEL BEADON said that it had been decided that they would stop sending money and that the Commission on which the Germans would be represented would have powers of control only, but because of the attitude of the Germans the plan could not be realized.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that anyhow his Government proposed that the Soviets should be represented on the Berlin International Commission. If this were the only means of releasing our prisoners, it would appear that this proposal should be seriously considered. One of Koltschak's [*Kolchak's*] representatives was, it transpired, already on the commission, and yet the Bolsheviks stated that their interests were not represented, and they had asked to be put on the Commission. His Government saw no reason why this demand of the

Soviets should not be agreed to, provided it would facilitate the repatriation of allied prisoners.

MR. CAMBON stated that the proposal of the British Government was such as to render consultation with the other Governments necessary.

SIR EYRE CROWE insisted that the question was an urgent one.

If the negotiations with Copenhagen dragged on, they ran a great risk of achieving no results. Besides, it was now winter, and the sufferings of our prisoners in Russia were increasing from day to day.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that the first question to be settled was establishing the Commission, which had been unable to get to work on account of the negative attitude of the Germans. It seemed difficult to reopen the discussion with them on the eve of the coming into force of the Treaty. The Germans had stated that if the Berlin Commission no longer controlled financial means, it was useless and that they preferred to deal with the question themselves. It must also be admitted that in this the Germans had right on their side.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that it was the Italian reservation on the distribution of expenses which had delayed our reply to the Germans.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that if it were decided that the Berlin International Commission had no longer any reason to exist, we should have found a graceful way out of the situation created by the Bolshevik request. It was obviously impossible to form part of a Commission which had ceased to exist:

MR. CAMBON asked each member of the Council to approach his Government with regard to the question raised by Sir Eyre Crowe.

The remainder of the discussion was put off until a later date.

The Council had before it:

1. —Two Notes from General Niessel to the President of the Council, dated the 11th and 13th December 1919 (Annexes “G” and “H”). 7. Violent Treatment of the Officers on the Niessel Mission
2. —A draft telegram from Marshal Foch to General Nudant giving instructions from the Supreme Council to the German Government. (Annex “I”).

GENERAL WEYGAND commented on the proposed telegram from Marshal Foch (Annex “I”). He added that instead of sending a telegram to the German Government, which, on the eve of the coming into force of the Treaty might run the risk of starting general discussion, he proposed, if Marshal Foch were in agreement, that this question should be dealt with in a verbal note which could be delivered to the German Delegation by the Secretary-General of the Conference.

After a short discussion it was decided to entrust to Mr. Dutasta the drawing up of a verbal note to be delivered to Mr. von Lersner, which would draw the attention of the German Government to the violent treatment of the officers belonging to General Niessel’s Mission.

GENERAL WEYGAND commented on a note dated the 30th December addressed by Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference regarding the military measures adopted by the Germans in Upper Silesia (Annex “J”). 8. German Military Measures in Upper Silesia

After a short discussion it was decided to ask Mr. Dutasta to submit to Mr. von Lersner a verbal note on the lines of the note attached to the report by Marshal Foch dated December 30th (See Annex “J”).

(That Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

M. DE ST. QUENTIN commented on a note from the French delegation on this subject (Annex “K”).

It was decided to ask the Allied Generals in Budapest to send with the least possible delay to the Comitadjas ceded to Austria by Hungary the Mission, the constitution of which had been agreed to

by resolution of the Supreme Council on the 2nd October.⁸ 9.
Position of the Comitadjas in Western Hungary

MR. SERRUYS commented on a note from the Economic Commission on this question dated December 26th (Annex "L"). 10. Report of the Economic Commission on the Amendments to the Economic Clauses of the Treaty With Hungary Proposed by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation

After a short discussion it was agreed:

1. —To refer to the European Coal Commission the request of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation that in the case of the inserting of an article in the Hungarian Treaty of Peace similar to Article 224 of the Treaty of St. Germain, the Czecho-Slovak Republic should not be cited as one of the States who would undertake to supply Hungary with coal.
2. —To adopt the recommendations of the Economic Commission rejecting the request put forward by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation for the deletion in the Peace Treaty with Hungary of Article 287 of the Treaty of St. Germain and to the corresponding modification on the Treaty with Hungary of Article 249 of the Treaty with Austria.

MR. DE MARTINO said that recently the question of putting the case of the Aaland Islands on the agenda had come forward. A Plebiscite had been held there as a result of which 90 per cent of the inhabitants had declared themselves in favor of Sweden. This question, therefore, would not appear to present any great difficulties and it could be agreed before the breaking up of the Conference. 11. The Question of the Aaland Islands

SIR EYRE CROWE was against raising this question *in extremis*. It appeared to be more the concern of the League of Nations.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN stated that it had indeed been proposed to leave this question to the League of Nations. At that time it was believed that the Supreme Council would not have been so long lived as it

actually had been, and since then the proposal to bring this question up at the Council had been again considered.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that this might mean dragging on their work indefinitely. A commission would have to be formed which, of course, would not be able to reach an agreement and for which therefore, the Council would have to arbitrate. That could not be done immediately.

M. DE MARTINO said that to him the question seemed quite clear and that the forming of a Commission was not a necessity.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Council that the fate of the Aaland Islands was of interest to Finland and was related to the Russian question. It was rather a delicate matter.

M. CAMBON was of the opinion that this matter should not at the moment be entered on the agenda. It would be time enough to add it when the necessity arose.

M. DE MARTINO stated that he would not press the matter.

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix A to HD-120

December 30, 1919.

Meeting of the Plebiscite Commissions

PROTECTION OF THE NATIONALS OF THE PLEBISCITE TERRITORIES

1.—The transfer of the plebiscite territories to the government or the Administration of the Interallied Commissions, raises the two following questions of an international judicial nature:

- a) Question of the protection of the nationals of those territories, outside those territories.
- b) Question of the exequatur of the consuls in the said territories.

2.—Concerning the first question, if no special measure were taken, the nationals of the plebiscite territories, who, on the said territories, are no longer under the German law, but under that of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, would, as soon as they leave the territory, fall again under the German authority, which must not be. It is incumbent upon the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to maintain their protection in Germany, as well as in the territory of the other Powers, and in particular, it is necessary that they may eventually reclaim in Germany, before a Representative of an Allied Power, their right to proceed freely to the above-mentioned territories, in order to take part in the plebiscite, and to take their families and property with them.

Although this protection is incumbent upon all the Allied Powers, in fact, it seems impossible that they exercise it in common. The solution suggested to the Supreme Council, according to which, this protection should be entrusted for each territory, to the Power which has the authority over this territory, provides also for the apportionment of the rights and charges, pertaining to this protection.

3.—Concerning those two questions, the following resolution is submitted to the Supreme Council, for approval:

- a) The nationals of the various plebiscite territories, indicated in the Treaty of Versailles, for each territory, as having a right to participate in the plebiscite, shall be, outside these territories, placed under the protection of the diplomatic agents of the Allied Power, to which the President of the Commission, of the said territory, belongs. (Pencil note: and in all other respects might receive? [*shall receive that protection?*]).
- b) The delivery of the exequatur to the diplomatic or consular agents of the Powers, other than the Allied Powers, shall be incumbent in each territory, upon the Interallied Commission of this Territory.

Appendix B to HD-120

*Memorandum by the British Delegation To Be Submitted to the
Supreme Council*

CONDITIONS OF THE ADVANCE OF FUNDS TO MEET THE EXPENSES OF THE ALLIED TROOPS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS

On November 19th the Supreme Council considered certain questions in connection with the financing of the Plebiscite Commissions to be set up under the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and instructed a special committee to draft proposals to be submitted to the Supreme Council for approval.⁹ The report of this Committee was considered by the Supreme Council on November 24th and approved with the exception of a single point, which was reserved for the decision of the Allied Governments.¹⁰ This point concerned the advance of the necessary funds for the armies of occupation in the areas in question as well as in the districts of Danzig and Memel, regarding which two alternative suggestions had been put forward:

- (a) That each of the States participating in the occupation should make the necessary advance for the maintenance of its own troops;
- (b) That the cost of occupation of these areas should be pooled and divided between the States participating in the occupation.

The British Delegation have now received instructions to state that His Majesty's Government consider that the Allied forces occupying the plebiscite areas of Upper Silesia, Allenstein, Marienwerder and Slesvig, as well as the districts of Danzig and [Memel] should be regarded as armies of occupation within the meaning of Article 249 of the Treaty of Peace and that their cost should be recoverable as the first charge on Germany. His Majesty's Government further considered that each State should advance the necessary funds for the maintenance of its own troops in these areas and that this procedure is preferable to the establishment of a common pool for the purpose.

The cost of the troops occupying Teschen is, under the terms of the decision of September 27th,¹¹ to be recovered from the two interested Governments on the conclusion of the plebiscite, but in other respects the same principles will apply.

PARIS, December 25, 1919.

*Note From the Italian Delegation Relative to the Occupation
Expenses of Plebiscite Zones*

ITALIAN DELEGATION TO
THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Hotel Edouard VII

No. 4211

From: G. De Martino.

To: Clemenceau.

I have the honor to call the attention of your Excellency to the fact that the Peace Treaty with Germany does not clearly and precisely indicate by whom the occupation expenses of the plebiscite zones, and in particular the expenses which might eventually exceed the local revenues, are to be assumed.

Furthermore, the Treaty contains no provision concerning the question of advances.

Therefore, I have the honor to transmit the memorandum hereto annexed on the question to your Excellency, and request that you kindly submit same to the proper organization for examination.

Accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

[Annex]

***Advance and Reimbursement of the Expenses of the Troops of Occupation in
the Plebiscite Zones***

The Peace Treaty with Germany does not clearly and fully stipulate who shall assume the expenses of occupation in the plebiscite zones, or by whom the advances necessary shall be effected.

Relative to the reimbursement of these expenses it is shown that:

- (a) The provisions of the Treaty concerning Upper Silesia are definite.
- (b) The Teschen question was regulated by a special convention.
- (c) As to the occupation of Marienwerder the Treaty provides only for the reimbursement of the expenses of the Interallied Commission.
- (d) No military occupation in Allenstein is provided for.

Moreover, the Treaty makes no reference to a common question affecting all the plebiscite zones, that is: the question of advances.

During the last month a Special Technical Commission was instructed by the Supreme Council to study the question.¹² A concrete statement was formulated by that Commission concerning the expenses relative to the normal administration of the plebiscite territories, and the operations of the Commissions, but no conclusion was presented regarding the necessary expenses for the upkeep of the troops. These expenses represent $\frac{7}{8}$ of the total expenses. The proposals submitted by the Technical Commission were approved by the Supreme Council during the Session of November 24,¹³ but the question relative to occupation expenses was not resolved.

The Italian Delegation proposed, on November 24, that this question be examined by the Supreme Council jointly with that of the civil administration expenses, and deems it expedient to insist upon this proposal in order that the nature and the extent of the financial obligations which will devolve upon each Government may be determined before the departure of the Interallied troops.

Consequently, it appears necessary:

- 1 —To definitely establish that the occupation expenses will be reimbursed even in cases where provision to that effect has not

- been made in the Treaty (Marienwerder and Allenstein zones).
- 2 —To establish that, in cases where, in a plebiscite zone, the local revenues would be insufficient, the excess expenses should be proportionately divided among the States to whom will be attributed the territories.
 - 3 —To determine by whom the necessary advances are to be effected.

Appendix D to HD-120

PARIS, December 29, 1919.

*Draft of Reply to the Swiss Note of December 18, 1919, Relative to
Adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations¹⁴*

In a memorandum dated December 18, 1919, the Swiss Legation, in referring to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the date of which is set by the Legation as of April 28, 1919, informed the Government of the French Republic that the Swiss Federal Assembly, on November 21, 1919, decided in favor of the entry of Switzerland in the League of Nations, text of this decision being annexed to the memorandum.

The Swiss Government adds that a formal declaration of adherence will be forwarded in proper time, under reservation of the result of the popular vote, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. This popular vote is provided for by the Helvetic Constitution and it ought not, according to the Swiss Government, necessarily to take place within the period of two months referred to in Article 1 of the Covenant, for the reason that the realization of the League of Nations depends upon the adherence of all the States to whom a permanent representation in the Council of the League is accorded by the Covenant.

In short, in the opinion of the Swiss Government, a notification of the decision of the Federal Assembly presented within a period of two months after the entry into force of the Treaty should assure to Switzerland all the rights of a State invited to adhere as an original member, and at the same time it would not anticipate the final

decision expressed by the Swiss people in the referendum required by the Helvetic Constitution.

In thanking the Swiss Legation for its memorandum, which as moreover, recognized by the Swiss Government, could not in any sense be considered as a declaration of adherence, the Government of the French Republic has the honor to present the following remarks:

1.—According to Article 1 of the Covenant, the declaration of adherence must be made without reservations, and within two months after the entry into force of the Covenant. A declaration of adherence which would be subject to the result of the referendum could not be considered as an adherence without reservations. Furthermore, the measures which are required by the Swiss Constitution in like matter concerned Switzerland only. As far as the other interested Powers are concerned a declaration of adherence made only in conformity with the terms of the Treaty can be taken into consideration.

2.—The Swiss Note refers to the date upon which the Government [*Covenant*] was adopted as April 28, 1919.

It is important to recall that the only official text is that which was signed by the Powers, and concerning which the date of April 28, 1919, does not apply.

3.—The basis of the Swiss Note, according to which the realization of the League of Nations depends upon ratification by the five Principal Powers, is not in conformity with the final clauses of the Treaty, as by these clauses, the Treaty, in all its parts, that is, inclusive of Part I Covenant of the League of Nations is applicable *arga omnes* in everything concerning the computation of delays, and will enter into force for all the Powers which will have ratified up to that time, upon the deposit of the ratifications of three of the Principal Powers and Germany.

4.—Finally, the measure of the Federal Council, copy of which was attached to the memorandum of the Swiss Government, contains

several considerations in its preamble relative to the relation between the adherence of the Helvetic Confederation to the League of Nations and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, as well as between Article 21 and 435 of the Treaty.

The Government of the Republic will hold this question for subsequent examination.

Appendix E to HD-120

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, December 1, 1919.
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES General Staff
3rd Section No. 5540

From: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,

To: The President of the Peace Conference, Secretariat General.

I have the honor to communicate to you herewith two drafts of resolutions concerning:

The first, the liquidation of the points pending since the dissolution of the Interallied Commission of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany.

The second, the reply to be made to the German note of November 6th last.

If these drafts were approved it is suggested that they be the object

The first, of a telegram to General Malcolm.

The second, of a notification to the German Government, through the intermediary of the I. P. A. C. [*P. I. A. C*]¹⁵ and of a communication to General Malcolm.

I deem it my duty to call your attention to the fact that it will be advantageous to communicate the first of these drafts to the

Financial Experts of the interested powers before it is discussed by the Peace Conference.

By order: The Major General
WEYGAND

[Enclosure 1]

DECEMBER 1, 1919.

Draft of Resolution

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, after having taken note of the report of the special commission in Paris, entrusted with the questions concerning the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, made, in its meeting of December 1919, the following resolution, with respect to the questions pending since the dissolution of the Interallied Commission in Berlin:

1st.—Liquidation of the liabilities of the Interallied Commission.

The 400,000 marks due to the British Red Cross will be reimbursed to the latter by the British Government.

2nd.—Reimbursement of the flour advanced by the German Government.

The flour advanced by the German Government will be reimbursed, not in kind, but in currency, that is to say, 7,680,000 marks.

The payment of this reimbursement will be effected by applying an equal sum to the credit of Germany in the reparations account; 100,000 marks being charged to the English account, and 7,580,000 marks to the Italian account.*
—

The above provision is calculated to increase the shares of Great Britain and Italy to 7,580,000 marks. [Footnote in the original.]

3rd.—The employment of the 200,000,000 Russian rubles detained by the German Government, is postponed until a settlement is made of the financial questions connected with the employment of this sum.

4th.—As to the question of reimbursement to the German Government of the 2,000,000 marks representing the upkeep expenses of the Kiev refugees, its solution is postponed until the results of an investigation as to the conditions under which the representatives of the Entente made agreements in this matter, are known.

[Enclosure 2]

Draft of Resolution

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, after having taken cognizance of the note of the German Government of November 6th, 1919 (5010 II/19 Wako), and of the proposals of the special commission on the Russian P. W., decided to address the following answer to the German Government.

“The Allied and Associated Powers confirm their resolution to incur no more expenses for the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, except those necessary for the upkeep of their representatives to the International Commission on Russian P. W. in Berlin.

On the other hand, as this Commission—whose role is only to supervise the material situation of the Russian P. W., and to eventually lend its assistance to the German Government for the repatriation of these prisoners—is not provided for by the Peace Treaty with Germany it will cease operating as soon as the Treaty goes into force.[”]

*[Note From M. Tannery of the Interallied Commission at Paris on
Russian War Prisoners in Germany]*

To: The Secretary General.

I have the honor to enclose herewith a note to the Supreme Council, which the Interallied Commission of Paris on Russian War Prisoners in Germany, during its Session of November 22 last, instructed me to prepare presenting the solution adopted by the Commission relative to the financial questions submitted for examination.

The draft of this note was approved by all the Allied Delegates, with the exception of the Italian Delegate, from whom despite repeated requests, I have been unable to obtain any response. In order to no longer delay the accomplishment of this nature, I enclose a text fully approved by the Delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan.

Please accept, etc.

J. TANNERY

[Enclosure]

Note to the Supreme Council

The Special Paris Commission entrusted with the questions concerning the Russian War prisoners detained in Germany, has examined the following points, which were submitted to the Commission by the Supreme Council.

- 1) —Reimbursement for the flour advanced by the German Government prior to August 23, 1919.
- 2) —Liquidation of the liabilities of the Interallied Commission; i. e., 400,000 marks.
- 3) —Reimbursement of the German Government for expenses incurred relative to the Kiew refugees.
- 4) —Employment of the Russian money now in the hands of the German Government (20 million rubles).

According to reports issued by the Berlin International Commission, the following obligation will devolve upon the Allied and Associated Governments:

Due the German Government:

For provisioning the Kiew refugees	2,000,000 [marks]
Values c. i. f. German Ports of 2,400 tons of wheat flour, or 3,700 tons of rye flour, furnished to the Russian War prisoners, the reimbursement of which is demanded in kind	7,680,000 “

Due the British Red Cross

Advances made by the British Red Cross, to be reimbursed in francs or in pounds Sterling	400,000 “
	10,080,000 “

After an examination of the data submitted by the Berlin International Commission, the Paris Commission expressed the opinion that the above statement is correct and legitimate and that the settlement of these expenses can be admitted. However, the British Delegation remarked that the advances made by the British Red Cross should be controlled in their details and the use made of the money.

Furthermore, the Italian Delegate, declines to present the opinion of his Government relative to the provisioning of the Kiew refugees, to an amount of 2,000,000 marks, until after inquiry into the conditions under which the engagement was contracted.

The British Delegate requests that the reimbursement of these two millions be delayed until proof is presented showing that the refugees were sheltered in Germany at the request of the Allies.

In distributing the liabilities in question between the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, the Commission used the following decision of the Supreme Council,¹⁶ relative to provisions, taken February 1, 1919, as a base:

Russian, Serbian and Russian [Rumanian] War Prisoners in Germany

“The Council approves the decision taken by the Permanent Committee in its Session of January 28.

“The French Government is directed, in the name of the four Associated Governments, with the provisioning of the Russian, Serbian, and Rumanian War prisoners in Germany.

“The distribution and control of the provisioning in Germany will be conducted by the Interallied Military Committee of Berlin, under the direction of General Dupont, in liaison with the Red Cross organizations of the different nations.

“The sums necessary will be advanced by France temporarily, the distribution of the expenses between the four Associated Governments to be settled later.”

This basis of distribution being admitted, subject to the approval of the Italian Government, each Delegate submitted the following elements of account, which total the supplies actually furnished by their respective Governments.

	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Approximate value in marks*</i>
France	11,000,000 francs (100 marks=38.25 frs)	28,770,000
Great Britain	80,000 pounds (1£=88.50 Mks)	7,080,000
U. S.	2,500,800 dollars (\$1.00=20 marks) (This sum includes \$1,727,800 which corresponds with the supplies furnished by the American Red Cross by virtue of a Special Agreement with the Government of the United States)	50,016,000
Italy	Memorandum	
	Total	85,806,000

In order to determine the share of each of the four Powers and the total cost of the upkeep of the Russian War Prisoners, and of the

Kiew refugees, it was decided that the present unpaid debt would be added to the cost of the supplies previously furnished and that the general total would be divided by four, the quotient representing the share of each Power.

Present debt	10,080,000 marks
Amount of previous expenses	85,806,000 “
Total	95,886,000 “
Share of each of the four Powers	23,971,500 “

From the above data, it appears that France and the United States have given more than their share to the common operations of the Allies. On the other hand, Italy and Great Britain did not assume their share of the liabilities. Consequently, it is incumbent on them to assume the present debt, in accordance with the following quota:

Great Britain	15,000,000
Italy	8,580,000

The peculiar position of the American Delegate was presented to the Supreme Council. He had received instructions, in fact, to officially indicate that the American Government is obliged to terminate all financial help tending to prolong the provisioning of the Russian War prisoners, or the Kiew refugees now in Germany. Consequently, the American Delegate has informed the Commission that it must be thoroughly understood that no representative or Agent of the American Government was authorized to engage his Government financially in the enterprise in question, and that he declares the amounts as presented in the present note, as far as unpaid debts are concerned, as representing the integral balance of the settlements to be made at this time.

The British, French and Italian and Japanese Delegates declared that, without being authorized to speak officially for their Governments, they were nevertheless convinced that their Treasuries would assume the same attitude as the American Treasury.

Consequently, the Commission requests that the International Commission at Berlin be informed that, in conformity with the principle already adopted by the Supreme Council,¹⁷ it is not authorized to financially engage the five Powers collectively in any enterprise whatsoever.

If the preceding proposals are approved by the Supreme Council, the questions submitted to the Special Paris Commission would be decided as follows:

The 400,000 marks due the British Red Cross (Question No. 2) would be reimbursed, by the English Government.

The flour advanced by the German Government (question No. 1) would be reimbursed, not in kind, but in money, for 7,680,000 marks. The price of the flour would be included with the 2,000,000 marks due for the upkeep of the Kiew refugees (question No. 3) and the amount of the total, 9,680,000 marks, would be credited to Germany in the Reparations account. The English account would be charged with 1,100,000 marks, and the Italian account with 8,580,000 marks. The disposition of the 20,000,000 Russian roubles now in the hands of the German Government (question No. 4) would be held for a solution in connection with more important questions pertaining thereto.

Appendix G to HD-120

INTERALLIED COMMISSION
IN THE BALTIC STATES 292 S/P

TILSITT, December 11, 1919.

From: General Niessel, President of the Interallied Commission in the Baltic States

To: M. Clemenceau, Paris.

During the numerous, difficult, and delicate missions fulfilled by the Allied officers with courage and coolness, a great many incidents took place.

Such officers were frequently insulted and attacked, sometimes even ill-treated and struck at, and usually under the indifferent and sarcastic eyes of the very German officers, who had been instructed officially, to facilitate their task and to look after their security.

Whenever such an attack occurred penalties were claimed verbally and in writing, from Admiral Hopman, Chief of the German Delegation. The German Government has again been officially informed of these facts by a note, which set them forth in detail, remitted to Minister Noske himself, by Colonel Dosse, on Dec. 6, at Berlin.

Today again, another cowardly attack has just been committed, this time by a group of German officers, on an isolated French soldier (see report annexed).

No satisfaction having yet been granted, in regard to the numerous and earnest claims for penalties made by the Commission, I have the honor to ask the Supreme Council to kindly strengthen, through direct action in Berlin, the claims to reparations to which our officers and soldiers are entitled.

I am transmitting this report to the President of the German Delegation immediately.

The culprits are easy to find. Their brutal cowardice demands immediate punishment.

I request that excuses be made to my soldier. I take his case to heart, more than that of the officers, because he was alone, defenseless; no pretext can be invoked for the brutality to which he has been submitted.

The President of the Interallied Commission

NIESSEL

[Annex 1]

TILSITT, December 12, 1919.

INTERALLIED COMMISSION No. 290 S/P
TILSITT BRANCH

REPORT

On Dec. 11, at 4 o'clock p.m., I entered the Restaurant of the "Preussischerhof Hotel", where I live, to give my key before beginning my duty. Some German officers who were in the Restaurant got up and pounced on me, forcing me to leave the restaurant and the hotel, kicking and striking me into the street.

Having been able to make them understand that I lived in the hotel, two officers came out to fetch me and took me inside, where an officer calling himself a Captain, apologized and asked me to shake hands with him, which I absolutely refused to do. I was again brutalized and thrown into the street, amidst blows and kicks, and under the threat of revolvers, which they held in their hands.

Three times I was knocked down.

The Captain spoke French very well, and I believe he lives in the hotel.

The hotel-keeper tried to protect me, but was also knocked about.

R. MONNIER

Seen and transmitted by the Chief
of the Tilsitt Branch (Signed) Du
Chouchet.

Seen and transmitted:
It will not be difficult to find the
culprits this time; a severe penalty is
indispensable. The General Commanding
the Mission of Control. (Signed) Vincent.
[Annex 2]

STATEMENT

OF THE ATTACKS MADE BY THE GERMAN TROOPS IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES ON THE PERSONS OF OFFICERS OF THE INTERALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Date and Place	Designation of the Allied Officers	Designation of the Military Germans responsible	Statement of the Incident
11/23 Prekuln Station	Captain Bot	Soldiers of the Plhewe Branch Captain Plhewe	Daily threats and insults against officers of Control.
11/25 Station of Poschervny	Captain Lewinson (French) of the Control of Poschervny	German military authorities of the station of Poschervny, on duty 11/25, Ltd. Bidefeld, officer of the Station Control.	At midnight a grenade is thrown into the window of the lodgings occupied by the Control Officers. No measure was taken by the German authorities to safeguard these officers.
11/25 Station of Kwrchany	Major Leveque	Captain Iordann, Chief of the Iordane Company	Window panes of the Control Officers' car, broken by stones and apples. Captain Iordane refuses to intervene.
11/26 Station of Bayoren	Captain Chipponi	Captain Shock, Commanding a battalion of the Plehve Corps. Afeldwebel of his battalion.	At 6:30 p.m. a detachment of the Plheve Corps arrived at the station to embark. The men spread over the station, shouting and threatening. The officers take refuge in

			the Control office, where they are immediately surrounded and threatened with rifles and grenades. Shock excites his men and insults the German station officers, who try in vain to keep order. A Feldwebel threatens our officers with his revolver.
11/26 Station of Eydekrug	Captain Henry	Captain Plhewe Lieut. Mausch of the Plhewe Corps	The men of train 8240 coming from Memel storm the office of the Control Officers, singing and howling. The manifestations clearly organized by Lieut. Mausch lasts half an hour.
11/28 Memel	Major Loustalot Captain Chipponi Captain Vink Lieut. Guarensan	Captain Plhewe. A soldier of the battalion of Shock.	Manifestations against our officers in a room of the Hotel Victoria. The soldiers of Shock battalion say: "We are going for reinforcements and tonight we will get rid of all those foreigners." The German Colonel Thauvenay having declared that he is powerless to assure the security of the Allied officers at Memel, as long as Shock's battalion

			remains there, the Allied officers, under the Command of Major U. S. Loustlot, go on board the French ships, in the Memel harbor.
11/29 Station of Tilsitt	Lieut. Valadon Lieut. Mannaz	Lt. Arnold, Control officer of Tilsitt Station. Captain Platnen, Chief of the Squadron of Lt. Cavalry, No. 18 of the Diebitch Corps.	At 16:45, German troops threaten our troops from a train, with blows and grenades. Shots are fired. Captain Platnen urges on his men. The German officer accompanying Col. von Luck, intervening, encourages the soldiers with a smile.
12/1 Station of Schavli	Major Giraud	Lt. Schepper of the Voluntary Corps, Petersdorf	Major Giraud while proceeding to the Control Bureau, is attacked by 30 German soldiers, commanded by an officer; he is surrounded by soldiers and menaced with fixed bayonets. Pushed about, and kicked, and thrown into the Kommandantur Bureau, amid howling and threats of death. He is received by a young officer who listens to his declarations

			sneering[ly] Capt. von Gordon, after trying in vain to calm the soldiers and Lt. Schepper, finally brings Major Giraud to his own residence.
12/2 Station of Schavli	Colonel Dosse Major Jocard Major Coriou Major Giraud Major Vanlande Major Keenen (A. B.) Capt. Jozan Lt. Messik (U. S.) Lt. Forster (A. B.) Lt. Martin- Prevel.	Gen. von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch	Nothing serious is done by Gen. von Eberhardt to assure the security of the Delegation. In the evening, the Delegation's train is fired upon by machine guns.
12/2 Station of Schavli	Major Coriou Major Pouvreau Major Giraud Capt. Chirossel Lt. Janvier Lt. Gladien	Lt. Hertmann Control Assistant.	On detached service with the Allied Officers, deserted his post. Has never done anything to assure the protection of the Allied officers, constantly menaced.
12/2 Station of Schavli	Gen. Jukovski Col. Dosse Major Keenen (A. B.) Major Jocard Major Giraud Major Coriou Major	Escadrille 34. Lt. Kredel	Gen. Jukovski and several Allied officers, having approached the train containing the material of the Escadrille 34, are immediately menaced by rifles and machine

	Vanlande Capt. Chirossel Capt. Jozan Lt. Forster (A. B.) Lt. Martin-Prevel		guns. The control of the material, thus being rendered impossible, Admiral Hopmann suggests that the train should be convoyed by an Allied officer. The Commanding Officer of the Escadrille warned him that this officer would certainly be killed. The train started in spite of the orders given by the Control Officers.
12/3 Station of Tilsitt	Lt. Lloyd-Wilson	Escadrille 34 Lt. Kredel	Lt. Lloyd-Wilson having approached the train, transporting the Escadrille, is coarsely insulted by Lt. Kredel, who orders him away. Lt. Lloyd-Wilson goes to fetch the German Control officer, and is followed by Lt. Kredel and his men, who insult him. Kredel seizes Lt. Lloyd-Wilson by the shoulders, tries to expel him and spits on him. He places the machine-guns in position. Lt. Lloyd-Wilson having ordered Kredel, in the absence of a German Control

			Officer, to abandon the machine guns because they are included in the regulation issued to the Escadrille is again insulted, and Kredel [?]
12/3 Station of Schilany	English Lt. Sandels, of Kovno Mission	German soldiers	Passing through the station of Schilany Lt. Sandels receives a grenade, within a range of 15 meters, thrown by German soldiers, who cannot be identified.

12/3 Station of Schavli	Colonel Dosse Major Keenen Major Jocard Major Giraud Major Jozan Lt. Forster (AB) Lt. Martin- Prevel Lt. Messik (US)	General von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch	Before the departure of the Delegation's train for Tilsitt, some German soldiers arrived with grenades, and are seen prowling around the train. General von Eberhardt, having taken no police measures, the officers of the Delegation organized their own defense by means of arms which the German Delegation in accompanying them, had ordered to be transmitted to them. These measures of security prevented incidents from occurring, at the departure.
12/4 Station of Schavli	Major Coriou Major Leveque Capt. Chirossel Capt. Buisson Lt. Gigonguilheme Lt. Gladien Lt. Janvier	General von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch	General von Eberhardt had agreed in writing to protect the Control Officers of Schavli. The car occupied by these officers had been attached to the Eberhardt train. About one o'clock in the morning, this car is detached, taken six hundred meters away from the Eberhardt train, and attacked by several soldiers, with

			grenades. Most of the windows are broken, and it is only through luck that the grenades do not burst in the cars. Major Coriou having gone to protest and ask for protection, an officer on duty answers him that the General and his Chief of Staff (Major von Tritsch) are sleeping and that it is impossible to wake them up. On the insistence of the German Delegation the posts of Control of Schavli and Kurchany were withdrawn.
12/6 Station of Insterburg	French Captain Angelli 2nd Lt. Jacquemet of the Control Bureau of Insterburg.	Capt. Killac Lt. Schumann of the Kommandantur	About 9 o'clock p.m. a train of troops entered the station, the soldiers gather in front of the rooms of the Control Offices. They threaten the latter with their arms. As the German officers of the Kommandantur do not intervene to calm the soldiers, the Control Officers are obliged to leave the station Insterburg.

INTERALLIED COMMISSION
TO THE BALTIC STATES 203 s/e

TILSITT, December 13, 1919.

From: General Niessel.

To: President of the Supreme Council.

I have the honor to enclose herewith translated copy of a letter which was addressed to me by a Delegation of Lithuanians of the territory of Memel.

These documents indicate the terror felt by the unhappy Lithuanian population as a result of the troops of the Baltic districts being maintained at Memel contrary to promises made officially. The German military authorities have done everything possible to prevent any knowledge of the atrocities committed in Lithuania and Latvia becoming public. In the meantime the Lithuanians of Memel are becoming daily more aware of what they must expect from troops who are accustomed to live by looting and to spread terror in their path. For that matter, the soldiers themselves declare that they prefer not to return to Prussia as "the life there is much less agreeable".

The justified alarm of the Lithuanian inhabitants is easily explained by the arrival of troops whose hatred has become still more intense over the fury they feel for having been obliged to evacuate Lithuanian territory.

The Lithuanians of Memel who drafted the letter referred to are Messrs. Jokub Stiklorus, Jonas Griga, Kristus Lemszas, and Giorgis Jagomastas, who were obliged to avoid giving their names through fear of reprisals. They informed me verbally that they are desirous of sending a Delegation to Paris if the Supreme Council would deign to receive them.

In the event it is decided that one alone should have a hearing, it would be advisable to designate Mr. Jokub Stiklorus for the mission.

NIESEL

[Enclosure]

TILSITT, December 13, 1919.

EXCELLENCY: In the name of the Delegation of the Lithuanian territory of Memel I take the liberty to express our warmest thanks for your intervention which resulted in the evacuation of the Baltic countries by the German troops, and the liberation of Greater Lithuania which is at last accomplished.

These Legions, as was recognized by Minister of War, Noske, are made up of very dangerous elements who, for years, have been practising extortions in Lithuania.

Instead of sending these troops back to their homes in Germany, they are allowed to occupy the territory on Memel. (Which they will inevitably put to sack as they did greater Lithuania).

For a long period already we have been awaiting in anguish for the time when the territory of Memel would be occupied by the Entente, thus putting an end to the German terror, but instead of this emancipation so long looked forward to we are now the victims of undisciplined hordes. We are subjected to the regime of a state of siege, and every movement in favor of our legitimate liberation is violently suppressed either by imprisonment or threats of death. (Doctor Guigelat).

In our distress we appeal to your Excellency, as Representative of the Entente, with the following supplication:

“Do the needful to cause an immediate evacuation of Smaller Lithuania by the Baltic troops, in order that we may not be abolished through terror and helplessness.”

May we be allowed to recall to Your Excellency that we are forced to remain Prussian Lithuanians against our wishes (we are nevertheless grateful that a small portion of our country to the north of Memel is at last officially liberated) because by far the greater part of the

former territory of Lithuania, to the south of Memel, remains separated from us. In fact, not only the region to the north of Memel, but all the country included between Kurisches Haff, the Deime and the Pregel, with Darkehmen, Goldap, Komenten [*Gumbinnen?*], are a part of the former territory of Lithuania. The names of all the villages, cities, streams and lakes, as well as the mountains and hills, forests and districts are Lithuanian, and testify that they were a part of antique Lithuania, and consequently should in all justice be returned to Lithuania as Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France.

Not only is it to the interest of Lithuania, but also to the entire Entente and the peace of the whole world, that Eastern Prussia as “head” of the monstrous “Prussian Militarism”, be sliced and cut to pieces in such a way that the Ermeland and Mazuria may go to Poland, and all the territory of former Lithuania to Lithuania, and that the remaining territory around Konigsberg be placed under the administration of the Entente.

Appendix I to HD—120

DECEMBER 30, 1919.

*Note From the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies Relative to
Action of Germans Toward Officers of Allied Mission of Control*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

Headquarters

3rd Section.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: General Nudant, President, I. P. A. C. [*P. I. A. C.*], Cologne.

Please transmit to the German Government the following communication from the Supreme Council:

Frequently, officers and soldiers of the Interallied Commission, presided over by General Niessel, while exercising their mission of control, have been insulted and even attacked by German officers and soldiers.

These outrages have been viewed with indifference and have sometimes even been committed in complicity with certain German authorities, to whom the task of assuring the security of the Allied Personnel of Control had been confided.

Although they have already been the subject of verbal and written complaints addressed by General Niessel to Vice-Admiral Hopman, and although the German Government has been officially informed by a joint note, remitted December 6, to the Minister Noske, Berlin, by Colonel Dosse, Chief of Staff of General Niessel, they have, nevertheless, remained unpunished to this day.

The German Government which might claim itself powerless in regard to undisciplined troops in the Baltic outside its frontiers, cannot, at a time when these troops are in its own territory, argue its powerlessness to cover impardonable acts for which it is responsible.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers demand that it impose without delay the necessary penalties on the culprits, and inform the Interallied Commission of Control, of the execution of the measures prescribed on this subject.

Appendix J to HD-120

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
No. 5848

GENERAL ALLIED HEADQUARTERS,
General Staff
December 30, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: M. Clemenceau.

Concording reports emanating from the French Military Mission in Berlin, and from various sources, point out, in Upper Silesia, a most disquieting situation created by the doings of the military party, with the toleration, if not under the secret protection of the German Government.

This situation, looked at from a military point of view, may be characterized as follows:

1. Concentrating in Upper Silesia of regular, important and efficient military forces.

The effective of these forces^{*} largely exceeds the needs of the military situation and of the interior police.

Their spirit, which is most ardent, is resolutely inclined towards resistance to the execution of the Treaty, by active propaganda in which Ludendorf himself seems to participate. Certain unities [units], such as the Marine Brigade, are particularly feared by the populations, on account of their sentiments of hatred and violence.

These forces, already too numerous, would be joined later by elements coming from the “Baltikum” and whose bad character and want of discipline are well known,[†]

2. Abnormal development of the Police Forces.

Besides these regular troops, the Germans extend the organization of their “police forces” in a proportion which is in no way justified by the interior situation of the country.

In fact, these police formations, becoming more numerous under different denominations (Sicherheitswehr, Burgerwehr, Reichswehrpolizei, etc.,[‡] are recruited among the demobilized soldiers, and can constitute, at the first sign, real unities [units] of reinforcement of regular troops.

3. Influx of demobilized men from the “Baltikum.”

Lastly, numerous demobilized men from the “Baltikum”, particularly from the Iron Division—and not natives of Upper Silesia, are reported in the country, where they increase every day, the ranks of the agitators.

This situation calls for the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments:

The concentration of such important forces, the presence of such active elements of agitation, the exalted sentiments by which they are agitated, may be the cause, at any moment, of serious incidents.

In particular, it is to be feared that violence be exercised against the inhabitants during the evacuation pursuant to the going into force of the Treaty, that armed conflicts burst out with the Allied troops of occupation, and that the International Commission be thus, from the very beginning, placed before inextricable difficulties.

In consequence, I deem it advisable to take this situation into account, as it involves the responsibility of Germany, and to invite the German Government to reduce without delay the force of their regular troops in Upper Silesia, as far as is consistent with the maintenance of interior [*internal*] order.

If you share this point of view, the Ambassador, Secretary General of the Peace Conference, might be directed to make to Mr. von Lersner, Chief of the German Delegation, a communication on this subject, based on the annexed Note.

[Annex]

Note Concerning the Situation in Upper Silesia

The Allied and Associated Powers carefully observed the continual reinforcement of the regular forces of the so-called “police forces”, in Upper Silesia.

The importance of those forces is justified neither by the needs of the military situation nor by the maintenance of order.

Such a situation is inconsistent with the desire expressed by the German Government to loyally execute the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

On the other hand, the difficulties which occurred in Courland give reasons to fear that the German Government will be again powerless to control the events in Upper Silesia, after having permitted the elements of disorder to accumulate there.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Governments take note of the situation created in Upper Silesia, and wish to make clear to the German Government the responsibilities which are incumbent upon it, on that account.

They deem that the following measures should be taken without delay in order to remedy this situation:

1. —Reduce the strength of the regular troops and police forces, at present in Upper Silesia, within the strict limit consistent with the maintenance of order and the safeguard of public and private property.
2. —Eliminate from the regular troops and police forces all the elements having been part of the “Baltikum” forces in 1919.
3. —Include, within the troops to be evacuated from Upper Silesia before the going into force of the Treaty, the Marine Brigade, the attitude of which is contrary to the pacification of the country.
4. —Take all necessary measures to put a stop to the appeals to resistance addressed to the troops of occupation by certain parties.
5. —Oppose the influx, in Upper Silesia, of the demobilized men not native of this country.

The above various measures should be carried out as soon as possible, so that they may become fully effective as soon as the Peace Treaty is put into force.

Note From the French Delegation on the Situation in the Comitats of Western Hungary

At the request of the Austrian Delegation, and in order to protect the population in the Comitats of Western Hungary ceded to Austria by virtue of the Treaty of Saint-Germain from the violences of Magyar troops, the Supreme Council, on October 2,¹⁸ decided:

“that an Interallied Military Mission, formed of officers chosen from among the members of the Vienna and Budapest Military Missions, would be sent into the Comitats of Western Hungary to cooperate in the maintenance of order in the territories transferred to Austria, by virtue of the Treaty of Saint-Germain;

that this Mission would be placed under the orders of the Allied Generals at Budapest;

that the outline of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, such as it is fixed by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, would be officially communicated to the Allied Generals at Budapest.”

According to information received from the French Representative at Vienna, and despite the fact that the Allied Generals at Budapest were notified of the resolution of the Supreme Council, the Mission whose formation was decided upon has never been constituted, and the Magyar authorities have continued to exercise uncontrolled authority in the Comitats attributed to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

A continuation of this situation may entail serious drawbacks, as it favors the spreading of false news in the Hungarian Press tending to pretend that the Entente has not made a final decision in the matter. This situation also encourages the development of a propaganda in Hungary in favor of maintaining these Comitats under Magyar sovereignty, and it has been announced in Budapest that a “League of Western Hungary” to organize this propaganda has been formed. There are even reasons to indicate that the Hungarian Delegation may attempt to present a proposal to the Peace Conference asking for

a revision of the Saint-Germain Treaty. If, on the contrary, the Interallied Military Mission were sent to the territories in question it would show that the Allied and Associated Powers do not intend to have the provisions of a Treaty, signed scarcely three months, brought up again for discussion.

Under these circumstances, it would be desirable to invite the Allied Generals at Budapest to immediately send the Military Mission, decided upon on October 2, to the Comitats attributed to Austria.

Appendix L to HD-120

PARIS, December 26, 1919.

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Czecho-Slovakian Delegation has sent directly to the President of the Economic Commission, the two proposals, copies of which are hereto annexed.

On account of the technical difficulties raised by those two proposals, the Commission was of the opinion that, the first, concerning the exportation of Czecho-Slovakian coal to Austria, should be submitted to the Commission dealing with this supply.

The second suggests that, "in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, the same advantages should be recognized to Czecho-Slovakia as to the other Allied and Associated Powers, participating in the reparations, as far as concerns the proceeds of the liquidations of enemy properties in the new States". For this purpose, the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation proposes the suppression, in the Treaty with Hungary, of Article 267 of the Treaty of St. Germain, and the corresponding modification of Article 249. The Economic Commission is of the opinion that the attention of the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation should be called to the fact that, even if the modifications requested were granted, Czecho-Slovakia would not be, for this reason, entitled to utilize the proceeds of the liquidation, for the settlement of its

reparations, as these proceeds can only be charged with indemnities pertaining to Czecho-Slovakian property and credits in Hungary.

*The Secretary Gen'l of the Economic Commission to the Peace
Conference:*
D. SERRUYS

[Annex 1]

PART X

SECTION I.

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

CHAPTER I.—*Regulation, Taxes, and Customs Restrictions*

CONSIDERATION

Article 224 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain pledges Czecho-Slovakia and Poland to maintain, during a certain period, a favorable duty regime for the exportation of coal to Austria, and even, until such times as a permanent settlement is reached, to take positive measures with a view to the provisioning of Austria with coal.

As it appears that the Treaty with Hungary is to be, in general, drawn up according to the same principles as were applied in the drafting of the Saint-Germain Treaty, it seems probable that the Supreme Council will insert an analogous article in the Peace Conditions with Hungary.

Now, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation wishes to call the following facts, pertaining to this question, to the attention of the Peace Conference:

The coal consumption throughout all Hungary, before the war, amounted to about 15 million tons per year. The Hungarian mines furnished 10,200,000 tons towards this consumption; 2,800 tons were imported from Germany, especially from Upper-Silesia, and about 1,500,000 was received from the Ostrau-Karvin Basin. A

considerable proportion, at least 3,500,000 tons, of the total consumption, was destined for the needs of the former Hungarian territories, which now form part of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. More than 50 per cent of the coal imported from Germany, and 75 per cent of the importations from the Ostrau-Karvin Basin remained in Slovakia. The lignite required by this region was received at the rate of about 480,000 tons from Salgo-Tarjan, and 300,000 tons from Handlova.

Under the present circumstances there only remains the Handlova mines in the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, as the Salgo-Tarjan mines are included in the Hungarian territory. Now, these latter mines furnished about 480,000 tons of lignite per year to Slovakia, while the Ostrau-Karvin Basin exported only about 200,000 tons of coal out of Czecho-Slovakia as it is now bounded. By considering the difference in the caloric value of these two kinds of coal it is shown that, judging by the pre-war figures, the territories of former Hungary located outside of Czecho-Slovakia were at a considerable advantage in comparison with the latter. This exposé shows clearly that Czecho-Slovakia should not be expected to furnish the coal provision for Hungary.

For these reasons the Czecho-Slovak Delegation takes the liberty of presenting the following

PROPOSAL:

In the event that the insertion of an Article in the Peace Treaty with Hungary analogous with Article 224 in the Treaty of Saint-Germain, would be provided for, the Czecho-Slovak Republic should not be included in the States that are to adopt measures with a view to facilitating the provisioning of Hungary with coal.

[Annex 2]

PART X

ECONOMIC CLAUSES

SECTION IV.—*Possessions, rights and interests*

CONSIDERATION

By terms of Article 249, lit. i of the Saint-Germain Treaty, the proceeds of the liquidations effected in the *new* states, signatories of the said Treaties as Allied and Associated Powers, should be paid directly to the proprietors. Article 267 of the same Treaty stipulates that the possessions, rights and interests of the Austrian nationals located on the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy are not to be subject to seizure or liquidation.

The reason for these two exceptional provisions is obvious; the Saint-Germain Treaty supposes that the new States will not participate in the reparations to be paid by Austria except for certain insignificant sums and that, in consequence, there is not sufficient motive to have the rights provided for in paragraph *b*, of the said Article recognized in their case.

Now, concerning Hungary, the Reparation Commission formally recognized that the Czecho-Slovak Republic was entitled to claim integral indemnities for the damages caused by the Magyar invasion of Slovakia, in the months of May and June last. As the amount of the claims coming under this head will reach several billion kronen, it appears just that, in the Treaty with Hungary, the same conditions be recognized to Czecho-Slovakia as are recognized to the other Allied and Associated Powers participating in the Reparations.

The Czecho-Slovak Delegation, therefore, takes the liberty of presenting the following Proposal:

- 1) —Omit, in the Treaty with Hungary, Article 267 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.
- 2) —Insert, in the Treaty with Hungary, Article 249 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, but with the following modification:

“i) Relative to the liquidations effected in the States which are not to participate in the Reparations to be paid by Hungary, the proceeds of the liquidations, etc.”

- ¹ Appendix B to HD–119, p. 713 [*Pg. 713 is part of [Doc. 35](#)*].
- ² Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .
- ³ HD–119, minute a, p. 705 [*Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 35](#)*].
- ⁴ Appendix C, p. 735 [*Pg. 735 is part of [Doc. 36](#)*].
- ⁵ HD–117, minute 5, and appendix E, pp. 675 [*Pg. 675 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*] and 683 [*Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].
- ⁶ Appendix D to HD–117, p. 681 [*Pg. 681 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].
- ⁷ HD–102, minute 6, p. 371 [*Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 18](#)*].
- ⁸ HD–65, minute 8, [vol. VIII, p. 491](#) .
- ⁹ HD–96, minute 5, p. 225 [*Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 12](#)*].
- ¹⁰ HD–99, minute 2, p. 305 [*Pg. 305 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*].
- ¹¹ HD–62, minute 8, [vol. VIII, p. 412](#) .
- ¹² HD–96, minute 5, p. 225 [*Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 12](#)*].
- ¹³ HD–99, minute 2, p. 305 [*Pg. 305 is part of [Doc. 15](#)*].
- ¹⁴ Appendix D to HD–117, p. 681 [*Pg. 681 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].
- ¹⁵ Permanent International Armistice Commission.

* The share of each power in the upkeep of the Russian P. W. is as [so] far as follows:

For France	28, 710, 000 marks
For Great Britain	7, 080, 000 “
For America	50, 015, 000 “
For Italy	0 “

¹⁶ i. e., Supreme Council of Supply and Relief; for other divergences in text, see another version of this note, appendix F to HD–102, p. 379 [*Pg. 379 is part of [Doc. 18](#)*].

* The Commission, having no data concerning the dates upon which the supplies estimated above were furnished, has taken as a basis, in the conversion of marks, the rates of exchange prevalent on August 26. The figures above indicated should, therefore, be examined before their final acceptance. Each Delegate has, moreover, expressly reserved the right for his Government to modify the total of the amounts representing its contributions towards the supplies if

January 3, 10:30 a.m. (HD–121)

[37] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Saturday, January 3, 1920, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, January 3, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/121

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/121

HD-121

[Document 37]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the
Quai d'Orsay, Saturday, January 3, 1920, at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, January 3, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon, Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. Norman

FRANCE
M. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

GREAT BRITAIN	Capt. Lothian Small
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	M. Zanchi
<i>Interpreter</i> —M. Mantoux	

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Cdt. MacNamara, R. N.
M. Malkin

FRANCE

General Weygand
General Le Rond
Admiral Le Vavas seur
Colonel Requin
M. Hermite
M. Kammerer
M. Alphand
M. de Montille
M. Fromageot

ITALY

C. Admiral Grassi
M. Stranieri
Cdt. Gabetti
M. Pilotti

The Council had before it a Note dated January 1, 1920, from the Chairman of the German Delegation to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference (Appendix "A").

VICE-ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR wished to draw the Council's attention to one passage of the letter from Baron von Lersner. The Chairman of the German Delegation said that "the Allies, as Mr. Loucheur had recalled, must have reckoned on the existence in Germany of more than 700,000 tons of floating docks when drawing up their list." This was a gratuitous suggestion on the part of Baron von Lersner. In the

Allied negotiations with the Germans, no inclusive figure had ever been mentioned: the Germans had therefore no reason for saying that one had been fixed. When the naval experts decided to claim 400,000 tons of materiel of all kinds to be handed over by Germany as reparation for the Scapa Flow incident, the information at their disposal as to the material existing in German ports gave the approximate figure of 620,000 tons, and their claim was based on this figure. The difference between their calculation and those of the Germans was therefore due to the difference between 620,000 and 520,000 and not between 700,000 and 520,000. He repeated that no maximum figure was ever given during negotiations. 1.

Negotiations With the German Delegation Concerning the Protocol¹

MR. CAMBON agreed that the Allies must therefore maintain their figures. Baron von Lersner was ill: in order that blame for the delays in bringing the Treaty into force for which the Germans were really to blame, might not be imputed to the Allies, M. Dutasta was prepared to go and visit him with M. Loucheur and would inform him that the Allies maintained their figures. It was important that the ensuing conversation should be carefully noted.

M. DUTASTA suggested leaving a memorandum with Baron von Lersner.

VICE-ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR said Commander MacNamara had drafted a note which might serve as a basis for drafting the memorandum. Its essential points were as follows:

1. Baron von Lersner's letter was inexact as far as floating dock tonnage was concerned.
2. No figure from the inventories prepared by the Allied naval experts was communicated to the Germans during the conversations between them and the Allied naval experts.
3. The chief subjects of discussion had been the 80,000 ton dock at Hamburg and the two 50,000 ton docks reported at Danzig: these were, indeed, the two most remarkable cases of disagreement between the inventories supplied by the Allied experts and the German documents; but it was never said that the Allies adopted as their own other information communicated by the German

delegates. Finally, the figure of 700,000 tons mentioned by M. Loucheur was given only by way of example and for comparison with the figure of 600,000 tons which also the Germans had given by way of example: neither figure was exact.

M. CAMBON thought that a document to this effect should be read to Baron von Lersner who would be asked to take note of it.

It was decided:

that in reply to the letter of January 1, 1920, from the Chairman of the German Delegation, the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should inform Baron von Lersner (who would be requested to take note of the fact) that, the Allies had never based their calculations upon the existence in Germany of 700,000 tons of floating docks, and that they maintained the figure of 624,000 tons.

The Council had before it a note dated January 2, 1920, (Appendix "B").

GENERAL LE ROND reported that during recent conversations the attitude of the German delegates had obviously changed: they seemed to have understood that the Allies did not intend to make extravagant claims, but that, on the contrary they keenly desired to disturb as little as possible the life of those regions that were going to pass temporarily under their control. Nevertheless, the situation had hardly changed: The German Delegates had not full powers, they had to refer constantly to Berlin and could only express personal opinions. Fresh experts had been summoned to settle questions concerning the Allenstein and Marienwerder territories, and to deal with questions of a military nature arising out of the relief of German troops by Allied contingents. Mr. von Simson had also pointed out that a series of problems remained to be settled concerning Memel and Danzig as well as the working of boundary commissions, and that it was also necessary to conclude the German-Polish negotiations begun in Berlin; finally, he had drawn the attention of the Allies to the Slesvig questions. Mr. von Simson had also asked what procedure the Allies had in mind for the several Commissions

taking over their functions—he meant the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions, and the Reparation Commission, did they intend merely to notify Germany that the authority of these Commissions had come into force or to negotiate with her on the matter. He must say that the German delegates seemed merely to expect notification on the part of the Allies. 2. Negotiations With the German Delegation Concerning the Putting Into Force of the Treaty

With regard to the organization of boundary commissions, he thought it would be sufficient to give M. von Simson the text of the instructions and note already approved by the Supreme Council.² With the Council's permission he would do this. The Chairman of the German Delegation had also asked him whether the Allies intended to summon the German members of these Commissions to Paris. That was a question which had still to be decided. As far as the settlement of Slesvig questions was concerned, there was a Commission on the spot to take all the necessary steps. Mr. von Simson was, however, not aware whether the German representatives had ratified the agreement prepared by it. In this connection he would point out to the Council that the Danish Minister had been very much disturbed by the news published in the press that the cost of upkeep of troops of occupation in plebiscite zones would be charged to the States to whom the territory was attributed. He pointed out that, as far as Slesvig was concerned, the Treaty expressly provided for the division of these expenses between Germany and Denmark. Obviously, a decision of the Supreme Council could not be carried out in contradiction of an article of the Treaty, and, moreover, the decision in question referred only to the plebiscite territories of eastern Germany.

With regard to Memel, Mr. von Simson pointed out that Germany would be justified in withdrawing her officials. This was true and might certainly cause an awkward state of affairs. He therefore thought it would be well to conclude an arrangement prepared on the Allied side by a special commission working on the following bases: (a) temporary retention of office by German officials with all their existing guarantees (b) retention of the existing and creation of a higher jurisdiction; (c) retention of German legislation; (d) delivery

to the Allies of property belonging to the Reich or to Prussia; (e) provisional retention of the economic and financial *status quo*.

Similarly, it would be well to make arrangements concerning German officials and services in Danzig.

Mr. von Simson did not object in principle to the provisions making the German Government responsible for the upkeep of offices responsible for disbursement of public monies in plebiscite territories. The German delegates even seemed ready to advance the necessary funds for the troops of occupation.

He would be grateful if the Council would kindly give him instructions on the points still in dispute. He recalled the fact that, as far as Upper Silesia and the Allenstein and Marienwerder territories were concerned, negotiations were proceeding (replies from Berlin were awaited) and that the German-Polish negotiations were beginning that very day.

MR. WALLACE asked whether the questions enumerated by General Le Rond must be settled before the signature of the Protocol.

GENERAL LE ROND replied that they must be settled but that could be done in a very few days.

M. CAMBON asked General Le Rond to be good enough to enumerate each of the questions still remaining to be settled: so that the Council might come to decisions upon them one by one.

GENERAL LE ROND said the first question was as follows: ought they merely to notify the German Government of the assumption of office of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions and the Reparation Commission, or should they enter into negotiations on the subject.

GENERAL WEYGAND reminded the Council that this point had already been settled. Germany had already been informed that the Control Commissions would act officially from the coming into force of the Treaty and that from that time the delegations which those

Commissions already had in Berlin would have power to act on behalf of the Commissions.

M. CAMBON stated that in the opinion of the Council there was no need to enter into negotiations with the Germans concerning the assumption of office by the Commissions just enumerated; notification would be sufficient.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the second point was the transfer of sovereignty in Memel; should a special commission prepare a separate arrangement on this subject.

M. CAMBON thought that the commission might at the same time prepare an arrangement for Danzig. He asked whether a special commission must be constituted.

M. SCIALOJA proposed that the task should be entrusted to the Commission on Polish Affairs.

GENERAL LE ROND agreed on condition that the Commission might co-opt any experts whose opinion it considered necessary.

M. CAMBON accepted this solution on behalf of the Council.

As for arrangements which the Slesvig Commission might have made with the German authorities, there was nothing for them to decide; it was merely a matter of asking Copenhagen for information.

GENERAL LE ROND, referring to the organization of boundary commissions, believed he was right in thinking that the Council had no objection to his transmitting a copy of the instructions approved on October 15 to Mr. von Simson; but ought they to summon the German members of those commissions to Paris.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what was the object of holding the meeting in Paris. To him the question seemed essentially a technical one.

GENERAL LE ROND replied that it was a question of coming to an understanding as to working methods. It was for this reason and because the same methods must be universally applied that they had

not granted the claim made by the Belgian Government that the members of the German-Belgian Boundary Commission should meet at Brussels.

MR. SCIALOJA was of opinion that the German representatives should be summoned.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed that this would be better.

GENERAL. LE ROND suggested alternative solutions; either the Allies should come to an agreement and when this was done, appoint a meeting place with the Germans, or they should summon the Germans to Paris.

M. CAMBON offered a third solution: the Allies could come to an agreement at Paris and, once that was done, summon the Germans. It was most essential that they should be in agreement before the Germans took part in their discussions.

(The Council accepted this proposal)

GENERAL LE ROND said there remained the Saar question; Colonel Requin would lay it before the Council.

COLONEL REQUIN recalled the fact that, in a letter dated December 28, Baron von Lersner had raised the question of the regime to be applied during the transition period preceding the formation of the Government Commission for the Saar. The German delegation thus admitted that there would be a transition period; but it was of opinion that the armistice regime could not be retained during that period. On this point they were in perfect agreement with the Germans. The French Government and Marshal Foch had never spoken of an armistice regime properly so-called; but they considered that the present regime though possibly relaxed to some extent must be retained. It would, indeed, be impossible to restore the government of the Saar territory to the Germans, since, as soon as the Treaty came into force, the French administration would take possession of the mines under the terms of the Treaty itself. Control by the military authority in occupation was therefore essential. It was

nevertheless clear that the present regime could be relaxed to such extent as did not prejudice the safety of the troops and on condition that no undertaking was given calculated subsequently to impair the freedom of action of the governing Commission. Marshal Foch had already given instructions to that effect. It was none the less certain that questions of detail would have to be settled with the German authorities, since the bonds uniting the German Saar administration with the Treves and Spier authorities were severed with the coming into force of the Treaty. Baron von Lersner proposed that they should negotiate on the matter with the chief administrator of Coblenz. They thought it better to return to the first solution proposed by the Germans themselves, that the necessary powers for these negotiations should be given to a Saar official. At the beginning of occupation and indeed for several months, the French authorities, with the consent of the German authorities, had dealt with a Saar official entitled the Verwaltungspräsident. It had certainly been necessary to expel the official in question on account of the part he had played during the recent strikes, but there was nothing to prevent the retention of the same system. It would therefore be well to reply to Baron von Lersner explaining the Allied point of view on the question of principle and indicating that questions of detail would be settled with a Saar official properly accredited by the German authorities.

SIR EYRE CROWE had no objections to make to this proposal.

MR. WALLACE could make no statement without special instructions from his Government.

In this connection he wished to say that, in view of the present political situation in the United States, his Government was very anxious that the Minutes should leave no doubt as to the attitude adopted by the American delegate. On December 20, a resolution was adopted on which he had made a formal reservation. Nevertheless, the Note provided for in that resolution and despatched, embodying in the text the formula "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers". He asked that that formula should not be used in any document to which the American Government had not given its explicit consent.

M. CAMBON said that the observations made by Mr. Wallace would be noted in the Minutes.

COLONEL REQUIN said that they must therefore define three points in the reply: 1. retention in principle of control of local administration by the military authority; 2. relaxation of the military regime as far as possible; 3. settlement of questions of detail by negotiations between the French authorities and a Saar official accredited by the German Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND wished to point out, in connection with the observation made by Mr. Wallace, that there was no question of innovation: the Council had already decided while Mr. Polk was sitting on it that the existing regime should be retained in the Saar territory after the coming into force of the Treaty and until the constitution of the Government Commission:³

It was decided:

1. —that there was no need to enter into negotiations with the German Government concerning the entry into office of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions and the Reparation Commission; the entry into force of these Commissions would merely be notified.
2. —that the Commission on Polish Affairs, which was authorized to co-opt any experts it might consider of use, should, as quickly as possible, prepare draft arrangements with the German Government concerning the transfer of sovereignty in Memel and Danzig.
3. —that General Le Rond should communicate to Mr. von Simson the text of the instructions and of the Note for the boundary commissions as approved by the Supreme Council, and that the German members of those Commissions should be summoned to Paris when agreement had been reached between the Allied representatives to those Commissions on all questions to be settled.
4. —that, with regard to the regime of the Saar territory after the coming into force of the Treaty and before the nomination of the Government Commission, the Chairman of the German Delegation

should be informed:—(a) that the control of local administration by the military authority was in principle retained; (b) that the regime of military occupation would be relaxed as far as possible; (c) that questions of detail would be settled by negotiations between the French authorities and a Saar official properly accredited by the German Government.

Mr. Wallace would refer the last paragraph of the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

The Council had before it a note dated January 3, 1920, from the Prisoners of War Commission (Appendix “C”).

MR. ALPHAND read and commented upon the text of the note from the Commission.

MR. WALLACE said that as there had been no American delegate on the Commission, he must reserve his his opinion. 3. Powers of the Prisoners of War Commission

After a short discussion it was decided:

1. That the Commission for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War established by Article 215 of the Treaty of Versailles should be authorized, on meeting the Germans, to settle with them various questions connected with repatriation, in particular those concerning the cost of repatriation, the search for missing men, the restoration of articles and valuables belonging to prisoners of war.
2. That those questions which were not inserted in the chapter on Reparations should be settled independently of the Reparations Commission. The various delegations to the Prisoners of War Commission should nevertheless keep in touch and act in agreement with delegates for relevant matters on the Reparation Commission.

Mr. Wallace would refer the last paragraph of the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled the fact that at a previous meeting⁴ he had stated that Mr. Lloyd George's coming visit to Paris might be such as would alter the views of the British Government concerning the agenda for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. At the present meeting he wished to inform the Supreme Council that this circumstance had in no way changed the opinion of his Government, which still thought that the nomination of the Saar Boundary Commission alone should appear in the agenda for the first meeting, the fixing of the agenda for the following meetings being left to the Council of the League. 4. Convocation of the League of Nations

MR. BERTHELOT said that as nothing was changed in the previous decision of the Supreme Council,⁵ they had only still to decide the date of the convocation of the Council. Had Sir Eyre Crowe any information concerning the wish, said to have been expressed by Sir Eric Drummond, for the postponement of the first meeting for several days in order to give more solemnity to the occasion.

SIR EYRE CROWE knew nothing about this. In any case Sir Eric Drummond was not competent to express the views of the Government, he only represented the Secretariat.

MR. MANTOUX added that, on account of the political election to be held in France from January 11 to 17, Mr. Leon Bourgeois would also like the first meeting to be postponed.

MR. BERTHELOT considered that there could obviously be no difficulty in holding the first meeting of the Council only several days after the coming into force of the Treaty.

MR. SCIALOJA asked what day was arranged for the Treaty coming into force. He had been summoned for January 6.

MR. BERTHELOT said that that was the date chosen at first, but the delay in the negotiations with the German delegates would necessitate postponing it for several days.

MR. WALLACE wished to inform the Council of the views of his Government on the matter. Mr. Wallace read the note which appears as Appendix "D".

SIR EYRE CROWE considered that it was for them to find the most practical method. If he understood aright, the convocation would take place in two phases: the President of the United States would issue the official convocation when he knew the day and hour fixed for the meeting; but before that, it would be well to inform the Powers represented on the Council of the League unofficially that the meeting would take place at an early date to be definitely fixed later. It would be best for this unofficial notice to be sent to the Powers concerned by the President of the Conference or the Secretariat-General. An official invitation would then be given by telegraph in a form chosen by President Wilson.

MR. CAMBON promised to inform the Government of the United States as soon as the Council had decided on a date for the meeting.

It was decided:

that the Secretariat-General of the Conference should unofficially inform the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations that the first meeting of the Council would take place a few days after the coming into force of the Treaty, and should indicate in his communication that the official convocation would be sent to those Powers by the President of the United States.

The Council had before it a telegram dated December 29, 1919, from General Franchet d'Esperey (Appendix "E").

MR. KAMMERER read and commented upon the telegram from General Franchet d'Esperey.

SIR EYRE CROWE was not in a position to express an opinion on the question. He doubted whether the British Government would be prepared to authorize an Allied authority to take charge of the evacuation and to have the Allies themselves bear the costs of

evacuation. He thought this a dangerous step to take. 5. Evacuation of Civilian Population From Districts Abandoned by Denikin's Army

MR. KAMMERER suggested in that case giving powers of direction to the Allied agents on the spot. The Bolsheviks advanced on Odessa six months ago, and everybody was convinced that the occupation of the town would only be temporary: departure was therefore rendered easy. At present things were different and there was no advantage to be gained by encouraging emigration; it was nevertheless certain that thousands would embark [*debark*] at Constantinople and they could not be left to die of hunger.

MR. CAMBON pointed out that the Western Powers had also very important material interests in those districts and the large quantities of military and naval materiel which risked falling into Bolshevik hands must also be taken into account.

MR. KAMMERER thought that there was no need for special instructions on this point. General Denikin or the Allied military authorities would do what was necessary. Their concern was with individuals. It must be explained to General Denikin that there was no need to evacuate many people; but it was hard to be indifferent to the laws of humanity.

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled the fact that at the time of the evacuation of northern Russia, Russians were not allowed to embark for Europe.

MR. KAMMERER agreed, but thought the situation in the present case somewhat different. They had had several months in which to prepare the evacuation; also, as events had proved, the northern districts were not really threatened by the Bolshevik armies. At Odessa they would have to anticipate vengeance on the part of the Bolsheviks; many people would flee, but the whole question was, what was to become of them.

SIR EYRE CROWE would have to consult his Government.

The rest of the discussion was adjourned.

A Report dated December 31, 1919, from the Central Territorial Committee was laid before the Council (Appendix "F"). 6.
Occupation of the Buk District by Greek Troops

After a short discussion it was decided:

1. that Greece should be authorized immediately to occupy the Buk bridgehead allocated to her by Article 27 of the Treaty of Neuilly.
2. General Franchet d'Esperey would be informed of this decision and would take the necessary executive measures.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government).

The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee dated January 2, 1920. (Appendix "G").

M. CAMBON pointed out that the Drafting Committee was an offshoot of the Conference. There might therefore be disadvantages in allowing it to give directly opinions on questions of interpretation. Dealings should all be through the Supreme Council. 7. Requests for the Opinion of the Drafting Committee on Interpretation of the Treaty

SIR EYRE CROWE added that otherwise the Council might find itself committed to interpretations to which it did not agree.

MR. SCIALOJA agreed, especially as a special Committee had been established for the execution of the Treaty of Versailles. Still less could the Drafting Committee take an initiative for an unratified Treaty.

MR. MATSUI thought that in case of emergency the Drafting Committee might be applied to, but not as a standing arrangement.

MR. WALLACE reserved his opinion, as America was not then represented on the Drafting Committee.

It was decided:

that without *ad hoc* permission from the Supreme Council the Drafting Committee was not authorized to give to Delegations which might apply to it, interpretations of clauses of the Treaties.

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled to the Council that Marshal Foch had suggested sending General Niessel to Esthonia on behalf of the Allied Powers to negotiate an arrangement between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenitch.⁶ He has asked the opinion of his Government on this suggestion. The British Government thought that the Niessel mission could hardly be of great utility. Yudenitch's army was gradually being absorbed by the Esthonian Army. That was a quite natural development in which it was better not to interfere. If the Allies approved of this progressive absorption there was no need to send a special mission. It would be enough, if the Allied representatives at Reval informed the Esthonian Government that the Allied Powers were not opposed to its thus engaging in its service elements of Yudenitch's Army: non-commissioned ranks would be absorbed first of all, but the same thing might well happen in the case of the officers. 8. Situation of Yudenitch's Army

MR. CAMBON said that Marshal Foch had informed the Council that he was recalling General Niessel to Paris to await fresh instructions from the Supreme Council. Under those circumstances and as the matter did not seem urgent, he proposed that it should be adjourned until Monday.

The rest of the discussion was adjourned.

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix A to HD-121

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN DELEGATION No. A 1782

PARIS, January 1, 1920.

*Note of January 1, 1919 [1920] From German Delegation to
Supreme Council Regarding Delivery of Floating Docks on Basis of
624,275 Tons*

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

Being, on account of a cold, confined to bed for three days, by order of the Doctor, and unable to visit you personally, I should like to communicate immediately, to your Excellency, a written summary of the remarks of my Government, concerning the estimate of our tonnage of floating docks, indicated in the document which was remitted to me, on behalf of the President of the Peace Conference.

According to the data of our technical Commission, the estimate of the tonnage made by the Germans has been, in the meetings held with the Allies, examined in detail, discussed thoroughly and found in accordance with the Allied estimates. The Allies did not assert that we mentioned docks not carried in their statement; they merely indicated that a large floating dock of 80,000 tons at Hamburg and two floating docks of about 50,000 tons at Dantzig, were omitted in the German list. Consequently, the Allies, as Mr. Loucheur remembered, were obliged to base their estimate on the existence in Germany of more than 700,000 tons of floating docks.

The amount, 624,275 tons, of German floating docks has never been indicated to our technical Commission or to myself. We were obliged to count, therefore, that the Allies calculated our floating tonnage as being over 700,000 tons. If, therefore, as I have said several times to your Excellency and to Mr. Loucheur, during our last confidential conversations—our tonnage of floating docks really existing is in accordance with the German valuation, we should not have to deliver more than our last offer of 30,000 tons of tonnage to be built, but, on the contrary, notably less.

Please accept.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix B to HD-121

JANUARY 2, 1920.

*Negotiations With the German Delegation Relative to the Coming
Into Force of the Treaty of Versailles*

NOTE TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL

In the course of the Conference of December 30th and 31st, 1919, and of January 1st, 1920 between General Le Bond, assisted by Messrs. Rennie and Pavia, and the German Delegation, presided over by Mr. von Simson, the question relative to first duties of the Interallied Commissions in the plebiscite territories were taken up, except the questions which the German Delegation had not the necessary experts in Paris to examine.

At the conclusion of the Conference of January 1st, Mr. von Simson remarked that, in connection with the Eastern frontiers of Germany, the questions referred to in Paragraph 4 of the Note of the Supreme Council, dated November 1, 1919,⁷ which was addressed to the German Government, relative to the operations of the Delimitation Commissions, were still unsettled, as well as the conclusion of the negotiations between Poland and Germany which were opened in Berlin, and which, according to the Supreme Council, were to be concluded in Paris.

Mr. von Simson then asked what action would be taken relative to the questions enumerated in the following paragraphs of the note above referred to:

1. Assuming of duties by the Interallied High Commission on Rhenish territories,
2. Assuming of duties by the Military, Naval, and Aeronautic Delegations.
3. Assuming of duties by the Reparations Commission.
4. Transfer of Government in the Saar Basin.

Mr. von Simson remarked that, concerning the questions 1, 2 and 3, he did not believe it necessary to open a discussion, but insisted particularly upon the necessity of regulating certain problems presented in question 4.

Pursuant to these remarks the German Delegation addressed two notes, copies of which are hereto annexed, to General Le Rond on January 2.

[Annex 1]

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

PARIS, January 2, 1920.

From: Von Simson.

To: General Le Rond.

The Note of the Allied and Associated Governments, under date of November 1, 1919, in enumerating the questions to be settled before the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, by the Representatives of the Allies, mentions the transfer of Government in the Saar Basin.

The German Delegation requests that a meeting be called in which this subject may be treated. During the meeting it would be desirable, in particular, to determine the manner in which the administration of the territory is to be conducted until such times as the Commission to be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations will be in a position to take over the Government.

At the same time the German Delegation would be grateful for information concerning the statutes relative to the rights of the officials and employees of the State coal exploitation in the Saar Basin, who will enter the service of the French state. The elaboration of the statutes was promised by the French Delegates at the time of the Saarbruck negotiations during the month of August. In the interest of the officials and employees concerned, who are in a justified state of unrest, it would appear particularly necessary to reach an agreement as soon as possible relative to the conditions under which they are to enter the service of the French State.

Accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

[Annex 2]

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

PARIS, January 2, 1920.

From: Von Simson.

To: General Le Rond.

The Note of the Allied and Associated Governments, under date of November 1, 1919, in enumerating the subjects to be settled by the Representatives of the German Government together with the Representatives of the Allies, mentions among other things the labors of the Delimitation Commissions which are to be assembled within a period of fifteen days after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. This refers to the Commissions which are instructed to fix the German-Belgium frontier; the Saar Basin frontier; the German-Polish frontier; the frontier of the future free city of Dantsig, and that of the Czecho-Slovak State.

The German Delegation requests that a conference be arranged in order that the manner in which the labors of these Commissions is to be conducted may be settled. At the same time, the German Delegation would be grateful for a list of the names of the members of the Delimitation Commissions.

Accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix C to HD-121

PARIS, January 3, 1920.

Note for the Supreme Council

The Commission on Prisoners of War, by unanimous decision of all its members, has the honor to suggest that the Supreme Council

make the following decisions:

“The Commission on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War, provided for by Article 215 of the Treaty of Versailles, is authorized to negotiate with the Germans, at such times as a meeting may be arranged, the various questions connected with the repatriation, and especially the questions relative to the repatriation expenses, locating of the missing, and the return of the objects and property of the Prisoners of War.

“These questions, which are not inserted in the Reparations chapter, will be dealt with independently of the action of the Reparations Commission. The various Delegations to the Commission on Prisoners of War will, nevertheless, maintain contact and act together with the Delegates of the Reparations Commission, in all matters pertaining thereto.”

Appendix D to HD-121

AMERICAN EMBASSY
PARIS

JANUARY 2, 1920.

Memorandum

The Government of the United States regrets that owing to the present political situation in America not to be able to send the preliminary notice as proposed in the resolution of November 10th.⁸

It might, however, be possible for the Department of State to verbally inform in Washington the diplomatic representatives of the Nations represented on the Council of the League of Nations.

In the event that this procedure were not considered advisable, it is proposed that M. Clemenceau, in his quality of President of the Peace Conference send notice to the Nations represented on the Council of the League that President Wilson will call the first meeting of the Council immediately after the going into effect of the Treaty by virtue of the deposit of ratifications by three of the Allied and Associated Powers and by Germany.

The Department of State would like to know if it is desired that the preliminary notice be given by the Department of State or by M. Clemenceau; and desires to know:

The hour, the date and the exact place where it is desired to have the meeting take place.

The President intends to send the convocation in the following sense:

[“]In compliance with article Five of the Covenant of the League of Nations which went into effect at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles of June 28th, 1919, of which it is a part, the President of the United States, acting on behalf of those nations which have deposited their instruments of ratification in Paris as certified in a *procès-verbal* to agreement of by the French Government dated (. . . .) has the honor to inform the Government of that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held in Paris on (date).

The President earnestly ventures the hope that the Government of will be in a position to send a representative to this first meeting. He feels that it is unnecessary for him to point out the deep significance attached to this meeting or the importance which it must assume in the eyes of the world.

It will mark the beginning of a new era in international cooperation and the first step toward the ideal concert of nations. It will bring the League of Nations into being as a living force devoted to the task of assisting the peoples of all countries in their desire for peace, prosperity and happiness. The President is convinced that its progress will accord with the noble purposes to which it is dedicated.”

If this draft meets with the approval of the Supreme Council, the hour, date and the place of meeting should be added at the end of the first paragraph.

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 29, 1919.

*Telegram From General Franchet d'Esperey of December 29
Regarding Situation of Denikin's Army Front*

FRENCH DELEGATION

TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY

The present situation on the Denikin Army front indicates that an important percentage of the civil population will attempt to escape from the Bolsheviks by sea.

On account of the disorder and the lack of resources at the disposal of the Russian authorities the care of these refugees will devolve upon the Allies, as they cannot allow them to die of hunger.

It is impossible to receive them at Constantinople as the city is overpopulated now and the cost of living is very dear without incurring the risk of famine and epidemic. I will investigate locally to what extent the Serbians and Bulgarians can come to our assistance.

I have already taken the matter up with the High Commissioners of the Allies and the British Command, but I am of the opinion that the question cannot be satisfactorily regulated unless the Supreme Council agrees:

- 1 —to appoint a supreme Allied authority to insure the conduct of the affair, as a centralization of authority is necessary in order to avoid the hesitations and difficulties which occurred last spring.
- 2 —to fix the share each Power must contribute towards the expenses. In my opinion, all the Great Powers and Greece should participate in the expenses.

I would be grateful to have this question examined at once by the Supreme Council.

DECEMBER 31, 1919.

*Report Addressed to the Supreme Council by the Central Committee
on Territorial Questions*

OCCUPATION OF THE BUK BRIDGEHEAD BY GREEK TROOPS

Article 27 of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, fixing the southern frontier of Bulgaria, and the watershed between the Mesta Karasou basin to the south and that of the Maritza to the north, removes a region of several square kilometres from Bulgaria to the north of Buk, designated by the Greeks as “The Buk Bridgehead”.

The Greek Military Attaché in Paris has asked that this territory be occupied by the Greek Army. Marshal Foch, in accordance with the views of General Franchet d’Esperey, raises no objection to an immediate occupation of the “Buk Bridgehead” by Greece.

The Central Committee on Territorial Questions, after an examination of the matter, unanimously agreed that Greece might, without inconvenience, be authorized to occupy the territory in question at the present time, as the modifications made concerning the frontier in 1913 were intended to insure that Power her natural frontier in that region.

If this suggestion receives the approval of the Supreme Council, General Franchet d’Esperey should receive notification of the decision, which would permit him to adopt the measures necessary to effect its execution.

JANUARY 2, 1920.

Note Presented to the Supreme Council by the Drafting Committee

In four letters, written on the 23rd and 24th of December last, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation asked the Drafting Committee for information as to the interpretation of certain Articles of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

The Drafting Committee would be grateful to the Supreme Council for instructions as to whether it is authorized to furnish the Czecho-Slovak Delegation with the interpretative advice solicited, and to act accordingly in analogous cases which might be presented eventually.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

¹ Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

² HD-70, minute 5, and appendices C and D, [vol. VIII, pp. 643](#)  and [651](#) .

³ HD-84, minute 2, [vol. VIII, p. 954](#) .

⁴ HD-119, minute 5, p. 708 [*Pg. 708 is part of [Doc. 35](#)*].

⁵ HD-88, minute 6, and appendix D, pp. 85 [*Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 4](#)*] and 91 [*Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 4](#)*].

⁶ HD-113, minute 1, and appendix A, pp. 594 [*Pg. 594 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*] and 604 [*Pg. 604 is part of [Doc. 29](#)*].

⁷ Appendix B to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 863](#) .

⁸ HD-88, minute 6, p. 85 [*Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 4](#)*].

January 5, 10:30 a.m. (HD–122)

[38] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, January 5, 1920, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, January 5, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/122

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/122

HD-122

[Document 38]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, January 5, 1920, at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, January 5, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta,
M. Berthelot,
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

GREAT BRITAIN	Capt. Lothian Small.
FRANCE	M. de Percin.
ITALY	M. Zanchi.
<i>Interpreter</i> —M. Mantoux	

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Cmdr. Lucas, R. N.
Cmdr. MacNamara, R. N.
Lt. Col. Kisch,
Mr. Malkin,
Mr. Herman,
Mr. Millington Drake

FRANCE

M. Cambon,
M. Loucheur,
M. Leygues,
Gen. Weygand,
Gen. Le Rond,
M. Laroche,
M. Seydoux,
Adl. Le Vavas seur,
M. Kammerer,
M. Fromageot,
M. Hermite,
M. Arnavon,
M. de Montille,
Capt. Roper

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero,
Vice-Adl. Grassi,
M. Pilotti,

JAPAN

M. Nagaoka.

MR. LOUCHEUR stated that at the preceding meeting of the Council¹ he had explained the state of the negotiations with the German Delegation concerning the tonnage claimed by the Allies. The German Delegation had sent a telegram to Berlin explaining that the 180,000 tons of docks which had been over-estimated by the Allies would be deducted from the figure of 400,000 tons originally claimed. That telegram did not take into account the error on the other side committed by the Allies, who had not reckoned the 80,000 tons, whose existence had been revealed by the German inventory. The point of view adopted in that telegram could not evidently be accepted by the Allies. Had it been admitted the 400,000 tons claimed would have been reduced to only 220,000. Mr. Dutasta and himself had explained to Mr. von Lersner that they could not accept the point of view of the German Delegation. Mr. von Lersner had then proposed as a compromise a draft which implied that the reduction agreed to by the Allies could not exceed 150,000 tons. The total amount to be surrendered by the Germans would thus have been 250,000 tons. They had then said to Mr. von Lersner that that figure seemed to them too small for the Council to accept it. After a rather long discussion, Mr. von Lersner had proposed the following draft: 1. States of Negotiations With the German Delegation Concerning the Protocol and The Coming Into Force of the Treaty

“From the 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges claimed by the Allies, there will therefore be deducted such tonnage of floating docks as, after verification, shall be found to appear in the Interallied inventory by mistake—tonnage which therefore does not in reality exist. That reduction, however, will not exceed a total of 125,000 tons.”

They had reserved their reply; but upon thinking it over they proposed that the Council accept that text, which constituted a very acceptable basis of compromise.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if he understood aright that text would guarantee to the Allies a minimum of 275,000 tons with the possibility of obtaining more.

MR. LOUCHEUR agreed that that was so in principle; but they should not conceal the fact that it was very unlikely that they would obtain a larger figure.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether it were necessary to arrive at a definite decision on that very day, or whether he might consult his Government on the proposed figure.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that naturally if Sir Eyre Crowe expressed the desire to consult his Government, they could not take an immediate decision; the question, however, was urgent, and it was advisable to have it finally decided.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the French Government accepted the text proposed by Mr. Loucheur.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it did.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in that case he also would accept it.

MR. LOUCHEUR stated that it would be wise to add in the last paragraph of the draft letter to the German Delegation, after the words—"The 192,000 tons proposed by the German Government"—the following phrase:—"And of which the list was submitted when the technical commissions discussed the subject".

It was a pure question of form but that addition would be useful to obviate all chance of misunderstanding.

It was decided:

to approve the draft letter to the Chairman of the German Delegation contained in Appendix "A", with the following addition: "and of which the list was submitted when the technical commissions discussed the subject." That sentence should be placed in the first sentence of the last paragraph of the draft letter, after the words: "The Allied and Associated Powers add that the 192,000 tons proposed by the German Government ...".

(Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

GENERAL LE ROND said that the Commission over which he presided had had two interviews with the German Delegates since the last meeting of the Council. Questions which it was absolutely important to solve before the coming into force of the Treaty were those concerning, on the one hand, the transmission of administrative powers, and on the other, economic affairs. On the first point agreement had practically been reached, but certain economic questions had been referred back to the Reparation Commission.

With regard to the situation of the plebiscite territories, their point of view had been given to the German Delegates in all its details four days before. The Germans had referred the question to Berlin. It was hoped that the reply of the German Government would arrive either on that or the following day.

Concerning the evacuation by German troops of the territories subject to plebiscite, the Germans had not been able to furnish any precise information. They had endeavored to draw the negotiations to Berlin, but on account of the Allies' definite refusal they had declared that they would send for experts and the arrival of these was imminent. On questions which affected Poland, they had asked the advice of the Reparations Commission, and they hoped that the latter would communicate to them its opinion in as short a time as possible. As a matter of fact, it was only a question of finding out whether the Reparations Commission accepted the texts which they had proposed.

With regard to Memel and Dantzig, the Supreme Council had decided at its last meeting that the Commission on Polish Affairs would be charged with preparing the draft agreement with the German Government concerning the transfer of sovereignty over those territories.²

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that it was important that the Commission on Polish Affairs submit to the Council a draft at its next meeting.

GENERAL LE ROND remarked that besides the questions which he had just enumerated there remained to be settled the one relating to transportation and that of the strength of the troops of occupation, which had been raised by a recent letter of Mr. von Lersner. (Appendix "B").

GENERAL WEYGAND said that there was no longer any difficulty on the question of transportation, properly speaking. Mr. von Lersner's letter, however, to which General Le Rond had just referred, might possibly reopen the whole question as it asked that the strength of the troops of occupation in the various plebiscite zones should be reduced.

MR. LOUCHEUR said that he did not believe that Mr. von Lersner's letter really re-opened the whole negotiation. The Chairman of the German Delegation was merely calling the attention of the Conference to the considerable expenses involved in occupying the Plebiscite Areas by the numbers of forces proposed. For Dantzig alone, the costs would amount to 80 million of gold marks, or nearly 800,000,000 of paper marks at the existing rate of exchange.

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that that was certainly an important point, and suggested that it should be referred to a commission composed of the Chairmen of the Plebiscite Commissions.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether M. Clemenceau thought that a commission of that kind could give the Council useful advice.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the question of the forces in the areas of occupation had already been examined by a mixed commission composed of diplomats and army members. Should they wish to proceed with a fresh inquiry into the question, it might be dealt with by the said commission, which had already been in operation, and consequently possessed the requisite working knowledge.

MR. LOUCHEUR said that it was not to be wondered at that the Germans were a little taken aback by the amount of the sums demanded from them. Thus, for Danzig, whose budget was four

millions of marks per year, the cost of occupation as estimated was to be 800 millions of marks.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, with regard to Dantzig, they had only decided on the organization of a base. The cost of maintenance of those troops could only be set against the Germans in the event of their having to be employed in the maintenance of order in the territory.

MR. LOUCHEUR remarked that the Germans were depending upon a figure of 8,000 men to be sent to Dantzig.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they should take care not to reduce their forces too much. In Upper Silesia, for example, the Germans had massed considerable forces and difficulties might be expected. It would be unwise not to have sufficient Allied forces on the spot.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the question of Upper Silesia presented itself in a very special light. But there was no reason to prevent their maintaining the forces agreed upon for Upper Silesia, while they might make reductions in the quieter regions, such as those of Allenstein and Marienwerder.

MR. LOUCHEUR said that it was evident that the Germans themselves understood the difficulties which might take place in Upper Silesia. And for that reason, they only asked in that province for a reduction of one-third on the estimated Allied forces.

MR. DE MARTINO stated that they had always been in favor of as great a reduction as possible of the Allied forces in the territories to be occupied. It was only because of the reiterated demand of the Allies that they had consented to sending the number of battalions which had been asked of them and which on account of their demobilization made it very difficult for them to furnish.

It was decided:

that the Commission which had decided the strength of the troops of occupation to be sent to the plebiscite zones in Germany, as well as to Dantzig and Memel, should be

entrusted with the further inquiry into that question, as also the objections contained in Mr. von Lersner's letter dated January 2, 1920. (See Appendix "B"); this commission would be entitled to hear the Chairmen of the various Plebiscite Commissions.

MR. LOUCHEUR commented upon a note of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission on that question, dated December 29, 1919. (See Appendix "C").

He added that besides its being purely a matter of form, he wished very earnestly to draw the attention of the Council to the situation in Austria which remained extremely threatening. No serious steps had yet been taken to protect Austria from famine with the exception of the sending of the 20,000 tons of food-stuffs now at Trieste. The victualing of Austria was only assured until the end of January. The Czecho-Slovaks had stated that they were unable to furnish the coal they had promised, as they lacked the rolling stock necessary for its transport. The situation could only be alleviated by the granting of a loan to Austria at the earliest possible moment. In this respect, however, it was impossible for the Allies to take any action until America had declared her intentions. [2] Conditions for a Loan to the Austrian Government

MR. WALLACE said that before taking any action the United States Government required a decision of Congress, which had not yet been obtained.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that if nothing were done a famine would occur in Austria by the end of the present month. Could not Mr. Wallace bring influence to bear on his Government, in order that the gravity of the situation in Austria might be emphasized to Congress, and that the latter be asked to reach a quick decision in the matter.

MR. DE MARTINO inquired what time would be required for sending to Austria the actually indispensable foodstuffs, and would they arrive in time to save Austria from famine.

MR. LOUCHEUR replied that as soon as they knew exactly where they stood, they could act rapidly. If need be, they would divert certain cargoes which would proceed to Trieste and the redistribution from there could be effected without much delay.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked how far they had got with the question of the creation of a commission for the temporary distribution of rolling stock between the various states resulting from the breaking-up of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Kingdom.

MR. LOUCHEUR replied that the decisions of the Council on the subject³ were being dealt with.

With regard to the loan of 30,000 million [30,000,000?] of florins which a Dutch group was to make to Austria,^{3a} the terms put up to the Austrian Government seemed very hard and there was the risk of a deadlock. The Austrian Minister of Finance was to arrive in Paris very shortly to discuss that question. In order to save time they intended to have him assisted by two members of the Reparations Commission. But in any case, this deal could not be concluded for a certain time and he wished to clearly state that it seemed impossible to him to stave off famine from Austria if the United States Government did not furnish a definite reply by the following week at the latest.

MR. WALLACE said that he would submit to his Government the situation described by Mr. Loucheur.

MR. CLEMENCEAU inquired what the situation would be, should the America's reply be in the negative.

MR. LOUCHEUR replied that nothing could then prevent starvation in Austria. Even if they decided to make the necessary financial sacrifices without America, their efforts would be unsuccessful, for the reason that it would be impossible for them to get dollars, which America alone had.

MR. KAMMERER commented upon two notes of the French Delegation on the question, dated December 31, 1919, and January

6[4], 1920. (See Appendices “D” and “E”.) 3. Assistance Demanded by General Denikin

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought the question presented itself from a military standpoint. Before attending to Denikin's demands they should decide whether the measures which he required of the Allies were not utterly useless. That was a question upon which their military experts should be called upon to give their opinion.

MR. KAMMERER said that General Denikin was of the opinion that the Allies had three ways of helping him: (1) Bring pressure to bear upon Poland and Roumania to force them to give adequate help to the Russian Army fighting against the Bolsheviks. That question was essentially one of a political nature. (2) Authorize the Bulgarians to send detachments to the assistance of Denikin's forces. The question at issue was really whether appeal could be made to an enemy power with whom peace had not yet been ratified. It should be noted as a matter of fact, that the enrolment of Bulgarian troops in the Russian armies was expressly forbidden by Article 103 of the Treaty of Neuilly.^{3b} (3) Lastly, any armament in Bulgaria in excess of that allowed for under the Peace Treaty might be sent to Denikin. That third question was of a military nature.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he believed that the military considerations should be the foundation of the decision to be taken, and that it was therefore necessary to consult their military experts. Why, for example, apply pressure on the Poles in order to ask them to help Denikin, if their assistance were not to change anything in the unfavorable situation in which that general found himself. He was personally inclined to think that Denikin's troops would continue to retreat whether the Poles intervened or whether they remained at a standstill. In any event, they could not give a decision without knowing what their experts thought.

MR. DE MARTINO said that he believed with Sir Eyre Crowe that if their aid were not sufficient to remedy the unfavorable situation of Denikin's army, it would hardly be worth while to force the Poles into an enterprise which would surely be useless and which involved certain dangers for Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that it seemed to him that the opinion of the Council was against any pressure being applied on the Poles to make them intervene in Denikin's favor. That was also his feeling. As for using Bulgarian troops, he would be very much opposed to that course, for it would cause considerable difficulties in the Balkans.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that, with regard to the first question, he could not express any opinion without referring to his Government. As for the use of Bulgarian troops, he was absolutely in accord with the President's way of thinking.

MR. KAMMERER said that it would, in principle, be quite desirable to send the surplus materiel to Denikin. The continued retreat of Denikin might, however, result in the loss of that materiel by allowing it to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks. It would, therefore, be wise to send it only to places from which it could be rapidly evacuated, in case of need. That was a question for the military experts and for General Franchet d'Esperey, who was on the spot, to examine.

MR. CLEMENCEAU agreed that they might refer the question either to Marshal Foch or directly to General Franchet d'Esperey.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, as the situation in Southern Russia was changing from day to day, it would be wiser to leave the matter to the judgment of the Allied military representatives on the spot.

It was decided:

to let General Franchet d'Esperey decide upon the wisdom of sending the Bulgarian war materiel in excess of the amount provided for in the Treaty of Neuilly to General Denikin's troops, as well as on the means to be used for ensuring the forwarding, if need be, of that materiel.

(Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

The Council had before it a note of the British Delegation on the question, dated January 4, 1920 (See Appendix "F").

SIR EYRE CROWE said that as he had explained at the preceding meeting,⁴ the British Government deemed it useless to send General Niessel to Reval in order to re-organize the Russian Army of the Northwest, which had been thrown back onto Esthonian territory. Army He thought that the best course to follow would be to allow the Esthonian Government to take the measures it deemed necessary with regard to General Yudenitch's troops. His Government, therefore proposed that the Esthonian Government be informed that the Allied and Associated Governments had no further objection to its proceeding with the dissolution of the Russian Forces of the Northwest in accordance with its original plan. 4. Representations To Be Made by the Allies to the Esthonian Government Concerning the Relations Between That Government and Yudenitch's Army

MR. BERTHELOT said that the idea of sending General Niessel to Reval to re-organize Yudenitch's army had been abandoned, and he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe in thinking that General Niessel's mission would be inopportune. He did not, however, think it possible to accept the British proposal, for the present situation was as follows: The Esthonians had badly used and completely disorganized the Russian forces which had taken refuge on their territory. They had, on the other hand, signed an armistice with the Bolsheviks and seemed disposed to negotiate a definite treaty with them, which would be absolutely contrary to the Allies' views. They had, furthermore, quarrelled with the Letts on the subject of some contested territory, and were threatening military occupation. As a result we had no reason to be satisfied with the present attitude of the Esthonians. The Allies had asked the Esthonian Government to spare Yudenitch's forces;⁵ the Esthonians had not taken any account whatever of that admonition of the Allies. They might of course, leave the situation as it was, but it seemed to him that they would be going too far if they expressly withdrew the observations they had made. It would seem to encourage the Esthonians at a time when they were not satisfied with their attitude. If the Esthonians concluded peace with the Soviets it was to be feared that the whole cordon of Baltic States, perhaps even Poland, would soon follow their example, and that would constitute a very real danger.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not wish to hide the fact that serious arguments could be brought forth in favor of a policy of inaction. The situation did not, however, seem to him to be quite as just described by Mr. Berthelot. They had asked the Esthonians to suspend the disarmament of the Russian troops while waiting for a decision of the Council. They should therefore let them know what course the Council had decided to follow. He had accused the Esthonians of having concluded an armistice with the Bolsheviks; they should, however, not forget that when the Esthonians had asked them for assistance against the Soviets, they had refused to intervene. It might very well be that the Esthonians had been so closely pursued by the Bolsheviks forces that no other course was open to them. It appeared that the maintenance of a Russian army under arms on Esthonian territory was contrary to certain clauses of the armistice which had just been concluded and that measures were to be taken to effect the withdrawal of the Russian troops after disarmament.

Mr. KAMMERER said that from the latest news they had received from Esthonia, the situation of Yudenitch's forces appeared to be desperate. They comprised approximately 15,000 sick men, and the 3 or 4 thousand remaining fit men did not offer any military value. It was rumored that these weak contingents would be transferred south. But that news had not been confirmed.

MR. BERTHELOT stated that they had not merely requested the Esthonians not to disarm Yudenitch's army; they had also informed them that they were opposed to any armistice with the Bolsheviks. That armistice was all the more regrettable as the Esthonians did not seem to have been forced in any way to conclude it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they did not know anything about that. A telegram received from Esthonia and which seemed more recent than the information given by Mr. Kammerer, indicated that the withdrawal of the Russian troops was under way, under the conditions of the preliminary disarmament which was required by the armistice concluded between Esthonia and the Soviets.

MR. BERTHELOT said that they were ignorant of the real situation. It therefore seemed that the best course would be to close their eyes with regard to the present attitude of the Esthonian Government and to leave, for the present, affairs in the *status quo*.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed that no communication be made to the Esthonian Government.

It was decided:

that no representations should be made, for the time being, by the Allies to the Esthonian Government on the subject of the relations of that Government with the Army of General Yudenitch.

GENERAL WEYGAND commented upon a note of the French Delegation, dated January 3, 1920, on that question. (See Appendix "G").

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the exceptions to the general rule consented to by the Supreme Council in favor of General Yudenitch and of the Czecho-Slovak Government were of minor importance.⁶ The exception now proposed in favor of Poland was of greater import. It seemed that before consenting, they should first find out whether the Poles actually lacked rifles and cartridges and whether their present claims did not conceal a desire to procure war materiel at small expense. 5. Authorization Demanded by the Polish Government To Buy Arms and Munitions in Germany

GENERAL WEYGAND remarked that even for any army which was not fighting, it was necessary to be constantly replacing rifles, as the wear and tear was extremely rapid. They had no means of verifying the needs of the Polish Army, but he was inclined to think they were real.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that they knew the importance attached in England to the idea of a progressive disarmament; he would not, therefore, like to furnish the Poles with war materiel of which they were not strictly in need. As a matter of fact, there was another point

of view: if the Poles were in possession of too great a quantity of guns of German origin they would be obliged to continue to obtain German material which would be contrary to the business interests of the Allies.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the latter argument had a certain value, but that on the other hand, they should recognize that Poland found itself isolated in opposing the Bolshevik wave and it was necessary that she should be strong to resist it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that before taking a decision he would ask for the opinion of his Government.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that they had a double reason for strengthening Poland: she constituted the strongest rampart against Bolshevism and on the other hand, on account of the strategical position she occupied, she might be of decisive aid in case of difficulties with Germany. All the other considerations seemed to him secondary and there would be time to examine them later. The Poles would not be using Mauser rifles forever. As for the allusion which Sir Eyre Crowe had made to disarmament, he wished to state that he was in favor of that policy, but that it was necessary that Germany should be the first to disarm. He did not personally see any objection to the 300,000 rifles in question being in Poland, a friendly country, rather than in Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would be surprised if the Germans consented to selling this materiel to the Poles.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that they would not have to interfere in that aspect of the question. The Poles said that they had the means of buying the materiel in Germany and asked for their authorization. The rest concerned the Poles.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that it seemed to him difficult to refuse to the Poles what they had granted to the Czecho-Slovaks. They had every reason to make use of the Poles to bring that troubled part of Europe to that state of equilibrium which alone would allow the possibility of the disarmament policy to which Sir Eyre Crowe had just referred.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would point out that the materiel in question could not in any case remain in the hands of the Germans as the Treaty provided for its destruction. The whole question, for him, was whether the Poles were really in need of that materiel. He would explain to his Government the arguments which had been put forward in the discussion which had just taken place.

MR. DE MARTINO said that the question would be brought before the Council when the British Delegate had received the instructions of his Government. He wished, however, to say at once that the Italian Delegation was of the opinion that if the transaction proposed by the Poles took place, the proceeds of the sales of these arms and munitions should be paid into the Reparations fund.

MR. WALLACE stated that he would refer the question to his Government and would communicate its opinion as soon as he had received the necessary instructions.

The discussion was adjourned to a later date.

MR. SEYDOUX commented upon a note of the French Delegation on the question, dated December 29, 1919. (See Appendix "H".) 6.
Prohibition of Enemy Trade in Turkey

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had been instructed by his Government to support the proposal of the High Commissioners at Constantinople. He would point out that Bulgaria was in exactly the same situation as Turkey as their relations with her were still governed by the Armistice Convention. He would summarize in five points the proposal of the High Commissioners, such as he understood it:

1. —No further license would be granted to German ships to enter Turkish ports,
2. —Ships used for the repatriation of Turkish, Bulgarian and Russian prisoners would no longer be authorized to land goods in Turkey,
3. —All goods embarked in a German or Bulgarian port on an Allied, neutral or enemy ship, could no longer be landed in Turkey, and

no goods could be shipped by an Allied, neutral or enemy ship in Turkey destined for a German or Bulgarian port,

4. —No goods could be landed in Turkey by a German or Bulgarian ship; no goods could be shipped on a German or Bulgarian ship in Turkey,
5. —All goods shipped in ports situated outside Germany and Bulgaria, by any non-German or Bulgarian ship could be landed in Turkey, whatever their origin might be.

If he understood Mr. Seydoux, he believed that these five points simply summarized the proposal of the French Delegation and coincided with it.

MR. SEYDOUX agreed.

MR. DE MARTINO stated that the question before them was being submitted to the examination of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission. The Italian Delegation was in favor of the suppression of Article 23 of the Armistice of October 30, 1918, with Turkey,⁷ for the following reasons:

1. Because the Convention had been signed on October 30, 1918, i. e., while they were still in a state of war with Germany and there was need to strengthen the blockade against Germany; whereas at the present time the Treaty of Peace was signed and on the point of coming into force, the blockade had been raised, thus allowing Germany to trade freely.
2. Because Article 23 of the Armistice Convention was intended primarily to closely encircle Germany and was not directed against Turkey, who might, and still could, transact every kind of business with Allied or neutral countries. The blockade of Germany having come to an end, Article 23 no longer had the same importance.
3. Because it was admittedly in the interest of the Allied and Associated Powers that Germany should be able to recover economically so as to be in a position to pay its debts.

The question which was before them having been postponed a number of times, he would ask that it be submitted to the

Reparations Commission and that the latter should communicate its opinion before any decision was taken by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not believe that the Reparations Commission was qualified to interfere in the present case.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that he also thought that the Reparations Commission was not competent, as there was no Treaty with Turkey.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was to prevent the Germans from getting a footing commercially in Turkey, before peace with that Power was signed, and from devoting themselves to a propaganda which, as recent incidents proved, might be full of danger. It was that which they had to consider and not the whole question of foreign trade in Turkey, a question bristling with difficulties.

MR. DE MARTINO said that he would consult his Government on the subject but would point out that the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission had already dealt with questions referring to the preparation of Treaties which had not yet been signed.

The discussion was adjourned to a later date.

CAPTAIN ROPER commented upon a draft note to be addressed to the German Government in reply to the German note of November 17, 1919 (Appendix "I"). 7. Reply to the German Note of November 17, 1919, Concerning the Manufacture of Aeronautical Materiel and the Organization of Aerial Navigation

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note to be addressed to the German Government in reply to the German note of November 17, 1919 (See Appendix "I").

(Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

MR. FROMAGEOT commented upon the Drafting Committee's note of January 3, 1920 (See Appendix "J") concerning the Polish protest against modifications of the financial arrangements of the Treaty. (See Appendix "K").

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he believed with the Drafting Committee that the modifications which the Poles complained of, tended, as a matter of fact, only to improve their situation. 8. Non-Signature by Poland of the Declarations of December 8, 1919, Modifying the Financial Arrangements of St. Germain-en-Laye⁸

MR. FROMAGEOT stated that an examination of the Polish note had led the Drafting Committee to ask whether, for the purposes of reparations, the Poles should or should not be considered as creditors of Austria. The natural deduction was, as a matter of fact, that if that question was to be answered in the negative the situation of Poland would not be in any way affected by the modifications made to the financial arrangements of St. Germain.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that the Supreme Council had not, as far as he knew, given a decision on that point.

MR. DE MARTINO said that the terms of the reply to be made to the Poles should not leave it possible for the latter to interpret them as constituting a decision of the Supreme Council in their favor, since the Council had not thereby intended to settle that delicate question.

MR. FROMAGEOT said that they would avoid giving to the Poles on that point any assurances whatsoever.

It was decided:

to request the Drafting Committee to reply to the Polish Delegation's note of December 19, 1919 (See Appendix "K"). That reply should take into account the considerations set forth in the Drafting Committee's note of January 3, 1920 (See Appendix "J"). The reply should, however, avoid giving the Polish Delegation the impression that the question whether Poland was or was not a creditor of Austria under the heading

of Reparations had been settled in one way or the other by the Supreme Council.

MR. FROMAGEOT stated that the draft Treaty with Hungary as it now stood left in suspense a certain number of questions which ought to be solved without delay. If the Council did not find it inconvenient, they would furnish a list of those questions to the Secretariat-General which might in turn put them, if advisable, before the Supreme Council. 9. Preparation of the Treaty with Hungary

The proposal was adopted.

MR. WALLACE stated that he noticed that in the draft note to the German Government on the aeronautical materiel existing in Germany (See Appendix "I",) the expression "Allied and Associated Powers" was used. As he had already explained at the last meeting of the Council his Government asked that if it had not explicitly given its assent, this formula should not be employed in any document.⁹ It would therefore be necessary to modify in the sense of the observations he had just made the text of the reply the Council had just approved. 10. Use of the Term "Allied and Associated Powers"

MR. FROMAGEOT said that the question raised by Mr. Wallace was of a very grave character. The American representative on the Supreme Council had no power of decision. If the American Government now intended to forbid their using the expression "Allied and Associated Powers", the tendency was nothing less than the dissolution of the Conference. That would be an extremely serious decision, for which he, for his part, would not assume responsibility.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether they might not avoid the use of the formula "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers". That was a question of drafting.

MR. DE MARTINO observed that the American Government did not oppose in principle the use of the expression "Allied and Associated Powers". It simply asked that it should be used only in documents which it had expressly approved.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that the essential thing was to know whether or not they could use the expression "Allied and Associated Powers". To be unable to do so would amount to the dissolution of the Conference. In that case each one would resume his own freedom of action and his own responsibilities; about his own, to speak for himself, he had no misgivings.

MR. WALLACE said that if the Council would only refer to the Minutes of the last meeting (See H. D. 121), it would see that they were not objecting in principle to the use of the formula under discussion, and that they only wished to restrict its use to the documents expressly approved by the Government at Washington.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that they would examine anew that question at a further meeting, for it was absolutely necessary to know whether or not they could continue to use a formula which expressed, in the eyes of the enemy and neutral Powers, the unity of the Conference.

MR. HARRISON explained that Mr. Wallace had not opposed the employment of the phrase "Principal Allied and Associated Powers", but had requested that when its use was proposed, as in the present instance, the assent of the United States Government should first be obtained.

(The meeting then adjourned).

Appendix A to HD-122

Note From the Supreme Council to the German Delegation of January 6th Regarding the Signature to the Protocol

Now that the Protocol of November 1st¹⁰ has been signed by the qualified representative of the German Government, and the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles deposited in consequence the Allied and Associated Governments wish to assure the German Government again that although they claimed necessary reparations for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow they do not wish to injure Germany's vital economic interests. By the present letter they confirm the declarations which the Secretary-General of the

Peace Conference was directed to make verbally on this point, December 23rd, to the President of the German Delegation. These declarations were as follows:

1. —The Secretary-General was authorized by the Supreme Council to assure the German Delegation that the Interallied Commissions of Control and the Reparations Commission would act scrupulously in conformity with the assurances contained in the note of December 8 concerning the safeguard of Germany's vital economic interests.
2. —As the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers are inclined to believe that part of the data upon which they based their demand for 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges may have been inaccurate in certain minor details, they think a mistake may have been made as to the 85,000 tons of floating docks in Hamburg. If the investigation to be conducted by the Interallied Commission of Control proves that an error has really been made the Allied and Associated Powers will be disposed to reduce their claims proportionately, so as to bring the quantity down to 300,000 tons in round figures or even lower if convincing arguments prove that this is necessary. But absolute facilities must be granted qualified representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers to make all necessary investigations in view of verifying the German assertions before any reduction of the original demands of the Protocol can be made by the Allied and Associated Powers.
3. —The Allied and Associated Governments referring to the last paragraph of the letter containing their reply do not consider that the scuttling of the German ships at Scapa Flow constitutes a crime of war for which individual penalties should be demanded according to Art. 228 of the Peace Treaty.

On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers draw attention to the fact that, mindful of Germany's vital economic interests, they had requested 400,000 tons on the basis of the inventory made by them. The German experts made a statement, which will be verified and which sets forth an inferior figure. Therefore, from the 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges demanded by the Allies, will be deducted the tonnage of the floating docks

which, upon verification will prove to have been erroneously included in the Interallied inventory and which, therefore, do not exist. Nevertheless, this reduction must not exceed the amount of 125,000 tons.

The Allied and Associated Powers add that the 192,000 tons offered by the German Government must be delivered immediately. For the remainder of the tonnage as determined by the Reparation Commission a time limit of not more than two years will be granted to the German Government for the full delivery.

Please accept, etc.

Appendix B to HD-122

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

PARIS, January 2, 1920.

From: Von Lersner.

To: Clemenceau.

By order of my Government, I have the honor to present the following remarks relative to the plan for dividing the Allied contingents destined to occupy the plebiscite zones, and also the territories of Dantzig and Memel.

Article 95 of the Peace Treaty provides for the evacuation of the territory of Eastern Prussia (Allenstein) by the German troops, but not for the occupation of this territory by Allied troops. By the terms of Article 97, the Commission for Western Prussia (Marienwerder) will have at its disposal "in case of need" the necessary allied forces, while paragraph 2 of the Annex to Article 88 provides for the occupation of Upper-Silesia by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers, at once, and unconditionally. As the German Delegation has already pointed out on several occasions, this is not due to an error in the drafting of the articles, but to a difference which is caused by the peculiar position of the territories in question.

However, if the Allies insist in placing foreign troops at the disposal of the International Commission in Eastern Prussia as well, they are going beyond the rights which they themselves stipulated in the Peace Treaty. Furthermore, in this instance, it cannot be contended that such a course was necessary as the Commission has sufficient police forces at its disposal for the guarding of the frontier and the maintenance of order.

Nevertheless, the German Government does not wish to enter any protest against the plan of the Allies: The Government accepts that this plan deviates from the provisions of the Peace Treaty on certain points. However, in the Allenstein territory, as in the other plebiscite zones, the troop strength should remain limited to that absolutely required by the circumstances. In Allenstein, for example, it will only be necessary to accompany the ceremonies of transferring the powers of administration to the International Commission by the presence of a small detachment. In Marienwerder, the protection of important railway lines must be added. In Upper-Silesia the situation is, it is true, a little different. The industrial region contains numerous disturbing elements and it will also be necessary to dispose of an important corps of military frontier guards. Nevertheless, order has been completely re-established for several months, and a lifting of the state of siege appears practicable. Finally, and above all, it is certain that a foreign corps of occupation need have no fear of an aggression on the part of insurgents from localities beyond the frontier.

The sending of contingents of greater strength than is absolutely necessary also presents objections: the financial situation of the States interested should be taken into account, and the fact that the unfavorable rate of exchange will greatly increase the expenses should be reckoned with. The regards which are due the population are also an important factor: experience has shown that all military occupation entails burdens and inconveniences, the aggravation of which is out of proportion with the increase of the strength of the occupying forces.

For these reasons the German Government requests that the occupation forces for Eastern and Western Prussia be reduced to one

battalion for each of these territories, and that the troops destined for Upper Silesia, especially the Infantry, be reduced by about one-third.

Concerning the territories of Dantzic and Memel, the Peace Treaty does not stipulate upon whom will be incumbent the expenses of military occupation. The German Government supposes that neither the free city of Dantzic nor the territory of Memel should bear these expenses, because their paying capacity is far from sufficient. Furthermore, the projected occupation would be a heavy burden on the population. The garrison strength of the troops destined for Dantzic will be considerably superior to that of peace times, and it will be impossible to billet them in the military buildings. In Memel, where the population is peaceful and, in greater part, rural, a very small garrison would suffice to assure peace and order.

Consequently, the German Government feels obliged, in the interest of the populations concerned, to request that the effectives destined to occupy these territories, be also reduced.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix C to HD-122

ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE
OF THE
REPARATION COMMISSION

Note of December 29 in Regard to Granting Credits to Austria

We have the honor to inform you that in execution of the Resolution of the Supreme Council of November 20, 1919 (H. D. 97 IV),^{[11](#)} the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission again examined the paragraph of its conclusions beginning with the words “require immediately the Austrian Government”.

The Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission agreed to propose to the Supreme Council the following draft of this paragraph:

- 1) Inform the Austrian Government that no granting of credits could be considered if it did not agree to:
 - a) Not effect, or allow to be effected, any alienation of public properties, or disposal of public authorities, even in the form of concessions or monopolies, without the consent of the Reparation Commission, and to declare null and void any alienation of this sort effected since the Armistice, November 3, 1918.
 - b) To take, at the request of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission all measures liable to prevent the alienation outside of Austria, or to other than Austrian nationals, without the consent of the Reparation Commission, of all private property if the alienation of such property would be of a nature to compromise the guarantees for credits to be opened.

B. O. of the Committee
The Interallied Secretary
Signature

Appendix D to HD-122

DECEMBER 31, 1919.

Assistance Requested by General Denikin

The gravity of the military situation in Southern Russia has been the subject of two requests, of which the French Delegation deems it its duty to make a report to the Supreme Council.

On one hand, General Denikin sent to the French Government, a telegram thus drafted:

“The failure of the struggle against the Bolsheviks in the East of Russia, the anti-Russian policy which has broken the north-western front, and the passivity of the Polish troops, have

made it possible for the Bolchevists to concentrate as many as 500,000 men against the army of Southern Russia. The obvious superiority of the adversary has placed my troops in a difficult situation and causes a retreat which might lead to abandoning the coal basin of Donetz, where are kept the reserves of coal, which aliment all Southern Russia, all the ships and ports of the Black Sea, and where are a great number of foreign establishments. Considering the fight I am fighting against the Bolchevists as an undertaking, not only of Russia, but of all Europe, I deem it my duty to inform you that a certain help in troops from the Allies is necessary for us, even if it were only one or two army corps. Without this help, the struggle threatens to drag on, for a long time, and not only to destroy what is left of Russian culture, but also to spread over the countries which escape moral and economic disorganization. At the same time that I inform you of these facts, I beg you to let me know, if I can count in a short time, on the assistance of the Allied troops, to what extent and on what conditions.”

On the other hand, the Russian Embassy in Paris has suggested that the Allies might authorize the enlistment in the Denikin Army of Bulgarian volunteers. It thinks that about 30,000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers and Bulgarian soldiers might be recruited in this way.

This suggestion is different to that of General Denikin’s in that it is based on the help of an enemy country, with which peace is signed, but not yet ratified.

The French Delegation, deems it its duty in a similar order of ideas, but not identical, to point out, the results of a study made by General Franchet d’Esperey, on the conditions of the Bulgarian Armament.

According to this document, after the operations at present in course of execution, or provided for, (sending arms and munitions to General Denikin, restoring to the Rumanians, the Rumanian material seized by the Bulgarians, unbreeching the arms in the army depots, army inspections, etc.,) there will remain in Bulgaria, in

comparison with the armament provided for this country by the Peace Treaty, an excess immediately available of about:

- 181,300 rifles
- 600 machine guns
- 900 cannons and trench guns
- 3,697,000 shells
- 210,200,000 cartridges

It must be remarked that as Bulgaria has to be disarmed, it is necessary to evacuate this material. Owing to General Denikin's situation, is it advisable to send it to him?

Appendix E to HD-122

FRENCH DELEGATION

JANUARY 4, 1920.

Enrolment of Bulgarians in the Denikin Army

General Mangin, sent by General Denikin, arrived at Constantinople on January 1. He reports that the military situation of the Volunteer Army is getting worse every day, the demoralized troops are not able to hold any halts. Only foreign help can prevent a disaster. Poland and Roumania, could help Denikin but require territorial compensations, which the latter has no power to accord. Denikin affirms that Bulgaria offers him 40,000 equipped, armed and officered men. He could transport them by sea, if coal were supplied to him. The serious objections the Allies may think of making to this project do not escape him: viz: the necessity of altering the Bulgarian Treaty, the possible pretensions of Bulgaria, the discontent and perhaps the opposition of Greece, Serbia and Roumania. But he adds that he is fighting for all Europe, and that the Allies have a primordial interest in saving him from defeat.

General Denikin is right in anticipating the opposition of the Balkan States, which are hostile to Bulgaria. In a letter dated December 27, addressed to the Minister of War, Colonel Eactivan, the Greek Military Attaché, at Paris, protested against the possible enrolment of Bulgarian officers in Denikin's Army. He argues that this

enrolment is forbidden by Article 103 of the Treaty of Neuilly, which obliges Bulgaria to prevent her nationals from taking service, even as instructors, in the naval, military, or air forces of a foreign country. He requests the French Government to assure the execution of this clause of the Treaty.

Appendix F to HD-122

BRITISH DELEGATION

PARIS, January 4, 1920.

General Niessel's Projected Mission to Reval

The British Government considers that any attempt which might be made either to re-organize the Russian Army of the Northwest on the Esthonian territory, or to transport certain units of this army, specially selected to be utilized elsewhere, would be both vain and impracticable. The British Government thinks that the best way would be to authorize the Esthonian Government to take freely such measures as may be deemed necessary, to disarm and utilize the forces still remaining on the Esthonian territory. In case the Supreme Council should share this point of view, the intervention of a corps, Commission or Officer with a special mission would be useless, whether of an Interallied character or not.

The Esthonian Government has been invited to suspend the disarmament of Russian troops, while awaiting the decision of the Supreme Council. The British Government suggests that this Government might be now informed that the Allied and Associated Governments do not object to the continuation of the dissolution of the Russian forces of the Northwest, according to the plan originally proposed by it.

Appendix G to HD-122

Note From the French Delegation

THE POLISH GOVERNMENT ASKS TO BUY ARMS AND MUNITIONS IN
GERMANY

The Polish Government asks to buy in Germany:

300,000 Mauser rifles
8,000,000 Cartridges
1,000,000 kilos of powder

The purchase would be made through the intermediary of Mr. Louis Moon, agent for the Purchasing Commission of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference, acting in the name of the Polish Minister of War; Mr. Moon would have to go to Berlin, as soon as possible, for this purpose.

Marshal Foch favors this request, on account of the critical situation in which General Denikin's defeats may place the Polish Army.

The French Delegation on this subject recalls that in its meeting of August 22 last, the Supreme Council decided that although Germany cannot alienate her war material, the Allies have the right to deliver licenses in certain special cases. In consequence, the Supreme Council, in the same meeting, authorized Germany to delivery miscellaneous material to General Youdenitch as well as to the Czecho-Slovakian Government.^{[12](#)}

The French Delegation has the honor to suggest to the Council that a similar measure be taken in favor of the Polish Government.

Appendix H to HD-122

Note From the French Delegation on the Prohibition of Enemy Trade in Turkey

In a telegram, copy of which is enclosed, the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, make to the Supreme Council two propositions, with a view to restrict trade with the enemy in Turkey, and assuring integral application of Art. 23 of the Armistice.^{[13](#)}

It must be recalled that when the Armistice with Turkey was concluded, the blockade was still in force, and that consequently, it was necessary to prevent Germany being provisioned by Turkey. The

situation is different now, and Germany has been authorized to resume commercial relations with various foreign countries, on certain conditions.

However, it seems to be dangerous, from a political point of view, to authorize Turkey to resume her commercial relations with the Central Powers, before a treaty has been concluded with her; this would open the way to German influence in the East, before the Allies established the economic status of the former Turkish Empire.

At a time when the Treaty of Versailles is going into force, and when in consequence, Germany is going to enjoy equal rights, it seems unnecessary to adopt stricter measures than those at present existing in Turkey. The present provisions which prohibit direct importation in Turkey of goods loaded on a German ship, or in a German Port, seem to be sufficient to prevent any German political action, and any action of her business men for propaganda purposes; in consequence, the aim of the Allies is realized.

On the other hand, any modification of the Armistice Convention of October 30, 1919 [1918], seems to be premature, as long as the Peace negotiations with Turkey are not ended.

Therefore, it is proposed that the existing measures destined to assure the execution of Art. 23 of the Armistice be maintained.

[Enclosure]

Telegram

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 23, 1919.

The High Commissioners are trying to assure the execution of Art. 23 of the Armistice and to prevent, as much as possible, the resumption of enemy trade in Turkey.

For his [*this?*] purpose, they have taken measures, of which I informed you, prohibiting the importation in Turkey of all goods loaded on a German ship or in a German port.

But this prohibition is not sufficient.

The Germans have promptly found means to evade it, by sending their goods from Allied or neutral ports and in Allied or neutral ships.

Therefore it is necessary to take some other measures.

The best means would be to require certificates of origin: but the resumption of this system, which has been applied during the war, seems to be impossible at present.

The High Commissioners propose (two) solutions.

- (1) Impose on the German products, destined to Turkey, and which, under the present regime, may be unloaded there, after having travelled through an Allied or neutral country, the obligation to be nationalized in this country, by paying importation duties. This obligation would not entirely prevent German goods from being introduced into Turkey, but would constitute an obstacle and would place these goods in a disadvantageous situation, in comparison with the Allied or neutral products; the nationality should be verified upon the arrival in Turkey, by showing the receipt of the Allied or neutral customs-house, which received the duties.
- (2) Publish a notice that no goods of German origin shall be received in Turkey, whatever may be the nationality of their owner, the port of embarkation, and the nationality of the transporting ship. This measure would be most efficacious, and would prevent, even the Allied or neutral tradesmen from introducing into Turkey, any goods of German origin, they may possess. But its application would be difficult on account of the circumstantial verifications which should be made at the unloading.

It should be notified that the Commanders or the agents of the navigation Companies could transport goods of German origin, only at their own risks, and that they should declare, upon their arrival in a Turkish port, that they have no German goods, bound to Turkey.

In case of false declaration, the Commander of the Allied ports should inflict upon them a penalty, and they should re-embark, at their own expense those German goods. Besides, the Allied customs-houses, and especially the Chambers of Commerce, could often give the necessary information for the application of this measure.

However, the Italian High Commissioner insists upon remarking, that, it would be advisable to consider whether the shipment, from an Allied or neutral port to a Turkish port, of German goods, nationalized in the States from which they come, would constitute an infringement of Art. 23 of the Armistice.

Before adopting one of the above solutions, and on account of the repercussions which the second might have on the Allied or neutral trade, the High Commissioners decided to refer to their Governments, and to ask them, by this telegram to the Supreme Council, for instructions.

DEFRANCE

Appendix I to HD-122

COMMISSION ON AIR CLAUSES,
OF THE PEACE TREATY No. 80

PARIS, December 11, 1919.

From: General Duval, President of the Commission on Air Clauses.

To: M. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to enclose herewith, a draft of Note to be sent to the German Government, in reply to its Note No. 6724 of Nov. 17, 1919, copy of which was transmitted to me, in a letter from Marshal Foch, under date of Nov. 21, 1919.

This draft of note, after having been drawn up by the Commission on Air Clauses, has been read and corrected by the drafting Committee of the Peace Conference.

DUVAL

[Enclosure]

***Draft of Note, To Be Addressed to the President of the Interallied Air
Commission of Control, for Transmission to the German Government, As Soon
As the Going Into Force of the Peace Treaty***

I have the honor, in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to reply as follows, to the German Government's Note, A. A. I. No. 6724, under date of November 17, 1919.

Concerning the three first paragraphs of this Note, I beg to recall the terms of my Note ... in which the opinion adopted by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as to what material, actually existing in Germany, may be considered as civil material, is clearly expressed.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers are obliged to reject the interpretation of Art. 201, which the German Government seems to have adopted. Article 198 permanently forbids Germany to possess any naval or military air force. Moreover, Art. 201 forbids for six months, the fabrication or importation of any air material in Germany. If it did not concern civil air material, this article would be meaningless, considering the stipulations of Article 198.

Part XI as indicated by its title, deals only with Air Navigation, and has no relation to the obligations imposed on Germany, for military reasons, and from an aeronautic point of view, and especially with the six months' prohibition of fabrication and importation of any air material, whether its character be military, naval or civil.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers do not pretend that the existence in Germany of routes for air Navigation, will be impossible after the going into force of the Treaty.

The existence of such routes may be admitted, and these routes may be utilized by:

1. Any aircraft, the civil nature of which shall have been thoroughly verified by the Interallied Air Commission of Control.

2. Any aircraft of non-military type which may be imported or constructed in Germany, after the expiration of the period of six months provided for by Article 201.

Concerning the neutral zone, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, shall only have to see that Article 43 is not violated.

They do not lay down, as a principle, that no landing fields for the civil air circulation, should not [*sic*] be established in the said zone, but it is obvious that the creation of landing fields might give rise to a state of things inconsistent with the strict execution of the clauses of Article 43.

In consequence, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have a right to see that the Commissions on the Establishment and Upkeep of landing fields be of such a nature, as to assure the execution of the stipulations of the Peace Treaty.

Appendix J to HD—122

Note Relative to the Polish Protest Against the Declaration Tending To Modify the Financial Arrangement

No reason has been given by Poland in explanation of her protest, which rather indicates a certain susceptibility of pride.

It is, furthermore, rather difficult to understand this protest considering that the modification, brought about by the Declaration of December 8,¹⁴ in reality creates a more advantageous situation for Poland than resulted from the original Arrangement.

In fact, supposing that in Poland's case the liberation debt is greater than the Reparations credit:—The modification does not alter the conditions established by the original Arrangement. There is compensation between the credit and the debt, and the issuing of bonds to cover the debit balance.

Supposing the reparations credits to be greater than the liberation debt: According to the original Arrangement, Poland would pay off

her debt by means of immediate compensation from her credits, but would not be allowed to receive anything from the credit account, as long as the other credit States had not themselves received sums corresponding to the amount already received by Poland in compensation. According to the modification, no compensation is to be effected between the reparations credit which is to remain untouched, and which allows Poland to immediately receive successive payments from this fund, on one hand,—and, on the other hand, the liberation debt, which Poland is to pay off by issuing bonds which will not be redeemable or interest-bearing until after periods of five and ten years. Until the expiration of these five and ten year periods, the share of Poland in the reparations is unencumbered; after these five and ten year periods, this share will be encumbered by an impost for the payment of the interest and the amortization of the bonds. Poland's position appears more favorable under the new system than under the original system.

In the opinion of the Drafting Committee, the best course to be taken would be, to induce Poland to withdraw her protest and agree to sign the Arrangement, by again presenting the Polish Delegation with the explanations which she has probably misunderstood.

In case Poland should persist in her refusal to sign, the consequences do not seem to be very important. Of course, in that case, the modification cannot be imposed on Poland. However, nothing prevents the application of the original system in the settlement of the Polish credit and debt, and, at the same time, the application of the new system in the settlement of the credits and debts of the other new States. The only difficulty which would result, would be, primarily, a certain material complication in the accounts, and secondly, an eventual abbreviation of the period, during which the Polish credit balance will have to wait for its settlement, because the other new States, by receiving their part of the reparations from the commencement would have thus hastened the proportional exhaustion of their credits proportionately with the Polish compensation.

For the Drafting Committee:
HENRI FROMAGEOT

JANUARY 3, 1920. **Appendix K to HD–122**

POLISH DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, December 19, 1919.

To: The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.

From: The Polish Delegation.

After having learned the reasons for the modification of the Arrangement of September 10th regarding the contribution towards the costs of liberation of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,¹⁵ and considering that the modifications proposed do not correspond to the interests of Poland, the Polish Delegation has the honor to solicit that, as far as Poland is concerned, the Arrangement which she signed, together with the Allied and Associated Powers, September 10, 1919, be maintained.

The Polish Delegation at the same time takes the liberty of expressing its keen regret that it did not have the opportunity to present, at an earlier date, its point of view in this respect.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

¹ HD–121, minute 1, p. 761 [Pg. 761 is part of [Doc. 37](#)].

² HD–121, minute 2, p. 762 [Pg. 762 is part of [Doc. 37](#)].

³ HD–10, minute 10, p. 546 [Pg. 546 is part of [Doc. 26](#)].

^{3a} See HD–111, minute 5, p. 562 [Pg. 562 is part of [Doc. 27](#)].

^{3b} *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXII, p. 781.

⁴ HD–121, minute 8, p. 770 [Pg. 770 is part of [Doc. 37](#)].

⁵ See HD–103, minute 3, p. 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 19](#)].

⁶ HD–36, minute 4, [vol. VII, p. 789](#).[☞]

⁷ See telegram No. 32 from the Special Representative at Paris, [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 441](#).[☞]

⁸ See HD-107, minute 1, and appendix A, pp. 472 [Pg. 472 is part of [Doc. 23](#)] and 479 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 23](#)].

⁹ HD-121, minute 2, p. 762 [Pg. 762 is part of [Doc. 37](#)].

¹⁰ Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 239 [Pg. 239 is part of [Doc. 13](#)].

¹² HD-36, minute 4, [vol. VII, p. 789](#) .

¹³ See telegram No. 32 from the Special Representative at Paris, [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 441](#) .

¹⁴ See HD-107, minute 1, and appendix A, pp. 472 [Pg. 472 is part of [Doc. 23](#)] and 479 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 23](#)].

¹⁵ Appendix I to HD-37, [vol. VII, p. 830](#) .

January 6, 10:30 a.m. (HD–123)

[39] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 6, 1920 at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, January 6, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/123

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/123

HD-123

[Document 39]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 6, 1920 at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, January 6, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. Norman

FRANCE
M. Cambon

Secretary
M. De Saint Quentin

ITALY
M. de Martino

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop,

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Lothian
Small,

FRANCE

M. de Percin,

ITALY

M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Millington Drake
Gen. Sackville-West
Cmdr. MacNamara
Mr. Carr

FRANCE

Gen. Weygand
Gen. Le Rond
Adl. Levavasseur
M. Laroche
M. Kammerer
M. Hermite

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero
Vice-Adl. Grassi
Cmdr. Scanagatta
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri
M. Manciola

JAPAN

M. Sawada

GENERAL LE ROND told the Council that in the course of conversations he had had with Mr. von Simson the latter recalled that the German delegation in a note of 28 October last had raised the question of the revision of the German-Polish frontier but that no reply had so far been made to their communication. He had replied that the German note amounted to nothing less than raising the

whole question of the treaty of Versailles and that, he considered, could not be countenanced by the Allied Governments. Mr. von Simson had then said that he would take note of the comment but that the German delegation were none the less anxious to have a written reply in order to justify themselves in the eyes of the local population who had insisted upon the German Government's obtaining some modification of the treaty. In those circumstances he had prepared a draft reply which had been submitted to Mr. Fromageot and which he would read to the Council. State of the Negotiations With the German Delegation Relative to the Signature of the Entry Into the Force of the Treaty of Peace. (a) Reply to the German Note of October 28, 1919 Proposing the Establishment of a Frontier Zone Between Germany and Poland

General Le Rond then read the document which appears as Appendix A.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft letter to the German delegation proposed by General Le Rond. (Appendix A.)

GENERAL LE ROND said that the German delegates had also recalled that in a letter of 5 November last they had asked that a certain limited territory, situated in the southwest of Upper Silesia and which, according to the treaty of peace, ought to go to Czecho-Slovakia, might be allocated to Upper Silesia and allowed to share the same fate as the plebiscite accorded to that province. He had confined his reply in that case also to saying that no modification of the Treaty of Versailles could possibly be considered. Mr. von Simson was satisfied with the reply and insisted only that it be communicated to him in writing. Nevertheless Mr. von Simson's request emphasized the necessity of an understanding between the Germans and the Czecho-Slovaks if the evacuation of that territory by the Germans and its handing over to Czecho-Slovakia were to be assured. He had advised the Czecho-Slovak Delegation about that situation in order that it might take steps to be represented for that question in the negotiations actually taking place. A draft statute for the territories of Memel and Dantzig was to be submitted to the

Council that very day. It had been prepared by the Commissions of Polish and of Baltic Affairs in joint session. It might be well if a sub-commission comprising two or three members of those Commissions would be good enough to take part in the negotiations that were going on.

That proposal was adopted.

GENERAL WEYGAND told the Supreme Council that, in accordance with its instructions,¹ the commission which had fixed the numbers of troops to be sent into the areas of occupation had met on the previous day to examine the objections raised in Mr. von Lersner's note.² It had been unanimous in thinking that the troops proposed could not be reduced in number without serious inconvenience and likewise that the arguments put forward by the Germans could not be discussed at all. For example, the Germans had professed that their military barracks did not have sufficient accommodation, although, as a matter of fact, the numbers of the troops fixed for the occupation were very appreciably lower than the numbers stationed in the German barracks in those territories in time of peace. Nevertheless, so far as concerned Allenstein, since the British troops had had to be reduced to the extent of one battalion, they had in the draft letter he was submitting to the Council, offered as a concession in that case that the number of battalions to be sent would be reduced from four to three. (b) Revision of the Numbers of Allied Troops To Be Sent to the Areas of Occupation

On the other hand, since the Government of the United States had not yet ratified the Treaty, and consequently could not for the moment send into Germany the forces originally decided the total force anticipated was reduced by one quarter. The Germans had therefore at the moment partial satisfaction and he proposed to tell them that that circumstance would allow the Allies to make a trial of the reduction asked by them.

GENERAL WEYGAND then read the draft reply to the note of the German Delegation of January 2, 1920 (Appendix B).

It was decided:

to adopt the draft reply to the note of the German Delegation of January 2, 1920, (Appendix B.)

MR. LAROCHE read a report on that question, presented jointly by the commissions of Baltic and of Polish Affairs. (Appendix C.)

He added that the basis of the arrangement with arrangement with Germany which appeared as an appendix to that report had been prepared by the Drafting Committee. The Commission had thought it well to make certain modifications and proposed to the Supreme Council the adoption of a text rectified in certain particulars. (c) Draft Arrangement With the German Government on the Transfer of Sovereignty at Dantzig and Memel

MR. LAROCHE then read the draft (Appendix D.)

He explained that the points on which they had modified the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee were two in number. One bore upon the condition in which the German officials of those territories would retain the rights they had acquired, and the other upon economic and revenue arrangements.

In agreement with the Drafting Committee they had deemed it necessary to give to the Germans, who would not fail to raise the question, certain concessions, but the formula of the legal experts had seemed too rigid, considering especially that the provisional regime, insofar as it affected Memel, might last for a considerable time; the draft they were proposing seemed to have the advantage of not prejudicing the future and of leaving to the Allied and Associated Powers greater liberty of action.

MR. WALLACE said that, so far as concerned Clause I, dealing with the procedure of the handing over of the ceded territories, he was obliged to state that the use of the formula "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" would make it necessary for him to ask instructions from his Government.

MR. LAROCHE insisted that they could not in that document use any other term than the one which already appeared in the Treaty of

Versailles.

MR. WALLACE said that he did not insist.

It was decided:

to accept the basis of arrangement with Germany on the transfer of German sovereignty over Memel and Dantzig and the provisional administration of those territories as appeared in Appendix D.

MR. CAMBON proposed to postpone until the following meeting the examination of that question as the Roumanian Government's reply was known to them so far only by the telegrams of French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucarest. They had just received the text of the Roumanian reply itself; there was every reason, it seemed to him, to postpone the discussion of the question till the text of that reply could be distributed to the several Delegations. Reply of the Rumanian Government to the Two First Points in the Supreme Council's Note of November 13th [15th] 1919³

(The remainder of the discussion was postponed until the following meeting.)

MR. CAMBON commented upon the French Delegation's note of January 4, 1920, (Appendix E). After a short discussion, Representations to the Hungarian Government in Favor of the Communists Condemned to Death

It was decided:

that the Allied generals at Budapest receive instructions to make representations to the Hungarian Government in order to ask its clemency towards the communists condemned to death.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained to the Council that, in accordance with its instructions, the Drafting Committee had handed to the Secretariat General the list of questions affecting the Hungarian

Treaty which were not yet definitely settled. The Secretariat General had obtained from the several competent commissions the necessary information on the stage reached in the decisions upon those questions. Status of the Treaty With Hungary

The first point concerned the liquidation of the property of Hungarian nationals by the Roumanians. That question had been the subject of a note from Sir George Clerk. The Drafting Committee had examined the possible consequences of that liquidation as it affected Hungarian or foreign nationals in the territories ceded to Roumania. As they were aware, Roumanian legislation prohibited foreigners from owning property, the Economic Commission had been apprised of the question and would send in its report that very day.^{[3a](#)}

The second point concerned the military and naval clauses, modifications in which were demanded by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation (note of December 22 [20], 1919) and by the Serb-Croate-Slovene Delegation (note of December 27, 1919).

The military representatives at Versailles were then examining those two notes and their report would be ready probably towards the 8th or 9th of January.^{[3b](#)}

A third point affected the mines of Pecs. The Commission on Roumanian Affairs had proposed to the Supreme Council to submit the exploitation of those mines for five years to the control of the Reparation Commission which would be in a position, if it considered that advisable, to take into account the Serb-Croate-Slovene State's need of coal.^{[4](#)} The Serbs had then sent a note to the Conference on December 22nd, in which they maintained that that arrangement was not such as could give them complete satisfaction and that in any case it would leave them without coal until the Treaty came into force. The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs was to meet on the following day to examine the Serb-Croat-Slovene note and would submit to the Supreme Council a report upon the possibility of acceding to the Yugo-Slav demand, both from the economic and from the political point of view.^{[4a](#)}

The fourth point affected the economic clauses of the treaty. The Czecho-Slovaks had made a formal protest against the obligations imposed upon them by the Treaty to supply to Hungary a certain quantity of coal. A decision of the Supreme Council of December 31st had referred that question to the Coal Commission.⁵ But Powers with limited interests being represented on that Coal Commission, there would be great difficulties in arriving at unanimous results for the reason that the interested parties themselves were represented thereon.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that it was nevertheless impossible to make the conclusion of the Treaty await a decision of the Coal Commission.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN thought it would be preferable to consult only the experts of the Principal Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE believed that that solution would indeed be preferable and, even so, it was necessary to hasten matters since the Hungarians were to arrive the following day.

It was decided:

to cancel the decision of December 31, 1919, referring to the European Coal Commission the examination of the Czecho-Slovak protest against supplying coal to Hungary and to refer the examination of the question to the technical experts of the Principal Powers.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained that another economic clause still remained in suspense, that namely which dealt with the liquidation of Hungarian property in the territories acquired by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The question was to be examined that day by the competent Commission.

A further question had been raised by the British Delegation: it dealt with the measures to be taken in favour of Allied nations who had been adversely affected by the issue of notes by the Hungarian Communist Government, notes which were then without value. The

question had been referred to the Financial Commission. That Commission had asked the British Delegation for precise information about the conditions in which the issue and exchange of those notes had taken place. It had also asked the Economic Commission to let it know whether the financial measures of the Government of Bela Kun could be considered as coming under the definition “exceptional war measures”, mentioned in Article 232 of the Treaty. The Economic Commission had stated that it had no objection to the insertion in the treaty of an article taking into account the case cited by the British Delegation. The Financial Commission would continue to meet to come to a decision upon the question which had been submitted to it.

One last point, a request from the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation, referred to canal administration in the Bachka, the Baranya and the Banat. The Serbs had presented two demands, one for the cession of the territory of Baya. It seemed to him that that demand could not be granted as the competent Commission had decided in favour of the maintenance of the frontier and the Supreme Council had approved its decision.⁶ The second demand of the Serbs on the same subject had been referred to the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways and the Secretariat General had asked that Commission to expedite its reply.

To resume, none of the points he had touched upon seemed to present insuperable difficulties and they might hope that the final text would be prepared by Friday.

MR. DE MARTINO asked whether that final text would be submitted to the Supreme Council.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN answered that the text had already been approved by the Supreme Council except in the four or five points which he had just discussed and upon which the Council would still have to give its decision.

MR. DE MARTINO explained that his financial expert had told him on the previous day that certain economic and financial clauses of the treaty had not been communicated to him.

MR. DE SAINT QUENTIN felt it difficult to understand how that could have happened. The clauses of the Treaties were as a matter of fact drafted by the Commissions and then, after approval by the Supreme Council, revised by the Drafting Committee. In any case the Italian financial expert might easily have communicated to him the clauses that interested him by applying to his colleague on the Drafting Committee.

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix A to HD-123

PARIS, January 6, 1920.

*[The President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau) to the
President of the German Delegation (Lersner)]*

PEACE CONFERENCE

THE PRESIDENT

MR. PRESIDENT: In the course of the present conversations, Mr. von Simson, President of the German Commission of Experts, asked for a reply to your letter of October 28, enclosing a Note “relative to the temporary demarkation line between Germany and Poland, and a rectification of the Eastern frontier.”

The proposals contained in the said Note are tantamount to placing the Treaty of Versailles under question, therefore, they cannot be given consideration.

The Allied Powers can only comply with the stipulations of the Treaty of June 28, 1919.

Accept, etc.

Appendix B to HD-123

PARIS, January 6, 1920.

*[The President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau) to the
President of the German Delegation (Lersner)]*

PEACE CONFERENCE

THE PRESIDENT

MR. PRESIDENT: The remarks which you presented in the name of the German Government regarding the plans for the distribution of Allied troops of occupation in the plebiscite zones, as well as in the territories of Dantzig and Memel, have been the object of a careful examination by the Allied and Associated Governments.

The Allied Governments are disposed to maintain in those territories only the forces which are indispensable. It is in this spirit that they have determined the number which seemed to them a necessary minimum. Nevertheless, in the zone of Allenstein they agree to reduce this number from four to three battalions.

It does not seem, on the other hand, that there is any reason to consider the remark regarding the insufficient quartering space in the military buildings, as the effectives determined upon as troops of occupation are notably less than the effectives of the German garrisons in those territories in times of peace.

The Allied Governments have therefore maintained the number of units determined for the different zones of occupation with the exception of Allenstein as indicated above.

But the fact that the American troops do not participate in the occupation before the ratification of the Treaty by the United States will temporarily reduce the total number of Allied forces by about one quarter and therefore make it possible to try out the reduction requested by the German Government.

In order to do away with any misunderstanding, it should be remarked that only police forces may remain in the territories occupied after the entry into force of the Treaty and such forces should only include local or municipal police forces and gendarmes,

exclusive of all formations which depended directly on the central authority before the entry into force of the Treaty.

Accept, etc.

Appendix C to HD-123

Report Presented to the Supreme Council by the Commissions on Polish and Baltic Affairs

During the meeting of January 3, 1920, it was decided by the Supreme Council: “that the Commission on Polish Affairs, which is authorized to employ the experts it may deem necessary, will immediately prepare plans for arrangements with the German Government concerning the transfer of sovereignty over Memel and Dantzig.”⁷

In the course of an expose presented to the Supreme Council by General Le Rond, it was indicated that the Arrangement between the Allied Powers and Germany might be elaborated on the following bases: *a)*—temporary maintenance of German officials, with the guarantees enjoyed by them; *b)*—maintenance of the jurisdictions existing at the present time; and creation of a Superior jurisdiction; *c)*—maintenance of the German legislation; *d)*—delivery of the properties belonging to the Reich and Prussia to the Allied Powers; *e)*—temporary maintenance of the economic and financial *status quo*.

The Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Baltic Affairs met on January 5.

They were unanimous in deciding that the immediate arrangements should be of a general nature, and that it was advisable to authorize the Temporary Administrator, representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Dantzig, and the Commander of the Occupation Forces in Memel, to adopt any necessary measures of detail on the spot.

Under these circumstances it appeared desirable to have special clauses prepared to cover the points (c) and (d) in the concluding of the Arrangement.

As Germany will automatically lose all rights of sovereignty over the territories of Dantzic and Memel, upon the entry into force of the Treaty, the temporary maintenance of the German legislation will be decided by the Allied and Associated Powers alone without requiring consultation with the German Government.

Furthermore, as the delivery of the properties belonging to the Reich and to the various German States is provided for, by Article 107 of the Treaty for Dantzic, and in the two first paragraphs of Article 256 for Memel, the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers will be authorized to regulate the conditions of this delivery on the spot.

Finally, it appeared to the Commission that it would entail serious inconveniences to formally agree to maintain the economic and financial *status quo* now existing.

If, in principle, this maintenance appears temporarily inevitable, it is important, nevertheless, to reserve, in the interest of the territories transferred to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the right to adopt any measures which may be deemed necessary (interdiction to export to Germany, for example).

In the same way, if the maintenance of the present local jurisdiction appears unavoidable, it is desirable to provide, in the Arrangement with Germany, for the creation of a Superior jurisdiction applicable in the ceded territories.

As Germany's relinquishment of her sovereignty rights releases, *ipso facto*, the inhabitants of Memel and Dantzic from the jurisdiction of German tribunals, the Allied and Associated Powers are authorized to institute a Superior District Court under any conditions deemed advisable by them.

From the German point of view, the maintenance of local jurisdiction amounts to an application of the temporary statutes of the magistrates now officiating in the ceded territories. (Therefore the question conflicts with point (a)).

The Arrangement between the Allies and Germany might be limited to a certain number of provisions according to which the officials of administrative or judiciary order, who would temporarily remain in office, would retain the powers vested in them by the German Government, but, on the other hand, it appeared to the Commission necessary that provisions be adopted regulating the conditions under which the delivery of ceded territories is to be effected, (settlement of the accounts, turning over of the archives, etc.)

In accord with the Drafting Committee, and under reservation concerning certain modifications made in the text prepared by the Committee, the Commission has the honor to submit the plan of Arrangement hereto annexed for the approval of the Supreme Council.

For the reasons above exposed, the Commission is unable to agree with Alinea 5, and proposes that it be replaced by the text submitted in Annex 2.⁸

[Annex]

Bases of Arrangement With Germany Relative to the Transfer of German Sovereignty in the Territories of Memel and Dantzig and of the Temporary Administration of These Territories

1. Procedure for the delivery of the ceded territories.

As the sovereignty of these territories will be transferred, *ipso facto*, by the entry into force of the Treaty, its delivery into the hands of the representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will be effected on the day following the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty, at mid-day, local time, (by the highest official of the German administration).

2. The German management of the finances and recording thereof, as well as all the administrative and judiciary direction, shall terminate upon the delivery of the territories. All the archives and records shall be placed at the disposal of the new authority.

3. Minutes covering the operations above provided for shall be drawn up and signed by the respective Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Germany.

A latitude of several days will be accorded for the accomplishment of these different formalities.

4. Temporary Administration of the ceded territories.

The administrative or judiciary officials and, in general, the personnel of the State Public Service, which, in accord with the Representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, shall continue to temporarily exercise their duties, shall retain the rights vested in them by the German Government, even should they later enter the service of Germany. In this case these officials are to be considered by the German Government as having been on leave temporarily. In the event that these officials remain permanently in the service of the ceded territories, their privileges acquired through the German Government, shall be determined at the time of the turning over of the territories.

5. The customs duties between the ceded territories and German territories shall not be regulated until after the establishment of a permanent regime for the said ceded territories.

JANUARY 5, 1920. **Appendix D to HD-123**

Bases for the Arrangement With Germany Concerning the Transfer of German Sovereignty in the Territories of Memel and Dantzig and the Provisioned Administration of These Territories

1. Procedure for the transfer of the ceded territories.

The sovereignty being transferred *ipso facto* to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers by the coming into force of the Treaty, the transfer of these territories will be effected (by the highest functionary of the German Administration) to the representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at the request of the latter and under the conditions which he will indicate.

2. The German financial administration and the [books of accounts] as well as the administrative and judicial registers will be closed at the date of the transfer of these territories. All archives and registers will be remitted into the possession of the new authority.

3. *Procès-verbal* of the above operations will be made and signed by the respective representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and of Germany.

A few days delay is granted them for the carrying out of these different formalities.

4. Provisional Administration of the Ceded Territories.

The administrative and judicial personnel and in general the personnel in the public service of the state, which, in accord with the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will continue to exercise their functions temporarily, will keep their acquired rights in Germany. If they later return in the German service, these functionaries will be considered by the German Government as having been temporarily on leave. In the event that they would remain indefinitely in the service of the ceded territories, their rights in regard to Germany will be determined at the date of the transfer of the territories and will be the subject of a subsequent convention.

5. The Economic and Customs regime of the ceded territories would only be determined when the final political regime of these territories shall have been established. The modifications which it may be necessary to bring provisionally in the present relations between these territories and Germany will take into serious account the reciprocal needs and interests of the population.

JANUARY 4, 1920.

*Proposal To Request the Clemency of the Hungarian Government
for Certain Communists*

FRENCH DELEGATION

EXECUTION OF COMMUNISTS AT BUDAPEST

From concordant information sent from Budapest by General Gorton and General Graziani, the Hungarian Courts have condemned to death, a certain number of communists, several of whom represented the most moderate element in the Government of Bela Kun. On the date of December 23, 14 communists had already been executed. At that time, General Gorton asked for and obtained from his Government instructions to intercede in favor of the condemned. But his steps were either too late or vain. Since then, he asked his French and Italian colleagues for assistance.

The French Government is willing, jointly with the other Governments, to invite the Hungarian Government to be indulgent, if the Supreme Council thus decides.

¹ HD–122, minute 1, p. 779 [Pg. 779 is part of [Doc. 38](#)].

² Dated January 2, appendix B to HD–122, p. 794 [Pg. 794 is part of [Doc. 38](#)].

³ Appendix A to HD-93, p. 182 [Pg. 182 is part of [Doc. 9](#)].

^{3a} See appendix C to CM–1, p. 966 [Pg. 966 is part of [Doc. 51](#)].

^{3b} See appendix A to CM–1, p. 961 [Pg. 961 is part of [Doc. 51](#)].

⁴ See appendix B to HD–104, p. 438 [Pg. 438 is part of [Doc. 20](#)].

^{4a} See appendix B to CM–1, p. 964 [Pg. 964 is part of [Doc. 51](#)].

⁵ HD–120, minute 10, p. 732 [Pg. 732 is part of [Doc. 36](#)].

⁶ HD–21, minute 7, and appendix G, [vol. VII, pp. 454](#) [↗](#) and [471](#) [↗](#).

⁷ HD–121, minute 2, p. 762 [Pg. 762 is part of [Doc. 37](#)].

⁸ The text submitted in annex 2 to the report of January 5, 1920, of the Commissions on Polish and Baltic Affairs is identical with paragraph 5 of the “Bases for the Arrangement With Germany Concerning the Transfer of German Sovereignty in the Territories of Memel and Dantzig and the Provisional Administration of These Territories” which appears in appendix D, p. 816 [*Pg. 816 is part of [Doc. 39](#)*].

January 9, 11:30 a.m. (HD–124)

[40] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 9, 1920, at 11:30 a.m.

Paris, January 9, 1920, 11:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/124

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/124

HD-124

[Document 40]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 9, 1920, at 11:30 a.m.**

Paris, January 9, 1920, 11:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison.

GREAT BRITAIN
Mr. Lloyd George
Lord Curzon
Mr. Bonar Law

Secretary
Sir M. P. A. Hankey

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta,
M. Berthelot,
Mr. Arnavon,
M. De Saint Quentin.

ITALY
M. Nitti
M. Scialoja

Secretary
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop,

FRANCE M. Massigli,

ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN
Mr. Leeper

FRANCE
M. Loucheur,
M. Cambon,
Gen. Weygand,
Gen. Le Rond,
M. Laroche,
M. De Fleuriau,
M. Hermitte,
M. de Montille,
M. Fromageot,

ITALY
Gen. Cavallero,
Vice-Adl. Grassi,
M. Manciola,

JAPAN
M. Sawada.

The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee, dated January 6, 1920 (See Appendix "A"), and a note from the British Delegation, dated January 8, 1920 (See Appendix "B"). 1. State of Negotiations With the German Delegation

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that before dealing with the Agenda he wished to express his thanks to the distinguished representatives of Great Britain and Italy who had been kind enough to attend. They

hoped that it would at last be possible, by a common effort, to settle with them the questions arising out of the war, which had not yet received a solution.

They intended to sign the protocol¹ on the following day and to proceed to the deposit [of] the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles. There remained, however, a difficulty which Mr. Loucheur would explain to the Council.

MR. LOUCHEUR said that there was a dispute concerning a sentence of the letter² which they had decided to deliver to the Head of the German Delegation after he had signed the protocol. The last sentence of the last paragraph but one of that letter noted that the reduction which might be made from the original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, etc., should not exceed 125,000 tons. The Drafting Committee, however, feared ambiguity; it might well be understood that the maximum of 125,000 tons only applied to the reduction which would be proposed by the experts after verification of the existing materiel. If the Supreme Council meant to say that that maximum included all the reductions which might be proposed for whatsoever cause, the Drafting Committee considered that it would be necessary to modify the text. The British Delegation supported these observations, and Sir Eyre Crowe declared that in his opinion, the figure of 125,000 tons, as adopted by the Council, should include all reductions, whatsoever. He hastened to say that they were all in agreement with Sir Eyre Crowe's interpretation. It was to be distinctly understood that in no case should the total of reductions to be made on the original demand of 400,000 tons exceed 125,000 tons. That point once established, it seemed to him dangerous to modify the terms of the letter which Mr. von Lersner had already accepted. Furthermore, was such a change necessary. They were the sole judges of reductions which might be consented to for economic reasons. It was therefore sufficient for the Allies to agree among themselves that in no case should the total of reductions, made for whatsoever cause, exceed 125,000 tons; but it was useless to notify their agreement to the Germans.

It was decided:

- (1) that the total of the reductions allowed for whatsoever cause, on the original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, cranes, etc., as reparation for the Scapa Flow affair, should not in any case exceed the figure of 125,000 tons;
- (2) that if the Council were agreed on that point, there would be no need to modify the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of the letter to be delivered to Mr. von Lersner after the signature of the protocol.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that the following ceremony would take place on the afternoon of the following day: They would first meet in M. Pichon's room, Mr. von Lersner would be introduced and would sign the protocol alone. They would then proceed to the Clock Room where the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications would be signed by a representative of each of the Powers which had ratified.

2. Ceremony of the Signature of the Protocol and of the Procès-verbal of the Deposit of Ratifications

The Council had before it a memorandum of the German Delegation, dated January 3, 1920 (See Appendix "C"), a note of the German Delegation, dated January 8, 1920 (See Appendix "D"), and a draft letter to Mr. von Lersner, dated January 9, 1920 (See Appendix "E").

3. Letter to the German Delegation in Reply to the First Paragraph of the German Memorandum Dated Jan. 3, 1920

MR. FROMAGEOT said that the German Delegation had addressed a memorandum to the Conference, the first paragraph of which stated "until such time as it is known whether the United States of America will ratify the Treaty or not, the German Government is prepared to let the Allies decide how the American representatives on the Commission provided for by the Treaty may be temporarily replaced". On the other hand, the German Delegation raised anew the question of the American representation in a short note concerning Memel and Dantzig, which had been received on the preceding day. Under these conditions it was advisable that there should not be a misunderstanding between the Allies and Germany,

the consequences of which might be serious. The United States not having ratified the Peace Treaty, had no claim to sovereignty over Memel and Dantzig: the Allied Powers did not, therefore, represent the rights of the United States—rights which were then nonexistent. It was important, on the other hand, that Germany should not be able to maintain later on that she had only accepted the Treaty temporarily and that, should the United States not ratify it, she was justified in questioning its validity. That was an argument which was directly contrary to the final stipulations of the Treaty. It had for that reason appeared necessary to reply to the German memorandum by a note which he would read to the Council. (Mr. Fromageot then read the draft note contained in Appendix “E”).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was in agreement with what Mr. Fromageot had just said. It was understood that when three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other, had ratified the Treaty, it should then come into force. That arrangement held good, irrespective of which of the Powers had ratified, and the situation would be similar if Great Britain, for example, had not ratified. Were this not so, there would be no peace; the state of war could not be prolonged. It was impossible to wait until America let them know whether she intended ratifying or not, before putting the Treaty into force. The Treaty was not a provisional one: it was a final Treaty which bound once and for all the Powers which had ratified, and Germany. This being so, and whilst approving the note as a whole, he wondered whether it would not be possible to suppress the reference made to China on the second page.

MR. FROMAGEOT remarked that this was a good argument.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it might be, but the question was whether the use of that argument were opportune.

MR. FROMAGEOT remarked that they might simply say “the absence of the signature of one Power would not prevent the Treaty from existing ... etc.”

MR. SCIALOJA did not consider the argument a good one. The question in substance was not whether the Treaty came into force or not, but to decide how much of its clauses as dealt with special action to be taken by the United States, or its representatives, could be applied: For example, those which mentioned the participation of the United States on such and such a Commission.

A case in point would be whether, in the absence of the American representative, a Commission could exercise its functions. The problem was not to decide whether the Treaty should be applied, but to decide how it could be applied.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that they were therefore all agreed to omit that argument.

It was decided:

To send to the Head of the German Delegation the letter, of which a draft was given in Appendix "E", omitting in the last paragraph of page 2 the argument drawn from the absence of China's signature of the Treaty.

The Council had before it a note from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated January 6, 1920 (Appendix "F"), and a draft verbal note to the German Delegation (Appendix "G").

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the note of Marshal Foch.

MR. WALLACE asked whether the Germans had not already agreed to withdraw their troops from those regions. 4. Draft of a Verbal Note to the German Delegation (Concentration of Troops in Western Prussia)

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the Germans had concluded an agreement with the Poles which laid down the conditions of the evacuation of the territories ceded to Poland. The Poles were now anxious about the concentration of German forces in the territories to be ceded, and especially of troops which came from the Baltikum: They feared incidents at the time of the handing over of those

districts to the Polish authorities. For that reason they asked the Conference to intervene.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wondered whether it would be advisable to send a note of that kind. The Germans were responsible for the maintenance of order until such time as the Polish and Allied troops would occupy those territories. Was it wise to send a note of that kind before they felt sure that the Germans intended to violate the Treaty? Up to that time there was no reason to suppose that such was their intention. He would point out that the evacuation of the German troops was only to begin on the seventh day. He feared a delay in the evacuation by the Germans much less than a delay on the part of the troops which were to replace them.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that as the Council had decided to bring the Treaty into force on the following day he would not insist, as the question lost much of its interest.

It was decided:

that there was no need to send a verbal note to the Head of the German Delegation on the subject of the concentration of troops in the territories of Western Prussia.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that on the preceding day they had signed an agreement with the German representatives concerning the transport of Allied contingents in the plebiscite areas. That agreement satisfied their demands regarding the number of wagons to be supplied by the Germans. The German representatives, however, had made reservations in the document which had been signed on the preceding day, with regard to the cost of this transport, stating that they had not received a reply from Berlin; they had therefore not agreed to grant the Allies military rates. 5. Transport of Allied Contingents in the Plebiscite Areas

The Council took note of General Weygand's communication.

MR. DUTASTA said that they had received a telegram from the French Minister at Copenhagen, dated January 5th, stating that the

representative of the German Government had not yet communicated in writing whether he was authorized to accept the arrangement which had been submitted to him by the International Commission concerning the occupation of the plebiscite area in Schieswig. Mr. Dutasta had seen Mr. von Lersner on the preceding day and had informed him that the Council must receive written approval of that agreement by the German Government by the following day. Mr. von Lersner thought that that approval must have been given since January 5th. In any case, he would obtain authority to give it himself, if need be. Relative to 6. Arrangement Schleswig

MR. BERTHELOT said that in order to meet certain wishes and also to give a certain solemnity to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, they had agreed to postpone that ceremony for a few days. In any event it would be well to fix the exact date thereof without delay, and communicate it to President Wilson who would send out the official convocation. Mr. Bourgeois suggested January 19th. 7. First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question was as follows: Did they wish the first meeting to be an official ceremony or not. Unless he were mistaken, that first meeting would only decide a practical question, i. e., the nomination of the Delimitation Commission of the Saar. Would it be necessary to have a highly ceremonial function for that. It seemed that a simple business meeting would be sufficient to attain that object. The inauguration, properly speaking, of the League could then take place, once all the delegates had been appointed and when it became possible to decide upon a more complete agenda.

MR. BERTHELOT said that it was, however, rather difficult that the first meeting should take place without any ceremony; and it was natural enough that some speeches should be made on that occasion. Some time previous, Mr. Fromageot had found an ingenious solution which came very near to Mr. Lloyd George's idea; to wit, to hold the second meeting before the first ... He did not think that would be possible ...

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the fact nevertheless remained that that meeting would not do very much, and were it not for the necessity of appointing the Saar Commission, there would be no need to call the Council at the present time.

MR. BERTHELOT replied that there were two distinct questions: the question of the Agenda upon which they were agreed, and that of the date of meeting. Sir Eric Drummond had asked that the first meeting be postponed. It was in order to meet his wish that they proposed a delay; but it was clear that there was no reason to surround that event with too much ceremony.

LORD CURZON said that Mr. Bourgeois, who was to preside at the first meeting, intended to make a speech, and he wished him to make one likewise. As far as he was concerned, he was willing not to do so and he thought that Mr. Bourgeois would also consent to this.

After some discussion,

It was decided:

that Lord Curzon and Mr. Bourgeois should agree upon the date of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

The Council had before it a note of the Chairman of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, dated January 5, 1920 (See Appendix "H").

After a short discussion, 8. Expenses of the Rhineland Interallied high Commission

It was decided:

That the expenses of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission should be paid by Germany by priority, on the same basis as the expenses of the army of occupation, provided for in Articles 249 and 251–*b* of the Treaty of Peace.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

The meeting then adjourned.

(The Chiefs of Delegations met *in camera*.)^{[2a](#)}

Appendix A to HD-124

Proposed Correction to Above Note to Baron von Lersner^{[3](#)}

The last phrase of the text to the last line seems to imply that the maximum of 125,000 tons refers only to the reduction proposed by the experts after verification.

If the intention of the Supreme Council is to have this maximum cover the reductions proposed for whatever the reason may be, that is to say, after valuation or for economic reasons, it would seem advisable to suppress this phrase, as the last phrase of the alinea, and to make a separate alinea reading as follows:

“In no case shall the total reduction exceed the amount of 125,000 tons.”

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

JANUARY 6, 1920.

Appendix B to HD-124

BRITISH DELEGATION

JANUARY 8, 1920.

Note

The Secretariat of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of the General Secretariat of January 6th, enclosing copy of a note^{[4](#)} drafted on the same date by the Drafting Committee, on the subject of the tonnage

of floating docks, etc., to be delivered by Germany as reparation for the destruction of the German fleet at Scapa Flow.

The Secretariat of the British Delegation is requested by Sir Eyre Crowe to state that he shares the views of the Drafting Committee regarding the interpretation which may be made of the passage in the draft letter under discussion, in its present form.

Sir Eyre Crowe certainly understood that it was [the] sense of the Supreme Council that the amount of 125,000 tons should include all possible reductions, granted according to the experts' inquiry, or for economic reasons. Such being his own understanding he considers that the text of the letter should be modified to comply with the suggestion of the Drafting Committee.

Appendix C to HD-124

Memorandum From German Delegation of January 3rd Regarding Temporary Replacement of American Delegates on Commissions Provided for in the Treaty

- 1) In order to facilitate the suppression of the difficulties caused by the non-participation of the United States of America in the establishment of the first *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications, the German Government wishes to continue to offer proof of its good faith. Until such times as it is known whether the United States of America will ratify the Treaty or not, the German Government is ready to let the Allies decide how the American representatives on the Commissions provided for by the Treaty may be temporarily replaced.
- 2) By the terms of the Note of December 22, the Allied and Associated Governments received information to the effect that, after November 3, the floating docks, floating cranes, and dredges which are not carried on the list submitted by the German Technical Commission, are to be sold abroad. An investigation ordered by the German Government shows that this information is incorrect. If, however, it were established that sales of this nature were being conducted by private individuals without the

knowledge of the Government, the circumstance should be taken in consideration.

- 3) The German Government, in the absence of more definite information from the Allies, is not in a position to assume a stand relative to the affirmation, according to which, among the crews interned consequent to the Scapa-Flow incident, there are individuals who are guilty of a violation of the laws and customs of war and concerning whom Article 228 of the Peace Treaty [is?] applicable. The German Government again protests against the fact that the crews which, with confidence in the terms of the Armistice Convention entered enemy waters, are retained by force.
- 4) According to a passage in the Allied Note of December 22, relative to the delivery of the five cruisers mentioned in the Protocol, the Allied and Associated Governments esteem that the change desired by Germany in the Article in question in the Protocol of November 1 would be in contradiction with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. The German Government is not in a position to judge to what extent this is exact, and would be grateful for more specific information in the matter.

According to Article 181 of the Treaty, the German Naval forces which are available include six small cruisers. According to Article 190, paragraph 3, the cruisers as well as the battle ships may be replaced by new constructions after a period of twenty years after their launching. This provision indicates, in the estimation of the German Government, that, when Germany was authorized to keep six cruisers, it was not intended to include ships whose launching dates so far back that they are susceptible to replacement after three or four years. In delivering the five cruisers exacted by the Protocol, there would remain eight cruisers from which to choose the six cruisers which are to be put into service. Now, among these eight cruisers there are only three which were built subsequent to 1900 or, to be exact, in 1902 and 1903. Moreover, the present condition of these eight ships is so bad that only two at most are available for military use, and this after a considerable outlay of money, repairs and time. In the mean time, it is absolutely necessary for Germany to dispose of militarily serviceable cruisers in the defense of her long coast line if she is to avoid being exposed to the attack of any naval forces, however feeble.

PARIS, January 3, 1920.
Appendix D to HD-124

JANUARY 8, 1920.

*General Observations From the German Delegation Regarding the
Negotiations as to the Territories of Memel and Dantzig*

The German Government believes it its duty to remark that according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace Germany must renounce her rights and titles to the territories of Memel and Dantzig in favor of the Allied and Associated Powers collectively (articles 99 and 100). I suppose that as the United States of America have not yet ratified the Peace Treaty, the Four Principal Powers who have ratified will provisionally represent the rights which in this respect belong to the United States, and I presume that the Government of the United States will agree to this procedure.

Appendix E to HD-124

*Note to the German Delegation of January 9th, Regarding the
Provisioned Replacement of the United States Delegates,
Particularly in Regard to Memel and Dantzig*

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT: In an *aide-mémoire* of the 3rd of this month, you were kind enough to inform the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference that “as long as the question of whether the United States would ratify or not remained in suspense, the German Government was prepared to leave to the Allies the task of deciding how American representatives in the Commissions provided for by the Treaty should be temporarily replaced”.^{[5](#)}

In “General Observations in Regard to the Negotiations as to the Territories of Memel and Dantzig” of January 8th, the German Delegation further remarks that according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace “Germany must renounce all rights and titles to these territories in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers collectively” and assumes that “the Four Principal Powers who have

ratified will provisionally represent the rights which in this respect belong to the United States” as long as this last Power shall not have ratified.⁶

It is to be feared that the terms in which these communications have been drafted may lead to some misunderstanding, which Germany and the Allies have a mutual interest to obviate. In the first place, there can be no question of replacing even temporarily the American representatives in the Commissions, for such replacement would constitute a modification of the Treaty. Neither is it conceivable that the Four Principal Powers can represent the rights belonging to the United States to Memel and Dantzig, since these rights resulting from the Treaty cannot exist for the United States until they shall have ratified.

Therefore, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, are, at the present moment, the only Powers who according to the Treaty have the quality of Principal Allied and Associated Powers as provided for by the Treaty.

To these four Powers and to these Powers alone, for the time being, do the provisions regarding the “Principal Allied and Associated Powers” apply.

It is therefore to these four Powers only that the undivided sovereignty of Memel and Dantzig is transferred. When the United States ratify, the undivided sovereignty will belong to five Powers instead of four; but that does not concern Germany.

Finally, the German Government has no reason to consider the non-participation of the United States at the first deposit of ratifications to question any provision of the Treaty or to reserve its liberty of action in case the United States decide not to ratify the Treaty. [The absence of China’s signature has neither been considered by Germany nor by the other Contracting Powers of a nature to prevent the Treaty from existing between those who had signed; the absence of ratification by another Power could not be considered of greater consequence.]⁷

From the moment of the *procès-verbal* establishing the first deposit of ratification, the Treaty must receive from all the Powers participating in the deposit full and absolute application in all its provisions.

Besides, the Supreme Council cannot in this respect do anything else but refer to its note of December 22nd and maintain without change the conclusions which the first paragraph of this document formulated on strict conformity with the final clauses of the Treaty.

Please accept ...

Appendix F to HD-124

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES General Staff
Section Three
No. 28

G. H. Q., January 6, 1920.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.

According to information of Polish origin, copy of which is hereto annexed, it is shown that the Germans are maintaining important forces in Western Prussia, which is in no way justified by the internal situation of the country.

These troops are composed, in particular, of Baltic elements and are principally concentrated in the region of Thorn.

As a result of an interior intervention, General Dupont obtained the assurance of the German Government that the territories of Western Prussia, which are to be annexed to Poland, would be freed of all the elements which had arrived, or might arrive, from Courland.

It would appear, from the information above referred to, that these promises have not been adhered to.

In the meantime any concentration of German troops in the regions to be evacuated, and particularly of troops brought back from the Baltic, would tend to provoke conflicts which it is important to avoid.

Consequently, it is desirable to invite the German Government, before the entry into force of the Treaty, to:

- a)* —reduce the forces in Western Prussia to a strength strictly necessary to assure the maintenance of order, and safe passage across the territory for the Polish troops;
- b)* —send all the elements having belonged to the Baltic troops, at the present time located either in territory which is to be ceded to Poland or in plebiscite territory, to Central Germany.

These measures, which are similar to those applied in Upper-Silesia relative to the military situation, might, should it be deemed expedient, be carried out in the same manner, by means of a verbal communication to Mr. von Lersner.

F. FOCH

[Annex]

POLISH MILITARY MISSION
IN FRANCE

No. 172/B

PARIS, January 4, 1920.

From: General Rozwadowski, Head of the Polish Military Mission.

To: The Commander-in-Chief of the Interallied Armies.

I have the honor to inform the Marshal of France that, according to a reliable source, the Germans are concentrating important forces at the base of the Vistula.

These forces are composed as follows: the 33rd Reichswehr Brigade, near Insterburg; the Olita Brigade, near Elk; the 20th, 41st, and 37th E. Brigades, near Thorn, while only three brigades are covering the Posnania front. All these units have received reinforcements since December 1st. The Germans have concentrated the Freikorps

Diebitsch; the Freikorps Plehwe; the Schauroth Detachment; the elements of the 17th R. Brigade, all except the elements of this Brigade, coming from Courland and Lithuania, in the neighborhood of Thorn.

The Courland troops, noted for their brutality and hostility towards the Poles and their lack of discipline, have evidently been brought to these regions to provoke the Polish population, and in that way, impede the turning over of these regions to Poland.

I have the honor to request that the Marshal of France cause the necessary measures to be taken to insure the evacuation of these territories by the heavy German fighting units before their cession to Poland, and especially, the removal of the undisciplined detachments from Courland before the commencement of the Polish occupation.

If such measures are not taken serious troubles might take place between the Germans and occupying troops, while, on the contrary, greatly inferior forces would be wholly sufficient to maintain order and assure the correct rendition of the territories in question.

ROZWADOWSKI

Appendix G to HD-124

PARIS, January 8, 1920.

[Draft of a Verbal Note to the German Delegation]

VERBAL NOTE

According to information which has reached the Supreme Council it is shown that the German Government is maintaining important forces, in no wise justified by the internal situation of the country, in Western Prussia.

Elements from the Baltic forces, in particular, are found among these units, which are principally concentrated in the Thorn region. Their presence is contrary to promises which were made by the German

Government to General Dupont, who was formally assured that the territories of Western Prussia attributed to Poland would be liberated of all elements coming, or to come, from Courland. Moreover, from a general point of view, any concentration of German troops and, in particular, the troops returning from the Baltic, would be of a nature to provoke conflicts which the German Government, primarily, has a special interest in avoiding.

The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference has the honor to bring this situation to the attention of the President of the German Delegation, with the information that the Supreme Council requests the German Government:

1. —to reduce the force in Western Prussia to the strength strictly necessary to insure the maintenance of order, and the safe passage of Polish troops across this territory;
2. —to send to Central Germany all the elements of the Baltic troops, at the present time located either in territory which is to be ceded to Poland, or in plebiscite territory.

Appendix H to HD-124

INTERALLIED RHINELAND COMMISSION
THE PRESIDENT

COBLENZ, January 5, 1920.

The President of the Interallied Rhineland Commission has the honor to transmit, annexed hereto, to His Excellency the Ambassador of France, Secretary General of the Peace Conference, the text of a resolution adopted by the Interallied Rhineland Commission in its meeting of December 18, 1919, as to priority in the reimbursement of the expenses of the High Commission.

The Interallied Rhineland Commission requests the Supreme Council to kindly decide that the expenses of the High Commission, which, by the terms of Article 6 of the Arrangement of June 28, 1919,⁸ are incumbent on Germany, be reimbursed on priority, before the Reparations, on a same footing with the expenses of the Army of Occupation, covered by Articles 249 and 251-*b* of the Peace Treaty.

*The High Commissioner of the French Republic
President of the Interallied Rhineland Commission***MONNIER**
[Annex]

INTERALLIED RHINELAND COMMISSION

*Extract From the Minutes of the 42nd Session of the Interallied
Rhineland Commission, December 18, 1919*

VI.

666

PRIORITY IN THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE
COMMISSION

The Commission, after having examined the draft notes on the expenses of the High Commission, submitted by the American, Belgian, British and French Juridical Advisers, decided to adopt the plan proposed by the Belgian Commissioner. This note, which represents the views of the Commission, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Council with a request for a decision.

INTERALLIED RHINELAND COMMISSION COBLENZ, December 17, 1919.

*Note Prepared by Mr. Rolin-Jaequemyns Relative to the Expenses
of the High Commission*

Article 6, alinea 3 of the Arrangement signed June 28, 1919, in conjunction with the Treaty of Versailles, states that "The German Government shall continue to be responsible for the cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation under the conditions fixed by the Treaty," and it also adds "That the German Government shall also be responsible for the costs and expenses of the High Commission—"

It appears, therefore, in accordance with the intentions of the Powers signatories of the Arrangement, that the expenses of the High

Commission are to be charged to Germany on the same footing as those of the armies of occupation.

Now Article 249 of the Treaty of Versailles, which charges the expenses of the armies of occupation to Germany, is completed by Article 251, which establishes, relative to the reimbursement of these expenses, a priority in relation to the reparations and other obligations incumbent on Germany.

The question has been brought up as to whether this priority reimbursement, established in favor of the expenses of the armies of occupation, includes the expenses of the High Commission as well?

Logically it would appear natural to place the expenses of the High Commission and those of the armies of occupation on the same footing since the High Commission and the Army are the result of the same cause and pursue the same object, that is the occupation of certain German territories as guarantee of the execution of the Treaty by Germany (Article 1 of the Arrangement).

It can also be added that the High Commission and the Army are, by virtue of the Treaty, inseparable and so far as Germany and all the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Versailles are concerned, form an indivisible whole.

The personnel of both are entitled to free lodging (Article 6, 7 and 8); both enjoy the benefits on the same footing of exemption from customs duties and imposts. Consequently, why suppose, in opposition to this regime of equality, that the expenses of the High Commission be met according to rules other than those relating to the armies of occupation?

It is obvious to those who have followed the negotiations of Paris and Versailles that the representatives of the Powers signatories of the Arrangement, which was drafted at the last moment, that is, much later than the Treaty, did not expect that any difference was intended concerning the reimbursement of the expenses of the High Commission and those of the armies of occupation.

However, it may be contended that the Arrangement, signed at Versailles on the same day as the Peace Treaty, although the result of the Treaty and especially of Article 432, cannot be accorded priority in opposition to any provision of the Treaty, as it is signed by only a few of the Powers signatories of the Treaty of Versailles.

We are therefore led to an examination of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and, first of all, to determine whether there is any provision in the Treaty which would prevent placing the expenses of the High Commission on the same footing as those of the armies of occupation, whether this is sufficiently specified in the text of the Arrangement or should be so specified in a special decision taken later.

It is primarily desirable to consider Article 249 of the Treaty, which expressly states that the maintenance cost of the armies of occupation, accorded the benefits of a special priority reimbursement, as is stated in Article 251, comprises “in general the cost of all administrative and technical services the working of which is necessary for the training of troops, and for keeping their numbers up to strength and preserving their military efficiency.” The Arrangement of June 28, in Article 3, however, stipulates that the High Commission “shall secure the maintenance, safety and requirements” of the military forces occupying the Rhenish territory. Does this not amount to the same thing as again affirming that the High Commission is included in the ensemble of the armies of occupation and therefore on a same footing relative to the reimbursement of the expenses pertaining thereto?

On this same question, the Juridical Advisor of the English High Commission, made a very just remark in connection with the definition of Article 249, which he considers as in no way limitative, as is shown by the words “included therein” written at the head of the enumeration of a series of objects included in the cost of the armies of occupation. It is permissible, therefore, to complete the enumeration by including therein the expenses of the High Commission since it is inseparable from the armies of occupation.

If such is the case, the text of Article 251 of the Treaty, which places the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation before the Reparations, offers no opposition to an extension of this privilege to cover the expenses of the High Commission.

The question, however, is too important, especially from the point of view of the harmonious functioning of the services of the High Commission, to delay its permanent regulation by competent authority.

It does not seem that the Commission itself is competent to act in this respect, as such authority is not granted to it by any text. Moreover, it would not appear desirable to have the High Commission legislate in its own case. Therefore the competent authority should be found to decide whether the expenses of the High Commission are or will be levied on priority, equally with the costs of occupation, and before the reparations, in compliance with Article 431 [249] or 451 [251] of the Treaty.

Obviously, such authority is the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, which has already had occasion to pronounce on these questions in a series of analogous cases.

Moreover, it is desirable to submit the question to the Supreme Council as promptly as possible, in order that a decision may be taken before the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles.

I am convinced that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, informed of the question of the High Commissioners to Rhenish Territories, will not fail to decide that, in principle, the expenses pertaining to the surveillance of occupied territory should be paid prior to the debt, which is guaranteed by this very occupation, and that, consequently, the expenses of the High Commission should be reimbursed on priority, before the reparations, and on a same footing as the direct costs of the armies of occupation.

¹ Appendix C to HD-80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

² Appendix A to HD-122, p. 793 [*Pg. 793 is part of [Doc. 38](#)*].

^{2a} See ICP–9, p. 859 [*Pg. 859 is part of [Doc. 44](#)*].

³ Appendix A to HD–122, p. 793 [*Pg. 793 is part of [Doc. 38](#)*].

⁴ Appendix A to HD–122, p. 793 [*Pg. 793 is part of [Doc. 38](#)*].

⁵ Appendix C, p. 825 [*Pg. 825 is part of [Doc. 40](#)*].

⁶ *Supra*.

⁷ The sentence enclosed in brackets is omitted from the English translation in the Department’s files. It appears, however, in the French text.

⁸ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910–1923, vol. III, p. 3524.

January 10, 11:30 a.m. (HD–125)

[41] Notes of a Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Saturday, January 10, 1920, at 11:30 a.m.

Paris, January 10, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/125

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/125

HD-125

[Document 41]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Saturday,
January 10, 1920, at 11:30 a.m.**

Paris, January 10, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

GREAT BRITAIN
Mr. Lloyd George
Lord Curzon
Mr. Bonar Law

Secretary
Sir M. P. A. Hankey.

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. De Saint Quentin.

ITALY
M. Nitti
M. Scialoja.

Secretary
M. Trombetti.

JAPAN
M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. Winthrop,

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Lothian
Small,

FRANCE

M. de Percin,

ITALY

M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

FRANCE

M. Cambon
M. Laroche
M. Hermite
M. Arnavon

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero

JAPAN

M. Sawada

MR. WALLACE referred to a reservation made by the American Delegation to the resolution of the Supreme Council on the subject dated December 9, 1919 (H. D. 110).^{[1](#)}

He explained that he had been authorized by his Government to accept, in the name of the United States, the suggestion made by Sir Eyre Crowe on the 9th of December on the subject of employing native troops in the Togo and Cameroons; to the effect that the text of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations will be maintained but interpreted with reference to the minutes of the Council of Ten, of January 30, 1919;^{[2](#)} in other words, in the event only of a general war, France will be allowed to raise within the territory held under her mandate native troops to be employed in her

own defence as well as in that of the territories in question. 1. Use of Native Troops of the Togoland and Cameroon for the Defence of the Metropolitan and of the Colonial Territory

MR. CLEMENCEAU read the text of the arrangement concerning the Interallied military organization which would take effect after the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles; the arrangement was couched in these terms: 2. Interallied Military Organization After the Coming Into Force of the Treaty

“The Allied and Associated Governments decide that the Interallied military organization shall continue under the presidency of Marshal Foch at Versailles and shall have as terms of reference:

“(a) to act as advisory council to the Allied and Associated Governments in military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

“(b) to carry into execution the orders given it by the Allied and Associated Powers in matters concerning the Commissions of Control and the Allied forces of occupation in the Rhineland and Plebiscite areas.”

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the name of the British Government he very gladly agreed to the proposal put before the Council. It was necessary that that organization should continue to sit at Versailles. Versailles was a word to which public opinion in England was accustomed. Further, he should very much like that that organization should be consulted not only upon the military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty with Germany but also upon military questions bearing upon other issues of common interest to the Allies. Among such questions he would cite those affecting southern Russia, Azerbaidjan and Georgia, where the situation—and he was going to discuss it shortly with the Council—was very grave.

MR. MATSUI pointed out that during the war Japan had not been represented on the Versailles Military Council. The Council was now being prolonged; was it understood that Japan would be represented?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that that depended upon Japan; that it was Japan itself that had not wished to be represented in the former Council.

MR. MATSUI asked whether they would have any objections in the event of his Government being prepared to be represented.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE felt that the Allies would have no objection whatever.

MR. NITTI approved the proposal submitted to the Council.

It was decided:

that the Interallied military organization should continue under the presidency of Marshal Foch at Versailles and have for instructions:

- (a) to act as advisory council to the Allied and Associated Governments in the military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Germany;
- (b) to execute the orders given it by the Allied and Associated Powers in matters concerning the Commissions of Control and the Allied forces of occupation in the Rhineland and Plebiscite areas.

It was further decided:

that, should the occasion arise, the Council could be consulted upon all military questions of common interest to the Allies which the latter might be agreed to submit to it.

Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions of his Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE told the Council that they had just received from the Caucasus very disturbing news. The Bolsheviks were advancing upon the Caspian; if, having entirely defeated Denikin's army, they should reach the sea, it was possible that the Turks might join with them, an event which would throw the States of the Caucasus into a

desperate situation. It became incumbent, therefore, on the Council to find out whether it would be wise to support those States by sending them, for example, arms and ammunition to facilitate their resistance to the Bolshevik drive. He did not mean to express in that place an opinion upon so delicate a question, but suggested referring it to the military organization at Versailles which without prejudicing the political solution might be able to give them the information of a purely military nature which they required in order to take a decision. 3. Situation in the Caucasus

MR. CLEMENCEAU thought it might be good if the British Delegation drafted a memorandum which the Council could submit to the military council at Versailles.

It was decided:

to refer to the Versailles Military Council the question of the aid it might be necessary to give to the Caucasian States against the Bolsheviks. The British Delegation would prepare a memorandum upon the subject which would be submitted to the Versailles Military Council for immediate examination and report to the Supreme Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed his regret at again proposing a subject not down on the agenda. But the agenda for that meeting was rather long and might possibly occupy them for quite a considerable time. There was a danger of its being so on the following days. Mr. Clemenceau's time was extremely limited as indeed was his own, for he would doubtless have to return to England shortly on account of serious labor troubles. To save time, he would suggest recourses to a method of organization that had already been tested, namely, to constitute on the one hand a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which would examine questions relative to the Peace Treaty with Hungary and all questions of detail on which, for that matter, Lord Curzon was much better informed than himself and to form on the other hand, a Council of the Heads of Governments who would examine only the larger questions of general policy, the discussion of which had been essentially the object of his visit. 4. Organization of the Work of the Conference

MR. NITTI supported Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. He too could not prolong very much his stay in Paris. He would remind them that he should have to be in Italy for labor questions, the solution of which was urgent as well as for the re-opening of Parliament which was to take place before the end of the month. The Council of Heads of Governments ought naturally to deal with the question of the Adriatic, but it was desirable that it should also examine the Albanian question which he very earnestly desired to have solved before his departure. The maintenance of a force of occupation in Albania was costing them enormous sums and they anxiously desired to have it settled.

It was decided:

that during the presence in Paris of the British and Italian Prime Ministers, there should be constituted:

- (1) a Council of the Heads of Governments who would deal with questions of general policy;
- (2) a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs who would deal with questions arising out of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary and all matters not examined by the Council of Heads of Governments.

The meeting adjourned.

¹ Minute 6, p. 541 [*Pg. 541 is part of [Doc. 26](#)*].

² BC-17, [vol. III, p. 785](#) ; BC-18, [ibid., p. 797](#) .

The International Council of Premiers: Minutes of Meetings (1919-1920):

[The minutes here printed are only those of the meetings of the International Council of Premiers at which representatives of the United States were present prior to the termination of the Peace Conference at Paris on January 21, 1920. The files of the Department of State do not contain minutes of the meetings of this Council at which the United States was not represented.]

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Paris, December 12, 1919, 11:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/2

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/2

ICP-2

[Document 42]

**Secretary's Notes of a Conference Held at 10,
Downing Street, London, S. W. 1. on Friday,
December 12, 1919, at 11:30 a.m.**

Paris, December 12, 1919, 11:30 a.m.

PRESENT

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P., Prime Minister.

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P., Lord Privy Seal, and Leader of the House of Commons.

The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K. G., G. C. S. I., G. C. I. E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the House of Lords.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Hon. J. W. Davis (Ambassador of the United States in London).

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau (President of the Council).

M. Cambon (French Ambassador in London).

M. Berthelot, French Foreign Office.

M. Fleuriau (Counsellor of the Embassy).

ITALY

Signor Scialoja (Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

The Marquis Imperiali (Italian Ambassador in London).

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G. C. B.,
Secretary to the Cabinet.

Professor P. J. Mantoux (*Interpreter*).

(1) MR. LLOYD-GEORGE proposed that the discussion should begin with the question of the Adriatic. A Joint Note had been prepared by

the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain, in Paris, with a view to its presentation to Signor Scialoja, and he understood that M. Clemenceau was prepared to hand the Note.¹ The Adriatic

M. CLEMENCEAU handed Signor Scialoja the Note. He said he had already informed his colleague Signor Scialoja semi-officially of the existence of this Note, and had told him that it had been signed in complete agreement by the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain. The object of the Note was to try and find a final settlement. The delay on this question had kept the Conference at bay for months. The same delay had brought Italy into a situation that was veritably revolution. There could be no peace in Europe till this question was settled. The United States Government, through President Wilson, had given an indication of the concessions to which it could agree and as to what it could not accept. On that basis Great Britain and France had always sought to find a text which would be acceptable to all parties. The difficulties had been increased owing to the occupation of Fiume by D'Annunzio and owing to the fact that a part of the Italian Army and Fleet had refused to obey the orders of the Italian Government. The British and French Governments had considered the question point by point, from the point of view both of the position of Italy and of President Wilson's concessions, and had done their best to bring the views of all into accord. They knew that the Italian Government opposed resistance on certain points. They knew also that the Italian Government would accept the Note in the friendly spirit in which it was offered, but asked to be allowed to make a reply and to present observations and criticisms. In handing this Note to Signor Scialoja he asked him, as well as the Italian Government, to bear in mind that it constituted a supreme and, as they hoped, a final effort to secure a peaceful settlement. He implored the Italian Government to make an attempt to reach an agreement. No great concession on their part was required. If the Allies could succeed in settling this question it would remove one of the great obstacles to the pacification of the world.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he would receive the Note with the same friendly sentiments as had been expressed by M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Allies. He had learned from M. Clemenceau that this

Note was to be presented, and he had afterwards learned certain further details from M. Polk and Lord Curzon, who had indicated to him the broad lines of the new proposal.² He doubted if Italy could accept it without certain alterations. What he attached great importance to was that the Note explained the reasons on each point. Up to now he thought that the reasons had not been sufficiently discussed in the consideration of this question, which had been treated too vaguely. The subject must be examined in close detail, with full regard to the realities of the situation. He thought if the reasons were examined on each point a solution could be found. He recognised that the Adriatic question was closely connected with the general European situation. Italy had suffered very much from the failure to settle the question of Fiume, and he recognised that Italy's internal difficulties were closely connected with these external difficulties. He asked what would be the best procedure as regards the Italian reply? To whom should it be addressed, in order to pave the way for an agreement? Should this question be separated and considered by itself?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he took a very strong view in regard to Signor Scialoja's last question. He did not believe that this matter could ever be settled by Notes. It was no use for the Powers to sling documents at each other's heads. This question would never be settled until people who had authority to sign a document could meet together. Personally he was so anxious for a settlement of the question of Fiume, that he would go anywhere and at all risks, and there were risks at a time when strikes were threatening. A point which strongly impressed him had been that the question would go from bad to worse if it was not settled soon. Already it constituted a danger to the internal peace of Italy, and it could not do this without affecting all the other countries. Moreover, it created doubts as to the unity of the Allies. He hoped, therefore, that there would be an end of Note-writing, and that persons with authority to settle would meet and come to an arrangement. He knew Signor Scialoja's difficulties, and naturally he could not settle the question in the absence of the Italian President of the Council. He would propose, therefore, that the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy, together with a representative of the United States, with full powers, if this could possibly be arranged (though he fully

realised the difficulty of this) should meet together. Even in the very regrettable absence of a representative of the United States with full powers, he thought it should not be impossible to reach an agreement which he felt sure would carry great weight with the American Government. He therefore asked Signor Scialoja if the Italian President of the Council, with his Foreign Minister, could not meet his colleagues somewhere and settle the question? When he had been in Paris the question had been bad enough, but since then D'Annunzio's *coup* and the trouble with the Italian Army and Navy had made it infinitely worse. It would be a great advantage, therefore, if Signor Nitti could meet his colleagues, together with the Foreign Ministers, and settle the question.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he would put this proposal before Signor Nitti. For the moment he feared it would be impossible for Signor Nitti to leave Rome, as the Chamber was engaged in difficult and, indeed, tumultuous debates. Signor Nitti could not leave the Chamber without a pilot. The session of the Chamber, however, would not last long, and, he thought, would be over about the 20th. Consequently, a meeting might be possible during the Christmas holidays.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested a meeting at San Remo.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was easier to find a place than to settle the question. It was important that everyone present should have full powers. There would be no difficulty about this in the case of Mr. Lloyd George and himself. He did not feel so sure, however, in regard to Signor Nitti. He feared that probably M. Davis would not receive full powers. In this event they might have a delightful journey to San Remo with deplorable results. The key to the whole question was the difference between Italy and President Wilson. He would ask the Italians to remember that they were all animated by the most friendly intentions towards them. He was afraid, however, that Italy approached the question exclusively from an Italian point of view, while their Allies were obliged to take into account the state of Europe and the peace of the world. The essential point was that all should come with full powers. It would be a great pleasure for him to meet Signor Nitti at San Remo, or anywhere else, but it would only

mislead public opinion if the meeting took place between people who had not full powers. If Signor Nitti was willing to discuss the question from the general European point of view, as well as from that of Italian local considerations, there was every prospect of an agreement. He would ask Italy to give some signs of a desire to settle. Then, if agreement could be reached, an approach might be made to the Government of the United States.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that if Signor Nitti and he came to a meeting, he would, of course, as Prime Minister, have full powers, and the two together would fully represent the Italian Government. Naturally, the possession of full powers did not involve an obligation to agree to any particular settlement.

(The MARQUIS IMPERIALI interposed that, of course, they would come with the full intention of settling, but they could not agree in advance to any particular settlement.)

In order to prepare for the discussion, it would be necessary for him to return to Rome in order to discuss all the points with Signor Nitti. If a meeting were arranged to take place in ten or twelve days' time, this would give him ample time. While the Italian representatives would come with full powers and a desire to settle, he felt some doubt as to whether a United States representative would be given full powers.

MR. DAVIS, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, said that he could not say much. He doubted as to whether the United States could send a delegate with full powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, supposing an agreement were reached between France, Great Britain and Italy, it would not carry great weight with the American Government?

MR. DAVIS replied that so much might be taken for granted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he felt he ought to explain why he felt doubt as to the full powers of Signor Nitti. He was not speaking of full powers from a constitutional point of view. He had no doubt about that. But

Italy was somewhat out of the constitutional track. Besides their regular full powers he thought that Ministers, in order to act with freedom, required irregular full powers. Italy was now suffering from the worst kind of revolution, namely, a military revolution. The danger was that the Italian representatives might come and say that they were in agreement with their Allies, and were ready to give the necessary orders, but they knew that the Army and the Fleet would not obey them. This would create a very grave situation, and extreme embarrassment. He knew well that Signor Nitti would come with the best desire to settle. But if the Army and Navy would not obey him, and if Italy was still bound to continue sending supplies to their troops at Fiume, no useful results would be achieved, and it would be a matter of extreme anxiety. It was most important that Signor Nitti should not be bound or tied by any agreement with D'Annunzio. This was not a matter that he would allude to in public; but this was a Secret Conference. He had seen a despatch which stated that D'Annunzio had offered to the Italian Government to come out of Fiume provided the Italian Government would not yield from the position which Signor Orlando had taken up. If Signor Nitti came to a Conference bound by such an agreement, he would place his friends in great difficulty. It was essential that Signor Nitti should come really free, and in possession of the fullest powers to settle.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he did not accept the statement that Italy was out of the constitutional track. He admitted that she was faced with very considerable and grave difficulties. These difficulties were one of the results of the Great War, and if we all looked in the mirror we would find that our faces had altered. The difficulties, however, had been founded on an exaltation of national sentiment. If D'Annunzio had not fundamentally been supported by public opinion he could not possibly have exerted any power. Naturally every Italian Statesman must take national sentiment into account. From this point of view the Italian Ministers could not deal with the question as an abstract one dependent on historical and geographical considerations. All States had to take into account the sentiments of their peoples. The question which the Italian Government had to consider was whether it could accept a settlement without creating a greater difficulty behind its back. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister together could determine the point to which Italy

could yield. They did not wish to remain in a negative position, which would be a danger to all. But they could not ignore the nationalist feeling which represented an important part of public opinion, and which in particular represented the forces of law and order on which the Government might have to depend in the event of certain contingencies. They could not overlook the possibility of a situation in which the nationalist forces were those on which they would have to rely very largely.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, in a spirit of personal good will and of national good will towards Italy, he must repeat what he had said in regard to the Italian Government and its constitutional authority. The D'Annunzio incident had made the greatest impression in France, and, he thought, in Great Britain as well. The Italian Army had flouted the Italian Government by refusing to obey its orders. If Mr. Lloyd George undertook an engagement and gave an order to the British Army, everyone knew that it would be executed. Exactly the same applied in the case of France. But this was not the case in Italy, and we had already seen what might happen. As he had so often said to Signor Orlando when the latter was in office, the trouble had been begun by the Italian Government themselves. They had established themselves at Fiume, not as participants in an Allied action, but separately. They had eliminated their Allies and posted up notices with the Italian Royal Arms at the top. This had been the great mistake that had been the beginning of the revolution. This, of course, was now past. If, however, a reasonable settlement was to be reached, the Italian Army must be induced to obey the orders of the Italian Government and, through the Italian Government, of the Supreme Council, since Fiume was really at the disposition of the Allied and Associated Powers as a whole. What he had said about D'Annunzio was based on despatches, and Signor Scialoja had not attempted to answer him. The statement in the despatches was that D'Annunzio had demanded that the Italian Government should pledge itself not to make concessions. If such pledges were made, it would be useless to meet at San Remo or anywhere else. He urged strongly, therefore, that Signor Nitti should come to the Conference with his hands free, and he would ask Signor Scialoja to tell Signor Nitti that one member of the Conference, at any rate, had taken this question most seriously.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, like everyone else, he deplored the abnormal situation which had existed at Fiume since its occupation by D'Annunzio. The Italian Government had for a long time been struggling to find a solution. He did not know what was happening between Signor Nitti and D'Annunzio. He had telegraphed for information, but had received no positive answer. It was very important that he should be able to telegraph something definite to Signor Nitti as the result of this Conference, as Signor Nitti was at the moment treating with D'Annunzio.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, like M. Clemenceau, he hoped that Signor Nitti would not tie his hands in such a way as to render a Conference futile. If the Conference came after some agreement with D'Annunzio it would not be fair to ask M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, himself and Lord Curzon, to come to a Conference, and would create a critical position. They did not want to meet in order to receive D'Annunzio's decision as to what the settlement was to be. Hence, it was essential that Signor Nitti's hands should be free, and that he should not be merely a messenger from D'Annunzio. Subject to that, he was all in favour of holding a Conference. If it would be easier for Signor Nitti to come to some place in Italy, he was ready to meet him. He knew that Signor Nitti's domestic difficulties in connection with this question were greater than his own. He knew also that they were not difficulties of his own creation, but inherited difficulties. Therefore, if it was easier to Signor Nitti to arrange the matter on Italian territory, either because it was difficult for him to leave Italy for several days or for any other reason, he was ready to come to Italy. It would be useless, however, if Signor Nitti was bound to D'Annunzio.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, as to the locality, he thought Signor Nitti would find no difficulty in coming to Paris. This would involve less travelling for M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Nitti was the youngest of the three.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would make to Italy all the concessions admissible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he hoped Signor Scialoja, in communicating with Signor Nitti, would make clear the importance of Signor Nitti coming with a free hand, and not tied by any agreement with D'Annunzio.

M. CLEMENCEAU recalled that Mr. Davis had said that if the three Powers were unanimous it could not fail to exercise the greatest influence on President Wilson. He would observe, however, that if President Wilson thought that one of the three Powers had bound itself in advance, and if he thought that the settlement merely followed the dictations of D'Annunzio, he would not be so favourably impressed.

(2) MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the House of Commons he had ventured to say that at their next Conference the Allied and Associated Powers would consider the question of Russia. He felt that they ought to have a common policy. He had spoken to M. Clemenceau on the subject on the previous day, and M. Clemenceau's views had been so much in accord with his own that he would ask him to recapitulate them. Russia

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had the more pleasure in reverting to his conversation with Mr. Lloyd George on the previous day in that that very morning he had received a visit from Mr. Churchill, who was reputed to hold very strong views on the question of Russia. He had found they agreed at almost every point. He thought that all were agreed that there could be no peace in Europe so long as Russia remained in her present state of anarchy, disorder, robbery, crime and revolt. This was a danger not only to Russia herself, but to the whole world. All were convinced of the truth of this. Intervention had been tried by every means—men, supplies and money—with the object of setting up a stable Government. Up to now no result had been achieved. The anti-Bolshevist elements had proved insufficient. He would not examine the reasons for this, which would bring him into the sphere of high political philosophy. This was not the occasion to discuss that. It was sufficient to face the facts. It was certain that up to now the Allied policy had not succeeded. They had tried to help Koltchak with material aid. They had sent him a Proclamation.³ That Proclamation had produced no result, and now

Koltchak had retired to the middle of Siberia and his troops were in a deplorable condition. Then the Allies had believed in Denikin, and great efforts had been made in his support by Great Britain and, to some extent, also by France. Denikin, however, was now retiring. It therefore seemed useless to continue on these lines, and he would suggest making, as it were, a barbed wire entanglement round Russia in order to prevent her from creating trouble outside, and in order to stop Germany from entering into relations with Russia, whether of a political or military character. This was not such a difficult policy to carry out. The stories which had been circulated of an enormous army in Germany were, he believed, entirely fanciful. We knew that Germany had an army of 400,000 men. In addition, she had *Sicherheitswehr* and *Einwohnerswehr* which was equipped with machine-guns, *flammenwerfen*, etc., but was only trained for street warfare. They had arms in their depots, but he did not believe the present German Government could stand without them. There was some evidence that Germany was in danger of a civil war, which might be occasioned by the return of the German forces from the Baltic to Berlin. This might end in a revolution. He did not believe, however, that Germany would fight again, in view of the great desire of her population to avoid further war. We must not be bluffed, and would have to watch the situation carefully; and, further, we must take no risks. We had been told that Germany would resist in the Baltic and Upper Silesia, but now it seemed that she would obey. The Allies must have perseverance, fairness and patience. In his view the support of Poland was the best way to check Germany. Poland occupied a first-rate strategical position. She had an army of half a million good soldiers enured to hardships and animated by a strong patriotism. Politically she was well-disposed to the Allies, and sufficiently armed. She only asked the Allies for help. It would be a great mistake if we did not maintain Poland in order to dam up the Russian flood and to provide a check to Germany. Mr. Churchill had observed to him that Poland must be regarded as the left wing of Denikin's army as against the Bolsheviki. He agreed that this ought to be carefully considered. He believed that Great Britain and Italy, and probably the United States of America, would agree with him on this matter. He would give up all idea of further direct intervention in Russia. All efforts in this direction would prove wasteful in the future as in the past. It merely led people to believe that we had an

honest desire to resuscitate the ancient regime in Russia. Our policy rather ought to be to fortify Poland in order to keep Russia in check and to contain Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous day he had expressed his full agreement with M. Clemenceau. Great Britain had spent about £100,000,000 in Russia, partly on the Archangel Expedition, but mainly in support of General Denikin. This sum included the last "packet" of £15,000,000 to £16,000,000, which would be delivered by the end of March. She had not got much in return for it. The last news was that General Denikin had been driven back, and the Bolsheviks were now nearing Kharkoff. If Kieff, and especially Kharkoff, should fall, there would not be much left to Denikin, because of the difficulties occasioned by Maknoff, who had occupied Ekaterinoslav in his rear. The situation in South Russia did not look at all satisfactory. So far as the British House of Commons was concerned, and, he believed, so far as France was concerned, these two countries were not prepared to go on helping in a material manner the anti-Bolshevist forces. He did not know how Italy and America regarded the question.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that Italy was of the same view.

MR. DAVIS said that he could only express his personal opinion, but he thought the United States were not willing to give further assistance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous day a proposal had been discussed for a Federation of the anti-Bolshevist States. This was of no use unless the Allies were prepared to support the Federation, and such support meant money, guns and equipment. He and M. Clemenceau had come to the conclusion that this was not a very helpful expedient. As regards Poland, in his view this depended upon whether Poland was expected to attack the Bolsheviks.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that nothing was further from his mind.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had mentioned the matter because, when he was in Paris in September, M. Paderewski had stated that he was prepared to march on Moscow if supported and equipped.⁴ Even Marshal Foch, who was most strongly anti-Bolshevist, had not supported this view, as he had considered that the traditional feeling in Russia against the Poles was so strong that it would only consolidate the resistance. The same would apply to the Finns. It would have much the same effect as the attacks of the Prussians and Austrians had had on the Jacobins in France. Hence, if the Polish Army were re-equipped, it must not be for an attack on Russia, but rather for future contingencies. He was so much in agreement with the rest of M. Clemenceau's observations that he would say no more.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he agreed entirely with Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood it was agreed that the Conference of anti-Bolshevist States and organisations should not be undertaken. He asked if Mr. Davis had anything to say.

MR. DAVIS said he spoke with hesitation and embarrassment, insomuch as he not only had no authority, but not even instructions from his Government. He believed, however, that the United States Government would be in accord with what Mr. Lloyd George had said. He knew that from the first they had been opposed to military intervention in Russia, and had gone as far as they were willing to go in rendering financial assistance.

LORD CURZON summed up M. Clemenceau's proposals as follows:—

- (i) A barbed wire fence, as it were, round Russia, within which the Allies should not interfere:
- (ii) To put an end to contributions of supplies and money for the purpose of upholding or reestablishing order in Russia:
- (iii) To build up Poland as a barrier against Russia and a check on Germany.

These were accepted by Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Scialoja, and, so far as he had authority to speak, by Mr. Davis. He doubted, however, if the question could be solved in such precise terms. The

Prime Minister had mentioned an alternative suggestion, namely, to call a Conference of the anti-Bolshevist States and organisations. He had rightly said that this was only a continuation of what had hitherto been attempted, except that perhaps it meant giving supplies to one set of men instead of to another. That seemed to condemn the proposal. But we must not leave the impression that we took no interest in Russia. Our interest depended on what was happening immediately outside the barbed wire fence. We must remember that all the States round Russia were struggling for freedom. This applied equally to Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Denikin and the Caucasus. Each of these was struggling for a national existence. He hoped, however, that if we withdrew our material support we should not also withdraw our moral support and take our representatives away. A second point was that we could not precisely draw a line as to when the new policy would begin. For example, the British Government had promised aid to the extent of a further £15,000,000 for Denikin, and this would take some time to send. It had been pointed out that Koltchak's Government was falling, and this was true. For some time past we had ceased to supply him with any material help. He hoped, however, that everything would not be withdrawn as a result of this Conference; for such action would mean the collapse of Koltchak and the over-running of Siberia by the Bolsheviks. The result would probably be that the Japanese would go in and establish a powerful force in Eastern Siberia. He hoped, therefore, that the policy would not be adopted with too great precision, and that every latitude would be allowed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was in complete accord with Lord Curzon.

MR. BALFOUR raised the question of the Baltic States. He felt much embarrassed as to where we stood in regard to this question, although, owing to the chaos, the present position was perhaps inevitable. We had acknowledged the independence of Finland and Poland, but he did not know where we were as regards the States lying between them. He understood that we had refused to acknowledge their independence, but we had recognised them as *de facto* Governments. Was our intention to give them no help, or were they to be included in the general decision?

LORD CURZON said that we had not for a long time given them any assistance, although we had allowed them to raise loans, so far as they were able to do so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if we were to recognise their independence?

MR. BALFOUR hoped that we should not do so. He asked if we were to acquiesce in their making peace with the Bolsheviks? We ought not to encourage them not to do so unless we could give them some support and assistance. If we were to surround Russia, as it were, with a barbed wire fence, could we leave so big a gap as lay between Poland and Finland? This would be to cut off Finland from Poland, and to give the Bolsheviks access to the sea. If we did not acquiesce in their making peace with the Bolsheviks, what steps were we to take?

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was of opinion that we could not disinterest ourselves from the Baltic States. We could lend them aid and give them assistance, but the nature of this need not be discussed today. Each case was different and would have to be considered on its merits. How to prevent them making peace was a proper subject for diplomatic communications between Paris, Rome and London, but was not one that need be considered now.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he understood that the populations of these States were very formidable people. They seemed to have made up their minds not to attack the Bolsheviks. He had had a letter from Sir Esme Howard, who was formerly much concerned in our policy towards these States, and he regarded the Esthonians and the Letts as a very formidable people. He did not believe that the Bolsheviks would attack them further. The Esthonians and Letts had already driven out the Bolsheviks and were rapidly driving out the Germans. If the Bolsheviks were to attack again, the question could be re-considered. As regards their making peace with the Bolsheviks, he agreed that we could not give advice unless we were prepared to support them. As a matter of fact they had some time ago asked us to let them have £10,000,000 for the purpose of resisting the Bolsheviks. At present the responsibility was theirs. He did not think

they intended to make peace, but they were suspending active military operations against the Bolsheviks.

MR. BALFOUR said he would be very sorry to see any peace which gave Russia access to the Baltic.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Baltic States might offer a means of peaceful penetration into Russia. The Bolsheviks had talked much of propaganda, but he thought that civilisation might also undertake its peaceful penetration.

2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S. W. 1, December 12, 1919.

¹ For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 3.

² See Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 9.

³ Appendix I to CF-37, [vol. VI, p. 73](#) .

⁴ See HD-53, minutes 4 (*b*), 6, and 8, [vol. VIII, pp. 204](#) , [208](#) , and [211](#) .

December 13, 4:30 p.m. (ICP-6)

[43] Secretary's Notes of a Conference Held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W. 1, on Saturday, December 13, 1919, at 4:30 p.m.

Paris, December 13, 1919, 4:30 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/3

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/3

ICP-6

[Document 43]

**Secretary's Notes of a Conference Held at 10,
Downing Street, London, S. W. 1, on Saturday,
December 13, 1919, at 4:30 p.m.**

Paris, December 13, 1919, 4:30 p.m.

PRESENT

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P., Prime Minister.

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P., Lord Privy Seal and Leader of
the House of Commons.

The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P., Lord President of the
Council.

The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K. G., G. C. S. I., G. C. I.
E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the House
of Lords.

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M. P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Hon. J. W. Davis (Ambassador of the United States in London).

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau (President of the Council).

M. Cambon (French Ambassador in London).

ITALY

The Marquis Imperiali (Italian Ambassador in London).

JAPAN

Viscount Sutemi Chinda (Japanese Ambassador in London).

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G. C. B.,
Secretary of the Cabinet.

Brigadier-General S. J. Wilson, C. B., C. M. G.,
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet.

Professor P. J. Mantoux (*Interpreter*).

(1) MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were two questions which it was very desirable to discuss while M. Clemenceau was in London. The first was the Russian question, and the second was what arrangements should be made as regards the future of the Peace Conference. Russia

As regards Russia, the question to be decided was what was to be done in regard to giving more money; and, again, what was to be done if the Baltic States were attacked by the Bolsheviki. Further, there was the question of the Caucasian States, and what was to be done if these were attacked by General Denikin. There was yet again the question of Siberia, although this was much more the concern of the United States of America and Japan than of the other Powers. He understood that the Japanese had 30,000 men still in Siberia, and the Americans 8,000. In so far as Russia in Europe was concerned, the views of the British, French and Italian Governments were that no further commitments should be entered into. England had promised to do certain things, and the French the same; and after that it was intended that neither Power would be under any obligation, but that each Power should have discretion to leave on the spot, or not, their Political or other Missions which may either be attached to the anti-Bolshevist elements or the despatch of which may have already been decided upon. The next question on which these Powers were agreed was that a strong Poland was desirable. The third point was that the Powers were agreed that the proposal to summon a general Conference of representatives of the anti-Bolshevist States must be rejected. The fourth point was in connection with the assistance to be given to the border communities, and it was agreed that the Allies should give them such assistance in defending their liberties as might be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arose. These were the principal points which it was desired to submit to the Conference for consideration.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he understood that it was not intended to encourage Poland to take offensive action, and that the extent of any assistance which might be given to her should be for the defence of her territories, and not for other purposes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that this was so, and the Conference approved of the addition to the wording of paragraph 2 of the words “to her for the defence of her territories”.¹

VISCOUNT CHINDA referred to the sum of £15,000,000 which he understood the British Government were giving to the anti-Bolshevist forces. He would like to know whether that sum was earmarked to General Denikin, or whether some of it could be given to the anti-Bolshevists in Siberia. In his opinion the situation in Siberia was very critical, and without further financial or military assistance he did not see how it could be retrieved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the money allotted by the British Government for assistance to Russia was earmarked for General Denikin, and asked Mr. Davis if he knew whether America was prepared to give any further assistance to Admiral Koltchak.

MR. DAVIS said that he did not know what the situation was in this connection.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he understood that the United States and Japanese Governments were discussing the question at the moment. He would like to read to the Conference the views of the Viscount Uchida, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in connection with the Siberian situation. These, as explained by Viscount Chinda, were, briefly, that the Japanese Government view with very great concern the situation in Siberia. The retirement of Admiral Koltchak had encouraged the Bolsheviks, and if Admiral Koltchak's retreat had to be continued the allied and associated troops might find themselves face to face with the Red Russian Army. In the opinion of the Viscount Uchida there were three alternative courses which might be taken:—

- (i) An attempt to crush the Red Russian Army by sending sufficient reinforcements to Siberia, and by acting in co-operation with the anti-Bolshevik forces.
- (ii) The carrying out of a partial withdrawal in order to avoid an encounter with the Red Russian Army:

(iii) An attempt to stop the Red Russian Army by maintaining the *status quo*.

To adopt course (i) would entail sending reinforcements of considerable strength, and public opinion in Japan made this impossible, in so far as Japan was concerned, as the Opposition in the Japanese Parliament were even demanding withdrawal from Russia. As regards the second course, it was the opinion of the Japanese Government that any partial withdrawal would lead to the augmentation of the Bolshevik strength and would necessitate in the end a total withdrawal. Such a situation would create a serious menace of Bolsheviks to Manchuria, Korea and even to Japan itself. Consequently, the only course of action appeared to be the third alternative, which was to maintain the *status quo* by sending such forces as were imperatively necessary in order to strengthen weak points on the front: and, in the opinion of the Japanese military authorities, 5,000 to 6,000 men would be required for this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the Japanese Government were contemplating the despatch of these reinforcements to Siberia it would be better, in drafting the Conclusions in regard to Russia,² to introduce in the first paragraph, after the word “promised”, in the second line, the words “or decided upon”.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he would like to explain that it was not the present intention of the Japanese Government to send all these reinforcements themselves, but that that was the estimate of the size of the force which, in the opinion of the Japanese military authorities, would be required.

After some further discussion it was agreed:—

That the first part of Paragraph 1 of the Conclusions in regard to Russia should be amended to read as follows:—

“not to enter into any further commitments beyond what have already been promised, or, in the case of Siberia, may be decided upon between the

Governments of the United States of America and Japan as to furnishing ..." etc.

It was also agreed:—

That Paragraph 3 should be amended to read as follows:—

“The Conference agreed that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to summon any general Conference of the representatives of the anti-Bolshevist States at the present time.”

After some further discussion, the Conclusions in regard to Russia, as shown in Resolution “A” were agreed to.

(2) MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the question of the publication of some statement to show the policy agreed upon. There appeared to him to be two alternatives, viz., either Announcement of Russian Policy

(a) For each Power to agree to make the same Statement,
or

(b) To agree to the Conclusions, and that each Power should make its own statement, based on these Conclusions.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that before any public statement was made as to policy he would like to consult his Government.

MR. DAVIS similarly said that he would have to consult his Government before committing himself to any public statement on policy. He would also have to dissociate himself from any statement that might be made in the meantime as regards policy.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he was in the same position as Mr. Davis.

After some further discussion it was agreed:—

That each Government should be left to make what statement it thought fit, based on the Conclusions arrived at.

(3) MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the next question was to decide what was to be the final text of the Conclusions in connection with the future of the Peace Conference. He would like to ask the Conference if they would agree to the draft which was before them and had been concurred in by himself and M. Clemenceau. Future of the Peace Conference

THE UNITED STATES and ITALIAN AMBASSADORS both pointed out that it would be necessary for them to refer the Conclusions in this respect to their Governments. They presumed that they might understand that the British and French Governments were in agreement on the matter and invited their Governments to concur.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was so.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he agreed to the terms of the Conclusions on behalf of the Japanese Government.

The terms of the Conclusion as agreed to by the French, British and Japanese Governments are given in Resolution “B”.^{[3](#)}

(4) MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the question of the Conclusions which had been arrived at in connection with the breaches of the laws of war and the surrender of the ex-Kaiser.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he was afraid he had not come to the Conference prepared to discuss these questions which exceeded his competence and the matter was dropped. Breaches of the Laws of War

2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S. W. 1, December 13, 1919. **Resolution A**

1. The Russian policy agreed to at the Conference may be summed up as follows:—

Not to enter into any further commitments beyond what have already been promised or, in the case of Siberia, may be decided’ upon between the Governments of the United States of America and Japan, as to furnishing assistance to the anti-Bolshevist elements in

Russia, whether in the form of troops, war material, or financial aid; the anti-Bolshevist elements still to be free to purchase war material in the Allied countries; each Power to have discretion to leave on the spot all political or other missions which may either be attached to the anti-Bolshevist elements or the dispatch of which may already have been decided upon; and to leave Bolshevik Russia, as it were, within a ring fence. Policy in Russia (Discussed at a Conference of American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Representatives)

2. The Conference considered that a strong Poland was in the interests of the Entente Powers and left for further consideration the question of the form and extent of the assistance to be given to her for the defence of her territories.

3. The Conference agreed that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to summon any general Conference of the representatives of the anti-Bolshevist States at the present time.

4. As regards the Border Communities with non-Russian populations which have been struggling for freedom and self-government, the Allies will give them such assistance in defending their liberties as may be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arises.

NOTE:—An understanding was reached that each Government should announce this policy in the words and in the manner it considered most convenient but in any case not before 3 p.m. on Monday, December 15th.

Resolution B

It was agreed that:—

1. The present session of the Peace Conference shall come to an end at Christmas or at latest within a fortnight of the first *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.
2. After the termination of the present session of the Peace Conference large questions of policy shall be dealt with by direct communication between the governments themselves, while

questions of detail shall be dealt with by a Conference of Ambassadors in Paris. Future of the Peace Conference. (Discussed at a Conference of the American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Representatives)

3. The principles of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey shall be first discussed between the heads of Governments before the Conference meets to consider the necessary treaties.
4. The Inter-Allied Military Organisation shall be continued under the presidency of Marshal Foch at Versailles and shall be instructed:
 - (a) To give advice to the Allied and Associated Governments on military questions relating to the execution by Germany of the Treaty of Peace.
 - (b) To execute such orders as the Allied and Associated Powers may give them.

¹ See Resolution A, p. 857 [*Pg. 857 is part of [Doc. 43](#)*].

² See Resolution A, p. 857 [*Pg. 857 is part of [Doc. 43](#)*].

³ *Post*, p. 858 [*Pg. 858 is part of [Doc. 43](#)*].

January 9, 12:15 p.m. (ICP-9)

[44] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 9, 1920, at 12:15 p.m.

Paris, January 9, 1920, 12:15 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/4

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/4

ICP-9

[Document 44]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the
Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 9, 1920, at 12:15
p.m.**

Paris, January 9, 1920, 12:15 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
The Hon. Hugh Wallace.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P., Prime Minister.
The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P., Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K. G., G. C. S. I., G. C. I.
E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Secretary

Sir Maurice Hankey, G. C. B.
Mr. Leeper.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Cambon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Massigli.

ITALY

M. Nitti
M. Scialoja

Secretary

M. Trombetti

Interpreter: M. Mantoux

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had had the pleasure of several conversations with M. Nitti in London. The latter had made certain suggestions which he himself had taken into consideration with his colleagues. As the result of their deliberations he had prepared a Memorandum of Proposals which he would now invite his colleagues on the Supreme Council to examine. The Adriatic. The Question of Fiume

(At this point Mr. Lloyd George's proposals were handed round—Appendix).

His latest proposals, though based on M. Nitti's suggestions, had not yet been seen by M. Nitti. His suggestion was that the proposals in his Memorandum should be considered as presented to the Conference and to M. Nitti by the signatories of the Treaty of London.¹ In this connection Mr. Lloyd George recalled that on April 19th, at the Council of Four, in the presence of President Wilson, he had informed M. Orlando that Great Britain stood by the Treaty of London, and had made it clear that, if Italy insisted on it, Great Britain would abide by it.² At the same time he had also made it clear that, in the opinion of the British Government, the Treaty of London was not quite suitable to existing conditions. He was quite well acquainted with M. Nitti's difficulties, which were largely internal. The fact was that Fiume had become, as it were, a "flag" to Italian public opinion. Apart from that, it was not really a question of any great intrinsic importance. Nevertheless, it was very urgent to settle the matter. Otherwise the situation was full of peril to Italy, to the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to Europe. He did not think the Council could take the responsibility of allowing the present state of affairs to continue. In this complicated question no perfect solution was possible. The populations of this area were so mixed as to prevent this, and the only thing to do was to reach some rough and ready solution which all parties could accept. Consequently, if his

new proposals should prove acceptable to Italy, he proposed that the Council should then see the representatives of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State and put the proposal before them.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if M. Nitti had had an opportunity of studying the document.

M. NITTI replied that he had not.

M. CLEMENCEAU then proposed that, in order to give M. Nitti time to study the question, it should be adjourned until 11-30 on Saturday, January 10th.

PARIS , January 9, 1920.**Appendix**

THE ADRIATIC SITUATION

Draft of Suggested Joint Memorandum by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George

The British and French Governments have consistently declared their willingness to abide by the Treaty of London. They cannot forget that Italy voluntarily came to the aid of the Allies at a critical and dangerous moment in the war, and that, in spite of the very gallant and memorable fight put up by the Serbian nation, it was mainly through the courage, self-sacrifice, and the endurance of the Italian people and Army that the Croatian and Slovene peoples have won that independence and freedom from German and Magyar domination which they now enjoy. They are prepared, should the Italian Government require it, to abide by the terms of the Treaty they have signed. If, however, the Italian Government agrees in thinking that, owing to the disappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy, the rise of national States in its place, the great uprising of Italian feeling in Fiume, and the other great events which have occurred since 1915, the Treaty of London no longer constitutes a satisfactory settlement of the Adriatic question, they are willing, subject to the amendments set forth below, to adopt as the basis of settlement the memorandum presented to Signor Scialoja by the representatives of France, the United States of America and Great

Britain on December 9th, 1919,³ and modified by the proposals made to them by Signor Nitti on January 6th, 1920.⁴ They advance these amendments to Signor Nitti's memorandum in the conviction that, while they are wholly consistent with Italy's vital interests, they are essential to lasting peace and good relations between Italy and its neighbours which the British and French Governments have so much at heart and which they regard as their duty to promote. The British and French Governments, therefore, would propose to the Conference the following settlement of the Adriatic question:—

- (1) There should be constituted a "Free State of Fiume according to President Wilson's plan" but the Western frontier of the proposed State should in the South be moved Eastwards. As, however, it is vital that the railway running northward from Fiume should be wholly within the Free State, it is proposed that the frontier should run as follows:—

The line should leave the Coast at Punta Kolova and run through points 642, 1095 and 1142 up to Mount Planik, thence northwards it would follow the red line shown on the map.

- (2) "The City of Fiume with its district (*corpus separatum*) should be guaranteed by a statute efficaciously safeguarding its Italianity". This would be fully attained by conferring upon the *corpus separatum* the same degree of autonomy within the Free State as it enjoyed under Austro-Hungarian rule. Both the privileges of Fiume (*corpus separatum*) and the Free State itself should be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The international character of the port, together with full facilities for its development in the interests of all nations concerned, and especially of Jugo-Slavia, Hungary and Roumania, must also be secured under the guarantee of the League of Nations.
- (3) Inasmuch as the preponderant population of the Island of Cherso is Slav, there are serious objections to the removal of the Island from the Free State of which it is an integral part. The Island of Lagosta, however, should be ceded to Italy should the Italian Government consider it necessary for strategic reasons.

- (4) The Free State of Zara should be governed by a High Commissioner advised by a Council representative of the inhabitants which should select its own diplomatic representation. Arrangements should also be made governing the economic relations of Zara with the rest of Dalmatia which falls to the Jugo-Slav State. Zara will therefore be within the Serb-Croat-Slovene Customs Union.
- (5) The Italian proposals for the effective neutralisation of all the Islands of the Adriatic should be accepted, but the proposal to neutralise the mainland of Dalmatia as well, involving as it must the prohibition to an independent State of all measures of self-defence, is one which can hardly be forced upon a friendly Ally. The Conference, therefore, should ask the Italian Government to be content with the neutralisation of all the Islands which, together with the other most important safeguards conceded under the present arrangement, would seem to give as absolute security as they can reasonably demand.
- (6) The Italians of Dalmatia should be free to choose Italian citizenship without leaving the territory. In view of the fact, however, that Fiume is to be set up as a *corpus separatum* within the Free State under guarantee of the League of Nations, it is not possible to extend the arrangement to the citizens of Fiume.
- (7) Existing economic enterprises in Dalmatia should have their security safeguarded by an International Convention.
- (8) There must also be a discussion of the boundaries of Albania.

In conclusion, the British and French Governments would point out that the present proposal involving the severance of the Free State containing an overwhelming majority (200,000) of Jugo-Slavs from their motherland, the modification of its Western frontier in favour of Italy the cession of islands containing a Slav majority, and other points are very great concessions to ask of a State which is now a friendly Ally. The British and French Governments are prepared to ask the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to make these great concessions for the sake of an amicable and prompt settlement of a question which now threatens the peace and progress of Southern Europe. But they can go no further and they earnestly trust that the Conference and the Italian Government will accept them.

PARIS, January 9, 1920.

¹ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915*.

² IC-171D, minute 10, [vol. v, p. 91](#) .

³ Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

January 16, 10:30 a.m. (ICP–18)

[45] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 16, 1920, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, January 16, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/5

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/5

ICP-18

[Document 45]

**Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 16, 1920, at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, January 16, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretaries

Mr. Harrison,
Mr. Winthrop.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Lloyd George

Secretaries

Sir Maurice Hankey,
Mr. Leeper.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Secretaries

M. Dutasta,
M. Berthelot,
M. Arnavon,
M. Massigli.

ITALY

M. Nitti

Secretary

M. Trombetti

JAPAN

M. Matsui,

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Interpreter: M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Wise,
Mr. Philip Kerr.

FRANCE

M. Cambon,
M. Kammerer.

ITALY

M. della Torretta.

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that, before taking up the Agenda, he would remark to the Prime Minister of Great Britain that he had had a conversation with Mr. Ignace on the preceding day on the subject of the guilty parties to be surrendered by Germany. He had noticed that whilst Great Britain asked France to reduce the number of guilty parties which she claimed, the British were increasing theirs. Such a procedure was not equitable. He therefore proposed that Mr. Ignace have an interview with the British Lord Chancellor and that as soon as an agreement between them had been reached, they should give the Supreme Council the benefit of their conclusions. 1. Surrender of Guilty Parties in Execution of the Treaty With Germany, Art. 228

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that, with regard to the re-opening of certain trading relations with Russia, Mr. Berthelot would give them an exposé.

MR. BERTHELOT commented upon the report of the committee appointed to consider the re-opening of certain trading relations with Russia, dated January 15, 1920. Appendix "A". 2. Re-opening of Certain Trading Relations With the Russian People

He added that the representatives of the Russian Cooperative Organizations had met the representatives of the Great Powers two days before and also on the preceding day at two different times; and the Commission thus composed had agreed on the draft which had been circulated.

As had been brought out by the Premier of Great Britain the Commission had recognized that it would be important to be able to trade directly with the Russian peasants in the whole of the interior of Russia; that would be the best way were it successful, to ruin Bolshevism; it would also be remedy for the fall of exchange, as well as to reduce the prices of important products, such as foodstuffs, cereals, etc.

The difficulty of the question lay in that, while refusing to negotiate with the Bolsheviks—a course which would seem to recognize the Bolshevik Government—and while refusing to enter into direct relations with the Bolsheviks, there still remained to be found a way of obtaining their assent.

In theory, the argument to put forward in order to obtain that assent, should be that means of living would thus be given to the populations in interior Russia which the Bolsheviks were incapable of giving them for the reason that, as Mr. Lloyd George had said it, the Bolsheviks could only pay with paper money which had no value, and the peasants were in need of clothing, shoes, medicines, which the Allies alone could give them.

It was therefore not absolutely impossible, in theory, for the Soviet people to say that they would let a certain quantity of wheat, flax, wool or coal go out in exchange for whatever products their populations could get in return. It was, however, to be noted that they would in that case reach another conclusion; they could not send Allied officers or individuals to Moscow to treat with the Soviets; that would be an indirect method of recognition. But the Co-operative Organizations which had offices in London and Paris, as well as in many of the Russian towns, might try and arrive at a direct understanding with the Soviet Government in order to obtain the authorization to export products which those co-operatives

themselves could sell. It had indeed been agreed that those organizations would attempt to adopt that system, and the Council would be kept informed. The report which had been distributed and was the result of an unanimous agreement, explained how the system would operate: a direct purchase from the Bolsheviks, such purchases, however, being made by the Co-operative Organizations in Russia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was in complete agreement on the general terms of the report which had been circulated and explained; he would, however, suggest some slight changes thereto.

In paragraph No. 8, for instance, he would prefer that the word "Bolsheviks" should not appear; also, on the first page where it was stated that "for reconstructing trading relations with the whole of Russia, he would propose that the following be substituted: "With the Russian people".

It was important that the Powers should be shown to be sympathetic towards the Russian peasants.

On the whole, he was in complete agreement and thought the report which had been signed by the representatives of France, Italy and Great Britain was a good one.

MR. NITTI said that he had no remarks to make.

MR. MATSUI approved it, but said that he would reserve his Government's approval.

MR. WALLACE said that he would refer the resolution to Washington.

It was decided:

to refer the question to the Commission which had drawn up the report for the latter to carry out the terms of the agreement approved.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Matsui would refer the resolution to their Governments for instructions.

In the discussion which followed:

MR. KAMMERER stated that the first thing to be done would be to notify the decision of the Council to the Co-operative Societies. They should, for the present, not go any further, and await the sending of the necessary telegrams.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE wished to ask what would be communicated to the Press.

MR. CLEMENCEAU replied "as little as possible".

MR. KAMMERER remarked that they should indeed avoid that the Bolsheviks consider the action taken as a starting point for raising the blockade.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that there was no blockade. But, as a matter of fact, it was impossible to keep silent on their decision which would necessarily be revealed by the action of the Co-operative organizations.

MR. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Berthelot to prepare a draft communiqué for the Press.

MR. BERTHELOT later read a draft communiqué to the Press concerning the Russian question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if he understood it well, it had been told them that the Russian Co-operative Societies would not like to appear as if they were taking the initiative in those operations. On the other hand, as the Government of the Soviets was not to participate or intervene, it would be well, perhaps, to state that they acted under the influence of the situation which it had brought about.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that, on the other hand, he would prefer that they did not refer to the "regime of anarchy", and that they substitute the following words therefor: "the regime of interior disorganization then existing in Russia".

He asked Mr. Berthelot to kindly prepare a final draft and submit it to the Council at the afternoon meeting.

(See Appendix “B”, French press communiqué; Appendix “C”, Anglo-American press communiqué.)

MR. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Cambon to give an exposé of the situation. 3. The Question of Georgia and the Azerbaidjan

MR. CAMBON stated that Mr. Phillip Carr [*Kerr*], Marquis della Torretta and himself had got in touch on the preceding day with the representatives of Georgia and the Azerbaidjan.

He had informed those gentlemen that according to the decision of the members of the Council of Three [*Ministers?*]¹ the Supreme Council of the Allied Governments had recognized the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaidjan as “de facto” governments. They had then asked them whether they had any questions to put.

The representatives of Georgia were Messrs. Tseretelli and Avaloff; the representatives of the Azerbaidjan were Messrs. Dopchbacheff and Mageramoff, who had spoken in turn.

These gentlemen had first thanked them for the “de facto” recognition of their Governments, but they had gone further: They asked that nothing be placed in the way of the course they were following in order to be completely separated from Russia, and they asked for the assistance of the Powers on financial, military and political grounds so as to liquidate their original situation. They had then put questions to the representatives of Georgia and the Azerbaidjan concerning their interior situation and the danger which might threaten them on the part of former Russia. They had appeared more generally pre-occupied concerning Denikin’s intentions than those of the Bolshevists; but the actual condition of Denikin’s army re-assured them completely on their countries’ future for the time being.

Mr. Phillip Carr [*Kerr*] had put questions to them on the military situation of both Republics and their answers had not been very

definite. They had then pressed them further, and the representatives of Georgia had declared that they could put 50,000 men in the field, and those of the Azerbaidjan approximately 100,000.

MR. CLEMENCEAU thought that extremely doubtful.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that they made very good fighting troops, as they were mostly Tartars.

MR. CAMBON went on to say that their army was composed first, of a regular army with officers, and even ex-General officers of the Russian Army, and second, of a national guard.

Mr. Tseretelli had especially insisted on the fact that he considered that the troops they had then under arms were sufficient to defend both Georgia and Azerbaidjan against a possible invasion, should an offensive come either from the former armies of Denikin, or the Bolsheviks, but it would be impossible to arouse the military feeling of their populations to make an offensive warfare, that is to say, a war which would not be solely in defence of the Caucasian territory.

The two Republics had sufficient men to put in the field, but what they lacked was arms and munitions, and they asked the Allies to supply them with such.

Besides, as Denikin's army had at a previous time re-established the Russian authority in Daghestan, i. e. in the mountainous districts north of the Caucasus, those representatives had asked them that the Council should recognize "de facto" the Republic of the Daghestan so as to constitute a kind of buffer between the threats from the north and the Republics of Georgia and the Azerbaidjan.

MR. CAMBON wished especially to point out the different point of view of the representatives from the two Republics: the representatives of Georgia, on account of their geographical position, were of the opinion that the most important menace against their independence would come from the Russian or Bolshevik Armies, which would follow the shores of the Black Sea, and thought that

they would have nothing to fear on the Caspian Sea. On the other hand, however, the representatives of the Azerbaidjan, which was bounded by the Caspian Sea, had declared that the danger lay in that direction: if the Bolsheviks pursued the rest of the army of Volunteers (Denikin's Army) up to the town of Derbent, Bakou would be in dire straits. Once in possession of that town, the situation in the Caspian would be extremely dangerous. There were also some Bolshevik ships in the Caspian Sea which were then ice-bound, and other ships which belonged to Denikin. It was to be feared that the crews of the latter would go over to the Bolsheviks at the first opportunity. There was also in the Caspian a ship flying the British flag, but this seemed manifestly insufficient to have the slightest influence.

What he had just said summarized briefly the conversation they had had with the representatives of the two Republics.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that, as a matter of fact, there were four states in that country; Azerbaidjan and Daghestan were Musulman territories, as he thought; and Georgia and Armenia were Christian, although he was not quite sure to which confession they belonged.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that the representative of Armenia had told him that he was a Gregorian, but he had been unable to explain to him what that meant.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was evident that the recognition "de facto" of the Daghestan which was asked of them might be as wise a step as that of Georgia and Azerbaidjan, especially on account of its buffer position between the North and the latter Republics; what they knew of the history of those countries showed the difficulties which had impeded the Russian armies in their march through the Caucasus. They were not asked for troops: That was a satisfactory point, and he thought that they might try to supply them with arms and munitions. The Caspian Sea fleet was in the hands of Denikin, and they had better send out 1500 sailors and ask Denikin to hand over his ships to them. They also had four British battalions at Bakou which might either remain there, if that proved to be useful, or be

withdrawn. He was strongly in favor of the Daghestan's recognition: that step would give great satisfaction to the Mohammedans, as it would mean two Mohammedan Republics in that part of the world. The Allies also had plenty of munitions which they might send. The difficulty lay in finding transport for arms and munitions to be sent into these Republics.

MR. CLEMENCEAU remarked that he thought most of it had gone to the Soviets through Denikin's army.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that they might at least send a lot of clothes, etc.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be well to examine this question further.

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix A to ICP-18

Report of Committee Appointed To Consider the Reopening of Certain Trading Relations With the Russian People

The Committee understands that it has been instructed to consider the practical details of a scheme for reconstructing trading operations with the Russian people without recognising officially the Bolshevik Government, and that in particular it is to examine how far it is possible for the cooperative organisations to assist in this process.

The following outline proposals, which are made after taking into consideration the suggestions put forward by M. Berkenheim² are recommended for adoption by the Conference on the assumption that direct communications between Allied countries and territories occupied by Bolshevik forces are practicable.

- (1) The Allied Governments should inform the cooperative organisations that they are prepared to permit the exchange of goods, on the basis of reciprocity, between all Russia and Allied

and neutral countries, and should invite these organisations to export surplus grain, food and raw materials from Russia so as to provide exchange for clothing and other goods needed by Russia.

- (2) The cooperative organisations would then communicate by wireless with their headquarters in Moscow, and enquire whether the cooperative movement was prepared to undertake the responsibility for handling the export and import of goods and whether such exchanges were practically possible. Representatives of the Paris or London office of the Cooperative Organisations would at once proceed to Moscow to discuss details.
- (3) The cooperative headquarters in Moscow would ascertain whether it would be permitted to export grain, flax, etc., and whether transport and other necessary facilities would be afforded to it.
- (4) On receipt of a reply the cooperative headquarters would then communicate its decision to its Paris representatives.
- (5) If the cooperative headquarters are prepared to undertake the responsibility, M. Berkenheim and the other officials of the cooperative organisation would then be prepared to make definite contracts to supply grain, flax, etc., from Russia, provided that they were financed at the beginning up to 25% of the full value of the contracts either direct or through British French or Italian cooperative organisations or private traders.
- (6) The balance of the credits required, they would themselves provide from their own resources in London, Paris, etc., or by arrangement with the British French or Italian cooperative movement or private bankers or traders.
- (7) They would immediately proceed to start the shipment of goods purchased with these credits to the Black Sea or the Baltic ports any loss falling on them if the goods were confiscated or destroyed.
- (8) With regard to transport, the cooperative headquarters at Moscow would endeavor to secure at least four complete trains for use to and from the Black Sea ports. If this was impossible M. Berkenheim and his associates would utilise some of their credits for purchasing trucks and locomotives in allied countries. They would in any case send out a number of motor lorries to assist the railways.
- (9) As soon as it became clear that grain started to be moved out of Russia and that the Bolsheviks were offering no resistance, the

contracts would of course be considerably extended so as to cover the full amount of at least 1 million tons of grain which it is estimated can be exported within a reasonable time.

**E. F. WISE
A. KAMMERER
DELLA TORRETTA**

PARIS , January 15, 1920.
Appendix B to ICP-18

Draft of a Communiqué for the Press

The Supreme Council has taken up, and has attempted to remedy the cruel situation and isolated position of the populations in the interior Russia who are deprived of all manufactured products and supplies from abroad as a consequence of the profound internal disorganization reigning in Russia.

Qualified Representatives of the powerful Co-operative Societies whose organization and union extends to all the regions of Russia, and who have established a system of offices abroad, notably in London and Paris, have been in touch with the Council of the Allies. Their proposal to attempt to organize, apart from political interference, a regular exchange of merchandise (Russian cereals, food stuffs, and raw materials in exchange for clothing, shoes, manufactured products of all kinds, and medicines) has been taken up by the Supreme Council.

The humanitarian efforts in no way imply any modification in the policy of the Allies with regard to the Soviet Government. Only those directly concerned will, themselves, independent of any governmental action, endeavor to establish a current of exchanges which is essential not only for the well-being of the inhabitants, but for their very existence.

Appendix C to ICP-18

Press Communiqué re the Decision To Permit the Exchange of Goods on a Basis of Reciprocity Between the Russian People and Allied and Neutral Countries

With a view to remedying the unhappy situation of the population of the interior of Russia, which is now deprived of all manufactured products from outside Russia, the Supreme Council, after having taken note of the report of a Committee appointed to consider the re-opening of certain trading relations with the Russian people, has decided that it would permit the exchange of goods on the basis of reciprocity between the Russian people and Allied and neutral countries. For this purpose it decided to give facilities to the Russian Co-operative Organizations which are in direct touch with the peasantry throughout Russia so that they may arrange for the import into Russia of clothing, medicines, agricultural machinery, and the other necessities of which the Russian people are in sore need, in exchange for grain, flax, etc., of which Russia has surplus supplies.

These arrangements imply no change in the policy of the Allied Governments towards the Soviet Government.

PARIS, January 16, 1920.

¹ CM-I, minute 5, p. 958 [Pg. 958 is part of [Doc. 51](#)].

² Alexander Berkenheim, Chief of the Foreign Directorate and Vice-president, All-Russian Central Union of Consumers' Societies.

January 16, [2:30] p.m. (ICP–19)

[46] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 16, 1920, at 4:30 [2:30] p.m.

Paris, January 16, 1920, 4:30 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/6

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/6

ICP-19

[Document 46]

**Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 16, 1920, at 4:30
[2:30] p.m.**

Paris, January 16, 1920, 4:30 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace,

Secretaries

Mr. Harrison,
Mr. Winthrop.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Lloyd George,
Lord Curzon,
Mr. Bonar Law.

Secretaries

Sir Maurice Hankey
Capt. Lothian Small

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau.

Secretaries

Mr. Dutasta,
Mr. Berthelot,
Mr. Arnavon,
Mr. Massigli.

ITALY

Mr. Nitti.

Secretaries

Don Prospero Colonna,
Mr. Zanchi

JAPAN

Mr. Matsui,
Secretary
Mr. Kawai.

Interpreter: Mr. Mantoux

The following were also present for questions in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN
Mr. Wise,
Mr. Philip Kerr.

FRANCE
Mr. Cambon.

ITALY
Mr. Delia Torretta,
Mr. Vannutelli Rey.

MR. CLEMENCEAU invited Count Apponyi, the President of the Hungarian Delegation, to address the Council.

COUNT APPONYI: Monsieur le Président and Gentlemen, I thank you once again for having accorded me the opportunity of addressing you. What I should like essentially is a discussion, which I consider is the only means of arriving at a clear perception and grasp of the complicated matters with which we have to deal. But, since the wish of the Supreme Council in that respect is definite, I can only accept their will; I accept the situation as it is offered to me, and, in order not to encroach too much upon your valuable time, I shall go right to the heart of my subject.

It is only since yesterday that the conditions of Peace have been officially made known to us. I feel how heavy is the immense responsibility that lies upon me at this moment when I must pronounce the first word of Hungary upon those conditions.

I have no hesitation in telling you with perfect candour that the conditions of peace, as you have been good enough to present them

to us, without certain essential modifications, appear unacceptable for my country. I know full well and I see very clearly the dangers and the troubles which would result from a refusal to sign this peace. Nevertheless, if the country were placed in the situation of having to pronounce between acceptance of the conditions as they stand and refusal to sign, it would have to ask itself whether it were well to commit suicide in order not to die.

Happily we are not yet arrived at that point. You have invited us to present our observations. We have had the honor of transmitting to you certain ones, even before the conditions of peace were submitted to us. We are certain that those which already have been, and those which are going to be, presented, will have at your hands that conscientious and serious examination which the gravity of the situation demands. We hope that then we shall convince you. We hope it all the more, since we have not the slightest intention, today or later, of making a useless display of sentiment nor even of taking exclusively the point of view of those special interests which it is our mission to defend. We are looking for common ground upon which mutual understanding is possible; that ground, gentlemen, is already found. It is the ground of the great principles of international justice and of the liberty of peoples which the Allied Powers have so nobly proclaimed; it is that of the great common interests of peace, of stability and of European construction. It is from the point of view of those principles and of those interests that it behoves us to examine the conditions of peace which we are offered.

At the very outset it is impossible not to be struck by the extreme severity of those conditions. Let me explain. Certainly, upon the other belligerent nations, upon Germany, upon Austria and upon Bulgaria, hard enough conditions of peace have been imposed; but none of these have had to submit to a redistribution of territories so essential to the national existence as those imposed upon us.

For Hungary it is a case of losing two-thirds of its territory and almost two-thirds of its population. Besides that, the territory remaining to Hungary would lose all the conditions of economic prosperity, for that poor centre, separated from its surrounding territories, in which are found the best part of its coal, its minerals,

its salt, building timber, oil, bituminous gas, its reserves of workers, its alpine pastures which support its reserves of cattle, that poor centre, I repeat, would find taken away from it at the very time when it was being asked to produce in greater quantities, all its resources and means of economic progress. Confronted by so serious and so exceptional a situation, one wonders why, in the light of those principles and those interests alluded to above, this particular severity has been shown to Hungary.

It is from the point of view of those great principles and interests already indicated that I touch, with all possible brevity, upon this question.

Can it be an act of punishment upon Hungary? You, gentlemen whom victory allows to sit in judgment, have declared the culpability of your former enemies [,] of the Central Powers, and you have decided to let the consequences of the war fall upon those who are responsible. Very well, but then it seems to me that retribution ought to be in proportion to the degree of culpability; and since it is upon Hungary that the hardest conditions, the conditions most threatening to its very existence, are inflicted, one would say that Hungary is considered the guiltiest nation of all. Well, gentlemen, without entering into the fundamentals of that question, upon which we are going to submit documents to you, it seems to us at the outset that that verdict cannot be pronounced upon a nation which, at the outbreak of war, did not have complete independence, which had only its own share of influence and which, as documents recently published prove, exercised that influence in opposition to measures tending to involve it in the war. No, I cannot think it possible that there is here any question of a verdict; a verdict implies a procedure in which the parties are heard under the same conditions and have the same facilities for making their arguments prevail. Now, Hungary has not been heard; it is therefore impossible that the conditions of peace are of the nature of a verdict.

Is it then, Gentlemen, an application of the principle of international justice in the sense of trying to create in place of a polyglot combination, such as Hungary presents to your eyes, new organizations sharing those territories more justly and more

equitably among different nationalities to assure better the liberty of each? Here again, on a study of the facts, I am obliged to doubt whether that can be the reason for those arrangements.

In the first place, among those 11,000,000 souls to be taken away from Hungary, there are 35% Magyars, i. e. 3½ million souls making the calculation in the way least favorable to the requirements of our argument. There are nearly one million and a quarter Germans, together making 45% of the whole number. Not merely would these benefit nothing from the new application of the racial principle; rather, they would suffer by it. Admitting then—which I am very far from doing—that for the remaining 55% the application of the racial principle did more justice than did historical Hungary, there would still be nearly half of the population to be detached upon whom that principle would have either none or an adverse effect. Now it seems to me that if principle there be, that principle ought to apply equally to all who are affected by the arrangements of the Treaty. But there is more to be said. If we consider the enlarged states formed upon the ruins of the former Hungary, we find, that from the racial point of view, they would be nearly all of them just as much divided as was Hungary itself or even more divided.

I do not wish to weary you with an enumeration of statistics that you will find in the documents we are presenting to you on the subject but, pending your perusal of these, I would ask you to grant my thesis in order to follow the consequences which I shall take the liberty of deducing therefrom.

I do not see, therefore, how the racial principle, the principle of national homogeneity will be justified by this dismemberment. There is but one consequence which, without wishing to be ungracious to anyone at all, I would permit myself to raise. That consequence would be the transfer of national hegemony to races which are today of a lower level of culture in at least the majority of cases. I would merely put before you the following statistics. Of the Magyars, the proportion of those who can read and write is 80%; of the Germans of Hungary, 82%; of the Roumanians, 35%; of the Serbs, between 59% and 60%. If you take the ruling classes, those who have had their education in the high schools, who have passed what the

French call the “baccalauréat”, those whose degree of culture corresponds to the “baccalauréat”, it is seen that 84% of those are Magyars, whilst Magyars constitute 34% of the total population. Four percent are Roumanians, who constitute 16% of the total population and 1% or 2% are Serbs, although that race constitutes 25% of the total population.

I repeat that I make the observation without any ungenerous intention towards anyone. This state of affairs is due to the irrefutable fact that these neighboring nations, owing to their unfortunate history, entered the family of civilized nations later than we. It seems to me therefore, that the transfer of national hegemony to an inferior culture is not a matter of indifference to the wider cultural interests of humanity. We have already a proof of this: during the last year, those of our neighbors who coveted part of our territories, have seized them. According to the terms of the armistice, they had the right to have their armies occupy those territories, but they at the same time seized the whole of the machinery of government. We now see the results of that. In a special document, which we will place before you, we will demonstrate all the destruction of cultural values that has already been effected in that one year. You will see that two fine universities, Pressburg, an ancient home of Hungarian culture and the younger university of Kolozsvár, both of them institutions at the very summit of all that modern science can offer, have been destroyed. The professors have been driven away and I wish you could see who have been put in their places. I would entreat you to send commissions of scholars to compare the two regimes and realize what actually exists today. It is impossible that those universities, those Faculties, with all their history, can disappear in this way and be replaced by anything to equal them. It is quite impossible for new arrivals to replace institutions of such deep culture. Is it conceivable that newcomers, with lower standards of culture and without its cherished tradition of patient scholarship, could remove all its members and replace in a day the slow precious growth which is Oxford? Obviously it is not and it is equally impossible for those, who have taken upon themselves the task, to continue the traditions, or replace the culture, of the old universities of Hungary.

What is true in the case of the universities, is no less true of the administration of government and of national education of every grade. Already, in the territories occupied by the Roumanians, more than 200,000 children are running about in the streets receiving no education whatever, through mere lack of teachers, for the Hungarian teachers have been dismissed and it is impossible to replace them. I believe, gentlemen, that from the point of view of the greater humanitarian interests, this transfer of national hegemony to races who, whatever their promise for the future, stand today upon a lower plane of culture, cannot be regarded with indifference or with complacency.

We have seen that the cause of the harsh measures meted out to Hungary cannot be an act of retribution: we have seen that the principle of nationality will gain nothing by it. Can it be then that it has been done in the name of the liberty of nations?

If so, it would appear that a certain presupposition has crept in, the presupposition namely that the non-Magyar races of Hungary prefer being parts of a state belonging to those of their own race to being citizens of the Hungarian state under Magyar hegemony. Very well, but that is a supposition. And if we are to argue by suppositions, I might well observe that the converse supposition is valid for those 45% Magyars and Germans who, in the transfer proposed would go to the new states and who might well be supposed, on those very grounds, to prefer to remain members of the Hungarian state. It is a mere matter of considering one set of preferences or another. But why proceed by the method of presupposition? Why act on that basis, when there is a very simple means, a unique means, a means whose application we all clamour for today, for removing all doubt, I mean the plebiscite. In the name of the great principle so well formulated by President Wilson, the principle that no group of human beings, no population, should be transferred from one state to another without being consulted, as if they were herds of cattle, in the name of that great principle which is also an axiom of good sense and public well-being, for those portions of our country which it is sought to tear from us, we claim only the plebiscite. And I declare that we bow in advance to the result of that plebiscite, whatever it

may be. Naturally, we ask that it be carried out in conditions that ensure perfect liberty.

That plebiscite is all the more necessary since the Hungarian national assembly, which is to decide in the last resort, upon the conditions of peace that you offer us, will be incomplete. The inhabitants of those occupied territories will not be represented at all. Now no government, no national assembly, has the right, legal or moral, to decide the fate of populations they do not represent. Besides, under this head, the Treaty of Peace contains expressions which apparently anticipate difficulties. It says: "Hungary renounces, in so far as it lies with it ..." Those are approximately the words of the Treaty. We should not have, in fact, the opportunity of taking decisions binding, legally or morally, upon the populations which would not be represented in the national assembly.

That, I repeat, is fundamentally the principal request which we address to the Peace Conference. If the arguments that we can adduce in favor of our ancient territory, in favor of the historical Hungary, do not seem to you sufficiently well founded, if none of them seemed to you conclusive, we say this, ask the populations interested, address yourself to the people in question. We submit in advance to the verdict that will be returned by them. Now, if we take up that position, and our adversaries do not dare to submit their claims and their aspirations to the popular verdict, I ask you, in whose favor do the presuppositions tend?

There is another point of view from which the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination can be considered. It might be said that the liberty and rights of national minorities would be better assured on the territory of the new states than they were in Hungary.

I will not at this time call to your attention the kind of treatment attributed to Hungary in the matter of the alleged oppression of non-Magyar races in our country. All that I can tell you is that we shall be very happy if, in the territories taken away from us, our Magyar brothers shall enjoy all the rights and all the opportunities that our co-citizens of non-Magyar races had in Hungary.

But that question it will be necessary to raise again. It is not my mission to discuss it at this moment; for that matter, I am not able to, not having at my disposal the necessary documents, but I am ready to discuss it completely at any time or place. All I say is that the regime of the nationalities of the former Hungarian State, had it been a thousand times worse than our bitterest enemies themselves say, would be infinitely to be preferred to what is actually going on in the countries occupied by our neighbors and their troops. We shall place before you, gentlemen, a series of documents concerning what is taking place, especially in Transylvania. We have made a searching investigation into all the reports that we have received on this subject: although we have received the testimony of the heads of the three Christian churches in Transylvania—the Catholic, the Calvinist and the Unitarian churches—we have not made the claims—we could not make the claim—to be believed on our word alone, for against our declarations there are others; but what we do ask of you is to go and see what is taking place, to send, before you take your final decision, a commission of experts to the spot, to convince yourselves of what is being done in the region I have talked to you about.

We it is, gentlemen, who are always asking that there be light. It is we who wish always only such decisions as are taken in full cognizance of the facts and what we still ask of you is that in the extreme case where territorial readjustments are being imposed upon us there should be a more effective and detailed arrangement for the protection of minorities than the one contained in the draft treaty that you have presented to us. In our eyes, the guarantees provided are absolutely inadequate. We ask stronger guarantees which we are ourselves willing to apply to all the non-Magyar populations remaining in Hungary. On that matter, we have already reached complete agreement with their representatives but we believe that it will be especially difficult to obtain such a guarantee from our neighbors whose racial zeal undoubtedly exceeds ours. The experiment that we are making now shows us that that will be very difficult; on the question of the withdrawal of the Roumanian troops to the line of demarcation, a withdrawal which we have claimed, a withdrawal of which our Government made the very condition of sending our Peace Delegation to Paris, the Allied Powers spoke to Roumania in terms so energetic that it seemed impossible that their

instructions should not be followed. Nevertheless, you know what has happened, you will understand, therefore, the anxieties we entertain for those of our race, for our brothers, if they fall under that foreign yoke.

Having finished the score of principles, the principle of international justice, the principle of nationality and the principle of the liberty of peoples, and having found no single application of these, which would enlighten us upon the justification of those conditions of peace that it is desired to impose upon us, I wonder, then, if they have been inspired by the great interests I mentioned at the beginning of this discourse—the interests of peace, of stability and European reconstruction.

Gentlemen, the Hungarian problem is no such small portion of that general problem as statistics would seem to indicate. For centuries this territory, which was and still no less is, Hungary, has played a role of extraordinary importance for the maintenance of the peace and the security of Europe, especially of Central Europe. In the centuries that have gone before, the conquest of this territory by the Hungarians and its conversion to Christianity, it knew neither repose nor security. It suffered every kind of barbarian invasion. It is only from the moment when the Hungarian rampart was built, that its security has existed. It is important for the general interests of stability and peace that that nest of trouble which Eastern Europe essentially is, grow no larger and that those troubles do not gain the heart of Europe. The historical development having been interrupted in the Balkan peninsula by Turkish occupation, equilibrium has not yet been established there. Heaven grant that it soon may be. It is therefore essential that those troubles which have so often disquieted Europe, which have several times already brought us to within an ace of war, should extend no further.

The Historical State of Hungary has fulfilled the task of maintaining a state of equilibrium, a stability that assured the peace of Europe against the immediate dangers common to the East. That task it has fulfilled for ten centuries. It has been able to do so, thanks to its organic unit. “The country ...”, I cite the celebrated French geographer, Élisée Reclus ... “that country has the most perfect

geographical unity that there is in Europe. The system of its rivers and valleys all converging from the circumference to the centre, form a unity that can be controlled only under a unified regime. The economic interdependence of its parts is no less complete—the centre a vast agricultural plain, the circumference containing everything that can assist the progress of agriculture.”

This historical Hungary has then the most natural geographical and economic unity that exists in Europe. Nowhere can you trace a natural frontier within its territory; you cannot separate one part from it without making all the others suffer. That is why history has preserved that unity for ten centuries. You may quite well ask whether the structure that has existed in history is the structure justified in law; to that I have nothing to say; but you cannot challenge the testimony of history when it tells you the same thing throughout ten long centuries. That is no accident, it is the nature of things speaking through the mouth of history. Hungary had every condition of organic unity, one only excepted, unity of race.

I have just told you that none of those states you would erect according to the terms of this treaty upon the ruins of Hungary, would have racial unity, which is the only principle of unity lacking in the Hungary of today; I add, they would have no other unity. The states thus created would cut the natural lines of geography, thwart that fruitful interior emigration which brings laborers to where the best opportunities of employment exist, it would break the thread of those traditions which after all create a common mentality amongst those who have lived together for centuries, who have endured the same reverses, shared the same glories, the same victories, the same progress, the same misfortunes. Is it not to be feared then that in the place of a centre of stability, you will create centres of ever-imminent conflagration? For upon this there is no use having illusions. Those new structures would be undermined by irredentisms far different and far more dangerous than those said to exist in Hungary, which indeed did exist in Hungary among a certain number of intellectuals but which hardly penetrated the masses; they would be undermined by the irredentism of nations who felt themselves subject not only to a foreign domination but to the hegemony of a culture lower than our own. The thing proposed is an organic impossibility. It might

possibly be conceived, indeed, that even a national minority, enjoying a higher culture, might assume the hegemony over a majority occupying a lower plane; but that a majority [*minority*] of lower culture, or even a very slight majority of these should assume the hegemony, should obtain the voluntary submission of a majority enjoying a higher degree of culture and assimilate that majority morally, that, gentlemen, is an organic impossibility.

We are freely credited with the design of wishing to upset by force whatever in the arrangements to be concluded, fails to suit us. We are far, gentlemen, from entertaining such mad designs. It is from the moral force of the truths and of the principles by which we are supported that we expect everything; and everything that we are unable to obtain today, we expect to come to us through the pacific action of the League of Nations, one of the very objects of which is to remedy those international arrangements which are calculated to endanger the maintenance of peace. Having said thus much, I would declare, gentlemen, so that my words may not be interpreted in the sense of a threat which would be as puerile as idle, that it is hardly possible, under the artificial arrangement contained in the Treaty of Peace for that part of Europe, so tormented, yet so important for the peace of the world, ever to achieve political tranquility. It is only tranquility in those countries that can preserve Central Europe from the dangers which perpetually menace it from the East.

Europe is still in need of economic reconstruction. Very well, it is impossible for those newly-manufactured states to do anything but retard economic progress. I have shown you to what extent that will necessarily be true in the territories remaining to Hungary, but it will likewise be true in all those lands detached from it, for the simple reason that they will come under an administration of an inferior kind, under the regime of a lower level of culture and that they will be separated from the other parts of that organic unity in union with which it is possible for them to advance but without which they are reduced to stagnation or will more probably go backward.

Europe is in need of social peace. You know better than I do, the dangers that are threatening that peace, you know better than I that the consequences of the war have disorganized and unsettled men's

minds as well as the conditions of economic life. We have had the sad experience that the progress of revolutionary parties is due especially to everything that disturbs the moral forces of society, to whatever irritates national sentiment, above all, to the miseries of unemployment. If, in that part of Europe which is very near the still smouldering centre of Bolshevism, you aggravate the conditions of labor, if you act so as to render more difficult the resumption of productive toil, then you are aggravating the dangers that menace the social peace. All barriers are without avail against epidemics, especially moral epidemics.

As against all those fine theories, you may very well say that there remains one great fact—victory and the rights of victory. Gentlemen, we know that. We are realists enough in politics to reckon with that factor. We know what we owe to victory and we are ready to pay the ransom of our defeat. But is force the only, is it the best, reconstructive principle? What is based on force alone can be maintained by force alone and force can be transferred from one dominion to another.

Under the dominion of material force alone, the future of Europe would be sad indeed. We cannot believe, gentlemen, that such is the mentality of the victorious nations. We do not find that mentality in the declarations wherein you have defined the principles for the triumph of which you fight and the objects you set before yourselves in waging the war.

I tell you that that does not appear to us the mentality of the great nations who are victorious today. Do not take it ill if beyond the France, the England, the Italy of today—to speak only of the victorious European nations—I discern the outlines of that other France which has ever been the pioneer of generous aspirations, which has ever been the mouthpiece of all grand ideas; of that other England, mother of all political liberties; of that other Italy, cradle of the Renaissance, of the arts and intellectual advance. And if without a murmur I submit to the law of the victor, I willingly bow before that other France, before that other England, before that other Italy, for I recognize them gladly as our masters and teachers. Permit me to say this: do not imperil that grand moral influence to which you

are entitled by over-emphasizing that note of force which it is yours to wield today but which is liable to change hands: preserve intact the finest part of your heritage.

In spite of all the difficulties that surround us, in spite of all the misunderstandings, of all the obstacles that some would multiply upon our path, we are setting out with confidence on the way which is at last opened to us of participation in the work of peace and we do it in entire good faith. We have confidence in the sincerity of the principles that you have proclaimed. To think otherwise would be to do you injustice. We have confidence in those moral forces with which we would identify our cause and all that I can wish for you, gentlemen, is that the glory of your arms be surpassed by the glory of the peace that you give to the world.

I have but few more words to say. You will understand that I cannot enter into a detailed examination of the draft treaty which you offer me. I have spoken exclusively of the territorial questions, since, in the last resort, that comprises all the others, but I wish to call your attention to certain matters which seem to me more urgently to require solution. First of all there is a humanitarian question—the question of prisoners of war. According to the terms of the treaty, repatriation of prisoners of war could be undertaken only after the Peace is ratified. I would beg you, gentlemen, to be good enough to depart from a mere formality from which so many innocent families have to suffer. We addressed a special request to the Supreme Council on behalf of the unhappy prisoners who are in Siberia. That is a question for the solution of which I appeal to your goodness and your humanity, and these are feelings that ought to be above politics, even in a time of war.

I wish likewise to make an observation on the financial clauses. I think that sufficient account has not been taken of the exceptional situation of Hungary, which has had to not only suffer two revolutions but also for four months the ravages of Bolshevism and several months of Roumanian occupation. In those circumstances, it is impossible for us to execute the financial and economic clauses contemplated in the Treaty. If, as is there provided, repayment of all the credits made to us by citizens of the victorious powers can be

exacted immediately the Peace is signed, that means insolvency, bankruptcy, the effect of which will certainly be felt by the victorious nations. We have indeed numerous creditors in your countries. They will be repaid if time is given us; but they cannot, if repayment is demanded immediately.

We are asked also—which proves how useful it would have been to see us earlier—to supply iron ore to Austria. Considering that we are ourselves obliged to import ore, it will not be possible for us to supply any. The situation is exactly the same in the matter of building-timber. Those are some of the details I would ask you to be good enough to examine with that good will which several of your unofficial representatives have promised us.

Before concluding, I wish very cordially to thank you, gentlemen, for having granted me the opportunity of addressing you and for having given me throughout my exposition, attention so sustained and so full of good will.

At the end of his speech, Count Apponyi made some remarks in Italian to the following effect:

“I would add some words in Italian to demonstrate our profound respect for the Italian nation. Hungarian blood and Italian blood have not always flowed in opposed camps. It has flowed too on battlefields where the two nations have fought for liberty side by side against ancient wrongs. I would seek protection in those memories so as to obtain from Italy, if our observations appear just, all that support for them which the principles of justice and the interests of Europe render desirable.”

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Plenipotentiaries of the Hungarian State—gentlemen—you have remarked with what attention we have followed the presentation of your case. All the reasonings that have been maintained before us will be carefully examined, but you must understand that we can take no decision based upon a one-sided presentation. It is therefore my duty to remind you that we have sent you in writing the text of the treaty of peace which we offer you. To make our decision we await your reply. We have offered you a period

of a fortnight to study the treaty. We hope that that period will suffice for you to collect the documents you wish to put before us and present whatever observations you have to formulate. We should be happy to have your assurance that your reply will be in our hands within a fortnight.

COUNT APPONYI: I cannot, Sir, give you the assurance, but we shall do our utmost. We shall be obliged to examine the Treaty in all its details and doubtless to go to Budapest. If that is necessary, we will ask you for several days delay; nevertheless, we will make every effort not to make it too long.

The questions that we have most at heart are the plebiscite of those populations it is desired to detach from Hungary and the sending of Interallied Commissions into the occupied countries to convince you of the state of affairs created by an occupation that has lasted one year.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Does anyone wish to speak?

No one desiring to do so, the Conference adjourned at 16:10.

January 16, 4 p.m. (ICP–20)

[\[47\] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 16, 1920, at 4 p.m.](#)

Paris, January 16, 1920, 4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/7

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/7

ICP-20

[Document 47]

**Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 16, 1920, at 4 p.m.**

Paris, January 16, 1920, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace.

Secretaries

Mr. Harrison,
Mr. Winthrop.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Lloyd George.

Secretary

Sir Maurice Hankey.

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau.

Secretaries

Mr. Dutasta,
Mr. Berthelot,
Mr. Massigli.

ITALY

Mr. Nitti.

Secretary

Mr. Trombetti.

JAPAN

Mr. Matsui.

Secretary

Mr. Kawai.

Interpreter: Mr. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Wise.

ITALY

Mr. Delia Torretta.

This meeting took place immediately after the reception of the Hungarian Plenipotentiaries. (See I. C. P. 19.)^{[1](#)}

MR. LLOYD GEORGE communicated to Mr. Matsui the report of the Committee charged with the examination of the question of the commercial policy to be followed towards Russia and approved by the Council at its morning meeting. (See I. C. P. 18.)^{[2](#)} 1. Commercial Policy Towards Russia

MR. MATSUI: (Having read the document) I shall communicate this report to my Government. It does not, however, seem to be of very great interest for Japan.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: handed to Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Nitti a draft communiqué to the Press prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr and Mr. Wise.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I should like to make certain modifications of this draft, using for that purpose the draft prepared by Mr. Berthelot. (See Appendix "B" to I. C. P. 18).^{[3](#)}

After some discussion the draft communiqué to the Press, as contained in Appendix "A", was approved.

MR. MATSUI read the text of the note addressed to the Dutch Government concerning the surrender of Wilhelm II. (See Appendix "B".) 2. Surrender of Wilhelm II

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The note will be delivered this evening at 6:30 p.m. to the Dutch Minister.

MR. MATSUI: This is the first time that I have seen this document. The question has already been examined and a draft approved, but I cannot give my approval to the new text without first referring to my Government.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: It is impossible to delay the communication which must be made to the Dutch Government.

MR. WALLACE: I myself have not known anything about this note.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: This is a matter concerning the execution of a Treaty which the United States has not yet ratified. The Allies can inform Mr. Wallace of their decisions upon the subject; but it is difficult for them to ask him to participate in the discussion.

MR. WALLACE: I would simply wish to point out that I was not concerned in the drafting of this document.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: When we hear the Hungarian plenipotentiaries we are concerned with the preparation of a new Treaty; the presence of the American representative was therefore quite natural. In the other meeting, however, we were examining various measures of execution of a Treaty which we have ratified; only the Powers who had ratified could participate in the discussion.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The note to the Dutch Government will be presented in the name of the Council, but not in the name of the United States, which have not ratified the Treaty, nor in that of Japan, which has not yet approved the draft. Mr. Matsui can, if he so desires, address a note on the subject to the Secretariat General, or present his remarks at the next meeting: they will then be recorded in the minutes.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Appendix A to ICP-20

JANUARY 16, 1920.

Note re the Decision To Permit the Exchange of Goods on a Basis of Reciprocity Between the Russian People and Allied and Neutral Countries

With a view to remedying the unhappy situation of the population of the interior of Russia, which is now deprived of all manufactured products from outside Russia, the Supreme Council, after having taken note of the report of a Committee appointed to consider the re-opening of certain trading relations with the Russian people has decided that it would permit the exchange of goods on the basis of reciprocity between the Russian people and Allied and neutral countries. For this purpose it decided to give facilities to the Russian Cooperative Organisations which are in direct touch with the peasantry throughout Russia so that they may arrange for the import into Russia of clothing, medicines, agricultural machinery, and the other necessities of which the Russian people are in sore need, in exchange for grain, flax, etc., of which Russia has surplus supplies.

These arrangements imply no change in the policy of the Allied Governments towards the Soviet Government.

PARIS, January 16, 1920.

Appendix B to ICP-20

PARIS, January 15, 1920.

Note to the Queen of Holland Demanding the Delivery of the Kaiser for Trial

The Powers, in communicating herewith to the Government of the Queen the text of Article 227 (certified copy annexed hereto)⁴ of the Peace Treaty with Germany, which was put into force on January 10, 1920, have, at the same time, the honor to advise that they have decided to enforce the provisions of that Article without delay.

Consequently, the Powers address the official request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to the Allies of

William of Hohenzollern, ex-Emperor of Germany, in order that he may be put on trial.

As the persons residing in Germany against whom complaint has been lodged by the Allied and Associated Powers must be surrendered to them in compliance with Article 228 of the Treaty of Peace, the ex-Emperor, if he had remained in Germany, would have been surrendered under the same conditions by the German Government.

The Dutch Government is aware of the unassailable reasons which imperatively demand that the premeditated violations of international treaties, as well as systematic disregard of the most sacred rules of international law, suffer, irrespective of persons, no matter of how high position, the penalties provided for by the Peace Congress.

The Powers call attention, among other crimes, to the cynical violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, the barbarous and merciless hostage system, the mass deportations of populations, the carrying away of the young women of Lille, torn from their families and thrown defenceless into the most promiscuous environment, the systematic devastation without military justification of entire territories, the unrestricted submarine warfare including the inhuman abandon of victims on the high seas, the innumerable acts committed by the German authorities against non-combatants in contempt of the laws of war, etc. The responsibility for all these acts, at least the moral responsibility, lies with the supreme chief who commanded and who took advantage of his power to break, or to permit to be broken, the most sacred rules of the human conscience.

The Powers cannot conceive that the Dutch Government could consider the tremendous responsibility of the ex-Emperor with less disapproval than they themselves.

Holland would not be fulfilling her international obligations if she refused to join the other nations within the means at her disposal in

carrying out or at the very least in not hindering the punishment of the crimes committed.

In addressing this request to the Government of the Netherlands, the Powers deem it their duty to dwell especially on the particular character of this request. It is the duty of the Powers to insure the execution of Article 227 without being held back by argumentation, because the case under discussion does not fall within the lines of a public accusation of a fundamentally legal nature, but is an act of high international policy, imposed by the conscience of the universe, for which the procedure was provided in order to give the accused such guarantees as have never been known before in international law.

The Powers are convinced that Holland, a country that has always asserted its respect of Law and its Love of Justice, and which, among the first, asked for a place in the League of Nations, will not attempt to help cover with her moral authority, violations of the essential principles of the solidarity of nations, all equally interested in preventing the return of a similar catastrophe.

The people of the Netherlands have the highest interest in not appearing to protect or to shelter the principal author of these crimes on their territory, and in facilitating the trial which the voices of millions of victims demand.

¹ *Supra*.

² Minute 2, p. 863 [*Pg. 863 is part of [Doc. 45](#)*].

³ *Ante*, p. 870 [*Pg. 870 is part of [Doc. 45](#)*].

⁴ The document referred to does not accompany appendix B to ICP–20.

January 19, 10:30 a.m. (ICP–21)

[\[48\] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, January 19, 1920, at 10:30 a.m.](#)

Paris, January 19, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/8

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/8

ICP-21

[Document 48]

**Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, January 19, 1920, at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, January 19, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretaries

Mr. Harrison,
Mr. Winthrop.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Lloyd George
Lord Curzon
Mr. Churchill
Mr. Long.

Secretary

Sir Maurice Hankey.

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau.

Secretaries

Mr. Dutasta,
Mr. Berthelot,
Mr. Arnavon,
Mr. Massigli.

ITALY

Mr. Nitti

Secretary

Mr. Trombetti.

JAPAN

Mr. Matsui

Secretary

Mr. Kawai.

Interpreter: Mr. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Adl. Beatty
Marshal Wilson
Mr. Vansittart
Mr. Carr.

FRANCE

Mr. Cambon
Marshal Foch,
Gen. Weygand,
Mr. Laroche,
Mr. Kammerer,
Mr. Hermite,
Mr. de Montille

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero,
Col. Castoldi,
Mr. della Torretta

JAPAN

Mr. Sawada.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The first question that arises is that of the telegram that ought to have been sent dealing with the arrangement with the Russian Co-operatives. That telegram has not been sent. Why? 1. Commercial Policy With Russia

MR. KAMMERER: We were waiting for instructions on the point. Last night Mr. Berthelot told me that the telegram could be sent. I stated that, for my own part, we had no objection to its despatch.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Were you in a position to raise objections to the despatch of that telegram?

MR. KAMMERER: Not at all, but I had to say that I had not any instructions and that I was awaiting them. In any case the telegram is ready and is going to be sent.

MR. NITTI: To arrange the details of execution of the question in the best way possible, it would be well to send it to the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am in entire agreement. All that ought to be done by the Economic Council and not by the Foreign Ministers.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We are then agreed upon that.

It was decided:

that economic questions involving the commercial policy of the Allies in Russia should be dealt with by the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We will go on to the Caucasian question. I think that Marshal Wilson or Marshal Foch ought first to be heard.

MARSHAL FOCH: A question on this subject was put to the Interallied Military Committee at Versailles: the committee pronounced an opinion. It is to that opinion that I am now going to refer. 2.
Situation in the Caucasus

MR. CLEMENCEAU: You mean, I take it, the pronouncement of the 12th January: that has been circulated; everybody here knows it; have you nothing to add to that? (See Appendix "A").

MARSHAL FOCH: No, Mr. President, I have nothing to add unless it be that since that time the situation cannot have appreciably changed, that in any case, if it has changed, that can only be to our disadvantage, and consequently that the restrictions we formulated are perhaps even more justified at the present moment.

SIR HENRY WILSON: I also am in the position of having nothing to add.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is necessary at the very outset is to collect all available information so as to be in a position to discuss the matter profitably later on.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We are agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The military advice, if I have understood it correctly, is that no barrier, consisting of less than three divisions would be effective against the Bolsheviks; and Lord Beatty could not send his sailors unless there were already assurance of such effective military measures.

LORD BEATTY: I have nothing to add to that statement of the situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The situation may be regarded from another point of view. With the object of holding up the Bolsheviks, would it be any good to supply the Caucasian Republics of Azerbaidjan, Daghestan and Georgia with guns and war materiel? And if so, ought it to be done immediately?

MARSHAL FOCH: That question is very difficult to answer from here. Only an officer on the spot would be in a position to say what effective force those countries can muster and whether therefore it is worth while supplying them with anything whatsoever.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Does the Marshal suggest entrusting such a mission to an Allied general?

MARSHAL FOCH: There is an English general with Denikin and the French general Mangin is also there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: But what I want now is military advice. We have already been asked to send material to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is militarily expedient.

MARSHAL FOCH: I am entirely without information as to whether those populations are ready to receive materiel and to employ it to advantage or whether all that we might send would not simply fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

SIR HENRY WILSON: In the meeting that took place the day before yesterday and at which we examined the defence of the Batoum-Baku line, the conclusion was reached that unless the British Navy effectively held the Caspian, that line could not be effectively defended: and, inversely, that unless there existed the means of defending that line, it was impossible to send Naval forces into the Caspian. For that matter, unless the Caspian is occupied and held, Baku will certainly fall.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I take it then to be Sir Henry Wilson's advice that we ought not to send war materiel to those peoples to help them to defend themselves against the Bolsheviks.

SIR HENRY WILSON: That, Sir, is undoubtedly my opinion if the Caspian is not effectively held by the British Navy—I should then send nothing.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: I entirely agree with Sir Henry's opinion on that point. Indeed, if the Caspian were not held, all that we might send would almost immediately pass into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

LORD CURZON: I should like to add a word. If, as General Wilson says, an Allied military expedition could not succeed, then obviously we ought not to send one, but the present question it seems to me, is not so comprehensive. I have been speaking with the representatives of the Caucasian republics who are at this moment in the adjoining room. They have told me already that the Bolsheviks will attack them; they are anxious to defend themselves, provided we supply them with food, arms and munitions. So supplied, they believe that the danger could be averted. Without supplies, their fall, they say, is inevitable. In any case I suggest that we take no decision upon the matter without first of all hearing them.

MARSHAL FOCH: I repeat my question: can we inform ourselves sufficiently here? I am willing to accept the discussion which ought to be profitable, but I think that we cannot have really adequate information unless we send actually on to the spot a representative of the Allied Powers.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The reason for your remark is, I believe that you did not quite understand what has just been said, to wit, that the representatives of the republics of the Caucasus are at present within the building and that it would be possible to hear them now.

(The representatives of the Republic of Georgia, Messrs. Tsheidze, Tseretelli and Avaloff and of Azerbaidjan, Messrs. Topchibacheff and Magaramoff, were then introduced.)

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Gentlemen, the Conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaidjan food, arms and ammunition. We are told that you can give us information about an intended Bolshevik attack upon your people and of the means at your disposal for defence. We wish to know if at this juncture you would be in a position to exploit the help that we might be able to send you. We are quite disposed to do something effective but we want to know the present state of your countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against the Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the materiel sent and thus to make matters worse.

MR. TSERETELLI: I speak in the name of the Georgian Delegation as well as in that of the Delegation of Azerbaidjan. We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the Entente, the Bolsheviks might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need the material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Am I to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?

MR. TSERETELLI: That would be better still; but the mere fact of being protected on the sea and receiving the arms, munitions and food we require, would be an invaluable help. The state of mind of our people is such that, should the Bolsheviks attack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the Entente, we hope to defeat every attack. But such material aid is necessary immediately. We would like in any case to point out that the present situation in the Caucasus is dangerous from the point of view of the morale of the populations. When Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. Today, our people see their independence recognized and we are convinced that all the forces of the Highlanders will be used to resist a Bolshevik invasion and to defend our independence. It is under those circumstances that we build so much hope upon receiving help from the Supreme Council. We do not wish war: we are even ready to come to an agreement if that were possible, with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognize our independence.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: You would really sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks?

MR. TSERETELLI: Yes, on condition that they pledged themselves not to invade our country and that they did not try to introduce propaganda among our people. But I must repeat, if we were strong, and the Entente were to help us, the Bolsheviks would be obliged to recognize our independence and give up their attempts.

I should nevertheless like to point out that there are three Trans-Caucasian Republics—Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia. We would like to know why Armenia has not received *de facto* recognition. That recognition would help us all and render easier resistance to any aggression whatsoever. But, in short, it is in immediate help that our hope of resistance lies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many men can Azerbaidjan put into the field?

MR. MAGARAMOFF: A military law has been passed by our Parliament; assuming that we have the necessary arms and munitions, we shall be able to put into the field some 100,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Have you the troops at the moment?

MR. MAGARAMOFF: We have a little army, in the command of a native Azerbaidjan general, about 50,000 strong, perhaps more, disciplined, but there are only from 10,000 to 12,000 of these men with arms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: And in Georgia?

MR. TSERETELLI: We have about 16 battalions of regular troops, each 600 strong and nearly 15,000 men of the National Guard. These are well-disciplined troops. In a fortnight we could mobilize 50,000 men if we had the necessary arms and munitions. But on the other hand in a war for independence we could count upon the support of our whole people, among whom national enthusiasm runs very high. I am myself not a military specialist; but, if the Supreme Council wishes quite accurate information we can ask our Government by telegraph to supply it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Is compulsory military service the system obtaining in Georgia?

MR. TSERETELLI: Yes, and, in the Russian Army, Georgian officers were considered the best. Our troops too, were among the flower of the Russian Army.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Have the young men of Azerbaidjan received military instruction?

MR. MAGARAMOFF: There was no compulsory military service with us; but at the beginning of the war there were organized detachments of volunteers who distinguished themselves in the Iron Division. We had remarkable officers and generals. It was only two years ago that our Republic was constituted: henceforth all our youth must serve with the colors.

LORD CURZON: Reports that I have received say that a certain number of officers of Azerbaidjan are Turkish officers. Does the presence of these Turkish officers in the army leave us the guarantees necessary in a fight against the Bolsheviks?

MR. MAGARAMOFF: After the conquest of Azerbaidjan by Russia a great part of the population emigrated 25 years ago to Turkey. Later on, when the Turkish Army invaded the Caucasus, a certain number of its officers were natives of our country and of Daghestan. Among these, some 50 preferred to remain in Azerbaidjan but they are native Caucasians and we can be certain that they, like all our populations, will use their whole energy in fighting the Bolsheviks for the defence of our independence.

MR. TOPCHIBACHEFF: We, the inhabitants of Azerbaidjan, dread Bolshevism even more than do our Georgian neighbors. We have had an experience of it. The Bolsheviks occupied our country for four months. I myself, head of a Trans-Caucasian committee, was a prisoner with them for two months and a half.

The danger threatens us from two sides: from the north and from the Caspian. On the Caspian side we hope that the English, who have a naval base at Enzeli, will give us perhaps marines and, in any case, arms and munitions. As for the northern frontier, we believe that in order to protect the whole of Trans-Caucasia, and especially Azerbaidjan, it is expedient to recognize the Republic of the Highlanders, which would then form a buffer state against Bolshevik attacks. These Highlanders are indeed a very brave people.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Did the fight against Denikin take place in Georgia or Daghestan?

MR. TSERETELLI: Denikin invaded Daghestan and the fight developed between the Highlanders and him. As for Georgia, it has always been threatened by Denikin; we displayed our sympathy with the Highlanders, who were defending themselves against him.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Why did Denikin attack Daghestan?

MR. TSERETELLI: Denikin looked upon Daghestan and all Trans-Caucasia as Russian provinces. He judged it easier to invade those territories than to fight the Bolsheviks; it was against the peoples of the Caucasus that he turned the arms which were supplied to him to maintain the fight against the army of the Soviets.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: For that attack had he great forces at his disposal?

MR. TSERETELLI: His forces were fairly large, how large I cannot say, exactly. Anyhow, he had to use a great many men in maintaining the strife of factions in which the Highlanders involved him. The fight lasted nearly a year: I do not know whether it is not still going on. We have no recent news. I believe that Denikin has issued an appeal to his troops. Whatever may be the number of his forces, they are disorganized and demoralized and are doubtless no longer worth very much.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is the Cossack's attitude towards Denikin?

MR. TSERETELLI: According to reports we have received from Tiflis, confirmed by Mr. Bitch, president of the Kouban delegation, who is in Paris, great discontent reigns among the Kouban population; it is possible that the discontent is already receiving some direction. In the existing situation the Red Army is able to invade Kouban. But resistance to the Bolsheviks is being organized under the direction of Mr. Magaramko, the president of the Rada of Kouban. But it is still necessary to have the guarantee that it is not Denikin who will profit by the defeat of the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How long has the Kouban Delegation been in Paris?

MR. TSERETELLI: For a year.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Is there a separatist movement in Kouban?

MR. TSERETELLI: That is the political tendency of the Kouban Delegation, which is keeping in touch with its own country. That

Delegation presented to the Conference a memorandum asking for recognition of the independence of the Kouban Republic.

MR. NITTI: If I have properly understood Mr. Tseretelli, the real objective of Denikin's army is the reconstitution of the old centralized Russia, rather than the defeat of the Bolsheviks; is Mr. Tseretelli quite sure about that?

MR. TSERETELLI: I am certain. I do not know Denikin's personal ideas, but the unanimous opinion was that, had he managed to defeat the Bolsheviks, he would immediately have turned all his efforts towards the reduction of those nations whose independence has been proclaimed. That is not merely my conviction, it is that of all those independent states of which I speak and which defended themselves against him. It is the conviction also of our Azerbaidjan neighbors.

MR. NITTI: Do you believe that the recognition of the Caucasian Republics, which exist already, or which will be recognized later could arouse the spirit of resistance in the country?

MR. TSERETELLI: I am convinced that that recognition will strengthen resistance to all aggression from whatever side the aggression comes. We entertain the high hope that after the first step which has just been taken, the Supreme Council will go to the full length of recognizing our Republics *de jure*. That is the hope that sustains the courage of our peoples and our Governments; our population will display all the more zeal as they know that this *de jure* recognition will come about.

As for Denikin's policy, he has declared officially several times that he did not recognize the right of our nations to self-determination: in his eyes, we still constitute mere provinces of the old Tsarist Russia.

MR. MAGARAMOFF: The Georgian Delegate, in explaining the dangers that might menace his country from the direction of the Black Sea, has shown that on that side the Entente could send ships of war. But for us, on the Caspian, the situation is entirely different. Sending ships of war there cannot be thought of. There is a Bolshevik fleet to

the North of Petrovsk and a small fleet of Denikin's between Petrovsk and Baku; finally, at Enzeli, there is an English ship with some small gun boats.

Recently, the Azerbaidjan Government protested against the allocation of a fleet to Denikin; but, at the present moment the volunteer army is beaten and the crews of his fleet, who manifested sentiments of sympathy with the Bolsheviks, are going possibly to join them: hence will arise a danger for Baku and for the defence of all Trans-Caucasia. That is why we should be happy if the Conference would be good enough to take the necessary measures to prevent Denikin's joining the Bolshevik fleet.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Could you garrison Baku if you were given the arms? How many men could you find to defend that town?

MR. MAGARAMOFF: There is a strong garrison at Baku already.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Of how many men?

MR. MAGARAMOFF: We do not know now, as for two months direct communications have been cut off. Within that time, the strength of the garrison may have varied. However, that may be, two months ago, there were 7,000 men in Baku, all natives of Azerbaidjan, of which state Baku is the capital.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Why did Denikin not receive the support of the peasants in Ukrainia? Why did they abandon him?

MR. TSERETELLI: I think that Denikin was considered in Ukrainia the representative of the counter-revolutionary movement which was going to take the land from the peasants and restore it to the nobility. He was looked upon as a man who had placed the Ukraine under the yoke of a centralized government reminiscent of Tsarism. In fact, both from the social and from the national points of view, the peasants looked upon Denikin as the enemy.

To avoid all misunderstanding, allow me to supplement what I said a little while ago. I spoke of Kouban. I am not qualified to make known here the aspirations of its population and I cannot say whether the

separatist movement is very strong in that region or whether it is merely destined to avert the possibility of a civil war. In any case, I should not like to give the impression that the cause of Azerbaidjan and of Georgia ought to be considered from the same standpoint as that of Kouban. As you know, our populations are, from the national point of view, quite different. For centuries they have lived as independent states. I want it to be clearly understood that all I have said has merely the value to be attached to the information that can be given by a man who has read the newspapers. There is a Kouban Delegation in Paris; only that Delegation is in a position to speak precisely upon the national aspirations.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Was the Kouban Delegation regularly appointed by the Rada?

MR. TSERETELLI: Yes, and its president is the president of the Rada. He is Mr. Bitch, a man very well known in the Caucasian world. He has been here for nearly a year.

(At this point the representatives of Georgia and of Azerbaidjan left the Conference.)

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Could Marshal Foch tell us whether he looked upon the question of the defence of the Caucasus as a problem standing by itself or as a part of the problem of the general defence against Bolshevism?

MARSHAL FOCH: I have not considered the problem exclusively from the former point of view. To me it seems obvious that that question is part of the general problem of the defence against Bolshevism.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: On which side are the forces at present threatening the Caucasus most formidable, Denikin's or the Bolshevik?

MARSHAL FOCH: I believe that Denikin's forces may be considered so far reduced that in a short time they will not exist, but I have no precise information. I have still less information about the Bolshevik army; but it is beyond question that Bolshevism is in the ascendant,

that it is led by a great number of German officers, who, having no occupation at home, are going to gain their living elsewhere. We can therefore count upon seeing it still carried on by its own momentum, I would not say victorious but at least penetrating various countries under different guises. In those circumstances, it is high time to establish, wherever we can, at least a barrier.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Does Marshal Foch consider Poland in danger? Is he aware of concentrations of Bolshevist forces in that direction? And assuming that Denikin's forces disappear, does he think it probable that Poland will be attacked? In that case, when might the attack take place?

MARSHAL FOCH: I do not know that Bolshevist concentrations or attacks are in preparation, but that is quite possible at some undefined future date. Considering the extent of their resources, that seems all the easier; the Bolsheviks are going to have at their disposal vast territories of enormous resources and also, as I already said, German officers who will imprint a military stamp upon bands hitherto rather loosely organized. There is therefore every reason for apprehension. I do not know that they are going to attack Poland but such an attack might well take place. When it does they may easily be strong enough to get the better of the Polish army. Were Russia to recover all its former vast area, any calamity is possible unless serious precautions are taken to meet it. In a word, it is necessary to confront a vast Bolshevist Russia with strong, united efforts. It is not by Poland alone that it must be resisted, but by every state which can collaborate in the effort.

The forces that can be opposed to the Bolsheviks are those of scattered republics organized or unorganized. Passing from Azerbaidjan by the Caucasus there are Georgia, Bessarabia, Poland, Esthonia, Latvia,—all new states which might be placed in a very difficult situation if they were abandoned. If on the contrary they are taken in hand, it is possible to succeed in establishing a system of military forces powerful enough to hold Bolshevism in check.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do you propose a military entente between these different states with the object of attacking Soviet Russia, or,

on the contrary, with the object of common defence in case the Bolsheviks attack?

MARSHAL FOCH: The first thing to be done is to stop the advancing Bolshevism and to consolidate the states which have just been founded. It is a matter of establishing a defensive organization, a safety belt to protect Central Europe against the advance of the Bolsheviks. That is the goal to be reached first of all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: You would not then propose equipping the Polish army to enable it to enter Russia?

MARSHAL FOCH: No, and I go further still. Even if the Polish army were equipped it could not accomplish that task. If I were asked for my opinion I should only propose to realize an "entente" between Poland, Roumania, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and Finland. An entente in the first instance, political, with the object of arresting the progress of Bolshevism. That league the Trans-Caucasian countries would join and Bolshevism would thus be surrounded.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do you know whether the Bolsheviks are preparing to attack those countries?

MARSHAL FOCH: That one cannot know till after the event.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Could you now mention a single one of those countries against which the Bolsheviks contemplate a military attack?

MARSHAL FOCH: When that attack takes place, I shall be in a position to reply. I could not do so beforehand.

(At this point the military experts left the Conference.)

LORD CURZON: I should like to explain why, when recognition was given to Georgia and Azerbaidjan, it was not also given to Armenia. I myself was responsible for the original proposal that Georgia and Azerbaidjan should be recognized. Why I did not propose at the same time to recognize Armenia was that the question of Armenia had still to be decided by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. It was felt that to

give recognition at that time would be to anticipate the work of the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, there are now strong reasons for giving recognition to Armenia. The present Armenian state forms part of the old Russian Empire with its capital Erivan, just as did Georgia and Azerbaidjan. Moreover, the Armenian state is prepared to join in the defence of the Trans-Caucasian states against the Bolsheviks. Consequently, I think it would be just and wise to give it recognition on the clear understanding that that does not prejudice the ultimate delimitation of Armenia, the boundaries of which have still to be decided in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Are there any objections? As there are none, we therefore agree to recognize the Armenian republic on the condition just proposed by Lord Curzon.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: The decision we have just taken being of a diplomatic and political nature, does not solve the military problem. The present situation of the Armenian republic, like that of the other Caucasian republics, remains precarious; attacked by Turks on the south and threatened on the north by the Bolsheviks, its complete extinction is a possibility to be reckoned with.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am informed that the United States Treasury has made a recommendation to Congress that the sum of 25,000,000 dollars should be allotted to Armenia. The recommendation has still to be considered by Congress and the Senate, but I understand that it will probably be adopted. That will be a very material help.

MR. WALLACE: I believe that Mr. Lloyd George's statement is accurate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: That is one very important matter settled. We have now to decide what support, if any, ought to be given to the Caucasian states. Marshal Foch has said that three divisions are necessary. The British Government cannot possibly spare these.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Neither can we.

MR. NITTI: Italy too cannot send any.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We must then find out whether we can send arms and munitions.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: That question is bound up with the Caspian problem.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: That question does not quite arise at the moment but may be considered later on. I do not see that any harm can come of sending arms and supplies. Before the Bolsheviks can reach the Caucasus, they have to pass through the most productive provinces of Southern Russia; consequently they would have no need to capture any food we might send to the Caucasus. As for war materiel, the Reds already have so many rifles that the capture of 25,000 or 50,000 more would not make much difference: they have captured from General Denikin some 600 guns, many of them made in Great Britain and they have also captured some excellent tanks. In those circumstances, the danger from supplying a certain number of guns and rifles to the Caucasian states is not very great. These people claim that they can put up a good enough fight to impress upon the Bolsheviks that it is not worth their while to attack. The chances are, too, that the Bolsheviks do not want to wage a big fight in those regions except in order to secure Baku. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion to supply the Trans-Caucasian Republics with all the material aid asked for, on the express condition that the Caucasian states will resist the Bolsheviks and garrison Baku with all their strength.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: I hope that any grant of arms to the Caucasian states will not be deducted from the final "packet" of supplies to be sent to General Denikin.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I should like to point out that the final "packet" to Denikin is purely a British affair.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Our immediate question is whether arms should now be sent or whether further enquiries on the spot should be made first of all. I myself agree with Mr. Lloyd George and I think that the

Council has already sufficient information on the subject. Under these circumstances, I agree with Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. That I think is the decision that ought to be communicated to the military experts by telling them we have decided to send war materiel to the Caucasus as quickly as possible; and they should be asked to deal with the question of quantity and the means of dispatch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am in entire agreement.

MR. NITTI: The Italian Government cannot undertake in this matter any engagement at all, either in men or arms, since to do so would be contrary to a law which has been passed in the Italian Parliament by all parties, including the Conservatives, almost unanimously. The gist of that law is that Italy can take no part in any intervention against *de facto* Governments, such as that of Russia. The object of the Italian Chamber is to prevent the Bolshevist Government from increasing its strength as a nationalist government. Unfortunately, the Bolshevist government has already assumed a sort of nationalist character.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We are going to send that materiel to *de facto* governments; that cannot be regarded as intervention in Russian affairs, as assistance to Kolchak or Denikin might be.

MR. NITTI: Intervention in favor of the one or the other is for us impossible. I must conform to the vote of the Italian Chamber.

LORD CURZON: If my information is correct, there is nevertheless a precedent for Italian intervention. Sometime ago, Italy sent arms to the Daghestan, whose cause found warm support in the Italian mission; on the other hand, my information is that much is hoped from the Italian aid at Baku and in the Daghestan.

MR. NITTI: I cannot do anything officially. There are some Italian interests in Georgia and I believe that Italian volunteers have gone there. Probably I will be able to help this move; it will be impossible, however, to send regular troops, or even to send any materiel officially; if I did, I would have the Italian Government against me, even the Conservatives.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It does not matter very much whether the arms are sent officially or unofficially, so long as they reach the Caucasian states.

MR. NITTI: I may say very confidentially that I could supply arms and war materiel if Great Britain or France will take the responsibility of sending them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We agree.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We decide then to accept in principle the supply of war materiel and food to the republics of the Caucasus and to refer to the military experts for their solution the problem just put.

LORD CURZON: Who do you mean by “military experts”?

MR. CLEMENCEAU: In practice that would be Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson, since officially we cannot include an Italian representative. If that is done, it ought to be possible to reach a conclusion within forty-eight hours.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Government of the Armenian State should be recognized as a *de facto* government on condition that this recognition in no way prejudices the question of the eventual frontiers of that state;
- (2) that the Allied Governments are not prepared to send to the Trans-Caucasian states the three divisions contemplated by the Interallied Military Council;
- (3) to accept the principle of sending to the Trans-Caucasian States arms, munitions, and, if possible, food;
- (4) that Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson are requested to consider of what these supplies should consist and the means for their dispatch.

Mr. Wallace will refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions.

Mr. Matsui also reserves the acceptance of his Government with regard to Paragraph 1.

PARIS, 12 January, 1920.

[Report of the Interallied Military Committee at Versailles]

ALLIED MILITARY COMMITTEE
BRITISH SECTION

The British Delegation has prepared a Memorandum^{*} on the situation created in the Caucasus by the defeat of General Denikin's armies, and of the measures to be taken to enable the Caucasian Republics to offer a resistance to the junction of the Bolshevik and Mussulman Forces across their territories.

After a preliminary examination of the question the Allied Military Committee is of the following opinion:—

If it has not been possible to overcome Bolshevism on its own soil, it should be possible to arrest it on certain dangerous routes such as that of the Caucasus.

With this end, the organization of a military barrier on the line of the Caucasus could well be considered.

In view of the unstable condition of the local Governments and of the immature condition of their military forces, this barrier should first of all be organized by European troops, whose strength might be fixed at two divisions.

Eventually these European troops could be relieved by local forces, as soon as the latter shall have been reconstituted, organized and provided with the necessary armament.

Beyond financial and material provision, this organization of the defensive barrier of the Caucasus would require time (a minimum of three months should be allowed).

It would be advisable, therefore, to undertake it without delay.

In the meantime the elements of General Denikin's armies of the East which, in spite of their reverses, constitute the only force in these regions which has any military value, might advantageously continue the struggle with a view to denying to the Bolsheviks the approaches to the Caucasus and of allowing the necessary time for organizing the defensive barrier.

Consequently, without being able to foresee the period during which their resistance would be effective—probably not a long one—it would certainly be advisable to continue to give them material assistance within the scope of possible action by them.

The military barrier of the Caucasus should be strengthened and completed by the grouping under Allied command of as large a number of ships in the Caspian Sea as possible; thus ensuring the command of this Sea.

It is on these lines—according to the available information on the present situation—that the general conditions of defensive military action in the Caucasus should be drawn up.

If the Allied Governments consider it advisable to undertake such action, the question would remain of considering the possibilities of carrying it out and of examining the best means to that end.

F. FOCH

Marshal,

President of the Allied Military Committee

C. SACKVILLE-WEST

Major-General,

British Representative,

Allied Military Committee

UGO CAVALLERO

Italian Representative,

Allied Military Committee

ANNEXURE A

Note Prepared by British Delegation

Present situation caused by defeat of both Kolchak and Denikin.

Bolsheviks having failed to upset Europe have made agreement with Mussulmen to attack the East.

Owing to collapse of Denikin Trans-Caucasus becomes bridge which must be defended by Allies to prevent union of these two hordes.

It, including the Caspian and especially Georgia, is the natural barrier separating these two forces.

At present in consequence of impending advance of Red Army towards the Caucasus the situation in Georgia becomes complicated. Without effective aid Georgia, which is passing through painful economic crisis, will be unable to resist attack from both North and South and crushing of Georgia will have serious consequences for Allies. If Allies will help Georgia will have sufficient courage and strength to defend her frontiers.

As a preliminary measure and before considering the larger aspect of preventing Bolshevik invasion of the East certain steps can and should be taken:—

- (1) Recognition by Allies of Georgia and Azerbaijan (this has now been done).
- (2) Diversion of all stores, etc. now en route to Denikin, to these Republics and to Armenia.
- (3) Additional help by Allies to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
 - (1) Financial.
 - (2) Military stores, especially cartridges and boots.
 - (3) Provisions, especially bread.
- (4) Sufficient military assistance to secure Batum and Baku.
- (5) Denying of the Caspian and the fleet to the Bolsheviks. Denikin's fleet must either be voluntarily sunk or secured for our own use.

PARIS, 12 January, 1920.

* Annexure "A". [Footnote In the original.]

January 20, 10:30 a.m. (ICP–22)

[49] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 20, 1920, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, January 20, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/9

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/9

ICP-22

[Document 49]

**Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 20, 1920, at 10:30
a.m.**

Paris, January 20, 1920, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretaries

Mr. Harrison,
Mr. Winthrop.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Lloyd George,
Lord Curzon.

Secretaries

Sir Maurice Hankey,
Mr. Leeper,
Capt. Lothian Small.

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau,
Mr. Millerand.

Secretaries

Mr. Dutasta,
Mr. Berthelot,
Mr. Massigli.

ITALY

Mr. Nitti,

Secretary

Mr. Trombetti.

JAPAN

Mr. Matsui.

Secretary

Mr. Kawai.

Interpreter: Mr. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

FRANCE

Mr. Cambon,
Mr. Ignace,
Marshal Foch,
Gen. Weygand.

ITALY

Mr. della Torretta,
Colonel Castoldi.

JAPAN

Mr. Sawada.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The agenda comprises the drawing up of the list of guilty persons to be demanded from Germany.

MR. IGNACE: You have given us a double mission: firstly to draw up the list of guilty persons which the Entente is to demand from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles; secondly, to arrive at a settlement concerning the mixed Tribunals which are to judge persons who have been guilty of crimes against nationals of various States. 1. List of Guilty Persons

Each Power prepared a list, which, at the outset, was fairly long. We then proceeded to revise the lists, and arrived at the following result, which we submit for your consideration.

The British Empire	claims	95	guilty persons;
France	“	334	“
Italy	“	29	“
Belgium	“	334	“

Poland	“	51	“	“
Roumania	“	41	“	“
The Serb-Croat-Slovene State claims		4	“	“

amounting to a total of 888 accused persons to be demanded from Germany.

I will point out immediately that from this figure of 888 it will be necessary to deduct certain individual entries which have been made more than once and which amount to 34. The number of accused persons whom we are demanding from Germany under the Treaty of Peace is therefore 854.

Complete agreement has been reached between the Lord Chancellor and myself concerning this figure.

It was decided:

to sanction the list revised by the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Ignace, of guilty persons the surrender of whom will be demanded from Germany, in accordance with Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Council had before it a draft telegram addressed to the French Ambassador at Washington, for transmission to the American Government. (Appendix “A”).

MR. BERTHELOT: Mr. Lloyd George asked that the text of this telegram should be submitted to the Council, in order that it might receive Mr. Nitti’s approval. 2. Telegram to Washington Concerning Russian Affairs

MR. NITTI: I approve of this draft.

MR. MATSUI: Concerning the recognition of Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia, as *de facto* Governments, I must make certain reservations: I have referred the matter to my Government, and am awaiting its instructions.

It was decided:

that Mr. Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference, should address the telegram which figures in Appendix "A" to the French Ambassador at Washington, in the name of the Supreme Council, to be transmitted to the American Government;

Mr. Matsui made reservations with regard to the last paragraph of the said telegram, concerning the recognition of Georgia, Azerbaidjan, and Armenia, as *de facto* Governments.

The Council had before it a Note from the Central Committee for Territorial Questions on the administration of justice in the occupied territory of Western Thrace. (Appendix "B"). 3. Judicial Administration of Thrace

MR. LAROCHE read and commented on this report. He then added:

This draft will not come into force until the Treaty with Bulgaria has been ratified and has itself come into force. In the meantime, it is for the military authorities to take such measures as they shall consider most suitable to satisfy the wishes of the populations.

It was decided:

to approve the draft decision concerning the administration of justice in the occupied territory of Western Thrace, which had been submitted by the Central Committee on Territorial Questions. (Appendix "B").

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I had a visit from Mr. Ador, who expressed his desire to be heard by the Council. He attaches much importance to the explanations which he intends to submit; I therefore ask to receive him. Because of the effect it must have upon national *amour propre*, I think that hearing him can only have good results. 4. Admission of Switzerland to the League of Nations

As far as I could understand, he would like us to settle questions which only the League of Nations can decide. He would like to know, in particular, how the neutrality of Switzerland can be reconciled with its membership in the League of Nations. It is in the interests of his country, gentlemen, that I ask you kindly to hear him. If he asks us definite questions, we will give him equally definite replies, otherwise we will refer him to the League of Nations.

MR. BERTHELOT: The question has already been examined by the Council.¹ Switzerland had sent a memorandum concerning the manner in which her neutrality was to be interpreted.² The Supreme Council then decided to refer the question to the League of Nations. Mr. Ador asks to be heard in order to explain the difficulties which may result for the neutrality of Switzerland through her entry into the League of Nations under the conditions now contemplated.

(Mr. Ador and Mr. Max Huber were admitted.)

MR. ADOR: I thank the Supreme Council for giving me the opportunity of being heard. I apologize for troubling it with a question which it may consider secondary, i. e., that of the neutrality of Switzerland.

For us it is of very great importance. The Federal Council, the Chambers, and the Swiss Nation desire most ardently to be able to join the League; provided, however, that Switzerland still preserves the character which she has possessed from all time, i. e., that of perpetual neutrality granted her in the interests of Europe.

In the Treaty of Peace you have inserted an Article 435, according to which the Powers which are Signatories to the said Treaty recognize afresh, as being in the interests of Europe, the obligations established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, in favor of the recognition of perpetual neutrality for Switzerland. Also, in the Covenant of the League of Nations, an Article 21 has been inserted stating that international agreements for the maintenance of Peace are by no means incompatible with the aim of the League of Nations.

We are therefore confronted with two texts, Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace, drafted and inserted by you, and Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, also inserted in the Treaty of Peace.

These two texts seemed to us to possess unquestionable clearness. No doubt existed in our minds as to the significance and interpretation of this Article. However, the French Government, or rather the Secretariat General of the Conference transmitted to us on January 2, in reply to questions by the Swiss Government concerning the time limit for joining the League of Nations, a Note, which in its second part, after observing that a connection between Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace and Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was being established by a decision of the Federal Chambers, declared that the examination of this question would have to be reserved.^{[3](#)}

This note was the cause of much misgiving in Switzerland; people wondered whether the question of the perpetual neutrality had really been brought once more under discussion, and whether this question, which we had always considered to be finally settled, was not really settled after all. While desiring to join the League of Nations as a perpetually neutral State, you may be sure that Switzerland intends to assume all the duties and responsibilities incumbent on members of the League of Nations. It will be said against us that we are demanding a privileged position.

We are asking to remain what we have been for many centuries, a country which has always pursued a peaceful policy. Situated in the centre of Europe and particularly exposed, our country, by reason both of its position and of its constitution, ought to be and to remain a neutral country; we intend to undertake, at our own risk and peril, to defend and maintain the inviolability of our soil; we will not permit anyone to penetrate into Swiss territory. This is a responsibility which we accept, and which we will fulfill with all the loyalty of which, in this matter Switzerland has always given proof.

We are prepared to accept all the economic consequences of our entry into the League of Nations; and consequently to submit to all collective measures which the League of Nations may impose on its

members; but we ask that it may be recognized that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland excludes the right of passage of troops across her territory.

This is perhaps a somewhat delicate point which it will be necessary to examine, but it is a fundamental article of our Swiss constitutional law, and I am expressing on this point the sentiments of my nation. We could not permit ourselves to be placed once more in the conditions we suffered in 1815, when we were obliged to abandon our neutrality to permit the hostile armies who were pursuing Napoleon, to cross a portion of our territory.

I understand that the Conference cannot give me a reply in this matter today. I did not come here as a petitioner. The question deserves serious consideration. We are being given an extremely short time in which, as an original member, to join the League of Nations. Moreover, we feel that it is entirely to your interest that Switzerland should not remain outside the League; just as we ourselves have a very real interest in joining the League, in order to continue to fulfill the humanitarian and philanthropic duties, which, thanks to our geographical position, we have been able to carry on during this war, and which have been of some service to the various countries.

We are of opinion that Switzerland, if neutral, might be admitted into the League of Nations in the peculiar position of a country that has always been neutral, placed as it is in the centre of Europe, and made up of races speaking different languages—a country which, consequently, can exist owing to its neutrality alone.

We earnestly beg the representatives of the Governments forming the Supreme Council to be good enough to tell us that such was their intention when they recognized the neutrality of Switzerland: and, further, if any special conditions are to be introduced, whether these may be discussed with the Council of the League of Nations. It seems to me, however, that the Council of the League of Nations ought at least to know the intentions of those who signed the Treaty of Peace, for that Council might confront us with the objection that it had not signed the Treaty, and that, consequently, it does not know how the

latter should be interpreted on the matter of the neutrality of Switzerland. That is the delicate point to which I venture to draw your attention.

In a memorandum which I have had the honor, together with my Colleague, Professor Max Huber, to address to all the Representatives of the Powers at the Conference, I developed and set forth with the greatest clearness and extreme frankness the point of view of the Federal Council. We are entirely at the disposal of the Governments represented here, to confer with them amicably and openly on this question. We shall tell them frankly our point of view. We quite understand that you are unable to give us a final reply to this question today, but we wish to draw your attention to the necessity of giving it a speedy settlement, in order that the matter may not arise three weeks or a month hence, after the prescribed time limit for joining the League of Nations has expired.

These, gentlemen, are the observations which I desired to submit.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I have now only to thank Mr. Ador for the statement which he has kindly submitted to us.

(Mr. Ador and Professor Max Huber left the room.)

MR. NITTI: I agree entirely with the considerations which have just been urged.

It seems to me that the neutrality of Switzerland ought to be maintained; from the military and political point of view it is of the greatest interest that this neutrality should be as complete as possible. But the question is a complex one; it does not arise merely from a military point of view, it has also to be considered from an economic point of view. Is it to be admitted that Switzerland, in joining the League of Nations, would be able to take part in an economic blockade? That might determine a limit to punitive measures. What we desire is that Swiss neutrality should remain intact. We have every interest in maintaining it as complete as possible.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: It is a question which must of necessity be examined by the Council of the League of Nations.

MR. LAROCHE: As regards the time limit prescribed for entry into the League of Nations, the opinion of the legal experts may be adopted: according to that the time limit dates from the coming into force of the last Treaty of Peace. In these conditions Switzerland would not have two months in which to join the League of Nations dating from the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles, she would have two months dating from the coming into force of the last Treaty of Peace.

It was decided:

- (1) Questions concerning the entry of Switzerland into the League of Nations, which were stated to the Supreme Council by Mr. Ador, on behalf of the Federal Council, should be referred to the Council of the League of Nations for examination and report:
- (2) in notifying Mr. Ador of this decision, the President of the Conference shall inform him that, in view of the attitude of the Federal Constitution, and in order to facilitate Switzerland's entry into the League of Nations, the Supreme Council admits that for Switzerland only, the period of two months dating from the coming into force of the Covenant, as provided in the Covenant, for entry into the League, shall date not from the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles, but from the coming into force of the last Treaty of Peace containing the Covenant to be signed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. WALLACE: The American Embassy in Paris has received a telegram according to which the General commanding the Roumanian army of occupation in Hungary, has just notified the Interallied Military Mission in Budapest, where there still are a British, a French and an Italian Representative, that, since the Roumanian troops are now east of the Theiss, he desires that the mission will no longer send him direct communications, but that it will address them to Bucharest. This is in contradiction with the orders of the Supreme Council. 5. Affairs of Roumanis and Hungary

The Government of the United States desires, on the other hand, to know what measures were taken by the Supreme Council obliging the Roumanians to effect the evacuation of Hungarian territory according to its orders.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Since we are going to hear the Roumanian President of the Council, the simplest method in order to be certain, would be to ask him the question.

(Mr. Vaida-Voevod, Roumanian President of the Council, and Mr. Cantacuzens were admittted.)

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Before asking you to speak, I have a question to put. We have just received from President Wilson a telegram in which he asks what measures we have taken in order to compel the Roumanians to evacuate Hungarian territory.

May I ask you if you are in a position today to tell us by what date this evacuation will be completed?

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: It is to our interest that these territories be evacuated as soon as possible. In accordance with the obligations which we have undertaken towards the Supreme Council, this evacuation has already begun. If it is not completed it is because we have had to cope with difficulties of a technical nature: we have no locomotives to effect the transport of troops; and we have, further, had great difficulty, at this particular time of the year, in finding shelter for our soldiers.

It is my opinion that the evacuation will still take several weeks.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Can you fix a date for us by which you undertake that the evacuation of Hungarian territories shall be completed?

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: In order to fix a date, I should be obliged to consult our military experts. I think I can say that the evacuation will be completed within a few weeks.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: What do you mean by “a few weeks”?

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I hope that the evacuation will be completed by the 1st of March. But we will make every effort to hasten it as much as possible.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: There is another point to which I wish to call your attention.

The General commanding the Roumanian army in Hungary has notified the Interallied Military Mission in Budapest, which still includes a British, a French, and an Italian Representative, that as he is now east of the Theiss, he desires that the mission should no longer send communications to him direct, but should address them to Bucharest, a request which is in contradiction of the orders given to the mission by the Supreme Council.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I will give proper orders on this matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I wish to say a word on this question. Ever since July we have urgently insisted that the evacuation of Hungary by Roumanian troops must be carried out. This evacuation has always been retarded on account of various difficulties. We are told today that if it cannot be carried out more quickly it is for want of means of transport. The Roumanian army of occupation has, however, been able to find the means of transport to transfer to Roumania the cattle and agricultural implements requisitioned by her. These facts may very well give rise to fresh difficulties between the Roumanians and Hungarians, and cause Roumania to forfeit the sympathies of those who are her best friends, simply on account of the resistance she has so long shown to the desire expressed by the Supreme Council that this evacuation be effected without delay. At present, since their agricultural implements have been taken away, the Hungarian peasants are deprived of the means of working, it is to be feared that they may lose patience and that bloodshed may ensue. If war again broke out it would be regrettable, under these conditions, to think that the responsibility would rest with Roumania, and that consequently, she would not have the sympathy of the western Powers.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I do not wish here to recall the past. My role is to busy myself with the present and to face the future.

I am obliged to state that Roumania was devastated by German and Austro-Hungarian troops, who took away her agricultural implements, and above all her cattle. The trains were not able to take to Germany all the cattle that was stolen. On account of the slowness of means of communication these probably died on the way. Cattle worth fortunes were thus wasted between the Theiss and the Danube. Transylvania, in particular, was the object of systematic requisitioning. All the cattle in that region were taken, on the grounds that such provisions were indispensable for the army.

Roumania possessed locomotives of the latest model: Marshal von Mackensen took possession of these. In these distressing conditions, we had to endure the Bolshevik attacks of Bela Kun, at the time when the Supreme Council was preparing a plan to deal a mortal blow to Bolshevism. The attack which surprised us was extremely violent. In order to resist it the Roumanian army had to fight hard battles. We have to deplore in consequence, the loss of several thousands of men and officers of high rank.

We had to take preventative measures for the future. Unfortunately a misunderstanding between the Supreme Council and Roumania occurred, and it is to avoid enduring in the future the evils which have overwhelmed us in the past, that I ask permission to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to certain definite facts. Admiral Horthy is at present organizing conspiracies not only at Budapest, but on our own territory. He is forming White Guards, at the head of which he is placing officers of the former Magyar and Austro-Hungarian army. These officers have under them officers of lower rank scattered throughout the villages. A veritable net-work of conspiracies has thus been established. At present they are merely at the organizing state, but no secret is made of the fact that next spring they will pass on to action. A plan has already been prepared: it consists of seizing the municipal buildings, stations, and post and telegraph offices.

A fortnight ago we arrested some of the conspirators; officers who served in Karolyi's army. The Allied representatives at Bucharest requested us to set them at liberty. We made no difficulty about that. We thought that they would cease planning conspiracies, but scarcely were they released when they returned to their former activities. The High Command of the Roumanian army is taking measures to guard against all eventualities in this matter, but an attack will most certainly be directed against the Czecho-Slovaks, the Yugoslavs, and the Roumanians in the spring. I consider it a moral duty for the Supreme Council, in the interest of the Great Powers themselves, to take the necessary measures in order that the Magyars shall not attack us after the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

I desire especially to appeal to Mr. Lloyd George and to ask him to show some pity towards the Roumanian peasants. Whilst the Magyar peasant is still fairly well clothed, the Roumanian peasant is deprived of everything. He is overwhelmed with poverty. The German troops took every thing from him. They left only one shirt to each peasant and took away even the children's cradles. The country was literally sacked. No population has suffered so much as the Roumanian population.

If the Magyar peasants rise up, their insurrection will not be due to exorbitant requisitioning inflicted by the German [*Rumanian?*] troops, it will be due to the Bela Kun and the Christian Socialist movements. The Jews are now the victims of the murders and insurrections which take place, but tomorrow the peasants will rise against the landed proprietors, and, if any attempt is made to avoid the application of agrarian reform, they will turn against the Government which refuses them the land. Gentlemen, I do not wish to promise anything which I cannot fulfill. I will give orders for the evacuation of Hungarian territory, and I hope they will be carried out. In conclusion I will repeat once more the urgent request which, at the beginning of these observations, I addressed to the Supreme Council, to take all necessary measures in order that the Czecho-Slovak, Yugo-Slavs, and we ourselves may not become the object of an attack on the part of the Magyars, and in order that our safety may be assured in future.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: You say that you are afraid of being attacked in March; your troops are, however, still in Hungarian territory, which Roumania promised to evacuate. If you were attacked while Roumania was still occupying territory which ought to remain Hungarian, what would you have to complain of? The Hungarians will employ all imaginable means in their attempts to drive you from it, and they will be entirely within their rights in so doing.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: Perhaps the Hungarian offensive will begin in this manner, but there is no doubt but that the Hungarians will subsequently try to invade territories which have been assigned by the Treaty of Peace either to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Roumanians, or the Yugo-Slavs. Besides, the Roumanian troops were received with much enthusiasm when they entered Hungary, for the people considered that we had delivered them from the Bolshevists.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: You are not entirely answering Mr. Lloyd George's remark, who states that you are occupying these territories in spite of the Conference. For many months past you have promised to evacuate; in not keeping your promise, you are affording your enemies a pretext for aggression. That is the opinion of the Conference, and I can do nothing in the matter. You say, "It will be understood, etc." It is not a question of understanding, it is a question of preventing the aggression of which you may be the victim.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: We shall withdraw our troops.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Let it be as soon as possible! If you desire the support of the Conference, your troops must be withdrawn without delay from Hungarian territory.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: We shall do so as soon as possible; and then it will be necessary for you to help us.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The danger will be far less than if war were to ensue because the Roumanian troops remained in Hungary, and the Allies were therefore unable to show for Roumania the sympathy which, in other circumstances, they would have shown.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We are well aware that you, gentlemen, are not responsible for this state of affairs, but your attitude is of the greatest importance as regards Roumania: by your actions you will either keep or forfeit the sympathy of the Conference.

If it is the desire of the Council, the incident shall be considered closed, and the Roumanian President of the Council shall speak to us on the subject of Bessarabia. I will now ask him to speak, but he must not forget that the Conference has already come to a decision on that subject.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: The Conference has in theory come to a decision on this subject, which I have not forgotten; it has recognized Roumania's right to annex Bessarabia, but, without desiring to weary you with a long statement, I should like to ask the Conference to ensure the realization of that decision. 6. Question of Bessarabia

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Yes, but you must understand that your position is a false one: you do not carry out certain decisions of the Conference while you ask it to carry out others. I know you are not personally responsible for this. I have explained to you the state of mind of the Conference.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: After the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, the frontiers of Roumania on the Bessarabian side will be finally determined. The population of Bessarabia has decided to join Roumania, a decision which was proclaimed for the third time by the deputies appointed at the last elections, without distinction of speech, race or nationality; on December 29, 1919, they all voted for union with the mother country. The Conference has virtually recognized this state of affairs, but it has not actually proclaimed it, and our position is difficult in consequence since we are neighbors of the Bolsheviks and have to live, not to philosophize. Bolshevik ideas were spread among us, especially recently, by Russians who fled from Odessa when the Bolsheviks again approached that town. We offered them generous hospitality, but we could not distinguish among the refugees those who were Bolsheviks and those who were not. The Conference has not yet fully granted us Bessarabia and, if the Russians advance still more, the population will be in a state of

great uncertainty. Some people among them are in favor of the Bolsheviks because they hope to render impossible the execution of the agrarian reform begun by us. Moreover, there are Roumanian priests who were brought up at Kiev and who long for the old regime which gave them a position privileged in comparison with that which they now have: they are pro-Russian agents. Such a state of affairs cannot come to an end until you recognize that Bessarabia must be joined to Roumania; until then it will be impossible to restore order in that part of our territory.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Will you kindly summarize what you ask of us?

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: We have summarized our requests in a note which I have ventured to transmit to the Conference. We want the Conference to recognize the union of Bessarabia with Roumania *de jure*.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Have we not already done so?

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: Yes, but that was at the time when it was still hoped that Kolchak would defeat the Bolsheviks. That was some time ago, but if now the Conference would proclaim the union of Bessarabia with Roumania, the result would be a legal position on which we could base the restoration of order.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: It is not the defeat of Kolchak which prevents us from giving you satisfaction, but it is your disobedience of the unanimous wishes of the Conference. First of all we want the evacuation of those territories which are not given to you by the Treaty of Peace and you talk of postponing the evacuation of Hungary once more for a month or six weeks. That is what troubles us, although we are in agreement in principle.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: We will carry out that evacuation in the shortest possible time.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: You say so, but we have been awaiting your evacuation for months: I am explaining to you the difficulty by which we are confronted.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: The two questions should not be connected, since the Magyars attacked us.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: But you disobeyed the Conference from the very beginning. I know that is not in the least your fault and I should like to satisfy you. Only a short time ago we were agreed not to give you Bessarabia because you constantly disobeyed the Conference. Now our opinions are different, but we cannot reply unconditionally to your request; we are obliged to defer our reply because you yourselves deferred evacuation.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: Sir, I undertake to wire this very day ordering evacuation as soon as possible.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Please believe that I am not hostile to you—quite the contrary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We cannot grant you what you ask if, when we take a decision in your favor, you accept it, but when we take a decision which is not beneficial to Roumania, Roumania resists.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: The engagement which we have taken to carry out the decision of the Conference shall, I assure you, be fulfilled.

The present Roumanian Government cannot be punished for the faults of the former regimes.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We want to help, not to punish you.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I will give the order for evacuation in conditions which are considered practicable by the Conference, but I cannot give a promise which I might be unable to keep.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The Conference is in sympathy with your cause, but it has been hindered by your predecessor for two years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We are convinced of your intention to evacuate Hungary, but we think you may be faced by certain difficulties from the military party and we think the military party would be more willing to obey the order of the Conference to evacuate Hungary

immediately if you said to them: "The Conference is waiting our evacuation of Hungary before deciding that Bessarabia shall be definitely Roumanian."

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I thank you with all my heart. From that I conclude that the Conference will acknowledge our claim to Bessarabia from the day evacuation is effected. I may say that?

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We cannot now say that we undertake to recognize your right: we can only say that we are going to discuss it as soon as you have evacuated Hungary.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: That does not give me the moral support which I require.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I would willingly go further than Mr. Lloyd George: in my name, and I think I can say in the name of France, I can state that we are prepared to recognize Roumania's right to Bessarabia.

(Mr. Miller and made a sign of assent.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: As Mr. Berthelot pointed out, the Commission on Roumanian Affairs, on which all the Powers are represented, has unanimously decided to attribute Bessarabia to Roumania. That is the actual position.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We are all sincere in this matter.

MR. VAIDA-VOEVOD: Gentlemen, I thank you for the great concession you have granted me; I will do my best to ensure the evacuation of Hungarian territories as soon as possible and also the settlement of the question of Bessarabia.

(Mr. Vaida-Voevod and Mr. Cantacuzens withdrew.)

The Council took note of the statements of Mr. Vaida-Voevod; it acknowledged that, although it had as yet come to no decision as to

the attribution of Bessarabia and could not do so until Roumania had carried out the orders of the Conference in Hungary, the Commission on Roumanian Affairs was unanimously of opinion that this territory should be attributed to Roumania.

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand were introduced.)

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I have before me a proposal from Mr. Patek, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, which raises the question of the defence of Poland against the Bolsheviks. Mr. Patek proposes to refer this question to the Military Committee at Versailles, of which Marshal Foch is Chairman. 7. Defence of Poland Against the Bolsheviks

I suppose nobody has any objections to make?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: This letter was not communicated to me.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Mr. Berthelot will have it circulated.

MARSHAL FOCH: Our plans are upset by the absence of nine English battalions destined for the plebiscite territories. We will attempt to find a means of remedying the situation. The first question, I will ask is the following: Can Italy undertake to supply some troops in place of the English battalions? 8. Occupation of Plebiscite Zones

MR. NITTI: For the time being I can give no undertaking.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Mr. Lloyd George, you and I discussed this matter yesterday. As England cannot supply the number of men we counted upon, we discussed the question as to whether Italy and France could make up the deficit. Marshal Foch was not there. It was a matter of no less than five battalions for us, which is a great deal. There are eleven battalions short: England was to have supplied one, Italy five, and France five. I am afraid that is more than we can give.

MARSHAL FOCH: In view of the absence of ten English battalions, there are questions of principle which I ask leave to submit to the assembled Governments.

The most serious question is that of Dantzig. Dantzig was to have received four battalions, including two English and one American. These are missing: only one French battalion remains. To occupy a large town with only one French battalion is very dangerous.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Could we not send one or two supplementary battalions?

MARSHAL FOCH: We have not got them. In these circumstances I ask the Governments whether they could not consider this solution: send only one battalion to Dantzig, but on condition that we keep Polish troops near at hand so as to appeal to them in case of need. Those Polish troops would not occupy Dantzig, but they could enter it in case of necessity.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: What do you mean by “near at hand”?

MARSHAL FOCH: On the borders of Dantzig territory.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: While I am here, I should prefer that we make an effort, which I think could be made, to send French troops instead of bringing Polish troops to some station near at hand: that would create difficulties of which we cannot at present foresee the consequences. When must Dantzig be occupied?

MARSHAL FOCH: The first troops must leave on the 27th of this month. To send one single French battalion to Dantzig is, I repeat, very unwise.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I propose that two battalions are taken from the 40,000 men guarding German prisoners. The Polish solution you suggested is dangerous, not from the military, but from other points of view. That is my opinion, but I believe that the President of the Council, who is to succeed me tomorrow, shares it.

MR. MILLERAND: Certainly.

MR. NITTI: For my part, I will do all I can.

MARSHAL FOCH: Even if two battalions are taken from the prisoners' guard, they will not be ready for some time yet.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I do not ask you to perform a miracle, I ask you to do what you can.

MARSHAL FOCH: If in a fortnight's time there should be firing at Dantzig, we shall run a great risk.

The same question arises in the case of Silesia. We ought to have a total of 18 battalions there. As the English and American battalions are lacking, six French battalions and 3 Italian remain, i. e. 9 instead of 18. If absolutely necessary, that might be sufficient, on condition that we renounce the occupation of Teschen, which is quite close.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: That is impossible: it would mean civil war at Teschen.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many battalions were there to have been at Teschen?

MARSHAL FOCH: Three: one French, one Italian and one American.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Are three battalions required at Teschen?

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The Americans are lacking.

GENERAL WEYGAND: If we had had 18 battalions in Silesia, we should have been able to do without the Americans at Teschen, keeping only two battalions there; if anything serious had happened at Teschen, we should have appealed to the troops in Silesia. But now that the troops in Silesia are practically reduced to nothing, we cannot count any more on those actually there.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I think if there is one French and one Italian battalion at Teschen, that is quite sufficient.

GENERAL WEYGAND: The position of Teschen has not changed, but we asked that the troops provided for Teschen might be sent to Silesia. The Chairman of the Governing Commission of Silesia will be

responsible for maintaining order in Silesia with a reduced number of nine battalions instead of 18. That is extremely difficult. The question is to know whether the Chairman of the Silesian Commission will undertake the responsibility.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: You must confer on this subject with General Le Rond. It is not for us to take decisions of a purely military nature. If, after conferring with General Le Rond, Marshal Foch says it is impossible, we shall be obliged to find another solution.

GENERAL WEYGAND: General Le Rond is Chairman of the Governing Commission. In this capacity his mission is not military: he is undertaking the government of Silesia. It is by chance that this government has been entrusted to a soldier.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: There is a Governing Interallied Commission which is going to administer Silesia. Its Chairman is General Le Rond. It was arranged that he was to have 18 battalions at his disposal. This number is reduced to nine. If the Commission says: "I undertake to administer Silesia with 9 battalions", I will let them do it; but if it says that it cannot do so, I for my part cannot impose that responsibility on it. What is the opinion of the Commission?

MARSHAL FOCH: I have not consulted it. I therefore request that there may be a meeting this very evening between the Chairmen of the Commissions, the representatives of the Governments and the Allied military representatives to decide whether the Commissions for plebiscite districts and Dantzig can perform their duties with this reduced force.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I should like this question to be settled as soon as possible and the heads of Governments to be informed this very evening of the conclusions of this meeting, so that Mr. Nitti, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Millerand or myself may consider the matter.

GENERAL WEYGAND: Each Delegation should appoint a diplomatic or political representative, since political questions are concerned, and a military representative. They should also be able to consult the heads of the Governing Commissions.

MR. BERTHELOT: All the troops provided for Upper Silesia are not required immediately, for the difficulties of maintaining order will begin with the plebiscite operations themselves. That is not immediate. Now the two battalions at present at Teschen will be free within three months at the latest; they could then be sent to Upper Silesia. I think this consideration, which is one side of the question, should be taken into account.

GENERAL WEYGAND: An officer who has returned from Silesia states that the Germans are still retaining their troops in all the territories which must be evacuated under the Treaty. Difficulties may arise on that score.

MR. BERTHELOT: We can expect some violation of the Treaty by the Germans everywhere. We must not forget that, but, on the other hand, we need not think that they will inevitably take place everywhere. I know the documents to which you have just referred. I do not think them convincing; the Germans have often made attempts of that kind which have come to nothing.

GENERAL WEYGAND: According to the agreements signed with the Germans, they must evacuate territories on the arrival of our troops. If we cannot send the troops on which we are counting, the Germans may consider those territories unoccupied. Will the Chairmen of the Governing Commissions accept this responsibility? We must know their opinions.

MR. BERTHELOT: They will give their opinion this evening.

MARSHAL FOCH: The meeting of the Chairmen of the Commissions and the delegates of each Government might take place at four o'clock.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Have you any other communications to make?

MARSHAL FOCH: At Memel there is only one battalion left. Is that enough in a port like Memel? Moreover, there is no governor at Memel.

MR. BERTHELOT: It was said that the governor would be the officer commanding the troops. It may be the head of the French battalion as it was formerly the English officer.

MARSHAL FOCH: No, it was an English general. The head of an English battalion would not be enough there.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Send them an officer of high rank.

MR. BERTHELOT: There is no great danger of disturbances or violence at Memel.

MARSHAL FOCH: There are no troops left in Allenstein. Allenstein was to have been occupied by the English. Is it still to be occupied?

MR. BERTHELOT: The Germans have discussed the occupation of Allenstein. It was not in the Treaty. The matter was entirely forgotten.

MARSHAL FOCH: There is only one Italian battalion at Marienwerder, but that is sufficient.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I do not know what conclusions will be reached at the meeting this evening. They should be communicated immediately to the heads of Governments in order that a practical conclusion may be reached. The heads of Governments should also meet this evening or tomorrow morning at the latest to adopt resolutions.

MR. NITTI: Unfortunately I have to leave for Italy this evening at 8 o'clock, on account of urgent business.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We will meet at six o'clock.

It was decided:

- (1) that in the afternoon Marshal Foch should preside over a Committee composed of political and military representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments together with the Chairmen of the Governing Commissions of Marienwerder,

Allenstein, Upper Silesia, and Teschen and with the Allied representative at Dantzig, in order to examine whether it would be possible to ensure the administration of the said territories with reduced forces, in view of the temporary withdrawal of the British contingents;

(2) That the Supreme Council would meet at 6 p.m. to examine the report of that Committee.

MR. NITTI: Before the meeting rises, I must make a statement with regard to the Adriatic question. We hope, for the sake of the peace of Europe, that this question will be settled as soon as possible. Unfortunately, a solution has not been reached up to the present. 9. Question of the Adriatic

In those circumstances, I must make the following statement:

“His Majesty’s Government, being desirous of reaching an equitable solution of the Adriatic question in the general interest, has made proposals and accepted counter-proposals extending to the uttermost limit the concessions compatible with the vital interests of Italy.

“During the course of negotiations, the Allies have had occasion to observe the extent of the spirit of conciliation and sacrifice shown by Italy.

“In spite of this, the efforts she has made to reach an agreement have constantly failed owing to the absolutely uncompromising spirit of the Jugo-Slav aspirations.

“Consequently, after noting with regret the impossibility of reaching a conclusion, the Italian Delegation feels compelled to declare that it considers all concessions made during the long negotiations as of no effect and null and void.

“In these circumstances, the Treaty of London of 1915⁴ must be carried into full effect.”

MR. CLEMENCEAU: As President of the Conference, I am obliged to say that this seems to me quite impossible under present circumstances, inasmuch as it is at variance with procedure we have already adopted.

In agreement with Mr. Nitti, we have requested a reply from the Serbian Government: This reply has not yet reached us, owing to the interruption of the telegraph wires; it does not, therefore, seem possible for the Italian Government to withdraw the concessions it has made without at the same time injuring most seriously both itself and the Conference. The impossibility of an agreement cannot be stated until that becomes evident from the Serbian reply. To postulate one now would throw upon you a heavy responsibility in the eyes of all Europe, owing to the consequences which might be entailed by a rupture of the Conference on this point. I am certain I express the opinion of all the members of the Council when I invite Mr. Nitti to prolong his stay in Paris for a few hours, until the arrival of the Serbian reply.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I join in the appeal made by the President. Negotiations once before reached a point at which agreement seemed very probable. Then an incident occurred which caused keen feeling on both sides. Mr. Orlando decided to leave for Rome; Mr. Clemenceau and I besought him not to go; we told him that, if he went to Rome, there would be popular manifestations which would render it impossible for him to accept concessions which might otherwise have been possible. I believe there were members of the Italian Delegation who shared this opinion. Nevertheless, Mr. Orlando left; if he had left 45 hours later with the solution of the affair in his pocket, all would be finished today.

No doubt it is presumptuous of me to discuss what should be done with regard to the opinion of a foreign nation, but I cannot do otherwise than support what Mr. Clemenceau has just said. I do not think it reasonable for Mr. Nitti to leave before being certain that the Serbs will not accept the proposed solution; that would merely be fanning the flames; unless other urgent reasons compel Mr. Nitti to leave Paris this very evening, we beg him to prolong his visit a little.

MR. BERTHELOT: On Saturday we were given to hope that we should have the reply this afternoon. That assurance is rather doubtful, in view of the state of communications, but it is not the fault of the Serbs.

Moreover, we have received a telegram of January 16 from our agent at Belgrade, according to which the President of the Serbian Council accepted the proposed arrangement, save for two or three points; the opinion was conciliatory.

MR. NITTI: I think, Sir, there is a misunderstanding. I did not say that I was leaving the Conference because I was not in agreement with the Serbs; I said quite clearly that I was returning to Italy for domestic reasons. Since six o'clock this morning we have had a railway strike; a reduced service will run, but I think that my presence is necessary. This movement is not only of interest to Italy; its bearing is more general, it is only beginning with Italy: it is therefore to the interest of all the Allied countries that a solution should be reached as soon as possible. I have no desire to break with the Jugo-Slavs; I have always considered the Jugo-Slav question with the utmost impartiality and in quite a friendly spirit, but we cannot exceed the limits of the concessions we have made. If I went beyond that, I should no longer be master of the situation. If the Serbs approve of the conditions which you yourselves approved, I am at the disposal of the Conference, but the situation must not be prolonged, otherwise we shall fall back upon the provisions of the Treaty of London.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The result of what you have just said is that for the moment your note is null and void: they must accept or not accept, there is no middle course.

MR. NITTI: We have made the last concession we can; if, while awaiting a solution, the Serbs were to quibble—excuse this expression—and prolong the present state of things, the result would be general embarrassment for us, for themselves, and for the Conference.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: In short, the concessions made by Italy are still open?

MR. NITTI: Yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We have already said that, if negotiations fail, we will carry out the Treaty of London, and we said it not only to the Italian Premier, but also to Mr. Trumbich and Mr. Pachich: consequently, the Serbs know perfectly well what are the intentions of France and Great Britain.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We are in agreement.

The meeting adjourned at 1:15 p.m.

Appendix A to ICP-22

[Draft Telegram Addressed to the French Ambassador at Washington for Transmission to the American Government]

FRENCH AMBASSADOR, *Washington*.

I beg you to submit to the American Government, on the part of the Peace Conference, the following telegram.

The overthrow of Admiral Koltchak and General Denikin has led the Allied Governments to again take up the Russian question as it is now evident that the attempt, supported up to the present time by the Allies, to overthrow the Bolshevik regime by anti-Bolshevik forces has definitely failed.

After attentive examination the Allies have decided upon the two following conclusions:

In the first place, after having heard the Representatives of the Russian Cooperative Societies, which are the only organizations which have survived the Bolshevik efforts at destruction and which have a membership of 25,000,000 persons, they have decided to permit the free exchange of the products necessary for the Russian peasants, to be obtained in Allied countries, on condition that grain,

flax, skins, and other raw products to be found in Russia, be received in exchange. The Allies have been advised by the Representatives of the Russian Cooperative Societies that last year's corn crop in southern Russia established a record and that enormous quantities of food stuffs and other raw products are available for exportation if the necessary transportation facilities can be obtained, and if merchandise could be shipped to Russia in exchange for which the peasants would be disposed to surrender their products. These food stuffs are absolutely necessary in Europe in order to meet the acute food shortage which is the principal encouragement to Bolshevism in the West. The Russian Cooperative Societies are also convinced that the most efficient action which could be taken against the Bolsheviks is to put these commercial exchanges into operation. These Cooperatives point out that it is possible for a Government in time of war to deprive the population of many of the conveniences of life, but that, on the other hand, as soon as the pressure of the state of war ceases to be felt, the population will act on its Government in order that the sale of its products, and the purchase, in exchange, of clothing, shoes, machinery, etc., may be rendered possible. Now that the defeat of Koltchak and Denikin has robbed the Bolsheviks of the argument that they are fighting for the defense of the revolution and the protection of peasant property, the pressure exercised by the Bolsheviks, to end the state of war, restore normal conditions, and abandon the measures of repression which have no other justification than the state of war itself, will be infinitely strengthened. In the opinion of the Allies the reorganization of Commerce is the best means of destroying the extremist forms of Bolshevism in Russia itself.

The projected exchange of products will not involve any negotiations between the Allied Governments and the Government of the Soviets, nor the recognition of the Bolsheviks, nor the authorization for Bolshevik Representatives to enter the Allied countries. It will only imply a grant of facilities, by which the Cooperatives, which, for some time, have had organizations in the capitals of Europe, will be placed in a position to organize these exchanges of products with the Allied countries. This plan will naturally make it necessary for the Cooperatives to secure the consent and the assistance of the Soviet authorities, especially in the matter of transportation, but, for the

reasons which have already been presented, it is thought that internal pressure will be strong enough to compel them to give their assent. With reference to the preceding, the United States are not directly concerned as they have never participated in the blockade, and, in consequence, the Allied Governments do not doubt but what the Government of the United States will fully approve this decision.

The second conclusion reached by the Allied Governments is that they must declare themselves as having arrived at an agreement, in so far as the future is concerned, by which they will observe a policy of non-intervention in affairs within the boundaries of Russia, but that they have recognized the independence of the neighboring States, to the list of which has just been added Georgia, Azerbaidjan, and Armenia, and that in the eventuality that the Bolsheviks would refuse to make peace with these States and would attempt to infringe on the independence of the said communities by force, the Allies would accord these States the fullest support in their power. The Allied Governments are very desirous of knowing whether the Government of the United States is disposed to concur in this policy.⁵

Appendix B to ICP-22

JANUARY 20, 1920.

Note From the Central Committee on Territorial Questions to the Supreme Council Relative to the Administration of Justice in the Occupied Territory of Western Thrace

The Central Committee on Territorial Questions has established, in accord with the Drafting Committee, a plan of statutes, hereto annexed, as to the organization of the judicial administration in the occupied territory of Western Thrace.

In submitting this plan, the members of the Central Committee unanimously recommend it for the approval of the Supreme Council.

[Annex]

Plan of Statutes Submitted by the General, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in the East, Relative to the Administration of Justice in the Occupied Territory of Western Thrace

JANUARY 15, 1920.

The General, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East, acting in compliance with the powers conferred on him,

In view of Decree No. 1, of October 28, 1919, relative to the temporary administration of the occupied territory of Western Thrace.

Decree:

ARTICLE 1

In civil matters, justice will be administered in the occupied territories of Western Thrace, in conformity with the local law, and in the name of the Law, by:

- (1) The Justices of the Peace, established in the town of each district;
- (2) The Central Tribunal, with headquarters at Gümüldjina;
- (3) The Court of Appeals, with headquarters at Gümüldjina;
- (4) Lastly, the Religious Tribunals now functioning.

ARTICLE 2

The Justices of the Peace personnel shall include:

One judge only;
A clerk;
One or more sworn interpreters.

This personnel will be nominated by the Governor General.

ARTICLE 3

The Justice of the Peace will have jurisdiction over the entire District. He will be competent to deal initially in the Lower Court

with cases involving sums as high as 3,000 Levas, and finally in the Lower and Higher Courts with cases as high as 1,000 Levas.

ARTICLE 4

The Central Tribunal will be composed as follows:

- (1) One President and two Judges; all three to be nominated by the General, Commander-in-Chief, on the recommendation of the Governor General, and chosen from among the local population; but to be of different nationalities;
- (2) One Chief Clerk of the Court and one or more interpreters, nominated by the Governor;

One or two assistant judges may be nominated. These nominations will be effected under the same conditions as those of the President and the Judges.

ARTICLE 5

The Jurisdiction of the Central Tribunal will extend over all the occupied territory of Western Thrace. The Tribunal will be authorized to deal with:

- (1) Appeals from judgments rendered by the Justices of the Peace in the Lower Court, and appeals on decisions rendered by the administration in fiscal matters;
- (2) Initially, on appeal, all litigations in which the amount involved does not exceed 10,000 Levas;
- (3) Initially, all litigations in which the amount involved exceeds 10,000 Levas.

ARTICLE 6

The Court of Appeals shall be composed of:

- (1) A President, named by the General, Commander-in-Chief, and chosen from among the French Magistrates;
- (2) Two Counsellors, chosen from among the British and Italian Drogmen of the British and Italian Diplomatic Missions to

Constantinople, and named by the General, Commander-in-Chief, on the recommendation of the British and Italian Governments.

ARTICLE 7

The Court of Appeals will examine the appeals from judgments rendered, initially, by the Central Tribunal, and complaints formulated for violations of the law against decisions of the Justices of the Peace and the Central Tribunal, rendered initially or on appeal.

ARTICLE 8

The functions of the State Attorney shall be exercised before the Central Tribunal and the Court of Appeals by an Officer, appointed by the General, Commander-in-Chief, on the nomination by the Governor.

ARTICLE 9

The Religious Tribunals now existing shall retain their present composition and their present attribution.

ARTICLE 10

All decisions of the Justices of the Peace, of the Central Tribunal, and the Court of Appeals, shall be drawn up in French, and in the language the most commonly used on the spot.

ARTICLE 11

Regarding repressive measures, justice shall be rendered by the French Military authorities, in conformity with the French Military Code.

ARTICLE 12

During the period of occupation, the right of Consular jurisdiction shall be recognized by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

and these Rights shall continue to be exercised by the Consuls of the other Powers as now accepted.

¹ HD–117, minute 5, p. 675 [*Pg. 675 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*]; HD–120, minute 5, p. 728 [*Pg. 728 is part of [Doc. 36](#)*].

² Appendix D to HD–117, p. 681 [*Pg. 681 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].

³ Appendix D to HD–120, p. 737 [*Pg. 737 is part of [Doc. 36](#)*].

⁴ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915*.

⁵ For the attitude of the United States Government with respect to the proposal of the Supreme Council, see telegram No. 483, March 6, 1920, 11 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, [Foreign Relations, 1920, vol. III, p. 703](#) .

January 20, 6:30 p.m. (ICP–23)

[\[50\] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 20, 1920, at 6:30 p.m.](#)

Paris, January 20, 1920, 6:30 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/10

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/10

ICP-23

[Document 50]

**Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai
d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 20, 1920, at 6:30
p.m.**

Paris, January 20, 1920, 6:30 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretaries

Mr. Harrison,
Mr. Winthrop.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Lloyd George,
Lord Curzon.

Secretaries

Sir Maurice Hankey,
Mr. Leeper.

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau,
Mr. Millerand.

Secretaries

Mr. Dutasta,
Mr. Berthelot,
Mr. Massigli.

ITALY

Mr. Nitti

Secretary

Mr. Trombetti.

JAPAN

Mr. Matsui

Secretary
Mr. Kawai.

Interpreter: Mr. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN
Field-Marshal Wilson
Mr. Wise.

FRANCE
Mr. Cambon,
Marshal Foch,
Gen. Weygand,
Gen. Le Rond,
Mr. Laroche,
Mr. Hermite.

ITALY
Mr. de Martino,
Gen. Cavallero,
Vice-Adl. Grassi,
Col. Castoldi,
Mr. della Torretta.

JAPAN
Mr. Sawada.

GENERAL WEYGAND read the report prepared by the Committee charged with examining anew the situation as regarded the troops to be sent to plebiscite areas. (See Appendix "A"). 1. Allied Contingents in plebiscite Areas

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I suggest that the best course would probably be to examine each article of the report in turn.

If I understood Mr. Berthelot aright, he explained to us this morning that at Teschen the plebiscite would be terminated within three months and that we might then send to Upper Silesia the two battalions, one French and one Italian, provided for Teschen. Would this not be a first satisfaction?

MARSHAL FOCH: Yes, in three months.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Mr. Berthelot also told us at the same time that during the next three months, and also because the plebiscite was still rather far off, there would perhaps be no need to reinforce the troops in Silesia, at least not as much as contemplated.

MR. BERTHELOT: I still think that the greatest need for troops will present itself in the period when the plebiscite takes place, in order to prevent any pressure by the Germans. As a matter of fact, General Le Rond is more competent than I to reply on that point, as he is President of the Government Commission and will thus have all responsibility on the spot.

GENERAL LE ROND: From the information at hand concerning the German occupation, the German forces have varied from 60,000 to 100,000 men. At the present time the occupation is maintained by 35,000 men, all the reductions we demanded having been made. The plan of occupation of these 35,000 men corresponds with the holding of points which it is necessary to occupy with troops. By reducing the number of troops which are indispensable in order to hold all these points, we arrived at the quota of British, Italian and French troops contemplated, while taking into account the deduction that we had to make of four British battalions it was originally intended to send. Should, however, the three British battalions be in default, we shall not be able to occupy all the principal industrial centres, railroad crossings and cities which it is indispensable to hold.

From the political standpoint, according to information which we received yesterday, the Germans wish to be ready for any emergency. But I do not know whether they will try to rise now or later. At any rate, they have prepared to take advantage of the first opportunity offered: and they will find it in the reduction of our forces. Therefore, from the military, as well as from the political standpoint, a reduction of Allied troops in Upper Silesia is rather dangerous. I would add that the Germans have already learnt in the course of negotiations, which took place between December 20th and January

10th, the number of troops contemplated; any reduction of these numbers will therefore have certain repercussions in Upper Silesia.

My colleagues on the Commission have left, one for London, the other for Rome. I am now alone to represent them here, but I believe I can speak in their name and say that they consider, as I do, that it is advisable to maintain the number of troops provided for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It is obviously very unfortunate that, the first time a matter of execution of the Treaty occurs, we should be forced to abstain. I need not explain here why we are obliged to act as we are doing.

This being said, we believe that we shall be able to satisfy the proposals of Marshal Foch concerning the first point; we could send small Naval forces to Memel and Dantzig; I do not think that would offer any difficulty.

On the other hand, after a conversation on the subject with my Chief of Staff, I have arrived at the conclusion that it might be possible for Great Britain, by a special effort, to send two battalions into Germany; that will always help the situation a little.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: That would make three battalions, counting the one which has already left.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Quite so. If it is difficult to find troops to occupy and garrison those plebiscite areas, it would be well first of all to look to the most important areas.

I feel with General Le Rond that the most important point for the time being is Upper Silesia. We are going to have difficulties there not only from the Germans, but also, I believe, from the Poles whose feelings are running very high—an observation which only tends to strengthen General Le Rond's argument.

On the other hand, there does not seem to be the same necessity for occupying the areas of Allenstein and Marienwerder; those are quiet districts, occupied by an agricultural population, and there will be no need there of strong measures to maintain order. I will even add that

these territories are principally German and I have never very well understood the necessity of holding a plebiscite there.

To summarize, my proposal is as follows: Great Britain will furnish Naval forces asked for at Memel and Dantzig; she will furnish two battalions of infantry for the occupation of the plebiscite areas, thus raising the number of battalions from one to three. Lastly, should the Allies find it inconvenient to occupy all of these territories, they will abstain in the cases of Allenstein and Marienwerder.

MARSHAL FOCH: A matter of principle is involved. According to the provisions of the Treaty, we take possession of these two districts, and I believe that we therefore must occupy them. The Germans are evacuating them as the Treaty obliges them to. How shall we take possession if we do not occupy them?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Why not be satisfied, instead of sending a battalion to Allenstein and another to Marienwerder, with sending to those districts an Allied Commission?

MARSHAL FOCH: Either we must execute the Treaty, or say that we do not intend to carry out its terms. But in order to carry out the occupation it is not possible to draw upon the other detachments which are already insufficient.

Yesterday Great Britain withdrew nearly all of her contribution in troops to this whole task of occupation: today she gives us two battalions, making three in all, and then tells us to do the best we can. I am quite willing, but when I met the Presidents of the Commissions, these declared that, of the nine battalions promised but not forthcoming, six would have to be found. Of these six here then are two; we have therefore, still to find four. I will ask whether Italy and France can themselves furnish these four battalions.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We were nearly agreed this morning to make a great temporary effort for two battalions; I will now ask Mr. Nitti to be good enough also to give us two. I cannot believe that Italy does not recognize the necessity of this effort and that she is unable to

lend us two thousand men. In this way the question would be solved, or very nearly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The Treaty does not state that the districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder should be occupied by troops. A Commission must take possession of them, supported, if occasion demand, by detachments.

GENERAL WEYGAND: The Treaty clearly states—for Marienwerder—that the Commission shall be supported by troops if it is thought necessary; but there has certainly been an oversight in the case of Allenstein; there is no question of troops. But the Supreme Council itself has decided¹ that where, under the provisions of the Treaty, German sovereignty in those territories disappears, and a Commission takes over the government, the latter should be supported by troops; it had been naturally thought that one could not send Allied Commissions into those territories without having them accompanied by contingents for the maintenance of order. Otherwise these Commissions would have to rely on German troops.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The remark just made by General Weygand seems to me very important. We cannot send an Allied Commission to those territories and allow it to depend on German troops to maintain order.

I must then ask Mr. Nitti to be good enough to accede to my request. Great Britain has great need of her troops for reasons we know: she is giving two battalions, so are we, although we also are confronted with extreme difficulties. I ask Italy then to furnish two battalions also.

MR. NITTI: We have before us a general question and a special one. From the general point of view, I believe it is necessary that all the Entente countries should be represented in the occupation of the plebiscite territories, were it only for the moral effect. On the special question of Italian participation, before I can accede to Mr. Clemenceau's request I must ask him to wait until I have returned to Italy and studied the effectives at my disposal.

I would also point out that we have promised to send five battalions, and that an Italian contains more men than an Allied battalion. If, I am then able to make an effort, you may be convinced that I will do so; but I would beg of you to wait.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: When does Mr. Nitti think he can give us a reply?

MR. NITTI: Friday, probably.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: What is Marshal Foch's opinion?

MARSHAL FOCH: I conclude that we have not got the number of men to have the Treaty executed. We are not meeting our obligations. I would ask Mr. Nitti whether he maintains the reservation made by Mr. de Martino by reason of Italy's situation?

MR. NITTI: I have just promised to reply next Friday.

MARSHAL FOCH: Even concerning the battalions on which the agreement has been arrived at?

MR. NITTI: We are agreed on the five battalions which have been promised; I am only speaking of the two additional battalions which we have been asked for.

MARSHAL FOCH: When shall we have the British battalions?

SIR HENRY WILSON: We shall agree on that.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Is this solution satisfactory?

MARSHAL FOCH: Practically, on condition that the hopes which have just been expressed shall be realized.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We shall keep our word; so will Great Britain; and we hope we shall have a formal promise from Italy on Friday.

It was decided:

- (1) that Great Britain should furnish in order to occupy the plebiscite areas, two battalions besides one battalion intended for the occupation of Schleswig; also that she should send sufficient Naval forces to Dantzig and Memel;
- (2) in order to replace the seven other British battalions originally provided for, French should furnish two additional battalions, and Italy would make every effort to furnish two battalions;
- (3) that the distribution of these battalions in the areas to be occupied should be made by the Interallied Military Commission presided over by Marshal Foch.

MARSHAL FOCH: I wish to call the attention of the Council to Mr. von Lersner's note dated January 19, 1920 (See Appendix "B"). The head of the German Delegation declares that his Government throws on the Allies all responsibility for the damage which may follow any delay to take place in the transfer of Allied troops. Any modification in the dispositions already taken would involve our responsibility. 2. Functioning of Delimitation Commissions

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Are you of the opinion that we should take this responsibility? If we have troops there, we are responsible.

MARSHAL FOCH: Yes, *if* those troops are there.

GENERAL WEYGAND: Then read the draft reply prepared by him as contained in Appendix "C".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I approve the draft.

MR. NITTI: I agree.

It was decided:

that the President of the Peace Conference should send to the Head of the German Delegation the letter contained in Appendix "C", in reply to his note of January 19, 1920.

MR. BERTHELOT summarized the reply made by the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom to the proposals delivered on January

14, 1920. The text of this reply is contained in Appendix "D". 3.
Adriatic Question

MR. NITTI: I have only a simple declaration to make.

As I have already stated, I am obliged to leave Paris tonight. As a matter of fact, I wish it to be clearly understood that my departure bears no relation whatsoever to the discussion of the Adriatic problem; it is question of a domestic nature which obliges me to return to Italy as soon as possible.

I have, however, nothing to add to what I have said. We have made every effort of which we were capable. I must thank Messrs. Clemenceau and Lloyd George for the good will they have shown in such a difficult question, in their effort to find a solution necessarily so complex, one satisfactory to everyone and especially one able to safeguard the peace of Europe.

I wish to state quite sincerely that I have done all in my power; I have given up everything I could, in order to find a solution acceptable to Yugo-Slavs and Italians. The compromise which we had arrived at did not seem to satisfy either the one or the other; for—I must repeat it—I have always regarded the Yugo-Slavs with a friendly feeling and I have taken into account the excited feeling of a people still in its political youth.

But having said so much, I can make no further concession on any single point in the conditions upon which we have agreed here; it would be impossible for me to defend further concessions in Italy.

I think it useless to enter into the detail of the Serbian reply; were I to do it, I should have to show the impossibility of separating the city from the commune of Zara; I should have to emphasize that the Serbian reply is a blunt refusal of any desire which the City of Zara itself might express to be represented diplomatically by a nation of its own choosing on the League of Nations—a conception which, to my mind, is still very hazy.

I therefore must emphasize what I said this morning: all the concessions which we granted in the Pact of London² had a single aim, i. e., to find a solution acceptable by everyone. We are, however, not pledged, and I cannot myself accept anything I could not justify before the Italian Parliament. If the Yugo-Slavs accept our proposals, we shall agree; if they wish to have them modified, we cannot consent.

I also wish to be excused if after my departure I am unable to be represented here by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Scialoja. In case of need, Mr. de Martino will be at the disposal of the Conference.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Could we not now let the representatives of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes come in, and, if we are agreed, tell them that we maintain our former proposals? Each question can doubtless be discussed by itself, but that is not how the problem stands before us. There is a pact of London, to which England and France wish to remain faithful. We have already told Mr. Pachitch and Mr. Trumbitch that they must choose between the compromise we have just outlined and the Pact of London. We can only repeat it once more and demand a reply, either "Yes" or "No".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: As our Italian colleague, Mr. Nitti must return to Italy, allow me to interrupt for a moment the proceedings in order to express my very deep and grateful thanks to Mr. Clemenceau for the way he has presided over our discussions. I have sat on this Conference for months: Messrs. Nitti and Wallace have participated in its proceedings for a shorter time; if those who had preceded them were present, I feel certain that they would join in the homage that I would render to our President.

It will be the great honor of my life to have taken part in the work of this Conference, which has been presided over in such a wonderful way by a statesman so eminent as Mr. Clemenceau. He knows with what deep feelings of esteem and admiration he is regarded by my whole country, and I have greater regret than I can express at the thought that he will no longer be present with us in future. I wish the following declaration to be placed on record in the minutes:

“Mindful of the inestimable services which M. Clemenceau as President for more than one year of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, has rendered to the Cause of Peace, and grateful of the dignity, impartiality and sagacity with which he has conducted our proceedings, we, his colleagues, desire to convey to M. Clemenceau the expression of our unalterable esteem, and our hope that in a tranquil retirement he may live to see the fruits of his incomparable labours for the glory of France and the revived prosperity of the world.”

MR. WALLACE: Mr. President: It is a matter of deep regret for me to realize that we shall no longer have the benefit of your great wisdom and incomparable humor. It has been a great privilege for me to know you and therefore to love you. President Wilson spoke to me many times about his deep attachment for you and his admiration for your transcendent abilities. On behalf of the American Government and myself I wish you a long and happy life.

MR. NITTI: I wish to associate myself with the sentiments so nobly expressed by Messrs. Lloyd George and Wallace. We have likewise admired the transcendent quality of your mind, and grandeur of your sentiments. We shall always remember all that you have done for the cause of humanity and for the Entente, and we shall always hold you in the kindest remembrance.

MR. MATSUI: Allow me, Mr. President, to add a few words in the name of the Japanese Delegation.

If the Head of our Delegation, Marquis Saionji, were still in Paris, he would have been the first to express his thanks and feelings of deep esteem. In his absence, I am happy to join the distinguished representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments in expressing to you the cordial feelings of the Japanese people.

MR. MILLERAND: In the name of the new Cabinet, I am happy to thank the representatives of the Great Powers, and particularly Mr. Lloyd George, for the homage which they have just rendered to the man who for over a year has represented the French Republic at the Peace Conference in the worthy way you have just recalled. France

will be profoundly touched by this homage which her Allies have spontaneously rendered and which honors them as much as the man to whom it is addressed.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Gentlemen, when people are leaving each other, it is usual—courtesy requires it—to exchange friendly words. I should like to believe that in the praises, certainly extravagant, which you have been kind enough to offer me, there is a little more than the courtesy of custom. I should be happy if there remained between us the deep feeling that the alliance of our countries ought indeed to inspire. If I have succeeded in letting enter our hearts some of those beautiful feelings that you have been so kind as to express, it is clear that it is my country, and your countries that are going to reap the benefit of our understanding.

We have all tried here to continue the work of our noble soldiers. The supreme event of the world has been the unexpectedness, the immensity of this war, suddenly terminating at a moment when we believed that an effort of many months would still be necessary and we arrived here, somewhat disconcerted sometimes, by the gravity of the problems presented and the difficulty of solving them. In fighting an enemy, all are necessarily in agreement; each gives his life gladly for the great cause of his fatherland, but it is by no means necessarily the same when the victors meet to calculate and realize the fruits of victory, to arrange what belongs to each, not the honour, which is each one's share, for, were it a matter of honour, that has been shared in such quantity by our soldiers in that mighty battle that it is not ourselves who can increase it.

And yet we have tried to accomplish that difficult task. In reality, I might say that I have never presided over your meetings. They have not really been presided over. We have exchanged ideas, we have never, properly speaking, had difficulties in our discussions and the President has never had to exercise his powers. We have been friends entrusted with a great duty—to make the peace, to conclude a peace stable in the first instance between ourselves, while increasing the chances of peace for humanity.

Mr. Lloyd George, who so kindly took the initiative in this tribute, must have smiled on recalling the great fights that we have sometimes waged. He said, when in the adjoining room he proposed me for the Presidency: "we have fought each other vigorously already." Then he added: "We are both of us Celts and yet we have not controlled our expressions." That is quite true and we have continued like that.

We have all of us uncompromisingly defended what we believed to be the interest of our countries; but I think I can say that with Mr. Lloyd George as with all of us, we have never lost sight of the necessity of a common understanding. I think too that we are at one today in affirming that if the particular interests of each nationality must be husbanded and respected, there yet cannot be a peaceful Europe unless the rights of all are recognized. We have put above all the need of the Entente. If Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Japan, France, remain united, we have there a guarantee of peace worth more than all those that can be written on paper. If one day those nations were to become disunited, I dare not think what misfortunes might result.

Sometimes in the course of our discussions, I have been accused of having made too many concessions. The same charge has been levelled at the other Heads of Governments. That is a question that may usefully be discussed in the days to come, but at a time when the verdict will hardly interest me more. Yet my conscience is easy, I am sure that yours is too; in the expression of our opinions, as in the decisions we have taken, we have been guided by one sole principle. The nations that have spilled so much of their blood deserved first of all national satisfaction; but thereafter it was necessary to harmonize all the national satisfactions so that there should result a great common peace to all.

Gentlemen, I do not wish to speak longer. From the bottom of my heart I am grateful to each of you for the feelings of kind sympathy expressed. In his mind's eye Mr. Lloyd George sees me in a retirement which indeed begins today; he expressed the hope that I shall yet see our labours bear all their fruit. He may at least be certain that I shall never take my eyes off the peace we are now

concluding and that I shall continue to follow its progress; till my last breath I shall endeavor, with my earnest desires at least, to contribute to the full extent of my powers to the solidarity of that peace. If certain elements of discord should unhappily arise between us, how terrible would it be to think that the finest blood of the civilized world—the blood of our soldiers—had been shed in vain for hopes not to be realized.

I cannot believe in such a catastrophe; I know well the feelings that inspire my friend Mr. Millerand. He is convinced, as I am, that an alliance, a lasting entente, must be maintained between the peoples represented here. That is the feeling that I have found in Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Wallace, Mr. Nitti, Mr. Matsui and the feeling which animates all of us, animates him too. That I can vouch for and it is essential that you too, now that we are separating, should be convinced of it.

For myself, I shall ever cherish among my most precious memories the remembrance of those friendly conversations, sometimes stormy, by which we have carried on the effort of the great war. We have learnt to know each other, to love each other. This fraternal friendship must be passed on from the statesmen to the peoples themselves. Let me offer you all the sincere wishes from the bottom of my heart for the prosperity of Great Britain, the United States, Italy and Japan. Let us wish for the work to which we have given the best of ourselves that the results already obtained and those of the future will bring, will be such that the peoples will feel for all of us without distinction, a gratitude which, in that happy event, we shall have well deserved. Gentlemen, I thank you once again from the bottom of my heart.

(The Italian representatives withdrew.)

Messrs. Pachitch and Trumbitch then entered the room.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Gentlemen, the members of the Council have read the reply which you have submitted; the Council is of opinion that discussion of the different points you raise is henceforth useless.

As far as I am personally concerned, I feel that your thesis can be justified theoretically and logically on many points; but the question does not thus present itself at this time. This Adriatic question has been pending for months, nearly years, it must be settled. As you know, we have for a year tried all sorts of plans without being able to solve it and reach an agreement.

Allow me at this point to tell you that your protests arrived a little late, for, during all the time we discussed with the Italians we have had made known to us no Yugo-Slav counter-proposals.

We first discussed the subject with President Wilson. Mr. Lloyd George and myself sent him a memorandum proposing our solutions: that did not have any better success. We then tried a way which consists in bringing together the two parties by proposals acceptable by all.

If the question be examined separately, your theory, as I said before, might very easily be defended: but we looked at the question from another point of view. A great war breaks out; a Yugo-Slav State, Serbia, fights by our side and reaps a harvest of glory and honor which history will not deny to it; but, on the other side, we find the Yugo-Slavs kept in the ranks of the Austrians, fighting against us until the very last minute. Of course some divisions fought in our ranks when it became possible to organize them from amongst the prisoners we had taken, but these men were only made prisoners because they had fought against the Entente.

The situation must be faced courageously, and we must see, what, under these circumstances, it is possible for you to obtain.

I tell you in a friendly spirit, but firmly, that you must choose between the present proposals we are making—I say “we” because it is not Italy which is offering them but the Entente—and the application of the Pact of London, the execution of which has already been claimed this morning by Mr. Nitti. The signatures of France and Great Britain appear at the foot of this treaty. Mr. Lloyd George and I have declared that we could not repudiate it. You must therefore realize the attitude you have obliged us to adopt.

I have the honor—much as I regret it—to say this to you: you must choose between the proposals made to you by France and Great Britain, and the application of the Pact of London on the Adriatic coast. We desire an answer to this question. Italy has arrived at a point where it is impossible for us to start new discussions. We therefore turn to you. If you do not wish to accept the great advantages which are offered you, Mr. Nitti has announced that he would immediately ask for the execution of the Pact of London. Neither Mr. Lloyd George nor myself will be able to refuse.

MR. PACHITCH: We have received from our Government the reply which we have communicated to the Supreme Council; our Government gave us permission to make the concessions shown in that reply, but it has also given us the order not to go any further: we are not authorized to make other concessions than those mentioned in the reply of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: If that is the final reply of your Government, we then know what remains for us to do. If, on the contrary, it can yet be modified, do you intend to ask it of your Government?

MR. PACHITCH: We are ready to ask our Government immediately for another reply.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: When can we expect to receive it?

MR. PACHITCH: We shall get in communication with our Government this very evening and we hope to get the reply within three days.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Let us say one extra day, and that we shall have a final reply within four days.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Make it quite clear to your Government that the only question before it is whether it accepts our proposals. It must either accept or refuse. If it accepts, as I am leaving for London, there will be no need for the Conference to meet further to discuss the Adriatic question; if it does not accept, our representatives here will take note of this refusal and the Pact of London will then be applied.

MR. TRUMBITCH: We shall ask our Government to reply by “yes” or “no”.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Exactly.

MR. TRUMBITCH: You have just said, Mr. President, that we came at the last minute to state our claims ...

MR. CLEMENCEAU: That was not meant as a reproach.

MR. TRUMBITCH: We were only asked once to appear before the Supreme Council, in February.³ We submitted the question as it appeared at the time and communicated a memorandum containing our whole programme.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I am not trying to reproach you: I simply wish to explain to you our embarrassment. I beg of you to believe in the universal sympathy which you find here.

MR. TRUMBITCH: I thank you.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: A new State has been created: we want it to live in the glory which the Serbian Army has won for it; we would like to give it better conditions. But everyone must make concessions; France also has not obtained all the satisfaction she desired. Other countries in the Entente are in the same position. I therefore beg of you to make a sacrifice, as we have done, to necessity; that sacrifice will be amply repaid by the sympathetic friendship and the generous aid which will be given you by the Entente.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Appendix A to ICP–23

Report of the Commission Appointed by the Supreme Council To Examine the Situation of the Troops To Be Sent to the Plebiscite Countries

The Commission appointed by the Supreme Council to again examine the situation of the troops to be sent to the Plebiscite countries, met at 4 p.m., under the Presidency of Marshal Foch.

The Commission, after having heard the Chiefs of the Delegations of the various Governments, and the Presidents of the Commissions or their Representatives, submits to the Supreme Council, the following decisions:

Upper Silesia.—No reduction is possible.

Consequently, it is necessary to send three battalions to replace the three British battalions.

Teschen.—The troops of occupation cannot be reduced.

Consequently, no troops can be taken from that region to replace the absent battalions.

Dantzig.—Although Mr. Tower declared that he could fulfil his mission at Dantzig, with only one battalion, if necessary, it seemed to the military members of the Commission quite impossible to assure the occupation of a city and port of such importance with so small a force.

Consequently, it is necessary that the two missing English battalions be replaced by one battalion at least.

Moreover, it would be prudent to have an English Naval force participate in the occupation of Dantzig, in order to re-inforce it and assert its interallied character.

Marienwerder.—The remaining Italian battalion will be sufficient provided it is completed by a small detachment of another nation, so as to assert the Interallied character of the occupation.

Allenstein.—Two battalions are necessary to replace the three missing English battalions.

Memel.—The remaining French battalion will be sufficient, provided it is re-inforced by a small British Naval force, under the same conditions and for the same reasons, as apply to Dantzig.

In short, the Commission esteems that a minimum of six new battalions in lieu of the nine English battalions originally provided for, and two detachments of Naval forces at Memel and Dantzig, should be assigned to the occupation of the Plebiscite territories, which constitutes the first material demonstration of the execution of the Treaty.

N. B. All these calculations are based on the supposition that the Italian Contingents will not be modified.

However, the Italian Delegate, Mr. de Martino has made reservations on this subject, on account of the situation in Italy.

Appendix B to ICP—23

No. 82

PARIS, January 19, 1920.

To: President of the Peace Conference.

From: President of the German Peace Delegation.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, in answer to the note of the 17th inst., that the German Government can only comply with the desire to postpone for five days the transportation of the troops to the plebiscite zones of Upper Silesia, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Dantzig and Memel, if the Allies assume responsibility for the damages which might result from this measure.

The transportation of the Germans, in view of the evacuation of the territories in question has already begun, The evacuation, as well as the occupation of Dantzig, is only possible if the transportations being carried out by the Polish Government in Western Prussia are stopped on the 15th day of the evacuation, that is to say, on the 22nd day after the going into force of the Treaty.

Moreover, the German Government asks that one of the Allied Generals, already in Berlin, be given the necessary powers to settle all the minor questions raised by this delay.

In order that the necessary measures may be taken, I beg you to kindly give me as prompt an answer as possible.

BARON VON LERSNER

Appendix C to ICP-23

JANUARY 20, 1920.

From: Clemenceau.

To: Von Lersner.

After having noted the reply of the German Government, under date of January 19, 1920,⁴ I have the honor to inform you, in the name of the Peace Conference, that the Allied and Associated Governments, for unavoidable reasons, are obliged to postpone for a period of five days the transportation of the troops destined to occupy the plebiscite zones of Upper-Silesia, Allenstein, Marienwerder, and the Dantzig and Memel territories.

In the common interest of both the Allied and Associated Governments and the German Government, it is advisable that the movement of the German troops and the Allied troops, carefully harmonized in order to avoid any disorder, be executed according to the plan drawn up in common accord, but upon dates five days subsequent to the dates previously agreed upon.

If this is done the troubles which the German Government seems to fear are not likely to occur.

Naturally, the movement of Polish troops towards Eastern Prussia will stop on the 15th day of the evacuation.

Consequently, the Peace Conference will send a French Officer, familiar with the evacuation and transportation questions, accompanied by a Polish Officer, to arrive in Berlin for January 28th, in order to arrange with the German Command subsequent questions of detail relative to movements in Eastern and Western Prussia.

Accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Note

It is necessary that the French Officer, to be sent to Berlin on January 28th, with a view to arranging, with the German Command, the questions of detail relative to the movements in Eastern and Western Prussia, be furnished, before his departure from Paris, with all the information necessary for the successful accomplishment of his Mission.

In order that this Officer may be enabled to learn beforehand just what information will be necessary, the Peace Conference has the honor to suggest that one of Military Experts, having already discussed the evacuation and transportation questions in Paris, Major Michaelis or Major von Boetticher, come to Paris in order to study in advance, with the designated French Officer, [the problems to be?] handled in Berlin.

In this connection, we would suggest that Lieut-Colonel Lefort be chosen for the Mission to Berlin.

Appendix D to ICP-23

ADRIATIC QUESTION

Reply, in Accordance With Instructions From the Royal Dutch Government [sic], of the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, to the Proposals Submitted to Mr. Pachitch and Mr.

Trumbitch by Mr. Clemenceau, During a Meeting Held at the Quai d'Orsay on January 14, 1920

—1—

The “corpus separatum” of Fiume would not be under Yugo-Slav sovereignty, and, in principle the independence of Fiume is accepted.

Consequently, the “corpus separatum” of Fiume, without the railroads and without the port, will be an independent state under the sovereignty of the League of Nations, Fiume’s diplomatic representation will also be under the League of Nations.

The port of Fiume, inclusive of the great pier and the terminal railroads of Fiume, as well as the installations connected with these services will be the property of the League of Nations and will be placed under the management of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The railroad system of Fiume, which port is the only Serbian commercial outlet by water, belongs to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The S-C-S State will have the right to develop the port and the railways and is to conclude arrangements with Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary for the development of the commerce of these countries. In case of a disagreement, the question will be settled by the Council of the League of Nations.

The city of Souchak and the Port of Baros, which form an integral whole and which were constructed exclusively for the lumber trade of Croatia, will be attributed to the S-C-S Kingdom as its property. This small port would be the only outlet, from a commercial point of view, on the entire Adriatic coast, which would be the exclusive property of Yugo-Slavia.

—2—

The frontier between Italy and Yugo-Slavia, established by the Wilson line, from the Julian Alps as far as the Arsa is the only frontier which corresponds with the geographic, strategic, and economic conditions, and it is entirely in favor of Italy. This frontier is accepted, although, by according 400,000 Yugo-Slavs to Italy, it

greatly prejudices the principle of nationalities. This enormous sacrifice, greater than any other Allied State has been asked to accept, is, nevertheless, agreed to by the Yugo-Slav people in the interests of accord and Peace.

The unjustifiable annexation of purely Yugo-Slav territories beyond the Wilson line would constitute a new and flagrant violation of the principle of Nationalities. It would inevitably create a permanent hotbed of irredentism within the frontiers of Italy, of a nature precisely analogous to that which was held as a justification of the claims of “Italia Irredenta” in which its return to the mother country was demanded, as well [as?] was so excellently emphasized in the “London Memorandum.”⁵

- a) —Concerning the territory on which the railway line from Fiume runs along the coast, if it were attributed to Italy insurmountable difficulties would occur daily with reference to the customs control, the coast services, and other analogous services, effecting a strip of land of irregular configuration of but a few metres width between the sea and the railway line which constitutes the Yugo-Slav frontier. This would inevitably create a source of daily misunderstandings.
- b) —The aggrandizement of Italian territory to the east of the Wilson line in the Senozetche region, resulting from an extension of the frontier a few kilometres to the east, cannot be justified on the grounds of better protection for Trieste. On the contrary, such a measure would result in according a further part of Yugo-Slav territory on the Senozetche plateau to Italy, and bringing the Italian frontier to within 5 or 6 kilometres of the important Saint-Pierre railroad junction. This railway line, which is the vital artery of the Yugo-Slav countries, would be thus directly menaced.
- c) —The districts of a purely Yugo-Slav character comprise not only those located along the blue line, traced on the map attached to the draft, but also those located to the south of Senozetche and extending as far as the sea, which compose a territory almost in the form of a triangle. By the cession of this territory, 60,000 more persons of Yugo-Slav nationality would be attributed to Italy. The coast extending from Arsa to Boloska, more than fifty kilometres in length, dominates the Fiume Gulf in which Italy has no

legitimate interests. On the other hand, the Fiume Gulf is essentially necessary to the existence of Yugo-Slavia as it is her only economic outlet. By the cession of this territory to Italy the entire hinterland, which, as well as the coast, is inhabited by a purely Yugo-Slav population, would be separated from the sea.

—3—

As to Zara, although having a population of only 12,000 inhabitants, and representing but an isolated point in the middle of the Yugo-Slav territory from which it acquires its means of existence, the Delegation does not insist on its demand that that city be placed under Yugo-Slav sovereignty, and accepts the principle of its independence.

Consequently, Zara (the city only, exclusive of the rest of the territory of the Zara commune) will become an independent State under the sovereignty of the League of Nations, to which will also appertain its diplomatic representation.

It cannot be admitted that Fiume and Zara should have the right to choose their diplomatic representation. If this choice laid with Italy it would amount to a disguised annexation.

However, we wish very seriously to again call attention to the fact that Zara, which possesses no independent means of existence, would be economically ruined if it were separated from the rest of Dalmatia and constituted an independent State, because, for centuries, it has been the administrative center of Dalmatia. In view of the fact that nothing opposes a solution of the question by according complete administrative autonomy to Zara, under the protection of the League of Nations, its constitution as an independent State, which would separate it from the rest of Dalmatia, is unjustified.

If, nevertheless, it is decided to create this State, the S-C-S State would have the right to transfer the Credit Foncier Bank of Dalmatia, the provincial administrations, the archives, the administration

library, and all matters pertaining to provincial administration, from Zara.

–4–

As to Albania, the S-C-S Delegation wishes to remark again, as it has done repeatedly since the beginning of negotiations, that the best solution would be to confide the administration of Albania, as was established by the Conference of Ambassadors at London in 1913, to a local autonomous Government without interference on the part of any outside Power.

In the event that this solution is not accepted, and if the plan to attribute portions of Albanian territory to other States, now under consideration, is permanently adopted, it will be necessary to submit the proposed frontier of northern Albania to the modifications indicated on the map hereto annexed.⁶ The Albanian districts will enjoy, as autonomous provinces, a special regime analogous to that which is stipulated by the terms of the Peace Treaty with the Czecho-Slovak Republic, relative to the autonomous Ruthenian province of Czecho-Slovakia.

–5–

In order to facilitate the solution, the S-C-S State would accept, eventually, the demilitarization of the islands, thus making a great sacrifice, but on condition that the Island of Lissa, which is purely Slav and which, from an economic point of view, is indissolvably united with Dalmatia, shall be attributed to the S-C-S Kingdom. Consequently, the Lussing and Pelagruza Islands would remain Italian and would be demilitarized like the other islands of the Adriatic.

The demilitarization will consist of an interdiction to fortify the islands. War vessels, however, will be able to move freely in these waters.

–6–

The S-C-S State recognizes that the Italians of Dalmatia have full liberty to opt for Italian nationality, without leaving the territory of the S-C-S Kingdom.

—7—

An international convention will guarantee the rights acquired by Italian subjects relative to their industrial enterprises in Dalmatia.

—8—

Reciprocally, full and entire protection relative to the nationality, language, and the economical and intellectual development of the Yugo-Slav population remaining in Italy will be guaranteed.

—9—

The question of the division of the Austro-Hungarian war and commercial fleets is closely connected with the Adriatic problem.

Concerning the commercial fleet, it is necessary that Yugo-Slavia and Italy immediately be authorized to effect a division of these ships on the basis of the decision which was adopted by the Supreme Council on November 22 [20], 1919.⁷

As to the War Fleet, the Delegation demands, in conformity with its letters of June 2, 1919, and January 8, 1920, copies of which are annexed hereto, that the ships mentioned therein, which are indispensable for the elementary defense of the Yugo-Slav coasts, may be attributed to the S-C-S Kingdom.

PARIS, January 20, 1920. **Annex**

[DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM
OF THE S. C. S. [No. 1462]
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE]

[JUNE 2, 1919.]

The fleet of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was obliged in the month of October, 1918, by the revolutionary action of the Yugo-Slav

sailors, to surrender to the Jugo-Slav Committee of Zagreb. Special Delegates were sent by the said Committee to take possession of it. This operation was regularly carried out and a *procès-verbal* of it drawn up. Mr. Clemenceau, Colonel House, Mr. Lloyd-George and Mr. Orlando, that is to say, the Chief Representatives of the Allied States, were informed of this surrender by a radio-telegram dated November 1, 1918. They took it into consideration in their reply sent by wireless to the Jugo-Slav Representatives at Pola. In this telegram, which has for the Jugo-Slavs an historical importance, the Four Representatives of the Allied States greeted the Delegates of the Jugo-Slav National Committee of Zagreb and invited them to place themselves, with the fleet, at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Naval forces at Corfu.

Thanks to the intelligent patriotism of the Jugo-Slav sailors, the powerful fleet of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was kept intact—except the *Viribus Unitis* destroyed by the Italians—and was prevented from making a sortie at the last moment. Without this patriotic action on the part of the Jugo-Slav sailors, the Fleet would have been blown up. Therefore, the fleet of the Hungarian Monarchy has really become the property of Jugo-Slavia; after the political change which took place a short time later, this fleet should have become the fleet of the S. C. S. State.

On account of its home-port and the composition of its crews as well as the manner in which it has been kept, this fleet is Jugo-Slav. Consequently, the Kingdom of the S. C. S. has the honor to ask that the fleet be delivered to it.

Two arguments, from two different sides, might be opposed

1. On the part of Italy. The latter might claim a part of the former Austro-Hungarian fleet in putting forward the following argument: the Jugo-Slavs were not recognized as belligerents, and in consequence, the above-mentioned surrender of the fleet cannot be valid, from an international point of view, that is to say, it constitutes war booty only.
2. On the part of the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Delegates of the National Committee consented, at

the time the fleet was taken over, the insertion in the *procès-verbal* of the surrender, of a sentence by which the rights of the other nationalities of the said Monarchy to this fleet were reserved.

The Delegation of the kingdom of the S. C. S. will not try to show to what extent those two arguments prejudice each other; neither will it try to prove the low value of the reserve inserted in the *procès-verbal* by Rear Admiral Horthy. In fact, the surrender of the fleet was definitely decided on even before the consent of the Emperor of Austria arrived; besides, the reserve in question is in contradiction to the spirit of the surrender itself which was to be complete, as well as with the circumstances, as the Emperor was at that time no longer Commander of the Fleet, which, a few hours earlier had surrendered unconditionally. This reserve, inserted at the request of the Representative of the Emperor, is of a sentimental nature; it was probably inserted in the *procès-verbal* thanks to the urgency of the delivery, the Delegates of the National Committee of Zagreb not having had the time to realize its importance and the different interpretations which might be given to it.

The foregoing represents the point of view of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. regarding the principle involved as far as the Fleet of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is concerned.

Expecting to meet with insurmountable difficulties in obtaining complete recognition of its rights the Delegation of the Kingdom of the S. C. S., with a view to overcoming the numerous objections opposed to its position, and to give proof of its solidarity with the other Allies, that is to say, with the Governments of the friendly Nations which formerly comprised the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, has decided to claim:

1. For the High Sea Fleet:

The four cruisers of the *Spaun* type.

The nineteen destroyers of the *Dukkja*, *Tratza* and *Hussar* type.

The 26 turbine torpedo boats.

The half, that is to say, 12 of the torpedo boats of *Caiman* type.

The 11 gasoline motor-torpedo boats.

All the submarines and
All the hydroplanes with their motors.
Also the 15 auxiliary ships: *Pola*, *Theodore*, *Miramar*, *Lakroma*,
Cyclope, *Pelikan*, *Vesta*, *Herkules*, *Kameleon*, *Dremedar*,
Salamander, *Basilisk*, *Nikse*, *Najade*, *Nimfe*, and all the mine and
port tenders.
Three large training ships, among which the *Vulkan*.
In *Pola*: all the machines of the arsenals and other factories, all the
munitions, torpedoes, mines, all the wireless telegraphy material,
all the port material, all the boats equipped with oars and all the
floating docks. All the guns of the coast defence, the electrical
material, the explosives, campaign railways and searchlights.
In *Cattaro* and *Sebenico*: all the land and sea war material movable
and immovable, such as was left by *Austro-Hungary*.
In the towns occupied by the Italians, in particular at *Fiume*; the
restitution of all the land and sea material, which is in those
places, or a corresponding indemnity.

2. For the Danube and Save fleets:

The six monitors and two patrol ships which wintered at *Belgrade*:
Bosna, *Sava*, *Ens*, *Temes*, *Keresz*, *Bodrog*, *Wells* and *Barsch*.
The repair-ship (*Werkstaettenschiff*) which is at *Budapest*.

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM

PARIS, January 8, 1920.

OF THE S. C. S.

No. 5049

TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

By a letter dated December 7 last, the Secretariat General of the
Peace Conference informed this Delegation that the Supreme Council
of the Allied and Associated Powers, in its meeting of December 4,
1919, had decided to grant the S. C. S. State, a certain number of
small enemy battleships, to be used only for police purposes.⁸
Pursuant to this decision, the Supreme Council, in its meeting of
December 9 last, decided to place at the disposal of the S. C. S. State,
12 enemy torpedo boats, previously disarmed, with the exception of
one gun, and also to be used only for police purposes.⁹

Without anticipating the decision which the Royal Government may deem proper to take, concerning this offer, the Delegation of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. has the honor to inform the Peace Conference that it maintains its requests expressed in Note No. 1462 of June 2 last,¹⁰ based on the reasons set forth in this note and renewed in that of December 7, last, No. 4785, referring to our claims concerning our Navy. Therefore, these requests are maintained concerning the Navy as well as concerning the Danube fleet.

Pursuant to the two above-mentioned notes, our Delegation has the honor to beg the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers kindly to authorize the attribution to the kingdom of the S. C. S. of all the installations and material of the Arsenal of Tivat (Teodo), which are at present in the Port of Cattaro, and moreover, of the 15,000 ton dock, and dock "F". In fact, this arsenal is the only one existing on the territory of the kingdom of the S. C. S. and, if deprived of it, this State would not possess any ship for strictly indispensable reparations.

Please accept

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM
OF THE S. C. S. No. 5050
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PACHITCH
PARIS, January 8, 1920.

To: Mr. Clemenceau.

Pursuant to its note, No. 5049 of January 8 last,¹¹ the Delegation of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. has the honor to beg the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, to kindly decide:

- (1) The attribution to the arsenal of Tivat (Teodo), of the auxiliary ship *Cyclop* which is provided with storage batteries, without which the lighting of the public buildings at Tivat, would be impossible;
- (2) The cession to the authorities of the military port of Tivat, (Teodo), of 3,000 tons of coal which are on board the ships of the

Erzherzog model;

- (3) The cession to the arsenal of Tivat, for its lighting, of the storage batteries and reserve electric motors, which were taken off submarine No. 4.
- (4) The cession of another storage battery from the submarine 22, which is in the electric central of the submarine base, and is used for the lighting of all the public institutions of Djenovic and Kumbom;
- (5) The cession to the S. C. S. State of pontoon “B” and of the 10 ton pontoon. In fact, without pontoon “B” it is impossible to make any reparation on the ships and (floats?). Besides, this pontoon did not belong to the former Austro-Hungarian Navy, but to the former direction of the maritime region of Trieste and was intended to satisfy the needs of all the ports of Dalmatia;
- (6) The Cession to the S. C. S. State of all the air planes of the aeronautic Station of Cattaro.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

¹ See HD–69, minute 5, [vol. VIII, p. 604](#).

² Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915*.

³ BC–35, minute 1, [vol. IV, p. 44](#).

⁴ *Supra*.

⁵ For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 3.

⁶ The map does not accompany the minutes in the Department’s files.

⁷ HD–97, minute 2, and appendix C, pp. 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 13](#)] and 252 [Pg. 252 is part of [Doc. 13](#)].

⁸ HD–106, minute 2, p. 469 [Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 22](#)].

⁹ HD–110, minute 1, p. 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 26](#)].

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 947 [Pg. 947 is part of [Doc. 50](#)].

¹¹ *Supra*.

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Minutes of Meetings (1920):

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1920, at Noon

Paris, January 10, 1920, noon

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03701/1

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03701/1

CM-1

[Document 51]

**Notes of a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday,
January 10, 1920, at Noon**

Paris, January 10, 1920, noon

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Lord Curzon

FRANCE
Mr. Cambon

Secretaries
Mr. Berthelot
M. de Saint-Quentin

ITALY
Mr. Scialoja

JAPAN
Mr. Matsui

Secretary
Mr. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

Captain Winthrop,

GREAT BRITAIN

Captain Lothian
Small,

FRANCE

Mr. Massigli,

ITALY

Mr. Zanchi.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Norman.

FRANCE

Mr. Sergent,
Gen. Desticker,
Mr. de Fleuriau,
Mr. Hermite,
Mr. Serruys,

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero,
Mr. Manciola,

JAPAN

Mr. Sawada

The Council had before it a report of January 7, 1920 by the Military representatives at Versailles upon modifications to the military clauses of the Hungarian Peace Treaty requested by the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugo-Slav Delegations. (Appendix "A"). 1. Conditions of Peace With Hungary. (a) Military Clauses

GENERAL CAVALLERO read and commented upon the military representatives' reports as well as a draft reply to those delegations prepared by the military representatives.

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to communicate to the Czecho-Slovak and to the Jugo-Slav Delegations in accordance with the recommendation of the

military representatives at Versailles the letter, the draft of which appears in Appendix "A".

The Council had before it a report of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, dated January 9, 1920 (See Appendix "B"). 2. Conditions of Peace With Hungary. (b) Exploitation of Mines of Pecs

MR. LAROCHE said that the report which the Council had before it was drafted in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by those members of the Commission who were present at its last sitting, but it had not been approved in a special meeting of the Commission.

The British Delegation, however, had promised its approval, and he thought that the report was also in agreement with the views of the Italian and American Delegations.

Mr. Laroche then read and commented upon the report in question.

MR. CAMBON asked what they would do if the Hungarians refused to conclude with the Reparations Commission the arrangement proposed by the Commission.

MR. LAROCHE replied that they would be justified in letting the Hungarian Delegation know that, should the Hungarians, pending the coming into force of the Treaty, refuse to supply coal to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, they would feel obliged to authorize the Serbs to prolong their occupation until the Treaty came into force.

It was decided:

to adopt the proposals of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, made in its report of January 9th, 1920, concerning the exploitation of the mines of Pecs and the distribution of the coal drawn from those mines until the coming into force of the Peace Treaty.

The Council had before it a note from the Secretariat General of the Economic Commission, dated January 7, 1920. (Appendix "C") 3. Conditions of Peace With Hungary. (c) Financial Sub-clauses

MR. SERGENT said that the Council would recall that the British Delegation put before it the case of Allied and Associated nationals who were adversely affected by measures which the government of Bela Kun adopted for the substitution of Hungarian “blue” bank notes by Bolshevik “white” notes, notes which, by an order of the new Hungarian Government, would be accepted at only one-fifth of their value.¹ The Economic Commission, to which the matter had been referred, considered that the losses thus borne, entered within the category of “exceptional war measures”, as defined in Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary; but it thought it well to take the opinion of the Financial Commission upon the question. That Commission, which met that same morning, considered that the case was in fact covered by Section E, of Paragraph 1 of the appendix to Article 232 and that, should those nationals have difficulties on the point, they could submit their case to the mixed arbitration Tribunal provided for in that appendix. Under those circumstances, it seemed unnecessary to insert in the Hungarian Treaty special *ad hoc* provisions.

The Financial Commission had also been informed of the modifications which the Serbian Delegation wished to have introduced to the regulations concerning the liquidation of enemy property.² The Serbian request had been already the subject of a report by the Economic Commission.³ The Financial Commission would be unable to consider that subject until its meeting on the following Monday.

The Commission was confronted further by a much more delicate problem. The Serbian Delegation asked that in the preparation of the Hungarian Treaty, account be taken of the fact that Croatia was not an integral part of Hungary but a distinct State, united to Hungary under the Crown of St. Etienne. From that circumstance the Serbian Delegation made a series of deductions which had important consequences from the financial point of view. Between Hungary and Croatia there existed, the Serbians maintained, a financial understanding, just as one existed between the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom; this last understanding had been taken into account in determining, for example, what part of the Austro-

Hungarian debt would have to be met by Austria and what part by Hungary. Account ought therefore to be taken of the Hungarian understanding in settling the allocation of enemy liabilities and assets. They had carefully examined the documents supplied them, as indeed it deserved careful examination. They were of opinion, nevertheless, that they were not competent to decide whether, from the legal point of view, the Serbian proposition was just. On that point they would like to consult the legal advisors, all the more so, since the decision which would be taken might affect other parts of the Treaty. The question was certainly pregnant with consequences, not on account of the significance of the amount involved, for that indeed was very slight, but from the point of view of Croatian pride. The Serbian Delegation maintained that the Croats had always claimed that there was an independent Kingdom of Croatia; they could hardly then admit that the Treaty of Peace proclaimed that there was not.

MR. CAMBON said that the question would be adjourned until Tuesday.

It was decided:

that there was no reason for inserting in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary a special clause concerning the losses sustained by Allied and Associated nationals through the “substitution by the Government of Bela Kun of Bolshevist “white” notes for the Hungarian “blue” notes in circulation, and by the decision of the new Hungarian Government to accept those “white” notes in payment at only one-fifth of their value. Compensation for the losses that Allied and Associated nationals might have sustained thereby was ensured by Article 232 of the Hungarian Treaty.

LORD CURZON stated that, in company with Mr. de Fleuriau, he had seen Mr. Bourgeois on the preceding day, with the object of deciding with him the date of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. They had agreed upon the 16th of January at half past ten. The agenda would be limited to the nomination of the Commission of the delimitation of the Saar. Mr. Bourgeois would give a short

address and he would himself make some remarks. It was further Mr. Bourgeois' intention that on the eve of the first meeting the representatives of the various Powers who were to sit on the Council, should meet at his house to decide upon the procedure to be followed. 4. First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations

MR. WALLACE said that if the Council ratified that decision, he would cable it to his Government.

It was decided:

- (1) that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations would be held at 10:30 A.M. on the 16th of January, 1920, at the Quai d'Orsay;
- (2) that Mr. Wallace would inform his Government of the date fixed upon in order that the President of the United States might issue the official convocation.

LORD CURZON said that Mr. Lloyd George had just raised the serious question of South Russia and the Caucasus. (H. D. 125).⁴ The Bolshevist victories had given rise to a grave military danger. The Versailles Council would take up that matter, but the problem had also a political aspect which he would like to put before the Council. The following were the considerations he had proposed to submit to the Heads of Governments: 5. Situation in the Caucasus

There were three States in the Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia. The fate of Armenia would be decided by the Peace Conference when it made its decision upon the Turkish problem. There remained, then, Georgia and Azerbaidjan whose independence for the past year and a half has been most precarious. These countries were exposed to a threefold danger: in the first place they lived in dread of the conquered army of Denikin which might perhaps come down upon them from the North; on the other hand, they were exposed to the Bolshevist peril, Bolshevist troops advancing upon them from two sides—along the Caspian and in pursuit of Denikin's armies; finally, on the west and on the south, there was the Turkish danger—already in Azerbaidjan Enver Pasha and his brother Noury were at work. The military authorities would

take the steps required by the situation; but, on the other hand, there was a political step which the British Government was very anxious to see taken, and from which it anticipated happy results; he meant the recognition of the “de facto” Governments of Georgia and Azerbaidjan. British troops had occupied those regions since the armistice and His Majesty’s Government had thus had, more than any other, the opportunity of manifesting its sympathy with those States. Later, they had evacuated those regions except Batoum; but they had consuls at Baku, Tiflis and elsewhere. The countries he mentioned had shown a firm desire to become real states. Their Governments were socialist but decidedly anti-Bolshevist. They were living in dread of a Bolshevist invasion, at once political and military. They turned, therefore, towards Europe as suppliants. They asked the Allies to accord their support; to recognize their “de facto” Governments would be equivalent to according them support. That was how they had acted towards the Baltic States.

MR. BERTHELOT said that he had already discussed this subject with Lord Curzon in London. He had given Mr. Clemenceau an account of that conversation and he knew that he was willing to accord that “de facto” recognition subject to the reserve that the recognition of Georgia and Azerbaidjan in no wise prejudiced the future frontiers of Armenia.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed with him on that point.

MR. SCIALOJA said that he was equally inclined to grant that “de facto” recognition on the same conditions as for the Baltic States.

MR. MATSUI remarked that, on a question of that nature, he would have to ask for instructions from his Government.

MR. WALLACE said that he was in the same situation.

MR. BERTHELOT added that the Powers who were already disposed to recognize those “de facto” Governments would take such a step together.

It was decided:

that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should together recognize the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaidjan as “de facto” governments, subject to the reserve that the representatives of the United States and the representative of Japan would request instructions from their Governments on the question.

MR. BERTHELOT said that he had received from Mr. Adatci a letter in which he asked to be informed of the day on which the Commission appointed to examine the question of handing over William II would meet. That problem would arise immediately; they were awaiting British proposals. 6. Handing Over of Wilhelm II

LORD CURZON asked whether he meant that the British Government should lay a special proposition before the Council.

MR. BERTHELOT said that he merely wished to know whether the Commission that had met the preceding day under the Presidency of the Lord Chancellor was to examine the question.

LORD CURZON said he did not think so. That Commission was concerned only with reducing the list of criminals whose surrender was to be demanded from the Germans, for the reason that it would be easier to obtain the surrender of 500 of these, than 1,000.

MR. SCIALOJA stated that a special commission was indeed useless: the Treaty itself stipulated that the surrender of William II be demanded. It was merely a matter of finding the formula in which the demand should be made. The formula should be as legal as possible. The task of drafting it should be left to the Drafting Committee.

MR. BERTHELOT said that he would like simply to put the following question: the Peace Treaty provided for the handing over of William II to the Allies. Were they going to ask for it? In what form and at what moment?

MR. CAMBON remarked that it would appear that it was for the President of the Conference to formulate that demand. It was for him

therefore to entrust the legal experts with drafting it and consequently it would be sufficient for them to refer it to the Drafting Committee.

MR. MATSUI said that Mr. Adatci's question had been called by a sentence of Mr. Lloyd George uttered on the preceding day. He had understood that the Commission over which the Lord Chancellor presided would also deal with the question of the surrender of William II. They were not interested in the handing over of criminals but only in the surrender of William II.

It was decided:

to ask the Drafting Committee to submit to the Council at its next meeting a draft note asking the Dutch Government to hand over the ex-German Emperor.^{[4a](#)}

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix A to CM-1

SUPERIOR WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

PARIS, January 7, 1920.

Report Concerning the Modifications to the Military Clauses of the Peace Treaty With Hungary Requested by the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations

The Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations, by respective letters dated December 20, 1919, and December 27, 1919, requested the Supreme Council to authorize a certain number of additions to the Military Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Hungary (Clauses adopted by the Supreme Council during the Session of August 20, 1919).^{[5](#)}

After having confirmed that the two requests were identical in their draft, and after examination of the said requests,

THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES DECIDED:

1)—Concerning the 1st addition demanded: namely: Insertion in Article 120 of the Peace Treaty with Austria (as alinea 2): “The military forces of Hungary shall be limited to two divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry.”

—that the total strength of the Hungarian forces authorized (35,000 men) and the limit of the maximum and minimum strength of each full unit, as imposed by the Military Clauses of the Treaty (Table 4), prohibit Hungary from mobilizing more than three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry, of minimum strength;

—that Hungary’s obligation to group her forces in two divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry, whose strength might be more important, would constitute a decrease in her military power;

—and that, consequently, it will be unnecessary to change the method of limitation as applied to Austria and Bulgaria.*

2)—Concerning the second addition demanded, namely:

Insertion in Article 122 (as alinea 2) of the following paragraph:

“The Hungarian General Staff and all other military formations will be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.” (Similar to Article 160 of the Treaty with Germany);

—that Article 105 of the Military Clauses (corresponding with Article 121 of the Peace Treaty with Austria) prohibits any organization involving the commanding of troops or preparation for war” other than those prescribed in the annexed Tables;

—that these Tables indicate no Staff or organ superior to the Infantry Division or Cavalry Division Staffs;

—that the maintenance of the Hungarian General Staff or even of any staff of a Corps d’Armée or the grouping of the Divisions is clearly prohibited.

3)—Concerning the third addition demanded, namely:

Insertion in Article 120 (as the two last alineas) of the following paragraphs: “The Hungarian troops are to be quartered on the territory in their Peace garrisons and are not to be assembled in proximity to the frontiers.”

“During a period of five years after the entry into force of the present Treaty, no Magyar garrisons are to be installed within a distance of 10 kilometres from the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav frontiers; and that, within a zone 50 kilometres deep from the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav frontiers no concentration of more than one quarter of the Hungarian forces will be allowed.”

—that Article 104, last alinea, (corresponding with 120 of the Peace Treaty with Austria) stipulates that: “the Hungarian Army is to be exclusively employed in the maintenance of order throughout the territory, and in the police of the frontiers”.

that it is to the interest of the boundary states that the Hungarian Government be in a position to maintain order;

—that, for this purpose, military intervention may be necessary within 10 kilometres from the frontier;

—that the greater part of the Hungarian cities (inclusive of the capital) are located within 50 kilometres from the frontier and that the maintenance of order in these important centres may necessitate the concentration of more than one quarter of the Hungarian forces, that is, 9,000 men;

—that the servitude imposed on Hungary in favor of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States should be imposed under the same conditions in favor of the Roumanian and Austrian States, which, in view of the relatively small extent of the Hungarian State, would render any movement of Hungarian troops almost impossible.

4)—Concerning the 4th addition demanded, namely:

Insertion in Article 128 (as alinea 2) of the following paragraph: “No military organization outside of the Army (Preparation Societies, Police forces, Local Guards, etc.) will be allowed.”

—that the Peace Treaty authorizes Hungary to maintain police forces, on the condition that they do not exceed the strength for similar service in 1913, within the boundaries of Hungary such as they are determined by the Peace Treaty.

—that Article 112 of the Military Clauses with Hungary (corresponding with Article 128 of the Peace Treaty with Austria) prohibits the maintenance of any society having any interest, even incidental, in military questions.

—that, in consequence, the said clause prohibits any military organization outside of the Army, and renders the addition proposed unnecessary.

5)—Concerning the 5th addition demanded, namely:

Insertion in Article 128 (as alinea 3) of the following paragraph:
“Hungarian nationals shall not take part in any military exercise or study within boundary territory,”

—that this clause would be without real value unless it were applicable to a frontier zone of a depth of at least 50 kilometres.

A zone of this depth in Hungary cannot be considered on account of the geographical situation of the country and the extensive area which it would include. A less extensive zone would offer no guarantee to the boundary states.

—that, moreover, such an interdiction would prevent Hungary from studying the eventual defense of her territory.

6)—Concerning the 6th addition demanded, that is to say:

Insertion after Article 128 of the Peace Treaty with Hungary, of an Article, corresponding to Article 180 of the Treaty with Germany, which would be drawn up as follows:

“All fortified works, fortresses and field works, situated in Hungarian territory, at a distance of 50 kilometres from the Czecho-Slovak or Jugo-Slav frontier shall be disarmed and dismantled.

—“That the construction of any new fortification, whatever its nature or importance, is prohibited within the zone determined in Alinea 1 of the present Article.”

“That no permanent modern fortified works exist at the present time in this zone.”

—That the servitude to be imposed upon Hungary, at the request of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations may be claimed, for the same reasons, by the Roumanian and Austrian Governments.

—that there seems no justifiable reason for prohibiting Hungary to organize the defense of her frontiers.

7) —Concerning the 7th addition demanded, that is to say:

Insertion in article 136 (last Alinea) of the following paragraph: “The armed ships of the Hungarian Danube fleet (or of the Hungarian Danube Police) shall not navigate in that part of the Danube which forms the frontier, between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, (or the Kingdom of the S. C. S.)”

—that it is in the interest of the boundary states to allow the Hungarian Government the possibility of maintaining order.

—that to this effect an intervention by the armed ships of the Hungarian Danube Police, may be necessary in the frontier district itself.

—that, besides, the Peace Treaty only grants to Hungary, the right to keep three scouting launches, for the Danube Police Service.

CONSEQUENTLY, THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ESTEEM:

That there is no reason to take into consideration, the demands presented by the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations, and that consequently it is not advisable, to make any modification, in the military clauses approved by the Supreme Council on August 20th.

RESERVATION OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE.

Colonel T. Bentley Mott, as Representative of the United States of America, specified that he is not qualified to take any decisions in the name of the American Peace Delegation, or to make any agreement in the name of his Government—although he will take part in the debate, and give his opinion concerning the military questions which might be raised.

Colonel Mott called attention to the fact that, when Mr. Polk left Paris, the Treaty with Hungary was complete and ready to be presented to the Hungarians, and Mr. Polk signed the Treaty, in the name of the United States. That is why any modifications in this Treaty should be submitted to Washington, because nobody in Paris at present, is authorized to accept and sign, in the name of the United States any modifications which may be made.

The French Mil. Rep.

S. S. DESTICKER

The British Mil. Rep.

S. SACKVILLE-WEST

The Italian Mil. Rep.

S. CAVALLERO

The American Mil. Rep.

S. BENTLEY MOTT

The Japanese Mil. Rep.

S. WATANABE

Appendix B to CM-1

PARIS, January 9, 1920.

Report Addressed to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

—I—

Provision of the Treaty covering the exploitation of the Pecs Mines.

During its Session of December 5, 1919,⁶ the Supreme Council, upon a proposal submitted by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-

Slav Affairs and the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, decided to add to Paragraph 1, Annex 5, Section I, Part VIII of the Treaty with Hungary, the following phrase:

“Hungary grants, furthermore, to the Allied and Associated Powers, as partial reparation, an option on the annual delivery, for a period of five years to follow the entry into force of the Treaty, of an amount of traction coal to be taken from the Pecs Mines. This amount will be periodically fixed by the Reparations Commission and will be disposed of in favor of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, under conditions to be established by the Reparations Commission.”

–II–

Demand of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.

In a Note dated December 22, 1919, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation requested that the Paragraph above referred to be completed, by stipulating:

- a) —that the amount distributed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State by the Reparations Commission be not less than 60% of the total production;
- b) —that special organizations, appointed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, be entrusted with the execution of the decisions of the Reparations Commission;
- c) —that, until the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, the exploitation of the Pecs Mines remain under the control of the military authorities of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

–III–

Opinion of the Commission,

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs, after having heard the experts on reparations and coal matters, esteems that the two first proposals of the S-C-S Delegation would infringe on the prerogatives of the Reparations Commission, and would interfere with its action which, to be effective, must be freely exercised.

Concerning the third proposal, tending to effect the insertion of a stipulation in the Treaty, establishing a regime before the entry into force of the same Treaty, the Commission is of the opinion that it is inadmissible, and is in favor of a rejection of the S-C-S demand.

However, the Commission fears, that in the absence of formal engagements, Hungary may refuse to supply the Serb-Croat-Slovene State with any coal from the Pecs Mines, before the entry into force of the Treaty, and that the S-C-S State in order to provide against the serious inconveniences which such action would cause in the operation of her railways, might attempt to postpone the evacuation of the mines despite the orders of the Supreme Council.

—IV—

Proposals of the Commission.

Consequently, the Commission has the honor to submit the following proposals to the Supreme Council:

1. —As soon as the credentials and powers of the Hungarian Delegation shall have been verified, the Reparations Commission of the Treaty of Versailles, acting as Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission provided for by the Treaty with Hungary, shall negotiate and conclude with the Hungarian Delegation an Arrangement established on the following basis:
 - a) —Hungary agrees to furnish from the present time until the entry into force of the Treaty, to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, a certain quantity of traction coal to be taken from the Pecs Mines. This coal will be disposed of in favor of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, under conditions to be established by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.
 - b) —The Arrangement to be assumed by Hungary will determine, in percentage, the proportion due the S-C-S State by Hungary from the total monthly production of traction coal from the Pecs Mines. In determining this percentage, account will be taken of the average distribution, in 1913, of this same coal to the

territories now attached to each of the two States by virtue of the Peace conditions.

- c) —Payment for the coal will be effected according to compensation methods which will be determined by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.
- d) —The Arrangement will come to an end upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. —Immediately after the conclusion of the Arrangement, the Supreme Council will renew the injunction already addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government on November 7, 1919, to the effect that all Hungarian territory situated beyond the boundaries assigned the S-C-S State, within which territory is located the Pecs Mines, must be evacuated.[7](#)

Appendix C to CM-1

PEACE CONFERENCE
ECONOMIC COMMISSION

PARIS, January 7, 1920.

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The special Committee of the Economic Commission has examined the two following questions, submitted by you:

a) whether the Economic Commission considers as “Exceptional war Measures” such as defined in Article 232 of the Peace Treaty with Hungary, the measures taken by the Government of Bela Kun, to substitute the Bolshevik “white” bank notes for the Hungarian “blue” bank notes.

Under the reserve of the necessary verifications and of the proof of the damage caused, which will be in certain cases very difficult to procure, the *imposed* substitution of Bolshevik “white” bank notes for the “blue” bank notes, seems to require compensation, according to Article 232, Paragraph 1, of the draft of Treaty with Hungary.

The form of proof to be furnished, and the kind of compensation to be accorded, should, however, be determined by the Financial Commission, which should, in particular, prove that this substitution has really been a general and compulsory measure and that, by submitting to it, our Allied nationals have not infringed their own laws concerning trading with the enemy.

b) the Economic Commission has examined, in detail the different British notes, relative to the liquidation carried out, up to the present, by the Roumanians, in the territories which are to be transferred to them, in execution of the Peace Treaty, as well as the report presented on this question by the Drafting Committee.

The Economic Commission is in full accord with the Drafting Committee in esteeming that the Roumanian Government has no right to take such measures on her territories, as long as the Treaties which confer them on Roumania, have not come into force.

On the other hand, the Economic Commission esteems that, after the coming into force of the said Treaties, Roumania may, under reserve of the clauses relating to nationalities, and of the Convention relating to the protection of minorities, apply, on the territories which she will have acquired, such legislation as she may institute, concerning the situation of foreigners.

In the course of its debates, and even before taking up the elaboration of the clauses concerning the situation of Allied and Associated nationals in enemy territory, the Economic Commission had admitted the principle of the complete Liberty of each Allied and Associated Power, in the matter of the establishment of foreigners, under the following form:

“Each of the Allied and Associated Powers shall keep its full freedom of action, in the regulation of the conditions under which former enemy foreigners may establish themselves on its territories, colonies, or Dominions.”

It is to be remarked, however, that, the above advices, formulated by the Economic Commission, were expressed in the absence of the

British and American Delegates, to whom a copy of this text has been sent.

D. SERRUYS

¹ Appendix D to HD–114, p. 621 [*Pg. 621 is part of [Doc. 30](#)*].

² Appendix G to HD–119, p. 717 [*Pg. 717 is part of [Doc. 35](#)*].

³ Appendix H to HD–119, p. 719 [*Pg. 719 is part of [Doc. 35](#)*].

⁴ Minute 3, p. 837 [*Pg. 837 is part of [Doc. 41](#)*].

^{4a} See ICP–20, minute 2, and appendix B, pp. 886 [*Pg. 886 is part of [Doc. 47](#)*] and 887 [*Pg. 887 is part of [Doc. 47](#)*].

⁵ HD–34, minute 5, and appendix E, [vol. VII, pp. 736](#) and [747](#).

^{*} The French Military Representative esteems that it would be advisable to clearly specify that Hungary is forbidden to organize the military forces accorded her by the Peace Treaty, into Mixed Brigades, as such organizations are particularly adaptable to rapid mobilization by transferring the Mixed Brigades into as many Infantry Divisions. [Footnote in the original.]

⁶ HD–107, minute 6, and appendix F, pp. 477 [*Pg. 477 is part of [Doc. 23](#)*] and 499 [*Pg. 499 is part of [Doc. 23](#)*].

⁷ See HD–85, minute 1, p. 2 [*Pg. 2 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

January 13, 11 a.m. (CM-2)

[52] Notes of a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Held at Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 13, 1920, at
11 a.m.

Paris, January 13, 1920, 11 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03701/2

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03701/2

CM-2

[Document 52]

**Notes of a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Held at Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 13,
1920, at 11 a.m.**

Paris, January 13, 1920, 11 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. Hugh Wallace

Secretary
Mr. Harrison

GREAT BRITAIN
Lord Curzon

Secretary
Mr. Sargent.

FRANCE
Mr. Cambon

Secretaries
Mr. Berthelot
Mr. de Saint-Quentin

ITALY
Mr. Scialoja

Secretary
Mr. Trombetti

JAPAN
Mr. Matsui

Secretary
Mr. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES
OF

Capt. B. Winthrop.

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Lothian
Small.

FRANCE

Mr. de Percin.

ITALY

Mr. Zanchi.

Interpreter—Mr. Cammerlynck

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Fuller, R. N.
Comdr. MacNamara, R. N.
Mr. Malkin,
Mr. Campbell,
Mr. Herman,
Mr. Hutchinson.

FRANCE

Adl. Le Vasseur,
Mr. de Fleuriau,
Mr. de Serruys,
Mr. Laroche,
Mr. Seydoux,
Mr. Escoffier,
Mr. Fromageot,
Mr. Hermite.

ITALY

Rear-Adl. Grassi,
Mr. Ricci Busatti
Mr. Manciola
Capt. Ruspola, R. N.

The Council had before it a note, dated January 12, 1920, (Appendix "A") from the Drafting Committee, in reply to certain questions raised in a note from the Financial Commission (Appendix "B") concerning the relation of Croatia-Slovenia towards Hungary in common law. 1. Treaty of Peace With Hungary, Report of Drafting Committee on Nature of Compromise Between Hungary and Croatia-Slovenia

MR. FROMAGEOT explained the note from the Drafting Committee (Appendix "A") the conclusion of which was that there was no need to grant the request formulated by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation in its letter of December 29, 1919, and that the text of the Treaty with Hungary could remain in its present form as far as that question was concerned.

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to reject the alteration to the text of the Treaty with Hungary requested by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation in its letter dated December 29, 1919.

A note from the Financial Commission dated January 12, 1920, (Appendix "C") was laid before the Council, in which the former pronounced against an alteration of the text of the Article of the Treaty with Hungary corresponding to Article 211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which alteration was requested in a report of the Economic Commission dated December 27, 1919. (Appendix "D"). 2. Treaty of Peace With Hungary. Report of Financial Commission on Modification Requested by Economic Commission of Article Corresponding to Article 211 of Treaty With Austria

MR. CHEYSSON explained the note from the Financial Commission (Appendix "C").

MR. SCIALOJA: I am entirely in favour of the conclusion adopted by the Financial Commission. In addition to the considerations urged by the latter, another argument may be invoked, i. e. that the question of entail has nothing in common with that of public undertakings. It is a question of interior regulation and concerns private international law. If Serbia considers the institution of entail as contrary to public order, she will be perfectly free in future not to recognize this mode of transferring property within her territory. In Italy we have taken certain measures against trusts, which we consider have draw-backs of an economic nature. There is nothing to prevent Serbia from taking similar measures if she so desires. But it

is, I repeat, a domestic question which arises more naturally in legal terms than within the sphere of finance and politics.

MR. SERRUYS: The question raised by the Italian Foreign Minister presents a certain gravity and much exceeds the Article in question. I do not think it at all obvious that the provisions of the Treaty with Hungary leave Serbia entirely free in her domestic legislation where these entails are concerned. I would point out, moreover, that a similar question has arisen in Roumania, where a law has just been promulgated concerning the settlement of foreigners. The provisions of the Treaties in force are apparently opposed to the application of this law to former Austro-Hungarian nationals.

MR. SCIALOJA: Serbia will obviously not be able to confiscate these entails, but will be free to regulate the conditions of administration and succession of these properties as she likes.

MR. SERRUYS: Entail represents quite a special form of property which does indeed seem to be guaranteed by the provisions of the Treaties. They constitute an economic appropriation of ceded territory and I think they can be compared to a certain extent with public concessions. I would, moreover, point out that, according to the solution we propose, the Reparations Commission could, after liquidating such property, attribute it as it thought best. This property might therefore return to the Hungarians themselves. Without in any way prejudging the financial clauses, we thought it fair to free Serbia from an economic appropriation which might become very formidable. Moreover, the position of Serbia is particularly critical from the point of view of reparation, since the Serbs possess no Hungarian security in Serbia, since sequestrations which had been enforced were raised as a result of the enemy occupation of Serbia. Sums owed by Serbia to Austria-Hungary were paid as the result of violent measures taken by the occupying authorities, sale of furniture, etc. Serbia therefore possesses no material security for the sums owed her by Hungary. I do not think the alteration we propose is contrary to the general system forbidding the liquidation of property of persons belonging to ceded territories.

MR. CAMBON: I see good reasons in favor of each of the two solutions proposed to us, one by the Economic Commission and the other by the Financial Commission. My opinion is that, as Mr. Scialoja suggests, the question comes chiefly within the legal sphere. In those circumstances, I rather think it would be wise to refer the question to the Drafting Committee, which might be consulted immediately. In my opinion we should nevertheless explain to it the desire of the Council that, where domestic legislation is concerned, Serbia should be assured freedom in the liquidation of these entails.

LORD CURZON: I am in favor of the solution proposed by the Financial Commission. I know that the Economic Commission has given its judgment after thorough investigation, but I note that no British representative was present during its deliberations. Had the British representative been present, I do not think the Commission would have reached an unanimous decision. For my part, I am quite prepared to settle the question immediately by accepting the conclusions of the Financial Commission.

MR. SCIALOJA: I am also in favor of this solution.

MR. CAMBON: We must nevertheless avoid appearing to cover and perpetuate the institution of entail which may present serious dangers for Serbia, and at least be certain that the Serbs will be entirely free to settle the method of succession of these domains as they think best, without the possibility of opposing the provisions of the Treaty to the legislative measures they may be called upon to take. A question of private international law arises which might be referred to the Drafting Committee.

MR. SCIALOJA: I myself am a legal expert and I am unable to understand what legal objection could be formulated with the object of refusing Serbia complete freedom of action where her domestic legislation is concerned.

MR. CHEYSSON: I must point out that the Financial Commission has not examined the question in principle; it has merely given its decision on the clearly defined proposal of the Economic Commission.

MR. LAROCHE: To avoid all difference of interpretation, would it not be possible to introduce a short provision expressly reserving the right of the Serbs to regulate as they wish the conditions of transmission of the domains in question, while protecting them against any attempt at liquidation or seizure?

MR. SCIALOJA: I do not see what article there is which could possibly be opposed to measures taken by the Serbs.

MR. SERRUYS: It is the article protecting the property of enemy nationals inhabiting ceded territories. The institution of entail implies certain special forms of ownership and administration of property which might, like exemptions from taxation, be considered as forming part of the property itself and consequently as being protected by the same provisions of the Treaty. If we leave the text of the Treaty unaltered, it is to be feared that the Hungarians will maintain that the Serbs have no right to alter the transfer of property as provided for by the instrument constituting the entail.

MR. LAROCHE: An article might be inserted making it possible for the Serbs to abolish the law of entail subject to an indemnity to the owners.

MR. SCIALOJA: I do not think such a provision necessary. In my opinion the abolition of entail can in no way be considered equivalent to confiscation.

MR. CAMBON: Even if a provision of this kind is superfluous, I see no drawback to inserting it.

MR. SCIALOJA: If we provide for an exception in the Treaty with Hungary, a similar provision would have to be inserted in all the other Treaties, which has not been done. General legal principles are obviously applied, without any necessity for expressly stating the fact.

MR. CAMBON: In view of the legislative confusion arising out of the creation of so many new States and the litigious nature of the Hungarians, we must avoid leaving any doubt which might later

cause the Serbs serious difficulties. I think it would be better to provide a special provision for the case under discussion.

MR. SCIALOJA: The aim of the Serbian request was nothing less than the confiscation of entail, which we cannot allow. I should like to know which article is feared for the domestic liberty of Serbian legislation.

MR. SERRUYS: It is Article 276 [267?] of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

MR. SCIALOJA: That Article refers expressly to the case of seizure or liquidation. It does not, therefore, apply to the situation under consideration. By raising useless exceptions we risk causing doubt as to the general rule to be applied.

MR. LAROCHE: Then we might draft a reply to the Serbian note¹ indicating the reasons for which their request was not allowed. They would thus know that they are free to alter the conditions of transfer and administration of entail if they think fit.

MR. CAMBON: This solution seems to me the best. Mr. Scialoja, whose opinion has prevailed might, if he will, undertake to draft this reply to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, explaining to them the reasons for which their freedom of domestic legislation on this question of entail remains intact.

It was decided:

- (1) to adopt the conclusions of the note of the Financial Commission of January 12, 1920, and not to alter the Article of the Treaty with Hungary corresponding to Article 211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.
- (2) to instruct Mr. Scialoja to draft a reply to the note of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation of December 12, 1919, explaining the reasons for which there is no need to grant its request and specifying that no provision of the Treaty is opposed to the right of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to settle by provisions of domestic legislation the conditions of transfer and administration of entails

situated within the districts ceded by Hungary to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

The Council had before it a joint note, dated January 13, 1920 (Appendix "E") from the representatives to the Economic Commission and those of the European Coal Commission. This note was in favor of an alteration of Article 224 [207?] of the Treaty with Hungary, which makes it compulsory for the Czecho-Slovak State and for Poland to supply Hungary with a certain quantity of coal or lignite in exchange for food-stuffs and raw materials. 3. Treaty of Peace With Hungary. Report of Special Commission on Modifications to Article 207 Claimed by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation

Mr. SERRUYS commented upon this note from the Economic Commission. (Appendix "E").

It was decided:

to adopt the conclusions formulated in the note from the Economic Commission dated January 13, 1920, (Appendix "E") together with the alterations to Article 224 [207?] of the Treaty with Hungary, indicated in the annex to that note. (See also Appendix "E").

MR. SEYDOUX: The last time that the question of enemy trade in Turkey came before the Council, a note from the French Delegation was discussed, (See H. D. 122, Appendix "H"),² favoring the retention of the *status quo*; and the British Delegation had likewise drawn up a proposal of five points (see H. D. 122)³ reaching practically the same conclusions. As the Italian representative considered that the question concerned the Reparations Commission, he asked to refer the matter to his Government. The United States Ambassador also declared that he must refer the matter to Washington. 4. Prohibition of Enemy Trade in Turkey

LORD CURZON: The proposal of the French Delegation and that formulated by the High Commissioners in Constantinople differ very slightly. Nevertheless, the latter applies to Bulgaria in the same way

as to Germany, which is not, I think, the case in the former. I should think it better to accept the proposal formulated by our agents on the spot.

MR. SEYDOUX: The original proposal of the High Commissioners in Constantinople considered a very strong reinforcement of the measure at present in force. The French Delegation thought it was impossible to render the existing state of affairs more severe at a time when the Treaty was about to enter into force and that it was sufficient to retain the *status quo*. The desired object was not to paralyse German trade in Turkey, but only to prevent German direct action for propaganda purposes in a country with which we are not yet at peace. When the question came before the Council, the British Delegation submitted a draft of five points the conclusions of which almost equalled the retention of the *status quo*. I should like to know whether the proposal referred to by Lord Curzon is really that of the five points or the telegram from the High Commissioners in Constantinople asking for much more radical measures.

LORD CURZON: I am referring to the five points proposed by the British Delegation and I recommend their adoption.

MR. SCIALOJA: Those five points amount in short to excluding direct trade by sea between Germany and Turkey. I should nevertheless like to make one remark; since we discussed this question, a fresh fact has arisen, i. e., the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles. Since the day before yesterday, Germany has ceased to be an enemy Power and enjoys all rights not expressly taken from her by a definite provision of the Treaty. I do not think we could find in the Treaty of Versailles any provision limiting Germany's right of trade abroad.

LORD CURZON: Germany's rights are limited by the conditions of the Armistice with Turkey.

MR. SEYDOUX: Article 23 of the Armistice Convention with Turkey⁴ forbids all commercial relations between Turkey and the Central Powers.

MR. SCIALOJA: But Germany was then an enemy Power while today, from the legal point of view, she is a neutral Power between us and Turkey.

MR. CAMBON: We cannot impose restrictions on Germany, but we are free to impose them on Turkey, with whom we are not yet at peace.

MR. SCIALOJA: I think there is nevertheless a serious difficulty in so doing.

MR. WALLACE: My Government is not in sympathy with this proposal. We are not at peace with Germany as you are, and we think that the Reparations Commission should deal with the question, so that the payment of sums owed by Germany to the Allies may not be made more difficult by imposing useless restrictions on her commerce.

MR. CAMBON: The French Government has received from Washington a telegram indicating that the United States has informed Germany⁵ that their relations with that Power are still regulated by the Armistice Convention of November 11, and by subsequent agreements.^{5a}

MR. WALLACE: My Government's point of view on this question is perhaps broader, for the United States are not as especially interested in this question of reparation as other countries.

MR. SEYDOUX: I would recall the fact that, the last time that the Council discussed this question, the Italian representative thought that the question concerned the Reparations Commission, but Mr. Clemenceau pointed out that the Reparations Commission was only competent to deal with the execution of treaties already in force and the majority of the Council appeared to agree with him. I would add that the system we recommend puts no obstacles in the way of German-Turkish commercial relations, but merely limits the possibilities of direct relations and consequently of German influences in Turkey. German trade with the Ottoman Empire is therefore not abolished. Moreover, this trade cannot, in my opinion have a great effect on the question of reparation.

MR. SCIALOJA: It would be well to examine the five points separately.

MR. CAMMERLYNCK read the five points of the British proposal. (See H. D. 122).

MR. SCIALOJA: I think these five points can be accepted. But the drafting of them must be altered in such a way that we do indeed seem to forbid Turkey, and not Germany, to trade.

LORD CURZON: I approve entirely Mr. Scialoja's proposal.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve in principle the five points of the British proposal concerning the prohibition of enemy trade in Turkey as they appear in the Minutes of the meeting of January 5, 1920 (H. D. 122);
- (2) to instruct the British Delegation to modify the drafting of these five points so as to address the prohibition against trading formulated therein to Turkey and not to Germany.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

The Council had before it a note, dated from Coblenz, January 5, 1920 (Appendix "F") from the Interallied Rhineland High Commission. This note asked the Supreme Council to decide that the costs of the Commission should be refunded by Germany by priority, before Reparation, and on the same footing as the costs of the army of occupation. 5. Costs of Interallied Rhineland High Commission

MR. SCIALOJA: I should consider that there are drawbacks to accepting purely and simply the proposal submitted to us. It seems to me dangerous to depart from the terms of the Treaty. Now the latter expressly states what are the privileged expenses to be refunded before reparation. The costs of the Interallied Rhineland Commission are not included in that category. To include them with a high hand would be to create a dangerous precedent, and, were that example followed, would risk lessening appreciably the common security of Reparation. In any case, I do not think the Supreme

Council, whose existence is coming to a close, is competent to take a decision of this kind, the results of which might be serious. Only the Reparations Commission could deal with the question. The rather vague wording of Article 248 leads one to suppose that the Reparations Commission is competent to deal with the matter. I should see no drawback to the extension of the competence of the Reparations Commission in this way; but I should object to the Supreme Council entering on a course of action which would lead to a derogation of the Treaty.

MR. CAMBON: We might certainly refer the question to the Reparations Commission, although its Chairman is in favor of the proposal submitted to us.

It was decided:

to refer to the Reparations Commission the proposal formulated in the note dated January 5, 1920, from the Interallied Rhineland Commission.

ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR commented upon the note which appears as Appendix "G".

MR. WALLACE: Is the proportion of 2% which it was proposed to allocate to the United States in the distribution of enemy warships and docks maintained? 6. Distribution of Enemy Warships, Submarines and Port Material

ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR: The Naval representatives have had no occasion to examine the question anew since they submitted their report in which they proposed the bases of distribution which the Council examined and which the American representative was to submit for the approval of his Government.

MR. WALLACE: Inasmuch as the arrangement is maintained, I am authorized to state that the Government of the United States will not demand, or expect to receive any portion of the surrendered German Navy, or of the materiel which is to be handed over as reparation for Scapa Flow.

LORD CURZON: Does the United States Government's waiver of the proportion allocated to it apply also to the vessels that were to be employed for propaganda purposes?

ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR: The question of the propaganda ships is entirely distinct from the question of distribution of tonnage.

MR. BERTHELOT: The United States refuse the 2% allocated to them because they consider that proportion insufficient: that consideration does not apply to the propaganda ships, for the distribution of which they are upon the same footing as the other Allied Powers.

MR. CAMBON: The Council will record Mr. Wallace's declaration. The distribution can be effected forthwith.

LORD CURZON: As a result of the United States' waiver of their share, a surplus of 2% remains. I propose, if the Japanese Ambassador has no objection to that procedure, that it be divided equally between France and Italy.

MR. MATSUI: I accept Lord Curzon's proposal.

MR. CAMBON: We thank Lord Curzon for his friendly proposal and accept it gratefully.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve definitely the basis of distribution of enemy warships, submarines and port materiel, provided for in the resolutions of the Supreme Council bearing the respective dates of November 29, 1919 (See H. D. 102),⁶ December 2, 1919 (H. D. 104),⁷ and December 9, 1919 (H. D. 110);⁸
- (2) to allocate to France and Italy in equal shares, the two percent attributed to the Government of the United States, to which the latter waived all claim;
- (3) that the waiver of the United States Government to the percentage of two percent, refers expressly to the reservations made by Mr. Polk concerning the ratio attributed to the United

States in the distribution of enemy warships (H. D. 102, Paragraph 4, Minute 1, also H. D. 110, paragraph 1, Minute 1), of enemy submarines (H. D. 104, Paragraph 3, Minute 9, also H. D. 110, Paragraph 1, Minute 1), and of port materiel (H. D. 110, Paragraph 1, Minute 1, and Appendix "A", Paragraphs 2 and 4, to H. D. 110).

The Council had before it a note submitted by the Secretariat General concerning the general collection of the Conference records. (Appendix (H)). 7. Publication of the Records of the Conference

MR. ESCOFFIER: All practical arrangements are made in order that the publication of the records of the Conference may be made as soon as possible and approximately within a period of from six to nine months. But a certain number of questions of principle arise in connection with the publication on which we require instructions from the Council.

The first is that concerning the printing of the records of the Supreme Council. Should they be printed, and if so, how many copies, and in what conditions should they be distributed. From both the historical and the practical points of view, it seems better to have these documents printed, since they have been struck off on the duplicator on fragile paper and would disappear quickly were they to remain the only copies.

MR. CAMBON: The duplicator is certainly a poor means of preserving the traces of our deliberations for history. In my opinion it would be better to have a small number of copies of these documents printed, on condition that they are placed in the archives without being made public.

MR. WALLACE: I have a very strong impression that Mr. Wilson considered the conversations of four which took place sometimes at his rooms, sometimes at those of Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Clemenceau, as absolutely confidential and never to be printed. Does Mr. Escoffier think that the deliberations of the Council of Four should also be printed?

MR. BERTHELOT: When we speak of printing these texts, it must be clearly understood that it is not a question of publishing them. We simply mean that it would be better to have these texts printed, both for the examination of precedents and for the work of future historians.

LORD CURZON: The question is of much importance. A careful distinction should be made between documents which it is a question of publishing and those which are simply to be printed while retaining their secret character. Plenary meetings and those of the Commissions can eventually be published. But I am here referring specially to the minutes of the various Councils, Council of Ten, Council of Five, Council of Four. These are very confidential documents which only exist in type and which it is now proposed to replace by printed documents in order to ensure their preservation. In theory I accept this proposal, the advantages of which are obvious, but subject to the reservation that the figure proposed by the Secretariat-General of 100 copies for each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers seems to me clearly too large. Such a large number of copies would lead to a divulgence of these documents which must remain wholly secret. I would propose fixing the total number of copies printed of the records of the Supreme Council at 50.

It should be understood that, once the printing was done, the forms would be destroyed.

MR. BERTHELOT: That is understood: Moreover, they always are destroyed.

MR. SCIALOJA: Was there not a period when there were no regular minutes, but only notes taken by the various secretaries, especially by Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. Mantoux? Those notes cannot take the place of real minutes and in those circumstances it seems to me rather difficult to think of having them printed, even if they are to remain secret.

MR. BERTHELOT: This is how it happened. With one single exception which I shall give later, the records of the Supreme Council first

formed two sets of minutes. One was drawn up in English by Sir Maurice Hankey and is a model of the kind, the other was prepared by Mr. de Beam under my direction and its accuracy is also certain. It was not till later that a joint secretariat was established, responsible for drafting one single set of minutes. These minutes are attested and are the only ones prepared under absolutely regular conditions. But the two sets of minutes prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. de Beam complete each other remarkably and could perfectly well serve as a basis for printing, especially in view of the fact that it is a question of documents not meant for presentation to the public.

The exception which I pointed out just now applies to the Council known as the Council of Four, or of Three, according to whether the Italian Representative was present or not. Strictly speaking, no regular minutes were taken down. As regards the first few meetings, notes exist which were taken down by Mr. Mantoux, who was acting as interpreter. It was not until half way through these meetings that Sir M. Hankey drew up minutes which were much more complete than Mr. Mantoux's notes. As to the latter, it was decided that they should be destroyed, and only one copy thereof exists, which is in the possession of Mr. Clemenceau, who keeps them in a safe, and I think, intends to destroy them. Mr. Wilson and his Colleagues were very much concerned that these notes should not become known, so that they themselves should not be confronted with them later. As to the minutes drafted by Sir Maurice Hankey, it would be a pity to destroy them. One copy exists, in the possession of the English, and another, which we have. I should be in favor of these copies being kept, with the understanding that each Government undertakes, on its honor, to treat them as absolutely secret. I see, therefore, no objection to destroying the notes taken down by Mr. Mantoux, more especially seeing that these contained disjointed conversations, and that traces of the conclusions arrived at by means of these conversations are evident in the resolutions by the Council of Four, which are preserved in the archives of the Secretariat General, as in those of the Delegations of the Great Powers.

MR. SCIALOJA: Since these resolutions are extant, would it not be advisable to distinguish between them and the deliberations of the Council of Four? In my opinion the resolutions should be arranged in

groups and even distributed to all the Delegations, since they are of general interest. The publication thereof should include any reservations, made with regard to one or other of these resolutions, by any members of the Council. I do not think that any one of these resolutions is of a secret nature. Once these resolutions had been published it would be time to consider whether the deliberations should or should not be published *in extenso*.

LORD CURZON: This being the case, which are the documents of which there is a question of publishing 50 copies?

MR. ESCOFFIER: The position therefore is as follows: In the first place, it is now merely a question of the records of the Supreme Council. As regards the Council of Four no documents are to be printed. The deliberations of the Council of Five and those of the Council of Ten are to be printed, the total number of copies being 50.

MR. MATSUI: I should like to point out that we were not represented on the Council of Four, and do not know what took place at its meetings.

MR. BERTHELOT: You were aware of the resolutions taken by the Council of Four.

MR. ESCOFFIER: As regards all the other records of the Conference, the Secretariat General agrees with the Drafting Committee in considering that the distribution of these documents should be effected in accordance with the rules laid down in the Note of September 23, 1919, section I (See Appendix "G" [*H*]^{8a}). It also considers that the meetings of Commissions of a general nature should be distributed to all the Powers with limited interests, and that the minutes of meetings of Commissions on which only a few of the Powers with limited interests were represented, should be distributed only to the Powers represented thereon. As regards publicity, the Secretariat General is of opinion that only the minutes of plenary meetings should be made public. Other documents of the Conference, which would be marked "confidential" would be reserved exclusively for the use of the Governments.

MR. WALLACE: When will the minutes of the League of Nations be published?

MR. ESCOFFIER: If it were necessary, we should, from a material point of view, be ready to publish them in a week's time.

MR. WALLACE: It would be most embarrassing for the American Government if these documents were published before the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

MR. ESCOFFIER: We are merely considering a complete publication of these documents which will not take place before five or six months at the earliest.

The Delegations will be kind enough to inform the Secretariat General how many copies they require of each set. A double edition will be made of the records of the Conference, one part printed in English under the auspices of the British Delegation, and the other in French, drawn up by the Secretariat General.

It was decided:

- (1) that the minutes of the meetings of the Council of the Heads of Governments should not be printed. The British and French Governments should preserve the notes taken at these meetings and kept by them, pledging themselves to treat the same as strictly secret;
- (2) that the records of the Council of Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers, those of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and those of the Council of Heads of Delegations should be printed, the total number of copies being 50, and distributed to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, at the rate of ten per Government. The type used to print these documents should be destroyed as soon as the latter were worked off;
- (3) that all the resolutions (with the reservations referring thereto) adopted by the various Councils mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) above, should be printed in a separate collection and distributed to each of the Allied and Associated Powers;

- (4) that the conclusions of Part B of the Note from the Secretariat General be adopted: (Appendix “H”)
- (5) that a double edition be made of the records thus printed, one part in English under the auspices of the British Delegation, and the other in French under the auspices of the Secretariat General;
- (6) that each Delegation should inform the Secretariat General of the number of copies of each set which it would require.

The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated January 12, 1920, concerning this question (Appendix “I”).

MR. BERTHELOT commented upon this Note. He added the following: It seems to me that the question raised by the British Delegation should be considered as settled by a previous resolution of the Council, whereby American representatives are free to take part, or not, in Commissions sitting in Germany, to be present at their meetings in an official or officious capacity, according to the instructions from their Government.⁹ Under these circumstances it seems to me that the Chairman of the Interallied Naval Commission of Control in Germany cannot refuse to receive American naval officers who apply to him with a view to taking part in the said Commission. It is not for us to change our view on a question which we have had much difficulty in preventing the Germans from raising.
8. American Representation on the Interallied Naval Commission of Control in Germany

The Drafting Committee decided that the Germans could not derive any argument from the absence of the American Representatives, with a view to evading the obligations imposed on them under the Treaty.

LORD CURZON: The British Note raises two questions. It is a question here of American naval representatives who have come from the United States in order to take part in the work of the Commissions at Berlin and Heligoland. On the other hand, however, the American Government is sending no representative to the military Commissions. I cannot understand the difference thus made by the Americans between the military Commissions and the Naval Commissions.

MR. WALLACE: I cannot understand it any more than you, and I will put the question to my Government immediately.

LORD CURZON: The second point is of practical importance; i. e. who is to pay the allowances of these officers, Mr. Berthelot tells us that there is no reason for refusing to recognize them. I admit this, strictly speaking; but the German Government will doubtless refuse to pay them, and naturally the British Government cannot think of doing so. What will the position be?

MR. WALLACE: In view of the fact that the Germans have not yet raised any difficulties on that point, it would be better to leave the question open until I shall have received the instructions which I am going to ask for immediately.

LORD CURZON: If we are to wait for instructions from Washington it would be preferable for these officers not to take part in the labors of the Commissions until we know what our position is.

MR. WALLACE: It is possible that these officers may be provided with credentials from the American Government without my knowledge.

MR. BERTHELOT: There has probably been a lack of coordination between the American military and naval administration. It would be advisable for a joint decision to be taken, or for the American Government to point out the reasons for this difference which has been established between two situations, which appear to be similar. In any event it seems that we ought to leave the American officers entirely free to act as they think fit.

MR. WALLACE: I shall endeavor to obtain some light on the subject, and I hope to receive a reply with [*within*] a very short time.

LORD CURZON: Then we will do nothing before we hear the decision of the American Government?

MR. BERTHELOT: We might however ask the American officers to refrain from taking part in the labors of the Commission until this slight mis-understanding has been cleared up.

MR. CAMBON: We might inform the Chairman of the Commission that the Supreme Council is asking for explanations from Washington through the intermediary of Mr. Wallace, and considers it preferable that the American officers refrain from taking part in the meetings of the Commission until the Government of the United States has made known its intentions.

It was decided:

to inform the Chairman of the Interallied Naval Commission of Control in Germany in reply to the latter's request concerning the question of American representation on the said Commission, that the American representative on the Supreme Council was asking his Government whether the American officers were authorized to take part in the labors of the Commission; and that pending a reply from the Government at Washington it would be preferable for these officers to refrain provisionally from attending the meetings of the Commission.

LORD CURZON: I should like to raise an important question concerning the formation of our Council itself. This Conference has, during the last six months, included Mr. Clemenceau as Representative of France, Mr. Polk as Representative of the United States, Sir Eyre Crowe as Representative of the British Empire, Mr. Scialoja as Representative of Italy, and Mr. Matsui as Representative of Japan. 9. Organization of the Conference

It was decided two days ago to replace this Council by a Council of Foreign Ministers.^{9a} The present state of affairs can only last a few days, since Mr. Scialoja and myself have neither the time, nor the possibility, nor—as far as I myself am concerned—I will add—the competence, to discuss each day questions of detail which take considerable time. The object of my journey to Paris was to examine the Adriatic question as also Turkish affairs. It would be impossible to prolong my stay beyond a few days. Mr. Scialoja, who has represented his country for several months on the Conference, is better informed than I am of the questions which are before it, but he also is pressed for time. It is therefore impossible for the present

Council to be prolonged for more than a few days. It is to be replaced by the Ambassador's Council. Would it not be preferable for the Ambassadors' Council to take our place without delay? It would be better for it to examine forthwith the questions with which it will deal in future. I confess that I think the formation of our Council to have been a mistake, and that it would have been better to institute from the outset the Council of Ambassadors.

MR. CAMBON: The considerations put forward by Lord Curzon are most certainly worthy of attention, but I should like to point out that we were appointed through a decision of the Heads of Governments, and it is for them to decide whether we remain in function or disperse.

It seems to me that Lord Curzon's proposal is beyond our competence.

LORD CURZON: I do not think so. It was not the Council of Heads of Governments which appointed us, but rather the Supreme Council, of which we are the legitimate successors. I consider, therefore, that we are perfectly free to dissolve if we think that the time has come.

MR. MATSUI: As far as I personally am concerned, the question affects me very little, since being at the same time Ambassador and Plenipotentiary, I would necessarily take part in either Council. I must point out, however, that the formation of a Council of Ambassadors was decided several months ago, in order to ensure the execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany.^{[10](#)} It is evident from its mandate that it is only competent to deal with these questions. It would not be competent to deal with other questions, notably with those concerning Hungary, unless indeed we extend its competence by a fresh decision; and I see difficulties in the way of such a course.

LORD CURZON: It would however be an actual practical impossibility for us to continue to sit indefinitely.

MR. CAMBON: In spite of Lord Curzon's remark, I am not convinced that we are not obliged to consult in this matter the Heads of

Governments. Doubtless one has always the right to commit suicide, but it seems to me that it would be difficult for us to take a decision to dissolve without notifying the Prime Ministers.

MR. SCIALOJA read the resolution adopted on December 13, 1919 at the meeting in London (see Appendix "J"). He added:

In spite of the extreme importance of that meeting on account of the rank of the persons attending it, it cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a meeting of the Supreme Council.

I think however that Lord Curzon's proposal is capable of a practical solution without our being obliged to adopt it by means of a formal resolution. Each of us is free to delegate his powers, and to instruct either the Ambassador of his own Government in Paris or one of the delegates at the Conference, to represent him. We should thus arrive by practical means at the immediate formation of the Ambassadors' Council which Lord Curzon desires. I agree, moreover, with my British Colleague in thinking that the meetings of the Council cannot continue indefinitely unless the formation thereof is changed.

MR. CAMBON: I should also like to state that since our agenda is finished, there will be no need to fix today the date of our next meeting.

LORD CURZON: This being the case, it is not necessary to form an immediate resolution; as regards my proposal, I shall interview the British Prime Minister on the subject, and would be glad if my French and Italian Colleagues would, on their part, kindly see Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Nitti, on the matter.

(The meeting then adjourned).

Appendix A to CM-2

DRAFTING COMMITTEE
FOR THE CONFERENCE

JANUARY 12, 1920.

[Note]

1. According to Article I of the Hungro-Croatian Compromise of 1868,^{[11](#)} “Hungary, Croatia-Slavonia, and Dalmatia form a sole and same political community, in relation to other nations, subject to H. M., as well as in relation to all other countries.”

In practice, however, from a point of view of international relations, no Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatian individuality or character has ever been recognized by the Powers regardless of what may have been in fact or in law the position or the character of Croatia in relation to Hungary.

2. According to the Austrian Treaty, Article 203, and according to the present draft of the Hungarian Treaty, Article 186, it will be the duty of the Reparations Commission to estimate the contributory capacity of the ceded territories.

It is true that a financial compromise conventionally determined the contributive share of Croatia in regard to her own and Hungary’s mutual expenses. The last financial compromise, drawn up in 1906,^{[12](#)} was to expire in 1913, and has not been renewed. The Drafting Committee is unaware as to whether or not this compromise has remained effective by tacit agreement.

If the application of the quotations stipulated in the compromise be admitted in determining the share each of the ceded territories must assume towards the Hungarian debt, the estimates which are to be determined *ex-aequo* and *bono* would, automatically, fall beyond the competence of the Reparations Commission. Now, for political or other reasons, it is possible that the provisions of the compromise were not based exclusively on the paying capacity of the two countries. A new system would, therefore, not be in conformity with the general principle adopted.

3. Finally, it is desirable to indicate that the Financial Arrangement (Article 2) signed by the Serbians, relative to the contributions towards the war expenses, has already settled the question for these territories, inclusive of Croatia, by sanctioning the solution adopted in the Austrian Treaty and the present draft of the Hungarian Treaty.

Appendix B to CM–2

[Note From the Financial Commission]

The Financial Commission, during its meeting of December 29, 1919, examined letter No. 4668, and annexes thereto, submitted by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, relative to the Peace Treaty with Hungary.

According to the S–C–S Delegation, Croatia-Slovenia constitutes a state apart from Hungary. These two states alone formed the country of the Saint-Etienne Crown, and their unity, comparable to the Austro-Hungarian unity, was regulated by compromises. The last of these compromises was established in 1904 [1906].

Now that these countries of the Saint-Etienne Crown dissolve their union, it is desirable to effect a liquidation. The method of conducting this liquidation has been set forth by the S-C-S Delegation. The Delegation considers that in the division of the Hungarian debt and in the payment of public properties it will be impossible to apply provisions similar to those inserted in the Austrian Treaty, which were provided for ceded territories and not for states united under a same crown the separation of which has been decided upon.

The financial commission, before examining the liquidation methods to be applied between Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia, desires the opinion of the Legal Advisors on the question of International Law raised by the Serb Delegation.

Are there any grounds for assuming that Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed special statutes distinguishing her from the Banat, Prekomania, and other Hungarian comitats?

Were the successive compromises between Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia similar to the compromises between Hungary and Austria?

Do they authorize us to conclude that Croatia-Slavonia was an independent State, possessing an independent debt, and having full

possession of domanial properties the greater part of which would have been, in all probability governed by the common Hungarian administration?

Do these compromises authorize Croatia-Slavonia to claim a right of possession over common Hungro-Croatian property, whether situated in Croatia or in Hungary?

Do these compromises authorize a distinction between the Croat-Slovene expenses and the Hungarian expenses, as well as the common expenditures of Hungary and Croatia?

What was the quota of Croatia-Slavonia in the contribution towards the common expenses in 1914?

As soon as the Financial Commission receives the advice of the Legal Advisors, it will be in a position to examine the technical provisions proposed by the Serb Delegation relative to the division of the debts and the payment of public properties.

Appendix C to CM-2

PEACE CONFERENCE
FINANCIAL COMMISSION

JANUARY 12, 1920.

[Note From the Financial Commission]

The Financial Commission has examined the proposition made by the Economic Commission,^{[13](#)} relative to a modification to be introduced into the text of Article 194 of the Peace Conditions with Hungary (corresponding to the Article 260, of the Treaty with Germany) destined to give satisfaction to a claim made by the Delegation of the S-C-S.^{[14](#)}

The Financial Commission considers that it is not in a position to appreciate whether the maintenance in the Hungarian territories which have been transferred to the Kingdom of the S-C-S, of majorats, ensuring certain Hungarian subjects, both an economic

influence in vast estates and certain lordly rights, would not be likely to create political or administrative difficulties.

The Commission esteems that it is a political question which can only be settled by political measures and not by financial clauses.

The terms of Article 194 of the Peace Treaty with Hungary (corresponding to Article 211 of the Treaty with Austria) should, according to the opinion of the Financial Commission be taken in a restrictive sense, in order not to infringe the principle laid down by Article 250 (corresponding to Article 267 of the Treaty with Austria), and make it possible to the States which have ceded Hungarian territories to obtain through the intermediary of the Reparations Commission the disposition of Hungarian property, which they were forbidden to liquidate themselves.

Appendix D to CM-2

FRENCH REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE,
INDUSTRY, POSTAL AND
TELEGRAPH SERVICE

PARIS, December 27, 1919.

Cabinet of the Minister
No. 334

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Ambassador of France, Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Economic Commission has examined, in detail, the Serbian note under date of December 12, regarding the interdiction to liquidate Hungarian property in the territories transferred to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.^{[15](#)}

The Commission esteems that, by the application of the Articles of part X of the Peace Treaty, especially those having reference to the prejudices caused by decisions rendered in case of property, rights and interests, without the party concerned having an opportunity to offer any defense, the cases indicated by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, regarding the actions of the Hungarian authorities

relative to the recovery of Hungarian credits during the occupation of Serbia, justify the Serbian Government in demanding an indemnity from the Hungarian Government.

The Economic Commission was uncertain as to whether, in order to permit the Serbian Government to reimburse its nationals for the damages caused by the above mentioned act it would be advisable to authorize a liquidation of Hungarian property in new Serbia. The Commission recognized, however, that even if this authorization were accorded to the Serbian Government, the Government might be unable to employ the proceeds of the liquidation as a reparation of the damages [in] question, since by the terms of Article 297 of the Treaty with Germany (249 of the Treaty with Austria) the proceeds of the liquidation can be levied upon only for indemnities relative to the properties or credits of Serbians in Hungary.

However, the Economic Commission esteemed that, by a slight revision of Article 260 of the Treaty with Germany (211 of the Treaty with Austria) it would be possible to meet the serious objection presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, without infringing on the general system which rules in the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria concerning enemy property in transferred territory.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation specified, in demanding the liquidation of Hungarian property in the transferred Hungarian territories, that an interdiction to liquidate would maintain, within the territories which the former Empire recognized as under Hungarian influence, the economic superiority of Hungary as beneficiary, not only of most of the public concessions (means of transportation, canals, lighting etc.) but also of the *majorats* which afford certain Hungarian subjects with an important economic influence over vast domains and seigniorial rights, which might entail difficulties of an administrative or political nature.

The Economic Commission esteemed that it was impossible not to recognize the argument presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, and is of the opinion that satisfaction might be accorded Serbia by a sufficiently extensive application of Article 260 of the

Treaty of Versailles (211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain), which provides that in the transferred territories, the Reparations Commission may, within a period of one year after the entry into force of the Treaty, demand that the enemy State acquire full rights or interests for its nationals in all enterprises of public utility, or in all concessions. With special reference to the question of *majorats* the Economic Commission is of the opinion that mention of the *majorats* should be inserted in the Article above referred to in the Treaty with Hungary, under the form “demand that Hungary acquire full rights or interests for her nationals in all enterprises of public utility, or in all concessions, as well as in all *majorats*, etc. ...”

In order that, on one hand, the regime adopted concerning enemy property situated in transferred territory may not be infringed on, and, on the other hand, equitable guarantees may be assured the Serb-Croat-Slovene State against a danger which cannot be disregarded, it will be advisable, after having introduced the revision proposed by the Economic Commission in Article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles (211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain) that the Supreme Council indicate to the Reparations Commission that an extended application of this Article is to be anticipated regarding the Hungarian territories transferred to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

D. SERRUYS

Appendix E to CM-2

JANUARY 13, 1920.

Note for the Supreme Council

The representatives of the Economic Commission and the European Coal Commission assembled on January 12, 1920, to examine certain objections formulated by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, relative to Article 224 of the Treaty with Austria which stipulates an obligation by virtue of which Poland and Czecho-Slovakia are to furnish a certain amount of coal or lignite to Hungary in exchange for food stuffs and raw materials.

It has been unanimously recognized that the text of Article 224 should receive the necessary modification to the following effect:

- 1 —To take into account, in determining the quantities to be delivered, the amount of lignite which Czecho-Slovakia received from Hungary.
- 2 —Not to burden Hungary with new obligations, such as would result from the furnishing of traction coal from the Pecs Mines to the S-C-S State.
- 3 —To subject the furnishing of lignite by Hungary to Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to the same conditions as those which are imposed on these States in connection with the furnishing of coal to Hungary.

The text attached hereto has been unanimously approved by the Mixed Commission.

[Annex]

Article 224

Paragraph 1.—Special Arrangements shall be concluded between Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State and Hungary relative to the reciprocal furnishing of coal, inclusive of lignite, food stuffs, and raw materials.

Paragraph 2.—Until the conclusion of these arrangements, but in no case for more than five years following the entry into force of the Treaty, the Czecho-Slovak State and Poland undertake to impose no exportation duties or restrictions whatsoever on the exportation of coal or lignite to Hungary to an amount which, in default of an agreement between the States concerned, shall be determined by the Reparations Commission. In determining this amount the Reparations Commission will take all the elements of the situation into consideration, inclusive of the quantities of coal and lignite exchanged before the war between on the one hand, the present territory of Hungary and, on the other hand, Silesia and the territories of the former Austrian Empire transferred to the Czecho-Slovak State and Poland, in conformity with the stipulations of the Peace Treaties, as well as the quantities actually

available for exportation to these countries. Reciprocally, Hungary is to furnish the Czecho-Slovak State and Poland with lignite, food stuffs, and raw materials as referred to in Paragraph 1, in compliance with whatever decision may be adopted by the Reparations Commission.

Paragraph 3.—The Czecho-Slovak State and Poland, moreover, agree to take all necessary measures during the period to guarantee that this coal and lignite may be acquired by the buyers inhabiting Hungary under conditions equally favorable to those which govern the sale of similar products to buyers inhabiting the Czecho-Slovak State or Poland in their respective countries or in any other country, in all cases where the situation is analogous.

Paragraph 4.—The provisions of Paragraphs 2 and 3, prohibiting duties or restrictions on exportations, and establishing the conditions to govern sales, shall apply also to the supply of lignite furnished to Czecho-Slovakia and Poland by Hungary.

Paragraph 5.—In the case of any differences which may arise relative to the execution or interpretation of any of the above provisions the Reparations Commission will have the deciding voice.

Appendix F to CM–2

Note Dated January 5, 1920, From the Interallied Rhineland High Commission

[Here follows note printed as appendix H to HD–124, page 831 [*Pg. 831 is part of [Doc. 40](#)*].]

Appendix G to CM–2

[PARIS, January 7, 1920.]

Note Concerning the Attribution of Enemy Battleships

1.—In a resolution H. D. 102 (1) of Nov. 29, 1919,^{[16](#)} the Supreme Council in order to permit Mr. Polk to refer to his Government, decided to postpone the settlement of the percentages to be observed in the distribution between the Principal Allied and Associated

Powers, of enemy battleships and port material claimed from Germany by the Protocol of November 1st.^{[17](#)}

A similar decision was taken in the resolution H. D. 104 (VI [IX] of December 2nd, in regard to enemy submarines).^{[18](#)}

2.—The Treaty of Peace with Germany will shortly come into force. This Treaty provides that the ships to be delivered shall be taken to Allied Ports; therefore, these ports should be indicated; but this cannot be done before the attribution of the ships shall have been agreed upon by the Powers concerned. Now, this distribution depends on the percentage.

3.—For the above reasons, it is requested that the Government of the United States be invited to make known, as soon as possible, whether it accepts the proposal presented by the other four Allied Powers, concerning the distribution of the enemy surface battleships and submarines, and of the port material.

Appendix H to CM–2

PEACE CONFERENCE
SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Note Relative to a General Compilation of the Acts of the Conference

The Secretariat General of the Conference has, at the request of the Delegations, taken up the question of printing a General Compilation of the Acts of the Conference. The plan of classification hereto annexed (Annex A) is approved by the General Secretariat of the Principal Powers.^{[*](#)}

The Secretariat General has the honor to submit this plan for adoption by the Supreme Council, with a special request that the Council pronounce, in particular, on the following points:

(A) *Printing of the Acts of the Supreme Council.*

These Acts only exist in a state of mimeographed copies, and as they are liable to disappear rapidly, it is desirable to have them printed and kept in the Archives of the Governments having participated in the different phases of the Supreme Council.

It is certain that during the execution of the Treaties of 1919, the Allies will be obliged to repeatedly refer, for interpretation of texts, to the Resolutions of the Supreme Council and to the discussions which preceded their adoption.

The number of copies of the Acts of the Supreme Council might be limited to 100 to each of the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

(B) Distribution of the Minutes and Reports of the Commissions.

In the course of the Conference, copies of the minutes and reports were printed and distributed among the Delegations for their immediate needs. However, in the course of the execution of the Treaties, the various ministerial Departments of the Allied and Associated Powers and the organizations on execution will require an ensemble of these documents printed and bound, as is the custom at the conclusion of any international Conference.

However, in view of the character of certain Commissions whose deliberations are to remain secret, it is desirable to arrange distribution and publicity rules to cover these various documents.

The Drafting Committee has given its views in the annexed note (Annex B).

The Secretariat General agrees in regard to the part upon which the Drafting Committee was unanimous, but refers to the Supreme Council for a decision relative to No. 4 of Part I of the said Note, namely:

4.—Each of the other Allied and Associated Powers should receive the Minutes and Reports of the Commissions (including the Sub-Commissions, Committees or sub-Committees) in which they participated.

1.—Whether the Minutes of the Commissions should be distributed to Powers other than those having participated therein;

2.—Whether these documents should be not only delivered privately, but generally published.

1) As there were two different kinds of Commissions; those of a general order in which all the Powers with special interests were represented by Delegates nominated by them; or those in which only a few Powers with special interests were represented; the Secretariat General esteems:

that, relative to the Acts of the first named Commissions, it is desirable to distribute them to all the Powers having special interests;

and that, relative to the Acts of the second named Commissions, only the Powers represented—and not those merely consulted—should be entitled to these documents.

2). Concerning general publication, the Secretariat General esteems that, in conformity with the rules of the Conference, only the Protocols of the Plenary Sessions should be given publicity, and that the other documents of the Conference which bear the mention “Confidential” should be reserved for the exclusive use of the Governments.

Annex A

General Compilation of the Acts of the Peace Conference

CLASSIFICATION PLAN

PART I.—ACTS OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL

(Not printed and reserved.)

A.—Council of the Heads of the Governments and of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. (January 12–March 24, 1919).

B.—Council of the Heads of Governments (March 25–June 28, 1920 [1919]).

C.—Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (March 27–July 5, 1919).

D.—Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers. (July 5, 1919–January, 1919 [1920]).

PART II.—MINUTES OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

PART III.—PROTOCOLS OF THE PLENARY SESSIONS, AND OF THE MEETINGS OF THE POWERS OF SPECIAL INTERESTS

A.—Plenary Sessions: Protocols 1 to 8.

B.—Meetings of the Powers of Special Interests (2 and 3).

PART IV.—COMMISSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

(Minutes, Acts and Reports.)

A.—Committee on the Verification of Powers.

2. Drafting Committee.

B.—General Questions.

1. Commission of the League of Nations.

2. Commission of the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, and penalties.

3. Commission on the Reparations of Damages.

4. Commission on International Labor Legislation.

5. Commission of the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

6. Financial Commission.

7. Economic Commission.

8. Air Commission.

9. Prisoners of War Commission.

10. Geographical Commission.

C.—Territorial Questions.

1. Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs.
2. Commission on Polish Affairs.
 - a) Interallied Polish Commission.
 - b) Permanent Interallied Teschen Commission.
 - c) Commission on Polish Affairs. (Paris)
 - d) Commission for the Negotiation of an Armistice between Poland and Ukraina.
3. Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs.
4. Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs.
5. Commission on Danish and Belgian Affairs.
6. Commission on Baltic Affairs.
7. Central Committee on Territorial Questions.

D.—Special Questions.

a) Preparation of the Treaties with enemy States.

1. Commission of the Drafting of the Military, Naval, and Aerial Clauses.
2. Commission on Sub-Marine Cables.
3. Moroccan Commission.
4. Commission on German Colonies.
5. Interallied Commission to the Left Bank of the Rhine.
6. Tien-Tsin Commission.

b) Treaties between Allies.

1. Commission on New States.
2. Revision of the Acts of Berlin and Brussels.

c) Divers Treaties.

1. Spitzberg Commission.
2. Commission on the Revision of the Treaties of 1839.

PART V.—TREATIES,—NEGOTIATION AND SIGNING OF.

A. Treaties and Conventions with enemy powers.

a) Germany.

1. From the convocation of the German Delegation until the delivery of the Observations of that delegation on the Peace Conditions (April 17–May 29, 1919).
2. Study of the Observations of the German Delegation and Reply of the Allies. (Minutes of the Reply and Coordination Committees) (May 10–June 16, 1919).
3. From the delivery of the Observations of the German Delegations until the signing of the Treaty (from May 30 to June 28, 1919).

Annex—Successive stages of the Treaty.

b) Austria.

1. From the Convocation of the Austrian Delegation until the delivery of the Observations of that Delegation on the Peace Conditions (May 2–August 6, 1919).
2. Study of the Observations of the Austrian Delegation and Reply of the Allies. (Minutes of the Reply and Coordination Committees.) (August 6–September 2, 1919).
3. From the delivery of the Observations of the Austrian Delegation until the signing of the Treaty (from August 6 to September 10, 1919).

Annex—Successive stages of the Treaty.

c) Bulgaria.

1. From the convocation of the Bulgarian Delegation until the delivery of the Observations of that Delegation on the Peace Conditions. (July 10–October 24, 1919.)
2. Study of the Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation and Reply of the Allies (Minutes of the Reply and Coordination Committees.) (October 25–November 3, 1919).
3. From the delivery of the Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation until the signing of the Treaty (from October 27 to November 27, 1919).

Annex—Successive stages of the Treaty.

d) Hungary.

1. From the convocation of the Hungarian Delegation until the delivery of the Observations of that Delegation on the Peace Conditions (December 1, 1919)
- 2.
- 3.

Annex—Successive stages of the Treaty.

e) Turkey.

1. From the convocation of the Ottoman Delegation to the departure of that Delegation. (June 4–July 4, 1919).

B. Treaties and Conventions with the Allies.

a) General Treaties between Allies.

1. Aeronautic.
2. Arms.
3. Spirits.
4. Revision of the Acts of Berlin and Brussels.

b) Special Treaties between Allies.

1. Poland.
2. Czecho-Slovakia.
3. Serb-Croat-Slovene State.
4. Roumania.
5. Greece.
6. Etc.

C. Treaties and Conventions with other States.

1. Spitzberg.
2. Revision of the Treaties of 1839.

PART VI.—TREATIES—ENTRY INTO FORCE.

A. Preparation of the Entry into Force.

1. Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty.
2. Rhineland Commission.
3. Commission on German Colonies and Mandates.
4. Scapa-Flow Commission.
5. Prisoners of War Commission.
6. Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.
7. Commission of the League of Nations.
8. Commission on the Organization of the Labor Conference.
9. Organization Commission on Mixed Tribunals.

B. Exchange of Notes relative to the Entry into Force.

1. Germany.
2. Austria.
3. Bulgaria.
4. Etc.

C. Ratification, Accession, and Entry into Force.

PART VII.—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS.

1. Delegation Memoranda.
2. Fiume and Smyrna Inquiry Commissions.
3. Etc.

Annex B

SEPTEMBER 23, 1919.

Note for the Secretariat General

The Secretariat General of the Conference has asked the Drafting Committee to present its opinion relative to the distribution of the documents concerning the preparatory labors of the Peace Treaties.

The Committee has the honor to reply as follows:

–I–

1. Each of the Allied and Associated Powers and each of the enemy Powers concerned should receive the minutes of the sessions of the Congress, that is: the Versailles Sessions, relating to Germany; the Saint-Germain Sessions, relating to Austria; and the Sessions at Paris and Neuilly, relating to Bulgaria.
2. Each of the Allied and Associated Powers should receive the Minutes of the Plenary Sessions of the Peace Conference, which is an Interallied Conference.
3. Each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should receive all the Minutes and the Reports of the Commissions (including the Sub-Commissions, Committees or Sub-Committees) and in general all the official works of the Conference.
4. Each of the other Allied and Associated Powers should receive the Minutes and Reports of the Commissions (including the Sub-Commissions, Committees or Sub-Committees) in which they participated.

The opinion of the Committee is unanimous on these different questions.

–II–

Relative to the questions as to whether or not the distribution above referred to should be extended, and, in particular if the Minutes of the Commissions should be distributed, to Powers other than those having participated therein,—whether these documents should be given publication instead of being delivered privately,—the Drafting Committee, whose views on this point are not unanimous, esteems that this point is essentially a political matter and that any legislation pertaining thereto should be submitted to the Supreme Council.

For the Drafting Committee
[No signature on file copy]

BRITISH DELEGATION
PARIS

Memorandum

The question has been raised by the President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control for Germany as to American representation on that Commission.

He states that the United States officers designated by their Government as members of the Commission propose to present themselves to him, in his capacity as President.

His view is that he cannot recognize them as members of a Commission set up under a Treaty to which their Government is not a party; and he requests that the Supreme Council may decide as to whether the American representatives can form part of his Commission, either officially or unofficially. If they co-operate unofficially, it is thought that the Germans may have the right to refuse to pay any expenses on their behalf.

JANUARY 12, 1920. **Appendix J to CM-2**

(Supreme Council, December 13, 1919, 3:30 p.m.)
(Session held at London, 10 Downing Street.)

Resolution B

FUTURE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Those present:

American	representatives,
British	“
French	“
Italian	“
Japanese	“

It was decided:

- (1) that the present Session of the Peace Conference should terminate by Christmas, or at the latest, within the fifteen days following the *procès-verbal* of the Deposit of the Ratifications of the Peace Treaty with Germany;
- (2) that at the expiration of the present Session of the Peace Conference, all important political questions should be handled by means of direct communications between the Governments themselves, while all questions of detail should be taken up by the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris.

¹ Appendix G to HD–119, p. 717 [Pg. 717 is part of [Doc. 35](#)].

² *Ante*, p. 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 38](#)].

³ Minute 6, p. 789 [Pg. 789 is part of [Doc. 38](#)].

⁴ See telegram No. 32 from the Special Representative in Paris, [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 441](#) .

⁵ See note to the Swiss Minister, January 13, 1920, [Foreign Relations, 1920, vol. II, p. 258](#) .

^{5a} [Vol. II, pp. 1](#) –[16](#) .

⁶ Minute 1, p. 360 [Pg. 360 is part of [Doc. 18](#)].

⁷ Minute 9, p. 435 [Pg. 435 is part of [Doc. 20](#)].

⁸ Minute 1, p. 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 26](#)].

^{8a} Annex B, p. 996 [Pg. 996 is part of [Doc. 52](#)].

⁹ HD–72, minute 7, and appendix I, [vol. VIII, pp. 690](#)  and [707](#) .

^{9a} See HD–125, minute 4, p. 838 [Pg. 838 is part of [Doc. 41](#)].

¹⁰ HD–17, minute 1, [vol. VII, p. 356](#) .

¹¹ For text, see Great Britain, Foreign Office Handbook No. 8, *Croatia-Slavonia and Fiume* (London, 1920), p. 78.

¹² See *ibid.*, p. 92.

¹³ See appendix D, *infra*.

¹⁴ See appendix G to HD–119, p. 717 [Pg. 717 is part of [Doc. 35](#)].

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ante*, p. 360 [Pg. 360 is part of [Doc. 18](#)].

¹⁷ Appendix C to HD–80, [vol. VIII, p. 865](#) .

¹⁸ *Ante*, p. 435 [Pg. 435 is part of [Doc. 20](#)].

*
_ The British Delegation has agreed to publish the compilation in English; the Secretariat General will publish the French Compilation.
[Footnote in the original.]

January 21, 11 a.m. (CM-3)

[\[53\] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Wednesday, January 21, 1920, at 11 a.m.](#)

Paris, January 21, 1920, 11 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03701/3

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03701/3

CM-3

[Document 53]

Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Wednesday, January 21, 1920, at 11 a.m.

Paris, January 21, 1920, 11 a.m.

PRESENT

BRITISH EMPIRE

Lord Curzon

Secretaries

Mr. Leeper,
Capt. Lothian Small

ITALY

Mr. de Martino,

Secretaries

Mr. Trombetti,
Mr. Zanchi.

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau,
Mr. Millerand,

Secretaries

Mr. Dutasta,
Mr. Berthelot,
Mr. Massigli.

JAPAN

Mr. Matsui,

Secretaries

Mr. Kawai.

Interpreter—Mr. Mantoux

General Cavallero (Italy) was also present at the meeting to deal with questions with which he was concerned.

MR. MANTOUX read a draft letter prepared by the British Delegation in reply to a communication from Mr. Lansing.¹ (Appendix “A”.)

A draft letter prepared by Mr. Berthelot in reply to the same communication was then read. (Appendix “B”). (1) Reply to Mr. Lansing’s Memorandum

MR. BERTHELOT: In preparing this draft reply I took up a different point of view, as the Council observes. Lord Curzon’s reply seems to me to be infinitely superior; it is far more complete, and goes to the very bottom of the questions. But I chose to interpret Mr. Lansing’s Note as a display of bad temper and not as a direct communication from President Wilson, and I replied without entering very deeply into the questions, which would have been dealt with subsequently in an appendix, in which we should have asked to know the opinion of the American Government.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: It seems to me that the question of peace with Turkey ought not to be included in this reply to Mr. Lansing; it is important, I know; but this is yet another reason why it should be treated separately from the question of the Adriatic; also it is a question to be dealt with by my successor.

I asked Mr. Millerand to permit me to remain until now in order to settle the Italian question, concerning which we have been interrogated by Mr. Wilson; there are papers in connection with it which are signed by me, and I intended to make a suitable reply.

The question of peace with Turkey of course remains on the agenda, but it must be discussed with Mr. Millerand; I have no right to deal with it.

That being said, I think the two draft letters excellent; each has its advantages and disadvantages: nevertheless, I could not accept that of Lord Curzon without a slight alteration on which he will, I think, be in agreement with me: he says that, once an agreement had been

reached, we should not have failed to inform President Wilson; I would rather that we used the following formula: that we should not have failed to submit it for his approval. For it is indeed a matter of approval.

MR. DE MARTINO: President Wilson may prefer not to pronounce an opinion.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Then he will not pronounce one. Mr. Berthelot points out to me that, if we use that formula we appear to make President Wilson an arbitrator: but in our system of discussion we are all arbitrators: we must be unanimous among ourselves; if one of us disagreed, nothing would be done.

I think the wording I propose would quite disarm Mr. Wilson: it only expresses the truth.

LORD CURZON: I agree with you.

MR. MILLERAND: So do I.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: With this alteration, I am prepared, while thinking Mr. Berthelot's text excellent, to adopt that of Lord Curzon.

LORD CURZON: I think Mr. Clemenceau's observation is perfectly true.

As to avoiding all mention of the Turkish question, another argument in favour of the point of view supported by Mr. Clemenceau is that the telegram communicated to us only spoke of Russia and Italy and not of Turkey at all.

Moreover, I quite understand that Mr. Clemenceau only wishes to reply to those points which concern the part he has taken in negotiations, and that the Turkish negotiations must in future be considered as within the competence of the new French Cabinet.

I am therefore prepared to accept these considerations if the text I have proposed is otherwise accepted.

Our draft has, indeed, several advantages. Mr. Berthelot's is, as he said, in reality a reply to Mr. Lansing, but there is no doubt, however the telegram communicated to us is read, that it comes from the Government of the United States; it would consequently be better to address that Government itself.

Finally, it is better to go thoroughly into the questions and give arguments, while showing, of course, the greatest courtesy to the American Government, both as regards substance and form.

MR. DE MARTINO: Since the American Government addressed the French and British Governments, I am not concerned in the drafting of this reply. I merely thank you for so kindly communicating it to us. Nevertheless, I should like to make one request.

In his draft reply, Mr. Berthelot says that the Allied Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan never intended to come to a decision apart from and contrary to the advice of President Wilson: this idea does not appear in Lord Curzon's note. I request that it may be added.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: I agree.

MR. MATSUI: The Japanese Delegation has not always been consulted. It would therefore be better to omit this reference to Japan. I ask that this word be struck out, especially as I do not know the contents of Mr. Lansing's note.

MR. DE MARTINO: May I, Sir, before you retire, return to the letter sent by Mr. Nitti to the President of the Conference on January 17, of which I was speaking to you a short time ago.

It is, in short, a matter of verifying a simple *de facto* circumstance, and of seeing whether there is or is not a mistake and whether or not Mr. Nitti makes a new proposal.

According to us, it is a mistake which has crept into the text and which Mr. Nitti has to rectify by drawing attention to the enormous difficulty by which he would be faced in order to obtain the acceptance by our Parliament of the limitation of the sovereignty of

Fiume, thus placed under the control of the League of Nations. I am going to telegraph to Mr. Nitti.

MR. BERTHELOT: I share the opinion of the Council, and so think it would be better not to speak of Turkey in the reply to Mr. Lansing. The question was well put recently, but by Mr. Jusserand, who pointed out that the attitude adopted by America would postpone the solution of that question indefinitely. To this Mr. Lansing replied that he had no intention of postponing the settlement by the Allies of the Turkish problem. In reality, the opinion of the American Government seems to be as follows: it did not make war on Turkey; we can therefore deal with the Turkish question among ourselves; on the other hand, if it is interested in the Adriatic question, the Russian problem, it is because it was involved in the war against Austria and was associated with Russia.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Mr. Jusserand's telegram is only of value to the Conference for the information it gives.

I do not oppose the request made by the Japanese Ambassador.

Finally, Mr. de Martino states that a drafting error has crept into the text concerning Fiume; this is a question to be settled with the Secretariat. For my part, I think we are bound to defend the document transmitted to the Yugo-Slavs; our word is pledged; as far as I am concerned, I wish to change nothing in that text.

On the other hand, the British Representative agrees not to mention Turkey in the reply to Mr. Lansing and accepts the addition proposed by Mr. de Martino.

We are therefore in agreement.

MR. BERTHELOT: Will the note be sent through the intermediary of Mr. Jusserand on behalf of the Conference and signed by the President, or will it on the other hand be transmitted by the British Government?

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The question is not who will send it, but who will sign it. I think it should be signed by Mr. Lloyd George and myself,

since I remained here specially for this question; especially as Mr. Wallace himself transmitted it to Mr. Lloyd George and to me.

LORD CURZON: Then we must give the reply to Mr. Wallace signed by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau. I am authorized by the British Prime Minister to sign it for him.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The reply will therefore be signed by Mr. Lloyd George and myself.

It was decided:

that Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George would hand the telegram appearing in Appendix "C" to Mr. Wallace for transmission to Washington.

LORD CURZON: I think an error has crept into the decision adopted after hearing Mr. Ador.² We decided that the question of the retention of perpetual Swiss neutrality within the League of Nations should be laid before the Council of the League, which would examine it and communicate its decisions to the Supreme Council, which would take the final decision. 2. Entry of Switzerland Into the League of Nations

After investigation it appears that in this resolution there were certain drawbacks and that the question raised comes exclusively within the scope of the Council of the League of Nations.

It would thus be best to say that the Council of the League of Nations shall pronounce judgment and shall inform the Supreme Council of its decision. The danger of the adoption of contradictory decisions could thus be avoided. It is, moreover, probable that Switzerland will obtain satisfaction; otherwise she will still have the right to appeal to the Assembly of the League in conformity with the Covenant.

I therefore propose to alter the resolution adopted yesterday.

Another question arises.

We decided that the date from which should count the period allowed to Switzerland for admission into the League of Nations as an original member should be that of the entry into force of the last Treaty containing the Covenant; consequently it would perhaps be the date of the entry into force of the Treaty with Turkey, which is not yet drafted. That solution seems impossible.

The neutrals have, indeed, been informed that they had two months from the ratification of the Treaty with Germany in which to adhere to the Covenant; if Switzerland is allowed a special regime, those might plead this precedent and it would then become impossible, in case of necessity, to summon the League of Nations and its Assembly. This cannot have been the intention of the Supreme Council.

Accordingly, it would, I think, be better to retain the original decision, the period of two months from the date of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles.

MR. MATSUI: From the legal point of view, this point is open to discussion; thus China, for instance, who did not sign the Treaty of Versailles, can ask to belong to the League of Nations after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty with Austria, which also contains the Covenant of the League.

MR. BERTHELOT: It was desired to render the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations possible and the constitutional delays required by her in order to organize her referendum were taken into account. That was the question about which Mr. Ador was concerned.

On the other hand, as Lord Curzon said, it is obvious that neutrals have only two months after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles; but the fact that Switzerland is allowed a privileged position on account of the guarantees of perpetual neutrality given by the Powers, is perhaps not enough to alter what was decided for the other States.

It is none the less true that it is perhaps excessive to give Switzerland two months after the coming into force of the last Treaty; between the two extremes a solution might perhaps be found in the ingenious suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador and the period might date from the coming into force of the Treaty with Austria.

MR. MILLERAND: Could it not be considered enough for the Federal Government to have given its consent subject to the referendum to be taken?

MR. BERTHELOT: The Swiss Government is of the opinion that this solution would not justify it before the country and that it would risk seeing the referendum decide against adhesion to the League.

LORD CURZON: My proposal was suggested to me by Sir Eric Drummond, who has dealt exclusively with the legal point of view and who, as you can well believe, is actuated by no feelings of hostility to Switzerland, but rather the reverse.

Moreover, if it was agreed that the time necessary for taking a referendum must be granted to Switzerland, the suggestion made by the Japanese Ambassador, that the period of two months should only count from the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty with Austria, would perhaps offer a means of evading the difficulty.

MR. BERTHELOT: Switzerland is in an exceptional position; it is the only state which is perpetually neutral: that is perhaps legitimate reason to make special arrangements for her.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Do you then wish us to refer this question for the examination of Mr. Fromageot and his colleagues?

It was decided:

- (1) That the question how far the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland is compatible with her entry into the League of Nations be referred for examination by the Council of the League of Nations, which would be requested to inform the Supreme Council of its conclusions.

(2) That the question as to how Switzerland must notify her adhesion to the League of Nations be referred for examination to the legal experts.

Mr. Clemenceau withdrew and Mr. Millerand took his place in the chair.

LORD CURZON: A resolution was voted by the Supreme Council some time ago³ according to which:— 3. Future of the Conference.
Ambassador's Council

“The present session of the Peace Conference shall terminate at the latest in the fortnight following the drawing up of the first minutes of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Germany; after the close of the present session, important political questions shall be dealt with by direct communications between the Governments themselves, while questions of detail shall be settled by a Conference of the Ambassadors in Paris.”

We have reached a time when, owing to the departure of Messrs. Lloyd George and Nitti, the illness of Mr. Scialoja and the need for my return to England, the Conference can no longer continue in its present form. Accordingly, I think the resolution adopted during the London conferences of December 11–13, 1919, should be executed and that this Conference of Ambassadors should be inaugurated, to deal from day to day with questions concerning the Treaty and its execution, important essential political questions being reserved for direct decision by the Governments.

If we are agreed to inaugurate this new phase of our work, I declare, on behalf of the British Government, that the British representative on that Conference will be Lord Derby.

MR. DE MARTINO: Mr. Scialoja, whose health is happily slightly improved and whom I saw a short time ago, asked me to support the point of view which he has already defended before the Conference. Indeed, he sees no need to create a fresh organization since there are still important questions to be discussed such as that of the Treaty

with Hungary and others; under these circumstances, Mr. Scialoja thinks it would be well to allow the Governments to be represented on that meeting by the men they consider most qualified; it may be their Ambassador but, if necessary, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs could, if they so desire, take part in person.

We are agreed in thinking that important questions of principle will be dealt with in meetings of the Presidents of the Council or by direct communication between the Governments; but the execution of decisions thus taken should nevertheless be examined and prepared by an Interallied meeting. That is why Mr. Scialoja wished to accept the point of view expressed by Lord Curzon to the effect that the Ambassadors would be empowered to take part in that meeting when their Governments thought fit.

MR. MATSUI: I can the more readily accept Lord Curzon's proposal as I am ambassador and at the same time plenipotentiary but it is understood that if I, for instance, or Lord Derby, were prevented from being present at a meeting, we could always send somebody in our place.

MR. MILLERAND: In view of the resolution already adopted and the execution of which is alone requested by Lord Curzon, I for my part have no objection to make to the execution of that resolution.

Would it not, however, be well if it was understood that, when a Government considered it better to replace the Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs or by the Head of the Government, this should take place automatically? In other words, I should not like the term "Ambassadors' Conference" to be taken in too narrow a sense, so as to prohibit Heads of Governments or Ministers for Foreign Affairs from taking part in the discussion.

LORD CURZON: I agree entirely with the President. We have a resolution to carry out: consequently, this Ambassadors' Conference must be set working: but, when circumstances render it necessary, there is nothing to prevent the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Head of the Government of a country, or even any individual whose

presence is considered necessary by the latter, from taking part in it instead of and on behalf of the Ambassador.

On the other hand, I would reply to Mr. de Martino that, as far as the Treaty with Turkey is concerned, the Governments never intended to entrust the preparation of the Treaty to the Ambassador's Conference. That is a question reserved for the Supreme Council and which will ultimately render it necessary for it to meet.

MR. BERTHELOT: The Premiers who met in London had no idea of an Ambassadors' Conference; this meeting was given a much more modest title, that of "Ambassadors' Committee"; it was thought that current affairs could be treated in this way by general collaboration: but it was also understood that, whenever a question required the opinion of the Governments, a meeting might be held to discuss it either at London, at Rome, or Paris, as decided by the Heads of Governments.

Accordingly, when it was decided to deal with the Turkish question, the Ambassadors' Committee would not have power to discuss it: it would be examined in a meeting of the Premiers in one of the three capitals.

Moreover, unless my memory fails me, it was agreed between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau that when the Turks were summoned it should be to Paris, and that in the same way the Treaty would be signed in Paris.

LORD CURZON: I wish to make two remarks.

First, as regards the term "Ambassadors' Conference", since the expression is used in the resolution, I think it would be better for us to retain it, instead of substituting that of "Ambassadors' Committee"; especially as the result of the latter phrase would be to limit the object of that meeting.

In the second place, I know of no arrangement concluded between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau concerning the place to which the Turkish representatives would be summoned or where the Peace

with Turkey would be signed. All I know is that Mr. Lloyd George intends the discussion of Turkish affairs to take place in London, for it will for a long time be difficult for him and for me to leave England.

I wished to make this statement, so as not to be bound by what Mr. Berthelot has just said.

MR. BERTHELOT: In the conversation which I ventured to recall, it was indeed decided that the discussions on Turkish affairs should take place in London, but at the same time it was added that the Turks would be summoned to Paris, where the Treaty with them would be signed.

MR. MILLERAND: That is, moreover, what Mr. Clemenceau told me. It is clearly understood, as I have already told Mr. Lloyd George, that I am at his disposal and at yours to go to London as soon as this is desired, in order to begin discussing the Treaty with Turkey.

I only ask permission to reserve the two points indicated by Mr. Berthelot, i. e. the summoning of the Turkish delegates to Paris and the signature of the Treaty at Paris.

MR. BERTHELOT: Mr. Clemenceau also relied on the fact that the Turkish delegates have already been summoned to Paris and that, at a time, when the Conference has sent them a reply that the question is pledged.

MR. MATSUI: I wish to make a remark on the powers of this conference of Ambassadors.

A resolution was passed on the 28th July last establishing the Council of Ambassadors and investing it with certain powers;⁴ but the resolution adopted in London in December is not at all the same. What is the opinion of the meeting on the subject?

MR. MILLERAND: I imagine that it will be necessary to decide definitely on the powers of the respective assemblies.

As I understand it, the Committee or the Conference of Ambassadors will only sit in the intervals of the meetings of the Supreme Council: it is therefore essential to establish exactly the powers of the two assemblies.

For example, which of them is to deal with the Treaty with Hungary? the Committee of Ambassadors, or will it be necessary to convoke the Supreme Council.

MR. BERTHELOT: The Treaty has already been handed to the Hungarians, it is therefore only a question of details and henceforth these will be examined and decided by the Conference of Ambassadors. The resolutions passed by that Conference will be submitted to the various Governments for approval and for decisions as to concessions: final decisions will be taken by the Heads of Governments.

MR. DE MARTINO: Are the Ambassadors then not to have full powers as the plenipotentiaries of their Governments?

MR. MILLERAND: It would appear so from the second paragraph of the London resolution; the Ambassadors are to have powers only on questions of detail. It has also been decided that the Governments represented at the Conference of Ambassadors can, if they think necessary, be represented by a substitute for the more general questions.

LORD CURZON: Mr. Clemenceau has expressed the opinion that it would be better, in the answer to be made to the telegram of the United States Government, not to mention Turkey at all but to speak only of Italy and Russia; on the other hand the negotiations on the Turkish question will be commenced as soon as Mr. Millerand is able to go to London. Would it not be a good thing therefore to see in what way we could advise the United States that we desire their presence and their counsels? Not to take this step might cause grave offence. 4. Turkish Question

It was with this in mind that I drafted my telegram on the subject of Turkey: could we not now express the same idea in some way?

MR. MILLERAND: This idea you wish to express is already contained in your first draft, apart from all reference to Turkey: you say there "It goes without saying that the French and British Governments attach the greatest importance to the presence of a United States representative."

MR. DE MARTINO: That is so; nevertheless, when the time comes actually to begin negotiations with Turkey, it would be expedient to ask once more for the co-operation of the United States. The United States Government will then have either to accept co-operation, and this would be all to the good, or to refuse: in neither case will it have any cause for complaint.

MR. MILLERAND: We could now inform the United States what negotiations are about to be opened and that we should be glad to see a representative of the United States take part in them.

LORD CURZON: Who is to make this communication?

MR. MILLERAND: All the Allies.

LORD CURZON: Has the passage referring to Turkey been left in the draft letter?

MR. MILLERAND: I think that the most satisfactory solution both for you and for us would be to delete all reference to Turkey from your note, as was indeed decided, leaving only the passage in which you express the value we attach, generally speaking, to the presence of a United States representative here.

Further, before the meeting to be held in London, the Allies should send a note to Washington, asking the American Government to send a plenipotentiary as its representative, if possible.

LORD CURZON: I think that we should communicate this to Washington at once in as definite a way as possible; the situation in the East will not allow delay; we must not be content with merely formulating in a general way our wish to obtain the collaboration of the United States on other matters and put off until the moment of

our meeting in London our request that they send a plenipotentiary to London.

MR. MILLERAND: If we are agreed as I think we are, that in the letter to be sent in answer to Mr. Lansing's telegram, all mention to [*of*] Turkey should be omitted, and that the expression of our wish to see the United States represented should be maintained, I see no reason why we should not at the same time draw up a special note advising the United States Government, in the name of the Allies, that a Conference by the Heads of Governments is to be held in London immediately on Turkish affairs and that we attach the greatest importance to the participation of an American plenipotentiary.

LORD CURZON: We are agreed and I therefore ask your permission to draw up the communication in question with Mr. Berthelot.

MR. BERTHELOT: In these circumstances, the first telegram might be remitted to Mr. Wallace who would forward it to his Government; the other note would be transmitted to the United States Government by Mr. Jusserand. The two communications would be kept definitely separate, as a sign of deference to Washington.

It was decided:

that a telegram be sent to Washington in the name of the Supreme Council to invite the United States Government to send a plenipotentiary as its representative to the forthcoming negotiations on the Turkish Question.

MR. DE MARTINO: I understand that the Conference of Ambassadors will decide the outstanding questions on the Italian frontier?

The frontiers of what ought to have been the buffer state have already been fixed but the line has not yet been defined from the north of the buffer state to the Austrian frontier. 5. Frontiers of Italy and of Yugo-Slavia

MR. BERTHELOT: All that remains to be done, I believe, is the work of delimitation by the commissions on the spot.

MR. DE MARTINO: It is a question of adjusting the line laid down by the Treaty of London and the Wilson line to the north of the territory to form the buffer state.

GENERAL CAVALLERO: I think that is not so. From the buffer state to Tarvis nothing definite has been decided, either in principle or in fact.

MR. BERTHELOT: It is difficult to discuss this question without the aid of a map. We might study it separately and bring the matter up again before the Council of Ambassadors who in its turn would decide whether it is necessary to refer it to the Heads of Governments.

MR. DE MARTINO: In any case, the question cannot be decided without our co-operation.

MR. MILLERAND: This will be an example of a case in which the Ambassador of the Royal Government can, if he judges necessary, ask to have the matter referred to the Supreme Council.

MR. LAROCHE: The memorandum of the 9th December 1919⁵ had decided in principle the question of the whole Italian frontier, and only matters of detail remain which can only be established on the spot.

GENERAL CAVALLERO: The Italian Delegation considers that the frontier has not been laid down between the buffer state and Tarvis.

MR. BERTHELOT: It is simply a matter of referring to the minutes of the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs which dealt with the question.

MR. MILLERAND: If you allow, we will refer this matter to the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs and wait for the answer of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. If their answer involves the fixing of the frontier and if the Italian Delegation on receipt of it considers that there is any omission necessitating a decision by the Supreme Council the matter will be put before it.

GENERAL CAVALLERO: We consider that this is still an open question.

MR. MILLERAND: You know the terms in which the Serb-Croat-Slovene representatives have been addressed. In the case of their refusal, the Treaty of London comes into force; if, on the contrary, they agree to our views and if, then, you still consider that there is a gap in the scheme as drawn up, it will be a case of bringing the matter before the Supreme Council.

MR. DE MARTINO: I suggest that this question be submitted without delay to the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs for their examination.

MR. MILLERAND: Then we are agreed.

It was decided:

that the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs be entrusted with the study of the line of the frontier between Italy and Yugo-Slavia to the South of Tarvis in so far as this frontier has not yet been established.

The meeting adjourned at 12:50.

Appendix A to CM-3

Draft Reply to Mr. Lansing's Memorandum

The British and French Prime Ministers have examined with the closest attention the memorandum which was communicated to them by the Ambassador of the United States, relative to Russian and Italian negotiations.^{[6](#)}

With reference to the Russian question, they had already communicated their views to Washington for examination by the American Government, at the same time asking for the assent and the cooperation of this Government.^{[7](#)}

As to the Italian question, the absence of the United States was never at any time regarded as other than temporary by the British and French Governments; they have never lost sight of the American point of view concerning this question, the solution of which is of

such vital importance for the future of the world. They never had any intention of acceding to a permanent arrangement without giving full consideration to the views of the American Government.

Consequently, they took up the Adriatic question at the point where it was under discussion at the time Mr. Polk left for Washington. Mr. Nitti presented certain proposals⁸ which tended to modify the common memorandum communicated to Mr. Scialoja by the Representatives of the United States, France, and Great-Britain on December 9, 1919.⁹ At the time the Conference again assembled in Paris, about fifteen days ago, Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George immediately opened negotiations between the Italian Government and the representatives of Jugo-Slavia, and reached a plan of arrangement which they consider as the best system of conciliation practicably possible between the Italian and Jugo-Slav points of view.

The details of this arrangement are annexed hereto.¹⁰

The French and British Governments are pleased to affirm that, in practice, all the really important points of the common memorandum of December 9, 1919, remain intact and have now received the approval of the Prime Minister of Italy.

Two points only of this memorandum have been modified, and these two points are to the advantage of Jugo-Slavia.

1. —The Free State of Fiume, which would have separated 200,000 Jugo-Slavs from their Country, disappears; three quarters of these populations are now and henceforth united to Jugo-Slavia; a source of perpetual quarrels and intrigues disappears; and if, in exchange, Jugo-Slavia is to cede to Italy territories upon which there are about 50,000 Jugo-Slav inhabitants over and above those which were included by the Wilson proposal, the balance is to the advantage of Jugo-Slavia. Fiume becomes an independent State under the guarantee of the League of Nations whose authority over the port becomes direct and absolute for the good of all concerned.

2. —Relative to Albania, an effort has been made to accord satisfaction to the essential needs of all the parties concerned. The details of the administration of this country by Jugo-Slavia, Italy and Greece have not yet been elaborated, but in their elaboration the sentiments and future interests of the Albanian people will be kept fully in mind, and every effort will be made to have these points fully considered in the preparation of the permanent arrangement.

The French and British Governments esteem that in this manner a suitable arrangement of a dangerous and difficult question has been arrived at; they have informed the Italian and Jugo-Slav Governments that, in the event this arrangement were not accepted, they would find themselves obliged to place the Treaty of London,^{[11](#)} which would satisfy no one, in force.

Had a Plenipotentiary representing the Government of the United States been in Paris at the time, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau would have cordially welcomed his entire cooperation in these negotiations, but in the absence of a Representative who could speak in the name of the United States, and in view of the vital importance of the settlement of a question which has inflamed the south-east of Europe for more than a year and which, if not regulated promptly would not only delay the rehabilitation and reconstruction of two countries greatly exhausted by the war, but might also provoke another war, the Prime Ministers of France and Great-Britain concluded that there was no other alternative than to adopt the measures necessary to effect a disappearance, as rapidly as possible, of the difficulties existing between two of their Allies, and this by consulting both of these Allies in an uninterrupted and exhaustive manner, and taking advantage of the fact that they were all together in Paris.

In so doing, they had no intention whatsoever to lack in courtesy towards the Government of the United States, and have not thought, for one moment, of concealing the developments of their negotiations from the United States. They are convinced that President Wilson would not have wished, by demanding that each phase of the negotiations be communicated to Washington for his

assent to the proposals which were submitted, when it was impossible for the President to hear the arguments and, himself, present questions to the principal parties concerned, to render impossible the achievement of this arrangement, during the necessarily short stay of the Prime Ministers at Paris.

In their opinion, the only plan possible was to conduct the negotiations as rapidly as possible, and to inform the Government of the United States of the result as soon as a definite conclusion was reached.

The French and British Governments esteem that they are obliged to adopt the same procedure with reference to the Peace with Turkey. They have already waited a long time in order to accord the United States sufficient time to adopt their course of action, and this because they are very anxious to have the views and cooperation of the American Government. Without speaking of the heavy military expenses imposed in consequence on two countries, already heavily burdened, this delay has allowed the anarchist elements hostile to the Allies in Turkey to resume a great deal of their power, and to establish dangerous relations with the Bolsheviks. It is, in consequence, impossible to delay negotiations any longer.

Moreover, aside from the necessity of conducting these negotiations with the desirable rapidity and decision, it would be impossible to succeed if, in the absence of an American Plenipotentiary supplied with full powers, the numerous questions which are to be settled had to be referred to the Government of the United States each and every time before being decided.

The French and British Governments—needless to say—attach the greatest importance to American assistance and collaboration; they would be extremely pleased to have an American Plenipotentiary sit among them. However, in case the Government is unable to act in this sense, they consider that there is no other alternative open to them than to continue peace negotiations with Turkey without delay, at the same time keeping the American Government fully informed as to the progress of the discussions and with full consideration for

American sentiments in so far as is compatible with an early conclusion of peace.

Appendix B to CM-3

[Draft Reply Prepared by M. Berthelot in Reply to a Communication From Mr. Lansing]

His Majesty's Ambassador has been good enough to communicate to Mr. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, and to Mr. Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, a telegram concerning the study by the Supreme Council of the solutions of the Russian question, the Adriatic question and in a general way, of all the different problems still under consideration, for the re-establishment of Peace.^{[12](#)}

The American note contains a demand for information about the procedure followed, remarks on the non-consultation of the United States on the solutions under discussion, and finally, a protest against any decision taken without the assent of the American Government, or against its views.

Mr. Lansing's telegram finishes by the affirmation that the Government of the United States cannot delegate a qualified Representative to the Council of Prime Ministers and by suggesting a return to normal diplomatic procedure for the settlement of all the questions.

Messrs. Clemenceau and Lloyd George have the honor to inform Mr. Lansing that the examination of the political problems, rendered more and more pressing by the course of events, and in particular, the Russian and Italian questions, has been carried out by the Supreme Council and between the Government Heads, either in Paris or London, in the presence of the American Ambassador.

The French, English, Italian, and Japanese Governments have never had any intention of settling definitely any questions under discussion without the advice of the American Government, although naturally unable to stop the course of the peace negotiations, and at

the same time adapting themselves to the special forms that the United States was obliged to give its representation.

Innumerable proposals concerning the Adriatic question have been suggested, either in the presence of President Wilson, or since his departure, by the memorandum of Sept. 10; by personal telegrams from Messrs. Clemenceau and Lloyd George, and by qualified negotiations with Mr. Polk.

These exchanges of views led to the drafting of a memorandum^{[13](#)} signed by Messrs. Clemenceau, Polk, and Sir Eyre Crowe, in the name of their Governments, memorandum which was remitted at London, on December 9, last, to Mr. Scialoja, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Italy, in the presence of the American Ambassador in England.^{[14](#)}

On the same day, it was decided that Mr. Nitti would proceed as soon as possible to Paris, to give the answer of the Italian Government and the projected Conference met lately and decided on the handing over of the transaction proposals to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, which was heard, submitted counter-proposals and referred the matter to its Government at Belgrade.

The Allied Powers were in fact of opinion that under the present conditions, the prolonged state of indecision concerning the Adriatic solution, was a most dangerous obstacle to the re-establishment of Peace in Europe, so imperiously demanded by all the peoples. It would seem that the semi-official disposition noted at Rome and Belgrade, for a direct understanding, should not be neglected, and offer a serious chance of re-establishing through the willingness of the concerned parties, confidential relations between Italy and the Kingdom of the S. C. S. The interchanges of views take place in a satisfactory manner, in spite of the difficulties inherent to the negotiation. It is understood that as soon as the two countries, principally concerned have come to an agreement, the Government of the United States will be called upon, before any definite settlement takes place, to state its point of view, to which all the Powers attach the greatest importance. We do not doubt that, if the Jugo-Slavs and the Italians agree, this fact will appear to President

Wilson, as to the Heads of the Allied Governments, of the greatest importance for the final decision.

As to the general question posed by Mr. Lansing about the present procedure of the Peace Conference; Messrs. Lloyd George and Clemenceau have endeavoured to take into consideration in all sincerity, the successive forms given by the United States to its Representation and participation, and shall continue to maintain, in this point, the same confident and friendly attitude.

But the uncertainty of American decisions concerning even the ratification of the first Treaty with Germany, and its eventual participation in the different solutions under discussion, should not be allowed to indefinitely delay the re-establishment of peace in Europe and in the world.

Appendix C to CM-3

Draft Reply to Mr. Lansing's Memorandum

The British and French Prime Ministers have examined with the closest attention the memorandum which was communicated to them by the Ambassador of the United States, relative to Russian and Italian negotiations.^{[15](#)}

With reference to the Russian question, they had already communicated their views to Washington for examination by the American Government, at the same time asking for the assent and the cooperation of this Government.^{[16](#)}

As to the Italian question, the absence of the United States was never at any time regarded as other than temporary by the British and French Governments; they have never lost sight of the American point of view concerning this question, the solution of which is of such vital importance for the future of the world. The French, British and Italian Governments have never had any intention of acceding to a permanent arrangement without giving full consideration to the views of the American Government.

Consequently, they took up the Adriatic question at the point where it was under discussion at the time Mr. Polk left for Washington. Mr. Nitti presented certain proposals¹⁷ which tended to modify the common memorandum communicated to Mr. Scialoja by the Representatives of the United States, France, and Great Britain on December 9, 1919.¹⁸ At the time the Conference again assembled in Paris, about fifteen days ago, Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George immediately opened negotiations between the Italian Government and the representatives of Jugo-Slavia, and reached a plan of arrangement which they consider as the best system of conciliation practicably possible between the Italian and Jugo-Slav points of view.

The details of this arrangement are annexed hereto.¹⁹

The French and British Governments are pleased to affirm that, in practice, all the really important points of the common memorandum of December 9, 1919, remain intact and have now received the approval of the Prime Minister of Italy.

Two points only of this memorandum have been modified, and these two points are to the advantage of Jugo-Slavia.

1. —The Free State of Fiume, which would have separated 200,000 Jugo-Slavs from their Country, disappears; three quarters of these populations are now and henceforth united to Jugo-Slavia; a source of perpetual quarrels and intrigues disappears; and if, in exchange, Jugo-Slavia is to cede to Italy territories upon which there are about 50,000 Jugo-Slav inhabitants over and above those which were included by the Wilson proposal, the balance is to the advantage of Jugo-Slavia. Fiume becomes an independent State under the guarantee of the League of Nations whose authority over the port becomes direct and absolute for the good of all concerned.
2. —Relative to Albania, an effort has been made to accord satisfaction to the essential needs of all the parties concerned. The details of the administration of this country by Jugo-Slavia, Italy and Greece have not yet been elaborated, but in their elaboration the sentiments and future interests of the Albanian people will be

kept fully in mind, and every effort will be made to have these points fully considered in the preparation of the permanent arrangement.

The French and British Governments esteem that in this manner a suitable arrangement of a dangerous and difficult question has been arrived at; they have informed the Italian and Jugo-Slav Governments that, in the event this arrangement were not accepted, they would find themselves obliged to place the Treaty of London,^{[20](#)} which would satisfy no one, in force.

Had a Plenipotentiary representing the Government of the United States been in Paris at the time, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau would have cordially welcomed his entire cooperation in these negotiations, but in the absence of a Representative who could speak in the name of the United States, and in view of the vital importance of the settlement of a question which has inflamed the south-east of Europe for more than a year and which, if not regulated promptly would not only delay the rehabilitation and reconstruction of two countries greatly exhausted by the war, but might also provoke another war, the Prime Ministers of France and Great-Britain concluded that there was no other alternative than to adopt the measures necessary to effect a disappearance, as rapidly as possible, of the difficulties existing between two of their Allies, and this by consulting both of these Allies in an uninterrupted and exhaustive manner, and taking advantage of the fact that they were all together in Paris.

In so doing, they had no intention whatsoever to lack in courtesy towards the Government of the United States, and have not thought, for one moment, of concealing the developments of their negotiations from the United States. They are convinced that President Wilson would not have wished, by demanding that each phase of the negotiations be communicated to Washington for his assent to the proposals which were submitted, when it was impossible for the President to hear the arguments and, himself, present questions to the principal parties concerned, to render impossible the achievement of this arrangement, during the necessarily short stay of the Prime Ministers at Paris.

In their opinion, the only plan possible was to conduct the negotiations as rapidly as possible, and to inform the Government of the United States of the result as soon as a definite conclusion was reached.

[The sessions of the Peace Conference at Paris terminated with the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on January 21, 1920. Thereafter the Conference of Ambassadors continued to carry on business which had been begun by the Conference, while questions of a more general nature were reserved for the action of the governments themselves or for meetings of Premiers.]

¹ Following is a paraphrase of the telegram from Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Wallace, dated January 19, 1920 (file No. 763.72119/8736a):

Please take up with Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George the question of the way the Russian and the Italian problems have been handled and ascertain their point of view. The United States is being put in the position of having the matter disposed of before the American point of view can be expressed, as apparently Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George have sought only the views of the Italian and Yugoslav Governments before ascertaining the views of the United States Government. Is it the intention of the British and French Governments in the future to dispose of the various questions pending in Europe and to communicate the results to the Government of the United States? There are features in connection with the proposed Fiume settlement which both Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George must realize could not be acceptable to the President.

As it was pointed out by Mr. Polk before his departure, the Dalmatian and other questions should be taken up through regular diplomatic channels, and the fact that you are not charged with full powers could have no bearing on the question. As no American official could be sent to these gatherings that could have the same authority as the Prime Ministers of the three Governments in question, it is manifestly impossible for the United States Government to be represented at the meetings of the Prime Ministers.

LANSING

² ICP–22, minute 4, p. 907 [*Pg. 907 is part of [Doc. 49](#)*].

³ ICP–6, minute 3, and resolution B, pp. 856 [*Pg. 856 is part of [Doc. 43](#)*] and 858 [*Pg. 858 is part of [Doc. 43](#)*].

⁴ HD–17, minute 1, [vol. VII, p. 356](#) .

⁵ For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 3.

⁶ See footnote 1, p. 999 [Pg. 999 is part of [Doc. 53](#)].

⁷ See appendix A to ICP-22, p. 924 [Pg. 924 is part of [Doc. 49](#)].

⁸ See Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰ The document referred to does not accompany file copy of appendix A to CM-3. For text, see appendix to ICP-9, p. 860 [Pg. 860 is part of [Doc. 44](#)].

¹¹ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915*.

¹² See footnote 1, p. 999 [Pg. 999 is part of [Doc. 53](#)].

¹³ For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 3.

¹⁴ See ICP-2, minute 1, p. 841 [Pg. 841 is part of [Doc. 42](#)].

¹⁵ See footnote 1, p. 999 [Pg. 999 is part of [Doc. 53](#)].

¹⁶ See appendix A to ICP-22, p. 924 [Pg. 924 is part of [Doc. 49](#)].

¹⁷ See Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 10.

¹⁸ For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): *Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question*, p. 3.

¹⁹ The document referred to does not accompany file copy of appendix C to CM-3. For text, see appendix to ICP-9, p. 860 [Pg. 860 is part of [Doc. 44](#)].

²⁰ Great Britain, Cmd. 671. Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915*.

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¹ This is primarily a subject index; no attempt has been made (except in a few instances) to include names of persons. Directories of the various delegations are printed in [vol. III, pp. 1–153](#).